The commentaries of C. Julius Cæsar of his warres in Gallia, and the civil warres betwixt him and Pompey / translated into English with many excellent and judicious observations thereupon ; as also The art of our modern training, or, Tactick practise, by Clement Edmonds Esquire, ... ; where unto is adjoyned the eighth commentary of the warres in Gallia, with some short observations upon it ; together with the life of Cæsar, and an account of his medalls ; revised, corrected, and enlarged.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Have already handled this practice of a pre∣tended fear,* 1.1 which the History doth so often recommend to our consideration, and have shewed the inconvenience of over-light credu∣lity, leading such easy weeners to a disappoint∣ment of their hopes, and consequently to the hazzard of their fortune. I will now proceed to that which is further implyed in this relation, and respecteth the chiefest duty of a chief commander:* 1.2 and that is, what specially is re∣quired of a Generall in the carriage and directi∣on of a battel. Concerning which point, as there is nothing more materiall to the effecting of any businesse then opportunity of time, con∣veniency of place, and an orderly disposition of the means according to time and place: so in question of encounter or waging battel, the du∣ty of a Leader may be included in these three circumstances. Concerning the quality of the place, as the chiefest and first respected in the choice of a judiciall directour, the whole scope of the Roman discipline, from the time of their first Kings even to the last of their Emperours, did alwayes aim at the advantage of place, as a necessary help for the obtaining of victory: which I have already noted in the Helvetian a∣ction.* 1.3 Yet forasmuch as the wisdome and expe∣rience of those times did deem it a circumstance of such importance, give me leave once again to inforce the use thereof by these examples. Habe∣tis, milites, (saith Labienus in this place) quam petiistis facultatem, hostem iniquo atque impedito loco tenetis, praes••are eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam saepenumero Impe∣ratori praestitistis, Ye have, fellow-souldiers, that opportunity which ye desired, &c. Where∣by he cleareth himself of all imputation of ill di∣rection, as having performed the uttermost duty of a Commander, and given such helps by the advantage of the place as are requisite to an easy victory, leaving the rest to the execution of the souldiers. Caesar at the losse he received at Dyr∣rachium cleared himself to his souldiers in this sort: Quod esset acceptum detrimenti, cuivis potius quam suae culpae debere tribui, locum se∣curum ad dimicandum dedisse, &c. the da∣mage that was received was to be attributed to any body rather then him, he had chosen them a safe place of fighting, &c. And as it follow∣eth in the seventh Commentary, being imbattel∣led upon the side of a hill right over against the army of the Galles, which stood likewise in a readinesse to entertain the Roman valour, he would not suffer his men to hazzard themselves in the passage of a bogge of fifty foot in breadth lying between both the armies, but rather per∣swaded his souldiers, disdaining the confront∣ment of the enemy, to endure their contumely, rather then to buy a victory with the danger of so many worthy men, and patiently to attend some further opportunity. Which passage of Caesar, even in the said terms as it is there rela∣ted, was urged to good purpose by Sir Francis Vere in the year one thousand six hundred at a consultation before the battel of Newport.* 1.4 For the army of the Netherlanders being possest of the Downs, which are small swelling hils rising unevenly along the sea shore upon the coast of Flanders, and the enemy making a stand up∣on the sands at the foot of those hils, and so cut∣ting off the passage to Os••end, it was disputed by the Commanders, whether they should leave the Downes, and go charge the enemy where he stood imbattelled upon the sands, or attend him in the fastnesse of the Downes whereof they were possest. The whole Councell of war were earnestly bent to forsake the Downes, and to hazzard the fight on equall terms, as impatient that their passage and retreat to Ostend should be cut off. But Sir Francis Vere well knowing how much it imported the businesse of that day to hold a place of such gain and advantage, per∣swaded Count Maurice by many reasons, and specially by this of Caesar which I last alledg∣ed, not to forgo the help of the Downs, but to expect the enemy in that place, and so make use of that benefit upon the first encounter, rather then to adventure the successe of the battel in worse terms, in hope of clearing the passage: and shewing also many probable conjectures, that the enemy would not continue long in that gaze. Wherein as his opinion then prevailed, so all that were present were eye-witnesses both of the truth of his conjecture, and the sound∣nesse of his judgement. For the enemy within a while after coming on to charge the troups of the States, was received with such a counterbuffe from the hils, and were violently beaten back in such rude manner, as our men had the execution of them for the space of a quarter of a mile or more, which was no small advantage to the fortune of that day. Touching the opportunity of time, which Pindarus calleth the Mother of worthy exploits, and oftentimes dependeth upon the circumstance of place, a Generall ought care∣fully to advise that he neither precipitate nor foreslow the occasion, which is well expressed in this particular service of Labienus. For where his purpose was to draw the enemy over a river that had steep and uneasy banks, and thereby of a hard and difficult passage, he would not shew his resolution untill he had drawn them all over the river: for he was well assured that the Ro∣man legions would so charge the enemy upon their first encounter with the unresistable weight of their piles, that in their giving back they could not escape the danger of the river. And therefore to make the victory more absolute and

compleat, he suffered them all to come over the water, that all might be endangered in their passage back again. And this is the benefit which opportunity bringeth, which is the rather to be attended with all carefulnesse, forasmuch as Non saepe, ac d••u, eadem occasio est, a man hath neither often nor long the same opportunity.

Concerning the last circumstance, of the apt and fit disposition of the forces according to time and place, which is necessarily required in the duty of a General; it is referred to this end on∣ly, that they may be ranged in such manner, that as one man is assistant to another in their severall files and ranks, so one troup may be in subsidiis, assistant to another, to the end that no part may stand naked, or fall in the singlenesse of its own strength, but that one may second another from the first to the last. C. Sempron••us a Roman Consul having fought unadvisedly, and recei∣ved an overthrow, Julius the Tribune of the people caused Tempanius a horseman that was present at the battel to be called, and as Livie reporteth it, Coram eis, Sexte Tempani, inquit, arbitreris ne C. Sempronium Consulem, aut in tempore pugnam intisse, aut firmasse subsidi∣is aciem? he said thus before them, Sextus Tempanius, do you believe that C. Sempronius the Consul chose a good time to fight, or that he took order for assistant supplies to his army? for Livie saith, he fought incaute inconsulteque, non subsidiis firmata acie, non equite apte lo∣cato, heedlesly and without good advice, neither strengthening his army with supplies, nor well placing his cavalry. And of these three circum∣stances consisteth the duty and office of a Gene∣rall, touching the direction of a battel; wherein whosoever faileth, doth hazzard the prerogative of his command over that army whic he lea∣deth, according to that of Caesar in the first of his Commentaries, Se scire, quibuscunque ex∣ercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse, aut aliquo facinore comperto, avaritiae esse convictum, that he knew well, whensoever an army refused to be obedient to their Commander, it was either be∣cause upon some ill successe they saw he was un∣fortunate, or that by the discovery of some noto∣rious matter they found him convict of avarice. Which Caesar himself needed not to fear, if we may believe Plutarch,* 1.5 who writeth that he was indowed by nature with an excellent prompti∣tude and aptnesse to take opportunity in any bu∣sinesse.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Com. 3. cap. 8.
• * 1.2

  The duty of a Generall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 battel.
• * 1.3

  Lib. 1. cap. 6.
• * 1.4

  Battel of Newport.
• * 1.5

  In the life of Caesar.