The commentaries of C. Julius Cæsar of his warres in Gallia, and the civil warres betwixt him and Pompey / translated into English with many excellent and judicious observations thereupon ; as also The art of our modern training, or, Tactick practise, by Clement Edmonds Esquire, ... ; where unto is adjoyned the eighth commentary of the warres in Gallia, with some short observations upon it ; together with the life of Cæsar, and an account of his medalls ; revised, corrected, and enlarged.

The fourth Commentary of the warres in GALLIA. (Book 4)

The Argument.

THe Usipetes and Tenchtheri are driven to seek new seats in Gal∣lia; they drive the Menapii out of their territories: but in the end are overthrown by Caesar. That warre being ended, he maketh a bridge upon the Rhene, and carrieth his Army over into Germany. He taketh revenge upon the Sicambri; and giveth liberty to the Ubii: returneth into Gallia, and carrieth his Army over into Bri∣tanie; with the occurrences of that warre.

CHAP. I.

The* 1.1 Ʋsipetes and* 1.2 Tenchtheri bring great multi∣tudes of people over the Rhene into Gallia. The nature of the Suevi.

THe winter following,* 1.3 Pompey and Crassus being Consuls, the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, two German nati∣ons, passed over the Rhene with great multitudes of people, not farre from the place where it falleth into the sea. The reason of their slitting was, the ill intreaty which for ma∣ny years together they had received of the Sue∣vi, the greatest and warlikest nation amongst the Germans. For these Suevi had one hundred Cantons or shires, which yearly furnished their warres with a thousand men apiece; and kept as many at home to maintain both themselves and their Armies abroad: and these the year fol∣lowing were in Armes, and the other stayed at home and performed the like duty; and so by this means they all continued their experience both of tillage and matter of warre. No man had any ground proper to himself, neither might they abide longer then a year in one place. They li∣ved chiefly upon cattell and milk, and used much hunting; which was the cause (what through the quality of their diet, their continuall exer∣cise, and liberty of life, being never brought up to any calling or tyed to any discipline, nor urged to any thing against their disposition) that they were strong and of a large stature: and they had used themselves so to it, that they never cared for any cloathing in the coldest place they came in, more then skins and hides, which covered but part of their body, the rest being naked: and they wash their bodies usually in the rivers. They have merchants that frequent their ports, not so much to bring them any commodities from abroad, as to buy the prey and spoil they take in warre. And whereas the Galles take much de∣light in oxen and other beasts, and stick not to give any price for them; the Germans care not for the bringing of them amongst them, but ra∣ther use their own mishapen ugly cattel, which by daily inuring they bring to perform any ser∣vice. Their horsemen oftentimes in time of bat∣tel forsook their horse, and fought on foot; their horses being taught to stand still in one place, that when they would they might return unto them. Neither was there any thing accounted more base, or uselesse in the course of their life, then to use furniture for horses: and therefore they would adventure to charge upon great troups of horse that used Equipage, with a few of their own quality. They admitted no wine to be brought in unto them, least it might effeminate their warlike inclination, or make them unapt for labour. The greatest honour in their opinion was, to have then bordering Territories ly waste and desolate: for so it would be thought that many States together could not resist their con∣quering valour: and it was reported that the countrey lay waste from the Suevi one way six hundred miles together.

THE OBSERVATION.

BY this practice of the Suevi it appeareth how little a naked resolution of valour availeth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral 〈◊〉〈◊〉

and civile discretion, to make use of that greatnesse which prowesse hath obtained: for notwithstanding that they were a nation both warlike and of good ability, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of manhood, that it sor∣ted to no other end then to maintain barbarisme at home, and desolation abroad; whereas true valour is alwayes subordinate to the preservation of Commonweals, and is as the defensive Armes of civile society. Which I have the rather noted, inasmuch as it resembleth an humour that aboun∣deth in this age, especially in the particular havi∣our of our young Gallants; whose naked valour revealing it self only in the lie and in the stabb, for want of other assistant vertues to temper the heat of so brittle a metall, leadeth them into such inconveniences and disordered actions, that it changeth the nature thereof into giddy-headed rashnesse; and in lieu of vertues guerdon, is re∣paied with irrision.

CHAP. II.

The motives inducing the Ʋsipetes to come over the Rhene into Gallia.

NExt unto these Suevi inhabited the Ubii,* 1.4 a very ample and potent State: and through their entercourse and traffick with merchants, being sea∣soned also with the manners of the Galles their neighbours, somewhat more civil then the rest of the Germans. With these the Suevi had of∣ten waged battel: and albeit they could not ex∣pel them out of their countrey, forasmuch as their State was very great and populous; yet by conti∣nuall incursions they brought them under, and much weakened their estate. In the same case were the Usipetes and Tenchtheri before men∣tioned: for having made head against the Sue∣vi for many years together, they were constrain∣ed in the end to forsake their possessions, and wan∣dering the space of three years through the Con∣tinent of Germany, at last they arrived where the* 1.5 Menapii inhabited the banks on either side the river Rhene: who being terrified with the arrivall of such a multitude, forsook all their dwellings beyond the river, and planted them∣selves on this side of the water, to hinder the Germans from further passage.

The Usipetes with their associates having tried all means, and not finding themselves able to passe over by force for want of boats, nor by stealth by reason of the diligent watch of the Menapii, fained a retreat to their old habitation: and after three dayes journey, their horsemen in one night speedily returned again, and slew the Menapii both unguarded and unprovided, For they upon the departure of the Germans, feared not to return over the river into their towns and houses. These being slain and their shipping ta∣ken, they got over the river before the rest of the Menapii had any notice of their coming: by which means they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and lived that winter upon the provision they found there.

Caesar understanding of these things, and fearing the weaknesse of the Galles, inasmuch as they are sudden and quick in their resolutions, and withall desirous of novelty, he durst no way trust their unconstancy: for it was their practice and custome to stay travellers and passengers, and inquire of them what they either heard or knew concerning any thing that had happened; and the common people would flock about Merchants in faires and markets, and learn of them whence they came, and what news they brought from thence: and by these rumours and hearsayes they directed the main course of their actions; where∣of they could not but soon repent themselves, being grounded upon such weak intelligence as was u∣sually coined to please the multitude. Which cu∣stome being known, Caesar to prevent a greater warre, hasted to his Army sooner then he was wont to do.

OBSERVATION.

SUch as have spent their time in the contempla∣tion of Nature, and have made diligent search of the temperature and quality of climates and nations, have all with one consent made Choler the Regent of the French complexion; distin∣guishing the people with such attributes as the said humour usually breedeth. Neither have these conditions which Caesar so long ago observed in the ancient Galles, any disresemblance from that which the learned of this age have delivered concerning the nature of the said inhabitants; but that irresolute constitution, which breeds such novelties and contrarieties of actions, continueth the same unto these times in the inhabitants of that country, notwithstanding the alteration of customes and people, or what else so long a time hath changed: which argueth the unresistable power of celestiall influence, establishing an u∣niformity of nature, according as the site of the place lieth capable of their powerfull aspect.

The reason of the diversity in the temperature of nations which are differenced by North and South, is not without apparent cause attributed to their propinquity or distance from the course of the sun, which distinguisheth by heat and cold the Northern and Southern climates of the earth, and separateth the inhabitants thereof by the do∣minion of their active qualities. But the reason why two Nations which are both in the same

climate, and under the same parallel, receiving the vertue of the celestiall bodies by the same downfall and rebound of their beams, being dif∣ferenced only by East and West, are so much dis∣united in nature, and so unlike in disposition, is not so apparant: whether it be, as some have i∣magined, forasmuch as the all-inclosing sphear, which remaineth quiet and immoveable above the circuit of the first motor, hath his parts di∣versly distinguished with variety of properties, which by continuall reference and mutuall aspect are imprinted in the correspondent quarters of the earth, and so keep a perpetuall residency of one and the same quality in one and the same place, and make also the variety of fashions in such parts as otherwise are equall favourites of the heavens majesty, by receiving an equall measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the said quarters of the earth are in themselves diversly noted with severall qualities, which appropriate the self-same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other unknown cause: I will leave every man to satisfy himself with that which seem∣eth most probable unto him, and proceed to the discovery of this cholerick passion. Wherein I will endeavour to shew how impatiency, sudden resolution, and desire of novelty, are naturall ad∣juncts of this humour. And if Caesar made use of this Philosophy in the managing of that war, let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a Generall to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first I must lay for a maxime that which long experience hath made authenticall, that the motions of the mind are ei∣ther quick or slow, according as the complexion is tempered either with heat or cold: for as the phlegmaticall humour is of a moist, cold and hea∣vy nature, begetting weak and grosse spirits, and benumming the instruments with a livelesse dis∣ability; so is the motion of the internall faculties proceeding likewise after a slow manner, accor∣ding to the quality of the instruments whereby it moveth: and therefore men of this waterish con∣stitution are no way apt to receive an impression, nor to entertain any sensible apprehension, un∣lesse it be beaten into them with often and strong repetitions; and then also they proceed as slowly in discoursing of the consequence, and linger in the choice of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this flava bilis, being of a hot piercing na∣ture, and resembling the active vertue of the fire, doth so purify the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the vivacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had been oftentimes presented unto them with many strong circumstances. And thence it hap∣peneth, that inasmuch as the Species is so readily received, and possesseth the apprehending faculty with such facility of entrance, that it moveth the other powers of the soul with as great efficacy at the first conception, as if it had been brought in with troups of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of undoubted truth. It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtile and fit disposition of the instruments, which proceed∣eth from heat the chiefest quality in choler) that the object is at the first moment so strongly set∣led in the first receiving faculty, that the other powers of the mind with as great speed manifest their offices concerning the apprehension, and deliver a sentence answerable to the strength of the first conception: which maketh them so im∣patient of delay, and so suddenly to alter their former resolutions, not suffering the discoursive power to examine the substance thereof by confe∣rence of circumstances, nor to give judgement according to the course of our intellectuall court. It behoveth therefore every man in that unsteady disposition, especially in matter of moment, to be suspicious of his own credulity, and not to give place to resolution, before his judgement be in∣formed by discourse of the strength or weaknesse of the conceived opinion.

But to leave these speculative meditations to Philosophers of learned conceit; forasmuch as the right use of passions is either true wisdome, or cometh nearest to the same; I will only touch in a word what degree of choler best befitteth a souldier, or how it availeth or disadvantageth in matter of war. And first it cannot be denied, that there is almost no passion that doth more e∣clipse the light of reason, or sooner corrupteth the sincerity of a good judgement, then this of anger which we now speak of: Neither is there any motion that more pleaseth it self in his own acti∣ons, or followeth them with greater heat in the execution. And if the truth chance to shew it self, and convince a false pretended cause as the authour of that passion, it oftentimes redoubleth the rage even against truth and innocency. Piso condemned a souldier for returning from forra∣ging without his companion, being perswaded that he had slain him: but at the instant of the execution the other that was missing returned, and with great joy of the whole Army they were carried to the Generall, thinking to have much gratified him with the manifestation of the truth: but he through shame and despight, being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a subtilty which his passion furnished him withall, he made three culpable for that he found one innocent; the first because the sentence of death was past against him, and was not to be recalled without the breach of law: the second for that he was the cause of the death of his com∣panion: and thirdly the executioner, for not o∣beying his commandment.

Concerning matter of war, as it consisteth of differenced parts, so hath choler divers effects. In case of discourse and consultation, whenas the powers of the mind ought to be clear of all vio∣lent

affections, it greatly darkeneth the under∣standing, and troubleth the sincerity of a good judgement, as Caesar noted in his speech to the Se∣nate concerning Catiline:* 1.6 and therefore a Com∣mander must by all means endeavour to avoyd e∣ven the least motions of so hurtfull a passion, and season his affections with that gravity and con∣stancy of spirit, that no turbulent disposition may either hinder his understanding, or withhold his will from following that course, which reason appointeth as the best means to a fortunate suc∣cesse; alwayes remembring that all his actions are presented upon a stage, and passe the censure of many curious beholders, which applaud grave and patient motions, as the greatest proof of true wisdome, and disallow of passionate and head∣strong affection, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how just soever otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and fury of battel, I take anger to be a necessary instrument to set va∣lour on foot, and to overwage the difficulties of terrour with a furious resolution: for conside∣ring that the noblest actions of the mind stand in need of the impulsions of passions, I take anger to be the fittest means to advance the valiant car∣riage of a battel; for as fear is treacherous and unsafe, so anger is confident and of an un∣quencheable heat. And therefore a Commander ought by all means to suggest matter of anger a∣gainst an Enemy, that his men may behold them with a wrathfull regard, and thirst after the day of battel, to satisfy their fury with the bloud of their adversaries. If any urge that it hath been hereto∣fore observed of the Galles, that in the beginning of a battell they were more then men, and in the later end they were lesse then women; and therefore a cholerick disposition is not so fit for service, as we seem to make it: I answer, that there is a difference between a disposition to cho∣ler, such as was observed in the Galles, and the passion of anger well kindled in the mind: for the first is subject to alteration and contrariety of actions; but the other is furious, invincible, never satisfyed but with revenge. And so that of Aristotle is proved true, that anger serveth often∣times as a weapon to vertue: whereunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature; for we do manage other wea∣pons, and this doth manage us; our hand gui∣deth not it, but it guideth our hand; it possesseth us,* 1.7 & not we it, as it happened in the reign of Ti∣berius amongst the mutinous legions at Vetera:* 1.8 and therefore a Commander ought to take great heed, whom he maketh the object of that anger which kindleth in his Army. For as it is a passi∣on of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to be wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regard of obedience, which was the only thing which Caesar required in his souldiers.

But to leave this hasty matter, and fall nearer that which we seek after: I may not omit the Prognostication which Caesar made of the con∣sequence of this accident, by the naturall disposi∣tion of the people; the event whereof proved the truth of his predictions: which sheweth what advantage a learned Generall that hath been somewhat instructed in the school of Nature, hath gained of him whom only experience hath taught the active rudiments of the war, and thin∣keth of no further lession in that art, then that which the office of a Serjeant or Lancepresado containeth.

CHAP. III.

Caesar cometh to his Army, marcheth towards the Germans, and by the way treateth of conditions of Peace.

CAesar being come to his Army,* 1.9 found that to have happened which he be∣fore suspected: for some of the States of Gallia had sent messengers unto the Germans, to leave the banks of Rhene, and to come further into the Continent, where they should find ready whatsoever they desired. Whereupon the Germans began to make further incursions, and to waste the land as farre as the confines of the* 1.10 Eburones and the Condrusi, who were un∣der the protection of the Treviri. The Princes of the Galles being called together, Caesar thought it best to dissemble what he had disco∣vered concerning their revolt; and confirming their minds with an approbation of their loialty, he commanded certain troups of horse to be levi∣ed, and resolved to make war upon the Germans: and having made provision of corn, he directed his march towards them. From whom, as he was on the way within a few dayes journey of their Camp, he received this message: The Germans as they were not willing to make war upon the Romans first, so they would not refuse to make triall of their manhood if they were justly provoked; for their ancient custome was to answer an Enemy by force, and not by treaty: yet thus much they would confesse, that they came thither very unwillingly, being driven by violence out of their possessions. If the Roman people would accept of their friendship, and either give them territories to inhabit, or suffer them to keep that which they had got by the law of Armes, they might prove profitable friends un∣to them. They only yielded to the Suevi, to whom the Gods in feats of Arms were inferiour; any other Nation they would easily conquer.

To this Caesar answered what he thought fit; but the purport of his speech was, That he

could not make any league with them if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable that they that could not keep their own, would get possessions out of other mens hands: Gallia had no vacant place to entertain so great a mul∣titude: but if they would they might find a welcome amongst the* 1.11 Ubii, whose agents were at that instant in his Camp, complaining of the injury of the Suevi, and desiring aid against them; thus much he himself would intreat of the Ubii. The messengers went back with these Mandates, promising within three dayes to re∣turn again to Caesar: in the mean time they de∣sired him not to bring his Army any nearer their quarters. Which request Caesar denyed. For understanding that a few dayes before a great part of their Cavalry were passed over the Mo∣sa to the Ambivariti, there to pillage and get provisions, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more then the return of their horsemen.

The river Mosa hath its rise from the mount Vogesus in the dominions of the Lingones, and having run farre, it receives the river* 1.12 Wa∣lis, which is a part of the Rhene: these two joyn∣ing make the island of the Batavi: fourscore miles below which it falleth into the sea. The Rhene ariseth amongst the Lepontii, a people inhabiting the Alpes; and after a tedious course through the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Me∣diomatrices, Triboci and Treviri, drawing near the sea, it divides into severall branches, and so makes many considerable islands, most of which are inhabited by savage and barbarous people, some whereof live only upon fish and the eggs of birds: after this the river empties it self at se∣verall mouthes into the Ocean.

When Caesar was come within twelve miles of their Camp, their Ambassadours returned, and meeting him on the way, entreated him ear∣nestly to march no further towards them. But being denyed of their suit, they besought him to send to those troups of horse which marched be∣fore the Army, that they should not fight nor make any hostile incounter; and that he would give them leave to send messengers to the Ubii: of whose entertainment they would willingly ac∣cept, if the Princes and Senate would swear faith and safe continuance unto their people: nei∣ther would they require more then three dayes to negotiate this businesse. Caesar conceived this intreaty to import nothing else then the return of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within three dayes; notwithstand∣ing he promised them to march but four miles further that day, to a convenient watring-place, and bade that a considerable number of them should come thither to him next day, that he might know what they desired: in the mean time he sent to the Commanders of the horse that were before, not to provoke the Enemy to fight; and if they were set upon, to sustain the charge untill he came nearer with the Army.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FIrst, we may observe his dissembling of the practice of the Galles with the Germans; and the incouragement which he gave them in a faith∣full and loyall affection to the people of Rome, when he himself knew they had started from that duty which both their honour and a good respect of their friends required: for he well understood that his presence did take away all scruple of any further motion in that kind; and therefore to have objected unto them their errours, had not been to heal, but to discover their wound. Only he took the way to cut off their hopes of any pra∣ctices which they might attempt against the Ro∣man people; and held them in the mean time in the apparance of faithfull friends, that they might not be discouraged by the detection of their re∣volt.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SEcondly, upon this resolution that there was no league to be made with the Germans if they continued on this side the Rhene, we may observe how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such consents and denials, as might manifest his rea∣dinesse to further what he made shew of, and not weaken the means of his best advantage. For as he was content they should take a quiet fare∣well of Gallia, and plant themselves in the pos∣sessions of the Ubii; so was he loath to yield to any condition which might disadvantage his for∣cible constraint, or weaken his command, if per∣swasion failed: for he well knew that powerfull means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authority in a parlee, then any other motive how reasonable soever.

Moreover we may observe how carefull he was not to impose upon the Germans a necessity of fighting;* 1.13 but opened a passage (by propoun∣ding unto them the association of the Ubii) by which they might avoyd the hazard of battel. Which thing was alwayes observed by Comman∣ders of ancient times, who diligently searching into the nature of things, found that neither of those noble instruments whereby man worketh such wonders (I mean the hand and the tongue) had ever brought so many excellent works to that type of perfection, unlesse they had been forced

thereunto by necessity: and therefore we are wisely to handle the course of our actions, least while we stand too strict upon a violent guard, we give occasion to the Enemy, by the way of Antiperistasis, to redouble his strength, and so furnish him with that powerfull engine, which Vetius Mescius calleth ultimum and maxi∣mum telum, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appear by these ex∣amples.

Some few of the Samnites,* 1.14 contrary to the ar∣ticles of peace between them and the Romans, having made incursions into the territories of the Roman confederats, the Senate of that State sent to Rome to excuse the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction. But being rejected, Claudius Pon∣tius Generall of their forces, in an excellent O∣ration which he made, shewed how the Romans would not hearken to peace, but chose rather to be revenged by war; and therefore necessity con∣strained them to put on Arms: Justum est bel∣lum (saith he) quibus necessarium; & pia ar∣ma quibus nulla nisi in Armis spes est, That war is just which is necessary; and it is piety in those men to take up arms, who have no hope but in taking up arms. The issue thereof was, that the Samnites intrapped the Romans in a place of ad∣vantage, so that they were forced upon disho∣nourable terms to save their lives, as it is at large in the ninth book of Livie.

Caius Manlius conducting the Roman legi∣ons against the Veii,* 1.15 part of the Veian Army had entred the Roman Camp; which Manlius per∣ceiving, he hasted with a band of men to keep the breach, and to shut in the Veii: which they no sooner perceived, but they fought with that rage and fury that they slew Manlius; and had o∣verthrown the whole Camp, had not a Tribune opened them a passage by which they fled away.

In like manner Camillus, the wisest of the Ro∣man Captains, being entered into the City of the Veii, that he might take it with greater facility, and disarme the Enemy of that terrible weapon of necessity, he caused it to be proclaimed, that no Veian should be hurt that was found unarmed. Whereupon every man cast away his weapon, and so the town was taken without bloudshed.

Let a souldier therefore take such hold of occa∣sions and opportunities as are offered unto him, that in time of battel he may seem to cast necessity upon his own cause, and retain it in his pay: con∣sidering how the power thereof altereth the works of Nature, and changeth their effects into con∣trary operations; being never subject to any or∣dinance or law, and yet making that lawfull which procedeth from it.

CHAP. IIII.

The Germans, contrary to their own request made to Caesar, set upon the Roman horsemen, and overthrow them.

NOtwithstanding the Germans request concerning the truce,* 1.16 assoon as they saw the Roman horsemen, which were in number five thousand (whereas the Germans had not above eight hundred horse, those that went over the Mosa to forrage not being yet returned) they charged up∣on the Romans not expecting any hostile incoun∣ter, inasmuch as their Embassadours were new∣ly departed from Caesar, and had obtained that day of truce: but being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their usuall custom, for sook their horse, and fighting on foot ran our horses into the bellies, and overthrew many of our men, so that they easily put the Romans to flight; who never look∣ed back, untill they came into the sight of the legions. In that battel were slain 74 Roman horsemen, & amongst the rest Piso an Aquitane, a valiant man, and born of noble parentage, whose grandfather was the chief ruler in his city, and called friend by the Roman Senate. This Piso seeing his brother compassed about by the enemy, brake in upon them and rescued him: but having his horse wounded under him in the action, and being dismounted, he fought stoutly on foot, till such time as the enemy hemm'd him in, and gave him in, and gave him severall wounds; then he fell down. Which his brother seeing afarre off (for he had left the battel) he clapp'd spurrs to his horse, and rushing upon the throng to rescue him, was there slain.

After this battel Caesar thought it not safe either to hearken to any conditions, or to receive any message from them that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, and meant nothing but warre: And to attend any longer untill their horsemen returned, was but to give them that advantage against him, especially considering the weaknesse of the Galles, amongst whom the Germans by this battel had gained great repu∣tation; and therefore he durst not give them space to think upon it.

OBSERVATION.

THis cunning of the Germans offereth occasi∣on to speak somewhat concerning that main controversie of policie, which is, whether the acti∣ons of Princes and great Commanders are al∣wayes to be attended with integrity and faithfull accomplishment thereof. Wherein I will only set down such arguments and grounds of reason, which vertue and morall honesty on the one part, (for we will make it no question to a Chri∣stian mind) and the daily practice of States-men

on the other side, alledge to make good their con∣trary assertions.

The great Politicians of the world, that com∣mend vertue in a shew, and not in esse and be∣ing, and study to maintain their states only with humane reason, not regarding the authority of divine ordinance, set this down as a maxime in their Art; That he that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an end sorting to his contentment, must in all respects be like qualifi∣ed, both in judgement and disposition, as the party is with whom he dealeth: otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared to hold himself strong in the matter, which he undertaketh. For a wrastler that cometh with mere strength to in∣counter another that hath both strength and cun∣ning, may beshrew his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skill, and be laught at as an unworthy Champion for serious sports: in like manner in this universall confusion of infidelity, wherein subtilty flyeth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicity of spirit to wind through the labyrinths of falshood, and avoyd the snares of deceit, shall find himself too weak for so diffi∣cult a task, and beshrew his honesty, if he regard his commodity. For it is the course that every man taketh which must bring us to the place to which every man goeth: and he that opposeth himself against the current of the world, may stand alone in his own conceit, and never attain that which the world seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore as craft and deceit are so generall, it be∣hoveth a man of publick negotiations to carry a mind apt and disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that which ancient writers re∣port of Achilles, who was sent to Chiron the Centaur, half a man and half a beast, to be in∣structed in the rudiments of Princely carriage; that of the brutish part he might learn to strength∣en himself with force and courage, and of the humane shape so to manage reason, that it might be a fit instrument to answer or prevent whatsoe∣ver mans wit might forge to overthrow it. Nei∣ther ought a private man to wonder at the strangenesse of these positions, considering that the government of kingdoms and Empires is car∣ried with another bias, then that which concer∣neth particular affairs in a wel-ordered State: wherein truth-breakers and faithlesse dissemblers are worthily condemned, inasmuch as they ne∣cessarily enforce the ruine thereof. But these that sit at the helm of government, and are to shape the course of a State according to the variation of times and fortunes, derive their conclusions from other principles, whereof inferiour subjects are no more capable then men are able to under∣stand the works of the Gods: and therefore they are called arcana imperii, secrets of State, to be reverenced rather then lookt into.

To conclude, the affairs of particular persons are of so short extension, and incircled in so small a compasse, that a mean capacity may easily ap∣prehend the advantages or inconveniences which may ensue upon the contract; and therefore it is requisite they should stand to the adventure, and their judgement is worthily taxed with the losse: but the businesses of the Commonweal are both subject to so many casualties of fortune, and rely upon such unexpected accidents, that it is impossible for any spirit, how provident soever, to foresee the issue in that variety of chances. Be∣sides that every particular subject is much inter∣essed in the fortune of the event, and may justly chalenge an alteration of the intended course, ra∣ther then suffer shipwrack through the errour of their Pilot: And so the safety of the State doth balance out the losse of credit in the Gover∣nour.

On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirm vertue to be the same both in Prince and people; neither doth condition of state or calling, or the quality of publick or pri∣vate businesses alter the nature and essence of goodnesse: for to deprive the tongue of truth and fidelity were to break the bond of civile socie∣ty, which is the basis and ground-plot of all States and Commonweals. They do not deny but that a wise Prince may so carry a treaty, that he may seem to affect that most which he least intendeth; or answer doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that he may use with great honour the practices and stratagems of war, when the fortune of both parties consisteth upon their own industry: but to break any covenants a∣greed upon may well get a kingdome, but never honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the means whereby a State is continued in happy govern∣ment: whereof thus much I dare say by the war∣rant of this History, that he who fal••••fieth his word upon advantage, howsoever he regardeth his honour, had need to pay them home in re∣gard of his own safety: for if they once recover the losse, and get any advantage against those truth-breakers, they will find as little favour as the Germans did with Caesar.

CHAP. V.

Caesar marcheth directly to the Camp of the Ger∣mans, and cutteth them all in pieces, and so endeth that warre.

VPon these considerations,* 1.17 Caesar ma∣nifesting his resolution to the Le∣gates and Questor, there happened a very fortunate accident. For the next day very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chiefest of the Germans came unto Caesar into his Camp, to excuse their fraudu∣lent practice, and withall to continue their peti∣tion of truce. Whereof Caesar was exceeding

glad, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant brought his Army out of the Camp, commanding his horsemen to follow the legions, because they had been daunted with so late an overthrow: And making a triple battel, marched speedily eight miles, and so came upon the Germans before they had notice what had happened. Who being terrified with our sudden arrivall, and the departure of their own leaders, knew not whether it were their best course to bring forth their forces, or defend their Camp, or otherwise to seek their safety by flight. Which tumult and fear was no sooner perceived by the Roman souldiers, but calling to mind their perfidious treachery, they brake into the Camp, and were at first a little resi∣sted. In the mean time the women and chil∣dren (for they had brought all they had over the Rhene) fled every one away: which Caesar perceiving sent his horsemen to pursue them. The Germans hearing the clamour and scr••ech∣ings behind their backs, and seeing their friends pursued and slain, did cast away their weapons, forsake their ensigns, and fled out of the Camp: and coming to the confluence of the Mase and the Rhene, such as had escaped cast themselves into the river; where what through fear, wearinesse, and the force of the water, they were all drowned. In this conflict the Romans lost not a man. The number of the enemy was 430000, with women and chil∣dren. To them whom he had retained in his Camp, he gave leave to depart: but they fea∣ring the cruelty of the Galles for the mischief they had done them, desired that they might con∣tinue with the Romans: which Caesar agreed unto.

OBSERVATION.

THis relation affordeth little matter of war, but only a severe revenge of hatefull treache∣ry: notwithstanding I will hence take occasion to discover the offices of the Quaestor and the Le∣gates; and shew what place they had in the Ar∣my. And first concerning the Quaestor, we are to understand that he was elected by the common voice of the people, in the same Court which was called to create the Generall. His office was to take charge of the publick treasure, whether it came out of their A••rarium for the pay of the Army, or otherwise was taken from the enemy.

Of him the souldiers received their stipend, both in corn and money: and what other booties were taken from the enemy, he either kept them or sold them for the use of the Commonweal.

The Legates were not chosen by the people, but appointed by the Senate, as Assistants and Coadjuto••s to the Emperour for the publick ser∣vice, and were altogether directed by the Gene∣rall, in whose absence they had the absolute com∣mand: and their number was for the most part uncertain, but proportioned according to the number of legions in the Army.

CHAP. VI.

Caesar maketh a bridge upon the Rhene, and carrieth his Army over into Germany.

THe German war being thus ended,* 1.18 Caesar thought it necessary to trans∣port his Army over the Rhene in∣to the Continent of Germany for ma∣ny causes: whereof this was not the least, that seeing the Germans were so easily perswaded to bring their Colonies and their vagrant multi∣tudes into Gallia, he thought good to make known unto them, that the Roman people could at their pleasure carry their forces over the Rhene into Germany. Moreover, those troups of horse which were absent at the late overthrow of the Germans, being gone as I said before for spoil and provision over the Mosa, after they saw their friends overthrown, were fled into the confines of the Sicambri, and joyned with them. To whom when Caesar sent Messengers to de∣mand them to be sent unto him, they answered that the Roman Empire was limited by the Rhene: and if the Germans were interdicted Gallia, why should Caesar challenge any autho∣rity in their quarters? Lastly the Ubii, who a∣mongst all the rest of the Germans had only ac∣cepted of Caesars friendship, and given pledges of their fidelity, had made earnest sute unto him to send them aid against the Suevi; or at the least to transport his Army over the Rhene: that would serve their turns, that would be help and incouragement enough to them; for the name and opinion of the Roman Army was so great, and of such fame, what with Ariovistus o∣verthrow, and this last service, that it sounded honourable amongst the farthest Nations of Germany, so that it was the greatest safety to have them their friends. For these reasons Cae∣sar resolved to passe the Rhene; but to carry his Army over by boat was neither safe, nor for his own honour, nor the majesty of the people of Rome. And albeit it seemed a matter of great difficulty, by reason of the breadth, swiftnesse and depth of the river, to make a bridge: yet he resolved to try what he could do, otherwise he de∣termined not to passe over at all. And so he built a bridge after this manner.

At two foot distance he placed two trees of a foot and halfe square, sharpened at the lower end, and cut answerable to the depth of the river: these he let down into the water with engines, and drove them in with commanders, not perpen∣dicularly

after the fashion of a pile, but gable∣wise, and bending with the course of the water: opposite unto these he placed two other trees, joyned together after the same fashion, being for∣ty foot distant from the former, by the dimension between their lower parts in the bottome of the water, and reclining against the course of the river. These two pair of couples thus placed he joyned together with a beam of two foot square, equall to the distance between the said couples, and fastened them at each end on either side of the couples with braces and pins: whereby the strength of the work and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the stream was, and the faster it fell upon the timber-work▪ the stronger the bridge was united in the cou∣plings and joynts. In like manner he proceeded with couples and beams, untill the work was brought unto the other side of the river: and then he laid straight planks from beam to beam, and covered them with hurdles; and so he made a floor to the bridge. Moreover on the lower side of the bridge he drove down supporters, which being fastened to the timber-work▪ did strength∣en the bridge against the force of the water: and on the upper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boats, or what else the enemy might cast down to trouble the work or hurt the bridge. Within ten dayes that the timber began to be cut down and carried▪ the work was ended, and the Army transported. Caesar leaving a strong garison at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri. In the mean time Em∣bassadours came to him from many cities desiring peace and the friendship of the Romans: whom Caesar answered courteously, and required hosta∣ges of their fidelity.

OBSERVATION.

IT shall not be amisse to enter a little into the consideration of this bridge, as well in regard of the ingenious Architecture thereof, as also that we may somewhat imitate Caesar; whom we may observe to insist with as great plenty of wit and el••quence, in presenting unto us the subtilty of his invention in such manner of handy-works, as upon any other part of his actions; as this particular description of the bridge may suffici∣ently witnesse: besides the fortifications at Ale∣sia, and the intrenchments in Britany, for the safety of his shipping, with many other works, which he might well record as the greatest de∣signes of an heroick spirit, and the wonderfull effects of magnanimous industry, that succeeding ages might not boast either of Art or prowesse which his vertue had not expressed, or otherwise might wonder at that worth which they them∣selves could not attain unto. And to that pur∣pose he entertained Vuruvius the Father of Ar∣chitecture, and as worthily to be imitated in that faculty, as his Master Caesar is in feats of Armes. By whose example a great Commander may learn, how much it importeth the eternity of his fame to beautify his greatest designes with Art, and to esteem of such as are able to intreat the Mathematicall Muses to shew themselves under the shape of a sensible form; which albeit, through the rudenesse of the matter, fall far short of the truth of their intellectuall nature, yet their beauty expresseth such a majesty of Art, that no time will suffer the memory thereof to pe∣rish.

The workmanship of this bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double posts, whereof the first order bending with the stream, and the lower rank against the stream, when they came to be coupled together with overthwart beams, which were fastened in the couplings with braces which he nameth Fibulas, the more violent the stream fell upon the work, the faster the joynts of the building were united, as may better appear by a modell of that making, then can be expressed by any circumstance of words.

I might hence take occasion to speak of the di∣versity of bridges, and of the practices which an∣tiquity hath devised to transport Armies over Ri∣vers: but inasmuch as it is a common subject for all that undertake this Military task,* 1.19 and hath been handled by Lapsius upon the occasion of this bridge, I will refer the Reader to that place; and only note the singular disposition of this a∣ction, inasmuch as Caesar made the means cor∣respondent to that end which he intended. For considering that the chiefest end of his passage was, to let the Germans understand that the power of the Roman Empire was not bounded with the Rhene, and that a river could not so se∣parate their territories, but that they were able to joyn both the Continents together, and make a common road-way where it seemed most unpas∣sable: he thought it best to passe over his Army by a bridge, that so the Germans might know the power of his forces, and also conceit their Terri∣to••ies as united unto Gallia, or to be united at the pleasure of the Romans with a firm Isthmus, and plain passage by foot, which in times past had alwayes been separated by a mighty river. Neither would a transportation by boat have wrought that effect, forasmuch as the daily use thereof was so familiar to the Germans, that it nothing altered their imagination of an unacces∣sible passage: but when they saw so strange a thing attempted, and so suddenly performed, they would easily understand that they were not so

farre off, but that they might be overtaken, and so direct their demeanour accordingly.

Let this suffice therefore to prove that a passage over a river by a bridge is more honourable, safe, and of greater terrour to the enemy, then any o∣ther way that can be devised; especially if the ri∣ver carry any depth, such as the Rhene is: other∣wise, if it have either shallows or fords, where∣by men may wade over without any great incum∣brance, it were but lo•••• labour to stand about a bridge, but rather to think of it as of a place in∣cumbred with such hindrances as men often meet with in a march.

CHAP. VII.

Caesar taketh revenge upon the Sicambri: giveth liberty to the Ubii; and returneth again into Gallia.

THe Sicambri understanding that Caesar was making a bridge over the Rhene,* 1.20 prepared themselves to fly; and at the perswasion of the Usipetes & Tenchtheri forsook their country, and conveyed themselves and their possessions into woods and solitary Deserts. Cae∣sar continuing a few dayes in their quarters, having set on fire their villages and houses, and burned up their Corn and provision, came to the Ubii, promising them aid against the Sue∣vi: by whom he understood, that assoon as the Suevi had intelligence that he went about to make a bridge, calling a Councell, according to their manner, they sent unto all quarters of their State, that they should forsake their towns, and carry their wives and children and all that they had into the woods; and that all that were able to bear Armes should make head in one place, which they appointed to be the midst of their Country; and there they attended the coming of the Romans, and were resolved in that place to give them battel. Which when Caesar understood, having ended all those things in regard whereof he came into Germany, which was chiefly to terrify the Germans, to be revenged upon the Sicambri, to set the Ubii at li∣berty; having spent in all eighteen dayes be∣yond the Rhene, and done enough as well in re∣gard of his own honour, as the good of the com∣monweal, he returned into Gallia, and brake up the bridge.

CHAP. VIII.

Caesar thinketh of a voyage into Britanie: he en∣quireth of Merchants concerning the nature of that people.

ALthough the Summer was almost spent,* 1.21 and that in those parts the winter hastened on a pace, inasmuch as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithstanding he resolved to go o∣ver into Britanie, ••orasmuch as he understood that in all the former wars of Gallia, the Ene∣my had received most of their supply from thence. And although the time of the year would not suffer him to finish that war; yet he thought it would be to good purpose, if he went only to view the Island, to understand the qua∣lity of the inhabitants, and to know their coast, their ports, and their landing-places, whereof the Galles were altogether ignorant; for sel∣dome any man but merchants did travell un∣to them. Neither had they discovered any thing but the sea-coast, and those regions which were opposite unto Gallia. And therefore cal∣ling merchants together from all quarters, he neither could understand of what quantity the Island was; what nations, or what power they were that inhabited ••t; what use or experience of war they had; what laws or customes they used; nor what havens they had to receive a na∣vy of great shipping.

OBSERVATION.

AS the Germans had oftentimes stirred up mo∣tions of rebellion amongst the Galles, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their kingdome; so the Britans had upheld most of their wars, by furnishing them with such supplies as from time to time they stood in need of. So that if Caesar or the Roman people would rest se∣cure of their quiet and peaceable government in Gallia, as they had chastised the insolencie of the Germans, and sent them back again with greater losse then gain; so was it necessary to make the Britans know, that their assistance in the war of Gallia would draw more businesses upon them then they were well able to manage. For as I have noted in my former discourses, the causes of an unpeaceable government are as well externall and forreign, as internall and bred in the body; which need the help of a Physician to continue the body in a perfect state of health, & require as great a diligence to qualify their malicious ope∣rations, as any internall sicknesse whatsoever.

In the second Commentary I briefly touched the commodity of good discovery: but because it is a matter of great consequence in the fortu∣nate carriage of a war, I will once again by this example of Caesar remember a Generall not to be negligent in this duty. Suetonius in the life of our Caesar reporteth, that he never undertook a∣ny expedition, but he first received true intelli∣gence of the particular site and nature of the Country, as also of the manners and quality of the people; and that he would not undertake the voyage into Britany, untill he had made perfect discovery by himself of the magnitude and situa∣tion of the Island. Which Suetonius might un∣derstand by this first voyage, which Caesar would needs undertake in the later end of a Summer, although it were, as he himself saith, but to dis∣cover.

It is recorded by ancient Writers, that those demi-gods that governed the world in their time, gave great honour to the exercise of hunt∣ing, as the perfect image of war in the resem∣blance of all parts, and namely in the discovery and knowledge of a Country; without which all enterprises, either of sport in hunting, or ear∣nest in wars, were frivolous and of no effect. And therefore Xenophon in the life of Cyrus sheweth, that his expedition against the King of Armenia was nothing but a repetition of such sports as he had used in hunting. Howsoever, if the infinite examples registred in history, how by the dexterity of some Leaders it hath gained great victories, and through the negligence of others irrecoverable overthrows, are not sufficient mo∣tives to perswade them to this duty; let their own experience in matters of small moment mani∣fest the weaknesse of their proceedings, when they are ignorant of the chiefest circumstances of the matter they have in hand. But let this suffice in the second place to prove the necessity of good discovery, and let us learn of Caesar what is principally to be inquired after in the discovery of an unknown country: as first, the quantity of the land; secondly, what Nations inhabite it; thirdly, their use of war; fourthly, their civile government; and lastly, what Havens they have to receive a Navy of great shipping. All which circumstances are such principall Arteries in the body of a State, that the discovery of any one of these demands would have given great light concerning the motion of the whole body.

CHAP. IX.

Caesar sendeth C. Volusenus to discover the coast of Britanie; and prepareth himself for that voyage.

CAesar sent out Caius Volusenus with a Galley to discover what he could con∣cerning these things,* 1.22 with charge that having made perfect discovery, he should return again unto him as speedily as might be: he himself marching in the mean time with all his forces unto the* 1.23 Morini; forasmuch as from thence lay the shortest cut into Britanie. Thither he commanded that ships should be brought from all the maritime Cities of that quarter, and namely that fleet which he had built the year before for the war at Vannes. In the mean time his resolution being known, and carried into Britanie by Merchants and others, many private States of that Island sent Embassa∣dours unto him, promising him hostages of their loyalty, and signifying their readinesse to submit themselves to the Roman Empire. To these he made liberall promises, exhorting them to con∣tinue in that obedience; and so sent them back again. And with them he sent Comius, whom he had made King of Arras, whose wisdome and vertue he held in good account, and whom he took to be faithfull to him, and of great authori∣ty in those Regions. To him he gave in charge to go to as many of the States as he could, and perswade them to accept of the friendship of the Roman Empire, and acquaint them that Caesar himself would presently follow after.

Volusenus having taken what view of the Countrey he could (for he durst not go on shore to commit himself to the barbarisme of the ene∣my) after five dayes returned to Caesar, and re∣lated unto him all that he had discovered. Whilst Caesar stayed in those parts for the furnishing of his fleet, the Morini sent messengers unto him, excusing themselves for their former faults, that being a rude and barbarous people, and altogether unacquainted with our customes, they had made war against the people of Rome; and withall manifesting their readinesse to obey his commands.

Caesar not willing to leave any enemy behind him, or to engage in a new war at this time of the year, or to neglect his voyage into Britanie for such small matters, willingly accepted of their submission, having first received many hostages of them: and having made ready eighty ships of burthen, which he thought sufficient to transport two legions, he divided the Gallies to the Que∣stor, the Legates, and the Commanders of the horse. There were also eighteen ships of burthen more, which lay wind-bound at a Port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the horsemen. The rest of the Army he committed to Q. Titu∣rius Sabinus and Luc. Aurunculcius Cotta, com∣manding them to go to the confines of the Mena∣pii, & into those parts of the Morini who had sent no Embassadours to him: and appointed P. Sulp. Rufus a Legate to keep the Port with a sufficient garrison.

CHAP. X.

Caesar faileth into Britanie, and landeth his men.

THese things being thus d••spatched,* 1.24 having a good wind, in the third watch he put out to Sea, comman∣ding his horsemen to ••mbark them∣selves at the further Port and fol∣low him; which was but slowly performed. He himself arrived upon the coast about the fourth hour of the day, where he found all the Clifts possessed with the forces of the ene∣my. The nature of the place was such, that the hils lay so steep over the sea, that a wea∣pon might easily be cast from the higher

ground upon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit landing-place; notwith∣standing he cast anchour untill the rest of the Navy were come up unto him.

In the mean time calling a Councell of the Legates and Tribunes, he declared unto them what advertisements he had received by Volu∣senus, and told them what he would have done; and withall admonished them that the course of Military affairs, and especially Sea mat∣ters, that had so sudden and unconstant a motion, required all things to be done at a beck, and in due time. The Councell being dismissed, having both wind and tide with him, he weighed anchours, and sailed eight miles from that place, unto a plain and open shore.

The Britains perceiving the Romans deter∣minations, sent their horse and chariots (which they commonly use in war) before, & the rest of their forces followed after to the place where the Romans intended to land. Caesar found it exceeding difficult to land his men for these respects: the ships were so great that they could not be brought near unto the shore; the souldiers in strange and unknown places, ha∣ving their hands laden with great and heavy weapons, were at one instant to go out of the ship, to withstand the force of the billow, and to fight with the enemy; whereas the Britains either standing upon the shore, or making short sallies into the water, did boldly cast their weapons in known and frequented places, and managed their horses accustomed to such ser∣vices.

The Romans being terrified with these things, and altogether unskilfull of this kind of fight, did not use the same courage as they were wont to do in land-services. Which when Caesar perceived, he caused the Gallies, that were both strange to the Britains, & readier for use, to be removed from the sh••ps of burthen, and to be rowed up and down, and laid against the open side of the enemy; that from thence with slings, engines, and arrowes, the Enemy might be beaten up from the water side: which stood the Romans in good stead. For the Bri∣tains being troubled with the strangenesse of the Gallies, the motion of their Oares, and the unusuall kind of engines, were somewhat dis∣mayed, and began to retire back, and give way to the Romans. But the souldiers still linge∣ring, and especially for fear of the depth of the sea, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth legion de∣siring the Gods that it might fall out happily to the legion, If you will, saith he, forsake your Eagle, O ye souldiers, and betray it to the ene∣my; for mine own part, I will do my duty both to the Commonweal and to my Imperator. And hav••ng spoken this with a loud voice, he cast himself into the Sea, and carried the Ea∣gle towards the Enemy. The Romans exhor∣ting one another not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed, they all leaped out of the ship: which when others that were near at hand per∣ceived, they followed them with as great ala∣crity, and pressed towards the enemy to encoun∣ter with them.

The fight on both parts was very eager: the Romans (not being able to keep any order of battel, nor to get any firm footing, nor to follow their Ensignes, forasmuch as every man kept with those Ensignes which he first met with∣all) were wonderfully troubled. But the Ene∣my acquainted with the flats and shallows, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their ships, putting spurs to their horse, would set upon them incumbred and unprepa∣red, and many of them would over-lay a few: others would get the advantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thick∣est troups of them. Which when Caesar per∣ceived, he caused the shipboats and smaller vessels to be manned with souldiers; and where he saw need of help, he sent them to rescue such as were overcharged.

Assoon as the Romans got footing on the firm land, they made head together and charged the enemy, and so put them to flight: but they were not able to follow them, nor take the Island at that time, for want of horsemen, which thing was only wanting to Caesars won∣ted fortune.

THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

UPon this circumstance of landing, I may justly take occasion to handle that contro∣versy which hath been often debated by our En∣glish Captains; which is, whether is be better in question of an invasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing upon our Coast, or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our forces into some in∣land place, and there attend to give him battel. It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion that we ought not by any meanes to incounter an enemy at his landing, for so we might much endanger our selves and our Countrey, did ground themselves upon the authority of Monsieur de Langey not observing the difference between an Island and a Continent. For where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes as border one upon another in the same Conti∣nent: but where their territories are disjoyned by so great a bar as the Ocean, & they have not such means to surprise one another, it were mere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better ap∣pear by the sequele of this discourse. Wherein I will first lay down the reasons that may be ur∣ged to prove it unsafe to oppose an ene∣my

at his landing, not as being urged by that party (for I never heard any probable mo∣tive from them which might induce any such opinion) but set down by such as have looked into the controversies, both with experience and good judgement.

And first it may be objected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the uncertainty of place, as of time: for being ignorant in what place he will attempt a landing, we must either defend all places of ac∣cesse, or our intentions will prove m••re frivolous; and to perform that, it is requisite that our defen∣sive forces be sufficient according to the particu∣lar quality of every place subject to danger: which, considering the large extension of our ma∣ritime parts, and the many landing-places on our Coast, will require a greater number of men then this Island can afford. And although it could furnish such a competent number as might seem in some sort sufficient, yet the uncertainty of the time of the enemies arrivall would require that they should be lodged either upon, or near the places of danger many dayes at least, if not many weeks, before the instant of their attempt; which would exhaust a greater masse of Treasure, then could be well afforded by the State.

Secondly, it may be objected that all our land∣ing-places are of such disadvantage for the defen∣dants, that it were no safety at all to make head against him at the landing: for inasmuch as such places are open and plain, they yield no commo∣dity to shelter the defendants from the fury of the artillery, wherewith the Enemy will plentifully furnish their long boats and landing vessels; which beating upon the beach (for most of our landing-places are of that quality) will so scatter them, that no man shall be able to endure the in∣convenience thereof.

The third objection may arise from the dispa∣rity both of numbers, and condition of the for∣ces of either party. For the first, it must needs be granted that the defendants, being to guard so many places at once, cannot furnish such num∣bers to every particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence.

Concerning the quality of the forces, it is without question that a great and potent Prince (for such a one it must be that undertaketh to in∣vade the territories of so absolute and well-obey∣ed a Princesse as her Majesty is) would draw out the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of his souldiery wheresoever; besides the ga••••ant troups of voluntaries which do commonly attend such services. Now these being h••s qualified and drawn into one head, and being to make as it were but one body, how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being uncertain) that the defendants should equall them with forces of like vertue and experience.

These are the reasons which may be drawn from the disadvantage which they have that go about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that have been urged by such as main∣tain ••his opinion, are either 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceed to the answer of these reasons, I will ••ay this down for a princi∣ple, That it is impossible for any forreign Prince, how puissant soever, to make such a preparation as shall be fitting to invade a State so populous, and respective of their Sovereign (notwithstanding the pretences devised to dis∣semble the same) but it must of necessity be discovered before it can be made able to put a∣ny thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage which is required for so great a fleet. But I will rest my self in the example of the year eighty eight, which proveth the discovery of the preten∣ded invasion before it could come to execu∣tion.

Concerning therefore the first objection,* 1.25 it cannot indeed be denied but the place of the e∣nemies landing will be doubtfull, and therefore our ••••re must generally extend it self to all pla∣ces of accesse: but that our defensive forces are not sufficient in a competent manner to guard all such places, according as the necessity of them shall require, that is the point in que∣stion.

To prove that our forces are sufficient, we must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take Kent for a president, as not altogether unacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceive not my self, is a shore of as large extension upon the maritime parts as any other within this kingdome. For the breadth thereof enlarging it self from the point of N••sse by Lyd, which is the uttermost skirt upon the coast of Sussex, unto Margate upon the coast of Essex, is by computation about twenty four miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixth part thereof is not subject to the landing of such an enemy as we speak of; partly in regard of the hugenesse of the cliffs, which do inclose a great part of that skirt, and partly in regard that much of that quantity which may be landed upon hath such eminent and difficult places near adjoyning, as an Army that should put it self there on shore, should find it self, being opposed but by a small force, so streightened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparant ruine of their whole forces.

Further, it cannot be denied but that general∣ly along the coast of Kent there are so many rocks, shelves, flats, and other impediments, that a Navie of great ships can have no commodity to anchour near the shore; and for the most part the coast lieth so open to the weather that the least gale of wind will put them from their An∣chour:

all which particularities duly considered, it will appear that this large sk••••t of Kent will af∣ford a far lesser part fit for the landing of an Ar∣my, then was thought of at the first. And were it that so publick a treatise as this is would admit with good discretion such an exact relation as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would undertake to make it so evident, by the particular description both of the number, quantity, and quality of the places themselves, as no man of an indifferent judgement would ima∣gine our forces to be insufficient to afford every of them such a safe and sure guard, as shall ••e thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is unfitting to give such particular satisfaction in this publick discourse, give me leave, submitting my self alwayes to better judgements, to give a generall taste of that means as would secure all places with a competent number of men.

Having shewed you before the circuit of the maritime parts of Ke••t, I would observe this or∣der: first, to make a triple division of all such forces as shall be appointed for this service; as for example, I will suppose the number to be twelve thousand, of which I would lodge three thousand about the point of Nesse, and three thousand about Margate, and six thousand a∣bout F••ulks••on, which I take to be as it were the centre; for my greatest care should be so to dis∣pose of them, as they might not only succour one another in the same shire, but as every shire Lordereth one upon another, so they should mu∣tually give help one unto another, as occasion should be ••ffered: as if the enemy should attempt a landing about Nesse, not only the six thousand lodged as before should march to their succours, but such also of the Sussex forces as were near unto that part, and so likewise of the ••est. By which you may see, how great a force would in few houres ••e assembled for the renforcing of any of these out-skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one half of the whole forces are thus lodged in the centre of the Shire, which is nearer to all parts then any other place whatsoever. There would also in the quartering of them an especiall care ••e had to the places of danger, as might be answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast by regi∣ments and companies, as the Country might af∣ford best opportunity to entertain them.

Now concerning the later part of this objecti∣on, which urgeth the uncertainty of time when the enemy shall make his approches, I hold it most requisite that our defensive forces should be drawn into a head, before the enemy should be discovered near our coast, ready to put himself on shore: for it were a grosse absurdity to imagine that companies could upon such a sudden be as∣sembled, without confusion; and make so long a ma••ch, with such expedition as the necessity of the occasion would require. Now, for that hus∣banding respect of her Majesties 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which ••s urged to such extremity, as it would be unsup∣portable for this State to ••e••r, as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualify that suppo∣sed immoderate expence; so I assure my self, that men of ••ound judgement will deem it much out of season to dispute about unnecessary th••ift, when the whole kingdome is brought in question of being made subject to a stranger.

Ut jugule•••• homines surgunt de nocte latrones: Non experg••scer••s, ut te ••psum serves? Thieves rise by night to cut the throats of men. Wilt not thou then arise to save thy self?

The enemy (peradventure) hath kept thirty thousand men in pay two months before, to make havock of our Country, and to ••ring us into perpetuall thraldome; shall we 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it much to maintain sufficient forces upon 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Coast, to assure our selves that no such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 shall enter into our Country? The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of this charge would be qualified by our good 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which would proportion our attendance with the necessity which is imposed upon us to be carefull in businesses of this nature. Let this suffice there∣fore to prove that our forces are sufficient to keep the Sea-coast, and that the uncertainty of time when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder us from performing that duty which the care and respect of our Prince and Countrey imposeth upon every good subject; which is the substance of the first reason which I set down in the beginning of this discourse.

Now concerning the second reason,* 1.26 which urgeth the disadvantage of the place in regard of the fury of the Enemies artillery; true it is, that such places as yield the Enemy commodity of landing are for the most part plain and open, and afford naturally no covert at all. What then? shall a souldier take every place as he findeth it, and use no Art to qualify the disadvantages there∣of? Or shall a man forgo the benefit of a place of advantage, rather then he will relieve with in∣dustry the discommodity of some particular cir∣cumstance? I make no question but an ingeni∣ous Commander, being in seasonable time lodg∣ed with convenient forces upon any of those places, yea upon the beach it self, which is as un∣apt to make defensible as any place whatsoever, would use such industry as might give sufficient security to his forces, and over-weigh the Ene∣my with advantage of place; especially consi∣dering that this age hath afforded such plentifull examples of admirable inventions in that behalf. But this cannot be done, if our forces do not make head before the instant of the Enemies at∣tempt, that our Commanders may have some time to make ready store of Gabio••s, and hand-baskets, with such moveable matter as shall be thought fit for that service.

Neither let this trouble any man; for I dare avouch it, that if our forces are not drawn into a head before the Enemy be discovered upon the Coast, although we never mean to oppose their landing, but attend them in some in-land place to give them battel, our Commanders will be far to seek of many important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let us have but a reasonable time to bethink our selves of these necessaries, and we will easily overcome all these difficulties, and use the benefit of the firm land to repell an Ene∣my, weakned with the Sea, tossed with the billow, troubled with his weapons, with many other hinderances and discouragements, which are presented unto him both from the Land and the Sea. He that saw the landing of our forces in the Island of Fiall in the year ninety seven, can somewhat judge of the difficulty of that matter: for what with the working of the Sea, the steep∣nesse of the Cliffs, and the troublesomnesse of their Armes, the souldiers were so incumbred, that had not the Enemy been more then a cow∣ard, he might well with two hundred men have kept us from entering any part of that Island.

Concerning the third Objection,* 1.27 this briefly shall be sufficient, that we are not so much to re∣gard that our forces do equall them in number, as to see that they be sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the Enemies landing: for we know that in places of advan∣tage and difficult accesse, a small number is able to oppose a great; and we doubt not but, all cir∣cumstances duly considered, we shall proporti∣onably equall the Enemy both in number and quality of their forces: alwayes presupposed, that our State shall never be destitute of sufficient forces trained and exercised in a competent man∣ner, to defend their Country from forreign E∣nemies. For the neglect thereof were to draw on such as of themselves are but too forward to make a prey of us, and to make us unapt not only to oppose an Enemies landing, but to de∣fend our selves from being overrun, as other Nations living in security without due regard thereof have been.

And thus much concerning the answer to those three reasons, which seem to prove that an Enemy is not to be resisted at his landing. Now if we do but look a little into the discom∣modities which follow upon the landing of an Enemy, we shall easily discover the dangerous∣nesse of this opinion: as first, we give him leave to live upon the spoil of our Country; which cannot be prevented by any wasting, spoiling, or retiring of our provisions, in so plentifull a Country as this is, especially considering that we have no strong towns at all to repose our selves upon. Whereof we need no further testimony then is delivered unto us out of the seventh book of these Commentaries, in that war which Cae∣sar had with Vercingetor••x.

Secondly obedience, which at other time is willingly given to Princes, is greatly weakned at such times; whereby all necessary means to maintain a war is hardly drawn from the subject. Thirdly, opportunity is given to malecontents and ill-disposed persons either to make head themselves, or to fly to the Enemy. Fourthly, 'tis madnesse to adventure a kingdome upon one stroke, having it in our disposition to do other∣wise: with many other disadvantages which the opportunity of any such occasion would dis∣cover.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe word Imperator,* 1.28 which the Eagle-bearer attributeth to Caesar, was the greatest title that could be given to a Roman Leader: and as Zo••aras in his second Tome saith, was never given but upon some great exploit, and after a just victory obtained▪ and then in the place where the battel was fought, and the Enemy o∣verthrown, the Generall was saluted by the name of Imperator with the triumphant shout of the whole Army; by which acclamation the souldiers gave testimony of his worth, and made it equivalent with the most fortunate Comman∣ders.

This Ceremony was of great antiquity in the Roman Empire,* 1.29 as appeareth by many Histories, and namely by Tacitus, where he saith that Ti∣berius gave that honour to Blesus, that he should be saluted Imperator by the legions; which he sheweth to be an ancient dignity belonging to great Captains, after they had foiled the Enemy with an eminent overthrow. For every victory was not sufficient whereby they might challenge so great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certain number of the Enemies to be slain. Appian in his second book saith, that in old time the name of Imperator was never taken but upon great and admirable exploits: but in his time ten thousand of the Enemy being slain in one battel was a sufficient ground of that ho∣nour.* 1.30 Cicero saith that two thousand slain in the place, especially of Thracians, Spaniards or Galles,* 1.31 did worthily merit the name of Impera∣tor. Howsoever, it seemeth by the same Authour that there was a certain number of the Enemy re∣quired to be slain, where he saith, Se just a victo∣ria Imperatorem appellatum, that he was cal∣led Imperator upon a due and full victory.

CHAP. XI.

The Britans make peace with Caesar, but break it again upon the losse of the Roman shipping.

THe Britans being overthrown in this battel,* 1.32 assoon as they had re∣covered their safety by fligh••, they presently dispatched messengers to Caesar to intreat for peace, promi∣sing hostages, and obedience in whatsoever he commanded. And with these Ambassadours returned Comius of Arras, whom Caesar had sent before into Britany, and whom the Britans at his first landing with Caesars mandates, had seized upon and thrown into prison; but af∣ter the battel they released him, and becoming now suitours for peace, threw all the blame thereof upon the multitude, excusing them∣selves as ignorant of it, and so desiring to be pardoned. Caesar complained; that whereas they sent unto him into Gallia to desire peace, notwithstanding at his coming they made war against him without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance, he commanded hostages to be delivered unto him: which they presently performed in part, and the rest being to be set further off, they promi∣sed should likewise be rendered within a short time. In the mean while they commanded their people to return to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters to commend themselves and their States to Caesar. The peace being thus concluded, four dayes after that Caesar came into Britany, the eighteen ships which were appointed for the horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle wind: and approching so near the coast of Britany, that they were within view of the Roman Camp, there arose such a sudden tempest, that none of them were able to hold their course; but some of them returned to the port from whence they came, other some were cast upon the lower part of the Island, which lieth to the West-ward, and there casting anchour took in so much water, that they were forced to com∣mit themselves again to the sea, and direct their course to the coast of Gallia. The same night it happened that the moon being in the full, the tides were very high in those seas; whereof the Romans being altogether ignorant, both the Gallies that transported the army which were drawn up upon the shore were filled with the tide, and the ships of burthen that lay at anchour were shaken with the tempest. Nei∣ther was there any help to be given unto them; so that many of them were rent and split in pieces, and the rest lost both their anchours, ca∣bles and other tackling, and by that means be∣came altogether unserviceable. Where at the whole Army was exceedingly troubled; for there was no other shipping to recarry them back again, neither had they any necessaries to new furnish the old; and every man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia, forasmuch as there was no provision of corning those places where they were. Which thing being known to the Princes of Britany, that were assembled to conferre of such things as Caesar had comman∣ded them to perform, when they understood that the Romans wanted both their horsemen, shipping and provision of corn, and conjectu∣ring of the paucity of their forces by the small circuit of their Camp, (that which made it of lesse compasse then usual being, that Ca••sar had transported his souldiers without such necessa∣ry carriages as they used to take with them;) they thought it their best course to rebell, and to keep the Romans from corn and convoyes of provision, and so prolong the matter untill win∣ter came on. For they thought that if these were once overthrown and cut off from returning into Gallia, never any man would afterward adventure to bring an Army into Britany. Therefore they conspired again the second time, and conveyed themselves by stealth out of the Camp, and got their men privily out of the fields, to make head in some convenient place against the Romans.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

COncerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes thereof, it hath already been handled in the second book: to which I will add thus much, as may serve to shew how the Romans became so ignorant of the spring-tides, which happen in the full and new of the Moon. It is observed by experience, that the motion of this watery element is altogether directed by the course of the moon; wherein she exerciseth her regency according as she findeth the matter qua∣lified for her influence. And forasmuch as all mediterranean seas, and such gulfs as are inclo∣sed in sin••es and bosomes of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallnesse of their quantity, are not so capable of celestiall power as the Ocean it self; it consequently followeth that the Tuscan seas, wherewith the Romans were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the moon as the main sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit, and through the plentious abundance of his parts, better an∣swereth the vertue of the Moon. The Ocean therefore being thus obedient to the course of the celestiall bodies, taking her course of slowing from the North, falleth with such a current be∣tween the Orcades and the main of Norvegia, that she filleth our channel between England and France with great swelling tides, and ma∣keth her motion more eminent in these quarters

then in any other parts of the world. And hence it happeneth that our river of Thames, lying with her mouth so ready to receive the tide as it co∣meth, and having withall a plain levelled belly, and a very small fresh current, taketh the tide as far into the land as any other known river of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ig∣norant of the spring-tides in the full of the moon.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SUch as either by their own experience, or o∣therwise by observation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the government of Commonweals, are not ignorant with what difficulty a nation that either hath long lived in liberty, or been governed by Commanders of their own chusing, is made subject to the yoak of bondage, or reduced under the obedience of a stranger. For as we are apt by a naturall incli∣nation to civile society; so by the same nature we desire a free disposition of our selves and pos∣sessions, as the chiefest end of the said society: and therefore in the government of a subdued State, what losse or disadvantage happeneth to the Victour, or how indirectly soever it concer∣neth the bond of their thraldome, the captive peo∣ple behold it as a part of their adversaries over∣throw; and conceive thereupon such spirits as answer the greatnesse of their hope, and sort with the strength of their will, which alwayes maketh that seem easy to be effected which it desireth. And this was the reason that the Britans altered their resolution of peace, upon the losse which the Romans had received in their shipping.

CHAP. XII.

Caesar new tri••ameth his late shaken navy: the Britans set upon the Romans as they harvested; but were put off by Caesar.

CAesar,* 1.33 although he had not discove∣red their determination, yet con∣jecturing of the event by the losse of his shipping, and by their delay of gi∣ving up hostages, provided against all chances: for he brought corn daily out of the fields into his Camp; and took the hulls of such Ships as were most dismembred, and with the timber and brasse thereof he mended the rest that were beaten with the tempest, causing other necessaries to be brought out of Gallia. Which being handled with the great in∣dustry and travell of the Souldiers, he lost only twelve ships, and made the other able to abide the Sea.

While these things were in action, the seventh legion being sent out by course to fetch in corn, and little suspecting any motion of war, as part of the souldiers continued in the field, and the rest went & came between them and the Camp, the station that watched before the gate of the Camp gave advertisement to Caesar, that the same way which the legion went there appeared a greater dust then was usually seen. Caesar suspecting that which indeed was true, that the Britans were entred into some new resolution, he took those two cohorts which were in station before the port, commanding other two to take their place, and the rest to arm themselves, and presently to follow him; and went that way where the dust was descried. And when he had marched some distance from the Camp, he saw his men overcharged with the Enemy, and scarce able to sustain the assault, the legion thronged together on a heap, and weapons cast from all parts amongst them. For when they had harvested all other quarters, there re∣mained one piece of corn, whither the Enemy suspected the Romans would at last come, and in the night time conveighed themselves secretly into the woods, where they continued untill the Romans were come into the field: and as they saw them disarmed, dispersed, and occupied in reaping, they suddenly set upon them, and slaying some few of them, routed the rest, and incompassed them about with their horsemen and Chariots. Their manner of fight with Cha∣riots was, first to ride up and down, and cast their weapons as they saw advantage; and with the terrour of their horses and ratling of their wheels to disorder the companies; and when they had wound themselves between any troups of horse, they forsook their Chariots, and fought on foot: in the mean time the guiders of their chariots would drive a little aside, and so place themselves, that if their masters needed any help, they might have an easy passage unto them. And thus they performed in all their fights both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firm stability of footmen; & were so ready with daily practice, that they could stay in the declivity of a steep hill, & turn short or mode∣rate their going as it seemed best unto them, and run along the beam of the coach & rest upon the yoak, or harnesse of their horses, & return as speedily again at their pleasure. The Romans being thus troubled, Caesar came to rescue them in very good time: for at his coming the E∣nemy stood still, & the souldiers gathered their spirits unto them, & began to renew their cou∣rage that was almost spent. Caesar taking it an unfit time either to provoke the Enemy or to give him battel, continued a while in the same place, & then returned with the legions into the Camp. While these things were a doing, and the Romans thus busied, the Britans that were in the field conveighed themselves all away.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

BY this we plainly find that there were usually two cohorts (which according to the rate of one hundred and twenty in a maniple amounted to the number of 720. men) which kept the

day-watch before the gate of the Camp, and were alwayes in readinesse upon any service. The commodity whereof appeareth by this ac∣cident: for considering that the advertise∣ment required haste and speedy recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue, to have so many men ready to march forward at the first motion, that they might give what help they could untill the rest of their fellowes came in.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THeir manner of fight with Chariots is ve∣ry particularly described by Caesar, and needeth not to be stood upon any longer: only I observe that neither in Gallia, nor any other country of Europe, the use of Cha∣riots is ever mentioned; but they have ever been attributed as a peculiar fight unto the Eastern Countries, as sutable to the plain and levell situation of the place, whereof we find often mention in the Scripture. Which may serve for an argument of Geoffrey of Mon∣mouth, to prove the Britans descent from Troy in Asia, where we likewise find mention of such Chariots.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THirdly, we may observe the discreet and moderate temper of his valour, and the means he used to make his souldiers confi∣dent in his directions: for notwithstanding the Britans had exceedingly urged him to make ha∣zard of a present revenge; yet finding it an un∣fit time, (inasmuch as his men had been some∣what troubled with the fury of the Britans) he thought it best to expect some other opportunity. And again, to avoid the inconveniences of a fearfull retreat, he continued a while in the same place, to imbolden his men with the sight of the Enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full perswasion in his souldiers that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a carefull respect of their safety: which gave his men resolution when they were carried upon service, being assured that what service so∣ever they were imployed upon was most dili∣gently to be performed, as a matter much im∣porting the fortunate issue of that war: whereas if they had perceived that headstrong fury (which carrieth men on with a desire of victory, and never looketh into the means whereby it may be obtained) had directed the course of their pro∣ceedings, they might with reason have drawn back from such imployments, and valued their safety above the issue of such an enterprise. And hence ariseth that confident opinion which the souldiers have of a good Generall; which is a matter of great importance in the course of war.

CHAP. XIII.

The Britans make head with their forces; and are beaten by Caesar: his return into Gallia.

AFter this for many dayes together there followed such tempests and foul weather,* 1.34 that both the Romans were constrained to keep their Camp, and the Britans were kept from at∣tempting any thing against them. But in the mean time they sent messengers into all quar∣ters, publishing the small number of the Ro∣man forces, and amplifying the greatnesse of the booty, and the easy means offered unto them of perpetuall liberty, if they could take the Roman Camp. Shortly upon this, having ga∣thered a great company both of horse & foot, they came to the place where the Romans were in∣camped. Caesar (although he foresaw the e∣vent by that which before had hapned, that if the Enemy were beaten back, he would avoid the danger by flight) yet having some thirty horse, which Comius of Arras had carried with him at his coming into Britany, he imbattel∣led his legions before his Camp, and so gave them battel. The Enemy not being able to bear the assault of the Roman souldiers, turned their backs and fled: the Romans followed them as far as they could by running on foot, and after a great slaughter, with the burning of their towns far and near, they returned to their Camp. The same day the Britans sent messengers to Caesar to intreat for peace; whom he commanded to double their number of ho∣stages, which he commanded to be carried into Gallia. And forasmuch as the Aequinoctium was at hand, he thought it not safe to put him∣self to the sea in winter with such weak ship∣ping: and therefore having got a convenient time he hoised sail a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe unto the Continent. Two of these ships of burthen, not being able to reach the same haven, put in somewhat lower into the land: the souldiers that were in them which were about three hundred being set on shore, and marching towards their Camp, the Morini, with whom Caesar at his going into Brita∣ny had made peace, in hope of a booty, first with a few of their men stood about them, comman∣ding them upon pain of death to lay down their weapons: and as the Romans by casting them∣selves into an Orbe began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them there were suddenly gathered together about six thousand of the Enemy. Which thing being known, Cae∣sar sent out all the horsemen to relieve them. In the meantime the Romans sustained the force of the Enemy, and fought valiantly about the space of four hours; and receiving themselves only some few wounds, they slew many of the Enemy. As soon as the Roman horsemen came in sight, the Enemy cast away their wea∣pons

and fled, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.

OBSERVATION.

OF all the figures which the Tactici have cho∣sen to make use of in military affairs, the circle hath ever been taken for the fittest to be ap∣plyed in the defensive part, as inclosing with an equall circuit on all parts whatsoever is contain∣ed within the circumference of that Area: and therefore Geometry termeth a circumference a simple line, forasmuch as if you alter the site of the parts, and transport one arch into the place of another, the figure notwithstanding will re∣main the same, because of the equall bending of the line throughout the whole circumference. Which property as it proveth an uniformity of strength in the whole circuit, so that it cannot be said that this is the beginning or this is the end, this is front or this is flank: so doth that which Euclide doth demonstrate in the third of his E∣lements, concerning the small affinity between a right line and a circle (which being drawn to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) shew the greatnesse of this strength in regard of any other line, by which it may be broken. Which howsoever they seem as specu∣lative qualities, conceived rather by intellectuall discourse then manifested to sensible apprehensi∣on; yet forasmuch as experience hath proved the strength of this figure in a defensive part, a∣bove any other manner of imbattelling, let us not neglect the knowledge of these naturall pro∣perties, which discover the causes of this effect: neither let us neglect this part of military know∣ledge, being so strong a means to maintain va∣lour, and the sinew of all our ability: for order correspondent to circumstances is the whole strength and power of an Army. Neither ought there any action in a wel-ordered discipline to be irregular, or void of order. And therefore the Romans did neither eat nor sleep without the di∣rection of the Consul, or chief Commander; o∣therwise their valour might rather have been ter∣med fury then vertue: but when their courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time, it never failed as long as the said order continued perfect.

It appeareth therefore how important it is for a Commander to look into the diversity of orders for imbattelling, and to weigh the nature thereof, that he may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The Romans termed this figure Orbis, which signifieth a round body both with a concave and a convex surface: in resemblance whereof I understand this Orbe of men imbattelled to be so named; which might peradventure consist of five, or more, or fewer ranks, inclosing one another after the nature of so many circles described about one Centre; so that either the midst thereof remained void, or otherwise contained such carriages and impe∣diments, as they had with them in their march. This form of imbattelling was never used but in great extremity: for as it was the safest of all o∣ther, so it gave suspicion to the souldiers of ex∣ceeding danger, which abated much of their heat in battel; as will hereafter appear by the testimony of Caesar himself in the fifth Commentary, upon the occasion which happened unto Sabinus and Cotta.

CHAP. XIIII.

THe next day Caesar sent Titus Labie∣nus a Legate,* 1.35 with those legions which he had brought out of Britany, against the revolted Morini; who having no place of refuge because their bogs and fens were dryed up, where they had sheltred themselves the year before, they all fell under the power of his mercy. Q. Titurius and A. Cotta the Legates, who had led the le∣gions against the Menapii, after they had wa∣sted their fields, cut up their corn, burned their houses (for the Menapii were all hid in thick woods) returned to Caesar. These things being thus ended, Caesar placed the wintering Camps of all his legions amongst the Belgae; to which place two only of all the Cities in Britany sent hostages unto him, the rest neglecting it. These wars being thus ended, upon the relation of Caesars letters, the Senate decreed a supplicati∣on for the space of twenty dayes.

OBSERVATION.

IN the end of the second Commentary we read of a supplication granted by the Senate for fif∣teen dayes; which was never granted to any man before that time since the first building of the City: but forasmuch as in this fourth year of the wars in Gallia it was augmented from fifteen unto twenty dayes, I thought it fit to refer the handling thereof unto this place. We are there∣fore to understand, that whensoever a Roman Generall had carried himself well in the wars, by gaining a victory, or enlarging the bounds of their Empire, that then the Senate did decree a supplication to the gods in the name of that Captain. And this dignity was much sought af∣ter: not only because it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their gods should be opened, and their victories ac∣knowledged with the concourse and gratulation of the Roman people; but also because a suppli∣cation was commonly the forerunner of a tri∣umph, which was the greatest honour in the Ro∣man government:* 1.36 And therefore Cato nameth it the prerogative of a triumph. And Livie in his 26 book saith that it was long disputed on in the Senate, how they could deny one that was

there present to triumph, whose absence they had honoured with supplication and thanksgiving to the gods for things happily effected. The man∣ner of the Ceremony was, that after the Magi∣strate had publickly proclaimed it with this form or stile, quod bene & feliciter rempublicam administrasset, that he had happily and succes∣fully administred the affairs of the common∣weal, the Roman people clothed in white gar∣ments and crowned with garlands, went to all the Temples of the gods, and there offered sacri∣fices, to gratulate the victory in the name of the Generall. In which time they were forbidden all other businesses but that which pertained to this solemnity. It seemeth that this time of supplica∣tion was at first included within one or two dayes at the most, as appeareth by Livie in his third book, where he saith that the victory gained by two severall battels was spitefully shut up by the Senate in one dayes supplication; the peo∣ple of their own accord keeping the next day holy, and celebrating it with greater devotion then the former.

Upon the victory which Camillus had a∣gainst the Veii there were granted four dayes of supplication; to which there was afterward a day added, which was the usuall time of suppli∣cation unto the time that Pompey ended the war which they called Mithridaticum, when the u∣suall time of five dayes was doubled and made ten, and in the second of these Commentaries made fifteen, and now brought to twenty dayes. Which setteth forth the incitements and rewards of well doing, which the Romans propounded both at home & abroad to such as endeavoured to inlarge their Empire, or manage a charge to the benefit of their Commonwealths. And thus en∣deth the fourth Commentary.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Those of Zutphen.
• * 1.2

  Of Hassia.
• * 1.3

  Caesar.
• * 1.4

  Caesar.
• * 1.5

  Geldres and Cleve.
• * 1.6

  Salust.
• * 1.7

  Tacit.
• * 1.8

  1. Annal.
• * 1.9

  Caesar.
• * 1.10

  Liege.
• * 1.11

  Co••o••ia Agrippina.
• * 1.12

  Wael.
• * 1.13

  Vincitur haud gratis jugulo qui provocat hostem.
• * 1.14

  Liv. lib. 9.
• * 1.15

  Liv. lib. 7.
• * 1.16

  Caesar.
• * 1.17

  Caesar.
• * 1.18

  Csar
• * 1.19

  Lib. de Machin.
• * 1.20

  Caesar.
• * 1.21

  Caesar.
• * 1.22

  Caesar.
• * 1.23

  〈…〉〈…〉 Mon∣str••ul.
• * 1.24

  Caesar.
• * 1.25

  Ans••er to the first objection.
• * 1.26

  The answer to the se∣cond rea∣son.
• * 1.27

  The answer to the third reason.
• * 1.28

  Of the name Im∣perator.
• * 1.29

  3. Ann••l.
• * 1.30

  Phil. 14.
• * 1.31

  Lib. 2 epist. 9.
• * 1.32

  Caesar.
• * 1.33

  Caesar.
• * 1.34

  Caesar.
• * 1.35

  Caesar.
• * 1.36

  Lib. 15. ••a•• Cicero.