THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

UPon this circumstance of landing, I may justly take occasion to handle that contro∣versy which hath been often debated by our En∣glish Captains; which is, whether is be better in question of an invasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing upon our Coast, or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our forces into some in∣land place, and there attend to give him battel. It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion that we ought not by any meanes to incounter an enemy at his landing, for so we might much endanger our selves and our Countrey, did ground themselves upon the authority of Monsieur de Langey not observing the difference between an Island and a Continent. For where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes as border one upon another in the same Conti∣nent: but where their territories are disjoyned by so great a bar as the Ocean, & they have not such means to surprise one another, it were mere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better ap∣pear by the sequele of this discourse. Wherein I will first lay down the reasons that may be ur∣ged to prove it unsafe to oppose an ene∣my Page  94 at his landing, not as being urged by that party (for I never heard any probable mo∣tive from them which might induce any such opinion) but set down by such as have looked into the controversies, both with experience and good judgement.

And first it may be objected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the uncertainty of place, as of time: for being ignorant in what place he will attempt a landing, we must either defend all places of ac∣cesse, or our intentions will prove m•re frivolous; and to perform that, it is requisite that our defen∣sive forces be sufficient according to the particu∣lar quality of every place subject to danger: which, considering the large extension of our ma∣ritime parts, and the many landing-places on our Coast, will require a greater number of men then this Island can afford. And although it could furnish such a competent number as might seem in some sort sufficient, yet the uncertainty of the time of the enemies arrivall would require that they should be lodged either upon, or near the places of danger many dayes at least, if not many weeks, before the instant of their attempt; which would exhaust a greater masse of Treasure, then could be well afforded by the State.

Secondly, it may be objected that all our land∣ing-places are of such disadvantage for the defen∣dants, that it were no safety at all to make head against him at the landing: for inasmuch as such places are open and plain, they yield no commo∣dity to shelter the defendants from the fury of the artillery, wherewith the Enemy will plentifully furnish their long boats and landing vessels; which beating upon the beach (for most of our landing-places are of that quality) will so scatter them, that no man shall be able to endure the in∣convenience thereof.

The third objection may arise from the dispa∣rity both of numbers, and condition of the for∣ces of either party. For the first, it must needs be granted that the defendants, being to guard so many places at once, cannot furnish such num∣bers to every particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence.

Concerning the quality of the forces, it is without question that a great and potent Prince (for such a one it must be that undertaketh to in∣vade the territories of so absolute and well-obey∣ed a Princesse as her Majesty is) would draw out the 〈◊〉 of his souldiery wheresoever; besides the ga••ant troups of voluntaries which do commonly attend such services. Now these being h•s qualified and drawn into one head, and being to make as it were but one body, how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being uncertain) that the defendants should equall them with forces of like vertue and experience.

These are the reasons which may be drawn from the disadvantage which they have that go about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that have been urged by such as main∣tain •his opinion, are either 〈◊〉 to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceed to the answer of these reasons, I will •ay this down for a princi∣ple, That it is impossible for any forreign Prince, how puissant soever, to make such a preparation as shall be fitting to invade a State so populous, and respective of their Sovereign (notwithstanding the pretences devised to dis∣semble the same) but it must of necessity be discovered before it can be made able to put a∣ny thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage which is required for so great a fleet. But I will rest my self in the example of the year eighty eight, which proveth the discovery of the preten∣ded invasion before it could come to execu∣tion.

Concerning therefore the first objection,* it cannot indeed be denied but the place of the e∣nemies landing will be doubtfull, and therefore our ••re must generally extend it self to all pla∣ces of accesse: but that our defensive forces are not sufficient in a competent manner to guard all such places, according as the necessity of them shall require, that is the point in que∣stion.

To prove that our forces are sufficient, we must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take Kent for a president, as not altogether unacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceive not my self, is a shore of as large extension upon the maritime parts as any other within this kingdome. For the breadth thereof enlarging it self from the point of N•sse by Lyd, which is the uttermost skirt upon the coast of Sussex, unto Margate upon the coast of Essex, is by computation about twenty four miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixth part thereof is not subject to the landing of such an enemy as we speak of; partly in regard of the hugenesse of the cliffs, which do inclose a great part of that skirt, and partly in regard that much of that quantity which may be landed upon hath such eminent and difficult places near adjoyning, as an Army that should put it self there on shore, should find it self, being opposed but by a small force, so streightened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparant ruine of their whole forces.

Further, it cannot be denied but that general∣ly along the coast of Kent there are so many rocks, shelves, flats, and other impediments, that a Navie of great ships can have no commodity to anchour near the shore; and for the most part the coast lieth so open to the weather that the least gale of wind will put them from their An∣chour: Page  95 all which particularities duly considered, it will appear that this large sk••t of Kent will af∣ford a far lesser part fit for the landing of an Ar∣my, then was thought of at the first. And were it that so publick a treatise as this is would admit with good discretion such an exact relation as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would undertake to make it so evident, by the particular description both of the number, quantity, and quality of the places themselves, as no man of an indifferent judgement would ima∣gine our forces to be insufficient to afford every of them such a safe and sure guard, as shall •e thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is unfitting to give such particular satisfaction in this publick discourse, give me leave, submitting my self alwayes to better judgements, to give a generall taste of that means as would secure all places with a competent number of men.

Having shewed you before the circuit of the maritime parts of Ke•t, I would observe this or∣der: first, to make a triple division of all such forces as shall be appointed for this service; as for example, I will suppose the number to be twelve thousand, of which I would lodge three thousand about the point of Nesse, and three thousand about Margate, and six thousand a∣bout F•ulks•on, which I take to be as it were the centre; for my greatest care should be so to dis∣pose of them, as they might not only succour one another in the same shire, but as every shire Lordereth one upon another, so they should mu∣tually give help one unto another, as occasion should be •ffered: as if the enemy should attempt a landing about Nesse, not only the six thousand lodged as before should march to their succours, but such also of the Sussex forces as were near unto that part, and so likewise of the •est. By which you may see, how great a force would in few houres •e assembled for the renforcing of any of these out-skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one half of the whole forces are thus lodged in the centre of the Shire, which is nearer to all parts then any other place whatsoever. There would also in the quartering of them an especiall care •e had to the places of danger, as might be answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast by regi∣ments and companies, as the Country might af∣ford best opportunity to entertain them.

Now concerning the later part of this objecti∣on, which urgeth the uncertainty of time when the enemy shall make his approches, I hold it most requisite that our defensive forces should be drawn into a head, before the enemy should be discovered near our coast, ready to put himself on shore: for it were a grosse absurdity to imagine that companies could upon such a sudden be as∣sembled, without confusion; and make so long a ma•ch, with such expedition as the necessity of the occasion would require. Now, for that hus∣banding respect of her Majesties 〈◊〉, which •s urged to such extremity, as it would be unsup∣portable for this State to •e•r, as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualify that suppo∣sed immoderate expence; so I assure my self, that men of •ound judgement will deem it much out of season to dispute about unnecessary th•ift, when the whole kingdome is brought in question of being made subject to a stranger.

The enemy (peradventure) hath kept thirty thousand men in pay two months before, to make havock of our Country, and to •ring us into perpetuall thraldome; shall we 〈◊〉 it much to maintain sufficient forces upon 〈◊〉 Coast, to assure our selves that no such 〈◊〉 shall enter into our Country? The 〈◊〉 of this charge would be qualified by our good 〈◊〉, which would proportion our attendance with the necessity which is imposed upon us to be carefull in businesses of this nature. Let this suffice there∣fore to prove that our forces are sufficient to keep the Sea-coast, and that the uncertainty of time when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder us from performing that duty which the care and respect of our Prince and Countrey imposeth upon every good subject; which is the substance of the first reason which I set down in the beginning of this discourse.

Now concerning the second reason,* which urgeth the disadvantage of the place in regard of the fury of the Enemies artillery; true it is, that such places as yield the Enemy commodity of landing are for the most part plain and open, and afford naturally no covert at all. What then? shall a souldier take every place as he findeth it, and use no Art to qualify the disadvantages there∣of? Or shall a man forgo the benefit of a place of advantage, rather then he will relieve with in∣dustry the discommodity of some particular cir∣cumstance? I make no question but an ingeni∣ous Commander, being in seasonable time lodg∣ed with convenient forces upon any of those places, yea upon the beach it self, which is as un∣apt to make defensible as any place whatsoever, would use such industry as might give sufficient security to his forces, and over-weigh the Ene∣my with advantage of place; especially consi∣dering that this age hath afforded such plentifull examples of admirable inventions in that behalf. But this cannot be done, if our forces do not make head before the instant of the Enemies at∣tempt, that our Commanders may have some time to make ready store of Gabio•s, and hand-baskets, with such moveable matter as shall be thought fit for that service.

Page  96 Neither let this trouble any man; for I dare avouch it, that if our forces are not drawn into a head before the Enemy be discovered upon the Coast, although we never mean to oppose their landing, but attend them in some in-land place to give them battel, our Commanders will be far to seek of many important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let us have but a reasonable time to bethink our selves of these necessaries, and we will easily overcome all these difficulties, and use the benefit of the firm land to repell an Ene∣my, weakned with the Sea, tossed with the billow, troubled with his weapons, with many other hinderances and discouragements, which are presented unto him both from the Land and the Sea. He that saw the landing of our forces in the Island of Fiall in the year ninety seven, can somewhat judge of the difficulty of that matter: for what with the working of the Sea, the steep∣nesse of the Cliffs, and the troublesomnesse of their Armes, the souldiers were so incumbred, that had not the Enemy been more then a cow∣ard, he might well with two hundred men have kept us from entering any part of that Island.

Concerning the third Objection,* this briefly shall be sufficient, that we are not so much to re∣gard that our forces do equall them in number, as to see that they be sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the Enemies landing: for we know that in places of advan∣tage and difficult accesse, a small number is able to oppose a great; and we doubt not but, all cir∣cumstances duly considered, we shall proporti∣onably equall the Enemy both in number and quality of their forces: alwayes presupposed, that our State shall never be destitute of sufficient forces trained and exercised in a competent man∣ner, to defend their Country from forreign E∣nemies. For the neglect thereof were to draw on such as of themselves are but too forward to make a prey of us, and to make us unapt not only to oppose an Enemies landing, but to de∣fend our selves from being overrun, as other Nations living in security without due regard thereof have been.

And thus much concerning the answer to those three reasons, which seem to prove that an Enemy is not to be resisted at his landing. Now if we do but look a little into the discom∣modities which follow upon the landing of an Enemy, we shall easily discover the dangerous∣nesse of this opinion: as first, we give him leave to live upon the spoil of our Country; which cannot be prevented by any wasting, spoiling, or retiring of our provisions, in so plentifull a Country as this is, especially considering that we have no strong towns at all to repose our selves upon. Whereof we need no further testimony then is delivered unto us out of the seventh book of these Commentaries, in that war which Cae∣sar had with Vercingetor•x.

Secondly obedience, which at other time is willingly given to Princes, is greatly weakned at such times; whereby all necessary means to maintain a war is hardly drawn from the subject. Thirdly, opportunity is given to malecontents and ill-disposed persons either to make head themselves, or to fly to the Enemy. Fourthly, 'tis madnesse to adventure a kingdome upon one stroke, having it in our disposition to do other∣wise: with many other disadvantages which the opportunity of any such occasion would dis∣cover.