The commentaries of C. Julius Cæsar of his warres in Gallia, and the civil warres betwixt him and Pompey / translated into English with many excellent and judicious observations thereupon ; as also The art of our modern training, or, Tactick practise, by Clement Edmonds Esquire, ... ; where unto is adjoyned the eighth commentary of the warres in Gallia, with some short observations upon it ; together with the life of Cæsar, and an account of his medalls ; revised, corrected, and enlarged.

The second Commentary of the wars in GALLIA. (Book 2)

The Argument.

LIke as when a heavy body lieth upon the skirt of a larger con∣tinued quantity, although it cover but a small parcell of the whole surface, yet the other quarters are burthened and kept under with a proportionable measure of that weight; and through the union and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one To∣tality, feel the same suppression which hath really seised but upon their fellow part: In like manner the Belgae, inhabiting the furthest skirt of that triple Continent, seemed to repine at that heavy burthen which the Roman Empire had laid upon the Province, the Hedui, and other States of that kingdome. And least it might in time be further removed, and laid directly upon their shoulders, they thought it ex∣pedient whilst they felt it but by participation, to gather their severall forces into one head, and try whether they could free their neigh∣bour Nations from so grievous a yoak, or at the least keep it from coming any nearer unto themselves. And this is the Argument of this second book; which divideth it self into two parts: the first containing the wars between Caesar & all the States of Belgia united together; the second recording the battels which he made with some of the States thereof in particular, as time and occasion gave him means to effect it.

CHAP. I.

Caesar hasteth to his Army, marcheth towards the Confines of the Belgae, and taketh in the men of Rheims.

WHile Caesar was in his winter quar∣ters in the hither Gallia,* 1.1 there came every day fresh rumours to him (the same thing being also certified by let∣ters from Labienus) that all the Belgae, being a third part of Gallia, had leagued together a∣gainst the people of Rome, and had given mutu∣all hostages one to another. The grounds of their confederacy were these: First, they were afraid that Caesar having setled all the rest of Gallia

in quiet, would bring his armies upon them. Secondly, they were sollicited to do it by some of the Galles, such namely who, as they did not de∣sire the company of the Germans longer in Gal∣lia, so they were very much troubled to think that the Roman army should winter and settle themselves there; and such again as levity and inconstancy prompted to seek new governments; lastly such as saw that it was an easy matter for those men that were powerfull and had the command of monies to seise upon kingdomes in Gallia, which they could not so easily do in those parts where the Romans bare sway. Caesar be∣ing moved with letters and other intelligence to this purpose, levied two new legions in the hi∣ther Gallia, and as soon as Summer came on sent them by Q. Pedius his Legate into the fur∣ther Gallia: and as soon as there was forrage in the fields he himself came to the army. He had before given charge to the Senones and other of the Galles that bordered upon the Belg••e, to learn every day what they could of their doings, & to give him an account thereof. These presently informed him that of a certainty there was no∣thing in Belgia but mustering of souldiers, and ga∣thering their forces into one head. He thought it not therefore safe to make any further delay; but having made provision of corn, he drew out his Army from their wintering camps, and within fifteen dayes he came to the borders of the Bel∣gae. Assoon as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for, the men of Rhemes being the uttermost of the Belgae, next adjoyning to the Celtae, thought it best to enter∣tain a peaceable resolution, and sent Iccius and Antebrogius, two of the chief men of their State, unto Caesar, to submit themselves and all that they had to the mercy of the Roman Empire; affirming that they were innocent both of the counsell of the Belgae, and of their conspiracy a∣gainst the Romans. For proof whereof they were ready to give hostages, to receive them into their towns, and to furnish them with corn or what other thing they stood in need of. That the rest of the Belgae were all in Arms, and the Germans on the other side of the Rhene had promised to send them succour: yea their mad∣nesse was so great, that they themselves were not able to hold back the Suessones from that at∣tempt being their brethren and kinsmen in bloud, and using the same laws and customs as they did, having both one magistrate and one form of go∣vernment; but they would needs support the same quarrell which the rest of the Belgae had under∣taken.

OBSERVATION.

I Might here take occasion to speak somewhat of a particular revolt in a generall cause; and how a confederate State may in regard of their own safety forsake a common quarrell, or what∣soever the universall society hath enacted preju∣ciall to their common weal; but that I onely intend to discover warlike practices, leaving these questions of law and policy to men of great∣er judgement and better experience. Onely▪ I ob∣serve in the behalf of the Roman government, that such cities as yielded to the Empire, and be∣came tributary to their treasury (howsoever they were otherwise combined by confederacy) sel∣dome or never repented them of their fact, in re∣gard of the noble patronage which they found in that State, and of the due respect observed to∣wards them.

Chap. II.

The power of the Belgae, and their preparation for this warre.

CAesar inquiring of the Embassadours which came from Rhemes what the States were that had taken Armes,* 1.2 and what they were able to do in matter of Warre, found the Belgae to be descen∣ded from the Germans, who passing over the Rhene time out of mind, and finding it to be a fertile countrey, drove away the Galles and seated themselves in their possessions: and that these onely of all the Galles kept the Cimbti and Teu∣toni from entering into their countrey; and in that regard they challenged to themselves great authority, and vaunted much in their feats of Armes. Concerning their number they had these advertisements; Thea 1.3 Bollovaci exceeded all the Belgae in prowesse, authority, and num∣ber of men, being able to make 100000 fighting men, and out of that number had promised 60000 towards this undertaking, and in that regard they demanded the administration of the whole warre. Next to them lay theb 1.4 Suesso∣nes, who dwelt in a large and fruitfull country, and had lately Divitiacus for their king, being the most powerfull man in all Gallia, who had in possession a great part of these countreys, and also of Britain it self. Galba was their king now, on whom, for his singular justice and pru∣dence, generally with one consent they bestowed the management of the war. They had 12 wal∣led towns, and promised to set forth 50000 men. Thec 1.5 Nervii, who were the most barbarous a∣mongst them all, and dwelt furthest off, promi∣sed

as many; thed 1.6 Atrebatii 15000. thee 1.7 Ambian•• 10000. the Vellocassii andf 1.8 Vero∣mandui as many; theg 1.9 Morini 25000. the Menapii 9000. the Caletes 10000. the Adua∣tici 29000. theh 1.10 Eburones, Condrusi, and o∣thers 40000.* 1.11 Caesar encouraging the men of Rhemes to persist in their faithfulnesse to the Roman Empire, propounded unto them great offers and liberall promises of recompence, and commanded all their Senate to come before him, and bring with them their Noble-mens Sons to be given up for hostages: which they dili∣gently performed by a day appointed. And ha∣ving received two especiall advertisements from the men of Rhemes, the one concerning the mul∣titude of the enemy; and the other touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their manhood: he provided for the first by per∣swading Divitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those businesses, to keep asunder the power of the enemy; and to withhold their forces from making a head, that so he might avoid the danger of encountering so great a power at one instant. Which might easi∣ly be brought to passe, if the Hedui would enter with a strong power into the Marches of the Bellovaci, and sack their Territories with sword and confusion. Which Divitiacus promised to perform, and to that purpose he speedily return∣ed into his country. Ʋpon the second advertise∣ment, which presented unto him the great va∣lour and manhood of his enemies, he resolved not to be too hasty in giving them battell, but first to prove by skirmishing with his horsemen what his enemies by their prowesse could do, and what his own men durst do.

OBSERVATION.

THis rule of making tryall of the worth of an enemy, hath alwayes been observed by pru∣dent and grave commanders, as the surest princi∣ple whereon the true judgement of the event may be grounded. For if the doctrine of the old Phi∣losophers, which teacheth that the word non pu∣tabam, I wist it not, was never heard out of a wise mans mouth, hath any place in the course of humane actions; it ought especially to be re∣garded in managing these main points, whereon the State of Kingdoms and Empires dependeth. For, unlesse was be perswaded that blind Chance directeth the course of this world with an uncer∣tain confusion, and that no foresight can sway the ballance of our hap into either part of our for∣tune, I see no reason why we should not by all means endeavour to ground our knowledge up∣on true causes, and levell our proceedings to that certainty which riseth from the things them∣selves. And this is the rather to be urged, inas∣much as our leaders are oftentimes deceived when they look no further then to match an enemy with equality of number, referring their valour to be tried in the battell; not considering that the eye of it self cannot discern the difference between two champions of like presence and outward car∣riage, unlesse it see their strength compared toge∣ther and weighed as it were in the scale of triall: which Caesar omitted not diligently to observe, before he would adventure the hazard of battell. For, besides his own satisfaction, it gave great encouragement to his men, when they saw them∣selves able to countermatch an enemy, and knew their task to be subject to their strength. Neither did he observe it only at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for we find that he never incountered any enemy, but with sufficient power, either in number or in va∣lour, to make head against them: which equality of strength being first laid as a sure foundation, he used his own industry and skill, and the discipline wherein his men were trained, as ad∣vantages to oversway his adversarie; and so drew victory maugre fortune unto himself, and seldome failed in any of his battels.

Chap. III.

Caesar passeth his Army over the river* 1.12 Axona, leaving Titerius Sabinus encamped on the other side with six cohorts.

AS soon as Caesar understood as well by his discovers,* 1.13 as from the men of Rhemes, that all the power of the Belgae was assembled together in∣to one place, and was now making towards him no great distance off; he made all the haste he could to passe his Army over the River Axona, which divided the men of Rhemes from the o∣ther Belgae, and there encamped. Whereby he brought to passe that no enemy could come on the back of him to work any disadvantage; and that corn might be brought unto him from Rhemes and other cities without danger. And further, that he might command the passage back again, as occasion should serve▪ to his best advantage, he fortified a bridge which he found on the river with a strong garrison of men, and caused Titurius Sabinus a Legate to encamp himself on the other side of the river with six cohorts, commanding him to fortify his camp with a rampier of 12 foot in altitude, and a trench of 18 foot in breadth.

OBSERVATION.

IF it be demanded, why Caesar did passe his Ar∣my over the river, leaving it on his back, and

did not rather attend the enemy on the other side, and so take the advantage of hindring him, if he should attempt to passe over; I will set down the reasons in the sequele of this warre, as the oc∣currences shall fall out to make them more e∣vident. In the mean time let us enter into the particularitie of these six cohorts, that we may the better judge of such troups which were em∣ployed in the services of this war. But that we may the better conjecture what number of soul∣diers these six cohorts did contain, it seemeth ex∣pedient a little to discourse of the companies and regiments which the Romans used in their Ar∣mies.

And first we are to understand, that the great∣est and chiefest regiment in a Roman Armie was termed by the name of Legio;* 1.14 as Varro saith, quod leguntur milites in delectu;* 1.15 or as Plutarch speaketh,* 1.16 quod lecti ex omnibus essent militares; so that it taketh the name Legio, of the choice and selecting of the souldiers. Romulus is said to be the first authour and founder of these legi∣ons, making every legion to contain 3000 soul∣diers: but shortly after they were augmented, as Festus recordeth, unto 4000; and afterward again from 4000, to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion untill Hanni∣bal came into Italy,* 1.17 and then it was augmented to 5000: but that proportion continued only for that time. And again, when Scipio went in∣to Africk, the legions were increased to 6200 footmen, and 300 horse. And shortly after the Macedonian warre, the legions that conti∣nued in Macedonie to keep the Province from rebellion, consisted of 6000 footmen and 300 horse. Out of Caesar it cannot be gathered that a legion in his time did exceed the number of 5000 men, but oftentimes it was short of that number: for he himself saith that in this warre in Gallia his souldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we ex∣amine that place out of the 3. of the civile warre, where he saith that in Pompey his Army were 110 cohorts, which amounted to the number of 55000 men; and it being manifest as well by this number of cohorts, as by the testimony of divers authours, that Pompey his Army consi∣sted of 11 legions; if we divide 55000 into 11 parts, we shall find a legion to consist of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout being gene∣rally known to be the usuall rate of a legion, the Romans alwayes expressed the strength of their Army by the number of legions that were there∣in: as in this warre it is said that Caesar had eight legions; which by this account might arise to 40000 men, besides associates, and such as ne∣cessarily attended the Army. Further we are to understand that every legion had his peculiar name, by which it was known and distinguished from the rest: and that it took either from their order of muster, or enrollement; as that legion which was first enrolled, was called the first le∣gion, and that which was second in the choice, the second legion, and so consequently of the rest; and so we read in this history, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleventh and twelfth legion: or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of legiones Ger∣manicae, Pannonica, Britannicae, and such others: and sometime of their Generall, as Augusta, Claudia,* 1.18 Vitelliana legiones, and so forth: or to conclude, from some accident of quality, as Rapax, Victrix, Fulminifera, Plundring, Victorious, Lightning, and such like. And thus much of the name and number of a legion: which I must necessarily distinguish into divers kinds of souldiers, according to the first institu∣tion of the old Romans, and the continuall ob∣servation thereof unto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of these smaller parts whereof a Legion was compounded.

First therefore we are to understand that af∣ter the Consuls had made a generall choise and sworn the souldiers, the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of Velites.* 1.19 Their place in re∣gard of the other souldiers was both base and dishonourable: not only because they fought a∣far off, and were lightly armed; but also in re∣gard they were commonly exposed to the enemy, as our forlorn hopes are. Having chosen out a competent number for this kind, they proceeded to the choice of them which they called Hastati,* 1.20 a degree above the Velites both in age and wealth, & termed them by the name of Hastati, forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of Javelin, which the Romans called Hasta: but before Polybius his time they used Piles; notwithstanding their ancient name continued unto the later time of the Empire. The third choice which they made, was of the strongest & lustiest-bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called Principes:* 1.21 the rest that remain'd were na∣med Triarii,* 1.22 as Varro saith, Quod tertio ordine extremis sub sidio deponuntur: These were al∣wayes the eldest and best-experienced men, and were placed in the third division of the battell, as the last help and refuge in all extremitie.* 1.23 Poly∣bius saith that in his time the Velites, Hastati, and Principes did consist of 1200 men apiece, and the Triarii never exceeded the number of 600. although the generall number of a legion were augmented:* 1.24 whereof L••psius alledgeth these reasons; First, because these Triarii con∣sisted of the best of the souldiers, and so might countervail a greater number in good worth and valour. Secondly, they seldome came to buckle with the enemy, but when the controversy grew very doubtfull. Lastly, we may well conjecture that the voluntaries and extraordinary followers ranged themselves amongst these Triaries, and so made the third battell equall to either of the

former: but howsoever they never exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth that in Polybius his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.

In this division of their men, consisted the ground of that well-ordered discipline;* 1.25 for in that they distinguished them according to their yeares and ability, they reduced their whole strength into severall classes; and so disposed of these different parts, that in the generall com∣position of their whole body, every part might be fitted with place and office, acc••••ding as his worth was answerable to the same: and so they made not only a number of grosse, but a number distinct by parts and properties; that from eve∣ry accident which met with any part of the Ar∣my, the judgement might determine how much or how little it imported the whole body: besides the great use which they made of this distinction in their degrees of honour and preferment, a mat∣ter of no small consequence, in the excellency of their government.

The souldiers at their enrollement being thus divided according to their yeares and abi∣lity,* 1.26 they then reduced them into smaller com∣panies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they divided the Hastat••, Prin∣cipes, and Triarii, each of them into 10 com∣panies, making of those three sorts of souldiers 30 small regiments, which they called Mani∣puli:* 1.27 And again, they subdivided every maniple into two equal parts, and called them Ordines, which was the least company in a legion,* 1.28 and according to the rate set down by Polybius, con∣tained 60 souldiers. In every Ordo there was a Centurion or Captain, and a Lieutenant, whom they named Optio or Tergiductor. The maniples of the Triarii were much lesser then the maniples of either the Hastati or the Principes; forasmuch as their whole band consisted but of 600 men. The Velites were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other maniples; and therefore the Hastati, Principes and Triarii were called subsignani milites, to make a difference between them and the Velites, which were not divided into bands, and so consequently had no ensigne of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies: so that every Maniple had 40 Ve∣lites attending upon it. And now I come to the description of a Cohort, which the history here mentioneth.

The word Cohors in Latine doth signify that part of ground which is commonly inclosed be∣fore the gate of a house,* 1.29 which from the same word we call a court:* 1.30 and Varro giveth this rea∣son of the metaphor. As in a farm house, saith he, many out-buildings joyned together make one inclosure; so a cohort consisteth of seve∣rall maniples joyned together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for every le∣gion had ten cohorts, which must necessarily comprehend those thirty maniples: but these three maniples were not all of one and the same kind of souldiers, as three maniples of the Ha∣stati, three of the Principes, and three of the Tri∣arii, as Patricius in his Paralleli seemeth to affirm; for so there would have remained an odd maniple in every kind, that could not have been brought into any cohort: But a cohort con∣tained a maniple of the Hastati, a maniple of the Principes, and a maniple of the Triarii; and so all the thirty maniples were included into ten cohorts, and every cohort was as a little legion, forasmuch as it consisted of all those sorts of soul∣diers that were in a legion. So that making a le∣gion to contain five thousand men, a cohort had five hundred; and so these six cohorts which he encamped on the other side of the river under the command of Titurius Sabinus, contained three thousand souldiers: but if you make a legion to consist but of four thousand two hundred, which was the more usuall rate, there were two thou∣sand five hundred and twenty souldiers in these six cohorts.

By this therefore it may appear that a legion consisted of four sorts of souldiers, which were reduced into ten cohorts, and every cohort con∣tained three maniples, and every maniple two orders, and every order had his Centurion mar∣ching in the head of the troup, and every Centu∣rion had his Optionem, or Lieutenant, that stood in the tail of the troup.

When a legion stood ranged in battell ready to confront the enemy,* 1.31 the least body or squa∣dron that it contained was a maniple; wherein the two orders were joyned together, making joyntly ten in front, and twelve in file: and so every five files had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rereward, to direct them in all adventures. In the time of the Emperours, their battalions consisted of a cohort, and never ex∣ceeded that number how great soever the Army were.

Polybius distinguishing a maniple into two centuries or orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes,* 1.32 commanded the right order, which was that order which stood on the right hand, known by the name of Primus ordo; and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left order; and in the absence of either of them, he that was present of them two commanded the whole maniple. And so we find that the Centurion of the first place was called Prior Centuri••:* 1.33 in which sense Caesar is to be understood, where he saith that all the Centuri∣ons of the first cohort were slain, praeter princi∣pem priorem. From whence we gather two spe∣cialities: first, the priority between the Centuri∣ons of the same Maniple; for a cohort consisting of three Maniples, whereof the first Maniple were Triarii, the second Principes, and the third Ha∣stati,

and every Maniple containing two orders, and every order a Centurion, he saith that all the Centurions of this cohort were slain, saving the first or upper Centurion of the Principes. The second thing which I observe,* 1.34 is the title of the first cohort: for these ten cohorts whereof a Legion consisted, were distinguished by degrees of worthinesse; and that which was held the worthiest in the censure of the Electors, took the priority both of place and name, and was called the first cohort; the next, the second cohort; and so consequently unto the tenth and last.

Neither did the Legions want their degrees of preeminence, both in imbattelling and in en∣camping, according either to the seniority of their inrollment, or the favour of their Generall, or their own vertue: And so we read that in these wars in Gallia the tenth Legion had the first place in Caesars Army. And thus much concer∣ning the divisions and severall companies of a Legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.

Upon this description it shall not be amisse briefly to lay open the most apparent commodi∣ties depending upon this discipline;* 1.35 the excel∣lency whereof more plainly appeareth, being compared to that order which Nature hath obser∣ved in the frame of her worthiest creatures: for it is evident that such works of Nature come near∣est to perfect excellency, whose materiall sub∣stance is most particularly distinguished into parts, and hath every part indued with that pro∣perty which best agreeth to his peculiar service. For being thus furnished with diversity of instru∣ments, and these directed with fitting abilities, the creature must needs expresse many admirable effects, and discover the worth of an excellent nature: whereas those other bodies that are but slenderly laboured, and find lesse favour in Na∣tures forge, being as abortives, or barbarously composed, wanting the diversity both of parts and faculties, are no way capable of such excel∣lent uses, nor fit for such distinct services, as the former that are directed with so many properties, & inabled with the power of so wel-distinguisht faculties. Which better works of Nature the Ro∣mans imitated in the Architecture of their Army, dividing it into such necessary and serviceable parts as were best fitting all uses and imploi∣ments; as first Legions, and legions into co∣horts, and cohorts into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and these into files; wherein every man knew his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion: and thus the universall multitude was by order disposed into parts, untill it came unto a unity. For it cannot be denied but that these centuries were in themselves so sensibly distinguished, that every souldier carried in his mind the particular Map of his whole century: for in imbattelling, every century was disposed into five files, containing twelve in a file; whereof the leaders were al∣wayes certain, and never changed but by death or some other speciall occasion; and everie leader knew his follower, and every second knew the third man, and so consequently unto the last.

Upon these particularities it plainly appeareth how easy a matter it was to reduce their troups into any order of a march or a battell, to make the front the slank, or slank front, when they were broken and disrankt to rally them into any form, when every man knew both his own and his fellows station. If any companies were to be imploied upon sudden service, the generall I∣dea of the Army being so deeply imprinted in the mind of the commanders, would not suffer them to e••re in taking out such convenient troups, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safety of the Army, or nature of the action. At all occasions and opportunities these princi∣ples of advantage offered themselves as ready means to put in execution any design or strata∣gem whatsoever: the project was no sooner re∣solved of, but every man could readily point out the companies that were ••it to execute the inten∣tion. And which is more important in regard of the life and spirit of every such part, their soda∣lity was sweetned, or rather strengthened with the mutuall acquaintance and friendship one of another; the captain marching alwayes in the head of the troup, the ensign in the midst, and the lieutenant in the rereward, and every man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend: which bred a true and unfeigned courage, both in regard of themselves and of their followers. Besides these specialities, the places of title and dignity depending upon this order were no small means to cut off all matter of civile discord, and intestine dissension: for here every man knew his place in the File, and every File knew his place in the Century, and every Century in the Maniple, and every Maniple in the Cohort, and every Cohort in the Legion, and every Legion in the Army; and so every souldier had his place according to his vertue, and every place gave ho∣nour to the man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The want of this discipline hath dishonoured the martiall government of this age with blo••d∣shed and murthers; whereof T••ance is too true a witnesse, as well in regard of the French them∣selves, as of our English forces that have been sent thither to appeale their tumults: for through defect of this order, which allotteth to every man his due place, the controversy grew between Sir William Drurie and Sir John Burrowes, the issue whereof is too well known to the world: wherein as our Commanders in France have been negli∣gent, so I may not forget to give due commenda∣tion to the care which is had of this point amongst the English troups in the service of the States in the United Provinces, where they are very curi∣ous

in appointing every man his place in the File, and every File in the Troup, and find much bene∣fit thereby, besides the honour of reviving the Ro∣man discipline.

To conclude this point,* 1.36 I will only touch in a word the benefit which the Romans found in their small battalions, and the disadvantage which we have in making great squadrons. And first it cannot be denied but that such troups stand best appointed for disposition and array of bat∣tell, which standing strong to receive a shock, bring most men to ••ight with the enemy: for the principall things which are required in setting of a battell, are so to order the troups, that the depth in slank may serve conveniently to with∣stand the assault, taking up no more men then may well serve for that purpose, and giving means to the rest to fight with the enemy: and in these two points were both their defensive and offensive considerations comprehended. But smaller troups and battalions afford this conve∣niency better then great squadrons, which drown up many able men in the depth of their ••lanks, and never suffer them to appear, but when the breaking of the squadron doth present them to the butchery of the enemy. The Mace∣donian Phalanx, as I have noted in the first book, never carried above sixteen in slank, and brought five hundred to fight in front. And these little battalions (considering them as they stood in battell ray) made as great a front or greater then that of the Phalanx, keeping a depth answe∣rable to the same; besides the second and third battell, which alwayes were to succour them, which the Phalanx wanted: neither would their thick and close imbattelling admit any such suc∣cour behind them. Now if we compare the ad∣vantages and discommodities which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great odds between them. These great squa∣drons are not feasible but in plain and open pla∣ces, where they may either stand immoveable, or make easy and slow motions without shaking or disordering their body: but the lesser are a scant∣ling for all places, champain or wooddy, levell or uneven, or of what site or quality soever. And to conclude, if two or three ranks of these great battalions chance to be broken and disordered, the whole body is as much interessed in the disor∣der as the said ranks are, and hath lesse means to rally it self then any other lesser company: but if any violence chance to rout a Maniple, it proceedeth no further in the Army then that part which it taketh: Neithe can the disranking of any one part betray the safety of the Army to disorder and confusion, forasmuch as their di∣stinction served to cut off such inconveniences, and yet no way hindered the generall uniting of their strength into one body. More may be said concerning this matter; but I only point at it, and leave the due consideration thereof to the judgement of our Commanders, and return to our history.

CHAP. IV.

The Belgae attempt the surprize of* 1.37 Bibrax: Caesar sendeth succour unto it.

THere was a town called Bibrax, be∣longing to the state of Rhemes, about eight miles from Caesars camp, which the Belgae thought to have surprised as they came along to meet with Caesar; and suddenly assaulted it with such fury, that the townsmen could hardly hold out the first day. The Celtae and Belgae use one and the same man∣ner in assaulting a town: For having beset the whole compasse of the wall with rankes of soul∣diers, they never cease flinging of stones untill they find the wall naked of defendants; and then casting themselves into a Testudo, they approach to the gate and undermine the walls. Which thing was easily effected here; for so great was the number of them that threw stones and darts, that it was impossible for the defendants to abide upon the walls. Assoone as the night had made an end of the assault, Iccius of Rhemes, a man of great birth and authority in his countrey, who at that time was governour of the town, and had been before with Caesar, to treat and conclude a Peace, sent him word by messengers, that if there came not present succour, he was not able to hold out any longer. The same night about midnight (using the same messengers for guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretian Archers, & Sling∣ers of the Iles of Baleares to relieve the town; by meanes whereof the townsmen were put in good hope to make their party strong, and the enemy made hopelesse of winning the town: and there∣fore after a small stay, having depopulated their fields, and burned their villages and out-build∣ings, they marched with all their power towards Caesars Camp, and within lesse then two miles of the Army they incamped their whole host; which, as was gathered by the smoke and fire, took up more ground then eight miles in breadth.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the description of their assault, we are to ob∣serve two circumstances. The first is, the man∣ner they used in a sudden surprise: The second is,* 1.38 the form and quality of a Testudo. Although Caesar seemeth to attribute this manner of assault∣ing a town as peculiar to the Galles, yet we may not think but that the Romans used it as often as they had occasion to surprise any city: but be∣cause

the Galles knew no other means to take a town but this, therefore he setteth it down as pe∣culiar unto them. The Romans called this man∣ner of assault Corona; and so we read often∣times this phrase, Cingere urbem corona, foras∣much as the souldiers inclosed the town with a circle, and so resembled a crown or garland. Ammianus speaketh of a triple crown of souldi∣ers which encompassed a town: And Josephus telleth of Jotapata, which the Romans besieged duplici peditum corona, with a double circle of footmen: and besides these, there was a third circle of horsemen outmost of all. There is no fur∣ther matter to be observed but this, that in surpri∣sing a town, they incircled it round about with thick continued ranks of men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entred as they could.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Testudo requireth a larger discourse, and is lively described in Livie after this manner.* 1.39 In the Amphitheatre,* 1.40 where the people did of∣ten assemble to see strange sights and publick shews, were brought in (saith he) sixty lusty young men, who after some motion and seemly march, cast themselves into a square troup, and roofing their heads close with their targets, the first rank which made the front of the Testudo, stood up right on their feet; the second rank bowed it self somewhat lower; the third and fourth ranks did more incline themselves, and so consequently unto the last rank, which knee∣led on the ground: and so they made a body re∣sembling halfe the side of an house, which they called Testudo. Unto this squadron so strongly combined together came two souldiers running some an hundred and fifty foot off, and threat∣ning each other with their weapons, ran nimbly up the side of the roof; and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemy that would have entred upon it, sometimes again encountering each other in the midst of it, leaped up and down as steadily as if they had been up∣on firm ground. And which is more strange, the front of a Testudo being applyed to the side of a wall, there ascended many armed men upon the said Testudo, and fought in an equall height with other souldiers that stood upon the said wall to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the souldiers that were in front, and in the sides of the square, carried not their Tar∣gets over their heads as the other did, but covered their bodies with them; and so no weapons ei∣ther cast from the wall, or otherwise thrown a∣gainst it, could any way hurt them; and what∣soever weight fell upon the Testudo, it quickly glyded down by the declivity of the roof, without any hurt or annoiance at all.

Thus far Livie goeth; neither do I know what to say further of it: the chiefest use there∣of was in a surprise or sudden attempt against a town, before the townsmen were throughly pre∣pared to defend the same. This invention served them to approach the wall with safety, and so ei∣ther to undermine it, or to climb up: and to that end they oftentimes erected one Testudo upon a∣nother. Tacitus saith that the souldiers climbed upon the wall super iteratam testudinem, by one Testudo made upon another. And this was the ancient form and use of a Testudo in a sudden assault or surprise.

Dio Cassius in the acts of Antony saith,* 1.41 that being galled with the Parthian Archers, he com∣manded his whole Army to put it self into a Te∣studo: which was so strange a sight to the Par∣thians, that they thought the Romans had sunk down for wearinesse and faintnesse; and so forsaking their horses, drew their swords to have made execution: and then the Romans, at a watch-word given, rose again with such a fury, that they put them all to sword and ••light. Dio describeth the same Testudo after this manner: They placed, saith he, their baggage, their light-armed men and their horsemen in the midst; and those heavy-armed footmen that carried long gutter-tiled Targets, were in the utmost cir∣cles next unto the Enemy: the rest (which bare large ovall Targets) were thronged together throughout the whole troup, and so covered with their Targets both themselves and their fellowes, that there was nothing discerned by the Enemy but a roof of Targets, which were so tiled toge∣ther, that men might safely go upon them.

Further, we oftentimes read that the Romans cast themselves into a Testudo, to break through an Enemy, or to rout and disrank a troup. And this use the Romans had of a Testudo in field ser∣vices, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a Testudo in regard of the strength, for that it covered and sheltred as a shell covereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a Te∣studo.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THirdly,* 1.42 we may observe how carefully Caesar provided for the safety of such succours as he sent unto Bibrax: for he commanded the same messengers that came from the town to direct them, as the best and surest guides in that jour∣ney; least peradventure through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconveniences or dangers. A matter of no small consequence in managing a war; but deserveth an extraordina∣ry importunity to perswade the necessity of this diligence: for a Generall that hath perfectly discovered the nature of the country through which he is to march, and knoweth the true di∣stances of places, the quality of the wayes, the compendiousnesse of turnings, the nature of the

hills, and the course of the rivers, hath all these particularities as main advantages, to give means of so many severall attempts upon an enemy. And in this point Hannibal had a singular dex∣terity, and excelled all the Commanders of his time, in making use of the way by which he was to passe. But he that leadeth an Army by an unknown and undiscovered way, and mar∣cheth blindfold upon uncertain adventures, is subject to as many casualties and disadvantages as the other hath opportunities of good fortune. Let every man therefore perswade himself that good Discoverers are as the eyes of an Army, and serve for lights in the darknesse of igno∣rance, to direct the resolutions of good pro∣vidence, and make the path of safety so mani∣fest, that we need not stumble upon casualties. Caesar in his journey to Ariovistus, used the help of Divitiacus the Heduan, in whom a∣mongst all the Galles he reposed greatest confi∣dence, to discover the way, and acquaint him with the passages: and before he would under∣take his voyage unto* 1.43 Britanie, he well in∣formed himself by Merchants and travailers of the quantity of the Iland, the quality of the peo∣ple, their use of war, and the opportunity of their havens. Neither was he satisfied with their rela∣tions, but he sent Caius Volusenus in a ship of war, to see what he could further discover con∣cerning these points. Suetonius addeth more∣over, that he never carried his Army per insidiosa itinera, through places where they were subject to be way-laid, unlesse he had first well discover∣ed the places.

Concerning the order which skilfull Leaders have observed in discoveries,* 1.44 we are to know that this point consisteth of two parts; the one, in understanding the perfect description of the country; the second, in observing the moti∣ons of the enemy. Touching the first, we find as well by this as other histories, that the Ro∣mans used the inhabitants of the country for Guides, as best acquainted with their native places, that they might not erre in so important a matter; provided alwaies that their own scouts were ever abroad to understand what they could of themselves, that they might not alto∣gether rely upon a strangers direction. The mo∣tions of the Enemy were observed by the horse∣men: and these for the most part were Veterani, well experienced in the matter of warre, and so the Generall received sound advertisements: and yet they were not too forward upon any new motion, unlesse they found it confirmed by divers wayes; for some Espials may erre, either through passion or affection, as it happened in the Hel••••tian war. If therefore the use and be∣nefit which prudent and wise Commanders made of this ••••igence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought upon the igno∣rant, have any authority to perswade a circum∣spect care herein, this little that hath been spoken may be sufficient for this point.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

THe souldiers which Caesar sent to relieve Bi∣brax were Archers of Creta and Numi∣dia,* 1.45 and Slingers of the Iles Baleares, which are now called Majorica and Minorica: which kind of weapon because it seemeth ridiculous to the souldiers of these times, whose conceits are held up with the fury of these fiery engines, I will therefore in brief discover the nature and use thereof.

The Latines (saith Isidore) called this wea∣pon funda, quod ex ea fundantur lapides, be∣cause out of it stones are cast. Plinie attri••uteth the invention thereof to the Islander•• called Ba∣leares. Florus in his 3 book and •• chap. saith that these Baleares used three sorts of slings, and no other weapon besides; and that a boy had never any meat given him before he had first struck it with a sling. Strabo distinguisheth these three sorts of slings which the Baleares used, and saith that they had one sling with long reines, which they used when they would cast afarre off; and another with short reines, which they used near at hand; and the third with reines of a mean sise, to cast a reasonable distance. Lipsius saith that in Columna Antonina at Rome he observed that the Balearean was made with one sling about his head, another about his belly, and the third in his hand; which might be their ordinary manner of carrying them. The mat∣ter whereof they were made was threefold: the first was hemp or cotton, the second hair, and the third sinews; for of either of these stuffs they commonly made them. The form and fashion of a sling resembled a platted rope, somewhat broad in the middest, with an Ovall compasse, and so by little and little decreasing into two thongs or reines. Their manner of slinging was to whirle it twice or thrice about their head, and so to cast out the bullet. Virgil speaking of Mezentius saith,

Ipse ter adducta circum caput egit habera. He fetcht the rein three times about his head,

But Vegetius preferreth that skill which cast the bullet with once turning it about the head. In Suidas we find that these Baleares did com∣monly cast a stone of a pound weight: which agreeth to these names in Caesar, fundas libra∣les. The leaden bullets are mentioned by Salust, in the warre with Jugurth, and by Livie, where he saith that the Consul provided great store of arrows, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in re∣quest amongst divers nations, as well in regard of the readinesse and easy reiterating of the blow, as also for that the bullet fled very farre, with great violence. The distance which they could

easily reach with their sling, is expressed in this verse,

Fundū Varro vocat,* 1.46 quem possis mittere funda. Fundum according to Varro is so much ground as a man may sling over. Which Vege∣tius interpreteth to be six hundred foot. Their violence was such, as the same authour affirmeth in his first book and sixteenth chap. that neither helmet, gaberdine, nor co••selet could bear out the blow; but he that was hit with a sling, was slain sine invidia sanguinis, as he saith in the same place. Lucrece, Ovid, and Lucan, three of the Latine Poets say, that a bullet skilfully cast out of a sling went with such violence, that it melted as it flew:* 1.47 whereof Seneca giveth this reason, Motion, saith he, doth extenuate the ayre, and that extenuation or subtilty doth inflame; and so a bullet ca•••• out of a sling melteth as it flieth. But howsoever▪ Diodorus Siculus affirmeth that these Balearean slingers brake both target, head-piece, or any other armour whatsoever.

There are also two other sorts of slings, the one mentioned by Livie, and the other by Vegetius. That in Livie is called Cestrophendo, which cast a short arrow with a long thick head: the other in Vegetius is called Fustibalus, which was a sling made of a cord and a staffe. But let this suf∣fice for slings and slingers, which were reckoned amongst their light-armed souldiers, and used chiefly in assaulting, and defending towns and fortresses, where the heavy-armed souldiers could not come to buckle; and present the place of our Harquebusiers, which in their proper nature are levis armatur•• milites light-armed souldiers, although more terrible then those of ancient times.

Chap. V.

Caesar confronteth the Belgae in form of battell, but without any blow given: the Belgae attempt the passing of the river Axona; but in vain, and to their losse: they consult of breaking up the war.

CAesar at the first resolved not to give them battel,* 1.48 as well in regard of their multitude, as the generall fame and opinion conceived of their valour: notwithstanding he daily made triall by light skirmishes with his horsemen, what the enemy could do, and what his own men durst do. And when he found that his own men were nothing in∣feriour to the Belgae, he chose a convenient place before his camp, and put his Army in battell: the bank where he was encamped rising somewhat from a plain levell, was no larger then would suffice the front of the battell; the two sides were steep, and the front rose aslope by little and little, untill it came again to a plain, where the legions were imbattelled. And least the enemy abounding in multitude, should circumvent his men and charge them in the flank as they were fighting, (which they might easily do with their number) he drew an overthwart ditch behind his Army from one side of the hill to the other, six hundred paces in length; the ends whereof he fortified with bulwarks, and placed therein store of engines. And leaving in his Camp the two legions which he had last enrolled in Lom∣bardy, that they might be ready to be drawn forth when there should need any succour, he im∣battelled his other six legions in the front of the hill, before his Camp. The Belgae also bringing forth their power, confronted the Romans in or∣der of battell. I here lay between both the Ar∣mies a small Marish: over which the enemy expected that Caesar should have passed, and Cae∣sar on the other side attended to see if the Belgae would come over, that his men might have char∣ged them in that troublesome passage. In the mean time the Cavalry on both sides incountered between the two battells: and after long expe∣ctation on either side, neither party adventuring to passe over, Caesar having got the better in the skirmish between the horsemen, thought it suffi∣cient for that time, both for the encouraging of his own men, and the contesting of so great an Army, and therefore he conveighed all his men again into their Camp. From that place the enemy immediately took his way to the River Axona, which lay behind the Romans Camp: and there finding foords, they attempted to passe over part of their forces, to the end they might either take the fortresse which Q. Titurius kept, or break down the bridge, or spoile the territo∣ries of the state of Rhemes, and cut off the Ro∣mans from provision of corne. Caesar having advertisement thereof from Titurius, transpor∣ted over the river by the bridge all his horsemen, and light-armed Numidians, with his Slingers and Archers, and marched with them himself. The conflict was hot in that place: the Romans charging their enemies as they were troubled in the water, slew a great number of them; the rest like desperate persons, adventuring to passe over upon the dead carkases of their fellowes, were beaten back by force of weapons: and the horse∣men incompassed such as had first got over the water, and slew every man of them.

When the Belgae perceived themselves fru∣strated of their hopes of winning Bibrax, of pas∣sing the River, and of drawing the Romans in∣to places of disadvantage, and that their own pro∣visions began to fail them; they called a coun∣cell of war, wherein they resolved that it was

best for the State in generall, and for every man in particular, to break up their Camp, and to return home unto their own houses: and into whose confines or territories soever the Romans should first enter, to depopulate and wast them in hostile manner, that thither they should hasten from all parts, and there give them battell; to the end they might rather try the matter in their own country, then abroad in a strange and un∣known place, and have their own houshold pro∣vision alwayes at hand to maintain them. And this the rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that Divitiacus with a great power of the Hedui approached near to the borders of the Bellovaci; who in that regard made hast homeward to defend their coun∣try.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FIrst we may observe the Art which he used to countervail the strength of so great a multi∣tude, by chusing out so convenient a place, which was no broader in front then would suffice the front of his battel: and having both the sides of the hill so steep, that the enemy could not ascend nor climb up, but to their own overthrow; he made the back-part of the hill strong by Art, and so placed his souldiers as it were in the gate of a fortresse, where they might either issue out or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred security and safety before the vain opinion of fool-hardy resolution, which savoureth of Barbarisme rather then of true wise∣dome: for he ever thought it great gain to loose nothing; and the day brought alwayes good fortune, that delivered up the Army safe unto the evening; attending untill advantage had laid sure principles of victory: and yet Caesar was never thought a coward.

And now it appeareth what use he made by passing his Army over the river, and attending the enemy on the further side, rather then on the side of the state of Rhemes: for by that means he brought to passe, that whatsoever the enemy should attempt in any part or quarter of the land, his forces were ready to trouble their pro∣ceedings; as it happened in their attempt of Bi∣brax: and yet notwithstanding he lost not the opportunity of making slaughter of them as they passed over the river. For by the benefit of the bridge which he had fortified, he transported what forces he would, to make head against them as they passed over; and so he took what advantage either side of the river could afford him.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

ANd here the Reader may not marvell, if when the hils are in labour, they bring forth but a mouse; for how soon is the courage of this huge Army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruted of their valour? but being ha∣stily carried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dispersed upon the sight of an e∣nemy: which is no strange effect of a sudden humour. For as in Nature all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durability or lasting qualitie of all actions proceedeth from a slow and temperate progression; so the resoluti∣ons of the mind that are carried with an untempe∣rate violence, and savour so much of heat and passion, do vanish away even with the smoak thereof, and bring forth nothing but leasurable repentance. And therefore it were no ill counsell for men of such natures, to qualify their hasty re∣solutions with a mistrustfull lingering; that when their judgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedy execution.

But that which most bewrayeth their indiscreet intemperance in the hot pursuit of this enterprise is, that before they had scarce seen the enemy, or had opportunity to contest him in open field, their victuals began to fail them: for their minds were so carried away with the conceit of war, that they had no leisure to provide such necessa∣ries as are the strength and sinew of the war. It was sufficient for every particular man to be known for a souldier in so honourable an acti∣on, referring other matters to the care of the State. The States in like manner thought it e∣nough to furnish out fourty or fifty thousand men apiece, to discharge their oath, and to save their hostages, committing other requisites to the generall care of the confederacy: which being directed by as unskilfull governours, never looked further then the present multitude, which seemed sufficient to overthrow the Roman Em∣pire. And thus each man relied upon anothers care, and satisfied himself with the present garbe. So many men of all sorts and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such strife and emula∣tion what state should seem in greatest forward∣nesse, were motives sufficient to induce every man to go, without further inquiry how they should go. And herein the care of a Generall ought especially to be seen, considering the weak∣nesse of particular judgements, that having the lives of so many men depending altogether upon his providence, and engaged in the defence of their state and country, he do not fail in these main points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike designes. To conclude this point, let us learn by their errour so to carry a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handling it, then it was before we first took it to our charge; as it here happened to the Belgae. For their tumultuous armes sorted to no other end, then to give Caesar just occasion to make war upon them, with such

assurance of victory, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that he should not in all likelihood meet with the like strength again, in the continuance of that war. And this was not only gravius bellum succes∣sori tradere, to leave a more considerable war unto his successour, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued war; but to draw a dangerous war upon their heads that otherwise might have lived in peace.

Chap. VI.

The Belgae break up their Camp, and as they return home, are chased and slaughtered by the Romans.

THis generall resolution being enter∣tained by the consent of the whole coun∣cell of warre,* 1.49 in the second watch they departed out of their camp with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or government, every man pressing to be formost on his journey, and to be first at home: in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away. Whereof Caesar having notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practise, not as yet perceiving the reason of their departure, he kept his Army within his Camp. In the dawning of the day, upon certain intelligence of their depar∣ture, he sent first his horsemen under Q. Pe∣dius and L. Aurunculcius Cotta two Legates, to stay the rereward, commanding Labienus to follow after with three legions: these overtaking the Belgae, and chasing them many miles, slew a great number of them. And while the rereward sta••ed, and valiantly received the charge of the Romans, the vantguard being out of danger, and under no government, assoon as they head the alarm behind them, brake out of their ranks and betook themselves to flight: and so the Ro∣mans slew them as long as the sun gave them light to pursue them; and then sounding a re∣treat, they returned to their Camp.

OBSERVATION.

IT hath been an old rule amongst souldiers, That a great and negligent errour committed by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to treachery. We read of Fulvius a Legate in the Roman Armie lying in Tusc••nie; The Consul being gone to Rome to perform some publick duty, the Tuscans took occasion by his absence to try whether they could draw the Romans into any inconvenience; and placing an ambuscado near unto their camp, sent certain souldiers atti∣red like shepherds, with droves of cattell to passe in view of the Roman Army: who handled the matter so, that they came even to the rampier of the camp. Whereat the Legate wondering as at a thing void of reason, kept himself quiet untill he had discovered their treachery, and so made frustrate their intent. In like manner Caesar not perswaded that men should be so heedlesse, to carry a retreat in that disorderly and tumultuous manner, would not discamp his men to take the opportunity of that advantage, untill he had found that to be true, which in all reason was unlikely. And thus 308000 Belgae were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the Romans, for want of government and order in their depar∣ture.

Chap. VII.

Caesar followeth after the Belgae into the Countrey of the Suessones; and there besiegeth* 1.50 Noviodunum.

THe next day after their departure, before they could recover themselves of their fear and flight, or had time to put themselves again in breath, Caesar, as it were continuing still the chase and victory, led his Army into the countrey of the* 1.51 Suessones, the next borderers unto the men of Rhemes: and after a long journey came unto Noviodunum a town of good importance, which he attempted to take by surprise, as he passed a∣long by it. For he understood that it was alto∣gether unfurnished of defensive provision, having no forces within to defend it: but in regard of the breadth of the ditch and height of the wall, he was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore having fortified his camp, he be∣gan to make preparation for a siege. The night following the whole multitude of the Suessones, that had escaped by flight, were received into the town: howbeit when the Vineae were with great expedition brought unto the wall, the mount raised, and the turrets built, the Galles being amazed at the highnesse of the workes, such as they had never seen nor heard of before, and the speed which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent ambassadours to Caesar, to treat of giving up the town; and by the mediation of the men of Rhemes obtained their suit.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN this relation we may observe the industrious art which the Romans used in assaulting, & ta∣king holdes & towns; wherein we find three sorts of engines described, Vinea, Agger, and Turres.

Vinea is thus described by Vegetius:* 1.52 A little strong-built house or hovell,* 1.53 made of light wood, that it might be removed with greatest ease; the roof was supported with divers pillars of a foot square, whereof the foremost were eight foot high, and the hindmost six, and between every one of these pillars there was five foot distance. It was alwayes made with a double roof, the first or lower roof was of thick planks, and the up∣per

[illustration]

CAESARS march where in euery Legion had his Cariadges in front

roof of hurdles, to break the force of a weight without further shaking or disjoyning the build∣ing: the sides were likewise walled with hurdles, the better to defend the souldiers that were under it: the whole length was about sixteen foot, and the breadth seven, the upper roof was commonly covered with green or raw hides, to keep it from burning. Many of these hovels were joyned toge∣ther in rank, when they went about to undermine a wall: the higher end was put next unto the wall, that all the weights which were thrown upon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the engine: the four sides and groundsils had in every corner a wheel, and by them they were driven to any place as occasion served. The chiefest use of them was to cover and defend the souldiers, as they undermined or overthrew a wall. This engine was called Vinea, which sig∣nifieth a Vine, for it sheltered such as were under the roof thereof, as a Vine covereth the place where it groweth.

Agger,* 1.54 which we call a mount, is described in divers histories to be a hill or elevation made of earth and other substance, which by little and little was raised forward, untill it approached near unto the place against which it was built; that upon this mount they might erect fortresses and turrets, and so fight with an advantage of height. The matter of this mount was earth and stones, faggots and timber. Josephus saith that at the siege of Jerusalem the Romans cut down all the trees within 11 mile compasse, for matter and stuff to make a mount. The sides of this Ag∣ger were of Timber, to keep in the loose matter: the forepart which was towards the place of ser∣vice, was open without any timber-work; for on that part they still raised it, and brought it nearer the walls. That which was built at Mas∣silia was 80 foot high, and that at Avaricum 80 foot high and 30 foot broad. Josephus and Egesippus write that there was a fortresse in Ju∣dea 300 cubites high: which Sulla purposing to win by assault, raised a mount 200 cubites high; and upon it he built a castle of stone 50 cubites high, and fifty cubites broad; and upon the said castle he erected a turret of 60 cubites in height, and so took the fortresse. The Romans often∣times raised these mounts in the mouth of a haven, and commonly to over-top a town, that so they might fight with much advantage.

Amongst other engines in use amongst the Romans,* 1.55 their moveable Turrets were very fa∣mous: for they were built in some safe place out of danger, and with wheels put under them were driven to the walls of the town. These tur∣rets were of two sorts, either great or little: the lesser sort are described by Vitruvius to be sixtie cubites high, and the square side seventeen cubites; the breadth at the top was a fifth part of the breath at the base, and so they stood sure without any danger of falling. The corner pillars were at the base nine inches square, and six inches at the top: there were commonly 10 stories in these little turrets, and windowes in every story. The greater sort of towers were 120 cubites high, and the square side was 24 cubites, the breadth at the top was a fifth part of the base; and in every one of these were com∣monly 200 stories. There was not one and the same distance kept between the stories; for the lowest commonly was 7 cubites and 12 inches high, the highest story 5 cubites, and the rest 4 cubites and a third. In every one of these stories were souldiers and engines, ladders and casting bridges, by which they got upon the wall and en∣tered the town. The forepart of these turrets was covered with iron and wet coverings, to save them from fire. The souldiers that removed the tower to and fro, were alwayes within the square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new water-work by Broken-wharfe in London much resembleth one of these towers.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

UPon the building of these mighty engines, it was no marvell if the Suessones submitted themselves to such powerfull industry. For what∣soever is strange and unusuall, doth much af∣fright the spirits of an enemy, & breed a motion of distrust & diffidency, when as they find themselves ignorant of such warlike practises: for novelty alwayes breedeth wonder; in as much as the true reasons and causes being unknown, we appre∣hend it as diverse from the usuall course of things, and so stand gazing at the strangenesse thereof: and wonder, as it addeth worth to the noveltie, so it inferreth diffidencie, and so consequently fear, the utter enemy of martiall valour.

Chap. VIII.

Caesar carrieth his Army to the Territories of the Bellovaci, Ambiani and the Nervii.

CAesar taking for pledges the chiefest of their Citie,* 1.56 and amongst the rest king Galba's own two sons, upon the delivery of all their Armes received the Suessones to mercy: and from thence led his Army against the Bellovaci;* 1.57 who having con∣veyed both themselves and their goods into the town called Bratuspantium, and understanding that Caesar was come within five mile of the place, all the elder sort came forth to meet him, signifying by the stretching forth of their hands, and by their suppliant words, that they yielded themselves up to Caesars disposall, and would no longer bear armes against the people of Rome. And so again when he was come near the town, and had there set down his army, the very boyes and women appearing upon the walls with extended hands (as their custome is) be∣sought

sought peace of the Romans. For these Divi∣tiacus became a mediatour, who after the Belgae had broken up their Camp, had dismissed his He∣duan forces and was returned to Caesar. The Hedui, saith he, have alwayes found in the Bel∣lovaci a faithfull and friendly disposition to their State: and if they had not been betrayed by their nobility (who made them believe that the Hedui were brought in bondage by the Ro∣mans, and suffered all villany and despight at their hands) they had never withdrawn them∣selves from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the Romans. The authours of this coun∣sel perceiving into what great misery they had brought their countrey, were fled into Britanie: wherefore not only the Bellovaci, but the Hedui also in their behalf besought him to use his cle∣mency towards them. Which thing if he did, it would very much greaten the esteem & authority of the Hedui amongst the Belgae, who formerly in their wars had recourse to them for supplies and assistance. Caesar, in regard of the Hedui and Di∣vitacus, promised to receive them to mercy; but for asmuch as the State was very great, and more populous and powerfull then other towns of the Belgae, he demanded six hundred hostages. Which being delivered and their armour brought out of the town, he marched from thence into the coast of the Ambiani:* 1.58 who without further lingering, gave both themselves and all that they had into his power. Ʋpon these bordered the Nervii;* 1.59 of whom Caesar found thus much by inquiry, That there was no recourse of Mer∣chants unto them, neither did they suffer any ••••ine, or what thing else might tend to riot, to be brought into their countrey: for they were perswaded that by such things their courage was much abated, and their vertue weakened. Fur∣ther, he learned that these Nervii were a savage people, and of great valour; often accusing the rest of the Belgae for yielding their necks to the Roman yoak, openly affirming that they would neither send Embassadours, nor take peace upon any condition.

Caesar having marched three dayes journey in their country, understood that the river* 1.60 Sa∣bis was not past ten miles from his camp; and that on the further side of this river all the Nervii were assembled together, and there at∣tended the coming of the Romans. With them were joyned the At••ebates and Veroman∣dui, whom they had perswaded to abide the same fortune of war with them. Besides they ex∣pected a power from the Aduatici. The women and such as were unmeet for the field, they be∣stowed in a place unaccessible for any Army, by reason of fens and bogs and marishes. Ʋpon this intelligence, Caesar sent his discoverers and Cen∣turions before to chuse out a fit place to in∣camp in.

Now whereas many of the surrendred Belgae and other Galles were continually in the Ro∣man Army, certain of these (as it was after∣ward known by the captives) observing the or∣der which the Romans used in marching, came by night to the Nervii, and told them that be∣tween every legion went a great sort of carria∣ges; and that it was no matter of difficulty, as soon as the first legion was come into the camp, and the other legions yet a great way off, to set upon them upon a suddain before they were dis∣burdened of their carriages, and so to overthrow them: which legion being cut off and their stuffe taken, the rest would have small courage to stand against them. It much furthered this ad∣vice, that forasmuch as the Nervii were not able to make any power of horse, but what they did they were wont to do with foot, that they might the better resist the cavalry of their borderers, whensoever they made any rode into their mar∣ches, their manner was to cut young trees half asunder, and bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughes in breadth, and with thorns and briars planted between them they made them so thick, that it was impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or passe through them: so that when by this occasion the passage of the Roman Army must needs be hindered, the Nervii thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected.

The place which the Romans chose to incamp in was a hill of like levell from the top to the bottome, at the foot whereof ran the river Sa∣bis: and with the like levell on the other side rose another hill directly against this, to the quantity of two hundred paces; the bottom whereof was plain and open, and the upper part so thick with wood, that it could not easily be looked into. Within these woods the ••ervians kept themselves close: and in the open ground, by the river side, were only seen a few troups of horse, and the river in that place was about three foot deep.

Caesar sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power. But the manner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Nervii: for inasmuch as the ene∣my was at hand, Caesar (as his custome was)

[illustration]

CAESARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand▪

led six legions alwayes in a readinesse, without burthen or carriage of any thing but their Armes: after them he placed the baggage of the whole Army. And the two legions which were last inrolled, were a rereward to the Ar∣my, and guarded the stuffe.

OBSERVATION.

THis treacherous practice of the surrendred Belgae hath fortunately discovered the manner of Caesars march,* 1.61 as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no small consequence in martiall discipline, being subject to so many inconveniences, and capable of the greatest art that may be shewed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet carri∣age of a march, by this circumstance it may be ga∣thered that Caesar principally respected safety, and secondly conveniency.* 1.62 If the place afforded a secure passage, and gave no suspicion of hosti∣lity, he was content in regard of conveniency, to suffer every legion to have the oversight of their particular carriages,* 1.63 and to insert them a∣mong the troups,* 1.64 that every man might have at hand such necessaries as were requisite, ei∣ther for their private use or publick discipline. But if he were in danger of any sudden attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an ene∣my, he then omitted convenient disposition in re∣gard of particular use, as disadvantageous to their safety; and carried his legions in that rea∣dinesse, that if they chanced to be engaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march or incumbrance of their carriages, receive the charge in that form of battell as was best ap∣proved by their military rules, and the ancient practice of their fortunate progenitours.

The old Romans observed likewise the same respects: for in unsafe and suspected places they carried their troups againe quadrato,* 1.65 in a square march, which, as Livie seemeth to note, was free from all carriage and impediments which might hinder them in any suddain alarme. Nei∣ther doth that of* 1.66 Hirtius any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith that Caesar so disposed his troups against the Bellovaci, that three legions marched in front, and after them came all the carriages, to which the tenth legion served as a rereward; and so they marched pene agmine quadrato almost in a square march.* 1.67 Seneca in like manner noteth the safety of agmen quadratum, where he saith that where an enemy is expected, we ought to march agmine quadrato ready to fight. The most materiall consequence of these places al∣ledged is, that as oft as they suspected any onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing differed from their usuall manner of imbattel∣ling; and therefore it was called agmen quadra∣tum or a square march, inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts as were observed in qua∣drata Acie, in a square body. For that triple forme of imbatteling which the Romans gene∣rally observed in their fights, having respect to the distances between each battel, contained al∣most an equall dimension of front and file: and so it made Aciem quadratam a square body; and when it marched, Agmen quadratum a square march.

Polybius expresseth the same in effect,* 1.68 as often as the place required circumspection; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the carriages: for he saith that in time of danger, especially where the country was plain and champain, and gave space and free scope to clear themselves, upon any ac∣cident the Romans marched in a triple battel of equall distance one behind another, every bat∣tell having his severall carriages in front. And if they were by chance attacked by an ene∣my, they turned themselves according to the op∣portunity of the place either to the right of left hand; and so placing their carriages on the one side of their Army, they stood imbattelled ready to receive the charge.

The contrary form of marching, where the place afforded more security, and gave scope to conveniency,* 1.69 they named agmen longum a long march or train; when almost every maniple or order had their severall carriages attending upon them, and strove to keep that way which they found most easy both for themselves and their impediments. Which order of march as it was more commodious then the former in regard of particularity, so was it unsafe and dangerous where the enemy was expected:* 1.70 and therefore Caesar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta for marching, when they were deluded by Ambi∣orix, longissimo agmine in a very long train; as though they had received their advertisements from a friend, and not from an enemy.

And albeit our modern wars are farre diffe∣rent in quality from them of ancient times,* 1.71 yet in this point of discipline they cannot have a more perfect direction then that which the Ro∣mans observed, as the two poles of their motions, Safety and Conveniencie: whereof the first de∣pendeth chiefly upon the provident disposition of the leaders; and the other will easily follow on, as the commodity of every particular shall give occasion.

Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can be taken then that manner of imbattelling, which shall be thought most con∣venient if an enemy were present to confront them? for a well-ordered march must either car∣ry the perfect forme of a battel, or contain the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receive that perfe∣ction of strength which the fittest disposition can afford it. First therefore a prudent and circum∣spect Leader, that desireth to frame a strong and

orderly march, is diligently to observe the na∣ture and use of each weapon in his Army, how they may be placed for greatest use and advan∣tage, both in respect of their different and con∣curring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this know∣ledge will consequently inferre the best and exa∣ctest disposition of imbattelling, as the said for∣ces are capable of; which, if it may be observed in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactnesse of imbattelling will not admit conve∣nient carriage of such necessary adjuncts as per∣tain to an Army, the inconvenience is to be re∣lieved with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary judgement shall be found expedient; that albeit the form be somewhat changed, yet the principles and ground, wherein their strength and safety consisteth, may still be retained.

Neither can any man well descend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exempli∣fy the practices of many great and experienced commanders, what sort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rereward, in what part of the Army the Munition marched, and where the rest of the carriage was bestowed, according as their severall judgements thought most expedient in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that ob∣served this rule before prescribed, did seldome miscarry through an unsafe march. Let a good Martia list well know their proper use in that di∣versity of weapons in his Army, how they are ser∣viceable or disadvantageous, in this or that place, against such or such an Enemy; and he will speedily order his battel, dispose of his march, and bestow his carriages, as shall best fall out both for his safety and conveniency.

Caesars custome was to send his Cavalry and light-armed footmen before the body of his Ar∣my, both to discover and impeach an Enemy; for these troups were nimble in motion and fit for such services: but if the danger were greater in the rereward then in the front, the horsemen marched in the tayl of the Army, and gave secu∣rity where there was most cause of fear. But if it happened that they were found unfit to make good the service in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in Africa against the Numi∣dians; he then removed them as he best found it convenient, and brought his legionary souldiers, which were the sinews and strength of his forces, and marched continually in the bulk of the Ar∣my, to make good that which his horsemen could not perform. And thus he altered the antique prescription and uniformity of custome, accor∣ding as he found himself best able to disadvan∣tage an Enemy, or make way to victory.

Chap. IX.

The Romans begin to fortify their camp: but are interrupted by the Nervii. Caesar maketh hast to prepare his forces to battell.

THe Roman horsemen,* 1.72 with the sling∣ers and archers, passed over the ri∣ver, and encountred the Cavalry of the Enemy: who at first retired back to their companies in the wood, and from thence sallied out again upon them; but the Romans durst not pursue them further then the plain and open ground. In the mean time the six legions that were in front, having their work measured out unto them, began to fortify their camp. But as soon as the Ne••vii perceived their former carriages to be come in sight, which was the time appointed amongst them to give the charge, as they stood imbattelled within the thicket, so they rushed out with all their forces, and assaulted the Roman horsemen: which being easily beat∣en back, the Nervii ran down to the river with such an incredible swiftnesse, that they seemed at the same instant of time to be in the woods, at the river, and charging the legions on the other side: For with the same violence having passed the river, they ran up the hill to the Roman camp, where the souldiers were busied in their intrenchment. Caesar had all parts to play at one instant: the flag to be hung out, by which they gave the souldiers warning to take Arms, the battel to be proclaimed by sound of trum∣pet, the souldiers to be recalled from their work, and such as were gone farre off to get turf and matter for the rampier, to be sent for, the battel to be ordered his men to be incouraged, and the sign of battel to be given: the most of which were cut off by shortnesse of time, and the sud∣den assault of the Enemy.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

AS the Romans excelled all other nations in many good customes,* 1.73 so especially in their camp-discipline they strove to be singular: for it seemed rather an Academy, or a City of civile government, then a camp of souldiers; so care∣full were they both for the safety, and skilfull ex∣perience of their men at Arms. For touching the first, they never suffered their souldiers to lodge one night without a camp, wherein they were in∣closed with ditch and rampier, as in a walled town: neither was it any new invention or late found out custome in their State, but in use a∣mongst the ancient Romans, and in the time of their kings. Their manner of encamping was in∣cluded within these circumstances.

The Centuri••••s that went before to chuse out a convenient place,* 1.74 having found a fit situa∣tion

[illustration]

Porta Praetoria THE ROMAINE CAMPE Porta Dceumana

for their camp, first assigned the standing for the Emperours pavilion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the camp; from whence he might easily overview all the other parts, or any alarme or signum pugnae might from thence be discovered to all quarters.* 1.75 This pavilion was known by the name of Praetorium, for as much as amongst the ancient Romans the Generall of their Army was called Praetor. In this place where the Praetorium was to be erected, they stuck up a white ensign, and from it they measured every way a hundred foot, and so they made a square containing two hundred foot in every side; the Area or content whereof was almost an acre of ground: the from of the Prae∣torium was round and high, being as emient among the other tents, as a Temple is amongst the private buildings of a City; and therefore Josephus compareth it to a Church. In this Prae∣torium was their Tribunal or chair of the estate, and the place of divination, which they called Augurale, with other appendices of majesty and authority.

The Generals tent being thus placed,* 1.76 they con∣sidered which side of the pavilion lay most com∣modious for forrage and water, and on that side they lodged the legions, every legion divided one from another by a street or lane of fifty foot in breadth; and according to the degree of honour that every legion had in the Army, so were they lodged in the camp, either in the midst which was counted most honourable, or towards the side which was of meaner reputation. And a∣gain, according to the place of every cohort in his legion, so was it lodged nearer the pavilion of the Emperour, towards the heart of the camp; and so consequently every maniple took place in the cohort, distinguishing their preeminence by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outsideward, according as they distinguished the place of their legions. There went a street of fifty in breadth overthwart the midst of all the legions,* 1.77 which was called Quintana, for that it divided the fifth cohort of every legion from the sixth.

Between the tents of the first maniples in every legion and the Praetorium, there went a way of a hundred foot in breadth throughout the whole camp,* 1.78 which was called Principia; in this place the Tribunes sat to hear matters of justice, the souldiers exercised themselves at their weapons, and the leaders and chief commanders frequen∣ted it is as a publick place of meeting; and it was held for a reverent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decency. On either side the Emperours pavilion, in a direct line to make even and straight the upper side of the Principia, the Tribunes had their Tents pitched,* 1.79 every Tribune confronting the head of the legion whereof he was Tribune: above them, towards the head of the camp, were the Legates and Treasurer: the upper part of the camp was strengthened with some select cohorts and troups of horse, accor∣ding to the number of legions that were in the Army.

Polybius describing the manner of en∣camping which the Romans used in his time, when as they had commonly but two legions in their Army, with as many associates, placeth the Ablecti and Extraordinarii, which were select bands and companies, in the upper part of the camp, and the associates on the outside of the legions.

The ditch and the rampier that compassed the whole camp about,* 1.80 was two hundred foot di∣stant from any tent: whereof Polybius giveth these reasons; first, that the souldiers marching into the camp in battell array, might there dis∣solve themselves into maniples, centuries and decuries, without tumult or confusion; for or∣der was the thing which they principally respe∣cted, as the life and strength of their martiall bo∣dy. And again, if occasion were offered to sally out upon an Enemy, they might very convenient∣ly in that spacious room put themselves into com∣panies and troups: and if they were assaulted in the night, the darts and fire-works which the E∣nemy should cast into their camp, would little indamage them, by reason of the distance be∣tween the rampier and the tents.

Their tents were all of skins and hides, held up with props, and fastened with ropes: there were eleven souldiers, as Vegetius saith, in every tent,* 1.81 and that society was called Contubernium, of whom the chiefest was named Decanus, or Ca∣put Contubernii.

The ditch and the rampier were made by the legions,* 1.82 every maniple having his part measured out, and every Centurion overseeing his Centu∣ry; the approbation of the whole work belonged to the Tribunes. Their manner of intrenching was this: the souldiers being girt with their swords and daggers, digged the ditch about the camp, which was alwayes eight foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not far off, the ditch was alwayes eleven or fifteen or eighteen foot in latitude and altitude, according to the discretion of the Generall: but what scantling soever was kept, the ditch was made directis la∣teribus, that is, as broad in the bottom as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch was three foot in height, and sometimes four, made after the manner of a wall, with green turfes cut all to one measure, half a foot in thicknesse, a foot in breadth, and a foot and a halfe in length. But if the place wherein they were incamped would afford no such turfe, they then strengthen∣ed the loose earth which was cast out of the ditch with boughs and faggots, that it might be strong and well-fastened. The rampier they properly called Agger:* 1.83 the outside whereof, which hung

over the ditch, they used to stick with thick and sharp stakes, fastened deep in the mound, that they might be firm; and these for the most part were forked stakes; which made the rampier very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great dif∣ficulty. Varro saith that the front of the rampier thus stuck with stakes,* 1.84 was called vallum a va∣ricando, for that no man could stride or get o∣ver it.

The camp had four gates: the first was called praetoria Portae,* 1.85 which was alwayes behind the Emperours tent; and this gate did usually look either toward the east, or to the Enemy, or that way that the Army was to march. The gate on the otherside of the camp opposite to this, was cal∣led Portae Decumana,* 1.86 a decimis cohortibus; for the tenth or last Cohort of every legion was lodged to confront this gate: by this gate the souldiers went out to fetch their wood, their water, and their forrage, and this way their offendours were carried to execution. The other two gates were called Portae principales,* 1.87 forasmuch as they stood opposite to either end of that so much respected place which they called principia,* 1.88 only distingui∣shed by these titles, laeva principalis and dextra, the left and the right-hand principall gate. All these gates were shut with doors, and in standing Camps fortified with Turrets, upon which were planted Engines of defence, as Balistae, Cata∣pulta, Tolenones, and such like.

The Romans had their summer Camps, which they termed Aestiva, and their winter Camps, which they called Hiberna,* 1.89 or Hibernacula. Their summer camps were in like manner diffe∣renced, according to the time which they conti∣nued in them. For if they remained in a place but a night or two, they called them Castra or Mansiones; but if they continued in them any long time, they called them Aestivas or Sedes: And these were more absolute, as well in regard of their tents, as of their fortification, then the for∣mer wherein they stayed but one night. The o∣ther which they called Hiberna had great labour and cost bestowed upon them,* 1.90 that they might the better defend them from the winter season. Of these we read, that the tents were either thatched with straw, or roofed with boards, and that they had their armory, hospital, and other publick houses. These camps have been the beginning of many famous towns, especially when they con∣tinued long in a place, as oftentimes they did, upon the banks of Euphrates, Danow, and the Rhene. The order which they alwayes observed in laying out their Camp was so uniform, and well known to the Romans, that when the Cen∣turions had limited out every part, and marked it with different ensignes and colours, the Soul∣diers entred into it as into a known and familiar City; wherein every society or small contubernie knew the place of his lodging: and which is more, every particular man could assign the pro∣per station of every company throughout the whole Army.

The use and commodity of this incamping I briesly touched in my first book:* 1.91 but if I were worthy any way to commend the excellency thereof to our modern Souldiers, or able by per∣swasion to restablish the use of incamping in our wars, I would spare no pains to atchieve so great a good, and vaunt more in the conquest of negli∣gence, then if my self had compassed a new-found∣out means: and yet reason would deem it a matter of small difficulty, to gain a point of such worth in the opinion of our men, especially when my discourse shall present security to our forces, and honour to our leaders, majesty to our Ar∣mies, and terrour to our enemies, wonderment to strangers, and victory to our nation. But sloth hath such interest in this age, that it com∣mendeth vain-glory and fool-hardinesse, con∣tempt of vertue and derison of good discipline, to repugne the designes of honour, and so far to overmal••••reason, that it suffereth not former harms to bear witnesse against errour, nor cor∣rect the ill atchievements of ill directions: and therefore ceasing to urge this point any fur∣ther, I will leave it to the carefull respect of the wise.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe fury of the Enemy and their sudden as∣sault so disturbed the ceremonies which the Roman discipline observed,* 1.92 to make the Souldiers truely apprehend the weight and importance of that action, which might cast upon their state ei∣ther soveraignty or bondage, that they were all for the most partomitted: notwithstanding they are here noted under these title; the first was vexillum proponendum, quod erat insigne cum ad Arma concurri oporteret, the hanging out the flag, which was the sign for betaking themselves to their arms: for when the Generall had deter∣mined to fight, he caused a skarlet coat or red flag to be hung out upon the top of his tent, that by it the Souldiers might be warned to prepare themselves for the battel; and this was the first warning they had; which by a silent aspect pre∣sented bloud and execution to their eyes, as the only means to work out their own safety, and purchase eternall honour. The second was Sig∣num tuba dandum, the proclaiming the battel by sound of trumpet: this warning was a noise of many trumpets, which they termed by the name of classicuma calando, which signifieth calling; for after the eye was filled with species sutable to the matter intended, they then hasted to possesse the eare, and by the sense of hearing to stir vp warlike motions, and fill them with resolute thoughts, that no diffident or base conceits might take hold of their mindes. The third was milites cohortandi, the encouraging of the soul∣diers:

for it was thought convenient to confirm this valour with motives of reason, which is the strength and perfection of all such motions. The use and benefit whereof I somewhat inlarged in the Helvetian war, and could afford much more labour to demonstrate the commodity of this part, if my speech might carry credit in the opinion of our souldiers, or be thought worthy regard to men so much addicted to their own fashions. The last was signum dan∣dum, the sign giving; which, as some think, was nothing but a word, by which they might distin∣guish and know themselves from their enemies. Hirtius in the war of Africk saith, that Caesar gave the word Felicity; Brutus and Cassius gave Liberty; others have given Virtus, Deus nobis∣cum, Triumphus Imperatoris, and such like words, as might be ominous to a good successe.

Besides these particularities, the manner of their delivery gave a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times and cues; whereof Caesar now complaineth, that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for with∣out all controversy, there is no matter of such consequence in it self, but may be much graced with ceremonies and complements, which like officers or attendants add much respect and ma∣jesty to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth far meaner and of lesse regard.

CHAP. X.

The battel between Caesar and the Nervii.

IN these difficulties two things were a help to the Romans:* 1.93 the one was the knowledge and experience of the souldiers; for by reason of their pra∣ctice in former battels, they could as well pre∣scribe unto themselves what was to be done, as any other commander could teach them. The other was, that notwithstanding Caesar had gi∣ven commandment to every Legate, not to leave the work or forsake the legions untill the fortifi∣cations were perfected; yet when they saw extre∣mity of danger, they attended no countermand from Caesar, but ordered all things as it seemed best to their own discretion. Caesar having com∣manded such things as he thought necessary, ran hastily to incourage his souldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth legion; where he used no fur∣ther speech, then that they should remember their ancient valour, have couragious hearts, and va∣liantly withstand the brunt of their enemies.* 1.94 And forasmuch as the enemy was no further off, then a weapon might be cast to incounter them, he gave them the sign of battel: and hastening from thence to another quarter, he found them already closed and at the incounter. For the time was so short and the enemy so violent, that they wanted leisure to put on their head-pieces, or to uncase their targets: so that what part they lighted into from their work, or what ensign they first met withall, there they stayed; least in seeking out their own companies, they should lose that time as was to be spent in fighting. The Army being imbattelled rather according to the nature of the place, the declivity of the hill, and the brevity of time, then according to the rules of art; as the legions incountred the ene∣my in divers places at once, the perfect view of the battel being hindred by those thick hedges before spoken of, there could no succours be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needfull to be done: and therefore in so great un∣certainty of things, there happened divers ca∣sualties of fortune.

The souldiers of the ninth and tenth legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, casting their piles with the advantage of the hill, did drive the Atrebates, breathlesse with running and wounded in the incounter, down into the river; and as they passed over the water, slew many of them with their swords. Neither did they stick to follow after them over the river, and ad∣venture into a place of disadvantage, where the battel being renewed again by the Enemy, they put them to flight the second time. In like man∣ner two other legions, the eleventh and the eighth having put the Veromandui from the upper ground, fought with them upon the banks of the river; and so the front and the left part of the camp was well-near left naked. For in the right cornet were the twelfth and seventh legions, whereas all the Nervii, under the conduct of Bo∣duognatus, were heaped together; and some of them began to assault the legions on the open side, and other some to possesse themselves of the highest part of the camp.

At the same time the Roman horsemen, and the light-armed footmen that were intermingled amongst them, and were at first all put to flight by the Enemy, as they were entering into the camp, met with their enemies in the face, and so were driven to fly out another way. In like man∣ner the pages, and souldiers boyes, that from the Decumane port and top of the hill had seen the tenth legion follow their enemies in pursuit over the river, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the ene∣my in their camp, betook them to their heels as fast as they could. At the same time rose a great

hubbub and outcry of those that came along with the carriages, who being extremely troubled and dismayed at the businesse, ran some one way and some another. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the Treviri (who for their prow∣esse were reputed singular amongst the Galles, and were sent thither by their State to aid the Romans) first when they perceived the Roman camp to be possesst by a great multitude of the Enemy, the legions to be overcharged and al∣most inclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and Numidians to be dispersed and fled, that without any further expectation they took their way homeward, and reported to their State that the Romans were utterly overthrown, and that the Enemy had taken their carriages.

Caesar departing from the tenth legion to the right cornet, finding his men exceedingly over∣charged the ensignes crowded together into one place, and the souldiers of the twelfth legion so thick thronged on a heap, that they hindred one another; all the Centurions of the fourth cohort being slain, the ensign-bearer kill'd, and the en∣sign taken, and the Centurions of the other co∣horts either slain, or sore wounded; amongst whom Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, a valiant man, so grievously wound∣ed that he could scarce stand upon his feet; the rest not very forward, but many of the hindmost turning taile and forsaking the field; the Enemy 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the other side giving no respite in front, al∣though he fought against the hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a nar∣row issue, without any means or succour to relieve them: he took a target from one of the hindmost souldiers, (for he himself was come thither without one) and pressing to the front of the bat∣tel, called the Centurions by name, and incoura∣ging the rest, commanded the ensignes to be ad∣vanced toward the enemy, and the Maniples to be inlarged, that they might with greater faci∣lity and readinesse use their swords.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefest Centurion of the twelfth legion,* 1.95 being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarn that was of the first Cohort in that legion: for that place was the greatest dignity that could hap∣pen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of Centurio primipili, or simply Pri∣mipilus, and sometimes Primiopilus, or Primus Centurio. By him were commonly published the mandates and edicts of the Emperour and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centu∣rions at all times had an eye unto him; and the rather for that the eagle, which was the peculiar ensign of every legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this dignity without speciall commodity, as may be gathered out of divers Authours. We read far∣ther, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribuneship was expired, to be a Primi∣pile in a legion; notwithstanding there was a law made, I know not upon what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suffice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

ANd here I may not omit to give the Target any honour I may:* 1.96 and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Caesars hand, as in the place of greatest dignity, and much honouring the excellency thereof. Polybius maketh the Target to contain two foot and an half in breadth, over∣thwart the convex surface thereof, and the length four foot, of what form or fashion soever they were of: for the Romans had two sorts of Tar∣gets amongst their legionaries; the first car∣ried the proportion of that figure which the Geo∣metricians call Ovall, a figure of an unequall latitude, broadest in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and narrow at both the ends like unto an egge, described in plano: the other sort was of an equall latitude, and resembled the fashion of a gutter-tile, and thereupon was called Scutum imbricatum. The matter whereof a target was made was a double board, one fastened upon another with lint and Buls glew, and covered with an Oxe hide, or some other stiffe leather; the upper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of iron, to keep it from cleaving; and in the midst there was a bosse of iron or brasse, which they called Umbo. Romulus brought them in first among the Romans, taking the use of them from the Sabines. The wood whereof they were made was for the most part either sallow, alder, or fig-tree:* 1.97 whereof Plinie giveth this reason; for∣asmuch as these trees are cold and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made upon the wood, was presently contracted and shut up again. But forasmuch as the Target was of such reputation among the Roman Armes, and challenged such interest in the greatnesse of their Empire, let us enter a little into the conside∣ration of the use & commodity thereof; which can∣not be better understood then by that comparison which Polybius hath made between the weapons of the Romans and the Macodonians: and there∣fore I have thought good to insert it in these dis∣courses. And thus it followeth.

Of the difference of the Roman and Macedo∣nian Weapons.

I Promised in my sixth book that I would make a comparison between the weapons of the Ro∣mans and Macedonians: and that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their Armies, how they do differ one from another; and in what regard the one or the other were ei∣ther inferiour or superiour: which promise I will now with diligence endeavour to perform. And forasmuch as the Armies of the Macedonians have given so good testimonies of themselves by their actions, by overcoming the Armies as well of Asia as of Greece, and that the battels of the Romans have conquered as well those of Africa, as all the Eastern countries of Europe; it shall not be amisse, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times have not once, but many times seen triall both of their battels and forces: that know∣ing the reason why the Romans do overcome, and in their battel carry away the better, we do not as vain men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteem them without reason hap∣py victours; but rather looking into the true causes, we give them their due praises, according to the direction of reason and sound judgement. Concerning the battels between Hannibal and the Romans, and concerning the Romans losses, there is no need that I speak much. For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Armes, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexterity and industry of Hannibal. But we have intreated thereof when we made mention of the battels themselves; and the end it self of that warre doth especially confirm this our opinion: for when they had gotten a Captain equall with Hannibal, even consequently he with all his victories vanished. And he had no sooner overcome the Romans, but by and by re∣jecting his own weapons, he trayned his Army to their weapons: and so taking them up in the beginning, he continued them on unto the end.

And Pyrrhus in his war against the Romans did use both their weapons and order, & made as it were a medly both of the cohort and phalanx: but notwithstanding it served him not to get the victory, but alwayes the event by some means or other made the same doubtful: concerning whom it were not unfit that I should say something, least in being altogether silent, it might seem to preju∣dice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison.

Now touching the phalanx, if it have the dispo∣sition and forces proper to it, nothing is able to oppose it self against it, or to sustain the violence thereof; as may easily by many documents be approved. For when an armed man doth stand firm in the space of three foot in so thick an ar∣raie of battel, and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis or scantling sixteen foot, but according to the true and right conve∣niency of them fourteen cubites, out of which are taken four allowed for the space between the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butt end thereof, whiles he stands in a readinesse to at∣tend the encounter; being thus ordered, I say, it is manifest that the length of ten cubites doth extend it self before the body of every armed man, where with both his hands he doth advance it ready to charge the Enemy. By which meanes it followeth that some of the pikes do not only ex∣tend themselves before the second, third, and fourth rank, but some before the foremost, if the phalanx have his proper and due thicknesse, ac∣cording to his naturall disposition, both on the sides and behind: as Homer maketh mention when he saith, that one target doth enclose and fortify another; one head-piece is joyned to ano∣ther, that they may stand united & close together.

These circumstances being rightly and truly set down, it must follow that the pikes of every former rank in the phalanx do extend themselves two cubites before each other, which proportion of difference they have between themselves: by which may evidently be seen the assault and im∣pression of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of sixteen ranks in depth or thicknesse. The excesse of which num∣ber of ranks above five, forasmuch as they can∣not commodiously couch their pikes without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long enough to enlarge themselves beyond the foremost ranks, they grow utterly unprofita∣ble, and cannot man by man make any impres∣sion or assault: but serve only by laying their pikes upon the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustain and hold up the swayes and giving back of the former ranks which stand before them, to this end, that the front may stand firm and sure; and with the thicknesse of their pikes they do repell all those darts, which passing over the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those ranks which are more backward.

And farther, by moving forward with the force of their bodies, they do so presse upon the former, that they do make a most violent im∣pression. For it is impossible that the foremost ranks should give back.

This therefore being the generall and particu∣lar disposition of the phalanx, we must now speak on the contrary part touching the proper∣ties and differences, as well of the Armes, as of the whole disposition of the Roman battel. For every Roman souldier for himself and his wea∣pon, is allowed three foot to stand in, and in the incounter are moved man by man, every one co∣vering himself with his target, and mutually mo∣ving whensoever there is occasion offered. But those which use their swords, do fight in a more thin and distinct order; so that it is manifest that they have three foot more allowed them to

stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from back to belly, that they may use their wea∣pons with the better commodity. And hence it cometh to passe that one Roman souldier taketh up as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the Macedonian Phalanx: so that one Roman is as it were to oppose himself a∣gainst ten pikes, which pikes the said one souldier can neither by any agility come to offend, or else at handy blowes otherwise annoy: And those which are behind him are not only unable to re∣pell their force, but also with conveniency to use their own weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible that any battel be∣ing assaulted by the front of a phalanx, should be able to sustain the violence thereof, if it have his due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the Romans do o∣vercome, and that those that do use the phalanx are voyd of the hope of victory? Even from hence, that the Roman Armies have infinite com∣modities, both of places and of times to fight in. But the phalanx hath onely one time, one place, and one kind whereto it may profita∣bly apply it self: so that if it were of necessity that their enemy should encounter them at that instant, especially with their whole forces, it were questionlesse not only not without danger, but in all probability likely that the phalanx should ever carry away the better. But if that may be avoyded, which is easily done, shall not that disposition then be utterly unprofitable, and free from all terrour? And it is farther evi∣dent that the phalanx must necessarily have plain and champain places, without any hinde∣rances or impediments, as ditches, uneven places, vallies, little hils and rivers; for all these may hinder and disjoyn it. And it is almost impos∣sible to have a Plain of the capacity of twenty stadia, much lesse more, where there shall be found none of these impediments. But suppose there be found such places as are proper for the phalanx: if the Enemy refuse to come unto them, and in the mean time spoil and sack the Cities and country round about, what commodity or profit shall arise by any Army so ordered? for if it remain in such places, as hath been before spoken of, it can neither relieve their friends, nor preserve themselves. For the convoies which they expect from their friends are easily cut off by the Enemy, whiles they remain in those open places.

And if it happen at any time that they leave them upon any enterprise, they are then exposed to the Enemy. But suppose that the Roman Army should find the phalanx in such places, yet would it not adventure it self in grosse at one instant, but would by little and little retire it self; as doth plainly appear by their usuall pra∣ctice. For there must not be a conjectur of these things by my words only, but especially by that which they do. For they do not so equally frame their battel, that they do assault the Enemy altogether, making as it werebut one front: but part make a stand, and part charge the Ene∣my, that if at any time the Phalanx do presse them that come to assault them and be repel∣led, the force of their order is dissolved. For whether they pursue those that retire, or fly from those that do assault them, these do disjoyn themselves from part of their Army; by which meanes there is a gap opened to their Enemies, standing and attending their opportunity: so that now they need not any more to charge them in the front, where the force of the pha∣lanx consisteth, but to assault where the breach is made, both behind and upon the sides. But if at any time the Roman Army may keep his due propriety and disposition, the phalanx by the disadvantage of the place being not a∣ble to do the like, doth it not then mani∣festly demonstrate the difference to be great between the goodnesse of their disposition, and the disposition of the phalanx?

To this may be added the necessities impo∣sed upon an Army: which is, to march through places of all natures, to encamp themselves, to possesse places of advantage, to besiege, and to be besieged; and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in view of the Enemy. For all these occasions necessarily accompany an Ar∣my, and oftentimes are the especiall causes of vi∣ctory, to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit or convenient; forasmuch as neither in their generall order, nor in their particular dis∣position, without a convenient place, they are able to effect any thing of moment: but the Ro∣man Army is apt for all these purposes. For every souldier amongst them being once armed and ready to fight, refuseth no place, time nor occasion; keeping alwayes the same order, whe∣ther he fight together with the whole body of the Army, or particularly by himself man to man.

And hence it happeneth, that as the com∣modity of their disposition is advantageous, so the end doth answer the expectation.

These things I thought to speak of at large, because many of the Graecians are of an opinion that the Macedonians are not to be overcome. And again, many wondered how the Macedoni∣an phalanx should be put to the worse by the Roman Army, considering the nature of their weapons.

Thus far goeth Polybius in comparing the weapons and embattelling of the Romans, with the use of Arms amonst the Macedonians: wherein we see the Pike truly and exactly orde∣red, according as the wise Gracians could best proportion it with that form of battel, which might give most advantage to the use thereof: so that if our squadrons of Pikes jump not with the

perfect manner of a phalanx, (as we see they do not) they fall so much short of that strength, which the wisdome of the Grecians and the ex∣perience of other nations imputed unto it. But suppose we could allow it that disposition in the course of our warres, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of Polybius, the said manner of imbattelling is tied to such dangerous circum∣stances of one time, one place, and one kind of fight, I hold it not so profitable a weapon as the practice of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woody countries, such as Ireland is, where the use is cut off by such inconveniences as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtlesse, if our Commanders did but con∣sider of the incongruity of the Pike and Ire∣land, they would not proportion so great a num∣ber of them in every company as there is; for commonly half the company are Pikes, which is as much as to say in the practice of our wars, that half the Army hath neither offensive nor defensive weapons, but onely against a troup of horse. For they seldome or never come to the push of pike with the foot companies, where they may charge and offend the enemy: and for defence, if the enemy think it not safe to buckle with them at hand, but maketh more advan∣tage to play upon them afarre off with shot, it affordeth small safety to shake a long pike at them, and stand fair in the mean time to enter∣tain a volley of shot with the body of their battalion. As I make no question but the pike in some services is profitable, as behind a ram∣pier, or at a breach; so I assure my self there are weapons, if they were put to triall, that would countervail the pike, even in those services where∣in it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Target, we see it take the hand, in the judgement of Polybius, of all other weapons whatsoever, as well in regard of the di∣vers and sundry sorts of imbattelling, as the quality of the place wheresoever: for their use was as effectuall in small bodies and centuries, as in grosse troups and great companies; in thin and spacious imbattelling, as in thick-thronged Testudines.

Neither could the nature of the place make them unserviceable; for whether it were plain or covert, levell or unequall, narrow or large, if there were any commodity to fight, the target was as necessary to defend as the sword to offend: besides the conveniency which accom∣panieth the target in any necessity imposed upon an Army, whether it be to march through places of all natures, to make a fast march, or a speedy retreat, to incamp themselves, to possesse places of advantage, to besiege and to be besieged, as Polybius saith, with many other occasions which necessarily accompany an Army. The use of this weapon hath been too much neg∣lected in these later ages, but may be happi∣ly renewed again in our Nation, if the industry of such as have laboured to present it unto these times in the best fashion, shall find any favour in the opinion of our Commanders. Concer∣ning which target I must needs say thus much, that the light target will prove the target of ser∣vice, whensoever they shall happen to be put in execution: for those which are made proof are so heavie and unwieldy (although they be somewhat qualified with such helps as are an∣nexed to the use thereof) that they overcharge a man with an unsupportable burthen, and hin∣der his agility and execution in fight with a weight disproportionable to his strength. For our offensive weapons, as namely the Harque∣busiers and Musketiers, are stronger in the of∣fensive part, then any armes of defence, which may be made manageable and fit for service. Neither did the Romans regard the proof of their targets further then was thought fit for the rea∣dy use of them in time of battel, as it appeareth in many places both in the Civil wars, and in these Commentaries: for a Roman Pile hath oftentimes darted through the Target, and the body of the man that bare it, and fastened them both to the ground; which is more then a Mus∣ket can well do, for the bullet commonly resteth in the body. And although it may be said that this was not common, but rather the effect of an extraordinary arme; yet it serveth to prove that their targets were not proof to their offensive weapons, when they were well delivered, and with good direction. For I make no doubt but in their battels there were oftentimes some hin∣derances, which would not suffer so violent an effect as this which I speak off: for in a vol∣ley of shot we must not think that all the bullets fly with the same force, and fall with the like hurt; but as Armour of good proof will hardly hold out some of them, so slender Armes, and of no proof, will make good resistance against others. And to conclude, in a battell or incounter at hand, a man shall meet with more occasions suit∣ing the nature and commodity of this light Tar∣get, then such as will advantage the heavy Target of proof, or countervail the surplus of weight which it carrieth with it.

Some men will urge, that there is use of this Target of proof in some places and in some ser∣vices: which I deny not to those that desire to be secured from the extremity of peril. But this falleth out in some places, and in some particu∣lar services; and hindereth not but that the uni∣versall benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important occasions of a warre.

Thus much I am further to note concerning the sword of the Targetiers, that according to the practice of the ••mans, it must alwayes hang on the right side; for carrying the Tar∣get

upon the left arm, it cannot be that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trou∣ble and annoiance. And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side it must be very short, otherwise it will never be readily drawn out: I say, that the sword of the Targetiers, in regard of the use of that weapon, ought to be of a very short scantling, whenas the Targetier is to command the point of his sword within the compasse of his Target, as such as look into the true use of this weapon will easily discover. But let this suffice concerning the use of the Pike and the Target.

Chap. XI.

The battel continueth, and in the end Caesar overcometh.

AT the presence of their Generall the souldiers conceived some better hopes;* 1.98 and gathering strength and courage again, when as every man bestirred himself in the sight of the Empe∣rour, the brunt of the enemy was a little stayed. Caesar perceiving likewise the seventh legion, which stood next unto him, to be sore over-laid by the enemy, commanded the Tribunes by little and little to joyn the two legions together, and so by joyning back to back, to make two contrary fronts; and being thus secured one by another from fear of being circumvented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the mean time the two legions that were in the rere∣ward to guard the carriages, hearing of the bat∣tel, doubled their pace, and were descried by the enemy upon the top of the hill. Titus Labienus, having won the Camp of the Nervii, and behold∣ing from the higher ground what was done on the other side of the river, sent the tenth legion to help their fellowes: who understanding by the horsemen and Lackies that fled in what case the matter stood, and in what danger the Camp, the legions, and the Generall was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose coming there hap∣pened such an alteration and change of things, that even such as were sunk down through ex∣treme grief of their wounds, or leaned upon their Targets, began again to fight afresh; and the Pages and the boyes perceiving the enemy ama∣zed, ran upon them unarmed, not fearing their weapons.

The horsemen also striving with extraordi∣nary valour to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselves in all places be∣fore the legionary souldiers. Howbeit the Ene∣my in the utmost peril of their lives shewed such manhood, that at fast as the foremost of them were overthrown, the next in place bestrid their carcasses, and fought upon their bodies: and these being likewise overthrown, and their bo∣dies heaped one upon another, they that remain∣ed possest themselves of that Mount of dead car∣casses, as a place of advantage, and from thence threw their weapons, and intercepting the piles returned them again to the Romans.

By which it may be gathered that there was great reason to deem them men of haughtie cou∣rage, that durst passe over so broad a River, climbe up such high rocks, and adventure to fight in a place of such inequality; all which their magnanimity made easy to them. The battel being thus ended, and the Nation and name of the Nervii being well-near swallowed up with destruction the elder sort with the women and children, that before the battel were con∣veyed into Ilands and Bogs, when they heard thereof, and saw now that there was nothing to hinder the conquerour, nor any hope of safety to the conquered, by the consent of all that re∣mained alive sent Embassadours to Caesar, and yielded themselves to his mercy; and in laying open the misery of their State affirmed, that of six hundred Senatours they had now left but three, and of sixty thousand fighting men, there was scarce five hundred that were able to bear Armes. Caesar, that his clemencie might ap∣pear to a distressed people, preserved them with great care, granting unto them the free possession of their townes and countrey, and streightly com∣manding their borderers not to offer them any wrong or injury at all.

OBSERVATION.

ANd thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous battel,* 1.99 which Ramus complaineth of as a confused narration, much differing from the direct and methodicall file of his other Com∣mentaries. But if that rule hold good which learned Rhetoricians have observed in their O∣ratory, That an unperfect thing ought not to be told in a perfect manner; then by Ramus leave, if any such confusion do appear, it both savoureth of eloquence, and well suteth the turbulent car∣riage of the action, wherein order and skill gave place to Fortune, and providence was swallowed up with peradventure. For that which H••rtius saith of the overthrow he gave to Pharnaces, may as well be said of this, that he got the victo∣ry, plurimum adjuvante deorum benignitate, qui cum omnibus belli casibus intersunt, tum praecipue iis quibus nihil ratione potuit admini∣strari,

by the very great favour and assistance of the gods; who as they give aid in all cases of war, so especially in those where reason and good skill are at a losse. For so it fell out in this battel, and the danger proceeded from the same cause that brought him to that push in the battel with Pharnaces: for he well understood that the Nervii attended his coming on the other side the river Sabis: Neither was he ignorant how to fortifie his Camp in the face of an enemy without fear or danger, as we have seen in his warre with Ariovistus; when he marched to the place where he purposed to incamp himself with three battels, and caused two of them to stand ready in Armes to receive any charge which the enemy should offer to give, that the third battel in the mean time might fortify the Camp. Which course would easily have frustrated this stratagem of the Nervii, and made the hazard lesse dangerous: but he little expected any such resolution, so con∣trary to the rules of Militarie discipline, that an enemy should not stick to passe over so broad a river, to climbe up such steep and high Rocks, to adventure battel in a place so disadvanta∣geous, and to hazard their fortune upon such in∣equalities. And therefore he little mistrusted any such unlikely attempt, wherein the enemy had plotted his own overthrow, if the legions had been ready to receive them.

Which may teach a Generall that which Cae∣sar had not yet learned, that a Leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses, nor too carefull in his best advised directions; consider∣ing that the greatest means may easily be pre∣vented, and the safest course weakened with an unrespected circumstance: so powerfull are weak occurrences in the main course of the weightiest actions, and so infinite are the wayes whereby either wisdome or fortune may work. Neither did this warm him to provide for that which an enemy might do, how unlikely soever it might seem unto him; as appeareth by that accident in the battel with Pharnaces. Which practise of attempting a thing against reason and the art of warre, hath found good successe in our modern warres, as appeareth by the French histories: notwithstanding it is to be handled sparingly, as no way favouring of circumspect and good di∣rection, forasmuch as Temeritas non semper fe∣lix, Rashnesse does not alwayes speed well, as Fabius the great answered Scipio.

The chiefest helps which the Romans found, were first the advantage of the place; whereof I spake in the Helvetian warre. Secondly, the experience which the souldiers had got in the for∣mer battels, which much directed them in this tur∣bulent assault; wherein they carried themselves as men acquainted with such casualties. Lastly, the valour and undanted judgement of the Ge∣nerall, which overswaied the perill of the battel, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherein we may observe, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the battel rested upon his dire∣ctions, he wholly intented warinesse and cir∣cumspection: so in the hazard and perill of good hap, he confronted extremity of danger with ex∣tremity of valour, and over-topt fury with a higher resolution.

Chap. XII.

The Aduatici betake themselves to a strong hold, and are taken by Caesar.

THe* 1.100 Aduatici before-mentioned co∣ming with all their power to aid the Nervii,* 1.101 and understanding by the way of their overthrow, returned home again; and forsaking all the rest of their Towns and Castles, conveyed themselves and their wealth into one strong and well-fortified town, which was compassed about with mighty rocks and steep downfalls, saving in one place of two hundred foot in breadth, where there was an entry by a gentle and easy ascent: which pas∣sage they had fortified with a double wall of a large altitude, and had placed mighty great stones and sharp beames upon the walls, ready for an assault. This people descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni, who in their journey into Italy, left such carriages on this side of the Rhene, as they could not conveniently take along with them, and 6000 men to look to them: who, after the death of their fellowes, being many yeares disquieted by their neighbours, sometimes invading other States, and sometimes defending themselves, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselves in.

At the first coming of the Roman Army, they sallied out of the town, and made many light skirmishes with them: but after that Caesar had drawn a rampier about the town of twelve foot in height, fifteen miles in compasse, and had fortified it with Castles very thick about the town, they kept themselves within the wall. And as they beheld the Vines framed, the Mount rai∣sed, and a tower in building afarre off; at first they began to laugh at it, and with scoffing spee∣ches from the wall, began to aske with what hands, and with what strength, especially by men of that stature (for the Romans were but lit∣tle men in respect of the Galles) a tower of that huge massie weight should be brought unto the walles. But when they saw it removed, and ap∣proaching near unto the town (as men astonished at the strange and unaccustomed sight thereof) they sent Embassadours to Caesar to intreat a

peace, with this message; They believed that the Romans did not make war without the speciall assistance of the Gods, that could with such faci∣lity transport engines of that height, and bring them to incounter at hand, against the strongest part of their town: and therefore they sub∣mitted both themselves and all that they had to Caesars mercy, desiring one thing of him ear∣nestly, which was, that if his goodnesse and cle∣mency (which they had heard so high praises of) had determined to save their lives, he would not take away their Arms from them; forasmuch as all their neighbours were enemies unto them, and envied at their valour; neither were they able to defend themselves, if they should deliver up their Armour: so that they had rather suffer any inconvenience by the people of Rome, then to be butcherly murthered by them, whom in former time they had held subject to their command.

To this Caesar answered; that he would save the City rather of his own custome, then for any desert of theirs, so that they yielded before the Ram touched the wall; but no condition of re∣medy should be accepted without present delivery of their Armes: for he would do by them as he had done by the Nervii, and give commandment to their neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answer being returned to the City, they seemed contented to do whatso∣ever he commanded them: and thereupon casting a great part of their Armour over the wall into the ditch, insomuch as they fill'd it almost to the top of the rampier, and yet (as afterward was known) concealing the third part, they set open the gates, and for that day carried themselves peaceably. Towards night Caesar commanded the gates to be shut, and the souldiers to be drawn out of the town, least in the night the townsmen should be any way injured by them. But the Aduatici, having consulted together before (forasmuch as they believed that upon their sub∣mission the Romans would either set no watch at all, or at the least keep it very carelesly) partly with such Armour as they had retained, and partly with targets made of bark, or wrought of wicker, which upon the suddain they had cover∣ed over with Leather, about the third watch, where the ascent to our fortifications was easiest, they issued suddainly out of the town with all their power: but signification thereof being pre∣sently given by fires, as Caesar had commanded, the Romans hasted speedily to that place. The Enemy fought very desperately, as men in the last hope of their welfare, incountering the Ro∣mans in a place of disadvantage, all their hopes now lying upon their valour: at length, with the slaughter of four thousand, the rest were driven back into the town. The next day, when Caesar came to break open the gates, and found no man at defence, he sent in the souldiers, and sold all the people and spoil of the town: the number of per∣sons in the town amounted to fifty three thousand bondslaves.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the surprise attempted by the Belgae upon Bi∣bract, I set down the manner which both the Galles and the Romans used in their sudden sur∣prising of a town: whereof if they failed (the place importing any advantage in the course of war) they then prepared for the siege in that manner as Caesar hath described in this place. They invironed the town about with a ditch and a rampier,* 1.102 and fortified the said rampier with many Castles and Fortresses, erected in a conve∣nient distance one from another; and so they kept the town from any forreign succour or re∣liefe: and withall secured themselves from sal∣lies, or other stratagems which the townsmen might practice against them. And this manner of siege was called circumvallatio;* 1.103 the particu∣lar description whereof I referre unto the history of Alesia, where I will handle it according to the particulars there set down by Caesar.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Ram,* 1.104 which Caesar here mentioneth, was of greatest note amongst all the Roman En∣gines, and held that place which the Canon hath in our wars. Vitruvius doth attribute the inven∣tion thereof to the Carthaginians, who at the ta∣king of Cadiz,* 1.105 wanting a fit instrument to raze and overthrow a Castle, they took a long beam or timber-tree, and bearing it upon their armes and shoulders, with the one end thereof they first brake down the uppermost rank of stones; and so descending by degrees they overthrew the whole tower. The Romans had two sorts of Rams; the one was rude and plain, the other artificiall and compound:* 1.106 the first is that which the Carthaginians used at Cadiz, and is pour∣trayed in the column of Tra••an at Rome.

The compound Ram is thus described by Jo∣sephus;* 1.107 A Ram, saith he, is a mighty great beam, like unto the mast of a ship, and is strengthened at one end with a head of iron fashioned like unto a Ram, and thereof it took the name. This Ram is hanged by the midst with ropes unto a∣nother beam, which lieth crosse a couple of pil∣lars: and hanging thus equally balanced, it is by force of men thrust forwar and recoild back∣ward,

and so beateth upon the wall with his iron head: neither is there any tower so strong, or wall so broad, that is able to stand before it.

The length of this Ram was of a large scant∣ling; for Plutarch affirmeth that Antony in the Parthian war had a Ram fourescore foot long. And Vitruvius saith that the length of a Ram was usually one hundred and six, and sometimes one hundred and twenty; and this length gave great strength and force to the engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Century or order of souldiers; and their forces being spent, they were seconded with another Century; and so the Ram played continually upon the wall without intermission. Josephus saith that Titus, at the siege of Jerusalem, had a ram for every le∣gion. It was oftentimes covered with a Vine, that the men that managed it might be in more safety. It appeareth by this place, that if a town had continued out untill the ram had touched the wall, they could not presume of any accepta∣tion of rendry; forasmuch as by their obstinacy they had brought in perill the lives of their ene∣mies, and were subdued by force of Armes, which affordeth such mercy as the Victor pleaseth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe Aduatici, as it seemeth, were not igno∣rant of the small security which one State can give unto another, that commendeth their safety to be protected by it: for as Architas the Pytha∣gorean saith, A body, a Family, and an Army are then well governed, when they contain with∣in themselves the causes of their safety; so we must not look for any security in a State, when their safety dependeth upon a forreign protecti∣on. For the old saying is, that Neque murus, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propria arma non texere, Neither wals nor friends will save him, whom his own weapons do not defend. Although in this case the matter was well qualifi∣ed by the majesty of the Roman Empire, and the late victories in the continent of Gallia; whereof the Hedui with their associates were very gainful witnesses: but amongst kingdomes that are bet∣ter suted with equality of strength and authority, there is small hope of safety to be looked for, un∣lesse the happy government of both do mutually depend upon the safety of either Nation, For that which Polybius observed in Antigonus king of Macedonia, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; that Kings by nature esteem no man either as a friend or an enemy, but as the calculation of profit shall find them an∣swerable to their projects. And contrariwise it cutteth off many occasions of practices and at∣tempts, when it is known that a State is of it self able and ready to resist the designes of forreign enemies, according to that of Manlius; Osten∣dite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videant vos paratos ad vim, jus ipsi remittent, Do but shew them war, and you shall have peace: let them see you are provided to repell force, and they will do you nothing but right.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

THe manner of signifying any motion or at∣tempt by fire,* 1.108 was of great use in the night sea∣son, where the fortification was of so large an extension: for fire in the night doth appear far greater then indeed it is; forasmuch as that part of the aire which is next unto the fire, as it is illu∣minated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance cannot be discerned from the fire it self, and so it seemeth much greater then it is in sub∣stance. And contrariwise in the day time it sheweth lesse then it is; for the clear brightnesse of the air doth much obscure that light which pro∣ceedeth from a more grosse and materiall body: and therefore their custome was to use fire in the night, and smoak in the day, suting the trans∣parent middle with a contrary quality, that so it might more manifestly appear to the behol∣der.

THE FIFTH OBSERVATION.

ANd albeit after the victory, the Romans in∣flicted divers degrees of punishment, accor∣ding to the malice which they found in an enemy; yet as Flavius Lucanus saith in Livie,* 1.109 there was no Nation more exorable, nor readier to shew mercy then the Romans were.* 1.110 The punish∣ments which we find them to have used towards a conquered Nation were these; either they pu∣nished them by death, or sold them for bond∣slaves sub corona, or dismissed them sub jugum, or merced them in taking away their territories, or made them tributary States.

Of the first we find a manifest example in the third of these Commentaries, where Caesar having overthrown the Veneti by sea, inasmuch as they had retained his Embassadours by force, contra∣ry to the law of Nations, he put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest sub corona.

Festus saith that an enemy was said to be sold sub corona, inasmuch as the captives stood crown∣ed in the Market-place where they were set out to sale: as Cato saith in his book De re militari, Ut populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam coronatus supplicatum eat; quam re male gesta coronatus vaeneat; That the people may rather for well performing go to supplicate crowned, then for ill performance be sold crowned. And Gellius affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, forasmuch as the souldiers that kept them while they were in selling, incircled them round about to keep them together; and this round-about-standing was called corona. Festus saith that oftentimes they used a spear, and

therefore they were said to be sold sub hasta: for∣asmuch as amongst the Greeks, by the spear or pike was signified the power of Armes, and ma∣jestie of Empires.

When they dismissed them sub jugum, their order was to erect three trees like a pair of gal∣lowes, under which they caused all the captives to passe, as a sign of bondage: for they had so conquered them by force of Armes, that they laid upon their neck the yoak of thraldome.

Livie saith that Quintius the Dictator dis∣missed the Aequos sub jugum; and this jugum was made of three speares, whereof two were stuck upright in the ground, and the third was tied overthwart them. The souldiers that passed sub jugum were ungirt, and their weapons taken from them, as Festus saith.

Sometimes again they took away their lands and territories, and either sold it for money, and brought it into the treasury, or divided the land amongst the Roman people, or let it out to farme∣rent: of all which Livie hath many pregnant ex∣amples.

Of the second sort, the selling of the Veii in his fifth book, and of 7000 Samnites in his ninth book. Of the third, that remarkable example of passing the two Consuls T. Veturius Calvinus, and Spurius Postumius, with the Legates, Tri∣bunes, and whole Roman Army sub jugum, by Caius Pontius leader of the Samnites, in his ninth book. Of the fourth, in all kinds thereof frequently through his history.

Chap. XIII.

Crassus taketh in all the maritime Cities that ly to the Ocean: the legions carried into their wintering Camps.* 1.111

THe same time Pub. Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion to the Ve∣neti, Unelli, Osis••••••, Curiosolitae, Sesuvii, Aulerci, and Rhedones, be∣ing the maritime Cities that lay to the Ocean, advertised him that all those States had yielded themselves to the people of Rome. The warres being thus ended, and all Gallia being settled in peace, there went such a fame of this warre a∣mong other barbarous people, that from Nations beyond the Rhene there came Embassadours to Caesar, offering both hostages, and obedience to whatsoever he commanded them. But Caesar, forasmuch as he then hasted into Lombardie, after he had placed his legions in their wintering Campes, willed them to repair unto him again in the beginning of the next Sommer. He him∣self therefore, after he had first disposed his army into winter-quarters amongst the Carnutes, Andes, and Turones, cities next to those places where his warres had been, took his journey forthwith for Italy.* 1.112 For these things, upon the sight of Caesars Letters, a generall supplication was proclaimed in Rome for fifteen dayes toge¦ther: which honour before that time had hap∣pened to no man.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Caesar.
• * 1.2

  Caesar.
• a 1.3

  The coun∣trey about B••auvois.
• b 1.4

  The coun∣trey about So••ssons.
• c 1.5

  The peo∣ple about Tournay.
• d 1.6

  Arras.
• e 1.7

  Amiens.
• f 1.8

  Verman∣dois.
• g 1.9

  Tervenne.
• h 1.10

  Liege.
• * 1.11

  308000. in all.
• * 1.12

  La Disne.
• * 1.13

  Caesar.
• * 1.14

  A legion what it was.
• * 1.15

  Lib. 4.
• * 1.16

  De vita Ro∣muli.
• * 1.17

  Liv. lib. 22.
• * 1.18

  Taci••us ••. hist.
• * 1.19

  Velites.
• * 1.20

  Hastati.
• * 1.21

  Principes.
• * 1.22

  Triarii.
• * 1.23

  Lib. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.24

  Lib. 1. de mil. Rom.
• * 1.25

  The use of this divi∣sion.
• * 1.26

  The distin∣ction of their com∣panies.
• * 1.27

  Manipuli.
• * 1.28

  Ordines.
• * 1.29

  Cohors.
• * 1.30

  Lib. 3. de re ••ust.
• * 1.31

  A legion ranged in battell.
• * 1.32

  The first or∣der.
• * 1.33

  3 De bello civili.
• * 1.34

  Prima co∣hor••.
• * 1.35

  The bene∣fit of this discipline.
• * 1.36

  The benefit of small battalions, and the dis∣advantage of great squadrons.
• * 1.37

  Bray in the county of Re••ell.
• * 1.38

  To take a town by surprise.
• * 1.39

  A Testudo described.
• * 1.40

  Lib. 44.
• * 1.41

  Lib. 4••
• * 1.42

  The neces∣sity of good discovery.
• * 1.43

  Now Eng∣land.
• * 1.44

  The order which is to be observed in disco∣very.
• * 1.45

  Slingers with their art and use.
• * 1.46

  Lib. ••.
• * 1.47

  Lib. 2. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. quest.
• * 1.48

  〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.49

  Caesar.
• * 1.50

  No••on. Caesar.
• * 1.51

  Soyssons.
• * 1.52

  Lib. 4.
• * 1.53

  A Vinea or Vine de∣scribed.
• * 1.54

  Agger or mount.
• * 1.55

  Towers or Turrets de∣scribed.
• * 1.56

  Caesar.
• * 1.57

  The Bello∣vaci taken to mercy.
• * 1.58

  The Ambi∣ani yield up themselves.
• * 1.59

  The Nervii.
• * 1.60

  Sambre near Na∣mur.
• * 1.61

  The manner of the Ro∣man march.
• * 1.62

  The two respects which Cae∣sar had in ordering a m••r••h.
• * 1.63

  1 Safety.
• * 1.64

  2 Conveni∣ency.
• * 1.65

  Agmen qua∣dratum.
• * 1.66

  Lib. 8. de bel. Gall.
• * 1.67

  60. Epist.
• * 1.68

  Lib 6.
• * 1.69

  Agmen lon∣gum.
• * 1.70

  Lib. 5. de bello Gall.
• * 1.71

  The use that may be made of this, in our modern wars.
• * 1.72

  Caesar.
• * 1.73

  The descri∣pt on of the Roman Camp with all the parts belonging unto it.
• * 1.74

  The Centu∣rions made 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 place
• * 1.75

  The Praeto∣rium.
• * 1.76

  The lodg∣ing of the legions.
• * 1.77

  Quintana.
• * 1.78

  Principia.
• * 1.79

  The tents of the Tri∣bunes.
• * 1.80

  The space between the tents and the ram∣pier.
• * 1.81

  Contuber∣nium.
• * 1.82

  The ditch and the rampier.
• * 1.83

  Agger.
• * 1.84

  Vallum.
• * 1.85

  Praetoria porta.
• * 1.86

  Portae De∣cumana.
• * 1.87

  Portae principales.
• * 1.88

  Laeva Dextra.
• * 1.89

  Castra Aestiva.
• * 1.90

  Hiberna.
• * 1.91

  The com∣modity of this in∣camping.
• * 1.92

  The cere∣monies which they used in their prepa∣ration to battel.
• * 1.93

  Caesar.
• * 1.94

  And there∣fore I ra∣ther take it be some∣thing else then a word.
• * 1.95

  The place and offices of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Pri∣mipile.
• * 1.96

  The Target described.
• * 1.97

  Lib. 16. cap. 40.
• * 1.98

  Caesar.
• * 1.99

  Lib. de Mi∣litia Ju. Cae.
• * 1.100

  Either Doway or Bolda•• in Brabant.
• * 1.101

  Caesar.
• * 1.102

  Circumval∣latio.
• * 1.103

  In the se∣venth Com∣mentary.
• * 1.104

  Aries, or the Ram.
• * 1.105

  Cales.
• * 1.106

  Aries sim∣plex.
• * 1.107

  Aries com∣posita.
• * 1.108

  To give no∣tice of an Alarme by fire.
• * 1.109

  Lib. 25.
• * 1.110

  The punish∣ments which the Romans laid upon a conquered Nation.
• * 1.111

  Caesar.
• * 1.112

  Of this sup∣pli••••tion I ••ill speak in the latter end of the fourth book.