The commentaries of C. Julius Cæsar of his warres in Gallia, and the civil warres betwixt him and Pompey / translated into English with many excellent and judicious observations thereupon ; as also The art of our modern training, or, Tactick practise, by Clement Edmonds Esquire, ... ; where unto is adjoyned the eighth commentary of the warres in Gallia, with some short observations upon it ; together with the life of Cæsar, and an account of his medalls ; revised, corrected, and enlarged.

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Title
The commentaries of C. Julius Cæsar of his warres in Gallia, and the civil warres betwixt him and Pompey / translated into English with many excellent and judicious observations thereupon ; as also The art of our modern training, or, Tactick practise, by Clement Edmonds Esquire, ... ; where unto is adjoyned the eighth commentary of the warres in Gallia, with some short observations upon it ; together with the life of Cæsar, and an account of his medalls ; revised, corrected, and enlarged.
Author
Caesar, Julius.
Publication
London :: Printed by R. Daniel and are to be sold by Henry Tvvyford ... Nathaniel Ekins ... Iohn Place ...,
1655.
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Subject terms
Caesar, Julius. -- De bello Gallico. -- English.
Pompey, -- the Great, 106-48 B.C.
Caesar, Julius. -- De bello civili. -- English.
Military art and science -- Early works to 1800.
Gaul -- History -- 58 B.C.-511 A.D.
Rome -- History -- Republic, 265-30 B.C.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A31706.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The commentaries of C. Julius Cæsar of his warres in Gallia, and the civil warres betwixt him and Pompey / translated into English with many excellent and judicious observations thereupon ; as also The art of our modern training, or, Tactick practise, by Clement Edmonds Esquire, ... ; where unto is adjoyned the eighth commentary of the warres in Gallia, with some short observations upon it ; together with the life of Cæsar, and an account of his medalls ; revised, corrected, and enlarged." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A31706.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 10, 2024.

Pages

Chap. VIII.

Caesar carrieth his Army to the Territories of the Bellovaci, Ambiani and the Nervii.

CAesar taking for pledges the chiefest of their Citie,* 1.1 and amongst the rest king Galba's own two sons, upon the delivery of all their Armes received the Suessones to mercy: and from thence led his Army against the Bellovaci;* 1.2 who having con∣veyed both themselves and their goods into the town called Bratuspantium, and understanding that Caesar was come within five mile of the place, all the elder sort came forth to meet him, signifying by the stretching forth of their hands, and by their suppliant words, that they yielded themselves up to Caesars disposall, and would no longer bear armes against the people of Rome. And so again when he was come near the town, and had there set down his army, the very boyes and women appearing upon the walls with extended hands (as their custome is) be∣sought

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sought peace of the Romans. For these Divi∣tiacus became a mediatour, who after the Belgae had broken up their Camp, had dismissed his He∣duan forces and was returned to Caesar. The Hedui, saith he, have alwayes found in the Bel∣lovaci a faithfull and friendly disposition to their State: and if they had not been betrayed by their nobility (who made them believe that the Hedui were brought in bondage by the Ro∣mans, and suffered all villany and despight at their hands) they had never withdrawn them∣selves from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the Romans. The authours of this coun∣sel perceiving into what great misery they had brought their countrey, were fled into Britanie: wherefore not only the Bellovaci, but the Hedui also in their behalf besought him to use his cle∣mency towards them. Which thing if he did, it would very much greaten the esteem & authority of the Hedui amongst the Belgae, who formerly in their wars had recourse to them for supplies and assistance. Caesar, in regard of the Hedui and Di∣vitacus, promised to receive them to mercy; but for asmuch as the State was very great, and more populous and powerfull then other towns of the Belgae, he demanded six hundred hostages. Which being delivered and their armour brought out of the town, he marched from thence into the coast of the Ambiani:* 1.3 who without further lingering, gave both themselves and all that they had into his power. Ʋpon these bordered the Nervii;* 1.4 of whom Caesar found thus much by inquiry, That there was no recourse of Mer∣chants unto them, neither did they suffer any ••••ine, or what thing else might tend to riot, to be brought into their countrey: for they were perswaded that by such things their courage was much abated, and their vertue weakened. Fur∣ther, he learned that these Nervii were a savage people, and of great valour; often accusing the rest of the Belgae for yielding their necks to the Roman yoak, openly affirming that they would neither send Embassadours, nor take peace upon any condition.

Caesar having marched three dayes journey in their country, understood that the river* 1.5 Sa∣bis was not past ten miles from his camp; and that on the further side of this river all the Nervii were assembled together, and there at∣tended the coming of the Romans. With them were joyned the Atebates and Veroman∣dui, whom they had perswaded to abide the same fortune of war with them. Besides they ex∣pected a power from the Aduatici. The women and such as were unmeet for the field, they be∣stowed in a place unaccessible for any Army, by reason of fens and bogs and marishes. Ʋpon this intelligence, Caesar sent his discoverers and Cen∣turions before to chuse out a fit place to in∣camp in.

Now whereas many of the surrendred Belgae and other Galles were continually in the Ro∣man Army, certain of these (as it was after∣ward known by the captives) observing the or∣der which the Romans used in marching, came by night to the Nervii, and told them that be∣tween every legion went a great sort of carria∣ges; and that it was no matter of difficulty, as soon as the first legion was come into the camp, and the other legions yet a great way off, to set upon them upon a suddain before they were dis∣burdened of their carriages, and so to overthrow them: which legion being cut off and their stuffe taken, the rest would have small courage to stand against them. It much furthered this ad∣vice, that forasmuch as the Nervii were not able to make any power of horse, but what they did they were wont to do with foot, that they might the better resist the cavalry of their borderers, whensoever they made any rode into their mar∣ches, their manner was to cut young trees half asunder, and bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughes in breadth, and with thorns and briars planted between them they made them so thick, that it was impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or passe through them: so that when by this occasion the passage of the Roman Army must needs be hindered, the Nervii thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected.

The place which the Romans chose to incamp in was a hill of like levell from the top to the bottome, at the foot whereof ran the river Sa∣bis: and with the like levell on the other side rose another hill directly against this, to the quantity of two hundred paces; the bottom whereof was plain and open, and the upper part so thick with wood, that it could not easily be looked into. Within these woods the ervians kept themselves close: and in the open ground, by the river side, were only seen a few troups of horse, and the river in that place was about three foot deep.

Caesar sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power. But the manner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Nervii: for inasmuch as the ene∣my was at hand, Caesar (as his custome was)

Page [unnumbered]

[illustration]

CAESARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand▪

Page [unnumbered]

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led six legions alwayes in a readinesse, without burthen or carriage of any thing but their Armes: after them he placed the baggage of the whole Army. And the two legions which were last inrolled, were a rereward to the Ar∣my, and guarded the stuffe.

OBSERVATION.

THis treacherous practice of the surrendred Belgae hath fortunately discovered the manner of Caesars march,* 1.6 as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no small consequence in martiall discipline, being subject to so many inconveniences, and capable of the greatest art that may be shewed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet carri∣age of a march, by this circumstance it may be ga∣thered that Caesar principally respected safety, and secondly conveniency.* 1.7 If the place afforded a secure passage, and gave no suspicion of hosti∣lity, he was content in regard of conveniency, to suffer every legion to have the oversight of their particular carriages,* 1.8 and to insert them a∣mong the troups,* 1.9 that every man might have at hand such necessaries as were requisite, ei∣ther for their private use or publick discipline. But if he were in danger of any sudden attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an ene∣my, he then omitted convenient disposition in re∣gard of particular use, as disadvantageous to their safety; and carried his legions in that rea∣dinesse, that if they chanced to be engaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march or incumbrance of their carriages, receive the charge in that form of battell as was best ap∣proved by their military rules, and the ancient practice of their fortunate progenitours.

The old Romans observed likewise the same respects: for in unsafe and suspected places they carried their troups againe quadrato,* 1.10 in a square march, which, as Livie seemeth to note, was free from all carriage and impediments which might hinder them in any suddain alarme. Nei∣ther doth that of* 1.11 Hirtius any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith that Caesar so disposed his troups against the Bellovaci, that three legions marched in front, and after them came all the carriages, to which the tenth legion served as a rereward; and so they marched pene agmine quadrato almost in a square march.* 1.12 Seneca in like manner noteth the safety of agmen quadratum, where he saith that where an enemy is expected, we ought to march agmine quadrato ready to fight. The most materiall consequence of these places al∣ledged is, that as oft as they suspected any onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing differed from their usuall manner of imbattel∣ling; and therefore it was called agmen quadra∣tum or a square march, inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts as were observed in qua∣drata Acie, in a square body. For that triple forme of imbatteling which the Romans gene∣rally observed in their fights, having respect to the distances between each battel, contained al∣most an equall dimension of front and file: and so it made Aciem quadratam a square body; and when it marched, Agmen quadratum a square march.

Polybius expresseth the same in effect,* 1.13 as often as the place required circumspection; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the carriages: for he saith that in time of danger, especially where the country was plain and champain, and gave space and free scope to clear themselves, upon any ac∣cident the Romans marched in a triple battel of equall distance one behind another, every bat∣tell having his severall carriages in front. And if they were by chance attacked by an ene∣my, they turned themselves according to the op∣portunity of the place either to the right of left hand; and so placing their carriages on the one side of their Army, they stood imbattelled ready to receive the charge.

The contrary form of marching, where the place afforded more security, and gave scope to conveniency,* 1.14 they named agmen longum a long march or train; when almost every maniple or order had their severall carriages attending upon them, and strove to keep that way which they found most easy both for themselves and their impediments. Which order of march as it was more commodious then the former in regard of particularity, so was it unsafe and dangerous where the enemy was expected:* 1.15 and therefore Caesar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta for marching, when they were deluded by Ambi∣orix, longissimo agmine in a very long train; as though they had received their advertisements from a friend, and not from an enemy.

And albeit our modern wars are farre diffe∣rent in quality from them of ancient times,* 1.16 yet in this point of discipline they cannot have a more perfect direction then that which the Ro∣mans observed, as the two poles of their motions, Safety and Conveniencie: whereof the first de∣pendeth chiefly upon the provident disposition of the leaders; and the other will easily follow on, as the commodity of every particular shall give occasion.

Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can be taken then that manner of imbattelling, which shall be thought most con∣venient if an enemy were present to confront them? for a well-ordered march must either car∣ry the perfect forme of a battel, or contain the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receive that perfe∣ction of strength which the fittest disposition can afford it. First therefore a prudent and circum∣spect Leader, that desireth to frame a strong and

Page 54

orderly march, is diligently to observe the na∣ture and use of each weapon in his Army, how they may be placed for greatest use and advan∣tage, both in respect of their different and con∣curring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this know∣ledge will consequently inferre the best and exa∣ctest disposition of imbattelling, as the said for∣ces are capable of; which, if it may be observed in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactnesse of imbattelling will not admit conve∣nient carriage of such necessary adjuncts as per∣tain to an Army, the inconvenience is to be re∣lieved with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary judgement shall be found expedient; that albeit the form be somewhat changed, yet the principles and ground, wherein their strength and safety consisteth, may still be retained.

Neither can any man well descend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exempli∣fy the practices of many great and experienced commanders, what sort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rereward, in what part of the Army the Munition marched, and where the rest of the carriage was bestowed, according as their severall judgements thought most expedient in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that ob∣served this rule before prescribed, did seldome miscarry through an unsafe march. Let a good Martia list well know their proper use in that di∣versity of weapons in his Army, how they are ser∣viceable or disadvantageous, in this or that place, against such or such an Enemy; and he will speedily order his battel, dispose of his march, and bestow his carriages, as shall best fall out both for his safety and conveniency.

Caesars custome was to send his Cavalry and light-armed footmen before the body of his Ar∣my, both to discover and impeach an Enemy; for these troups were nimble in motion and fit for such services: but if the danger were greater in the rereward then in the front, the horsemen marched in the tayl of the Army, and gave secu∣rity where there was most cause of fear. But if it happened that they were found unfit to make good the service in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in Africa against the Numi∣dians; he then removed them as he best found it convenient, and brought his legionary souldiers, which were the sinews and strength of his forces, and marched continually in the bulk of the Ar∣my, to make good that which his horsemen could not perform. And thus he altered the antique prescription and uniformity of custome, accor∣ding as he found himself best able to disadvan∣tage an Enemy, or make way to victory.

Notes

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