Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the morall law and the covenants, from the errours of Papists, Arminians, Socinians, and more especially, Antinomians in XXX lectures, preached at Laurence-Jury, London / by Anthony Burgess ...

LECTURE VII.

ROM. 2. 14.

For when the Gentiles, which have not the Law, doe by na∣ture the things of the law, &c.

THe Doctrine already gathered from these words is, that, The Gentiles have a law of Nature written in their hearts: Which law doth consist partly in light and knowledge of speculative principles; and partly in practice and obedience to practicall principles. So then from hence we may consider, first, Of the light of Nature, and then secondly, Of the power of Nature; and from both these we may have profitable matter, and also may confute some dangerous errours, which have poisoned too ma∣ny. I shall begin therefore with the light of Nature, or Reason, and shall endeavour to shew the Necessity of it, and yet the Insufficiency of it: It is not such a starre that can lead us to Christ.

In the first place take notice, that this light of Nature may be considered in a three-fold respect:

First, As it's a relict or remnant of the image of God: for, howso∣ever * 1.1 the image of God did primarily consist in righteousness and true holinesse; yet secondarily it did also comprehend the powers and faculties of the reasonable soule in the acts thereof: And this later part abideth. It is true, this light of Nature, com∣paratively to that of faith, is but as a glow-worme to the Sun; yet some light and irradiation it hath. God, when he made man, had so excellently wrought his owne image in him, that man could not fall, unlesse that were also destroyed; as they write of Phidias, who made Alexanders statue, yet had wrought his own picture so artificially in it, that none could break Alexanders sta∣tue, but he must also spoile Phidias his image, who was the ma∣ker of it: And thus it is in Adams fall, yet there remaineth some

light still, which the Apostle calleth (Rom. 1.) Truth; he vouch∣safeth that name to it, They detain the truth in unrighteousnesse. Now this moon-light or glimmering of Nature is of a three-fold use:

1. For societies and publike Common-wealths, whereby they have * 1.2 made wholsome lawes. It's wonderfull to consider, how excellent the Heathens have been therein. Thus Chrysostome, speaking how the most excellent men need the counsell of others, instanceth in Jethro's advice to Moses, about choosing assistant officers: That great man Moses (saith he) who was so potent in words and workes, who was the friend of God, which commanded the creatures, was helped incounsell by Jethro his father-in-law, an obscure man, and a Barbarian: Although, to speak the truth, Jethro, when he gave this counsell, was not so, but had the knowledge of the true God.

2. This light of nature serveth for the instigation and provocation * 1.3 of men to many good actions and duties towards God and man. Hence still observe that phrase, They detain: reason and naturall light is bound, as a prisoner, by the chaines of lusts and sinfull af∣fections; which thing Aristotle doth fully set forth in his in∣continent person, whom he describeth to have a right opinion in the generall about that which is good; yet, being too much affected to some particular pleasure or profit, by that meanes the better part is over-born: and therefore Aristotle saith, the better part of the minde did provoke to better things. This agreeth with that of Paul. And as they bound captivated practicall truths towards man, so they also imprisoned them about God. Plato had the knowledge of one God, yet he dared not to communi∣cate it to the vulgar: Therefore (saith he) Opificem universorum ne{que} invenire facile, ne{que} inventum in vulgus promulgare tutum: It was not easie to finde out the Maker of the world, nor yet safe to make known to the people him, when he was found out. Here for feare of the people, he detained this truth. And Austin hath a most excellent chapter, cap. 10. lib. 6. de Civit. to shew how Seneca kept the truth in unrighteousnesse: he speaks of a Book Seneca wrote (which now is lost) against Superstitions, where he doth most freely and boldly write against the practices of their wor∣ship; but, saith Austin, He had liberty in his writing, but not

in his life, Libertas affuit scribenti, non viventi. I will name some passages, because they are applicable to Popish Idolatry, as well as Paganish. They dedicate their gods in most base materialls, and call them gods, which if taking life, they should meet us on a sudden, we should judge them monsters. They doe things so unseemly grave men, so unworthy free-men, so unlike wise sound men, that no man would doubt but that they were mad, if there were but few of them, whereas now the multitude of those that are thus mad is a patronage to them; Immortales deos in materia vilissima & immobili dedicant—Numina vocant, quae si spiritu ac∣cepto subitò occurrerent, monstra haberentur—Faciunt tam indecor a honestis, tam indigna liberis, tam dissimillima sanis, ut nemo fuerit dubitaturus furere eos, si cum paucioribus furerent; nunc sanitatis patrocinium est insanientium turba. But Seneca, when he had spoken thus, and much more, in the scorn of those gods, what doth he resolve upon that his wise man shall doe in those times? Let him not religiously account of them in his minde, but feigne them in his outward acts, In animi religione non habeat, sed in actibus fingat. And again, All which things a wise man will observe, as com∣manded by Law, not as acceptable to God, Quae omnia sapiens ser vabit tanquam legibus jussa, non diis grata. And further, Istam ignobilem deorum turbam, quam longo aevo longa superstitio con∣gessit, sic adorabimus, ut meminerimus cultum ejus ad morem magis pertinere quam rem. Some say, Seneca was coetaneous with Paul, and that he had Paul's Epistles; might he not (if so) see him∣self described in this phrase, detaining the truth in unrighteousnesse? But how well doth Austin in the same place stigmatize him? He worshipped, what he reproved; did, what he argued against; adored, what he blamed; Colebat, quod reprehendebat; agebat, quod arguebat; quod culpabat, adorabat. And are there not many such Popish spirits, that know their superstitions and falshoods, yet, because of long custome, will not leave them? What else was the meaning of Domitianus Calderinus, when, speaking of going to Masse, he said, Eamus ad communem errorem? And so it was a speech of a disputing Sophister, Sic dico quando sum in scholis, sed, penes nos sit, aliter sentio. You see then by this, that naturall truth would encline to better actions, but it is suppressed. When I say, naturall light enclineth the heart to good, it is to be understood

by way of object meerly, shewing what is to be desired, not that we have any strength naturally to what is good. If you aske why truth, apprehended by naturall light, should be lesse efficacious to alter and new-mould the heart and life, then truth received by faith (for in the Scripture we reade of wonderfull conversions; and the Heathens have but one story that they much boast of, of one Palemon (if I mistake not) who was a great drunkard, and came to deride Socrates, while he was reading his discourse to his scholars, but was so changed by that lecture, that he left off his drunkennesse: This alteration was only in the skin, and not in the vitalls. What then should be the difference?) I answer, not that one truth in it selfe is stronger then another, but the difference is in medio, or instrumento, the instrument to receive this truth. When Nature receives a truth, it's but with a dimme eye, and a palsie-hand; but when we receive it by faith, that is accompanyed with the power and might of the holy Ghost. The influence of truth by naturall light, is like that of the Moon, waterish and weak, never able to ripen any thing; but that of faith is like the influence of the Sun, that doth heat, and soon bring to maturity.

3. The last use of this naturall light is, to make men inexcusable; * 1.4 for, seeing they did not glorifie God according to their know∣ledge, for that they are justly condemned. This indeed is not the onely use of the light of Nature, as some say; but it is a main one, Rom. 1. 20. not that this is the end of God, in put∣ting these principles into us, but it falleth out by our sinfulness. But how are they inexcusable, if they could not glorifie God by nature, as they ought? Some answer, the Apostle speaks of ex∣cuse in regard of knowledge: but if you understand it of power, it is true; for by our fault we are unable, and none went so farre as naturally they were able. And thus Nature is considered in the first place.

Secondly, You may consider it as corrupted and obscured by sin: * 1.5 And in this sense it's no help, but a desperate enemy to what is good: and the more reason this way, the more opposition to God: and thus it fell out with all the great naturall Luminists; they became vain in their reasonings, the more they enquired and searched, the further off they were from what is true, 1 Cor. 2. 14.

The naturall man perceiveth not the things of God: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is not a man carnall and grosse in sinne, but a souly man, one that doth excolere animam, such as Tully and Aristotle. Now the wiser these men were, the vainer they were. Chrysostome's comparison doth well agree with them: As if (saith he) a king should give much money to a servant that by it he should make his family more glo∣rious, and he goeth presently and spends all his money upon whores and bawds. Thus did the Heathens: As Austin wrote to a man of great parts, Ornari abs te Diabolus quaerit, The Divell seeks to be adorned by thee.

Hence Egypt, that is accounted the mother of Sciences, and Moses in regard of knowledge is preferred before the Egypti∣ans; yet that was the seat also of Idolaters: and so the Astro∣nomers, who lifted up themselves above others in their know∣ledge of heavenly things, brought in those monsters into heaven, and attributed worship to them, and in their worship of their gods they added many feasts and sports. Thus they invented an happinesse, which Austin calleth Scyllaeum bonum, consisting of humane and brutish parts. If you aske how this naturall light * 1.6 cometh to be thus obscured; I answer, three waies: 1. By ill education. This is like the first concoction, or the first settling of the limbs of a man. Secondly, By long custome and degeneration. Hence some Nations have by their publike lawes allowed grosse sins lawfull; as some Nations have allowed robberies, some incest, some that all old men should be thrown down headlong a steep hill. Thirdly, By the just judgement of God; therefore three times in Rom. 1. God is said to give them up to sin.

Thirdly, You may speak of Nature as informed, and enlightened * 1.7 by Gods Word: and while it's thus, you need not cast this Hagar out of doores. Let Scripture and the Word of God lay the foun∣dation stone, and then Reason may build upon it. It is Stella his comparison: It is with Faith and Reason, as with the mould that is at the root of the barren and fruitlesse tree; take the mould out, and throw in muck or other compost, and then put the mould in, it will much help the tree, which hindered it before. Thus, lay aside Reason at first, and then receive truths by Faith; and afterwards im∣prove them by Reason, and it will excellently help. Divine truths are not founded upon Reason, but Scripture; yet Reason

may bear them up: as you see the elme or wall bear up the vine, but the elme or wall doth not bring forth the fruit; onely the vine doth that. As long therefore as the light of Nature is not the rule, but ruled and squared by Gods Word, so long it cannot deceive us.

The second grand consideration is, That the light of Nature is * 1.8 necessary in religious and morall things, though it be not sufficient. We speak of the light of Nature in the first consideration, as it is the residue of the glorious image of God put into us (for of the later, as it is informed by Scripture, it is no question.) Now this is absolutely necessary two wayes: 1. As a passive qualifica∣tion of the subject for faith; for, there cannot be faith in a stone, or in a beast, no more then there can be sin in them: Therefore Reason, or the light of Nature, makes man in a passive capacity fit for grace; although he hath no active ability for it: And, when he is compared to a stone, it is not in the former sense, but the later. And secondly, it's necessary by way of an instrument; for we cannot beleeve, unlesse we understand whether know∣ledge be an act ingredient into the essence of faith, or whether it be prerequisite: all hold there must be an act of the understand∣ing, one way or other, going to beleeve. Hence knowledge is put for faith, and Hebr. 11. By faith we understand. Thus it is necessa∣ry as an instrument.

3. There is nothing true in Divinity that doth crosse the truth of Nature, as it's the remnant of Gods image. This indeed is hard to * 1.9 cleere in many points of Divinity; as in the doctrine of the Trinity, and the doctrine of Christs Incarnation, which seemeth paradoxall to Reason; of whom Tertullian, lib. 5. de carne Christi, cap. 5. thus, Natus est Dei Filius, non pudet, quia pudendum est; Mortuus est Dei Filius, prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum; Sepultus resurrexit, certum est, quia impossibile. Yet, seeing the Apostle calls the naturall knowledge of a man Truth, and all truth is from God, which wayes soever it come, there can therefore be no con∣tradiction between it. And hereupon our Divines doe, when they have confuted the Popish doctrine of Transubstantiation by Scripture, shew also, that for a body to be in two places, is against the principles of Nature. They indeed call for faith in this point: and Lapide, upon these words, Hoc est corpus meum,

saith, If Christ should aske me at the day of judgement, Why did you be∣leeve the bread to be the body of Christ? I will answer, This text, if I be deceived, These words have deceived me. But we must compare place with place, and Scripture with Scripture. As for the doctrine of the Trinity, though it be above Reason, and we cannot look into that mysterie, no more then an Owle can into the Sun beames, yet it is not against it.

4. The same object may be known by the light of Nature, and by * 1.10 the light of Faith. This may easily be understood: I may know there is a God by the light of Nature; and I may beleeve it, be∣cause the Scripture saith so: so Hebr. 11. I may by faith under∣stand the Word was made, and by arguments know it was made; and this is called faith, by James. The divels beleeve, that is, they have an evident intuitive knowledge of God, and feel it by experience; not that they have faith, for that is a supernaturall gift wrought by God, and hath accompanying it pia affectio, to him that speaketh, as the first truth. Faith therefore, and the light of Nature go to the knowledge of the same thing different waies: faith doth, because of the testimony and divine revelation of God; the light of Nature doth, because of arguments in the thing it self by discourse. And faith is not a dianoeticall or dis∣cursive act of the understanding, but it's simple and apprehen∣sive.

5. Though Reason and the light of Nature be necessary, yet it is not * 1.11 a Judge in matters of faith. The Lutheran seemeth to depresse Reason too much, and the Socinian exalteth it too high: They make it not onely an instrument, but a Judge; and thereupon they reject the greatest mysteries of Religion. I know some have endeavoured to shew, that Religio est summa ratio; and there are excellent men that have proved the truth of the Christian Reli∣gion by Reason: and certainly, if we can by Reason prove there is any Religion at all, we may by the same Reason prove that the Christian Religion is the true one. But who doth not see how uncertaine Reason is in comparison of Faith? I doe not therefore like that assertion of one, who affects to be a great Rationalist (it is Chillingworth) that saith, We therefore receive the Scriptures to be the Word of God, because we have the greatest Reason that this is the Word of God. But we must not confound the instru∣ment

and the Judge: holy truths, they are Scripture truths, though hammered out by Reason. As the Smith that takes golden plate, and beates it into what shape he pleaseth, his hammer doth not make it gold, but only gold of such a shape: And thus also Reason doth not make a truth divine, onely holds it forth, and declareth it in such a way.

6. It's altogether insufficient to prescribe or set down any worship of * 1.12 God. Hence God doth so often forbid us to walk after our own imaginations, and to doe that which we shall choose. The Apostle calleth it Will-worship, when a mans Will is the meere cause of it. Now, it's true, men are more apt to admire this, as we see in the Pharisees and Papists; they dote upon their Traditions more then Gods Institutions. Hence Raymundus, a Papist, speaking of the Masse, It is (saith he) as full of mysteries, as the sea is full of drops of water, as the heaven hath Angels, as the firmament hath starres, and the earth little crummes of sand. But what saith our Saviour, Luk. 18. that which is highly esteemed before men, is abomination before God? That word, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is applyed to idols and false-worship. It's true indeed, even in worship, light of Nature and prudence is instrumentally required to order the Institutions of God; but as Reason may not make a new Article of Faith, so neither a new part of worship. Now Natures insufficiency is described in these three rea∣sonings:

1. To have all the worship of God sensible and pleasing to the eye. It * 1.13 was well called by Parisiensis, a madnesse in some, who doubted not to say, The Church was better ruled by the inventions of men then by the Scriptures. The people of Israel would have sen∣sible gods, that they might see them: and certainly men doe as much delight in sensible pompous worship, as children do in gay babies; therefore the Prophet speaketh of their goodly images. But all this ariseth, because they are ignorant of spirituall wor∣ship, and cannot tell how to make spirituall advantage from God. It was well said by one, that A superstitious man is Gods flutterer, and not his friend; he is more officious then needs: and where a man is busie ubi non oportet, (said Tertullian) he is negligent ubi oportet. Such carnall sensible worshippers are well compared to those that, because they have no children, delight in birds and

dogs; so because they have no true graces of the Spirit of God, they delight in these imitations.

2. To appoint mediatours between us and God. This was the * 1.14 great Argument of the Heathens; they thought themselves un∣worthy, and therefore appointed others to mediate between them and God; which Argument of the Heathens, some of the Fathers wrote against. But, doe not the Papists the same thing? Doe not they tell us, Petitioners at the Court doe not addresse themselves immediately to the Prince, but get Favourites to speak for them; so must we to God? And therefore Salmeron doth give some reasons why it's more piety and religion to pray to God and Saints together, then to God alone. But is not this to forget Christ our head, who is made neerer to us then Angels are? And, indeed, Angels are reconciled to us by Christ. If therefore we follow the light of Nature thus, we shall fall in∣to the ditch at last; and superstition is never more dangerous, then when it's coloured over with the specious colours of Ar∣guments.

3. To doe all by way of compensation, and satisfaction to God. * 1.15 Upon this ground were all the sacrifices of the Heathens. And is not all this with Popery? Doe they not make all penall things compensative? If they pray, that is meritorious; if they fast, that is satisfactory. Hence ariseth that seeming not to spare the flesh, Col. 3. ult. and the Apostle saith, it hath a shew of wisdome. But the more like any actions are to worship and wisdome, and are not so, the more loathsome they are: as in an Ape, that which makes an Ape so much deformed and loathsome, is because it is so like a man, and is not a man.

Use. Of Instruction. What hath made the idolatry of the Church of Rome so like Paganish and Ethnicall idolatry? Even because they followed their light, the light of Nature and Rea∣son. Look over all their Paganish gods, and they have answerable saints. As the Heathens had their Ceres, and Bacchus, and Aesculapius; insomuch that Varro said, Discendum fuisset quâ de causâ quis{que} deorum avocandus esset, nè à Libero aqua, à Lympho vinum optaretur: so here, they have their St. Martin for the vineyard, Christopher for suddaine death, Nicholas for mariners, &c. And this was done at first, they say, to gain the Heathens;

but the contrary fell out. Let us then follow the light of Na∣ture no further then we ought; let her be an hand-maid, not a mistresse. And then we must take heed of going against her where she doth truly direct. Are there not many, not only unchristian, but also unnaturall actions? let us remember that.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The light of Nature is a remnant of Gods image.
• * 1.2

  1. The light of Nature use∣full and ne∣cessary for the making of wholsome lawes in Common-wealths.
• * 1.3

  2. It instiga∣teth to good duties to∣wards God and man.
• * 1.4

  3. It makes men inexcusa∣ble.
• * 1.5

  The light of Nature, as corrupted by sin, is an ene∣my to God and goodnes.
• * 1.6

  The light of Nature ob∣scured three wayes.
• * 1.7

  The light of Nature in∣form'd by Gods Word an excellent help.
• * 1.8

  The light of Nature, as it is a relict of Gods image is necessary in religious and morall things, and that two wayes.
• * 1.9

  Though some divine truths may transcend the reach of Nature, none do crosse the truth thereof, as it is the remnant of Gods image.
• * 1.10

  Faith and the light of Na∣ture go to the knowledge of the same thing diffe∣rent wayes.
• * 1.11

  The light of Nature a ne∣cessary instru∣ment, but no Judge in mat∣ters of Faith.
• * 1.12

  Nature insuf∣ficient to pre∣scribe divine Worship.
• * 1.13

  1. Because it would have all the wor∣ship of God sensible and pleasing to the eyes
• * 1.14

  2. Because it's prone to ap∣point media∣tours between God and us.
• * 1.15

  3. Because it performes all duties by way of compensa∣tion & merit.