A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is, by pregnant texts of Scripture vindicated from false glosses
Burgess, Anthony, d. 1664.


A Three-fold Appetite in Man.

THe third particular necessary for the understanding of this Doctrine, viz. That original sinne is lust or concupiscence in a man, is, To take notice of a three fold appetite, Natural, Animal and Rational: Even inanimate bodies, the stone and the fire have a kind of an appetite, to descend, the one downward, the other upward. In a man there is a natural appetite of eating or drinking.

2. There is the animal or sensitive appetite, whereby the sensitive faculties do desire their sutable objects.

Page  159 Lastly, There is the Rational Appetite, whereby a man is carried out to desire those good things that are judged to be so by reason: Now if we take these ap∣petites substantially, as it were, or physically, so they are good, and the actions that flow from them are good; but then take them Ethically and Morally with that Ataxy and Inordinacy that doth cleave to them, as they are in man, and so they do become polluted, and defiled: Insomuch that a man doth sinne till rege∣nerated in all these things; his eating and drinking became sinne, and all other his actions, because the principles from which they flow are all vitiated; So that whatsoever principle we have of any action, it being destitute of that original rectitude, which adhered to it; therefore it is that it moveth to every object sinfully; So that this consideration may take off that calumny which the adver∣saries of original sinne would fasten upon the Orthodox herein, as if we made man to be nothing but opus Diaboli, the work of the Devil, as if he were not the good creature of God. Vide August. lib. 2do, de nuptiis & concupiscentiâ, where the Pelagian saith, Qui originale peccatum defendit perfectè Manichaeus est, ne vo∣centur Haeretici fiunt Manichai, as also this freeth them from the aspersion of ••ccianism. though Cortzen the Jesuite saith,

The Calvinists by their prin∣ciples cannot avoid it, Necessario concedere coguntur substantiam esse peccatum, qui concupiscentiam affirmant, (Com. 5. ad Rom.)
but very absurdly. For we say, take these faculties of the soul, as they are naturally planted in the soul, so they are good and of God. The understanding, the will, the affections, these are in themselves good, but man having sinned away original righteousnesse, which would have habitually disposed them to their due objects, in a due manner, for a due end, hereby it is, that they are only for sinne, which were at first only for good.