A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is, by pregnant texts of Scripture vindicated from false glosses / by Anthony Burgess.

CHAP. IX.

Objections Answered.

SECT. I.

I Am only demonstrating, that it is sin, and not what it is; There∣fore I proceed no further in the positive Explication of it, but come to answer those Objections, that are made by all sorts of persons against this sinne, whether Pelagians, some Pa∣pists, Arminians or Socinians; And when these Clouds are dispelled, the light of the Truth will shine more evident∣ly. And

First, That which is a famous and obvious Objection, owned by all the Ad∣versaries to this Doctrine, is, The necessariness and involuntariness of it.

Object. Every sinne (say they) must be voluntary; This is a principle in∣graffed, as they conceive, in the conscience of a man: No man is to be faulted, or blamed for that which is not in his power to prevent; And they press that known Rule of Austins, Vsque adeo voluntarium peccatum est malum, quod non sit peccatum, nisi voluntarium, If it be not voluntary, it cannot be any sinne at all. Now (say they) this original sinne comes upon us by natural necessity, it lieth no more in our power to prevent it, then to hinder our being born; Shall then we conceive God willing to damn a man, especially an Infant, for that sinne which ne∣ver was in his power, or his will to do? This they think cannot be admitted. Therefore though some of them grant, Adam's actual sinne may be made ours, be∣cause our will is interpretatively in his, yet not this inherent corruption, because this is a particular personal sinne, and so requireth a personal actual will to make it a sinne. And this seemeth to have some plausible colour, while we attend only to principles of humane Reason, and Arguments of Philosophy: But let us see, whether it will not be too light, if weighed in the balance of the Sanctua∣ry. And

Answ. 1. We must understand in what sense any sinne at all can be called vo∣luntary, and that is, not as if any man could will sinne, no not he that sinneth maliciously, as it is sin. This is granted by all moral Philosophers, That no man willeth sin, as it is sin, because bonum, either real or appearing so, is the adequate object of the will: As in the understanding, that cannot assent to any thing that is apparently false; so neither doth the will choose any thing that is manifested to be evil, as evil, but when it imbraceth any sine, there is some deceivable good or other, which deceiveth the soul. Thus Adam when he transgressed the com∣mand of God, he did not will this as a sinne, nor did he positively intend the damnation of his posterity (For we suppose that he knew himself to be a com∣mon Parent, and that he received a common stock for all mankind) But he willed that action, to which sinne was annexed; And thus no wicked man, when he sinneth, doth will the damnation of his soul formally, but

consequentially by willing that to which this guilt doth belong.

Secondly, Although it be granted, That every sinne must be voluntary, yet (as Austin of old answered) this sinne may be called voluntary, as it is in In∣fants, because their will is interpretatively in Adam, and we therefore are all said to sinne in him: Adam's will may be said to be our will two wayes:

1. By way of delegation, as if we had chosen him to be our common parent, and had translated our wils over to him, as amongst men, it is usual in arbitrati∣ons, and then they are said to will, that which their Arbitrator hath done, though it may be they dislike it, and in this sense, Adam's will is not our will, for we had no actual being or existence in him. Hence

2. Adam's will may be said to be ours interpretatively, God appointing him to be the universal principle of mankind; what he did is interpreted, as if we had done it, and the equity of making Adam's will ours, ariseth from the institu∣ting will and Covenant of God, that would have it so: But more especially, be∣cause God then dealt with Adam in a Covenant of works, which if broken and violated, carrieth condemnation to all his off-spring, as appeareth by the curses threatned in the Law. This original sinne then is voluntary, because committed by Adam's will, which by Gods imputation is made ours; so that as in Adam upon his actual disobedience, the Image of God was lost, and in stead thereof came an universal pollution of his whole man; which was in him truly and properly a sinne; So it is in every Infant descended from him.

Thirdly, If it be granted, That every sinne must be voluntary, yet this also will hold good in Infants sinne; for a thing may be said to be voluntarium in causa, but involuntarium in se. With moral Philosophers, all habits of sinne are involuntary in themselves, but voluntary in their cause; those actions that did produce them; And thus is original sin inherent in mankind, it is voluntary in its cause, which was Adam's sin.

Fourthly, Austin himself, who urgeth voluntariness in sinne, yet afterwards considering how the Pelagians made use of it, he answereth, That this is to be understood of actual sinne, not original sinne; Every actual sinne must be volun∣tary, it's not necessary original sinne should be personally and formally so: A∣gain, he limits that Rule to such sins as are meerly sins, not punishments also, but original sin is both a sin and punishment.

Lastly, He grants this to be true amongst the Laws of men, and therefore cals it politica sententia; And no wonder if Philosophers required a formal will in every sin, else not to make it imputable, because they were wholly ignorant of this Truth.

But in the last place, our Divines do deny that voluntariness is requisite to every actual sinne; for there are sinnes of ignorance for which Sacrifices were to be offered; And David prayeth to be cleansed from secret sins, which he did not know, and if so, they must be involuntary; yea, Paul expresly cals that a sin, Rom. 7. which yet was against his will, although it may be granted, that even in these there is some kind of voluntarines; For a thing may be voluntary either in its cause, or in it self, or absolutely involuntary, but comparatively voluntary, as when we do things for fear, or there may be a mixture of voluntarines and involuntarines, which Paul seemeth to acknowledge in himself, yet still the proper notion of a sinne lieth in the contrariety of it to the Law of God: Therefore John defineth sinne by that, whether it be voluntary or not, he doth not take notice of. This is ac∣knowledged by some Scholastical Writers, especially Holkot (De imputabilitate peccati) answereth this Objection fully to our purpose, where he positively af∣firmeth, That sinne is not therefore imputable unto us, because it was in the power of the will, but as righteousness is therefore praise-worthy, because it is righteous∣ness, so unrighteousness is therefore culpable, and damnable, because it is unrigh∣teousness

(that is, if I may interpret him) because it's against a Law. Hence he proceedeth to shew, That a thing is not righteous or vnrighteous meerly because it was in the power of the will, for the will of a child would have been made righteous by God, sine proprie motu, without any proper motion of the childs will; And then why may it not as well be sinfull without any such voluntary motion in an Infant? So that he concludeth, It's as proper to original sinne to be naturally contracte•• or derived from another, without any proper act of the will, as it is to an actual sinne, to have the will one way or other consenting to it: Even as in the state of integrity, original righteousness in Infants would have been propagated, but actuall Righte∣ousness voluntarily performed. And these things may satisfie this first Objection, yet hereafter we shall speak more to this.

SECT. II.

THe second Objection is in effect to this sense, What is a punishment cannot be a sinne: But the deprivation of Gods Image in man upon Adam's disobedience is a punishment; And therefore it cannot be a sinne. Original sinne, if not totally, yet principally consists in the losse of that original Righteousnesse and rectitude, which God made man in: Seeing therefore the privation of this came upon man by way of punishment, when Adam transgressed; We cannot conceive it (say they) to be a sinne also, for a punishment and a sinne, are wholly contradictory; a sinne must be voluntary, a punishment involuntary, a sinne is an action, and a punish∣ment is a passion; a sinne is an evil, and God cannot be the author of it; a punish∣ment is good, and an act of Justice; so that God cannot be said to permit that, but to inflict it.

This Argument (at the first view) hath likewise some colour, but upon the examination of it, it will quickly vanish: I shall not answer in a large dispute about that famous Question, Whether the same thing may be a sin and a punish∣ment? Or, whether God doth punish one sin with another, but shall speak as much, briefly, as is convenient for this Objection. And

First, You must know that Arminius began to dislike this Doctrine of original sinne (Respons. ad Artic. 31.) which was mentioned in their publique Cate∣chism, upon this very reason, because it was a punishment; and he gave this Reason to the Minister then conferring with him,

Because if God did punish Adam's sinne with this sinne, then he must punish this with another, and that other with another, and so there must be a processus in infinitum.

But his followers the Remonstrants (in their Apology for their Confession contra Censuram) seem to disclaim this opinion,

That our original corruption is either malum culpae, or poenae, properly so called, Because where there is an evil of punish∣ment, it must be for some sinne: But Infants have committed no voluntary sinne, and therefore could not deserve such a punishment.

So that they pro∣fess themselves to be of Zuinglius his mind, whether he retracted it, or not after∣wards they are not certain, viz. That it is a morbus, a vitium, a languor, an imbecillity of nature, but neither the evil of sinne or punishment. Some Papists as Pighius, Catharinus, Mayro, and some Scotists hold,

That native pollution to be no sinne, because it's a punishment, and that for Adam's sinne imputed to all, concluding on this, That it cannot be a sinne, because it's a pu∣nishment. The Socinians they say, The necessity of dying with other punish∣ments, is the punishment of Adam's sinne; and therefore that repugnancy and contrariety which is between the flesh and the Spirit, is from our very Creation; The sensitive appetite rebels against the rational, from the very first Creation of man, and would have been whether Adam had sinned or no; yea, it was from this vehement opposition of the appetite to reason, that he did sin.

I shall consider the strength of their Objection, as it lieth in this, The same thing cannot be a sin and a punishment too. The Remonstrants affirm this, and Papists likewise, but with some explication. And

1. It is confessed, That there are some punishments of sinne, which are not sinne, as when God for Adam's disobedience hath made man obnoxious to mise∣ries, to sickness and death; These are not sinnes; It comes from sinne to have pain, and to die, but they are not sinnes; and the Reason is, Because these are malum naturale, not morale, they are a natural evil, not a moral.

In the second place, Austin saith, and he saith it truly from Scripture,

That original inherent sinne, which he calleth concupiscence, is both a sinne, a pu∣nishment of sinne, and a cause of sin; Even as blindness of mind, or hardness of heart, is both a sinne, a punishment, and a cause of further sinne, (Lib. 5. contra Juhan. cap. 3.)

That it is a sinne appeareth by the many Texts already brought: And Austin's Reason in that place is very cogent, Quia inest illi ino∣bedientia contra dominatum mentis; There is in it a disobedience against the domi∣nion of mind and spirit, therefore the Spirit lusteth against it. That it is a pu∣nishment is manifest by the event, for upon Adam's disobedience he lost Gods Image, and so hath blindness in mind, perversness in his will, and a disorder over the whole man, in which dreadfull and horrible estate we all succeed him: and this the Text in hand speaketh to. That it is the cause of sinne is manifest, Gen. 6. 5. for from that corrupt heart of man, it is, That the imaginations of a mans heart are only evil, and that continually. This is a furnace red hot, which alwayes sends forth those sparks. Thus you see that original sinne is all these three, a sin, a punishment, and a cause of sin.

3. It is very clear and plain by Scripture, that God doth punish one sinne by another; So that when a man hath committed one sinne, he is justly given up by God to commit more. Amongst the many instances that may be given, I shall pitch on two only, 2 Thess. 2. 10, 11. where you have a sinne mentioned that God will punish, viz. They received not the truth of God in love: A sinne that is very ordinary: But then observe how dreadfully God punisheth this, God shall send them strong delusions, that they should believe a lie; This is their punishment; a spiritual punishment, more than any corporal one; and that this is a sinne, as well as a punishment, is plain, Because to believe a lie is a sinne, to take falshood for truth, the delusions of the Devil, for the voice of Gods Spirit; This is a sinne and a very hainous one. The other instance is Rom. 1. 21. where you have the Heathens sinnes mentioned, Because that when they knew God, they glorified him not. &c. There you have their punishment, to be given up to uncleanness, to all vile lusts and sins against nature. None can deny but these were sinnes, and that they were a punishment for corrupting their natural light implanted in them, is plain, for the Apostle, vers. 24, 26, 28. saith, For this cause, or therefore God gave them up to these lusts, and vers 27. the expression is observable, That they received in themselves that recompence of their error which was meet. Hearken to this with both ears, and tremble all you who live under Gospel light, if natural light corrupted bring such heavy soul-judgments, no wonder, if supernatural; And therefore if you see men, notwithstanding all the preaching of Gods word, yet given up to be beastly sots, or obstinate malicious men in their wickedness; Wonder not at it, for they receive in themselves a just recompence for the abu∣sing of that light God hath vouchsafed to them. Many other instances there are, wherein it is plain, That God makes one sinne a punishment of another; Yea, it's said, That every sinne since the first, is both a sinne and a punishment; There∣fore the want of Gods Imagine us, as soon as we are born, with a proneness to all evil may be the punishment of Adam's actual disobedience, and yet a sinne in us.

4. As for the distinction assigned between sinne and punishment, the one vo∣luntary,

and an action, the other involuntary and a passion. Though there be learned men, both Papists and Protestants, viz. Vasquez and Twisse, who dis∣prove this by instances, yet (if it be granted) it will not hinder or enervate our Position, That original inherent sinne is both a sinne, and a punishment also; For when the learned say,

That sinne may be a punishment of a sinne, they do not mean sin, quâ sinne, peccatum, quâ peccatum, for that is, wholly of man, but peccatum quâ poena, as a judgment it is of God.

To understand this therefore, take notice, That in sinne there is the Obliquity, and the Action to which this Obliquity is annexed; Now sinne in the Obliquity of it, so it is not a punishment, but in the action or materiale of it, to which it doth adhere: As for instance, Those vile and unclean lusts the Heathens were given up unto, were a punishment of their rebellion unto the light; Now as they were sinnes in their formality, so they were onely permissivè and ordina∣tivè of God; but take the Actions substracted to that Obliquity, which was in them, so they were efficienter of God, and he gave them up to their lusts.

2. When God doth punish one sinne with another, the meaning is not, as if he did infuse this wickedness, but only he denieth that mollifying and softning grace, which if a man had, he would resist the temptations of sinne, as in this particular of original sinne; You must not conceive of God, in the Creation of the soul, as if a man were pouring poison in a vessel, so he did put sinne into our natures, but he denieth to give and continue that Righteousness Adam had, and then our souls do necessarily receive the clean contrary, darkness for light, Atheism for faith, disorder for order: Even as if God should withdraw the Sunne at noon-day, continue the light thereof no longer to us, it would upon that sub∣duction be immediately dark, there needed no other cause to introduce it: Thus it is here upon Adam's fall, God denying to continue his Image, and ori∣ginal righteousness in us, original sinne without any other positive cause cometh in the stead thereof; and therefore we are not, as Austin of old well observed, to seek after the causa efficiens, but deficiens peccati, sin hath no efficient, but defi∣cient cause.

Therefore thirdly, In this original sinne we may consider that which is pecca∣tum, and so it's evil, and that which is poena, and so it's good; For as you look∣on it, being the deprivation of that rectitude which ought to be in a man, so it is a sinne; but as you consider it to be the denying of that holiness on Gods part, which once we had, so it's poena, or rather punitio; The denying of this Image o•• God at first was punitio, but this loss continued is poena; so that the want and loss of that righteousness which once we enjoyed, if considered on Gods part, who continueth his denial of it, is a just punishment, and a good thing ordained by God; but if you consider it as inherent in man, who hath deserved this at Gods hand, so it's an evil, and properly a sin in him.

4. The same thing may be a sinne and a punishment also, in divers respects, As it may be a sinne in respect of a sinner, but a punishment in respect of others. Thus Absolom's sinne was a sinne in respect of himself, but a punishment in re∣spect of David; So Parents sinnes may be sinnes in respect of themselves, but punishments in respect of their children; and we are especially to take heed of such sinnes, as are not our sinnes onely, but others punishments, such are passions and unmortified anger, this is a sinne to thee, and a punishment to others.

5. Every sinne is a punishment, in this respect, That it brings anxiety, ter∣ror, and fear with it, a guilt of conscience is contracted upon every sinne. Thus some expound that known saying of Austin, Jussisti Domine, & sic est, ut omnis animus inordinatus sit sibi ipsi poena; O Lord, thou hast so commanded, and thus it is, that a soul immoderate any way, should be a punishment to it self. Thus,

as the moral Philosophers say, Virtus est sibiipsi praemium, so peccatum est sibiipsi poena, Virtue is a reward to it self, because it brings sweetness and comfort of conscience, so a sinne is a punishment to it self, because it brings terror and fear with it.

Lastly, The same thing may be both a sinne and a punishment, both poena dam∣ni, and poena sensus, a punishment of loss, and so every sinne, in that it is a sin, depriveth the soul of that spiritual good and glory which it ought to have, and so is a kind of disease or death it self; and then in some sins they are a punishment of sense, as in envy and anger. Thus when Ahitophel and Judas hanged them∣selves, their self-murder was both a sinne and a punishment of loss, and sense also.

SECT. III.

IN the third place it is objected,* 1.1 If original inherent sinne be made a distinct sin from Adam's imputed sinne, we do needlesly make two guilts, and so multiply sins without necessity, for all the guilt that is in Adam's sinne imputed, the cor∣ruption of Nature which floweth immediately from it, doth not make a new sin, but makes the former more hainous: As if (say they) a man should by some sin lose his eyes, that act whereby he put out his eyes was a sinne, but then it's not a new distinct sin in him, to be without eyes: Or if a Commander, who had a Castle to keep, upon which depended the good of a Town adjacent, if he prove persidious, and give it up to the enemy, his perfidious act at first is all the sinne, if the Town adjacent have much misery thereby, it is an aggravation of his sin, but it doth not make him guilty of two sins.

This hath made some think,* 1.2 That our original pollution, as distinct from Adam's sinne imputed, is not a sinne; and that whensoever the Fathers call it a sinne, they understand it, as connexed with Adam's sinne. Thus the learned Vossius in his Pelagian History. But the truth no doubt is on their side, who hold a twofold distinct guilt, That Adams sinne imputed to us, and that inherent are two distinct sins, though one doth necessarily imply an order to another, and the later is alwayes to be looked upon, as a relative to the former. Neither doth that similitude of a man wilfully putting his eyes out, make to this purpose: For when a man hath lost his eyes, there is a natural impotency ever to have them again; Neither is there any obligation, or Law binding him thereunto: But besides the guilt of imputed sinne, we are bound to have that inherent re∣ctitude we once lost, and therefore being defective in that we ought to have, it's truly a sinne. The loss of a mans eyes is malum naturale, this is morale; And thus Aristotle determined that a drunken man, who committed any sin worthy of punishment, was to be twice punished both for his drunkenness, and the other sinne committed. Thus Rivet also in the matter of Lot's Incest, which he com∣mitted while he was so drunk, that he could not tell what he did, inclineth to their opinion, who say,

That Lot's Incest was not only a punishment of his drunkenness, and so an aggravation of his sinne, but truly and properly In∣cest; so that he had two sins, and was twice guilty.

Some learned men do de∣termine,

That if a man commit such a sin, upon which other sins do usually follow, though while they do them, they cannot avoid them, not knowing what they do, yet those subsequent sins are to be charged upon them, besides the first that was the cause of all; as murder is to be charged, as a distinct sin up∣on a drunkard, though happily in his drunkenness he knew not that he commit∣ted such a sin.

SECT. IV.

ARe we all guilty of sinne as soon as we are born? This should teach us Hu∣miliation and Patience under the death or miseries of our Infants; we are ready to say, Why are such poor Innocents exposed to such calamities? The knowledge of original sinne will stop thy mouth herein. When Titus the Em∣perour was dying, who for his good and sweet Government was called Deliciae generis humani, he quarrelled with the gods, because he thought they did eripere vitam immerenti, he deserved not to die, he thought death was a wrong to him; but had he understood original sinne, he would have seen his desert of it, though he had never committed any actual impiety. Pliny likewise if he had known this, would not have uttered that foolish complaint, That homo was animal infaeliciter natum, which did cum suppliciis vitam auspicari, unam tantum ob culpam, quia natum est, that did begin his life with miseries, and punish us for this fault only because he was born; No, The Scripture would have informed him, it was, because he was born in sinne. This is the rise and spring of all mans calamity.

SECT. V.

I Shall at this time conclude this famous and noble Text, wherein we have the Doctrine of original sinne so evidently asserted, notwithstanding all the fogs and mists that some have indeavoured to bring upon it. The remaining work is to dissolve some further Objections, that are laid in the way as stumbling∣blocks, which, when removed, we shall proceed to the practical improve∣ment of it.

In the next place therefore,* 1.3 this is thought a powerfull weapon against this Truth, viz. It cannot be truly and properly a sinne, because it is not against any Law. The Apostle makes contrariety to the Law, to be of the essence of sinne: If therefore Infants new-born, or before they are born, are not under a Law, then they are not capable of any sinne; and truly it hath a seeming absurdity to say, Infants are commanded by Gods Law, to be born without sinne, seeing that is no more in their power than to be born. This consideration did press that learned Divine Molinaus (Enodatio graviss. Quaest. de peccato origin. pag. 130.) to acknowledge, That no such Law was upon Infants, and therefore he saith, That the Law doth condemn original sinne, but not prohibit it. But this seemeth very strange, For how can the Law condemn a thing, but because it is against it? And how can it be against it, but because it doth prohibit? If therefore the meaning of that learned man be, that original sinne is not immediately and proximely forbidden, that is readily granted, for so only actual sins are, but mediately and remotely, both the habits of sinne, and original, must necessarily be prohibited, if they be condemned. The learned Vossius also affirmeth, That original sinne is not forbidden by the moral Law, though he con∣fesseth it is by the natural Law, which was at first in the Creation of man, but that primordial and original Law is the same for substance with the moral, though differ∣ing in some respects.

To the Argument therefore we say,

First,* 1.4 That as this original sinne is voluntary, voluntate causae, which was Adam's will, so it is also against a Law which was enjoyned Adam; For although Adam had not a Law upon him in respect of the beginning or original of the righ∣teousness he had, he being created in that, and so was not capable of any Law, yet in respect of the preservation and continuation of this for himself and his posterity, so he had a Law imposed on him, and therefore violating of that Law,

we in him also did violate it: You see then this original sin is a transgression of that Law which Adam was under, viz. the continuation of the righteousness he was created in, both for himself and his posterity.

Secondly, Even by the moral Law, or the Decalogue, this original corrup∣tion is forbidden. The Apostle Rom. 7. sheweth, That he had not known lust to be a sinne, had not the Law said, Theu shalt not lust: So that as the Law forbiddeth actual lusting, thus it doth also the principle and root of it; for the Law is spiri∣tual and in its obligation reacheth to the fountain, and root of all sin, it doth not only prohibit the sinfull motions of thy soul, but the cause of all these: Even as when it commands any holy duty, to love God; for instance, it re∣quireth that inward sanctification of the whole man, whereby he is inabled to love God upon right and induring grounds, otherwise if this were not so, the habits of sinne would not be against Gods Law, nor the habits of Grace required by it, as therefore it was with Adam his actual transgression, was directly and immediately forbidden by the Law of God; but that habital depravation of the whole man, which came thereupon, was forbidden remotely and by consequence: Thus it is with that native contagion we are born in, and this should teach us in every sin we commit, to think the Law doth not forbid and condemn this actual sin only, but the very inward principle of it; say to thy self, Alas I should not only be without such vain thoughts, such vain affe∣ctions, but without an inclination thereunto; Therefore mark the Apostle rea∣soning, Ephes. 4. 22, 24, 25. When he had exhorted them to put off the old man, that is original sinne, and to put on the new man, which is the Image of God, im∣mediately opposing that; See what he inferreth thereupon, Wherefore put away lying, they must leave that actual sinne, because they have in measure subdued original sinne. Thus it holds in all other sins, put away pride, earthliness, pro∣phaneness, because the old man is first put away in some degrees, But oh how little do men attend to this? They think of their actual sins, they say, This, I have done, is against Gods Law, but go no deeper, they do not further consider, but God forbids and layeth his axe to the root, as well as the branches & the fruit.

Thirdly, A sinne doth not therefore cease to be a sin, because the Law doth not now forbid it, it was enough, if it were once forbidden, and contrary to Gods Law, otherwise we might say, That all sins which are past, are no sins; for the Law doth not require, that what hath been done, should be undone again, or not to be done, for that is impossible ex natura rei; If therefore ever original sinne hath been under a Law prohibitive of it, that is enough to make it a sin, though now it cannot be helped. Hence Almain the Schoolman hath a distin∣ction of Debitum praecepti, and Debitum statuti (which other Schoolmen also mention) now they apply it thus,

To be born without sin, is not (say they) Debitum praecepti, it doth not become due by any precept or command, but it is Debitum statuti, that is, God had first appointed such an order, that who∣soever should come of Adam, should be born in that righteousness, which A∣dam was created in, and was to preserve for himself and his posterity; so that though there be no direct Praeceptum divinum, yet (they say) there is Ordi∣natio divina, that we should have been born without sinne.

Although we need not runne to this, because it is now against the moral Law of God, as you heard proved.

SECT. VI.

ANother Objection is from the Justice,* 1.5 Equity and Righteousness of God, as also his Mercy and Goodness; How can it be thought consonant to any of these attributes, that we should be involved in guilt and sinne, because of anothers

especially they urge that Ezek. 18. 18, 19. where God saith, The child shall not bear the sins of his father, and the Lord doth it to stop their prophane ca••il against his wayes, as if they were not equal, because the fathers did eat sour grapes, and the childrens teeth were set on edge. The Remonstrants are so confident, that in their Apology, cap. 7. they say, Neither Scripture, nor Gods Truth, nor his Justice, nor his Mercy and Equity, nor the Nature of sinne will permit this.

To answer this:* 1.6 First, It is not my purpose at this time to enter into that great Debate, Whether the sins of parents are punished in their children? And it so, How it stands with the Justice of God? It is plain, That in the second Command∣ment it is said, That God being a jealous God, because of Idolatry, he will visit the sins of such persons, to the third and fourth generation. The same likewise is attri∣buted unto God, Exod. 34. 7. when his glorious Properties are described, expe∣rience also in the destruction of Sedom and Gomorrah, as also in the drowning of the world, doth abundantly testifie this; For no doubt there was in those places, as God said of Ninevch, many little ones, that did not know the right hand from the left, and so could not have any consent to the actual iniquities of their Parents. To reconcile therefore that place of Ezek. 18. where God saith, The child shall not bear the iniquity of his Father, with those former places, hath ex∣ercised the thoughts of the most learned men variously, endeavouring to unty that knot. Though I find some of late, understanding that of Ezekiel, only for that particular occasion, as it did concern the Jews, in their particular judgment of Captivity, who complained that for their fathers iniquities they were transport∣ed into a strange Land; So that they think it not to be extended universally, but limited to that people only, and at that time, and that alone to that Land of Is∣rael, because they were driven from their own Countrey: But whether this In∣terpretation will abide firm or no, it is certain that the Text doth not militate against our cause in hand. For

1. As hath been shewed, There is not the same reason of parents, since Adam's fall, as of Adam; for he was a common person, and therefore Christ and he are compared as the two fountains, and universal principles of all; For which rea∣sons also it is that the Apostle doth here call him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Type of him that was to come: Insomuch that we may easily see, why there is a difference between Adam and other parents; So that although the child dieth not for his parents sins, yet he doth, and most for Adams. Learned men use to illustrate our being in Adam, and sinning in him, (for which our punishment is just and due) by that of the Apostle, Heb 7. 9, 10 where Levi is said, to pay Tyths to Mel∣chizedech long before he was born, because he was in Abrakams l••ins: And although it may be granted, that there is some disproportion, Abraham not being such a common parent to Levi, as Adam was to all mankind; yet Sceinus his exception is very frivolous. The Apostle saith, he useth that diminutive phrase, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as I may so say, which doth demonstrate, that it was not a proper saying. To this we answer, That if you do regard Levies actual paying of Tyths, as it he had an actual existence, then there was some impropriety, which made the Apostle use that phrase, but not in regard of the truth of his paying in a moral consideration. Thus when we say, All sinned in Adam, we may well use that phrase, and speak thus, As we may so say, we did all actually will Adam's sinne, we did all actually transgress that Commandment; Thus it is a diminutive expression in relation to our actual existence, but not to our sinne; For by Gods Covenant we were looked upon, as in him. Though I must consess that is a very absurd and forced expositi∣of Catharinus (Opusc. de pece••t. orig) whose opinion is,

That all our origi∣nal sinne is Adams actual sinne made ours, and referreth that expression of Christ to Nathaneel, Joh. 1. 49. When thou wast under the fig-tree, I saw thee, to Nathaneels being in Adam, while he did eat of the forbidden ••ruit, which

some say was a fig-tree:

Howsoever it be, you see that place in Ezekiel doth not reach to our case in hand.

2. That place will overthrow the Socinians themselves also; For they grant, That by Adam's sinne, death though otherwise natural, is now made necessary and penal, insomuch that we actually die, because of Adam's disobedience. And

3. That place in Ezekiel, it is commonly interpreted thus, The child shall not bear the Fathers siane, viz. if he be innocent, and not guilty of it, as well as his Fa∣ther. I do not discuss, whether this be the full interpretation of that place: But if it be so, then our punishment, because of Adam, hath no injustice in it, be∣cause by that actual transgression of Adam, we are made sinners, as well as he, and so have in our selves, though new born, a just desert of all the wages of sin. The Infant dying because of that particular inherent sin, which is in him, so that it is both Adams and his own, in several respects.

In the second place, to answer this Argument, take notice, That though it be of the will of God, that Adams sin is made ours, for if he pleased, he might have done otherwise; Yet we are not to say as the Remonstrants, That God imputeth this sinne to mankind, meerly because he will, as if the thing in it self were indif∣ferent: Even as God appointed things should be unclean in the Old Testament meerly and solely from his will, because he had appointed so, for it is from his Justice also, such is the hatred of God against sinne, and withall dealing with A∣dam according to the Covenant of works, the curse of that, if violated, would descend from parents to children, as appeareth in Moses his curses, pronounced against those that should not continue in the Law, it was to them and their chil∣dren. Therefore some learned men expound that passage of Gods saying, The child shall not die for the iniquity of his Father, which is also mentioned Jer. 31. 29. to belong to the Evangelical Covenant, but according to the Legal Covenant, the child must suffer with the father, and this interpretation they urge, because v. 31, 32. presently followeth the declaration of Gods Evangelical Covenant, he will make with his people: But let this prove as it can, this we must conclude of, That God doth not impute Adams sinne to us, meerly because he will, but be∣cause of his Justice also inclining him thereunto. So that the Remonstrants speak too slightly of it, as if it were only a dispensative imputation to make way for grace through Christ. But I shall hereafter have occasion to speak more fully to this particular; as also to the other Objections, which may again frequently interpose themselves.

Vse. Of Instruction, from all these subtil and specious Arguments against it, and that in all ages, we may see the subtilty and craft of Satan, who would gladly have this Doctrine wholly buried; for man is naturally proud and self-righteous, hardly brought to be thought so miserable a sinner: If therefore any Doctors shall arise, that shall likewise plead for such a supposed innocency and freedom, How welcome and suitable is this to flesh and bloud? Therefore look upon this Do∣ctrine, as a Fundamental Truth, specially in reference to the practice of godliness, and acknowledge it the good hand of God, that as there have been any, subtil and bold to deny it in any age, so he hath raised up eminent and choice men, in the same ages, to propugn this Doctrine; especially do thou often compare thy foul nature with the pure rule of Gods Law; Be not like the Elephant, which they say, before it drinketh, bemuddeth the waters that it may not see his own defor∣mity.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Object.
• * 1.2

  Answ.
• * 1.3

  Object.
• * 1.4

  Answ.
• * 1.5

  Object.
• * 1.6

  Answ.