SECT. III.
IN the third place it is objected,* 1.1 If original inherent sinne be made a distinct sin from Adam's imputed sinne, we do needlesly make two guilts, and so multiply sins without necessity, for all the guilt that is in Adam's sinne imputed, the cor∣ruption of Nature which floweth immediately from it, doth not make a new sin, but makes the former more hainous: As if (say they) a man should by some sin lose his eyes, that act whereby he put out his eyes was a sinne, but then it's not a new distinct sin in him, to be without eyes: Or if a Commander, who had a Castle to keep, upon which depended the good of a Town adjacent, if he prove persidious, and give it up to the enemy, his perfidious act at first is all the sinne, if the Town adjacent have much misery thereby, it is an aggravation of his sin, but it doth not make him guilty of two sins.
This hath made some think,* 1.2 That our original pollution, as distinct from Adam's sinne imputed, is not a sinne; and that whensoever the Fathers call it a sinne, they understand it, as connexed with Adam's sinne. Thus the learned Vossius in his Pelagian History. But the truth no doubt is on their side, who hold a twofold distinct guilt, That Adams sinne imputed to us, and that inherent are two distinct sins, though one doth necessarily imply an order to another, and the later is alwayes to be looked upon, as a relative to the former. Neither doth that similitude of a man wilfully putting his eyes out, make to this purpose: For when a man hath lost his eyes, there is a natural impotency ever to have them again; Neither is there any obligation, or Law binding him thereunto: But besides the guilt of imputed sinne, we are bound to have that inherent re∣ctitude we once lost, and therefore being defective in that we ought to have, it's truly a sinne. The loss of a mans eyes is malum naturale, this is morale; And thus Aristotle determined that a drunken man, who committed any sin worthy of punishment, was to be twice punished both for his drunkenness, and the other sinne committed. Thus Rivet also in the matter of Lot's Incest, which he com∣mitted while he was so drunk, that he could not tell what he did, inclineth to their opinion, who say,
That Lot's Incest was not only a punishment of his drunkenness, and so an aggravation of his sinne, but truly and properly In∣cest; so that he had two sins, and was twice guilty.Some learned men do de∣termine,
That if a man commit such a sin, upon which other sins do usually follow, though while they do them, they cannot avoid them, not knowing what they do, yet those subsequent sins are to be charged upon them, besides the first that was the cause of all; as murder is to be charged, as a distinct sin up∣on a drunkard, though happily in his drunkenness he knew not that he commit∣ted such a sin.