our confidence: Lapide on the 8th Chapter, and Verse 21. (where we have the
like expression and metaphor,) doth offer ntollerable' violence to the sacred
Text; for whereas it saith, The imagination is only set to evil, he would make
two shops (as it were) wherein this imagination doth work, a shop of sinne,
wherein it only fabricateth evil; and a shop of vertue, wherein it imagineth
good things; but what can be directly to confront a Text, and to put the lie
upon it, if this be not? Let us then be willing to be found out in all this evil;
Let us acknowledge, that our imagination doth continually set up vanities,
Idols; we make to our selves gods, and so leave the only true God.
We have made some entrance already upon the discovery of that wound and
deadly blow the imaginative power of man hath received by original sinne;
and wonder not if in the managing of this point, we often mention thoughts,
discourse, invention and apprehensions, attributing these to the Imagination;
for although the understanding be properly the power of the soul, from whence
these operations do proceed; yet because (as you have heard) the imagina∣tive
faculty is so near to the inteliectual, that in all is operations it hath some
dependance on it, so that it is hard to know or perceive when some internal
parts of the soul are the operations of the fancy, or of the mind; Though indeed
sometimes reason doth correct our imaginations, even as they do sense: Yea
Divines and Philosophers do commonly attribute some kind of opinion, and
judgement, yea imperfect discourse unto it; and this difference is given be∣tween
the common internal sense and the imagination: The common sense doth
receive the simple impressions of things, as of a stone, of bread, as the wax recei∣ving
the impression of a seal, not the seal it self, but the image of it; Thus doth
the common sense receive the species of things, and retaineth them; But the
fancy doth go higher, it doth compound these single species together, witness
those many dreames, and also Chimeraes which many do Imagine, that never
had any existence in the world; Therefore by this office it hath, we see how
near it is to the understanding; yea Suidas saith, That Aristotle calleth it
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (viz.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it hath in it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,
because it is with formes and species that it doth apprehend things, and there∣fore
saith Suidas, it is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quasi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,
make those forms and appearances to consist: however this be, we may conclude,
because of the immediate subserviency to the understanding and conjunction
with it, we may without any absurdity say, The thoughts, the opinion, the
judgement thereof: And so I proceed to the further manifestation of its pol∣lution.