A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is, by pregnant texts of Scripture vindicated from false glosses / by Anthony Burgess.

SECT. II.

Propositions concerning the Nature of the Will.

BEfore we come to lanch into this ocean of wormwood and gall (for the pol∣luted will, polluteth all other things) Let us say something to the nature of the will, not enlarging our selves, either as Philosophers or Divines do in this point, but select only what is fit for our purpose.

First, Therefore consider, That God hath appointed and ordered in nature, that every apprehensive power should have an appetitive power proportionable thereunto. The apprehensive being like the eye to discern and discover the object; The ap∣petitive like the hand to imbrace it: Thus the Angels, as they have an under∣standing to know things, so they have a will to desire them; In beasts there is a sensitive apprehension by imagination, and a sensitive appetite accordingly. Now because man in his soul is like an Angel, and in his body communicateth with beasts, therefore he hath both a two-fold apprehension, intellectual and sensi∣tive, understanding and imagination; and also a two-fold appetite, a rational one, which is the will, and a sensitive one, which is the sensitive appetite in a man, wherein the passions and affections are seated; The will then is in a man his rational appetite, following the proposition and manifestation of the understand∣ing: For if a man did know what was good, or what is evil, and no appetite to

imbrace the one, or avoid the other, he would be no better than a stone or a statue for all his reason. We see then why God hath placed such a power in the soul, as the will is; It is that the good which the understanding manifesteth may be imbraced and entertained, and the evil it doth discover may be shunned, Whe∣ther this will be distinct really from the soul it self, and from the understanding is a Philosophical Dispute, and will not tend to your edification.

Secondly, Though it be the appetite in a man, yet it is a rational appetite, it is subjected in the rational soul. There is a three-fold appetite,

1. Natural, which is in the motion of inanimate things, as in the stone to descend downwards, this is called an appetite, though properly it is not so, be∣cause it doth not follow knowledge, but is consequent upon the forme imme∣diately.

2. There is the sensitive appetite, which moveth upon the knowledge of sense, and this is both in beasts, and also in men, yea naturally we live and desire, even all the motions of the soul are according to sense, and so in this respect man is become like the bruit beast: But of this afterwards.

3. There is the rational appetite, and that is called the will, and this is in man onely; a beast hath not properly any will, no more then he hath understanding, so that the will of a man is a noble and high faculty in him, appointed to follow reason, and to be regulated by it in all things; and therefore Austin saith, Vo∣luntas tantum est in bonis; The will is only in good things; If a man love evil or desire evil, this is not voluntas (saith he) but cupiditas; It doth not deserve the name of the will, but of lust, but common speech is otherwise, there is a bad will, a corrupted will as well as a good will, only when we say, the will is a ra∣tional appetite, that must not be understood formaliter, but participativè, as they say, that is, the will doth not know, doth not reason, but is directed there∣by, therefore it is called coeca potentia, a blind power, and if you say, it is blind, How then can it see the good proposed? I answer, it followeth the good propo∣sed, not because it knoweth it, but because of its essential subordination to the understanding; Hence it is that to have a good will, it is so requisite to have a sound mind. Ignorant and blind minds are alwayes accompanied with corrupt and polluted wils; There cannot be a sanctified will, where there is not an en∣lightened mind; This should make the ignorant and stupid to tremble in their estate they live in: This should make you prize knowledge above gold and pearls, as also to wait upon the Ministery with diligence, seeing that by knowledge the will com∣eth to be made holy.

Fourthly, we are the more to inform our selves about its depravation, by how much the more noble and excellent it is. It is hotly disputed between the two facti∣ons of Thomists and Scotists, which is the more excellent faculty, the understand∣ing or the will; The Thomists are for the understanding; the Scotists for the will, but these two cannot absolutely and in every respect be commended before each other, only in respect of power and efficacy, the will is more eminent, for the understanding it self in respect of its exercise is subject to the dominion of the will, and the will also is properly the original and fountain of all good or evil in a man; for though the understanding hath actual sinfulnesse, and the affections, yet this is because of the will either directly or indirectly; so that to an actual deliberate sinne there is required some kind of voluntarinesse, either expresly or interpretatively, either in se, or in causâ; Original sinne (you heard) was vo∣luntary in some sense, although we need not judge of that by Aristotle's rules, who was ignorant of any such thing. Therefore Julian the Pelagian triumphed in his Aristotelical Philosophy against original sinne, despising his Ecclesiastical Judges, as not knowing Aristotle's Categories; as if (saith Austin) he desired a Synod of Peripateticks rather than Judges in the Church; but though original sinne, with the indeliberate motions thereof, have not the actual personal will

of a man, yet all other sinnes have, so that the pollution of the will, is in effect the pollution of the whole man. Hence

In the fifth place, There is this difference between the understanding and the wil in relation to its objects, The understanding doth receive the species of the object, to it self, not the objects themselves; and therefore when we know or under∣stand evil as an object, this doth not defile the understanding, but is a per∣fection of it. Thus Godknoweth all the evil committed in the world, yet his knowledge is not polluted thereby, Scire malum, non est malum, but the will that goeth out to the objects as they are in themselves, and thereby loving of them, is what the object is. Thus if we will sinne it is sinne, and not if we know sin, because the will goeth out to a sinfull object as it is in it self, so that above all keepings we are to keep the will, for what that is placed upon, it presently becomes like it; If thou lovest the world, or earth, thou art earth, thou art of the world: Hence all the while sinne is kept out from the will, though it be in thy mind, though it be by suggestion to thee, yet because there is no consent, it is not thy sinne but thy misery. I speak not of the motus principatus, which are antecedent to our will, but of suggestions only offered from without, but when the will yeeldeth, when that consencs, it becometh thy evil immediately, as poison while it is in the remote parts of the body may not kill, but when it striketh to the heart, then it is mortall. Thus sinne in temptation, sinne in suggestion doth not destroy till the will receive it, so great a matter is it to look to this power of the soul. For

In the sixth place, Because of this rule and dominion the will hath therefore it is called the universall appetite of the whole man. We see all the other powers of the soul have their peculiar and proper inclination, The eye to see, the ear to hear, the understand to know, but the will is to will the good for the whole person, therefore it is not limited to one good object, more then another, but bonum in communi, the good in general is the object of it, so that the will is the universall appetite and inclination of the whole man; now if this great wheel that moveth all, be irregular and out of order, what good can be ex∣pected in the less wheeles, if the foundation be destroyed, how can the building be established: Let then your attention, your thoughts and affections be greatly quickned, while we anatomize all the evil of the will. This is the most grievous and most dreadfull instance of all the pollution original sinne infecteth us with.

In the 7^th place, When we speak of the pollution of the will, The wera [will] may be take ambigously; for sometimes therby is denoted, the power to will, someomes again the very act of willing, and somtimes the object that we do will, is often called our will: Thus when the Scripture speaketh of Gods will, it doth sometimes mean the object willed, and this is often called Gods will, sometimes the act of willing, thus (if God will) and sometimes that power whereby he doth will, not that there is, Potenis volendi properly in God, for all power is, Perfectibilis per actum, whereas every thing in God, is actum purus, only we speak so of God, according to our capacity. Some indeed have questioned, Whether we may porperly attribute the word [will] to God; or metaphorically only? but seeing that simply to will, is, Perfectio simpliciter simplex, and absolute and most simple per∣fection, therefore it is not to be denied to God; for as the Psalmist saith He that maketh man know, shall not be know? Thus he that maketh man will, shall not he will? only will is not in God, as it is in man, for mans will is carried out to a good desired, or not enjoyed. In our will there is, convenientia and indigentia; First, A convenience, or sutebleness between the faculty and the object, and therefore we will it: And then there is an indigency or want of it; Now Gods will being the same with his Essence, is absolutely perfect and sufficient, but the created will in man is otherwise, and this will since mans

fall, whether taken for the power to will, or the act of willing, or the object will••d, is altogether a corrupt and a diseased will, there is nothing found or good in it; Although our purpose is to speak of the will as a power in the soul, yet prone to put it self immediately into actings.

In the eighth place, The will having this great dominion over the whole soul, and being the universal appetite of a man, therefore it is that in it is seated obedi∣ence or disobedience to God. Obedience or disobedience to God is not properly, at least not primarily, or radically, in any part but in the will. It is true, all the other parts of the soul in regeneration are made holy and sanctified, and thereby in their way conformable to the will of God, yet obedience and disobedience are primarily acts of the will; so that as the will is qualified, so is a man said to be obedient to God: A good will is the good tree, that ma∣keth the fruit good, and a bad will is the bad tree that maketh the fruit bad. As then all the evil or good of a tree cometh from the root, so doth all the evil or good of a man come from his will; For till this be sanctified, till this be renewed, nothing can be good in a man; Therefore if you examine, what is the cause of all the impiety, and all the wickedness that most commit, it is because their wills are corrupt, their wils are rebellious; Their minds, their consciences many times, tell them they ought to do other∣wise, only their wils are slubborn and contumacious, Joh. 5. 40. Ye will not come unto me that ye may have life: So in the Parable, Mat. 21. 29. when the sonne was commanded to go, and work in the vineyard, he saith, I will not, It is then the will of man, that is the desperate and implacable enemy to all the things of God, men may delude themselves with reasons and fair glosses, but it is their will, and only their unsanctified will, that maketh them continue in such opposition to God; now the will is therefore the root of all obedience, of disobedience in a man, because that is like the Centurion in a mans soul, whatsoever it biddeth this, or that power of the soul do, it doth; what it bids the mind think, it thinketh; what it bids love to love, it loveth; what it bids the hand move to, it moveth to; for there are two acts of the will wherein it demonstrateth its dominion, The Elicite acts, and the Imperate; Elicite are those which the will doth immediately produce, as election, intention, consent, &c. and herein it hath full power, yet so, as that it's in subordination to God; The Imperate acts, are those which are produced by other parts of a man, yet from the command of the will, so when we move our hands or our feet, these are imperate acts of the will; Thus when we turn our mind from one object, and place it upon another, this is an imperate act of the will: The affections also they are in some measure under the command of the will, but not so absolutely as the body and the motions thereof are. By which you see that all things in a man are reduced to his will, and therefore the more active and universal this is, the greater is the defilement thereof.

In the ninth place, The will in regard of its constitution at first, hath for its object that which is good; And in the state of integrity it was alwaies a true real good, but in this state of revolt from God, the will cannot indeed be carried out to any thing but what is good, only it's but an apparent good, a disguised good, it is a true and real evil. As the object of the understanding is truth, and it cannot give its assent to that which doth appear to be false, so the object of the will is good; neither can the will have any motion or tendency to any object, which hath not the colour (at least) of some good. As the Devil ap∣peared in Samuel's cloaths, and so was believed to be Samuel; Thus doth all the evil in the world, which doth at any time seduce and draw the will aside, it hath the mantle and covering of good; It being impossible that the will should desire evil▪ as it is evil. It is true, some deny, that bonnus is the ob∣ject, adiquate, and general of the will; but they say, good is the object of the

will, as it is prosequntiva, prosecuting and desiring; but malu•••• is the object of the will, as it is persequntiva and aversiva, as it doth repel and dislike, so evil is the object of the will; For displicency and hatred are acts of the will, and the ob∣jects of these is evil. But we speak of the will now, as it is a rational desiring appetite, satisfying it self with love of some object, and if this be not good, either real or apparent, the will can no more tend to it, then the eye to musick, or the car to colours; onely by original sinne, herein ariseth our unspeakable miserey, that the good which the will doth now imbrace, is onely a counterfeit specious guilded good, no true real good; They are but seeming goods, and real evils; Like the Glow-worm that shineth in the night, and is nothing but an earthly worm; Like a rotten Post or Tree, that in the night seemeth to be glori∣ous, but in the day we know what it is: Thus if we could take off the visor, the painting from those objects, we place our wils upon, we shall see nothing but damnable guilt, and real abominable evils, which will at last damne our souls, Per falsa mala itur ad vera bona, per falsa bona itur ad vera mala; by that which is speciously good, we come indeed to that which is truely evil; and by that which is apparently evil, we come to what is substantial∣ly good.

Lastly, In the will (according to those that are exercised in School-Divinity) We are to conceive in it sutable and proportionable affections, to those we call passions in the sensitive part. Thus in the will (as it is a rational appetite) there are love, joy, desire, fear and hatred. This is plain, because in Angels there are such affections; so also in the soul separated, there is love and joy, earnest desire for the coming of Christ, and its reunion to the body; by which it appeareth evidently, that besides those passions in a man, which work by a corporal trans∣mutation, there are these spiritual and immaterial affections, or rather actions, and operations of the will; So that the will loveth, the will rejoyceth, the will desireth, &c. This is the more to be attended unto, because hereby this pol∣lution of original sinne, will appear the more extensive and diffusive; The love of the will, the desire of the will, the joy of the will are become abo∣minable.