The serpent salve, or, A remedie for the biting of an aspe wherein the observators grounds are discussed and plainly discovered to be unsound, seditious, not warranted by the laws of God, of nature, or of nations, and most repugnant to the known laws and customs of this realm : for the reducing of such of His Majesties well-meaning subjects into the right way who have been mis-led by that ignis fatuus.

Answer.

We had done with Consent before, but now we mee•…•… * 1.1 with it again: such Windings and Mea•…•…ders there a•…•… in this Treatise. But though Consent be like the titl•…•… set upon the outside of an Apothecaryes box, yet i•…•… we look into the subsequent Discourse, we shall find little or nothing of it. The Observer tells us a long st•…•…∣ry, that after the fall of Adam the Law written 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Mans brest was not sufficient to make him a socia•…•… ble Creature, that without Society Men could 〈◊〉〈◊〉 live, and without Laws Men could not be sociabl•…•… that without Magistr•…•…tes Law was a voide and va•…•… thing: it was therefore quickly provided that Law•…•… ag•…•…ble to the Dictates of Reason, should be rat•…•…∣fied by common consent, and that the execution a•…•… interpretation of those Laws should be intrusted 〈◊〉〈◊〉 some Magistrate. To all which I readily assen•…•… wit•…•… this animadversion, that the rule is not cat•…•… pantos or universally true. A•…•… for the order of Law•…•… or Magistrate•…•…, it is confessed on the one side tha•…•… sometimes the People did choose their Magistrat•…•… and Law both together, and sometime the Law be∣fore the Magistrate, especially upon the extinctio•…•… of a Royall Family: but o•…•… •…•…he other side it canno•…•… be denyed that many times, very many times, Ma∣gis•…•…es did either assume Soveraignty by just Con∣•…•…, o•…•… were absolu•…•…ely elected without any suc•…•… restriction. So much the Observer co•…•…fesseth a li•…•… after, that in the infancy of the World, most Nation•…•… did choose rather to submit themselves to the meere dis∣discretion

of their Lords, then rely upon any limits, and be ruled by Arbitrary Edicts, rather then written Sta∣tutes, In which case it is plaine, that the Law is po∣steriour to the King, both in order of Nature and of Time.

The Observer proceeds to shew; That intrusted Magistrates did sometimes tyrannize over their Peo∣ple; that it was difficult to invent a Remedy for this mischief. First because it was held unnaturall to place a Superiour above a Supreme. Secondly, because the restraint of Princes from doing evill, by diminu∣•…•…ion of Soveraigne Power, doth disable them also from doing good, which may be as mischievous as the other; That the World was long troubled between these extremityes; That most Nations did choose ab∣solute Governours; That others placed Supervisors over their Princes, Ephori, Tribuni, Curatores, (which remedy the Observer confesseth to have proved worse then the disease, and that the issue of it commonly was to imbroile the State in blood;) That in all great distresses the Body of the People was con∣streined to rise and by the force of a Major party to put an end to all intestine Strifes; That this way was too slow to prevent suddain Mischiefes; That it pro∣duced much spoile and effusion of blood, often exchan∣ging one Tyranny for another; That at last a way was found out to regulate the moliminous Body of the People by Parliament, where the People may assume their own power to doe themselves Right, where by virtue of Election and Representation, a few act for many, the wise for the simple: That the Parliament is more regularly formed now then when it was cal∣called

the Mickle Synod, or where the reall Body of the People did throng together; That the Parlia∣ment yet perhaps labours with some defects that might be amended, & that there are yet some differen∣ces and difficultyes concerning it, especially the Pri∣vileges of it, which would be resolved. This is the summe of his Discourse here, and a little after in the 21. page and the three pages following, he falls into a needlesse commendation of the Constitution of Parliaments, of their Wisdome and Justice, how void they are of danger, how full of advantage to the King and People, how Princes may have sinister ends, but that it was never till this Parliament withstoo•…•… that a Community can have no private ends to mislea•…•… it.

In all which there are not many things to be muc•…•… misliked, saving some results of his former false an•…•… seditious Principles; as that the People are the Pri∣mogenious Subject of Power, that the essentiall an•…•… representative Body of the Kingdome are all one•…•… (he might as well say that a whole County and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Grand Jury are convertible terms.) To place a Su∣periour above a Supreme is monstrous, and opens 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ready way to an infinite progresse, which both A•…•… and Nature abhorre. I joyne with him in this tha•…•… to limit a Prince too far is often the cause o•…•… much mischief to a State. But the Observer havin•…•… given a good meale casts it down with his Foot: fo•…•… after in the 40 page he tels us that the People had bet∣ter want some right, then have too much wrong done them▪ It may be so, it may be otherwise: but ordinaril•…•… the sufferings of one year in a time of Sedition, a•…•…

more burthensome to the Subject, then the pressures they sustein from a hard Soveraigne in a whole Age. A limited Commission may now and then bring ease to a Society, but an unsufficient Protection exposeth them to an hundred hazards and blowes, from Supe∣riours, Inferiours, Equalls, Forreiners, Domesticks. The Observer would have such a Prerogative as hath great power of Protection and little of oppression. Can you blame him? he would have his fire able to warm him, but not accidentally to burn him. Protection is the use, oppression the abuse of power. To take away power for fear of the abuse, is with Lycurgus to cut down all the vines of Sparta, roote and branch, for fear of Drunkennesse. By the same reason he will leave neither a Sunne in Heaven, nor any Crea∣ture of eminency on Earth. If he will have no Bees but such as have no stings, he may catch Drones, and want his honny for his labour. To limit Prin∣ces too farr is as if a Man should cut his Hawkes •…•…ings that she might not fly away from him: so he may be sure she shall never make a good flight for •…•…im. Saint Bernard tells us a Story of a King who •…•…eing wounded with an arrow, the Chirurgeons de∣•…•…ired Liberty to bind him, because the lightest mo∣•…•…ion might procure his Death: his answer was non •…•…ecet vinciri Regem, it is not meet that a King should •…•…e bound, and the Father concludes

Libera sit Regis & semper salva potestas.

In two particulars this third Cato is pleased to expresse himselfe, he would have the disposition of great offices, &

power of calling and dissolving Parliaments, shared be∣twen the King and the People. Yesthe great Offices of the Kingdome and the Revenues of the Church have been the great wheeles of the Clock, which have set many little wheeles 〈◊〉〈◊〉 going; doubt you not the Ob∣server meant to lick 〈◊〉〈◊〉 own fingers. These speculati∣ons might be seasonab•…•…e in the first framing of a Mo∣narchy: Now when a Power is invested in the Crown by Law and lawful•…•… Custome, they are sawcy and se∣ditious. Howsoever his bolt is soone shot, He that is wise in his own eyes, there is more hope of a Foole then of such a Man. Other•…•… •…•…s much wiser then he is, almost as he conceives him•…•…lfe to transcend them, are abso∣lu•…•…ely of another mi•…•…; that this were to open a sluce to Faction and Sedi•…•…on, to rolle the Apple of Con∣ten•…•…ion up and down both Houses of Parliament and each County and Burrough in the Kingdom, to make labouring for places & packing for votes, & in a word to disunite and dissolve the contignation of this Kingdom; This in Policy. They say further, that in Iustice, If the King be bound by His Office and sworn by His Oath, to cause Law, Iustice, and Dis∣cretion, in mercy and truth to be executed to His Peo∣ple, If he be accountable to God for the Misgo∣vernment of his great Charge, that it is all the reason in the World why he should choose his own Offi∣cers and Ministers. Kings are shadowed by those brazen Pillars which Hiram made for Solomon, ha∣ving Chapiters upon their heads adorned with Chaines and Pomgranates. If these Sonnes of Belial may strip Majesty by Degrees of its due Ornaments, first of the chaines, that is the power to punish evill

Doers, and then of the Pomegranates, the ability to reward good deserts, and so insensibly to robbe them of the dependence of their Subjects; the next steppe is to strike the Chapiters or Crownes from of their heads. But how can this be, except all Parliaments were ta∣ken as deadly Enemyes to Royalty? Still when the Observer comes to a piece of hot Service, he makes sure to hold the Parliament before him, which de∣vise hath saved him many a blow. They that are not haters of Kings may be Lovers of themselves: We are all Children of Adam and Eve: He would be a God and she a Goddesse. His instance that this is no more then for the King to choose a Chancellour or a Treasurer upon the recommendation of such or such a Courtier, is ridiculous; there His Majesty is free to dissent, here is a necessity imposed upon him to grant. Yet saith he, the Venetians live more happily under their conditionate Dukes, then the Turks under their absolute Emperours. The Trophees which Rome gained under conditionate Commanders, argue that there could be no defect in this popular and mixt Govern∣ment. Our Neighbours in the Netherlands being to cope with the most puissant Prince in Christendom, put themselves under the conduct of a much limited Generall, which streigthned Commissions have yeelded no∣thing but victoryes to the States, and solid honour to the Prince of Orange. Were Hanniball, Scipio &c. the lesse honoured or beloved because they were not in∣dependent? was Caesar the private Man lesse succes∣full or lesse beloved then Caesar the perpetuall Dicta∣tor? Whatsoever is more then this, he calls the pain∣ted rayes of spurious Majesty, and the filling of a phan∣tasticall

humour with imaginary grandour. Whose heart doth not burn within him to heare such audacious expressions? yet still he protests for Monarchy, A fine Monarchy indeed, a great and glorius Monarchy, an Aristo-Democracy nicknamed Monarchy, a cir∣cumscribed, conditionate, dependent Monarchy, a Mock-Monarchy, a Monarchy without coercive Po∣wer, able to protect, not to punish; that is in effect neither to protect nor punish, a Monarch subordi∣nate to a Superiour and accountable to Subjects, that may deny nothing, a Monarchy in the Rights where∣of another challengeth an interest Paramount. Quor∣sum haec? he is more blind then a Beetle that sees not whither all this tends, To advance King Charles to the high and mighty Dignity of a Duke of Ve∣nice or a Roman Consull: whilest this Gentleman might sit like one of the Tribunes of the Com∣mon People to be his Supervisor. It were to be wi∣shed that the Observer would first make tryall of this modell of Government in his own House for a yeare or two and then tell us how he likes it. That Form may fit the Citty of Venice that will not fit the Kingdome of England. I beleeve he hath not carefully read over the History of that State; Though now they injoy their Sun-shines and have their Lu∣cida intervalla; yet heretofore they have suffered as much misery, from their own Civill and Intestine Dissentions as any People under Heaven: and so have their Neighbour States of Genoah, Florence, &c. And of Florence particularly it is remarkeable, that though * 1.2 their Prince hu•…•…band his Territory with as much advantage to himselfe and pressure to his People, as

any Prince in Europe: yet they live ten times more happily now, then they did before in a Republick; when a bare legged Fellow out of the Scumme of the People could raise Tumults, surprise the Senate, and domineere more then two great Dukes; so that now they are freer then when they did injoy those painted rayes of spurious Liberty. If th•…•… Romans had not found a defect in their popular Government, they had never fled to the choise of a Dictator or absolute Prince, as a sacred Anchour in all their greatest ex∣tremityes. And for the Netherlands; it is one thing for a free People to elect their owne forme of Go∣vernment; another for a People obliged to shake off that Forme which they have elected. It is yet but earely of the day to determine precisely whether they have done well or ill. The danger of a Popular Go∣vernment is Sedition; a common Enemy hath hither∣to kept them at unity; and the King of Spaine hath been their best Friend. Scipioes opinion that Carthage should not be destroyed was more solid and weighty then Catoes, (as experience plainly shewed.) Those Forrein Warres preserved Peace at home, and were a Nursery of Souldiers to secure that State. When the United States come to have peace a while, then let them take heed of falling in pieces. The condi∣tion of the English Subject when it was at the worst under King Charles (before these unhappy broiles) was much more secure and free from excises and other burdens and impositions, then our Neighbours the Ne∣therlanders under their States. If His Majesty should use such an Arbitrary Power as they doe, it would smart indeed. I wonder the Observer is not ashamed

to instance in Hanniball: he knows the Factions of Hanno and Hannibal did ruine themselves and Car∣thage: whereas if Hannibal had been independent, Rome had run that fortune which Carthage did. How near was Scipioes Conquest of Affricke to be disapoin∣ted, by the groundlesse suggestions of his Adversaryes in the Roman Senate? When he had redeemed that Citty from ruine, how was he rewarded? Sleighted, called to the Barre by a factious Plebeian, and in ef∣fect banished from that Citty whereof he had been (in a kind) a second Romulus or Founder: but if he had been independent, he had been a nobler gallanter Sci∣pio then he was. And if Caesars Dictatorship had not preserved him from the like snuffles, he might have tasted of the same sawce that Scipio did and many others. It is true he was butchered by some of the Observers Sect, (a Rebell is a civill Schismatick, and a Schismatick an Ecclesiasticall Rebell, the one is to∣gata, the other is armata seditio,) and some of them as notoriously obliged as Servants could be to a Master: but revenge pursued them at the heeles as it did Ko∣rah and his Rebellious Crew, Zimri, Absalom, Adonijah, Achitophel, Iudas &c. Frost and falshood have alwayes a foule ending.

Neither is it true altogether, That Parliaments are so late an invention. What was the Mickle Synod here but a Parliament? what were the Roman Senates and Comitia, but Parliaments? what were the Grae∣cian Assemblies, Amphictionian, Achaian, Boetian, Pan-AEtolian, but Parliaments? what other was that then a Parliament, Moses commanded us a Law, even * 1.3 the inheritance of the Congregation of Jacob. And he

was King in Jesurum, when the Heads of the People and Tribes of Israell were gathered together? Here is the King and both Houses with a legislative power. Non de possessione sed de terminis est contentio; the dif∣ference is not about the being of Parliaments, but the bounds of Parliamentary Power. As Parliaments in this latitude of signification have been both very an∣cient, and very common: so if he take the name strict∣ly, according to the present constitution of our Par∣liament, he will not find it so very ancient here at home, nor a Policy common to us with many Na∣tions; yea, if the parts of the comparison be precise∣ly urged, with none, not so much as our Neighbour Nation. I pray God it be not some Mens aime to re∣duce our setled Form to a conformity with some for∣rein Exemplars. But if it be understood to have such a fulnesse of power, as he pretends, according to his late found out art, to regulate the moliminous body of the People; it is neither ancient, nor common, nor ours. He may seek such presidents in republicks, but shall never find so much as one of them in any true Monar∣chy under Heaven.

I honour Parliaments as truely as the Observer, yet not so as to make the name of Parliament a Me∣d•…•…saes head, to transform reasonable Men into stones. I acknowledge that a compleat Parliament is that Panchreston, or Soveraigne salve, for all the Sores of the Common-wealth. I doe admire the presumption of this Observer, that dare find holes and defects in the very constitution of the Government by King and Parliament, (which he should rather adore at a distance,) as if he were of the posterity of Iack Cade,

who called himselfe Iohn A•…•…ead all. It is l•…•…wfull for these Men onely to cry out against innovations, whilest themselve•…•… labour with might and maine to change and innovate the whole fram•…•… of Government both in Church and 〈◊〉〈◊〉. We reade of Philip of Maced•…•…n, that he g•…•…thered all the naughty seditiou•…•… fellowes in his King•…•…ome together, and put the•…•… •…•…ll into 〈◊〉〈◊〉 C•…•…y by thems•…•…lves, which he called 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Che•…•…er. I wish King Charles would doe the like (if a Citty would contein them,) and make the Observer the head of the Corporation, where he might molde his Governm•…•…nt according to hi•…•… pr•…•…vate conceit.

And yet it cannot be denyed, but the greatest and most eminent Councells in the World, m•…•…y be ei∣ther made or wrought by their Major Part to serve private end•…•…. I omit the Lay Parliament 1404, and Sir Henry Wottons younge Parliament 18. Iacobi: our Historians tell us of a Mad Parliament 1258, and the Parliament of B•…•…tts or B•…•…ttownes 1426; a kind of Weapon fitter for Cav•…•…leers then peaceable As∣semblyes. The Statu•…•…es of Oxford were confirmed by the Parliament at We•…•…minster 1259, and ratified by a course against the breakers of them: shortly after the King and Prince were both taken Prisoners: yet in the Parliament following at Winchester 1255, all the said Acts were rescinded and dis•…•…nulled, and the King cryed quittance with his Adversaryes. In the raigne of Edward the second after the Battell at Burton, we see how the tydes of the Parliament were turned, untill the comming of Q•…•…een Izabell and then the Floods grew higher then ever. In the dayes

of Richard the second, how did the Parliament•…•… change their Sanctions? as the C•…•…maelion her colours, or as Platina writeth of the Popes, after Stephen had taken up the body of Formosus out of his grave, It be∣came an usual thing for the Successors either to infringe or altogether to abrogate the Acts of their Predecessors. The Parliaments of 1386. and 1388. were contra∣dicted and revoked by the subsequent Parliaments of 1397. and 1398, and these again condemned and dis∣anulled by the two following Parliaments in 1399. and 1400: yea though the Lords were sworn to the inviolable observance of that of 1397, and Henry Bullenbrooke who was a great Stickler for the King in that Parliament, of 1397. against the Appealants; yet in that of 1399, was elected King by the Trayterous deposition of Richard, and the unjust preterition of the right Heires. Parliaments are sublunary Courts, and mutable as well as all other Societyes. If we descend a little lower to the times of Henry the sixt, we shall find Richard Duke of Yorke, declared the Lord Protector in Parliament, yet without Title to the Crown in 1455. Shortly after we find both him and his Adherents by Parliament likewise attain∣ted of High Treason in 1459. The yeare following 1460, he was again by Parliament declared not only Lord Protector, but also Prince of Wales and right Heire to the Crown, and all Acts to the contrary made voide, and the Lords sweare to the observance thereof. It rests not here, the very next year 1461. his Sonne Edward the fourth not contented to be an Heire in reversion, assumes the Imperiall Diadem, and in Parliament is received actuall King. The

end is not yet, ten yeares after this 1471, King Hen∣ry is admitted King by Parliament again, and King Edward attainted of High Treason, declared an Usur∣per, and the Crown intailed upon King Henry and his Heires Males, and for want of such issue, to George of Clarence and his Heires. But this lasted but a while; disinherited Edward and Clarence are reconci∣led, and the very next Yeare, Edward is Crowned again, and received King in Parliament. You see here,

Signa pares aquilas & peila minantia peilis,

Parliaments against Parliaments: and this in that very question which you say is properly to be judged by Parliament, who is the right King? When the ele∣ction is not of a particular person and his Heires, but of a Person and his Family, so as the People have li∣berty to elect whom they please of that stock, (as it was long since in Scotland, till it was rescinded by Act of Parliament to take away those storms of dis∣cord and Faction which it raised,) The Parliament was the most proper Judge who should succeed: but where the Crown is hereditary, there needs little question of the right Heire, which for the most part every Country Man knows as well as the great Coun∣cell of the Kingdome. How easily were Queens rai∣sed and deposed in Henry the eights time by Autho∣rity of Parliament? Adde to this with what facillity Religion was reformed in part by Henry the eight, more by Edward the sixt, altered by Queeen Mary, & restored again by Queen Elizabeth, & all this by Au∣thority

of Parliament within the compasse of a few yeares; and it will evidently appear out of all that hath been said, that Parliaments are not excepted from the defects of all humane Societyes, Nescience, Ignorance, Feare, Hope, Favour, Envy, Selfe-love, and the like, That they may erre both in matters of Fact, and in point of Right, That it is the incom∣municable property of God alone, to be the same Yesterday, to Day, and for Ever, That though we owe a tender respect to Parliaments, yet we may not follow their directions as infallible, nor resolve our reason into their meere Authority, as if their sole advice or command were a sufficient ground for our actions, which is the maine scope which this Iehu our Obser∣ver doth so furiously drive at in all his writings, That no evill is to be presumed of the representative Body of the Kingdom. And so farre he is right; it ought not indeed to be presumed without proofe. But he goes further that it may not be supposed or admitted, It is of dangerous consequence to suppose that Parliaments will do any injustice, it looseth one of the firmest sinews * 1.4 of Law to admit it.

But such Communities can have no private ends. What had the Shechemites by the suggestion of a wor∣thy Member of their Citty? Or the Brethren of Io∣seph? * 1.5 If any Man boggle at it, may he not be overvo∣ted or overawed, as Reuben was? What ends had the Romans when they made that arbitriment, quod in medio est, populo Romano adjudicetur? What had the whole Citty of Ephes•…•…, being perswaded by Deme∣trius and his Craftsmen, that there was a strange plot against Diana? The High Priests, and Scribes, and

Elders, and if you adde to these, Pilate, Iudas, the Souldiers and the Divell, all had their private ends. The High Priests and Elders to satisfy their envy, Pilate to keep his place, Iudas to get the thirty piece•…•…, the Souldiers for Christs Garments: yet all these concurred in a generall designe to take away C•…•…rist. Which shews us thus much, That a Community may have private ends, yea, and contrary ends, all te•…•…∣ding to mischief, though upon contrary grounds: and yet all agree well enough so long as they keep themselves in a negative or destructive way. I intend these instances no further then to shew the weaknesse of the Observers grounds; Parliaments are more ve∣nerable: yet till this corruptible have put on incorrup∣tion, private ends will seek to crowde into the best Societyes. When a Bill was tendred to Richard the se∣cond to take away the temporalties of the Clergy, there was old sharing: And Thomas Walsingham saith, he himselfe did heare one of the Knights sweare deeply, that he would have a thousand marks by year, out of the Abby of Saint Albons. The very like Bill was put up to King Henry the fowerth, with this motive or addition, That those temporall Possessions would suffice to find an hundred and fifty Earles, fifteen hun∣dred Knights, six thousand and two hundred Esquires, and an hundred Hospitalls more then there was in the Kingdome, (it had been a great oversight if they had not stuck down a few feathers.) Do you not see private ends in those dayes? but even then they found themselves mistaken in their accounts. And now when the Lord Verulam and sundry others of our most eminent Countrymen

have acknowledged (I have heard the very same fro•…•… Sir Ed•…•… Sands) that all the Parliament•…•… since the 27. and 31. of King Henry the eight, seem in some sort * 1.6 •…•…o stand obnoxious and obliged to God in Conscie•…•… to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 somewhat for the Church, to reduce the Patrimony thereof to a competency. Now I say when the Tempo∣raltyes of the Clergy are so inconsiderable in comparison of the Honour of the Nation and the Order of the Church, and so unable to satisfy the appetite and expectation of 〈◊〉〈◊〉; in so much as I dare speak it confidently, that all the Temporaltyes of the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, Deanes, Arch-Deacons, Deanes and Chap•…•…ers, Pre∣ben•…•…, Petty Canons, Vicars Chorall, (which are re∣cited in folio to make a shew,) and of all the Ecclesi∣asticall Dignita•…•…yes and Corporation•…•… whatsoever, let them take Masters of Hospitalls in to boo•…•…, (ex∣cept the two Universityes and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Benefices with cure,) do not all amount in penny rent to the Revenues of some two Earles: Such a proposition seems now to be much more unseasonable then it was then, yet even then the Bill was commanded by the King to be cancelled. I confesse the true and utter∣most value, may be double or triple to this, but what is redundant above the rent is in the hands of the Gen∣try and Commons, who will think much to lose ei∣ther their Interest or Tenent-right. I confesse like∣wise that besides their Temporaltyes, they have Spi∣ritualtyes consisting of Tithes and Oblations: but to think of taking these away also, will highly dis∣please their Leaders of the old Edition. Heare the humble 〈◊〉〈◊〉, It is the duty of the Commonwealth

to convert those things which by their foundation were meant to the service of God to that very use, that Refor∣mation be not rather thought a baite to feed our bellyes, then to proceed of godly zeal. He calls it a plaine moc∣kery of God, a scorn of Godlinesse, the most Divellish Policy in the World, that upon pretence to further Gods Ser∣vice, Men should rob and ransack the Church. To the same purpose Mr. Cartwright, This is our meaning, not that these goods should be turned from the Possession of the Church, to the filling of the bottomlesse sacks of their greedy appetites, who gape after this prey, and would thereby to their perpetall shame purchase to themselves a field of blood. After he calls them Cormorants and protests against it as plaine Sacrilege. A supply from hence, As it is Sacrilegious in the opinion of their greatest Reformers: so it would be inconside∣rable either to inrich the Crown, or to disingage the Kingdom, or to satisfy the appetites or private ends of necessitous Persons.

Notes

• * 1.1

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 •…•…4.
• * 1.2

  •…•…ngtons •…•…y of •…•…ny
• * 1.3

  •…•…tr. 33. 4.
• * 1.4

  first ob. p•…•… 7.
• * 1.5

  Gen. 34 Gen. 37.
• * 1.6

  Considerati∣ons dedica∣ted to Kin•…•… James