Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions in the case concerning liberty and universal necessity wherein all his exceptions about that controversie are fully satisfied.

CHAP. 3. (Book 3)

That the Hobbian Principles are incon∣sistent one with another.

MY third Harping-Iron is aimed at the head of his Leviathan, or the ra∣tional part of his discourse, to shew that his Principles are contradicto∣ry one to another, and consequently destru∣ctive one of another. It is his own observa∣tion. That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom in him that formeth a Religion, or addeth * 1.1 to it when it is already formed, is an enjoyning a belief of contradictories, for both parts of a con∣tradiction cannot possibly be true. And therefore to enjoyn the belief of them, is an argument of igno∣rance. How he will free himself from his own censure, I do not understand; let the Reader judge.

He affirmeth that an hereditary kingdom is the best form of government; We are made * 1.2 subjects to him upon the best condition, whose in∣terest it is that we should be safe and sound. And this cometh to to passe when we are the Soveraigns inheritance, (that is in an hereditary kingdom)

for every one doth of his own accord study to pre∣serve his own inheritance. Now let us hear him retract all this. There is no perfect form of government where the disposing of the succession is * 1.3 not in the present Soveraign. And whether he transfer it by testament, or give it, or sell it, it is rightly disposed.

He affirmeth, That which is said in the Scripture, It is better to obey God than man, hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature. One can scarcely meet with a more absurd senslesse Paradox, That in Gods own kingdom of Nature, (where he supposeth all men equal, and no Governour but God,) it should not be better to obey God than man, the Creatour than the creatour, the Sove∣raign rather than a fellow-subject. Of the two it had been the lesse absurdity to have said, that it had place in the kingdom of God by nature, and not by pact, because in the kingdom of God by pact, Soveraigns are as mortal gods.

Now let us see him Penelope like, unweave in the night what he had woven in the day, or rather unweave in the day, what he had woven in the night. It is manifest enough, that when man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey * 1.4 that, and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawful Soveraign. Take another place more expresse, speaking of the first king∣dom of God by pact with Abraham, &c.

He hath these words, Nor was there any con∣tract which could adde to, or strengthen the obli∣gation, * 1.5 by which both they and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty. And * 1.6 before any such Kingdom of God by pact, As the moral law they were already obliged, and * 1.7 needed not have been contracted withall. He fancieth that God reigneth by pact over Adam and Eve, but this pact became presently voide. And if it had stood firm, what Kingdom of God by nature could have been before it? But he reckons his Kingdom of God by pact from Abraham, from him the Kingdom of God by pact takes its beginning. But in Abrahams time, and before his time, the World was full of Kings: every City had a King; was it not better for their subjects to obey God than them? yet that was the Kingdom of God by nature, or no Kingdom of God at all.

Sometimes he saith the Laws of nature are Laws, whose Laws (such of them as oblige all mankind) and in respect of God, as he is the God * 1.8 of Nature, are natural, in respct of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Laws; and right reason is a Law. And he defines the * 1.9 Law of nature, to be the deictate of right reason. Where by the way observe, what he makes to be the end of the Laws of na∣ture, The long conservation of our lives and members, so much as is in our power. By this the Reader may see what he believes of honesty,

or the life to come. At other times he saith that they are no laws. Those which we call the Laws of nature, being nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason of things to be done; or to be left undone. And a law, if we speak properly and accurately, is the speech of him that * 1.10 commandeth something by right to others, to be done, or not to be done, speaking properly, they are not laws, as they proceed from nature.

It is true, he addeth in the same place, That as they are given by God in holy Scripture, they are most properly called Laws, for the holy Scripture is the voice of God ruling all things by the greatest right. But this will not salve the contradiction, for so the Laws of nature shall be no Laws to any but those who have read the Scripture, contrary to the sense of all the World. And even in this he contradicteth himself also. The Bible is a Law? to whom? to all the World; he knoweth it is not: How came it then to be a Law to us? Did God speak * 1.11 it viva voce to us? Have we any other warrant for it than the word of the Prophots? Have we seen the miraoles? Have we any other assurance of their certainty, than the authority of the Church? And so he concludeth, That the authority of the Church is the authority of the Common-wealth, the authority of the Common-wealth, the authority of the Sove∣raign, and his authority was given him by us. And so the Bible was made Law by the * 1.12

assent of the Subjects. And the Bible is their only Law, where the civil Soveraign hath made it so. Thus in seeking to prove one contradiction * 1.13 we have met with two.

He teacheth that the Laws of nature are * 1.14 eternal and immutable, that which they forbid can never be lawful, that which they command never unlawful. At other times he teacheth, that in war, and especially in a war of ast men against all men, the Laws of nature are silent. And that they do not oblige as Laws, before there be a Common-wealth constituted. When a Common-wevlth is once setled, then are they * 1.15 actually Laws, and not before.

He saith true religion consisteth in obedience to Christs Lieutenants, and in giving God such * 1.16 honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their severall Lieutenancies, shall ordein. Which Lieutenant upon earth is the supreme civill magistrate. And yet contrary to this he ex∣cepteth from the obedience due to sove∣raign Princes, all things that are contrary to the lawes of God, who ruleth over rulers. Ad∣ding * 1.17 that we cannot rightly transfer the obedi∣ence due to him upon men. And more plainly, If a soveraign shall command himself to be wor∣shipped with divine attributes and actions, as such as imply an independance upon God, or immorta∣lity, or infinite power, to pray unto them being absent, or to ask those things of them which only God can give, to offer sacrifice, or the like. Al∣though * 1.18

Kings command us we must ab stein. He conefesseth that the subjects of Abraham had sinned, if they had denied the existence or provi∣dence of God, or done any thing that was expressely against the honour of God, in obedience to his * 1.19 commands. And actions that are naturally signes of contumely, cannot be made by humane power a part of divine worship, cannot be parts of divine worship, and yet religion may consist in such worship, is a contradiction.

He confesseth, That if the Common-wealth should command a Subject to say or do something * 1.20 that is contumelious unto God, or should forbid him to worship God, he ought not to obey. And yet maintaineth that a Christian holding firmly the faith of Christ in his heart, if he be com∣manded by his lawful Soveraign, may deny Christ with his tongue, alledging, That profession with the tongue is but an external thing. And that it is not he in that case, who denieth Christ be∣fore men, but his Governour, and the law of his Country. Hath he so soon forgot him∣self? * 1.21 Is not the denial of Christ contumelious to God?

He affirmeth that if a Soveraign shall grant to a Subject any liberty inconsistent with Sove∣raign power, if the Subject refuse to obey the So∣veraigns command, being contrary to the liberty granted, it is a sin, and contrary to his duty, for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with * 1.22 Soveraignty, &c. And that such liberty was

granted through ignorance of the evil consequence thereof. Then a Subject may judge not only what is fit for his own preservation, but also what are the essentiall rights of Soveraignty, which is contrary to his doctrine elsewhere. It belongs to Kings to discern what is good and evil; and private men, who take to themselves * 1.23 the knowledge of good and evil, do covet to be as Kings, which consisteth not with the safety of the Common-wealth; which he calleth a seditious doctrine, and one of the diseases of a Common-wealth. Yet such is his forgetfulnesse, that he * 1.24 himself licenseth his own book for the Presse, and to be taught in the Universities, as contein∣ing nothing contrary to the word of God or good manners, or to the disturbance of publick tran∣quility. * 1.25 Is not this to take to himself the know∣ledge of good and evil?

In one place he saith that the just power of Soveraigns is absolute, and to be limited by the strength of the Common-wealth, and nothing else. * 1.26 In other places he saith his power is to be li∣mitted by the Laws of God and nature. As there is that in Heaven, though not on earth, * 1.27 which he should stand in fear of, and whose Laws he ought to obey. And though it be not determi∣ned in Scripture, what Laws every King shall constitute in his dominions, yet it is determined, what Law he shall not constitute. And it is true, that Soveraigns are all subject to the laws of * 1.28 nature, because such laws be divine, and can∣not

by any man or Common-woalth be abrogated.

In one place hemaintaineth that all men by na∣ture are equal among themselvs. In another place, that the father of every man was originally his So∣veraign * 1.29 Lord, with power over him of life & death. * 1.30

He acknowledgeth that God is not onely good, and just, and merciful, but the best. That nature doth dictate to us that God is to be ho∣noured; and that to honour, is to think as highly of his power and goodnesse as is possible, and that nothing ought to be attributed * 1.31 to him, but what is honourable. Nothing can be more contrary to this goodnesse, or more dishonourable to God, than to make him to be the cause of all the sinne in the World. Perhaps he will say that this opinion maketh God the cause of sin: But doth not the Bishop think him the cause of all actions? And are not sins of * 1.32 commission actions? Is murder no action? And doth not God himself say, Non est malum in civitate quod ego non feci? And was not mur∣der one of those evils? The like doctrine he hath. Qu. p. 108. and 234.

I chanced to say, that if a child, before he have the use of reason, shall kill a man in his passion; yet because he had no malice to incite him to it, nor reason to restrein him from it, he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular justice, unlesse there be some mixture of publick justice in the case, shewing onely what was the law, not

what was my opinion. An innocent child for terrour to others, in some cases may be deprived of those honours and inheritances, which were to have discended upon him from his father, but not of his life. Amazia slew the murderers of the King his father, but he * 1.33 slew not their children, but did as it is written in the Law, in the book of Moses, The fathers shall not dye for the children, nor the children for the fathers, And he presently taxed me for it, The Bishop would make but an ill Iudge of inno∣cent children. And the same merciful opinion * 1.34 he maintaineth elsewhere. All punishments of innocent Subjects, be they great or little, are against the law of nature. For punishment is only for transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. Yet within few lines after he changeth his note. In Sub∣jects who deliberately deny the authority of the Common-wealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the fathers, but * 1.35 also to the third and fourth generation. His reason is, because this offence consisteth in re∣nouncing of subjection: so they suffer not as Sub∣jects, but as enemies. Well, but the children were born subjects as well as the father, and they never renounced their subjection, how come they to lose their birth-right, and their lives for their fathers fault, if there can be no punishment of the innocent, so the contradicti∣on stands still.

But all this is but a copy of his counte∣nance, I have shewed formerly expressely out of his principles, That the foundation of the right of punishing, exercised in every Common-wealth, is not the just right of the Soveraign for crimes committed, but that right which every man by nature had to kill every man. Which right he saith every Subject hath re∣nounced, but the Soveraign by whose autho∣rity punishment is inflicted, hath not. So if he do examine the crime in justice, and condemn the delinquent, then is properly pu∣nishment. If he do not, then it is an hostile act, but both waies just and allowable. Rea∣der, if thou please to see what a slippery me∣mory he hath: for thine own satisfaction, read over the beginning of the eight and twentieth Chapter of his Leviathan. Inno∣cents cannot be justly punished, but justly kil∣led upon his principles.

But this very man, who would seem so zealous sometimes for humane justice, that there can be no just punishment of innocents, no just punishment, but for crimes committed, how standeth he affected to divine justice? He reguardeth it not at all, grounding every where Gods right to afflict the Creatures upon his omnipotence: and maintaining that God may as justly afflict with eternal tor∣ments without sin, as for sin. Though God have power to afflict a man, and not for sinne, without

in justice: Shall we think God so cruel, as to afflict a man, and not for sinne, with extream and end∣lesse torments? Is it not cruelty? No more than to do the same for sinne, when he that afflicteth * 1.36 might without trouble have kept him from sinning. Whether God do afflict eter∣nally, or punish eternally; whether the Soveraign proceed judciially, or in an ho∣stile way, so it be not for any crime commit∣ted; it is all one as to the justice of God and the Soveraign, and all one as to the sufferings of the innocent. But it may and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may * 1.37 be put to death by the command of the Soveraign power, and yet neither do the other wrong; that is to say, both be innocent, for that is the whole scope of the place. It is against the law of nature to punish innocent Subjects, saith one place, but innocent Subjects may law∣fully be killed or put to death, saith ano∣ther.

Sometimes he maketh the institution of Soveraignty to be only the laying down the right of Subjects, which they had by nature. For he who renounceth or passeth away his right, giveth not to any other man, a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature, but onely standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hinderance from him, * 1.38 not without hinderance from another. And else∣where,

The Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right, but onely in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, &c. So it was * 1.39 not given, but left to him, and to him only. And the translation of right doth consist onely in not * 1.40 resisting. He might as well have said, and with as much sense, the transferring of right doth consist in not transferring of right. At other times he maketh it to be a surrender, or giving up of the subjects right to govern him∣self to this man. A conferring of all their power and strength upon one man, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices to one wil. An appointing * 1.41 of one man to bear their person, and acknowledging themselves to be the authours of whatsoever the Soveraign shall act, or cause to be acted in those things which concerne the common safety; a submission of their wills to his will, their judge∣ments to his judgement. And David did no inju∣ry * 1.42 to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself. Before we had a transferring without transferring, now we have a giving up without giving up, an appointing or constituting, without ap∣pointing or constituting, a subjection without subjection, an authorising without authorising What is this?

He saith that it cannot be said honourably of * 1.43 God, that he hath parts or totality, which are the attributes of finite things. If it cannot be said honourably of God, that he hath parts or

totality, then it cannot be said honourably of God that he is a body; for every body hath parts and totality. Now hear what he saith, Every part of the Universe is body; And * 1.44 that which is no body, is no part of the Universe. And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing. Then if God have no parts and totality, God is nothing. Let him judge how honourable this is for God.

He saith, We honour not God but dishonour him by any value lesse than infinite. And how * 1.45 doth he set an infinite value upon God, who every where maketh him to subsist by succes∣sive duration. Infinite is that to which nothing can be added, but to that which subsisteth by successive duration, something is added every minute.

He saith, Christ had not a Kingly authority committed to him by his Father in the World, but * 1.46 onely consiliary and doctrinal. He saith on the contrary, That the kingdom of Iudaea was his hereditary right from King David. &c. And when it pleased him to play the King, he required entire obedience, Math. 21. 2. Go into the vil∣lage over against you, and streightway ye shall find an assetied, and a colt with her, loose them and bring them unto me. And if any man say ought * 1.47 unto you, ye shall say, The Lord hath need of them.

He saith, The institution of eternal punishment was before sin. And if the command be such as * 1.48 cannot be obeyed without being damned to eternal

death, then it were madnesse to obey it. And what evil hath excommunicatien in it, but the con∣sequent, * 1.49 eternal punishment? At other times he saith there is no eternal punishment. It is evident that there shall be a second death of every * 1.50 one that shall be condemned at the day of Iudge∣ment, after which he shall die no more. He who knoweth no soul nor spirit, may well be ig∣norant of a spiritual death.

He saith, It is a doctrine repugnant to civil so∣ciety, that whatsoever a man does against his con∣science is sin. Yet he himself saith, It is a sin * 1.51 whatsoever one doth against his conscience, for they that do that, despise the Law. * 1.52

He saith, That all power secular and spiritual under Christ, is united in the Christian Common-wealth; * 1.53 that is, the Christian Soveraign: Yet he himself saith on the contrary, It cannot be doubted of, that the power of binding and loosing; that is, of remotting and retaining sins, (which we call the power of the keyes) was given by Christ to future Pastours in the same manner as to the pre∣sent Apostles. And all power of remitting sin which * 1.54 Christ himself had, was given to the Apostles. All spiritual power is in the Christian Magistrate. Some spiritual power (that is the power of the keyes) is in the successours of the Apo∣stles, that is not in the Christian Magistrate, is a contradiction.

He confesseth, That it is manifest that from the ascension of Christ until the conversion of

Kings, the power Ecclesiastical was in the Apo∣stles, and so delivered unto their successours by * 1.55 imposition of hands. And yet straight, for∣getting himself, he taketh away all power from them, even in that time when there were no Christian Kings in the World. He al∣loweth them no power to make any Ecclesia∣stical laws or constitutions, or to impose any manner of commands upon Christians. The office of the Apostles was not to command, but teach. As Schoole-Masters, not as Com∣manders. * 1.56 Yet Schoole-Masters have some power to command. He suffereth not the Apostles to ordain, but those whom the Church appointeth, nor to excommunicate, or absolve, but whom the Church pleaseth. He maketh the determination of all contro∣versies to rest in the Church, not in the Apo∣stles. And resolveth all questions into the authority of the Church. The election of Do∣ctours and Prophets did rest upon the authority of the Church of Antioch. And if it be inquired by what authority it came to passe that it was re∣ceived for the command of the Holy Ghost, which * 1.57 those Prophets and Doctors said proceeded from the Holy Ghost, we must necessarily answer, By the authority of the Church of Antioch. Thus every where he ascribeth all authority to the Church, none at all to the Apostles, even in those times before there were Christian Kings. He saith not, tell it to the Apostles; but

tell it to the Church, that we may know the defini∣tive sentence, whether sin, or no sin, is not left to * 1.58 them, but to the Church. And it is mani∣fest, that all authority in spiritual things, doth depend upon the authority of the * 1.59 Church

Thus not contented with single contradi∣ctions, he twisteth them together; for accor∣ding to his definition of a Church, there was no Christian Church at Antioch, or in those parts of the World, either then or long after. Hear him. A Church is a company of men pro∣fessing Christian Religion, united in the person of * 1.60 one Soveraign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble. Yet there was no Christian Soveraign in those parts of the World then, or for two hundred years after, and by con∣sequence, according to his definition, no Church.

He teacheth, That when the civil Soveraign is an infidel, every one of his own subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the Laws of God, and rejecteth the counsel of the Apostles, that ad∣monisheth all Christians to obey their Princes, and * 1.61 all children and servants to obey their Parents and Masters in all things. As for not resisting, he is in the right, but for obeying in all things, in his sense, it is an abominable errour. Upon this ground, he alloweth Christians to deny Christ, to sacrifice to idols, so they preserve

faith in their hearts. He telleth them, They have the license that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for their faith. That is, they have liberty to do any external acts, which their infidel Soveraigns shall com∣mand them. Now hear the contrary from himself. When Soveraigns are not Christians, in spiritual things; that is, in those things which per∣tain to the manner of worshipping God, some * 1.62 Church of Christians is to be followed; Adding, that when we may not obey them, yet we may not resist them, but eundum est ad Christum per martyrium, we ought to suffer for it.

He confesseth, That matter and power are indifferent to contrary forms and contrary acts. * 1.63 And yet maintaineth every where that all matter is necessitated by the outward causes to one individual form; that is it is not indif∣ferent. And all power by his Principles is li∣mitted and determined to one particular act. Thus he scoffeth at me for the contrary, very learnedly, as if there were a power that were not a power to do some particuler act, or a power to kill, and yet to kill no body in particular. Nor doth power signifie any thing actually, but those motions * 1.64 and present acts, from which the act that is not now, but shall be hereafter, necessarily proceedeth. If every act be necessary, and all power deter∣mined to one particular act, as he saith here, how is power indifferent to contrary

Acts, as he saith there?

He acknowledgeth, That though at some certain distance the reall and very object seem in∣vested with the phansie it begets in us, yet still the * 1.65 object is one thing, the image or phansie is ano∣ther. And yet affirmeth the contrary, That the Preachers voice is the same thing with hear∣ing, and a phansie in the hearer. Even so he might say, that the colour or the sight, is the same thing with seeing. Men utter their voice many times, when no man heareth them.

He saith, Inspiration implies a gift superna∣tural, and the immediate hand of God. On the contrary he saith, To say a man speakes by su∣pernatural * 1.66 inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can alledge no natural and sufficient reason. He reckoneth this opinion, that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and * 1.67 reason, but by supernatural inspiration, among the diseases of a Common-wealth. And lastly he acknowledgeth no proper inspiration, but blow∣ing of one thing into another, nor metaphorical, but inclining the spirit.

He saith, Ordinary men understand the word body and empty, as well as learned men; And when they hear named an empty vessel, the learned as well as the unlearned, mean and understand the same thing, namely, that there is nothing in it that * 1.68 can be seen, and whether it be truly empty, the

plow-man and the Schoole-man know alike. Now hear him confesse the contrary. In the s•…•…se of common people not all the Universe is called body, but onely such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of feeling to resist the force, or by the * 1.69 of their eyes to hinder them from a farther prospect, therefore in the common language of men, air and aeriall substances, use not to be taken for bodies.

He holdeth that no law may be made to command the will. The stile of law is, Do this, * 1.70 or do not this; or if thou do this thou shalt suffer this. But no law runs thus. Will this, or will not this; or if thou have a will to this, thou shalt suffer this. And yet he defineth sin to be that which is done, or left undone, or spoken, or willed * 1.71 contrary to the reason of the Common-wealth. Then the laws of men are made to bind the will, if that which is willed contrary to the laws be a sin.

He saith, Necessary is that which is impossible to be otherwise, or that which cannot possibly be, * 1.72 and possible and impossible have no signification in reference to the time past, or time present, but one∣ly time to come. Yet in the very same para∣graph he asserteth a necessity from eternity, or an antecedent necessity, derived from the very be∣ginning of time.

He saith, There is no doubt a man can will one thing or other, or forbear to will it. If a man * 1.73 can both will and forbear to will the same

thing, then a man is as free to will as to do. But he teacheth the contrary every where, That a man is free to do if he will, but he is not free to will. * 1.74

He saith, Though Ged gave Solomon his choise, that is, the thing which he should chuse, it doth not follow that he did not also give him the * 1.75 act of election; that is, determine him to that which he should chuse. To give a man choice of two things, and deter∣mine him to one of them, is contradi∣ctory.

He confesseth, That it is an absurd speech to say the will is compelled, And yet with the * 1.76 same breath he affirmeth, That a man may be compelled to will. The reason why the will cannot be compelled is, because it implyeth a contradiction. Compulsion is evermore a∣gainst a mans will; How can a man will that which is against his will? Yet saith T. H. Many things may compel a man to do an action in producing his will. That a man may * 1.77 be compelled to do an action, there is no doubt, but to say he is compelled to do that action which he is willing to do, that is when a new will is produced, or that a will to do the action is produced then when the man is compelled, is a contradiction.

He maketh the soveraign Prince to be the onely authentick interpreter of Scripture, and to * 1.78 have Pastor all authority jure divino, which all o∣ther

Pastors hath but jure civili, yet in all que∣stions of faith, and interpretation of the word of God, he obligeth the soveraign to make use of Ecclesiasticall Doctours, rightly ordai∣ned by imposition of hands, to whom he saith Christ hath promised an infallibility, His glosse that this infallibility is not such an infallibility, that they cannot be deceived themselves, but that * 1.79 a subject cannot be deceived in obeying them, is absurd, for such an infallibility (upon his grounds) the Soveraign had without their * 1.80 advise. To passe by his confused and party coloured discourse, how doth this agree with his former objection? which I shall insert here mutatis mutandis. That the right interpretation of scripture should depend upon the infallibility of Ecclesiasticall Doctors, many incommodities and absurdities which must follow from thence, do pro∣hibit, the chiefest whereof is this, that not only all ci∣vill obedience would be taken away, contrary to the precept of Christ, but also all society, and hu∣mane peace would be dissolved, contrary to the lawes of nature. For whilst they make the Eccle∣siasticall Doctors the infallible Iudges, what plea∣seth God, and what displeaseth him, the subjects cannot obey their Soveraigns, before the Doctors have judged of their commands, whether they be conformable to Scripture or not. And so either they do not obey, or they obey for the judgment of their Doctors, that is they obey their Doctors, not eheir Soveraign, Thus civill obedience is taken

away. These are his own words with a little v•…•…iation, onely putting in the Doctors for the subjects. I consider not what is true or false in them for the present, but only shew the inconsistency of his grounds, how he buildeth with one hand, and pulleth down with the other.

He saith it is determined in Scripture what lawes every christian King shall not constitute in his dominions. And in the next words, Sove∣raigns * 1.81 in their own dominions are the sole Legisla∣tors. And that those books only are canonicall in every nation, which are established for such by * 1.82 the soveraign authority. Then the determina∣tions of Scripture upon his grounds are but civill lawes, and do not tie the hands of Sove∣raignes. He teacheth us every where that the subsequent commands of a Sovereign contrary to his former lawes is an abrogation of them. And that it is an opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth, that he that hath the soveraign power is subject to the civill lawes. The deter∣minations of Scripture upon his grounds do bind the hands of Kings, when they them∣selves please to be bound, no longer.

To conclude sometimes he doth admit the soule to be a distinct substance from the body, sometimes he denieth it. Sometimes he maketh reason to be a naturall faculty, sometimes he maketh it to be an acquired ha∣bit. In some places he alloweth the will to

be a rationall appetite, in other places he dis∣allowes it. Sometimes he will have it to be a law of nature, that men must stand to their pacts, Sometimes he maketh covenants of mutuall trust in the state of nature to be void. Sometimes he will have no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone, At other times he maketh all crimes to be inevi∣table. Sometimes he will have the depen∣dence of actions upon the will to be truly li∣berty, At other times he ascribeth liberty to rivers, which have no will. Sometimes he teacheth that though an action be necessita∣ted, yet the will to break the law maketh the action to be unjust, at other times he maketh the will to be much more necessitated than the action. He telleth us that civill law-ma∣kers may erre and sin in making of a law, And yet the law so made is an infallible rule. Yes to lead a man infallibly into a ditch. What should a man say to this man? How shall one know when he is in earnest, and when he is in jest. He setteth down his opi∣nion just as Gipsies tell fortunes, both waies, that if the one misse the other may be sure to hit, that when they are accused of falsehood by one, they may appeale to another. But what did I write in such a place.

It was the praise of John Baptist, that he was not like a reed shaken with the wind, bending or inclining, hither and thither, this way and

that way, now to old truths, then to new er∣rours. And it is the honour of every good Christian. St. Paul doth excellently describe such fluctuating Christians by two compari∣sons, the one of little children, the other of a ship lying at Hull, Eph. 4. 14. That we hence∣forth be no more children tossed too and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, as a child wavers between his love and duty, to his parent or nurse on the one hand, and some apple or other toy which is held forth to him on the other hand, or as a ship lying at anchor changeth its positure with every wave, and every puffe of wind. As the last company leaves them, or the present occasion makes them, so they vary their discourses.

When the time was T. H. was very kind to me, to let me see the causes and grounds of my errours. Arguments seldome work on men of wit and learning, when they have once in∣gaged themselves in a contrary opinion. If any thing will do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of their errours. One good turn requireth ano∣ther. Now I will do as much for him. If it * 1.83 do not work upon himself: Yet there is hope it may undeceive some of his disciples. A principall cause of his errours is a fancying to himself a generall state of nature, which is so far from being generall, that there is not an instance to be found of it in the nature of things, where mankind was altogether with∣out

laws & without governours, guided only by self interest, without any sense of conscience, ju∣stice, honesty, or honour. He may search all the corners of America with a candle and lanthorn at noon day, and after his fruitlesse paines, return a non est invent us.

Yet all plants and living creatures are sub∣ject to degenerate and grow wild by degrees. Suppose it should so happen that some rem∣nant of men, either chased by war, or perse∣cution, or forced out of the habitable world for some crimes by themselves committed, or being cast by shipwrack upon some deserts, by long conversing with savage beasts, lions, beares, wolves and tygers, should in time be∣come more bruitish (it is his own epithite,) than the bruites themselves, would any man in his right wits make that to be the univer∣sall condition of mankind, which was onely the condition of an odd handfull of men, or that to be the state of nature, which was not the state of nature, but an accidentall dege∣neration?

He that will behold the state of nature rightly, must look upon the family of Adam, and his posterity in their successive generati∣ons from the creation to the deluge, and from the deluge, untill Abrahams time, when the first Kingdome of God by pact is supposed by T. H. to begin. All this while (which was a great part of that time the world hath

stood) from the creation lasted the Kingdom of God by nature, as he phraseth it, And yet in those daies there were lawes and govern∣ment, and more Kings in the world, then there are at this present, we find nine Kings engaged in one war, and yet all their domi∣nions * 1.84 but a narrow circuit of land. And so it continued for divers hundreds of years after, as we see by all those Kings which Joshua discomfited in the land of Canaan. Every City had its own King. The reason is evi∣dent, The originall right of fathers of families was not then extinguished.

Indeed T. H. supposeth that men did spring out of the earth like Mushromes or Man∣drakes. That we may return again to the state * 1.85 of nature, and consider men as if they were even now suddenly sprouted and grown out of the earth, after the manner of Mushroms, without any obligation of one to another. But this sup∣posion is both false and Atheistical, howsoe∣ver it dropt from his pen. Mankind did not spring out of the earth, but was created by God, not many suddenly, but one to whom all his posterity were obliged as to their fa∣ther and ruler.

A second ground of his his errours is his grosse mistake of the laws of nature, which he relateth most impersectly, and most un∣truly. A moral Heathen would blush for shame, to see such a catalogue of the laws of nature.

First he maketh the laws of nature to be laws and no laws: Just as a man and no man, hit a bird and no bird, with a stone and no stone, on a tree and no tree: not laws but theorems, laws which required not performance but endea∣vours, laws which were silent, and could not be put in execution in the state of nature. * 1.86 Where nothing was another mans, and therefore a man could not steal, where all things were common, and therefore no adultery, where there was a state of war, and therefore it was lawfull to kill, where all things were defined by a mans own judgement, and therefore what honours he pleased to give unto his father: and lastly, where there were no publick judgements, and therefore no use of witnesses. As for the first table he doth not trouble himself much with it, except it be to accommodate it unto Kings. Every one of these grounds here alledged, are most false, without any verisimilitude in them, and so his superstructure must needs fall flat to the ground.

Secondly he relateth the laws of nature most imperfectly, smothering and con∣cealing all those principall laws, which concern either piety, and our duty towards God, or justice, and our duties towards man.

Thirdly, sundry of those laws which he is pleased to take notice of, are either misre∣lated, or misinterpreted by him. He maketh the only end of all the laws of nature to be

the long conservation of a mans life and members, most untruely. He maketh every man by nature the only judge of the means of his own conservation, most untruly. His father and Soveraign in the weightiest cases, is more judge than himself. He saith that by the law of nature every man hath right to all things, and over all persons, most untruely. He saith the natural condition of mankind is a war of all men against all men, most untruely. And that nature dictateth to us to relinquish this feigned right of all men to all things, most untruely. And that nature dictateth to a man to retein his right of preserving his life and limbs, though against a lawfull magistrate, lawfully pro∣ceeding, most untruely. I omit his uncouth doctrine about pacts made in the state of na∣ture: and that he knoweth no gratitude, but where there is a trust, fiducia. These things are unsound, and the rest of his laws, for the most part, poor triviall things, in comparison of those weightier dictates of nature, which he hath omitted.

All other Writers of Politicks do derive Common-wealths from the sociability of nature, which is in mankind, most truely. But he will have the beginning of all humane society to be from mutual fear: as much con∣trary to reason as to authority. We see some kind of Creatures delight altogether in

solitude, rarely, or never in company. We see others, (among which is mankind) de∣light altogether in company, rarely, or never in solitude. Let him tell me what mutuall fear of danger did draw the silly Bees into swarms; or the Sheep and doves into flocks; and what protection they can hope for, one from another? and I shall conceive it possible, that the beginning of humane society might be from fear also.

And thus having invented a fit found∣ation for his intended building, y•…•…leped the state of meer nature, which he himself first devised for that purpose, he hath been long moduling and framing to himself a new form of policy, to be builded upon it: but the best is, it hath onely been in paper. All this while he hath never had a finger in morter. This is the new frame of absolute Soveraignty, which T. H. knew right well would never stand, nor he should be ever permitted to reer it up in our Europaean Climates or in any other part of the habita∣ble World, which had ever seen any other form of civil government. Therefore he hath sought out for a fit place in America, among the Savages, to try if perhaps they might be perswaded, that the Laws of God and nature, the names of good and evil, just and unjust, did signifie no∣thing

but at the pleasure of the Soveraign Prince.

And because there hath been much clash∣ing in these Quarters about Religion, through the distemperd zeal of some, the seditious orations of others, and some pernicious prin∣ciples, well meant at first, but ill understood, and worse pursued: to prevent all such gar∣boiles in his Common-wealth, he hath taken an order to make his Soveraign to be Christs Lieutenant upon earth, in obedience to whose commands true religion doth consist. Thus ma∣king policy to be the building, and religion the hangings, which must be fashioned just according to the propertion of the policy; and (not as Mr. Cartwright would have had it) making religion to the building, and po∣licy the hangings, which must be conformed to religion.

Well the law is costly, and I am for an accommodation, that T. H. should have the sole priviledge of setting up his form of go∣vernment in America, as being calculated and fitted for that Meridian. And if it pros∣per there, then to have the liberty to trans∣plant it hither: who knoweth (if there could but be some means devised to make them understand his language) whether the Ame∣ricans might not chuse him to be their Sove∣raign? But all the fear is, that if he should

put his principles in practise, as magistrally as he doth dictate them, his supposed subjects might chance to tear their mortal God in pieces with their teeth, and entomb his Soveraignty their bowels.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Le. p. 58.
• * 1.2

  Ci. c. 10. s. 18.
• * 1.3

  Le. p. 99. Ci. c. 9. s. 13. Le. p. 193.
• * 1.4

  Le. p. 321.
• * 1.5

  Le. p. 249.
• * 1.6

  Ibid.
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  Ci. c. 16. s. 2. s. 1.
• * 1.8

  Le. p. 185.
• * 1.9

  Ci. c. 2. s. 1.
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  Ci. c. 3. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 33.
• * 1.11

  Q. p. 136.
• * 1.12

  Ibid.
• * 1.13

  Le p. 332.
• * 1.14

  Ci. c. 3. s. 29. Ci. c. 5. s. 2.
• * 1.15

  Le. p. 138.
• * 1.16

  Q•…•…. p. 334. p. 341.
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  Ci. c. 6. s. 13.
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  Ci. c. 15. s. 18.
• * 1.19

  Ci. c. 16. s. 7. Le. p. 192.
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  Ci. c. 15. s. 18.
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  Le. p. 271.
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  Le. p. 157.
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  Ci. c. 12. s. 1.
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  Le. p. 168.
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  Le. p. 395.
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  Ci c. 6. s. 18.
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  Le. p. 167.
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  Le. p. 199. p. 169.
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  Ci c. 1. s. 3.
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  Le. p. 178.
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  Ci c. 15. s. 9. Le. p. 188.
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  Qu. p. 175.
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  2 Chro. 25. 4. Deur. 24. 16.
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  Qu. p. 277. Le. p. 165.
• * 1.35

  Ibid.
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  Q. p. 13.
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  Le. p. 109.
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  Le. p. 65.
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  Le. p. 162.
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  Ci. c. 2. s. 4.
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  Le. p. 87.
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  Le. p. 109.
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  Ci. c. 15. s. 14.
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  Le. p. 371.
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  Le. p. 357. Qu. p. 266.
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  Ci. c. 17. s. 6.
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  Ci. c. 11. s. 6.
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  Ci. c. 4. s. 9. Le. p. 321.
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  Le. p. 245.
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  Le. p. 168.
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  Ci. c. 17. s. 25.
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  Le. p. 267.
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  Ci. c. 17. s. 24. Le. p. 269.
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  Ci. c. 17. s. 24.
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  Ci. c. 17. s. 25.
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  Le. p. 248.
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  Le. p. 330.
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  Ci. c. 18. s. 13.
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  Qu. p. 292.
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  Qu. p. 108.
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  Le. p. 4. Qu. p. 245.
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  Le. p. 324. Le. p. 196.
• * 1.67

  Le p. 169 Le. p. 214.
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  Qu. p. 307.
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  Le. p. •…•…07
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  Qu. p. 138.
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  De Ci. c. 14. s. 17.
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  Qu. p. 26. & p. 36.
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  Qu. p. 310.
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  Qu. p. 54.
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  Qu. p. 208.
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  Ibid.
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  Ci. c. 17. s. 27. Le. p. 296.
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  Ci. c. 17. s. 24.
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  Qu. p. 214.
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  Le. p. 199.
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  Le. p. 169.
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  Q. p. 334
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  Gen. 14.
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  Ci. c. 8. s. 1.
• * 1.86

  Ci. c. 14. s. 9.