Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions in the case concerning liberty and universal necessity wherein all his exceptions about that controversie are fully satisfied.

CHAP. 2. (Book 2)

That the Hobbian Principles do destroy all relations between man and man, and the whole frame of a Common wealth.

THe first Harping-iron is thrown at the heart of this great Whale; that is, his Religion; for with the heart a man believeth unto righteousnesse. Now let him look to his chine; that is, his Com∣page or Common-wealth. My next task is to shew that he destroyeth all relations be∣tween man and man, Prince and subject, Pa∣rent and child, Husband and wife, Master and servant, and generally all Society.

It is enough to dash the whole frame of his Leviathan or common-wealth in pieces, That he confesseth it is without example; as if the molding of a Common-wealth were no more than the making of gun-powder, which was not found out by long experience, but by meer accident. The greatest objection (saith T. H.) is that of practice, when men ask when and * 1.1

where such power has by subjects been acknow∣ledged. It is a great objection indeed. Ex∣perience the Mistrisse of fooles, is the best, and almost the onely proof of the goodnesse or badnesse of any form of government. No man knoweth where a shooe wringeth, so well as he that weareth it. A new Physitian must have a new Church-yard, wherein to bury those whom he killeth. And a new unex∣perienced Polititian, commonly putteth all into a combustion. Men rise by degrees from common souldiers to be decurions, from de∣curions to be Centurions, from Centurions to be Tribunes, and from Tribunes to be Gene∣rals, by experience, not by speculation. Alex∣ander did but laugh at that Oratour who dis∣coursed to him of Military affairs. The Lo∣crian law was well grounded, that whosoever moved for any alteration in the tried policy of their Common-wealth, should make the proposition at his own perill with an halter a∣bout his neck. New Statesmen promise golden mountains, but like fresh flies they bite deeper than those which were chased away before them. It were a strange thing to hear a man discourse of the Philosophers Stone, who never bestowed a groatsworth of char∣cole in the inquiry. It is as strange to hear a man dictate so magisterially in Politicks, who was never Officer nor Counsellor in his life, nor had any opportunity to know the intri∣gues of any one state. If his form of govern∣ment

had had any true worth or weight in it, among so many Nations, and so many suc∣ceeding Generations from the Creation to this day, some one or other would have light upon it. His Leviathan is but an idol of his own brain.

Neither is it sufficient to say, That in long∣lived * 1.2 Common-wealths the subjects never did di∣spute of the Soveraigns power. Power may be moderated, where it is not disputed of. And even in those kingdomes where it was least disputed of, as in Persia, they had their fun∣damental laws, which were not alterable at the pleasure of the present Prince. Whereof one was as we find in the story of Esther, and the book of Daniel, that the law of the Medes and Persians altered not: much lesse was it alterable by the onely breath of the Prin∣ces mouth, according to T. H. his Prin∣ciples.

He urgeth, That though in all places of the World men should lay the foundations of their hou∣ses * 1.3 on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. He was a ashamed to make the application. So suppose all the world should be out of their wits and he onely have his right understanding. His supposition is a supposition of an impossibility, which maketh an affirmative proposition to turn negative, much like this other supposition, If the skie fall we shall have larkes; that is in plain English, We shall have no larkes. His argument had

held much more strongly thus, All the world lay the foundation of their houses upon firm ground, and not upon the sand; Therefore he who crosseth the practice of the whole world, out of an over-weening opinion that he seeth further into a mill-stone than they all, is he that builds upon the sand, and deserveth well to be laught out of his humour.

But he persisteth still, like one that knows better how to hold a Paradox, than a Fort. The skill of making and maintaining Common-wealths consisteth in certain rules, as doth Areth∣matick and Geometry, and not as Tennis-play, on practice onely; which rules neither poor men had the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity or the method to find out. O excellent, how fortunate are we if we knew our own happinesse, to have this great discovery made in our dayes? What pity it is that this new Mercury did not live in the dayes of the old Mercury, Qui feros cultus hominum recentum voce formavit catus, That the art of preserving the world in perpetual tranquility, should not be discovered until the evening of the world. May we not hope (since he pleased to tell us that after the Resur∣rection, mankind shall be eternally propaga∣ted) * 1.4 that these monuments of his may escape the last fire, as well as some others are sup∣posed to have escaped the generall Deluge, for the good of those successive generations,

they being his own invention, as well as this frame of government.

Yet his argument is most improper, and most untrue. State-policy, which is wholly involved in matter, and circumstances of time, and place, and persons, is not at all like Arithmetick and Geometry, which are altoge∣ther abstracted from matter, but much more like Tennis-play. There is no place for liberty in Arithmetick and Geometry, but in policy there is, and so there is in Tennis-play. A game at Tennis hath its vicissitudes, and so have States. A Tennis plaier must change his play at every stroke, according to the occa∣sion and accidents: so must a States-man move his rudder differently, according to the various face of heaven. He who mesnageth a Common-wealth by general rules, will quickly ruine both himself, and those who are committed to his government. One mans meat is another mans poison; and those which are healthful Rules for one Society at one time, may be pernicious to another Society, or to the same society at another time. Some Nations are like Horses, more patient of their riders than others; And the same Nations more patient at one time than at another. In summe, general rules are easie, and signifie not much in policy. The quintessence of policy doth consist in the dex∣terous and skilful application of those rules to the subject matter.

But I will not rest in presumptions. Con∣cerning forreign States, and first such as are not onely Neighbours but Allies, of a Com∣mon-wealth, such as have contracted friend∣ship and confederated themselves together by solemne oaths, with invocation of the holy name of the great God of Heaven and earth: He teacheth, That such an oath doth * 1.5 bind no more than nudum pactum, a naked Co∣venant. It is true, that every Covenant is either lawful or unlawful. If it be unlawful, an oath cannot be the bond of iniquity: If it be lawful, it bindeth in conscience, though it were never confirmed by oath. It is true further, That he who can release a naked promise, can release the same promise con∣firmed by an oath, because it was not made or intended as a vow to God, but as a pro∣mise to man. But yet to say that a naked Covenant bindeth no lesse than an oath, or that an oath addeth nothing to the obligation, or that the meer violation of a Covenant is as great a sinne, as perjury and covenant-breaking twisted together, is absurd, and openeth a large gap to forreign war.

Secondly he teacheth, That in all times Kings and persons of Soveraign Authority, be∣cause * 1.6 of their indepency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiatours, ha∣ving their weapons pointing, and their eies fixed on one another. It is good for a Soveraign Prince to have his sword alwaies by his side,

to be ready to protect his Subjects, and offend those who dare invade him: but to put Prin∣ces in the posture of gladiators, watching continually where they may hit one another, or do one another a mischief, is dangerous. There can be no firm amity, where there is no mutual confidence. T. H. his perpetual diffidence and causelesse jealousies, which have no ground, but an universal suspicion of the humane nature, (much like the good womans fear, that the log would leap out of the fire, and knock out the brains of her child) do beget perpetual vexations to them that cherish them, argue a self-guiltinesse, teach them who are suspected, often to do worse than they imagined, and ordinarily produce hostility and war. The state of Com∣mon-wealths among themselves is natural, that is, * 1.7 hostile. Neither if they cease to fight, is it peace, but a breathing space; wherein the one enemy observing the motion or countenance of the other, doth esteem his security not from pacts, but from the forces and counsels of his adversary. He maketh confederacies to be but empty shews without any realty.

But for all other neighbour Common-wealths, which are not confederates, but ex∣ercise commerce one with another, by the Law of Nations; he reckons them all as enemies, and in a state of nature, (the Hob∣bian nature of man, is worse than the na∣ture of Bears, or Wolves, or the most savage

wild beasts) and maketh it lawful to destroy them, nocent or innocent, indifferently. All men that are not Subjects, are either enemies, or * 1.8 else they have ceased from being so, by some pre∣cedent Covenants. But against enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful, by the original right of nature, to make war wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent and innocent. Here is no precedent injury supposed, no refusal to do right, omnia dat qui justa neg at, nor the least suspicion of any will to wrong them, but only that the Common-wealth (that is, the Prince) judge them capable to do them hurt.

Neither doth he hold it needful to de∣nounce war in such cases, but maketh it law∣ful to suppresse them, and cut their throats without any warning. From this [natural] * 1.9 diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipa∣tion, that is, by force or wiles to master the per∣sons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. For in the state of meer * 1.10 nature, the laws of nature are silent, as to the actual exercise of them. And this he may do, vel palam vell ex insidiis, either by force or treachery. What is now become of the law of Nations? How much were the old Ro∣mans better neighbours than these new Hob∣bians?

They did not so easily fall to the shedding of humane bloud, but sent their Legate first to demand justice, and after three and thirty dayes expectation in vain, to pro∣claim aloud upon the confines of the enemies Country, Hear O Iupiter, and thou Juno, * 1.11 Quirinus thou, and all ye hods, that this people is unjust, &c. And then the Herald or Faecial lanced his Javeline into the enemies Country, as a defiance, and beginning of war.

Thus destructive are his principles to the publick peace and tranquility of the World, but much more pernicious to the Common-wealth it self. He did prudently to deny that virtue did consist in a mean, for he himself doth never observe a mean. All his bolts fly over or under, but at the right mark it is in vain to expect him. Sometimes he fancieth an omnipotence in Kings, sometimes he strip∣peth them of their just rights. Perhaps he thinketh that it may fall out in politicks, as it doth sometimes in physick, Bina venena invant, Two contrary poysons may become a Cor∣dial to the Common-wealth. I will begin with his defects, where he attributeth too lit∣tle to Regal power.

Fist he teacheth, that no man is bound to go to warfare in person, except he do volun∣tarily undertake it. A man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against the enemy, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse without in∣justice.

Of these many cases, he setteth down onely two. First, when he substituteth a sufficient * 1.12 souldier in his place, for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. Secondly, there is allowance to be made for natural timorous∣nesse, or men of feminine courage. This might passe as a municipal law, •…•…tc exempt some persons at some time in some places. But to extend it to all persons, places and times, is absurd, and repugnant to his own grounds, who teacheth that justice and injustice do de∣pend upon the command of the Soveraign, that whatsoever he commandeth, he maketh lawful and just by commanding it. His two cases are two great impertinencies, and belong to the So∣veraign to do, or not to do as Graces, whoso is * 1.13 timerous or fearful, let him depart, not to the Subjects as right. He forgetteth how often he hath denied all knowledge of good and evill to Subjects, and subjected their will absolute∣ly to the will of the Soveraign, The Soveraign * 1.14 may use every mans strength and wealth at his pleasure. His acknowledgement that the So∣veraign hath right enough to punish his refusal with death, is to no purpose. The question is not whether his refusal be punishable or not, but whether it be just or not. Upon his prin∣ciples a Soveraign may justly enough put the most innocent Subject in the World to death, as we shall see presently. And his ex∣ception when the defence of the Common-wealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to

bear armes, is no answer to the other case, and it self a case never like to happen. He must be a mortall god indeed, that can bring all the hands in a Kingdome to fight at one battle.

Another of his principles is this, Security is the end for which men make themselves subjects to * 1.15 others, which if it be not enjoyed no man is under∣stood to have subjected himself to others, or to have lost his right to defend himself at his own discre∣tion. Neither is any man understood to have bound himself to any thing, or to have relinquished his right over all things, before his own security be provided for. What ugly consequences do flow from this paradox, and what a large win∣dow it openeth to sedition and rebellion, I leave to the readers judgement. Either it must be left to the soveraign determination, whether the subjects security be sufficiently provided for, And then in vain is any mans sentence expected against himself, or to the discretion of the subject, (as the words them∣selves do seem to import,) and then there need no other bellowes to kindle the fire of a civill war, and put a whole commonwealth into a combustion, but this seditious Ar∣ticle.

We see the present condition of Europe what it is, that most soveraignes have subjects of a different communion from themselves, and are necessitated to tolerate different rites, for fear least whilst they are plucking up the tares, they should eradicate the wheat. And

he that should advise them to do otherwise, did advise them to put all into fire and flame. Now hear this mercifull and peaceable Au∣thor, It is manifest that they do against conscience, and wish, as much as is in them, the eternall de∣struct on of their subjects, who do not cause such doctrine and such worship, to be taught and exhi∣bited to their subjects, as they themselves do * 1.16 believe to conduce to their eternall salvation, or tolerate the contrary to be taught and exhibited. Did this man write waking or dreaming.

And howsoever in words he denie all re∣sistance to the soveraign, yet indeed he ad∣mitteth it. No man is bound by his pacts whatso∣ever * 1.17 they be, not to resist him, who bringeth upon him death or wounds, or other bodily dammage. (by this learning the Scholler if he be able, may take the rod out of his masters hand, and whip him) It followeth. Seeing therefore no man is bound to that which is impossible, they who are to suffer death or wounds or rather corporall dammage, and are not constant enough to endure them, are not obliged to suffer them. And more fully. In case a great many men together have alrea∣dy resisted the soveraign power unjustly, or commit∣ted * 1.18 some capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the liberty to join together, and assist and defend one another? certainly they have, for they do but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the innocent. There was indeed unjustice in the first

breach of their duty. Their bearing of armes sub∣sequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. Why should we not change the name of Leviathan into the Rebells catechism? Observe the difference between the primitive spirit, and the Hobbian spirit. The Thebaean Legion of known valour in a good cause, when they were able to re∣sist, did chuse rather to be cut in pieces to a man, than defend themselves against their Emperour by armes, because they would ra∣ther die innocent, than live nocent. But T. H. alloweth Rebells and conspirators to make good their unlawfull attempts by armes: was there ever such a trumpetter of rebellion heard of before? perhaps he may say that he alloweth them not to justifie their unlawfull acts, but to defend themselves. First this is contrary to himself, for he alloweth them to maintain what they had unjustly done. This is too much and too intolerable, but this is not all. Secondly, If they chance to win the field who must suffer for their faults? or who dare thenceforward call their Acts unlaw∣full?

Will you hear what a casuist he is? And for the other instance of attaining soveraignty by rebellion, it is manifest that though the event fol∣low, * 1.19 yet because it cannot reasonably be expected; but rather the contrary, and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like man∣ner, the attempt thereof is against reason. And

had he no other reasons indeed against hor∣rid Rebellion but these two? It seemeth he accounteth conscience or the bird in the breast to be but an Idoll of the brain. And the Kingdome of heaven (as he hath made it not valuable enough to be ballanced a∣gainst an earthly Kingdome. And as for hell he hath expounded it and all the infernall fiends out of the nature of things, otherwise he could not have wanted better arguments against such a crying sin.

Another of his theorems is, that no man is obliged by any pacts to accuse himself. Which * 1.20 in some cases is true, but in his sense, and in his latitude, and upon his grounds it is most untrue. When publick fame hath accused a man before hand, he may be called upon to purge himself or suffer. When the case is of publick concernment, and the circumstances piegnant, all nations do take the liberty to examine a man upon oath in his own cause, and where the safety and welfare of the com∣monwealth is concerned, as in cases of high treason, and for the more full discovery of conspiracies, upon the rack. Which they could not do lawfully if no man was bound in any case to discover himself. His reason is silly, For in vain do we make him promise, who when he hath performed we know not whether he have performed or not. And makes as much a∣gainst all examination of witnesses as delin∣quents. In vain do we make them give testimony,

who when they have testified, we know not whether they have given right testimony or not.

But his next conclusion will uncase him ful∣ly, and shew us what manner of man he is, If the commonwealth come into the power of its ene∣mies, so that they cannot be resisted, he who had * 1.21 the soveraignty before, is understood to have lost it. What enemies he meaneth, such as have the just power of the sword, or such as have not, what he meaneth by the commonwealth the whole Kingdome, or any part of it, what he intendeth by cannot be resisted, whether a prevalence for want of forces to resist them, or a victory in a set battle, or a finall cenquest, And what he meaneth by losing the soveraign∣ty, loosing it de facto, or de jure, losing the pos∣session only, or losing the right also, he is si∣lent. It may be because he knoweth not the difference, Qui pauca considerat facile pronunti∣at, He that considers little, giveth sentence more easily than truly, we must search out his sence some where else. The obligation of sub∣jects to the soveraign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them, &c. Wheresoever a man seeth protection either in his own or in anothers * 1.22 sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it. By his leave this is right dogs play, which alwaies take part with the stronger side. But yet this is generall.

The next is more particular, when in a war forreign or intestine the enemies get a final victory * 1.23

so as the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no longer, there is no farther protection of subjects in their loyalty, then is the commonwealth dissolved, and every man at liberty to protect him∣self, by such courses as his own discretion shall sug∣gest unto him. Yet these words final victory are doubtfull. When Davids forces were chased out of the Kingdome, so that he was not able to protect his subjects in their loyalty, could this be called a final victory?

The next place is home, He who hath no obligation to his former soveraign, but that of an ordinary subject hath liberty to submit to a Con∣querour, when the meanes of his life is within the guards and garrisons of the enemy, for it is then * 1.24 that he hath no longer protection from him, [his soveraign] but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution. And he concludeth that a totall submission is as lawfull as a contribution. Which is contrary to the sense of all the world. If a lawful soveraign did give a gene∣rall release to his subject, as well as he giveth him licence to contribute, he said something. And to top up all these disloyall paradoxes he addeth, That they who live under the protection of a Conquerour openly, are understood to submit themselves to the government. And that in the very act of receiving protection openly, and not re∣nouncing it openly, they do oblige themselves to o∣bey the lawes of their protector, to which in recei∣ving * 1.25 protection they have assented.

VVhere these Principles prevaile, adieu honour, and honesty, and fidelity, and loyal∣ty: all must give place to self-interest. What for a man to deserte his Soveraign upon the first prevalence of an enemy, or the first pay∣ment of a petty contribution, or the first appa∣rence of a sword, that is more able to protect us for the present? Is this his great law of na∣ture, pactis standum, to stand to what we have obliged our selves? Then Kings from whom all mens right and property is derived, should not have so much right themselves in their own inheritance as the meanest subject. It seemeth T. H. did take his Soveraign for bet∣ter, but not for worse. Faire fall those old Roman spirits who gave thanks to Teren∣tius Varro, after he had lost the great battle of Cannae by his own default, because he did not despair of the Common-wealth. And would not sell the ground that Hannibal was en∣camped upon, one farthing cheaper than if it had been in time of peace, which was one thing that discouraged that great Captain from continuing the siege of Rome.

His former discourse hath as many faults as lines. First all Soveraignty is not from the people. He himself acknowledgeth, That fatherly Empire or Power was instituted by God in * 1.26 the Creation, and was Monarchical. Secondly, where the application of Soveraign power to the person is from the people, yet there are o∣ther ends besides protection. Thirdly, pro∣tection

is not a condition, though it be a duty. A failing in duty doth not cancel a right. Fourthly, protection ought to be mutual. The subject ought to defend his King, as well as the King his subject. If the King be disabled to protect his subject, by the subjects own fault, because he did not assist him as he ought, this doth not warrant the subject to seek pro∣tection elsewhere. Fifthly, he doth not di∣stinguish between a just Conqueror who hath the power of the sword, though he abuse it, and him that hath no power at all. I will try if he can remember whose words these are; They that have already instituted a Com∣mon-wealth, being thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgements of one, cannot law∣fully * 1.27 make a new covenant among themselves to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever without his permission. And therefore they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy,, nor transfer their per∣son from him that beareth it, to another man. This is home both for right and obligation.

Sixthly, there are other requisites to the ex∣tinction of the right of a Prince, and the obli∣gation of a subject, than the present preva∣lence or conquest of an enemy. Seventhly, nature doth not dictate to a subject to violate his oaths and allegiance, by using his endea∣vours to maintain protection wheresoeve he seeth it, either in his own sword or another mans. Eightly, total submission is not as law∣ful

as contribution. Ninthly, actual submis∣sion doth not take away the Soveraigns right, or the subjects obligation. Tenthly, to live under the command or protection of a Con∣querour doth not necessarily imply allegi∣ance. Lastly, much lesse doth it imply an as∣sent to all his laws, and an obligation to obey them.

These are part of T. H. his faults, on the one hand against Monarchs, opposite enough to peace and tranquillity, which none can ap∣prove who either have a settlement, or wish one. But his faults are ten times greater and grosser for Monarchs, on the other hand, in so much as I have thought sometimes that he observed the method of some old cunning Parliament men, who when they had a mind to crosse a bill, were alwayes the highest for it in the House, and would insert so many and so great inconveniences into the act, that they were sure it could never passe.

Tuta frequens{que} via est per amici fallere nomen.

So he maketh the power of Kings to be so exorbitant, that no subject who hath either conscience or discretion, ever did or can en∣dure, so to render Monarchy odious to man∣kind.

I passe by his accommodating of the four first Commandments of the Decalogue to Soveraign Princes, which concern our duty

to Almighty God. Let his first Paradox of this kind be this. A Monarch doth not bind * 1.28 himself to any man by any pacts, for the Empire which he receiveth. And it is vain to grant So∣veraignty * 1.29 by way of precedent covenants. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his power by covenant; that is to say, on condition, (learned∣ly expounded) proceedeth from want of under∣standing * 1.30 this easie truth, that covenants be∣ing but words and break, (marke that) have no force to oblige, &c. but from the publick sword. What is now become of all our Coronation∣oathes, and all our Liberties and great Char∣ters?

Another Paradox is this. Every Monarch may make his Successour by his last will, and that * 1.31 which one may transfer to another by testament, that he may by the same right give or sell whilest he is living. Therefore to whomsoever he dispo∣seth it either for love or money, it is lawfully dispo∣sed. And there is no perfect form of govern∣ment where the disposing of the succession is not in * 1.32 the present Soveraign. The whole body of the kingdom of England were of another mind in King Johns case; and if he had disposed the Soveraignty to a Turke, as some of our Historiographers relate that he made an overture, it is not likely that they would have turned Turkish slaves.

Hear a third Paradox. The Soveraign hath so much power over every subject by law, as every * 1.33 one who is not subject to another hath ever himself;

that is, absolute, to be limitted by the power of the Common-wealth, and by no other thing. What neither by the Laws of God, nor Nature, nor Nations, nor by the laws of the Land, neither co-actively nor directively? Would not this man have made an excellent guide for Prin∣ces? But more of this anon.

I proceed. When the Soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former law, the command as to that particular fact, is an ab∣rogation * 1.34 of the law. Parliaments may shut up their shops, there is no need of them to repeale former laws.

His fifth excesse is a grievous one, That be∣fore the institution of a Common-wealth, every * 1.35 man had a right to do whatsoever he thought ne∣cessary to his own preservation, subduing, hurting, or killing any man, in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised in every Common-wealth. And his sentence in brief is this; That if the Magi∣strate do examine and condemn the Delin∣quent, then it is properly punishment, if not, it is an hostile act, but both are justifiable. Judge Reader, whether thou wilt trust St. Paul or T. H. St. Paul telleth us, that the Magistrate is the ordinance of God, the Minister * 1.36 of God, the Revenger of God, the Sword-bearer of God to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.

No saith T. H. punishment is not an act of the Magistrate as he is a Magistrate, or as he is an Officer of God to do justice, or a re∣venger

of evil deeds; but as he is the onely private man who hath not laid down his na∣tural right to kill any man at his own discre∣tion, if he do but suspect that he may prove noisome to him, or conceive it necessary for his own preservation. Who ever heard of such a right before, so repugnant to the Laws of God and Nature? But observe Reader what is the result of it, that the Soveraign may lawfully kill any of his subjects, or as many of them as he pleaseth, without any fault of theirs, without any examination on his part, meerly upon suspicion, or without any suspi∣cion of the least crime, if he do but judge him to be hurtful or noisome, as freely as a man may pluck up a weed, because it hinders the nourishment of better plants. Before the in∣stitution of a Common-wealth every one may law∣fully * 1.37 be spoiled and killed by every one, but in a Common-wealth onely by one, that is the Sove∣raign. And by the right of nature we destroy without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men. He makes no difference be∣tween a Christian and a wolfe. VVould you know what is noxious with him, even whatso∣ever he thinketh can annoy him. VVho would * 1.38 not desire to live in his Common-wealth, where the Soveraign may lawfully kill a thou∣sand innocents every morning to his break∣fast? Surely this is a Common-wealth of fishes, where the great ones eat the lesser.

It were strange if his Subjects should be in a better condition for their fortunes, than they are for their lifes, no I warrant you: do but hear him. Thy dominion and thy property * 1.39 is so great, and lasteth so long, as the Common-wealth (that is, the Soveraign) will. Perhaps he meaneth in some extraordinary cases? Tush, in all cases, and at all times. When thou didst chuse a Soveraign, even in chusing him thou madest him a deed of gift of all thou hast, Et tu ergo tuum jus civitate concessisti, and therefore thou hast granted all thy right to the Common-wealth. * 1.40

Yet some may imagine that his meaning is only that property may be transferred by Laws or Acts of Parliament from one to another. As the Lacedemonians, when they per∣mitted children to steal other mens goods, they * 1.41 transferred the right from the owners to the chil∣dren. No, no, T. H. is not for general laws, but particular verbal mandates. The Kings word is sufficient to take any thing from any sub∣ject, * 1.42 if there be need, and the King is judge of that need. If by need he did understand ex∣tream necessity, for the preservation of the Common-wealth, it might alter the case. But his need is like Ahabs need of Naboths vineyard. There is neither necessity, nor Common-wealth in the case. The Lacede∣monian thefts were warranted by a general law, not only consented to universally, but sworn unto. And if it had been otherwise,

the value was so small, and the advantage apprehended, to be so great to the Common-wealth, that no honest Subject would contra∣dict it.

Right and Title may be transferred by Law, and there can be no wrong, where consent is explicate and universal; such con∣sent taketh away all errour. But if the con∣sent be onely implicite, to the making or ad∣mitting of just laws, and unjust laws be obtru∣ded in the place of just: the Subject suffers justly by his own Act: but he or they that were trusted sinne. And if he be a Soveraign, oweth an account to God, if subordinate, both to God and man. But he justifieth the taking away of mens estates, either in part, or in whole, without president Law, or pre∣sident necessity, or subsequent satisfaction. And maintaineth, that not only the Subject is bound to submit, but that the Soveraign is just in doing it.

I cannot passe by his good affection to the Nobility of Europe: In these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a right of certain persons, * 1.43 to have place in the highest Councel of State by inheritance, but good councel comes not by inheri∣tance. And the politicks is an harder study than Geometry. I think he mistakes the Councel of State for the Parliament. And who more fit to concur in the choice of Laws, than they who are most concerned in the Laws, than they who must contribute most, if there be

occasion, to the maintenance of the Laws. No art is hereditary more than politicks. A Musitian doth not beget a Musitian. Yet we see the fathers eminence in any Art, begets a propension in his posterity to the same. And where two or three successive generati∣ons do happily insist in the steps one of ano∣ther, they raise an Art to great perfection. I do easily acknowledge that Politicks are an harder study than Geometry, and the pra∣ctise more than the Theorye, gained more by experience than by study. Therefore our Parliaments did prudently permit the eldest sons of Barons, to be present at their consul∣tations, to fit them by degrees, for that person which they must one day sustein. But he had a mind to shew the States men his teeth, as he had done to all other professions.

There are many other errours and mistakes in his Politicks, as this, That Soveraignty can∣not be divided, or that there cannot be a mixed * 1.44 form of government, which is a meer mistaking of the question. For though it be sometimes stiled a mixed monarchy, because it doth partake of all the advantages of Aristocracy and Democracy, without partaking of their inconveniences: yet to speak properly, it is more aptly called a temperated or modera∣ted Soveraignty, rather than divided or mixed. Neither did any English Monarch communicate any essential of Soveraignty to any Subject or Subjects whatsoever. All

civil power, legislative, judiciary, military, was ever exercised in the name of the King, and by his authority. The three Estates of the Kingdom assembled in Parliament, were but suppliants to the King, to have such or such Laws enacted. What is it then that hath occasioned this mistake? though the King hath not granted away any part of his Soveraign power: yet he hath restrained himself by his Coronation-oath, and by his great Charters, from the exercise of some part of it in some cases, without such and such requisite conditions, (except where the evident necessity of the Common-wealth, is a dispensation from Heaven for the contrary) So he hath restrained himself in the exercise of his legislative power, that he will governe his Subjects by no new Laws, other than such as they should assent unto. It is not then any legislative power, which the two Houses of Parliament have either exclusively without the King, or inclusively with the King, but a receptive, or rather a preparative power, sine qua non, without which no new laws ought to be imposed upon them: and as no new laws, so no new taxes or imposition; which are granted in England by a Statute Law.

But this it is evident how much his dis∣course of three souls animating one body, is wide from the purpose, and his supposition of set∣ting up a supremacy against the Soveraignty,

Canons against Laws, and a ghostly authority against the civil, weigheth lesse than nothing, seeing we acknowledge, That the civil Sove∣raign hath an Archirectonicall power, to see that all Subjects within his dominions do their duties in their several callings, for the safety and tranquility of their Common-wealth, and to punish those that are exorbitant with the civil sword, as well those who derive their habitual power immediatly from Christ, as those who derive it from the Soveraign himself. Then the constitution of our English policy was not to be blamed, the exercise of the power of the keys, by authority from Christ, was not to be blamed; but T. H. deserveth to be blamed, who presumeth to censure before he understand.

Another of his whimsies is, That no law can be unjust; by a good law I mean, not a just law, * 1.45 for no law can be unjust, &c. It is in the Laws of the Common-wealth, as in the laws of gaming. Whatsoever the Gamsters all agree on, is injustice to none of them. An opinion absurd in it self, and contradictory to his own ground. There may be laws tending to the contumely of God, to Atheisme, to denial of Gods provi∣dence, to Idolatry, all which he confesseth to be crimes of high treason against God. There may be Laws against the Law of na∣ture, which he acknowledgeth to be the divine Law, eternally, immutable, which God hath made known to all men, by his eternal word born * 1.46

in themselves, that is to say, natural reason. But this question, whether any law can be unjust, hath been debated more fully between him and me, in my answer to his Animadversions. The true ground of this and many other of his mistakes, is this, That he fancieth no * 1.47 reality of any natural justice or honesty, nor any relation to the Law of God or nature, but only to the Laws of the Common-wealth. So from one absurdity being admitted, many others are apt to follow.

His Oeconomicks are no better than his Po∣liticks. He teacheth parents that they cannot be injurious to their children, so long as they are in * 1.48 their power. Yes, too many wayes, both by omission and commission. He teacheth mo∣thers that they may cast away their infants, or * 1.49 expose them at their own discretion lawfully. He teacheth parents indifferently, that where they are free from all subjection, they may take away * 1.50 the lifes of their children, or kill them, and this justly.

What horrid doctrines are these? It may be he will tell us, that he speaketh only of the state of meer nature, but he doth not, for he speaketh expressely of Common-wealths, and paralleth Fathers with Kings and Lords, to whom he ascribeth absolute dominion, who have no place in his state of meer nature. Neither can he speak of the state of meer nature, for therein, according to his grounds, the children have as much priviledge to kill

their Parents, as the Parents to kill their chil∣dren, seeing he supposeth it to be a state of war of all men against all men,

And if he did speak of the state of meer nature, it were all one. For first his state of meer nature is a drowsie dream of his own feigning, which looketh upon men as if they were suddenly grown out of the ground like mush∣roms. * 1.51 The primigenious and most natural state of mankind, was in Adam before his fall, that is, the state of innocence. O•…•… sup∣pose we should give way to him to expound himself of the state of corrupted nature, that was in Adam and his family after his fall. But there was no such state of meer nature as he imagineth. There was Religion, there were Laws, Government, Society: and if there ever were any such barbarous savage rabble of men, as he supposeth, in the World, it is both untrue and dishonourable to the God of nature, to call it the state of meer nature, which is the state of degenerated na∣ture. He might as well call an hydro•…•…ical distemper, contracted by intemperance, or any other disease of that nature, the natural state of men. But there never was any such degenerate rabble of men in the World, that were without all Religion, all Government, all Laws, natural and Civil, no, not amongst the most barbarous Americans, (who ex∣cept some few criminal habits, which those poor degenerate people, deceived by national

stome, do hold for noble) have more principles of naturall piety, and honesty, and moralty, then are readily to be found in his writings. As for the times of civill war, they are so far from being without all pacts and governours, that they abound overmuch with pacts and gover∣nours making policy not only to seem, but to be double.

This evident truth may be demonstrated from his own grounds. All those places of holy * 1.52 Scripture by which we are forbidden to invade that which is another mans, as, thou shalt not kill, thou shall not steale, thou shalt not commit adulte∣ry, do confim the last of distinction of mine and thine. For they suppose the right of all men, to all things to bt taken away. How can that be, when he confesseth every where that these are the eternal lawes of God and nature. But that which is much more true, they both suppose and demonstrate that there never was any such right of all men to all things. Let him call them lawes or theorems, or what he please, they confute that state of meer nature which he maketh the foundation of his commonwealth

Hitherto he hath been too high for the parents. Now they must expect a cooling card. The question who is the better man hath no place in the condition of meer nature, where all men are equall. Are the parent and child e∣quall? Yes, they are equall who can do equall things one against another, But they who can do the greatest things, that is to kill, can do equall

things. Therefore all men by nature are equall a∣mong themselves. If the son have as strong an arme, and as good a cudgell as his father, he is as good a man as his father.

Another of his aphorismes is, paternall do∣minion is not so derived from generation, as if * 1.53 therefore the parent had dominion over his child, because he begat him, but by the childs consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. And will you see how this consent is gained? The attaining to soveraign power is by two waies, one by naturall force, as when a man maketh his children submit themselves and their children to his government, as being able to destroy * 1.54 them if they refuse. These principles are so false that the very evidence of truth doth ex∣tort the contrary from him at other times. The Bishop saw there was paternall government in Adam, which he might do easily, as being no deep * 1.55 consideration. And again, To kill ones parent, is a greater crime than to kill another, For the parent ought to have the honour of a soveraign, though he have surrendred his power to the civil law be∣cause he had it originally by nature. Great is * 1.56 truth, and prevaileth.

If this were no deep consideration, the more he deserveth to be blamed, who at sometimes robbeth both parents of their honour, some some other times the man only, as by the right of nature the dominion over an infant doth belong first to him who hath him first in his power. And it is manifest that he that is born is sooner in the

power of his mother than of any other, so that she might either bring him up, or cast him out, at her * 1.57 pleasure, and by right. Never without the fa∣thers licence, again, in the state of nature it can∣not be known who is father of an infant, but by the relation of the mother. Therefore he is his, whom the mother would have him to be, and therefore the mothers. Doth this man believe in earnest * 1.58 that marriage was instituted by God in Para∣dice, and hath continued ever since the crea∣tion, He might as well tell us in plain termes, that all the obligation which a child hath to his parent, is because he did not take him by the heeles and knock out his braines against the walls, so soon as he was born. Though this be intolerable, yet there is something of gratitude in it, and in that respect it is not altogether so ill as his forced pacts.

How repugnant is this which he saith of the mothers dominion over her children, to the law of nations? By the law of the twelve tables a father might sell his child twice, bis vaenum dicat. The mother had no hand in it. Neither doth the judiciall law of the Jewes, dissent from this, If a man sell his daughter is * 1.59 be a maid servant. So likewise a childs vow might be invalidated by the authority of a father, but not of a mother.

He aboundeth every where with such de∣structive conclusions as these, as to generation God hath ordained to man an helper, and there be alwaies two that are equally parents, The dominion

therefore over the child should belong equally to both, and he be equally subject to both, which is * 1.60 impossible, for no man can obey two masters. Whe∣ther had he forgotten the commandement, Honour thy father and thy mother, or thin∣keth he that obedience is not a branch of honour?

In the next place his principles destroy the subordination of a wife to her husband. The inaequality of naturall strength is lesse than that a man can acquire dominion over a woman without * 1.61 war? And he giveth this reason why the con∣trary custome prevaileth, because common-wealths were constituted by fathers of families, not * 1.62 by mothers of families, and from hence it is that the domesticall dominion belongs to the man. The scriptures assign another reason of the subject∣ion of the woman, and the rule of the man, namely the ordinance of Almighty God. Gen. 3. 16. And St. Paul secondeth it, Women are com∣manded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. 1. Cor. 14. 34. I trow that law was not made by fathers of families. Wives submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. Eph. 5. 22. Why, because of the civill law? No such thing for the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church, v. 23. And the man is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of the man, for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man, neither was the man created for the woman, but the woman, for the man. 1. Cor. 11. 7. 8. 9. He would not

suffer a woman to usurp authority over a man. 1. Tim. 2. 12. much lesse over her own husband. I might cite St. Peter to the same purpose, but I am afraid lest he should accuse both S. Peter and St. Paul of partiality, as well as the first founders of commonwealths.

Upon his principles no man is sure of his own wife, if the soveraign please to dispose her to another. For although the law of nature do prohibit theft, or adultery. &c. Yet if the civill law command a man to invade any thing, that is not theft or adultery. And what is the civill law in his sense? the command of the lawgiver. * 1.63 And his command is the declaration of his will. So if the lawgiver do but declare his pleasure that any one shall enjoy such a mans wife, or * 1.64 that she shall no longer be his wife, according to his grounds, husband and wife must both obey. What is theft? what is murder? what is adultery? is known by the civill law, that is by the commands of him that is Soveraign in the com∣monwealth. And without the Soveraignes * 1.65 command, if either party do but suspect one another, the party suspected is disobliged, for there is no pact, where credit is not given to him that maketh the pact, neither can faith be vio∣lated where it is not had.

The next politicall relation is between the Master and the servant, which the Hobbian * 1.66 principles do overthrow as well as the rest. One of these principles is, that a Master can∣not do any wrong to his servant, because the ser∣vant

hath subjected his will to the will of his Master. In all such submissions there is ever∣more either expressed or implied a salvo, or * 1.67 a saving of his duty to God, and his allegi∣ance to his Prince. If his master shall punish him for not doing contrary to these, or by menaces compell him to do contrary to these, he doth him wrong. No man can transfer that right to another, which he had not himself. The servant before his submissi∣on to his master, had no right to denie due obedience to god, or due allegiance to his Prince.

Another of his Paradoxesis, that whosoe∣ver is obliged to obey the commands of any other, before he know what he will command, is bound to all his commands simply, and without restriction. Now he that is obliged, is called a servant, he to whom he is bound, a Master. What if the ma∣sters * 1.68 command be contrary to the lawes of God or nature? Or the lawes of the common-wealth. In the presence of a greater autho∣rity, a lesser authority ceaseth. Such impli∣cite obligations are ever to be understood, quantum jus fasque fuerit, according to law and equity.

Hitherto servants have been grieved, but now they shall be relieved, if T. H. his au∣thority can do it. Servants who are holden in bonds are not comprehended in the definition of servants, because they serve not by pact, but to avoid beating, And therefore if they fly away, or * 1.69

kill their master, they do nothing contrary to the lawes of nature. For to bind them is a sign that the binder did suppose them not sufficiently bound by any other obligation. His consequence is infirm, because the Master binds his servant therefore he distrusts him, therefore there were no pacts. A man may give his parole for true imprisonment, and having given it to a just enemy, is obliged to hold it, what if his conquerour or master did spare his life, upon condition that he should be true priso∣ner, untill he could find out a fit exchange for him. This was a lawfull pact. Then doth not T. H. instruct the prisoner well, to cut his Conquerours throat, who spared his life, upon a lawfull condition.

But to dispell these umbrages, he teacheth that a servant who is cast into bonds, or any way * 1.70 deprived of his corporall liberty, is freed from that other obligation which did arise from his pact So as according to his principles, If a servant, (that is more than a captive,) having not only had his life spared by a just Conquerour, but also contracted and engaged himself to be a loyall servant, as firmly as may be, shall neverthelesse be cast into any bonds by his master, or be restrained of his corporall li∣berty, upon delinquency, or just suspicion, he is acquitted of all his pacts and obligations, and as free to run away, or cut his masters throat, as if he had never pacted or ingaged at all.

His defaults come so thick, I am weary of observing them. Take an hotchpotch to∣gether.

1. In the state of nature profit is the measure of right. * 1.71

2. Every one is an enemy to every one whom he neither commandeth nor obeyeth.

3. Not onely to contend against one, but even this very thing not to consent, is odious; for not to * 1.72 consent with one in some thing, is tacitely to accuse him of errour in that thing, as to dissent in many things, is to hold him for a foole. In the name of God what doth he hold the whole VVorld to be? I am sure he dissenteth from them all in many things.

4. It is not reasonable that one perform first, if it be likely that the other will not perform after∣wards, * 1.73 which whether it be likely or no, he that feareth shall judge. It is true he addeth, That in the civil state, where both parties may be com∣pelled, he who is to perform first by the contract, ought to perform first. But what if the civil power be not able to compel him? VVhat if there be no witnesses to prove the contract? then the civil power can do nothing. May a man violate his faith in such cases upon gene∣ral suspicions of the fraud and unfaithfulnesse of mankind?

5. If a people have elected a Soveraign for term of life, and he die, neither the people before election, nor he before his death, having ordained * 1.74 any thing about a place of meeting for a new ele∣ction,

it is lawful for every one, by equal, that is natural right, to snatch the Soveraignty to him∣self if he can. His opinion of the state of na∣ture is a very bundle of absurdities.

6. When a Master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger, if it be not done, the in∣jury is done to the Master, whom he had before * 1.75 covenanted to obey, but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation, and therefore could not injure him. True according to his Principles, who maketh neither consci∣ence nor honesty nor obligation from any one to any one, but onely by pacts or promi∣ses. All just men are of another mind.

7. Those men which are so remisly governed, that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce * 1.76 a new opinion, are still in war, and their condition not peace, but onely a cessation of arms, for fear of one another. Why is the fault rather imputed to the remisnesse of the Governour, than to the sedition of the people, and a state of war feigned, where none is? The reason is evi∣dent, because he had no hand in the govern∣ment, but had a hand in the introduction of new opinions.

8. In a Soveraign assembly, the liberty to pro∣test is taken away, both because he that protesteth there, denieth their Soveraignty, and also what∣soever * 1.77 is commanded by the Soveraign power, is as to the subject, justified by the command, though not so alwayes in the sight of God. That is not taken away which all Soveraigns do allow, even

in the competition for a Crown, as was veri∣fied in the case of the King of Spain and the House of Braganza, about the kingdom of Portugal. It is no denial of Soveraignty, to appeal humbly from a Soveraign misinform∣ed, to himself better informed. The com∣mands of a Soveraign person or assembly are so far justified by the command, that they may not be resisted; but they are not so far justified, but that a loyal subject may lawfully seek with all due submission, to have them rectified.

9. If he whose private interest is to be debated and judged in a Soveraign Assembly, make as * 1.78 may friends as he can, it is no injustice in him. And though he hire such friends with money, un∣lesse there be an expresse law against it, yet it is no injustice. It is to be feared that such provaca∣tions as this, are not very needful in these times. Is it not unlawful to blind the eyes of the wise with bribes, and make them pervert judgement? Others pretend expedition, or an equal hearing; but he who knoweth no obligation but pacts, is for downright hiring of his Judges, as a man should hire an hack∣ney-coach for an hour. There is no grati∣tude in hiring, which is unlawful in the buyer, though not so unlawful as in the seller of Ju∣stice. If any man digged a pit, and did not cover it, so that an oxe or an asse fell into it, * 1.79 he who digged it was to make satisfaction. He that hireth his Judges with money to be

for him right or wrong, diggeth a pit for them, and by the equity of this Mosaical-Law, will appear not to be innocent.

Thus after the view of his Religion, we have likewise surveighed his Politicks, as full of black ugly dismal rocks as the former, di∣ctated with the same magisteral authority; A man may judge them to be twins upon the first cast of his eye. It was Solomons advice, Remove not the ancient land marks which thy fa∣thers have set. But T. H. taketh a pride in re∣moveing * 1.80 all ancient land-marks, between Prince and subject, Father and child, Husband and Wife, Master and servant, Man and Man. Nilus after a great overflowing, doth not leave such a confusion after it as he doth, nor an hog in a garden of herbs. I wish he would have turned probationer a while, and made trial of his new form of government first in his own house, before he had gone about to obtrude it upon the Common-wealth. And that before his attempts and bold endeavours, to reform and to renew the policy of his native Country, he had thought more seriously and more sadly of his own application of the fable of Peleus his foolish daughters, who desiring to renew the youth of their decripit father, did by the counself Medea cut him * 1.81 in pieces, and boyle him together with strange herbs; but made not of him a new man.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Le. p. 107.
• * 1.2

  Ibid.
• * 1.3

  Ibid.
• * 1.4

  Le. p. 346.
• * 1.5

  Ci. c. 2. s. 22.
• * 1.6

  Le. p. 63.
• * 1.7

  Ci. c. 15. s. 7.
• * 1.8

  Le. p. 165.
• * 1.9

  Le. p. 61.
• * 1.10

  Ci. c. 5. s. 2, 1.
• * 1.11

  Liv.
• * 1.12

  Le. p. 112.
• * 1.13

  Judg. 7. 3.
• * 1.14

  Ci. c. 6. s. 13.
• * 1.15

  Ci c. 6. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 3.
• * 1.16

  Ci c. 13. s. 5
• * 1.17

  Ci c 2. s. 18.
• * 1.18

  Le. p. 112.
• * 1.19

  Le. p. 73.
• * 1.20

  Ci. c. 2. s. 19.
• * 1.21

  Ci. c. 7. s. 18.
• * 1.22

  Le. p. 114.
• * 1.23

  Le
• * 1.24

  Le. p. 190.
• * 1.25

  Q. p. 137
• * 1.26

  Ci. c. 10. s. 3.
• * 1.27

  Le. p. 88.
• * 1.28

  Le. p. 177.
• * 1.29

  Ci. c. 7. s. 11
• * 1.30

  Le. p. 89.
• * 1.31

  Ci. c. 15. s. 19.
• * 1.32

  Le. p. 99.
• * 1.33

  Ci. c. 6. s. 18.
• * 1.34

  Le. p. 157.
• * 1.35

  Le. p. 161.
• * 1.36

  Ro. 13. 2, 4.
• * 1.37

  Ci. c. 10. s. 1.
• * 1.38

  Qu. p. 116. & 140.
• * 1.39

  Ci. c. 12. s. 7.
• * 1.40

  Ibid.
• * 1.41

  Ci. c. 14. s. 10.
• * 1.42

  Le. p. 106.
• * 1.43

  Le. p. 184.
• * 1.44

  Ci. c. 7. s. 4. Le. p. 170. &c.
• * 1.45

  Le. p. 182.
• * 1.46

  Ci. c. 14. s. 4.
• * 1.47

  Nu. 14.
• * 1.48

  Ci. c. 9. s. 7.
• * 1.49

  Ci c. 9. s. 2.
• * 1.50

  Qu. p. 137.
• * 1.51

  Ci. c. 8. s. 1.
• * 1.52

  Ci. c. 4. s. 4.
• * 1.53

  Le. p. 102.
• * 1.54

  Le. p. 88.
• * 1.55

  Qu. p. 139.
• * 1.56

  Le. p. 160.
• * 1.57

  Ci. c. 9. s. 2.
• * 1.58

  Ibid. s. 3.
• * 1.59

  Exod. 21. 7. Num. 30. 4.
• * 1.60

  Le. p. 102.
• * 1.61

  Ci. c. 9. s. 3.
• * 1.62

  Ibid. s.
• * 1.63

  Ci. c. 14. s. 10.
• * 1.64

  Ibid. s. 13.
• * 1.65

  Ci c. 6. s. 16.
• * 1.66

  Ci. c. 8. s. 9.
• * 1.67

  Ci. c. 8. s. 7.
• * 1.68

  Ci. c. 8. s. 1.
• * 1.69

  Ci. c. 8. s. 4.
• * 1.70

  Ibid. l. 9.
• * 1.71

  Ci. c. 1. s. 10 Ci. c. 9. s. 3.
• * 1.72

  Ci. c. 1. s. 5.
• * 1.73

  Ci. c. 2. s. 11.
• * 1.74

  Ci. c. 7. s. 16.
• * 1.75

  Le. p. 74.
• * 1.76

  Le. p. 91.
• * 1.77

  Le. p. 117.
• * 1.78

  Le. p. 122.
• * 1.79

  Exod. 21 33.
• * 1.80

  Pov. 22. 28.
• * 1.81

  Le. p. 177.