Castigations of the Animadver∣sions, Num. 35.

HIs first endeavour in this Section is to reduce his argument into better form; * and when all is done, it proveth but a Sorites. The only commendation that I can give it, is this, That the matter and form are agreeable, both stark naught. Thus he argu∣eth, That which is an Agent, worketh; That which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action; and consequently is therefore a sufficient cause, and if a sufficient cause then also a necessary cause. I deny his first proposition, That every Agent worketh. There are causes and Agents in power as well as in act: But it may be he meaneth an Agent in act; then he proveth the same by it self, That which acteth work∣eth; and when they returned, then they came home again. He taketh pains to prove that which no man in his right wits can doubt of.

His second proposition conteineth such another sublime point of Apodeictical learn∣ing, Page  407 called idem per idem, the same by the same; That which worketh wanteth no∣thing requisite to produce the action or the effect it produceth. It may want truth that is requisite to the production of that which it ought to produce. But it can want nothing to produce that which it doth▪ produce. Whatsoever acteth when it acteth doth ne∣cessarily act what it doth act. He is still stumbling upon that old foolish rule. What is all this to his antecedent necessity?

His third proposition follows, And conse∣quently is thereof a sufficient cause. Yes in his canting language, which makes deficience and sufficience to be all one. Whereunto tendeth all this? Hitherto he hath not ad∣vanced one hairs breadth. But now he unit∣eth all his force to pull down the Castle of Liberty. And if a sufficient cause, then also a necessary cause. I denyed his consequence: And gave him a reason for it; otherwise God himself should not be allsufficient. He replieth, That Gods allsufficience signifieth no more than his omnipotence, and omnipotence signi∣fieth no more than the power to do all things that he will. Yes Gods infinite power and suffi∣cience ought not to be limited to those things which he doth actually will, or which have actual being; No more than his eternity is commensurable by time. He was sufficient to raise up children to Abraham of stones, which he never did, and probably never will Page  408 do. If God did all which he could do, and could justy do, who was able to abide it? we were in a wretched condition. A covetous person may have more than sufficient for his back and his belly, and yet no will to bestow it upon himself. So he hath proved himself a sufficient Agent, sufficient to make this Sorites, though very unsufficient to prove his intention.

But I took pity on him to see him toile himself to no purpose, and was contented out of grace and curtesie to admit these two things. First that every effect in the World hath sufficient causes. Secondly, that sup∣posing the determination of the free and con∣tingent causes, every effect in the World is necessary, that is necessary upon supposition. But this will do him no good. Necessity upon supposition is far enough from antece∣dent necessity. He objecteth, That necessity is onely said truly of somewhat in future. I deny i•…. He proveth it thus. Necessary is that which cannot possibly be otherwise. And possibility is al∣wayes * understood of some future time. Good: Where are his eyes that he cannot distin∣guish between possible and not possible? If ne∣cessary had been that which could possibly be otherwise: or if impossibility had alwayes reference to the future as well as possibility, he had said something. By this argument he might prove that yesterday is not past, but to come, because it is not possible to bring back Page  409 yesterday, and possibility is alwayes under∣stood of the time to come.

But out of pure necessity he is contented to make use of my curtesie. Seeing he granteth so favourably that sufficient causes are necessary causes, I shall easily conclude from it, that what∣soever those causes do cause are necessary antece∣dently. He may easily prove it, if he can make possible and impossible all one. I gave him an inch, and he takes an ell. I admitted that every effect in the World is necessary upon supposition, and he taketh it for granted, that they are necessary without supposition. But that is more than I can yeild him. If that be his meaning, he had best stick to his own grounds: But they will afford him no more relief than my concession. Howsoever thus he argueth.

If the necessity of the thing produced, when * produced, be in the same instant of time with the existence of its immediate cause, then also that immediate cause was in the same instant with the cause by which it was immediately produced. The same may be said of the cause of this cause, and backward eternally. From whence it will follow, that all the connexion of the causes of any effect from the beginning of the World, are altogether existent in one and the same instant. It is well that I meet with a beginning of the World, for I was afraid of those words and so backwards eternaly. If his Mathematical engins be such as these, he will never prove so terrible an Page  410 enemy as Archimedes. He proveth that all immediate causes and their particular di∣stinct effects successively, were together in time at the very instant of their causation successively since the beginning of the World. But he lets the question alone, as bad Archers do the But; Whether the first cause did de∣termine the second to every individual act which it doth, necessarily and without any supposition, and the second the third, and so downward to the last? Of this he saith not a word. Where there is no need of proof he swelleth with arguments, where the question is, he is silent. I will shew him the palpable absurdity of his argument in an instance. When Mr. Hobs made his Leviathan, his Le∣viathan, and he were necessarily coexistent in the same instant of time: So likewise when his father did beget him, his father and he were necessarily coexistent in the same instant of time. The like may be said of his grand∣father, and his great grandfather, and so up∣wards to the beginning of the World. There∣fore Adams begetting of Seth, had a neces∣sary connexion with his writing of his Levia∣than, so as to necessitate him antecedently and inevitably to write it, and stuff it with Para∣doxes. Or thus, A man kindles a fire to warm himself, The fire and he are necessa∣rily coexistent, and there is necessary con∣nexion between them; Another man steals part of the fire and burns an house with it, Page  411 the fire and the conflagration are together, and have a necessary connexion; therefore the kindling of the fire had a necessary con∣nexion with the burning of the house, to render it inevitable. See with what doughty arguments they use to catch Dot∣terels.

From hence he concludeth, That conse∣quently all the time from the beginning of the * World, or from eternity to this day, is but one in∣stant. Better and better. Why doth he not infer likewise that the sea burneth? His pre∣mises will sustain the one, as well as the other. Why will he lose his cause for want of con∣fidence? If God who is an infinite Essence be free from all variablenesse and succession of time, Must he who is but a turning shadow upon the old Exchange of this World, chal∣lenge the same priviledge? Because eternity is a nunc stans, must successive parts of time make one instant or nunc stans? But he ad∣deth, That by this time I know it is not so. He hath been spinning a fair threed, and now like a curst Cow casts down his meale with his foot. First to endeavour to prove that it is so, and then confesse that it is not so. Neither can he say, that he proceedeth upon my grounds, whilest his own grounds are so much higher than mine. I make but an hy∣pothetical necessity, which implieth onely an accidental connexion; He maketh an ab∣solute antecedent necessity, which implieth a Page  412 necessary connexion of the whole conjoinct series of causes and effects.