Castigations upon the Animaver∣sions, Num. 6.

THere is no occasion offered to make any long stay upon this subject. I produced three places of Scripture to prove, That men have liberty, or power of election. He answered, That men are necessi∣tated to what they do chuse by antecedent causes. I took away this answer three wayes. First by reason. To this he is silent. Secondly by instances. Thirdly by the texts themselves. To this he rejoyneth. That these texts and instances do onely prove, that a man is free * to do if he will, which he denieth not. But they do not prove that he is free to will. And in the second instance, The Seniour of the messe, chuseth what he hath an appetite to, but he Page  106 chuseth not his appetite. This is all he an∣swereth.

This distinction hath been allready suf∣ficiently refuted, as contradictory to his own * grounds, which do as much necessitate a man to do, as to will. Secondly, as unprofitable, the necessity of willing being much more subject and obnoxious to all those blows, and all those absurdities, which flow from fatall destiny, than the necessity of doing. Thirdly as contrary to the sense, and meaning of the whole world. Fourthly as contrary to the Scriptures. Lastly, I have demonstrated the unreasonablenesse of his comparison between the intellectuall and sensitive appetite, both as it is a comparison, Theologia Symbolica non est argumentativa. As also as it is an infe∣rence from the lesser to the greater nega∣tively.

Now I add, That that glosse is accursed, which doth corrupt the text, as this glosse of his doth, That a man is free to do if he will, but not free to will. Election is that very thing which he saith is not free, that is the appetite; and it is thus defined, Electio est appetitus rei praeconsileatae, Election is an appetite of some thing, that hath been predeliberated of. But the texts alleadged do demonstrate that to chuse or elect is free, and undetermined to one. Therefore they do demonstrate that it is not free onely to do, but much more to will or to chuse. It is in the husbands choice, either Page  107 to establish the vow of his wife, or to make it * voide. Here is a liberty of contradiction or of exercise. Again, Chuse ye this day whom ye will serve, whether the gods of your fathers, or the gods of the Amorites, and, I offer thee three * things, chuse the which of them I shall do. Here is a liberty of contrariety or specification. And in all these places, here is a liberty of e∣lection, to will, to desire, to chuse their own appetite.

Secondly, the same is demonstrated from the definition of free-will, to be a free power given of chusing one thing before another, or accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently, given to the intellectuall nature for the glory of God, in order to some end. But all these texts by me alledged, and many more do attribute unto the will, a power of chusing one thing before another, or of accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently. Therefore all these texts do de∣monstrate that the will of man is free, not onely to do if he will, but to will, that is, to, chuse or to elect. Wheresoever, whensoever and howsoever the will acteth, it is volition, but election is the proper formall act of the will, as it is free. And it is alltogether im∣possible there should be any election, without a freedom to will. The will imployeth the understanding to consider of the most conve∣nient means to attain some desired end. The understanding doth return its judgement, which is like a bill presented to the King by Page  108 the two houses. The will is free either to su∣spend its act, or deny its approbation with la volonte s'advisera, The will will advise bet∣ter, or else to consent, with la volonte l•… vent, the will approveth it, which consent to the judgement of the understanding is properly election, as it were the conclusion of a practi∣cal Syllogisme, an intellective appetite, or an appetite intelect.

If a great Prince should offer to his poor subject three distinct gifts, & bid him take his choice of them, having underhand given a∣way two of them before to another from him, Were it not an abuse, and a meer mockery? God offered David in like manner his choice of three things; I offer thee three things, chuse which of them I shall do. Did God openly offer to David the free choice of three things, and had secretly determined that two of them should never be? Far be this from God. Especially to do it so seriously, and with such solemn protestations, as I call heaven and earth this day to record against you, that I have set be∣fore you life and death, blessing and cursing, there∣fore * chuse life, that both thou and thy seed may li•…e. Can any man who hath but so much reverential fear of God, as a grain of mustard-seed, which is the least of seeds, harbour such an unworthy thought in his breast, that truth itself should be guilty of such grosse dissimu∣lation? It is a decided case in law, that he who hath granted to another liberty of electi∣on, Page  109 cannot before his election, dispose of that which he hath granted away to another. He who hath a right to elect, if he chuse an un∣worthy person, by the sentence of the law for∣feites his right to elect, for that turn. Why so, if he was necessitated without his will to chuse as he did? We say truely, consent taketh away errour. That man is not wrong∣ed, who consents to his own wrong: how so, if his consent be against or without his own will? If the will be not free •…ut necessita∣ted, then nothing is unlawful. That which is not lawful by the law, necessity maketh lawful. In case not onely of absolute, but even of extreme necessity, meum and tuum ceaseth, and that which otherwise had been plain the•…, becom∣eth just. He who necessitateth all events, taketh sin out of the World.

One of my instances was in the election of the King of the Romans, to which he an∣swereth as formerly, That th•… electors are free to name whom they will, but not free to will. If they be not free to will, then they are not free to elect, for election is the proper formal act of the will; and then the electors are no ele∣ctors. There is one contradiction. Neither are they free to name whom they will in∣differently, if they be determined necessarily and antecedently to name one. Possibility of more than one, and a precise determina∣tion to one, (that is, may name and must name,) are likewise contradictories in adjecto. Page  110 This is not all: We see by the golden Bull * what care there is to bring the electors toge∣ther to Frankfort, and to secure them there. Every one of them must take a solemn oath upon the Gospel of St. Iohn, that according to his faith which he oweth to God and the Roman Empire, to the best of his discretion and under∣standing, he will chuse [volo eligere] with the help of God a King of the Romans, that is, fit for it, and give his voice and vote without all pact, stipend, price, or promise. And if they do not accord actually within thirty dayes, they are thenceforth to have nothing but bread and water until they have made their election. If it was antecedently determined by extrinse∣cal causes who should be chosen, and no o∣ther; What needed all this trouble and charge to so many great Princes, when they might as well have stayed at home, and have set seven ordinary Burgers to have drawn lots for it? Do men use to swear to chuse that which (it may by) is not in their power to chuse, and to refuse that which (it may be) is not in their power to refuse. The belly is a vehement oratour; but if it be absolutely de∣termined whom they must chuse, and when, they might as well give them mosel, wine, and the best meat the Country affords, as bread and water. Here we have expressely volo eligere, I will chuse, which is as much as to say, vollo velle, I will will: Which phrase T. H. esteemeth an absurd speech: But Ju∣lius Page  111 Scaliger thought otherwise, Dicimus & * vere, & ex omnium gentium consensu, vollo velle. The very words cum adjutorio Dei, with the help of God, might teach them, that God is neither the total cause, nor the determining cause of mans election.

Lastly, this distinction maketh T. H. worse than the Stoicks themselves; for the Soicks * together with their Fate, did also maintaine the freedom of the will. And as we find in many Authors, both theirs and ours, did not subject the soul of man nor the will of man to the rigid dominion of destiny. The Stoicks substracted some causes, and subjected others to necessity. And among those which they * would not have to be under necessity, they placed the will of man, lest it should seem not to be free, if it were subjected to necessity. Chrysippus made two sorts of causes, principal causes which did necessitate and compel all things, except the will of man, and adjuvant causes, as objects, which did onely excite and allure. These (said he) do awaken the mind of man, but being awakened it can move of it self: which he setteth forth by the com∣parison of a wherlegigge, and a roller cast down a steep place, which have the beginning of their motion from without themselves, but the progresse from their own form and volu∣bility. So T. H. is worse than a Stoick in this respect, and extendeth fatal necessity * further than they did. I have done with Page  112 this distinction for this time; I say nothing of the bird, but the egge is bad.