Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions in the case concerning liberty and universal necessity wherein all his exceptions about that controversie are fully satisfied.

AN ANSWER TO HIS RELATION Of the Occasion of the Controversie.

HEre is nothing of moment to advantage his cause. Another man would say, Here is nothing alleadged by him which is true. Whereas he saith, That the question disputed among the old Philosophers was, Whether all things that come to passe, proceed from necessity, or some from chance? It was as well debated among the old Philosophers, Whether all things come to passe by chance, and nothing proceed from necessity? And likewise, Whether some events proceed from ne∣cessity, and some come to passe by chance? as that

which he mentions, Whether all events pro∣ceed from necessity, or some come to passe by chance? That is the first errour.

His second errour is, That he opposeth chance to necessity, as if all things came to passe by necessity, which come not to passe by chance: whereas those ancient Philosophers, (of whom he speaks) did oppose contigen∣cy to necessity, and not chance alone. Chance is but one branch of contingency. Free acts are done contingently, but not by chance.

Thirdly, He is mistaken in this also, that he saith, Those ancient Philosophers did ne∣ver draw into argument, the allmighty power of the Deity. For we find in Tully, and in Chrysip∣pus, (as he is alledged by Eusebius) That one of the main grounds of the Stoicks was the prescience of God; and that the predictions of their Oracles and Prophets could not be certain, unlesse all things came to passe by inevitable necessity.

Fourthly, he erreth in this, That liberty is a third way of bringing things to passe, distinct from necessity and contingency: For liberty is subordinate to contingency. They defined contingents to be those things, which might either come to passe, or not come to passe, that is, either freely, or casually: and in all their questions of contingency, liberty was princi∣pally understood.

His fifth errour is, That free-will is a thing that was never mentioned among them. I believe it was never mentioned by them in English, by the name of free will; but he may find 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Let him read Ari∣stotle alone, and he shall find not onely this free elective power of the will, but also the difference between voluntary or spontaneous (which is all the liberty he admitteth) and free, or that which is elected upon deliberati∣on. Here Calvine, Semper apud Latinos liberi arbitrii nomen extitit, Graecos vero non puduit arrogantius usurpare vocabulum, seiquidem, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, dixerunt, 2 Instit. cap. 2. Sect. 4.

Sixthly, he erreth yet more grosly, in say∣ing, That free will was never mentioned by Chri∣stians in the beginning of Christianity, but, for some ages brought in by the Doctours of the Ro∣man Curch. Whereas it is undeniably true, That sundry ancient fathers have written whole Treatises expressely of free will, that there is scarcely one father that doth not mention it; and sundry of the first Hereticks, as Simon Magus, the Manichees, the Mar∣cionites, &c. and their followers, have been condemned for maintaining absolute necessity against free-will.

His seventh errour is, That St. Paul never useth the term of free will, nor did hold any do∣ctrine equivalent to it. Hear himself, Am I not an Apostle? Am I not free? Have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as the othor

Apostles? Or I onely and Barnabas, have not we power to forbear working? St. Paul did those things freely upon his own election, which he was not necessitated to do; and did forbear those things freely, which he was not necessi∣tated to forbear. This doctrine is equivalent to ours of the freedom of the will from necessita∣tion. Take another place, wherein you have both the name and the thing; Neverthelesse, he that standeth stedfast in his heart, having no necessity, bu•…•… hath power over his own will. The words in the originall are a plain description of the old 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (which name Calvin did so much dislike) or free will, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Here is not onely free∣dom, but power and dominion. Mr. Hobbes teacheth us, That a man is free to do, but not free to will. St. Paul teacheth us, That a man hath power over his own will: If he have pow∣er over his own will, then he is free to will, then his will is not extrinsecally predeter∣mined.

Eighthly, he wrongs the Doctours of the Roman Church, as if they exemted the will of man from the dominion of Gods will. They maintain, That the freedom of the will of man is expressely from the will of God, who made it free. They reach that God can suspend the act of the will, can determine the will, can change the will, doth dispose of all the acts of the will, can do any thing but com∣pell the will, which implieth a contradiction.

Ninthly, (to let us see what a profound Clerk he is in Ecclesiasticall controversies) Mr. Hobbes thinks he hath hit the nail on the head, of the difference between the Church of Rome and us, concerning free will, in this disputation, Just as the blind Senator in Ju∣venal made a large encomium of the goodly Turbot which lay before Caesar, but (as ill luck would have it) turned himself the quite contrary way: At illi dextr•…•… jacebat Bellua. The controversie lies on the other side, not about the freedom of the will in naturall or civill actions, which is our question, but (if it be not a logomachy) about the power of free will, in morall and supernaturall actions, without the assistance of grace.

In the tenth place, he misinforms his Rea∣ders, That this opinion (of freedom from ne∣cessitation and determination to one,) was cast out by the reformed Churches, instructed by Luther, Calvine, and others. Where have the reformed Churches, or any of them in their publick confessions cast out this freedom from necessitation, whereof we write? Indeed Lu∣ther was once against it, and so was Me∣lancthon, but they grew wiser, and retracted whatsoever they had written against it. And so would Mr. Hobbes do likewise, if he were well advised: Either he did know of Luthers retraction; and then it was not ingenously done to conceal it, or (which I rather believe) he did not know of it, and then he is but

meanly versed in the doctrine and affairs of the Protestants.

Lastly, he accuseth Arminius to have been a restorer or reducer of the Romish doctrine of free will, by a postliminium. I do not think that ever he read one word of Arminius in his life, or knoweth distinctly one opinion that Arminius held. It was such deep Con∣trovertists as himself, that accused the Church of England of•…•… Arminianisme, for holding those truths, which they ever professed before Arminius was born. If Arminius were alive, Mr. Hobbes out of conscience, ought to ask him forgivenesse. Let him speak for himself, De libero hominis arbitrio ita sentio, &c, In statu vero lapsus, &c, This is my sentence of free will, That man fallen, can neither think, nor will, nor do that which is truly good, of himself, and from himself, But that it is needfull, that he be regenerated, and renewed in his understanding, will, affections, and all his powers, from God, in Christ, by the Holy Ghost, to understand, esteem, consider, will, and do aright that which is truely good. It was not the speculative doctrine of Arminius, but the seditious tenets of Mr. Hobbes, and such like, which opened a large window to our troubles.

How is it possible to pack up more errours together in so narrow a compasse? If I were worthy to advise Mr. Hobbes, he should neve•…•… have more to do with these old Philosophe•…•… (except it were to weed them for some obs•…•…∣lete

opinions: Chrysippus used to say, He sometimes wanted opinions, but never want∣ed arguments) but to stand upon his own bot∣tom, and make himself both Party, Jurer, and Judge in his own cause.

Concerning the stating of the question.

THe righ stating of the question, is com∣monly the mid way to the determination of the difference, and he himself confesseth, that I have done that more than once, saving that he thinketh, I have done it over cauti∣ously, with as much caution as I would draw up a lease. Abundant caution was never thought hurtfull until now: Doth not the truth require as much regard as a lease? On the other side, I accuse him to have stated it too carelessely, loosly, and confusedly. He saith, He under∣stands not these words, [the contversion of a sinner concerns not the question] I do really believe him: But in concluding, That what∣soever he doth not understand, is unintelligi∣ble; he doth but abuse himself and his rea∣ders. Let him study better what is the differ∣ent power of the will, in naturall or civill acti∣ons, which is the subject of our discourse, and morall or supernaturall acts, which con∣cernes not this question; and the necessi•…•…y of adding these words, will clearly appear to him.

Such another pitifull piece is his other ex∣ception, against these words, [without their own concurrence] which he saith are unsigni∣ficant, unlesse I mean that the events themselves, should concur to their own production: Either these words were unsignificant, or he was blind, or worse than blind, when he transcribed them. My words were these, [Whether all Agents, and all Events be predetermined:] He frau∣dulently leaves out these words, [all Agents,] and makes me to state the question thus, Whether all Events be predetermined without their own concurrence. Whereas those words, with∣out their own concurrence, had no reference at all to all Events, but to all Agents; which words he hath omitted.

The state of the question being agreed up∣on, it were vanity, and meer beating of the air in me, to weary my self and the reader, with the serious examination of all his extra∣vagant and impertinent fancies: As this, Whether there be a morall efficacy which is not naturall? which is so far from being the que∣stion between us, that no man makes any question of it, except one, who hath got a blow upon his head with a mill-saile. Natu∣rall causes produce their effects by a true reall influence, which implies an absolute deter∣mination to one: as a father begets a son, or fire produceth fire. Morall causes have no na∣turall influence into the effect, but move or induce some other cause without themselves

to produce it: As when a Preacher perswa∣deth his hearers to give almes; here is no ab∣solute necessitation of his hearers, nor any thing that is opposite to true liberty.

Such another question is that which fol∣lowes, Whether the object of the sight be the cause of seeing? meaning, (if he mean aright,) the subjective cause. Or, how the understanding doth propose the object to the will? which though it be blind, as Philosophers agree, yet not so blind as he, that will not see, but is ready to follow the good advice of the intellect. I may not desert that which is generally appro∣ved, to satisfie the phantastick humour of a single conceited person. No man would take exceptions at these phrases, the will willeth, the understanding understandeth, the former term expressing the faculty, the later, the elicite act, but one who is resolved to pick quarrels with the whole World.

To permit a thing willingly to be done by ano∣ther, that is evil, not for the evils sake which is permitted, but for that goods sake which is to be drawn out of it, is not to will it positive∣ly, nor to determine it to evil by a natural in∣fluence; which whosoever do maintaine, do undeniably make God the authour of sin. Be∣tween positive willing, and nilling, there is a meane of abnegation, that is not to will.

That the will doth determine it self, is a truth not to be doubted of; what different de∣grees

of aide or assistance the will doth stand in need of in different Acts, natural, moral, supernatural; where a general assistance is sufficent, and where a special assistance is ne∣cessary; is altogether impertinent to this pre∣sent controversie, or to the right stating of this question.

In the last place, he repeateth his old di∣stinction, between a mans freedom to do those things which are in his power, if he will; and the freedom to will what he will, which he illustrat∣eth (for similitudes prove nothing) by a com∣parison drawn from the natural appetite, to the rational appetite. Will is appetite, but it is one question Whether he be free to eate that hath an appetite; And another question whether he be free to have an appetite. In the former, he saith, He a∣greeth with me, That a man is free to do what he will. In the later he saith, He dissents from me, That a man is not free to will, And (as if he had uttered some profound mystery) he addeth in a triumphing manner, That, if I have not been able to distinguish between th•…•…se two questions, I have not done well to meddle with either. And if I have understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if he will, is to deale uningenuously and fraudulently with my readers.

Yet let us have good words. Homini homino quid praestat? What difference is there be∣tween man and man? That so many wits before Mr. Hobbes in all Ages should beate

their brains about this question, all their lives long, and never meet with this distinction, which strikes the question dead. What should hinder him from crying out 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. I have found it, I have found it. But stay a little, the second thoughts are wiser, and the more I look upon this distinction, the lesse I like it. It seemeth like the logge in the fable, which terrified the poor Frogs with the noise it made at the first falling of it into the water, but afterwards they insulted over it, and took their turns to leap upon it. Some take it to be pure nonsense; Whether a man be free in such things as be within his power: That is, whe∣ther he be free wherein he is free, or that be within his power, which is in his power.

I have formerly shewed, and shall demon∣monstrate further as there is occasion, that this distinction is contradictory and destru∣ctive to his own grounds, according to which all the other powers and faculties of a man are determined to one, by an extrinsecal fluxe of natural causes, equally with the will. And therefore a man is no more necessitated to will, or chuse what he will do, than to do what he wills. Secondly, I have shewed, that this distinction is vain and unuseful, and doth not hold off, so much as one blow from Mr. Hob•…•…es and his bleeding cause. All those grosse absurdities which do necessarily follow the inevitable determinations of all actions

and events by extrinsecal causes, do fall much more heavily and insupportably upon the ex∣trinsecal determination of the will. So he stickes deeper, by means of this distinction in the same mire. All the ground of justice that he can find in punishments, is this; That though mens actions be necessary, yet they do them willingly. Now if the will be irresistibly determined to all its individial acts, then there is no more justice to punish a man for willing necessarily, than for doing necessarily. Third∣ly, I have shewed already in part, that this di∣stinction is contrary to the sense of the whole World, who take the will to be much more free than the performance: Which may be thus enlarged.

Though a man were thrust into the deepest dungeon in Europe, yet in despite of all the second causes, he may will his own liberty. Let the causes heap a conglomeration of dis∣eases upon a man, more than Herod had, yet he may will his own health, Though a man be withheld from his friend by Seas and Mountains, yet he may will his presence. He that hath not so much as a cracked groat to∣wards the payment of his debts, may yet will the satisfaction of his Creditors. And though some of these may seem but pendulous wishes of impossibilities, and not so compatibile with a serious deliberation, yet they do plainly shew the freedom of the will. In great things (said the Poet) it is sufficient to have willed,

that is, to have done what is in our power. So we say, God accepteth the will, that which we can, for the deed, that which we cannot. If there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath, that is to will, And not accor∣ding to that he hath not, that is to perform. And yet more plainly: To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, that find I not. Yet saith T. H. A man is free to do what he willes, but not to will what he will do.

To come yet a little nearer to T. H. For since he refuseth all humane authority, I must stick to Scripture. It is called a mans own will, and his own voluntary will. If it be deter∣mined irresistibly by outward causes, it is ra∣ther their own will, than his own will. Nay to let him see that the very name of free-will it self is not such a stranger in Scripture as he imagineth, it is called, a mans own free will. How often do we read in the books of Moses, Ezra, and the Psalms, of free-will offerings? This free-will is opposed not onely to com∣pulsion, but also to necessity, not of necessity but willingly. And is inconsistent with all extrin∣secal determination to one, with which ele∣ction of this or that indifferently is incompa∣tible. Is not the whole land before thee (said A∣braham to Lot?) If thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left. God said to David, I offer thee three things, chuse one of them. And to Solomon, Because thou hast asked

this thing, and hast not asked long life, or riches. And Herod to his daughter, Ask of me whatso∣ever thou wilt. And Pilate to the Jews, Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you? And St. Paul unto the Corinthians, What will ye? shall I come unto you with a rod, or in love? Both were in their choice. Yet T. H. doth tell us, That all these were free to do this or that in∣differently if they would, but not free to will. To chuse and to elect, is, of all others, the most proper Act of the will. But all these were free to chuse and elect this or that indifferently, or else all this were meer mockery: And therefore they were free to will.

The Scripture koweth no extrinsecal de∣terminers of the will, but i•…•…self. So it is said of Eli's sons, Give flesh to roast for the Priest, for he will not have sodden flesh of thee, but raw. And if thou wilt not give it, I will take it by force. Sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas. Here was more will than necessity. So it is said of the rich man in the Gospel. What shall I do? This I will do, I will pull down my barnes and build greater, and there will I bestow all my fruits and my goods. And I will say to my soul, take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry. Both his purse and person, were under the command of his w•…•…ll. So St. Iames saith, Go to now, ye that say to day, or tomorrow we will go into such a City, and continue there a year, and buy and sell, and get gain: whereas ye know not what shall be to mor∣row, &c. for that ye ought to say, if the Lord will

we shall live, and do this, or that. The defect was not in their will to resolve, but in their power to perform. So T. H. his necessity was their liberty, and their liberty was his neces∣sity.

Lastly, the Scriptures teach us, that it is in the power of a man to chuse his own will for the future; All that thou commandest us we will do. And whithersoever thou sendest us we will go. As we hearkened unto Moses in all things, so will we hearken unto thee. So saith St. Paul, What I do, that I will do. And in another place, I do re∣joyce, and I will rejoyce. And they that will be rich. When Christ inquired of his Disciples, Will ye also go away? According to T. H. his principles he should have said, Must ye also go away?

We have viewed his distinction, but we have not answered his comparison. Will is an appetite; And it is one question whether he be free to eat, that hath an appetite? And another, Whe∣ther he be free to have an appetite? Compari∣sons are but a poor kind of reasoning at the best, which may illustrate something, but prove nothing. And of all comparisons this is one of the worst, which is drawn from the sensual appetite, to the rational appetite. The rational appetite and the sensual appetite, are even as like one to another, as an apple and an oyster. The one is a natural Agent, the o∣ther is a free Agent; The one acts necessarily, the other acts contingently, (I take the word

largly.) The one is determined to one, the other is not determined to one: The one hath under God a Dominion over it self, and its own acts; The other hath no Dominion over it self, or its own acts. Even the will it self, when it acts after a natural manner, (which is but rarely, in some extraordinary cases, as in the appetite of the chiefest good being fully revealed, or in a panical terrour, which admitteth no deliberation,) acts not freely, but necessarily. How much more must Agents meerly Natural, which have neither reason to deliberate, nor dominion or liberty to elect, act necessarily and determinately? So to answer a comparison, with a comparison, his Argument is just such another as this; The Gally-slave which is chained to the oare, is a man, as well as the Pilot that sits at the sterne, therefore the Gally-slave hath as much domi∣nion in the ship as the Pilot, and is as free to turn it hither and thither. So falls this dread∣full engine all in pieces, which should have battered down the Fort of Liberty.

His gentle reprehension, That if I have not been able to distinguish between these two questi∣ons, I have not done well to meddle with either. And if I have understood them, I have dealt un∣ingenuously and frandulently, would better be∣come me, who defend liberty, than him who supposeth an irresistible necessity of all events. If he think I have not done well, yet according to his own grounds, he may rather blame the

causes that do necessitate me, than blame me, who am irresistibly necessitated to do what I do. Fraud and deceit have no place in neces∣sary Agents, who can do no otherwise then they do. He might as well accuse the Sea to have dealt fraudulently with him, because he mistook the tide, and could not passe over the Foard at an high water, as he purposed. Such is the power of truth, that it comes to light many times when it is not sought for. He doth see in part already that I understand the vanity of his distinction: and shall see it better yet before this Treatise be ended. Yet if I would be so courteous as to forgive him all this, his distinction would not prejudice me. The places of Scripture alledged by me in my former defence, do not onely prove that a man is free to do if he will; but much more, that a man is free to chuse and to elect, that is as much to say, as to will, and determine it self.

An answer to his Fountains of Arguments in this Question.

IT is a certain rule, Contraries being placed one besides another, do appear much more clearly. He who desires to satisfie his judg∣ment in this controversie, must compare our writings one with another without partiality,

the Arguments, and Answers, and pretended absurdities on both sides. But T. H. seeketh to ingratiate himself and his cause before hand; and, if it be possible, to anticipate and preoccupate the judgements of his readers, with a Flourish or Preludium, under the spe∣cious name of Fountains of Arguments. So before a serious war, Cities use to personate their adverse party, and feign mock-combats and skirmishes, to encourage their friends; wherein (you may be sure) their own side shall conquer. As Players make their little puppets prate and act what they please, and stand or fall as they lend them motion: which brings to my mind, the Lions answer in the Fable, when the picture of a man beating a Lion was produced to him; If a Lion had made this picture, he would have made the Lio•…•… above, and the man beneath. It is a sufficient an∣swer to this prologue, That Mr. Hobbes (that is an adversary) made it.

Nihil est, quin male narrando possit, depravarier.

What had he to do to urge arguments fo•…•… me? or to give solutions for me? or to pres•…•… the inconveniences and absurdities which flow from fatal destiny on my behalf? I ga•…•… him no commission. I need none of his help▪ yet by this personated conflict, he hoped to have stolen an easie victory, withou•…•…

either blood or sweate.

I will not tire out my selfe and the reader, with the superfluous repetition of those things which we shall meet with again much more opportunely in their proper places. Some Au∣thours are like those people, who measuring all others by themselves, believe nothing is well understood, until it be repeated over and over again.

Qui nihil alios credunt intelligere, nisi idem dictum est centies.

But whatsoever is new in this Preface, if it have but any one grain of weight, I will not faile to examine and answer it, either here or there.

And first, I cannot chuse but wonder at his confidence, that a single person who never took degree in schooles, that I have heard of, (except it were by chance in Malmesbury) should so much sleight, not onely all the scholars of this present Age; but all the Fa∣thers, Schoole-men, and old Philosophers, which I dare say he hath not studied much, and for∣get himself so far, as to deny all their authori∣ties at once; if they give not him satisfaction, to make his private and crasy judgement to be the standard and seale of truth, and himself an universal Dictatour among Scholars, to plant and to pull up, to reform and new modulate; or rather turn upside

down, Theology, Phylosophy, Morality, and all other Arts and Sciences, which he is pleased to favour so much, as not to eradi∣cate them, or pluck them up root and branch, as if he was one of Aesops fellows, who could do all things, and say all things. He is not the first man in the World, who hath lost himself by grasping and ingrossing too much. As the Athenians used to say of Metiochus. Metiochus is Captain, Metiochus is Surveier, Metiochus bakes the bread, Metiochus grinds the Corn, Metiochus doth all; an evill year to Meti∣ochus. He mentioneth the Scriptures indeed, but his meaning is to be the sole Interpreter of them himself, without any respect to the per∣petuall and universall tradition of the Catho∣lick Church, or the sense of all ancient Expo∣sitors. Well, for once, I will forbear all the advantage which I have from the authority of Councells, Fathers, Schoolmen, and Philoso∣phers, & meet him singly at his own weapon, yet with this protestation, that if he value his own single judgement above all theirs, he comes within the compasse of Solomons cen∣sure, Seest thou a man wise in his own eyes? there is more hope of a fool than of him.

He telleth us, That the Attributes of God are oblations given onely for honour, but no sufficient premises to infer truth, or convin•…•… falshhood. Let them be Oblations, or Sacrifices of praise if he will; but are they not likewise truths? Hath not God given the same attri∣butes

to himself every where in holy Scrip∣ture? Doth God stand in need of a lie, to uphold his honour? It is true, they are not perfectly conceivable by mortall man. The goodnesse, and justice, and mercy, and truth of God, are transcendent above the goodness, and justice, and mercy, and truth of men, and of a quite different nature from them: As St, Austine said, God is good without quality, great without quantity, a Creatour without indi∣gence, every where without place, eternall without time. But yet we do understand these attri∣butes so far, as to remove from God all con∣trary imperfections. He that is good, or good∣nesse it self, can not be the authour of evill. He that is true or truth it self, cannot lie or dissem∣ble. He that is mercifull or mercy it self, cannot be guilty of tyranny or cruel. He that is just or justice it self, cannot do unjust actions. And thus far the attributes of God are argumentative, That be far from thee, to slay the righteous with the wicked, Shal not the Judge of all the earth do right?

I come now to his Texts of Scripture, and first to those which he saith do make for him: To which I answer, first in generall, That there is not one of them all pertinent to the present question, they concern not true liber∣ty from extrinsecall necessity, but the power of free will in morall and supernaturall acts, wherein we acknowledge, That the will of man hath not power to determine it self aright, without the assistance of Grace: His

arguments tend rather to prove that God is the authour of sin, or that he saves men with∣out their own endeavours, than to disprove true liberty.

Secondly, I answer, That though his alle∣gations were pertinent, yet they come all short of his conclusion: He should prove that all acts of free Agents are necessita∣ted antecedently, and extrinsecally: and he endeavoureth onely to prove that some par∣ticular acts of some particular persons were not free from necessity. Which Thesis we do not simply disapprove, though we dislike his in∣stances. God may and doth sometimes extra∣ordinarily determine the will of man to one; but when it is so determined, the act may be voluntary, not free: So he concludeth not contradictorily.

Concerning his places in particular. To his first place, Gen. 45. 5. I answer, That we ought to distinguish between the action of Josephs brethren which was evill, and the passion of Joseph which was good. God willed and predefined the suffering of Joseph, and disposed them to his own glory, and the good of his Church. God sent Joseph before, how? dispositively, to preserve life. But he willed not, nor predefined the action of his brethren, otherwise than permissively, or at the most occasionally, by doing good, which they made an occasion of doing evill, or in respect of the order of their evill act. The

very same answer serveth to Acts 2. 23. and Acts 4. 27, 28.

To his instances of Gods hardening the hea•…•…t, Exod. 7. 3. and Deut. 2. 30. and to Rom. 9. 16. he hath had a large answer in my former defence.

To Shimei's cursing David, 2 Sam. 16. 10. I answer three wayes, first, That God is often said to do, or will those things, which he doth onely will to permit, and dispose. All that was acted against Job, is ascribed to God, The Lord hath taken away: yet it is as clear as the noon-day sun, That Gods concurrence in the determination of Jobs sufferings, in respect of Satan, was onely permssive. Se∣condly, God was the cause of Schimeis cur∣sing David occasionally, by afflicting David for his sins, which exposed him to Shimeis curses. So we say, occasion makes a thief, and gifts blind the eyes of the wise. Thirdly, God was the cause of Shimeis cursing David, not as the authour of that evill, but as the authour of the order in evill, that is by restreining Shimeis malice from breaking out at other times, and in another manner, and letting him loose to vent his vindictive thoughts at that time, in that manner. So he who shuts all the doors and windows in a Chamber, and leaves onely one open, is in some sort, the cause why a desperate person throws himself down headlong from that window, rather than from another. In the same sense,

the cause of Rehoboams obstinacy is said to be from the Lord, 1 Kings 12. 15. God is not obliged to confer prudence and other fa∣vours upon undeserving persons. So like∣wise God is said to lay a stumbling block be∣fore a wicked person, Ezek. 3. 20. and there∣fore this note thence, That the sins of the wicked are not the cause of their punishment, is a meer collusion. The order in evill is Gods, the sins are their own, what he objecteth out of Job 12. 14. &c. and likewise out of Isaiah 10. 6. concerning the King of Assyria, deserveth no answer, God may freely and justly with∣draw his protection and his other graces and favours from his creatures, and leave them to be afflicted for their offences by evill Agents and Instruments, and dispose the sins of others to be their punishments, without necessitating them to acts morally evill. Job is as far from disputing our question in that place, as these places by him alleadged are from making God the author of evil by a physical determi∣nation.

The Prophet Jeremy saith, Jer. 10, 23. O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself, it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps. Most true, man is not secured from danger by his own wisdom and care, but by Gods providence and protection, nor preser∣ved from all sin and utter destruction by the power of his own free will, but by the speciall grace of God, which doth freely prevent us,

pursue us, excite us, assist us, operate in us, cooperate with us, by permanent habits, by transient motions, sufficiently, effectually, ac∣cording to his good pleasure, whose grace is the onely fountain of salvation. If we fanci∣ed an all-sufficient or independent power to our selves, this text were to the purpose; now it signifies nothing.

Our Saviour saith, John 6. 44. No man can come unto me except the father which hath sent me draw him. Scis tu simulare cupressum, quid hoc? He knows how to paint a Cypresse tree, but what is that to the question of liberty and necessity? The coming unto Christ is a •…•…upernaturall action, and requireth the preventing or preparing grace of God, which is called his fathers drawing. But this drawing is not such a physicall determination of the will, as to destroy liberty in the very act of conversion, but an inward calling in an opportune time, a perswading of the heart, an inlightning of the mind, an inspiring of the •…•…eed of good desires, yet withall, leaving to •…•…he will its naturall freedom to elect, and will actually, and to consent to the calling of God, that is to determine it self by the power of grace.

To 1 Cor. 4. 7. I answer, whether we un∣derstand the text of saving grace, or of graces freely given, both waies it is the grace of God that makes the discrimination. But all the debate is of the manner how it is made,

whether morally by perswasion, or physically by determination of the will to one, and de∣stroying the liberty of it: Of which this text is silent.

The next place, 1 Cor. 12. 6. is understood of those miraculous graces freely given, such as the gift of tongues, of healing, of prophe∣cying, &c. and if it were understood of saving grace, yet it did not at all exclude our coope∣ration. The same Apostle who teacheth us, that it is God who worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure, in the same place exhort∣eth us to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling. God worketh in us both the will and the deed, not by physicall determi∣nation of the will, not by destroying the na∣ture of his Creature, but sweetly, morally, by illumination, perswasion and inspira∣tion.

We are said to be the workmanship of God created in Christ Iesus unto good works, 2 Eph. 10. because without Christ we can do no∣thing. No man can have the actuall will to believe and to be converted, but by the pre∣venting grace of God. Our indeavous are in vain, except he help them, and none at all ex∣cept he excite them. Gods calling and illu∣mination, and inspiration is not in our power; and we are brought by his grace, as it were for nothing, to a new being in Christ; in which respect a regenerated Christian is cal∣led a new Creature. Metaphors do not hold

in all things: when David praied, Create in me a new heart, O Lord, his meaning was not that his heart should be annihilated, and a new substance crated, but to have his heart purged and cleansed.

The main body of his forces is dispersed, yet his reserve remains untouched; Even all the places, that make God the Giver of all graces, and wherein men are said to be dead in sin, for by all these (saith he) it is manifest, That although a man may live holily if he will, yet to will is the work of God, and not eligible by man. Let him reduce his argument into what form he will, there is more in the conclusion, than in the premises; namely, these words, and not illi∣gible by man. Who ever argued from the po∣sition of the principall cause, to the removall of all second Agents and means? It is most true, That all grace is from God, but it is most false, that God hath not given man a will to receive it freely. This is plain boyes play, to jump over the backs of all second causes. As all grace is from God, so the elective power to assent to the motions of grace is from God likewise. To shew him the weaknesse of his consequence, he argueth thus, All light is from the sun, therefore, though a man may see if he will open his eyes, yet to open his eyes is the work of God, and not eligible by man.

It is usuall i•…•… Scripture, to call an habituall sinner a dead man, but it is a weak argument

which is drawn from a metaphor, beyond the scope of him that useth it, And if it be insisted upon too much, involves men in palpable contradictions, as not to step aside from the same metaphor, This thy brother was dead, and is alive again, and was lost, and is found. If he was but lost, then he was not absolutely dead: If he was absolutely dead, then he was more than lost. So in another place, Awak•…•… thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead. To sleep and to be dead are inconsistent: but sleep is an image of death. So is idlenesse, Hic situs est Vaccia, Here lieth Vaccia, was written upon an idle persons door. So is old age, He considered not his own body now dead, nor the deadnesse of Sarahs womb. So is habituall sin, And you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins. In some, wheresover there is no appearance of life, (as in the trees in winter) there is an image of death.

To leave Metaphors, this death in sinne is not a naturall, but a spiritual death, and there∣fore no utter extinction of the naturall powers and faculties of a man. Such are the under∣standing and the will, which though they were much weakened by the fall of Adam, yet they were not, they are not utterly extinct, either by originall or actuall sin, but being excited, and, as it were, enlived by preventing grace, they may and do become subservien•…•… to grace; the understanding being illumina∣ted by those raies of heavenly light, and the

will enabled to consent as freely to the moti∣ons of grace, in supernaturall acts, as it did formerly to the dictates of reason in natu∣rall and civill acts. So every way T. H. is gone. First, the will is able and free without preventing grace, to determine it self in na∣turall and civill acts, which is enough to prove my intention, against the universall necessity of all Events. Secondly, the will being excit∣ed and assisted by grace, hath power to put in practise its naturall freedom in suprernatural acts: as to consent to the motions of grace, and to reject the suggestions of the flesh & the de∣vill, without any physical determination of it self without it self. Even as the dead body of A∣braham, & the dead womb of Sarah, being, as it were; new quickened by God, did truely be∣get Isaac; so even in the act of conversion it self, the will is free from physicall determination.

That Physicall determation of all causes and events whatsoever to one, by an out∣ward flux of naturall causes, which T. H. maintains, doth as much necessitate all the actions of free Agents as their wills, or more; because volition is an inward im∣mediate act of the will, but all other acts of a free Agent are externall and mediate acts of the will, over which the will hath not so abso∣lute a dominion as over the volition: whence it followeth irrefragably, That if there be no freedom to will, much lesse is there a freedom to do. He saith a man may live holily if he will,

but to will is the work of God, and not eligible by man. Can a man then live holily without the grace of God? Or is not an holy life the work of God as much as a sanctified will. If he can not shew this, let him never mention this vain destinction any more, of freedom to do, without freedom to will. May not a man be so bold to put him himself in mind of that Iar∣gon, which he objected to the Schoolmen? unlesse perhaps he thinks nonsense is more intelligible in English than in Latin.

Hitherto I have traced T. H. his steps, though he be wandred quite out of the lists, or rather, in plain terms, fled away from his cause, to take sanctuary under the sacred name of Gods grace, which will afford no shelter for his errour. Our question was not about the concurrence of grace and free-will in the conversion of a sinner, but meerly about the liberty or necessity of all naturall and civil events: when he hath acquitted himself like a man in the former cause, then he is free to undertake the second.

The next collection is of such places of Scripture as say there is election, of which T. H. is pleased to affirm, That they make equal∣ly for him and me. I do not blame him if he de∣sire that all places which maintain Election, and that all natural and civil events, should quite be sequester'd from this controversie. For it is not possible to reconcile these places with fatal necessity. All choice or election is

of more than one, but there can be no choice of more than one, where there is an extrinse∣cal determination of all particular events with all their circumstances, inevitably, irresistibly to one, by a fluxe of natural causes. So they leave no manner of Election at all, no more freedom to chuse a mans actions, than to chuse his will. But all these places, and many more, prove expressely, that a man is free, not onely to do it if he will, but to will: The reason is evident, because to chuse is to will, the proper, elicite, immediate act of the will, and to chuse one thing before another, is no∣thing else, but to will one thing before ano∣ther. But all these places say, that a man is free to chuse; that is, to will one thing before another. Chuse life, saith one place, Chuse whom ye will serve, saith a second place; Chuse one of three, saith a third place: and so of the rest. But I have pressed these places formerly, and shall do further, if there be occasion.

His third sort of Texts, are those which seem to make for me against him. But I am at age to chuse and urge mine own argu∣ments for my self, and cannot want weapons in this cause. Therefore he may forbear such a thanklesse office. He telleth us of a great apparent contradiction, between the first sort of Texts, and the last; but being both Scripture, they may and must be reconciled. This is first to wound the credit of the Scriptures, and then to give them a plaister. The supposed con∣tradiction

is in his own phansie. Let him take them according to the analogy of faith, in that sense wherein the Church hath ever taken them, and there is no shew of contra∣diction. The Scripture consists not in the words, but in the sense, not in the outside but in the mar∣row.

He demands, Whether the selling of Ioseph did follow infallibly and inevitably upon the per∣mission of God? I answer, If we consider Gods permission alone, neither inevitably nor infal∣libly: If we consider his permission joyntly with his prescience, then infallibly, but not in∣evitably. Foreknowledge doth no more ne∣cessitate events to come to passe, than after-knowledge. Gods prescience did no more make Judas his treason inevitable to him, than my remembrance now of what was done yesterday, did make it inevitable then to him that did it.

He urgeth further, So the prescience of God might have been frustrated by the liberty of hu∣mane will. I answer nothing lesse. The na∣tures and essences of all things come to passe, because they were foreknown by God, whose knowledge was the directive cause of them. But the acts and operations of free Agents are therefore foreknown, because they will come to pass. If any thing should come to pass otherwise, God had foreknown from eter∣nity, that it should have come to passe other∣wise, because his infinite understanding doth

encompasse all times and all events in the in∣stant of eternity. And consequently he be∣holds all things past, present, and to come, as present. And therefore, leaving those forms of speech, which are accommodated to us and our capacities: To speak properly there is neither fore-knowledge nor after-know∣ledge in God, who neither knows one thing after another, nor one thing by deduction from another.

He askes, Whether the treachery and fratri∣cide of Iosephs brethren were no sin? I answer, yes; and therefore it was not from God po∣sitively, but permissively, and dispositively; Ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good, to save much people alive. But (he ur∣geth,) Joseph said, Be not grieved, nor angry with your selves that ye sold me hither: Ought not a man to be grieved and angry with himself for sinning? Yes, but penitent sinners such as Jo∣sephs brethren were, have great cause of joy and comfort, when they understand that God hath disposed their sin to his glory, their own good, and the benefit of others.

He demands further, Doth God barely permit corporal motions, and neither will them, nor nill them? Or how is God the cause of the motion, and the cause of the law, yet not of the irregularity? It were a much readier way to tell us at once directly, That either there is no sin in the World, or that God is the authour of sin, than to be continually beating the bush

after this manner. But I answer, All corpo∣ral motion in general, is from God, not onely permissively, but also causally; that is, by a general influence, but not by a special influ∣ence. The specifical determination of this good general power to evil, is from the free Agent, who thereby doth become the cause of the irregularity. There is no contrariety between motion in general, and the law, but between the actual and determinate abuse of this good locomitive power, and the law.

He demands, Whether the necessity of hard∣nesse of heart be not as easily derived from Gods permission, that is from his withholding his grace, as from his positive decree? This question is pro∣posed in a confused blundering manner, with∣out declaring distinctly, what grace he mean∣eth. I answer two wayes. First we are to di∣stinguish between a necessity of consequence, or an infallibility, and a necessity of conse∣quent or a causal necessity: Supposing, but not granting, that hardnesse of heart is as in∣•…•…allibly derived from the one, as from the o∣ther, yet not so causally, nor so culpably in •…•…espect of God, who is not obliged in justice •…•…o give his free grace to his creature, but he is •…•…bliged by the rule of his own justice, not to determine his own creature to evil, and then punish him for the same evil.

Secondly, I answer, that even this supposed necessity of infabillity can no way be imputed to God, who never forsakes his creature by

with holding his grace from him, until his creature have first forsaken him; who never forsakes his creature so far, but that he may by prayers, and using good indeavours, obtaine the aide of Gods grace, either to prevent or re∣move hardnesse of heart. When God crea∣ted man, he made him in such a condition, that he did not need special exciting grace to the determination of his will to supernatural good. And to all that are within the pale of his Church he gives sufficient grace to pre∣vent hardnesse of heart, if they will. If man have lost his primogenious power, if he will not make use of those supplies of grace which Gods mercy doth afford him, that is his own fault. But still here is no physical determi∣nation to evil, here is no antecedent extrinse∣cal determination of any man to hardnesse of heart, here is nothing but that which doth consist with true liberty.

Lastly, he saith, We make God onely to permit evil, and to will good actions conditionally and con∣sequently, if man will them. So we ascribe nothing at all to God, in the causation of any action, good or bad. He erreth throughout, God is the to∣tal cause of all natures and all essences. In evil actions God is cause of the power to act, of the order in acting, of the occasion, and of the dis∣position thereof to good. In good actions freely done, he is the author & original of liberty, he enableth by general influence, he concurreth by speciall assistance and cooperation to the

performance of them, and he disposeth of them to good. He doth not will that meerly upon condition which himself hath prescri∣bed, nor consequently which he himself hath antecedently ordained and instituted.

Now having cleared all his exceptions; it re∣maineth next to examine, how he reconcileth the first and the third sort of Texts. The will of God (saith he) sometimes signifieth the word of God, or the commandments of God, that is his re∣vealed will, or the signs or significations of his will. Sometimes it signifieth an internal act of God, that is, his counsel and decree. By his revealed will God would have all men to be saved, but by his internal will, he would not. By his revealed will he would have gathered Ierusalem, not by his inward will. So when God saith, [What could I have done more to my vineyard?] that is to be understood out∣wardly, in respect of his revealed will. What di∣rections, what laws, what threatnings, could have been used more? And when he saith, [It came not into my mind,] the sense is, to command it. This I take to be the scope and summe of what he saith. Thus far he is right, that he distingui∣sheth between the signifying will of God, and his good pleasure, for which he is beholding to the Schooles: And that he makes the re∣vealed will of God, to be the rule of all our actions; And that many things happen a∣gainst the revealed will of God, but nothing against his good pleasure. But herein he er∣reth grossely, that he maketh the revealed

will of God and his internal will to be con∣trary one to another; as if God did say one thing, and mean another, or command one thing, and necessitate men to do another, which is the grossest dissimilation in the World.

Odi illos seu claustr•…•… erebi quicun{que} loquu•…•…nr Ore aliud, tacito{que} aliud sub pectore condunt.

He saith, It is not Christian to think, if God had a purpose to save all men, that any could be damned, because it were a sign of want of power to •…•…ffect what he would. It is true, if God had an absolute purpose to work all mens salvation irresistibly, against their wills, or without themselves. But God hath no such absolute will to save all men. He loves his creatures wel, but his own justice better: And he that made men without themselves, will not save them without themselves. He co-operates with all his creatures according to their distinct na∣tures which he hath given them, with neces∣sary Agents necessarily, with free Agents freely. God hath given men liberty to assent to saving truth, They abuse it. He hath pro∣posed a condition under which they may be saved, They reject it. So he willeth their salvation by an antecedent will, and their damnation by a consequent will: which two wills in God, or within the Divine Essence, are no way distinct; for they are the same with

the Divine Essence. But they are distin∣guished onely in order to the things wil∣led of God; Neither is there the least contra∣diction between them. The one shews us what God would have us to do, The other is, what God himself will do. The one looks upon man as he was created by God, or as he should have been or might have been with∣out his own fault; The other looks upon man as he is with all circumstances. The one regards onely the order of the causes and means designed by God for our salvation; The other regards also the application or misapplication of these meanes by our selves.

In answering to these words, Say not thou it is through the Lord I fell away, Say not thou, he hath caused me to erre. He distinguisheth between say not, and think not; as if it were unlawful to say so, but not unlawful to think so. Curse not thy King (saith Solomon) no not in thy thought, much lesse thy God. Thought is free from man, but not from God. It is not ho∣nourable (saith he) to say so; No more is it to think so.

It is not lawful (saith he) to say that any acti∣on can be done, which God hath purposed shall not be done; that is, in his language, which shall not actually come to passe in due time. Our Saviour was of another mind. Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve Legions of

Angels? He knew some things can be done, which never will be done.

Next he proceedeth to touch those incon∣veniencies, which flow from the opinion of universal necessity, but very gently and spar∣ingly. Arts, and armes, and bookes, and con∣sultations, and medicines, &c. are not superfluous, though all events be necessary, because the means are equally necessitated with the event. Suppose it were so, so much the worse. This must needs utterly destroy all care and solicitude of free Agents. He is a madman that will vexe and trouble himself, and take care, and con∣sult, about things that are either absolutely ne∣cessary, or absolutely impossible; as about the rising of the Sun, or about the draining of the sea with a sieve. Yet such are all events, and all the means to effect them in his opi∣nion, either as absolutely necessary as the ri∣sing of the Sun, or as absolutely impossible as the draining of the Ocean with a sieve. What need he take care for a Medicine, or a Phy∣sician, who knows that if he must recover, and if a Medicine or a Physician be a necessary means for his recovery, the causes will infal∣libly provide him one, and it may be a better Medicine, or a better Physician, than he should have used? If a man may recover or not recover, both means, and care to use means, do well: But if a man must recover, or not recover; that is, if the end and the means be both predetermined, the meanes

may be necessary, but all care and sollicitude is altogether vain and superfluous

But he telleth the Reader, that this absur∣dity followeth as much from my opinion, as from his. For as I beli•…•…e that what is, is, and what hath been, hath been; So I hold this for a certain truth, that what shall be, shall be. And therefore the argument holds as strongly against me, as against him; If I shall recover I need not his unsavoury potion; If I shall not recover, it will do me no good. In all my life I never heard a weaker or sillier Sophisme, urged in earnest, by a rational man. That which is, is neces∣sary to be, upon supposition that it is: That which hath been, is necessary to have been, upon supposition that it hath been; So that which shall be, shall be necessarily; that is, infallibly upon supposition that it shall be. And the event cannot be supposed, except it be supposed that the free Agent shall deter∣mine it self in such manner, and except all ne∣cessary means be likewise supposed. Such a necessity upon supposition is very consistent with true libery, but T. H. his necessity is of another nature, an antecedent extrinsecal ne∣cessitation and determination to one, which is altogether inconsistent with election, and true liberty. According to my opinion we say, That which may be, may be; but that which may be, may not be. According to his opi∣nion we say, That which must be, must be; but that which must be, cannot be otherwise.

According to my opinion, I am free either to walk abroad, or to stay within doors, whe∣thersoever I do this is true, that which shall be, shall be, But if I walk abroad, (as I may do) then my stay within doors shall not be. And on the other side, If I stay within doors, (as I may do likewise,) then my walking a∣broad shall not be. The event hath yet no determinate certainty in the causes, for they are not yet determined. The Agent may de∣termine it self otherwise, the event may come otherwise to passe, even until the last moment before the production. And when the event is actually produced, and is without its causes, it hath a determinate certainty, not antece∣dent, not from extrinsecal determination, not absolute; but meerly hypothetical or upon supposition; the not distinguishing aright of which two different kinds of necessity, makes the reader and us all this trouble.

It follows, Laws are not superfluous, because by the punishment of one, or a few unjust men, they are the cause of justice in a great many. This answer hath been taken away already, and shall be surther refelled if it be surther pressed. But he willingly declineth the main scope of my argument, which reflected more upon the unjustice, than upon the superfluity of human laws, if his opinion were true. Those laws are unjust which punish men for not doing that which was antecedently impossible for them to do, and for doing that which was

impossible for them to leave undone. But up∣on supposition of T. H. his opinion of the ab∣solute necessity of all events, all humane laws do punish men for not doing that which was antecedently impossible for them to do, and for doing that which was antecedently im∣possible for them to leave undone. Here we have confitentem reum, our adversaries con∣fession within a very few lines. It is true that seeing the name of punishment hath relation to the name of crime, there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone. This is the first ingenuous confession we have had from T. H. I hope we shall have more: From whence it followeth, First, that there neither is, nor can be any crime deserving punish∣ment in the World, that is to say, no such cri∣minal thing as sin; for nothing by his do∣ctrine was ever done, that could have been left undone. Secondly, it followeth hence, that no punishment is just, because nothing can be left undone that is done. And that all men are innocent, and there is no such thing as a delinquent in the World. How saith he then, That the laws are the cause of justice in many, by punishing one or a few unjust men? Upon his principles, the Laws and Judges them∣selves are unjust, to punish any men. If this be not a contradiction, I have lost my aime.

And if punishments are not just, then nei∣ther are •…•…ewards just. Thus by his doctrine

we have lost the two great pillars or preserva∣tives of all well-ordered Societies, as Lycur∣gus called them, the two hinges whereupon the Common-wealth is turned, Reward, and Punishment. Yet St. Peter doth teach us, That Kings and Governours are sent from God, for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well.

The last inconvenience which he men∣tions, (of those that were urged by me) is this. God in justice cannot punish a man with eter∣nal torments for doing that which never was in his power to leave undone. To which ad∣mitting (as you have heard) that there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone, he gives two answers: The first is this. Instead of punishment if he had said affliction, may not I say that God may afflict, and not for sin? Doth he not afflict those creatures that cannot sin? And sometimes those that can •…•…n, yet not for sin; as Job, and the blind man in the Gospel? This is still worser and worser. He told us even now, that nothing which is dishonourable ought to be attributed to God: And can there be any thing in the World more dishonourable, than to say, That God doth torment poor innocent creatures in hell fire, without any fault of theirs, without any relation to sin, meerly to shew his dominion over them? The Scripture teacheth us clear otherwise, That a man complains for the pu∣nishment of his sins. Sin and punishment are

knit together with adamantine bonds. He phrases it for the manifestation of his power. If it were true, it was the greatest manifesta∣tion of cruelty and tyranny that is imagi∣nable.

I confesse, that chastisements ioflicted after the sin is forgiven, are not properly punish∣ments, because they proceed a patre castigant•…•…, non a Iudice vindicante, from a father correct∣ing, not from a Judge revenging. Yet even these chastisements are grounded upon sin, The Lord hath put away thy sin, thou shalt not die, Howbeit, because by this deed thou hast given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blas∣pheme, the child that is born unto thee, shall surely die. But what place have such chastisements as Davids were in hell? Is any man better∣ed by his sufferings there? What place have probations and trialls of mens graces (such as Jobs were) in hell, where there are no graces to be tried. Jobs triall, and Davids chastise∣ments, and the poor mans blindnesse, were the greatest blessings that ever befell them; For their light afflictions which were but for a moment, did work out unto them a far more excel∣lent and eternall weight of glory. But the paines of hell are heavy, and endlesse, and work out nothing but torment: In a word, these af∣flictions we now treat of are downright pu∣nishments. So the Holy Ghost stiles them, everlasting punishment: he doth not afflict the children of men willingly, except it be for sin,

Fools are afflicted because of their transgression. The afflictions (as he calleth them) of those creatures that cannot sin, that is, brute beasts, are alltogether of another nature. They were created for the use of man, they were given for the sustenance of men, every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you, even as the green herb, have I given you all things. But the tormenting even of the brute creatures needlessely for the pleasing of our sensual ap∣petites, or the satisfaction of our humour, is not onely unchristian, but unhumane, A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast, but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruell. God hath made two covenants with man, none with the beasts.

He saith, It is no more cruelty to afflict a man with endlesse torment for sin, than without sin, when he might without trouble have kept him from sinning. Is it not great pitty, that T. H. was not of God Almighties councel, when he ordered the World? that he might have advised him to have made man impeccable, which he might have done without any trou∣ble, or that otherwise his fall, and conse∣quently his punishment, might be justly im∣puted to God himself. It was well enacted in the laws of the twelve tables, Ad divos ade∣unto caste, pietatem adhibento, qui secus faxit Deus ipse vindex erit, our addresses to God ought to be pure and devout, they who do otherwise, will find God himself the revenger.

Doth T. H. believe St. Jude, That God hath reserved the Angels, that kept not their first estate, in everlasting chains, under darknesse, unto the judgement of the great day? God could by his absolute power have kept them in their first e∣state, yet he would not. By his absolute power, he can do all things which do not implic im∣perfection or contradiction: but by his ordinate power he cannot change his decrees, nor alter whathe hath ordained. Acts of grace may be free, but punishments must be alwayes just. That King who doth not pardon a willfull traitour, is not equally guilty of murther, with him that hangs up an innocent Subject. Then to answer fully to his question, Why God suffered man to sinne, having power to with∣hold him? To preserve that order and course which he had established in the World, and to draw a greater good out of evill, for the further manifestation of his own glory, First, the manifestation of his power, as St. Austin saith, He that created all things very good, and did foreknow that evill would arise from good, knew likewise that it appeerteined rather to his most Almighty goodnesse, to draw good out of evill, then not to suffer evill. Secondly, the manifesta∣tion of his providence, in suffering man, whom he had indowed with freedom of will and power, sufficient to resist and overcome Sa∣tan, either to conquer or yield at his own choice. Thirdly, the manifestation of his ju∣stice and mercy, by punishing some out of the

corrupted masse justly, and saving others out of his meer mercy. If T. H. thinks vainly, that the onely manifestation of Gods power, is a sufficient ground for the punishment of men in hell fire, without their own faults or crimes, how much better may good Christi∣ans conclude, That the greater manifestation of Gods power, and providence, and justice, and mercy, is a sufficient ground for the pu∣nishment of men with the like torments, for their own crimes.

His second answer is set down by way of in∣terrogation, What infallible evidence hath the Bi∣shop, that a man shal be eternally in torments, & ne∣ver die? Even the authority of our Saviour and the Holy Scriptures, which call it an everlast∣ing fire, an eternall fire, a fire that is not quench∣ed, everlasting punishment, everlasting chains, the worm that never dyeth, and the fire that goeth not out, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devill and his angels. The Bishop hath the testimony of the Athanasian creed, that they who have done good, shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil, into everlasting fire. He hath the testimony of the universall Church of all ages, except a few Originists. If T. H. have no more than his own single private authority to oppose a∣gainst all these, he is a bold man. They who question everlasting torments, will not stick to question everlasting life. To his demand, about the second death, I answer, This is

the second death, if he could see wood for trees.

In the next place, he urgeth how that incon∣veniencies follow from our opinion. First, That mans liberty to will, quite takes away the pre∣science of God; for if man have it in his power to will or not to will, it cannot be certainly foreknown what he will will. The second, That Gods presci∣ence doth take away liberty, by making all events necessary from eternity, for it is impossible that that should not come to passe, or come to passe otherwise than it was foreknown, which God foreknoweth shall come to passe; And if it be impossible that it should not come to passe, then it is necessary that it should come to passe. This is too severe, first, to make us take prescience quite away, and yet with the same breath, to argue against us from prescience. But for once, I will give him a clea•…•… solution to both his pretended demonstrations, and let him see that there is no necessity, that men must either turn blocks without liberty, or sacrilegious to rob God of his prescience. But I give him it upon a condition, That hereafter, before he take away either prescience or liberty, he will first take away this answer, and not repeat us the same thing over and over again, to no purpose.

To the first inconvenience I answer, That a thing may be said to be foreknown two wayes; either as it is in its causes, before it be produced, and so I confesse, That if the free

Agent have it in his power, to will or not to will, there is no determinate truth of future contingents, that is, in their causes, and con∣sequently no prescience or foreknowledge in that respect; or else a thing may be said to be foreknown, as it is or shall be in it self, in the nature of things, after it is produced. And thus every particular event, that shall be un∣till the end of the World is foreknown, or, to speak more properly, is known to God from all eternity. For in Gods knowledge there is neither before nor after, past nor to come. Those things which are past or to come to us, are allwayes present to God, whose infi∣nite understanding (that is himself) doth en∣compasse all times and events in one instant of eternity, and so doth prevent or anticipate all differences of time. Time is the measure of all our acts; but Gods knowledge, being in∣finite, is not measured but by eternity; so that which is a prescience, or a before-hand knowledge (as he calleth it) to us, is a present intuition with God. And therefore as my present beholding of a man casting himself down headlong from some precipice, whilest •…•…e is in the act of casting himself down, is not •…•…he cause of his precipitation, nor doth any way neccessitate him to precipitate himself, yet upon supposition, that I do see him pre∣cipitate himself, it is necessarily, that is, infal∣•…•…ibly true, that he doth precipitate himself, but not necessarily true, by any antecedent

and extrinsecall determination of him to do that act, nor so necessarily true as to ex∣clude his freedom or liberty in the act. Even so Gods knowledge of future contingents, be∣ing a present intuition or beholding of them, by reason of his infinite intellect, doth not at all determine free Agents, nor necessitate con∣tingent events, but onely infers an infallibility, that is, as we use to call it, an hypotheticall necessity, or a necessity upon supposition, which doth consist with true liberty.

Much of this is confessed by Mr. Hobbes himself, That the foreknowledge of God should be the cause of any thing, cannot be truely said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth on the existence of thing known, and not they on it.

I desire to know whether God do his own works, ad extra, as the creation and destructi∣on of the World freely or necessarily? a•…•… whether he was necessitated to create the World precisely a such at time, in such a man∣ner? Certainly God foreknoweth his own works, as much as he foreknoweth the deter∣minate acts of free Agents. Yet his fore∣knowledge of his own works, ad extra, doth not necessitate himself. If he say that God himself determineth his own acts, ad extra, so I say doth the free Agent also, with this difference, That God is infinite and indepen∣dent upon any other, but the free Agent is finite and dependent upon God, both for his

being, and for his acting. Then if Gods free∣dom in his own works, ad extra, doth not take away his prescience, neither doth the li∣berty of free Agents take it away.

To his second inconvenience, That it is impossible that that which is for: known by God should not come to passe, or come to passe otherwise than it is foreknown, I answer, That Gods foreknowledge is not such an act as T. H. ima∣gineth, that is, an act that is expired, or an act that is done and past; but it is alwayes in do∣ing, an eternall act: a present act, a present in∣tuition: and consequently, doth no more make the Agent unfree, or the contrary event impossible, untill it be actually produced, than my knowing that such a man stabbed himself upon such a day, made it then un∣possible for him to have forborn stabbing of himself, or my seeing a man eat in present, made it unpossible for him before he did eat, to have forborn eating. God is the totall cause of all natures and essences, but he is not the totall cause of all their acts and operations. Neither did he create his Creatures to be idle, but that they should each of them exercise such acts, as are agreeable to their respective natures, necessary Agents, necessary Acts, free Agents, free Acts. And untill the free Agent have determined it self, that is, untill the last moment before production, the con∣trary Act is not made unpossible, and then on∣ly upon supposition. He that precipated him∣self,

untill the very moment that he did pre∣cipitate himself, might have withheld him∣self. And if he had withheld himself, then I had not seen him precipitate himself, but withhold himself.

His frequent invectives against unsignifi∣cant words are but like the complaints of that old Belldam Harpaste in Seneca, who still cried out against the darknesse of the room, and desired to be brought into another chamber, little believing that her own blind∣nesse was the true cause of it. What Suares saith, As I know neither what, nor where, so neither doth it concern either me or the cause.

His last assault against liberty in his foun∣tains of Arguments is this, Certainly to will is impossible without thinking on what a man willeth, but it is in no mans election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on. A man might well conjecture by this ve∣ry reason that his fountain was very near drying up. This Argument is levied rather against the memory, or against the under∣standing, than against the will, and may serve as well against freedom to do, as a∣gainst freedom to will, which is contrary to his principles. It is as impossible to do with∣out thinking on what a man doth, as it is to will without thinking on what he willeth, but it is in no mans election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on: There∣fore

a man is not free to chuse what he will do. I know not what this word [to think] signifies with him, but I know what other Authours make it to signifie, to use reason, to understand, to know, and they define a thought to be the understanding actually im∣ployed, or busied about some object. Hath not he spun us a fair thred? He underta∣keth to shew a defect in the will, and he alleadeth a defect in the understanding. Is a man therefore not free to go to his dinner, because perhaps he thinks not on it just at dinner time? Let the free Agent be free to will or nill, and to chuse which part he will, without necessitation or determination to one, when he doth think on it, and we shall not want true liberty.

An Answer to the Animadversions upon the Epistle to my Lord of Newcastle.

IT was no passion but a sad truth, To call the opinion of fatall destiny blasphemous, which maketh God to be directly the au∣thour of sin, which is a degree worse then Athisme; and desperate, which taketh away all care and solicitude, and thrusts men head∣long without fear or wit, upon rocks and pre∣cipices; and destructive, which turneth all go∣vernment divine and humane off from their hinges: the practicall consequences whereof do utterly ruine all societies. Neither am I guilty (that I know of yet) so much as of one uncivill word, either against Mr. Hobbes his person or his parts. He is over unequall and indulgent to himself, who dare assume the boldnesse to introduce such insolent and pa∣radoxicall opinions into the World, and will not allow other men the liberty to wellcome them as they deserve. I wish he himself in his Animadversions, and his parasiticall pub∣lisher of his former treatise, had observed the same temper and moderation: particularly towards the lights of the Shools, whom he

slighteth and vilifieth every where, as a company of pedantick dunses, who under∣stood not themselves, yet held the World in awe under contribution, by their •…•…stian jargon, untill a third Cato dropped down from Heaven, to stand up for the vindication of Christian liberty from Scholastick tyran∣ny, and Stoicall necessity, from naturall and morall liberty. But this is certain, if these poor despised Schoolmen were necessitated by antecedent and extrinsecall causes, to speak such gibrish and non-sense, and the Christian World to receive it, and applaud it, they cannot be justly blamed. And if that great assertour were necessitated in like manner, he cannot justly be praised, any more than we praise a Conduit for spouting out water, when the cock is turned.

An answer to the Animadversions upon the Bishops Epistle to the Reader.

I Am well contented to believe that the Copy of T. H. his Treatise was surrepti∣tiously gained from him. Yet he ac∣knowledgeth, that he shewed it to two, and if my intelligence out of France did not fail, to many more. I am well pleased to believe that he was not the authour of that lewde E∣pistle, which was perfixed before it; but ra∣ther some young braggadochio, one of his disciples, who wanted all other means to re∣quite his Master, for his new acquired light, but servile flattery: whom he stileth the great Authour, the repairer of our breaches, the Asser∣tour of our reputation, who hath performed more in a few sheets, than is comprehended in all the voluminous Workes of the Priests and Ministers; yea, as if that expression were too modest, in all the Libraries of the Priests, Iesuites, and Ministers, or in the Catechismes and Confessions of a thousand Assemblies. On the other side, he belcheth out reproaches against the poor Clergy, as if they were a pack of fooles and knaves. For their folly, he stickes not to stile the black-coates, generally taken, a sort of ig∣norant tinkars, &c. And for their knavery, he

saith, they make the Scriptures, (which he setteth forth in as gracelesse a dresse, as he can imagine) the decoies of the people, to advance themselves to promotions, leisure and luxury. And so he concludeth that this little Treatise of Mr. Hobbes, will cast an eternal blemish on all the corn•…•…rd caps of the Priests and Iesuits, and all the black and white caps of the Ministers. Herein I cannot acquit Mr. Hobbes, That be∣ing in London at the same time when this ri∣diculous Epistle was printed and published, he did not for his own cause, sooner or later, procure it to be suppressed.

Concerning my self, I can safely say, That I was so far from intending my defence for the presse, that since it was perfected, and one one∣ly Copy transcribed for the Marq. of New∣castle and himself, it hath scarcely ever be∣held the Sun. Questions may be ventilated, and truth cleared from mistakes privately between particular persons, as well or better, than publickly in print.

As touching my exceptions to his book de Cive, he saith, He did indeed intend to have an∣swered them, as finding them neither political, nor Theological, nor that I alledged any reasons by which they were to be justified. The inference would have holden more strongly the contra∣ry way; that because they were neither Theological, nor Political, and destitute of reasons to support them, they were fitter to be despised, than to be answered. But why

did he then intend to answer them, and thought himself so much concerned in it? Surely he hath forgotten himself; for there was never a one of those exceptions, which was not back∣ed with several reasons. But concerning them and his Leviathan, I shall be sparing to speak more in present. Peradventure I may reserve two or three Chapters; one to shew him his Theological errours, another how destructive his Political errours are to all So∣cieties; a third of his contradictions: out of all which, if my leisure serve me, I may chance to gather a posie, and present it to him.

He chargeth me to say, That there were two of our own Church answering his Levia∣than: It may be so; but it is more than I know. I said one of our own Church, and one stranger.

In the conclusion of my Epistle to the rea∣der, I used this innocent form of valediction, So God blesse us, a form of all others most usual for shutting up our Epistles, So God blesse us, or So God blesse you, or So I commit you to God, or Commend you to the protection of the hig hest Majesty. But it seemeth, he, misapprending it to be a prayer for protection or deliverance from his opinions, stiles my well-meant prayer, a Bouffonly abusing of the name of God t•…•… calumny. How, am I charged with Bouffo∣nery, and calumny, and abusing of the holy name of God? And all this for saying, God blesse us? Is this a fit man to reprehend others

for uncivility? Did he learn this high strain of curtesie at Malmsbury? I confesse, I do not dislike a little tooth-lesse jesting, when the subject will bear it.

—Ridiculum acri Fortius & melius magnas plerum{que} secat res.

But I do not like jesting with edge-tooles, nor jesting with God Almighty, much lesse bouffonly abusing of the holy Name of God to calumny. He need not fear any such re∣viling terms from me; But if his cause meet now and then with an innocent jerk for it, Sciat responsum, non dictum esse. He that know∣eth not the way to the Sea, must get a River to be his guid.

An answer to his Animadversions upon my Reply. Num. 1.

I Said I was diverted from reading his de∣fence by businesse: Hence he inferreth, that the will is not free; for nothing is free that can be diverted by any thing but it self. I deny this Proposition, and he will prove it at the Greek calends. There is a great difference between diversion, and determination. Di∣version is but an occasional suspension of the exercise of liberty; but physical determina∣tion to one, is a compulsion of the will, so far

as the will is capable of compulsion, that is, necessitation. The will doth chuse its own di∣version, but there is no choice in necessitation. And therefore necessitation to one is opposit to liberty, but diversion is not, nor moral efficacy.

Out of his very first words [I had once re∣solved, &c.] I urged two arguments against him. Frst all resolution presupposeth delibera∣tion: So much is acknowledged by himself, That to resolve, is to will after deliberation, (he knoweth no difference between willing and electing,) But all deliberation of that which is inevitably determined without our selves, (as all events are determined according to his opinion,) is vain. As it is vain for a con∣demned person to deliberate whether he should be executed, it is vain for a man to de∣liberate whether he should grow in stature, or whether he should breath. The onely thing questionable in this argument, is the truth of the assumption, whether it be vain to deli∣berate of that which is already inevitably determined? to which he answereth not one syllable in terminis, but runs away with a false sent, altogether wyde from the purpose. A man (saith he) may deliberate of what he shall do, whether the thing be possible or not, in case he know not of the impossibility, though he can not de∣liberate what another shall do to him. And there∣fore my three instances are impertinent, because the question is not what they shall do, but what they shall suffer. And here he vapoureth marvel∣lously,

supposing that he hath me at an huge advantage. Such are commonly all his ad∣vantages; much good may they do him. First he erreth grossely in affirming, that all deli∣beration is onely of what a man will do, or not do; And not at all of what a man will suffer, or not suffer. Deliberation is as well about evil to be eschewed, as about good to be pursued. Men deliberate equally of their doings and of their sufferings, if they be not inevitably determined; but if they be, then neither of the one nor of the other. A Mar∣tyr or a Confessor, may deliberate what tor∣ments he will suffer for his Religion. Many of those acts whereabout we do usually delibe∣rate are mixt motions, partly active, and partly passive, as all our senses. Secondly, it is a shame for him to distinguish between actions and sufferings in this cause, when all the actions of all the free Agents in the World, by his doctrine, are meer sufferings. A free Agent is but like a bullet rammed up into the barrel by the outward causes, and fired off by the outward causes; the will serves for no use but to be a touchhole; and the poor Agent hath no more aime or under∣standing of what he doth, than the arrow which is forced out of the bow towards the mark, without any sense or concurrent in it self. A condemned person may be reprieved, and deliberate about that, but the sentence of the causes produceth a necessity from eter∣nity,

(as he phraseth it) never to be inter∣rupted or altered.

Thirdly, he erreth in this also, That he af∣firmeth all my three instances to be onely of passions or sufferings; Growing up in stature is a vegetative act, Respiration is a sensitive act, or an act of the moving and animal fa∣culty. Some question there hath been, whe∣ther respiration were a natural motion, or a voluntary motion, or a mixt motion; but all conclude, that it is an act or motion, which is performed whilst we sleep, when we are un∣capable of deliberation.

Lastly, to say that a man may deliberate of a thing that is not possible, if he know not of the impossibility, will not advantage his cause the value of a rush; for supposing an universal ne∣cessity of all events from eternity, there can be no such case, seeing all men know, that upon this supposition all acts and events, are either antecedently and absolutely necessary, or an∣tecedently and absolutely impossible, bo•…•… which are equally uncapable of deliberation. So the impertinence will prove to be in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 answer, not in my instances.

My second argument out of his own word•…•… was this. To resolve a mans self, is to deter∣mine his own will, and if a man determine his own will, then he is free from outward neces∣sity. But T. H. confesseth, that a man 〈◊〉〈◊〉 resolve himself: I resolved once, &c. And 〈◊〉〈◊〉 further to resolve is to will after deliberation.

Now to will after deliberation, is to elect, but that he hateth the very term of electing or chusing, as being utterly destructive to his new modeled fabrick of universal necessity. And for that very reason, he confounds and blunders together the natural, sensitive, and intellectual appetites. Either the will deter∣mineth it self in its resolution, or both will and deliberation and resolution, are predetermi∣ned by a necessary fluxe of natural causes; if the will determine it self in its resolution, then we have true liberty to will or nill: If both the will, and the deliberation, and the resolu∣tion, be predetermined by outward causes, then it is not the resolution of the will it self, nor of the Agent, but of the outward causes; then it was as much determined, that is to say, resolved before the deliberation, as after, because the deliberation it self and the whole event of it, particularly the last resolution, was outwardly predetermined from eternity.

To this he answereth nothing, but accor∣ding to his usual manner, he maketh three objections. First, No man can determine his own will, for the will is an appetite, and it is not in mans power to have an appetite when he will. This argument would much better become the kitchin than the Schooles: to argue from the lesser to the greater negatively, which is against all rules of Logick. Just thus, A brute beast cannot make a Categorical Syllogisme, thererefore a man cannot make one. So here,

the sensitive appetite hath no dominion over its own acts, therefore neither hath the ratio∣nall appetite any dominion over its own acts. Yet this is the onely pillar that supporteth his main distinction, which must uphold his Castle in the aire, from tumbling down a∣bout his ears. But be what it will be, it hath been sufficiently answered allready.

His second oblection hath so little solidity in it, that it is ridiculous, Over whatsoever things there is dominion, those things are not free; but over a mans actions there is the dominion of his wil. What a medius terminus hath he light upon? This which he urgeth against liberty, is the very essence of liberty. If a mans actions were under the dominion of another mans will, or under the dominion of his extrinsecall causes, then they were not free indeed; but for a mans own actions to be in his own power, or in the power, or under the dominion of his own wil, that is that which makes them free.

Thirdly he objects, If a man determine him∣self, the question will yet remain, What determined him to determine himself? If he speak properly in his own sense of physicall determination, by outward causes, he speaketh plain non-sense; for if he was so determined by ano∣ther, then he did not determine himself. But if he mean onely this, What did concur with the will in the determination of it self, I an∣swer, That a friend, by perswasion, might concur morally, and the understanding, by re∣presenting

might, concur intrinsecally, but it hath been demonstrated to him over and over, that neither of these concurrences is inconsistent with true liberty from ne∣cessitation and physicall determination to one.

Something I say afterwards which doth not please him, which he calleth a talking to my self at random; My aime in present is onely to answer his exceptions, a little more punctually, then he hath done mine: not at all to call him to an account for his omissions; that part I leave to the Readers own obser∣vation.

He telleth me plainly, That I neither under∣stand him, nor what the word (necessary) signifieth, if I think he holds no other necessity, then that which is expressed in that old foolish rule, what so∣ever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is. If I understand him not, I cannot help it, I un∣derstand him as well as I can, and wish that he understood himself a little better, to make him speak more significantly. Let us see where the fault lies, that he is no better under∣stood. First he defineth what is necessary; That is necessary, which is impossible to be other∣wise. Whence he inferreth, That Necessary, Possible, and Impossible, have no signification in reference to the time past, or time present, but one∣ly the time to come. I think all men will conde∣scend to him thus far, That possibility hath only referrence to the time to come. But for ne∣cessity,

and impossibility, he overshooteth himself beyond all aime. If an house do actually burn in present, it is necessary, that is, infallible, that that house do burn in present, and impossible that it do not burn. If a man was slain yestarday, it is necessary, that he is slain to day, and impossible that he should nor be slain. His own definition doth sufficiently confute him, That is necessary which is impossi∣ble to be otherwise, but it is impossible, that that which is doing in present, or which was done yestarday should be otherwise. How hang these things together? Or this that he telleth us, That his necessary is a necessary from all eternity, which with him is an everlasting succession. And yet he telleth us, That ne∣cessary signifieth nothing in reference to the time past; then how is it necessary from all eternity? And here he thrusteth out for rot∣ten, a great many of old Scholastick terms, as empty words. As necessary when it is, or ab∣solutely and hypothecally necessary, and sensus compositus & divisus, and the dominion of the will, and the determining of its self. I must put him in mind again of the good old wo∣man in Seneca, who complained of the dark∣nesse of the room, when the defect was in her own eye-sight. I wonder not that he is out of love with distinctions, more than I wonder why a bungling workman regards not a square or a plum. But if he understood these distinctions a little better, he would not trou∣ble

his reader with That which shall be shall be, and a bundle of such like impertinen∣cies.

He acknowledgeth, That my Lord of New∣castle desire, and my intreaty were enough to pro∣duce a will in him to write his answer. If they were enough, then he was not necessitated, nor physically predetermined to write it. We had no more power than to perswade, no na∣tural influence upon his will. And so he was, for us, not onely free to write, but free to will also. But perhaps there were other imaginations of his own, that contributed their part. Let it be so, yet that was no extrinsecall or abso∣lute determination of his will. And so far was our request from producing his consent, as necessarily as the fire burneth, that it did not, it could not produce it at all, by any naturall causall influence and efficacy, The sufficiency and efficiency and productive power was in his will it self, which he will not be brought to understand.

An Answer to his Animadversions upon the Reply, Num. 2.

HEre is nothing of moment to detain the Reader. He saith, Whosoever chanceth to read Suares his opuscula, shall find the greatest part, if not all, that I have urged in this question. Said I not truely? Give Innova∣tors line enough, and they will confute them∣selves? whosoever chanceth, &c. And why chan∣ceth? By his doctrine, it was as necessary for him that readeth to read, as it is for the fire to burn. Doth the fire sometimes burn by chance? He will say, That where the certain causes are not known, we attribute Events to Chance. But he sticks still in the same mire, without hope ever to be freed; who knoweth the cer∣tain reason why the needle touched with the loadstone pointeth allwayes towards the North? Doth it therefore point by chance? How many thousands are ignorant of the true causes of Comets and Earthquakes and Eclipses? Do they therefore attribute them to chance? Chance never hath place, but where the causes concur accidentally to pro∣duce some effect, which might have been pro∣duced otherwise. Though a man strive to expell these common notions with a fork, yet

now and then they will return. And though I could not surprize him, yet the truth can. Thus, Penelope like, he hath undone that in the dark, which he hath been weaving all this while in the light. It were more ingenu∣ous to say it was a slip of his pen.

It is indifferent to me, whether the greatest part of what I urge in this question, or all that I urge, or perhaps more than I urge, be con∣tained in Suares his Opuscula. So the truth may prevaile, I care not who have the ho∣nour of the atchievement. But Suares un∣derstood himself better, then to confound two such different questions, namely, that of the necessity or liberty of all Events, naturall and civill, which is our question, with the concurrence of grace and free-will, in morall and supernaturall acts, which he saith is the subject of Suares his discourse in that place. In all my life, that I do remember, I never read one line of Suares his Opuscula, nor any of his works, the sixteen years last past. I wish he had been versed in his greater works, as well as in his Opuscula, that he might not be so averse from the Schools, Ignoti nulla cupido. Then he would have known the terms and arguments used in the Schools as well as o∣thers. It is no blemish to make advantage of other mens pains and experience. Dies diei eructat verbum, & nox nocti indicat scientiam. But Mr. Hobbes, trusting over much to his own particular abilities, presumeth to stand

upon his own bottom, without any dread of Solomons ve sol•…•…, Wo to him that is alone when he falleth, He scrupleth not to remove the ancient land-marks which his fathers had set, nor to stum∣ble from the ancient paths, to walk in a way that was never cast up. It were meer folly to expect either a known ground, or a received term from him. Other men are contented to learn to write after a Copy, but he will be printed a Philosopher, and a Divine of the first edition by himself: and, Icarus like, find out a new way with his waxen winges, which mortalls never knew, though he perish in the attempt. Such undigested phancies may please for a while, during the distemper and green-sick∣ness fit of this present age, as maids infected with that malady, preferre chalk or coles in a corner, before healthfull food in their fathers house, but when time hath cured their mala∣dy, and experience opened their eyes, they wil abominate their former errours, and those who were their misleaders.

He had slighted whatsoever I produced as common and triviall, having nothing new in it, either from Scripture or reason, which he had not often heard. I replied onely that then I might expect a more mature answer, and ad∣vised him, under the similitude of Epictetus his sheep, rather to shew his reading in his works, than to glory of it. And where I said, that great recruits of reasons and autho∣rities did offer themselves to me in this cause,

he threatneth before he have done with me, to make it appear to be very bragging, and nothing else, Adding, That it is not likely, that Epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and wooll, be∣cause he was not acquainted with paying of tithes. I could not suspect that a poor similitude out of Epictetus should make him so passionate. But tange montes, & fumigabunt; touch the high mountains, and they will fume and smoak. It seemeth strange to me, that he should be so ignorant in Epictetus a Stoick, one of his principall friends, of so great fame, that his earthen lamp was preserved as a relick, and sold for three thousand Drachmes, whom, even Lucian, that great scoffer, calleth, an ad∣mirable old man, as to say, That it is not likely, that Epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and wool, he meaneth from sheep. To inform him better; let him hear his words, For sheep do not bring their grasse to their shepherd, to shew him how much they have eaten, but concocting their meat inwardly, do bring forth wool and milk. This might be pardoned, but his scoffing at payment of tithes, and particularly, lamb and wool, being an institution of God himself, and established by the laws of our own realm, can∣not be excused. I appeal to all those who have read any thing upon this subject, whe∣ther I might not have added many more reasons, and produced the authority of the Christian World against him, in this cause of liberty, with the suffrages of the Fathers in

all successive ages. But I remember that of our Saviour, Cast not your Pearles before swine least they trample them under their feet.

An answer to the Animadversions upon Num. 3.

HE is displeased that I do not set down the difinitions of necessity, spontaneity, and liberty, without which (he saith) their difference cannot possibly appear: Yet formerly, and again in this very Chapter, he confesseth, that the question is truely and clearly stated by me.

The question which the Bishop stateth in this place, I have before set down verbatim, and al∣lowed. What a trifling humour is this? Ma∣ny things are not capable of perfect defini∣tions, as (to passe by all others) accidents, and modes, or such terms as signifie the man∣ner of being. And in such things as are cap∣able of definition, yet essentials (whereof a definition must consist, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) are neither so obvious nor so useful, to common capacities. I believe that all the perfect definitions which T. H. hath made in his life in Philosophy or Theology, may be written in one little ring; whereof I shall be bold henceforth, now and then as I find oc∣casion,

to put him in mind. Nay even in Ma∣thematicks, which by reason of their abstra∣ction from matter are lesse subject to errour, he can misse the cushion as well as his neigh∣bours, and be contented sometimes to ac∣knowledge it; not because those errours are greater, or so great as his errours in Philoso∣phy or Theology, but because their convicti∣on is more easie, and more evident. And therefore for the most part a plaine descrip∣tion must serve the turn; sometimes from the etymological unfolding of the name, some∣times by the removing of what is opposite or contrary, sometimes by a periphrastical circumlocution, sometimes by instances and examples. And thus, by his own confession, the question is cleared between us.

Yet, to satisfie him, I will describe them more formally. To begin with liberty. Li∣berty is a power of the will, (or free Agent) to chuse or to refuse, this or that indifferently, after deliberation, free from all antecedent and extrin∣secal determination to one. Election is the pro∣per act of the will; and without indifferency or indetermination and deliberation, there can be no election, which is a consultative ap∣petition. And they, and they onely, are free Agents, who (supposing all things to be present that are requisite to action,) can nevertheless either act, or forbeare to act, at their own choice: Which description hath already been

explained, and shall be further in due place.

Secondly voluntary or Spontaneous, is that which hath its beginning from an inward prin∣ciple, (that is the will) with some knowledge of the end. Such are the acts of children, fooles, and madmen, whilest they want the use of reason; And the sudden acts of passionate persons, whensoever the violence of their pas∣sion doth prevent all deliberation. Such are many actions of brute beasts, as the spiders making of her webs to catch flies; the birds building of her nest therein to lay her egges; both which proceed from an inward principle, with some knowledge of the end. So then this is the difference between that which is free, and that which is voluntary or spontaneous; that every free act is also a vo∣luntary or spontaneous act, but every volun∣tary or spontaneous act is not a free act. The reason is evident, because no act is free, ex∣cept it be done upon deliberation: But ma∣ny voluntary or spontaneous acts are done without all deliberation, as the acts of brute beasts, fooles, children, madmen, and some acts of passionate persons. Secondly, there is no liberty but where there is a possi∣bility towards more than one, and freedom to chuse this or that indifferently. But in all those other kinds of voluntary or spontaneous acts, there is an antecedent determination to one, and no indifferency of election. So spon∣taneity

is an appetite of some object, proceeding either from the rational or sensitive will, either an∣tecedently determined, or not determined to one, either upon deliberation or without deliberation, either with election, or without election.

The last term is necessity; He himself hath defined necessary, to be that which is impossible to be otherwise. Here is a difinition without either matter or form, genus or differentia, without any thing in it that is essential, or so much as positive, a very periphrase or circum∣locution, and (which is worst) not convertible or reciprocal with the thing defined. Many things may be necessary respectively, which are not impossible to be otherwise: as to let blood in a Ple•…•…risie; A horse is necessary for a long voyage: yet it is not impossible for a man to perform it on foot. And on the other side, Many things are impossible to be otherwise, which are not necessary in that sense wherein we take necessity in this que∣stion, as that which is necessary upon science or prescience; and that which is necessary upon condition or supposition. As if Thomas write, then he lives; Yet neither his writing, nor his living, is absolutely necessary. So whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is, or impossible to be otherwise. None of these necessities have any place in this contro∣versie. None of these sorts of necessity are opposite to true liberty. By the way, T. H. calls this rule Whatsoever is, when it is, is neces∣sarily

so as it is; and old foolish rule, (yet it is de∣livered by Aristotle, and received ever since in the World,) upon his own authority, without ever examining it, or understanding it. Satis pro imperio. So then necessity (as it is pro∣per to this question) I conceive may be thus fitly described, Necessity is a manner or pro∣priety of being, or of acting, whereby that which is, or acteth, cannot possibly but be and act, nor be, or act otherwise then it doth, by reason of an ante∣cedent extrinsecal and inevitable determination to one. I say of being, or of acting, because there is a double necessity, in essendo, & in ope∣rando, and both considerable in this cause. That which is necessarily, may act freely, as God Almighty without himself; And that which is freely or contingently, as fire kindled by the help of a tinderbox, or by the stumb∣ling of an horse upon the pavement of a street, may act and burn necessarily. Here he may see if he please, how necessity and will, or spontaneity may meet together, be∣cause that which is antecedently and extrin∣secally determined to one, may agree well enough with my appetite, or the appetite of another: But necessity and liberty, can ne∣ver meet together; because that which is an∣tecedently and extrinsecally determined to one, cannot possibly be free; that is, undeter∣mined to one, nor capable of election, which must be inter plura, nor a fit subject for delibe∣ration.

He urgeth that, seeing I say necessity and spontaneity may meet together, he may say that ne∣cessity and will may stand together. He doth but betray his own ignorance, and intolerable boldnesse, to censure all the World for that which he never read nor understood. We all say in like manner, That necessity and will may stand together, for will and sponta∣neity a•…•…e the same thing. But necessity and liberty, can never stand together. If he will shut his eyes against the light, he may stumble as often as he pleaseth.

He saith, He doth not fear that it will be thought too hot for his fingers, to shew the vanity of such words as these, Intellectual appetite, Con∣formity of the appetite to the object, Rational will, Elective power of the rational will, Reason is the root of liberty, Reason representeth to the will. Reader, behold once more the unparalelled presumption of this man. Words and terms are not by nature, but by imposition. And who are fit to impose terms of Art, but Ar∣tists, who understand the Art? Thus were all these terms imposed. Again, verborum ut nummorum, words are as money is; The most current is the best. This was the current lan∣guage of all Schooles of learning, which we learned from our Tutours and Professours: But a private man starteth up, not bred in the Schooles, who opposeth his own authority to the authority of the whole World, and cryes down the current coin, that is, the generally

received terms of Art; Where is his com∣mission? What is his reason? Because he doth not understand them, he guesseth that they did not understand themselves. Is his private understanding (which is filled up to the brime with prejudice and presumption) fit to be the publick standard and seal of other mens capacities? They who will understand Schoole-terms, must learn and study them; which he never did. Those things that are excellent and rare, are alwayes difficult. He who shall affirm that all the famous Divines and Philosophers in the World, for so many succeeding Ages did speak nonsense, deser∣veth to be contemned. His respect to weak capacities must not serve his turn, Nullae sunt occultiores insidiae, quam hae quae latent in simula∣tione officii. If he could shew any authour be∣fore himself, wherein these terms were not used, or wherein his new terms were used, it were something. There is no Art in the World which hath not proper terms, which none understand but they who understand that Art.

But cui bono? If we should be so mad to quit all received Schoole-terms, and distincti∣ons, and lose all the advantage which we might reap by the labours and experience of so many great wits, What advantage would this be to him? None at all at long running. Whatsoever be the terms, the state of the question must be the same: And those very

reasons which convince him now in the old language of the Schooles, would convince him likewise in the new language, which he desireth to introduce, after it was formed and generally understood. All the benefit that he could make of it, would be onely a little time between the suppression of the one, and the introduction of the other, wherein he might jugle, and play hocus pocus, under the cloak of harmonymies and ambiguous ex∣pressions. And that is the reason why he is so great a friend to definitions, and so great an enemy to distinctions.

Whereas I affirmed that necessity of sup∣position may consist with true liberty, he ob∣jecteth, That all necessity is upon supposition; as the fire burneth necessarily, upon supposition that the ordinary course of nature be not hindered by God, for the fire burnt not the three children in the furnace: And upon supposition that fewell be put unto it. His supposition, if the ordinary course of nature be not hindred, is impertinent and de∣structive to his own grounds. For though it be true, that those things which are impossible to the second causes, as to make a Camel go thorough the eye of a needle, are all possible with God: Yet upon his opinion that all things are necessary from eternity, God hath tied his own hands, and nothing is possible to God, which is not absolutely necessary and impossible to be otherwise.

His other instance of putting fewell to the fire, is a necessary supposition, to the continu∣ance or duration of the fire, but not to the act∣ing or burning of the fire. So long as there is fire, it doth and must burn. When all requi∣sites to action are present, the will is still free to chuse or refuse. When all things requi∣site to action are present to the fire, it cannot chuse but burn, and cannot do otherwise.

Thirdly I answer, That there is a twofold necessity upon supposition; the one a necessity upon an antecedent extrinsecall supposition. This cannot consist with liberty, because it implieth an antecedent determination, and the thing supposed was never in the power of the Agent. The other is a necessity upon a consequent supposition, where the thing sup∣posed is in the power of the free Agent, or depends upon something, or supposeth some∣thing that is in his power; this is very well consistent with true liberty. As for example, If T. H. do run, then it is necessary, that he moves. This necessity is no impediment at all to liberty, because the thing supposed, that is to run or not to run, is in the power of the free Agent. If a mans will be determined antecedently by extrinsecall causes, to chuse such a woman for his wife, and her will to chuse him for her husband, then it is necessa∣ry, that they elect one another. This ne∣cessity is upon an antecedent supposition, and is utterly destructive to liberty, because the

determination of the extrinsecall causes, is not in the power of the free Agent.

Lastly, T. H. his two instances of the fire are alltogether impertinent. For first, The fire is a naturall necessary Agent; and there∣fore no supposition, antecedent or consequent can make it free. Secondly, God•…•… hin∣dering the ordinary course of nature is an antecedent supposition, And if the fire were a free Agent, it were suffi•…•…ient to destroy the liberty thereof, as to that act.

He saith, That it seemeth I understand not what these words free and contingent mean, be∣cause I put causes among those things that operate freely. What doth the man mean? Are not free Agents causes? If they be not, how do they act? I understand these words, free and contingent, as they ought to be understood; and as the World hath understood them for two thousand years. As for his new nick-na∣ming of free and contingent Agents, I heed it not.

He hath shewed, That this liberty, whereof we treat, is common to bruit beasts, and inanimate creatures with man, as well as he could shew it, or can shew it, or ever wil be able to shew it: that is, just as much as he hath shewed that the sea burneth. If it were not for this confounding of terms, and a company of trifling homo∣nymies, he would have nothing to say or do.

When a man (saith he) doth any thing freely, many other concurrent Agents work necessarily. As

the man moveth the sword freely, the sword wound∣eth necessarily. A free Agent may have con∣current Agents: but his instance in a sword is very impertinent, which is but an instru∣ment, yea, a passive instrument, and though it have an aptitude in it self, from the sharpnesse and weight thereof, yet the determination of the action, and the efficacy or causation ought to be ascribed to the principall Agent. The sword did not wound, but the man wounded with the sword. Admit the sword may be said in some sense to concur actively to the cutting, certainly it concurs onely passively to the motion.

But he would make us believe that the man is no more active than his sword, and hath no more power to suspend or deny his concurrence, then the sword, because a man doth not move himself, or at least, not move himself originally. I have heard of some, who held an opinion, that the soul of man was but like the winding up of a watch, and when the string was run out, the man dyed, and there the soule determined. But I had not thought before this, that any man had made the body also to be like a Clock, or a Jack, or a Puppet in a play, to have the originall of its motion from without itself, so as to make a man in his animal mo∣tion, to be as meer a passive instrument, as the sword in his hand. If by originally he do un∣derstand independently, so as to suppose that a man hath his locomotive faculty from him∣self,

and not from God, we all affirm, That the originall of a mans locomotive faculty is from God, in whom we live and move and have our being. But if he understand originally, not in relation to the faculty, but to the act of moving (as he must mean, unlesse he mean nonsence) then we affirm, that a man doth move himself originally, and desire not to tast of his paradoxicall knowledge of motion. It is folly to dispute with such men, and not rather to leave them to their own phantasticall Chi∣mera's, who deny all principles and rules of art, whom an adversary cannot drive into greater absurdities, than they do willing∣ly plunge themselves into. Thus they do on purpose put out the lights, and leave men to fence in the dark; and then it is all one, whether a man have skill at his weapon or not.

That he would have contingency to depend upon our knowledge, or rather our ignorance, and not upon the accidentall concurrence of causes; That he confoundeth free causes, which have power to suspend or deny their concurrence, with contingent causes, which admit onely a possibility to concur, or not concur, rather out of impotence than power; That he maketh free causes, which are prin∣cipall causes, to be guided by inferiour and in∣strumentall causes, as if a man should say, That a man is guided by the sword in his hand, and not the sword by the man, de∣serves

no other answer, but contempt; or pity, that a man should so poyson his intel∣lectuals, and entangle himself in his own er∣rours.

Such another mistake is his argument to prove that contingent causes could not have concurred otherwise then they did, I know no•…•… whether more pedanticall or ridiculous. For I conceive not (saith he) how when this run∣neth this way, and that another; they can be said to concur, that is, run together. Wheresoever there are divided parties, as in a Court or a Camp, or a Corporation, he who concur∣reth with one party, doth thereby desert the other.

Concerning his instance of the necessity of casting ambs ace, If he can shew that the caster, was antecedently necessitated to cast, so that he could not possibly, have denied his concurrence, and to cast so soon, so that he could not possibly have suspended his concur∣rence, and to cast just with so much force, so that he could not possibly have used more force or lesse force, and to cast into that table, and that very individuall place, (it may be whilest he winked, or looked another way) I say, if he can shew that all these contingent accidents were absolutely predetermined, and that it was not at all in the Casters power to have done otherwise than he did, then he hath brought contingency under the juris∣diction of fate. But if he faile in any one of

these, (as all men see that he must faile in all of these) then I may have leave to tell him, that his casting of ambs ace, hath lost him his game.

But now Reader, I desire thee to observe his answer, and to see him plainly yield the cause. Though the subject [ambs ace] be mean and contemptible, yet it yieldeth thee light enough to see what notorious triflers these are. Thus he saith, The suspending of the casters concurrence, or altering of his force, and the l•…•…ke accidents, serve not to take away the ne∣cessity of ambs ace, otherwise then by making a necessity of deux ace, or some other cast that shall be thrown. This is ingenuously answered, I ask no more of him. He confesseth, That the caster might have suspended his concur∣rence, or have altered his force, or the acci∣dents might have fallen out otherwise than they did. And that if these alterations had happened, as they might have happened, then there had been as great a necessity of deux ace, or some other cast, as there was of ambs ace: where he saith, That the alterati∣on of the accidents serveth not to take away the necessity of ambs ace, otherwise than by making a necessity of deux ace, or some other cast, he con∣fesseth, That by making a necessity of deux ace, or some other cast, they might serve to take away the necessity of ambs ace. What is now become of his antecedent determina∣tion, of all things to one from eternity? and of

the absolute impossibility that any Event should come to passe otherwise than it doth. If this be all his necessity, it is no more than a necessity upon supposition, where the thing supposed was in the Agents power: And where the contrary determination by the Agent being supposed, the Event must necessarily have been otherwise. And so he is come unwittingly under the protection of that old foolish rule, which even now he renoun∣ced, Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is.

I said most truely, That that is not the questi∣on which he maketh to be the question. For al∣though at sometimes he assent to the right stating of the question, yet at other times, like a man that doth not understand himself, he varieth quite from it. And in the place of an absolute antecedent necessity, he introduceth a consequent hypothecal necessity. As we have seen even now in the case of ambs ace: and where he argueth from prescience; and where he reasoneth thus, That which shall be, shall be, as if the manner how it should be, were not materiall: and where he maketh deliberation and perswasion to determine the will. All these do amount to no more then a necessity upon supposition. The question is as much or more of the liberty of doing what we will, as wil∣ling what we will. But he makes it to be only of willing.

He proceedeth like another Jehu, He that cannot understand the difference between free to do, if he will, and free to will, is not fit to hear this controversie disputed, much lesse to be a writer in it. Certainly, I think he meaneth by him∣self, for he neither understandeth what free is, nor what the will is. A bowle hath as much free-will as he, the bowle is as much an agent as he, neither of them, according to his his opinion, do move themselves originally. The bias is as much to the bowle, as his will is to him. The bias is determined to the one, so is his will. The bowle doth not bias it self, no more hath he the government of his own will, but the outward causes. It is not the fault of the bowle, if it have too much bias, or too little bias, but his fault that biast it: So if he chuse evill, it is not his fault, but the cau∣ses which biast him over much, or over little, or on the wrong side. And this is all his free∣dom; a determinate propension to one side, without any possibility to incline the other way. As a man that is nailed to a post, is free to lay his ear to it. Then as Diogenes called a displmued cock, Platos man, a living crea∣ture with two feet, without feathers. So I may call a bowle Mr. Hobbes his free Agent.

And yet he glorieth in this silly distinction, and hugs himself for the invention of it. It is true, very few have learned from tutours, that a man is not free to will, nor do they find it much in

books, Yea, when I call shepherds, Poets, Pa∣stours, Doctours, and all mankind to bear witnesse for liberty, he answereth, That nei∣ther the Bishop nor they ever thought on this que∣stion. If he make much of his own inventi∣on, I do not blame him, The infant will not live long before it be hissed out of the World. In all my life, I never saw a little empty boat bear so great a saile, as if he meant te tow the World after him: but when the sun is at the lowest, it makes the longest shadows. Take no∣tice (by the way) that his freedom is such a freedom, as none of mankind, from the shep∣herd to the Doctour, ever dreamed of before himself. This vain unprofitable distinction which wounds himself and his cause more then his adversary, and leaves him open to the blows of every one that will vouchsafe to assault him, which contradicts both the truth and it self, hath been twice taken away all∣ready in a voider, (whither I refer the Rea∣der) and ought not, like twice sodden Cole∣worts, to have been served up again in tri∣umph so quickly, upon his single authority, & before this Treatise be ended. I shall meet with it again to some purpose, I wonder whe∣ther he do never cast away a thought upon the poor woman that was drowned bymischance, whose dead body, whilest her neighbours sought for down the river; her husband, who knew her conditions better than they, advised them to seek up the river; for all her life long

she loved to be contrary to all others, and he presumed she would swimme against the stream being dead. Is it not hard that he who will not allow to other men any domi∣nion over themselves, or their own acts, will himself needs usurpe an Universal Empire over the wills and understandings of all other men.

Is it not freedom enough (saith he) unlesse a mans will have power over his will, and that his will must have another power within it, to do vo∣luntary acts? His errour proceedeth from the confounding of voluntas and volitio, the faculty of the will, and the act of willing. Not long after he reiterateth his mistake, taxing me for saying, that our wills are in our power, ad∣ding, that through ignorance I detect the same fault in St. Austine. If he mean my ignorance to mistake St, Austin, let St. Austine himselfe be Judge, Voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset nisi esset in nostra potestate, &c. Therefore our will should not be our will, unlesse it were in our power. Because it is in our power, it is free to us, for that is not free to us which is not in our power, &c. If he mean that it is an errour in St. Au∣stine, he sheweth his insolence and vain-glory. If this be an errour in him, it is an errour in all the rest of the Fathers; I will not bate him one of them in this cause. Mr. Calvin (whom he citeth sometimes in this Treatise) profes∣seth, that he will not differ a syllable from St. Austine; I do not say in this question of

natural necessity or liberty, which no man then doubted of, but even in that higher que∣stion of the concurrence of grace with free∣will. So here is neither errour in St. Austine, nor ignorance in me.

Whereas I demanded thus; If whatsoever a man doth and willeth be predetermined to one precisely and inevitably, to what pur∣pose is that power whereof T. H. speaketh, to do if he will, and not to do if he will, which is never deduced into act indifferently and in utramque partem, and consequently frustrane∣ous? He answereth, That all those things may be brought to passe, which God hath from eternity predetermined. In good time; he might as well say, that God hath given man a liberty to both parts, to do or not to do, to chuse or to refuse, and yet hath limited him punctually and precisely to one part; which is a pure contradiction, to give him choice of two, and yet restrain him to one.

He addeth, that though the will be necessi∣tated, yet the doing what we will is liberty: Yes, it is the liberty of a bowle, it is his mock liber∣ty, but it is no wise mans liberty, where all deliberation is vain, and all election is impos∣sible.

I argued thus, If a man be free to act, he is much more free to will, because quod efficit tale illud magis est tale. To which he answer∣eth with an ignorant jeere, As if he should say, if I make him angry, then I am more angry. Par∣don

me, I will free him from this feare: I see nothing in him that should move a man to anger, but rather to pity. That Canon hold∣eth onely in causis perse, such causes as by na∣ture or the intention of the free Agent, are properly ordained to produce that effect, such as his outward causes are; supposed by him to be, in the determination of the will. And therefore my instance was proper, Not in causis per accidens, where the effect is not pro∣duced naturally, or intentionally, but acci∣dentally, as in his ridiculous instance.

My last argument, which he vouchsafeth to take notice of, was this; If the will be de∣termined, then the writing is determined: And then he ought not to say, he may write, but he must write. His answer is, It follow∣eth that he must write; but it followeth not that I ought to say, he must write, unlesse he would have me say more than I know, as he himself doth. What poor crotchets are these, unworthy of a man that hath any thing of reality in him? as if my argument did regard the saying of it, and not the thing it self. If it follow precise∣ly that he must write, then he hath no free∣dom in utramque partem, either to write or not to write, then he is no more free to do, than to will; both which are contrary to his assertion.

I demanded, if a mans will be determined with∣out his will? Why we do ask him, whether he will do such a thing or not? His answer is,

because we desire to know. But he wholly mi∣staketh the scope of the question. The em∣phasis lieth not in the word we, but in the word his; how it is his will? For if his will be determined by natural causes without his will, then it is the will of the causes, rather than his own will.

I demanded further, why we do represent reasons to men, why we do intreate them? He answereth, Because we think to make them have the will they have not. So he teacheth us, First that the will is determined by a necessary in∣fluence of natural causes; and then prateth of changing the will by advice and moral perswasions. Let him advise the clock to strike sooner or later than it is determined by the weight of the plumb, and motion of the wheeles. Let him disswade the Plants from growing, and see how much it availeth. He saith the will doth will as necessarily as the fire burneth. Then let him intreat the fire to leave burning at his request. But thus it fal∣leth out with them who cannot, or will not, dishinguish between natural and moral effi∣cacy.

I asked then, why do we blame free A∣gents? since no man blameth fire for burning Cities, nor accuseth poison for destroying men. First he returneth an answer, We blame them because they do not please us. Why? may a man blame every thing that doth not please his humour? Then I do not wonder why

T. H. is so apt to blame others without cause. So the Schollar may blame his Master for correcting him deservedly for his good. So he who hath a vitious stomack may blame healthful food. So a Lethargical person may blame his best friend for endeavouring to save his life.

And now having shot his bolt, he begins to examine the case, Whether blaming be any more than saying the thing blamed is ill or imper∣fect? Yes, moral blame is much more, It is an imputation of a fault. If a man be born blind or with one eye, we do not blame him for it: But if a man have lost his sight by his intemperance, we blame him justly. He in∣quireth, May not we say, a lame horse is lame? Yes, but you cannot blame the horse for it, if he was lamed by another without his own fault. May not a man say one is a fool or a knave (saith he) if he be so, though he could not help it? If he made himself a sot, we may blame him, though if he be a stark sot, we lose our labour. But if he were born a natural idiot, it were both injurious and ridiculous to blame him for it. Where did he learn, that, a man may be a knave, and cannot help it? Or that knavery is imposed inevitably upon a man without his own fault? If a man put fire to his neighbours house, it is the fault of the man, not of the fire. He hath confessed formerly, that, a man ought not to be punished but for crimes; The reason is the very same

that he should not be blamed for doing that which he could not possibly leave undone; no more than a servant whom his Master hath chained to a pillar, ought to be blamed for not waiting at his elbow. No chaine is stronger than the chaine of fatal Destiny is supposed to be.

That piece of eloquence which he thinks I borrowed from Tully, was in truth taken immediately out of St. Austine, who applieth it most properly to this case now in question. He urgeth, That a man might as well say, that no man halteth which can not chuse but halt, as say, That no man sinneth in those things which he cannot shun; for what is sin but halt∣ing? This is not the first time that he hath contradicted himself. Before he told us, that there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone: Now he telleth us, that a man may sin who cannot chuse but sin; Then sin is not a punishable crime. He might even as well say, that there is no such thing as sin in the World; Or if there be, that God is the authour of it. Reader, whosoever thou art, if thou reverence God, eschew such do∣ctrines. His comparison of halting is frivo∣lous and impertinent. Halting is not against the eternal rule of Gods justice, as sinning is. Neither doth a man chuse his halting freely, as he doth his sinning.

In the conclusion of his Animadversions upon Num. 3. there is nothing that is new, but

that he is pleased to play with a wooden toppe. He calleth my argument from Zenos cudgel∣ling of his man, a wooden argument. Let him chuse whether I shall call his a wooden, or a boyish comparison. I did never meet with a more unfortunate instancer than he is. He should produce an instance of natural Agents, and he produceth an instance of vo∣luntary Agents. Such are the boyes that whip his wooden toppe. He should produce an instance of a natural determination; so he affirmeth, that the will is determined; and he produceth an instance of a violent deter∣mination, for such is the motion of his toppe. I hope he doth not mean that the will is compelled; if he do, he may string it up with the rest of his contradictions.

Hath not he brought his hogs to a faire market, when God hath created him a free man, a noble creature, to make himself like a wooden toppe? Deserveth not he to be mo∣ved as the toppe is with a whip, until he con∣fesse his errour, and acknowledge his own li∣berty. If this wooden toppe should chance to hit T. H. on the shinnes, I desire to know whom he would accuse: The toppe? That were as mad a part, as it is in the dog to run after the stone and bite it, never looking at the man who did throw it. What then should he accuse the boyes that whipped the toppe? No, that were equally ludibrious, seeing the boyes are as much necessitated; and to use

his own phrase, as much lasht to what they do by the causes, as the toppe is by the boyes. So he may sit down patiently, and at last think upon his liberty which he had aban∣doned, and if the causes will give him leave, get a plantin leafe to heale his broken shinne.

Such an unruly thing as this toppe which he fancieth, is he himself, sometimes dicta∣ting errours, sometimes writing paradoxes, sometimes justling out Metaphysicks, some∣times wounding the Mathematicks; And in a word, troubling the World, and disorder∣ing all things, Logick, Philosophy, Theology, with his extravagant conceits. And yet he is offended that men will go about to keep pos∣session of their ancient Principles against his upstart innovations, and is ready to implead them (with that quarrelsome Roman) be∣cause they would not receive his weapon fair∣ly with their whole bodies. It were a much more Christian contemplation to elevate his thoughts from this wooden toppe; to the or∣ganical body of a man, wherein he may find God an hundred times, from the external form or figure of the one, which affords it onely an aptitude to move and turn, to the internall and substantiall form of the other, which is the subordinate beginning of animal motion, from the turning of his toppe, which is so swift, that it prevents the discovery of the sharpest eye-sight, and seemeth to stand stock

still, to the eternity of God where motion and rest do meet together, or all motion is swal∣lowed up into rest; Lastly from these boyes who hold the toppe up by their continued lashings, to the infinite power of an Almighty God, who is both the procreating and con∣serving cause of all our life, being, and mo∣tion, and to magnifie him for his wonderful workes, wherein he hath manifested to the World his own power and wisdom.

An answer to his Animadversions upon Num. 4.

THese Animadversions will produce no great trouble either to me or the Reader. I did demonstrate in this Section the difference between liber∣ty of exercise or contradiction, and liberty of specification or contrariety. He onely takes notice of it, and calls it Jargon; and so with∣out one word more, shaketh hands and with∣draweth himself.

I said it was a rule in art, that homonymous words, or words of a double or doubtful signi∣fication, ought first to be distinguished, that Disputants may understand one another rightly, and not beat the aire to no purpose.

I shewed out of the Scriptures, that the

word liberty or freedom, was such an ambi∣guous word, and shewed further what this li∣berty is whereof we dispute: A liberty from necessitation or determination to one by ex∣trinsecal causes. He confesseth, that this is the question; adding, That he understandeth not how such a liberty can be. Then what remained but to go to our proofes? Yet here he raiseth a storm of words upon the by, and foameth out his own disgrace. He denieth that there is any such rule of Art. I am sure (saith he) not in the art of reason which men call Logick. And all Logicians are sure of the contrary who give not onely one but many such rules, in treating of simple terms, of complex terms, of fallacies. They teach that an ambiguous term before it be distinguished, signifieth nothing; That it cannot be placed in any predicament; That it cannot be defined nor divided: And they give this general Rule, Distinctio vocis ambi∣guae prima sit in omni rerum consideratione. Either this man never read one word of Logick in his life, or it is most strange how pride hath defaced all Logicall notions out of his mind.

He telleth us, that the signification of an ambiguous word may be rendered perspicu∣ous by a definition. But Logicians teach us better, that it cannot be defined before it be distinguished. How should a man define he knoweth not what? Suppose I should aske him the definition of a degree, Can he or any

man define a degree, before they know what degree is to be defined? whether a degree in the Heavens, or a degree in the Schooles, or a degree of Consanguinity, or a degree of Comparison? He may as well define a crabbe before he know whether it be a crab-fish or a crabbe-fruit. The difinition and the thing defined, are the same thing. But am∣biguous words have several significations, which cannot be of the same thing.

His definition of liberty is this; Liberty is the absence of external impediments to motion. Before I have done, I shall make him out of love with his definitions. Liberty is an absence; If liberty be an absence, then liberty is no∣thing, for an absence is nothing in the nature of things; but a meer privation. An absence of impediments; Impediments may take away the liberty of execution, not the liberty of election. There may be true liberty where there are impediments; and there may be no impediments, yet without liberty. An ab∣sence of outward impediments: And why of outward impediments? may not inward im∣pediments withhold a man from acting freely as well as outward? May not a fit of sick∣nesse keep a man at home, as well as a shower of rain? A man may be free, and act freely, notwithstanding impediments. Many impe∣diments are vincible: A man may go out of his house though there be a great logge laid at his door. Lastly an absence of impedi∣ments

to motions. Election is the most pro∣per intrinsecall act of liberty, which may be without locall motion.

I durst not stile my poor description by the name of a definition. Yet it set down the right nature of liberty, and shewed what was the difference between us. His definition hath nothing to do with liberty, and com∣eth not near our question by twenty fur∣longs.

Our controversie is, Whether the will be antecedently determined by extrinsecall cau∣ses, we have nothing to do with impediments of motion. But to let him see the vanity of his definitions, I will demonstrate out of them, That the most necessary Agents are free Agents, and the most free Agents necessary Agents, that the will is free, and necessity is liberty. First, when a stone falleth from a steeple to the ground, or when a fire burneth, there is an absence of all externall impedi∣ments to motion: yet by his own confession, these are not free, nor so much as voluntary, but naturall necessary actions. The stone falleth necessarily, not freely. The fire burn∣eth necessarily, not freely. So his definition fitteth a necessary Agent, as well as a free Agent. On the other side, he defineth neces∣sary to be that which is impossible to be otherwise. But by this doctrine, it is impossible for any free or voluntary Agent to be otherwise than it is, or act otherwise than it doth. Therefore

by his definition, all free and voluntary A∣gents are necessary Agents. Secondly, if an absence of externall impedements to mo∣tion be a true definition of liberty, then the will is free, for the will hath no externall im∣pediment to motion. Externall impediments may hinder action, not election, which is the proper act of the will.

Lastly, by his definition, liberty it self is necessity, and necessity is liberty, as is made evident thus. The absence of outward impe∣diments to motion is the definition which he giveth of liberty, and therefore must be reci∣procall or convertible with liberty it self. But necessity is much more an absence of outward impediments to motion. For if there were any impediments that could hinder the pro∣duction of the effect, there could be no ne∣cessity. Thus he confoundeth all things with his definitions, free Agents with necessary Agents, and necessary Agents, with free A∣gents: necessity it self with liberty, and liber∣ty with necessity. And now learning is well reformed.

He is displeased at me for calling him a particular man, as if (saith he) I or any other was an universall man; and he conceiveth that I mean a private man. I mean as I write, a particular man is not opposed to an universall man, but to mankind, though he maketh his City, to be a kind of universal man. My meaning was, a particular man, that is, not a

Church, not a Councel, not so much as a company of men, but one single man, and it may, an handfull of his seduced disciples. There is neither a Church, nor a Councel, nor a company of men, but they may justly challenge more respect than one single man.

Here he boasteth of his constant medita∣tions, That he hath done allmost nothing else but to meditate upon this and other naturall que∣stions. Still he forgeteth Epictetus his rule, that the sheep should not brag how much it hath eaten. If he had meditated to any great purpose, we should have found it in his works. For my part, I do neither believe, that he had so much spare time from other imployments, to bestow upon his meditations. Nor that private meditation, without ma∣king use of the studies and experience of other men, is so ready a way to attain to perfecti∣on in such hidden learning. If he had spent all his time in meditating how to become a good Physitian, and had never read a line of Hippocrates or Galen, or any other learned Authour, the meanest of which, had more knowledge, than he is able to attain unto with all his meditation, during his whole life, What would it have availed him? Facile est inventis addere, It is much easier to top a state∣ly edefice, then to build it up from the very foundation. Lastly, I do not believe that he was capable of meditation, upon those high

subjects, which he never understood, as ap∣peareth plainly by his writings. How should a blind man judge of colours?

Yet he will not give over, untill he have had another fling against School terms, be∣cause he findeth it easier to censure, than ei∣ther to confute or understand. He hath been answered formerly, and shall receive a further answer in due place. For the present, I shall onely put him in mind of two sayings, the one of Schaliger, Voces didacticae rudibus ingeniis acerbae, delicatis ridiculae sunt, Terms of art de∣vised for instruction, are unpleasant to palates not exercised in them, and ridiculous to nice and deli∣cate ears. There is a double perspicuity, the one vulgar to common people, the other more intellectuall to Artists. In vulgar appel∣lations (saith Aristotle) we are to speak as the common people, but in terms of art, we are to fol∣low the most approved Artists.

He asketh with what patience I can hear Mar∣tine Luther and Philip Melancthon, speak against School Theology, whereof he giveth some in∣stances, but without citing the places. So he must receive an answer without perusing of them. If they have condemned all School-men and School-learning, it is for him to de∣fend them, not for me. If they did so, I should not much value their judgement in that par∣ticular. But I do not believe that any who made so great use of School-learning, did condemn all School-men in generall. Luther

stinted his accusation to under 300 years. It may well be, That in that time some School-men, in some questions were too licentious. But T. H. condemneth not onely the men, but the learning, all their grounds, all their termes, and more particularly in this very question of the liberty of the will, he censu∣rureth and contemneth all Fathers, Philoso∣phers, and Classick Writers. I trow, Martine Luther and Philip Melancthon did not so.

He pleadeth, That he doth not call all School-learning Iargon, but that which they say in de∣fence of untruths, and especially in the mainte∣nance of free-will I believe he hath read very little School-learning, either upon that sub∣ject, or any other; if he have, we find very litle fruit of it in his writings. But if that be his quarrel against the School-men, for maintaining of freedom of will from antece∣dent and extrinsecall necessitation in naturall acts, if he will stand to authorities, I am con∣tented to joyn issue with him, that not onely all the School-men, but all Fathers, Philoso∣phers, and Chassick Writers were propug∣ners of this freedom or liberty of will; and particularly his two witnesses, whose words he citeth in this place, Luther and Me∣lancthon, whereof the former saith, That he and his party speak undiscreetly, and the other (that is, Melacthon) calleth his opinion of universall necessity, a Manichean opinion, and an horrible lie.

Castigations upon the Animadver∣sions, Num. 5.

IN this fifth Section there are no Ani∣madversions, and so there is no need of Castigations.

Castigations upon the Animaver∣sions, Num. 6.

THere is no occasion offered to make any long stay upon this subject. I produced three places of Scripture to prove, That men have liberty, or power of election. He answered, That men are necessi∣tated to what they do chuse by antecedent causes. I took away this answer three wayes. First by reason. To this he is silent. Secondly by instances. Thirdly by the texts themselves. To this he rejoyneth. That these texts and instances do onely prove, that a man is free to do if he will, which he denieth not. But they do not prove that he is free to will. And in the second instance, The Seniour of the messe, chuseth what he hath an appetite to, but he

chuseth not his appetite. This is all he an∣swereth.

This distinction hath been allready suf∣ficiently refuted, as contradictory to his own grounds, which do as much necessitate a man to do, as to will. Secondly, as unprofitable, the necessity of willing being much more subject and obnoxious to all those blows, and all those absurdities, which flow from fatall destiny, than the necessity of doing. Thirdly as contrary to the sense, and meaning of the whole world. Fourthly as contrary to the Scriptures. Lastly, I have demonstrated the unreasonablenesse of his comparison between the intellectuall and sensitive appetite, both as it is a comparison, Theologia Symbolica non est argumentativa. As also as it is an infe∣rence from the lesser to the greater nega∣tively.

Now I add, That that glosse is accursed, which doth corrupt the text, as this glosse of his doth, That a man is free to do if he will, but not free to will. Election is that very thing which he saith is not free, that is the appetite; and it is thus defined, Electio est appetitus rei praeconsileatae, Election is an appetite of some thing, that hath been predeliberated of. But the texts alleadged do demonstrate that to chuse or elect is free, and undetermined to one. Therefore they do demonstrate that it is not free onely to do, but much more to will or to chuse. It is in the husbands choice, either

to establish the vow of his wife, or to make it voide. Here is a liberty of contradiction or of exercise. Again, Chuse ye this day whom ye will serve, whether the gods of your fathers, or the gods of the Amorites, and, I offer thee three things, chuse the which of them I shall do. Here is a liberty of contrariety or specification. And in all these places, here is a liberty of e∣lection, to will, to desire, to chuse their own appetite.

Secondly, the same is demonstrated from the definition of free-will, to be a free power given of chusing one thing before another, or accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently, given to the intellectuall nature for the glory of God, in order to some end. But all these texts by me alledged, and many more do attribute unto the will, a power of chusing one thing before another, or of accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently. Therefore all these texts do de∣monstrate that the will of man is free, not onely to do if he will, but to will, that is, to, chuse or to elect. Wheresoever, whensoever and howsoever the will acteth, it is volition, but election is the proper formall act of the will, as it is free. And it is alltogether im∣possible there should be any election, without a freedom to will. The will imployeth the understanding to consider of the most conve∣nient means to attain some desired end. The understanding doth return its judgement, which is like a bill presented to the King by

the two houses. The will is free either to su∣spend its act, or deny its approbation with la volonte s'advisera, The will will advise bet∣ter, or else to consent, with la volonte l•…•… vent, the will approveth it, which consent to the judgement of the understanding is properly election, as it were the conclusion of a practi∣cal Syllogisme, an intellective appetite, or an appetite intelect.

If a great Prince should offer to his poor subject three distinct gifts, & bid him take his choice of them, having underhand given a∣way two of them before to another from him, Were it not an abuse, and a meer mockery? God offered David in like manner his choice of three things; I offer thee three things, chuse which of them I shall do. Did God openly offer to David the free choice of three things, and had secretly determined that two of them should never be? Far be this from God. Especially to do it so seriously, and with such solemn protestations, as I call heaven and earth this day to record against you, that I have set be∣fore you life and death, blessing and cursing, there∣fore chuse life, that both thou and thy seed may li•…•…e. Can any man who hath but so much reverential fear of God, as a grain of mustard-seed, which is the least of seeds, harbour such an unworthy thought in his breast, that truth itself should be guilty of such grosse dissimu∣lation? It is a decided case in law, that he who hath granted to another liberty of electi∣on,

cannot before his election, dispose of that which he hath granted away to another. He who hath a right to elect, if he chuse an un∣worthy person, by the sentence of the law for∣feites his right to elect, for that turn. Why so, if he was necessitated without his will to chuse as he did? We say truely, consent taketh away errour. That man is not wrong∣ed, who consents to his own wrong: how so, if his consent be against or without his own will? If the will be not free •…•…ut necessita∣ted, then nothing is unlawful. That which is not lawful by the law, necessity maketh lawful. In case not onely of absolute, but even of extreme necessity, meum and tuum ceaseth, and that which otherwise had been plain the•…•…, becom∣eth just. He who necessitateth all events, taketh sin out of the World.

One of my instances was in the election of the King of the Romans, to which he an∣swereth as formerly, That th•…•… electors are free to name whom they will, but not free to will. If they be not free to will, then they are not free to elect, for election is the proper formal act of the will; and then the electors are no ele∣ctors. There is one contradiction. Neither are they free to name whom they will in∣differently, if they be determined necessarily and antecedently to name one. Possibility of more than one, and a precise determina∣tion to one, (that is, may name and must name,) are likewise contradictories in adjecto.

This is not all: We see by the golden Bull what care there is to bring the electors toge∣ther to Frankfort, and to secure them there. Every one of them must take a solemn oath upon the Gospel of St. Iohn, that according to his faith which he oweth to God and the Roman Empire, to the best of his discretion and under∣standing, he will chuse [volo eligere] with the help of God a King of the Romans, that is, fit for it, and give his voice and vote without all pact, stipend, price, or promise. And if they do not accord actually within thirty dayes, they are thenceforth to have nothing but bread and water until they have made their election. If it was antecedently determined by extrinse∣cal causes who should be chosen, and no o∣ther; What needed all this trouble and charge to so many great Princes, when they might as well have stayed at home, and have set seven ordinary Burgers to have drawn lots for it? Do men use to swear to chuse that which (it may by) is not in their power to chuse, and to refuse that which (it may be) is not in their power to refuse. The belly is a vehement oratour; but if it be absolutely de∣termined whom they must chuse, and when, they might as well give them mosel, wine, and the best meat the Country affords, as bread and water. Here we have expressely volo eligere, I will chuse, which is as much as to say, vollo velle, I will will: Which phrase T. H. esteemeth an absurd speech: But Ju∣lius

Scaliger thought otherwise, Dicimus & vere, & ex omnium gentium consensu, vollo velle. The very words cum adjutorio Dei, with the help of God, might teach them, that God is neither the total cause, nor the determining cause of mans election.

Lastly, this distinction maketh T. H. worse than the Stoicks themselves; for the Soicks together with their Fate, did also maintaine the freedom of the will. And as we find in many Authors, both theirs and ours, did not subject the soul of man nor the will of man to the rigid dominion of destiny. The Stoicks substracted some causes, and subjected others to necessity. And among those which they would not have to be under necessity, they placed the will of man, lest it should seem not to be free, if it were subjected to necessity. Chrysippus made two sorts of causes, principal causes which did necessitate and compel all things, except the will of man, and adjuvant causes, as objects, which did onely excite and allure. These (said he) do awaken the mind of man, but being awakened it can move of it self: which he setteth forth by the com∣parison of a wherlegigge, and a roller cast down a steep place, which have the beginning of their motion from without themselves, but the progresse from their own form and volu∣bility. So T. H. is worse than a Stoick in this respect, and extendeth fatal necessity further than they did. I have done with

this distinction for this time; I say nothing of the bird, but the egge is bad.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 7.

IN these Animadversions there is nothing contained which is material, either for necessity or against liberty, but passion and animosity. Where it is said, that the will doth perpetually follow the last di∣ctate of the understanding, or the last judge∣ment of right reason: He excepteth that I am mistaken, for the will followeth as well the judgement of an erroneous, as of a true reasoning. First his exception is improper, it is the judge∣ment of Reason, not of reasoning. Secondly it is impertinent, the onely question here is, whether the will do follow the last judgement of reason, not whether the reason be right or not. Thirdly it is false, whilst the will doth follow the erroneous judgement of reason, yet it followeth it as the judgement of right reason: When the judgement of Reason is erroneous, the will followeth it onely de facto, but when it is right, it followeth it both de facto and de jure.

His second exception is, that I make the un∣derstanding to be an effect of the will. Good

words. I said not the understanding, but the act of the understanding; that is, the deliber∣ation or judgement of the understanding, which is so far truely said to proceed from the will, because the will employeth the under∣standing to deliberate and judge. How the understanding moveth the will, and the will moveth the understanding mutually, is a su∣perfluous question, seeing they do not differ really, but rationally. The understanding is the essence of the soul as it knoweth, the will the same essence of the soul as it extendeth it self to enjoy the thing known. Neither am I obliged to read Lectures. It is sufficient to know that the will is moved to the specifica∣tion of its act, onely by the understanding, or which is all one, by the object known and re∣presented. But the will is moved and doth move the understanding to the exercise of its act by it self, except onely in that motion which is called motus primó primus, that is the motion of the will towards the last end, which it is not in the power of the will to will, or not to will, as its other motions are, but requireth the excitation of the first cause. The will moveth both the understanding and it selfe effectively. The understanding moveth the will objectively, by making those things to be actually known, which were onely potential∣ly intelligible. As the light of the Sun ma∣keth those things actually visible, which be∣fore did lie hid in darknesse.

If he will not understand those things, which all old Divines and Philosophers do assent unto, (chusing rather to be a blind leader of the blind, than a follower of them who see) nor the command of the will, nor the difference between natural and moral efficacy; If he understand not what is the judgement of the understanding practically practical, he must learn, and not adventure to censure before he knows what he censures. What he is not able to confute, he should not dare to sleight. I do not justifie all the questions, nor all the expressions of all Schoolemen: But this I will say, There is often more profound sense and learning in one of these obscure phrases, which he censureth as jargon, and unintelli∣gible, than in own of his whole Treati∣ses.

And particularly, in this which he sleight∣eth more than any of the rest in a domineer∣ing manner; that is, The judgement of the un∣derstanding practically practical. A country man (saith he) will ackowledge there is judge∣ment in men, but will as soon say, the judgement of the judgement, as the judgement of the under∣standing. Then, shall country men be Judges of terms of Art, who understand not any one terme of any Art? much lesse the things in∣tended by those termes, and the faculties of the soul with their proper acts. But such a sily Judge is fittest for T. H. I will not cite a Schoole-man, but contain my selfe with∣in

the bounds of Philosophy.

Philosophers do define the understanding by its subject, proper acts, and objects, to be a faculty of the soul understanding, knowing, and judging, things intelligible. If to judge of its object, be the proper act of the understanding, then there must needs be a judgement of the understanding. Every sense judgeth of its pro∣per object, as the sight of colours, the hear∣ing of sounds. Shall we grant judgement to the senses, and deny judgement to the under∣standing? Now this judgement is either con∣templative, or practical. Contemplative is when the understanding aimeth onely at knowledge, what is true, and what is false, without thought of any external action. Pra∣ctical judgement is when the understanding doth not onely judge what is true, and what is false, but also what is good, and what is evil, what is to be pursued, and what is to be shunned. So we have the practical judgement of the understanding. Yet further, when the understanding hath given such a practical judgement, it is not necessary that the will shall follow it: but it may suspend its consent and not elect. It may put the understanding upon a new deliberation, and require a new judgement. In this case the judgement of the understanding is practical, because it intends not meerly contemplation, what is true and what is false, but also action, what is to be pursued, and what is to be shunned: But yet

it is not practically practical, because it takes not effect, by reason of the dissent of the will. But whensoever the will shall give its free as∣sent to the practical judgement of the under∣standing, and the sentence of reason is ap∣proved by the acceptation of the will; then the judgement of the understanding becomes practically practical. Then the election is made, which Philosophers do therefore call a consultative appetition. Not that the will can elect contrary to the judgement of reason, but that the will may suspend its consent, and re∣quire a new deliberation, and a new judge∣ment, and give consent to the later. So we have this seeming piece of non-sense judicium intellectus practice practicum: not onely tran∣slated, but explained in English, consonantly to the most received opinions of Classical Authours. If he have any thing to say a∣gainst it; let him bring arguments, not re∣proaches: And remember, how Memnon gave a railing souldier a good blow with his Lance, saying, I hired thee to fight, and not to raile.

The absurdity which he imputeth to me in natural Philosophy, That it is ridiculous to say, that the object of the sight is the cause of see∣ing, which maketh him sorry that he had the ill fortune to be ingaged with me in a dispute of this kind, is altogether impertinent and ground∣lesse. The cause of seeing is either the cause of the exercise of seeing, or the cause of the

specification of the act of seeing. The object is the cause of the specification, why we see this or that, and not the cause of the exercise. He that should affirm, that the object doth not concurre in the causation of sight, (espe∣cially going upon those grounds that I do, that the manner of vision is not by sending out beames from the eye to the object, but by receiving the species from the object to the eye,) was in an errour indeed. For in send∣ing out the species there is action, and in the reception of them passion. But he that should affirm, that the object is the cause of the ex∣ercise of sight, or that it is that which maketh that which is facultate espectabile to be actu aspectabile, or that it is that which judgeth of the colour or light; or (to come home to the scope of the place,) that the object doth ne∣cessitate or determine the faculty of sight, or the sensitive soul to the exercise of seeing, were in a greater errour. Among many an∣swers which I gave to that objection, that the dictate of the understanding doth determine the will, this was one, That supposing it did determine it, yet it was not naturally, but morally, not as an efficient by physical influ∣ence into the will, but by proposing and re∣presenting the object, which is not my single opinion, but the received judgement of the best Schoole-men. And in this sense, and this sense onely, I said truely, that the under∣standing doth no more by proposing the ob∣ject

determine and necessitate the will to will, than the object of sight doth determine and necessitate the sensitive soul to the actual exer∣cise of seeing: whereas all men know that the sensitive Agent (notwithstanding any effi∣cacy that is in the object) may shut his eyes, or turn his face another way. So that which I said was both true and pertinent to the que∣stion. But his exception is altogether imper∣tinent, and if it be understood according to the proper sense and scope of the place, un∣true. And this is the onely Philosophical no∣tion which hitherto I have found in his An∣imadversions.

Castigations of his Animad∣versions, Num. 8.

WHosoever desireth to be secure from T. H. his arguments, may hold himself close to the question, where he will find no great cause of fear. All his contention is about terms. Whatsoever there was in this Section which came home to the principal question, is omitted, and nothing minded; but the meaning or signification of voluntary and spontaneous acts, &c. which were well enough understood before by all Scholars, until he arose up like another Davus

in the Comedy, to trouble all things. So he acts his part like those fond Musicians, who spent so much time in tuning of their Instru∣ments, that there was none left to spare for their musick.

Which are free, which are voluntary, or spontaneous, and which are necessary Agents, I have set down at large, whither (to prevent further trouble) I refer the Reader: And am ready to make it good by the joynt testi∣monies of an hundred Classick Authours, that this hath been the common and current lan∣guage of Scholars for many Ages. If he could produce but one Authour, Stoick or Christian before himself, who in the ventila∣tion of this question did ever define liberty as he doth, it were some satisfaction. Zeno, one of the fairest flowers in the Stoicks Garland, used to boast, that he sometimes wanted opi∣nions, but never wanted arguments. He is not so lucky; never wanting opinions, ever wanting proofes. Hitherto we have found no demonstrations, either from the cause or from the effect; few topical arguments, or authorities that are pertinent to the question; except it be of country men and common people, with one comparison.

But to come to the Animadversions them∣selves. He chargeth me, or rather the Schoole-men, for bringing in this strange word, Spontane∣ous, meerely to shift off the difficulty of maintain∣ing our Tenet of free-will. If spontaneous and

voluntary be the same thing, as we affirm, and use them both indifferently; I would gladly know how the one can be a subterfuge more than the other? or why we may not use a word that is equipollent to his own word? But to cure him of his suspition, I answer, That the same thing and the same terme of spontaneous, both in Greek and La∣tine, in the same sense that we take it, as it is distinguished from free, and just as we define it, was used by Philosophers a thousand years before either I, or any Schoole-men were borne: as we find in Aristotle. That is spon∣taneous [or voluntary, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] whose be∣ginning is in it self, with knowledge of the end, or knowing every thing wherein the action doth consist. And the same Authour in the very next Chapter, makes the very same dif∣ference between that which is voluntary, and that which is free or eligible, that we do.

His second exception is against these words, Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the appetite, either intellectual or sensitive to the object, which words (saith he) do signifie that spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the object, which to him soundeth as if I had said, that the appetite is like the object, which is as proper, as if I had said, that the hunger is like the meat. And then he concludes trium∣phantly, If this be his meaning, as it is the mean∣ing of the words, he is a very fine Philosopher.

All his Philosophy consists in words: If there had been an impropriety in the phrase, (as there is none) this exception had been below an Athenian Sophister. I had allmost said, (saving the rigorous acception of the word, as it was used afterwards) an Athenian Syco∣phant. Conformity signifies not onely such a likenesse of feature as he imagineth, but also a convenience, accommodation, and agreeablenesse. So the savoury meat which Rebeckah made for her husband, was conform to his appetite. So Daniel and his fellows con∣formed their appetites to their pulse and wa∣ter. Thus Tully saith, Ego me comformo ad ejus voluntatem, I conform my self to his will. Where there is an agreeablenesse, there is a conformi∣ty; as to conform ones self to another mans humour, or to his councel, or to his commands. He resolveth to have no more to do with sponta∣neity: I thought that it had not been himself, but the causes that resolved him, without his own will. But whether it be himself, or the causes, I think, if he hold his resolution, and include liberty therein for company, it will not be much amisse for him.

Here he readeth us a profound Lecture, what the common people, on whose arbitration de∣pendeth the signification of words in common use among the Latines and Greeks, did call all actions and motions, whereof they did perceive no cause, spontaneous and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, And in the conclusion of his Lecture, according to his custom he

forgeteth not himself. The Bishop understanding nothing of this, might if it pleased him, have cal∣led it Iargon. What pitty is it, that he hath not his Gnatho about him, to ease him of this trouble, of stroaking his own head? Here is a Lecture, able to make all the Blacksmiths and Watchmakers in a City, gape and won∣der, to see their workmanship so highly ad∣vanced.

Thus he vapoureth still, when he lights upon the blind side of an equivocall word. For my part, I not onely might have called it, but do still call it meer Iargon, and no better.

To passe by peccadillo's, First he tel∣leth us, How the common people did call all actions spontaneous, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. How doth he know what the common people called them? The books which we have, are the books of Scholars, not of the common people.

Secondly he saith, That the signification of all words dependeth upon the arbitration of the common people. Surely he meaneth onely at Athens, where it is observed, That wise men did speak, and fools did judge. But neither at Athens, nor at any other place were the common people, either the perfecters or arbi∣trators of language, who neither speak regu∣larly nor properly, much lesse in words that are borrowed from learned languages.

Thirdly, he supposeth, that these words liberty, necessity, and spontaneity, are words

in common use, which in truth are terms of art. There is as much difference between that liberty and necessity, which ordinary people speak, and the liberty and necessity in∣tended in this question, (whereof we are a∣greed) as there is between the pointing out of a man with ones finger, and a logicall de∣monstration, or between an habit in a Tailers shop, and an habit in Logick or Ethicks.

Fourthly, He confoundeth spontaneity and chance comprehending them both under the name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I confesse that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Poets and Oratours, is a word of very am∣biguous signification; sometimes signifieing a necessary; sometimes a voluntary, or sponta∣neous; sometimes a casuall; sometimes an artificiall Agent or Event. Such equivocall words are his delight: But as they are terms of art, all these words are exactly distinguish∣ed, and defined, and limitted to their proper and certain signification. That which is vo∣luntary or spontaneous, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as we see plainly in Aristotle. That which is freely elected, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and that which is by chance, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as he may see in the places cited in the margent, where all these words are exactly distinguish∣ed and defined.

Fifthly, He saith, the Latines and Greeks did call all actions and motions, whereof they did perceive no cause, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which accord∣ing

to Aristotle and other Philosophers, doth signifie things done by chance. And in his reason whereof they did perceive no cause, He is mistaken on hoth sides. For first the causes of many things are apparent, which yet are said to be done by chance, as when a tile falleth down accidentally from an house, & breaketh a mans head. And on the other side, many things whereof the causes were not known, as the ebbing and flowing of the sea, were not said to be done by chance.

I shall not need for the present to make any further inquiry into his extravagant in∣terpretations of words, which he maketh gratis upon his own head and authority, and which no man admitteth but himself. Rectum est Index sui & obliqui.

Sixthly he saith, Not every appetite, but the last is esteemed the will, when men do judge of the regularity or irregularity of one anothers actions. I do acknowledge, that de non apparentibus, & non existentibus eadem est ratio, If it do not appear outwardly to be his will, man cannot judge of it as his will. But if it did appear to be his will, first or last, though he change it over and over, it was his will, and is judged by God, to have been his will, and may be justly judged so by man, so far as it did appear to have been his will by his words and acti∣ons. If he mean his last will and testament, that indeed taketh place and not the former; yet the former will was truly his will, untill it

was revoked. But of this, and of his delibera∣tion, I shall have cause to speak more here∣after.

I come now to his contradictions. His first contradiction is this, All voluntary acts are deliberate: Some voluntary acts are not de∣liberate. The former part of his contradicti∣on is proved out of these words, Voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to to say, some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing, and ab∣staining from the action deliberated of. The second part is proved as plainly, When a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any thing appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinions, of the goodnesse or harm of it. These actions I call voluntary, &c. because these actions that follow immediately, the last appetitite are voluntary. And here, where there is one onely apppetite, that one is the last. To this he an∣swereth, Voluntary presupposes deliberation when the judgement whether the action be voluntary, or not, is not in the Actor, but in the Iudge, who re∣gardeth not the will of the Actor, when there is nothing to be accused in the action of deliberate malice, yet knoweth, that though there be but one appetite, the same is truely will for the time, and the action, if it follow, a voluntary action.

To which term doth he answer? Of what term doth he distinguish? Some have been

observed to have lost the benefit of their Cleargy, at their deaths, because they despised it in their lifes. It is no marvel, if he receive no help from any distinction now, who hath ever been an enemy to distinctions, and a friend to confusion. If his answer have any sense at all, this must be it. That an indelibe∣rate act may be in truth, and in the judge∣ment of the Agent himself a voluntary act: yet, in the common or publick judgement of other men, it may be esteemed and passe for an involuntary and unpunishable act. But first, neither the questionn nor his assertion was, what is to be judged a voluntary act by men, who neither know the heart of man, nor are able to judge of his will, but what is a voluntary act in it self; and what is the essence and definition of a voluntary act. I argue thus, That which is essentially a volun∣tary act, cannot by any thing that is extrinse∣call and subsequent, and which perhaps may never be, be made no voluntary act. But the judgement of other men is extrinsecall and subsequent to the act, and may perhaps never be. How many thoughts of every man every day passe unknown, unjudged whether they were regular, or irregu∣lar.

Secondly, God Allmighty, who is the onely searcher of hearts, is the proper and onely Judge of the will, If the act be truely voluntary, he judgeth it to be truely volunta∣ry,

whether it be for the Agents advantage or disadvantage: man cannot judge what acts are voluntary, and what are not, because he doth not know the heart. If one perform outward obedience to the law against his will, man judgeth it to be willing obedience, and cannot do otherwise. If a man do an evill act, man must needs judge it to be a voluntary act: And indeed so much more voluntary, by how much it was lesse deliberated of, be∣cause the will is lesse curbed, and must have lesse reluctation. How much doth he erre, who prefers the judgement of man before the judgement of God?

Thirdly, according to T. H. his princi∣ples, all acts of free Agents, whatsoever are voluntary, and cannot possibly but be volun∣tary. For so he teacheth, That a man is free to do if he will, but he is not free to will: Would he have men to judge that to be unvoluntary, which cannot possibly but be voluntary? If he will, with him is a necessary supposi∣tion.

Lastly, Judges do esteem rash unadvised acts, not to be so irregular, or so punishable as other acts, not because they are lesse volun∣tary, for they are more voluntary, but be∣cause the carefullest man breathing, cannot arme himself sufficlently against all occasions, but that he may be surprized by sudden passi∣on. But if after the first fit of passion, he had time and means to cool his heat, and to de∣liberate

of his duty, before the fact commit∣ted, and yet he continued obstinate, the law looks upon him without pity, not onely as a willing, but as a willful offender, though there was no malice nor inveterate hatred in the case, but perhaps a quarrel upon some punctilio of honour, But for persons uncapable of de∣liberation, as naturall fools, mad men, and children, before they have use of reason, though there may be hatred and malice, as experience hath taught us, yet the law doth not punish them in the same nature, because it supposeth them uncapable of deliberation, and unable to consider seriously and suffici∣ently, either of their duty, which they owe to God and man, or of the dangers which they incur by that act, and because it is not their fault, that they are uncapable. So the judgement of men is no save-guard to him from his contradiction. For Judges go upon our grounds, which deny all liberty and power of election, to such as have not sufficient use of reason, without their own fault. But he goeth upon contrary grounds to us and to the law, holding fools, mad men, children, yea, even bruit beasts, to be capa∣ble of deliberation and election, and there∣upon, supposing all voluntary acts to be deli∣berated, in vain doth he seek shelter under our practise, who is an enemy to those prin∣ciples, whereupon our practise is groun∣ded.

His second contradiction, which he rela∣teth amisse, is this, All spontaneity is an in∣considerate proceeding. This is plainly set down by himself, By spontaneity is meant in∣considerate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it. To which this is contradictory, Some spontaneity is not an inconsiderable proceed∣ing, affirmed by him likewise, When a man gi∣veth mony voluntarily to another for merchandise, &c. he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latine is sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous. From whence I argue thus, All giving of merchandise for mony is a sponta∣neous act, but all giving of merchandise for mony, is not an inconsiderate act, there∣fore all spontaneous acts, are not incon∣siderate act. To this he answereth no∣thing.

His third contradiction is this, That having undertaken to prove that chil∣dren, before they have the use of reason, do deliberate and elect, yet he saith by and by after, That a childe may be so young as to do what he doth, without all delibera∣tion.

I acknowledge this to be no contradicti∣on, as it is here proposed. The acts of rea∣son, as deliberation, do not come to a child in an instant, but by degrees. A child is fit to deliberate of his childish sports, or whe∣ther he should crie or not, before he can de∣liberate

of matters of greater moment. Bu•…•… if the contradiction be proposed, as I propo∣sed it, and allwayes intended it, of young suck∣ling children, soon after their birth, I see not how he can excuse his contradiction. For they have spontaneity the first houre: And yet by his confession, they are too young to deliberate. But if deliberation were no more than he maketh it, a demurring upon what they should do, out of sensitive hope, to suck the breast, and sensitive fear of some strange fi∣gure: Or as he calleth it elsewhere, An alter∣nate appetite to do or to acquire an action, they may deliberate well enough.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 9.

TO that place by me alleadged, Be∣cause thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thy self long life, &c. He answereth thus, How doth he know (understanding power properly taken) that Solo∣mon had a reall power to ask long life? No doubt Solomon knew nothing to the contrary: Yet it was possible that God might have hindred him. For though God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing that he should chuse, it doth not follow that he did not also give him the act of election.

It is no new thing with him to confound the act and the object, choice, and the thing chosen; election, which is allwayes of more than one, and the thing elected, which is pre∣cisely one.

I doubt not, but Solomon had his power to elect from God, I doubt not, but the grace of God did excite Solomon, and assist him in his election to chuse well. But that Solomon was necessitated by God to ask wisdom, and not to ask long life, or riches, or the life of his enemy, is clearly against the text.

First God said to Solomon, Ask what I shall give thee. If God had predetermined precisely what Solomon must ask, and what he must have, and what he must not ask, and what he must not have: it was not onely a superfluous, but a ludicrous thing, to bid him ask what gift he would have from God. Then follow∣eth Solomons deliberation to enable him to chuse what was most fit for him. If God had predetermined what he would give, and what Solomon must ask, how ridiculous had it been for him to deliberate of what God had done.

Thirdly it is said, The speech pleased the Lord, that Solomon had asked this thing. There is no doubt but all the works of God do please him, God saw all that he made, and it was very good. But what had Solomon done to please God, if God did necessitate Solomon irresistibly, to do what he did?

Then follow the words alleadged by me, Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thy self long life, &c. which words, if this opinion of universall necessity were true, can bear no other sence but this, Because thou hast done this which was inevitably imposed upon thee to do, and hast not done that, which was alltogether impossible for thee to have done. As if a master should first bind his servant head and foot, head and heels together, and chain him fast to a post, and then tell him, Because thou hast staid here, and didst not run away.

He urgeth, That Solomon knew nothing to the contrary, but that it was in his power to have done otherwise. If Solomon the wisest of men did not know it, there is little probability that T. H. should know it. But he must know, that it is not Solomon who speaketh these words, but God; I hope he will not suspect God Allmighty, either of ignorance or of nescience. Lastly, we see what a corollary God gave Solomon for asking well, about that which he did ask, riches and honour. No man deserveth either reward or punishment, for doing that which it was not in his power to leave undone.

I urged these words of St. Peter, After it was sold, was it not in thine own power? to shew that power which a man hath over his own actions. He answereth, That the word power signifieth no more than right, not a reall naturall,

but a civill power, made by a Covenant, or a right to do with his own what he pleased. I answer the word power doth not, cannot signifie any such right to do with his own as he pleased in this place. For that which St. Peter complaineth of, was Annanias his unjust and sacrilegious detention of part of that which he had de∣voted to God, when it was in his power to have offered the whole, that is, to have per∣formed his vow: If sacriledge be right, then this was right: If that which he had purloin∣ed sacrilegously were his own, then this was his own: If Ananias had been necessitated by external causes, to hold back that part of the price, it had been no more sacriledge, than if Theeves had robbed him of it before he could offer it. The reason is thus made evi∣dent, If it was in the power of Ananias to have done that which he did not do, and to have offered that according to his vow, which he did detain contrary to his vow, then all actions and events are not necessitated: and it is in mens power to do otherwise than they do, But St, Peter saith it was in Ananias his power to have offered that which he did not offer, &c.

Castigations upon the Animad∣versions, Num. 10.

MY reason against universal necessity in this Section was this. To nece∣ssitate all men to all the individual actions which they do, inevitably; And to expostulate with them, and chide them, and reprehend them, for doing of those very things which they were necessitated to do, is a counterfeited hypocritical exaggaration. But according to T. H. his doctrine, God doth necessitate all men inevitably to do all the individual actions which they do; and yet expostulates with them, and chides them, and reprehends them for doing of those very things which he did necessitate them inevi∣tably to do. This assumption, which onely can be questioned, is proved by the expostu∣lations and objurations and reprehensions themselves contained in holy Scripture. Therefore, according to his opin•…•…on, God himself is guilty of counterfeited, hypocritical exaggarations.

It were more ingenuous to confesse that this is not to be answered, than to bustle and keep a coile, and twist new errours with old, and taxe others ignorantly of ignorance, and

say nothing to the purpose.

His first answer is generally, That I would have men believe, that because he holds necessity, therefore he denyes liberty. A dangerous accu∣sation, to accuse him of a matter of truth. But he saith, He holds as much that there is true li∣berty, as I do, or more. Yea, such a liberty as children, and fooles, and madmen, and brute beasts, and rivers have; A liberty that con∣sists in negation, or nothing. He saith in∣deed that he holds a liberty from outward im∣pediments. But it is not true, for external causes are external impediments. And if he say truly, all other causes are hindered from all other actions than what they do by exter∣nal causes. But true liberty from necessita∣tion and dtermination to one, he doth not ac∣knowledge, and without acknowledging that, he doth acknowledge nothing. I won∣der to which of my Propositions, or to what term in them, this answer is accommodated.

His second answer is particular to the ex∣postulations themselves, That these words spoken by God to Adam; Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldest not eat, do convince Adam, that notwithstanding that God had placed him in the Garden a means to keep him perpetually from dying, in case he should ac∣comodate his will to obedience of Gods Command∣ment, concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Yet Adam was not so much master of his own will, as to do it. What ridiculous, or ra∣ther

deplorable stuffe is this? How should it be expected that Adam should be master of his own will, if God did necessitate his will without his will? and determine him inevi∣tably to what he did? If his doctrine were true, this doth not convince Adam, but God Almighty, who did first necessitate his will, and then chide him for that which was Gods own act. Can any man be so blind as not to see the absurdity of this doctrine? That God did place in the Garden a means to keep man perpetually from dying, and yet did deprive him of it inevitably without his own fault? And this is all that he answereth to the other places; as that to Eve, Why hast thou done this? And to Cain, Why art thou wroth? And, Why will ye die, O ye house of Israel?

I urged this Argument further. Doth God reprehend man for doing that which he had antecedently determined that he must do? He answereth, no. How, no? Are not these reprehensions? Or doth not he maintain, that God had determined man antecedently to do what he did? yes, but he saith, God con∣vinceth man and instructeth him, that though im∣mortality was so easie to be obtained, as that it might be had for the abstinence from the fruit of one onely tree, yet he could not obtain it thereby. If God would onely have convinced man, certainly he would have convinced him by fitter, & juster means than hypocritical exag∣gerations. But how doth he say that, immor∣tality

was so easie to be obtained? which by his doctrine was altogether impossible to be ob∣tained by man, by that means? It is neither so easie, nor possible to oppose and frustrate the Decrees of an infinite God.

I shall reserve his errours in Theology for a fitter place. Whosoever would trouble him∣self with his contradictions, might find more than enough. Here he telleth us that the de∣pendance of the actions on the will, is that which properly and truly is called liberty; elsewhere he told us, that Rivers are free Agents, and that a River hath true liberty, which if my igno∣rance do not mislead me, have no wills.

That God hath a secret and revealed will no man denieth. To say that these wills are opposite one to another, all good men do detest, because as I said formerly (which he taketh no notice of,) they concern several persons. The secret will of God is what he will do himself. The revealed will is that which he would have us to do. He objecteth, God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, yet his will was he should not do it. Ionah by Gods command denounced the destruction of Nineveh, yet it was Gods will it should not be destroyed. Doth not he see that the person is varied in both these instances? God would prove Abrahams faith by his readinesse to sacrifice his son upon his command. He did it. He would have Nineveth prepared for repen∣tance by Ionahs denunciations of his judge∣ments;

His will was accomplished. But it was not Gods will that Isaac should be sacri∣ficed, or Nineveh destroyed. All denun∣ciations of Gods judgements are understood with exception. He who phansieth any contradiction in these two instances, under∣standeth little of the rules of contradictions. There is great difference between that which God will have done by others, and what he will do himself. There was just reason for what Abraham did, and what Ionah did; but there can be no reason for God to contradict himself.

If God had reprehended Abraham or Ionah for what they did in obedience to his own commands, and punished them for it, and justified it by his omnipotence, which is T. H. his inexcusable errour, (as I have shewed him already, and shall shew him further in due place, if there be occasion,) this had been something to his purpose; now all that he saith is wholly impertinent.

Likewise, whereas he saith, that the expo∣stulation of man against God will be equally just or unjust, whether the necessity of all things be granted or denied, because God could have made man impeccable and d•…•…d not. He doth but be∣tray his own weaknesse and presumption, to talke of any just expostulation with God in any case, I have shewed him already what a vain recrimination this is, and given him

just reasons why God Almighty did not make men impeccable.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 11.

IN these Animadversions is contained, first a repetition of my Argument, to which he answereth nothing but this, That liberty is to chuse what we will, not to chuse our will, which he saith no inculcation is sufficient to make me take notice of. I know not what he calleth taking notice. I have confuted it over and over again, both in my defence formerly, and now in these Castigations; And shewed it to be a vain, silly, unprofitable, false, contra∣dictory, distinction. What he would have me to do more for it, I understand not: But I observe that he never mentioneth this di∣stinction, but he is presently up upon his tippe∣toes. He will find by degrees how little ground he hath for it.

Then he proceedeth to my Reply, to which he giveth two Answers. First, that if you take away these words from it, Knowledge of approbation, practical knowledge, heavenly bodies act upon sublunary things, not onely by their mo∣tion, but also by an occult virtue; which we call influence, moral efficacy, general influence, special

influence, infuse something into the will, the will is moved, the will is induced to will, the will suspends its own acts; which are all nonsense, unworthy of a man; nay, if a beast could speak, unworthy of a beast. There is an hundred times more sense in these phrases, than there is in his great Le∣viathan put altogether. He who dare abuse and so much vilifie many of the Ancient Fa∣thers, and all the lights of the Schooles for so many successive ages, and all Philosophers, natural and moral, who have written any thing, as to stile them all without exception beasts, and worse than beasts, deserves no other answer, but contempt of his ignorant pre∣sumption, or pity of his bold blindnesse. He saith This malady happened to us by having our natures depraved by doctrine. We say, His ma∣lady happened to him, because his nature was never polished with doctrine; but he would needs be a Master in all Arts, before he had been a Scholar in any Art. The true reason why he sleighteth these words, is because he understandeth very little of them: and what he doth understand, he is not able to answer. So it fareth with him as with one that hath a politick deafenesse, who seemeth not to hear, what he knoweth not how to answer; as I could shew him by many and many in∣stances, but that I dare not tell him, that any thing is too hot for his fingers.

I said that the heavenly bodies do act upon sublunary things, not onely by their motion

and light, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence. Against the matter he ex∣cepteth not, but against the expression, an oc∣cult virtue, whereas I should have said, I know not how. If he alone be so happy as to know di∣stinctly the causes of all acts, it is well for him, but if this be nothing but bold presumption, it is so much the worse. I have good ground for the thing it self; Canst thou bind the sweet influences of the Pleiades? If he be so much more skilful than all other men, about the in∣fluences of the Stars, I desire to know of him a natural reason of that peculiar virtue which the Moon hath of moistning, and Saturne of cooling, and Mercury of raising winds, &c. I fear when all is done, he will prove to be but one of Aesops companions, who pretended to know all things, and did know no∣thing.

I argued from his principles, that if God by special influence did necessitate the second causes to operate as they did, and if they, be∣ing thus determined, did necessitate man ine∣vitably, unresistably, by an essential subordi∣nation of causes to do whatsoever he did; then one of these two absurdities must follow, either, That there is no such thing as sin in the World, or, That God is more guilty of it than man; as the motion of the watch is more from the Artificer who makes it and winds it up, than from the watch it self. To this he an∣swereth onely this, That my consequence is

no stronger then if out of this, That a man is lame necessarily, one should inferre, That either he is not lame, or that his lamenesse proceeded ne∣cessarily from the will of God. And is it pos∣sible that he doth not see that this infer∣ence followeth clearly and necessarily from his principles? If he doth not, I will help his eye-sight. All actions, and accidents, and events, whatsoever, do proceed from the will of God, as the principal cause de∣termining them to do what they are, by a naturall necessary subordination of cau∣ses. This is the principle. I assume that which no man can deny; But the lame∣nesse of this man (whom he mentioneth) is an accident or event. Therefore this lamenesse (upon his principles) is from the will of God, &c.

Castigations upon the Animad∣versions, Num. 12.

IN this Section, he behaveth himself as the Hound by Nilus, drinketh and run∣neth, as if he were afraid to make any stay; quite omitting the whole contex∣ture and frame of my discourse: onely catch∣ing here and there at some phrase, or odd ends of broken sentences. The authority of St. Paul was formerly his Palladium, the fate of his opinion of Fate, or his seven-fold shield which he bore up against all assailants. And now to desert it as the Oestredge doth her egges in the sand, and leave it to the judgement of the Reader, to think of the same as he pleaseth, seemeth strange. That man usually is in some great distresse, who quitteth his buckler. I de∣sire but the judicious Reader upon the By, to compare my former defence with his tri∣fling exceptions, and I do not fear his vere∣dict.

He saith it is blasphemy to say that God can sin, so it is blasphemy also to say that God is the authour or cause of any sinne. This he himself saith, (at least implicitly) and this he cannot but say, so long as he maintaineth an universal antecedent necessity of all things

flowing from God by a necessary flux of se∣cond causes. He who teacheth that all men are determined to sin antecedently, without their own concurrence, irresistibly beyond their own power to prevent it, and efficaci∣ously to the production of sinne: He who teacheth that it is the antecedent will of God, that men should sinne and must sinne: He who maketh God to be not onely the cause of the act and of the law, but likewise of the irregularity or deviation, and of that very anomy wherein the being of sin (so far as sin hath a being) doth consist; maketh God to be the principall cause and authour of sin. But T. H. doth all this.

He saith it is no blasphemy to say that God hath so ordered the World, that sin may necessarily be committed. That is true in a right sense, if he understand onely a necessity of infallability upon Gods presence, or a necessity of suppositi∣on upon Gods permission. But what trifling & minsing of the matter is this? Let him cough out, and shew us the bottom of his opinion, which he cannot deny, that God hath so or∣dered the World, that sin must of necessity be committed, and inevitably be committed: that it is beyond the power of man to help it or hinder it; and that by vertue of Gods omni∣potent will, and eternall decree. This is that which we abominate.

Yet he telleth us, That it cannot be said that God is the authour of sin, because not he that ne∣cessitateth

an action, but he who doth command or warrant it, is the authour. First I take that for granted which he admitteth, that by his opi∣nion, God necessitateth men to sinfull actions, which is a blasphemy as well as the other. Secondly his later part of his assertion is most false, That he onely, who commandeth or warranteth sin, is the authour of it: He who acteth sin, he who necessitateth to sin, he who first bringes sin into the World, is much more the authour of it, than the bare commander of it. They make God to be the proper and predominate cause of sin, by an essential sub∣ordination of the sin of man, to the will of God, and in essential subordinates allwayes the cause of the cause, is the cause of the effect. If there had never been any positive com∣mandment or law given, yet sin had still been sin, as being contrary to the eternall law of justice in God himself. If an Heathen. Prince should command a Christian to sacrifice to Idols or Devils, and he should do it; not the commander onely, but he who commits the idolatry, is the cause of the sin. His in∣stance in the Act of the Israelites robbing the Egyptians of their Jewels, is impertinent: For it was no robbery nor sin, God who is the Lord Paramount of Heaven and Earth, having first justly transfered the right from the Egyptians to the Israelites, and in proba∣bility, to make them some competent satis∣faction for all that work and drudgery which

they had done for the Egyptians without payment. This is certain, if God necessitate the Agent to sin, either the act necessitated is no sin, or God is the principall cause of it. Let him chuse whether of these two absurdities, this Scylla, or that Charybdis, he will fall into.

The reason which he gives of Gods objur∣gations, to convince men that their wills were not in their own power, but in Gods power, is sense∣lesse, and much rather proveth the contrary, that because they were chidden, therefore their wills were in their own power. And if their wills had not been in their own power, most certainly God would not have repre∣hended them for that which was not their own fault.

He saith, That by interpreting hardening to be a permission of God, I attribute no more to God in such actions, then I might attribute to any of Pharaohs servants, the not perswading their ma∣ster, &c. As if Pharaohs servants had the same power over their master, that God Allmighty had, to hinder him, and stop him in his evill courses: As if Pharaohs ser∣vants were able to give or withhold grace, as if Pharoahs servants had divine power to draw good out of evill, and dispose of sin, to the advancement of Gods glory, and the good of his Church: As if an humble petiti∣on or perswasion of a servant, and a physicall determination of the will, by a necessary flux

of naturall causes, were the same thing. He who seeth a water break over its banks, and suffers it to run out of its due channel, that he may draw it by furrows into his medows, to render them more fruitfull, is not a meer nor idle sufferer. His absurdities drop as thick as Sampsons enemies, heaps upon heaps.

He objecteth, That I compare this permission of God, to the indulgence of a parent, who by his patience encourageth his son to become more rebel∣lious, which indulgence is a sinne. Arguments taken from a parable or similitude, are of force no further than they pertein to the end of the parable, or that resemblance for which things are compared. The labourers peny doth not prove an equality of glory in Hea∣ven. Nor our Saviours commendation of the unjust Steward, justifie his cheating of his Master. Christ proveth the readinesse of God to do justice to his servants, upon their constant prayers, by a similitude taken from an unjust Judge. So here the end of the simi∣litude was onely to shew that goodnesse may accidentally render evill natures more obdu∣rate and presumtuous. Neither was there any sinfull indulgence, either intended or in∣timated in my words, like that of Eli to his sons, but onely patience, and innocence, gen∣tlenesse of a render father, such as God him∣self doth vouchsafe to own, Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse, and forbearance, and long suffering, not knowing that the goodnesse of

God leadeth thee to repentance? But after thy hardnesse and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thy self wrath.

He urgeth, That whether it be called an an∣tecedent, or a consequent will, an operate or a permissive will, it is enough for the necessity of the thing, that the heart of Pharaoh should be hard∣ened. An antecedent will is without previsi∣on of sin; A consequent will is upon previsi∣on of sin: Is it all one whether God do harden mens hearts for sin, or without sin, for his fault, or without his fault? An opperate will pro∣duceth an absolute necessity, an antecedent necessity: A permissive will inferreth no more at the highest, but a consequent necessity upon supposion, which may consist with true liberty, as hath been made clear to him over and over.

He desires the Reader to take notice, that if I blame him for speaking of God as a necessitating cause, and as it were a principall Agent in causing of all actions: I may with as good reason blame my self, for making him an accessary by concur∣rence. And here he vapours, Let men hold what they will contrary to the truth, if they write much, the truth will fall into their pens. I desire the Reader likewise to take notice, and observe, what silly cavels he brings, commands for ex∣ceptions, and how vainly he puffeth up him∣self, like the Frog in the fable, with his abor∣tive conceptions: Where did I ever use the word [accessary] or any thing in that sense?

Mala mens malus animus. If he knew the difference between generall and speciall influ∣ence, he would be ashamed to infer a particu∣lar guilt from a generall occurrence, A gene∣rall and special influence, is no nonsense. A Prince giveth commission to a Judge, thereby enabling him to determine criminall and capitall causes; that is a generall influence of power. By vertue of this commission he heareth causes, and abusing this generall power, taketh bribes, giveth unjust sentences, and punisheth innocent persons. Is the Prince that gave him the commission and judiciary power, accessary to his fault? Nothing lesse, But the Judge abuseth his commission, and misapplyeth his just power. But if the Prince had given him a speciall commission, like that of Iezabel, Proclaim a fast, set Naboth on high, and let two men of Belial bear witnesse a∣gainst him, saying, Thou didst blaspheme God and the King, and stone him that he may die. This had been speciall influence indeed; and the Prince had not onely been an accessary, but a principall in the murther. By which we may see how God concurreth to the doing of evill by a generall, not by a speciall influ∣ence.

I exemplified this distinction of general and speciall influence to him in the earth, which concurreth to the nourishment of all plants by a generall influence, but that one plant con∣verteth this nourishment to healthfull food,

another to poyson, that is, not from the gene∣rall influence of the earth, but from the speci∣all quality of the root. But quite contrary, both to my words, and to my sense, he mis∣applieth it to the operative and permissive will of God, without head or foot. It seemeth (saith he) that he thinketh that God doth will but permissively, that the hemlock should poyson a man, but operatively, that the wheat should nourish him, Risum teneatis amici?

I cleared this likewise to him in his instance of the murther of Uriah, shewing him that Davids power was from God, but the misap∣plication of that power was from David him∣self, As if (saith he) there were a power that were not the power to do some particular Act, or a power to kill, and yet to kill no body in particular. He might even as well say, as if there were a commission or a power given by the Prince to hear and determine causes in generall, o•…•… to arraign and try malefactors in generall, and not to sentence this man, and hang that man in particular. Every generall commission o•…•… power doth justifie particular Acts, whilest they, who are impowered do pursue their commission, and not abuse their power, but if they abuse their power, neither will their generall power justifie their particular mis∣deeds, nor their particular faults render the Prince accessary, who gave them their ge∣nerall power.

In this impertinent instance of the divine. right of Bishops to ordain Ministers, which he bringeth in by the head and shoulders, he sheweth nothing but his ignorance and his teeth. Every man who hath an undoubted right to do some act, hath not presently a right to exercise it promiscuously, when and where, and upon whom he will, without any respect to those who had a precedent right before himself. Let him inquire further into the difference between an actual and habitual power, and it will save him the further labour of inquiring, and me of informing him. Qui pauca consider at facile pronunciat.

He demandeth, Did not God foreknow that Uriah in particular, should be murthered by David in particular? And what God for knoweth shall come to passe. Yes, God doth know in eternity; for with God, properly, there is neither fore∣knowledge nor afterknowledge, neither past, nor to come, but all things present alwayes. Or if he will have us speak after the manner of men, God did foreknow that David should kill Uriah with the sword of the children of Ammon. And God did likewise foreknow that T. H. should maintain this Paradox so dishonourable to his Majesty, that God did necessitate David to kill Uriah: But know∣ledge of what kind soever it be, taketh away no mans liberty. Uriah might have gone to his own house upon Davids intreaty: and then David had not killed Uriah upon any

necessitation from Gods foreknowledge. U∣riah might have killed David, and then God had foreknown that, not this. But this ob∣jection hath been formerly fully answered: whither I refer the Reader.

He chargeth me to say, that the case agitated between us, is Whether Gods irresistible power, or mans sin, be the cause why he punisheth one man more than another? whereas the case agitated be∣tween us, is, Whether a man can now chuse, what shall be his will anon. There are several cases or questions between us. First the general or main question which is already stated by con∣sent, Whether the wil of man be free from ex∣trinsecal determination to one antecedently? and not as it is here proposed by him fondly and ambiguously, Whether a man can now chuse what shall be his will anon. For first a man is not certain that he shall live so long, to be able to chuse his will. And al∣thought he were certain to live so long, yet succeeding time may make such a change of affairs, that he may have just reason to chuse otherwise.

Quemquam posse putas more's narrare futuros? Dic mihi si fias tu leo qualis eris.

But besides the maine general question, there are likewise many particular subordi∣nate questions, as this in this Section, whether this opinion of universal necessity do not

make all punishment to be unjust, because if a man be necessitated antecedently and una∣voidably to do what he doth, he is punished without his own fault, and consequently un∣justly. To escape this argument he is driven to seek shelter under the omnipotence of God. Power irresistble justifieth all actions really and properly in whomsoever it be found. And when God afflicted Iob he did object no sin to him. That which he doth is justified by his doing it. So the present dispute was, Whether mans sin or Gods omnipotence were the just ground of punishment? This was all I said, and more than I said. But he can set down nothing without either mistaking it, or confounding it. Gods Power is not the rule of his Justice, but his will; not because his will maketh that to be just which otherwise was unjust, but be∣cause he can will nothing, but that which is just. But he addeth not one grain of weight more in these Animadversions about this subject, to what he had formerly said; all which hath been fully and clearly satisfied in my former defence, to which he hath replyed nothing.

That which I said of the Jews, that it was in their own power by their concurrence with Gods grace to prevent those judge∣ments, and to recover their former estate, is so true, and so plainly affirmed by St. Paul, that no man but himself durst have cavilled against it, But he who knows no liberty but

from outward impediments, no general power of motion without a necessitation to kill Uriah, no grace but that which is irresi∣stible, who hath never heard of the concur∣rence of grace and free will in the conversion of a sinner, it is no marvel if he think that God will save men without themselves, as well as he made them without them∣selves.

I said God may oblige himself freely to his creature. Who ever doubted of it before him? What doth he think of Gods promise to A∣braham; I will be the God of thee, and of thy seed after thee? Or of the legal Covenant, Do this and thou shalt live? Or of the Evan∣gelical Covenant; He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved? But he saith, He that can oblige, can also release when he will; and be that can release himself when he will is not ob∣liged. Is not this comfortable doctrine, and suitable to the truth and majesty of Almighty God, in whom there is no variablenesse nor shadow of turning? Nothing is impossible to Gods absolute power: But according to his ordi∣nate power, which is disposed by his will, he cannot change his own decrees, not go from his promise. If Gods decrees were change∣able, what would become of his universal ne∣cessity? But he shooteth at random, not much regarding so it fit his present humour, whe∣ther it make for his cause or against it.

But now I am to expect an heavy charge. Hitherto he hath been but in jest, That I am driven to words ill becoming me to speak of God Almighty, for I make him unable to do that which hath been within the ordinary power of men to do. How is this? I said God cannot destroy the righ∣teous with the wicked, which neverthelesse is a thing done ordinarily by armies. The great mountain hath brough forth a little mouse. Might not I say, that God cannot sin, though mean men can do it? Why might not I say that God cannot do unrighteous things, or God cannot be unrighteous, which is the same thing in effect? as well as the Scripture saith, God cannot lie, God cannot repent, God can∣not deny himself? And God is not unrighteous to forget your works. As if he should say, If God could break his promise, God could be un∣righteous, but he cannot be unrighteous. Yea the Lord doth submit himself, as it were, to a trial upon this point; The Lord hath a con∣troversie with his people, and he will plead with Israel. And he doth challenge them upon this very point. Hear now, O house of Israel, is not my way equal? are not your wayes unequal? And in the same Chapter he protesteth, As I live s•…•…h the Lord, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel; the fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge: But the soul that sinneth shall die. And Abraham saith the same that I say, (thought he deny it,) by way of intrroga∣tion

indeed, but with much more vehe∣mency; Wilt thou also destroy the righteous with the wicked, &c? That be far from thee to do af∣ter this manner, to slay the righteous with the wick∣ed, and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee. Shall not the Iudge of all the Earth do right? Neither can he except, because it is not said, Canst thou? but Wilt thou? for we speak of the ordinate power of God which is ordered by his will.

That which he saith of an army, weigheth lesse than nothing. For first that destruction which an army maketh, is not like that de∣struction whereof Abraham speaketh, which fell upon Sodom and Gomorrah, which the Apostle calleth the vengeance of eternal fire. The destruction made by an army may be a punishment to some, a chastisement or a bles∣sing to others. Jeremy the Prophet was in∣volved with the rest of the Jews in the same Babylonian Captivity; but the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, was an expresse pu∣nishment for sin. Thirdly, an army acteth by way of publick Justice, regarding the justice of the cause, not of particular persons; for it is not possible in the height of war to do justice according to the particular merits of single persons. But after this necessity is over, and particular Justice can take place, then no man ought to suffer, but according to his guilt: Then it is no more lawful to destroy the righteous with the wicked. Necessity may

justifie the sufferings of innocent persons in some cases. But no necessity can warrant the punishment of innocent persons. Inno∣centium lachrimae diluvio periculosiores.

Whether they did well or ill for the man∣ner of the act, who put out their bodily eyes, because they supposed them to be an impedi∣ment to the eye of the soul, is not pertinent to our purpose, yet was apt enough to prove my intention, that bodily blindnesse may some∣times be a benefit.

His instance in brute beasts which are affli∣cted, yet cannot sin, is extravagant. I did not go about to prove that universal necessity doth take away afflictions, it rather rendereth them unavoidable. But I did demonstrate (and he hath not been able to make any shew of an answer to it,) that it taketh away all just rewards and punishments, which is against the universal notion and common belief of the whole World. Brute beasts are not capable of punishment: They are not knocked down out of vindictive justice for faults committed, but for future use and benefit. I said there was a vast difference between the light and mo∣mentany pangs of brute beasts, and the in∣tollerable and endlesse pains of Hell. Sure enough. Dionysius the Tyrant seeing an oxe knocked down at one blow, said to his friends, What a folly it is to quit so fair a command for fear of dying, which lasts no longer a space. He himself, when his wits are calmer, doth ac∣knowledge

as much as I, and somewhat more. Perhaps (saith he) if the death of a sin∣ner were an eternall life in extream misery, a man might as far as Job hath done, expostulate with God Allmighty, not accusing him of injustice, &c. but of litle tenderness & love to mankind. But now he is pleased to give another judgement of it, As if the length or greatnesse of the pain, made any difference of the justice or unjustice of inflicting it, yes, very much. According to the measure of the fault, ought to be the number of the stripes. If the punishment exceed the offence, it is unjust. On the other side, it is not onely an act of justice, but of favour and grace to inflict temporary paines for a greater good. Otherwise a Master could not justly correct his Scholler. Otherwise a Chirurgion might not lance an impostume, or put a man to pain to cure him of the stone. If God afflict a man with a momentary sicknesse, and make this sicknesse a means to fit him for an eternall weight of glory, he hath no cause to complain of injustice.

He is angry that I would make men be∣lieve that he holds all things to be just, that are done by them who have power enough to avoid pu∣nishment. He doth me wrong, I said no such thing; If he be guilty of this imputation, either directly, or by consequence, let him look to it; he hath errours enough which are evi∣dent. I did indeed con44te this tenet of his, That irresistible power is the rule of justice, of

which he is pleased to take no notice in his Animadversions. But whereas he doth now re∣strain this priviledge to that power alone, which is absolutely irresistible, he forgetteth himself over much, having formerly extend∣ed it to all Soveraignes and Supreme Coun∣cels, within their own dominions. It is mani∣fest therefore, that in every Common-wealth there is some one man or Councel which hath, &c. a Soveraign and absolute power, to be limited by the strength of the Common wealth, and by no other thing. What neither by the Law of God, nor nature, nor nations, nor the municipall laws of the land, nor by any other thing but his power and strength? Good doctrine, Hunc tu Romane caveto.

Lastly, to make his presumtion compleat, he indeavoureth to prove that God is not only the author of the Law: which is most true, and the cause of the act, which is partly true, because he is the onely fountain of power, but that he is the cause of the irregularity, that is, in plain English, (which he delighteth in) the sin it self. I think (saith he) there is no man but un∣derstands, &c. That where two things are compa∣red, the similitude or dissimilitude, regularity or irregularity that is between them, is made in, and by the things themselves that are compared. The Bishop therefore that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies him to be the cause both of the law, and of the action. This is that which he himself calleth blasphemy elsewhere, that

God is the authour or cause of sin. Sin is no∣thing, but the irregularity of the Act. So St. John defineth it in expresse terms, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Sin is an anomy, or an irregula∣rity, or a transgression of the law. For sin is nothing else but a declination from the rule, that is, an irregularity. Another definition of sin is this, Sin is that which is thought or said or done against the eternall law. Still you see the formall reason of sin, doth consist in the contrariety to the law, that is, the irre∣gularity. Othets define sinne to be a want of rectitude, or a privation of conformity to the rule, that is, irregularity. An irregular action is sin materially, Irregularity is sin formally. Others define sinne to be a free transgressi∣on of the commandement. Every one of these definitions demonstrate that Mr. Hobbes maketh God to be properly the cause of sinne.

But let us weigh his argument, He who is the cause of the law, and the cause of the action, is the cause of the irregularity; but God is the cause of the law, and the cause of the action. I deny his assumption, God indeed is the cause of the law, but God is not the total or adaequate cause of the action: Nay, God is not at all the cause of the action qua talis, as it is irregu∣lar, but the free Agent. To use our former instance of an unjust judge; The Prince is the authour or cause of the law, and the Prince is the cause of the judiciary action of

the Judge in generall, because the Judge de∣riveth all his power of judicature from the Prince. But the Prince is not the cause of the irregularity, or repugnance, or non-confor∣mity, or contrariety which is between the Judges actions and the law, but the Judge himself, who by his own fault, did abuse and misapply that good generall power, which was committed and entrusted to him by the Prince; he is the only cause of the anomy or irregularity.

Or as a Scrivener that teacheth one to write, and sets him a copy, is both the cause of the rule, and of the action, or writing, and yet not the cause of the irregularity or devi∣ation from the rule. Sin is a defect, or devia∣tion, or irregularity. No defect, no devia∣tion, no irregularity can proceed from God. But herein doth consist T. H. his errour, that he distinguisheth not between an essential and an accidentall subordination. Or between a good generall power, and the derermination or misapplication of this generall power to evill. What times are we fallen into! to see it publickly maintained, That God is the cause of all irregularity, or deviation from his own rules.

Num. 13.

HEre is no need of Castigations, there being no Animadversions.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 14.

IN the beginning, he repeateth his empty objections, from what shall be, shall be, and from foreknowledge, and that a man cannot chuse to day for tomorrow: and thence con∣cludeth, (nemine consentiente) That my deducti∣ons are irrationall and fallacious, and that he need mak no further answer. As if he should say, I sent forth two or three light horsemen to va∣pour, who were soundly beaten back, and made their defence with their heels, therefore I need not answer the charge of the main battle. He told me that I did not understand him, if I thought he held no other necessity, than that which is contained in that old foo∣lish rule, Whatsoever is, when it is, it is necessarily so as it is. But I see, when all is done, he must sit down and be contented to make his

best of that old foolish rule, For praescience, and what shall be shall be, doe imply no more.

In the next place, he chargeth me with three great abfurdities. The first that I say, A law may be unjust. The second, That a law may be tyrannicall. The third that I say, It is an unjust law which prescribes things impossible in them∣selves to be done. A grievous accusation. These absurdities are at age, let them even answer for themselves.

He saith, Civil laws are made by every man that is subject to them, because every one of them consented to the placing of the Legislative power. I deny his conse∣quence. Indeed in causes that are naturally, necessarily, and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is allwayes the cause of the effect, as he that planteth a vineyard, is the cause of the vine. But in causes that are acci∣dentally or contingently subordinate, as the people electing, the law-giver elected, and the law made are; the cause of the cause is not allwayes the cause of the effect. As he that planteth a vineyard, is not the cause of the drunkennesse. The Kings commission maketh a Judge, but it is not the cause of his unrighteous judgement. Two Cities in Italy contending about their bounds, chose the people of Rome to be their Arbitrators; they gave either City a small pittance, and reserved all the rest to themselves, Quod in medio est,

populo Romano adjucetur. The two Cities did not so much like their Arbitators at the first, as they detested the Arbitrament at the last. And though they had contracted a necessity of compliance by their credulous submission, yet this did not free that unconscionable Ar∣bitrament from palpable injustice; no, nor yet so much as from palpable injury: for though a man is not injuried, who is willing to be in∣juried, volenti non fit injuria; Yet he who doth chuse an Arbitrator, doth not chuse his unjust Arbitrament; nor he that chuseth a Law-giver, chuse his tyrannical Law. Though he have obliged himself to passive obedience, yet his obligation doth not render either the injur•…•…ous Arbitrament of the one, or the ty∣rannicall law of the other to be just. So the main ground of his errour is a grosse fallacy, which every Sophister in the University is a∣ble to discover.

I answer secondly, That though every subject had actually consented, as well to the laws, as to the Law-giver; yea, though the law were made by the whole collective body of the people in their own persons; yet if it be contrary to the law of God or nature, it is still an unjust law. The people cannot give that power to their Prince, which they have not themselves.

Thirdly, many laws are made by those who are not duely invested with Legislative power, which are therefore unjust laws.

Fourthly, many laws are made to bind forraigners: who exercise commerce with sub∣jects, which if they be contrary to the pacts and capitulations of the confederate nations, are unjust laws. Forraigners never consented to the placing of the Legislative power.

Fifthly, no humane power whatsoever, ju∣diciary or Legislative, civill or sacred, is ex∣empted from excesses, and possibility of doing or making unjuct acts.

Lastly, the people cannot confer more power upon their Law-giver, than God him∣self doth confer; neither is their election a greater priviledge from injustice, than Gods own disposition: but they, who have been placed in soveraign power by God himself, have both made unjust laws, and prescribed unjust acts to their subjects.

I said those laws were unjust, which pre∣scribed things impossible in themselves. A∣gainst this he excepteth, Onely contradictions are impossible in themselves; all other things are possible in themselves, as to raise the dead, to change the course of nature. But never any Tyrant did bind a man to contradictions, or make a law, com∣manding him to do and not to do the same action, or to be, and not to be in the same place, at the same moment of time. I answer first, That Tyrants may command, and by their Depu∣ties have commanded contradictory Acts, as for the same Subjects to appear before seve∣ral Judges, in several places, at the same time.

And to do several duties inconsistent one with another, which imply a contradiction: and have punished Subjects for disobedience in such cases.

Secondly I answer, That when we say Law-makers ought to command things possi∣ble, it ought to be understood of things possi∣ble to their Subjects, upon whom they impose their commands; not of such things as are possible to God Allmighty. To make a law that subjects should raise the dead, or change the course of nature, (which he reckons as things possible in themselves) is as unjust a law, as a law that should injoine them contra∣dictions, & the acts as impossible to the Subject.

Thirdly, these words, [impossible in them∣selves] which he layeth hold on, have a quite contrary sense to that which he imagineth, and are warranted by great Authours, Some things are impossible to us by our own defaults, as for a man to hold the liquour firm∣ly without shedding, who hath contracted the Palsy by his own intemperance. These impossibilities may justly be forbidden and punished, when we have had power, and lost it byour own fault. Secondly, there are other im∣possibilities in themselves, such as proceed not from our own faults, which never were in our power, as those which proceed from the an∣tecedent determinatioo of extrinsecall causes. To injoine these by law, and to punish a man for not obeying, is unjust and tyrannicall.

Whereas I called just laws the ordinances of right reason, he saith It is an errour that hath cost many thousands of men their lives. His reason is, If laws be erroneous shall they not be obeyed? Shall we rather rebell? I answer, neitheir the one one nor the other. We are not to obey them actively, because we ought to obey God rather than man. Yet may we not rebell, Submit your selves to every ordinance of man, for the Lords sake. Passive obedience is a mean between active obedience and rebel∣lion. To just laws which are the ordinances of right reason, active obedience is due. To unjust laws which are the ordinances of reason erring, passive obedience is due. Who shall hope to escape exception, when this innocent difinition is quarrelled at. I wish his own principles were half so loiall.

He saith I take punishment for a kind of re∣venge, and therefore can never agree with him, who takes it for nothing else but for a correction, or for an example, &c. I take punishment in the same sense, that all Authours both sacred and civil, Divines and Philosophers, Lawyers, and generally all Classick Writers have ever taken it. That is, for an evill of passion which is inflicted for an evill of action. So to passe by other Authours, as sleighted by him, the ho∣ly Scripture doth allwayes take it. As where∣fore doth a living man complain? for the pu∣nishment of his sins. And this is an heinous crime,

yea it is an iniquity to be punished by the Iudges. And thou hast punished us lesse than our iniquities deserved. Yea, punishment doth not onely pre∣suppose sin, but the measure of punishment, the degree of sin. He that despised Moses law, died without mercy; of how much sorer punish∣ment shall he be thought worthy, who hath tramp∣led under foot the son of God? The Judge was commanded to cause the offender to be beaten according to the fault. This truth we learned from the ferula's and rods which we smarted under when we were boyes. And from the gibbets and axes, and wheeles, which are prepared for offenders. Omnis paena si justa est, peccati paena est.

That the punishment of Delinquents hath other ends also, there is no doubt, Nemo pru∣dens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Punishment respects the Delinquent in the first place, either to amend him, or to prevent his doing of more mischief. Secondly, it regar∣deth the party suffering, to repair his honour, or preserve him from contempt, or secure him for the time to come. Lastly, it respects o∣ther persons, that the suffering of a few may be ex•…•…mplary, and an admonition to many. But herein lies his errour, That punishment is for nothing else but for correction or example. God spared not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down into Hell. That was no correction. And at the last Judgement, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire: there is neither correction nor

example, but in both instances there is punish∣ment. Whence it is apparent, that some punishment, especially divine, doth look one∣ly at the satisfaction of justice.

I gave five instances of unjust laws; Pha∣raohs law to drown the Israelitish children; Nebuchadnezars law to cast them who would not commit idolatry, into the firey Furnace; Darius his law that whosoever prayed to God for thirty dayes, should be cast into the Den of Lions; Ahashuerosh his law to destroy the Jewish Nation root and branch; The Pharisees law to excommuni∣cate all those who confessed Christ. To all these he answereth nothing in particular, but in general, he giveth this answer; That they were just laws in relation to their subjects, because all laws made by him to whom the people have given the Legislative power, are the acts of every one of that people: and no man can do injustice to him∣self. But they were unjust actions in relation to God. He feareth the Bishop will think this d•…•…scourse too subtile: Nay rather the Bi∣shop thinketh it too flat and dull. Dii te Da∣masippe deae{que} Tale jud•…•…cium donent tenere. I have answered his reason before, that it is a Sophistical fallacy, flowing from the acci∣dental subordination of the causes. A man may will the Law-giver, and yet not will the Law. That is one reply to his distin∣ction.

Secondly, I reply, That when the people did give them the Legislative power, they gave a Kingly power to preserve and protect their Subjects: they meant not a power to drown them, to burn them, to cast them to the Lions, to root them out from the earth by the means of unjust, bloody, tyrannical laws, made on purpose to be pitfalls to catch Sub∣jects. Hear himself: No man can transferre or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment. If the right be not transferred in such cases, then the law is groundlesse and unjust, and made without the consent of the Subject. They did not give, they did not intend to give, they could not give them a divine power, or rather a power paramount above God: To command idola∣try, to forbid all prayer and invocation of Gods holy Name; And therefore, though such laws do not warrant rebellion, because it is better to die innocent, than to live nocent; yet that hindereth not but such laws are un-just, both towards God, and towards man.

Thirdly, if these laws had been just in rela∣tion to the Subjects, then the Subjects had been bound to obey them actively, but they were not bound to obey them actively; yea they were bound not to obey them. The Mid∣wives feared God, and did not as the King of E∣gypt commanded them. The three children answered; Be it known unto thee, O King, that

we will not serve thy gods, nor worship thy golden image, which thou hast set up. The Parents of Moses are commended for their faith, in sa∣ving Moses contrary to the Kings command∣ment.

Fourthly, Subjects have given to their So∣veraigns, as well Judiciary as Legislative power over themselves; but their Judiciary power doth not justifie their unjust acts or sen∣tences, even towards their Subjects. Elias accused Ahab of murther. And Elisha cal∣led his son Joram, The son of a murderer. Sauls injustice towards the Gibeonites, did draw the guilt of blood upon his House. And the Lord was not satisfied until the Gibeonites had received satisfaction. He himself stileth Davids act towards Uriah murther. Cer∣tainly murther is not just, either towards God, or towards man. Therefore neither doth the Legislative power justifie their unjust lawes.

Fiftly, of all Law-givers, those who are placed freely by the people, have the least pretence to such an absolute and universal re∣signation of all the property and interest of the Subject. For it is to be presumed that the people who did chuse them, had more regard to their own good, than to the good of their Law-giver, and did look principally at the protection of their own persons, and the pre∣servation of their own rights, and did con∣tract accordingly. As we see in the most

flourishing Monarchies of the World; as that of the Medes and Persians: They had their fundamental laws, which were not in the single power of the present Law-giver to alter or violate by a new law or command, with∣out injustice.

If a pupill shall chuse a Tutour or Guar∣dian for himself, he investeth him with all his power, he obligeth himself to make good all his acts. Neverthelesse he may wrong his pupill, or do him injustice: There is onely this difference, that a pupill may implead his Guardian, and recover his right against him; But from a Soveraign Law-giver there lies no appeal, but onely to God. Otherwise there would be endlesse appeales, which both na∣ture and pollicy doth abhor. As in the in∣stance of the Roman Arbitrament, formerly mentioned. An arbitrary power is the high∣est of all powers: Judges must proceed accor∣ding to law, Arbitrators are tied to no law, but their own reason, and their own con∣sciences. Yet all the world will say, that the Romans dealt fraudulently and unjustly with the two parties.

Lastly, the holy Scriptures do every where brand wicked Laws as infamous. As the Sta∣tutes of Omr•…•…, and the Statutes of Israel, and stileth them expressely unjust laws, or unrigh∣teous decrees.

He asketh to whom the Bible is a law? The Bible is not a law, but the positive laws of God

are contained in the Bible. Doth he think the Law of God is no Law without his suffrage? He might have been one of Tiberius his Council, when it was proposed to the Senate, Whether they should admit Christ to be a God or not. He saith, I know that it is not a law to all the World. Not de facto indeed. How should it? when the World is so full of A∣theists, that make no more account of their soules, than of so many handfuls of salt, to keep their bodies from stinking? But de jure, by right it is a Law, and ought to be a Law to all the World. The Heathens, and par∣ticularly the Stoicks themselves, did speak with much more reverence of the holy Books, of which to suspect a falsehood, they held to be an heinous and detestable crime. And the first ar∣gument for necessity, they produced from the authority of those Books, because they said that God did know all things, and dispose all things.

He asketh, How the Bible came to be a Law to us? Did God speake it viva voce to us? have we seen the miracles? have we any other as∣surance then the words of the Prophets, and the au∣thority of the Church? And so it concludeth, that it is the Legislative power of the Common-wealth, wheresoever it is placed, which makes the Bible a Law in England. If a man digged a pit, and covered it not again, so that an oxe or an asse fell into it, he was obbliged by the Mosai∣cal Law, to make satisfaction for the dam∣mage.

I know not whether he do this on pur∣pose to weaken the authority of holy Scrip∣ture, or not. Let God and his own consci∣ence be his Triers: But I am sure he hath dig∣ged a pit for an oxe or an asse, without cover∣ing it again, and if they chance to stumble blindfold into it, their blood will be required at his hands. If a Turke had said so much of the Alchoran at Constantinople, he were in some danger.

If it were within the compasse of the pre∣sent controversie, I should esteem it no diffi∣cult task to demonstrate perspicuously, that the holy Scriptures can be no other then the word of God himself; by their antiquity, by their harmony, by their efficacy, by the san∣ctity and sublimity of their matter; such as could not have entered into the thoughts of man, without the inspiration of the Holy Ghost: By the plainnesse of their stile so full of Majesty, by the light of prophetical pre∣dictions, by the testimony of the blessed Mar∣tyrs, by a multitude of miracles, by the simpli∣city of the Penmen and Promulgers, poor fishermen and shepherds, who did draw the World after their oaten reeds; and lastly, by the judgements of God that have fallen upon such Tyrants and others, as have gone about to suppr esse or profane the Sacred Oracles. But this is one of those things de quibus nefas est dubitare, which he that calleth into question, deserveth to be answered otherwise than with arguments.

But that which is sufficient to confute him, is the law of nature, which is the same in a great part with the positive Law of God re∣corded in holy Scriptures. All the ten Com∣mandments in respect of their substanrials, are acknowledged by all men to be branches of the law of nature. I hope he will not say, that these laws of nature were made by our Suffrages, though he be as likely to say such an absurdity, as any man living. For he saith, the law of nature is the assent it self which all men give to the means of their preservation. Every law is a rule of our actions; a meer as∣sent is no rule. A law commandeth or forbid∣deth, an assent doth neither. But to shew him his vanity; Since he delighteth so much in distinctions, let him satisfie himself out of the distinction of the law of nature. The law of nature is the prescription of right reason, whereby thorough that light which nature hath placed in us, we know some things to be done because they are honest, and other things to be shunned because they are dishonest. He had forgotten what he had twice cited and approved out of Cicero, con∣cerning the law of nature, which Philo calls, The law that cannot lie; not moral, made by mor∣tals, not without life, or written in paper or co∣lumnes without life, but that which can not be corrupted, written by the immortal God in our un∣derstandings.

Secondly, if this which he saith did deserve any consideration, it was before the Bible was

admitted, or assented unto, or received as the word of God. But the Bible hath been assent∣ed unto, and received in England sixteen hundred years. A fair prescription; and in all that time, I do not find any law to au∣thorize it, or to under-prop heaven from fal∣ling with a bullrush. This is undeniable, that for so many successive ages, we have received it as the law of God himself, not depending upon our assents, or the authority of our Law-makers.

Thirdly, we have not onely a nationall tradition of our own Church, for the divine authority of holy Scripture, but which is of much more moment: we have the perpe∣tuall constant universall tradition of the Ca∣tholick Church of Christ, ever since Christ himself did tread upon the face of the earth This is so clear a proof of the universall reception of the Bible, for the genuine Word of God, that there cannot justly be any more doubt made of it, than whether there ever was a William the Conquerer or not.

But this is his opinion, That true religion in every Country is that which the Soveraign Magistrate doth admit and injoyne. I could wish his deceived followers would think upon what rock he drives them. For if this opinion be true, then that which is true reli∣gion to day, may be false religion tomorrow, and change as often as the chief Governour

or Governours change their opinions. Then that which is true religion in one Country, is false religion in another Country, because the Governours are of different opinions; then all the religions of the World, Christian, Jewish, Turkish, Heathenish, are true religi∣ons in their own Countries: and if the Go∣vernour will allow no religion, then Atheisme is the true religion. Then the blessed Apo∣stles were very unwise to suffer for their con∣science, because they would obey God rather than man, Then the blessed Martyrs were ill advised to suffer such torments for a false religion, which was not warranted, or indeed which was for bidden by the Soveraign Ma∣gistrates. And so I have heard from a Gen∣tleman of quality, well deserving credit, that Mr. Hobbes and he talking of self-preserva∣tion, he pressed Mr. Hobbes with this argu∣ment drawn from holy Martyrs. To which Mr. Hobbes gave answer, They were all fools. This bolt was soon shot: but the primitive Church had a more venerable esteem of the holy Martyrs, whose sufferings they called palms; their Prison a Paradise, and their death-day, their birth-day of their glory: to whose memory they builded Churches, and instituted festivalls, whose monuments God himself did honour with frequent mira∣cles.

He asketh why the Bible should not be canoni∣call in Constantinople, as well as in other places,

if it were not as he saith? His question is Apo∣cryphall, and deserveth no other answer, but another question, Why a ship being placed in a stream, is more apt to fall down the stream, than to ascend up against the stream? It is no marvel if the World be apt to follow a sensuall religion, which is agreeable to their own appetites. But that any should embrace a religion which surpasseth their own un∣derstandings, and teacheth them to deny themselves, and to saile against the stream of their own natural corruptions, this is the meer goodnesse of God.

He saith, That a Conquerour makes no laws over the conquered, by virtue of his power and conquest, but by virtue of their assent. Most vainly urged like all the rest. Unjust Con∣querours gain no right, but just Conquerours gain all right, Omnia dat qui justa negat, Just conquerors do not use to ask the assent of those whom they have conquered in lawfull war, but to command obedience. See but what a pret•…•…y liberty he hath found out for conquered persons, They may chuse whether they will obey or dye. Una salus victis, nullam sperare salutem, What is this to the purpose, to prove that Conquerours make laws by the assent of those whom they have conquered? nothing at all. And yet even thus much is not true upon his principle: Conquered Persons are not free to live or die indifferently, according to his prin∣ciples; but they are necessitated either to the

one or the other, to live slaves, or dye captives.

He hath found out a much like assent of children, to the laws of their Ancestors, without which he would make us believe that the laws do not bind. When a child cometh to strength enough to do mischief, and to judgement, that they are preserved from mischief, by fear of the sword that doth protect them, in the very act of receiving protection, and not renouncing it, they obliege themselves to the laws of their protectours. And here he inserteth further some of his pe∣culiar errours, as this, That Parents who are not subject to others, may lawfully take away the lives of their children, and Magistrates take away the lives of their Subjects, without any fault or crime, if they do but doubt of their obedience. Here is comfortable doctrine for children, that their parents may knock out their brains lawfully. And for Subjects, that their Sove∣raigns may lawfully hang them up, or behead them, without any offence committed, if they do but doubt of their obedience. And for Sove∣raigns, that their Subjects are quitted of their allegiance to them, so soon as they do but re∣ceive actual protection from another: And for all men if they do receive protection from a Turk, or an heathen, or whomsoever; they are obliged to his Turkish, Heathenish, Idolatrous, Sacrilegious, or impious laws. Can such opini∣ons as these live in the World? surely no longer •…•…han men recover their right wits. Demades •…•…hreatned Phocion, That the Athenians

would destroy him, when they fall into their mad fits. And thee, Demades, (said Pho∣cion) when they returne to their right minds.

He saith, That I would have the Iudge to condemn no man for a chrime that is necessitated. As if (saith he) the Iudge could know what acts are neressary, unlesse he knew all that had anteceded both visible and invisible. If all acts be necessa∣ry, it is an easie thing for the Judge to know what acts are necessey. I say more, that no crime can be necessitated; for if it be ne∣cessitated, it is no crime. And so much all Judges know firmly, or else they are not fit to be Judges. Surely he supposeth there are, or have been, or may be, some Stoicall Judges in the World. He is mistaken, no Stoick wss ever fit to be a Judge, either Capitall or Civill. And in truth, Stoicall princi∣ples, do overthrow both all Judges and Judg∣ments.

He denieth that he ever said, that all Magi∣strates at first were elective. Perhaps not in so many words, but he hath told us again, that no law can be unjust, because every Sub∣ject chuseth his law in chusing his Law-giver. If every Law-giver be elective, then every Soveraign Magistrate is elective, for every Soveraign Magistrate is a Law-giver. And he hath justified the laws of the Kings of E∣gypt, of Assyria, of Persia, upon this ground, because they were made by him, to whom

the people had given the Legislative power.

He addeth, That it appears, that I am of opi∣nion, that a law may be made to command the will. Nothing lesse, if he speaks of the law of man. My argument was drawn from the lesser to the greater, thus, If that law be unjust, which commands a man to do that which is im∣possible for him to do, then that law is likewise unjust, which commands him to will that which is impossible for him to will. He seeth I condemne them both, but much more the later. Yet upon his principles, he who com∣mandeth a man to do impossibilities, com∣mandeth him to will impossibilities, because without willing them, he cannot do them. My argument is ad hominem, and goes upon his own grounds, That though the action be necessitated, neverthelesse, the will to break the law, maketh the action unjust. And yet he maintaineth, that the will is as much or more necessitated than the action, because he maketh a man free to do if he will, but not free to will. If a man ought not to be punished for a necessitated act; then nei∣ther ought he to be punished for a necessitated will.

I said truely, That a just law justly execu∣ted, is a cause of justice. He inferreth that he hath shewed that all laws are just, and all just laws are justly executed. And hereupon he conclu∣deth. That I confesse, that all I reply unto here is

true. Do I confesse that all laws are just? No, I have demonstrated the contrary: or do I believe that all just laws are justly executed? It may be so, in Platos Common-wealth, or in Sr. Thomas Mores Eutopia, or in my Lord Verulams Atlanteis. But among us Mortals, it is rather to be wished, than to be hoped for. He who builds partly upon his own principles, and partly upon his adversaries, is not very likely to lay a good foundation.

He accuseth me of charging him falsely for saying, That God having commanded one thing openly, plots another thing secretly, which he cal∣leth one of my ugly phrases. I did not charge him for saying that God did so, but that he might do so, without injustice. Whether the charge be true or false, let his own words bear witnesse, That which God does, is made just by his doings: Iust I say in him, not allwayes just in us by the example. For a man that shall com∣mand a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinde∣rance of the same, if he punish him, he so com∣manded for not doing it, is unjust. I wish him a better memory.

I said there was never any time when man∣kind was without Governours, Laws, and Societies. He answereth, That it is very likely to be true; That since the Creation, there never was a time in which mankind was totally without Society. And confesseth further, That there was Paternall government in Adam. But he addeth, That in those places where there are

Civill wars, there is neither Law nor Common∣wealth, nor Society. Why then doth he teach the contrary with so much confidence, That it cannot be denied, but that the naturall state of men, before they en•…•…red into Society, was a war of all men against all men. Why doth he say here, That where there is no law, there no killing or any thing else can be unjust. And that by the right of nature we destroy (without being unjust) all that is noxious, both beasts and men. Where there was paternall government from the beginning, there were Laws, there were Societies, there was no war of all men against all men. Then the naturall state of men was never without Society. Doth he call a civil war the naturall state of men? nei∣ther was Adam alone such a Governour, but all heads of families. Neither the whole World, nor the tenth part of the World, was ever since the Creation without Society. The World was long without war, what need had they to war one upon another, who had the sharing of the whole World among them? And when there was war, it was not civill war: And when and where there are civill wars, yet there are laws, though not so well executed; and a Common-wealth, though much troubled and disordered. For him to make the naturall and primogenious state of mankind to be a war of all men against all men, to be lawlesse without government, barbarous without Societies or civility,

wherein it was lawfull for any man to kill another, as freely as a Wolf or a Tyger, and to enjoy whatsoever they could by force, without further care or conscience, reflects too much, not onely upon the honour of man∣kind, but likewise upon the honour of God himself, the Creatour of mankind.

He chargeth me to say, That there never was a time, when it was lawfull ordinarily (those were my words) for private men to kill one ano∣ther, for their own preservation, I say the same still in that sense, wherein I said it then, and I think all the world may say the same with me, except himself.

In cases extraordinary, as when a man is assaulted by Thieves or Murderees, I said ex∣pressely then, and I say the same now, That it is lawfull to kill another in his own defence, cum moder amine inculpatae tutelae, And this is all which the Laws of God or nature do al∣low: which Cicero in his defence of M•…•…lo pleadeth for, as the words following do abun∣dantly testifie, ut si vita nostra in aliquas insidias, si in vim, in tela aut latronum aut inimicorum in cidisset, omnis honesta ratio esset expediendae salutis. And again, Hoc & ratio doctis, & necessitas barbaris, & mos gentibus, & feris natura ipsa praescripsit, ut omnem semper vim quacunque ope possent, a corpore, a capite, a vita sua propulsarent. I wonder he was not ashamed to cite this place so directly against himself. He saith the same words in general that I say, but in a

quite contrary sense, that by the law of nature any man may kill another without scruple, if he do but suspect him, or if he may be noisome to him, as freely as a man might pluck up a weed or any herb, because it draws the nourishment another way. And this ordi∣narily, though the other do not offer to as∣sault him, and though his own life be in no manner of perill. This he maketh to be the first, and to be the natural state of mankind, before they had entered into any pacts one with another. In this sense I did deny, and do still deny, that it either is, or ever was, or∣dinarily lawful for one private man to kill an∣other, though he plead his own preservation and well-being never so much: and although T. H. telleth us here, without either reason or authority, that it seemeth to him, that God doth account such killing no sin. An excellent Casuist.

All creatures forbeare to prey upon their own kind, except in case of extream hunger,

—Parcit Cognatis maculis similis fera. Quando leoni Fortior eripuit vitam leo? Quo nemore unquam Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri? Indica tygris agit valida cum tygride pacem Perpetuam. Saevis inter se convenit ursis.

And were mankind onely made to murther one another promiscuously? That is to be worse than wild beasts, or savage Cannibals.

We beheld him even now more bold than welcome with the holy Scriptures, saving onely that he abstained from the imputation of Jargon. Now he jests with the pulpit, as well he may, considering what small benefit he hath received from it. Then he laughs at cases of conscience, not in his sleeve, or tho∣rough his fingers, although God Almighty was more careful in stating the cases of blood∣guiltinesse punctually. But he loves a distin∣ction worse than manslaughter. After the man is killed (saith he) the Bishop shall be Iudge, whether the necessity was invincible, or the danger extream, as being a case of conscience. If he had writ this defence of wilful murder, as Demost∣henes did the praise of Helene; or Erasmus the commendation of folly, onely to try his wit, it had been too much to jest with the blood of man; but to do it in earnest, con∣trary to the Law of God and nature, without any authority, sacred or profane, without rea∣son, nay without common sense, is his own peculiar priviledge.

And yet before he leave this Subject, he must needs be fumbling once more upon the old string, That in the natural state of man, every man might lawfully kill any man whom he suspected, or who might be noisome to him. And so taking this for granted, he concludeth, that he might lawfully resign it up into the hands of the Magistrate. I was the more sparing in confuting this point, be∣cause

it is so absured, that the very repetition of it is a sufficient consutation, it being an opi∣nion so barbarous, and so brutish, fitter for a bloody Canibal, one of the African Anthro∣pophagi, than one who hath born the name of Christian, or been a member of any civil Society. Such an opinion, as, if it had not all laws of God and man against it, yet the hor∣rid consequences of it, if it were once enter∣tained, would chase it out of the World, with the propugner of it. I would not cast away one Text of Scripture upon it, but that he ad∣mitteth that proofe, and rejecteth all humane authority.

My first reason is demonstrative, because all killing of men by private men was forbidden to all mankind by the positive law of God, presently after the flood, before there were ever any such pacts as he imagineth in the World. Whoso sheddeth mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the Image of God made he man. That which he makes lawful in the natural state of man, and onely prohibited by covenant between man and man, was de∣clared unlawful by the positive Law of God, to Noah and his posterity, from whom all the Cities, and Societies, and Common-wealths in the World, are descended.

Secondly, this Law of God was no new Law then, but a declaration of the law of na∣ture, which was imprinted in the heart of man from the beginning, as appeareth evidently

by the reason annexed to the Law; for in the Image of God made he man. Either in the fa∣mily of Adam was the natural state of man, or there never was any natural state of man in the World, before any such Common-wealths as he imagineth could be gathered, or any such pacts or covenants made. Yet even then the killing of those whom they judged noysome to them by private persons, was not onely esteemed an ordinary sin, but was a crying sin, for which we have the testi∣mony of God himself to Cain, What hast thou done? the voice of thy brothers blood cryeth unto me from the ground?

Thirdly, private men never resigned up in∣to the hands of the Soveraign Magistrate the power of defending their own lives in case of extream necessity, though it were with the death of the assailant, for that power they hold still. Let him not confound two different powers together. This power which he chal∣lengeth, affirming that the people did resign it to the Magistrate, which we deny with de∣testation, is a right to destroy what soever a man thinketh can annoy him, (they are his own words in this place) or a general power of kil∣ling their enemies; that is, of killing whom∣soever they will; for all men by their do∣ctrine are their enemies, seeing he maketh it a war of all men against all men. Now if private men had once such a right and did resign it up into the hand of the Soveraign Magistrate,

then the Soveraign Magistrate may use the same right still, and kill whomsoever he thinketh may annoy him, without sin: But this he cannot do. Saul sinned in killing the Gibeonites, and the Priests. Wherefore wilt thou sin against innocent blood? David sinned in killing Uriah. It is said of Manasseh, that he filled Ierusalem with innocent blood, which the Lord would not pardon. Ahab is stiled a mur∣therer. Hast thou killed, &c.

Lastly, the exaggarations of this sin in holy Scripture, and the incredible wayes which God useth to find it out, and those blind blows & ghastly horrours of conscience which do ordinarily accompany it, do proclaim to all the World, that there is more in it than an offence against mutual pacts and covenants between man and man. He that doth violence to the blood of any person, shall flee to the pit, let no man slay him. The wilful murderer must be pulled out of the City of Refuge; yea, Gods Altar must yeild him no protection. This sin is a defacing of the Image of God; It de∣fileth a whole land, and proceedeth from the special instigation of the Devil, who was a murderer from the beginning. O how heavy (said one) is the weight of innocent blood? How much do all Authours Sacred and Ci∣vil, inveigh against the shedding of innocent blood? Some have apprehended a fishes head in the platter for the head of him they had murthered. Others after a horrid mur∣ther

had been observed to have their hands continually upon their daggers. This opi∣nion of his, takes away all difference between nocent and innocent blood. This inward guilt, these fears of vengeance, and the extra∣ordinary providence of God in the discovery of murthers, do proclaim aloud, that there is more in bloodguiltinesse, than the breach of mutual pacts between man and man.

In the next place, he maketh us an ela∣borate discourse of a Lion, and a Beare, and an Oxe, as if he stood probationer for the place of Attorny General of the brutes. This is evident, he hath deserved better of them, than either of his God, or of his Religion, or of the humane nature. In the first place, he ac∣quitteth the beasts from the dominion of man, and denieth that they owe him any subjecti∣on. He that shall use T. H. his books as the countrymen did his prognostication, write down every thing contrary, fair for foule, and foule for fair, true for false, and false for true, if he could get but a good wager upon each opinion, would have advantage enough. I hope he doth not understand it of a political dominion or subjection, but onely that the other creatures were designed by God for the use and service of men, in the same sense that Virgil saith,

Sic vos non vobis veller a fertis oves. Sic vos non vobis fertis aratra boves.

When God had created man male and fe∣male,

after his own Image, he gave them his benediction. Sub due the earth and have dominion overthe fish of the sea, and over the fowles of the air and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. And this very dominion was a part of the Image of God, wherein man was created. Therefore God brought all the creatures to man as to their Lord and Master under him∣self, to give them names, which is a sign and a proofe of dominion. Therefore said the Kingly Prophet, Thou madest him [man] to have dominion over the workes of thy hands; Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet: All sheep and oxen, &c. Here is but an harsh beginning of his Attorny-ship.

Secondly, he maintaineth, that the Lion hath as much right, or, as he calleth it, liberty to eat the man, as the man hath to eat the Oxe. I hope he will not deny that the Crea∣tor of all things had right to the donation of his own creatures. Man harh Gods deed of gift. Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you. Even as the green hearb have I given you all things. Can he shew such ano∣ther grant for the Lions to devour men? When God said, Whoso sheddeth mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the Image of God made he man. Was it intended onely that his blood should be preserved for the Lions? or do not their teeth deface Gods Image, as much as mans weapons? But the Lion had liberty to eat man long before. He is

mistaken, the creatures did beare a more aw∣ful respect to the Image of God in man, be∣fore his fall. But mans rebellion to God, was punished with their rebellion of the creatures to him. He saith, it was impossible for most men to have Gods license to use the creatures for their sustenance. Why so? as if all the world were not then comprised in the family of Noah. Or as if the Commandments and di∣spensations of God were not then delivered from father to son by tradition, as they were long after by writing. He asketh how I would have been offended if he should have spoken of man as Pliny doth, Then whom, there is no living creature more wretched or more proud. Not half so much as now. Pliny taxeth one∣ly the faults of men, he vilifieth not their hu∣mane nature. Most wretched; What is that but an argument of the immortality of the soul? God would never have created the most noble of his creatures for the most wret∣ched being. Or more proud; that is, then some men. Corruptio optimi pessima. The best things being corrupted, turn the worst

But he acknowledgeth two advantages which man hath above other creatures, his tongue and his hand. Is it possible that any man who believeth that he hath an immor∣tal soul, or that reason and understanding are any thing but empty names, should so far forget himself and his thankfulnesse to God, as to prefer his tongue and his hands, before

an immortal soul and reason? Then we may well change the definition of a man which those old dunses the Philosophers left us, Man is a reasonable creature, into this new one; Man is a prating thing with two hands. How much more was the humane nature beholden to Tully an Heathen, who said, That man differed from other creatures in reason and speech. Or to Ovid, who stileth man, San∣ctius his animal ment•…•…sque capacius altae. If he have no better luck in defending his Levia∣than, he will have no great cause to boast of his making men examples.

And now it seemeth he hath played his masterprise. For in the rest of his Animad∣versions in this Section, we find a low ebbe of matter. Concerning consultations he saith nothing but this, That my writing was caused physically, antecedently, extrinsecally, by his an∣swer. In good time. By which I see right well, that he understandeth not what a physical cause is. Did he think his answer was so Ma∣thematical to compel or necessitate me to write? No, I confesse I determined my self. And his answer was but a slender occasion, which would have had little weight with me, but for a wiser mans advice, to prevent his over-weening opinion of his own abilities. And then followeth his old dish of twice sod∣den colewortes, about free, and necessary, and contingent, and free to do if he will, which we have had often enough already.

His distinction between seen and unseen ne∣cessity, deserveth more consideration. The meaning is, that seen necessity doth take away consultation, but unseen necessity doth not take away consultation or humane indea∣vours, Unseen necessity is of two sorts, either it is altogether unseen and unknown, either what it is, or that it is; Such a necessity doth not take away consultation or humane endea∣vours. Suppose an office were privately disposed, yet he who knoweth nothing of the disposition of it, may be as solicitous and in∣dustrious to obtain it, as though it were not disposed at all. But the necessity which he laboureth to introduce, is no such unseen un∣known necessity. For though he know not what the causes have determined particular∣ly, or what the necessity is, yet he believeth that he knoweth in general, that the causes are determined from eternity, and that there is an absolute necessity.

The second sort of unseen necessity, is that which is unseen in particular what it is, but it is not unknown in general that it is. And this kind of unseen necessity doth take away all consultation, and endeavours, and the use of means, as much as if it were seen in parti∣cular. As supposing that the Cardinals have elected a Pope in private, but the declaration of the person who is elected is kept secret. Here is a necessity, the Papacy is full; and this necessity is unseen in particular, whilest

no man knoweth who it is. Yet for as much as it is known that it is, it taketh away all in∣deavours and consultations, as much as if the Pope were publickly enthroned. Or sup∣pose a Jury have given in a privy veredict: no man knoweth what it is until the next Court∣day; yet it is known generally that the Ju∣rers are agreed, and the veredict is given in. Here is an unseen necessity: Yet he who should use any further consultations, or make further applications in the case, were a fool. So though the particular determination of the causes be not known to us what it is, yet if we know that the causes are particularly deter∣mined from eternity, we know that no con∣sultation or endeavour of ours can alter them.

But it may be further objected, that though they cannot alter them, yet they may help to accomplish them. It was necessary that all who sailed with St. Paul should be saved from shipwrack: Yet St. Paul told them, that ex∣cept the shipmen did abide in the ship, they could not be saved. So though the event be necessarily determined, yet consultation or the like means may be necessary to the determi∣nation of it. I answer, the question is not whether the means be necessary to the end, for that is agreed upon by all parties: But the question is to whom the ordering of the means which are necessary to the production of the event doth properly belong; whether

to the first cause, or to the free Agent. If it belong to the free Agent under God (as we say it doth) then it concerneth him to use consultations and all good endeavours, as re∣quisite means to obtain the desired end. But if the disposition of the means belong soly and wholly to God, (as he saith it doth) and if God have ordered all means as well as ends and events particularly and precisely, then it were not onely a thanklesse and superfluous office, to consult what were the fittest means to obtain an end, when God hath determined what must be the onely means, and no other; but also a saucinesse, and a kind of tempting of God, for a man to intrude himself into the execution of God Almighties decrees; where∣as he ought rather to cast away all care and all thought on his part, and resign himself up wholly to the disposition of the second causes, which act nothing but by the special deter∣mination of God.

Concerning admonition, he saith lesse than of consultation. The reason (saith he) why we admonish men of understanding rather than children, fooles, and madmen, is because they are more capable of the good and evil consequences of their actions, and have more experience, and their passions are more conform to their Admonitors; that is to say, moderate and stayed. And then after his Bragadochio manner, he con∣cludeth. There be therefore reasons under hea∣ven which the bishop knows not of. My one

reason [because they have the use of reason, and true liberty, with a dominion over their ownactions, which children, fools, and mad∣men have not] includeth more than all his three reasons put together. What is it that weigheth the good and evill consequences of our actions? Reason, What is it that preserveth us from being transported with our passions? Reason, And what is experienced of good and evil? Reason impoproved by observati∣on. So we have gained nothing by the change of my reason, but three crackt groats fore one good shilling.

But he hath omitted the principal part of my answer, that is, the liberty and dominion over their actions, which men of understand∣ing have much more than children, fools or madmen. Without which all his capable∣nesse of good and evill consequences, all his experience of good and evil, all his calmness and moderation, do signifie just nothing. Let a man have as much capacity as Solomon, as much experience as Nestor, as much modera∣tion as Socrates; yet if he have no power to dispose of himself, nor to order his own acti∣ons, but be hurried away by the second causes inevitably, irresistiblity, without his own willl it is to as much purpose to admonish him, as when Icarus had his wings melted by the Sun, and was tumbling down headlong into the Sea, to have admonished him to take heed of drowning. A seasonable admoni∣tion

may do much good, but that is upon our principles, not upon his. If all events, with all their circumstances, and the certain means to effect them, were precisely determined from eternity, it were high presumption in us to interpose, without speciall warrant. Those means which we judge most conveni∣ent, are often not looked upon by God All∣mighty, who doth use to bring light out of darkness, and restore sight by clay and spittle, and preserve men from perishing by perishing. No Perigraph escapeth him without some su∣pererogatory absurdities. As here, that a man may deliberate without the use of reason, that bruit beasts may deliberate, that madnesse or phrensie is strength of passion.

He insisteth longer upon morall praise and dispraise, or moral goodnesse or badnesse, but speedeth worse, entangling himself in twenty errours, as these which follow: Meta∣physicall goodnesse is but an idle term. That is good wherewith a man is pleased. Good is not of absolute signification to all men. Nothing is good of evill, but in regard of the action proceeding from it, and the person to whom it doth good or hurt. Satan is evill to us, but good to God. If there were laws among Beasts, an Horse would be as morally good as man. The difference between naturall and morall goodnesse, procedeth from the [civill] law. The law is all the right reason that we have. We make it right reason by our appro∣bation. All actions of Subjects, if they be con∣formable

to the law of the land, are morally good. Morall praise is from obedience to the law. Mo∣rall dispraise is from disobedience to the law. To say a thing is good, is to say, It is as I, or another, or the state would have it. That is good to every man which is so far good as he can see. All the reall good which we call honest and morally virtu∣ous, is that which is not repugnant to the law. The law is the infallible rule of morall goodnesse. Our particular reason is not right reason. The rea∣son of our Governour whom we have set over our selves is right reason. His Laws whatsoever they be, are in the place of right reason to us. As in playmorality consisteth in not renoncing the trump, So all our morality consisteth in not disobeying the law. Is not here an hopefull litter of young errours, to be all formed out of three penfulls of inke? as if he had been dreaming lately in errours den. One Antycira will not afford Hellebore enough to cure him perfectly. I was apt to flatter my self a while, that by the law he understood the law of right reason. But I found it too evident, that by right rea∣son he understands the arbitrary edicts of an elective Governoour. I could not chuse but cal to mind that of our Laureate Poet, God help the man so wrapt in errours, endlesse train.

The Reader might well have expected matter of more edification upon this Subject. As wherein the formal reason of goodnesse doth consist, in convenience, or in the ob∣tainining of all due perfections. As likewise

the distinction of good; either subjectively, into the goods of the mind, the goods of the body, and the goods of fortune. Or formally, into bonum honestum, utile & delectabile, or ho∣nestly good, profitably good, and delightfully good. That which is honestly good, is de∣sirable in it self, and as it is such. That which is profitably good, is that which is to be desi∣red, as conducing to the obtaining of some other good. Thirdly, delightfully good is that pleasure which doth arise from the ob∣taining of the other goods desired. But he hath quite cashiered the two former sorts of good, That which is honestly good, and that which is profitably good; and acknowledg∣eth onely that which is delightfully good, or that which pleaseth him or me. So as if our humours differ, goodnesse must differ; and as our humours change, goodness must change; as the Chamaeleon changeth her colours. Many things are good that please not us, and many things please us that are not good. Thus he hath left no reall good in the World, but on∣ly that which is relatively good. Thus he hath made the Devil himself to become good, and which is yet worse, good to God. Thus he hath made horses to be as capable of morall goodnesse as men, if they had but onely laws. I wonder why he should stick at that: laws are but commands, and com∣mands may be intimated to horses, as we might see in Bankes his horse; which we

might call (upon his principles) an honest virtuous and morally good horse. There is a woe denounced against them who call evill good, and good evill.

This is not all, he confesseth that law-makers are men, and may erre, and think that law good for the people, which is not: yet with the same breath he telleth us, That there is no other right reason but their law, which is the in∣fallible rule of morall goodnesse. So right rea∣son and erring reason; a fallible rule, and an infallible rule are all one with him. What no other rule but this one Lesbian rule, the arbitrary dictates of a Governour? What is become of the eternall law, or the rule of justice in God himself? What is become of the divine positive law recorded in holy Scriptures? What is become of the law of nature, imprinted naturally in the heart of every man, by the finger of God himself? What is become of the law of nations, that is, those principles which have been com∣monly and universally received as laws, by all nations in all ages, or at least the most prudent pious and civill nations? What is become of that Synteresis or noble light of the soul, which God hath given mankind to preserve them from vices? Are they all gone, all vanished, and is no rule remaining but only the arbitrary edicts of a mortal Law-giver, who may command us to turn Turks or Pa∣gans to morrow, who by his own confession

may erre in his law-giving? Then not onely power absolutely irresistible, doth justifie whatsoever it doth, but also the power of mortall man may justifie the violation of the laws of the immortal God. But I have shewed him sufficiently, that there are unjust laws, not onely towards God, but likewise towards men: That unjust laws do not acquit our active obedience to them from damnable sin: That it is not onely lawful, but necessa∣ry to disobey them: That God himself hath approved such disobedience, and rewarded it. To conclude, it is not the pleasing of him or me, or some private benefit that may redound from thence to him or me, that makes any thing to be truely good, but the meeting of all perfection in it, whereof that thing is capable. Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quolibet defectu; all requisite perfections must concur to make a thing good, but one onely defect makes it evill. Nothing is morally good, nothing is praiseworthy, but that which is truly honest and virtuous. And on the other side, nothing is morally bad, no∣thing is dispraise worthy, but that which is dishonest and vicious.

To wrangle everlastingly whether those incouragements which are given to Setting∣dogs and Coyducks and the like be rewards, were a childish fighting with shadows, seeing it is confessed that they are not recompenses of honest and virtuous actions, to which the

laws did appoint rewards. Swine that run by a determinate instinct of nature to succour their fellows of the same Herd in distresse, do not desire a civicall crown; like him who saved the life of a Citizen. Nor the Spiders, whose phancies are fitted by nature to the weaving of their webs, deserve the like commendati∣on with Arachne, who atteined to her rare arts of weaving by assidious industry. There is a great difference between natural quali∣ties, and moral virtues. Where nature hath bestowed excellent gifts, the chief praise re∣doundeth to the God of nature. And where the bruits have attained to any such rare or beneficial qualities by the instruction of man, the chief praise redoundeth unto him that taught them. The Harp was not crowned in the Olympian Games, but the Harper, nor the Horses, but the Chariotter. And though the incouragements of men and bruits be sometimes the same thing materi∣ally, yet they are not the same thing for∣mally.

But where he confoundeth a necessity of specification with a necessity of exercise, and affirmeth that the Bees and Spiders are ne∣cessitated by nature as well to all their indi∣viduall actions, as to their severall kinds of works, it deserveth no answer but to be sleighted. His opinion doth require that he should say that they are determined to their individual actions, by the second causes and

circumstances (though it be untrue;) but to say they are determined by nature to each indivi∣duall act admitteth no defence.

In the last Paragraph, I am beholden to him, that he would instruct me: but I am of his mind, that it would be too great a labour for him. For I approve none of his newfangled principles, and think he might have spent his time better in meditating upon somewhat else, that had been more proper for him. I see that where the inferiour faculty doth end, the superiour doth begin. As where the vegeta∣tive doth end, there the sensitive doth begin, comprehending all that the vegetative doth, and much more. So where the sensitive ends, the intellectual begins. And should I confine the intellectual soul which is inorganical, im∣material, impassible, seperable, within the bounds of the sensitive, or to the power and proceedings thereof, when I see the un∣derstanding doth correct the sense, as about the greatnesse of the Sun? Sense hath nothing to do with universalls, but reason hath. Even in memory which he mentioneth, the intel∣lectuall remembrance is another manner of thing than the sensitive memory. But this be∣longs not to this question; and therefore I pass by it, and leave him to the censure of others.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 15.

IN this Section he chargeth me first with a double breach of promise, yet there is no promise; & if they had been promises, both are accomplished. One of my promises was, That I would not leave one grain of his matter un∣weighed, yet I leave these words unanswered. Our Saviour bids us pray thy will, not our will be done; and by example teacheth us the same; For he prayed thus: Father if it be thy will, let this cup passe. First this was no promise, but mine own private resolution, which I might law∣fully change at any time upon better grounds. Secondly, it had been an easie thing to omit two lines in a whole discourse unwillingly. Thirdly, the intent was onely to omit no∣thing that was material; but this was meerly impertinent. Lastly, without any more to do, it was fully answered in my defence in these words. [In the last place he urgeth, That in our prayers we are bound to submit our wills to Gods will. Who ever made a doubt of this? We must submit to the preceptive will of God or his com∣mandments. We must submit to the effective will of God, when he declares his pleasure by the event, or otherwise. But we deny, and deny again, that

God wills ad extra necessarily, or that it is his pleasure that all second causes should act necessari∣ly at all times, which is the question. And that which he aledgeth to the contrary comes not near it. Where were his eyes? That inference [which seemeth at least to imply that our prayers cannot change the will of God] is now first ad∣ded. And if it had been there formerly, is answered abundantly in the same Se∣ction.

The second breach of promise is this; that I said [here is all that passed between us up∣on this subject, without any addition or the least variation from the original.] But I have added these words [Yes, I have seen those silliest of crea∣tures, and seeing their rare works, I have seen enough to confute all the boldfaced Atheists of this Age, and their hellish blasphemies.] What a stirre is here about two lines, which contain neither argument, nor answer, nor authority, nor anything material. I did not apply these words to him, nor gave the least intimation of any such thing. If he be wronged, he wrongeth himself. I am as much offended with the Theists of this Age, as with the A∣theists, who are convinced that there is a God and professe it, yet never do him any service or worship, not so much as ante focum si frigus erit, by a warm fires side in a winters day: who when they know God, do not glorifie him as God. But to deale clearly with him; I pro∣fesse I do not know either when any such

words were added, or that any such words were added: Neither ever had I any other copy but that original which was sent to the presse: and that copy which was transcribed for him, and sent to him at the first. If the Amanuensis did omit two lines either in the margent (which is most likely by what he saith) or otherwise, I could not help it: My asseveration (for it was no promise) was true, that I sent the original it self, as it had lain long by me without any variation.

When he is afraid to be hard put to it, then he laieth in the other scale to counter∣ballance those new reasons which are brought against him, either prescience, or what shall be, shall be: Or a man cannot deter∣mine to day, what his will shall be to morrow. All which are impertinent to the question, and have been abundantly answered in these Ca∣stigations. His instance of a debter who in∣tended first to pay his creditor, then thought to defer it, and lastly resolved to do it for fear of imprisonment, is remote from the question. The determination of the debter is not ante∣cedent, but concomitant, not extrinsecal by the creditor, who perhaps never thought on it, but intrinsecal by the dictate of his own reason, which he calleth thoughts, lest he should seem to attribute any thing to reason. What are thoughts, but intellectus actu circa res occupatus? The understanding actually em∣ployed about something. If he hold no other

necessity but this, which no man opposeth; Why doth he trouble the World with his debitor and creditor about nothing?

I did not accuse him for making all piety to consist in the estimation of the judgement: he still mistaketh; but I did, and do accuse him, for placing all the inward piety of the heart in the estimation of the judgement. So he saith expressely, That to honour any thing, is nothing else but to think it to be of great power. If it were nothing else, the Devil honours God as much as the best Christian; for he be∣lieveth a God as much as they: and he can∣not believe a God, but he must believe him to be omnipotent. Thou believest there is one God, thou dost well, the devils also believe and tremble. I shewed him that inward piety doth consist more in the submission of the will, than in the estimation of the judgement, But I may not say that it was too hot for his fingers. He urgeth, That the devil cannot esteem God for his goodnesse: Let it be so. Neither is there any need that he should to make him de∣voute, if his ground were true, That to honour God is nothing else, but to think him to be of great power.

But to make amends for this oversight, he hath found us out two sorts of Devils. The one (and indeed all the devils that are in his creed) are wicked men, to whom he applieth the name of diabolus, and Sathan, and Abaddon in holy Scripture. The other are heathen gods,

meere phancies, or fictions of terrified hearts; or as he stileth them out of St. Paul, Nothings. What he will do with Heaven, I know not; but he hath emptied Hell at once, and swept away all the devils, except wicked men. He might do well to acquaint the Judges with it, to save the lives of so many poor old melan∣cholick women, who suffer as witches for confederacy with the devil. I desire to know of him, whether those devils which our Sa∣viour cast out of the possessed, or those devils which hurried the swine into the Sea, or that devil who took our Saviour up to the Pin∣nacle of the Temple, were heathen gods, or wicked men? Or how a legion of heathen gods or wicked men could enter into one pos∣sessed person, without crowding one another to death? But this belongeth to another spe∣culation. He asketh in what classis of enti∣ties I place devils? Will he learn to speak Iar∣gon? I answer, with Angels, among spiritual substances. He hath as much authority to empty Heaven of good Angels, as to empty Hell of bad Angels.

To cover his former errour, that the ho∣nour of God is nothing else but the estima∣tion of his power, he hath devised another errour, That all the Attributes of God are included in his Omnipotence. I confesse, that the Attributes of God are transcendents above our capacities, and are not of the same nature with the same attributes of mortal

men. I confesse further, that all the Attri∣butes of God, and whatsoever is in God, is God, or is the Deity it self. But to confound all these distinct Attributes in one, to no pur∣pose, without any ground is absurd, and ser∣veth onely to make those notions which were piously invented to help our understandings, to be the ready means to confound our under∣standings.

In the next place I shewed, that to com∣mand one thing openly, and to necessitate an∣other thing privately, destroyeth the truth of God, the goodnesse of God, the justice of God, and the power of God. This is an heavy accusation, and he had need to acquit himself like a man. But I believe he will fail. Here he bringeth in the prescience of God again twice, to seem to stop a gap with it. But it will not serve his turn. Where the souldiers are mustered over and over, it is a sign the companies are but thin. First to save the truth of God he saith, That truth consisteth in affirmation and negation, not in com∣manding. The sense is, That God who is truth it self, may will onething, and command an∣other, and hinder that act which he com∣mandeth. Mark but his reason. The Scrip∣ture which is his word, is not the profession of what he intendeth, but an indication what those men whom he hath chosen to salvation or destruction, shall necessarily intend. This is the same which he renounced formerly, as one of my ugly

phrases, That God should command one thing openly, and hinder the same privately or underhand, Reader, if thou delightest in such a god who will command one thing publickly, and hinder it privately, chuse Mr. Hobbes his God. God forbid we should at∣tribute any such double dealing to our God, who is truth itself. Some contraries, as heat and cold, may meet together in remisse de∣grees; but truth and falshood, an habit and privation, can never meet together. There is a truth in being; the picture of a man can∣not be the man himself. There is a truth in knowing, if the understanding be not adae∣quate to the thing understood, there is no truth in it. There is a truth in saying, which is a conformity or an adaequation of the sign to the thing said, which we call Veracity. When one thing is commanded publickly, and the same is hindered privately, and the party so hindered is punished for not doing that which was impossible for him to do; Where is the veracity? where is the confor∣mity and adaequation of the sign to the thing said? I dare not tell Mr. Hobbes that he un∣derstandeth not these things, but I fear it very much: If he do, his cause is bad, or he is but an ill Advocate.

Next to reconcile the goodnesse of God with his principles, he answereth first to the thing, That living creatures of all sorts are often in torments as well as men, which they could not

be without the will of God. I know no torments of the other creatures but death, and death is a debt to nature, not an act of punitive justice. The pangs of a violent death are lesse than of a natural, besides the benefit that proceedeth thence for the sustenance of men, for which the creatures were created. See what an Ar∣gument here is, (for all his answers are re∣criminations or exceptions,) from brute beasts to men, from a debt of nature, to an act of punitive justice, from a sudden death, to lingring torments, ut sentiant se mori, from a light affliction producing great good, to end∣lesse intolerable pains; producing no good, but onely the satisfaction of justice. Then to the phrase of Gods delighting in torments: He an∣swereth, That God delighteth not in them. It is true. God is not capable of passions, as de∣light or grief; but when he doth those things that men grieving or delighting do, the Scrip∣tures by an anthropopathy do ascribe delight or grief unto him. Such are his exceptions, not to the thing, but to the phrase, because it is too Scholastical, or too elegant. I see he liketh no tropes or figures. But in all this, here is not one word of answer to the thing it self. That, that which is beyond the cruelty of the most bloody men, is not agreeable to the Father of Mercies, to create men on pur∣pose to be tormented in endlesse flames, with∣out their own faults. And so contrary to the Scriptures, that nothing can be more, where∣in

punishment is called Gods strange Work, his strange Act, For God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living, but ungodly men with their works, and words, called it unto them. It this place seem to him Apocryphall, he may have twenty that are Canonicall. As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that he turn from his way and live: Turn ye, turn ye from your evil wayes, for why will ye die, O house of Israel?

That his opinion destroyeth the justice of God, by making him punish others for his own acts, is so plain, that it admitteth no de∣fence. And if any further corroboration were needful, we have his own confession, That there can be no punishment but for crimes, that might have been lest undone. Yet he keepeth a shuffling of terms, afflictions, and bruit crea∣tures, which by his own confession are not capable of moral goodnesse or wickednesse, and consequently, not subject to punishment, and quite taking away the proportion be∣tween sin and punishment, onely to make a shew of answering to them, who do not or cannot weigh what is said. Among guilty persons, to single out one to be punished for examples sake, is equall and just, that the pu∣nishment may fall upon few, fear to offend up∣on all. But to punish innocent persons for ex∣amples sake, is onely an example of great in∣justice. That which he calleth my opinion of

the endlesse tormenrs of hell, I learned from Christ himself, Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, and from my creed. When Origen and some others, called the mercifull Doctours, did indeavour to possesse the Church with their opinion of an universall restitution of all creatures, to their pristine estate, after suffi∣cient purgation, it was rejected by the Church. Without doubt, a sin against infinite majesty, and an aversion from infinite goodnesse, do justly subject the offenders to infinite punish∣ment. But he talketh as though God were obliged to do acts of grace, and to violate his own ordinances, that he might save men without their own wills. God loves his own creatures well, but his own justice better.

Whereas I shewed, That this opinion de∣stroyeth the omnipotence of God, by making him the authour or cause of sinne, and of all defects; which are the fruits of impotence, not of power. He distinguisheth between the cause of sinne and the authour of sinne, granting that God is the cause of sinne. He will say, That this op•…•…nion makes him [God] the cause of sinne. But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all actions; And are not sins of com∣mission actions? Is murther no action? Doth not God himself say there is no evill in the City which I have not done: And was not murther one of those evils? But he denieth that God is the authour of sinne, that is, God doth not own it,

God doth not give a warrant for it, God doth not command it. This is down-right blasphemy indeed. When he took away the devill, yet I did not suspect, that he would so openly substitute God Almighty in his place. Simon Magus held that God was the cause of sinne, but his meaning was not so bad: He only bla∣meth God for not making man impeccable. The Manichees and Marcionites did hold, that God was the cause of sinne, but their meaning was not so bad; they meant it not of their good God, whom they called light: but of their bad God, whom they termed darknesse. But T. H, is not afraid to charge the true God, to be the very acter of all sinne. When the Prophet asketh, Shall there be evill in a City, and the Lord hath not done it? He speaketh expressely of evill of punishment, not at all of the evill of sinne. Neither will it avail him in the least, that he maketh not God to be the authour of sinne. For first it is worse to be the physicall or naturall cause of sinne, by acting it, than to be the morall cause of sinne, by commanding it. If a man be the Authour of that which he commandeth, much more is he the authour of that which he acteth. To be an authour, is lesse than to be an actour. A man may be an authour by perswasion, or by example; as it is said of Vespasian, that he being antiquo cultu victuque was unto the Romans praecipuus astricti moris author, by his observing of the ancient dyet of

the country, and the old fashion of apparrel: He was unto the Romans, the principall authour of their frugality. Hath not he done God Almighty good service, to acquit him from being the authour of sinne, which is lesse, and to make him to be the proper cause of all sin, which is more. Thus to maintain fate, he hath deserted the truth of God, the good∣nesse of God, the justice of God, and the power of God.

In the next place I demanded how shall a man praise God, who believeth him to be a greater Tyrant than ever was in the World, creating millions to burn eternally without their own fault, to expresse his power. He answereth, That the word Tyrant was some∣times taken in a good sense; A pretty answer, and to good purpose, when all the world sees that it is taken here in the worst sense. And when he hath fumbled thus a while after the old manner, all his answer is a recrimination. How can the Bishop praise God for his goodnesse, who thinks he hath created millions of millions to burn eternally, when he could have kept them so easi∣ly from cōmitting any fault. I do not believe that God created millions, nor so much as one sin∣gle person to burn eternally, which is as true as his other slander in this place, That I with∣draw the will of man from Gods dominion. Both the one and the other are far from me. His principles may lead him upon such precipices, mine do not. God created not man to burn,

but to serve him here, and to be glorified by him and with him hereafter. That many men do misse this end, is not Gods fault, who gave them sufficient strength to have con∣quered, and would have given them a larger supply of grace, if they had sought it, but mans. God was not bound to reverse his own decrees, or change the order of the go∣vernment of the World, which he himself had justly instituted, to hold up a man from sinning against his will, when he could by his Almighty power draw good out of evil, and a greater degree of glory out of the fall of man. Concerning the number of those who are reprobated for their sins, I have nothing to say, but that secret things belong unto the Lord our God, and things revealed to us and to our chil∣dren.

My next demands were, How shall a man hear the Word of God with that reverence and devotion and faith that is requisite, who believeth that God causeth his Gospel to be preached to the much greater part of Chri∣stians, without any intention that they should be saved?

Secondly, How shall a man prepare himself for the receiving of the Sacrament with care and conscience, who apprehendeth that eat∣ing and drinking unworthily, is not the cause of damnation, but because God will damne a man, therefore he necessitateth him to eat and drink unworthily. To which two de∣mands,

he giveth one answer, That faith is the gift of God, if they have faith, they shall both hear the Word, and receive the Sacraments wor∣thily: and if they have no faith, they shall neither hear the Word, nor receive the Sa∣craments worthily. There needeth no more to be said to evidence to all the World, that he doth utterly destroy, and quite take away all care, all solicitude, all devotion and prepa∣ration of our selves for holy duties. If God give us faith, we can want nothing; If God do not give us faith, we can have nothing. We use to say truly, That God doth not deny his grace to them who do their endeavours, The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force, and how much more shall your father which is in heaven, give good things to them that ask him? St. Paul maketh hear∣ing to be the way to obtain faith, How shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard? And exhorteth Christians to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling. Devout prayers, and hearing, and reading, and par∣ticipating, did use to be the way to get faith, and to increase faith. As in our naturall life. so in our spirituall life, we must earn our bread in the sweat of our brows. Such despe∣rate opinions as these, which are invented onely to colour idlenesse and quench devoti∣on, are the pillows of Satan. We believe none are excluded from the benefit of Christs passion, but onely they who exclude them∣selves.

Absolute exclusion is opposed to ex∣clusion upon supposition, which usefull and necessary destinction (if he do not, or will not understand) we have no reason to phancy it one jot the worse, for his supercilious cen∣sures.

My next demand was, How shall a man make a free vow to God, who believes himself to be able to perform nothing, but as he is ex∣trinsecally necessitated. To this he answers, That the necessity of vowing before he vowed, hindred not the freedom of his vow. This it self is absurd enough, but whether it be his misapprehension or his cunning to avoid the force of an argument, he comes far short both of the force and of the hope of this reason, which was this. If a man be not left in any thing to his own disposition, and have no power over his own future actions, but is an∣tecedently determined to what he must doe, and must not doe, and yet knoweth not what he is extrinsecally determined to do, and not to do; then it is not onely folly but impiety, for him to vow that which he know∣eth not whether it be in his power to perform or not, But upon his grounds every man is antecedently determined to every thing he shall do, and yet knoweth not how he is determined. Universall necessity, and free vows cannot possibly consist toge∣ther

My last demand was, how shall a man con∣demne or accuse himself for his sinnes, who thinketh himself to be like a watch wound up by God? His answer is, Though a man think himself necessitated to what he shall do; yet if he do not think himself necessitated and wound up to impenitence, there will follow no impediment to repentance. My argument looketh at the time past, his answer regardeth the time to come; both ways he is miserably entangled. First for the time past, If a man was wound up as a watch by God, to all the individuall actions which he hath done, then he ought not to accuse or condemn any man for what he hath done: for according to his grounds, neither he nor they did any thing, but what was the secret and irresistible will of God, that they should do. And when the secret will of God is made known by the event, we ought all to submit unto it. Much lesse can any man accuse or condemn himself without, hypocrisie for doing that, which if his life had lain a thousand times upon it, he could not have helped, nor done otherwise than he did. The very same reason holdeth for the time to come. There is the same necessity in respect of Gods decree, the same inevitability on our parts for the future, that is, for the time past. The same submission is due to to the secret will of God, when it shall be declared by the event. How ill he hath been able to recon∣cile his principles, with the truth, and good∣nesse,

and justice and power of God, and with those Christian duties which we owe unto God, as vows, repentance, and praising of Gods Holy Name, the hearing of his Word, the receiving of his Sacraments, I leave to the judgement of the Reader.

The next thing which I disliked was his description of repentance. It is a glad return∣ing into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way. Who ever heard before this, of gladnesse or joy in the definition of repen∣tance? he telleth us, That it is not Christian repentance without a purpose of amendment of life. That is true, a purpose of amendment was comprehended in the old definition of repen∣tance, A godly sorrow for sinnes past, with a stedfast purpose to commit no more sinnes to be sorrowed for, St. Peter found no great sense of joy, when he went out and wept bitterly. And some tell us, that so long as he lived, he did the same, so often as he heard the cock crow. Nor Mary Magdalene, when she washed the feet of Christ with her tears, and wiped them with her hairs, yet she was a true penitent, and purposed amendment. Nor David, when he washed his bed night by night, and water∣ed his couch with his tears. St. Paul reckon∣eth all the parts of the repentance of the Co∣rinthians, Godly sorrow, carefulnesse, clearing of themselves, indignation, fear, vehement de∣sires, zeal, revenge, here is no word of joy or gladnesse in all this. Joy is a consequent

of repentance after reconciliation, but it is not of the essence of repentance, no more than a succeeding calme is of the essence of a storm, or the prodigals festival joy after his re-ad∣mission into his fathers house, was a part of his conversion. He is afraid that this doctrine of fasting and mourning, and teares, and hu∣micubation, and sackcloth, and ashes, pertain∣eth to the establishment of Romish pennance. Or rather they were natural expressions of sor∣row, before Rome was builded. Turn ye to me with all your heart, with fasting, and weeping, and mourning. Neither the Ninevits, nor the Tyrians and Zidonians, did learn their sack∣cloth and ashes at Rome. But many men love to serve God now adayes with as much ease as they can; as if God Almighty would be satisfied with any thing, vel uva, vel faba, either with a grape, or with a beane. And with the same measure they mete to God, he measureth to them again.

He chargeth me that, I labour to bring in a concurrence of mans will with Gods will, and a power in God to give repentance if man will take it; but not the power to make him take it. Hola. It is one question utrum possit, what God can do, another, utrum sit, what God will do. God can determine the will irresistibly, but he doth not do it ordinarily. Ye stiff necked and uncircumcised in heart, ye do alwayes resist the Holy Ghost. And I have called and ye refused, &c. The concurrence of God and man in

producing the act of our believing, or con∣version to God, is so evident in holy Scripture, that it is vanity and lost labour to oppose it. If God did not concurre, the Scripture would not say, It is God that worketh in us, both the will and the deed. If man did not concurre, the Scripture would not say, Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. If our re∣pentance were Gods work alone, God would not say to man, Turn ye unto me with all your heart: And if repentance were mans work alone, we had no need to pray, Turn us O Lord, and we shall be turned. We are com∣manded to repent and to believe. In vain are commandments given to them who cannot at all concur to the acting of that which is com∣manded. Faith and Repentance are pro∣posed unto us as conditions to obtain blessed∣nesse and avoid destruction, If thou shalt con∣fess with thy mouth, & believe with thy heart, &c. thou shalt be saved. And, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish. To propose impossible con∣ditions, which they to whom they are pro∣posed have no power either to accept or to re∣fuse, is a meer mockery. Our unbelief and impenitence is imputed to us as our own fault, Because of unbelief thou wert broken off. And after thy hardnesse and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up unto thy self wrath. Their unbe∣lief and impenitence were not their own faults, if they neither had power to concur with the grace of God to the production of

faith and repentance, nor yet to refuse the grace of God. The holy Scripture doth teach us that God doth help us in doing workes of piety. The Lord is my helper: And the Spirit helpeth our infirmities. If we did not co-operate at all, God could not be said to help us. There is, therefore there must be, co-operation, Neither doth this concurrence or co-operation of man, atall, intrench upon the power or honour of God, because this ve∣ry liberty to co-operate is his gift, and this manner of acting his own institution.

Those words, Behold I stand at the door and knock, are not understood onely of the Mini∣sters outward knocking at the door of the ear with perswasive words, but much more of God Almighties knocking at the door of the heart, by his preventing grace. To what end doth he knock to have it opened, if he himself had shut it by an irresistible decree? God first knocks at the door of our hearts by his preventing grace, without which we have no desire to open unto Christ: And then he helps us by his adjuvant or assisting grace, that we may be able to open. Yet the very name of Gods adjuvant, or assistant, or helping grace, doth admonish us, that there is something for us to do on our parts; that is, to open, to con∣sent, to concur. Why should our co-opera∣tion seem so strange, which the Apostle doth assert so positively? We are labourers together with God. And I laboured more abundantly than

they all; yet not I, (that is, not I alone) but the grace of God which was with me.

The last part of his Section is concerning prayer, which he mesnageth no better than the rest.

First he accuseth me for saying that prayer is a signification that we expect that which we pray for from God, which he calleth a pre∣sumption in me, and a detraction from the honour of God. But it is so far from being a presump∣tion, that it is a necessary requisite in prayer. S. James will have us pray without wavering: Let him ask in faith nothing wavering. S. Paul will have men to lift up holy hands without wrath or doubting. And our Saviour com∣mands, What things soever ye desire when ye pray, believe that ye shall receive them, and shall have them.

I cited many Texts of Scripture to prove the efficacy of prayer, whereof he is pleased to take notice of three; and to deny that helping, means, efficacy, availing, do signifie any causation; contrary both to the words and scope of those Texts, and contrary to the tenor of the whole Scripture.

The prayer of faith shall save the sick. And I know that this shall turn to my salvation thorough your prayers. Hannah prayed and the Lord granted her request. We see the like in Achab, in Zachary, in Cornelius, and many others. Hezekias prayed, and the Lord said, I have heard thy prayer, I have seen thy teares,

Behold I will adde unto thy dayes fifteen years. Nothing can be plainer than Solomons pray∣er at the dedication of the Temple. If there be famine in the land, if there be pestilence, &c. If their enemy besiege them in their Cities, whatso∣ever plague, whatsoever sicknesses there be, what prayer or supplication soever be made by any man, or by all thy people Israel, &c. and spread forth his hands toward this house, heare thou in Hea∣ven thy dwelling Place, and forgive, and do, &c. To all which, God himself condescended and promised to do accordingly.

His reason to the contrary, That no crea∣ture living can work any effect upon God, is most true; but neither pertinent to his purpose, nor understood by himself. It is all one as to the efficacy of prayer if it work upon us, as though it had wrought upon God himself, if it render us more capable of his mercies, as if it rendered him more merciful. Though the Sword and the Crown hang immovable, yet prayer translateth us from one capacity to another, from being under the sword, to be under the Crown.

Lastly, he telleth us in great sadnesse, That though our prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks, it is not necessary it should be so in our prayers and thanks to God Almighty. Prayers and thanksgiving are our acts, not Gods acts, and have their distinction from us, not from God. Prayer respects the time to come, thanksgiving the time past. Prayer is

for that we want, thanksgiving for that we have. All the ten Lepers prayed, Jesus, Master have mercy on us; but onely one of them returned to give God thanks. S. Paul distinguisheth prayer and thanksgiving, even in respect of God. By granting the prayers of his people, God putteth an obligation upon them to give thanks. He might as well have said, that Faith, Hope, and Charity, are the same thing.

He passeth over the rest of this Chapter in silence. I think him much the wiser for so do∣ing; If he had done so by the rest likewise, it had been as much credit for his cause.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 16.

HEere are three things questionable in this Section; First, whether he who maketh all things, make all things ne∣cessary to be, or whether it be a contra∣diction of me to my self to say so? First, this is certain, there can be no formal contradiction where there is but one proposition; but here is but one proposition. Secondly, here is no implicite contradiction; First because there is a vast difference between making all things necessary to be, and making all things to be ne∣cessary

Agents. The most free or contingent Agents in the World when they are, are ne∣cessarily such as they are; that is, necessary to be; But they are not necessarily necessary Agents. And yet he is still harping upon this string, to prove such a necessity as no man did ever deny. Thirdly, I told him that this which he contends for here, is but a necessity of supposition. As supposing a gar∣ment to be made of the French fashion, when it is made it is necessarily of the French faction. But it was not necessary before it was made, that it should be made of the French fashion, nor of any other fashion; for it might not have been made at all.

He excepteth, That the burning of the fire is no otherwise necessary then upon supposition. That is, supposing fuell be cast upon the fire, the fire doth burn it necessarily. But herein he is altoge∣ther mistaken. For that onely is called ne∣cessary upon supposition, where the thing sup∣posed is or was in some sort in the power of the free Agent, either to do it or to leave it undone, indifferently. But it is never in the power of the fire to burn or not to burn in∣differently. He who did strike the fire out of the flint, may be said to be a necessary cause of the burning that proceeded from thence upon supposition, because it was in his power, either to strike fire, or not to strike fire. And he who puts more fuell to the fire may

be said to be a necessary cause of the continu∣ance of the fire, upon supposition, because it was in his choice to put to more fuell, or not. But the fire it self cannot chuse but burne whilest it is fire; and therefore it is a neces∣sary cause of burning, absolutely and not up∣on supposition. What unseen necessity doth prejudice liberty, and what doth not, I have shewed formerly. How mean an esteem soever he hath of the Tailor, either he, or his meanest apprentise have more sense than himself in this cause. The Tailor knows that there was no necessity from eternity, that he should be a Tailor, or that that man for whom he made the garment, should be his customer; and much lesse yet of what fashion he should make it. But he is still fumbling to no purpose upon that old foolish rule, as he pleased once to call it, Whatsoever is when it is, is necessarily so as it is.

The second question is, Whether there be any Agents in the World which are truly free, or truly contingent Agents, according to his grounds? And it is easily demonstra∣ted, that there are not: Because he main∣taineth that all Agents are necessary, and that those Agents which we call free Agents and contingent Agents, do act as necessarily, as those Agents which we see and know to be necessary Agents: And that the reason why we stile them free Agents, and contingent Agents, is, because we do not know whether they

work necessarily or not. He hath told us hither∣to that all Agents act necessarily, otherwise there could not be an universal necessity. Now he telleth us that there be sundry A∣gents, which we know not whether they work necessarily or not. If we do not know whether they work necessarily or not, then we do not know whether there be universal necessity or not. But we may well passe by such little mistakes in him. That which I deduce from hence is this: That the formal reason of liberty and contingency according to his opinion doth consist in our ignorance or nescience; and then it hath no reall being in the nature of things. Hitherto the world hath esteemed nothing more than liberty; Mankind hath been ready to fight for no∣thing sooner than liberty: Now if after all this, there be no such thing as liberty in the world, they have contended all this while for a shadow. It is but too apparent what hor∣rible disorders there are in the world, and how many times, right is troden under foot by might, and how the worst of men do flourish and prosper in this world, whilest poor Hie∣remy is in the Dungeon, or writing bookes of lamentation. If there be true liberty in the world, we know well whereunto to impute all these disorders; but if there be no true liber∣ty in the world, free from antecedent neces∣sitation, then they all fall directly upon God Almighty and his Providence.

The last question is concerning his defini∣tion of contingent, That they are such Agents as work we know not how. Against which I gave him two exceptions in my defence. One was this. Many Agents work we know not how, as the Loadstone draweth iron, the Jet chaff; and yet they are known and acknow∣ledged to be necessary, and not contingent Agents. Secondly, many Agents do work we know how, as a stone falling down from an house upon a mans head, and yet we do not account it a necessary, but a contingent event, by reason of the accidental concur∣rence of the causes. I have given him other instances in other parts of this Treatise; And if need be, he may have twenty more. And yet though his definition was shewed formerly to halt down-right on both sides, yet he, good man, is patient and never taketh the least notice of it: But onely denyeth the consequence, and over-looketh the proofes.

His objection about the indetermination of the causes, That indetermination doth no∣thing, because it maketh the event equal, to happen, and not to happen, is but a flash with∣out any one grain of solidity. For by inde∣termination in that place, is clearly under∣stood, not to be predetermined to one by ex∣trinsecal causes, but to be left free to its own intrinsecal determination, this way, or that way, indifferently. So the first words By rea∣son

of the indetermination, have referrence to free Agents and free Events, And the other words, Or accidentall concurrence of the causes, have referrence to casuall Events. And both together, referendo sigul•…•… singulis, do include all contingents, as the word is commonly and largely taken by old Philo∣sophers.

Castigations of the Animadver∣sions, Num. 17.

REader, I do not wonder now and then, to see T. H. sink under the weight of an absurdity, in this cause. A back of steel were not able to bear all those unsupportable consequences, which flow from this opinion of fatall destiny. But why he should delight to multiplle needlesse absurdities, I do not know. Allmost every Section produceth some new monster. In this seventeenth Section, I demonstrated clearly, that this opinion of universal necessi∣ty, doth take away the nature of sinne. That which he saith in answer thereunto, is that which followeth.

First; it is true, he who taketh away the liber∣ty of doing according to the will, taketh away the nature of sinne, but he that denieth the liberty to will, doth not so. This answer hath been suffici∣ently taken away already, both in the defence, and in these Castigations. Inevitable and unresistible necessity doth as much acquit the will from sin, as the action.

Again, whereas I urged, That whatsoever proceedeth essentially, by way of physicall determination from the first cause, is good, and just and lawfull; he opposeth, That I might as well have concluded, that what soever man hath been made by God, is a good and just man. So I might, What should hinder me to conclude that every man, and every crea∣ture created by God is good, qua talis, as it is created by God: but being but a creature, it is not immutably good as God himself is. If he be not of the same opinion, he must seek for companions among those old Here∣ticks the Manichees or Marcionites.

So he cometh to his main answer, Sin is not a thing really made. Those things which at first were actions, were not then sins, though actions of the same nature with those which were after∣wards sins. Nor was then the will to any thing a sin, though it were a will to the same thing, which in willing now we should sin. Actions became then sins first, when the Commandemens came, &c. There can no action be made sin, but by the law. Therefore this opinion, though it derive actions

essentially from God, it derives not sins essentially from him, but relatively, and by the Cōmandement. The first thing I observe in him is a contra∣diction to himself. Now he maketh the ano∣my, or the irregularity and repugnance to the law to be the sinne, before he conceiveth the action it self to be the sin. Doth not the Bishop think God to be the cause of all actions? And are not sins of commission actions? Is mur∣ther no action? And doth not God himself say, there is no evil in the City which I have not done? And was not murther one of those evills, &c. I am of opinion, that the distinction of causes into efficient and deficient is Bohu, and signifieth no∣thing. This might have been pardoned to him.

But his second slip is worse, That the World was I know not how long without sin. I did demonstrate, That upon his grounds, all sins are essentially from God, and consequently are lawfull and just. He answereth, That the actions were from God, but the actions were not sins at the first, untill there was a law. What is this to the purpose? It is not materiall, when sin did enter into the World early or late, so as when it did enter, it were essentially from God, which it must needs be upon his grounds, that both the murther and the law against murther, are from God. And as it doth not help his cause at all, so it is most false. What actions were there in the World, before the sinne of the Angell? He

charged the Angels with folly. And if God spa∣red not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell; and the Angels which kept not their first estate. What were those first actions that were before the sinne of Adam? By one man sinne entred into the World, and death by sinne.

Thirdly he erreth most grossely, in suppo∣sing that the World at first was lawlesse. The World was never without the eternall law, that is, the rule of justice in God himself, and that which giveth force to all other laws, as the Divine Wisdom saith, By me Kings raign, and Princes decree justice. And sinne is defined to be that which is acted, said, or thought against the eternall law. But to let this passe for the present, because it is tran∣scendentally a law. How was the World ever without the law of nature? which is most properly a law, the law that cannot lie, not mortal from mortal man, not dead, or written in the paper without life, but incor∣ruptible, written in the heart of man, by the finger of God himself. Let him learn sounder doctrine from St. Paul, For when the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves, which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their consci∣ences also bearing witnesse, and their thoughts, the mean while, accusing or excusing one another. I passe by those Commandements of God,

which were delivered by tradition from hand to hand, from Father to Son. This, That mankind was ever without all law, is the most drowsie dream that ever dropped from pen.

Whereas he saith, That I allow that the nature of sin doth consist in this, that it is an acti∣on proceeding from our will against the law, and thence inferreth, That the formal reason of sin lieth not in the liberty of willing, he doth wrong himself, and mis-inform his Reader; for I never allowed it, nor never shall allow it in that sense, but said expressely the contrary. My words were these. [which in our sense is most true, if he understand a just law, and a free rational will] And then I added further, That the law which he understandeth is a most unjust law, & the will which is intended by him, an irrational necessitated will. Where did he learn to take that for granted, which is positively denied? He saith indeed, if the Reader could trust him, That he hath shewed, that no law can be unjust. But I expect argu∣ments, not his own authority, which I value not. He neither hath shewed that all laws are just, nor ever will be able to shew it, until the Greek Calends. Likewise where he seemeth not to understand what the rationall will is, I do think there is scarcely any one Authour, who did ever write upon this sub∣ject, but he hath this distinction between the rationall and the sensitive appetite. And hath

particularly made this main difference be∣tween them, that the rational appetite is free, but the sensitive appetite is necessary. If he alone will not understand that which is so evi∣dent and universally received by all Schollers, it is no great matter.

It is as unjust to command a man to do that which is impossible for man to do, as to command him contradictions. This silly eva∣sion will not serve his turn. Those things are said to be impossible to us in themselves, which are not made impossible to us by our own defaults. And those things which we make impossible by our defaults, are not im∣possible in themselves. Those impossibilities and onely those which we by our defaults have made, may lawfully be punished. Where he confesseth, That law-makers not knowing the secret necessities of things to come, do sometimes injoyne things that are made impossible from eternity, it cometh every way short of the truth. First in limiting it to humane law-makers, who only know not the necessities of things to come; for my Argument, That law which commandeth impossibilities is an un∣just law, doth hold as well of Gods law, as of mans law, not that we believe any law of God can be unjust, God forbid: but to de∣monstrate to him undeniably, that all those things which he conceiveth to be impossible from eternity, are not impossible from eter∣nity, because the contrary is commanded from

God, and God never commandeth impossi∣bilities. Secondly, he cometh short of the truth in this also, That he saith human law-givers do sometimes injoyne impossibilities; for by his leave upon his grounds, they do all∣wayes injoyn either absolute impossibilities, or absolute necessities, both which are equally ridiculous. Lastly, whereas I argued thus, If the will of man be determined by God, with∣out the will of man, then it is not mans will, but Gods will, he denieth my consequence, be∣cause it may be both Gods will and mans will. I answer, It is Gods will effectively, because he maketh it necessarily; and subjectively, because he willeth it; but upon his grounds it is the will of man onely subjectively, because he is necessitated to will it, but not effectively, because he had no hand in the producti∣on of it, and therefore how faulty soever it may be, yet it cannot be imputed to man.

Concerning his instance in a civil Judge. Fist I shewed that it was impertinent, because neither is a civill Judge the Judge of sin, nor the law of the land the rule of sin. To my reasons he answereth nothing in particular, but in general, That whereas I said that the law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity, it was no impertinent answer to say, That the Iudge looketh no higher than the will of the doer. Here are so many imper∣fections, that I scarcely know where to begin.

First, I never said that the law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessi∣ty; I allwayes said, and do still say, That if it be antecedently necessitated, it is no crime, either punishable, or unpunishable. Second∣ly, he did make the civill Judge to be the Judge of sinne, and the law of the land to be the rule of sin in expresse terms, A Iudge in judging whether it be sin or not, which is done against the law. Thirdly, That will which the law and the Judge do regard, is not his brutish necessitated irrationall appetite, but our free rational will, after deliberation, determined intrinsecally by the Agent him∣self.

Secondly I shewed, That his instance in a civill Judge was against himself, because this which he saith, That the Iudge looketh no higher than the will of the doer, doth prove that the will of the doer did determine it self free∣ly, and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would. To this he answers, That it proveth indeed that the male∣factor had liberty to have kept the law if he would, but it proveth not that he had the liberty to keep the law. Hath not this silly senselesse distincti∣on been canvased sufficiently yet, but it must once more appear upon the stage? Agreed. Thus I argue; first, If the Malefactour had liberty to have kept the law if he would, then the Malefactour had liberty to have contra∣dicted the absolute will of God, if he would;

then he had liberty to have changed the un∣alterable decrees of God, if he would. But he had not liberty to have contradicted the absolute will of God, if he would; he had not liberty to have changed the unalterable de∣crees of God, if he would. The assumtion is so evident, that it were great shame to questi∣on it. The consequence is as clear as the Sun. For upon Mr. Hobbes his grounds, it was the absolute will of God, and the unaltera∣ble decree of God, that the Malefactor should do as he did, and not do otherwise. And therefore if the Malefactor had liberty to have kept the law, and to have done otherwise if he would, he had liberty to have con∣tradicted the will of God, and to have chan∣ged the decree of God, if he would. But this is too absurd.

Secondly to have liberty to have kept the law if he would, implieth necessarily a con∣ditionall possibility. But the will of God and the decree of God, that the Malefactor should do as he did, and not keep the law, implieth an absolute impossibility. Now it is a rule in Logick, that impossibile habet in se vim Ad∣verbii universaliter negantis. An impossibility hath the force of an universall negative. But an universal negative and a particular affir∣mative are contradictory. That it was im∣possible for the Malefactor to have kept the law, and yet he had liberty to have kept the law if he would. There is not the least starting

hole for him through which he can endea∣vour to creep out of this contradiction, but by making this supposition [if he would] to signifie nothing, and to affirm that it was equally impossible for the Malefactor to will otherwise, and to do otherwise. Then see what a pretty liberty he hath left us, even a meer impossibility. If the Skie fall, then we shall catch Larks. Observe further the vanity of this distinction, between liberty to do if we will, and liberty to will. When both the one liberty and the other are equally impossible, upon his own grounds. And yet with this mock-liberty which signifieth nothing, he is fain to answer all the texts of Scripture which are brought against him, and all the absurdi∣ties which are heaped upon him.

Lastly, to say a man is free to do any thing if he will, implieth that he hath power enough, and there is nothing wanting to the doing of it, but his will. Otherwise if there be not power enough to do it (as in this case upon his grounds there is not) it is as ridicu∣lou to say a Malefactor was free to have kept the law if he would, as to say, a man is free to jump over the sea if he will, or to flie in the aire if he will.

Yet still he saith, The will of the Male∣factor did not determine it self. Then by his own confession, the Malefactor had the more wrong to be punished, for that which was unavoidably and irresistibly imposed upon

him. If the Malefactor was necessitated from God by an essential determination of extrinse∣call causes, both to will as he did, and to doe as he did, he was no more a malefactour than his Judge.

I have no reason to retract any one syllable of what I said concerning monsters, But he had need to retract his ordinary falsifying, and dismembring, and misinterpreting of my sayings. I affirmed (as all sound Philosophers do affirm) That nature never intendeth the generation of a monster, but that every mon∣ster is a deviation from the law of the first in∣stitution, that every creature should beget another in his own likenesse. Which pro∣ceedeth sometimes from the defect or inordi∣nate force of the plasticall or forming virtue, sometimes from the excesse or defect of the matter, sometimes from the fault of the womb, wherein the conception is perfected, sometimes from other lesser reasons; and therefore that the universal causes, as God and the Sun, are not to be blamed for monstrous births, but that particular cause from which the excesse or defect, or distorti∣on did proceed. What was herein to dero∣gate from the God of nature, who permit∣teth and disposeth of such irregularities in nature, as he doth of sinnes in morality, but with this difference, That morall aberrations are culpable and punishable, but aberrations in nature are onely deformities, not sinnes.

When Philosophers do say that nature in∣tendeth any end, they do not mean that na∣ture doth deliberate or resolve this or that, but that nature doth act for an end, which no man can deny with any credit. The Spider makes her webs to catch flies, there is natures end. The Ante gathers provision in Summer, for winter sustenance. The Bee makes Cell•…•…s for a depository for hony, and receptacles for young bees. The Vine brings forth leaves, flowers, and grapes, one in order to the pro∣duction or preservation of another. And lastly followeth the wine which is the end of all the rest, which being the last, was the first or principal end of nature. It is not the part of a reall Scholler to except against evi∣dent truth, upon Grammatical Scruples.

In the last Animadversion of this Section, nothing is contained that is either new or re∣quireth an Answer.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 18.

I cited Lipsius, onely to shew that the di∣stinction of destiny into Christian and Stoick destiny was not mine. And though Lipsius incurred some dislike by rea∣son of some inusitate expressions; yet there is no cause why T. H. should please himself so much, as to think that Lipsius was of his opi∣nion. He was no such friend of any sort of destiny, as to abandon the liberty of the will. The Stoicks themselves came short of T. H. his universal necessity. Yet I do not blame him if he desire to have one partner in such a desperate cause as this is.

That which concerneth him in the second distinction, is this; That though he acknow∣ledge a mock-liberty, that is, a will or an ap∣petite of the object, yet he maintaineth that this appetite is neither moved, nor excited, nor determined to its act or appetibility of this or that, lesse or more, by the free Agent, but altogether by extrinsecal causes. And so the pretended free Agent is no more free, than a bird which a man holdeth fast in his hand is free to flie whithersoever she will.

I said, Those things which God wills with∣out himself he wills freely and not necessari∣ly, which he censureth in this manner. He sayes rashly and untruly: Rashly, because there is nothing without God, who is infinite, in whom are all things, and in whom we live, move, and have our being. And untruly, because whatsoever God foreknew from eternity, he willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily. What should I do? should I fall down and thank this great Mo∣gull (as the Aethiopian slaves do their Em∣perour when they are lashed) for thinking on me? Although I know his Thrasonical hu∣mour very well, that his animal spirits are meer bubbles of vain-glory; & that he know∣eth right well that he cannot reign securely whilest there is one of a different opinion sur∣viving; yet I am perswaded that if he had been so well read, or so much versed in the writings of other men, as to know how many he wounded rashly and untruly, in this rash and untrue censure, he would have forborn it for his own sake. Hath he never heard of a common rule in Theology, that Opera Trini∣tatis ad extra sunt indivisa, The works or acts of the Trinity without it self are undivided? Or hath he never heard of that common di∣stinction between a necessary being, and a ne∣cessary acting? The most perfect manner of being is necessary, and therefore God is a ne∣cessary being, and that which he willeth within himself he willeth necessarily, because

whatsoever is in God is God; But the most per∣fect manner of acting without the Deity is freely, and therefore the Schooles do a∣gree, that God is a free Agent without him∣self.

These free acts are princially two. The first is the Creation, whereby things created do passe from a not being to a being. The second is Government, by which all things created are moved and ordered to their ends. All men acknowledge that the D•…•…ity filleth all places by its Essence, by its Presence, by its Power, being within all places and things but not included, and without all places and things, but not excluded. They acknowledge that all things which have a reall being do depend upon God for their being, for their making, for their conservation. And there∣fore when we speak of any thing that is without the Deity, we do not intend, that any thing is without the Essence, or the Presence, or the Power, or the circumference of it; God is a Circle, whose Center is every where, the Circumference no where. But by the works of God without himself, we under∣stand the Creation, and the Government of the World, which are not terminated in the Deity it self, but in the creatures, which are from God as their efficient, and for God as their end, and in God or thorough God in respect of their necessary and perpetual de∣pendence upon him, who is the Original

Essence of all things, I am hath sent me unto you: yet they are not of God as particles of the Divine Essence, nor in God in that sense wherein we use to say, Whatsoever is in God is God. And so they are his works ad extra, without the Deity.

To make good the second part of his cen∣sure that it was untruly said, he produceth no∣thing but his old threedbare argument taken from the prescience of God, which hath been answered over and over. Neither the presci∣ence of God, nor the will of God upon pre∣science, do imply any more than a meer hy∣pothetical necessity, which will do his cause no good.

In the conclusion of this Section he con∣fesseth, That God doth not all things that he can do if he will; but he saith, God cannot will that which he hath not willed from eternity, under∣standing by eternity, an everlasting succes∣sion; whereas in eternity, nothing is past or to come. I have shewed often in these Ca∣stigations, the falsity, uselessenesse, and con∣tradiction, of this absurd silly senselesse di∣stinction, in respect of men. But being here applied by him to God, nothing can be ima∣gined more absurd; for to will efficaciously, and to do, in God are the same thing. What he doth, he doth by his will. To imagine that many things are free to God to do, which are not free to him to will, sheweth that his meditations upon this Subject were either

none at all, or worth nothing.

But it shall susfice for the present, to shew how absurd and how unappliable this expo∣sition is to the two places by me produced. John Baptist told the Jews, that they might not flatter themselves with this, that they were the posterity of Abraham, that though all they should prove impenitent and unbe∣lievers; yet God was able to raise up children to Abraham of stones. If it were impossible for God to will the doing of any such thing, How was this truly said? And how could this afford any supply to the seed of Abra∣ham, in case his carnal posterity should con∣tinue obstinate? In the other place S. Peter drawing his sword in defence of his Master, Christ reprehended him, and told him that he could have a better guard to secure him from all the attempts of the Jews, if it pleased him not to lay down his li•…•…e freely. Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall give me presently more than twelve legions of Angels? He saith not, I can if I would, but positively, I can. Neither speaketh he of re∣mote possibilities, but he shall give me pre∣sently. Christ would shew by these words, that if it had not been his own will freely to suffer for the Redemption of mankind, he could have prayed to his Father, and he would have sent him a Guard of more than twelve Legions of Angels, and that presently, with∣out delay. If it was impossible for God to

will any such thing, then our Saviours plea to S. Peter was but a vain pretence, and had no∣thing of reality in it. If T. H. regarded the honour and veracity of Christ, he would not impose such a jugling delusory sense upon his clear assertion: As if our Saviour should have said, Peter, I have no need of thy en∣deavours to defend me, for I could pray to my Father, & he would immediately send me a Guard of twelve Legions of Angels. But to say the truth, he is not willing to do it, and to say the whole truth, it is not possible for him to be willing.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 19.

HE professeth that he never said the will is compelled, but doth agree with the rest of the World that it is not compelled. But to let us see that he understandeth not what the World meaneth in saying, the will is not compelled, twice or thrice in the same page he maketh it to be compelled. Many things (saith he) may compel a man to do an action in producing the will. If a man can be compelled to will, then the will can be com∣pelled. This appeareth yet more plainly a little after, where he maketh the casting of

ones goods into the sea in a storm, to be a voluntary free elective act: And yet he con∣fesseth that terrour was a necessary cause of the election. To which if we adde what he saith in his answer, A man is then onely said to be com∣pelled, when fear maketh him willing to it, it ap∣peareth that (according to his grounds) it is a compulsory action also. If voluntary acti∣ons may be compulsory actions, then the will may be compelled. To help to beare off this blow, he distinguisheth between the compul∣sion of the will, and the compulsion of the volun∣tary Agent, denying the former, but acknow∣ledging the later. That is, not a compulsion of the will, but of the man. The very same he hath again in these words, The necessitation of the will is the same thing with the compulsion of the man. If this be not plain Jargon, and Bohu (as he phraseth it,) let him tell me what is the compulsion of a man to will, but the com∣pulsion of his will. Whether by the will he understand the soul as it willeth, or the facul∣ty of the will, or the act of willing; every way, he that compelleth a man to will, com∣pelleth his will. Let him call it what he please, either to compell a man to will, or to compell the will: by his leave, it is a grosse contradi∣ction; for to compell implyeth reluctance and opposition, and to will implyeth inclination and appetition. To necessitate the will (as he doth) is to compell the will, so far as the will in the elicite acts of it is capable of com∣pulsion.

That is properly said to be compelled, which hath its beginning from an extrinsecal cause, that which suffereth contributing nothing to it, but resisting as much as he can. But he hath de∣vised a new improper kind of compulsion, which is caused onely by fear, which is not properly a compulsion, and such as it is, com∣mon to many other causes with fear: As to persuasion; So Sauls servants compelled him to eat. To command, So the drinking was ac∣cording to law, none did compell. To occasion, So S. Paul saith, I am become a foole in glory∣ing, ye have compelled me.

I passe by his uncouth terme of creation of the will, in every single act of willing. And his extravagant exception, If the same individual man who did chuse to throw his goods overboard, might chuse not to throw his goods overboard, then he might chuse to throw overboard, and not throw overboard. As if the liberty to throw or not to throw, and the liberty to throw and not to throw; that is, the liberty to do either part of the contradiction, or to do both parts of the contradiction were the same liberty. And secondly, as if a man who hath actually chosen, were as free to chuse now, as he was at the same time when he did chuse. I see if he cannot find a knot in a bulrush, he will do his indeavour to make it. If a man (saith he) by force seize on another mans limbs (as suppose his hand) and move them as himself, not as the other man pleaseth, the action so done is not the

action of him that suffereth, but of him that useth the force: But if he that useth the force shall give a third person a boxe on the ear with that hand which he forceth, then it is the action of both; but with this difference, that it is the voluntary action of the one, and the forced or compelled action of the other. But supposing the first man had the will of the second as much in his power as his hand, (as God Almighty hath) and should ne∣cessitate him to beate the third person wil∣lingly; certainly the second person being so necessitated, could be no more blamed for willing in such a case, than for striking un∣willingly.

That motions proceeding from Antipa∣thies are primó primi, such as surprise a man and prevent not onely all actual deliberation, but all advertence of reason, there is no doubt. But he who knoweth no other motus primo primos but onely Antipathies, is like to prove some such rare Divine or Philosopher, as Me∣gabyses shewed himself a Painter by his igno∣rant discourse. Whilest thou was silent (said Apelles) thou seemedst to be some body, but now there is not the meanest boy that grindes oker, but he laughs at thee. The difference between ne∣cessity upon antecedent supposition, and ne∣cessity upon a consequent supposition, hath been sufficiently cleared several times in these Castigations, and in my Defence in this very Section, to which I remit the Reader. Who∣soever

shall tell us that he who hath chosen to himself the profession of a Romish Priest, is still no more necessitated to take the oath of caelibate, than he was before he made choice of that office; and that the action of him who runs away upon the first view of a Cat, by reason of an antipathy which he cannot help, before all advertence of reason, is as free as a man casting his goods into the sea, to save his own life, after a sad and serious delibera∣tion. And that he who takes Physick out of wantonnesse, was as much necessitated to stay within doors, as he who lay bedrid of an he∣ctick fever. And that Balams blessing of Israel against his purpose and desire; And by Caiaphas his Prophesie which he spake not of himself, but necessarily by the special deter∣mination of the Holy Ghost, were altogether as free as Jacobs blessing of his sons upon ele∣ction; I say, he who shall tell us all this in earnest upon his own word without any rea∣son or authority, had need to meet with very credulous disciples, who judge of Colours winking.

It is true, we who see but thorough a glass darkly, do not in this mortality comprehend exactly the nature of God and of the holy An∣gels, partly by reason of the weaknesse of our understanding: The water can ascend no higher than the Fountains head; and partly for want of Revelation: Not to know what God hath not reve•…•…ed, is a learned igno∣rance.

And therefore he who searcheth pre∣sumptuously into the Majesty of God, is op∣pressed deservedly by his glory. But the much greater offence doth lie on the other side, that men do not indeavour to know God so much as they ought, and might by the light of na∣ture, the contemplation of the Creatures, and the Revelation of Gods holy Word, nor to serve him according to their knowledge. How shall we serve God if we do not know God at all? The least means of the know∣ledge of God is by the contemplation of the Creatures: yet even that doth render men without excuse. No man but himself would have objected it as a presumption to any man to have said, That God was freer to do good than mortal man, and uncapable of doing evill. Yet this is that which those dreadfull terms implyed. We measure liberty by the degree of rationability, and the power of reason over passion; he by the largenesse or streightnesse of the prison. Ours is a liberty of men, his is a liberty of Black-birds. If I were disposed to cavil at words as he doth, I could shew him out of Scaliger, That one heat is not more intensive than another, any more than one liberty is more intensive than another. Both phrases are metaphorical. In∣tention is properly the drawing out of the two extreams, the one further from the other, as in the string of a bow by bending it, and in a coard by stretching it out. But I forbear.

He had said in his first answer, He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible; And he that cannot, has none at all; I answered, That he who can do what he will, hath not onely a liberty, but omnipotence. To this he re∣plieth, That it is one thing to say a man hath li∣berty to do what he will, and another to say that a man hath power to do what he will. This is very true, but it helpeth not him at all. He spake directly of power, He that can do what he will, and he that cannot do what he will. Thus I ar∣gue, Either a man can do what he will, or he cannot do what he will, If he can do what he will, then he is not onely free, but omni∣potent; If he cannot do what he will, then he hath no liberty at all. So he hath made men to be either Almighty Gods, or sense∣lesse logs, both wayes he erreth. If he that can do what he will be not omnipotent (in good english) I have forgot my mothers tongue. He that is bound hand and foot, may wish that he were loosed; and he that is so sick that he cannot stand, may wish that he were in health, that they might both be able to walk; but to elect walking in that state and condition wherein they are, without supposition of the loosing of the one, or the recovery of the other, they cannot, for both want power, and election is of things actually possible. There is onely this difference, That in probability the bound man may be loosed, before the sick man recover his strength.

But yet it may so fall out, that the sick man may be restored to his health, before the other be loosed from his bonds. Therefore he saith amisse, That the sick man wanteth power, not liberty, and the bound man liberty, not power. If he understood the difference be∣tween the Elicite & Imperate acts of the will, he would be able to judge of such cases better than he is. I have onely one more Advertise∣ment to the Reader, that after all this glorious ostentation, He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible, he leaveth man as poor and bare and helpelesse as a grashopper in winter, without any liberty to will, and consequently without any liberty to do.

He nameth two Schoolmen, I think by the matching of them, they be a great part of his store, Suares and Iohannes a Duns. So he is pleased to call that honour of our Nation, and one of the subtilest writers, that these last ages have afforded: and four later Divines, Luther, Melancthon, Calvine, Perkins, whom he alwayes much admired. If he did so, they are the more beholden to him, for a man may see by his Treatises, That unlesse he meditated of them sometimes, he hath not been much ac∣quainted with them. He dare not refer his two sorts of devils, or his temporary pains of hell, or his lawlesse state of mankind by na∣ture, or his necessity of active obedience to all human laws, or his inefficacy of prayer, or his infallible rule of moral goodnesse, or his uni∣versal

necessity of all events, by the physical determination of the second causes; or any one of his hundreds of Paradoxes, to their determination.

Room for a great Censor, not an old Ro∣man Censor, but a new English Censor, who cometh armed with his own authority, to reform not onely Authours, but the Arts and Sciences themselves, after he hath been dreaming, I should have said meditating, some years upon the top of Parnassus, and now cometh forth sudainly Grammatticus, Rhe∣tor, Geometres, Pictor, Alyptes. To stay there were to do him wrong; a Pentametor added will not contain half his exploites: a Poet, a Logician, a Philosopher Naturall and Mo∣rall; an Astronomer, a Mathematician, a Theologian. To what purpose did our Uni∣versities nourish so many little Professors? one great Professor is best, as the Cat in the Fable said of one great way. But forget not Epictetus his rule, Remember to distrust. We have seen a Mountebanck, or Quacksalver, or Opera∣tour, or Charlatan, call him what you will, vapour upon a Stage, and sleight the good old Physicians for poring upon Galen and Hip∣pocrates, to learn a company of senlesse Apho∣rismes, whilest they by their own meditation and experience, had found out remedies more easie, more effectual, more universal. We blame the Court of Rome for their Index expurgatorius: It is a shrewd signe when liti∣gants

are forced to cut out the tongues of their own witnesses; yet they purged out but words, or sometimes a sentence; rarely prohibited one of their own Authours. Here words and sentences and whole Authours, and Arts, go to wrack together, much like the Mahumetan reformation, when they sacrifi∣ced the most part of their Interpreters of the Alchoran to the fire, without ever reading them; yet what they did, they did by pub∣lick authority, and spared some as Genuine Expositors. But what this our new Censor doth, he doth upon his own head, and like death sparing none; so did not they.

Down goes all Astrology and Metaphy∣sicks. The Moral Philosopher must quit his means and extreams in order to virtue, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity absolute & hypothetical, his propor∣tion Arithmetical and Geometrical, (I hope the Geometrician may have leave to hold it still) his principia congenita and acquisita, his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and most of his terms of Art, because Mr. Hobbes hath not read them, It is well if Moral Philosophy escape his censure. For if the law of the land be the onely infallible rule of right reason, then the knowledge of actions, morally good and morally bad, belongeth properly to the com∣mon lawyer. The Moral Philosopher may put up his pipes. The same Arbitrary power he assumeth to himself in natural Philosophy,

rejecting all the common terms used by Phi∣losophers, euphoniae gratia, because they sound not well in his ears, for other reasons he hath none. Let the naturall Philosopher no more mention his intentionall species, his understanding Agent and Patient, his receptive and reductive power of the matter, his qualities Symbolicall and dissymbolicall, his temperament ad pondus and ad justitiam, &c. I would have him fling away his Sympathies and Antipathies, his Antiperistasis and the like. Whether it was Astronomy or Astrology in my original, I do not know, nor have means to see, both may signifie the same thing. I am sure, I neither said nor meant Ju∣diciary or Genethliacal Astrology, as my in∣stances do evidence. The truth is, there are so many mistakes in that impression, that sometimes I scarcely know my self what to make of them.

But he is more propitious to the Astrono∣mer. His Apogeum and Perigeum, Artick, Antarctick, Aequator, Zodiac, Zenith, Ho∣rizon, Zones, are not so much as terms of art, but are as intelligible as an hatchet or a saw. What imaginary circles, and lines, and poles, and points, and an imaginary Axeltree, and Ramme, and Bull, and bears, and Dragon, and yet no terms of art? What are they then, Let him put it to a Jury of Malmsburi∣ans themselves, whether they understand these so well as an hatchet or a saw, and he is gone.

The like favour he shews to Logicians, Their words of the first and second inten∣tion, their Abstracts and Concretes, Their Subjects and Predicates, Their Modes and Figures, Their Method Synthetick and Analytick, Their Fallacies of Composition and Division, are no terms of Art, but plain intelligible words. He that can say this with∣out blushing, may dispute with any man. Por∣phyry makes the five predicables to be five terms of Art. Are not the predicaments and post-predicaments and demonstrations a priore and a posteriore terms of Art? who made a Mode and a Figure to signifie what they do but Artists? Let all the world hear them, or read them, who have not learned Logick, and they shall understand no more of them, then of his Jargon. Why is not an Antece∣dent and Hypothetical necessity as intelligible as a Categoricall and Hypotheticall Syllo∣gisme. An Individuum vagum, if it were not a term of Art, should signifie rather an atome, or a Rogue, than an honest person. Though he be so favourable to Logick here, he is as little beholden to it, as to the other Arts, who knows no better what are terms of Art. One of the first distinctions which we meet with∣all in Logick, is between the first and second notions. The second notions, such as all these are, are called expressely terms of Art, or Logicall Notions, or Logicall Organs, which they de∣fine to be images or representations, whereby the

understanding doth form to it self real notions. And they compare them to brasen weights, of no value in themselves, whereby neverthe∣lesse, all sorts of gold are weighed. There can be nothing more certain and evident than this, That all these Logicall and Astro∣nomicall terms, be second notions and terms of Art.

Nay, so extreamly blind and partiall he is, that he approveth of Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, which he maketh terms of Art, as a good invention to help the apprehension of young men: and yet with the same breath, rejecteth these most excellent and most significant di∣stinctions and expressions, which have been received in a manner universally, some of them for two thousand years, all of them for diverse Centuries of years, in the Church, and in the Schools, as well of Theology, as Phi∣losophy, which were invented for remedies against confusion, and helps to the clearer, and more distinct understanding of high and difficult notions, upon this false and slande∣rous praetext, that they were invented to blind the understanding, because he presu∣med to condemne them, before he took pains to understand them.

He addeth, That I cite no terms of Art for Geometry, saying, he was afraid I would have put in lines, or perhaps equality, and unequality, for terms of Art. To free him from this fear, I put in their numbers numbring and numbred,

their superficies, concave, and co•…•…vexe, their triangles, ambligone, and oxygone, their cones, cubes, cylinders, their parallells and parallelo∣grammes, their proportions, superpartinent, and superbipartinent, &c. their rules of Algebra and Helcataim, their Integers, and Numerators, and Divisors, and Denominators, and fabricall figures, their proportionality Arithmeticall and Geometricall, continuall and discontinuall, direct, conversed, alternative, inversed, compounded, parted. Geometry hath its words of Art and proper expressions, as well as all other Arts and Sciences. So hath Physick, Chirurgery, Law. So have Souldiers, Mariners, Hawkers, Hunters.

But of all others he hath the least favour for the Divine, whom he will not permit to use a word in preaching, but such as his Auditours, nor in writing, but such as his common Readers may understand. I do not like it any more than he, that a Divine should affect uncouth words, to make his ignorant Auditours to gape, I had rather speak five words in the Church with understanding, &c. than ten thousand in an unknown tongue. But doth he make no disticti∣an between the Church and the Schools? Doth he think that Theology, which hath the sublimest subject, doth not require as high, as learned, and as distinct expressions, as any Art or Science whatsoever? All hear∣ers and readers are not novices, nor of the vulgar or common sort. There are those who

have been brought up at the feet of Gama∣liel, and have been admitted into the inner∣most Closet of the School learning. The holy Scripture it self, though it affect plainnesse, is not allwayes such a stranger, either to learing or elegance. The onely answer I shall give him to this, is, That he is beyond his Last.

In the last part of this Section, he troubleth himself more than he needeth about a testi∣mony, which I cited out of his book De Cive, not out of any esteem I had for it, for I con∣demned it; but to let him see his contradicti∣on. There he made the Ecclesiasticall Doctours to be infallible, here he maketh them to be fallible. There he made their in∣fallibility to be a peculiar priviledge derived to them by imposition of hands from the A∣postles, whom they succeeded, and from the promise of Christ: Here he attributeth it wholly to that power which is committed to them by the civil Magistrate. And what if the civil Magistrate commit no power to them? then by his doctrine, Christ breaketh his promise, and this priviledge ceaseth. In∣fallibilitatem hanc promis•…•…t servator noster in iis rebus quae ad salutem sunt necessariae Apostolis usque ad diem judicii, hoc est Apostolis & pastori∣bus ab Apostolis successive per manuum impositio∣nem consecrandis. He answereth, That the in∣fallability of Ecclesiastical Doctours doth not consist in this, that they cannot be deceived,

but that a Subject cannot be deceived in obey∣ing them, when they are lawfully constituted Doctours. A pretty phancy, If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch, Doctour and Subject together. If the Doctours be decei∣ved themselves, they must needs deceive the Subjects, who trust to their interpretation. Secondly, he waveth now the two grounds of their infallibility, that is, the promise of Christ, and the priviledge conferred by imposition of hands; and ascribeth all their infallibility to the constitution of the civil power, which may render their expositions legal, according to the municipal laws, but cannot render them infallible. Thirdly, If Ecclesiastical Doctours lawfully constituted, be so far infallible, that they cannot deceive the Subject, why did he vary so much notoriously from their exposi∣tions at that time, as he hath done in his book De Cive, when they had both imposition of hands, and approbation from supreme au∣thority? Why doth he now, wanting both the promise of Christ, and imposition of hands, take upon him to be the tryer and ex∣aminer of the exposition, not onely of single Prophets, but of whole convocations.

Castigations of the Animadver∣sions, Num. 20.

IF Mr. Hobs did understand what true election and true compulsion is, it were evident that election of one out of more than one, cannot consist with antecedent de∣termination to one; much lesse with compul∣sion or force, where he that is compelled op∣poseth and resisteth as much as he can. That the same act should be both voluntary that is with our will, and compulsory, that is, against our will, not in part but in whole, is impos∣sible. But as the Sepia to preserve her self undiscovered doth shed forth about her a quantity of black inky blood, to hide her self from the fisher; So T. H. for fear to be catch∣ed in palpable errours, doth confound and blunder all things, making a new election, a new compulsion, a new liberty. There is not a word of moment here that hath not been di∣scussed formerly in this Treatise. And I do not esteem his raw meditations worthy of re∣petition over and over. What is new in them I shall cull out from the rest.

He telleth us, that when a stone is thrown upwards, the external agent giveth it a be∣ginning

of motion: So far we agree, what∣soever gives it the continuance. He saith further, That when the stone falleth it is moved downward by the power of some other Agent, which though it be imperceptible to the eye, is not imper∣ceptible to reason. Herein we differ, wherein all the world hitherto have agreed. But it was very meete that he should deny the stone the determination of its natural motion, who had denyed the intellectual soul the determi∣nation of its own will. Yet since he is pleased to conceale his new Agent, I have no desire to scrape acquaintance with it, especially upon such terms, to relinquish that intrinsecal prin∣ciple which all the World hitherrto hath re∣ceived.

So passing by his spiritual court unsaluted, (he loves to shew his teeth, though he can∣not bite) and leaving counterfeiting in hope of quarter, to himself as a person much more capable of that design; the next new Subject that presenteth it self is, Whether there be any mixt actions, partly voluntary, partly un∣voluntary. He denieth it positively, upon this ground, That one and the same action can never be both voluntary and unvoluntary. I answer first to his argument, That voluntary and unvoluntary are not opposed contradictorily, so as to admit no mean, but privatively, which do admit a mean, as the dawning of the day, or the twilight, is a mean between light and darknesse, when it may be truly said, it is,

partly light and partly dark. Melancthon hath an excellent rule to this purpose. Priva∣tive opposita nequeunt esse in eodem subjecto gradi∣bus excellentibus. Privative opposites cannot be in the same subject in eminent degrees, but in re∣misse degrees they may. As to avoid im∣portunity, a man may do a free act with re∣luctance; All reluctance is a degree of un∣willingnesse. When Nero in the beginning of his Quinquennium was to sign the condem∣nation of a malefactor, he used to wish that he had never learned to write; to shew, that though he did it willingly to satisfie Justice, for otherwise he might have pardoned him, yet he did it unwillingly in his own nature. And with this Aristotle agreeth fully. There are some actions which are neither properly volun∣tary, nor unvoluntary, but of a middle kind, (or mixed actions) as things done for fear of a greater evil, or for some honest cause. And he giveth two instances. This is one, of a man who throws his goods into the sea, willingly in respect of the end to save his life, but the action being simply considered in it self un∣willingly. The other instance of one com∣manded to do some dishonest act by a Ty∣rant, who hath his parents and children in his power. And so he concludeth truly, That they are mixt actions, but participate more of the voluntary than of the unvolun∣tary.

Whereas I urged that election of one out of more could not consist with determination to one; he answereth, That a man forced to pri∣son may chuse whether he will walk upon his feet or be haled upon the ground. Which as it is false, as I have shewed in my former defence, so it is wholly wide from his purpose. There is no doubt but he who is necessitated in one particular, may be left free in another; as he who is appointed the time and place for a Duel, may chuse his weapon. But in that particular wherein he is necessitated he can∣not chuse. If they will tie him to an horse∣taile, he must be tied: If they will fasten him to a sled and draw him to prison, he must be drawn. There cannot possibly be any electi∣on, where there is, and so far as there is, an antecedent determination to one.

He disliketh the terme of rational will, say∣ing, There is nothing rational but God, Angels, and men. I hope he is not in earnest. Surely he believeth there is a reasonable soul, or other∣wise he deserts his Athanasian creed; that is, The soul of a rational man, as a will, is the will of a rational man. Whether he make the will to be a faculty of the reasonable soul, or to be the reasonable soul as it willeth, I am indifferent. As the appetite of a sensitive creature is called the sensitve appetite; So the appetite of a rational or intellectual creature, is called the rational or intellectual will. He saith he would not have excepted against this

expression, but that every where I speak of the will and other faculties, as of men, or spirits in mens bellies. I do not confine the reasonable soul to the belly: but it is a spirit in a mans body. If it be not, let him say what it is. The will is either a faculty of the reasonable soul, or (which is all one) the reasonable soul it self, as it dischargeth the duties of such a fa∣culty. Sometimes he confesseth as much himself. Indeed as the will is a faculty or power of a mans soul, so to will is an act of it, according to that power. He jesteth at my five terrible things, saying, I had no more reason for five than fifteen. It seemeth that when he should have been reading Authors, he was meditating upon a dry Summer. Let him consult with Aristotle and his Expositors. That which determi∣ned the three children, was no antecedent ex∣trinsecal cause, but conscience and their own judgement, which dictated to them their du∣ty to their God.

He seemeth to be troubled at sundry pas∣sages in my former defence, as ex•…•…mpting Subjects from active obedience to unjust laws, which (he saith) makes it impossible for any na∣tion in the world to preserve it self from Civil wars. Whether was it want of memory, or rather subtilty in him, among these passages to omit that, Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. It is hard that we who have formerly been accused to maintain blind obedience, should

now be charged with seditious principles, which our souls abhor. But we sail securely between this Scylla, and that Charybdis, by steering the ancient and direct course of pas∣sive obedience. We justifie no defensive armes against a Soveraign Prince. We al∣low no Civil wars for conscience sake. When we are persecuted for not complying with the unlawful commands of a lawful Soveraign, we know no other remedy but to suffer or to flee, according to that memorable example of the Thebaean Legion, consisting wholy of Christians of unmatchable valour, and such as might in probability have defended them∣selves from the Emperours fury. Yet when Maximian commanded them to sacrifice to Idols, they refused, suffering every tenth man of them to be slain without a blow smitten; And when the bloody Emperour came a∣mong them again to renew his command, and to see them decimated the second time, they cryed out with one voice, Cognosce O Imperator, &c. Know, O Emperour, that we are all Christians, we submit our bodies to thy power, but our free souls flee unto our Saviour. Nei∣ther our known courage, nor desperation it self, hath armed us against thee, because we chuse ra∣ther to die innocents, than to live nocents. Thou shalt find our hands empty of weapons, but our breast armed with the Catholick Faith: And so having power to resist, yet they suffered them∣selves without resistance to be cut in pieces. They

are T. H. his own principles which make no difference between just and unjust power, be∣tween a sword given by God, and a sword taken by man, which do serve to involve Na∣tions in Civil Wars.

He saith it seemeth that I call compulsion force, and he calleth it a fear of force. I cal∣led it, as all the World called it, and as it hath been defined in the Schooles for two thou∣sand years. Yet I do not believe that it is al∣wayes necessary to all sorts of compulsion, that the force be actually exercised, as it is when a man is driven hither and thither with the wind, (there is no fear in that case) yet there is compulsion. But it sufficeth some∣times to compulsion, if the force be present, such as cannot be resisted, and ready to be put in execution if there be need. As a man that will not appear freely upon summons, is for∣ced by Pursevants and Serjeants, although they do not carry him upon their backs, nor drag him upon the ground. It sufficeth that they be Masters and able to compel him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But according to his Heterodox principles, every remote fear doth make compulsion. As if a man should say that a child was compelled to run away from a mouse, or a coward was com∣pelled to winke when a man holds up his hand at him, or a man is compelled to throw his goods overboard, which he himself confesseth to be freely and deliberately elected.

From this first mistake of what compulsion is, proceedeth a second, That the actions of men compelled, are neverthelesse voluntary: And a third, That compulsion doth not justifie the party compelled: all which are meer Logoma∣chies or contentions about words, which he is fallen into, either ignorantly by not under∣standing what compulsion is, or cunningly and deliberately to have a pretext of except∣ing against former Authours; although it be but like the dogs barking at the moon-shine in the water. Force actually exercised did acquit Tamar and the betrothed Damosel from all guilt. But Herods fear of a suc∣cessour did not excuse the murder of the in∣nocents; Nor the fear of his Masters severity, excuse the unprofitable servants hiding of his Talent in a napkin. But I leave these con∣tentions about words which signifie not so much as the shadow of an asse.

He hath plunged himself here into two reall errours. The one is, That if the fear be allowed, the action which it produceth is allowed also. Abrahams fear was just, The fear of God is not in this place, they will murder me for my wives sake. But the action which it pro∣duced, that is, the denial of his wife, is not al∣lowed. Peters fear was allowed, but the de∣nial of his master was not allowable. The o∣ther and more dangerous errour is, That fear doth abrogate a law, and make it to be no law in some cases. Take the larger exposition of

this out of his book De Cive. No man is bound by any pacts or contracts whatsoever, not to resist him who goeth about to kill him, or wound him, or to hurt his body. Mortem vel vulnera vel aliud damnum corporis inferenti, nemo pactis suis quibuscunque obligatur non resistere. So a Scholar may resist his Master when he goeth about to whip him; So a company of trai∣tors or other capital malefactors may lawful∣ly resist the Soveraign Magistrate. This is seditious indeed, and openeth a large window to civil war. This is directly contrary to what he said in his book De Cive. In every perfect Common-wealth the right of the private sword is excluded, and no Subject hath right to use his power to the preservation of himself at his own discretion. Judge, Reader, whether we or he be better Subjects, he who holdeth that in case of extream danger a Subject hath no obligation to his Soveraign, or we who hold it better to die innocents, than to live nocents. His reason because we bind or guard capital malefactors, sheweth a distrust of what they may do de facto, not a doubt of what they ought to do de jure. I alledged, That the omission of circumcision in the Wildernesse was not sin; to shew, that though no fear or necessity can justifie the breach of the nega∣tive Laws of God or nature; yet in some cases it may justifie the transgression of the positive Law, or the omission of a duty in∣joyned by affirmative precepts.

To my instance of two servants, the one spending his Masters money in a Tavern, the other having it taken away from him by force, or yeelding it up upon just fear, he an∣swereth nothing; the scope of them being to shew, that strength of temation doth not justifie an act, so much as extrinsecal necessity. If the second causes were as rackets, & men as tennis balls, or foot balles, To what purpose did God give men reason to govern themselves, and to bridle their passions, who are tossed to and fro inevitably, irresistibly, as the rackets please? Reason had been a fitter gift for the rackets, than for the balls, if his opinion were true. That upon the planting of a Canon a∣gainst a wall, the battery is necessary before the bullet arrive, is true, but there is no such necessary connexion between free or contin∣gent Agents and their acts as there is be∣tween the Canon and the Battery, which he might have easily perceived, if he had been pleased to have enlarged his meditation a little further. It was in the power of the Canoneer not to have charged the Canon, or to have given it but half a charge, or to have given no fire, or to have turned the mouth of it another way, higher or lower, to the right hand or to the left. In all these cases what had become of his Battery?

If he hath such a conceit that no man doth or can determine himself, contrary to the sense of the whole World, let him injoy it.

Some men have conceited themselves to be Urinals, and suffered none to touch them for fear of breaking them, but he must not think to obtrude his flegmatick phancies upon all other men, who understand themselves better. If he were not resolved to oppose all the World without any ground, he would never have denyed a moral efficacy, or metaphori∣cal motion, or have affirmed that motives, that is to say, persuasives or reasons, weighed in the understanding, do determine the free Agent naturally. Is the perswading of a man to eat, and the thrusting of it down his throat the same thing? Do an argument and a Canon bullet work after the same manner? Did he ever hear a bullet called a motive to the beating down of the wall, or flowers cal∣led motives to the production of the fruits, or meat a motive to nourishment? Natural effi∣cay is alwayes necessary, and determinate, and active to the height of its power; But mo∣ral Agents act not necessarily, nor determi∣nately, nor alwayes to the height of their power. The Lawyer that he speaketh of may refuse to pleade, or delay his pleading, or plead better or worse; and when he hath done his uttermost, it may so fall out that he effecteth nothing for his Client. I am asham∣ed of such silly verbal objections, contrary to the known Principles of Arts. He complain∣eth that I put his notions oftentimes into mine own termes. I had thought I had done

him a favour to tender him more intelligible, and put his sense into the common language of Schollers.

The understanding being the root of li∣berty, and the will being but intellectus extensus ad habendum aut faciendum quod cognoscit: the un∣derstanding extended to injoy, or do that which it knoweth, it must needs be, that the more rea∣son, the lesse passion, the lesse reluctance, and consequently the more liberty. He saith, When we mark not the force that moves us, we think that it is not causes but liberty, that produ∣ceth the action. I rendred him thus, The igno∣rnnce of the true causes and their power, is the reason that we ascribe the effect to liberty. Where lieth the fault? that which he calleth force and strength, I call power: and for that which moves us, I say causes, as he himself doth ex∣expresse himself in the same place. Where I say the will causeth, he saith the man chuseth. As if there were any difference between these two, the eye seeth, and the man seeth. This and a confounding of voluntas with volitio, the fa∣culty of willing with the act of willing, and a young suckling contradiction which he hath found out, That the will hath power to refuse what he willeth, that is, before it have willed it, not after, is the substance of this Animad∣version, which deserve no other answer, but that a man should change his risibility into actual laughter.

I produced two reasons to prove that true liberty is a freedom, not only from compulsi∣on, but from necessity. The former drawn from the nature of election, or the act of the will which is allwayes inter plura, the later, which I called a new Argument, because it had not formerly been touched in this Treatise, taken from the nature of the faculty of the will, or of the soul as it willeth, which is not capable of any other compulsion, but necessitation. And if it be physically necessitated, it is thereby acquitted from all guilt, and the fault transferred upon those causes that did necessi∣tate it. This argument indeed began with a distinction, but proceeded to a demonstra∣tion, which was reduced by me into form in my defence, to which he hath given no shew of satisfaction, either in his first answer, or in these Animadversions, except it be a concedo omnia, or a granting of the conclu∣sion.

The same ground which doth warrant the names of Tyrant, Praemunire, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, that is, Use, Quem penes ar∣bitrium est, & vis & norma loquendi, doth like∣wise justifie these generally received terms, of the Elicite and Imperate Acts of the will, there being scarcely one Authour, who hath written upon this subject in Latine, that doth not use them, and approve them. In the councel of Dort (which he himself mention∣eth)

he may find this truth positively main∣tained that voluntas elicit actum suum. Where he may likewise find what morall perswa∣sives or motives are, if he have a desire to learn.

Allthough he be convicted that it follow∣eth from his principles, That God is the cause of all sin in the world, yet he is loath to say so much, for that is an unseemly phrase to say that God is the cause of sin, because it soundeth so like a saying that God sinneth; yea, it is even as like it, as one egge is like another, or rather it is not like it, for it is the very same. Nullum simile est idem; He that is the determining cause of sin in others, sinneth himself. It is as well against the eternall law, that is, the rule of justice which is in God himself, to make another to sin, as to sin. Yet though he will not avow such an unseemly phrase, That God is the cause of sin. Yet he doth indeavour to prove it by four texts of holy Scripture, which are alltogether impertiuent to his pur∣pose. The first is that of the Prophet Amos, Shall there be evill in a City, and the Lord hath not done it? But that is clearly understood of the evill of punishment, not of the evill of sin. To the three other places, That the Lord said unto Shimei, curse David; and that the Lord put a lying spirit into the mouth of Ahabs Pro∣phets; And that of Rehoboams not heark∣ning to the people, the Reader may find a satisfactory answer formerly. But because

he seemeth to ground much upon those words which are added to the last place, for the cause was from the Lord, conceiving some singular virtue to lie in them, and an ovation at least to be due unto himself, (I will not say least the Bishop exclaim against me) applauding himself like the flie upon the Cart-wheel, See what a dust I do raise, I will take the liberty to tell him further, That there is nothing of any cause of sin in the text, but of a cause of Je∣roboams advancement, as he might have per∣ceived plainly by the words immediately following, The cause was from the Lord, that he might perform his saying, which the Lord spake by Ahijah the Shilonite, unto Ieroboam the son of Nebat. Which saying was this, I will rent the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee. So he hath produced an evil effect of punishment, for an evil effect of sin; and a cause of advancement, for a cause of sin, and a permitting or ordering or dis∣posing of sin, for a necessitating or determi∣ning to sin.

Yet he produceth six witnesses to prove that liberty is not opposed to necessity but to com∣pulsion. Luther, Zanchy, Bucer, Calvin, Moulin, and the Synod of Dort. First, Rea∣der, I desire thee to judge of the partiality of this man, who rejecteth all humane authority in this cause (as he hath reason) for it were an easie thing to overwhelme and smother him and his cause, with testimonies of Councels,

Fathers, Doctours, of all Ages and Commu∣nions, and all sorts of Classick Authours: and yet to seek for protection under the authority of a few Neoterick Writers. A double weight and a double measure, are an abomi∣nation.

Aut haec illis sunt habenda, aut illa cum his amittenda sunt,

Harum duarum conditionum nunc utram malis vide.

If he will reap the benefit of humane au∣thority, he must undergoe the inconvenience also. Why may he use the testimony of Calvine against me in this cause, and I may not make use of the testimonies of all the Ancients, Greek and Latine, against him? whom Calvine himself confesseth to have been for liberty against necessiry. Semper apud Latinos liberi arbitrii nomen extitit, Graecos vero non puduit multo arrogantius usurpare vocabu∣lum, siquidem 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 dixerunt, acsi potest as suiipsius penes hominem fuisset. But I am able to give him that advantage in this cause.

Secondly, a man may see by his citing of these testimonies, that he hath taken them up upon trust, without ever perusing them in the Authours themselves. I demand therefore, whether he will be tried by his own witnesses, in this case, in difference between him and

me, that is, concerning universal necessity, in natural, civil, and external actions, by reason of a necessary connextion of second causes, and a natural determination of the will? If he will not, he doth not deserve to have so much as one of his testimonies looked upon.

Thirdly I answer, That supposing (but not granting) that all his testimonies were true as he citeth them, yet none of them will advan∣tage his cause at all. Luther his first witnesse disclaimed it, and recanted what he had said. And the necessity which he speaketh of, is onely a necessity of immutability: And the Synod of Dort speaketh onely of a necessity of infillability, both which do imply no more than a consequent hypothetical necessity, which we also maintain. Zanchy, Bucer, Calvine, Moulin, speak of a necessity of sin∣ning, in respect of our original corruption. This concerneth not the liberty of the will, whether it be free or not free, but the power of free-will, whether it can without grace avoid sinne, and determine it self to morall or supernaturall good, which is nothing to the question between him and me.

And for an essay what he may expect from his witnesses, Calvine, who is the least disfa∣vourable to him of them all, saith no more but this, Deum quoties viam facere vult suae pro∣videntiae, etiam in rebus externis homiuum volun∣tates flectere & versare, nec ita liberam esse ipso∣rum

electionem, quin ejus libertati Dei arbitrium dominetur. That God (not allwayes but) as often as he will make way for his providence, even in external things, doth bow and turn the wills of men, neither is their election so free, but that the good pleasure of God hath a dominion over their liberty. Calvine did know no universal deter∣mination of all externall acts by God, but onely in some extraordinary cases. He ac∣knowledged that the will of man was free to elect in external things, but not so free as to be exempt from the dominion of God, which two things none of us doth deny. So we may conclude from Calvine, That God doth not ordinarily necessitate external e∣vents: that is, as much as to say, there is no universal necessity.

He will yet have lesse cause to please him∣self with the Councell of Dort, when he shall see what was said there by our British Divines, and approved by the Synod. That God made our wills and endowed them with liber∣ty. That he leavs to every thing its proper man∣ner and motion in the production of Acts, and to the wills of men to act after their native man∣ner, freely. That in vain are punishments threatned to Malefactors by the laws of men, if no man could leave undone that which he doth. They ask, who in his right wits will say, that David could not but have committed adultery, or after that could not but have murthered Uriah. They condemne his opinion positively as

an errour. Hominem non posse plus boni facere quam facit, nec pluus mali omittere quam omittit, That a man cannot do more good, or leave more evill undone, than he doth.

Still he is about his old quarrel concerning the Elicite and Imperate acts of the will, not against the thing, for it is as clear as the day∣light, that there is a ground in nature for such a distinction; and that externall Agents have not so much power over the will of man, to make him chuse what they think fit, as over the locomotive faculty and other members, to make a man move them at their pleasure. But all his contention is still about the words, Imperate, or commanded Acts; As if (saith he) the faculties could speak one to another. I answered him that there were mentall terms as well as vocall, by which the soule being willing, may expresse it self to the locomotive, or other inferiour facul∣ties. As the Angells do understand one ano∣ther, not by speech, but as we behold one another in a glasse. Here he is out again, quite mistaking the plain and obvious sense of my words, shewing that in his long and profound meditations, he did never meet with this subject. And telling us, That by mentall speech I understand onely an Idea of the sound and of the letters, whereof the word is made. And charging me most untruely to say, That when Tarquin commanded his son, by striking off the tops of Poppies, he did it

by mentall terms. This I said truly, That howsoever a Superiour doth intimate his commands to his Inferiour, whether it be by vocall terms, as ordinarily, or by mentall terms, as it is among the Angels; or by signes, as it was between Tarquin and his sonnes, it is still a command. And in this case of the souls imploying the Infe∣riour faculties, it is without dispute. But I never said that the striking off the tops of the Poppies with his rod, was mentall language, or the terms of his mind. It seemeth he hath never heard of mentall terms or mentall prayer. The concepti∣ons of the mind are the naturall repre∣sentations of things. Words are Signes or Symbols of the inward conceptions of the mind, by imposition, What way so∣ever the inward conceptions are intima∣ted, it is the same that speech is in effect 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an instrument or means of Communication. As a signe is an intima∣tion to a Traveller where he may find an harbour.

He saith, No drawing can be imagined but of bodies, and whatsoever is drawn out, is drawn out of one place into another. He knoweth no drawing, but drawing of wire, or drawing of water, or drawing of Carres. St. James saith, Draw nigh to God, and he will draw nigh to you; and no man can come unto me except my father draw him: and if I be lifted up from the earth,

I will draw all men unto me. In all these draw∣ings, here is no drawing out of one place into another. A fair object draws mens eyes, A good Oratour draweth them by the ears. There is metaphorical drawing. Take but one place more, Counsel in the heart of a man is like deep water, but a man of understanding will draw it out.

Castigations of the A nimad∣versions, Num. 21.

A Paradox is a private opinion of one man, or a few factious men, assumed or maintained sometimes out of errour of judgement, but commonly out of pride and vain glorious affectation of singula∣rity, contrary to the common and received opinion of other men. Such Paradoxes were the Stoical opnions, (Stoicks were fruitfull in producing Paradoxes) That all sins are equal, and that a wise man is all things, a good King. a good Captain, a good Cobler. I hope he will be better advised, than to condemne all those of ignorance, who out of civility stiled those new fangled opinions Stoicall Para∣doxes, rather than Stoical errours. He saith, Christiaen religion was once a Paradox. Never; A Paradox is a private opinion, contrary to

the common opinion. Points of faith are more than opinions. Faith is a certain assent grounded upon the truth and authority of the revealer. Opinion is a certain assent grounded upon the probable conjectures of reason. We do not use to call Turkish, Hea∣thenish, or Heretical errours by the name of Paradoxes. I confesse there may be opini∣ons, and consequently Paradoxes in religion, that is, in such points: the truth or falshood whereof is grounded more upon the probable discussion of reason, then upon the evidence of divine revelation, but errours in essentialls of faith, are not Paradoxes. He who dis∣believes any Article of his Creed, is not Pa∣radoxicall, but Hereticall. Such another mistake is his other, That but for Paradoxes we should be now in that savage ignorance, which those men are in that have not, or have not long had laws and Common-wealth. Politick precepts, and civill institutions, and practical instru∣ctions which consist not in Theorie or Spe∣culation, but in the application of practicall truths, neither are nor ever were called pro∣perly either opinions or Paradoxes.

But to come to the purpose, I did not, I do not, deny that there may be some true Para∣doxes, and rather in such things as are found out by reason, than in such as depend upon Revelation, which are delivered from age to age by universal tradition. An able industrous person by constant meditation, and the help

of other mens experience and observations, may sometimes find out a latent truth, or vin∣dicate one from the oppressive tyranny of prejudice or custome. But this is rarely, God and nature do not give all their gifts to one man, least he should grow proud. But when men are composed of Paradoxes, that as Ovid could not express himfelf without a verse, so they cannot speak without a Paradox, when they take upon them to censure all an∣cient truths in Divinity and Humanity, and seek to obtrude their brain-sick conceptions upon all other men as Oracles, I think he who telleth them only of their Paradoxes, dealeth gently with them. Zeleucus was more severe against Innovators, who enacted, That if any man made a proposition for a change in their policie, he should make it with an halter about his neck, that if he failed to justifie it by rea∣son, he should justifie his attempt by suf∣fering.

I leave his Paradoxes, and come to his Subtlety, That there is hardly any one action, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in rerum natura: And that there cannot be a motion in one part of the World, but the same must be communicated to all the rest of the World. That is to say, in plain English, That there is nor a Pie that chattereth, nor so much as an Aspine leaf that waggeth here in England, but it maketh some alteration in China and Peru, and the efficacy of it, like Drake or Ca∣vendish

doth encompasse the Globe of the Earth, and mounteth to Heaven, and (if there be any such thing) helpeth to make the eighth Sphere tremble. I thought it had been a modest expression to call this a Para∣dox.

To prove this, he maketh a Narration what a Schollar maintained to him, That if a grain or a feather be laid upon an anvil of Dia∣mant, at the first accesse it maketh it yeild, which he demonstrated thus, That if the whole World would do it, the least part thereof would do its part. Wherewith he rested convinced. But his re∣lation is doubly impertinent. First, we speak of voluntary Agents, and he instanceth in a natural Agent, we speak of the yeilding of the will, and he instanceth in the yeilding of an anvile. Secondly, it doth not come home to his assertion, because when a feather is laid upon an anvile of Diamant, yet it toucheth it, and by assiduous touching, something may be done. As we see how drops of rain do weare the heard stones. And Pliny telleth that flints have been worn with the feet of Ants. But to think the chattering of a Pie, or the shaking of an Aspine leaf should move the whole World, when the greatest Earth∣quakes are not felt many leagues, is incre∣dible.

Neither do I believe that the first touch of his feather doth make an anvile of Diamant to yeeld. I believe the Schollar put a fallacy

of composition and division upon him. All the parts being conjoyned do make the whole, and so have their proportionable part of the efficacy in the production of all effects, which are produced to the whole, be it the breaking of an anvil of Diamant, or whatso∣ever else. But the parts being divided and subdivided into grains and lesser quantities, though they still have their proportionable weight towards the producibility of the same effect, if they were conjoyned; yet it is not necessary that being so divided they shall actually produce the same part or proportion of the former effect. It is not universally true, that the patient suffers so much as the Agent acts. The reason is because quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis; That which receiveth doth not receive according to the force of that which makes the impression, but according to its own capacity of receiving. The first drop of water taketh away part from a piece of clay, but an hundred drops fall before a stone doth yield, or actually lose the least particle, though the first drop may affect the stone and prepare it. Suppose one scale of a balance to have a weight in it of a pound, which depresseth the scale to the ground: Put into the other scale a weight of two pounds, it lifteth up the other scale and sinketh that down: But take away the two pound weight, and put into the place of it a feather or a grain, and try if it will lift up the

scale proportionably. Not at all, no more than if it were nailed to the ground. It were not well argued to say, An Elephant can car∣ry a Castle a league, therefore a flie can carry it such a proportion of the way; yet I comend his discretion for chusing such an instance, wherein he cannot be contradicted by ex∣perience. If a man could live until the re∣volution of Platos year, and the feather not be consumed in all that time, he might still plead as he may do now, that the feather had worne the Diamant something, but it was invisible.

To make his new paradox good, he telleth us a tale of a tub, That if a great tun (suppose the great tun at Heydelberg,) were filled with water, one little particle (suppose a drop, or the hundredth part of a drop) being moved, all the rest would be moved also, but the greatnesse of the tun altereth not the case. And therefore the same would be true, if the whole World were the tun. I answer first, The case is not like. A tun of water is one continued body apt for motion, but the World is full of contiguous bodies of all sorts, which are more apt to terminate an easie motion, than to continue it. Secondly, I deny that the least particle of water, suppose the hundredth part of a drop, falling into a great tun of water, doth move all the water in the tun. The first particle moves the se∣cond, but more weakely than it self was mo∣ved, the second moves the third, yet more

weakly, the third moveth the fourth still more weakly, and so successively, until the motive power cease altogether, before the hundredth, or it may be the thousandth part of the water in the tun be moved. As we see in a stone thrown upwards, the motion is swifter or slower, of longer or of lesser continuance, according to the degree of the first impression of force, and the figure of the thing cast up∣wards, which ceasing by continued diminu∣tion, the motion ceaseth. Violent motioris are vehement in the beginning, remisse in the middle, and cease in the end. Lastly I an∣swer, That the case of a great tun and the whole World, is not the same: The World is too large a Sphere, and exceedeth the activity of poor little weak creatures, which are not able to leave such an impression of might, as should move upwards to the con∣vex superficies of Heaven, and downwards to the center of the Earth, and round about to the extremities of the VVorld. If this were true, the flie might say in earnest, See what a dust I do raise. It hath been given out that the burning of our heathes in England did hurt their vines in France. This had been strange, yet not so strange as his paradox, That the least motions that are, are commu∣nicated to the whole World. But wise men looked upon this pretence as a meer scare∣crow or made dragon: The hurt it did was

nearer home, to destroy the young moore∣powtes, and spoile some young Burgesses game.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 22.

HE cannot imagine how the question, Whe∣ther outward objects do necessitate or not necessitate the will; can any way be re∣ferred to moral Philosophy. That is his fault. If the objects do necessitate the will, they take away both virtue and vice; that is, moral good and moral evil, which consist in pre-election, and cannot stand with antecedent necessitation to one. To reform his errour, let him consult with Aristotle. Those things that are fair and pleasant do seem to be violent after a sort, because being without us, they move and necessitate Agents to act with their beauty and delight; but it is not so. What he addeth that the Principles of moral philoso∣phy are the laws, is an absurd supposititious ob∣trusion of the municipal law, in place of the law of right reason, which errour hath for∣merly been sufficiently refelled. And to his horse that is lame from some cause that was not in his power; I answer, That the lamenesse is a natural or accidental defect in the horse; but

to instance in an horse as a fit subject of virtue or vice, is a moral defect in him. If he de∣sire to speak to the purpose, he must leave such impertinencies.

In the next Animadversion, I meet with nothing but a meer sawing of the wind, or an altercation about nothing. All the differ∣ence between him and me is, concerning an antecedent necessity, but of a necessity of consequence, that when a thing is produced it must necessarily be so as it is, there can be no∣question between us. He himself confesseth as much, If the Bishop think that I hold no other ne cessity than that which is expressed in that old foolish rule [VVhatsoever is, when it is, is ne∣cessarily so as it is,] he understandeth me not: And he confesseth that the necessity which he maintaineth is, an antecedent necessity, de∣rived from the beginning of time. And yet ne∣verthelesse, a great part of that altercation which he makes in these Animadversions, is about such a necessity. Socrates confesseth that naturally he had vitious inclinations. This is no more than a proclinity to evil. If by his own condescension he fall into sin, this is but an hypothetical necessity, yet he ma∣keth it an antecedent necessity. Socrates by his good indeavours reformeth his vitious propensions, and acquireth the contrary ha∣bits or virtues. This is but an hyothetical necessity, yet he pretendeth it to be antece∣dent. Lastly, Socrates by the help of these

habits which he himself had acquired, doth freely do virtuous actions. Still here is no ne∣cessity but consequents, and still he pretend∣eth to Antecedent. Either (saith he) these ha∣bits do necessitate the will, or the will followeth not. If these habits or somewhat else do not ne∣cessitate the will, it may follow freely. But saith he, If they do onely facilitate men to do such acts, then what they do they do not. I deny his consequence, acquired habits are not solitary, but social and adjuvant causes of virtuous actions.

His next errour is yet more grosse, making the person of the Preacher, and not the sound of his voice, to be the object of hearing: Adding, that the Preachers voice is the same thing with the hearing, and a phansie of the hearer. Thus (as commonly their errours spring from confusion) he confoundeth the images of sounds with sounds themselves. What then is the report of a Canon, or the sound of a Trumpet turned to a meer phansie? By the same reason he may say, that the Prea∣cher himself is nothing but a meer phansie: There is as much ground for the one as for the other. If he go on in this manner, he will move me beyond smiling, to laugh out∣right. In what sense the object of sight is the cause of sight, and in what sense it is not the cause of sight, I have shewed distinctly. Here he setteth down another great paradox, as he himself stileth it out of gallantry, That in all

the sens•…•… the object is the Agent. If he had not said the Agent, which signifieth either the sole Agent, or the Principal Agent, but onely an Agent, we had accorded so far. But the Principal Agent in all the senses is the crea∣ture indowed with sense, or the sensitive soul perceiving and judging of the object by the proper Organ. The Preachers voice and the Auditos hearing have two distinct subjects, otherwise speaking should be hearing, and hearing speaking. I conclude this Castiga∣tion with the authority of as good a Philoso∣pher as himself, That it is ridiculous to think external things either fair or delightful to be the causes of humane actions, and not rather him who is easily taken with such objects.

In the later part of this Animadversion his errours are greater, and more dangerous than in the former. He affirmeth that the will is produced, generated, and formed, in such sort as accidents are effected in a corporeal subject; and yet it (the will) cannot be moved. As if generation, and augmentation, and alteration, were not kinds of motion or mutation. But the last words, because it goeth not from place to place, do shew plainly, that he acknowledgeth no motion but local motion. What no other natural motion but onely local motion? no metaphorical motion? that were strange. We read in holy Scripture of those who have been moved with fear, moved with envy, moved with compassion, moved with choler, moved by

the Holy Ghost. In all these there is no local motion. Outward persuasives, inward sug∣gestions, are all motions. God moveth a man to good by his preventing grace. The devil moveth a man to sinne by his temptations. There are many kinds of motions, besides moving from place to place. He himself con∣fesseth in this Section that we are moved to prayer by outward objects.

In the next place, supposing there were no other motions than local motions, yet he er∣reth in attributing no motion to any thing but bodies. The reasonable soul is moved accidentally, according to the motion of the body. The Angels are spirits or spiritual substances, no bodies, by his leave, and yet move locally from place to place. Jacob sees the Angels of God ascending and descending. The Angels came and ministred unto Christ; The Angels shall gather the elect from the one end of Heaven to the other. The soul of Lazarus was born by the Angels into Abra∣hams bosom. God sent his Angel to deliver Peter out of prison, and every where useth his Angels as ministring spirits.

Thirdly, he erreth in this also, That no∣thing can move, that is not moved it self. If he mean that all power to move is from God, he speaketh truly, but impertinently: But if he mean (as he must mean if he mean sense) that nothing moveth which is not moved of some second cause, he speaketh untruly. The

Angels move themselves; all living creatures do move themselves by animal motion. The inanimate creatures do move themselves, heavy bodies descending downwards, light bodies ascending upwards, according to their own natures. And therefore nature is de∣fined to be an internal cause or principle of mo∣tion and rest, &c. And even they who held that whatsoever is moved is moved by ano∣ther, did limit it to natural bodies, and make the form to be the mover in natural motion, and the soul in animal motion.

His last errour in this Animadversion (and a dangerous one,) is, That it is not truly said, that acts or habits are infused by God, for infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but bodies. I wish for his own quiet and other mens, that he were as great an enemy to errours and in∣novations, as he is to metaphors and distin∣ctions. Affectation of words is not good, but contention about words is worse. By such an argument a man might take away all Zones and Zodiack in Astronomy, Modes and Figures in Logick, Cones and Cylindres in Geometry; for all these are borrowed termes, as infusion is. What Logician almost doth not distinguish between acquired habits and infused habits? If all infusion be of bo∣dies, then he never infused any paradoxical principles into his Auditours. When any difference doth arise about expressions, the onely question is, Whether there be any

ground in nature for such an expression. He himself telleth us, That faith and repentance are the gifts of God. To say they are the gifts of God, and to say they are infused by God is the same thing, saving that to say they are infused by God, is a more distinct, and a more significant expression. I hope he will not controle the language of the Holy Ghost, I will powre out my spirit upon all flesh. No, (saith T. H.) that cannot be, nothing can be powred out but bodies. Saint Peter telleth us otherwise, This Iesus being exalted by the right hand of God, hath shed forth this which ye now see and hear. That was the gift of tongues, an act or habit infused. That which was shed forth or effused on Gods part, was infused on their part. So saith Saint Paul, The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost: Again, He saveth us by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly through Iesus Christ, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the word is still the same, signifying an effusion from God, and an infusion into us. All those graces freely given which were infused by the Holy Ghost, and are recited by the Apostle to the Corinthians, are either permanent Habits, or transient Acts.

In the remainder of this Section, is contain∣ed nothing but relapses, and repetitions of his former Paradoxical errours, still confound∣ing the intellectual will, with the sensitive ap∣petite,

Liberty with Spontaneity, the Faculty of the will, with the Act of willing, the liber∣ty of reasonable Creatures, with the liberty of mad men and fools. Before he told us, That he that can do what he will, hath no liberty at all. Now he telleth us of the liberty of doing what we will, in those things we are able to do, Before he limitted the power by the will, now he limitteth the will by the power. I affirmed most truely, That liberty is dimi∣nished by vitious habits; which he saith can∣not be unnderstood otherwise, then that vitious habits make a man lesse free to do vitious actions. There is little doubt but he would expound it so, if he were my Interpreter. But my sense and my scope is evident to the con∣trary, that vitious habits make a man lesse free to do virtuous actions. He will take notice of no difference between the liber∣ty of a man, and the bias of a bowl.

Yet in the midst of all these mistakes and Paradoxes, he hath not forgotten his old Thrasonicall humour. Where I say liberty is in more danger to be abused, than to be lost; he telleth me, It is a meer shift to be thought not licenced. I had not thought him such a dangerous Adversary, metuent omnes jam te, nec immerito, well, if it be a shift, it is such a shift as all conscionable men do find by experience to be true. And for his silencing of men, impavidum ferient ruinae. I do not fear silencing by him, except his arguments

have some occult quality, more than he or I dream of. If a fish could speak, a fish would not be silenced by him in this cause.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 23.

THere is a double question discussed in this Section. First, Supposing that the will doth alwayes follow the last judgement of the understanding, whether this do take away the liberty of the will. Secondly, Whether the will doth alwayes follow the last judgement of the understand∣ing: both which questions have formerly been discoursed of in this Treatise. For clear∣ing of the former question, it ought to be considered, That although men do ordina∣rily speak of the understanding, and of the will, as of two distinct Agents, or individual substances, subsisting by themselves; whereof the one understandeth, and the other willeth, partly for the eminence of these two powers, and partly for the clearer and more distinct conception and comprehension of them. And although the practise of all former Di∣vines and Philosophers do warrant us in so doing, yet if we will speak properly and in

rigour of speach, the understanding and the will are but two powers, flowing from the reasonable soul. And that the acts of willing and understanding are predicated most pro∣perly of the man, whilest the soul and body are united, Actiones sunt suppositorum, and of the reasonable soul after its separation. And because he suggesteth that this is done for advantage: and that it is not without cause, men use improper language, when they mean to keep their errours from being detected, to let him see that this is the sense of all men, and that this assertion will advantage his cause nothing, I am contented to answer his Animadversions upon this subject in the same phrase that he proposeth them.

He pleadeth that the election of the free Agent doth necessarily follow his last judge∣ment, and therefore his election is not free. My first answer to this is that determination which he maintaineth, and which taketh away freedom and liberty, is extrinsecal and antecedent. But the determination of the Agents election by his judgement, is intrinse∣call, made by himself, and concomitant, be∣ing together in time with the election. To this now he replyeth, That the will and the last dictate of the understanding, are produced in the same instant; but the necessity of them both was antecedent before they were produced: At when a stone is falling, the necessity of touching the earth is antecedent to the touch it self, unlesse it

be hindered by some contrary external motion, and then the stop is as necessary as the proceeding would have been.

To this I give three clear solutions. First, That his instance of the stone is altogether impertinent, the stone is a naturall Agent, the man is a voluntary Agent; Natural Agents act necessarily and determinately; Volun∣tary Agents act freely and undeterminately. The stone is determined to its motion down∣wards, intrinsecally by its own nature, that is, by the weight or gravity of it, but he maketh the will of the free Agent, to be determi∣ned extrinsecally by causes without him∣self.

Secondly, There is not the like necessary or determinate connexion, between the will and its antecedent causes, as is between the stone falling, and its touching the ground. It was in the power of the man to deliberate or not deliberate, to elect, or not elect, but it is not in the power of the stone, to fall, or not to fall. So the motion of the stone was de∣termined to one antecedently in its causes, but the elective will of man is not deter∣mined to one antecedently in its causes, until the man determine himself by his choice.

Thirdly, Though the stone be not such a free undetermined Agent as the man is, and therefore this concerneth not liberty: yet he himself confesseth, that casually it may be

hindred from touching the ground, unlesse it be hindred by some contrary externall motion. So the stones touching of the ground, is necessary onely upon supposition, unlesse it be hindred. But that necessity which he maintaineth, is a necessity antecedent, which cannot possible be otherwise. But there is this difference between the man and the stone, That the thing sup∣posed [to deliberate or not deliberate] is in the power of the man, but the thing supposed [to be hindred or not hindred] is not in the power of the stone.

He pleadeth further, That supposing the stone be hindred, then the stop is necessary. So still there is necessity. Nay by his favour, if the event be necessary to fall out this way upon one supposition, and necessary to fall out ano∣ther way upon a contrary supposition, then there is no absolute or antecedent necessity at all, for absolute necessity admitteth no such contrary suppositions, absolute or antece∣dent necessity, being that which cannot possi∣bly be otherwise.

My second answer was negative, That the free Agent in electing doth not alwayes chuse what is best or most convenient, in his judge∣ment. He affirmeth that I say this is but a pro∣bable opinion, nay I said it was probable at the least: and if he presse me further, I say it is but too evident. Otherwise there should be no sin against conscience, for what is consci∣ence but the practical judgement, or dictate of

reason, concerning things to be done, or to be shunned, here and now, with these or those circum∣stances. And such a man is truly 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 condemned by himself. A man who hath two dishes of meat set before him, the one more agreeable to his health, the other more pleasing to his palate, may, and, many times, doth chuse the later and the worse, his judge∣ment at the same time disallowing it. Saint Paul confesseth that he had done that which he allowed not. He saith it is impossible for a man to will any thing which appeareth not first in his understanding to be good for him. That is very true, but it cometh not home. If he would speak to the purpose, he should say, It is im∣possible for a man to will any thing which appeareth not in his understanding to be best for him. But this is false. As suppose one thing appear to a man to be honest, that is one good: Another thing appeareth to be delightfull, that is another good. Every man knoweth in his own judgement and consci∣ence, That that which is honestly good, is better than that which is delightfully good; yet men often chuse pleasure before honesty, their conscience at the same time accusing them for it.

I said a man is bound to follow his consci∣ence, as the last practicall dictate of reason. There is no doubt of it. The Scripture is plain, He ihat doubteth is damned if he eat, be∣cause he eateth not of faith, for whatsoever is not

of faith (that is to say, is not done upon a firm resolution that it is lawful) is sin. Reason is as plain, all circumstances must concur to make an action good, but one single defect doth make it evil. The approbation of con∣science is required to every good action, and the want thereof maketh it sinful; not simply in it self, but to that person, at that time. He excepteth That a man ought not to follow the dictate of his understanding when it is erroneous. That is most true with this limitation, Where∣in it is erroneous, or as it is erroneous. But there is an expedient for this in Case-divinity, which I easily beleive he did never meet with. He who hath an erroneous conscience is doubly obliged: first to reform it, and then to follow it. The dictates of right reason ought ever to be followed, and erroneous reason ought ever to be reformed, and made right reason.

I said that reason was the true root of li∣berty, That is plain, The object of the will is good, either reall or apparent. And a man cannot will any thing as good, but that which he judgeth in his understanding to be good. Nothing can affect that which it doth not know. And therefore reason must of necessi∣ty be the root of Liberty. This he taketh to be contradictory to what I say here, That actions and objects may be so equally cir∣cumstantiated, or the case so intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but

leaves the election to liberty or chance. How then (saith he) can a man leave that to liberty when his reason can give no sentence? And if by chance I mean that which hath no causes, I destroy Providence; if that which hath causes, I leave it to necessity. So where I say That reason cannot give a positive sentence, he maketh me say, That reason can give no sentence. There is a great difference between these two. The Judges name three men to the Sherifwick of of a County, Here is a nomination or judge∣ment, but not yet positive. The King picks one of these three, then the nomination or judgement is positive. So reason repre∣senteth to the free Agent, or the free Agent judgeth in his understanding three means to obtain one end, either not examining, or not determining any advantage which one mean hath above another. Here is an indefinite judgement for three good meanes, though it be not positive for any one more than the rest. In this case the will or the free Agent chuseth one of these three meanes as good, without any further examination which is best. Reason is the root of liberty in repre∣senting what is good, even when it doth give no positive or determinate sentence what is best. I am neither so vain to think there is any thing that hath a being, which hath not causes, nor so stupid on the other side, as to think that all causes are necessary causes. Chance proceedeth neither from the want,

nor from the ignorance, but from the acci∣dental concurrence of causes.

His next charge is, That it is false that actions may be so equally circumstantiated that reason cannot give a positive (that is, a deter∣minate) sentence. Yet he confesseth, that in these things elected, there may be an exact equality. If he did not confesse it, it is most evident in it self, as appeareth in my former instance of two plaisters of equal virtue: Or if he please in two peices of gold of the same stampe, weight, and alloy, sent to one man upon condition to chuse the one, and leave the other. He judgeth them both to be good, and is not such a foole as they are who say, that he would hang in a perpetual equili∣brium, and could chuse neither, for want of determination, which was best. Therefore he chuseth one of them, without more to do. But he saith, There may be circumstances in him that is to elect, that he do not spend time in vain or lose both. It is true there are reasons to move him to elect, because they are both good, but there are no reasons to move him to elect the one rather than the other, this rather than that, or that rather than this, but only the wil of him that electeth, all things be∣ing so equally circumstantiated, that reason can give sentence for them both as good, but not for the one positively and determinately, as better than the other. Whatsoever is good

is the object of the will, though it be not al∣wayes the best.

I said that reason doth not weigh every in∣dividual object or action to the uttermost grain. He pleadeth in answer, True, but does it therefore follow, a man gives no sentence? The will may follow the dictate of the judgement, whether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed. I acknowledge it, but he mi∣staketh the scope of my argument. The lesse exactly that reason doth weigh actions or ob∣jects, the lesse exactly it doth determine the free Agent, but leaveth him as in a case of in∣differency, or having no considerable differ∣ence, to chuse what he will as being not much material, or not at all material, whether he chuse the one part or the other.

Passions and affections (saith he) prevaile often against wisdom, but not against the judge∣ment or dictate of the understanding. The will of a peevish passionate foole doth no lesse follow the dictate of his nuderstanding, than the will of a wiser man. He must pardon me, passions prevaile not onely against wisdom, but a∣gainst the dictates of reason. It was Me∣deas passion which dictated to her, that to re∣venge her self upon her husband was more eligible than the lives of her children: Her reason dictated the contrary.

—Aliudque cupido, Mens aliud suadet; vidio meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.—

It was St. Peters feare, not his judge∣ment, which dictated to him to deny his Master. Every man is tempted when he is drawn aside of his own lust, not of his intellectual judgement. Jacob did not curse his mis∣understanding of Simeon and Levi, but their passion. Cursed be their anger, for it was fierce, and their wrath, for it was cruel. As the law is silent among armes, so is reason silent among passions. Passion is like an unruly passenger which thrusts reason away from the rudder for the time. Therefore they use to say that the dominion of reason, or of a reasonable man, over his sensitive appetite, is not despo∣tical, like the government of a Master over his slave, but political like that of a Magi∣strate over the people, which is often disturb∣ed by seditious tumults and rebellions. Passi∣on is an eclipse of reason, a short madnesse, the metamorphosis of a man into a wild beast that is goared, which runneth upon every thing that comes in her way without consi∣deration, or like a violent torrent descending down impetuously from a steep hill, which beareth down all respects before it, Divine and humane. Whilest passion is at the height,

there is no room for reason, nor any use of the dictates of the understanding, the minde for the time, being like the Cyclopian cave, where no man heard what another said.

The last part of this Section is not con∣cerning the fortunes of Asia, but the weigh∣ing of an horse-load of feathers, a light and trivial subject, wherein there is nothing, but a contempt of Schoole-termes without any ground, bold affirmations without any proof, and a continued detraction from the dignity of the humane nature, as if a reasonable man were not so considerable as a Jack-daw. When God created man, he made him a mean Lord under himself, to have dominion over all his creatures, and put all things in sub∣jection under his feet. And to fit him for this command, he gave him an intellectual soul. But T. H. maketh him to be in the disposi∣tion of the second causes; sometimes as a sword in a mans hand, a meer passive instru∣ment; sometimes like a toppe that is lashed hither and thither, by boyes; sometimes like a foot-ball, which is kicked hither and thither by every one that comes nigh it; and here to a pair of scales, which are pressed down now one way, then another way, by the weight of the objects. Surely this is not that man that was created by God after his own Image, to be the Governour of the World, and Lord

and Master of the creatures. This is some man that he hath borrowed out of the be∣ginning of an Almanack, who is placed im∣moveable in the middest of the twelve Signes, as so many second causes. If he offer to stir, Aries is over his head ready to push him, and Taurus to goare him in the neck, and Leo to teare out his heart, and Sagittarius to shoote an arrow in his thighes

Yet he tells us boldly, That no man can understand that the understanding maketh any alteration of weight or lightnesse in the object; or that reason layes objects upon the under∣standing. What poor trifling is this, in a thing so plain and obvious to every mans capacity? There can be no desire of that which is not known in some sort; Nothing can be willed but that which is apprehen∣ded to be good either by reason or sense, and that according to the degree of appre∣hension. Place a man in a darke roome, and all the rarest objects in the World be∣sides him, he seeth them not, he distin∣guisheth them not, he willeth them not. But bring in a light and he seeth them, and distinguisheth them, and willeth them, according to their distinct worths. That which light is to visible objects, making those things to be actually seen, which were onely potentially visible, that is, the under∣standing

to all intelligible objects, without which, they are neither known nor wil∣led. Wherefore men define the under∣standing to be A faculty of the reasonable soul, understanding, knowing, and judging all in∣telligible things. The understanding then doth not alter the weight of objects, no more than the light doth change the colours, which without the help of the light, did lie hid in the darke. But the light makes the colours to be actually seene; So doth the understanding make the latent value of intelligible objects to be apprehended, and consequently maketh them to be desired and willed according to their distinct de∣grees of goodnesse. This judgement which no man ever denyed to intelligible crea∣tures, is the weighing of objects, or attri∣buting their just weight to them, and the trying of them as it were by the Balance and by the Touchstone. This is not the laying of objects upon the understanding. The understanding is not the patient but the judge, but this is the representing of the goodnesse or badnesse of objects to the will, or to the free Agent willing, which re∣latively to the will, giveth them all their weight and efficacy.

There may be difference between these two Propositions, Repentance is not volun∣tary, and by consequence proceedeth from cau∣ses;

And Repentance proceedeth from causes, and by consequence is not voluntary; if his consequence were well intelligible, as it is not: All acts both voluntary and invo∣luntary doe proceed from causes. He chargeth me to have chopt in these words [And therefore.] The truth is, his words were, and by consequence, which I expressed thus [and therefore.] There∣fore and by consequence are the very same thing, neither more nor lesse. Is not this a doughty exception? But the other is his greater errour, That Repentance is not voluntary. No Schooleman ever said that the faculty of the will was voluntary, but that the Agent was a voluntary A∣gent, and the act a voluntary act.

Castigations of the Animadver∣sions, Num. 24.

HE accuseth me of charging him witly Blasphemy and Atheisme. If he be wronged in that kind, it is he who wrongeth himself by his suspicion. Spr•…•…ta exolescunt, si irascare, agnita videntur. I accused him not either of Blasphemy or Atheisme, in the Concrete. One may say a mans opinions are Blasphemous and Atheisti∣call in the Abstract; without charging the person with formall Atheisme or blasphemy. The reason is evident, because it may be, that through prejudice he doth not see the conse∣quences, which other men, whose eyes are not blinded with that mist, do see, and if he did see them, would abhor them as well as they. For this reason, he who chargeth one with speaking or writing implicite contra∣dictions, or things inconsistent one with ano∣ther, doth not presently accuse him of ly∣ing, although one part of a contradiction must needs be false, because it may be the force of the consequence is not evident to him.

A man may know a truth certainly, and yet not know the formal reason or the man∣ner of it so certainly. I know that I see,

and I judge probably how I see; yet the manner how I see, whether by sending out beams, or by receiving in the species, is not so evident as •…•…he thing it self, that I do see. They who do not agree about the manner of vision, do all agree about the truth of vision. Every man knoweth certainly, that he can cast a stone up into the air, but the manner how the stone is moved after it is seperated from the hand, whether it be by some force, or form, or quality impressed into the stone by the caster, or by the air; & if it be by the air, whe∣ther it be by the pulsion of the air following, or by the cession of the former air, is obscure enough, and not one of a thousand who knoweth the certainty of the thing, knoweth the manner how it cometh to passe. If this be true in natural actions, how much more in the actions of God, who is an infinite be∣ing, and not comprehensible by the finite wit of man? The water can rise no higher than the fountains head: A looking-glasse can represent the body, because there is some proportion between bodies; but it cannot represent the soul, because there is no propor∣tion between that which is material, and that which is immaterial. This is the reason why we can in some sort apprehend what shall be after the end of the World, because the soul is eternal that way: but if we do but think of what was before the beginning of the World, we are as it were presently swallowed

up into an Abysse, because the soul is not eternal that way. So I know that there is true liberty from necessity, both by Divine Revelation, and by reason, and by experi∣ence. I know likewise that God knoweth all events from eternity; the difficulty is not about the thing, but about the manner, how God doth certainly know things free or con∣tingent, which are to come in respect of us, seeing they are neither determined in the event it self, nor in the causes thereof. The not knowing of the manner which may be incomprehensible to us, doth not at all dimi∣nish the certain truth of the thing. Yet even for the manner sundry wayes are proposed, to satisfie the curiosities rather than the con∣sciences of men. Of which this is one way which I mentioned. It were a great mad∣nesse to reject a certain truth, because there may be some remote difficulty about the manner; and yet a greater madnesse for avoiding a needlesse scruple, to destroy all the attributes of God, which is by conse∣quence to deny God himself. His proof of necessity drawn from Gods eternall knowledge of all events, hath been suffi∣ciently discussed and satisfied over and over.

I pleaded that my doctrine of liberty is an ancient truth generally received; His opini∣on of universall necessity, an upstart Paradox, and all who own it may be written in a ring.

So I am an old possessor, he is but a new pre∣tender. He answereth, That he is in possession of a truth derived to him from the light of reason: And it is an unhandsome thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by succession from his Ancestor. I answer, That just possession is either by law, or by prescription. I have all laws Divine and Humane, Ecclesiastical and Civil, and a prescription of two thousand years, or at least, ever since Christianity came into the World, for liberty. His opinion of universal Destiny, by reason of a necessary connexion of the second causes, was never the general, nor the common, nor the current opinion of the World; and hath been in a manner wholly buried for sixteen hundred years, and now is first conjured out of its grave by him, to disturb the World. If this be just possession, an High-way robber may plead, possession, so soon as ever he hath stripped an honest Traveller. It is not onely no unhandsome thing, but it is a most comely and commendable thing, for a man to derive his religion by the universal approbation of the Christian World, from the purest Primi∣tive Times, throughout all ages, and never to deviate further, from the steps of his An∣cestors, than they had first degenerated from their predecessors. And where he telleth us, That the first Christians did not derive Christi∣anity from their Ancestours, It is very true, but very impertinent. For they had not their

religion from their own invention or pre∣sumption, as he hath his opinions, but by Divine Revelation, confirmed with miracles. When he is able to produce as authentick proof for his Paradoxes, as they did for their religion, he saith something.

That which he calleth my sc•…•…rrilous ar∣gumentation, he that drinks well, sleeps well. &c. is none of mine, but a common example used in Logick, to shew the weaknesse of such forms of arguings as his is, when the depen∣dance is not necessary and essentiall, but con∣tingent and accidental; as it is in his argu∣ment here. All actions are from God by a general power, but not determinately. The like contingent connexion there is between action and sense: sense and memory, memory and election. This is enough to shew the weaknesse of his argument. But he hath one main fault more, he hath put more in the conclusion than there was in the premisses.

He saith, If by liberty. I had understood onely liberty of action, and not liberty of will, it had been an easie matter to reconcile it with prescience and the decrees of God. I answer first, That liberty of action, without liberty of will, is but a mock liberty, and a new nothing, like an empty bottle given to a child to satisfie his thirst. Where there is no liberty to will, there is no liberty to act, as hath been formerly de∣monstrated. Secondly, The liberty to will is as reconciliable with the prescience and

decrees of God, as the liberty to act. Gods decrees do extend at least as much to acting as to willing. Thirdly, This liberty of acting, without a liberty of willing, is irreconciliable, with all the other attributes of God, his truth, his justice, his goodnesse, and his power, and setting the decrees of God in opposition one with another. How should a man have a liberty to act, and have no liberty to will, when he cannot act freely, except he will freely, because willing is a necessary cause or means of acting? That which followeth about Gods aspect and intuition, is meerly a contention about words, and such words as are received and approved by all Authours. Gods intuition is not of the same nature with ours; we poor Creatures do stand in need of organs, but God who is a pure simple in∣finite essence, cannot be made perfecter by organs, or accidents. Whatsoever he seeth or knoweth, he seeth or knoweth by his essence. The lesse T. H. understood the terms of Aspect and Intuition, the more apt he was to blonder them.

He pleadeth, If liberty cannot stand with necessity, it cannot stand with the decrees of God, of which decrees necessity is a consequent. And he citeth some body without name, who said, The will of God is the necessity of all things. I deny his consequence. Liberty is consistent with Gods decrees, though it be not consistent with universal necessity. The reason is plain,

because liberty is a consequent of Gods de∣crees as well as necessity. He who said that the will of God was the necessity of all things, was St. Austine. I wish he would stand to his judgement, or to his sense of those words. The meaning of those words is not that God doth will that all things should be necessary. But that whatsoever God doth will, that must necessarily be. If he will have all things ne∣cessary, then all things must be necessary, If he will have all things free, then all things must be free: If he will have some things ne∣cessary, and somethings free, then some things must be necessary, and some things free. When God formed man of the dust of the earth, he might have formed him either a child or a man, but whether he should be formed the one or the other, it was not in the condition of the Creature, but in the pleasure of the Creator, whose will is the necessity of things. What doth this concern the liberty of man? Nothing. It concerned him more to have understood St. Austines distinction, between Gods will, and his prescience in the same place, What God willeth shall necessarily be, (that is according to an absolute antecedent ne∣cessity) What God foreknows, shall truely be, (that is onely by a necessity of infallability) I might produce the whole world against him in this cause. But because he renoun∣ced Rumaine authorities, I have been sparing to alledge one testimony against

him. But to free Saint Austin from all suspition of concurring, in such a des∣perate cause, I will onely cite one place of an hundred, Neither is that necessity to be feared, which the Stoicks fearing, were careful to distin∣guish the causes of things so, that some they sub∣stracted from necessity, some they subjected to ne∣cessity. And in those which they would not have to be under necessity, they placed our wills, least they should not be free if they were subjected to necessity. For if that be to be called our necessity, which is not in our power, but effecteth what it can all though we will not, such as is the necessity of death: it is manifest that our wills, whereby we live well or ill, are not under such a necessity, &c. Here he may find the two sorts of necessity, which we have had so much contention about, the one in our power, which is not opposed to liberty: the other not in our power, that is an antecedent extrinsecal ne∣cessity, which destroyeth liberty: but he saith that it is manifest, that our wills are not subject to such an antecedent necessity. Here he may see that his friends the Stoicks, the great Patrons of necessity, were not for universall necessity as he is, nor did countenance ne∣cessity to the prejudice of the liberty of the will.

Onely to permit, and to permit liberty, do not signifie the same thing in this place. Onely to permit, is opposed to acting, to permit barely, is opposed to disposing. There are many things

which God doth not act, there is nothing which God doth not dispose. He acteth good, permitteth evil, disposeth all things both good and evill. He that cutteth the banks of a River, is the active cause that the water flow∣eth out of the Channel: He that hindreth not the stream to break the banks when he could, is the permissive cause; And if he make no other use of the breaking out, it is nuda permissio, bare permission, but if he dis∣poseth and draweth the water that floweth out by furrowes, to water the Medows, then though he permit it, yet he doth not barely permit it, but disposeth of it to a further good, So God onely permitteth evil, that is, he doth it not, but he doth not barely permit it, be∣cause he disposeth it to good.

Here he would gladly be nibling at the que∣stions, Whether universals be nothing but onely words, Nothing in the World, saith he, is general, but the significations of words and other signes. Hereby affirming, unawares, that a man is but a word, and by consequence, that he himself is but a titular, and not a real man. But this question is alltogether impertinent in this place. We do not by a general influence understand some universal substance or thing, but an influence of indeterminate power, which may be applyed either to good or evill. The influence is a singular act, but the power communicated is a general, that is, an indeterminate power, which may be applied

to acts of several kinds. If he deny all general power in this sense, he denieth both his own reason, and his common sense.

Still he is for his old errour, That eternity is a successive everlasting duration. But he produceth nothing for it, nor answereth to any thing which I urged against it. That the eternity of God is God himself, that if eter∣nity were an everlasting duration, then there should be succession in God; then there should be former and later, past and to come, and a part without a part in God; then all things should not be present to God; then God should lose something, namely; that which is past, and acquire something newly, namely, that which is to come: and so God, who is without all shadow of change, should be mutable, and change every day. To this he is silent, and silence argueth consent.

He saith, Those many other wayes which are proposed by Divines for reconciling eternal presci∣ence with liberty and contingency are proposed in vain, if they mean the same liberty and contin∣gency that I do, for truth and errour can never be reconciled. I do not wonder at his shew of confidence. The declining sun maketh longer shadows; and when a Merchant is nearest breaking, he maketh the fairest shew, to pre∣serve his reputation as long as may be. He saith he knoweth the loadstone hath no such at∣tractive power. I fear shortly he will not per∣mit us to say that a plaister or a plantine leaf

draweth. What doth the loadstone then, if it doth not draw? He knoweth that the iron cometh to it, or it to the iron. Can he not tell whether? This is worse than drawing, to make iron come or go. By potentiality he understandeth power or might: Others un∣derstand possibility or indetermination. Is not he likelely to confute the Schoolmen to good purpose?

Whereas I said that God is not just, but justice it self, not eternall, but eternity it self; He telleth me, That they are unseemly words to be said of God, he will not say blasphemous and Atheistical, that God is not just, that he is not eternal. I do not fear that any one Scholler, or any one understanding Christian in the World, should be of his mind in this. If I should spend much time in proving of such known truths, approved and established by the Christian World, I should shew my self almost as weak as he doth shew himself, to talk of such things as he understandeth not in the least, to the overthrowing of the na∣ture of God, and to make him no God. If his God have accidents, ours hath none; If his God admit of composition and division, ours is a simple essence. When we say God is not just, but justice, not wise but wisdom, doth he think that we speak of moral virtues? or that we derogate or detract from God? No, we ascribe unto him a transcendental

justice and wisdom, that is not comprehend∣ed under our categories, nor to be conceived perfectly by humane reason. But why doth he not attempt to answer the reasons which I brought, That that which is infinitely per∣fect, cannot be further perfected by accidents. That God is a simple essence, and can ad∣mit no kind of composition; That the infi∣nite essence of God can act sufficiently with∣out faculties; That it consisteth not with divine perfection to have any passive or receptive powers. I find nothing in answer to these, but deep silence. Attributes are names; and justice and wisdom are moral virtues: but the justice, and wisdom, and power, and eternity, and goodnesse, and truth of God, are neither names nor moral virtues, but altogether do make one eternal essence, wherein all perfections do meet in an infinite degree. It is well if those words of our Saviour do escape him in his next Animadversions, I am the truth, Or St. Paul for making Deum and Deitatem, God and the Godheads or Deity, to be all one; Or Solo∣mon for personating God under the name of Wisdom in the abstract.

To prove eternity to be no successive du∣ration, but one indivisible moment. I argu∣ed thus: The divine substance is indivisible, but eternity is the divine substance. In an∣swer to this in the first place, he denyeth the Major, That the divine substance is indivi∣sible.

If he had not been a professed Chri∣stian, but a plain Stoick, I should not have wondred so much at this answer, for they held that God was corporall. If the divine substance be not indivisible, then it is mate∣riate, then it is corporall, then it is corrupti∣ble, then the Anthropomorphites had rea∣son to attribute humane members to God. But the Scriptures teach us better, and all the World consenteth to it, That God is a Spirit, that he is immortall and invisible, that he dwelleth in light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath seen, nor can see. It is inconsistent with the nature of God to be finite; It is inconsistent with the nature of a body to be infinite. The speculations of Phi∣losophors, who had onely the light of reason, were not so grosse, who made God to be a most simple essence, or simplicity it self. All matter which is the originall of divisibi∣lity: was created by God, and therefore God himself cannot be material nor divi∣sible.

Secondly he denyeth the minor, That the eternity of God is the divine substance; I proved it from that generally received rule, Whatsoever is in God, is God. His answer is, That this rule hath been said by some men, thought by no man; for whatsoever is thought is understood. Said by some men? Nay, said and approved by all men, that ever had occasion to discourse upon this

subject, and received without contradicti∣on as a received principle of Theology. They who say against it, do, wittingly or unwittingly, destroy the nature of God. That which followeth is equally presump∣tuous, Thought by no man; for whatsoevor is thought is understood. It was too much to censure all the Shool-men for Pies or Parrots, prating what they did not un∣derstand. But to accuse all learned Chri∣stians of all Communions, throughout all ages, who have either approved it, or not contradicted it, of not understanding them∣selves, is too high an insolence. God being an infinite essence, doth intrinse∣cally include all perfection, and need∣eth not to have his defects supplyed by accidents.

Where I say to day all eternity is co∣existent with this day, and to morrow all eternity will be coexistent with to morrow; he inferreth, It is well that his eternity is now come from a nunc stans to be a nunc fluens, flowing from this day to to morrow. It were better, if he would confesse that it is a meer deception of his sight, like that of fresh-water passengers when they come first to sea, terraeque urbesque recedunt, who think the shoare leaveth them, when they leave the shoare. It is time that floweth and moveth, not eternity,

Non tellus Cymbam tellurem, cymba relin∣quit.

To conclude this point of eternity and this Section, God gave himself this name, I am that I am, to shew the truth, the simplici∣ty, the independence, and immutability of his essence; wherein there is neither fuit, not erit, hath been, not shall be, but onely present, I am. Eternity, onely eternity is truely simply, independently, immutably.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 25.

HIs first contradictions have been handled before, whither I refer the Reader; but because he expresseth his sense more clearly here than there, I will take the liberty to adde a few words. I charged him with contradictions, in making Voluntary to presuppose delibera∣tion, and yet making many voluntary acts to be without deliberation. He distinguisheth between deliberation, and that which shall be construed for deliberation by a Iudge. Some voluntary acts are rash and undeliberate in them∣selves; yet the Iudge judgeth them to be delibe∣rate, because they ought to have deliberated, and had time enough to deliberate, whether the action

were lawfull or not. First, This answer is a meer subterfuge. The question between us is not what actions are punishable by law, and what are not, but what is deliberation in its own nature, and whether all voluntary acti∣ons be deliberate or not; not in order to a trial before a Judge, but in order to the find∣ing out of the truth.

Secondly, Many of these rash actions do imply no crime. nor are cognoscible before a Judge, as tending onely to the Agents par∣ticular prejudice, or perhaps no prejudice but advantage. In all these cases, the sentence of the Judge cannot help to reconcile his con∣tradiction.

Thirdly, The ground of his distinction is not true. The Judge doth not alwayes judge of such rash acts to be deliberate acts, but judgeth them to have been indeliberate acts, whensoever he findeth them to have been justly destitute of all manner of deliberation. From whence did arise the well known di∣stinction between Man-slaughter and Will∣full murther in our law. Murther committed upon actual deliberation is held to be done maliciously, [ex malitia sua] But if it proceed out of suddain passion, it is found only Man-slaughter. The same equity is observed in the Judicial law. He who did kill another suddainly without enmity, was allowed the be∣nefit of the City of refuge.

Lastly, In many cases the Judge cannot judge that the Agent had sufficient time to deliberate, nor that it was his fault that he did not deliberate, for really he had not suffi∣cient time to deliberate. And where he talk∣eth that the Iudge supposeth all the time after the making of the law to have been time of delibera∣tion, he erreth most pitifully. There needeth little or no time to deliberate of the law. All the need of deliberation is about the matter of fact, and the circumstances thereof. As for example. A sudain affront is put upon a man, which he did not expect, nor could possibly imagine, such as he apprehendeth, that flesh and blood cannot endure, and con∣ceiveth himself ingaged in honour, to vindi∣cate it forthwith. This is that which required deliberation, the nature and degree of the affront; the best remedies how to procure his own reparation in honour, the inconveniences that may arise from a sudain attempt, and the advantage which he may make of a little forbearance, with all the circumstances of the accidents. How could he possible deliberate of all these things, before any of these things were imaginable? He could neither certainly divine, nor probably conjecture that ever such an accident should happen. And there∣fore it remaineth still a grosse contradiction in him, to say that voluntary alwayes supposeth deliberation, and yet to confesse that many vo∣luntary acts are undeliberate.

Whereas he saith, That he alway used the word spontaneous in the same sense; He mustex∣cuse me if I cannot assent unto it. In one place he telleth us, That by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it. In another place, he telleth us, That to give out money for merchandise is a spontaneous action. All the World knoweth that to buy and sell, doth require consideration.

He defineth liberty to be the absence of all extrinsecal impediments to action: But extrin∣secal causes are extrinsecal impediments, and no man is free (according to his grounds) from the determination of extrinsecal causes; Therefore no man is free from extrinsecal impediments.

His answer is, That impediment or hinder∣ance signifieth an oppsition to endeavour; and consequently extrinsecal causes that take away en∣deavour are not to be called impediments. He is very seldom stable to his own grounds, but is continually interfereing with himself. Now he telleth us that an impediment signifieth an opposition to endeavour; Elsewhere he tel∣leth us, That a man that is tied is not free to walk, and that his bonds are impediments, without any regard to his endeavour. It were meer folly for him to endeavour to walk, who can neither stir hand nor foot. This is not all; He telleth us further, That an in∣ward impediment is not destructive to liber∣ty, as a man is free to go though he be lame. And

men do not say, that the river wants liberty to ascend, but the power, because the water cannot ascend. And is not want of endeavour in∣trinsecal, as well as lamenesse? Or did he ever hear of a river that endeavoured to ascend up the channel? It is not true there∣fore that endeavour is of the essence of liber∣ty, or that impediment alwayes signifieth op∣position to endeavour. Lastly, extrinsecal causes do not alwayes take away endeavour, but many times leave men free to endeavour to obtain those things, which they never do obtain. If extrinsecal causes do take away all endeavours but such as are successeful, then there should never be any labour in vain. It remaineth therefore upon his own grounds, that extrinsecal causes whensoever they do not take away endeavours, are extrinsecal impediments and destroy li∣berty.

He saith, One may deliberate of that which is impossible for him to do. True, if he apprehend it as possible, and judge it to be possible; Or otherwise he is stark mad to deliberate about it. The shutting of the door of the Tennis-court is no impediment to play, until a man have a will to play, and that is not until he have done deli∣berating. Yes even in the act of deliberation, the finding of the door of the Tennis-court shut, determineth the deliberation, changeth the will, and may be the onely impediment which hindereth a man from playing. One

may have a will to play before deliberation, sometimes more absolute, out of humour, than after. Many times the last judgement is conditional, as to play if the door be open, and if the court be not taken up beforehand; And if it be shut, or the place taken up, then to go to bowles, or some other exercise.

Wheresoever the judgement is so indiffer∣ent, to do either this or that, or conditional to do this upon such conditions, it is not the deliberation, or the last judgement that doth determine the liberty of the free Agent, but leaveth him free to chuse either part, or to suspend his consent to both parts, pro re nata. So liberty may remain after deliberation is done. Although he did not use these words, sensitive appetite, rational hope, rational fear, ir∣rational passions, nor confound the termes of sufficiency and efficiency, or beginning of being and beginning of working, yet he might con∣found the thing whereof these termes are but notions; And so he doth.

All men do understand well enough what secret sympathies and antipathies are, except such as are captious, though men understand not usually why they are, as why one man gapeth at a custard rather than at a pie, and runneth away from a cat rather than from a mastiff. When, I say, it is thus far true, that the action doth follow the thought necessari∣ly, (namely in antipathies and violent passi∣ons, which admit no deliberation.) He de∣mandeth

how far it is false? I answer, It is false in ordinary thoughts, which are not accompanied with such violent passions. A man thinketh a thousand things in a day ac∣cidentally, which he never putteth in execu∣tion, nor so much as thinketh them worthy of deliberation.

No man would have denied that habits do facilitate actions, and render them lesse diffi∣cult and combersome, and consequently more easie and more free, but he that meant to make himself ridiculous. He might even as well tell us, That he who gropeth in the dark for every step, is as free to walk, as if it were faire day-light, or that a foundered horse that is afraid to stumble every foot, is as free to go, as he which is sound, and goeth on boldly without fear. But all this abuse groweth from the misunderstanding of liber∣ty. I take it for a power to act or not to act, and he taketh it for an absence of outward impediments. This confounding of words, and the heaping together of Scholastical termes with scorn, because he never under∣stood them, are the chiefest ingred ents in his discourse. I am not ashamed of Motus primó primi, or judicium practicé practicum, or actus elicitus and imperatus; But he hath great reason to be ashamed of his sleighting them, which he would not do, but that he never learned them, and so would make a virtue of culpable necessity. He saith he will not con∣tend

with one who can use motus primo primi, &c. He is the wiser, to have as little to do with Schollars as he can. His best play is in the dark, where there is no fenceing.

We both agree that some sudden undeli∣berated acts are justly punished. His reason is because the Agent had time to deliberate from the instant that he knew the law, to the instant of his action. But I have shewed the vanity of this reason, and that it was impossible to deliberate of sudden affronts and injuries which could not be expected or foreseen. But if the occurrences or accidents were such as were foreseen, or whereof the Agent was premonished, and he did deliberate of them; or if it was his own fault or improvidence that they were not foreseen nor deliberated of, then he is punishable, because his predeliberation about some such accident as might probably happen, was a virtual deliberation about this very act, which did afterward happen, though it were not then acted, but onely ex∣pected; or because he refused or neglected to fore-arme himself by deliberation against a surprise.

Here he cavilleth about termes of actual and virtual deliberation, as his manner is. If virtual deliberation be not actual deliberation, it is no deliberation; Adding that I call virtual deliberation, that which ought to have been and was not. He mistaketh the matter. I call vir∣tual deliberation a former deliberation about

this very act feared or expected out of provi∣dence or premonition, before it was acted, or about some act of the like nature. So it was an actual deliberation; yet not about this very act. But it might have served to have prevented the Agents being surprised, and have had the same virtue as if it had been an actual deliberation about this very accident. Did he never learn nor hear of the distinction in Philosophy between contactus verus, and contactus virtualis, true touching and virtual touching? True touching when the super∣ficies of two bodies are together, so as they can move and be moved mutually. And vir∣tual touching, when the virtue of one body doth extend it self to another. As it is be∣tween the Sun and the Earth, the Loadstone and the Iron, the hand of the Caster and the Stone moving upwards in the Aire. His ar∣gument holdeth as much in all the cases as in this of deliberation. If virtual touching be not true touching, it is no touching: And if virtual motion be not true motion, it is no motion. I shall find English enough at all times to answer him.

Concerning my instance which he saith, pleasantly, doth stink to the nose of the under∣standing, I desire him onely to read the fifteenth Chapter of Leviticus. I am sure he dare not call that a stinking passage.

He saith, The Bishop mould make but an ill Iudge of innocent children. And that he hopeth

we shall never have the administration of publick Iustice in such hands as his, or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him; because I said that if a child before he have the use of reason shall kill a man in his passion, yet be∣cause he wanted malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from it, he shall not die for it, in the strict rules of particular justice, unlesse there be some mixture of pub∣lick justice in the case.

—Siego dignus hac contumelia Sum maxime, at tu indignus qui faceres tamen.

If I deserved a reproofe, he was a most un∣fit man to be my reprover, who maintain∣eth, That no law can be unjust, That in the State of nature it was lawful for any man to kill another, and particularly, for mothers to expose or make away their children at their pleasure. Ita ut illum vel educare vel exponere suo arbitrio & jure possit. De Cive, c. 9. d. 2. That Parents to their children, and Sove∣rigns to their subjects, cannot be injurious, whether they kill them or whatsoever they do unto them. But what is it that I have said? I have delivered no judgement or opi∣nion of mine own in the case. I know what hath been practiced by some persons, in some places, at some times. I know what reasons have been pretended for such practices. So∣veraign dominion, The law of retaliation,

Psal. 137. 8, 9. The common safety, The satisfaction, or contentment of persons or fa∣milies injuried. But if I have delivered any opinion of mine own, it was on the contrary. Though I affirm not but that it may be sometimes lawful to punish Parents for acts truly treasonable in their posterity with lesser punishments, as losse of liberty, or the losse of the fathers estate, which was at the time of the delinquency in the fathers power to di∣spose, that they who will not forbear to offend for their own sakes, may forbear for their po∣sterities sakes. Though I know the practice of many Countries, even in this, to be otherwise. But for death, I know no warrant. Pliny observeth of the Lion, that he preyeth first upon men, more rarely upon women, and not upon children, except he be extremely pressed with hunger.

Private right and private justice, is between particular men; Publick right and publick justice, is either between Common-wealths, as in forreign war, or between Common-wealths and Subjects, as in case of Law-giving or civil war. Many things are law∣ful in the way of publick justice, which are not lawful in the way of private justice. But this inquisition hath no relation to our present controversie. My exception, Except there be some mixture of publick justice in the case, is as much as to say, Unlesse there be some thing more in the case, that doth nearly concern

the safety of the Common-wealth. It is not impossible but before the ordinary age of at∣taining to the perfect use of reason, a child may be drawn into very treasonable at∣tempts, so far as to act a ministerial part. And in such cases there is a rule in law, Malitia supplet aetatem. He hath confessed here e∣nough to spoile his cause, if it were not spoiled already. That want of reason takes away both crime and punishment, and maketh agents inno∣cent. If want of reason do it, without doubt antecedent extrinsecal necessity doth much more do it. How then hath he taught us all this while, That voluntary faults are justly punishable though they be necessary? A childs fault may be as voluntary as a mans. How a child may justly be put to death to satisfie a vow, or to save a great number of people, or for reason of State, I know not. This I do know, That it is not lawful to do evil, that good may come of it.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 26.

IT seemeth by the Animadversion which T. H. hath in this Section, wherein he maketh, Consideration, under∣standing, reason, and all the passions (or affecti∣ons) of the mind to be imaginations. And by some other passages in this Treatise, where he attributeth to bees and spiders, not onely electi∣on, but also art, prudence, pollicy, very near equal to that of mankind: And where he denieth to man all dominion over the creatures, making him like a toppe, or a foot-ball, or a pair of scales, and his chiefest difference from brute beasts to consist in his language, and in his hand; And his liberty to consist in an ab∣sence of outward impediments, ascribing to brute beasts deliberation, such as if it were constant, there were no cause to call men more rational than beasts; That he maketh the rea∣son and understanding of men to be nothing else but refined and improved sense, or the sense of brute beasts to include reason.

It was an old Stoical opinion, that the af∣fections were nothing else but imaginations; but it was an old groundlesse errour. Imagi∣nations proceed from the brain, affections

from the heart. But to make reason and understanding to be imaginations, is yet grosser. Imagination is an act of the sen∣sitive phantasie, Reason and understanding are proper to the intellectual soul. Imagi∣nation is onely of particulars, Reason of universals also. In the time of sleep or some raging fit of sicknesse, when the ima∣gination is not governed by reason, we see what absurd and monstrous and inconsi∣stent shapes and phansies it doth collect, remote enough from true deliberation. Doth the Physitian cure his Patient by imagi∣nations? or the Statesman govern the Common-wealth by imaginations? or the Lawyer determine differences by imagina∣tions? Are Logical arguments reduced in∣to due forme, and an orderly method, nothing but imaginations? Is prudence it selfe turned to imagination? And are the dictates of right reason which God hath given as a light to preserve us from moral vices, and to lead us to virtuous actions, now become meere imaginations? We see the understanding doth often contrary and correct the imaginations of sense. I do not blame the pusled Schoole-men if they dissented from such new-fangled specula∣tions.

And the ground of all these vain imagina∣tions is imagination. As any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his own thoughts. His

Argument may be thus reduced, That which we imagine is true, but we imagine all these to be imaginations. I deny both his proposi∣tions.

First, Our imaginations are not alwayes true, but many times such as are suggested to us by our working phantasies upon some sleight grounds, or by our fond or deceitful in∣structers, or by our vain hopes or fears. For one Whittington, that found his imaginati∣on to prove true, when the Bells rang him back to his Master, Turn again Whittington, thou shalt be Lord Mayor of London, a thou∣sand have been grossely abused by their vain imaginations.

Secondly, No man can imagine any such thing who knoweth the difference between the reasonable and the sensitive soul, between the understanding and the phantasie, be∣tween the brain and the heart, but confident assertions & credulity may doe much among simple people. So we have heard or read of some who were contented to renounce their eye-sight, and to affirm for company, that they saw a Dragon flying in the aire, where there was not so much as a Butterflie, out of a mannerly simplicity, rather than to seem to doubt of the truth of that, which was con∣firmed to them by the testimony and autho∣rity of such persons, whose judgment and ve∣racity they esteemed.

We have had enough of his understanding

understandeth, and will willeth, or too much unlesse it were of more weight. What a stir he maketh every other Section about no∣thing? All the World are agreed upon the truth in this particular, and understand one another well. Whether they ascribe the act to the Agent, or to the form, or to the faculty by which he acteth, it is all one. They know that actions properly are of Individuums. But if an Agent have lost his natural power, or acquired habit, (as we have instances in both kinds) he will act but madly. He that shall say that natural faculties, and acquired habits are nothing but the acts that flow from them, That reason and deliberation are the same thing; (he might as well say that wit and discourse are the same thing) deserveth no other answer but to be sleighted.

That a man deliberating of fit means to obtain his desired end, doth consider the means singly and successively, there is no doubt. And there is as little doubt that both the inquiry, and the result or veredict may sometimes be definite, or prescribe the best means, or the on∣ly means, and sometimes indefinite, determi∣ning what means are good, without defining which are the best, but leaving the election to the free Agent.

Castigations of the Animadver∣sions, Num. 27.

I Do not know what the man would have done, but for his trifling homonymy about the name of Will, which affoardeth him scope to play at fast and loose between the fa∣culty and the act of willing: We ended with it in the last Section, and we begin again with it in this Section. The faculty of the will (saith he) is no will, the act only which he calleth vo∣lition is the will. As a man that sleepeth hath the power of seeing and seeth not, nor hath for that time any sight, so also he hath the power of willing, but willeth nothing, nor hath for that time any will.

—Quantum est in rebus inane?

What profound mysteries he uttereth, to shew that the faculty of willing, and the act of willing, are not the same things? Did ever any Creature in the World think they were? And that the faculty doth not alwayes act. Did ever any man think it did? Let him leave these impertinencies, and tell us plainly, whe∣ther the faculty of willing, and the act of willing, be not distinct things; And whether the faculty of the will be not commonly cal∣led the will by all men but himself; and by himself also, when he is in his lucidae intervalles.

Hear his own confession, To will, to elect, to chuse, are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed, as the will is a faculty or power of a mans soul, so the will is an act of it according to that power. That which he cal∣leth the faculty here, he calleth expressely the will there. Here he will have but one will, there he admitteth two distinct wills. [to will is an act of the will.] Here he will not endure that the faculty should be the will, there he saith expressely, That the will is a faculty. All this wind shaketh no Oates. Whatsoever he saith in this Section, amounteth not to the weight of one graine.

If he had either known what concupiscence doth signifie, which really he doth not, or had known how familiar it is (both name and thing) in the most modest and pious Authours, both Sacred and prophane, which he doth not know, he would have been asha∣med to have accused this expression, as un∣becoming a grave person. But he, who will not allow me to mention it once to good pur∣pose, doth take the liberty to mention it six times in so many lines to no purpose. There hath been an old question between Roman-Catholicks and Protestants, Whether con∣cupiscence without consent, be a sin or not. And here cometh he, as bold as blind, to determine the difference, committing so ma∣ny errours, and so grosse, in one short deter∣mination, that it is a shame to dispute with

him; thrashing those Doctours soundly, whom he professeth to honour and admire, not for ill will, but because he never read them. He maintaineth that which the Ro∣manists themselves do detest, and would be ashamed of: As first, That concupiscence, without consent, is no sin, contrary to all his much admired Doctours. Secondly, That there is no concupiscence without consent, contrary to both parties, which we use to call the taking away the subject of the question. Thirdly, That concupiscence with consent, may be lawful, con∣trary to all men. Though the Church of Rome do not esteem it to be properly a sinne, yet they esteem it a defect, and not altoge∣ther lawful, even without consent, much lesse with consent. Fourthly, That concupiscence makes not the sin, but the unlawfulnesse of satisfy∣ing such concupiscence, or the designe to prosecute what he knoweth to be unlawful. Which last errours are so grosse, that no man ever avow∣ed them before himself. When lust hath con∣ceived, it bringeth forth sin, that is, when a man hath consented to the suggestion of his own sensuality. Though he scorn the School-men, yet he should do well to advise with his Doctors, whom he professeth to admire, before he plunge himself again into such a Whirly-pool.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 28.

IF I should give over the well known terms of the rational or intellectual will, so well grounded in nature, so well warranted by the authority and practise of all good Di∣vines and Philosophers, to comply with his humour or distemperd imaginations, I should right well deserve a Bable. The intellectual appetite, and the sensitive appetite, are both appetites, and in the same man they both proceed from the same soul, but by divers faculties, the one by the intellectual, the other by the sensitive; And proceeding from several faculties, they do differ as much as if they proceeded from several souls. The sen∣sitive appetite is organical, the intellectual appetite is inorganical; The sensitive appe∣tite followeth the judgement of the senses; The intellectual appetite followeth the judge∣ment of the understanding: The sensitive appetite pursueth present, particular, corporal delights; The intellectual appetite pursueth that which is honest, that which is future, that which is universal, that which is immor∣tal and spiritual. The sensitive appetite is de∣termined

by the object. It cannot chuse but pursue that object which the senses judge to be good, and flie that which the senses judge to be evill. But the intellectuall appetite is free to will, or nill, or suspend, and may reject that which the senses say to be good, and pursue that which the senses judge to be evil, according to the dictate of rea∣son.

Then to answer what he saith in particu∣lar. The appetite and the will are not alwayes the same thing. Every will is an appetite, but every appetite is not a will. Indeed in the same man, appetite and will is the same thing. (secluding natural appetite which concern∣eth not this question) but the sensitive appe∣tite, and the intellectual appetite are not the same thing, following several guides, pursu∣ing several objects, and being endowed with several priviledges. He demandeth whether sensual men and beasts do not deliberate and chuse one thing before another, in the same manner that wise men doe? Although he hath found out a bruitish kind of deliberation; if we take the word in the right sense, beasts cannot delibe∣rate. Sensual men may deliberate, but do not deliberate as they ought. And by conse∣quence beasts act necessarily, and cannot chuse: Sensual men do chuse, or may chuse, but do not chuse as they ought, not as wise men do. He saith it cannot be said of wills that one is rational, another sensitive. Not very pro∣perly;

but it may be said of appetites, That one is rational, another sensitive. And why not a rational will, as well as a rationall discourse. The will of a rationall Crea∣ture, rationally guided, is a rationall will; And so will be when we are dead and gone.

He concludeth, If it be granted that delibe∣ration is alwayes, (as it is not) there were no cause to call men rational more than beasts, for it is manifest by continuall experience, that beasts do deliberate. Such a deliberation as he phancieth is not worth contending for, good for nothing but to be thrown to the Dogs, or the Swine, An alternate ima∣gination, alternate hope and fear, an alternate appetite. Here is an heap of alternates, every one unlike another, and all of them as far distant from deliberation, as reason is from sense. Imagination is seated in the head, fear and hope in the heart: Appetite is neither the one nor the other. Yet this is all the deliberation, and all the reason which he attributeth to man; and he attributeth the same to bruit beasts, but not at all times. If they had this deliberation at all times, there were no cause to call men rational more than beasts. So the difference between a man and a beast is this, That men, or rather some men, are reasonable Creatures at all times, thanks to their own industry: and bruit beasts are reasonable creatures at some times. If he had

said that some men are but reasonable Crea∣tures at sometimes, I should rather have be∣lieved him for this discourse.

He is beholden to his Catachrestical ex∣pressions, for all the rest of his discourse in this Section. I take Liberty to be a power of the rational soule, or of the free Agent to chuse or refuse indifferently, upon de∣liberation. And he maketh liberty to be no more than the byas of a bowle, a strong inclination to one side, affixed by delibera∣tion. And by this abusive expression he thinketh to avoide the two arguments which were brought against him in this Section.

The former argument was this, If every Agent be necessitated to act what it doth act by extrinsecall causes, then he is no more free before deliberation, than after, which is demonstratively true of true liberty, but applying it to his new-fangled acception of liberty; He answereth, He is more free, but he is no lesse necessitated. Yet withall he confesseth that he is necessitated to deliberate as he doth, and to will as he doth; That is to say, He is necessitated to be free. This is a freedom of a free stone, not of a free man. If this be all the freedom which a man hath, we must bid adieu to all election. Then there is neither freedome of our will, nor of our actions, more than an in∣clination extrinsecally necessitated. And

then all those absurdities which he hath sought so earefully to avoid, tumble upon his head thick and threefold.

The second argument was this, Delibera∣tion doth produce no new extrinsecall impe∣diment, therefore either the Agent is free after deliberation, or he was not free before. He answereth, That he cannot perceive any more force of inference in these words, then of so many words put together at adventure. I won∣der at his dulnesse. He defineth liberty to be an absence of extrinsecal impediments. If this definition be true, then wheresoever there is the same absence of extrinsecal im∣pediments, there is the same liberty. But if deliberation produce no new extrinsecal im∣pediments, there is the same absence of ex∣trinsecal impediments, after deliberation which was before. Therefore upon his grounds there is the same liberty after deli∣beration which was before.

What he telleth of thoughts that arise in him that deliberateth, is nothing to the purpose, The last judgement is more than bare thoughts. But this maketh but an intrinse∣call determination, and a necessity upon sup∣position, not an extrinsecal determination, and an antecedent necessity, of which the question is between him and me. A man cannot have liberty to do or not to do, that which at the same time is already done. But a man may do that which he doth freely from all antece∣dent

necessity; and necessity upon supposition, is not destructive to liberty. He prophaneth the name of God, who maketh him to be corporal and divisible, to be compounded of substance and accidents, to be mutable, and to aquire and lose daily; not he who argueth soberly and submissively from the attributes or works of God.

Castigations of the Animadver∣sions, Num. 29.

HE hath given a proof lately of his Theology, now he pretendeth to shew his skill in Logick and Philosophy. He needeth not to tell us that he ac∣quired his knowledge by his own meditation, he is so long fumbling and spelling of every word. In the first place he giveth us the de∣finition of a definition. A right definition is that, (what? a right definition without a Genus?) which determineth the signification of the word defined. This definition agreeth as much to a Lexicon, as to a definition. By his leave, a right definition is an explication of the thing defined by the essential terms; those are the Genus and the difference.

His definition is but a poor description.

He confesseth, That the rule is good in defining to use first some general terme, and then to restrain the signification thereof, &c. He is but learn∣ing to spell in Logick, and yet is already cen∣suring. It is no marvel if he never thrive of the trade. It is not onely good, but a necessary rule, that in every perfect definition there be two notions; the one more common, where∣in the thing defined doth agree with other things, the other more distinct, wherein it differs from all other things. This was Platos doctrine, and Aristotles, and received by all Logicians ever since; and now he taketh upon him to be Judge of it, as Midas judged of Apollos musick.

He dislikes the termes, Genus and Differ∣ence, as too obscure for English Readers, and fit∣ter for Schoolemen, comprehending all Logici∣ans old and new under the name of Schole-men. Then why doth he himself use the term of Logick, and not rather witcraft, or definition, and not rather declaring? The vul∣gar Reader will understand his General term no better than genus, nor his new restraint; better than the old difference, but be ready to mistake his restraint of a general term, for the imprisonment of some Commander in Chief. But thus it must be done; first to render the people more benevolent to a man who studi∣eth nothing but their edification, and then to hide his own ignorance.

He pleadeth, That some words are so gene∣ral, that they cannot admit a more general. Yea, hath he found out that with his meditation? Every freshman in the University could have told him that, and much more, That omne quod perfecte definitur est species. He saith. I shall give him leave to cite some passages out of his book, de corpore. And he shall give me leave to sleight them and let them alone. If he will admit of humane authority, I am ready to bury him and his destiny in an heap of authorities. But for his own authority, I do not esteem it (more than he produceth reason) the value of a deafe nut.

At length he hath found us out a Genus and a Difference in his definition of liberty, but that I am such a beetle that I cannot see them. His genus is absence of impediments to action. Let him peruse all the tables of the predicaments and predicables, and if he find any such genus there, either summum or sub al∣ternum, he shall be my great Apollo. To make a genus of a privation that is an absence, nay an absence of impediments, was never heard of before, unlesse it be true in this case bina venena juvant, unlesse two privatives make one positive, and two negatives one affirma∣tive. His difference or restriction is worse, if worse may be, not contained in the nature of the Agent. So the essential difference is a ne∣gative also. His liberty must needs be a rare Jewel, which consisteth altogether of nega∣tives.

He chargeth me, That I require the matter and the form of the thing in the definition, but matter is a corporeal substance, and cannot be part of a definition. Whensoever he medleth with these things, he doth but shew his weak∣nesse; It were better for him to let them a∣lone. I do not say that genus and materia are all one; But I say that genus hath a great analogy with the first matter, and so may be materia analogica, which Porphyry upon the predicables might have taught him. The first matter is indeterminate to any form, so is the Genus to any difference; The matter is susceptible of opposite forms, so is the Genus of opposite differences. His reason That matter is corporeal, is as silly as his exception, and sheweth what a novice he is in Logick. There is intelligible matter, as well as sensible. As three lines are the matter of a triangle, and three propositions of a syllogisme.

He telleth us confidently, That a very ab∣sence is as reall as a very faculty. If he told it twice so confidently, we could not believe it, that a privation which is nothing, and out of all predicaments, should be as reall as a qua∣lity. Potential qualities ought to be defined by their efficients and proper acts, not by pri∣vations. But saith he, What if the word (defined) do signifie absence or negation? Then it cannot be defined, but onely described. And this description must not be by heaping together more negatives or privations, but by men∣tioning

the habits or powers whereof they are privations. What is this to liberty which is a potential quality?

I urged that by his definition of liberty a stone is tree to ascend into the aire, because there is no outward impediment to hinder it. He answered, That the stone is stopped by ex∣ternal impediments, otherwise it would either go upwards eternally, or it must stop it self; but it doth not ascend eternally, and I have confessed that nothing can move it self; And therefore he doubts not but I will confesse that nothing can stop it self. First his memory is very slippery. I never said that nothing can move it self: But if that will do him any good, I have often said the contrary. Secondly, he doth but flatter himself with vain hopes to think, that I will say nothing can stop it self. Although there were no resistance in the aire, when the ca∣sters force is ceased, the weight of the stone alone is sufficient to stop it. Thirdly, there have been those who have thought them∣selves as good Philosophers as he, who affirm∣ed that the stone did find no resistance in the aire, but was driven forwards by the follow∣ing aire towards the aire before it to prevent a Vacuum: That is far from resistance. Fourthly, Why might not I say as well, that upon his grounds, a stone is free to ascend into the aire, because there is no outward impedi∣diment to hinder it, as he might say, that the water is free to ascend up the channel; Men

never say that the water wanteth liberty to ascend, but power. Yet the water hath greater impe∣diments to ascend up the channel, than the stone hath to ascend in the aire. Lastly, this is without all doubt, that though a stone be not capable of moral liberty, yet if liberty were such a thing as he imagineth, by his de∣finition, a stone hath as much liberty to ascend up the aire, contrary to its natural appetite, as it hath to descend downwards according to its natural appetite, there being no extrinsecal impediment in the one motion more than in the other, the aire being more easily, or at least as easily driven upwards as downwards. Yet the stone stoppeth in its ascent, but not in its descent, (except it be accidentally) until it come to the earth.

To the rest of this Section he maketh an easie reply, That I talke so absurdly of the cur∣rent of Rivers, and of the motion of the Seas, and of the weight of water, that it cannot be corrected otherwise then by blotting it all out. He mi∣staketh but one word. It should have been, It cannot be answered by him otherwise than by blotting it all out.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 30.

ALthough his Paradoxes be contrary to the opinion of the whole World, yet in these five last Sections he hath not brought one argument to prove them, but onely explained his meaning, as if his own authority were proof sufficient. Now at last he bringeth two silly arguments. The first is this. Nothing taketh beginning from it self; Therefore the will taketh not beginning from it self, but from something without it self. I answered by distinguishing a beginning into a begin∣ning of being, and a beginning of working or action. No creature taketh its beginning of being from it self, because the being of all crea∣tures is a participated being, derived from the infinite and original being of God, in whom we live and move and have our being. But if he understand a beginning of action, it is a grosse errour to say, That nothing hath a beginning of its own actions or operations within it self. This is all I said, and this I said constantly. Then how uningenuously did he charge me in the last Section to have confessed, That nothing can move it self? And

in this Section accuse me of contradiction, for saying, That when a stone descendeth, the beginning of its motion is intrinsecal. Now to justifie himself, he saith, that from this which I did say, That finite things cannot be produced by themselves, he can conclude that the act of willing is not produced by the faculty of willing. If he could do as much as he saith, yet it was not ingenuously done, to feign that I had confessed all that which he thinketh he can prove, & that I contradicted my self, when I contradicted his conclusions. But let us see how he goeth about to prove it. He that hath the faculty of willing, hath the faculty of wil∣ling something in particular. In good time. This looketh not like a demonstration. But let that passe; And at the same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same. How, two faculties, the one of willing, the other of nil∣ling?. Hola. He hath but one faculty, and that is a faculty of willing or nilling some∣thing in particular, not of willing and nilling. He proceedeth, If therefore the faculty of wil∣ling be the cause he willeth any thing whatsoever, for the same reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of nilling it; And so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same time, which is absurd. I deny his consequence. It doth not follow that because the Agent hath power to will or nill indifferently, therefore he hath power to will and nill contradicto∣rily. He may chuse indifferently, whether he

will write or not, but he cannot chuse both to write and not to write at the same time con∣tradictorily. It doth not follow that because the Agent hath power to will or nill indiffer∣ently, before he do actually either will or nill, therefore when he doth will actually, he hath power to nill at the same time. Hath he forgotten that old foolish rule, Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is? How of∣ten must I tell him, that in the place of an absolute antecedent necessity, he seeketh to obtrude upon us hypothetical neces∣sity?

He proceedeth, It seems the Bishop had for∣gotten that matter and power are indifferent to con∣trary formes and contrary acts. No I had not forgotten it, but he had fogotten it: To say that the matter is indifferent to contrary formes, and yet necessitated antecedently to one form, or that power is indifferent to con∣trary acts, and yet necessitated antecedently to one act, is a ratling contradiction. He saith, That it is somewhat besides the matter that determineth to a certain form, and something besides the power that produceth a certain act. I acknowledge it, and it is the onely piece of sense that is in this Section. I made this ob∣jection to my self in my defence, and answer∣ed it in these words.

Yet I do not deny that there are other be∣ginnings of humane actions, which do con∣cur with the will, some outward as the first

cause by general influence, which is ever∣more requisite, Angels or men by perswad∣ing, evil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility; some inward, as the under∣standing by directing; so passions and acqui∣red habits. But I deny that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to one, except God alone, who doth it rarely in extraordi∣nary cases; And where there is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liber∣ty.

Where he maketh, The beginning of motion in a stone thrown upwards, and a stone descending downwards, to be both in the stone; it is but a poor trifling homonymy, as the most part of his Treatise is. The beginning of motion in a stone ascending is in the stone subjectively, but not effectively, because that motion pro∣ceedeth not from the form of the stone. But in the descent of the stone, the beginning of motion is both subjectively and effectively in the stone. And what he telleth us of a for∣mer motion in the ambient body, aire or water, to make the stone descend, is needlesse and frustra∣neous. Let him but withdraw the pin that holdeth the slate upon the house against its natural inclination, and he shall see presently there needeth no motion in the ambient body to make the stone drop down.

He adviseth me to consider with what grace I can say, that necessary causes do not alwayes produce their effects, except those effects be also necessarily produced. Rather let him consider with what grace he can mis-recite that which I say, by leaving out the word necessary. I said necessary causes do not alwayes produce ne∣cessary effects; and I can say that with better grace than he can deny it. When necessary Agents and free Agents are conjoynt in the production of the same effect, the effect is not antecedently necessary. I gave him an instance. Protagoras writ a book against the gods, De dis utrum sint utrum non sint nihil ha∣beo dicere. The Senate ordered his book to be burned for it. Although the fire be a ne∣cessary Agent, yet because the Senators were free Agents, the burning of his book was not antecedently necessary.

Where I say that the will is not a necessary cause of what it willeth in particular action•…•…, He inferreth, That there are no universal acti∣ons, and if it be not a necessary cause of particu∣lar actions, it is the necessary cause of no actions; And again, he would be glad to have me set down what voluntary actions (not particular) those are which are necessitated. It is scarcely possible for a man to expresse himself more clearly than I did, but clearly or unclearly, all is one to him, who is disposed to cavil. I did not oppose particular acts to universal acts, but to a collection of all voluntary acts

in general, qua tales, as they are voluntary. It is necessary, That all acts generally which proceed from the will, should be voluntary; and so the will is a necessary cause of volun∣tary acts, that is, of the voluntarinesse of them. But the will is not a necessary cause of the particular acts themselves. As upon sup∣position that a man be willing to write, it is necessary that his writing be voluntary, be∣cause he willeth it: But put the case without any supposition, and it is not necessary that he should write, or that he should will to write, because it was in his own power, whe∣ther he would write or not. So the volunta∣rinesse of all acts in general, proceeding from the will, is necessary, but the acts them∣selves were not necessary before the free A∣gent had determined himself; and then but upon supposition.

His excepting against these common ex∣pressions, The will willeth, or the will may either will or suspend its acts, is but seeking of a knot in a bullrush. It is all one, whether one say the will willeth, or the man willeth, or the will may will or suspend its act, or the man may will or suspend his acts. Scaliger saith that volo velle is a proper speech, I will will, and received by the common consent of all nations. If he had any thing of moment to insert into his Animadversions, he would not make use of such Leptologies. Canting is not chargable upon him, who useth common and known

terms of art, but upon him who deviseth new terms, as Canters do, which die with their inventers. He asketh, How can he that willeth at the same time suspend his will? Rather why doth he insert into his demand at the same time. It is enough to liberty, if he that willeth could have suspended his will. All this answer of mine to his second argument was illustrated by the instance of the election of a Pope, to which he opposeth nothing but It may be, and it doth not follow, and I would be glad to know by what arguments he can prove that the election was not necessitated. I have done it sufficiently all over in this Treatise. I am now answering to what he produceth, not proving. If he have any thing to demand, let him go to the Cardinals, and inquire of them, whether they be such fools, to keep such a deal of needlesse stir, if they were atecedent∣ly necessitated to chuse one certain man Pope, and no other.

Castigations of the Animadversion, Num. 31. and Num. 32.

I Joyne these two Sections together, be∣cause they concern one and the same thing: namely, Whether every sufficient cause do necessarily effect whatsoever it is sufficient for: Or which is the same in effect, Whether a free Agent, when all things are present which are needful to produce an effect, can, neverthelesse, not produce it. Which question may be understood two wayes, either inclusively, or exclusively, either including and comprehending the will of the Agent, under the notion of sufficiency, and among things requisite to the producing of the effect; so as the cause is not reputed to be sufficient, except it have both ability and will to produce the effect, and so as both requisite power, and requisite will, do con∣cur; and then there is no question but the effect will infallibly follow, Posita causa poni∣tur effectus; or else it may be understood ex∣clusively, not comprehending the will under the notion of sufficiency, or not reckoning it among the necessary requisites to the pro∣duction of the effect; so as the Agent is sup∣posed

to have power and ability to produce the effect, but no will. And then it is as in∣fallibly true on the other side, that the effect cannot be produced. Thus far this questi∣on is a meer Logomachy or contention about words, without any reall difference. And T. H. doth but abuse his Readers, to keep a jangling and a stir about no∣thing.

But in truth the water stopeth not here. If he should speak to the purpose, he should leave these shallows. If the will of the free Agent be included under the notion of suffi∣ciency, and comprehended among those things which are requisite to the production of the effect, so as both sufficient ability, and sufficient wil, are required to the making a suf∣ficient cause. Then it cometh to be considered in the second place, whether the will in things external be under God, in the power and disposition of the free Agent himself, which is the common opinion of all men, who un∣derstand themselves. And then the pro∣duction of the effect is onely necessary hypo∣thetically, or upon supposition, that the free Agent is willing. Or else, Whether the will of the free Agent be not in his own power and disposition, but determined antecedently by extrinsecal causes, which is the paradoxi∣cal opinion of T. H. and then the production of the the effect is, absolutely, and antece∣dently, necessary.

So still the question is where it was, and all his bustling about sufficiency and effici∣ency, and deficiency is but labour in vain. If he would have spoken any thing at all to the purpose, he should have attempted to prove that, every sufficient cause (excluding the will) that is, every cause which hath sufficient power and ability, doth necessaryly produce whatso∣ever it is able to produce, though the Agent be unwilling to produce it; or that the will of the Agent is not in his own power and disposition. We expect proofs, not words. But this he could not do, for he himself in this very Treatise, hath several times distinguish∣ed between liberty and power; telling us that a sick man hath liberty to go, but want∣eth power; And that a man who is bound hath power to go, but wanteth liberty. If he that is bound hath power to go, then he hath sufficient power to go, for unsufficient power cannot produce the effect. And so by his own confession an Agent may have sufficient power, and yet cannot necessarily, nor yet possibly, produce the effect.

I urged, That God is sufficient to produce many Worlds, but he doth not produce them; therefore a sufficient cause dorh not ne∣cessarily produce all those effects which it is sufficient to produce. He answereth, That the meaning is that God is sufficient to produce them if he will. Doth he not see that it followeth inevitably from hence, That there may be a

sufficient cause without will? Doth he not see likewise from hence plainly, that for those things which are within the power of man, he is sufficient also to produce them if he will. So still he would obtrude a necessity of supposition; If a man will, for an abso∣lute necessity. That which is but necessary conditionally, If a man will, is not necessary absolutely. And he confesseth that without this supposition, If he will, a man is not sufficient to produce any voluntary action.

I added other instances, as this, That the passion of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind, and so is acknowledged by all Christians, yet all mankind shall not be saved by virtue of his passion, therefore there may be a sufficient cause without production of the effect. This is the language of holy Scripture, Which of you intending to build a Tower, sitteth not down first and counteth the cost, whether he have [sufficient] to finish it? That is, as our Saviour expoundeth himself in the next verse, whether he be able to finish it. So St. Paul saith, Who is sufficient for these things? that is, Who is able for these things? When God saith, What could I have done more for my vine∣yard, that I have not done? God had given them sufficient means, and could have given them more, if they had been more capable; but because they were wanting to themselves, these sufficient means were not efficacious. I looked for grapes, saith God; How could God

look for grapes, if he had not given them sufficient means to bring forth grapes? yet these sufficient means were not effica∣cious.

These things being premised, do answer whatsoever he saith; as this, The Bishop thinks two Horses may be sufficient to draw a Coach, though they will not draw, &c. I say they may be sufficient in point of power and ability, though they will not draw. Many men have sufficient power to do what they will not do. And if the production of the effect do depend upon their wills, or upon their contingent and uncertain endeavours, or if their sufficiency be but conditional, as he maketh it, if they be not lame or resty, then the production of the effect is free or contingent, and cannot be antece∣dently necessary. For otherwise all these conditions and suppositions are vain.

Where he chargeth me to say, That the cause of a Monster is unsufficient to produce a Monster, he doth me wrong, and himself more. I never said any such thing. I hope I may have leave to speak to him in his own words. I must take it for an untruth, untill he cite the place, where I have said so. I have said, and I do say, That the cause of a Mon∣ster was unsufficient to produce a man, which nature and the free Agent intended, but it was sufficient to produce a Monster, other∣wise a Monster had not been produced.

When an Agent doth not produce what he and nature intend; but produceth a Mon∣ster instead of a Man, it is proof enough of his insufficiency to produce what he should, and would have produced, if he could. Where he addeth, That that which is sufficient to produce a Monster, is not therefore to be called an insufficient cause to produce a Man, no more than that which is sufficient to produce a man, is to be called an insufficient cause to produce a Monster, is even as good sense, as if a man should say, He who hath skill sufficient to hit the white, is insufficient to misse the white.

He pretendeth that sensus divisus, and com∣positus is nonsense, (though they be Logical terms of art) And what I say of the power of the will to forbear willing, or the dominion of the will over its own acts, or the power of the will in Actu primo, he saith are as wild words, as ever were spoken within the walls of Bedlam, though they be as sad truths as the founders of Bed∣lam themselves could have uttered. And the Authours who used them, the greatest wits of the World, and so many, that ten Bedlams could not hold them. But it may be he would have the Scene changed, and have the wisest sort of men thrust into Bedlam, that he might vent his Paradoxes more freely. So Festus accused Saint Paul of madnesse, Paul Paul, much learning hath made thee mad.

In the definition of a free Agent, Which when all things needful to the production of the effect are present, can neverthelesse not produce it. They understood all things needful in point of ability, not will. He telleth us gravely, That Act and Power differ in nothing but in this, That the former signifieth the time present, the later the time to come. As if he should tell us, That the cause and the effect differ nothing, but that the effect signifieth the time present, and the cause the time to come.

Lastly he saith, That except I shew him the place where he shuffled out effects producible, and thrust into their place effects produced, he will take it for an untruth. To content him I shall do it readily, without searching far for it. My words were these, [The question is whe∣ther effects producible be free from necessity: He shuffles out effects producible, and thrusts in their places, effects produced.] Now that he doth this, I prove out of his own words in the Section preceding. Hence it is manifest, That whatsoever is produced, is produced necessa∣rily: For whatsoever is preduced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had non been. Let the Reader judge if he have not here shuffled effects producible out of the que∣stion, and thrust into their places effects produced. The question is whether effects producible be necessarily produced; He

concludeth in the place of the contradicto∣ry, That effects actually produced, are necessary.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 33.

HE saith, That to define what Spontaneity, Deliberation, Will, Propension, Appetite, a free Agent, and Liberty is, and to prove that they are well defined; there can be no other proof offered, but every mans own experience and memory, what he meaneth by such words. I do readily believe all this to be true, in order to his own opinions; That there neither is, nor can be any proof of them but imagination. But his reason was shot at ran∣dom; For definitions being the beginning of all demonstration, cannot themselves be domonstrated, that is proved to another man. Doth he take all his particular imaginations to be so many definitions or demonstrations? He hath one conception of Spontaneity, of Deliberation, of a free Agent, of Liberty, I have another. My conception doth not prove my opinion to be true, nor his conception prove his opini∣on to be true; but our conceptions being con∣trary, it proveth either his, or mine, or both

to be false. Truth is a conformity, or con∣gruity of the conceptions of the mind with the things themselves, which are without the mind, and of the exteriour speech as the signe, with the things and conceptions, as the things signified. So there is a threefold truth; The first is objective in the things themselves; The second is conformative in the concep∣tions of the mind; The third is signative or significative in speech or writing. It is a good proceeding to prove the truth of the inward conceptions of the mind, from their conformity with the things themselves; but it is vain and ridiculous to prove the truth of things from their agreement, with the con∣ceptions of my mind, or his mind. The Clocks may differ, but the course of the Sun is certain. A mans words may not agree with his thoughts, nor his thoughts agree with the things themselves.

But I commend his prudence in this, and in this onely, That he hath chosen out a way of proof that cannot be confuted with∣out his own consent, because no man know∣eth another mans inward conceptions but himself. And the better to secure himself, he maketh his English Reader judge of La∣tine words, and his ignorant Readers judge of words of art. These are the fittest Judges for his purpose. But what if the terms be obscure? He answereth, If the words be unusa∣al, the way must be to make the definition of their

signification by mutual consent. What mutual consent? The signification of these words was setled by universall consent and cu∣stome; And must they be unsetled a∣gain, to satisfie the homour of every odd Paradoxical person, who could find no way to get himself reputation, but by blon∣dring all things? He telleth us that the School-men use not to argue by rule, but as Fencers use to handle weapons by quicknesse of the hand and eye, The poor School-men cannot rest quietly in their graves for him, but he is still persecu∣ting their ashes, because they durst presume to soare a pitch above his capacity. The Scool-men were the most exact observers of rules in the whole World, as if they had been composed altogether of rules. But they ob∣served not his rule, That whatsoever any man imagineth a word to be, that it is. Much good may his Lesbian rule doe him, which he may bend this way or that way at his pleasure. It is just such another rule as the Parish Clarks rule of the time, who preferred the Clock before a Dial, because he set it ac∣cording to his own imagination.

He asketh me (for he is much better at making knots than loosing them) what I will answer if he shall ask me how I will judge of the causes of things, whereof I have no idea or con∣ception in mine own mind? As if there were no mean, but either a man must want all inward notions and conceptions, or else he must

make his own imaginations to be the touch∣stone of truth. Nulla lux, and nimia lux, no light, and too much light, are both enemies to the sight. So to take away all inward conceptions, and to ground the true be∣ing and nature of things upon our fallible conceptions, are both enemies to the truth.

Albeit, He dare say (as he is bold enough, whilest the danger is but in words) that if one should ask an ordinary person whether our Antipodes should have their heads upwards or downwards, they would tell him as signifi∣cantly as any Scholler, that their heads were upwards, because they are towards Heaven; And that when they say there is no body in that room, they mean no more but there is no body that can be seen; Or when they say that vessel is empty, they do apprehend it to be full of air: Yet neither I, nor these ordinary per∣sons themselves do believe him. How should they apprehend such things rightly, until they be better informed both of the figure of the earth, and the nature of the air, than they are by their senses. He saith, The que∣stion is not, Whether such and such Tenets be true; but whether such and such words can be well defined, without thinking on the things they signi∣fie? I should be glad to find him once stating of a question truly. The question is not whe∣ther such and such words can be well defined without thinking on the things they signifie;

but whether every thought or every imagi∣nation of every odde phantastick person, or of the common people, be a right determi∣nation of the true sense and signification of every word. They who do not understand the distinct natures of things signified, cannot understand the right significations of words, which are but signs of things.

Right discipline or learning and good in∣struction, doth not onely enable a man to rea∣son truly in more numerous or various matters, but to reason more truly and exactly in all matters. Yea, even in those things which we have learned from our own senses and memo∣ries. As I shewed him before in the instance of the Sun, which sense judgeth to be no greater than a ball, but learning and reason do convince us that it is many times greater than the Globe of the Earth. If he will not admit this to be matter of fact, let him try if he can perswade us that it is matter of right. A mans sense and memory doth teach him, that the lightening is long done before the thunderclap begin, but being better instruct∣ed we know it to be otherwise. In vain were so may rules and precepts in Logick, if they did not teach us to reason better, as well as to reason in more numerous and various mat∣ters.

He inveigheth against Impostors as bad masters, deceivers or deceived, that teach for truth all that hath been dictated to them by their own in∣terest;

And doth not see or will not see, that no man is so much concerned in this repre∣hension as himself, who without these Para∣doxes had continued still a cypher and signi∣fied nothing. If there be any changlings, it is no other than himself, not by any inchantment of words not understood, but by his own over∣weening and vain-glorious conceits. He re∣citeth it as a saying of mine that [matter of fact is not verified by sense and memory, but by Arguments.] I never said so, And until he produce my words, I must put it into the ca∣talogue of his untruths. Neither did I, nor any Schooleman ever say, That the testi∣mony of a witnesse is the onely verifier of matter of fact, or that it doth not consist in sense and memory, or that it doth consist in Arguments and Syllogismes. These are his own collections and consequences, which hang together like ropes of sand.

He asketh, How can an unlearned man be brought to think the words he speakes ought to signifie, when he speakes sincerely, any thing else but that which he himself meaneth by them? Right, he cannot be brought to think that they do signifie otherwise than they do signi∣fie. But although he meant never so sincere∣ly, he may be brought to think that the signi∣fication by him used was improper, and that which he said according to the right sense of the words was untrue. As a man might say sincerely enough, that water is moister or

more humide than aire, by the seeming war∣rant of his sense. And yet upon better instru∣ction reform his judgement, and acknowledge that then he did not understand truly what moist or humid did signifie.

To that which I urged, That to love any thing and to think it good, is not the same thing; He answereth no more but this, That he doth not think so: As if he were some oracle of truth, or some great Lawyer declaring his opinion to his poor ignorant Clients. Let him reserve his thoughts for his credulous Schol∣lars. His next mistake is much worse. This was but in a word, but that is in a thing, eter∣nity. He would have his Reader believe, that some body holdeth, That eternity is this present instant of time; And that the next instant is eternity after this: And consequently, that there are as many eternities as there be instants in time. He doth but dream waking. Surely never any man since the beginning of the World did hold any part of this. That eter∣nity should be a part of time; Time is but the measure of motion, eternity was before motion. Time succeeding doth repair the losses of time passing. But God who is infi∣nite can acquire nothing, can lose nothing. Suppose a body to be infinite actually, it could have no middle, no extremities, but every point of it should be a center. So in the in∣finite eternity of God, there can be no extre∣mities of past or to come, but a present inter∣minable

possession of life. His ignorance is his best plea•…•…. Let him learn to cite his Ad∣versaries sayings more ingenuously, or hold his peace for ever, and keep his Paradoxes to himself. And not shew himself like the A∣thenians, who being well beaten by the Cre∣tians, and having no other way to revenge themselves, invented feigned stories of Bulls and Minotaures.

Being taken tripping in an apparent con∣tradiction about Spontaneity, making it to be considerate proceeding, and inconsiderate pro∣ceeding, or nothing, he hath no more mind to meddle with it, but quitteth his hands of it in these termes. It is no English; But let it sig∣nifie what it will, provided it be intelligible, it would make against me. Had not this man need to have credulous Readers, who before he knoweth what the word signifieth, knoweth by instinct that it would make against me. Just like that Mountebanck, who having made a long Oration to his hearers of the rare virtues of a feather, which he affirmed to have dropt from the wing of Michael the Archangel; And the feather being stolen from under his sleeve out of drollery, and a cinder put in the place of it, to try his hu∣mour, he went on confidently with his di∣scourse; telling them that though it was not the feather which he had mentioned, yet it was one of the coles which S. Laurence was broiled with, and had all those virtues which

he had formerly ascribed to the feather. So whether Spontaneity be a feather or a cole, it hath still the same virtue. And if it be any thing it would make against me. If it be all one to consider of the fittest means to obtain a de∣sired end or object, and consider of the good and evil sequeles of an action to come, Why did he change the definition generally received, to make a shew of difference where there is none by his own account?

I was willing to have brought him to his right wits, that he might have acknowledged himself a reasonable man; but seeing he is so peremtory that all the reason and understanding which man hath is but imagination; And weighing his ground, that he finds it so in him∣self by considering his own thoughts and ratiocina∣tions, and, which worketh with me more than all his confidence, finding his writings more full of phantasie than of judgement; I begin to relent, and am contented to come to an accord with him, that he, and such as he can gain to be of his mind, shall have the priviledge of phantasticks, provided that other men may still retain their old reason. Moreover I confesse that when I left other businesse to examine his writings, I did meet with greater trifles than I did before.

I would gladly save his credit, but he plun∣geth himself into so many grosse errours, that Ipsa si cupi at salus servare prorsus non potest. Now he telleth us that deliberation is nothing

else but so many wills alternatively changed, as if deliberation was but the measuring of a rod by inches, with his thumbs alterna∣tively; he wills, he wills not, he wills, he wills not, &c. And as the last thumb-breadth happeneth, So the Agent either willeth or nilleth. Before he made but one will, now he maketh I know not how many alternate wills. Before he made deliberation to be a consideration of the good or evil sequeles of an action. The will is an appetite, not a con∣sideration. The will is blind and cannot consider. Wise men use to look before they leap, and consider before they will. But he may have the priviledge to have his will stand for his reason, Stat pro ratione voluntas. So whilest the byas of his bowle is changing from the one side to the other alternatively by extrinsecal causes, the bowle is delibera∣ting.

I confesse I wondered at his definition of a free Agent, He that can do if he will, and for∣bear if he will; not that I did not foresee what paradoxical sense he would give it; but why he should retain the antient terms. I re∣member well his distinction between freedom to do if a man will, and forbeare to do if he will, and freedom to will if he will, and to nill if he will. And have made bold now and then to represent what a vain, false, uselesse, contradictory distinction it is, and I believe it lieth at the last gasp. But I might have saved

my labour. I used but one short argument in this place; either the Agent can will and forbear to will, or he cannot do and forbear to do, and it driveth him into a contradicti∣on. There is no doubt a man can will one thing or other, and forbear to will it. If a man can will and forbear to will the same thing, then he can will if he will, and forbear if he will. Where he maketh the state of the question to be, Whether a man to day can chuse to mor∣rows will? either he feigneth or mistaketh grossely. I will never trust him with stating of questions, or citing of testimo∣nies.

Although it be his turn now to prove, and mine to defend my self, and my cause, from his objections, yet he is still calling for proofes; And which is worse, would have me to prove negatives, when he himself can∣not prove affirmatives. How doth it follow (saith he) that a stone is as free to ascend as de∣scend, unlesse he prove there is no outward impedi∣ment to its ascent, which cannot be proved, for the contrary is true? Or how proveth he that there is no outward impediment to keep that point of the Loadstone which placeth it self towards the North, from turning from the South? First for the stone the case is clear, there is no other extrinsecal impediment to the stone ascending or de∣scending, but the Medium thorough which it passeth. Now the Medium is supposed to be the same, that is, the air equally disposed.

The air is as easily driven upwards as down∣wards; And therefore though the air give some impediment to the motion upwards, yet it giveth the same impediment at least to the motion downwards; And therefore the impediment being as vincible upwards as downwards, if the cause of motion were the same, and the presence or absence of extrin∣secal impediments being the same, it follow∣eth clearly upon his grounds, that the stone is as free to ascend as descend. Next for the Loadstone, I prove that there is no extrinse∣cal impediment which holdeth it from turn∣ing to the South, by sense and reason; both mine own, and all other mens, by the com∣mon consent of the World, and by his silence who is not able to pretend any impediment that is probable, without the stone, except it be in some other body far distant, which will render the difficulty the same.

His next passage is ridiculous. An Hawke wants liberty to flie when her wings are tyed, but it is absurd to say, she wants liberty to flie when her wings are plucked. So she wanted no li∣berty to flie when she was naked and newly hatched; So he himself wanteth no liberty to flie from hence to China. He saith, Men that speak English, use to say when her wings are plucked, that she cannot flie. So they use to say likewise when her wings are tyed. He de∣mandeth, Whether it be not proper language to say a bird or a beast are set at liberty from the

cage wherein they were imprisoned? What it may be at another time, when men are dis∣coursing upon another subject, is not mate∣terial at this time, and as to this subject which we are about, it is most impertinent and im∣proper. He himself as partial as he is, cannot think that this liberty is any thing to that mo∣ral liberty which renders a man capable of reward or punishment, any more that a Taylors measure is to the measure of mo∣tion.

I said and say again, That nothing can begin to be without a cause, and that nothing can cause it self. Yet I say many things do begin to act of themselves. This (he saith) is to contradict my self, because I make the action to begin without a cause. This is not the first time that he hath noted this for a contra∣diction. I shall sooner salve the contra∣diction, than he save his credit. As if the Agent and the Action were the same thing? Or as if the Agent was not the cause of the Action? Or as if there were any consequence in this; The Agent cannot begin to be of himself, therefore he cannot begin to act of himself? Or he cannot cause himself, there∣fore he cannot cause his action. Nothing can cause it self, but that which is caused by one thing, may cause another. Whereas he addeth, That it hath been proved former∣ly, that every sufficient cause is a necessary cause, and that is but Iargon to say free causes deter∣mine

themselves, it is but a puffe of his vain glorious humour. He hath made nothing to appear but his own ignorance and mi∣stakes.

In the later end of this Section, I made bold to make some serious demands to Mr. Hobs, which did not at all reflect upon him in particular, but at those natural notions which are common to all mankind.

The first demand was, Whether he doth not find by experience that he doth many things which he might have left undone if he would, &c. He answereth, Yet if he would, but he maketh it impossible for him to have had any other will. So he doth as good as tell us, that he might have done them upon an impossible condition or supposition; as he himself might have flown over sea if he had had a paire of wings. This is a contradiction indeed implied; first to say he might have done otherwise, and then to adde an impossible condition which makes his propo∣sition negative. I am sure it is not fairly done to avoide the scope and meaning of the de∣mand.

The second question was, Whether he do not some things out of meer animosity and will without regard to the direction of right reason, &c. He answereth, This question was in vain, unlesse I thought my self his confessor. No, it is enough, I desire not to intrude into his secrets.

My third demand (as he saith) was, Whe∣ther he writ not this defence of necessity against liberty, onely to shew that he will have a dominion over his own actions. He answereth, No, but to shew that he had no do∣minion over his will, and this at my request. My request was, That what he did upon this subject, should rather be in writing than by word of mouth. It seemeth that I had the dominion over his will. So might I come to be questioned for all his Para∣doxes. The truth is, This was no distinct question, but a Corollary of the second que∣stion.

My third demand was, Whether he be not angry with those who draw him from his study, or crosse him in his desires, and why he is angry with them, (if they be necessitated to do what they do) any more than he is an∣gry with a sharp winter, &c. This is wholly omitted by him.

The last demand was, Whether he do not sometimes blame himself, and say, O what a fool was I, to do thus, or thus; Or with to himself, O that I had been wise, and why he doth this if he were irresistibly necessitated to do all things that he doth. He might as well have wished, O that I had not breathed, or O what a fool was I to grow old. To this he answereth nothing, but subtle questions, and full of Episcopal gra∣vity;

And that he thinks in this question, I will appear the greater fool; supposing that I meant to put the fool upon him, which I professe my self to be innocent of; as he might have found by these words inserted among the questions, Which wise men find in themseves sometimes. Though I jest sometimes with his cause, or his arguments, I do not meddle with his person, further than to condemne his vain-glorious pre∣sumption, to arrogate so much to himself. Though I have not half so great an opinion of him as he hath of himself, yet I wish his humilility were answerable to his wit. Thus of four questions he hath quite omitted one, neglected another, refused to answer a third, and answered the fourth contrary to the scope of the question.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 34.

HIs bragging humour will not leave him, he still forgetteth Epictetus his sheep. He saith When I shall have read over his Animadversions, Num. 31. I will think otherwise, whatsoever I will confesse. Male ominatis parcito verbis. I should sooner turn Manichee, and make two Gods, one of good, the other of evil, than to make the true God to be the cause of all evill. But there is no danger either of the one or of the other. I have read over his Animadver∣sions, Num. 31. I have weighed them, and I professe I find nothing in them worthy of a Divine, or a Philosopher, or an ingenious person, who made a sad inquisition after truth, nor any thing that doth approach within a German mile of the cause in con∣troversie. And so I leave him to the Casti∣gations.

That his two instances of casting ambs ace and raining to morrow, are impertinent, ap∣peareth by these two reasons, First the questi∣on is of free actions, these two instannes are of

contingent actions. Secondly the question is of antecedent necessity, these instances are of an hypothetical necessity. And though I used the beauty of the World as a Medium to prove liberty, wherein contingency is in∣volved, yet this doth not warrant him to give over the principal question, and to start and pursue new questions at his pleasure. But let him be of good comfort, be they per∣tinent or impertinent, they shall not be neg∣lected.

Because I would not blonder as he doth, I distinguished actions into four sorts. First, The actions of free Agents. Secondly, The actions of free and natural Agents mixed. Thirdly, The actions of bruit beasts. Fourth∣ly, The actions of natural inanimate causes. Of these four sorts the first onely concerneth the question, and he according to his custom quite omitteth it; yet it was of more mo∣ment and weight, than all he saith in this Section put together. [A man proportioneth his time each day, and allotteth so much to his devotions, so much to his study, so much to his dyet, so much to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil visit, so much to his rest. He that will seek for I know not what necessary causes of all this without him∣self, (except that good God, who hath given him a reasonable soul) may as well seek for a necessary cause of the Egyptian Pyramides among the Crocodiles of Nilus.] This di∣stinction

of a mans time, is an act of domi∣nion, done on purpose to maintain his domi∣on over his actions, against the encroach∣ments of sensual delights.

He saith here upon the by, That he know∣eth no action that proceedeth from the liberty of mans will. And again, A mans will is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing. Yet he hath often told us, That a man is free to do if he will, and not to do if he will. If no action proceed from the liberty of the will, then how is a man free to do if he will. Before he told us, He is free to do a thing that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear it if be have the will to forbear it. If the liberty of the will be nothing, then this supposition, If he have the will, is nothing, but an impossibility. And here to all that I have said formerly against that frivolous distinction, I shall adde an undoubted rule both in law and Logick. A conditional proposition, having an impossible condition annexed to it, is equipollent to a simple negative. He who is free to write if he will, if it be impossible for him to will, is not free to write at all, no more than he is free to will. But this Castle in the aire hath been beaten down often enough about his ears.

Where I say that [contingent actions do proceed from the indetermination or contin∣gent concurrence of natural causes] my in∣tention was not to exclude contingent deter∣mination,

but necessary determination ac∣cording to an antecdent necessity, which he hath been so far from proving unanswerably, that he hath as good as yeilded the cause, in his case of Ames ace, by making the neces∣sity to be onely upon supposition.

Concerning mixt actions partly free and partly necessary, he saith, That for proof of them, I instance in a tile falling from an house which breaketh a mans head, How often must I tell him, that I am not now proving, but an∣swering that which he produceth? He may find proofes enough to content him, or rather to discontent him, in twelve Sections together, from the fifth to the eighteenth: And upon the by thoroughout the whole book. He who proveth that election is alwayes inter plura, and cannot consist with antecedent de∣termination to one, proveth that that man who did elect or chuse to walk in that street, at that very time when the stone fell, though he knew not of it, was not antecedently ne∣cessitated to walke there: And if any one of all those causes which concur to the produ∣ction of an effect be not antecedently necessa∣ry, then the effect is not antecedently neces∣sary, for no effect can exceed the virtue of its cause.

He saith, I should have proved that such con∣tingent actions are not antecedently necessary, by a concurrence of natural causes, though a little be∣fore I granted they are. First he doth me wrong,

I never granted it, either before or after. It is a foule fault in him to mistake himself, or his adversary, so often. Secondly, it is alto∣gether improper and impertinent to our pre∣sent controversie. Let him remember what he himself said. If they (the instances of ca∣sting ambs ace and raining to morrow) be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of mans will, he doth impertinently to meddle with them. Not so neither by his leave. Though I re∣fuse to prove them formally, or write Vo∣lumes about them, yet I do not refuse to an∣swer any thing which he doth or can pro∣duce. Such is his argument which followeth immediately. Whatsoever is produced by con∣currence of natural causes, was antecedently de∣termined in the cause of such concurrence, though contingent concurrence. He addeth, That though I perceive it not, concurrence and contin∣gent concurrence are all one. It may be in his Dialect, which differs from the received Dia∣lect of all Schollars, but not in the Dialect of wiser and learneder men. To his argument, (pardoning his confounding of natural and voluntary causes) I answer, That if he speak of the immediate adaequate cause as it is a cause in act, without doubt he saith truth, Causa proxima in actu posita, impossible est non s•…•…qui effectum. But he told us of a necessary connexion of all causes from eternity, and if he make not this good, he saith nothing. If he intend it in this sense, I deny his assertion,

That whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes, was antecedently determin∣ed from eternity. As for instance that the ge∣neration of a monster which nature or the Agent never intended, was necessary from eternity, or necessary before the contingence was determined.

Concerning the individual actions of brute beasts, that they should be necessitated to every act they do from eternity; As the bee (for example) how often she shall hum in a day, and how often she shall flie abroad to gather thyme, and whither, and how many flowers precisely she must suck, and no more, and such like acts; I had reason to say I see no ground for it. Yet the least of all these acts is known to God, and subject to his dispo∣sition. He telleth us, That he hath pointed out the ground in the former discourse. If he have, it is as the blind Senator (of whom I told him formerly) pointed the wrong way. All his intimations have received their an∣swers. But whereas I made an objection to my self, Are not two sparrows sould for a far∣thing? and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your father. He doth not deale clear∣ly to urge mine own objection, and conceale my answer. He doth not say, which your father casteth not down, or which your father doth not necessitate to fall, but without your father; That is, without your fathers know∣ledge, without his protection, without the in∣fluence

of his power, or which is exemted from your fathers disposition.

The last sort of actions are the natural actions of inanimate creatures, which have not the least pretence to liberty, or so much as spontaneity, and therefore were declined by me as impertinent to this question. Out of my words concerning these he argueth thus. If there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning, then there is no doubt but that all things happen necessarily: But there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning.

First I deny his consequence, and by it, he (who is so busie to take other mens heights in Logick, wherein he never medled yet but he was baffelled) may have his own height ta∣ken by them that are so disposed. There is scarce a freshman in the University but could have taught him the difference between causa efficiens physica, and voluntaria, the one acting by necessity of nature, the other freely according to deliberation. The former can∣not defer nor moderate its act, nor act op∣posite actions indifferently, but the later can. So though a necessary connexion of all natu∣ral causes were supposed, yet it inferreth not a necessary connexion of all voluntary causes.

Secondly, I deny his assumption, that there is a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning, for proof where∣of

he produceth nothing, nor is able to pro∣duce any thing. All he saith he alledgeth out of me, That it deserveth further examina∣tion. And from thence according to his wild roving imaginations, he draweth consequen∣ces from the staff to the corner, that have not the least grain of salt, or weight in them. As these, Hitherto he knows not whether it be true or no. And consequently all his arguments hi∣therto have been of no effect, nor hath he shewed any thing to prove, that elective actions are not necessitated. Thus his pen runneth over with∣out time or reason. He that would learn to build Castles in the air, had best be his Ap∣prentise. The truth is, I was not willing to go out of mine own profession, and therefore desired to hold my self to the question of liber∣ty, without medling with contingency; But yet with the same reservation that the Ro∣mans had in their Military Discipline; nec sequi, nec fugere, not to seek other questions, nor yet to thu•…•… them, if they were put upon me.

And now we are come to his two famous instances of casting ambs ace, and raining or not raining to morrow. I said that I had al∣ready answered what he produceth to prove all sufficient causes to be necessary causes. Now saith he, It seemeth that distrusting his former answer, he answereth again. O memory! he did not urge them in that place, neither did I answer them at all in that place. But

though he had urged them, and I answered them there, yet he repeating them, or en∣forcing them here, would he not have me to answer him? It is true that in another Secti∣on, upon the by, he hath been gravelled about his ambs ace, and therefore he treadeth ten∣derly still upon that foot. He saith, I bring no other argument to prove the cast thrown not to be necessarily thrown, but this that the caster did not deliberate. By his leave it is not truly said. I shewed undeniably, that the necessity upon which he buildeth is onely hypotheti∣cal. I enumerated all the causes which were or could be recited to make the necessity, As the dice, the positure of the casters hand, the measure of the force, the positure of the table, &c. And shewed clearly that there was not the least grain of antecedent necessity in any of them, which he is not able to answer, and therefore he doth well to be silent.

But if I had urged nothing else, This a∣lone had been sufficient to prove the caster a free Agent from his own principles. A free Agent (saith he) is he that hath not done deli∣berating. He who never began to deliberate hath not done deliberating. There can be no necessity imaginable why the caster should throw these dice rather than those other, or cast into this table rather than that, or use so much force and no more, but the casters will, or meer chance. The caster never de∣liberated nor so much as thought, of any one

of these things: And therefore it is unde∣niably apparent, that there was no necessity of casting ambs ace, but onely upon supposi∣tion, which is far enough from antecedent necessity.

But he pleadeth further, That from our ignorance of the particular causes that concurring make the necessity, I infer that there was no such necessity at all, which is that indeed which hath deceived me and all other men in this question. Whose fault was it then first to make this an instance, and then to plead ignorance? Be∣fore he was bold to reckon up all the causes of the antecedent necessity of this cast, and now when he is convinced that it is but a necessity upon suppositon, he is fain to plead ignorance. He who will not suffer the Loadstone to en∣joy its attractive virtue, without finding a reason for it in a fiddle-string, as Scoggin sought for the Hare under the leades, as well where she was not, as where she was, is glad to plead ignorance about the necessary causes of ambs ace. Whereas my reasons did evince not onely that the causes are unknown, but that there are no such causes antecedently necessitating that cast. Thus, If any causes did necessitate ambs ace antecedently, it was either the caster, but he thought not of it; or the dice, but they are square, no more inclin∣able to one cast than another, or the positure of the table, but the caster might have thrown into the other table, or the positure of the

hand, but that was by chance; or the measure of the force, but that might have been either more or lesse, or all of these together. But to an effect antecedently necessary, all the causes must be antecedently determined; where not so much as one of them is antece∣dently determined, there is no pretence of an∣tecedent necessity: Or it is some other cause that he can name, but he pleadeth ignorance. Yet I confesse the deceit lieth here, but it is on the other side, in the ignorant mistaking of an hypothetical necessity, for absolute antecedent necessity.

And here according to the advice of the Poet,

Nec deus inter sit nisi dignus vindice nodus Inciderit—

He calleth in the fore knowledge of God to his aid, as he doth alwayes when he findeth himself at a losse; but to no purpose. He him∣self hath told us, That it cannot be truly said, that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the thing known. God seeth not future contin∣gents in an antecedent certainty which they have in their causes, but in the events them∣selves, to which Gods infinite knowledge doth extend it self. In order of time one thing is before another, one thing is after another, and accordingly God knoweth them in

themselves to be one before another. But his knowledge is no beginning, no expiring act. Nothing is past, nothing is to come, but all things present to his knowledge, even those things which are future, with the manner of their futurition.

His casting ambs ace hath been unfortu∣nate to him, he will speed no better with his shower of rain. In the enterance to my an∣swer, and as it were the stating of the cause, I shewed that rain was more contingent in our Climate, than in many other parts of the World, where it is almost as necessary as the seasons of the year. I do not find so much weight in his discourse, as to occasionme to al∣ter one word, for which I could have produced authours enough, if I had thought it needful; but I alledged onely the Scriptures, mention∣ing the former and the later rain. And even this is objected to me as a defect or piece of ignorance. I thought (saith he) he had known it by experience of some Travellers, but I see he onely gathereth it from that place in Scripture; as if the Scripture alone were not proof good enough, except it be confirmed by the expe∣rience of Travellers.

From this preparatory discourse he frameth two Arguments, and puts them into my Cha∣racter, as if they were my Reasons. In our Climate, the natural causes do not produce rain so necessarily at set times, as in some Eastern Coun∣tries, therefore they do not produce rain necessarily

in our Climates, then when they do produce it. Again, We cannot say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to mor∣row; therefere it is not necessary either that it should rain, or that it should not rain to morrow. Such reasons as these do become him better than me; I disclaim them, and to use his own phrase, must take them for untruths, untill he cite the place where I have made any such ridiculous inferences, which con∣clude against hypothetical necessity, which we our selves do establish.

But I come to his arguments, which I shall set down in his own words, for it cannot be worse disposed, to let us see the great skill of this new controller in Logick; It is necessary that to morrow it shall rain or not rain, if therefore it be not necessary that it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain; otherwise it is not necessary that the proposition it shall rain, or it shall not rain, should be true. To this I answered, That it was most false, that the proposition could not be ne∣cessarily true, except one of the members were necessarily true, which is a truth evident and undeniable. This answer I illustrated thus; A conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and yet the proposition be true, As if the Sun shine, it is day; is a true propo∣sition at midnight. Logicians use to give another example, If an Asse flie, then he hath wings: The proposition is true, but both the parts are false: Neither doth the Asse flie,

neither hath he wings. To my direct an∣swer he replyeth not a word, either by denial or distinction; and so by his silence yieldeth the controversie. But to my illustration he excepteth thus. First, What hath a conjunct proposition to do with this in question, which is disjunctive? By his good favour, there are two propositions in his argument, the former is disjunctive, which is not questioned at all by either party, either for the truth of it, or the necessity of it, namely, Either it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow. His second proposition is conjunctive, and not disjunctive, namely, If therefore it be not ne∣cessary it shall rain, it is necessary that it shall not rain. This conjunctive proposition I deny; and I deny it upon this evident ground, be∣cause as in a conjunctive proposition, both parts of the proposition may be false, and yet the proposition true, or both parts true, and yet the proposition false, because the truth or falshood of the proposition, dependeth not upon the truth or falshood of the parts, but onely of the consequence. So in a disjunctive proposition, the disjunction may be necessa∣rily true, and yet neither member of the disjunction, be necessarily, because the truth or falshood of a disjunctive proposition de∣pendeth not upon the necessary truth of either member distinctly considered, but upon the necessary truth of the disjunction. The rea∣son is evident; in a disjunctive proposition,

nothing is affirmed or denyed, either of the one member, or the other, but onely the ne∣cessary truth of the disjunction. According to that rule in Logick, In propositione disjunctiva affirmatio & negatio aestimatur ex sola conjuctione disjunctiva, cui necesse est addi negationem si debet negativa esse propositio. Now the disjunction of contradictories is most necessary, Either it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow, though neither part of the contradiction be necessarily true. As for example, A man is to pay a sum of mony, Either he will pay it in gold, or he will not pay it in gold, is necessarily true, but it is not necessary that he shall pay it in gold, neither is it necessary that he shall not pay it in gold. Seeing he hath it in his choice to pay it in gold or in silver, or any other coine which is current. This is so clear, that no man can seriously oppose it, without his own discredit.

Secondly he saith that a conjuctive pro∣position is not made of two propositions, as a disjunctive is. What then? First this is altogether impertinent, and nothing to his purpose. Secondly it is also false. Every com∣pounded proposition (such as a conjunct pro∣position is) doth either actually or virtually include two propositions. Indeed, an hypothe∣tical proposition may sometimes be reduced to a cathegorical, that is, when there are but three terms; for when there are four terms, it is hardly reducible. What is this to the

question, or to any difference between us? Just which is the way to London? A sack full of plums. He might do well for his reputation sake, to reduce his argument into any Scholler like form, either Cathegorical, or hypothetical, or disjunctive, or any thing. But then the uglinesse of it would streight appear. This is the nearest to his sense that I can contrive it; Either it is necessary that it shall rain to mor∣row, or it is necessary that is shall not rain to mor∣row; Or this proposition, Either it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow, is not ne∣cessarily true. I deny the disjunction. Pono quartum, Or the one of these two (raining or not raining) will happen contingently. The disjun∣ction is alwayes necessarily true, before either of the members be determinately or necessaly true.

Whether this proposition, I know that either it will rain to morrew, or it will not rain to morrow, be a disjunctive proposition, or not, is not material. It includeth a disjun∣ctive proposition in it; and sheweth plainly that the certainty of a disjunctive proposi∣tion doth not depend upon the certainty of either of the members determinately, but upon the certainty of one of them indiffer∣ently.

He taketh great exception at my manner of expression, that God made his own decrees freely, because whatsoever was made had a be∣ginning, but Gods decrees are eternal. Besides,

Gods decree is his will, and the Bishop said for∣merly, that the will of God is God. Although God being a simple and infinite essence (to speak properly) is not capable of any man∣ner of composition, or of being perfected any further than he is: Yet to help our con∣ception, we use to attribute to God such acts and qualities and perfections, which being spoken after the manner of men, are to be underood according to the Majesty of God. Such is the notion of Gods decrees. More particularly, the decrees of God may be taken, and is taken in the Schools two wayes, actively or passively. Actively as it is an act immanent in God: and so the decree of God is nothing else but Deus decernens, God de∣creeing. Or else the decree of God may be taken passively for the execution of this de∣cree, or the order set by God for the govern∣ment and disposition of the World, which is an act done in time, and ad extra, or with∣out the Deity. This executive decree was that which I intended, as he might easily have perceived if he had pleased. He himself saith the same, which he dislikes in me; This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determi∣ned to be such as it is, by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the decree of God. What difference is there, whether one say this de∣cree was made, or it was set and ordered, as

he himself saith? My argument holds as well the one way as the other. God was not necessi∣tated to set this order, and yet this distinctive proposition was alwayes necessarily true, either God will order it thus, or he will not or∣der it thus.

To my last argument used in this Section, he answereth nothing but this, If God had made either causes or effects free from necessity, he had made them free from his own prescience, which had been imperfection. Which reason besides all the inconsequences thereof, and all the other absurdities which flow from it, doth deny to the infinite knowledge of God, the knowledge of possibilities and future contin∣gents: Whereas it is most certain, That God doth perfectly know, not onely all future contingents, (not in their causes onely, but in themselves) but also all possibilities, upon supposition of a condition, such as were never to be actually produced, Woe unto thee Chora∣zin, Woe unto thee Bethsaida, for if the mighty woks which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sydon, they would have repented long agoe in sackcloath and ashes. To know certainly future possibilities which shall never come into act, is more than to know future events, though never so contingent, and voide of necessity. Take another instance, Will the men of Keilah deliver me up? Will Saul come down? He will come down, they will deliver

thee up: And again, He was speedy by taken away, least wickednesse should alter his under∣standing.

Castigations of the Animadver∣sions, Num. 35.

HIs first endeavour in this Section is to reduce his argument into better form; and when all is done, it proveth but a Sorites. The only commendation that I can give it, is this, That the matter and form are agreeable, both stark naught. Thus he argu∣eth, That which is an Agent, worketh; That which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action; and consequently is therefore a sufficient cause, and if a sufficient cause then also a necessary cause. I deny his first proposition, That every Agent worketh. There are causes and Agents in power as well as in act: But it may be he meaneth an Agent in act; then he proveth the same by it self, That which acteth work∣eth; and when they returned, then they came home again. He taketh pains to prove that which no man in his right wits can doubt of.

His second proposition conteineth such another sublime point of Apodeictical learn∣ing,

called idem per idem, the same by the same; That which worketh wanteth no∣thing requisite to produce the action or the effect it produceth. It may want truth that is requisite to the production of that which it ought to produce. But it can want nothing to produce that which it doth▪ produce. Whatsoever acteth when it acteth doth ne∣cessarily act what it doth act. He is still stumbling upon that old foolish rule. What is all this to his antecedent necessity?

His third proposition follows, And conse∣quently is thereof a sufficient cause. Yes in his canting language, which makes deficience and sufficience to be all one. Whereunto tendeth all this? Hitherto he hath not ad∣vanced one hairs breadth. But now he unit∣eth all his force to pull down the Castle of Liberty. And if a sufficient cause, then also a necessary cause. I denyed his consequence: And gave him a reason for it; otherwise God himself should not be allsufficient. He replieth, That Gods allsufficience signifieth no more than his omnipotence, and omnipotence signi∣fieth no more than the power to do all things that he will. Yes Gods infinite power and suffi∣cience ought not to be limited to those things which he doth actually will, or which have actual being; No more than his eternity is commensurable by time. He was sufficient to raise up children to Abraham of stones, which he never did, and probably never will

do. If God did all which he could do, and could justy do, who was able to abide it? we were in a wretched condition. A covetous person may have more than sufficient for his back and his belly, and yet no will to bestow it upon himself. So he hath proved himself a sufficient Agent, sufficient to make this Sorites, though very unsufficient to prove his intention.

But I took pity on him to see him toile himself to no purpose, and was contented out of grace and curtesie to admit these two things. First that every effect in the World hath sufficient causes. Secondly, that sup∣posing the determination of the free and con∣tingent causes, every effect in the World is necessary, that is necessary upon supposition. But this will do him no good. Necessity upon supposition is far enough from antece∣dent necessity. He objecteth, That necessity is onely said truly of somewhat in future. I deny i•…•…. He proveth it thus. Necessary is that which cannot possibly be otherwise. And possibility is al∣wayes understood of some future time. Good: Where are his eyes that he cannot distin∣guish between possible and not possible? If ne∣cessary had been that which could possibly be otherwise: or if impossibility had alwayes reference to the future as well as possibility, he had said something. By this argument he might prove that yesterday is not past, but to come, because it is not possible to bring back

yesterday, and possibility is alwayes under∣stood of the time to come.

But out of pure necessity he is contented to make use of my curtesie. Seeing he granteth so favourably that sufficient causes are necessary causes, I shall easily conclude from it, that what∣soever those causes do cause are necessary antece∣dently. He may easily prove it, if he can make possible and impossible all one. I gave him an inch, and he takes an ell. I admitted that every effect in the World is necessary upon supposition, and he taketh it for granted, that they are necessary without supposition. But that is more than I can yeild him. If that be his meaning, he had best stick to his own grounds: But they will afford him no more relief than my concession. Howsoever thus he argueth.

If the necessity of the thing produced, when produced, be in the same instant of time with the existence of its immediate cause, then also that immediate cause was in the same instant with the cause by which it was immediately produced. The same may be said of the cause of this cause, and backward eternally. From whence it will follow, that all the connexion of the causes of any effect from the beginning of the World, are altogether existent in one and the same instant. It is well that I meet with a beginning of the World, for I was afraid of those words and so backwards eternaly. If his Mathematical engins be such as these, he will never prove so terrible an

enemy as Archimedes. He proveth that all immediate causes and their particular di∣stinct effects successively, were together in time at the very instant of their causation successively since the beginning of the World. But he lets the question alone, as bad Archers do the But; Whether the first cause did de∣termine the second to every individual act which it doth, necessarily and without any supposition, and the second the third, and so downward to the last? Of this he saith not a word. Where there is no need of proof he swelleth with arguments, where the question is, he is silent. I will shew him the palpable absurdity of his argument in an instance. When Mr. Hobs made his Leviathan, his Le∣viathan, and he were necessarily coexistent in the same instant of time: So likewise when his father did beget him, his father and he were necessarily coexistent in the same instant of time. The like may be said of his grand∣father, and his great grandfather, and so up∣wards to the beginning of the World. There∣fore Adams begetting of Seth, had a neces∣sary connexion with his writing of his Levia∣than, so as to necessitate him antecedently and inevitably to write it, and stuff it with Para∣doxes. Or thus, A man kindles a fire to warm himself, The fire and he are necessa∣rily coexistent, and there is necessary con∣nexion between them; Another man steals part of the fire and burns an house with it,

the fire and the conflagration are together, and have a necessary connexion; therefore the kindling of the fire had a necessary con∣nexion with the burning of the house, to render it inevitable. See with what doughty arguments they use to catch Dot∣terels.

From hence he concludeth, That conse∣quently all the time from the beginning of the World, or from eternity to this day, is but one in∣stant. Better and better. Why doth he not infer likewise that the sea burneth? His pre∣mises will sustain the one, as well as the other. Why will he lose his cause for want of con∣fidence? If God who is an infinite Essence be free from all variablenesse and succession of time, Must he who is but a turning shadow upon the old Exchange of this World, chal∣lenge the same priviledge? Because eternity is a nunc stans, must successive parts of time make one instant or nunc stans? But he ad∣deth, That by this time I know it is not so. He hath been spinning a fair threed, and now like a curst Cow casts down his meale with his foot. First to endeavour to prove that it is so, and then confesse that it is not so. Neither can he say, that he proceedeth upon my grounds, whilest his own grounds are so much higher than mine. I make but an hy∣pothetical necessity, which implieth onely an accidental connexion; He maketh an ab∣solute antecedent necessity, which implieth a

necessary connexion of the whole conjoinct series of causes and effects.

Castigations upon the Animadver∣sions, Num. 36.

I Cited his sense, that he could adde other arguments if he thought it good Logick. He complaineth that I mis-recite his words, which are I could adde if I thought it good Logick, the inconvenience of denying neces∣sity, as that it destroyes both the Decrees and Pre∣science of God Almighty. And are not these reasons drawn from the Decrees and Presci∣ence of God Arguments? or are they not his prime arguments? How glad would this man be to find any little pretence of excep∣tion? He distinguisheth between absurdities and inconveniences: Absurdities (he saith) are impossibilities, and it is a good forme of reason∣ing to argue from absurdities, but not from incon∣veniences. If all absurdities be impossibilities, then there are no absurdities in rerum natura, for there can be no impossibilities. This it is to take the sense of words not from Artists in their own Arts, but from his own imagi∣nations. By this reason there never was an absurd speech or absurd action in the World,

otherwise absurdities are not impossibilities. But he hath confuted himself sufficiently in this Treatise. One absurdity may be greater than another, and one inconvenience may be greater than another; but absurd and incon∣venient is the same thing. That is absurd which is incongruous, unreasonable, not fit to be heard. Truth it self may accidentally be said in some sense to be inconvenient to some persons at some times. But neither absurdi∣ties nor inconveniences in themselves do flow from truth. Now let us see what are those incoveniences which he mentioneth here. To destroy the decrees and prescience of God Al∣mighty. There can be no greater absurdities imagined, than these things which he calleth inconveniencies. He himself hath at the least ten several times drawn arguments in this Treatise from the prescience of God. Where was his Logick then? or his memory now? And in this very place where he condemneth it as no good form of reasoning to argue from in∣conveniences, yet he himself doth practice it, and argues from inconveniences. But he hath worn this subject so threed-bare, without adding either new matter or new ornament, that I will not weary the Reader with a needlesse repetition, but refer him to my de∣fence, which I dare well trust with his Anim∣adversions.

Castigations of the Animad∣versions, Num. 37.

IT is vain to talke any longer of keeping this controversie secret. Neither do I re∣gard whether it was made publick by his fault or his friends, or who it was that hanged out the Ivie-bush before it, to beg custom, and procure utterance for his first fardel of Para∣doxes. He thinketh it is great confidence in me to say, that the edge of his discourse was so abated, that it could not easily hurt any rational man, who was not over much possessed with prejudice. But I have much more reason to wonder at his transcendent confidence. The people of China did use to brag that they one∣ly had two eyes, The Europaeans one eye, and all the rest of the World no eyes. But he maketh himself to be a very Argus, all eye, better sighted than either Eagle or Serpent, and all the rest of the Europaean World to be as blind as Moles or Beetles, like so many changlings or enchanted persons that had lost their senses. For my part I am more confi∣dent since I see his Animadversions than be∣fore. And why should I not be confident in this cause? Grant me but that there is a God,

that he is just, and true, and good, and power∣full, that there is an Heaven, and an hell, and a day of judgement, that is, rewards and pu∣nishments; That good and evil, virtue and vice, holinesse and sin, are any thing more than empty names, That there is any election in the World, That admonitions and repre∣hensions, and praises and dispraises, and laws and consultations do signifie any thing, That care and good endeavours are to be che∣rished; That all motives to godlinesse and religious piety are to be maintained, and I cannot fall in this cause. There is no doubt but the best doctrines may be abused, as the doctrine of Gods providence to idlenesse, and his patience to procrastination, and his mercy to presumption. But such abuses do not flow necessarily and essentially from good do∣ctrines, as they do from universal necessity. He telleth us how God dealeth with those whom he will bring to a blessed end, and how he harden∣eth others: but he telleth us of nothing that is in mans power under God to doe, either to prevent this hardening, or to attain this bles∣sed end. He talketh of a mans examining his wayes, but he teacheth withall that a man is either necessitated unresistibly to examine his wayes, or otherwise it is impossible for him to examine them. He mentioneth some who reason erroneously, If I shall be saved, I shall be saved, whether I walk uprightly or no. But he teacheth also that they are necessitated to

reason erroneously, and to walk uprightly, and that they cannot avoide it by all the endeavours which are in their power. For according to his principles, nothing at all is in their power, either to do, or to leave un∣done, but onely to cry patience, and shrug up their shoulders, and even this also is deter∣mined antecedently and inevitably to their hands.

So he maketh man to be a meer footbal or tennis ball, smitten to and fro by the se∣cond causes, or a top lashed hither and thi∣ther. If the watch be wound up by the Ar∣tist, what have the wheels to do to be solli∣citous about any thing, but onely to follow the motion which it is impossible for them to resist? When he first broached this opini∣on, he did not foresee all those absurd conse∣quences which did attend it, which might easily happen to a man, who buildeth more upon his own imaginations, than other mens experience, and being once ingaged, he is resolved to wade through thick and thin, so long as he is able.

Castigations of the Animadversions, upon the Postscript. Num. 38.

WE are now come to his last Secti∣on, which is as full of empty and unsignificant vaunts, as any of the former. True reall worth useth not to send forth so many bubbles of vain-glory. The question is not whether persons once publickly ingaged in the defence of an opinion, be more tenacious of their errours, than those who have no such prejudice; which his own example doth confirm sufficiently, and no rational man can doubt of; but whe∣ther solid substantial proofs do work sooner upon persons of wit and learning, then upon those who are ignorant, whose judgements are confused and unable to distinguish be∣tween feigned shews, and real truths. How should he who understandeth not the right state of the question, be so likely to judge what reasons are convincing, and what are not, as he who doth understand it? Or he who knoweth not the distinction between that necessity which is absolute, and that which is onely upon supposition; be a competent Judge, whether all events be

absolutely necessary? He might even as well tell us that a blind man is more likely to hit the mark, or judge rightly of colours, then he that hath his sight.

He himself doth half confesse as much, I confesse the more solid a mans wit is, the better will solid reasons work upon him. What is it then that disgusteth him? It is the addition of that which I call learning, that is to say, much reading of other mens doctrines, without weighing them with his own thoughts. When did either I or any man else ever call that learning, to read Authours without weiging them? Such extravagant expressions become none but blunderers, who are able to say nothing to the question when it is truely stated. But I wonder what it is which he calleth learning. Nothing but a phantastick opiniastratie, joyn∣ed with a supercilious contempt of all other men that are wiser or learneder than himself, making the private thoughts of ignorant persons to be the standard and publick seal of truth. As the Scholler thinketh, so the bell clinketh. If there were nothing else, this alone (to except against them who should be both his Jurers and his Judges) were e∣nough to render him and all his Paradoxes suspected. Let him remember who said, Learning hath no enemy, but ignorance.

If he had ever read those Authours whom he condemneth, namely, The Fathers and Doctours of the Church, his presumption had

been somewhat more tolerable, though too high, But to condemne them all before he ever read any of them, requireth a propheti∣call light, to which he is no pretender. In the mean time he would have his Readers be∣lieve that what is done by him upon designe, meerly to hide his own ignorance, is done out of depth of Judgement. Like the Fox in the Fable, which having lost his tail by mischance, perswaded all his fellows to cut of theirs, as unprofitable burthens. The Philosopher divided them into three ranks: Some who knew good and were willing to teach others, these he said were like Gods amongst men. Others, who though they knew not much, yet were willing to learn, these he said were like men among beasts. And lastly, some who knew not good, and yet despised such as should teach them. These he esteemed as beasts among men.

Whereas he talketh of such as requite those who endeavour to instruct them at their own intreaty, with reviling terms, although he dictate more willingly than dispute, where no man may contradict him; yet neither do I take him to be of the ranck of Instructers, before he himself hath first learned; nor is he able to bring so much as one instance of any revi∣ling, or so much as discourreous language throughout my defence. If his back was gal∣led before, and that make him over-sensible,

and suspicious of an affront, where none was intended, who can help it? But now he him∣self having shewed so much scorn and pe•…•…∣lance in his Animadversions, though I have abstained from all reviling terms, yet I have tempered my stile so, as to let him plainly see, That he is not so much regarded, not half so formidable an adversary, as he vainly ima∣gineth.

In the next place he setteth down eight conclusions which he dreameth that he hath proved in this Treatise. It is good beating of a proud man. Though he be thrown flat upon his back at every turn, yet he hath the confidence to proclaim his own atchieve∣ments with a silver trumpet, when they do not deserve to be piped upon an oaten reed. I will make him a fair offer, If he have proved any one of them, or be able to prove any one of them, I will yield him all the rest. Besides the notorious falshood of them all, the two last are apparently ridiculous, That the do∣ctrine of liberty is an errour that maketh men, by imagining they can repent when they will, neg∣lect their duties; and moreover makes them unthankfull for Gods graces, by thinking them to proceed from the natural ability of their own will. The doctrine of liberty from superstoical necessity, doth neither make men truncos nor sacrilegos, neither stupid blocks voide of all activity, nor yet sacrilegiously to rob God of his honour. We know and acknowledge,

that both free will, and the good use of free will in repentance and all other acts of gratitude towards God, is from God, and proceedeth from grace. These inferences which he makes are no consequences of our doctrine, but his own drowsie dreams. All men that are not blinded with prejudice, do see clearly, that it is his desperate doctrine of inevitable necessity, which maketh men to neglect their duties, by teaching them to be∣live, that though they be impenitent or un∣thankful, yet it was not at all in their power to have been otherwise, they are as they must be, and as God hath ordained and necessita∣ted them to be.

He taketh me up for saying unskilfully, that they who dispute philosophically of God, ascribe un∣to him no proper faculties. Indeed I do not won∣der if he who ascribes to God potentialities and successive duration, who denies that the divine substance is indivisible, and saith that actus simplicissimus signifieth nothing, who makes an incorporeal substance to be a con∣tradiction, do make him likewise to be com∣pounded of substance and faculties. But they who penetrate deeper into the ugly conse∣quences of these bold and blind assertions, who considered that whatsoever is truely infi∣nite, is not capable of any variation or shadow of turning by change; and that whatsoever is infinitely perfect in it self, cannot be further perfected by the supplimental addition of any

faculties or accidents, will not judge my asser∣tion to be unskilful, but his paradoxes to be dishonourable to the divine nature, and dero∣gatory to the Majesty of God.

His reason of this reprehension is, Because to dispute philosophically is to dispute by natural reason, and from principles evident from the light of nature, and to dispute of the faculties and pro∣prieties of the subject whereof they treat. What, whether they have any faculties or no? that were very hard. It seemeth that Christian Philosophers are not Philosophers with him. And why may not a Philosopher make use of Divine Revelation? but let him not trouble himself about this. This truth hath been suffi∣ciently cleared already by the light of natu∣ral reason. Either the divine essence is infi∣nitely perfect in it self, or God is not God. And if it be infinitely perfect in it self, it can∣not be further perfected by any facul∣ties.

He saith he would fain know of me what im∣proper faculties I ascribe to God, I ascribe no faculties at all to God, except it be anthropo∣pathetically, as the Scripture ascribes eyes and hands to God, which must be understood as is beseeming the Majesty of God. He addeth, That I know not how to make it good that the will and understanding of God are faculties, and yet will have these words [his understanding and his will are his very essence] to passe for an axiome of Philosophy. It is true, I know not

how to make them faculties in God, speaking properly; and yet I doubt not of this truth, that Gods understanding and his will are his very essence. And this very objection sheweth clear∣ly, that he neither understandeth me, nor him∣self. This axiome that the will and the un∣derstanding of God are his very essence, is a fit medium to prove they are no faculties, not to prove they are faculties. Quicquid est in Deo est ipse Deus, Whatsoever is in God, is God; If he have any thing to say against it, why is he silent?

That God is incomprehensible, and that his nature can neither be expressed nor con∣ceived perfectly by mortal men, is a truth undeniable, not to be doubted of. How should finite reason be able to comprehend an infinite perfection? And therefore they who do search too curiously into the Majesty of God, or define his nature too sawcily and presumptiously, are justly to be reprehended. The pipe can convey the water no higher than the fountains head. But on the other side, seeing the invisible things of him, that is, his eternal power and Godhead are clearly seen from the creation of the world. And seeing he hath given us his word to be a light unto our feet, and a lanthorn unto our paths, not to endeavour soberly and humbly to know God, so far as he is represented to us by the Creatures, and revealed unto us in the Scrip∣tures, to the end we may glorifie him as God,

and help others to know him and glorifie him aright, is inexcusable ingratitude. It is not then simply the inquiring into, or dis∣coursing of the nature of God, but the trans∣gressing of the right manner and due bounds of our enquiry, which is unlawful. The fa∣thers disputed well from the nature of God against the Anthropomorphites. So did St. Paul against the idolotrous Athenians, For as much as me are the off spring of God, and live and move and have our being in him and from him, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold and silver, or stone graven with art. I acknowledge that though all possible per∣fection ought to be ascribed to God, yet the safest way to expresse him is by negative attributes. Admit but one negative attribute, which all men must admit, and do admit, that believe a God; and I will easily evince all the rest from thence, that is, That he is actually infinite, or an indivisible unity of in∣finite perfection. If Gods being be infinite, then it is not by successive duration. In suc∣cessive duration, something is added every minute; but to that which is infinite, nothing can be added. Again, if God be actually infinite, then he is not divisible nor materiate, nor corporal, nor hath parts without parts: An aggravation of finite parts, cannot make up an infinite being. If God be actually infi∣nite, then his understanding and his will are not distinct faculties, then his goodnesse and

his wisdom, and his justice, and his truth, are not distinct qualities. For if his will be with∣out his understanding, or his justice without his wisdom, then his understanding and his wisdom are not infinite, for that only is infi∣nite, without which nothing is or can be. It is not therefore enough to ascribe unto God whatsoever is honourable, unlesse we do it in an honourable manner, that is, infinitely; and that we can never do, but by making him an indivisible unity of infinite being and perfecti∣on. Not accidental, but essential, or transcen∣dent perfection. He who calleth God most perfect, (though T. H. see it not) comes short of that honour which is due to God. Most perfect is but a degree of comparison. But he who calleth him perfection it self, acknow∣ledgeth that all the perfection of the Crea∣tures is by participation of his infinite perfecti∣on. Such errours as these formerly recited, do deserve another manner of refutation; and when he is in his lucide intervalles, he himself acknowledgeth what I say to be true, That God is incomprehensible and immate∣rial. And he himself proveth so much from this very attribute of God, that he is infinite, Ci. c. 15. s. 14. Figure is not attributed to God, for every figure is finite. Neither can he be com∣prehended by us, for whatsoever we conceive is finite; nor hath he parts, which are attributed only to finite things; nor is be more than one, there can be but one infinite.

Whereas I called hell the true Tophet, he telleth us gravely, That Tophet was a place not far from the walls of Hierusalem, and conse∣quently on the earth; Adding after his boasting manner, That he cannot imagine what I will say to this in my answer to his Leviathan, unlesse I say that by the true Tophet in this place, is meant a not true Tophet. Whosoever answereth his Leviathan will be more troubled with his ex∣travagancies, than with his arguments. Doth he not know that almost all things happened to them as figures? There may be a true my∣stical Tophet as well as a literal; And there is a true mystical Gehenna or Vally of Hin∣non, as well as a literal. He that should say that Christ is the true Paschal Lamb, or the Church the true Hierusalem, or John Baptist the true Elias, may well justifie it, without saying, That by the true Paschal Lamb is meant no true Paschal Lamb, or by the true Hierusalem, no true Hierusalem, or by the true Elias, no true Elias. VVhat poor stuff is this?

And so he concludeth his Animadversion with a rapping Paradox indeed. True religion consisteth in obedience to Christs Lieutenants, and in giving God such honour both in Attributes and actions, as they in their several Lieutenancies shall ordain. That Soveraign Princes are Gods Lieutenants upon earth, no man doubteth, but how come they to be Christs Lieutenants with him? who teacheth expressely, that the

kingdom of Christ is not to begin till the ge∣neral Resurrection? His errours come so thick, that it is difficult to take notice of them all; yet if he had resolved to maintain his Paradox, it had been ingenuously done to take notice of my reasons against it in this place.

First, what if the Soveraign Magistrate shall be no Christian himself? Is an Heathen or Mahumetan Prince the Lieutenant of Christ, or a fit infallible Judge of the controversies of Christian Religion? Are all his Christian subjects obliged to sacrifice to idols, or blas∣pheme Christ upon his command? Certain∣ly he giveth the same latitude of power and right to Heathen and Mahumetan Princes that he doth to Christian. There is the same submition to both, I authorise and give up my right of governing my self to this man, whom he maketh to be a mortal God. To him alone he ascribeth the right to allow and disallow of all doctrines, all formes of worship, all mi∣racles, all revelations. And most plainly in the 42. and 43. Chapters of his Leviathan, where he teacheth obedience to infidel Prin∣ces in all things, even to the denial of Christ, to be necessary by the Law of God and nature.

My second reason in this place was this. What if the Magistrate shall command con∣trary to the Law of God? must we obey him rather than God? He confesseth, That

Christ ought to be obeyed rather than his Lieu∣tenant upon earth. This is a plain concession, rather than an answer. But he further ad∣deth, That the question is not who is to be obeyed, but what be his commands? Most vain∣ly. For if true Religion do consist in obedi∣ence to the commands of the Soveraign Prince, then to be truly religiou•…•… it is not needful to inquire further than what he com∣mandeth. Frustra fit per plura quod fier•…•… potest per pauciora. Either he must make the So∣veraign Prince to be infallible in all his com∣mands concerning Religion, which we see by experience to be false, and he himself con∣fesseth, that they may command their sub∣jects to deny Christ; or else the authority of the Soveraign Prince doth justifie to his sub∣jects whatsoever he commands, and then they may obey Christs Lieutenant as safely with∣out danger of punishment as himself.

My third reason was this. If true Religion do consist in obedience to the commands of the Soveraign Prince, then the Soveraigne Prince is the ground and pillar of truth, not the Church. But the Church is the ground and pillar of truth, not the Soveraign Prince. These things write I unto thee, &c. that thou mayest know how thou oughest to behave thy self in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the power and ground of truth. What the Church signifieth in this place may be de∣monstratively collected, both from the words

themselves, wherein he calleth it the house of God, which appellation cannot be applied to a single Soveraign, much lesse to a Heathen Prince, as their Soveraign then was. And likewise by the things written, which were directions for the ordering of Ecclesiastical persons.

The last Argument used by me in this place, was ad hominem, Why then is T. H. of a different mind from his Soveraign and from the laws of the Land concerning the Attributes of God, and the religious worship which is to be given to him? The Canons and Constitutions and Articles of the Church of England, and their Discipline and form of Divine Worship, were all confirmed by Royal authority. And yet Mr. Hobbes made no scruple to assume to himself, that which he denieth to all other subjects, the knowledge of good and evil, or of true and false religion, And a judgement of what is con∣sonant to the Law of Nature and Scripture, different from the commands of his So∣veraign and the judgement of all his fellow Subjects, as appeareth by his book De cive, printed in the year 1642. Neither can he pretend that he was then a local Subject to another Prince, for he differed more from him in Religion, than from his own natural Soveraign.

This Paradox hath been confuted before, and some of those grosse absurdities which

flow from it represented to the Reader, to all which he may adde these folowing reasons.

First, true Religion cannot consist in any thing which is sinful; But obedience to So∣veraign Princes may be sinful. This is proved by the example of Jeroboam, who established idolatry in his kingdom. And the Text saith, this thing became a sin. It may be he will say, this idolatrous worship was a sin in Jerobo∣am, not in the people, who obeyed him. But the Text taketh away this evasion, branding him ordinarily with this mark of infamy, Jeroboam the son of Nebat who made Israel to sin.

Secondly, true Religion cannot consist in obedience to contradictory commands. But the commands of Soveraign Princes are of∣ten contradictory one to another. One com∣mandeth to worship Christ, another forbid∣deth it. One forbiddeth to offer sacrifice to idols, another commandeth it. Yea the same person may both forbid idolatry in general, and yet authorise it in particular. Or forbid it by the publick laws of the Country, and yet authorise it by his personal commands.

Thirdly, true Religion is alwayes justified in the sight of God. But obedience to the commands of Soveraign Princes is not always justified in the sight of God. This is clearly proved out of his own expresse words. What∣soever is commanded by the Soveraign power, is as to the Subject, (though not so alwayes in the

sight of God) justified by their command. VVhence it is evident by his own confession, that the wicked commands of Soveraigne Princes are not justified by their Royal au∣thority, but are wicked and repugnant to the Law of God. And consequently that of the Apostle hath place here, Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. True Religion hath al∣wayes reference unto God.

Fourthly, true Religion doth not consist in obedience to any laws whatsoever which are repugnant to the Moral Law of God, or to the law of Nature. This Proposition is granted by himself. The laws of nature are im∣mutable and eternal. And all Writers do agree that the law of nature is the same with the moral Law. Again Soveraigns are all Subjects to the law of nature, because such laws be Divine, and cannot by any man or Common-wealth be abroga∣ted. And in all things not contrary to the moral Law, that is to say, to the law of nature, all Sub∣jects are bound to obey that of Divine Law, which is declared to be so by the laws of the Common-wealth. But the commands of a Soveraign Prince may be repugnant not onely to the Moral Law, or the law of nature, but even to the laws of the Common-wealth. This as∣sumption is proved four wayes. First by his own confession, It is manifest enough that when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey

that and not the other. If there can be no such contrary commands, then it is not manifest, nor yet true. Secondly, this is p•…•…oved by his resolution of two queres. The fist is this; Whether the City (or the Soveraign Prince) be to be obeyd if he command directly to do any th•…•…ng to the contumely of God, or forbid to worship God. To which he answereth directly; non esse obe∣diendam, that he ought not to be obeyed. And he gives this reason, Because the subjects before the constitution of the Common-wealth had no right to deny the honour due unto God, and there∣fore could transferre no right to command such things to the common-wealth. The like he hath in his Leviathan, Actions which do naturally signifie contumely, cannot by humane power be made a part of Divine Worship. As if the de∣nial of Christ upon a Soveraigns command, (which he justifieth) were not contumelious to Christ, or as if subjects before the consti∣tution of the common-wealth had any right themselves to deny Christ. But such palpable contradictions are no novelties with him. How doth true Religion consist in obedience to the commands of a Soveraign, if his com∣mands may be contumelious to God, and deny him that worship which is due unto him by the eternal and immutable law of na∣ture, and if he be not to be obeyed in such commands?

His second question is, If a Soveraign Prince should command himself to be worshipped with Di∣vine

Worship and Attributes, whether he ought to be obeyed? To which he answereth, That although Kings should command it, yet we ought to abstain from such attributes as signifie his in∣dependence upon God, or inmortality, or infinite power, or the like; And from such actions as do signifie the same. As to pray unto him being ab∣sent, to aske those things of him which none but God can give; as rain, and fair weather, or to offer sacrifice to him. Then true Religion may sometimes consist in disobedience to the com∣mands of Soveraign Princes.

Thirdly, that the commands of Soveraign Princes in point of Religion may be contrary to the law of nature, (which needeth no new promulgation or reception) doth appear by all those duties internal and external, which by his own confession nature doth injoyn us to perform towards God, and all which may be, and have been, countermanded by So∣veraign Princes, as to acknowledge the exi∣stence of God, his unity, his infinitenesse, his providence, his creation of the World, his omnipotence, his eternity, his incomprehen∣sibility, his ub quity, To worship him, and him onely with Divine worship, with prayes, with thanksgivings, with oblations, and with all expressions of honour.

Lastly, this is proved by examples. Ne∣buchadnezar commanded to worship a gol∣den image. And Darius made a decree that no man should ask any petition of any God or

man for thirty dayes, save of the King onely. Yet the transgression of both these com∣mands of Soveraign Princes was justified by God as true Religion.

Fiftly, Christ will deny no man before his Father for true Religion; But those who de∣ny Christ before men, to fulfil the commands of an earthly Prince, he will deny before his fa∣ther which is in Heaven. And therefore Christ encourageth his Disciples against these dan∣gers, which might fall upon them by disobe∣dience to such unlawful commands. Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both body and soul in hell. But Mr. Hobs hath found out an evasion for such Renegadoes. Whatsoever a Subject is compelled to, in obedience to his Soveraign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the lawes of his country, that action is not his, but his Soveraigns, nor is it he that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his Governour, and the law of his Country. If this Fig-leafe would have served the turn, Shedrach, Meshach and Abednego, needed not to have been cast into the fiery Furnace. For though they had worshipped the golden image, by this doctrine they had not been idolaters, but Nebuchadnezar onely and his Princes. If this were true, Daniel might have escaped the Lions Den: If he had forborne his praises to God, Darius had been faulty, and not he. But these holy Saints were of an∣other

minde. I hope though he might in his baste and passion censure the blessed Martyrs to be fooles, (which were so many, that there were five thousand for every day in the year, except the calends of January, when the Heathens were so intent upon their de∣votions, that they neglected the slaughter of the poor Christians,) yet he will not esteem himself wiser than Daniel. Behold thou art wiser than Daniel, was an hyperbolical, or rather an ironical expression. With the heart man believeth unto righteousnesse, and with the mouth is confession made unto salvation. If a man deny Christ with his mouth, the faith of the heart will not serve his turn.

Sixthly, Christ denounceth damnation to all those who for saving of their lives do deny their Religion, and promiseth eternal life to all those who do seale the truth of their Christian faith with their blood, against the commands of heathenish Magistrates. Who soever will save his life shall lose it, and who∣soever will lose his life for my sake shall find it. Christ doth not promise eternal life for viola∣tion of true Religion.

Lastly, no Christian Soveraign or Com∣mon-wealth did ever assume any such autho∣rity to themselves; Never any subjects did acknowledge any such power in their Sove∣raigns; Never any Writer of Politicks, either waking or dreaming, did ever phansie such an unlimitted power and authority in

Princes, as this which he ascribeth to them, not onely to make, but to justifie all doctrines, all laws, all religions, all actions of their Sub∣jects by their commands; as if God Almighty had reserved onely Soveraign Princes under his own Jurisdiction, and quitted all the rest of mankind to Kings and Common-wealths. In vain ye worship me, teaching for doctrine the commandments of men, that is to say, making true religion to consist in obedience to the commands of men. If Princes were heaven∣ly Angels, free from all ignorance and passions, such an unlimited power might bet∣ter become them. But being mortal men, it is dangerous, least Phaeton-like, by their violence or unskilfulnesse, they put the whole Empire into a flame. It were too too much to make their unlawful commands to justifie their Subjects. If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch. He who imposeth unlawful commands, and he who obeyeth them, do both subject themselves to the judgements of God. But if true religion do consist in active obedience to their commands, it justi∣fieth both their Subjects and themselves. True religion can prejudice no man.

He taketh upon him to refute the distincti∣on of obedience, into active and passive, As if a sin against the law of nature could be expiated by arbitrary punishments imposed by men. Thus it happeneth to men who confute that which they do not understand. Passive obedience is

not for the expiation of any fault, but for the maintenance of innocence. When God commands one thing, and the soveraign Prince another, we cannot obey them both actively; therefore we chuse to obey God rather than men, and yet are willing for the preservation of peace to suffer from man, rather than to resist. If he understood this distinction well, it hath all those advantages which he fancieth to himself in his new plat∣form of government, without any of those inconveniences which do attend it. And whereas he intimateth that our not obeying our Soveraign actively is a sin against the law of nature, meaning by the violation of our promised obedience, it is nothing but a grosse mistake; no Subjects ever did, nor ever could make any such pact, to obey the commands of their Soveraign actively, contrary to the law of God or nature.

This reason drawn from universal practise was so obvious, that he could not misse to make it an objection, The greatest objection is that of the practice, when men ask where and when such power has by Subjects been acknowledged. A shrewd objection indeed, which required a more solid answer, then to say, That though in all places of the World men should lay the foun∣dation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred that so it ought to be. As if there were no more difficulty in founding and regulating a Common-wealth, then in distin∣guishing

between a loose sand and a firm rock, or as if all Societies of men, of different tempers, of different humours, of different manners, and of different interests, must of necessity be all ordered after one and the same manner. If all parts of the World after so long experience do practise the contrary to that which he fancieth, he must give me leave to suspect that his own grounds are the quick∣sands, and that his new Common-wealth is but a Castle founded in the aire.

That a Soveraign Prince within his own dominions, is custos utrius{que} tabulae, the keeper of both the Tables of the Law, to see that God be duely served, and justice duely admi∣nistred between man and man, and to punish such as transgresse in either kind with civil pu∣nishment; That, he hath an Architectonical power to see that each of his Suctjects do their duties in their several callings, Ecclesia∣sticks as well as Seculars; That the care and charge of seeing that no doctrine be taught his Subjects, but such as may consist with the general peace, and the authority to prohibit seditious practices and opinions do reside in him; That a Soveraign Prince oweth no account of his actions to any mortal man; That the Kings of England in particular have been justly declared by Act of Parlia∣ment Supreme Governours in their own king∣doms, in all causes, over all persons, as well Ecclesiastical as Civil, is not denyed, nor so

much as questioned by me. Otherwise a kingdom, or a Common-wealth should be destitute of necessary means for its own pre∣servation. To all this I do readily assent, all this I have vindicated upon surer grounds than those desperate and destructive princi∣ples which he supposeth.

But I do utterly deny that true religion doth consist in obedience to Soveraign Magi∣strates, or that all their injunctions ought to be obeyed, not onely passively, but actively, or that he is infallible in his laws and com∣mands, or that his Soveraign authority doth justifie the active obedience of his Subjects to his unlawful commands. Suppose a King should command his Judges to set Naboth on high among the people, and to set two sons of Belial before him, to bear witnesse against him, saying, Thou didst blaspheme God and the King, and then carry him out and stone him, that he may dye. The regal au∣thority could neither justifie such an unlawful command in the King, nor obedience in the Judges. Suppose a King should set up a golden Image, as Nebucadnezar did, and command all his Subjects to adore it, his command could not excuse his Subjects from idolatry, much lesse change idolatry into true reli∣gion.

His answer to the words of Peter and John do signifie nothing. The High Priest and his Councel commanded the Apostles

not to teach in the name of Jesus. Here was sufficient humane authority, yet say the Apo∣stles, Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. The question was not what were the com∣mands, that was clear enough, what God commanded, and what man commanded, but who was to be obeyed, which could ad∣mit no debate. He asketh What has the Bishop to doe with what God sayes to me when I read the Scriptures, more than I have to do with what God sayes to him when he reads them? unlesse he have authority given him, by him whom Christ hath constituted his Lieutenant. First I answer his question with a question, What if the Bishop have such authority, and he hath not? He cannot deny but the Bishop had such au∣thority, when he had not. And yet he doubt∣ed not even then to interpret the Scriptures contrary both to the Bishop, and to Christs Lieutenant. Secondly I answer, That by his own confession there is a great difference be∣tween him and me in this particular, Our Saviour hath promised this infallability in those things which are necessary to salvation to the Apo∣stles, until the day of judgement, that is to say, to the Apostles and to Pastors to be consecrated by them by imposition of hands. Therefore the So∣veraign Magistrate, as he is a Christian, is obliged to interpret the holy Scriptures, when there is question, about the mysteries of faith by Ecclesi∣astical persons rightly ordained. Unlesse he have

such ordination by imposition of hands, I am better qualified then he is for the inter∣pretation of Scripture, by his own con∣fession.

But he supposeth that a Bishop or a Synod of Bishops, should be set up for our civil Soveraign. A likely thing indeed. Suppose the skie fall, then we shall have Larks. But to gratifie him, let us suppose it. What then? Then that which I object against him, he could object in the same words against me. So he might, if I should be so fond as to say that true religion did consist in obedience to that single Bishop, or that Synod of bishops, as he saith that it doth consist in obedience to the Soveraign Prince. He deceiveth himself, and mistaketh us, if he think that we hold any such ridiculous opini∣ons. If he could shew that Bishops do chal∣lenge an infallability to themselves by divine right, and which is more than infallability, a power to authorise all their commands for true religion, he said something to the pur∣pose.

He telleth us that he remembers there have been books written to entitle the Bishops to a divine right underived from the Civil Soveraign. Very likely if the law of nature do make a divine right. Perhaps a locomotive faculty, or a liberty of respiration, which all other men do challenge as well as Bishops. But he mean∣eth no religion, Why not? They have their holy orders by succession from the Apostles,

not from their civil Soveraigns. They have the power of the keys by the concession of Christ, Whose sins yet remit they are remitted, whose sins ye retain they are retained. None can give that to another, which they have not themselves. Where did Christ give the power of the keys, to the civil Magistrate?

I was far enough from thinking of Odes, when I writ my defence of liberty. That which he calleth my Ode, was written about a thousand years before I was born. I cited it onely to shew the sense of the primitive Christians, concerning obedience to the un∣lawful commands of Soveraign Princes, that we ought to obey God rather than them. And to that it is full.

Iussum est Caesaris ore Gallieni, Princeps quod colit ut colamus omnes, Aeternum colo principem dierum; Factorem dominumque Gallieni.

This put him into such a fit of versifying, that he could not forbear to make a Parode, such as it is, wherein out of pure zeal (if it were worth taking notice of) he retaineth the errours of the presse.

And so confounding Regal Supremacy with a kind of omnipotence, and the external Regiment of the Church with the power of the keys, and jurisdiction in the inner court of conscience, and forraign usurpations with the ancient rights and liberties of the English

Church, and a stipendiary School-master (who hath neither title nor right, but the meer pleasure of the master of the family) with Bishops, who are the successors of the Apostles in that part of their office which is of ordinary and perpetual necessity, and the Kings proper councel in Ecclesiastical affairs. He concludeth his Animadversion with this fair intimation to Doctor Hamond and me, That if we had gone upon these his principles, when we did write in defence of the Church of England, against the imputation of Scisme, quit∣ting our own pretenses of jurisdiction and jus di∣vinum, we had not been so shrewdly handled, as we have been by an English Papist. I hope nei∣ther the Church of England, nor any genu∣ine son of the English Church, hath com∣plained to him, that the Church hath suffered any disadvantage by our pains; nor our adversaries in that cause boasted to him of any advantage they have gained; I do ra∣ther believe that it is but his own imagina∣tion, without ever reading either party. Why should he interrupt his sadder meditations with reading such trifles? But for his princi∣ples (as he calleth them) I thank him, I will have nothing to do with them, except it be to shew him how destructive they are both to Church and Common-wealth. But this I believe in earnest, that if we had gone upon his principles, we should not have made our selves the object of our adversaries pity, but well of their scorn.

In his conclusion, or in his postscript (chuse whether you will call it) first he setteth down his censure of my defence, with the same inge∣nuity and judgement that he hath shewed hitherto, that is none at all, which I esteem no more than a deaf nut. Let the book justifie it self. And to the manner of writing, he bites first, and whines; doth an injury and com∣plains. The Reader will find no railing in my Treatise, nor any of those faults which he objecteth; I rather fear that he will cen∣sure it as too complying with such an adver∣sary. But he had not then given me so much occasion, as he hath done since, to make him lose that pleasure in reading which he took in writing.

In the next place he presenteth to the Readers view a large muster of terms and phrases, such as are used in the Schools, which he calleth nonsense, and the language of the kingdom of darknesse, that is all the confuta∣tion which he vouchsafeth them. He hath served them up oft enough before to the Rea∣ders loathing. Let him take it for a warning, wheresoever he reneweth his complaint, I shall make bold to renew my story of old Harpaste, who complained that the room was dark, when the poor Beldam wanted her sight. There is more true judgement and solid reason in any one of the worst of those phrases which he derides, then there is in one of his whole Sections.

Thirdly, he cavilleth against a saying of mine which he repeateth thus, He hath said that his opinion is demonstrable in reason, though he be not able to comprehend how it consisteth to∣gether with Gods eternal prescience, and though it exceed his weak capacity, yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. Whence he concludeth after this manner. So to him that truth is manifest and demonstrable by reason, which is beyond his capacity. Let the Reader see what an uningenuous adversary he is. In my first discourse of Liberty I had these words, [we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner] To which he answer∣eth, And I say the same. In my defence I re∣peate the same words, adding these, [Such a truth is that which I maintain, That the will of man in ordinary actions is free from extrinsecal determination. A truth demon∣strable by reason, received and believed by all the World. And therefore though I be not able to comprehend or expresse exactly the certain manner how it consists with Gods eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my weake capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest.] So first he quarrelleth now with that truth which form∣erly he yeilded. Secondly, that which I spake upon supposition [though I be not able,] he setteth down positively in his collection, which is beyond his capacity. Thirdly, he leaveth

out the word [exactly.] A man may com∣prehend truly that which he doth not com∣prehend exactly. Fourthly, he omitteth frau∣dulently these words [the certain manner] A truth may be certain and demonstrable, and yet the manner of it not demonstrable, or a man may know several wayes of recon∣ciling two truths together: And yet fluctu∣ate in his judgement to which of them cer∣tainly and expressely he ought to adhere. It is certain that by the force of a mans arme a stone is thrown upwards; And yet the cer∣tain manner how to reconcile this with ano∣ther truth, That whatsoever acteth upon another body, acteth by a touching, is not so easily found out. The incarnation of Christ is cer∣tain, yet the certain manner passeth both my capacity and his. Lastly, I do not say (as he suggesteth,) that that truth which is demon∣strable by reason passeth my capacity, but the certain and exact manner how to recon∣cile this truth with another truth. Yet there are sundry wayes of reconciling of them; And I have shewed him one in the same Se∣ction, which he is not able to refute. See how his discourse hangs together like ropes of sand. The prescience and decrees of God passe the capacity of mortal man, therefore the liberty of the will is not demonstrable by reason.

From the hard words and non-sense of the Schooles, he passeth to my little Logick and no Philosophy. It skilleth not much what he

saith, unlesse he were a greater clerke. He hath passed over a great part of my defence untouched; But I have not omitted one sen∣tence thoroughout his Animadversions, wherein I could find any one grain of reason. And among the rest, have satisfied his silly censures, or ignorant exceptions, in their pro∣per places, and the splinters of those broken reedes stick in his own fingers.

Before he concludes, he draweth up a sum∣mary of what he and I have maintained, very confusedly, most imperfectly, and in part false∣ly. Methinks it resembleth that unskilfull Painter who durst not leave his pictures to the free judgement of the beholders, unless he writ over their heads, This is a dog, and this is a beare; we had such a summary or draught of the Controversie in his Fountains of Arguments, before his Animadversions, as a Proeme. And now we have such another breveate in the conclusion by way of Epilogue after his Animadversions. He is very diffi∣dent of his cause who standeth in need of such Proemes and Epilogues, and dare not trust the indifferent Reader to chuse his own diet, unlesse he do first choppe it and chew it for him, and then thrust it down his throat. The last word may be efficacious with an ig∣norant multitude, who are like a ship at Hulle, every wave puts it into a new positure. But more accurate palates do naucitate and loath such thrice sodden coleworts. I leave the Reader to compare plea with plea, and

proofe with proofe. And let truth over∣come.

Thus he concludeth with a short Apology, least the Reader should think that he hath not used me with that respect which he ought, or might have done without disadvantage to his cause. His onely reason is, because divens in their bookes and sermons, without answering any of his arguments, have exclaimed against him, and reviled him for some things delivered by him in his book De Cive. What doth this con∣cern me? No more than the man in the Moon. Yes he saith, whereof the Bishop of Derry is one. Most falsely. I never prea∣ched against him, nor write against his book De Cive, but privately to himself, and then with more respect than either he or it de∣served. But his meaning was not by this Apology to make me any reparation, but to deterre others from medling with him, least he should make examples of them as he boasteth that he hath done of me. Be∣ware Reader he beareth hay on his horn•…•…. If he have gained any thing by his disrespect, much good may it do him. I do not envy him. Let the Reader judge. And if he have any sparke of ingenuity left in him, let himself judge, whether he hath made an example of me or of himself. Or if he like it better, let him thrust his head into a bush, and suppose that no body seeth his errours, because he is not willing to take notice of them himself.

Notes

• 1. Eleven grosse mi∣stakes in a few lines.
• 2.
• 3.
• De praepar. Evang. l. 4. c. 11.
• 4.
• 5.
• Ethic. l. 3. c. 3. 4, 5.
• 6.
• 7.
• 1 Cor. 9. 1, 5, 6.
• 1 Cor. 7. 3.
• 8.
• 9,
• 10.
• Visitat. Saxon. Loc. com. edit. poster.
• 11
• Declar. Sententiae. Arminii ad Ord. Hol∣landiae.
• The con∣version of a sinner concern∣eth not this que∣stion.
• A willfull cavill.
• Num. 3.
• Difference between natural & morall efficacy.
• Not to will is a means of abnega∣tion be∣tween willing and nil∣ing.
• His distin∣ction be∣tween free to will, and free to do, con∣futed.
• 2 Cor. 8. 12.
• Rom. 7. 18.
• Levit. 1. 3. and 19. 5.
• Ezra. 7. 13.
• Philem. 14.
• Gen. 13. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• 1 Sam. 2. 15.
• Luke 12. 17.
• Jam. 4. 13.
• Josh. 1. 16.
• 2 Cor. 11. 12.
• The sen∣sual and rational appetite very dif∣ferent.
• Mr. Hobbs his Flou∣rish.
• His pre∣sumption.
• Plutar•…•…h.
• The attri∣butes of God argu∣mentative.
• Gen. 18 25
• His texts of Scrip∣ture cited imperti∣nently.
• All his ar∣guments out of Scripture answered.
• Num. 12.
• Job. 1. 12.
• Phil. 2. 12. 13.
• How sin∣ners are said to be dead.
• Luke. 15. 32.
• Eph. 5. 14.
• Rom. 4. 19.
• Eph. 2. 1.
• Man is more free to will than to do.
• His second sort of texts do confute him unan∣swerably.
• Defence, Nu. 6. 7, 8, 9.
• T. H. First woundeth the Scrip∣ture, and then gi∣veth it a plaister.
• Gods pre∣science doth not necessi∣tate.
• Yet is in∣fallible.
• Gen. 50. 20.
• Hardness of heart not deri∣ved from Gods per∣mission.
• Gods hand in good and evil acti∣ons.
• Gods re∣vealed will and his secret will, not contrary.
• The doct∣rine of u∣niversal necessity taketh a∣way all care of do∣ing well.
• That which shall be shall be; a poor fallacy.
• Num. 14.
• T. H. His confession that no man is justly pu∣nished, but for crimes he might have shunned.
• 1 Pet. 2. 14.
• No pro∣per pu∣nishment but for sin.
• Lam. 3. 39.
• 2 Sam. 12. 13. 14.
• 2 Cor. 4. 17.
• Matth. 25. 46. Ioh 37. 23. Lam. 3. 33. Psal. 107. 17.
• Gen. 9. 3.
• Prov. 12. 10.
• Why God did not make man impecca∣ble.
• Jude v. 6.
• Matth. 25. 41, 46. Mar. 9. 44, 45. Jud. v. 6, 7.
• Punish∣ments of the dam∣ned are e∣ternall.
• Gods pre∣science proveth infallibli∣ty, not ne∣cessity.
• Resoluti∣on pro∣veth ele∣ction and liberty.
• In the an∣swer to the stating of the que∣stion.
• What is necessary.
• Chance is from acci∣dentall concur∣rence, not from igno∣rance.
• Eccles. 4. 10. Prov. 22. 28. Jer. 18. 15.
• Ex Plutar∣chi Polit. ad Trajan.
• Encheiri∣dion. c. 16.
• Math. 7. 6.
• Exact de∣finitions not fre∣quent.
• What li∣berty is.
• What is sponta∣neity?
• What is necessity?
• De inter∣pret. l. 1. c. ultimo.
• Necessity of being and act∣ing di∣stingui∣shed.
• Tull.
• Necessity upon sup∣position, what it is.
• Mark 10. 27.
• Man is not a passive instrument as the sword in his hand.
• Act. 17. 28.
• The in∣stance in ambs ace hath lost T. H. his game.
• T. H. his will is no more than the bias of a bowle.
• See state∣ing of the question & answer to Num. 1.
• St. Austi•…•… more to be credi∣ted than T. H:
• De lib. Arbit. l. 3. c. 3.
• To give liberty to two, and limite to one, is a contradi∣ction.
• Accord∣ing to T. H. his principles all perswa∣sions are vvin.
• We can blame no man just∣ly.
• A lame compari∣son.
• T. H. ma∣keth him∣self no better than a wooden toppe.
• T. H, his deep skill in Logick.
• His silly defini∣tions.
• Medition li•…•…tle worth without making use of o∣ther mens experience
• Terms of art are un∣ungrateful to rude persons.
• 1 Top. c. 2. ss. 2.
• Ans. to the stat. quest. fount. of Argum. cast. Num. 1, 3. def. Num. 3.
• Freedom to do if one will, without freedom to will, a vain di∣stinction.
• Num. 30. 14. Josh. 24. 15.
• 2 Sam. 24. 12.
• Deut. 30. 19.
• Bulla Ca∣roli. 4.
• Exercit. 307.
• And ma∣keth T. H. a degree worse than the St•…•…cks.
• Aust. de civit. de•…•… l. 5. c. 10.
• Apud Gel∣lium.
• Iudicium practicé practicum explained.
• Plut.
• How the object is, and how it is not the cause of seeing.
• Num. 3.
• Sponta∣neity.
• Ethic. l. 3. c. 2.
• Num. 3. Confor∣mity sig∣nifieth a∣greeable∣ness as well as likeness.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, what they are.
• Eth. l. 3. c. 1, 2. l. 3. c. 3, 4.
• Phys. l. 2. c. 6.
• A true will may be changed.
• Num. 8.
• Num. 25.
• Voluntari∣nesse doth not desend on the judgment of other.
• Num. 33.
• Num. 8.
• Num. 8.
• Num. 26.
• 1 King. 3. 11.
• Election of more than one.
• Verse 5.
• Ver. 6, 7, 8, 9.
• Ver. 10.
• Ver. 11.
• Ver. 13.
• Acts 5. 4. Was it not in thy power? Explained.
• Out of hatred to true liber∣ty T. H. makes God hypocriti∣cal.
• Gods se∣cret and revealed will not contrary. And why.
• Fount. of Arg. in fine.
• Occulte virtue, or influence.
• Job 38, 31.
• It is blas∣phemy to say that God is the cause of sinne.
• Or to say that sin is efficacious∣ly decreed by God.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 no •…•…d per∣•…•…ssion.
• The differ∣ence be∣tween ge∣neral and special in∣fluence.
• 1 King. 21. 9.
• Fountains of Arg•…•…∣ments.
• Iam. 4. 13, 14.
• Num. 12.
• Rom. 11. 23.
• God may oblige himself.
• Jam. 1. 17.
• God can∣not do any unrighte∣ous thing.
• Tit. 1. 2. Num. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 19. 2 Tim. 2. 13. Hebr. 6. 10. Mich. 6. 2.
• Ezek. 18. 25.
• Gen. 18. 23, 25.
• Iud. 7.
• Plut.
• Num. 10.
• It is just to afflict innocent persons for their own good.
• Lib. de cive tit. Imp. c. 6. n. 18.
• •…•…n is pro∣perly irre∣gularity.
• God no cause of irregula∣rity.
• Laws may be unjust.
• Impossibi∣lities made b•…•… our selves, may be justly imposed, not im∣possibili∣ties in them, selves,
• Acts 5. 29.
• 1 Pet. 2. 13
• Proper pu∣nishment is ever vin∣dictive in part.
• Lam. 3. 39.
• Job. 31. 11.
• Ezra, 9. 13.
• Heb. 10. 28.
• Deut. 25. 2.
• 1 Pet. 2 4.
• Yet fur∣ther of un∣just laws.
• L. 1. 14.
• Exod. 1. 17.
• Dan. 3. 18.
• Heb. 11. 23.
• 1 King. 21.
• 2 King. 6. 32.
• Dan. 6. 8.
• Mich. 6. 16. 2 K. 17 19. Isay 10. 1. The au∣thority of the Scrip∣ture, not dependent on the printer.
• Ammon. in lib. de In∣terpret.
• Mr. R. H.
• T. H. a fit Catechist for disloial and unna∣tural per∣sons.
• Num, 12.
• Mankind never without laws.
• De cive c. i. Num, 12.
• Never lawful for private men ordi∣narily to kill one another.
• Numbers 35.
• Fount. of Arg.
• Gen. 9. 6.
• Gen. 4. 10.
• 1 Sam. 19. 5.
• 2 King. 24. 4.
• Prov. 28. Deut. 10. 11. Exod. 21. 14. Gen. 9. 6.
• Joh. 8. 44.
• T. H. At∣torny Ge∣neral for the brute beasts.
• Gen. 1. 28.
• Gen. 2. 19.
• Psal. 8. 6.
• Gen. 9. 3.
• Prov. 26. 5.
• Seen and unseen necessity.
• Act. 27. 22. V. 30.
• If all things be absolutely necessary, admoni∣tions are all vaine.
• A litter of absurdi∣ties.
• What is morally good.
• Isa. 5. 20.
• Exod. 1. 21
• Rewards of bruits and men differ.
• Rom. 1. 21.
• What it is to honour God.
• Jam 2. 19.
• What are devils in his judge∣ment.
• God doth not hin∣der pri∣vately what he commands openly.
• His opini∣on de∣stroyeth the truth of God.
• And his goodnesse.
• Isa. 28. 21.
• Wisd. 1. 13.
• Ezek. 33. 11.
• Fount of Arg.
• And his justice.
• And omni∣potence making the cause of sinne.
• Amos 3. 6.
• A right Hobbist cannot praise God.
• Deut. 29. 29.
• Nor hear the Word, or receive the Sacra∣ment wor∣thily,
• Matth. 11. 12. Mat. 7. 11.
• Rom. 10. 14.
• Nor vowas he ought.
• Nor re∣pent of his misdeeds.
• What re∣pentance is.
• 2 Cor. 7. 11.
• Joel 2. 12.
• Mans con∣currence with Gods grace.
• Act. 7. 51.
• Prov. 1. 24.
• Mark 1. 15.
• Rom. 11. 20. Rom. 2. 5.
• Rev. 3. 20.
• 1 Cor. 3. 9.
• 1 Cor. 15. 10.
• Confi∣dence in praier, and the effica∣cy of it.
• Jam. 1. 6.
• 1 Tim. 2. 8.
• Mark. 11. 24.
• Jam. 5. 15.
• Phil. 1. 19.
• Isay 38. 5.
• 1 King. 8. 37. 2 Chron. 7. 12.
• Luk. 17. 13. & 18. 2 Cor. 1. 11.
• T. H. Still mistaketh necessity upon sup∣position.
• There is more in contin∣gency than ignorance.
• Def. Num. 3. stat. of quest. cast. Num. 1. & 3. &c.
• Sin in the world be∣fore the civil law.
• Job 4. 18. 2 Pet. 2. 4.
• Jude 6.
• Rom. 5. 12.
• Prov. 8. 15.
• Rom. 2. 14. 1•…•…. 15.
• To com∣mand im∣possibili∣ties is un∣just.
• Yet fur∣ther a∣gainst his silly di∣stinction, free to do if he will, not free to will.
• Of mon∣sters.
• What is said to be in deo, and what extra deum.
• Exod. 3. 14.
• To will & do in God the same thing. He willeth not all he could will.
• Lu•…•…. 3. 8.
• T. H. make the will to be compel∣led.
• Arist. Eth. lib. 3. c. 1.
• 1 Sam. 28. 23. Est. 1. 8. 2 Cor. 12. 11.
• Motus pri∣mó primi, and anti∣pathies.
• To search too boldly into the nature of God is a fault.
• But the greater fault is negligence
• Rom. 1. 20.
• Exer c. 12. d. 2.
• T. H. his liberty omnipo∣tence in shew, in deed no∣thing.
• He dare not refer himself to his own witnesses.
• Terms of Art.
• 1 Cor. 14. 19.
• A contra∣diction.
• c. 17. d. 28.
• Matth. 15. 14.
• Election and com∣pulsion inconsi∣stent.
• There are mixt acti∣ons.
• Eth. l. 3. c. 1.
• Rational will.
• Eth. l. 3. c. 6, 7, 8.
• Passive obedience.
• Act. 4. 19.
• Compul∣sion what it is.
• Fear of hurt doth not abro∣gate a law.
• Cap. 2. d. 18.
• C. 6. d. 13.
• Natural Agents act determi∣nately.
• Not vo∣luntary.
• Seal. exerc. 307. d. 3.
• T. H. ma∣keth God the cause of sin.
• Amos c. 3. 6.
• 2 Sam. 16. 10. 1 King. 22. 23. 1 King. 12. 15.
• Fount. of Argu.
• Six wit∣nesses for universal necessity answeted.
• Cal. Instit. l. 2. c. 2. d. 4.
• Visit. Saxon.
• Cal. Instir. l. 2. c. 4. d. 7.
• Iudic. Theol. Lorit de lib. A^rb. Thes. 4.
• Mentall terms.
• Metapho∣rical draw∣ing.
• Jam. 4. 8. Joh. 6. 44. Joh. 12. 32.
• Pro. 20. 5.
• Paradoxes what [they are.]
• Whether a feather make a Diamant yeild.
• Or a fal∣ling drop move the whole World.
• Power of objects concern∣eth the moral Phi∣losopher.
• Eth. l. 3 c. 2.
• Still he seeketh to obtru de hypothe∣tical ne∣cessity for absolute.
• Num. 1.
• Num. 3.
• Hearing & speaking all one with T. H.
• Eth. l. 3. c. 2.
• There are other mo∣tions than local.
• Spirits moved as well as bodies.
• Both bo∣dies and spirits move them∣selves.
• Quality infused by God.
• Joel 2.
• Acts 2. 33.
• Rom. 5. 5.
• Tit. 3. 6.
• 1 Cor. 12.
• Num. 9.
• The un∣derstand∣ing and will two powers of the reaso∣nablesoul.
• Mans wil∣ling is not like a fal∣ling stone.
• Absolute necessity admitteth no contra∣ry supposi∣tion.
• A man may will contrary to the di∣ctate of reason.
• Rom. 7. 15.
• Ro. 14. 23.
• An erro∣neous conscience obligeth, first to re∣form it, then to follow it.
• Reason is the true root of li∣berty.
• Actions may be equally circum∣stantiated.
• Passions often pre∣•…•…ile a∣•…•…inst rea∣•…•….
• Jam. 1. 13.
• Man was created to be Lord of the crea∣tures. Psal. 8. 6.
• How the under∣standing giveth to objects their pro∣perweight.
• Blasphmy in the ab∣stract, and in the con∣crete differ much.
• Aman may know a truth cer∣tainly, yet not know the man∣ner.
• The Do∣ctrine of liberty an ancient truth.
• Liberty to will more reconcilia∣ble with prescience than liber∣ty to do.
• How the will of God is the necessity of all things.
• Dei. Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 15.
• Ibid. c. 17.
• De Civit. Dei c. 5. c. 10.
• What it is to permit only, and to permit barely.
• Eternity is no succes∣sive dura∣tion.
• Why God is said to be justice it self, &c.
• Joh. 14. 6. Act. 17. 29. Prov. 8. & 9.
• God is in∣divisible.
• Joh. 4. 24. 1 Tim. 1. 17.
• God is e∣ternity it self.
• Exo. 3. 13.
• Num. 8.
• What a Judge judgeth to be indeli∣berate is imperti∣nent.
• And his assertion false.
• Num. 35.
• A man cannot predelibe∣rate per∣fectly of contingent events.
• Num. 33.
• Num. 8.
• Endea∣vour is not of the essence of liberty.
• Num. 29.
• There may be impedi∣ments be∣fore deli∣beration be done.
• And liber∣ty when it is ended.
• Some un∣delibera∣ted acts may be punish∣able.
• Virtual delibera∣tion.
• Children not pun∣ishable with death.
• Num. 8.
• He know∣eth no reason but imagina∣tion.
• The facul∣ty of wil∣ling is the will.
• Num. 20.
• Of concu∣piscence.
• Jam. 1. 15.
• Of the in∣tellectual•…•… and sensi∣tive appe∣tite.
• Not the same thing.
• His deli∣beration is no delibe∣ration.
• His liberty no true liberty.
• His defini∣tion of li∣berty.
• Analogi∣cal mat∣ter.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 4. d. 7.
• By his de∣finition a stone is free to ascend.
• Begin∣ning of motion from the mover.
• The same faculty willeth or nilleth.
• Other causes concur with the will.
• Necessary causes do not all∣waies act necessarily.
• Two sor•…•…s of suffici∣ency.
• Luk. 14. 28.
• 2 Cor. 2. 16.
• Isa. 5. 4.
• Our con∣ceptions are not the touchstone of truth.
• His grosse mistakes about e∣ternity.
• What is his deli∣beration.
• Man is free to will, or he is not free to do.
• He ma∣keth a stone as free to a∣scend as descend,
• A Hawke, saith he, is free to flie when her wings are pluck∣ed.
• Abegining of being & acting.
• His answer to some demands.
• Free to do if he will, yet not free to wil is against law and Logick. Num. 3.
• Num. 3.
• A necessa∣ry effect requires all neces∣sary cau∣ses.
• Math. 10. 29.
• His in∣stance of Ambs ace Num. 31, 32.
• Num. 3.
• Num. 11.
• His other idstance of raining or not rain∣ing to morrow.
• Deut 11. 14. Jer. 5. 24. Hos. 6. 3.
• Gods de∣cree consi∣deredactu∣ally and passively.
• Num. 11.
• God knows all future possibili∣ties.
• Math. 11. 21.
• 1 Sam 23. 11.
• His argu∣ment to prove uni∣versal ne∣cessity an∣swered.
• Possible and im∣possible all one with T. H.
• Remote causes are not toge∣ther with the effect.
• Nor doth all time make one instant.
• T. H. ad∣mitteth no absur∣dities but impossibi∣lities.
• Abuses do not flow essentially from good doctrines, as from universal necessity.
• Solid rea∣sons work soonest upon solid judge∣ments.
• Three sorts of men.
• The do∣ctrine of liberty maketh no •…•…man careless or thanklesse.
• God hath no facul∣ties.
• Num. 24. Q. & 1. Levi. c. 38.
• God is in∣compre∣hensible.
• Rom. 1. •…•…0.
• Psal. 119.
• Yet so far as we can, we are ob∣liged to search af∣ter him.
• Act. 17. 24.
• To admit that God is infinite, is enough to confute T. H.
• Tophet.
• True Re∣ligion consisteth not in o∣bedience to Princes.
• Lev. c. 42.
• Lev. c. 17, 18.
• Lev. c. 42.
• 1 Tim. 3. 14.
• Num. 14.
• 1. King. 12. 30.
• 1 King. 22. 52.
• •…•…ev. c. 22.
• Act. 4. 19.
• De Cive e. 3. Num. 29. & 31. Lev. c. 29. &c. 26.
• Leviath. c. 34.
• De Cive c. 15. Num. 18.
• C. 31.
• Ibidem.
• De cive, c. 15.
• Dan. 3. 4.
• Dan. 6. 7.
• Math. 10. 33. & 27.
• Hierome Epist. ad Chromat.
• Ezek. 28. 3.
• Rom. 10. 10.
• De Cive c. 14. Active and passive o∣bedience.
• Lev. c. 20. Universal practise a∣gainst him
• The just power of Priences.
• 1 King. 21. 9.
• Acts 4. 19.
• He confes∣seth that Ecclesia∣stical per∣sons have a priviledg above him∣self.
• De Cive. c. 17.