The cure of old age and preservation of youth by Roger Bacon... ; translated out of Latin, with annotations and an account of his life and writings / by Richard Browne. Also, a physical account of the tree of life / by Edw. Madeira Arrais ; translated likewise out of Latin by the same hand.

The Preface.

§. 1. EXpositors of Holy Writ have made the Tree of Life very fa∣mous, by which our first Parents and all their Posterity had been priviledg∣ed against Death, and might have spun their Thread of Life to Eternity, had they o∣beyed the Divine Precept. Moses menti∣ons this Gen. 2. and 3. And though Di∣vines dispute many things about it; yet since it is necessary in many things to have Recourse to the Principles of Physick, and also to our Doctrine of Occult Qualities, seeing such a Propagation of Life could ne∣ver be obtain'd, but by some Occult Vir∣tues (as shall be made evident in the pro∣cess of this Treatise) I cannot be thought to put my Sickle into another Man's Har∣vest, if concerning the Qualities of this Wood or Tree I shall at this time discourse what is worthy a Philosophical Man and his Knowledge: especially since never any Phi∣losopher yet disputed of it in Particular, nay nor spake one Word about it.

§. 2. Eight Doubts therefore may be moved about this Tree or Wood.

• First, Whether it was proper and true Wood, or Metaphorical?
• Secondly, Whether the Vertue it had to perpetuate Life, was Natural or Super∣natural?
• Thirdly, Whether its Vertue were such, as to preserve Life, Time without end?
• Fourthly, Whether it sufficed to give Life eternal, if it were but once taken?
• Fifthly, Whether this Wood of Life were a Cause adaequate to the escaping all Occasions of Death?
• Sixthly, By what Qualities in particular it performed this?
• Seventhly, After what manner the Re∣sistence of those Qualities might defend that Man's Body, who eat of the Tree of Life, from all external Causes that could hurt it?
• Eighthly, Whether the Cause of the ve∣ry long Life of the first Men were some other Trees of Paradise, or the Tree of Life?

§. 3. And although only the Sixth and Seventh (which were never disputed upon, or so much as hinted at by any one yet) do truly fall under our Cognisance: Ne∣vertheless that they may the more clearly be decided, it is necessary to resolve the

other according to the probable Opinions of Divines; most of which notwithstand∣ing the Reader may find adorned and am∣plified from the Philosophy of Physicians, especially from this of ours of Occult Qua∣lities.

DOUBT I. Whether the Wood of Life were a proper and true Tree, or only Metaphorical?

COncerning this first Doubt it is the com∣mon Opinion, nay, even Matter of Faith, as Suarez ^a asserts, that the Wood of Life was a corporeal and true Tree, which in Paradise yielded Fruit fit for Food, as other Trees that were made to grow there. This is manifestly proved from Scripture ^b: And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every Tree that is pleasant to the Sight, and good for food: the Tree of Life also in the midst of the Garden, and the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. Where the Word [made to grow] refers to this Wood, as well as other Trees, which were truly such. And the contrary Opinion is ascribed to Origen's Error, who makes the

History of Paradise Metaphorical. And because this Point is sufficiently cleared by Sacred Writers, I need not stay longer upon it.

^a Suar. l. 3. De Opere sex Dierum. c. 15. ^b Gen. 2. 9.

DOUBT II. Whether the Vertue of the Tree of Life to perpetuate Life, were Natural or Superna∣tural?

§. 1. AS to this second Doubt it is the more common Opinion that the Vertue of this Wood to perpetuate Life, was not Supernatural, but Natural. So think Thomas ^a, Cajetan ^b, Gabriel ^c, Ru∣pertus ^d, Hugo de Sancto Victore ^e, Strabus ^f, Durandus and Scotus ^g, and many others.

§. 2. Some would prove this Opinion from Holy Writ, ^h Lest he put forth his hand and take also of the Tree of Life, and eat, and live for ever: therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden. Be∣cause, if that Vertue (as they say) were on∣ly supernatural, that, namely, they should

live that were obedient, there had been no need to have turned Adam out of Paradise; but as soon as he had sinned, God was not bound to keep his Covenant, or to make good that Law of conferring Life and Im∣mortality by eating of this Tree.

§. 3. Nevertheless a Man can scarce con∣clude on this Ground, because two ways the Fruit of that Tree might have a super∣natural Vertue to prolong Life to Eternity, and yet sin might be no impediment of it. First, If in the aforesaid Tree there were some Supernatural Quality inherent, made good by God himself, whereby it should prolong Life to Eternity: In which Case Sin could not hinder the Activity and Ef∣ficacy of that Quality. Secondly, If God had made a Covenant to give Life Eternal to them that should eat of this Fruit, al∣though they should sin.

§. 4. But upon another Ground it may sufficiently be proved, that the Virtue of this Tree to give Eternal Life, is Natural: Namely, Because it is not repugnant, that in Nature such a Virtue should be found; Because the Effect of this Tree of it self is of a natural Order and finite Perfection: For it should have preserved Life to Eter∣nity, because it would have strengthened

all the Faculties of Man's Body, restored and preserved its natural Temperament, and have kept off all Morbifick Causes, as we shall hereafter shew. But what may be done by a Power Natural, that ought not to be referred to one Supernatural: Therefore not this of the Tree of Life.

^a D. Thom. 1 part. qu. 97. art. 4. ^b ibi∣que Cajetanus. ^c Gab. in 2 Dist. ^d Rup. l. 3. in Gen. c. 3. ^e Hug. de Sanct. Vict. in Annot. Gen. cap. 7. Gen. c. 2. ^f Strab. in Gen. ^g Durand. & Scot. in 2 Dist. 19. ^h Gen. 3. 22, 23.

DOUBT III. Whether the Virtue of this Tree were such, as to keep a Man alive, Time without end?

§. 1. THere are two extreme Opinions about this Question. The first is theirs, who say, That by eating of such a Tree a Man would not have been e∣ternal, but would only have endured a very long time; and he should therefore have been eternal in the State of Inno∣cence,

because after one or more Eatings, before the Virtue of the Tree were spent, he should have been translated from the State of Grace to Glory and Immortality, as Scotus ^a thinks.

§. 2. They prove this Opinion. First, The Virtue of that Tree would have been finite, in that it was created: Therefore it could not produce an infinite Effect. Se∣condly, If that Tree had had a Virtue to preserve Men to Eternity, that Virtue would have been useless, because no Man in the State of Innocence should have lived for ever in this World, but after an appoint∣ed Time all Men should have been translated, when, to wit, the Number of the Predesti∣nate was full (as these Men hold.) For at that Time the just should be translated to Glory, and the unjust to eternal Punish∣ment. Wherefore when this Time were finished, the Virtue of the Tree, that pre∣serves Men to Eternity, would have been superfluous.

§. 3. Thirdly, Because the Apple of that Tree taken for Nourishment would have rëacted upon the Body: Therefore it could never restore the Radical Moisture and the wasted Substance entire, and by con∣sequence could not preserve Life to Eter∣nity.

§. 4. Fourthly, Though the Tree of Life might for the most part take away inward Morbifick Causes, by restoring intire the natural Heat and Moisture, and the decay∣ed Substance, so that it should not wax old: Yet it could not take away external Causes, nor by consequence prevent a Man's being hurt by Wounds, or perishing by Hun∣ger, or being choak'd for want of Breath. Therefore from thence eternal Life could not of necessity follow.

§. 5. Fifthly, Because in the State of la∣psed Nature at least, Man would have been much more obnoxious to morbid Cau∣ses; whereas in the State of Innocence he lived more temperately without any Trou∣ble and in all Tranquillity, all which things after Sin, proved deficient. But the Tree of Life could not avoid so many Causes of Diseases in the state of lapsed Nature. Therefore it could not make Man immor∣tal.

§. 6. Augustine ^b seems of this Opinion, Thomas ^c holds it, Cajetan ^d, Gabriel ^e, Du∣randus ^f and others.

§. 7. The other Opinion is, That the said Tree had such a Virtue, that being tasted by Man, it would carry him to perfect Immortality. Of this Opinion is Au∣gustine

^g, the Interlineary Gloss ^h, Ruper∣tus ⁱ, Tostatus ^k, the Author ^l of the Que∣stions of the Old and New Testament, which Author is thought to be Augustine, and is quoted under his Name by Thomas ^m, Bonaventure ⁿ: And the Antient Fathers held it before, who affirm that God there∣fore drove Adam out of Paradise, lest he should eat of that Tree, and for ever live miserable, rather pitying than punishing him: For it had been too great a punish∣ment to endure an interminable Evil.

§. 8. So Irenaeus ^o, Hilarius ^p, Gregory Nazianzen ^q, Hierome ^r, Cyril ^s, Chryso∣stom ^t, Theodoret ^u, Eucherius ^w, Bede ^x, Stra∣bus ^y, Damascene ^z, Dionysius Carthusianus ^a•.

§. 9. And all these Authors agree in this, That the Tree of Life was able of it self to give eternal Life, both in the State of In∣nocence and in the State of lapsed Nature, if Men had eaten thereof: The difference among them only is, That some affirm it was necessary to eat often of it; others, that once to have eaten was sufficient. And then some thought it an adaequate Cause of Immortality; others thought, it only kept out the internal Causes of Death. Which Questions we shall discuss hereafter.

§ 10. This said Opinion is sufficiently

proved from these Words of Holy Writ; Lest he put forth his Hand, and take also of the Tree of Life and live for ever. There∣fore for that reason was Adam driven out of Paradise, lest he should live for ever, as he should have lived in the state of In∣nocence, had he eaten of the Tree of Life: Therefore the eating of that Tree must have preserved a Man for ever, by rea∣son of the Virtue it had to this end, and not only for a long Time.

§. 11. Some make answer to this Argument, that God spake Ironically. But they give not Satisfaction. First, because this Solu∣tion contradicts the Testimony of the a∣foresaid Fathers. Secondly, because Adam's ejection out of Paradise, and the Angel with the flaming Sword placed to keep the way of the Tree of Life, sufficiently de∣clare that God spake not by way of Irony, but properly and in good earnest.

§. 12. Secondly, others answer the fore∣said Argument thus, That the Words [for ever] ought not to be taken for true Eter∣nity, but for a very long Time. Which Answer yet doth not please. First, because that Word in its proper Signification de∣notes Eternity; but the Words of Holy Writ, unless some great Inconvenience hin∣der,

should ever be taken in their proper and genuine Signification, otherwise we should have nothing certain. Secondly, because the Life which was owing to Man in the state of Innocence, was Life Eternal, not only a very long Life: But the Tree of Life was made by God to make good that Life, which was owing to Man in the State of Innocence; Therefore not only ve∣ry long Life, but simply eternal Life was to be made good by eating of that Tree.

§. 13. And this is confirmed, First, be∣cause God for that Reason cast Man out of Paradise, lest he should enjoy that good which was due to him, had he been obe∣dient, and persisted in the State of Inno∣cence: But that Good due to the State of Innocence, whereof he was to be deprived, if he were not obedient, (as God had de∣clared in those words, in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely dye) was Life absolutely Eternal, not only a very long one: Therefore the same Life eternal must be made good by that Tree. Second∣ly, it is confirmed, because the Punishment threatned Man was the loss of Life absolutely eternal. But God executed this Punishment by the Loss of the Tree of Life. Therefore this Tree must give Life absolutely eternal,

otherwise it had not been necessary to de∣prive Man of the eating of this Tree.

§. 14. Secondly, The said Opinion is demon∣strated, because if that Tree had not continu∣ally kept off Old Age, at least in its Season repeated, it would follow, that in the state of Innocence something would have been lost of Nature's Vigour, and Men would have fal∣len from the Flower of their Age to a worse condition, which is contrary to the Sacred Text, which saith, in the day that thou eat∣est thereof, thou shalt surely dye, that is, thou shalt begin to decline to Death, or to de∣cay from the Integrity of Nature (as all Authors expound it) until thou decayest altogether, and dost dye. Therefore the Tree of Life did so make good eternal Life, that it would not suffer Nature to fall a whit from her Integrity. Therefore it would not only have given a long Life, but that Apple would not suffer the least Defect in Nature.

§. 15. Bellarmine ^{b b} judges either of these Opinions probable, and affirms they may be defended without Heresy. Yet he is for the latter, as I am, to be the more eligible.

§. 16. Therefore a Man may answer the first Argument for the opposite Opinion thus, That its Cogency is as great in the Beatifick Vision; for that it indures Time

infinite, when nevertheless the immediate Causes of this Duration are the Intellect and Light of Glory, which are finite Be∣ings. Therefore as it is no Obstacle in the Production of an Effect which will endure Time infinite, that these Causes are finite: So also there can be no Repugnance, that the Qualities of the Tree of Life might pro∣duce an Effect durable Time infinite.

§. 17. But you will urge. This takes not away the force of the Argument, Because an infinite Duration is an infinite Effect, therefore it cannot be effected by a finite Cause. Yet I deny the Consequence, Be∣cause it may immediately be effected by a finite Cause, when in the mean time it de∣pends on a Cause infinite. For the Quali∣ties of the Tree of Life were to be conser∣ved by God immediately to all eternity, therefore these very Qualities also would immediately conserve Life to Eternity: In∣stances hereof are spiritual Substances, which are conserved to Eternity by the First Cause immediately, and they themselves conserve their Effects to Eternity.

§. 18. To the Second I answer. From this it would follow, that all other Trees were superfluous, seeing they would remain af∣ter Translation. And yet the Fruits of

other Trees were not supervacaneous in Pa∣radise, although no Man eat of them.

§. 19. To the third it may be answered. That this Apple was not only Meat but Me∣dicine also, by reason of the Qualities, which shall hereafter be explained, where∣by it either hindred its own Rëaction, or made up the Dammage of the Rëaction, if there were any, whereby all things re∣specting the Integrity of Nature, might be restored, and reduced to the most perfect State. Whence it might correct by Me∣dicinal Qualities that Dammage which it brought by Rëaction.

§. 20. To the fourth I say. That the Qua∣lities of that Wood, which shall hereafter be enumerated, would have preserved from all Causes, which might bring a Preterna∣tural Disposition to the Body, so that it could neither be offended by Wounds, nor could be sick, or dye of Hunger, or want of Air; which hereafter we shall shew was possible.

§. 21. Others, who are unwilling to at∣tribute the perfect Cause of avoiding Death to the Tree of Life, reply. That those outward Causes must have been avoided by the extraordinary Providence of God: But we shall dispute this hereafter. Yet

grant it were so, this doth not hinder, but that the Tree of Life might remove the in∣ward Causes of Death for ever.

§. 22. To the fifth the same Answer will serve, to wit, That Reparation would have been made for all offending Causes, though never so violent and numerous, by the said Qualities of the Tree, as we shall here∣after shew.

^a Scotus in 2 dist. 19. q. unica. ^b D. Aug. l. 6. in Genes. c. 25. ^c D. Thom. 1. p. q. 97. a. 4. & 2. 2. q. 164. a. 2. ad 6. ^d Cajet. 1. p. q. 97. cit. loc. ^e Gabriel in 2 dist. 19. ^f Durandus ibid. ^g Aug. l. 13. de Civit. Dei c. 20. & l. 14. c. 26. & l. 1. de Peccat. mer. c. 3. & l. 8. in Genes. c. 5. ^h Glos. interl. in illa verba, Ne forte sumat de Ligno Vi∣tae, &c. ⁱ. Rup. l. 3. in Genes. c. 30. ^k To∣stat. super 13. c. Genes. q. 175. ^l Author quaest, Vet. & Nov. Testam. quaest. 19. ^m D. Th. 1. p. q. 97. a. 1. ⁿ Bonav. 2 sent. dist. 17. De Ligno Vitae. ^o Iraen. l. 3. advers. Haeres. c. 37. ^p S. Hil. in comment. Psalmi 68. in illa verba, Quem tu percussisti, &c. ^q S. Greg. Naz. Orat. de Pascha. ^r S. Hieron. c. 65. Isaiae. ^s S. Cyrill. l. 3. advers. Julian. cir∣ca med. ^t S. Joan. Chrysost. Hom. 18. in

Gen. ⁿ quem imitatur Theodoretus q. 26. in Genes. ^w Eucherius l. 1. in Genes. ^x Be∣da supra eadem verba. ^y Strabus ibid. ^z S. Johan. Damascen. l. 2. Orthodoxae Fidei c. 11. ^aa Dionys. Carthus. in Gen•• c. 2. ^bb Bellarm. in Disp, Controvers. contra Haeret. l. 1. tom. 4. cap. 8.

DOUBT IV. Whether it were sufficient for Immortality to eat only once of the Fruit?

§. 1. ABout this Doubt also there are two contrary Opinions, one whereof is Negative, the other Affirma∣tive. S^t Augustine ^a is for the Negative part, so Thomas ^b, Suarez ^c, Be••anus ^d, Be∣nedictus Pereira ^e, and consequently all those who affirm, that this Tree could not give Immortality.

§. 2. It is proved first, Because that Tree prolonged Life, in as much as it repaired the Radical Moisture, and Substance of the Body that was wasted, as perfect as it was; and reduced the Body to the best Temper and Constitution, if they were lost; and greatly strengthened the Native Heat;

whether it did this materially, being con∣verted into the Substance of the thing nou∣rished, and as it was Aliment; as also by Qualities manifest or occult, as a Medicine; or by all these ways. But all these good Properties in Tract of Time would grow remiss and be extinguished, both by the Rëaction of other Meats; and also by reason of the injuries of external Causes, which in the State of lapsed Nature would frequently have occurred, as likewise by the Rëaction of the Tree it self, which would necessarily have been, even in the State of Innocence. Therefore it would have been necessary that at several Inter∣vals the Tree should have been taken a∣gain, that it might repair again the lapsed Constitution of the Body; and that by this means Old Age and Death might be kept off, and Life might remain to Eternity.

§. 3. Secondly, Because that Tree was corruptible, when it was turned into the Substance of the thing nourished: There∣fore the Substance also that was generated of it would have been corruptible. There∣fore it was necessary that again and again it should be repaired by taking of that Wood. And it is confirmed,

§. 4. First, Because whatever is genera∣ted

is corrupted: But a Body is generated of that Wood; for Nutrition is also a cer∣tain Generation in respect of the Parts lost. Therefore a Body nourished by that Wood would have been corrupted.

§. 5. It is confirmed secondly, Because A∣ristotle ^f from thence proves against Hesiod and other Poets and Gentile Divines of his Time, that the Gods cannot be rendred im∣mortal by taking of Nectar and Ambrosia; Because whatever is nourished, must of ne∣cessity be corruptible and mortal: But the Body would have been nourished by the Tree of Life: Therefore according to A∣ristotle's Doctrine it would have necessa∣rily been and remained corruptible and mortal. Therefore the Repetition of the eating of the Tree was necessary to pre∣vent Mortality. Nor does it avail, if you say, the Body was made incorruptible by the Qualities received from the Tree. I say, it doth not avail. Because if these Qualities could not make the Wood it self incorruptible, how could they make ano∣ther Body incorruptible?

§. 6. Thirdly, If the Wood once taken had rendred the Body impatible, it would have followed, that if a Child had taken it, he could not grow further, nor could Old

Men grow young again, nor sick Men grow well, but would have remained in the same State for ever: But this is false: There∣fore the other also. The Major is proved, because a Body rendred impatible cannot be nourished, nor any way altered. There∣fore the Body would always abide in that state, in which the Wood once taken ren∣dred it impatible.

§. 7. Nevertheless there are firmer grounds for the Affirmative Part, and the Fathers a∣bove-cited in the third Doubt for the Opi∣nion which asserts, That this Tree could give Life eternal, do hold this, such as I∣renaeus, Hilary, Nazianzen, Hierome, and others there cited, of which Opinion the Interlineary Gloss seems to be, when it af∣firms that this Wood was not to be taken, but at that Time when the Just were to pass to the State of the Blessed, which seems for no other Cause, but that they might be made eternal by the Tree: Whence that one eating had been suffici∣cient. Rupertus ^g expresseth this Opinion when he saith, In no wise, as some do suppose, was the Tree necessarily to be frequented as a Pass-port of perpetuating Life: But it being once taken, the Body would have lived for e∣ver. Theodoret ^h is of the same Opinion.

§. 8. This is effectually proved from the ve∣ry Text of Holy Writ, Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take also of the Tree of Life, and eat, and live for ever. But if a Man ha∣ving once taken of the Tree did not re∣main eternal, it would have little matter∣ed, that he had taken it once or oftener; and had lived for many Years; when yet at what time soever he should be cast out and deprived of the eating of that Tree, he would have been subject to Death, and have suffered the Punishment of Disobedi∣ence. Therefore it is manifest, that once taken, it would have sufficed for Eterni∣ty.

§. 9. And it is confirmed by observing with Rupert the [also] and the [perhaps]. For these Words suppose, that as Adam took of the Tree of Knowledge, and as he took of the Fruits of other Trees; so he might also take of the Tree of Life, not indeed knowingly, but fortuitously; lest therefore he once taking by chance of this Tree should be made eternal, he was to be cast out before he touched it. Therefore once tasted it was sufficient for Eternal Life, and not only for living some long Time. The Argument is corroborated, For why with so great diligence and speed did God

drive Man out of Paradise, and why did the Angel keep the Way with a Flaming Sword? There seems no other Reason, unless because perhaps before his Going out, or perhaps Returning after his Exit, if he had tasted of the Tree, he might have been made eternal; otherwise there had been no need to use such Care, for though he had eaten sometimes before his going out, or had after returned to eat, being driven out again he had been subject to Death.

§. 10. It is proved secondly, Because in the state of Innocence, as Thomas ⁱ affirms, there might have been actual Sins: There∣fore there would have been some bad Men, who might have killed others, even the Just, by Wounds, Poyson, or by Hunger and Privation of Air: Therefore unless the Just were altogether fenced by once eating of the Tree, they might be subject to Death, and there might be danger lest the Inno∣cent should be deprived of their due Pri∣vilege, which ought by no means to be. For what easier way could there be to kill a just Man, than to hinder him that he could not come to the eating of the Tree of Life, or to keep him so long from eat∣ing thereof, that he should be consumed of Old Age?

§. 11. It is proved thirdly, Because that Tree, as the Assertors of the contrary O∣pinion do confess, was corruptible: There∣fore it would sometime fail, especially when (as seems to be inferred from Holy Writ) there was only one Tree, nor doth it appear whether others could be propaga∣ted or planted of its Seed. Therefore al∣though Men should eat thereof, yet if the Repetition of it were necessary, they could not live for ever.

§. 12. Fourthly, Because, as S^t Chryso∣stome ^k saith, It pleased the Lord (these are his very Words) that Man made by Him and living in Paradise, should have a certain Meditation of Obedience and Inobedience, and these two were shown by these two Trees, the one of Life, the other (as I may so say) of Death. Whence Bellarmine gathers, this was for the Punishment of Inobedience, the other for the Reward of Obedience: For although Life Eternal (as I apprehend) was owing to the State of Innocence; yet for a Reward of Obedience Man was not to be deprived of that Life Eternal. Where∣fore as the forbidden Tree once tasted brought a necessity of Death; so by pari∣ty of Justice the Tree of Life once tasted ought to give Eternity of Life. For which

Reasons this Opinion is more probable to me, as it is more consonant to Sacred Writ and the Holy Fathers. Wherefore

§. 13. It is answered to the Arguments of the contrary Opinion. To the first, granting the Major the Minor is denied, Because the Qualities of the Tree, seeing they did not depend of the Tree in their Conservation, and were incorruptible and altogether e∣ternal, would have defended the Body it self that it should not fall again from that best Constitution; Wherefore Man would never have further stood in need of a new Exhibition of the Tree. And although Rëa∣ction were granted, whilst the Apple of this Tree, or any other Food was concocted in the Stomach, and the other Work-houses, and in the whole Habit of the Bo∣dy; yet it would impart such Virtue to the Faculties or Powers of the Stomach, and of the other Work-houses, and of the whole Body, that it would correct the Damages of Repassion. As it happens to Fire, which by its Efficacy fully compen∣sates all Repassion brought from the Wood, so that if Fewel never fail, it is not dimi∣nished or extinguished; nay rather as plen∣ty of proportionate Fewel encreaseth, it is augmented.

§. 14. To the Second, granting the Ante∣cedent, the Consequence is denied, Because the Substance bred of the Tree would have been defended from Corruption by Quali∣ties received from the Tree, whereby be∣sides, the Temperament of the Body would have been rendred so firm, that it could neither further be intended or remit∣ted from within or from without; but the Faculties of the Bodies would have per∣formed Actions so perfect, that they would overcome all morbisick Causes, which here∣after we shall more explain.

§. 15. To the first Confirmation, I say, All that is generated is corrupted, except it be defended by the Qualities of the Tree, or by something else. But since in this State we want the Tree of Life, that Proposition is true: Yet it would not have been true in the Time of the State of Innocence, nor also in the State of lapsed Nature, had it been granted only once to have eaten of the Tree. But when it is said, If the said Qua∣lities could not defend the Tree from Cor∣ruption, how should they defend Mans Bo∣dy? I answer, Easily. Because the Tree had not these Qualities formally or actually, but potentially or virtually; and it would have produced them in the Body by a Tran∣sient

Action, as other Medicaments do, as I think more probably with the most learned Philosophers, such as are Patres Conimbri∣censes ^l, after the manner of Pepper, as Pe∣trus Garcia ^m. But after these Qualities ex∣isted formally or in act in the Body, they could make good to it the Effect of pre∣serving it from Corruption: Wherefore it is no Wonder if these Qualities were able to preserve our Body from Corruption, yet not the Fruit.

§. 16. To the second Confirmation, it is clear already what should be answered, and shall further appear hereafter. For in this State it is so, but in the State of Innocence it would not have so been, because by the Qualities of the Tree of Life a nutrible Bo∣dy would have been rendred incorruptible.

§. 17. But you will urge, The Tree would have produced such Qualities in the Body either before it was turned into the thing nourished, or after. Not before, because the Body rendred by them impassible could not turn Food into the Substance of the thing nourished: Not after, because the Form of the Wood would be then de∣stroyed, whereby they should be produ∣ced, and in the same Matter of the Wood the Form of Man would be introduced, of

which they could not be produced. There∣fore they could no way be produced in a Humane Body.

§. 18. Yet I answer, The Wood would have produced such Qualities both before, and after conversion into another Sub∣stance. Before, because to produce them it would have sufficed, that it should be a∣ctuated in the Stomach as other Medica∣ments, and the Wood being actuated, pre∣sently the Qualities would have been diffu∣sed through the whole Body; nor would the Impassibility of the Body have hindred the acquiring of Perfection, whilst the Bo∣dy wanted it, yet it would have been suffi∣cient that it did not fall from that Perfecti∣on, which it had, as hereafter we shall more explain. After, because the Virtue of the Wood would have remained in the Hu∣mors and the rest of the Juices of the Bo∣dy, which Virtue indeed being actuated, al∣though the Substantial Form were not then in the Wood, might produce actual or for∣mal Qualities, as we have said of the su∣pra-elementary Qualities of other Medica∣ments, as of Purgers and Poysons, which we have proved to remain in the Matter af∣ter the Substantial Forms are corrupted.

§. 19. I said [while the Body wanted it,

that is, Per••ection] Because if any one should have taken the Wood in that State, wherein he had his Substance perfectly re∣paired, he would not turn it into the Sub∣stance of the nourished, seeing then such Matter would be Superfluous; but the Me∣dicamentous Qualities only being received from the Wood, he would have expelled from his Body the Matter of it as Superflu∣ous, as now the Matter of other Medicines, which are not also Aliments, is expelled.

§. 20. To the third I answer, The Body would not have been rendred altogether impatible, except after it had arrived to all the Perfection was due unto it: For if it were below that, by the accession of the Qualities of the Tree, it could not fall from that it had, although most violent Causes happened to destroy it, and in this Sense at that very Time it had been impatible: Yet this did not hinder, that by Means of those Qualities impressed from the Wood, it should not acquire farther Perfection due unto it. And thence it is manifest that a Child should come to the Perfection of a Man, an Old Man should be reduced to Youth, even as a Sick Man to Health. But when a Man were constituted in all perfe∣ction of Health, he would remain for ever

impatible in all Senses; because he could neither decay, nor could he proceed fur∣ther.

§. 21. Which that it may the better be understood, it is to be observed from Tho∣mas ⁿ, that Passion is twofold. First, pro∣perly, so called, in which Sense one is said to suffer, who is removed from his natural Disposition. Secondly, commonly, accord∣ing to any Mutation, though it pertain to the perfection of Nature. And in the first Sense by eating of the Fruit of the Tree the Body would have been rendred impas∣sible, because it could never be removed from that Perfection it had. But in the se∣cond sense it had not been impassible, as long as it was not arrived at the top of Per∣fection, for it would have been receptive of such a Change.

§. 22. But you will question, Whether then Generation and Propagation of Chil∣dren could have been? I answer in the Af∣firmative. And prove it, Because if such Qualities ought to be no hindrance to a Child that his Body should come to its Perfection, nor to an Old Man that he should be restored to his, why should it hinder Generation of Seed in the Vessels, and Propagation of Children? You will

object. Therefore to this end, and to the growth of a Child's Body, and reduction of an Old Man's, it was necessary to take a∣gain of the Fruit of the Tree, or at least of other Food. I answer, to this Work perhaps so it was necessary, or may be the Faculties would have been so strong after the first taking of that Fruit, that from the ambient Air, Water, or from any other Mat∣ter one might have repaired the Substance wanting to the growing of a Child, or re∣storing an Old Man, or to breeding Seed for Children. For this would not then have been impossible to very strong Facul∣ties: Because perhaps the Fruit it self would have introduced alimentous Quali∣ties into any Matter, although of its own Nature such Matter had them not.

§. 23. But whether Man stated in this Im∣mortality acquired by the Fruit of the Tree, should have had those Actions and the same Qualities in kind, which we shall have after the Resurrection? I dispute not this, nor doth it belong to me, but let Divines de∣termine it. Amongst whom the interlinea∣ry Gloss ^o and Bellarmine ^p seem to think so.

§. 24. But Whether could Children newly born, before they eat the Wood, or also before

their Birth, in the Mothers Womb, be subject to Death? It seems to be denied, Because the Qualities of the Fruit of the Tree of Life, which was eaten by the Parents, would have been in their Seed also, and would have defended their Children from Death both before their Birth and after.

§. 25. You will infer, It had sufficed there∣fore that the Tree of Life had been once ta∣ken by Adam and Eve, for all that should be born of them to have been made immortal. And this Opinion seems to be confirmed, first, by an Argument taken from the ne∣cessary Efficient Cause; for these Qualities would have been incorrup••ible, and ever have remained so in the Matter, and with the Seed and its Virtue would have been propagated into all the Individuals of Hu∣mane Kind, and would have produced o∣ther like Qualities in a kind of Cause Uni∣vocal: Therefore there was no necessity for Adam's Successors to taste the Tree of Life, that they might live for ever.

§. 26. Secondly, By an Argument taken from the Final Cause: For if by taking of the Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, which was but once eaten of our First Parents, the Pu∣nishment of Death inevitable was inflicted upon them and their Descendents; also, that

equality of Justice might be observed, by once taking of the Fruit of the Tree of Life, Life eternal for a Reward of Obedi∣ence ought not only to be given to our Pa∣rents themselves, but to Universal Mankind. But if this doth not please any Man, one may say, that some Qualities of the Tree derived to the Child, would have preser∣ved it from perishing, till the Birth, and after the Birth also for some Time would have been communicated in the Mothers Milk; and afterwards, had it been necessa∣ry, he might also have eaten of the Fruit of Life it self.

§. 27. But whether should they, that had committed actual Sin (according to the O∣pinion which admits that) have been subject to Death afterwards, although before they had eaten of the Tree? It seems to be denied. First, Because even Adam after Sin should have been made free from Death, had he eaten the Fruit of Life. And seeing the Qualities of the Fruit would have been de∣rived to his Children, both Just and Un∣just would by them have been defended from Death. Secondly, Because the Pu∣nishment of Death was only imposed, if our first Parents violated that only Pre∣cept.

^a D. Augustinus l. 3. de Civitat. Dei c. 20. & l. 11. Genes. ad lit. cap. 4. & l. 1. de peccat. mer. c. 3. ^b D. Thom. 1. part. q. 97. art. 4. & colligitur ex 2. 2. quaest. 164. art. 2. ad 6. eám{que} habent communiter Scho∣lastici, & sequuntur Suarius. ^c L. 3. de opere sex dierum. cap. 15. ^d Becanus tract. de im∣mortalitate cap. 4. ^e Benedictus Pereire lib. 3. in Genes. disp. de arbore Vitae quaest. 3. ^f Aristoteles lib. 3. metaph. cap. 4. text. 15. ^g Rupertus lib. 3. in Genes. cap. 30. ^h The∣odoretus quaest. 16. in Gen. ⁱ Thomas 1. part. q. 100. art. 2. ^k Chrysostomus hom. 18. ^l Pa∣tres Conimbricenses 2. de generat. cap. 3. quaest. 2. articul. 2. assert. 2. & lib. 7. phys. cap. 1. quaest. 1. art. 2. ^m Petrus Garcia. Fen. 1. 4. tract. 1. cap. 4. disp. 2. quaest. 5. pagina 269. col. 2. ⁿ Thom. 1. p. quaest. 97. art. 2. §. Respondeo. ^o Gloss. interl. in illa verba Ne forte sumat. ^p Bellarm. lib. 1. tom. 4. contr. 1. c. 18.

DOUBT V. Whether the Tree of Life were a Cause ad∣equate to the escaping all Occasions of Death?

§. 1. NOW of those Authors who de∣ny to the Tree of Life the Vir∣tue of extending Life absolutely to Eterni∣ty, though it should be eaten at repeated Turns, when yet they are compelled to af∣firm, that in the State of Innocence Men would have been free from Death; Some do assert, following Scotus ^a, that this Tree by restoring the Native Heat and Radical Moisture (he spake according to the Old and Nugatory Opinion, that admits of a Ra∣dical Moisture diverse from the Living Parts) either as Nourishment or Medicine, or both ways, would have preserved Life for a very long Time; and they add, that before the Virtue of the Tree were spent, Men without the intervention of Death should have been translated to a State of Immortality. Wherefore according to this Opinion the Tree of Life would not have been an adequate Cause of Immortality. Which Opinion of Scotus notwithstanding

stands refuted from what hath been already said.

§. 2. But others with Cajetane ^b admit of a certain Supernatural and Spiritual Quali∣ty in the Soul, whereby the Body could re∣sist the Rëaction of the Tree of Life and of other Meats; and that for this Cause Men in the State of Innocence would have been eternal; which Quality since in the State of Lapsed Nature it was wanting, although Man had eaten of the Tree of Life, he would not have been altogether eternal, but would only have lived for a longer Time. But this Opinion is confu∣ted first from the Words of Holy Writ ^c, lest ••e put forth his hand, and take also of the Tree of Life, and eat, and live for ever. Now therefore of it self it had a Power to render Man eternal, without any other Supernatural Virtue. Neither can that In∣terpretation of a very long time be allow∣ed, as we have shown.

§. 3. Secondly, Because it cannot be, that a Spiritual Quality of the Soul can natural∣ly defend the Body from contrary Rëacti∣ons. For it should either do this by a for∣mal Resistance as a kind of Cause formal, or by an active Resistance as a kind of Cause efficient. The first it could not be, both be∣cause

a Spiritual Quality could not inhere••in a Corporeal Subject, especially since these Authors say, it was inherent in the Soul, nor by consequence could it inform the Body, and resist formally: And because the eating of the Tree of Life would have been superfluous for Reparation of what was lost; for the natural Qualities of the Body would then have been sufficiently de∣fended by the said Quality of the Soul, that they could not be lost. Not the second, Be∣cause if that Supernatural Spiritual Quality performed such an Effect as a Cause Efficient, it were able to produce other Qualities in the Body, which might formally resist; concerning which the same Doubt would return: Or certainly they would be super∣vacaneous, seeing they were sufficiently pro∣duced by the Tree of Life, as we shall here∣after shew.

§. 4. Others distinguish three Causes of our Destruction. The first is the different, nay and sometimes contrary Temperament of different Parts, whereby they mutually act and suffer among themselves, as the Brain moist and cold, the Heart hot and dry, the Flesh hot and moist, the Veins, Arteries and Bones cold and dry, and so of the rest. The second is the continual Acti∣on

of the Native Heat upon the Moisture, from which two Damages are considera∣ble: One is the Repassion from Food, from which Food the Radical Moisture and Members of the Body to be restored do suffer, by means whereof a Substance is not repaired, which is equal in Perfection to what was wasted: The other is the Remis∣sion of the Native Heat it self, whereby at length it is extinguished. The third Cause is from things extrinsick, as well al∣tering the Natural Temper, as dividing Continuity, and finally impeding the Mat∣ter whereby the Body should be refreshed, as Meat, Drink and Air.

§. 5. And they add, that the first Cause must have been avoided in the State of In∣nocence by a Supernatural Quality of the Soul, which we last confuted. The second by the Qualities of the Tree of Life, when eaten. The third three ways. First, By Humane Providence, which in that State would have been most perfect. Secondly, By Divine Providence, which for that State would have been greater and extraordina∣ry: Whence it would by extraordinary Concurrence hinder natural Causes offend∣ing; or would deny its general Concur∣rence, lest they should offend. Thirdly,

By the Protection of Angels.

§. 6. Yet this Opinion also is false: And I affirm, that for the first Cause the Quali∣ties of the Tree of Life had been suffici∣ent, as they were sufficient for the second. Wherefore that Supernatural Quality was not only unnecessary, but would have been hurtful also. First, Because as it resisted the Acti∣ons of different Parts, so it would resist those very Qualities, whereof the natural Temperament of the Body is constituted, seeing they are of the same kind. Second∣ly, Because even from that mutual Action and Passion, which is granted among the Parts of the Body; the total Temperament doth result, which is natural, and necessary for the living Creature to perform its Acti∣ons; wherefore it would be ill impeded by that Supernatural Quality, and consequent∣ly would be hurtful.

§. 7. And the Remedy which they bring for the third Cause is contradicted. First, Because the Fruit of Life was able to make good Qualities very sufficient to keep off all the Harms of external Causes, therefore the extraordinary Providence of God, and every other extrinsick Defence had been superfluous; We shall effectually prove the Antecedent hereafter. Secondly, Because if

the Supernatural Providence of God were necessary, to what purpose must Man be cast out of Paradise, or be deprived of eat∣ing the Tree of Life? For as that Su∣pernatural Providence had ceased, although Man had abode in Paradise, and eaten the Fruit of Life, yet he had been forthwith subject to Death: Which indeed is false: For the Sacred Word affirms, if he had eat∣en of the Tree, that he should have lived for ever. Therefore that Tree was an ad∣equate Cause to secure a Man from Death.

§. 8. Some may reply, It is true from the Words of Holy Writ it doth follow, that Man should have lived for ever: But this eternal Life after Sin would have been con∣tingent from eating the Tree of Life, not necessary: Wherefore lest Man eating of the Tree of Life should contingently live for ever, he was for that Reason driven out by the Lord. But that it was possible that Man might thus contingently live, they prove: For the Wood would prevent the internal Principles of Death; and Humane Providence, and the ordinary Protection of God and Angels without the Intervention of another Tutelage, might have sufficed to avoid the external Causes of Death as Hun∣ger, Suffocation, Poyson, Falling, Beating,

Hitting against any thing, and the Treache∣ry and Mischief of unjust Men. By which means former Men lived near a Thousand Years, and by the same means by eating of the Tree, might have lived innumera∣ble Thousands, being preserved by Reason and Humane Providence from the external Causes of Death.

§. 9. But this Solution is refuted: Because if in the State of Innocence, wherein Mens Prudence was most perfect, their Dwelling in a most pleasant Place, the number of wicked Men much less; and all the said external offending Causes and Occasions much fewer, the extraordinary Providence of God, and a greater Guard of Angels, was (as these Men think) necessary, that Life might be extended to Eternity, or at least to the Time of Translation: How, in the State of lapsed Nature, with much less Humane Providence, in so many and so great Concourses of offending Causes, amongst so many worst Dispositions of Men, could the Life of Man be extended, even contingently, to infinite Ages of Ages, without the parti∣cular and Supernatural Providence of God, unless by some means else, to wit, by the Qualities of the Wood, Man were secured from Death?

§. 10. Father Molina ^d supposeth, that Mans Body would have been defended from the external Causes of Death by an habitual Supernatural Gift, or an ha∣bitual Quality extended through the Body, which would have defended it from all Corruption: For he judgeth Natural Pow∣ers can no way be thought of, which were able to do this. But this Opinion is refuted almost by the same Reasons, whereby the for∣mer was contradicted. First, Because in the said Fruit there would have been natural Powers sufficient to defend the Body from external offending Causes, as we shall hereafter shew; wherefore it is not neces∣sary to have recourse to Supernatural Cau∣ses. Secondly, Because that Supernatural Quality would either have resisted all exter∣nal offending Causes by a Formal Resi∣stance, or by an Active. Not by a For∣mal: Both because one and the same Quali∣ty in kind could not formally be opposed to almost infinite, especially contrary Causes, as to Heat and to Cold: And because it would also resist the Elemental Qualities of the Body, necessary to its natural Constitu∣tion, seeing they are of the same kind with the Qualities produced of external Cau∣ses.

§. 11. Not by an Active: Because first, even the Qualities of the Tree could have done this. Secondly, Because either this Activity would have produced other Supernatural Qualities, and the same Doubt would have been concerning them; or Natural, to which either even Natural Causes would have sufficed; or also they would have been overcome of external Causes, as the Natural Qualities of the Bo∣dy. Therefore this Supernatural Quality of Father Molina is not to be admitted. Thirdly, Because Molina admits, Men may be altered by Rain, Wind, Heat, and other things, but with Delight. Therefore this Supernatural Quality would not have ren∣dred Men incapable of receiving Elemental Qualities. Therefore they might be burnt by the Fire, and consequently dye.

§. 12. Perhaps some Man may answer in Defence of Molina, that by this Quality the Activity of Agents upon the Body would not have been hindred; but only the Union of Soul and Body would have been maintained. But on the contrary, how can Heat in the highest Degree with Dry∣ness in the Height be granted, but the Form of Fire must be introduced in Man's Body, and the Rational be separated

without the greatest Miracle? Which must not be admitted.

§. 13. Let therefore the Conclusion be, That the Fruit of the Tree of Life by its Quali∣ties was an adaequate Cause of Immortality, so that Man by taking of it would necessari∣ly have lived for ever, both in the State of Innocence and in the State of lapsed Nature, the Case being granted, that in this State he did eat of the Tree. S^t Augustine seems of this Opinion ^e, where he saith, But Men therefore tasted of the Tree of Life, lest from any hand Death should creep upon them, or being spent with Old Age, when certain spa∣ces of Time were run over, they should dye; as if other things were for Aliment, this for a Sacrament. So that the Tree of Life in the Corporal Paradise may be construed to be like the Wisdom of God in the Spiritual, that is, in the Intelligible, whereof it is written in the third of Proverbs, She is a Tree of Life to them that lay hold upon her.

§. 14. Where we must accurately ob∣serve that [from any hand] and that [or] for Death might creep on from any hand, unless the Fruit of Life had preserved the Body from it: And the Particle [or] denotes a Disjunction, lest, to wit, Man should pe∣rish by Old Age, or by any other Occasion

whatever. Wherefore according to S^t Au∣gustine's Mind it would have been an adae∣quate Cause of Immortality. Which he manifestly confirms by the Example of the Wisdom of God in the Spiritual Paradise. And is gathered more manifestly from these Words, ^f There was Meat that he should not hunger, Drink that he should not thirst, the Tree of Life lest Old Age should destroy him, no Disease within, no Blow without was fear∣ed. Behold, how according to S^t Augustine this Tree would have defended a Man from all internal and external Causes of Death. Therefore according to his Opinion it was an adaequate Cause of Immortality.

§. 15. The Interlineal Gloss on these Words, Lest he take also of the Tree of Life, &c. insinuates the same Opinion, while it affirms, that when the Number of the Elect was compleat, they should have tasted of the Tree of Life, and so have passed to the Bles∣sed State. That, namely, by it the Body should have been rendred immortal, which Immortality would have been attained by rendring the Body free from all Harms, which could be brought from any Cau∣ses internal or external. And it is plainly gathered from Rupertus ^g, inasmuch as he affirms, that it had been sufficient once to

have taken of the Tree for Man to have li∣ved for ever; and from Chrysostome ^h and Theodoret ⁱ, whereas they affirm, this Tree was created for a Reward of Obedience: But this Reward was, that a Man should be free from Death, so that he could be killed by no Cause internal or external: There∣fore this Tree ought to defend a Man from all Cause of Death, otherwise it did not make good the Reward of Obedience, pro∣mised by God. It is gathered also from o∣ther Fathers above-quoted, Irenaeus, Grego∣ry Nazianzen, Eucherius, Cyrill, Hierome, and others, in that they affirm, this Tree could make Life to be Eternal; for if Man remained subject to Hunger, Sword, Precipice, Fire, Water and other things, he were not eternal. And so thinks Bellar∣mine ^k.

§. 16. Now the same Conclusion is already sufficiently proved by Reason; especially by this Argument, Because such Natural Qua∣lities are possible, as might defend a Man from all Causes of Death both internal and external: And we shall enumerate those Qualities in the following Section, and declare the manner how they perform it.

§. 17. It is further confirmed, that the said

Qualities are possible, by divers Examples of admirable Virtues, that are in things natural. For if there be indeed any such Fish as that called Echenëis or Remora, which is able to retard and hinder the most vio∣lent Motion of a Ship by a Natural Quali∣ty, which it impresseth on the Ship: Why might not the Fruit of Life have another Natural Quality, whereby Mans Body might be defended from the like Impulse and Mo∣on, and might be rendred free from all Strokes? If a Salamander cast into the Fire do by Natural Qualities resist the burning Fire for a great space of Time: Why should another Natural Quality be impossi∣ble, which might much more resist the Acti∣on of the Fire? And so resist, that its Re∣sistance might overcome the Activity of the Fire; for the Activity of the Fire is not intended to Infinity.

§. 18. If Fire naturally have a most a∣ctive Quality, why shall not another Na∣tural Quality equally or more resistent be possible? Are there not other Natural Vir∣tues equally admirable? Doth not the O∣striche's Stomach digest Iron? Aqua fortis dissolve Gold, Iron, and other Metals? Vi∣neger dissolve Stones and Steel? Doth not the Fish called Torpedo render the Fishes

that swim over it immoveable, and stupefy the Fishers Arm with its Virtue diffused along his Spear? Why therefore in like manner might there not be found other Natural Virtues in the Fruit of Life, resist∣ing the external causes of Death? I pass by other admirable things which manifestly appear from our Tract and other Mens Ob∣servations.

§. 19. Nor can it be said, it is false, and the Echenëis hath no such Virtue; for Ex∣perience confirms it, and very grave Au∣thors attest it, as S. Ambrose ^l, S. Basil ^m, AElian ⁿ, Plutarch ^o, Pliny ^p, Adam Leoni∣cenus ^q, Vincentius ^r, Rondeletius ^s, Carda∣nus ^t, and several others. Nor does it hin∣der, that Authors vary in describing the Echenëis, since some affirm that it is a great Fish, others that it is a little one; some a∣scribe one Figure to it, others another. It doth not hinder, I say, because there may be divers kinds of Fishes, which have this very same Virtue, as also there are divers sorts of Fishes that bring Numness, as our Torpedo doth, and every Man describes that which he hath experienced to detain the Ship. But after what manner it doth it, we will touch hereafter.

Histories of Wonderful Fishes, for the Con∣firmation of this Opinion.

§. 20. But that it may appear more clearly that what is reported of the Echenëis is not fabulous, we must not pass in Silence what our Portugueze have observed, and what the chief Historiographer of his Time our Iohannes de Barros hath recorded ^u, viz. that in the Year of our Lord 1518. when Emanuel the most Potent King of Portugal set out a Fleet for the East Indies on the twenty seventh day of March, whose Ad∣miral then was Didacus Lopez de Sequeira: And when the Ship of Don Iohn de Lima was come up to the Cape of Good Hope, and then near Mozambique, the whole Ship on a sudden shivered, so that it seemed to split, or to have struck on a Rock. But when pre∣sently she made her Course again, nor any Leak appeared, as they were afraid, the Por∣tugueze much astonished set sail, and prose∣cuted their intended Voyage: Neither was it possible for them at that present to find out the Cause of that Event, nor yet to su∣spect it.

§. 21. But when, after they were arrived at Cochim, they fell to refit the Ship, they

found stuck in her Bow the Horn of a Fish two Hand breadths in Length: It was in∣deed blackish, and in the shape of a Rhi∣nocerot's Horn; and besides so hard, that with it Iron might easily be cut as with a File. From whence the Cause of that sud∣den Concussion and Retardation of the Ship was discovered, that namely the vio∣lent Blow was struck, not by a Rock, but by the Horn of that Fish, whereby the Ship was a little detained, and much shaken, espe∣cially at that instant, when the Fish endea∣vouring in vain to pull out its Horn, rather broke it than drew it out.

§. 22. But the Mariners that argued a∣bout the Kind of the Fish, an Opinion pre∣vailed amongst them, that it was the Acus, in our Language Peixe Agulha. And that this Opinion was true, Experience afterwards confirmed to Iohannes de Barros: For some Years after when they made their Course through the Sea of Guiny by the Castle of S. George of Mina, having let down Hooks from the Ship, another Acus was caught, which equalled a Bull in bigness, and being firmly held with strong Hooks, it shook the Ship after the same manner, and at length being killed with much ado, and haled up to the Ship by more than

twenty Men, it shewed a Horn like the o∣ther in shape, having the same Colour, Fi∣gure, and Hardness in it; but much less than the other, because the Fish it self was less. Deservedly therefore this may come to be reckoned among the Kinds of the Remora, although this doth stop and shake a Ship a different Way from what we shall hereafter speak of.

§. 23. And those that travail the Coasts of Brasile make mention of another Fish, which causeth Numness, as our Torpedo doth: Whence it becomes sufficiently ma∣nifest, that there are many kinds of Torpe∣does to be found. But this kind lives espe∣cially in the River Itapecuro in the Country of Maragnani, and it is called Perachè, or as Gaspar Barlaeus observes, Puraquam, a∣mong those Barbarians. In shape and great∣ness it resembles a kind of Lamprey (or Muraena:) they use to kill it by striking it with Staves: But the Arm of him that strikes, and then his whole Body is stupefi∣ed, and shakes presently. Of which thing Frier Christopher Severinus Bishop Elect of Angola is my ocular Witness, a very skilful Person, who besides other Works already published, hath another of the Natural and Moral History of Maragnani ready for the

Press. It is evident therefore that there are several kinds of Remoraes and Torpedoes, dif••using the self same kind of Vertue from them. As it often falls out in many diffe∣rent kinds of Medicines, as in Rheubarb and Roses, whose Vertue to purge Choler is of the same kind. Therefore we must not infer, that the Remora is fabulous, be∣cause it is differently described of Authors; seeing there are several kinds of it, and eve∣ry one describes that which he knows.

§. 24. What wonder therefore, if such a Fruit were possible in Nature, as, a∣mongst other admirable Qualities, could break the force of things thrown, and could hinder local Motion, thô the most violent?

^a Scotus in 2 dist. 19. quaest. unica. ^b Caje∣t••n. 1. part. q. 97. ^c Gen. 3. ^d Molina de Opere sex dierum disp. 28. concl. 3. & 4. & disp. 27. concl. 1. 2. & 4. ^e D. Augustinus l. 13. de Civit. Dei cap. 20. ^f Aug. l. 14. de Civit. Dei cap. 26. ^g Rupertus lib. 3. in Gen. c. 30. ^h Chrysost. in Gen. Hom. 13. ⁱ Theodoret. in Gen. q. 26. ^k Bellarm. tom. 4. contr. 1. cap. 18. ^l D. Ambros. l. 5. ex hom. cap. 10. ^m D. Basil. hom. 7. ⁿ AElian. l. 12. cap. 4, 5. ^o Plutarch. in probl. symp. de∣cad.

2. probl. 7. ^p Plin. lib. 32. histor. nat. cap. 7. ^q Adam. Leonicen. lib. de aquatili∣bus. ^r Vincent. in Speculo natural. lib. 17. cap. 149. ^s Rondelet. lib. 15. de Piscibus cap. 18. ^t Cardan. rerum var. lib. 7. c. 37. ^u Johan. de Barros Decad. 3. lib. 3. c. 1. post princip.

DOUBT VI. What, and how many, were the Qualities of the Tree of Life, whereby it caused length of Life and Immortality?

§. 1. THis Doubt was never put to the Question by any Man, nor per∣haps ever thought of. But because it hath much respect to our Treatise of Occult Qualities, since such Qualities are Alexiphar∣mack, or Curers of manifest Diseases: therefore I think it worth my Labour to treat of them in this Place.

§. 2. That therefore this Doubt may more commodiously be resolved, it is to be obser∣ved first, that the Fruit of this Tree (For although we often name the Wood, we ra∣ther understand the Fruit, though even the very Wood of the Tree might be of

such a Nature, that it might also be eaten) hath a double Consideration, as Aliment, and as Medicament. As Aliment, inasmuch as it might be turned into the Substance of the thing nourished: As Medicament, inasmuch as it could produce in the Body several Qualities profitable for it. Where∣fore it might deservedly be called a Med∣cinal Aliment, or an Alimental Medicine.

§. 3. It is to be observed secondly, That the aforesaid Fruit is much more excellent in the way of Physick than of Food: For though as Food it might make something towards prolonging of Life, seeing it would nourish better than other things, and would less al∣ter the Body into a contrary Nature; Yet it would not on this account avail to extend it much, and less to prolong it to Eternity: But as Physick it would especially and chiefly conduce to this end. Now by what Qualities? And by what way? This is the most difficult to resolve.

§. 4. It is to be observed thirdly, That those Accidents which preserve our Body in perfect Health, some of them are mani∣fest, some occult. The manifest are three, Temperament, Composition, and Vnity of Parts: Which because they are perceived by the Senses, are called manifest. The oc∣cult,

according to the common Opinion that admits Powers, are the Faculties of the Body which by Philosophers are called Powers, that is, the Faculty Vi∣tal, Animal, and Natural. There are also occult Qualities belonging to the Alimentous, which are introduced into the Aliment by the common Work-houses, and by the Parts to be nourished (although no Man hath yet found them out) and there∣fore they may on that account also be cal∣led Alimentous: There are besides, Alexi∣pharmack Qualities also, newly found by us, which in another Treatise we have pro∣ved to be connaturally in the Body of every living Creature, that it may defend it self from Poyson.

§. 5. Which things observed, I say first. Divers Qualities are communicated by the Tree of Life, whereby all things which concern the Natural Constitution of the Body, if they be destroyed, may be re∣stored; if perfect, may be preserved, either to a certain and determinate Time, or to Eternity, according to the diversity of Opinions about this Mat∣ter. This Conclusion is m••nifest, because unless the Natural Constitution of the Body be preserved, Health and Life cannot na∣turally

continue: Therefore it is necessary that so many and so great Vertues must be given from the Wood, as were sufficient to repair and preserve all things concerning the Natural Constitution.

§. 6. I say Secondly, Supra-elementary Qualities must be contributed to the Body by the Tree of Life, which might produce Elemental ones in that degree only, which was agreeable to the Natural Temperament; to wit, that these Qualities of the Tree might concur as a kind of Cause effici∣ent with the Form (or with the Vertues of the Form, according to the Opinion which grants Virtual Qualities productive of the Elemental) towards the Production of E∣lemental Qualities, just to such a conve∣nient Degree. This Conclusion is proved, because it is necessary, the Natural Tem∣per should be preserved, that the Body may continue in Health. But such a Temper will be well preserved, if there be a fixt and efficacious Cause, which may help the intrinsick Agent in the Production of those degrees of each Quality, which makes up the Temperament. Therefore it is necessary that those Vertues be produced in the Body by the said Tree, which may suf∣fice to concur with the intrinsick Agent

productive of such Qualities. But these Vertues must needs be Qualities of a Supe∣rior Order. Therefore such must be produ∣ced in the Body by the Tree of Life.

§. 7. I say thirdly, These Qualities must also be of such Efficacy, that they may preserve that Degree fixt against all the Activity of an external Contrary, even the most violent, such as are Fire or Snow, according to the Opinion which affirms the Wood to be an adaequate Cause of Immor∣tality; so that these Qualities of the Wood of Life being present, Fire cannot act upon the Body, nor produce further Degrees of Heat beyond those, which are convenient for the Body: For the contrary Degrees of Cold would be so preserved by the Quality of the Wood, as a kind of Cause Efficient, that they could not be diminish∣ed by the Fire. And so it may be said of other Elemental Qualities. It is ma∣nifestly proved; Because unless the Quali∣ties of the Wood had so great Efficacy, they were not able to resist very violent external Agents: But they might resist, if they produced those fixt Degrees upon the Body, connatural to it, so that it might persist in Health.

§. 8. But to what kind of Quality would

these belong? I answer, They would be a kind of Habit: For according to the Opi∣nion, which affirms that Elemental Quali∣ties do not flow from the Soul, but are produced of other occult Qualities superad∣ed of a higher order, which are called Vir∣tual Qualities, they would belong to Ha∣bit: The Reason is, because these Virtual Qualities are Powers, seeing they are or∣dain'd only for Operation: But the Qua∣lities of the Wood do essentially suppose these Powers, and do help them efficiently in the production of the Elemental ones. Wherefore they are necessarily Habits, as are the Habits of Sciences, and some Super∣natural Qualities, as the Habit of Faith and Light of Glory, which Divines commonly affirm do belong to Habit, because they es∣sentially suppose Power, as Suarez ^a, Vas∣quez ^b, and others commonly hold. But according to the Opinion that denies Pow∣ers to the Soul, they are also to be accounted Habits, and to concur with the Soul, as Ha∣bits of Sciences and others. And these Qualities will prove a kind of those which cure manifest Diseases, of which we have spoken in another Book.

§. 9. Both Conclusions are confirmed, Because a living Body could no other way

be made durable to Eternity nor for any Time, but its Temperament would decline something from its Integrity, unless it were preserved the foresaid way. Therefore, &c. Nor doth it appear that the Qualities of the Wood would dispose the Body as a kind of Cause Formal, whereby it would have been made free from all natural Causes of Death internal and external; because a help by this kind of Cause would not have been sufficient, that by its means an intrin∣sick Agent could resist the most violent Causes.

§. 10. I say fourthly. It is also conveni∣ent, according to the same Opinion, that the Tree of Life should make good other Qualities, even Active ones which might concurr with the Faculties Animal, Vital and Natural, as a kind of Cause Efficient, that they might perform very strong Acti∣ons, when there should be a necessity. It is proved as to the Animal Faculty, because to avoid some Diseases of Composition, and Solution of Unity, as Dislocations and Wounds, and to resist some external Causes, which bring those Diseases, an ordinary strength of Actions of the Animal Faculty is not sufficient, even where there is the best Temperament. Therefore it is necessary

that this Faculty be helped by other Quali∣ties, which may concurr with it to render the Actions so strong, that they may be sufficient to avoid all Natural Causes what∣ever, especially those which might hurt by Local Motion.

§. 11. And as to the Pulsatil Faculty there is the same Reason; for it must per∣form a Motion against the Resistance of e∣very external Cause whatever. As to what concerns the Natural, it is proved: For it is necessary that the Attractive and Expul∣sive Faculty perform most perfect Actions, although there be an impeding Cause. The Digestive also, if it have a help, will ope∣rate more perfectly. And it is confirmed, because these Qualities are not only possible, but some such like there are indeed, effici∣ently concurring with the Powers to the Curing and Preventing manifest Diseases. Therefore it is necessary, that the Wood of Life should have them most efficacious.

§. 12. You will object. Therefore the Qualities productive of Elemental ones would have been superfluous, which we spoke of in the last Conclusion. The Se∣quel is denied; for they also would have been necessary to preserve the Natural and most perfect Temperament of Body. And

although by this means the Body of Man might resist all morbose Causes acting by Alteration; it might better and more rea∣dily resist together with these Qualities a∣ctively helping the Powers.

§. 13. But whether would one only Quali∣ty flowing from the Fruit suffice to concurr with all the Faculties? I answer negatively, but every lowest Species of Faculty ought to have its particular Quality distinct in Specie. It is manifestly proved, Because e∣very Faculty hath its particular and deter∣minate Effect: Therefore it wants a parti∣cular and determinate Concause, which hath Virtue for such an Effect. Secondly, Because Powers are distinguished in Specie by their Acts and Objects: Therefore those Qualities which participate with the Pow∣ers, are the same was distinguished. Third∣ly, because the Habit of one Power, or an Effect determinate to a certain Species, can∣not concurr with another Power, nor to another Species of Act: Nor therefore in like manner can these Qualities, which are as Habits in respect of the Powers.

§. 14. Therefore for the Animal Faculty there would have been given one Quality for Motion, and divers other for the Senses; and for every one as well internal as external (if

discerning Powers may seem necessary ei∣ther to long or eternal Life) its own Qua∣lity would have been allotted. For the Vital Faculty there would have been given one for the Motion of the Heart and Arteries, ano∣ther for Generation of Spirits, whilst there was any necessity for Motion or Generation of Spirits: For according to this Opinion, which affirms that eternal Life was given by the Wood, when the Body was reduced to the best Constitution, all things would have been kept in the same Tenor, so that nei∣ther any reparation of Spirits, nor of Sub∣stance, would have been further necessary.

§. 15. Wherefore by the Qualities of the Tree of Life the Health of the Body would have been defended from Hunger, Thirst, and want of Air, lest namely Man should perish for want of Meat, Drink or Air; which will more appear hereafter. In like manner there would have been given a particular Quality by the Fruit for every Species of Natural Fa∣culty, that is, for Attraction, Retention, Co∣ction, and Expulsion, that, to wit, they might operate most perfectly, while their o∣peration was necessary. And after the same manner there would have been another for Ge∣neration.

§. 16. You will object. The Fruit of this

Tree was of one Species only. Therefore it could not produce so many Species of Qualities. The Consequence is denied, Be∣cause the same Rheubarb performs divers Actions by Qualities different in Specie; for it evacuates Choler, strengthens the Li∣ver, opens Obstructions, binds lax Parts, produceth Heat, causeth Driness: And so we experience divers Virtues in many other Medicines.

§. 17. I say fifthly. Besides the said Qua∣lities (according to the same Opinion) there was another necessary, which should have been made good by the Tree of Life: And that is a Resistive Faculty, which might preserve the Union and due Composition of Parts, namely their Figure, Cavity, Number, and also their Magnitude. It is evidently proved, Because in defect there∣of Man would become obnoxious to Disea∣ses and Death, which would follow from Division of Continuity and from vitiated Composition. This Quality indeed would not have been Active, but relating to Pati∣ble Quality, as Hardness in a Stone: For informing the Parts of the Body, it would have rendred them incapable of any Divi∣sion or Compression, which could have been made by an external Cause. Where∣fore

by reason of this Quality, Man could not dye by a Precipice or a Blow. And it is confirmed, for as the Author of the Que∣stions of the Old and New Testament saith ^c, The Wood of Life was so to Man as an inexpugnable Wall: Therefore it must necessarily make good this Resistive Quali∣ty, as a Wall.

§. 18. You will object. If such a Quality were granted, the Limbs could not be bend∣ed. It is denied, Because it was not hard∣ness, but preserving of Union. Or rather, Whether was there not a Quality actively preserving the Union of Parts? It might probably be affirmed: And it would have been so strong in Preservation of the Uni∣on of Parts by a certain Action intrinsically terminated upon the very Union, that the Union could be dissolved by no finite na∣tural Cause. Yet much more probably, I think, there was no such active Quality, seeing the Resisting informing one was suf∣ficient, as we said in the last Conclusion.

§. 19. I say sixthly, According to this Opinion, the Tree of Life would have made good all Alexipharmack Qualities of every kind, whereby the Body would have been made free from all that are Poysonous. This Conclusion also is manifest. For in

defect of these Qualities Man might have perished, seeing those that are implanted in the Body cannot sufficiently resist strong Poy∣sons. Nor can it be doubted that this Qua∣lity was possible, seeing it is found natural∣ly in almost innumerable Medicines. There∣fore no Wonder, if it were granted to this Fruit naturally with so great Efficacy, that it overcame all Poysonous ones.

§. 20. You will object against what we have said. Heat would necessarily act up∣on Moisture, seeing it is a Natural Cause acting necessarily: Therefore it would ne∣cessarily rarefy it, turn it into Vapors and consume it: Therefore Reparation and Nu∣trition was necessary: Therefore Man would necessarily be obnoxious to Death by Hun∣ger, and it was needful for Man to eat the Wood again and again. I deny the Ante∣cedent: Because the Moisture would have been preserved two ways. First by the Oc∣cult Quality of the Wood (which we spoke of) producing Moisture in a proportionate fixt Degree. Secondly by another Occult Quality of the Wood, producing certain fixt Degrees of Cold, that the Heat could produce none further.

§. 21. You will urge. Therefore the Heat

would produce those Qualities at least, which are produced of it by Resultancy in the Substance wherein it subsists, that is, Rarity, and Levity (if it be a Second Quality) from which follows Resolution or Evaporation, and consequently the Consumption of such Substance. The Se∣quel is denied, Because that Resultance al∣so of Second Qualities would have been hindred by their contrary Qualities, which would have been produced by other First Contraries; for Example, The Resultance of further Rarity would have been hindred by the Degrees of Cold, for by them its contrary Density would have been preser∣ved proportional to the Rarity.

§. 22. You will object secondly. The Fa∣culty Pulsatil and Generative of Spirits would have been idle; Because we sup∣pose, the necessary Spirits once generated would have lasted for ever: And in like manner the Natural Faculties would have been idle, seeing we suppose, Nutrition would be no further necessary, when the Body had arrived at full Perfection: There∣fore those Qualities would not be necessary which might concur with such Faculties, ac∣cording to the Opinion which affirms, it had

been sufficient to have eaten the Fruit only once. I say they were necessary for the Reduction of a Child's Body and an Old Man's, or one any other way decayed or imperfect, to the most perfect Constituti∣on, and therefore they were to be added: But after the Perfection of the Body they were not necessary; but would have con∣tinued, as other things would, which also were not further necessary, as the common Workhouses of Aliment and Excrements, and the Faculty expulsive of them, and o∣ther things.

§. 23. You will object thirdly. To Durati∣on of Life there is no need, that the Ani∣mal Faculty be any stronger, than what suf∣ficeth to perform Respiration, as Galen ^d holdeth. Therefore to this at least there should no helping Quality be added, which might concur with it. It is answered, If there were a preternatural Affection be∣fore the eating of the Wood, which ought to be expelled by the Motion of the Ani∣mal Faculty, as by Coughing, or whereto the Animal Faculty ought to concur with the Natural, as Pissing, Strength must ne∣cessarily be added to the Faculty, that by the said Qualities it might perform a stron∣ger Motion: And in like manner as before

we have already said in the third Con∣clusion, Strength of the Animal Faculty was necessary for the Motive, that it might more readily resist external Causes. But as for the Discerning Powers, which belong to the Animal Faculty, seeing they conduce little to Duration, and would sufficiently o∣perate with the best Temperament, Compo∣sition and Unity of Parts; it seems more probable, that other Qualities are not ne∣cessary which should be produced by the Wood.

§. 24. You will object fourthly. We said in the fourth Conclusion, that by the Tree a Virtue was made good, concurring with the Animal Faculty to the avoiding those Causes, which by local Motion might di∣vide Continuity. Therefore the resistive Quality is superfluous. The Consequence is denied, because that Virtue concurring with the Faculties is necessary for their better be∣ing, to the end, namely, that Man might more perfectly be defended from the most violent Causes.

§. 25. In Summ therefore; The Qualities of the Tree of Life might be distributed in∣to four Classes; for some produced Elemen∣tal Qualities, others Alexipharmack Quali∣ties, others concurred actively with the Facul∣ties

of the Body to Connatural Actions, and others were Resistive. And these last (if a Quality actively resisting be not admitted) would belong to Patible Quality. The first would belong to Habit; for if they were Na∣tural Powers they might produce their Ef∣fects, where and when they were not ne∣cessary, and not according to the Exigence of the Body. And those which concur with the Faculties in their Actions, belong to Ha∣bit, the first Species of Quality: Seeing they necessarily and essentially suppose Powers to their Operation, and are Qua∣lities of difficult Expulsion, which two things are required to Habit according to common Opinion. But of the Alexiphar∣mack those which resist Poysons, as a kind of Cause Formal, belong rather to Patible Quali∣ty: What, as a Cause Efficient, if they con∣cur with the Motive Power or with another, ra∣ther belong to Habit, for the last said Reason: And they will belong to the same Species, what∣ever should concur with another Active Power. But we must take notice of the Resistive Qualities, if any there be actively resisting Division of Parts, that these, if they concur by themselves only, are Powers; if with the Natural Powers producing Union, they are Habits.

§. 26. But Whether were all the foresaid Qualities, actively concurring with the Powers, more noble than the Powers themselves? It seems to be more probably affirmed, that they were more noble, as to the manner of Ope∣ration: Because they elevate the Powers a Supra-ordinary Way (although within the Bounds of Nature) to more noble Actions, and at least more intense, stronger and quicker, than is consistent with their Na∣ture, as it operates ordinarily: So that the said Actions may especially be attributed to the Tree of Life, as to what concern∣eth this Manner of Operation. You will object. The Habits also of Powers acqui∣red by Acts do render the Actions more intense, stronger and quicker. And yet they are not more noble than the Powers: Therefore, &c. The Consequence is denied, and there is a disparity of Reason; for the Actions of Habits are such, that they are attributed especially to the Powers: But the Actions of the Powers, wherewith the Qualities of the Wood of Life concur, are so strong, intense and quick, and are so ef∣ficaciously performed by the Qualities, that they may rather be attributed to them, than to the Powers; and the Powers are more the Instruments of these Qualities in

respect of their Actions, than the principal Causes.

§. 27. But some one may enquire, Whether all Men would have been of the same Tempe∣rament? I say, according to our Opinion, that affirms, the Wood of Life would have been sufficient for eternal Life; and that to this there would have been necessary Su∣pra-elementary Qualities made good by the Wood, which would have actively produced Elemental ones in a certain fixt Degree; we must consequently say, That all Men would have been of the same Tem∣perament after Eating of the Wood. It is effectually proved; for the Cause of the E∣lemental Qualities in all Men would have been of the same Reason and Proportion, to wit, the more noble Qualities productive of the Elemental in the same proportionate and fixt Degree. Therefore the same Temperament in Specie would have been in all Men, when they had come to Perfecti∣on, and that most perfect. From whence also it follows, that all Men eating the Fruit, would have had equal Strength, e∣qual Actions of the Senses, as well inter∣nal as external, an equal Strength of Un∣derstanding, with dependency upon Phan∣tasms: For the disposition of the Phantasy

would also have been equal. When ne∣vertheless it is agreed, that some would have been wiser and iuster than others, as Thomas ^e observes. Because they would have acted by Free Will; whence some would have more applyed their Mind to learn this or that: Whereupon it would have followed, that some would have been better Proficients in Knowledge, others in Justice, &c.

§ 28. But you may deservedly enquire, Why in Reduction of an Old Man to Youth, or of a Sick Man to Health, or of an in∣temperate Body to a temperate, there would not have been Disease or Pain, seeing sudden Mutations, even terminated to a better State, do cause this? I answer first, That a quick Mutation to a natural or better state brings not Pain, nay but Pleasure, as Ga∣len testifieth ^f. Where••ore if sometimes from such Reduction Pain do happen, as when the Hands chilled with Snow are suddenly exposed to the Fire, this is by Accident, because, to wit, some Parts are preternaturally altered, whilst the Heat in others is reduced to its natural Perfe∣ction; or because from the Application of Heat, the Cold in others is suddenly intend∣ed by Antiperistasis. I answer secondly,

That Pain is a depraved Action of the Touch: And seeing the Sense it self (as other Powers) would have been helped to perform perfect Actions; there could ne∣ver have been a Depravation of Touch, which Pain is.

§. 29. But whether according to the Opi∣nion which denies the Fruit to be an ade∣quate Cause of Immortality, it had been ne∣cessary that Alexipharmack Qualities should be contributed by the Wood to Mans Body, whereby it might be preserved from Poysons? It seems to be affirmed, because it cannot be believed, these Vertues were wanting to the most perfect Medicament, when ma∣ny other ordinary Medicaments have effica∣cious Virtues against Poysons; nay, we must think, all other Supra-elementary Vir∣tues for curing Diseases must have been found in it, which are found in other ordinary Medicines: Those notwithstand∣ing excepted, which used without Art do hurt, such as are Purgative Virtues, which given unseasonably, and to a Healthy Man, bring no small Harm.

§. 30. I say seventhly. According to the same Opinion, which affirms, the Tree of Life was not an adequate Cause of Immor∣tality, but that the Supra-ordinary Provi∣dence

of God was necessary to avoid the Harms of External Causes; according to this Opinion, I say, it is not necessary to grant a Resistive Quality in the Tree, nor it may be other Qualities, which might preserve the Elemental ones of the Body in a necessary fixt Degree, at least not so effi∣cacious, as wholly to resist all external altering Causes. It is proved, because the Supra-ordinary Providence of God had been sufficient.

§. 31. But since from the Sacred Text it appears, that Women in the State of Obedience should have been free from the Pains of Birth, it seems worth our En∣quiry, Whether also the Qualities of the Tree of Life would have prevented the Pains of Birth in Women? It seems to be more probably answered in the Affirmative. First, Because seeing the Wood would have averted all internal Causes of Death, or also the external besides, according to different Opinions; and since it would have cured all preternatural Affections, it must of necessity have been able to pre∣vent and take away the Pains of Birth; nor is there need of any greater Reason, why it should take away these than o∣thers.

§. 32. Secondly, Because there are Medi∣cines found naturally, which by means of Supra-elementary occult Qualities do won∣derfully allay the Pains of several Parts, and preserve a Man from them, as a Wolf's Liver against the Pain of the Liver, as Ga∣len ^g testifies, and that famous Stone, which may deservedly be called Nephritick, brought from the West Indies, vulgarly cal∣led de la hijada, as Monardes ^h testifies, which tied to the Arm both takes away Nephritick Pains, and preserves a Man from them, as also doth a certain Wood of the same Name (which I have sometime seen) described by the same Author. Therefore it is credible, that in this Wood, which had admirable Virtues for all Preternatural Affections, these also were not wanting, which might preserve from Pains of Birth; especially seeing it makes for the Conserva∣tion of Life, as a Reward of Obedience, to which purpose in the primary intention it was created.

§. 33. But what way did it perform this Work? It may be doubted: For the Cause of the Pains of Birth is the breaking of those Bonds, that tye the Child to the Womb; which being a violent and sud∣den Solution of Continuity, it necessarily

causeth Pain. Wherefore that the Tree of Life may prevent these Pains, it is necessa∣ry, that it either stupefy the Sense in those Parts, as Narcotick Medicines do; or so mollify and dispose the Ligaments, where∣by the Child is knit to the Womb, as A∣nodyne Medicines do, that without vio∣lence they might be separated from the Parts of the Womb; or that it regulate the Faculties of the Womb after such a manner, that they work that Separation by little and little without Trouble: For only a violent Passion, which is preternatural, when it is done much together and speedily, causeth Pain; but what is done by little and little e∣scapes Sense, as Galen ⁱ expresseth it. Ano∣ther Way may also concur, viz. Because in that State the Wood of Life would join with and assist the Powers, that they might perform most perfect Actions. Therefore it would concur with the Touch, that it might feel most perfectly; wherefore a de∣praved Sensation could not be, in which Pain might formally consist, although the Object or Cause of Pain were present.

§. 34. But you will object. Either this Wood would have taken away the Pains of Birth in the State of Innocence, or in the State of Lapsed Nature. Not in the

first, because it appears from the Sacred Text, that in it Woman would have had no Pains in Birth: Not in the Second, because from the Sacred Text also it appears, that they must necessarily suffer Pains for a Pu∣nishment of Sin. Therefore it would take away Pains in no State. I answer, that both in the State of Innocence and in the State of Lapsed Nature this Wood would have been good against the Pains of Birth, if it had been eaten. In the State of Inno∣cence, because by it Women would have been preserved from Pains, and by means of it would have obtained, what was ow∣ing to that State. And in the State of Lap∣sed Nature, because therefore God cast Wo∣man with Adam out of Paradise, lest she should enjoy the Good due to Innocence, and the Reward promised for Obedience, and by consequence Eternal Life; and lest she should obtain Immunity from the Pains of Birth by Eating of this Wood.

^a Suar. in Met. disp. 42. sect. 4. n. 8. ^b Vasq. tom. 1, 2. ad q. 21. disp. 78. c. 3. n. 21. ^c Auth. quaest. vet. &. nov. Testam. q. 19. ^d Gal. 7. meth. cap. 13. lit. C. ^e D. Thom. 1. p. q. 96. art. 3. ^f Gal. lib. 1. de

causis sympt. cap. 6. ^g 8. local. cap. 8. F. ^h Monardes 1. p. c. propr. ⁱ Gal. 1. de causis sympt. cap. 6.

DOUBT VII. After what manner would the Resistance of Qualities defend that Mans Body, who eat of the Tree of Life, from all External Causes that could hurt it.

§. 1. ALthough the present Doubt be al∣ready resolved together with the foregoing: Yet since all these things are new, which we have alledged for the Pre∣servation of Man from Death by the Qua∣lities of the Wood of Life; and that those are more hard to be known, which should naturally defend him from the extrinsick Causes of Death, and seeing they are not sufficiently declared, as the Difficulty of the thing requires, I accounted it very necessa∣ry more amply to explain them, to the end, the strength of those things, which may be objected to the Contrary, may more ea∣sily be broken, and the Truth may be more open and clear.

§. 2. External Causes therefore, that bring

Diseases and Death, which must have been resisted by the Qualities of this Fruit, are of two kinds: For some are altering, others are locally moving, or impressing an Impulse. It is proved, for among Philosophers Acci∣dental Mutation is only twofold, that is, one to Quality, another to Place. I pass by Mutation as to Quantity, because since Quantity is never produced de novo (as the more probable Opinion saith) this is not a true Mutation.

§. 3. And of the Altering Causes, some move to the Manifest Elemental Qualities, and others to the Occult. The first are all those things which can produce Elemental Qualities, first or second, and by this means vitiate and overthrow the Temper of the Body, from whence various Diseases and Death do follow. The second are especi∣ally all Poysons, which introducing Occult Poysonous Qualities into the Body, waste Mens Strength, and take away Life.

§. 4. And the Causes moving locally are also of a twofold Difference: For either they move the Humors of the Body, as Medicines Purging, provoking Urine, Sweat and Wo∣mens Courses, which by reason of their un∣seasonable, or superfluous, or other preter∣natural Motions, can also cause Diseases

and Death: Or they impress such an impulse upon the Members of the Body, that they dissolve natural Continuity, or change the Situation of the Parts; whereon do follow Diseases in Conformation, viz. in Magni∣tude, Figure and Site; and consequently Death it self, which the Fruit of Life was obliged to avoid, averting all these Causes.

§. 5. But beside these Causes which pro∣duce positive Effects, others also may be considered, which produce other (if I may so call them) privative Effects, and conse∣quently bring Death: For seeing the Bo∣dy of a Living Creature, that it may live, doth stand in need of certain Matters, whereby the lost Substance may be repair∣ed, such as are Meat, Drink and Air; what things soever can deprive it of these Mat∣ters, without doubt will cause Death, that is, things causing Hunger, Thirst, Want of Air, or Suffocation.

§. 6. These Causes being declared, which coming from without can bring Dis∣eases and Death, now it follows that we explain, according to the Opinion that af∣firms the Wood of Life was an adequate Cause of Immortality, what way it could hinder them: Which thing indeed since it seems altogether difficult, or rather impos∣sible;

this Opinion is exploded by many, who have recourse to the Supra-ordinary Providence of God. But for its De∣fence.

§. 7. It is to be observed first. That the Vir∣tues of the Tree of Life would not so keep off external offending Causes, that most of them could not approach the Body, nor that the Body should abide beyond the Sphere of their Activity: for Example, They would not hinder the Fire to ap∣proach Mans Body, nor a Mad Dog to touch it, nor any other Poyson to be swallowed down: As neither would they hinder the Defect of Meat, Drink or Air: For it is manifest, it was not in the Power of the Wood to do this. Yet the Virtues of the Wood would hinder, that the afore∣said Causes could not produce their posi∣tive Effects upon the Body: to wit, that the Sun or Fire should not heat the Bo∣dy; or the Sword or a Stone should not dissolve Continuity by their Blow, or o∣therwise move the Parts of the Body con∣trary to their Nature; and so of other things: And in like manner the said Vir∣tues would preserve a Man, that he should not perish by Privation of Meat, Drink or Air. I said [that most of them should

not approach the Body] for we shall after∣wards prove, that it was possible for Virtue to be extended from the said Wood to a certain Space without the Body of Man, in which it might hinder those things which moved to Hurt, from moving far∣ther, or reaching to the Body.

§. 8. It is to be observed secondly. The Wood of Life would defend Man's Body from external Causes, producing Elemen∣tal first or second Qualities, by those occult Qualities, which would produce other Ele∣mental ones proportionate and natural to the Body, in a certain Degree so fixt, that they could be remitted by no other, even the most violent external or internal Cause, as we said before in the last Doubt: And as by these the Body would have been preser∣ved from the mutual immoderate Rëaction of the Parts among themselves, and from the Rëaction of the Aliment; so also the Body ought to be defended from the Action of ex∣ternal Causes. It is effectually proved, Because these would have sufficed to resist all Al∣terative Agents both internal and exter∣nal.

§. 9. But you will object. Two Degrees of Cold, for Example, which are necessary and proportionate to the Health of the

Body of Man, cannot naturally resist eight Degrees of Heat of Fire applied next to it, seeing the Action would necessarily fol∣low the stronger Side. Therefore it is impos∣sible, according to Nature, that the Tem∣per of the Body should endure in these two fixt Degrees after the application of the Fire, but that it should be removed from them, and part be burned. And it is confirmed, Because between equal contrary Agents, nay between unequal ones, there is mutual Repassion, as Experience shews, and it is the common Doctrine of Philoso∣phers: Therefore the inferior Agent ought to re-suffer from the stronger, that which resists with only two Degrees of Cold, from the Action of the Superior, acting at the Rate of eight Degrees of Heat.

§. 10. I answer, By distinguishing the Antecedent. Two Degrees of Cold consi∣dered in themselves, according to their formal Resistence and Activity, are not a∣ble to resist eight Degrees of Heat, so I grant the Antecedent: But considered ac∣cording to the Activity of their Cause pro∣ducing them, I deny it: For their Efficient Cause, that is, the Quality of the Wood produceth them with that Efficacy, and hath such Influence on their Production,

that they cannot be remitted by any other the most violent Agent. Which Answer is according to the Doctrine of Suarez ^a, as afterwards we shall declare. For this Resistence is not considered as Active, on the part of the Activity of the Degrees of Cold themselves, or as Passive, on the part of their Formality, so much, as for the Ef∣ficacy and Activity wherewith they are produced by their Cause. And for this Reason the Rest of the Qualities of the Temperament do resist, being preserved by the Qualities of this Wood, that they can never be remitted by their Contraries. Which I prove effectually. If God by him∣self alone, that is, by his actual Concur∣rence, will produce these two Degrees of Cold, and preserve them; although eight Degrees of Fire were applied, yet they could not be remitted, if God did not desist from his Concurrence; for the reason why they are corrupted when a hot Agent comes, is because God in presence of it de∣sists from his conserving Concurrence: Therefore in like manner they will not be remitted, if they be conserved by the same Efficacy of any other second Cause, not desisting from its Influence. And for this Cause we said these Degrees were fixt.

§. 11. Perhaps some will reply to this Ar∣gument, That it implies a Contradiction, if God will conserve these two Degrees of Cold by his alone Concurrence in the pre∣sence of eight Degrees of Heat, unless He should produce more Degrees of Cold: And therefore it would be necessary to produce some Supernatural Quality, which might resist eight Degrees of Heat. But on the contrary, first, it doth not appear wherein the Contradiction consists: For an Agent with eight Degrees of Heat, could never introduce into the Subject, having these two Degrees of Cold, but six Degrees of Heat, whereby the whole Lati∣tude of eight Degrees would be filled: For those two of Cold would be conserved by God: Which I prove, for the Concurrence of God produceth any thing necessarily: Therefore it would produce necessarily those two Degrees of Cold, while God continued his Concurrence. But Whether were it necessary that God should encrease his Concurrence? I answer negatively: For if he should encrease it, its Term also would be encreased, and more Degrees of Cold produced. Secondly, the foresaid Answer is refuted, Because either that Supernatural Quality would resist, as a kind of Cause

Formal, or Efficient: Not the first, Because Cold would resist more, as being contrary; wherefore a Supernatural Quality would be superfluous, as less resisting: Not the se∣cond, because this would be by producing Cold, which also the Concurrence of God would do. Therefore such a Quality would no way resist, or be necessary.

§. 12. But you will urge against the fore∣said Solution of the principal Argument. No Cause hath continual Influence, but up∣on an Effect depending on it in Conservati∣on: But Cold, and also other Elementary Qualities do not depend in their Conserva∣tion upon their Efficient Causes: Therefore the Qualities of the Wood of Life could not have continual Influence upon them: Therefore they could not actively be pre∣served by them in a fixt Degree. I answer first, That although the same Degree in Number be not preserved; yet the same in Specie is:

—namque uno amisso, non deficit alter.

For when one's lost, another doth not fail.

Which is sufficient for Incorruption of Tem∣perament, and to preserve Health. I answer

secondly, That although some Quality of its own nature be not dependent in Con∣servation; nor standeth in need of the continual Influx of its Cause, for its Con∣servation; yet there is no Inconvenience, that sometime it receive continual Influx from its Agent, as that which is dependent in its Conservation; after which manner a∣ctual Heat, existing in the very Fire, seems to receive it: Which Influx, though it be not necessary to its Being; yet it is neces∣sary to its much better Being.

§. 13. It is to be observed thirdly. That by the same Qualities of the Wood of Life, which would have kept the Natural Tem∣per of the Body in a fixt Degree, the Harm also, which follows the Want of Meat, Drink and Air, would have been prevent∣ed. Wherefore that Man, who had tasted the Fruit of Life, would never have pe∣rished by Hunger, Thirst, or prohibited Respiration. It is proved, Because in this Case the Heat would not act upon the Ra∣dical Moisture, (whether that Moisture be Something diverse from the Living Parts, as the Old Opinion held; or not, as now we more commonly think) nor would the Parts of the Body mutually act and suf∣fer among themselves beyond the Degrees

convenient for them, since every of the Na∣tural Elemental Qualities would have been conserved in its proportionate fixt Degree. Wherefore there would not be the Disso∣lution of any Substance necessary for the Body; nor therefore would any Reparati∣on on by Meat, Drink or Air, have been ne∣cessary; nor consequently would the De∣fect of these external Matters do Hurt.

§. 14. But you will object first. There∣fore the Introduction of these Matters at least would do Hurt, seeing the Actions are no less Hurt by Addition than by De∣fect. The Sequel is denied: For the most efficacious expulsive Virtue helped by other Qualities of the Wood, concurring with it self, acting most vehemently, would ei∣ther not admit what was Superfluous, or would presently expel it. This Harm might also be avoided by the Natural Providence of Man, who would not take Meat, Drink and Air Superfluous.

§. 15. You will object secondly. Men in the State of Innocence did eat, and ought to have eaten, if they had remained in the same State: For the Lord said unto them, that they might eat of every Tree of Para∣dise, except the forbidden one. Therefore the Tree of Life did not excuse Men from

Meat: therefore they might dye for want of it. I answer with a Distinction, That before Eating of the Wood of Life Men stood in need of Meat, I grant: After Eat∣ing of that Wood of Life, I again distin∣guish, If they were constituted in Perfecti∣on of Health, and in the best Constitution of Body due to perfect Age, I deny that they would have wanted Meat, Drink or Air: But if they were not constituted in the highest Perfection, as Children, Old Men and Sick Persons (if they had eaten the Wood in the State of Lapsed Nature; for in this State the Wood being denied, they might grow sick and old, and dye) that they would have stood in need of Meat and Drink, and Breath, I grant.

§. 16. You will infer. Therefore at least Children, Old Men and Sick Persons, see∣ing they suffered a Defect of Substance, might, though they had eaten of the Tree of Life before, notwithstanding perish by Hunger, Thirst, and Want of Air. The Sequel is denied: For they would have only wanted Meat and Drink, that they might come to the best Constitution of Body, but not that they might be preserved in the same imperfect State: Because since we have it proved, that the Qualities of the Tree

of Life kept the Temper in the same fixt Tenor, and hindred the contrary Qualities of the Body from acting mutually among themselves beyond measure; the pre-exist∣ing Substance could not be further wast∣ed, nor consequently Children or Old Men for Want of new Food be consumed.

§. 17. You will urge. The Qualities of the Wood were necessary Causes produ∣ctive of Elemental Qualities: Therefore they would necessarily introduce those De∣grees, which they were able, both in a Child and an Old Man: Therefore they would necessarily produce in them a Temper a∣greeable to perfect and flourishing Age: Therefore they should be Children and Old Men for their Temper, and they should not, because they would want due Magnitude, through Defect of Aliment, if they were deprived of it. I answer, In such a Case some might have been Chil∣dren, other Old Men, as to the Magnitude of Body; yet not as to their Temper: Which implies no Contradiction.

§. 18. And perhaps it might be answered, That the Vertues from the Qualities of the Tree were so strong, that they could dis∣pose any Matter, although it were not Ali∣mentous, and breed Blood of it, and Sub∣stance

for the thing nourished. Wherefore of Earth, Water and the Ambient Air, or of any other circumadjacent thing, what∣ever it were, they were able to make Nou∣rishment.

§. 19. Which may be effectually proved by the Example of that Maid of twelve years old, lying sick of a Diabetes, who turned the Ambient Air drawn in by Respiration and by the Pores, into Water or Serum, as was the certain Opinion of the Physicians then present: For she made thirty six pounds of Water every day, but did not take a∣bove seven pounds in Meat and Drink; and seeing this lasted threescore days, it appears that in that Time she made one thousand seven hundred and forty Pounds of Water above the Weight of her Meat and Drink, which was much more than the Weight of the Maid, if she had even been all dissolved into Urine, as Cardan ^b affirms: For the Maid weighed not above one hundred and fifty Pounds. Wherefore of necessity the inspired or circumfused Air must have been turned into Urine. What wonder there∣fore, if the strong Faculties of the Wood helping and elevating the Natural Powers of the Body, were able sufficiently to dis∣pose any indisposed Matter, and to turn it

into the Substance of the thing nourish∣ed?

§. 20. And it is confirmed, Because for any Matter to be fit to nourish, it sufficeth that Alimental Qualities be found therein, and that it want those which may hurt: But the Vertues of the Wood, which we suppose most efficacious and most agreeable to Nature, were able to introduce these Qualities into any Matter that occurr'd: Therefore the Body of Man arm'd with the Qualities of the Wood might be nourished by any occuring Matter whatever.

§. 21. You will object thirdly. If Men in Innocence or after the Fall had eaten the Fruit of Life, yet they would have genera∣ted by Abscision of Seed: But Matter is ne∣cessary for generation of the Seed to be ab∣scinded, and consequently Meat, Drink and Air: Therefore if they had used Vene∣ry, and notwithstanding had eaten nothing, without doubt they had dyed. I grant the Major and the Minor, I deny the Conse∣quence. Because for them who gave them∣selves to Generation and used Venery, e∣ven for those that were of the best Consti∣tution of Body, the use of Food was ne∣cessary towards the Generation of Seed: But though they used Venery, they would

not be sick for want of Food, because the strong Retentive Faculty of the Body would not suffer the Seed necessary for the Body to be expelled; nor therefore would Nature at that Time send Blood or other necessary Matter to the Seminary Vessels. Wherefore through want of Food, and consequently of Seed, they might be ren∣dred Barren; but dye they could not.

§. 22. You will object fourthly. There∣fore at least through defect or immoderate Use of the other non-natural things which are necessary for the preservation of Life, Diseases would happen, nor could Man be defended by the Qualities of the Wood of Life. And these things are, Sleep and Wa∣king, Motion and Rest, and the Accidents of the Mind, as Anger, Sorrow, Joy, and the like. I deny the Sequel, Because these non-natural things do so far preserve or de∣stroy Health, as they preserve or change Natural things; for it is by Accident that they alter the Temper of the Body, or change its Composition. But since we suppose the Qualities of the Wood of Life do keep the Temper of the Body in a fixt Proportion, it cannot be preternaturally changed by these Causes. Whereas also we suppose, the Faculties of the Body would

be helped by the Qualities of the Wood af∣ter such a manner as we have said, they would most easily prevent the Harms of the Excesses or Defects of the said non-natural things; as will easily appear to him that throughly considers the Use of each non-natural thing.

§. 23. It is to be observed fourthly. The Wood of Life defends the Body from Plague, Malignant Fevers, and contagious occult Diseases by those Alexipharmack Qualities, whereof we have treated be∣fore: For the Body is hurt by the Poyso∣nous Qualities of these things: Therefore it is well defended by other contrary A∣lexipharmack Qualities afforded by the Tree of Life.

§. 24. It is to be observed fifthly. A Natu∣ral Quality, which we called Resistive, was possible, which was able to defend the Body, that it could not be broken or divi∣ded by any Impulse or Blow, even the most violent. It is proved effectually first, Because as the Hardness of a Stone resists Division, so also there might be a Quality imparted by the Wood, which was able to resist Division. It is proved secondly. For in things Natural, there be Qualities, which indispose a Moveable Body, that it cannot

be moved by a Cause able to produce Mo∣tion. For it is evident from Experience, that Iron is so indisposed by some Quali∣ties, that it cannot be moved by Virtue of the Magnet. That Fishes swimming over the Torpedo, enclosed in the Mud or Sand for the purpose, when they come to the place whereto the Virtue of the Torpedo is extended, can stir no farther, by which Art She catches and eats them, as Aristo∣tle relates ^c. In like manner the Fishers Arm is deprived of Motion, when the Qua∣lity of the Torpedo reaches it. The Quali∣ty of Opium and other Stupefying Medi∣cines doth so dispose the Humors, that they cannot move further, during the Quality of the Opium; Wherefore Opium given stops violent Fluxes of Blood and other Humors. The Quality of the Blood-Stone doth also stop the Motion of the Blood.

§. 25. And what is more wonderful, a Remora coming near stops the swiftest Mo∣tion of a Ship under full Sail, as is the com∣mon Tradition of the fore-quoted Authors, and of many others: Which although it may happen, because the Remora draws the Ship a contrary way, as it fell out in that Fish, whereof we made mention be∣fore, because it had fixt its Horn most

firmly in the Ship: Yet the Remora may do it a more easie way, namely, by impressing such a Quality on the Ship, that, it being present, the Force of the Wind bearing upon the Ship, cannot produce Motion, by reason there is an Indisposition, which is as an Agent, that it cannot act. Wherefore a Power drawing the contrary way, or o∣therwise resisting, is not necessary for hin∣dring the Ship to be moved; but this Qua∣lity may most easily hinder its Motion.

§. 26. It is proved from the like. For if Amber be dulled by Moisture, its Virtue cannot produce Motion in Straws. If the Virtue of the Torpedo reach the Fishes swimming over her, or the Fishers Arm, their Motive Power cannot produce Moti∣on. If the Virtue of Opium come to the Humors, they cannot be expelled or any way moved by the Faculties. Therefore so it will happen in like manner in the Vir∣tue of the Remora impressed on the Ship, that, it being present, the force of the Wind cannot produce Motion on the Ship. Therefore after the same manner may a Quality be afforded by the Wood of Life, which being present, no external Motive Cause is able to effect Motion on the said Body. Nay, perhaps that Quality might

be diffused for some Space without the Bo∣dy of Man, who eat the Wood, by virtue whereof Darts cast, or Bullets shot from Guns, coming to the Sphere of that Quali∣ty, would presently lose Motion, and not come at the Body: Because the Motive Force, impressed on the Dart or Bullet, could not effect Motion, because of the indisposing Quality diffused without the Bo∣dy by the Virtue of the Wood.

§. 27. It is proved thirdly. Because (as before we have already said) all Natural Agents, although they have most violent Powers, are yet of a finite Virtue: There∣fore there is no Inconvenience, that a Re∣sistence may be, which surpasseth their Power. Seeing therefore such a Resistence is possible, whereby the Wood of Life might defend Man's Body from Death, and that the Sacred Text doth clearly intimate, that it was an adequate Cause of Immortality, unless some Supernatural Help should inter∣vene, why shall we dare to deny it? Why shall we seek other Interpretations for the Sacred Text? Medium's therefore should rather be enquired, whereby the Wood of Life m••ght be an adequate Cause of Immor∣tality: Which if they be found, as now by us, through God's Blessing, they are found,

it will be superfluous to have recourse to Miracles.

§. 28. You will object. If such a Quality were, which indisposed any thing to Moti∣on; if such a thing could not be moved by one Cause, neither also could it be moved by another Cause of equal Strength, since all Local Motion is of the same kind: Therefore there can be no Quality indispo∣sing to Local Motion. I answer, The said Qualities are not Indispositions on the part of the Patient to receive Motion; for if it were so, that thing which could not be moved by one Agent, could be moved by none, for its Incapacity of Motion: But they are Indispositions only on the part of the Agent, namely, of the Motive Quality, that it cannot produce Motion. And for this Cause the Virtue of the Magnet can produce Motion in Iron, not in other Bo∣dies, because it finds in it Dispositions ne∣cessary on the part of the Agent, which being present, it can operate; not in other things. And for the same Reason Amber moves Straws, not Iron, nor Stones: Aga∣rick purgeth Phlegm, and not other Hu∣mors; and so we may say of the rest.

§. 29. It is to be observed sixthly, to give better Satisfaction to the Point, That Phi∣losophers

reckon of a double positive Re∣sistence (beside another Negative) one A∣ctive, another Formal. Negative Resistence is the utter Incapacity of the Subject to receive any Form, such as is in the Heavens, suppo∣sing them incorruptible, as to receiving Qualities, altering to Corruption. Active Resistence is the very Action of the Agent, as by it a Term is produced, which formally re∣sisteth, or by it the Force of another Agent is broken, which is resisted; and it is called by ^d Suarez Radical Resistence, because by it another Agent is prevented, that it doth not act, and that its Virtue is diminished: And seeing it is not immediately diminish∣ed, but by the Form produced of such an Action, therefore it is called Radical Resi∣stence; and as it proceeds from an Agent, it is Active; but as it produceth an Effect immmediately resisting, it is Active Resi∣stence.

§. 30. Passive Resistence, or actual, is an Accidental Form, whereby the Subject is rendred incapable of receiving another, which is resisted, or whereby the Subject is indispo∣sed to another; and this Resistence consists (saith the same Author ^e) in a certain for∣mal Incompossibility, or Repugnance, from whence it comes, that the Action of a con∣trary

or any way repugnant Agent, is ei∣ther altogether hindred, or retarded, or remitted. And Active Qualities, as Heat and Cold, may as well have this Resist∣ence; as the not Active, as White and Black. From whence it follows, that one Quality can violently resist actively, but not at all formally, as Heat: or on the con∣trary, that another may violently resist for∣mally, not at all actively, as Dryness.

§. 31. But seeing Formal Resistence con∣sists in a Formal Incompossibility or Re∣pugnance; and two contrary Qualities in the same intense Degree, for example, Heat and Cold in the eighth Degree are equally incompossible in the same Subject, it is hard to assign a Cause, whence it comes that one can more resist than another. Yet Suarez ^f brings three Causes, for which it may hap∣pen. The first, is a greater and firmer U∣nion to the Subject, as it happens in things artificial, that some are more hardly part∣ed asunder, because other things cleave to them in form of a stronger Glew. The se∣cond is a greater Inequality in some Condi∣tion requisite to do or suffer, as Density in the Patient, by Reason whereof more Parts are united to resist the Action of the Agent. The third is a greater, or the

greatest Activity, whereby the quality flows from, or is otherwise produced of its Cause; which way, for example, it may be said, that the Moisture of Water resists more than that of Air, because it is produced or flows more efficaciously from the Form of Water than from that of Air. Also two or three of these Causes may be conjoyned, by reason whereof the Resistance may be greater; and besides the Active and For∣mal Resistance may be joyned, and there∣fore the Resistance may yet be more vehe∣ment.

§. 32. From whence it is easily gathered, that the Elemental Qualities, produced in Mans Body by the Supra-elemental, would both actively and formally resist other Con∣traries, which are produced by ordinary intrinsick or extrinsick Agents, Fire, for example, or Snow: And it is evident, that this Formal Resistance would have been much greater than the Formal Resistance of extrinsick active Qualities for the third Cause alleged by Suarez, namely for the exceeding Efficacy, whereby they are pro∣duced of the Qualities of the Wood of Life. Which in the same manner may be said of the Alexipharmack Qualities, which resist Poysonous ones.

§. 33. Therefore the Supra-elemental Qualities, as they most efficaciously produce the Elemental, they resist actively, radical∣ly and mediately: But the Elemental now produced resist formally and immediately other their Elemental Contraries, and can by no means be overcome of them: Be∣cause they are either perpetually produced in Specie by the Qualities of the Wood, which among all Natural Agents are the most efficacious in acting: Or because by their continual and most efficacious Influx they persist in the same, as we said before. But whether their Union or their Inherence to their Subject be greater, it doth not appear: because it appears not whence it should proceed.

§. 34. It is gathered from this Doctrine besides, that the Quality which resists di∣viding things, imparted to the Body by the Wood of Life, doth sufficiently resist them passively or formally only: First, because as Hardness resists Division, or Opacity the Light, so this Quality would resist dividing things. Secondly, because it would resist the dividing Impulse and other Motive Virtues, in the Nature of an indisposition on the part of the Agent, so that they could not produce Motion, as we have pro∣ved

by Example of other Qualities hin∣dring Production of Local Motion, that should be produced by some Motive Qua∣lities.

§. 35. Moreover it is proved before, that those who eat of the Wood of Life, were able to resist actively also, beyond this a∣bovesaid Manner, any extrinsick Causes ma∣king an Impulse, by Qualities actively con∣curring with the Animal Motive Power; by reason whereof they were able to pro∣duce stronger, nay, the strongest Motions, according to what we have said before.

^a Suar. 2. Tom. Metaph. disp. 43. sect. 1. num. 14. ^b Cardan. de variet. lib. 8. cap. 44. ^c Aristot. 6. de hist. animal. cap. 10. & 9. de hist. cap. 37. ^d Suar. tom. 2. metaph. disp. 43. sect. 1. nu. 8. ^e Suar. num. 10. ^f Suar. num. 12. & sequentibus.

DOUBT VIII. Whether the Cause of the very long Life of the first Men were some other Trees of Pa∣radise or the Tree of Life?

§. 1. PAssing by various Opinions about the long Life of the first Men, I declare I am of Opinion, that the Cause of the very long Life which these first Men injoyed, should be ascribed to the Quali∣ties of other wholesome Trees growing in Paradise, which were either in Fruits to be eaten, or transfused to the ambient Air (whether it were done by Vapors, which exhaled from the said Trees, or by continu∣al Alteration, or both ways) and then they were communicated by Food and Air to the Bodies of our first Parents, and from them again in Seed and Blood to their Children. All which things I endeavour to prove.

§. 2. And in the first place, that there are in Nature Trees and other Plants very Sa∣lutiferous, and which by occult Qualities both cure and prevent many as well mani∣fest as occult Diseases, is a thing most certain.

§. 3. But that such Trees and Plants ought not to be wanting in Paradise, seems

a thing most manifest: For since the Sacred Text declareth, there was every Tree that is pleasant to the Sight and good for Food; the Consequent seems infallible, that the most wholesome was there also; especially seeing those very Trees which are good for Food, and pleasant to the Sight, are like∣wise most wholesome. And we must con∣sequently suppose, that the wholesome Qua∣lities of these Trees excelled all other in the whole World be••ides; even as in Sweetness of Tast, Smell and Sight, and in goodness of Nourishment it was convenient they should surpass all other Trees.

§. 4. It follows therefore, that the Fruits, which our first Parents eat, were endued with such like Qualities: And that the Air, which they inspired, was likewise replenished with wholesome Qualities: And that the very same Qualities remained in the Body of our Parents themselves: for the Medicamentous Qualities of things that are eaten, remain in the Bodies of Animals, as the Virtue of Hellebore in the Body of a Quail.

§. 5. Seeing therefore such Fruits, and the inspired Air were efficacious in produ∣cing those Virtues; it is consequent, that the Virtues themselves must needs be pro∣duced in the Bodies of our first Parents,

and must from thence be communicated in Seed to their Children and Children's Chil∣dren. Wherefore of necessity they must strengthen the Faculties of the living Body, and concur with them to perform most perfect Actions, as Alexipharmacks and A∣mulets. Whence long lasting Health and Life must necessarily follow.

§. 6. All these things are confirmed from the like: For we daily experience, that grievous Diseases are contracted from bad Food, and from bad Air, infected with the rank Vapours of unwholesome Plants, or of neighbouring Lakes, or of nasty Places: We experience Diseases hereditary from Fa∣thers to Children and Children's Children, which is frequently observed in the French Disease, Gout and Falling Sickness, and in many others. What wonder therefore on the contrary, if from wholesome Food, and from very wholesome Air most wholesome Qualities be contracted; which propaga∣ted to Children and Children's Children, may become Causes of most perfect Health and Long Life?

§. 7. Besides, the Vicinity of the Place to Paradise might contribute to Diuturnity of Life: For their Habitation, when driven out, would not be far distant. Wherefore

as the Winds blowing from a wholesome or unwholesome Place render an Habitati∣on wholesome or unwholesome; So those blowing from Paradise, must necessarily with the same Qualities make the neighbouring Country's exceeding wholesome.

§. 8. For Corroboration whereof there comes very opportunely the History of that Indian, most famous among our Por∣tugueze, who lived above three hundred and thirty five years, as do testifie Patres Conimbricenses ^a, our Iohannes de Barros, who may rather be stiled the Lusitanian Livie ^b, and our Didacus de Couto a famous Portugal Historian ^c. Several of our Por∣tugueze at their Return from the East-In∣dies assured me they saw him alive. Nuni∣us à Cunna, when he govern'd India, found him there, and afterwards when Don Iohn de Castro presided Viceroy Anno Domini 1547. he was then alive. And all the Kings of those Parts, before they were sub∣ject to the Kingdom of Portugal, and our Governours and Viceroys afterwards, ap∣pointed an Allowance for the Maintenance of this wonderful Man.

§. 9. His Teeth fell several times, others e're long coming in their room; His Beard, when it was grown all white, as his Age re∣flourished,

grew black again. Some ascribe the Cause of this to certain Fruits, which he found in Ganges, and eat: For at cer∣tain Times after Inundations, rowing up and down Ganges in a Boat, he sought these Fruits, which, as they affirm, are brought with the Waters from Earthly Pa∣radise, from whence this River (as is be∣lieved) derives its Original.

§. 10. But Whether did these Fruits fall from the Tree of Life? It must without doubt be denied. For if God cast out A∣dam, lest he should eat thereof, and com∣manded the Angel to keep the Way with great Vigilance, how would he suffer them to glide down the Floud, that others might eat them? Again, according to the Opini∣on which affirms, that once eating of such Fruit would have been sufficient for eternal Life; it becomes most certain that these Fruits were not of the Tree of Life, since at length he is dead, who eat of them. Wherefore we must rather affirm, they were very wholesom Fruits of some other Trees, whose occult and wonderful Virtues concurring with the Powers of the Animal, kept off mortiferous Causes, and especially Diseases themselves, the same way that A∣lexipharmacks and Amulets, and other Me∣dicines

cure manifest Diseases by occult Vir∣tues; only these Fruits had much more effi∣cacious Vertues, by means whereof the Body of Animals persevered a very long time free from Diseases.

§. 11. But against the abovesaid things some might say, That those most Salutife∣rous Vertues before-mentioned were diffu∣sed through the Air from the Tree of Life, which did render not only Paradise, but all the Neighbouring Country most whole∣some: And there is no need to have Re∣course to the Virtues of other Fruits or Plants. I answer, That probably this might be said; nor would it therefore follow, that the Air was sufficient to impart eterni∣ty of Life; because such Vertues diffused in the Air would either be of a different kind from those which rendred Life eter∣nal; or if they were of the same kind, they had not Intenseness sufficient, as those had which the Fruit eaten afforded.

§. 12. Nevertheless I think it more pro∣bable, they were the Fruits of other Trees. First, Because if the Tree of Life had those Virtues that were sufficient for Eter∣nal Life; it were superfluous to have o∣thers, that made for the Prolongation of Life. And then if we suppose they were

the same, that were able to render Life E∣ternal, but more remiss; it seems, that in a∣ny Degree whatever they would have made it so: For they were of such a Nature and Efficacy, that in any Degree whatever they could easily overcome all other natural A∣gents, even the most violent: And thence it was, we judged before, that one Eating of our first Parents was sufficient, that these Qualities might be diffused with the Seminal Virtue to their Children, their Children's Children, and at length to Uni∣versal Mankind. But of these Opinions e∣very Man may follow that which pleaseth him best.

^a Conimb. lib. 2. de Gen. cap. 10. quaest. 1. art. 3. ad fin. ^b Johan. de Barros Decad. 4. lib. 8. c. 9. ad initium. ^c Didac. de Cou∣to lib. 1. Decade 5. c. 12.

FINIS.