Summum bonum, or, An explication of the divine goodness in the words of the most renowned Boetius translated by a lover of truth and virtue.

The TENTH PROSE.

That there is some true happiness, and where it is to be found.

SITH therefore thou hast had a Descrip∣tion of Imperfect and also of Perfect Good: it is fit that I should now demonstrate where the Perfection of Felicity is Seated. And here we must first make Inquiry, if there Be any such Good, as that which thou didst even now Define, least we should be Deceiv'd with a vain Imagination, there Being indeed no such thing, as that which we make the Subject of our Discourse. But that it doth Exist, or is Actually in Being, and that it is the Fountain, from whence All good things do flow, this is certain, and unquestionable. For whatsoever is said to be Imperfect, by Diminution of that which is Perfect it is call'd Imperfect. So it comes to pass that if there be any thing Imperfect in it's Kind, in the same Kind there must needs be something Perfect. For if ye take away Perfection,

it cannot be conceiv'd from whence that which we call Imperfect should have De∣riv'd it's Being. For the Nature of things tooke not it's Begining from that which is in any respect Faulty, or Defective, but proceeding from that which is Sound, and Free from all Imperfection, it descends at length to these Low, and Weak things. If there be a certain Imperfect Happiness, as we have already shown, it cannot be doubted but that there is an Happiness Entire, and Perfect. This Conclusion, quoth I, is Firm, and Irrefragable. But where It's Abode is, Think with thy selfe thus. That GOD, who hath the Governance of All things is Good, this is Natural to the Minds of Men to conceive. For it is impossible that our Thoughts should fix upon any thing Better than GOD: and who can doubt but such a Being is Good, which nothing can surpass in Goodness? but so doth Reason demonstrate GOD to be Good, that it doth also evince the Perfection of Goodness to be in Him. For unless He were Such a one He could never have the Governance of All things. For some thing, that hath the

Perfection of Goodness, would be more Excellent, than He, in as much as it would be found to have the Priority of Being. For it is manifest that All Perfect things have their Being Before those things, which are Unsound, and Imperfect. Wherefore that we may not be endless in our Reaso∣ning, it must be Granted that the Most High GOD is Full of the Highest, and Perfect Good. But we have Concluded that Perfect Good is Bliss, or True Happiness. Therefore it must needs follow that True Happiness is no where to be found but in the Most High GOD. I heartily As∣sent, quoth I, to what thou sayst, nei∣ther is it capable of any Contradiction. But, I pray thee, quoth she, see how thou mayst prove soundly, and Irrefragably that the Most High GOD is Full of the Highest, or Soveraign Good. How, quoth I? Thou mayst not suppose that this Father of All things hath Receiv'd that Soveraign Good, of which he is said to be Full, from without, or that he has It by Nature in such a manner, that thou mayst think that the Substance, or Essence of GOD Having,

and of the Soveraign Good Had, is not the Same. For if thou dost conceit that It is Receiv'd from without, thou mayst judge That which hath given, to be more Ex∣cellent than He which hath Receiv'd It. But we most worthily Confess Him to be the Most Excellent of All things. And if this Soveraign Good be in Him by Nature, but may be conceiv'd to be not altogether the Same with Him, sith we speak of Him, who is Acknowledg'd to have the Gover∣nance of All things, let any man Imagine, who it was that Join'd together these Di∣vers things? Lastly that which Differs from any thing Is not That thing, from which it Differs. Wherefore That which Differs in Substance, or Essence from Soveraign Good Is not Soveraign Good: And 'tis the greatest Impiety to have such a Thought of GOD, than Whom there can be nothing more Ex∣cellent. For it is impossible that the Nature of any thing should be Better than That from which it Receiv'd its Being. Where∣fore That from which All things Receiv'd their Being I may firmly Conclude to be in its own Nature the Soveraign Good. 'Tis

most certainly so, quoth I, as thou sayst. But it has been Granted that the Soveraign Good is True Happiness. Very right, quoth I. Therefore, quoth she, it must needs fol∣low that GOD is True Happiness. There can be no Reason, quoth I, to Deny the Premises, and I clearly perceive that this is their true, and proper Consequence. See, quoth she, if the same thing may not be more firmly prov'd by this Argument, that there cannot be Two Soveraign Goods, Diffe∣ring one from the other. For 'tis manifest that One of those Goods, which are Diffe∣rent from each other, cannot be That, which the Other is: for which cause Nei∣ther of them can be Perfect, sith One is Wanting to the Other. But that which is not Perfect cannot be Highest or Soveraign. The things then that are Soveraignly Good cannot be Different from each other. But we have prov'd that both True Happiness, and GOD are the Soveraign Good: where∣fore it must needs follow that Soveraign Hap∣piness, and Soveraign Divinity is One, and the same Thing. Nothing, said I, could ever be concluded more True, as to the

Matter; more Firm, as to the way of Pro∣ving it; or more becomming the Divine Majesty. Upon these things then, quoth she, as Geometricians having Demonstrated their Propositions, are wont to inferr cer∣tain 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Corollaries, as they call them, so shall I give thee a Corollarie. For sith Men become Happy by the acquiring of True Happiness, and True Happiness is Divinity it selfe, 'tis manifest that they be∣come Happy by the acquiring of Divinity. But as Men become Just by the acquiring of Justice, Wise by the acquiring Wisedome, so it must needs be that having gotten, or acquir'd Divinity, they become Gods. E∣very one then that is Truly Happy is a God: but indeed by Nature there is but One God, yet nothing hinders but that there may be very Many by the Participation of Divinity. And this, quoth I, is a Fair, and Pretious Corollarie indeed. But there is nothing more Fair than That which Reason perswades should be Annext to the things that have been spoken. What is that, quoth I? Sith True Happiness, said she, conteins Many things, whether All these things make up

One Body with a certain variety of Parts, or whether there be any one of them, which compleats the Substance, or Nature of True Happiness, the rest being refer'd Therunto? I would thou stouldst ex∣plain what thou sayst by rehearsing those se∣veral things. Do we not judge True Hap∣piness, quoth she, to be Good? yea, said I, the Soverain Good. Add this, said she, to All the rest of the things aforemention'd. For the same Bliss or True Happiness is judg'd to be Soveraign Sufficiency, Soveraign Power, and also Veneration, Renown, and Pleasure, or Delight Soveraign. What then? Are All these things as so many Limbs, or Parts of True Happiness, or are they refer'd to Good, as That, wherein the Nature of them All is contein'd? I un∣derstand now, quoth I, what thou dost propose, as the subject of our Inquiry, but I would fain know how thou dost Determine the Question. Thus. If All these things were as so many Parts of True Happiness, they would Differ one from the other. For this is the Nature of Parts, that being Di∣vers they make up One, and the Same Body.

But it hath been already prov'd that they are All but One thing. Ther's no doubt of that, quoth I, But I expect what thou wilt say next. This is manifest quoth she, that All those other things are refer'd to Good. For therefore is Sufficiency Desir'd, because it is judg'd to be Good, for the same Cause is Power Desir'd, and so Veneration, Re∣nown, Delight. 'Tis Good then, which is the Cause, For which any thing is Desir'd: sith that which retains not any thing in it selfe either Really, or Apparently Good, can in no wise be Desir'd. And on the contrary those things, which are not Good in their own Nature, yet if they Seem to be so, are Desir'd, as if they were Truly Good. Whence it comes to pass that Goodness is rightly judg'd to be the Cause, why any thing should be Desir'd. But that For which any thing is Desir'd is the Chief Object of the Desire. As if a man have a Will to Ride For his Health, 'tis not so much the Riding, as Health that he Desires. Sith therefore that All things are Desir'd For the obteining of Good, Good is the Chief, or Principal Object of all Desires whatsoever. But it

has been granted that True Happiness is That, For which any thing is Wisht, or Desir'd: wherefore it is evident that True Happiness is the Only thing Requir'd, or Sought after. And thus it cannot be De∣ny'd, that the Substance, or Nature of Good, and of True Happiness is One, and the Same. I see not how it is possible for any man to Dissent from this. But we have prov'd that GOD, and True Happiness is One, and the Same thing. Right, quoth I. Therefore we may Safely Conclude that the Nature of GOD consists in GOOD∣NESS, and in Nothing else.