The essays, or councils, civil and moral, of Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Alban with a table of the colours of good and evil, and a discourse of The wisdom of the ancients : to this edition is added The character of Queen Elizabeth, never before printed in English.
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- The essays, or councils, civil and moral, of Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Alban with a table of the colours of good and evil, and a discourse of The wisdom of the ancients : to this edition is added The character of Queen Elizabeth, never before printed in English.
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- Bacon, Francis, 1561-1626.
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- London :: Printed for H. Herringman, R. Scot, R. Chiswell, A. Swalle, and R. Bentley ,
- 1696.
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- Elizabeth -- I, -- Queen of England, 1533-1603.
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"The essays, or councils, civil and moral, of Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Alban with a table of the colours of good and evil, and a discourse of The wisdom of the ancients : to this edition is added The character of Queen Elizabeth, never before printed in English." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A28200.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 21, 2025.
Pages
Page 1
A Table of the Colours (or Appearances) of Good and Evil; and their Degrees, as Places of Per∣swasion, and Disswasion, and their several Fallaxes, and the Elenchs of them.
1.
CUI caeterae Partes, vel Sectae, secundas unanimiter deferunt, cum singulae principatum sibi vendicent, Melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quaeque ex zelo v••∣detur sumere; secundas autem ex vero & merito tribuere.That is,
Since all Parties, or Sects, challenge the Preheminence of the first Place to themselves; that, to which all the rest with one consent give the second Place, seems to be better than the others. For every one seems to take the first Place out of zeal to it self, but to give the second where it is really due.SO Cicero went about to prove the Sect of Academicks, which suspended all Asseveration, for to be the best. For, saith he, ask a Stoick, which Philosophy is true, he will prefer his own: then ask him, which approacheth (next) the Truth, he will confess, the Academicks. So deal with the Epicure, that will scant endure the Stoick to be in sight of him; so soon as he hath placed himself, he will place the Academicks next him.
So if a Prince took divers Competitors to a place, and examined them severally, whom next themselves they would chiefly commend; it were like the ablest man should have the most second Voices.
The Fallax of this Colour happeneth oft in respect of Envy; for men are accustomed, after themselves, and their own fashion, to incline unto them which are sof∣test,
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and are least in their way, in despight and deroga∣tion of them, that hold them hardest to it. So that this Colour of Meliority and Preheminence is a sign of Enerve∣tion and Weakness.
2.
Cujus excellentia, vel exuperantia Melior; id toto genere Melius.That is,
That kind is altogether best, whose Excellence, or Pre∣heminence is best.
APpertaining to this are the Forms: Let us not wan∣der in generalities. Let us compare particular with particular, &c. This appearance, though it seem of strength, rather Logical than Rhetorical, yet is very oft a Fallax.
Sometimes; because some things are in kind very ca∣sual; which if they escape, prove excellent: so that the kind is inferior, because it is so subject to peri••; but that, which is excellent, being proved, is superior. As the Blossom of March, and the Blossom of May, whereof the French Verse goeth:
Burgeon de Mars, enfans de Paris, Si un eschape, bien vaut dix.So that the Blossom of May is generally better than the Blossom of March; and yet the best Blossom of March is better than the best Blossom of May.
Sometimes, because the nature of some kinds is to be more equal, and more indifferent, and not to have very distant Degrees; as hath been noted in the warmer Climates, the people are generally more wise, but in the Northern Climate, the Wits of chief are greater. So in many Armies, if the matter should be tryed by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 between two Champions, the Victory should go on the one side; and yet, if it were tryed by the gross, it would go on the other side. For Excellencies go as it
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were by chance, but kinds go by a more certain Nature as by Discipline in War.
Lastly, Many kinds have much refuse, which coun∣tervail that which they have excellent; and therefore generally Metal is more precious than Stone, and yet a Diamond is more precious than Gold.
3.
Quod ad Veritatem refertur, Majus est, quam quod ad Opinionem. Modus autem & probatio ejus, quod ad Opi∣nionem pertinet, haec est: Quod quis, si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset.That is,
That which hath relation to Truth, is greater than that which refers to Opinion. But the Measure, and Try∣al of that, which belongs to Opinion, is this: It is that which a Man would not do, if he thought it would not be known.
SO the Epicures say to the Stoicks Felicity placed in Vertue; that it is like the felicity of a Player, who, if he were left of his Auditors, and their Applause, would streight be out of Heart and Countenance; and therefore they call Vertue, bonum theatrale; that is, a Stage good. But of Riches the Poet saith,
Populus me sibulat, At mihi plaudo:i. e.
Me People hiss abroad, But I my self applaud.And of Pleasure,
—Grata sub imo Gaudia corde premens, vultu simulato Pudorem:i. e.
Your welcome Joys within let stifled lie, But counterfeit abroad a Modesty.
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The Fallax of this Colour is somewhat subtil, though the Answer to the Example be ready: For Vertue is not chosen propter auram popularem, for the applause of People; but contrariwise, Maximè omnium teipsum revere∣re, a Man ought to stand most in awe of himself; so as a Vertuous Man will be Vertuous in solitudine, in a Desart, and not only in theatro, upon the Stage: though percase it will be more strong by Glory and Fame, as an Heat, which is doubled by Reflection. But that denieth the Supposition, it doth not reprehend the Fallax, where∣of the Reprehension is a Law, that Vertue (such as is joyned with Labour and Conflict) would not be cho∣sen, but for Fame and Opinion; yet it followeth not, that the chief Motive of the Election should not be real, and for it self; for Fame may be only causa impulsiva, the impelling or urging Cause, and not causa constituens, or efficiens, the constituting, or efficient Cause. As if there were two Horses, and the one would do better without the Spur than the other: but again, the other with the Spur would far exceed the doing of the former, giving him the Spur also; yet the latter will be judg∣ed to be the better Horse: and the Form, as to say, Tush, the Life of this Horse is but in the Spur, will not serve as to a wise Judgment: for, since the ordinary Instrument of Horsmanship is the Spur, and that it is no matter of Impediment or Burthen, the Horse is not to be accounted the less of, which will not do well with∣out the Spur, but the other is to be reckoned rather a Delicacy, than a Vertue. So Glory and Honour are the Spurs to Vertue: and, although Vertue would languish without them, yet since they be always at hand to attend Vertue, Vertue is not said to be the less chosen for it self, because it needed the Spur of Fame and Re∣putation. And therefore that Position, Nota ejus rei, quod propter Opinionem, & non propter veritatem eligitur, haec est; Quod quis, si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset; (That is, That the Mark of a Thing chosen for Opi∣nion, and not for Truth-sake; is this, That one would
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not do it, if he thought it would not be known,) is re∣prehended.
4.
Quod rem integram servat, Bonum: quod sine receptu est, Malum. Nam se recipere non posse, impotentiae genus est: potentia autem Bonum:That is,
That, which keeps a matter safe and entire, is Good: but what is destitute, and unprovided of a retreat, is bad. For, whereas all Ability of Acting is Good, not to be able to withdraw ones self, is a kind of Im∣potency.
HEreof Aesop framed the Fable of the two Frogs, that consulted together in the time of drought, (when many Plashes that they had repaired to were dry,) what was to be done: and the one propounded to go down into a deep Well, because it was like the Wa∣ter would not fail there; but the other answered, Yea, but if it do fail, how shall we get up again? And the Reason is, that Humane Actions are so uncertain, and sub∣ject to perils, as that seemeth the best course, which had most passages out of it. Appertaining to this Per∣swasion, the Forms are, You shall engage your self: on the other side, Tantum, quantum voles, sumes ex fortuna, i. e. Take what Lot you will; or, you shall keep the matter in your own Hand. The reprehension of it is, that pre∣ceeding and resolving in all actions is necessary. For, as he saith well, Not to resolve, is to resolve; and many times it breeds as many necessities, and engageth as far in some other sort, as to resolve. So it is but the covet∣ous Man's Disease translated in power; for the covetous Man will enjoy nothing, because he will have his full store, and possibility to enjoy the more; so, by this Rea∣son, a Man should execute nothing, because he should be still indifferent, and at liberty to execute any thing. Besides Necessity and this same Jacta est alea, or, once having cast the Dice, hath many times an advantage;
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because it awaketh the powers of the mind, and strength∣neth endeavour, (Caeteris pares, necessitate certè superiores istis:) which are able to deal with any others, but ma∣ster these upon necessity.
5.
Quod ex pluribus constat, & divisibilibus, est majus, quam quod ex paucioribus, & magis Unum: nam omnia, per partes considerata, majora videntur; quare & pluralitas partium Magnitudinem prae se fert. Fortius autem ope∣ratur Pluralitas partium, si Ordo absit: nam inducit si∣militudinem Infiniti, & impedit comprehensionem;That is,
That, which consists of more parts, and those Divisible, is greater, and more One, than what is made up of fewer; for all things, when they are looked upon piece-meal, seem greater; whence also a purality of Parts make shew of a Bulk considerable, which a Plurality of Parts effects more strongly, if they be in no certain Order; for it then resembles an Infinity, and hinders the comprehending of them.
THIS Colour seemeth palpable, for it is not Plura∣lity of Parts, without Majority of Parts, that ma∣keth the total greater; yet nevertheless, it often carries the mind away; yea, it deceiveth the sense; as it seem∣eth to the Eye a shorter distance of way, if it be all dead and continued, than if it have Trees, or Buildings, or any other marks, whereby the Eye may divide it. So when a great-monied man hath divided his Chests, and Coyns, and Bags, he seemeth to himself richer than he was. And therefore the way to amplifie any thing is to break it, and to make Anatomy of it in several parts, and to examine it according to several circumstances. And this maketh the greater shew, if it be done without Order, for confu∣sion maketh things muster more. And besides, what is set down by Order and Division, doth demonstrate, that nothing is left out or omitted; but all is there: whereas,
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if it be without Order, both the mind comprehendeth less that which is set down, and besides it leaveth a suspi∣cion, as if more might be said than is expressed.
This Colour deceiveth, if the mind of him that is to be perswaded, do of it self overconceive or prejudge of the greatness of any thing; for then the breaking of it will make it seem less, because it makes it to appear more according to the Truth. And therefore, if a Man be in Sickness or Pain, the time will seem longer with∣out a Clock, or Hourglass, than with it: for the mind doth value every moment; and then the Hour doth ra∣ther sum up the moments than divide the Day. So in a dead Plain the way seemeth the longer, because the Eye hath pre-conceived it shorter, than the truth: and the fru∣strating of that maketh it seem longer than the truth. Therefore, if any Man have an over-great Opinion of any thing, then if another think, by breaking it into se∣veral Considerations, he shall make it seem greater to him, he will be deceived. And therefore, in such Cases, it is not safe to divide, but to extol the Entire still in general.
Another Case, wherein this Colour deceiveth, is, when the matter broken, or divided, is not comprehended by the sence, or made at once in respect of the distracting or scattering of it: and being entire, and not divided, is comprehended. As an Hundred Pounds in Heaps of five Pounds will shew more than in one gross Heap: so as the Heaps be all upon one Table to be seen at once, other∣wise not. As Flowers, growing scattered in divers Beds, will shew more, than if they did grow in one Bed: so as all those Beds be within a Plot, that they be object to view at once; otherwise not. And therefore men, whose Living lyeth together in one Shire, are commonly counted greater landed, than those, whose Livings are dispersed, though it be more; because of the notice and com∣prehension.
A third Case, wherein this Colour deceiveth, which is not so properly a Case or Reprehension, as it is a counter Colour, being in effect as large as the Colour it self is,
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Omnis compositio indigentiae cujusdam videtur esse particep••. That every Composition seems to partake of a certain want; because, if one thing would serve the turn, it were ever best; but it is the Defect and Imperfection of things that hath brought in that help to piece them up: as it is said, * 1.1 Martha, Martba, attendis ad plurima, unum sufficit: that is, Mar∣tha, Martha, thou art troubled about many things; one thing is sufficient. So likewise hereupon Aesop framed the Fable of the Fox and the Cat: wherein the Fox bragged, what a number of shifts and devices he had, to get from the Hounds; and the Cat said, He had but one, which was to climb a Tree▪ which in proof was better worth than all the rest; where∣of the Proverb grew,
Multa novit Vulpes, sed Felis unum magnum.
Reynard the Hounds to scape had shifts not small, Grimalkin only one, as good as all.And in the Moral of this Fable, it comes likewise to pass, That a good sure Friend is a better help at a pinch, than all the Stratagems and Policies of Man's own wit. So it falleth out to be a common Error in Negotiating; where∣as Men have many Reasons to induce or perswade, they strive commonly to utter, and use them all at once, which weakeneth them. For it argueth, as was said, a neediness in every of the Reasons by it self, as if one did not trust to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himself only with that.
Et quae non prosunt singula, multa juvant.
And what help'd not alone before, Doth help full well, when joyn'd with more.
Page 9
Indeed, in a set Speech in an Assembly, it is expected, a Man should use all his Reasons in the Case he hand∣leth: but in private perswasions it is always a great Error.
A fourth Case, wherein this Colour may be reprehended is in respect of that same vis unita fortior, the acknow∣ledged strength of an united Power; according to the Tale of the FRENCH King, who, when the Empe∣ror's Embassador had recited his Master's Style at large, which consisteth of many Countries, and Dominions, the FRENCH KING willed his Chancellor, or other Mi∣nister, to repeat over FRANCE as many times as the other had recited the several Dominions; intending, it was equivalent with them all, and more compacted and united.
There is also appertaining to this Colour another Point, why breaking of a thing doth help it; not by way of adding a shew of Magnitude unto it, but a note of Ex∣cellency and Rarity: whereof the Forms are, Where you shall find such a Conourrence? Great, but not compleat: for it seems a less work of Nature or Fortune, to make any thing in his kind greater than ordinary, than to make a strange Composition. Yet, if it be narrowly considered, this Colour will be reprehended, or encountred, by impu∣ting to all Excellencies in Compositions a kind of Poverty, or (at least) a Casualty, or Jeopardy: for from that, which is excellent in greatness, somewhat may be taken, or there may be a decay, and yet sufficient left; but from that which hath his price in Composition, if you take away any thing, or any part do fail, all is Dis∣grace.
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6.
Cujus Privatio bona, Malum: cujus Privatio mala, Bo∣num.That is,
That, whose Privation (or, the want of which) is Good, is in it self Evil: that whose Privation (or, the want thereof) is an Evil, is in it self Good.
THE Forms to make it conceived, that that was Evil, which is changed for the better, are, He that is in Hell thinks there is no Heaven. Satis quercus; Acorns were good, till Bread was found, &c. And on the other side, the forms to make it conceived, that that was good, which was changed for the worse, are; Bona magis carendo quam fruendo sentimus: That is, we understand the Goodness of things more by wanting, than enjoying them. Bona à tergo formosissima: i. e. Good things never appear in their full Beauty, till they turn their back, and be going away, &c.
The Reprehension of this Colour is, That the Good or Evil which is removed, may be esteemed Good or Evil comparatively: and not positively or simply. So that if the Privation be Good, it follows not, that the former condition was Evil, but less Good: For the Flower or Blossom is a positive Good; although the remove of it, to give place to the Fruit, be a comparative Good. So in the Tale of Aesop, when the old fainting man in the heat of the day cast down his Burthen, and called for Death; and when Death came to know his will with him, said, It was for nothing, but to help him up with his burthen again: It doth not follow, that because Death, which was the privation of the Burthen, was ill, therefore the Burthen was good. And in this part the ordinary Form of Malum Necessarium, a necessary Evil, aptly reprehended this Co∣lour: For privatio mali necessarii est mala, the privation of a necessary Evil is Evil; and yet that doth not con∣vert the Nature of the necessary Evil, but it is Evil.
Again it cometh sometimes to pass, that there is an equality in the change of privation, and (as it were) a
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Dilemma boni, of the good; or, Dilemma mali, of the Evil; so that the * 1.2 corrupti∣on of one Good is a Generation of the other.
Sorti pater aequus utrique est:
Both Chances the same equal Parent have:
And contrarily, the remedy of the one Evil, is the oc∣casion and commencement of another; as in Scylla and Cha∣••••••dis.
9. Quod Bono vicinum, Bonum: quod à Bono remotum, Malum. That is,
What is near to Good, is Good: What is at distance from Good, is Evil.
SUCH is the Nature of things, that things contrary, and distant in nature and quality; and also severed and disjoyned in Place; and things like, and consenting in quality, are placed, and (as it were) quartered together: For partly, in regard of the Nature, to spread, multiply, and infect in similitude; and partly, in regard of the Nature to break, expel, and alter that which is disagreea∣ble and contrary, most things do either associate, and draw near to themselves the like, or (at least) assimilate to themselves that which approacheth near them, and do also drive away, chase, and exterminate their contraries. And that is the reason commonly yielded, why the middle Region of the Air should be coldest; because the Sun and Stars are either hot by Direct Beams, or by reflecti∣on. The direct Beams heat the upper Region; the reflected Beams from the Earth and Seas, heat the lower Region. That which is in the mid'st, being farther distant in place from these two Regions of heat, is most distant in Nature, that is coldest, which is that they term cold, or
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hot, per * 1.3 Antiperistasin, that is, en∣vironing by contraries: which was pleasantly taken hold of by him, who said, that an honest man •••• these days must needs be more honest than in Ages heretofore, propter An∣tiperistasin, because the shutting of him in the mid••st of Con∣traries must needs make the honester stronger, and more com∣pact in it self.
The Reprehension of this Colour is:
First, Many things of Amplitude in their kind do (as it were) engross to themselves all, and leave that which is next them most destitute. As the Shoots, or Under-Wood, that grow near a great and spread Tree, is the most pined and shrubby Wood of the Field; because the great Tree doth deprive and deceive them of the sap and nourishment; so he saith well, Divit is servi maxime Servi, That rich mens Servants are the greatest Slaves: And the Comparison was pleasant of him, that compared Courtiers attendant in the Courts of Princes, without great Place or Office, to Fasting-days; which were next the Holy-days; but otherwise were the leanest days in all the Week.
Another Reprehension is, that things of Greatness and Predominancy, though they do not extenuate the things adjoyning in substances, yet they drown them, and ob∣scure them in shew and appearance. And therefore the Astronomers say; that, whereas in all other Planets Con∣junction is the perfectest amity, the Sun contrariwise is good by Aspect, but evil by Conjunction.
A third Reprehension is, because Evil approacheth to Good, sometimes for concealment, sometimes for protection: And Good to Evil for conversion and reformation. So Hypo∣crisie draweth near to Religion for covert and hiding it self.
Saepe latet vitium proximitate boni.
Oft, under neighb-ring Good, Vice shrowded lies.
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And Sanctuary-men, which were commonly inordi∣••ate men, and Malefactors, were wont to be nearest to Priests, and Prelates, and Holy-men: for the Majesty of good things is such, as the Confines of them are reverend. On the other side, our Saviour charged with nearness of Publicans and Rioters, said Matt. 9. 11. The Physician approacheth the sick rather than the whole.
8.
Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, Majus Malum: quod ab externis imponitur, Minus Malum.That is,
That, which a Man hath procured by his own De∣fault, is a greater mischief (or Evil;) that, which is laid on by others, is a lesser Evil.
THE Reason is, because the sting and remorse of the mind, accusing it self, doubleth all Adversity: Con∣trariwise, the considering and recording inwardly, that a man is clear and free from fault, and just imputation, doth attempt outward Calamities. For if the Will be in the Sense, and in the Conscience both, there is a gemina∣tion of it: But if Evil be in the one, and Comfort in the other, it is a kind of Composition: So the Poets in Trage∣dies do make the most passionate Lamentation, and those that fore-run final despair, to be accusing, questioning, and torturing of a man's self.
Seque unum clamat causamque caputque malorum.
She railing doth confess her self to be The cause and source of her own misery.And contrariwise, the extremities of worthy Persons have been annihilated in the consideration of their own good deserving. Besides, when the Evil cometh from with∣out, there is left a kind of evaporation of grief, if it come by humane injury, either by indignation, and meditating of revenge from our selves or by expecting, or fore-conceiving,
Page 14
that Ne••esis and Retribution will take hold of the Authors of our hurt; or, if it be by fortune or accident; yet the•• is left a kind of expostulation against the Divine Powers▪
Atque Deos atque Astra vocat crudelia Mater:
The God's and cruel Stars the Mother doth charge.
But, where the Evil is derived from a man's ow•• fault, there all strikes deadly inwards and suffocateth.
The Reprehension of this Colour is:
First in respect of Hope: For Reformation of our fault is in nostra potestate, our own power; but amend∣ment of our fortune simply is not: Therefore Demosthe∣nes in many of his Orations saith thus to the People of Athens; That which having regard to the time past, is the worse Point and circumstance of all the rest; That as to the time to come, is the best. What is that? Even this, that by your Sloth, Irresolution, and Misgovernment, your affairs ••re grown to this Declination and Decay: For, had you used and ordered your means and forces to the best, and done your parts every way to the full; and notwithstanding your mat∣ters should have gone backward in this manner as they do; there had been no hope left of Recovery or Reputation. But since it hath been only by your own errors, &c. So Epictet••s in his Degrees saith, The worst state of man is to accuse ex∣tern Things, better than that to accuse any man's self, and best of all to accuse neither.
Another Reprehension of this Colour, is in respect of the well bearing of Evils, wherewith a man can charge no body but himself, which maketh them the less.
—Leve fit, quod bene fertur onus:
The Burthen's light, that's on discreetly laid.And therefore many natures, that are either extreamly proud, and will take no fault to themselves; or else very
Page 15
true, and cleaving to themselves, (when they see the ••lame of any thing that falls out ill, must light upon themselves) have no other shift, but to bear it out well, and to make the least of it: For, as we see, when some∣times a fault is committed, and before it be known who is to blame, much ado is made of it; but after, if it ap∣pear to be done by a Son, or by a Wife, or by a near Friend; then it is light made of: So much more, when a man must take it upon himself. And therefore it is com∣monly seen, that Women which marry Husbands of their own chusing, against their Friends consents, if they be ne∣ver so ill-used, yet you shall seldom see them complain, but set a good face on it.
9.
Quod opera & virtute nostra partum est; Majus Bo∣num: Quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia Fortu∣nae, delatum est; Minus Bonum.That is,
That which is gotten by our own Pains and Industry, is a greater good; that which comes by another man's Courtesie, or the Indulgence of Fortune, is a lesser Good.
THE Reasons are,
First, The future Hope: Because in the favour of others, or the good Winds of Fortune, we have no state, or certainty; In our endeavours, or abilities, we have. So as when they have purchased us one good Fortune, we have them as ready, and better edged and environed to procure another.
The Forms be: You have won this by play. You have not only the Water, but you have the Receipt: You can make it again, if it be lost, &c.
Next, because these Properties, which we enjoy by the benefit of others, carry with them an obligation, which seemeth a kind of burthen: Whereas the other, which de∣rive from our selves, are like the freest Patents, Absque ali∣quo inde reddendo, without making any restitution. And if they proceed from Fortune, or Providence, yet they
Page 16
seem to touch us secretly with the reverence of the ••••∣vine Powers, whose Favours we taste, and therefo•••• work a kind of Religious Fear and restraint: Whereas in the other kind, that comes to pass, which the Pro∣phet speaketh, Ezek. Laetantur, exaltant, immolant plag∣suis & sacrificat reti suo: Men are glad, they rejoice, they offer to their Toils, and sacrifice to their Nets.
Thirdly, Because that, which cometh unto us without our own Vertue, yieldeth not that Commendation and Repu∣tation: For Actions of great Felicity may draw wonder, but praise less; as Cicero said to Caesar, Quae miremur, habe∣mus; quae laudemus, expectamus: That is, They had what they might wonder at; but expected what they might praise.
Fourthly, Because the purchases of our own industry are joyned commonly with labour and strife; which gives an edge and appetite, and makes the fruition of our Desires more pleasant. Suavis cibus à venatu: Venison is sweet of ones own killing.
On the other side, there be four Counter-Colours to this Colour, rather than Reprehensions; because they be as large as the Colour it self.
First, Because felicity seemeth to be a Character of the Favour and Love of the Divine Powers; and according∣ly works both of confidence in our selves, and respect and authority from others. And this felicity extendeth to ma∣ny casual things; whereunto the care and virtue of man cannot extend; and therefore seemeth to be at large Good. As when Caesar said to the Sailer; Caesarem portas, & fortunam ejus; That he carried Caesar and his Fortune: If he had said, Et virtutem ejus, and his Valour; it had been small comfort against a Tempest; otherwise than if it might seem upon Merit, to induce Fortune.
Next, whatsoever is done by Virtue and Industry, seems to be done by a kind of Habit and Art; and thereupon open to be imitated and followed: Whereas Felicity is imitable. So we generally see, that things of Nature seem more excellent than things of Art, because
Page 17
they be imitable; for, Quod Imitabile est, potentia qua∣l••m vulgatum est: What is imitable, is by a certain power ••ade known abroad.
Thirdly, Felicity commendeth those things which come without our own labour: For they seem Gifts, and the others seem Peny-worths. Whereupon Platarch saith ele∣gantly of the Acts of Timoleon, who was so fortunate, compared with the Acts of Agesilaus and Epaminondas, That they were like Homer's Verses; they ran so easily, and so well. And therefore it is the Word we give unto Poesie, terming it a happy Vein; because Facility seemeth ever to come from Happiness.
Fourthly, This same praeter spem, vel expectatum, when things happen besides Hope or Expectation, it doth in∣crease the Price and Pleasure of many things; and this cannot be incident to those things that proceed from our own care, and compassing.
10.
Gradus Privationis major videtur, quam gradus Dimi∣nutionis: Etrursus, Gradus inceptionis major videtur, quam Gradus Inorementi:That is,
The Degree of Privation seems greater than the Degree of Diminution: And again, the Degree of Inception, (or Beginning,) seems greater than the Degree of Increase.
IT is a Position in the Mathematicks, that there is no Pro∣portion between somewhat and nothing: Therefore the Degree of Nullity and Quiddity, (or Act) seemeth Lar∣ger than the Degrees of Increase and Decrease. As to a Monoculus, it is more to lose one Eye, than to a Man that hath two Eyes. So, if one have lost divers Children, it is more grief to him to lose the last, than all the rest; be∣cause he is Spes Gregis, the Hope of his Stock. And there∣fore Sibylla, when she brought her Three Books, and had burned Two did double the whole price of both the other; because the burning of that had been gradus privationis, a
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Degree of Privation, and not Diminutionis, of Dimi••••∣tion.
This Colour is reprehended:
First, in those things, the Use and Service whereof reste•• in sufficiency, competency, or determinate quantity: As if 〈◊〉〈◊〉 man be to pay one hundred Pounds upon penalty, it is mo•••• to him to want twelve Pence, than after that twelve Penc•••• supposed to be wanting, to want ten Shillings more. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the decay of a Man's Estate seems to be most touched in th•• Degree, when he first grows behind, more than afterwards, when he proves nothing worth. and hereof the com∣mon Forms are: Sera in fundo parsimonia; or, It is too 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to pinch when the Purse is at the bottom; and, as good ne•••• a whit as never the better.
It is reprehended also in respect of that Notion, C••∣ruptio unius, generatio alterius: That the Corruption 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one thing is the Generation of another. So that Grad•••• Privationis, the Privative Degree is many times less Mat∣ter, because it gives the cause and motive to some 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Course. As when Demosthenes reprehended the People for hearkning to the Conditions offered by K. Philip, being not honourable, nor equal, he saith, They were but Element of their sloth and weakness; which if they were taken away, necessity would teach them stronger Resolutions. So Doctor Hector was wont to say to the Dames of London, when they complained, they were they could not tell how, but yet they could not endure to take any Medicine, he would tell them, their way was only to be sick; f•••• then they would be glad to take any Medicine.
Thirdly, This Colour may be reprehended in respect that the degree of Decrease is more sensitive than the De∣gree of Privation; for in the mind of Men, Gradus Dimi∣nutionis, the Degree of Decrease, may work a wavering be∣tween Hope and Fear, and keep the mind in suspence, from settling, and accommodating in Patience, and Resoluti•••• Hereof the common Forms are; Better cry out, than al∣ways ask; make or mar, &c.
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For the second Branch of this Colour, it depends upon the same General Reason: Hence grew the Common Place of extolling the beginning of every thing;
Dimidium facti, qui bene coepit, habet.
He hath his Work half done, Whoe'er hath well begun.
This made the Astrologer so idle, as to judge of Man's Nature, and Destiny by the Constellation of the moment of his Nativity, or Conception.
This Colour is reprehended, because many Inceptions are but (as Epicurus termeth them) Tentamenta, that is, im∣••erfect Offers, and Essays, which vanish, and come to no s••••stance, without any iteration; so as, in such Cases, the second Degree seems the worthiest; as the Body-Horse in the C••rt, that draweth more than the Fore-Horse. Here∣of the common Forms; The second Blow makes the Fray. The second Word makes the Bargain. Alter principium dedit, alter modum abstulit, &c. The one began, the other kept no mean.
Another Reprehension of this Colour, is in respect of De∣••••tigation, which makes perseverance of greater Dignity than Inception: For Chance or Instinct of Nature may cause Inception: but settled Affection, or Judgment, maketh the Continuance.
Thirdly, This Colour is reprehended in such things, which have a Natural Course and Inclination, contrary to ••n Inception: So that the Inception is continually evacu∣ated, and gets no start; but there behoveth perpetua In∣ceptio, that there be always a beginning; as in the com∣mon Forms: Non progredi, est regredi. Not to go for∣ward, is to go backward. Qui non proficit, deficit. He who makes no Progress decays. Running against an Hill; ••owing against the Stream, or with the Hill, then the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Inception is more than all the rest.
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Fourthly, This Colour is to be understood of Gradus Inceptionis à potentia ad actum comparati, non gradus a•• actu ad Incrementum; Of the Degree of Inception, in com∣parison of the Power with the Act, not of the Degree from the Act to the Increase. For otherwise, Major videt•••• gradus ab impotentia ad potentiam, quam à potentia ad actum, The Degree from Impotency to Potency, seems greater, than from the Power to the Act.
11.
Quod laudant homines & celebrant, bonum; quod vi••••∣perant, & reprehendunt, malum.
11.
That which Men praise and celebrate, is good; that which they disgrace, and reprehend, is bad.
THis Colour deceives four ways, viz. either through Ignorance, or through want of Integrity; o•• through particular Respect and Faction, or through the natural inclination of those that praise, or dispraise. First, Through Ignorance; for what signifies the Judg∣ment of the Rabble in distinguishing and determining Good and Evil? Phocian knew well enough, who, when the People applauded him more than ordinary, asked, Whether he had done any thing amiss? Secondly, Through want of Integrity; for those that praise and dispraise commonly carry on their own Designs and don't speak what they think.
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.
Every Man praises the Wares he would put off.It is naught, it is naught, says the Buyer; but when he is gone, he vaunteth. Thirdly, Out of Partiality; for eve∣ry one knows, that Men use to extol with immode∣rate praise those that are on their own side, and to de∣press those of the adverse Party below their desert. Lastly, Through a natural Inclination; for some Men are
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by nature framed and moulded for servile Fawning and Flattery, whilst others on the contrary are stiff, captious and morose; and when these commend or inveigh, they do but comply with their own Humours, not troubling their heads overmuch about the Truth of the business.
12.
Quod etiam ab inimicis laudatur, magnum bonum; quod verò etiam ab amicis reprehenditur, magnum malum.
12.
That which draws commendation even from Ene∣mies, is a great Good; but that which is reprehended even by Friends, is a great Evil.
THis Colour seems to stand upon this Foundation, That it may well be believed, that the force of Truth extorts from us whatsoever we affirm to be against our Wills, and contrary to the bent and inclination of our Minds.
This Colour deceives through the subtilty, as well of Enemies as Friends: For the praises of Enemies are not always against their Wills, nor as forc'd by Truth, but they chuse to bestow them in such cases where they may create Envy or Danger to their Adversaries. Therefore the Grecians had a superstitious Fancy, that if a Man were commended by another out of spight, and with a mischievous design, he would have a push rise upon his Nose: Besides, sometimes Enemies bestow Praises, like Preambles as twere, that they may the more freely and maliciously calumniate. On the other side, this Colour deceives, from the craft of Friends; for they'll sometimes take notice of the faults of their Friends, and speak freely of them; but they chuse such as may do them little hurt, as if for all the rest they were the best Men in the World. Again, it deceives, because Friends use their Reprehensions (as we said Enemies do their Commendations) as certain little Prefaces, after which they may expatiate more freely in their Praises.
Notes
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* 1.1
Luke 10. 41, 42.
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* 1.2
Curruptio uni∣us est generatio alterius.
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* 1.3
Antiperistasis is a Phi∣losophical Term, signify∣ing a repulsion on every part, whereby either Heat or Cold is made more strong in it self, by the restraining of the contrary.