The history of the famous Edict of Nantes containing an account of all the persecutions that have been in France from its first publication to this present time : faithfully extracted from all the publick and private memoirs, that could possibly be procured / printed first in French, by the authority of the states of Holland and West-Friezland, and now translated into English.

THE PREFACE OF THE Second Part.

WE left the Reform'd at the end of our First Part in a tolerable condition, and in a tranquility which settled it self by degrees, under the Protection of their King. After the hardships of War, Infideli∣tys, and Massacres, they began to relish the sweets of Peace with assurance, by the love of a Prince who had not forgot their Services: They thought them∣selves secure against the Malice of their Enemies, and were under no apprehensions for their Consciences or Lives. If they retain'd the least doubts or suspicions they only proceeded from a Prudence which consider'd the future, and consequently oblig'd them under a King who was favourable towards them, to take measures

against the designs of another, who might perhaps not en∣tertain the same kindness for them. This was the Aim of their Assemblies, both General and Particu∣lar, of their Councils, of their Synods, of their Associations, Petitions and Demands: All this* 1.1 was lawfu. They had had so many dismal proofs of the Maxims of the Church of Rome, in respect to those that are declar'd Hereticks by them, that they had no reason to confide too much on the appearences of the Peace that Church had granted them. They were not ignorant that the Popes had only consen∣ted to it, because the Catholick Religion did lose considerably by the War; and that the Court of Rome, finds its account much better in the intrigues of the Cabinet, and in the arificies of a fraudulent Policy, than in Military Expeditions, which they do not under∣stand. So that the Reform'd, who had learn'd to be wise by an experience of fourscore years, could not, without relapsing into that ancient simplicity which had done their Fore-fathers so much harm, and which their very Enemies had often upbraided them with in an insulting manner, neglect to take precautions, to secure themselves against the secret snares which the Church of Rome can set, with so much Art, and pre∣pare at such a Distance. Tho the King sometimes gave them causes of distrust, yet he was not averse to their Pretentions; and had he lived as long as his Constitution and Vigor, seem'd to promise, he might have put them in a condition which would

have oblig'd the Catholicks to cultivate a Peace, which they could not have broken without exposing themselves to sustain at least part of the damages of such a Breach. It is true that he was stopt sometimes by a political consideration, when the Jesuits and the Ca∣tholicks of their Party had filled his Head with the dread of a Cabal, ever ready to break out; ever dispos'd to receive malecontents, and to asist them; ever Mistress of the Government, by reason, that by the number of the places of surety, and by the credit of the Lords who enter'd into that Ʋnion, it was strong enough when∣ever Factions should be form'd in the Kingdom, to incline the Ballance to that Party they should side with. Moreover they told that Prince that it did not consist with his interest to suffer a Confederacy of part of his Subjects amongst themselves, for their own preservation, as if it had been against his Au∣thority, and that it had form'd a state within his Kingdom, having Cities of their own, Laws, In∣terests, and Politicks contrary to the common good of the Kingdom. The King who was haughty, passionate and jealous of his Grandeur, easily suffer'd himself to be deluded by those shadows; and at those times let fall words which gave cause to believe that he thought the Reform'd too great, & too formidable already to grant them any new favours. But then those little heats were as soon allaid, as they were assum'd. His resentments were only lightnings, the matter whereof was as soon consum'd as it had taken Fire; there nei∣ther

remain'd the least track of the heat or smoak of it. All his anger was evaporated by a Frown and a threatning Word. He thought himself sufficiently re∣veng'd when he had express'd that it was in his Power to take his revenge when ever he pleas'd.

Those who are well acquainted with the Character of that Prince, know that this was his real temper; which cannot be look'd upon as a Weakness; since the principle of it was Noble and worthy of a true Hero. He lov'd his Subjects, and Domestick quiet. His love of quiet made him angry, when ever he was possess'd with the thoughts that any body design'd to disturb it: But his love to his Sujects extinguish'd that Fire, as soon as he reflected on the necessity that oblig'd the Re∣formd to provide for their safety. Those that have collected the words which his anger inspir'd him with, while his Mind was possess'd with some suspicion, ought at the same time to have observ'd that those little flashes were the effect of his Temper, the heat of which of∣ten dictated words to him, which he should have been very sorry any body should have drawn Consequences from. His Menial Servants were never surpriz'd at them, because they daily found that he was easily appeas'd again, without being courted to it; and that he often made the first steps of reconciliation towards those that had given him a pretence of anger, particularly when they were Friends he had a good opinion of. His temper was very different towards the Enemies of the State: Without exclaiming against them in words, tho he was

sometimes guilty of it, even when Prudence requir'd the contrary, he persisted in the desire and design of bringing them to Reason. This shows that he was not naturally inclin'd to refuse the Reform'd such lawful means as were necessary for their safety. Only he did not design to leave the Cities of surety perpe∣tually in their Power: Neither had they any thoughts of keeping them for ever. Perhaps some Lords might have particular designs upon that Subject; but the Reform'd in general only insisted upon the keeping of them, upon the account that the King being mortal as well as other men, he might chance to Dye at a time when the Minority of his Successor might create great Troubles to them. So that if they could have kept them untill the Danger of a Minority had been past, they would more easily have been inclin'd to restore them to the King, since they would have been no longer necessary to them. But the very Word of Minority was sufficient to frighten them: and their fear was not so ill grounded as to be esteem'd unwor∣thy of Persons of Wit and Courage. The weakness of Francis the II. and the Minority of Charles the IX. had been so fatal to them by the Authority Catherin de Medicis had thereby Ʋsurp'd to the prejudice of the Princes of the Blood, which she exercis'd in a very odious manner, That they had a great deal of Rea∣son to dread falling again into the same misfortunes, un∣der the Regency of a Princes of the same Name, and

during the Minority or Weakness of a New King, whose Capacity was not known.

Thus it is apparent that the Reform'd, that fear being excepted, saw themselves in a state of Peace and Prospe∣rity, the perfect settlement of which was the only thing they could desire in order to be happy: and had the King liv'd but twelve years longer, That time would have been sufficient to remove part of their scruples. They would have seen a Dauphin of twenty years of Age, capable to Reign himself, bred up to all the Maxims and Designs of the King his Father accustom'd to see two Religions among the French. Thy would have seen the Edict confirm'd by Possession, civil and intestin Peace foster'd by custom between those of different Religions; the Catholicks dispos'd by degrees to see them injoy certain liberties; in a word the prejudices that had excited so many animosities and Wars against the Re∣form'd, dissipated by habit and repose, which would have allay'd the Passions and heart-burnings on all sides. But all was alter'd of a sudden, by the Kings unex∣pected Death, and that fatal Catastrophe hapning at a a time when the ancient Difidencies and Jealousies were not absolutely stifled, added new ones. So that we shall now behold the Reform'd entering under that new Reign, in a doubtful condition, which having held them long in Cruel agitations and incertainties, threw them at last into a deplorable Ruin: Partly, as when a Ship toss'd by the Winds and Billows, which drive

it against the Rocks, having nothing but the courage and skill of her Mariners to defend her against that violence, finally sinks on a sudden, notwithstanding their resistance and industry, by the redoubling of the Storm. Therefore we may consider them in this part of the History, as well as in the first, in three different con∣ditions. The first was a preparative to their approach∣ing ruin, which all the circumstances of Affairs gave them presages of▪ The History relates the reasons they had to be afraid; the divisions of the State and Court, and the secret machinations by which their Oppression was contriving by degrees. The second was an open declaration of a design to destroy them, which proceeded already from the project to the Execution, by the speediest, tho the most odious means, Fraud and Vio∣lence. The History shews us in this point their Dis∣union, Weakness and Decay. The third was a state of Constraint and Serui••ude, in which the Oppress'd durst not complain; and found themselves reduc'd by their Weakness to look upon it as a favour, That they were only cavill'd with, instead of being totally ex irpated by Fire and Sword. The History also acquaints us how that from the time of their being disarm'd and reduc'd to the mercy of their Enemies, if any stop was put to their final destruction, it was only in regard that the then state of Affairs both at home and abroad did not permit them to reduce so many thousands of People to the utmost extremity; who were able to defend their

Lives. Thus the Reform'd return'd by degrees into the same condition, in which their Fathers had been formerly, when they were expos'd to Racks, and other Outrages. In the first Part of this Work we behold them passing from Oppression to War, and from War to Quiet and Prosperity: In the second Part we find the Scene alter'd again, they fall a new from Prosperi∣ty into the Miseries of War; and finally, from War into an Oppression, which Policy only hinder'd their Enemies from pushing to extremity.

Their Enemies have not been wanting to accuse them of having abus'd that degree of Happiness and Power, in which they were at the King's Death, and of ha∣ving occasion'd their own Ruin by Factions, and continual Enterprises. But nothing can be grosser, or more unjust than that Imposture. It is true that they endeavour'd to secure themselves when they beheld their good Prince in the Grave. The jealousies they had entertain'd before that fatal ac∣cident, which had been combated by the kindness he often express'd to them, reviv'd a new, when the reason they had to lay them aside was remov▪d by his Death: and they found themselves reduc'd at that time to that doubtful floating condition, which they had endeavour'd to prevent, while they could rely on the favour of an equitable Prince. Those things seem'd to them more considerable and pressing when they ap∣pear'd nearer at hand: and they found themselves still

lyable to be attack'd on so many sides that they judg'd it absolutely necessary to provide for their safety by speedy and effectual means. Therefore the wisest and most moderate among them, who were us'd on all other occa∣sions to recommend Peace and Obedience above all things, joyn'd in that design. And indeed the thing spoke of it self, and that so lowd that the dullest and most stupid might apprehend it. A Minority, an Italian Regent, old Members of the Leagues, or Jesuits that were absolute in the Council; a revengeful Queen, who thought herself offended, and was govern'd by foreigners, for whom the Reform'd had no great consideration; a great number of Factious, either old ones, the seeds of which were not yet stifled; or new ones that daily form'd themselves; an invincible ascendant which the Court of Spain, that aim'd at nothing but the renewing of the Wars about Religion, had gain'd over France; and several other reasons obliged that Party, which had been so often deceived, to stand upon their Guard; and to take proper measures to secure them∣selves, at least untill time had dissipated those allarms. To pretend that it was a Crime for the Reform'd, that had suffered so much, and were assaulted by a thousand lawful terrors, to renew their Ʋnion, to hold assem∣blies, and to present Petitions, is undoubtly a ••yran∣nick absurdity: As if a Wretch should be impeached as a Criminal against the State, for having cryed out for help, seeing himself in danger of falling into a

Precipice, or for having taken hold of the first thing he could light on, to break the violence of his fall. And if it be alledged that at least after having taken mea∣sures with the Court for their safety, they ought to have laid a side their fears; troubling themselves with nothing but to serve God according to their Conscience, and to obey the King according to their Duty: I an∣swer that it would have been very reasonable and perhaps very easie so to do, had not the Court, in the very instant they granted them any favours, taken away more from them with one hand, than they gave with the other. They were comforted with ••words, while they were tormented by Effects. The Clergy granted nothing to the King without a considerati∣on. The first Article of their demands always con∣tain'd something in favour of the Catholick Religion; which never fail'd of being interpreted against the Reform'd Religion, as if the one could not have been preserv'd without the ruin of the other. The Court and Clergy persisted in this way of proceeding, untill the Civil Wars broke out: and the success of the Ar∣tiefices that were us'd to amuse the Reform'd having incourag'd their Enemies, they proceeded so far as to laugh at them publickly, and to Violate the most solemn Promises without shame. This may be seen at large in that part of the History that relates the disgrace of the Duke of Sulli, the Illusions practis'd at the Assembly of Sau∣mur, the Divisions sown among the Reform'd, the

Resolutions of the States, the Marriage accomplish'd be∣tween France and Spain, and all the other Transactions that justly create Jealousies. So that the same Law of Na∣ture which teaches Man to secure himself behin'd Walls and Ramparts, when he suspects an Enemy, against whom he only designs to stand upon the Defencive; that Law, I say, without doubt Authoriz'd the Reform'd, to whom the faithlessness of their Enemies was so well known, to secure themselves against the suspicious pro∣ceedings of a Court that had sworn their Ruin. I do not speak, in this place, of their Ʋnion with the Prince of Conde: because that War was of a different nature from the Rest. Religion had little or no∣thing to do in it; Interests of State were the true Motives of it. The Reform'd cannot be tax'd with it, but the accusation must fall with more violence upon the Catholicks. The last occasion'd it; the first on∣ly joyn'd with them, but too late, if we consult pru∣dent Policy only: by reason that it was no longer time to prevent the Marriages, which was the pre∣tence us'd for taking Arms. But that delay only proceeded from that most of the Provinces and Churches did not think themselves concern'd in that Business: So that it was not properly an af∣fair of the whole Party; but of some Lords, who were follow'd by their Creatures.

Therefore there is nothing in this first degree of the fall of the Reform'd, which they can be justly up∣braided for: But they seem to be less excusable in the second, in which they are seen actually in Arms a∣gainst their Prince. We are to resolve two questions, the better to understand the matter. The first is ge∣neral, and relates to Right, viz. Whether there are occasions on which Subjects may lawfully take Arms against a Soveraign. The second is Particular, and relates to the act, viz. Whether allowing that there may be such occasions, the case of the Reform'd was of that nature, and they had sufficient Reasons to Arm. The General Question is of too great a discusion, to be examin'd in a Preface, in which I do not design to inlarge. Therefore I shall only make eight or nine Ob∣servations, which may give some light to that matter. 1. I will observe that the thing which imbroils the said Question, is that it is perhaps never handled without Passion, or Interest. Those that have given a large extent to the Rights of the People, have often been animated by an Interest of Party: And those that have put no bounds to the Power of Kings are to be suspe∣cted either of having been paid for so doing, or of ha∣ving had particular reasons which oblig'd them to flatter Princes, in order to obtain some Favours from them. When ever there have been divers Parties in a State, it has been observable that the Weakest was ever the most fawning; and that in order to get the Prince

on their side, they extended the Rights of sovereign Power as much as in them lay. This mischief began in the first Ages of Christianity. The Emperors were so severe against the poor Christians, who were repre∣sented as Enemies to the State, that those poor Persecu∣ted Wretches were reduc'd to strain the Point, to per∣swade them that their Religion was not opposite to Soveraign Power. Passages of Scripture, Testimonys and Examples of the Old and New Testament were pro∣miscuously imploy'd with all the Art of interested Eloquence, which transferr'd the Rights of the Ju∣daic Kings to all the Princes of the World, wi••hout the least consideration. After Constantine had rais'd Christianity up to the Empire by his Conversion, the Clergy out of interest retain'd the Maxims, which they had maintain'd till then out of necessity: And where∣as they laid a great stress through Ambition and Avarice, on those Passages which direct Princes to be Fathers and Benefactors to the Church, he was oblig'd to continue to them, as it were, by way of re••al••ation for the temporal advantages he extorted from them, the au••hority wherewi••h he had invested their Prede∣cessors. Thus those ancient Prela••es who thereby ac∣quir'd such Treasures to the Church, according to the common Phrase, laid the Foundation of their Succes∣sors Policy; who in order to obtain great Priviledges, high Dignities, rich Gifts, and great Revenues have always been ready to confirm to them, as it were in exchange for their Favour, the Right of Oppressing the

People, and to trample upon the most lawful Priviledges of Liberty. Those who are any wise conversant with History must needs know that for several Ages complai∣sance towards the Prelates, and munificence towards the Church were sufficient to sanctifie all the Actions of Soveraigns, and even of Persons of an inferior Rank, when they were Rich and Potent.

2. The Policy of the Popes has also contributed con∣siderably towards the Oppression of the People. They have given Princes a helping hand to ruin their Sub∣jects, whenever Soveraigns have condescended to submit to the Authority of the Roman See. This is the way by which that See has indemnified Princes for the in∣dependence it has extorted from them. By sacrificing the interest of the people to them, they have recom∣penc'd them for what they have usurp'd over Crown'd Heads. This is the Reason that those that are the greatest assertors of Soveraign Power in relation to Sub∣jects, are those that are most zealous to maintain that the Popes are the only Judges of the Differences that happen between the State and the Prince; that they only can make it lawful for Subjects to take Arms, and free mankind from all the Bonds of subjection. There∣fore the Catholicks who were ingaged in the Holy League would never condemn it, nor treat with Henry the IV. as Rebells who sued for Pardon. The Popes had Authoriz'd their Fatal Conspiracy against their law∣ful King; whom they had declar'd a relaps'd Excom∣municated

Heretick: From whence we may conclude that to judge of the Liberties of Subjects we must never consult Popes nor their Adherents, who in order to make Kings their Subjects, assist Kings to make their Subjects Slaves.

3. Should the Suffrages of all those that have spoken of this matter be told, I do not doubt but the people would lose their Cause by the Plurality of Voices: but if we weigh opinions, and allow the recusation of partial Judges, the number of the Votaries for Ar∣bitrary Power, will diminish more than one half. If we retrench the decisive Voice of Ambitious, self in∣terested Writers, and Pensioners: of those that flatter by profession, or out of policy: of those that have been forc'd to allow all to Soveraigns, to gain their favour by the sacrifice of publick Liberty, and of all those that have had other reasons for what they have said upon that Subject, besides those that are drawn from the nature of things: there will not perhaps remain so many Votaries of Arbitrary Power as people common∣ly imagin. And if the rights of the people find as few adherants, it is not to be wondred at. There is no∣thing to be got by asserting that cause: and the danger is eminent. Pensions and Favours are not dispos'd of by the people: and the services of that kind are often attended with a miserable Life, or a shameful Death. To love liberty in a state where it begins to decay; To assert it when it is tumbling; To speak for it when its

Priviledges are violated by the strongest; is call'd Sedition and disturbing of the publick Peace, and judg'd worthy of the severest torments. Therefore it is no wonder that liberty seldom meets Protectors, since those that love it, and would preserve their Rights are ac∣counted Criminal.

4. We may conclude from thence that this question is neither to be decided by any consideration of number, nor yet by the quality of Assertors, among which there are few that are free from the marks of a lawful recusation. The best way to decide it were to consult Nature, and the things themselves: and to see what natural Right, of which the Principles are common to all the World, al∣lows to be to each party. In following this maxim it will be soon discovered that the Original of Societies, and States is very different, and that it is impossible to imagine a source of that Civil Ʋnion, applicable to all the Empires that have been form'd in the World. But in the diversity of the motives that have induc'd men to errect those Societies, or of the forms they have given them, we will observe three things, the truth of which is undeniable. The first is that mutual preservation was the end of those Ʋnions; and that none of them were ever made with an inten∣tion to give any one a power of destroying, and abusing the rest at pleasure and with out cause. If any would ex∣cept from this Rule the States that have been form'd by the violence of the strongest, which has constrain'd

the weakest to obey, it is evident that the said power of commanding others is a usurpation, which gives no right to him that assumes it; and of which the effect ceases with the cause. I mean that as soon as the Oppressor loses the force which he abuses, or the oppress'd recover their former vigor, Liberty re∣sumes its former rights, and Ʋsurpation loses its Con∣quests. That Right is so certain, that it is the foundation of that which annuls all forc'd contracts, and allows us to break them, as soon as we are free of the constraint that forc'd us to accept them. It is in vain to reply that God presides at the Birth and Pre∣servation of States; and that when he has allon'd them to be establish••d by Force, those that are in∣volv'd in them must respect their Slavery as a Di∣vine Ordinance, the yoke of which they ought to bear with patience. I answer, that God indeed is the Au∣thor of Order and Equity, and that consequently those forms of Government in which we find Order and Equity are undoubtedly the Work of his Providence: but that he has never reveal'd that he approv'd Disorder and Injustice; and that consequently we cannot look upon a Government, that is founded on Fury and Rapine, as ordain'd and instituted by God. Thus the mutual preservation, Order and Welfare of Societies ought to be accounted the first end of those that have form'd thein, and even of God by whom they are anthoriz'd.

The second, which is also an undeniable Truth, is

that publick Faith ought to be the Soul of all Govern∣ments, and that as there must of necessity be a bond to unite the parts that compose a Body of what nature so∣ever, Phisical or Moral, nothing but Publick Faith can make the Bond of those Societies. It is presupos'd, by all those that unite their interests for their common defence. Each Member using his particular endeavours expects that the others should concur with him for the Common Good. So that nothing can be more contrary to or more pernicious in Societies, than the violation of Publick Faith. It breaks the most sacred tyes of Civil Bodies; and, as it were takes away, their very Being. Therefore every individual compris'd in one of those Bodies, has a right to require of the o∣ther Members to keep their promise, and to contribute on their part without Fraud and Treachery, what they owe towards their mutual preservation.

The Third, which is likewise evident, is, that in all the relations that are among Men, there must be something reciprocal of Course. There are none in which the Obligations can be proved all on one side. Therefore we must look on those that are observ'd be∣tween the Head and the Members, as on all others. The Head must owe something to the Members, as well as the Members to the Head. The Duty of these is very different, according as the precautions people have taken in submitting themselves to a certain Power, are more or less favourable for liberty. But

there are two certain and invariable Characters in all the Forms a State can take. The one is, that even in those, in which Liberty has the greatest priviledges, the Duty of Subjects is of a great extent, and obliges them to submit to whatever may be advantagious for the Com∣mon Good: Nay, even in cases in which particular losses are recompenced by the advantages of the general. The other is that even in those in which Liberty has the narrowest bounds, Subjection can never extend so far as to oblige men to suffer themselves to be destroy'd out of Duty or Conscience. Those must needs have a strange depravation of mind who can conceive that when people did submit to one, or many, it could be on condi∣tion that their Rulers should be allowed to destroy them right or wrong, meerly by Vertue of Soveraign Power. Even those who surrender on Discretion, do it only in hopes of being preserv'd by the clemency of the Con∣queror, or at least to purchase the Redemption of the whole Body at the cost of some few unfortunate Members. The Duty of Soveraigns receives the same variation as that of their Subjects, according to the limitations that were given to both at the first formation of the State. But it has two Characters which answer those of the submission of the People. The one is that how narrow soever the Bounds of Supreme Power may be, yet still it is of a vast extent, and might be stil'd in some respect Infinite, in relation to the publick good, to which it must always have a relation: The other is,

that even in those States in which it is most extended, it never dispences the Soveraign from watching for the preservation of his Subjects; nor from sincerely applyng to that end the power he is intrusted with. It is con∣trary to nature to think that destruction without a cause, upon the bare account of a Power given to the Sove∣raign, can be the Right of supreme Authority. God who might do it, if he thought fit, claims no such right over mankind. He never destroys without a just Cause; and only to show his Soveraign Power. There∣fore there is no reason to believe that he au horizes men to exert a right over others which he is not willing to assume himself.

5. It follows from those Truths that when a Prince endeavours, without a lawful cause to destroy his peo∣ple whom he is oblig'd to preserve; when he publickly violates his Faith, which is the Seal of the mutual ob∣ligations of his people towards him, and of his towards his people; when he makes use even of their Patience and Submission, to ruin them the more easily; when he pursues them with open Force, and that disdain∣ing to observe the very formalities of Justice, to de∣stroy them with some shaddow of Reason, he makes use of Fire and Sword in all places, to reduce all his Sub∣jects to his Will and Discretion: It follows, I say, that granting those conditions, the resistance of Subjects is not Criminal. They never have a right to attack: But after having us'd all the Submissions and Remon∣strances

requir'd in such Cases, after all that Prudence can advise, to avoid falling into the utmost extremities, there are neither Divine Laws, nor Humane Reasons, to take away from them the Right of defending them∣selves. It is a Right that is born with all Men, which nothing can ever deprive them of.

6. Example being of a decisive force in Political Questions, it is most Certain that there is no Subject upon which so many can be alledg'd, as that of the Resistance of Subjects to their Soveraign, when he visibly endeavours to oppress them. We meet a world of them both in Ancient and Modern History. It is the source of divers Revolutions, which have from time to time chang'd the face of the World. And even in those States in which Princes have pretended to the highest degree of Power, the People being op∣press'd have often put a stop to the said oppressions by Vigorous oppositions, which otherwise would have been carried farther; and this Maxim, that Publick preservation is a lawful reason for People to de∣fend themselves, is so certain and so well known, that even in Seditions and Civil Wars in which the Ring Leaders have other ends, they never fail to place Publick Good at the Head of their Motives; to per∣swade the World by that specions Tittle that their Cause is Innocent, and to engage such into their Party as would be averse to it otherwise out of the scruples of a Tender Conscience.

7. If any should alledge that it is impossible to de∣cide to whom it belongs to judge in what degree of oppression it is lawful to lay a side Patience; and that whatever we fix upon in that case, we must needs expose our selves, as well as all the Authors that have Writen about it, to inexplicable difficulties: I answer that the Reason why those Writers are at such a loss, is that they endeavour to find out subtle study'd solutions to an absurd Objection. No man can judge so well, as he whose Life's in Jeopardy, whi∣ther he be in danger of losing it, by suffering the Agres∣sor to have his Will. It would be a cruel absurdity, to say that a Man being set upon on the Highway by a Company of Arm'd Men, who have drawn him into that Peril under a fair pretence, may not lawfully re∣sist them, without having first consulted an able Law∣yer, or obtain'd leave of my Lord Chief Justice. On such occasions Nature pleads her self, and supplies the want of a Doctor, or a Magistrate. So likewise sup∣posing the case of an evident Oppression, in which eve∣ry one beholds the Chains that are preparing for him; in which not only the Estates and Priviledges of some particular Persons are concern'd, without mind∣ing other Rights of less Consequence; but in which the whole State suffers, or at least a considerable part thereof, which is not to be dispis'd; in which the most natural and most precious part of Liberty, is at stake; in which there is reason to fear that the Pa∣tience

of the Oppress'd may authorise the progress of Oppression: In such a case, I say, no body can judge better of the necessity of making a defence, than those who see and feel the progress of the slavery that is impos'd upon them.

8. If any body exclaims against these and the pre∣ceeding Maxims, as being attended with pernicious Consequences; as favouring Rebellion, as containing pretences and excuses which the Factious and Distur∣bers of the Publick Peace may make an ill use of; I answer, first, that it is a misfortune annex'd to seve∣ral Truths; that they are lyable to great inconve∣niencies: but yet that they are not thereby deprived of the Right of Truth, by reason that those inconve∣niencies do not proceed from the Nature of those Truths, but from the Corruption of the Heart of Man, which extracts a Poyson out of the most profitable things. Thus the very Weapons of the Law are made use of to create disputes, tho made to suppress them: which abuse does not hinder those Laws from being Just and Necessary. Thus Casuists daily discover things in Theory, which tho very True are neverteless attended with ill Consequences in the Practice: which I mean of the most rigid, as well as of those that are accus'd of slackness. The most indispensible Duties of Religi∣on and Morality are so many Arguments of Dispair to Weak Souls, when represented to them in their whole extent, with the absolute necessity thereof, attended

with all their Circumstances and Consequences. Yet those inconveniencies do not deprive those Duties of their natural Justice, and do not discharge Men of the ob∣ligation they lay under, of submitting to them. To love our Neighbour is an indispensible Duty. The com∣mand of loving him as our selves receives no exceptions. It is the Epitomy of Natural Justice: It is the Summary of one half of the Divine Law. It is the Center from which, all the Precepts of Charity proceed as so many Lines, which is the greatest of all Virtues. Yet by the state to which sin has reduc'd the heart of Men, it happens very often that he who applies himself to that important Duty exposes himself to a thousand dan∣gers. Charity is only a Law to himself; and while he observes it scrupulously, the Wicked take the advan∣tage of it, to be the better able to annoy him. There is no greater inconvenient than to give way to the Oppression of the Innocent. That inconvenient is met with in the fundamental precept of Charity: but yet the truth thereof is not therefore the less evident; nor the Duty less necessary. This shows that the incon∣veniencies that attend a Doctrine do not always hinder it from being True.

Secondly, I answer, that the opposite Maxim, which abandons the Liberty of the Subject to the dis∣cretion of Soveraigns, and allows nothing to the Peo∣ple but Submission and Patience, is attended with as many inconevniencies as the other. I confess that it would be liable to none, if we could be certain of two

things; the one always to have a good, vertuous, Prince, a True Father of his Country; The other that having such a one, he would harken to and em∣ploy none but true Patriots, Persons without Interest, Ambition, or Disguise, by whom he might be well serv'd and council'd. We may indeed, and often do see the first; but the second is very rare; or to say better, impos∣sible. It is easie to determine the Fate of those People whose Fortune, Life, and Liberty pass through the hands of those who cannot be great without oppressing them, or Inrich themselves without their Ruin.

I say in the third place, that both sides being at∣tended with inconveniencies; those are evidently less considerable which attend the maxim which allows people when they are oppress'd, to resist oppresion, than those that attend that which makes it a Crime for them to oppose their own destruction. The reason of it is that the People are commonly very ill serv'd, very easily divided, tyr'd, and blinded; whereas Princes have all the advantage on their side: That the people never perceive the evil untill it is committed, when it is too late to remedy it; whereas Princes aim at a great distance, and take their measures, before their Subjects are aware of them: That the People often betray each other, and sa∣crifice Publick Interest to particular advantages: Where∣as Princes raise Soldiers among those very People, to attack them, and money to corrupt them. So that it often comes to pass that the Maxim which authoris••••

them to defend their Lives and Liberties becomes for them a truth in speculation only. It also happens of∣ten that finding the Prince ready in all points, and provided beforehand with all things necessary for his Enterprize, the People forfeit the remainder of their Liberty, when they bethink themselves of taking Arms to defend it. In those cases their Resistance is called Rebellion: and the Yoke that is impos'd upon them, is still'd a Just punishment for their Revolt. Moreover the Resistance of Subjects ought never to extend to the Life of the Soveraign. No Circumstances, nor Authority tho from the Pope can justifie an attempt of that Nature. It is the Prerogative of Supreme Power, to fix some∣thing that is Sacred in those in whom it resides, which ought to secure their Lives against all enterprises. What∣ever Power People reserve to themselves, to hinder the person they acknowledge for their Soveraign from in∣croaching upon their Priviledges, they can preserve no Right of Life and Death over him. They are so many Tribuns of the People whose person is inviolable, and even their faults, when they commit any, do not deface that character of Majesty which sets them above all others, and exempts them from Corporal Punish∣ment. Resistance therefore can go no farther on the People's side, than to reduce them to those Bounds to which their Authority is limited by the Laws; or at most to deprive them of a Power which they apply to awrong and unlawful use; when instead of imploy∣ing

it for the Protection of their Subjects, they im∣ploy it to their ruin. Finally the maxim which Au∣thorises the Resistance of Subjects against the unjust violences of their Soveraign being only allowable in this one case, the Consequences thereof are not so dan∣gerous as they seem to be: by reason that Subjects very seldom form designs against the Authority of Princes, unless Princes abuse it to the utmost extremity. We commonly find, that whatever precautions have been us'd at the founding of a Monarchy, yet he who is in∣vested with the Regal Authority will by degrees usurp some part of the Liberty the People have reserv'd to themselves: but there are few examples of Peoples incroaching upon the Prerogatives of their Soveraigns. The Prince and People may be compar'd to the man. and the Horse of the Fable which was invented to ex∣plain this matter in a popular manner. As the Horse can never pretend to free himself of the Bitt and Saddle, having once submitted to it; the people are oblig'd forever to wear the Yoak, they have freely im∣pos'd upon themselves: But whereas man by degrees extends the power he has receiv'd from the Horse, be∣yond the ends for which it was given him, and ap∣plies it wholly to his own advantage, forcing him not only to Hunt, and to serve him in the Wars, but al∣so to carry burthens for his service; to draw the Plough, and to turn divers machines: So the Prince

inscensibly and as it were undesignedly extends the bounds of his power, in so much that by degrees the protection he owes his people, which is the source of his Power, ceases to be the principal end thereof, and becomes an inlet of Slavery. Let all the States of Europe be examin'd, and you will not find one in which th•• Authority of the Soveraign is lessen'd from what it was at the beginning: but you will find many in which the liberty of the people is very much decay'd. It is the Fate of Monarchies: the longer they last, the more the Prince incroaches upon his Subjects. Tho his policy should hinder him from doing it; Time would do it for him, especially in Hereditary States. The long Chain of Succession creates a greater vene∣ration for the Royal Family, and accustoms Subjects to suffer their small Ʋsurpations without murmuring. History affords us sufficient proofs of this Truth, al∣most in all the States of the World. From whence it follows that Subjects freely leaving their Rights in suspence, and never endeavouring to defend them un∣till they are violated in the most essential parts, the maxim which authorizes their resistance against the Enterprises of their Soveraigns is not of so pernieious a consquence as some imagin. Subjects do so seldom put it in practice, to the prejudice of a lawful au∣thority, that no body ought to be frighted at it: And it is so easie for Princes to hinder it from being pre∣judicial to them, that they can blame none but them∣selves,

when it produces an ill effect. 'Tis but to be proud of commanding free People, who obey out of Gratitude and Love; to keep their Promises; to maintain the Laws, and to inrich their Subjects: To Govern their State with Equity, instead of endea∣vouring to enlarge their Frontiers, or their Authority by unjust means. It is not impossible to meet with Princes of that Character. France has produc'd some Kings who have signaliz'd themselves by that admira∣ble Policy. Such may be found elsewhere, and if ex∣ample could prevail with all Soveraigns to Reign thus, I could easily name some who might serve them for a Model.

9. The passages of Scripture which some oppose to this maxim are manifestly wrested; and cannot serve for the use they are applyed to, without being taken in a difficint sence from that which is natural to them. All the Arguments that are grounded upon those princi∣ples are defferent in one of these three cases; either they compare things that ought not to be compar'd; or they make Laws for Societies, of that which only contains Moral Rules among private persons; or else they contain precepts which presupose that those among whom there are Relations of Command and Obedience, do remain, at least prety near, within the mutual bounds of their Duty. It is not to be imagin'd that God design'd by his word to destroy the Rights of natural Justice, which are only grounded upon his own Ju∣stice:

His Will admits of no Contradiction. Therefore as there is a Natural Right which authorises Men to defend their Lives, when assail'd, at least to ward the Blows design'd by the Destroyer; and to disarm him of the Weapon he abuses: It is not to be believ'd that the precepts of Patience, Refigna••ion, and Charity, that are so freequent throughout the Holy Scriptures, can receive an explication that anihilates a Right so Just and so Ʋniversally acknowledged. Truths never contradict themselves. So that when they seem any∣wise to contradict each other, they must be understood in such a sence as may reconcile them. Neither would it be difficult to find the medium in which they agree, if it did not happen as I have already said, that by reason of the dispositions of the minds and hearts of Men, those things which are speculatively Innocent and True, become pernicious, or impossible in the Practice.

From all these considerations, which the briefness of a Preface does not allow me to enlarge any farther upon, we may inferr this conclusion, that tho it were always to be wish'd that people might never take up Arms, and that it is even often necessary to exceed in Patience and Submission, yet nevertheless, there may be occa∣sions in which oppression is so evident; in which the good of the State is so openly assail'd, in which the most Holy Rights of Justice and Liberty are violated with so little Caution, that the defence of the Oppres••••d

cannot be look'd upon as unlawful; nor can they be justly blaimed for taking Arms for their Preservati∣on. Nothing but Sophistry and Clamour can be op∣pos'd to the Truth of this maxim: and I am verily persuaded that those who oppose it, would be the first to put it in practice if being assailed, they could have hopes to preserve themselves by resistance. Profit, Am∣bition, Hope, may induce men to speak otherwise than Nature, when there is nothing present, or sensible to give their words the Lye: But Nature resumes her Rights, and silences Interest, and Passion, when an urgent accasion obliges man to remember the first of his privi∣ledges, which is Self-Preservation. If it could be said that the Soul is naturally Christian; by reason that notwithstanding her being prejudic'd by the Opinion of the Plurality of Gods, which was inspir'd into her by Education, and is become familiar to her by exam∣ple and custom, yet as soon as the danger presses, and brings man to himself again, she only remembers one God; we may also say that she is naturally in∣structed with the Right of repelling Violence and In∣justice; since that notwithstanding the Clouds where∣with divers Interests obstruct the lights she has re∣ceiv'd from Nature upon that Subject, yet one pres∣sing danger is sufficient to make her forget all the fo∣reign considerations she had been prejudic'd by, and to bring her back again to the use of the right she her self thought to have abandon'd.

It now remains to know, whether the Reform'd were in that condition which authorises the taking up of Arms. But that is a case that will plainly appear by the reading of this History. It will discover an open Conspiracy against them, which after many ill effects for the space of about Forty Years, to reckon from the Reign of Francis the 2d had been rather deffer'd by the kindness of Henry the 4th, than stifled by the Authority of his Edicts. You will see it renew'd as soon as that Prince was put in his Grave; prosecu∣ted during the space of Ten Years by thousand secret Artifices of the Court of Rome, conceal'd and cove∣red by all the Veils of a profound dissimulation, which however could not hinder them from discovering some glimpses of the means that were put in practice, in or∣der to their Ruin. You will see the King attacking, while his Subjects send Deputies to obtain his favour; Threatning while they Intreat; Arming while they Implore his Mercy, amidst a thousand Terrors, by submissions and intreaties; executing while they hesi∣tate and are deliberating; taking of Places the keep∣ing of which is still allow'd them for some years; turning out their Governours, violating his own Briefs; while they to avoid the reproach of taking Arms with too much precipitation, differ to put themselves in a po∣sture of Defence, which in a word ruins them half be∣fore the War is declar'd against them. If to all this you add a world of infidelities committed by the Council of that Prince; the constant practice of the Roman

Church, in what relates to Treaties made with Here∣ticks; Henry the 3d's Declaration, the Maxims of which had been inspir'd to that King by the Jesuits who had had the care of his Education: that surprisiing Declaration by which Henry the 3d. had acquainted the World that the Reform'd ought never to trust to his Word, when ever he made a Peace with them, because he would never do it, unless it were in order to take his time better, and to renew the War again with advantage: If, I say, we add all this, and se∣veral other considerations that may be drawn out of History, it will appear clearly that the Reform'd were more than convinc'd that their Enemies design'd to ex∣terminate them: That they kept barely upon the de∣fensive; That they were forc'd to take Arms, but too late for their preservation; That they tarry'd untill the Catholicks proceeded from craft to threatnings, and from threatnings to effects, before they lost their patience; That a Peace was only granted to deceive them; That they did not break it, neither the first, or second time, whatever their Enemies say: and in a word that they only de∣fended themselves weakly, and as it were in going back against a manifest Aggression. Their King had at that time, evidently renounced the Title of common Father of his Country, as well as Henry the 3d. and by en∣••ndeavouring to destroy a numerous and very potent part of his Subjects, he had given them a Just occasion to defend themselves. The Chatholicks would never have had so much Patience, had they foreseen at as great

a distance that a Prince design'd, I will not say to de∣stroy their Religion, and their main Privileges; but only to retrench one of their most useless Ceremonies, and, as I may say, to extinguish one of the Tapers of their Alters.

I will not insist on the secret design of the Court of France to deprive the People in General and without distinction of Religion, of the remainder of their Li∣berty; The Potent Cities of their Revenues, Privi∣leges, Exemptions and Franchises; The Nobility of their Lustre and Credit; The Parliaments of their Power and Majesty. This design was cover'd with the pretence of Religion, while the Reform'd had Citys in their Power. However the Court express'd it self so clearly about the Case of Rochel, that no body could pretend to be Ignorant of the reasons they had to de∣clare a War. That City was under Subjection without being a Slave. It was in France partly what the Im∣perial City's are in Germany. The King Commanded in it; but the Authority of that command was limited by Laws. The King had been perswaded not to con∣tent himself with that limited Power. What they de∣sir'd of the Rochilois was only to renounce acquir'd advantages, which had been confirm'd, and as it were consecrated, by Treaties, by Services, by Edicts, by all that is most holy and most inviolable in humane Right. Therefore that City was ruin'd, only because they were unwilling to submit to slavery. So that the War that was wag'd against it, tho useful according

to a certain Policy which allows everything Just that succeeds, was nevertheless at the bottom the most mani∣fest oppression that ever was heard of, as well as that of the Principality of Bearn. But I should be too Pro∣lix if I should urge all that could be said to prove that the resistance of that Place, and of all the Reform'd was not unlawful.

As for the third degree in which this History repre∣sents the Reform'd, I have no long remarks to make upon it. The Decay of their Religion appears in it in a thousand wayes. Their Enemies begin to quarel with them upon the least Trifles. Annexes, Synods, Books, Projects of reunion, the Rights of Temples, and several other Articles become continual occasions of Debates and Disputes. Offices, and Trades, the exemption of Mi∣nisters, the Rights of professing their Religion, the Liberty of abiding in all parts of the Kingdom, become the subject of a thousand Contestations. The Respect ••••e to the misteries of the Roman Religion, according to their pretentions expose the Reform'd to a thousand Troubles: To all the enterprises of the Clergy, to the violence of their Harangues, and of their Petitions, and to the progress of their designs against them, where∣by it is easie to judge that their Ruin was Sworn. ••he Death of the Cardinal, soon after follow'd by the ••ing, by a Minority; by a weak and wavering Re∣gency; by reason of the Ministry of a Stranger, not well settled yet, prov'd the true reason of their being allow'd some years Respite.

Notes

• * 1.1

  C••hirs.