of the objects, the soul it self is distinguished into its seve∣ral faculties, powers, and capacities▪ That as God hath given man five senses to partake of the five distinct excellencies of the ob∣jects of sense; so he hath diversifyed the soul of man either into faculties, powers or ways of acting, answerable to the various qua∣lifications and considerations of himself and the inferior objects of this soul: And as, if there be more sensible excellencies in the creatures, yet they are unknown to us who have but these five senses to discern them by, so whatever other excellencies are in God and our happiness, more then these faculties or powers of the soul can apprehend, must needs remain wholly unknown to us, till our souls have senses (as it were) suitable to those objects. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as it is unknown to a tree or a stone, what sound, and light 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sweetness are; or that there are any such things in the world 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
Now these matters of God are primarily diversifyed to our con∣sideration under the Distinction of True and Good, accordingly the primary Distinction concerning the soul, is into the facul∣ties of Understanding and Will; the former having Truth for its object, and the latter Goodness. This Truth is sometime known by evident Demonstration, and so it is the object of that we call knowledg (which also admits of divers distinctions according to several ways of demonstration, which I am loth here to puzzle you with) Sometime it is received from the Testimony of others, which receiving we call belief. When any thing else would obscure it, or stands up in competition with it; then we weigh their several evi∣dences, and accordingly discover and vindicate the Truth, and this we call Judgment. Sometime by the strength, the clearness, or the frequency of the understandings apprehensions, this Truth doth make a deeper impression, & so is longer retained, which imp••••ssion and retention we call memory. And as truth is thus variously pre∣sented to the understanding and received by it; so also is the goodness of the object variously represented to the will, which doth accordingly put forth its various acts. When it appeareth on∣ly as good in it self, and not good for us, or suitable▪ it is not the object of the will at all; but only this Enuntiation [It is good] is passed upon it by the Judgment, and withal it raiseth an admira∣tion at its excellency. If it appeare evil to us, then we Nill it. But if it appear both good in it self, and to us, or suitable, then it pro∣voketh