The Protestant religion truely stated and justified by the late Reverend Mr. Richard Baxter ; prepared for the press some time before his death ; whereunto is added, by way of preface, some account of the learned author, by Mr. Danel Williams and Mr. Matthew Sylvester.

The Nineteenth accused Point.

That by the fall of Adam, we have all lest our Free-will, and that it is not in our power to choose good, but only Evil.

Ans. Reader, I must desire thee not to judge of all the Learned Papists, by this Deceiver: For if thou hast read the loads of Voluminous Controversies about Grace and Free-will among themselves, it will remain doubtful to thee, whether this mans stating the Protestants Doctrine, prove him ignorant of it, or a willing Cheater. He tells you not, that this is as much a Con∣troversie among themselves, as with the Prorestants. He tells you not, how Augu∣stine and Palagius managed it, and that their Pope Celestine took Augustines part: He tells you not, that the Thomists, Domi∣nicans, Oratorians, and most Nominals, and Scotists, say as much against Free-will as we do, and we as much for it as they. He supposeth that you never read what Lombaerd, Aquinas, Bradwardine, Caje∣tane, Ferrariensis, Zumel, Bannez, Al∣varez, Aegedius Romi, Capreolus, and a Multitude more, say as much, and many more, against Free-will, than the Prote∣stants: He tells you, not that even the Learned Jesuits, Suarez, Vasquez, Bel∣larmine, with Penottus, and many such, are as much against Free-will, as most Learned Protestants. The man takes you for a Herd of silly Animals, that know not but that he saith true, what falshood

soever he shall tell you: But the truth of the Controversie is this:

1. The Protestants loath so silly a sta∣ting of Controversies, as this chat of Free-will without distinction: And so of Power.

2. They know that Physical, Moral, and Political Freedom of will, are not all one thing. Physical Freedom or Power, is that by which the natural faculty of the will, can determine it self to act, (not without a superiour Cause, but) without any extrinsick or intrinsick Coactor, or ne∣cessitating cause of Evil.

Moral Freedom and Power, is that by which the will is from under the overstrong Byas of a vicious Disposition, or deceitful Argument.

3. Political Freedom is, when no Law of God or Man obligeth him to any Evil, but all to good.

Prothestants hold, 1. That Physical Li∣berty and Power, is common to man, as man. That is, that he wants not natural faculties to choose aright, but a right Inclination: And that he sinneth not for want of such faculties, but for want of their right disposition and action.

2. That all men have just so much, and no more Moral Liberty and power, as they

have of Gods Grace, to Relieve their viti∣ated wills and dispositions, and to help them in the act. No man is freed from vitious Inclinations, further than Gods Grace freeth him, which is much more where there is special Grace and strong, than where there is but common Grace or weak. And that the Thraldom or Impotency of the Vitious, is but the disease of their wills, and aggra∣vation of their Sin: e. g. Where the Drunkard or Fornicator saith, I cannot forbear my Sin: He is so much the worse and more unexcuseable.

3. Every man hath not only Political Li∣berty to avoid Sin, but much more, even Gods urgent Precepts, Promises, and Threats: God doth not only give us Leave, but commandeth us not to Sin.

1. It is the very Essence of the will to be a natural power of faculty of willing good and nilling evil, as such, as so apprehended by the intellect, and commanding the infe∣rior faculties, some politically, and some de∣spotically, some difficultly, some easily, some perfectly, some imperfectly, according to it's resolution and their receptivity.

2. Libertas hominis, when a man may have what he chooseth, is more than Li∣bertas Voluntatis, which is but the Mode of it's self determination; as without con∣straint

it is a self determining principle, of its own elicite acts, considered compari∣tively.

Which is, 1. Liberty of contradiction, or Exercise, viz, to will or not will, nill or not nill. 2. Liberty of Contrariety, or Specification of the Act, viz. To will this or nill it. 3. Liberty of Competition, to will This object or That: To nill This or That, (of which see Robert Baronius his Metaphysicks.)

The will hath such various sorts of Li∣berty, and the word [Free-will] is so ambiguous, that it is a shame, and irksome to read a pretended Teacher, state a case thus indistinctly, Whether we have Free-will or power to choose good and refuse evil: He is no man that hath no such Free-will and power. And no man hath all sorts of Free-will and power. Nay, as Liberty is opposed to Necessity▪ every man is necessi∣tated to will Good as Good, and nill Evil as Evil, and can do no otherwise: And when∣ever he willeth Evil, it is sub ratione bon••, mistaking it for good: And who-ever nill¦leth good, doth it falsely, sub ratione malt. The will is free from Constraint to Sin: God will not so constrain it: Men, De∣vils, Objects, cannot. He that had read but their Pennattus and Gibi••uf only,

would see what a shame it is thus confu∣sedly to talk for or against Free-will.

But that which Protestants deny, is this.

1. They deny that mans will in his unre∣generate State, is free from a Vitious Incli∣nation, or from the Conduct of an Erring Intellect, or from the Byass and Tempta∣tion of Sensuality, or vitiated Senses and Imagination; or from the Temptations of Satan and the World.

2. They deny that the will thus Vitia∣ted and Tempted, will ever deliver it self without Gods Spirit and Grace; being ra∣ther inclined to grow worse.

3. They deny that this Grace is perfect in any in this Life, as without all defect in degree, or totally freeth any man from all Sin: and therefore they deny that any mans will is perfectly and incul∣pably free from every degree of vice and danger.

4. And as that degree of common Grace which is in the unregenerate, is but such as consisteth with the predominance or Reign of Sin, so that will of every un∣regenerate man in that pravity, is as a slave to it's own, vitious disposition, and to Er∣rour, Objects, and Temptations; being not delivered as to the predominance.

5. Yet we believe that common Grace is such, that these men are not utterly void of all good Inclination, and knowledge; and therefore that in Moral Sence, every man can do more good, and less Evil than he doth: And that men perish, because not only they will not (by pravity) do what they have natural strength to do, but also because they will not choose and do what morally they might have chosen and done, as to the wills own power.

6. And we still say, that whenever a man sinneth, it was not because it was na∣turally impossible to do otherwise, (as to touch the Moon, to see without Eyes, or through the Earth, &c.) nor for want of natural faculties, nor doth God by Grace, give man other natural faculties, making him an Animal of another Species: But men sin because they will sin, and they will because they are tempted and now viti∣ously inclined; from which their wills are made free only in that measure, that Gods Grace doth sanctifie them.

If our Priest would have told us, what there is in all this Doctrine of Free-will, that he dare accuse, (and what dare he not cccuse,) we should have seen cause to consider of his Arguments: But now he citeth Scripture as in a Dream.