An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches by reconciling explication without much disputing. Written by Richard Baxter.

An ANSWER TO Mr. Polehill's Exceptions about Futurition.

SIR,

IAm much chidden already for writing many Books, and Answering so many that object, and am told, That if the Case well Stated will not satisfie men, no Answer will do it, b••eause it is for want of their Receptive Capacity, which long and right Studies must help them to, and not a meer Answer to their Objections. I very highly value the worthy Gentleman whose Pa∣pers you sent me, hearing of few, if any, among us more commended for Knowledge and Piety. The question is but whether it be he or I that by half confused conceptions of the matters in question speaketh in the Dark, or which of us hath the more ripe digested and ordered thoughts hereof. And must others be troubled with such Cases? It is those that he pleadeth for that have made the edge of the Razor so thin that they or I do Cut our Fingers with it, and have spun such subtile Notions, which if their wits when they have done be not subtile enough to man∣age, they will oft slip through or be as Spiders Webs. As to the first Controversie of Futurity or Possibility, this Gentleman's method will do me no good, being no whit fitted to that which I expect. I should expect from him that he had

taken notice of my Distinctions and Explications ••f Futurity, and that he had directly pleaded only for that sort or sence which I deny, and had Answer'd the Reasons which both in the First and Second Part I bring against it. But it is not so: And to Dispute at such rates is but to try who shall live longest to have the last word, (it being easie at this rate to talk against one another as long as we live) which I cannot expect, and therefore shall give any man herein the best. All that he hath said against me is materially Answered in the Book already, and if he perceive it not, how can I help that? More Books are not like to do it, nor have I leisure for such tasks: Yet briefly I return,

I. As to my sence of the words (Future) and (Possible); 1. As they are predicated of the thing future or possible, they are termini diminuentes quod realitatem existentem, and futurity as it is rei ipsius futuritio is nothing. 2. Whether Time be any thing distinct à re durante or Nothing, is a Controversie, which I conjecture Mr. P—'s Pen and mine are never like to decide. It is enough for me now to say, that I take it for nothing Di∣stinct. 3. Yet shallow man that seeth not uno intuitu the Universe, as God doth, nor hath his essential Eternity, is in motion, where there is mensura motus, and must think of things by par∣tial Conceptions, and must make past, present, and future his differing Notions in Duration. 4. The internal Concept•••• in man of a thing as future (that it will be) is quid reale; for it is an act of the mind and a Ver••um mentis; and an act d•• ni••il••: A mental Negation is a real act:

To think and say in the mind (the World was not from Eternity: Darkness, Death, &c. are nothing) are real thoughts. 5. The ver•••••• prolatum ore vel scripto (sin will be, &c. the Su•• will rise, &c.) is quid reale: It is a Word, a Proposition. 6. The fundamentum or premises, from which such a Conclusion may be fetch'd, i•• quid reale: e. g. God's Will or Knowledge, or any necessitating Cause. 7. God that knoweth man, knoweth all his mental Conceptions and his Propositions de futuro, without Imperfection knowing our Imperfection; and so knoweth whe∣ther they are true or false. 8. God's willing and knowing that things were, are or will be, are all one ex parte Dei, being nothing but his sim∣ple, perfect Essence thus knowing and willing: But ex parte rei cognitae aut volitae, there is diffe∣rence; And thence by Relation, Connotation, or extrinsick denomination, God's internal Acts are variously named, as de praeterito, de praesenti, de futuro. 9. God's Will and Knowledge from Eternity, that there shall be Time, Successions, Man, Propositions, and that things shall be in such an Order, are a foundation of the verity of such a verbum mentis vel oris (these will be) if there had been any such eternal Words or Pro∣positions. 10. Though formaliter there was no such thing in God (& forma denominat); yet emi∣nenter that perfect intuition of God, which is the knowledge of all Intelligibles, comprehendeth all of man's Knowledge, which is any part of Perfection: And we must bear with the naming of God's perfect Acts by the same names that signifie our imperfect Acts; so be it we have due care not to ascribe to him the Imperfection;

nor from names which connote Imperfection in ••ersu primo, to infer false Doctrinal Conclusions of God. 11. An ipsum nihilum may receive in ••an's partial Conception, a name, and accor∣dingly many and divers names fetch'd from some ••easons of his Conceptions. 12. Accordingly we ••all a thing that is really nothing, but as in the Cogitation to be possible, or future, or past, as if these were rerum reales affectiones, or somewhat ••ow Real: Whereas the Epithets are but the modes of our own Notions or Thoughts, and rai∣sed from our knowledge of other things. And the proper Language is but this, (God can do this: God will do this) which suppose it not done. As (God can make the world) would have been a true word from Eternity, had there been any such word to be true. And thence we say (The World was possible.) And God's perfect Knowledge being eminenter somewhat infinitely more perfect than such Thoughts, Words, and Propositions, after the manner of weak man, we speak of God and of Nothings as related to his Will that they shall be, or to his Knowledge, and so call them possible and future.

II. Now I expect the Confutation of the Rea∣sons, which I gave (As that there was nothing Eternal but God, therefore Eternal possibility and futurition can be nothing but Conception of God himself; and so of the rest.)

III. His Exceptions have all their strength from the meer ambiguity of the word (futurity), con∣tinuing the Confusion after all my Explication. I have not time to Transcribe all his words, and therefore must suppose you to have his Writing by you, which I shall briefly Answer in Order.

Ad 1. As nothing they differ not, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 various Conceptions of them differ, as do 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Reasons of those Conceptions and Denominati∣ons: Sun and Moon, Angels and Men, were equal∣ly nothing from Eternity: And yet God's simpl••▪ Will to make all these, might have had various relative or extrinsick Denominations, had there been then a Created Intellect so to name it, and these nothings called Future, Angels, Men, &c. ac∣cordingly.

Ad 2. Nothing as nothing hath no Parts or Distinctions, but nothing may be variously na∣med; or to speak more aptly, Before Things are Any-things a purposing and fore-seeing Agent may make Names and Notions for them before▪ the things. Greg. Ariminea copiously disputeth that (that which is not, may be related to that which is, and that which is, to that which is not, or nothing): his Reasons are subtile. Rela∣tion is rerum referebilitas or Comparibilitas. If an Angel Existed before the Light or Sun, and knew that God would make the Light or Sun, why might not the Angels Intellect refer God's Will to the Light or Sun, which he would make, while it was nothing? Which is no more than to know (that God will make such a thing which is yet nothing.) But I say these nothing's relate not to God, but God's Power, Knowledge and Will, may by an Intelligent Creature be considered (while they are not) as that which will make them, doth foresee them, &c. which is to be re∣ferred to them. It's true that nothing is no effect, and will be nothing without God (which is that I said). It's true that the Divine Power doth not make meer Possibility to be any thing, for it is

nothing: But it being true that God can make ••hat which he yet hath not made, for this proper Speech (God can make it) man's broken thoughts ••ut a Name or Epithete on that which is not, ••nd call it possible for Discourse sake, and for the ordering of our thoughts about nothings, or things that yet are not (yea never will be): For we say that Millions of Millions of non futura are possible. And is Possibility then any thing extra m••ntem Di∣••inam & humanam? Why he spake of things be∣ing possible without the Divine Power I know not. •• take Possibility as real to be but part of that Ens rationis or mental Conception which by Rea∣soning we take up of Non-existents, because God can make them that yet are not made. The same •• say of his words (if futures be futures without the Divine will, what horrible Fate must be up∣on God?) Futures are nothing, and no good will ever be but by God's Will. And because he willeth it, we have the just ground of a Con∣clusion that it will be (if we know it). And this thought or word is therefore true, and had we been from Eternity, and had such a thought, it would have been true. And while there was no Sun or Earth, we should have said, They are fu∣tures, that is, they will be; that is, God will make them: And must futurity therefore be a Thing or Being? Whence then came the suppo∣sition of Fate, imposing on the summum Ens, or what meaneth it?

Ad 3. Nothing indeed hath no Verity: Fu∣tures are not true; but Conceptus or Propositi∣ons, that such things will be, are true. How God's perfect Knowledge is extrinsecally denominated the Knowledge that such things will be (which we

call Futurition) I opened in the Book at larg〈…〉〈…〉 You know, I suppose, how commonly it is ••a〈…〉〈…〉 That Nothings and Impossibles and Non-futurities a〈…〉〈…〉 all known to God: Must therefore Nothing, I〈…〉〈…〉 possibility, and Non-futurity be Beings, lest God can∣not know them? God cannot know things to be future you say, unless they are such: The word〈…〉〈…〉 (are such) sound to the ignorant, as if they sig∣nified Entity. God cannot know Nothings to be Nothing, Impossibilities, Non-futurities, unless they are such; that is, unless it be true that they are such: And it is true. But what is it that's true▪ The verbum mentis vel oris, that they are no∣thing, &c. Must they therefore needs be something▪ and so God be mistaken? But he saith (If there be no eternal Futures, what becometh of Divine Pre∣science?) Good mens Thoughts may wrong God, while they think they honour him. Augustine tell〈…〉〈…〉 you, That Prescience differeth not in God from Science of present things. You may say also, If there be no eternal Nothings, Non-futures, how can God know them? But must Futurity, or Non∣futurity, or Nothing, be therefore any thing? God's knowing that it will be and yet is not, proveth that the thing future is nothing; and therefore Futurity, no modus rei, but a Name put by us on Nothing from God's Will to make it. (Supposing it be not Sin, which God will not make, but hath ano∣ther Cause.) I had thought you had known, how commonly the School-men prove, That things that are not may be certainly known by God; yea, how the Nominals prove his Knowledge of future Contingents from his meer Perfection; so that Socinus is not unanswered in those things, and ye•• Futures and Futurity are no beings. At least, you

may see Answer enough in Strangius and Le Blank 〈…〉〈…〉 two Authors well worth your reading.) Those 〈…〉〈…〉hings are certo futura, which God will certainly make, or certainly knoweth will be done; and 〈…〉〈…〉et Futurity be nihil reale. I would you had told me, whether you take the Reality of Futurity to be 〈…〉〈…〉n esse rei extrinsecae, or in esse objectivo intrinseco? The former you are not able (considerately) to believe; (that nothing can have any real mode, accident, or affection;) if none of these, what is 〈…〉〈…〉t then? You must needs hold to the latter; and then in man, the futurity of things is nothing real, ••ut the mode of his Cogitation or Conception; as I have afore said, we may have real thoughts, that here is not such or such a thing, but will be; in which we frame a real Idea of that which will be (and is not) in our minds (from the helps of similitudes or words) and so say, Such a thing (thought on and named, but not in being) will be. But in God there is nothing but God; the Crea∣ture is of him, and is in him dependently as their Cause and Comprehender, but not as constituent of his immanent acts.

Why you add (Suppose nothing to have some Ve∣rity) is above my reach: I think Nothing hath no Verity: But, 1. God's Knowledge that it will be, hath Verity. 2. The Proposition (This will be) may have Verity. 3. But the thing future hath not Veritas rei. Futurity as in re hath no more Entity than Possibility: But to will or know that quid nominatum can be, and that it will be, are two real acts in Man, and two extrinseck Denominations of the Divine Will and Intellect. When you have answered what I said of Dr. Twisse, I may review it.

Ad 4. You say (Future is nothing; ergo, ••••∣thing is future.) I am glad that the Creed a〈…〉〈…〉 Bible are not thus worded: Future in your fir〈…〉〈…〉 Proposition signifieth the Affection or somewh〈…〉〈…〉 real of the thing future, and so it is nothing; 〈…〉〈…〉 you take future so in the second, it is fu••ile 〈…〉〈…〉 true, being but a gross expression of (Nothing hath real Futurity, which is aliquid rei.) But ac∣cording to common use, your second Propositio〈…〉〈…〉 will be taken for a denial of the Saying (Some∣what will be) and this is a real truth. You say th〈…〉〈…〉 Proposition is identical, as (Nothing is Nothing.) We speak not of the Being or truth of Proposi∣tions or Conceptions, but of futurity it self as in∣complexum. You after confess I told you so May you not equally say (Negations, Non-existents, Non-futurity are nothing; ergo Nothing is a Nega∣tion, Non-existent, Non-future?) Answer one and you answer the other. Negations in mente are Thoughts, and in the Mouth they are Words, but in re negata they are nothing: So I say of Non∣futurity and Non-existence. Frail Man dreameth that the mundus naturalis is the same with the mundus fantasticus & notionalis in his Brain; and Oh! how commonly do Words and Thoughts go in Disputes for Extrinseck Realities?

Ad 5. Because God decreeth to do any thing, you and I, when we know it, may truly say (This will be;) and (will be) is no being, but Gods will and our knowledg and our words are. Alas, that so much skill is necessary not to be deceived by ambiguity of words. God's Knowledg and your Knowledge and your Words, may be all true; and yet Futurity ex parte rei futurae, hath no proper Ve∣rity, metaphysical, physical or moral, being no

subject capable of any such. You say [Did not the Futurity of the World result from a Decree?] It's 〈…〉〈…〉earisome at every Sentence to repeat Distinction and open Confusion. The futurity of the World is nothing, Extra mentem Divinam & humanam, & extra propositionem de futuritione. Why talk you of our designing another Origin, when we are pro∣ving, that it's nothing, and needs no Cause? And why answer you not what I wrote against Dr. Twisse, before you call for an Answer to him? Or at least, why answer you not Strangius, but impertinently talk of the Serpent Socinus? If Socinus had no more wit than to take the Futurity of Sin for a Being, (Substance, Accident or Mode) no wonder if he knew not how to deny that God is the Cause of it. And why do you not attempt to answer me, who tell you, That if you take it to be a real Being and eternal, you must take it to be God himself; for nothing else is eternal. But I pray you say not (like your former arguing about nothing) [The eternal Futurity of Sin is God himself; ergo, God is the eternal Futurity of Sin.] The Subject and Pre∣dicate are not so convertible as you seem to make them. You say, if we say, Futurity is nothing, then it is a wonder, an independent on God and his Will, self-originated and unpreventable, &c. You write no wonders to me, this rate of Dis∣course being common in the World, and hath been in most Ages. Is Nothing a wonder? Is it a won∣der for nothing to be independent? but yet that which hath no dependent Being, may so far as a Nothing be at God's will, that he continue nothing or make something (the first non agendo, the se∣cond agendo) as he pleases, that is, by willing or not willing. And it were a wonder indeed for

Nothing to be self-originated, or that Nothing should spring from any thing as an efficient Cause: But reductively some Nothings may be ascribed to God's Non-agency, as Beings good are to his action. As God is improperly called the Cause of Darkness, because he there maketh not Light, so improperly he may be said to be the Cause of No∣things, because he made not the contrary Some∣things. You say (then there is fatum Stoicissimum on God) and all his Works, and this Futurity binds the Almighty, that he cannot do as he plea∣seth in Heaven and Earth. This is a wonder in∣deed that Nothing should be stronger than God, and rule him and the World. If Dr. Twisse hold Sin to be nothing, doth it follow, that it binds God, because it's nothing? Doth Death bind God, because it is but the privation of Life; or vacuity (si detur vacuum) because it is nothing? Or when there was nothing but God, did Nothing∣ness bind God? Is that God bound or conquer'd that can turn Nothing into Something at his pleasure? Non-futurity is nothing: therefore it hath no Cause. Is this Nothing the Ruler of God and All things, because he causeth not that which is not causable? Alas, that good men should keep up dividing Controversies at this rate of reason∣ing: You say, If it have no Cause, it can have no Impediment, and so there is Fatum Stoicissimum. We all talk at the rate that we understand. The World was nothing before it was made, and so had then no Cause in the esse causae, as being no effect (Relations in esse being simultaneous): Doth it fol∣low that God was subject to Fate? There was no Impediment indeed to Nothingness; it is not ne∣cessary that Nothing be hindred, lest it become

Something. God can make somewhat where there is nothing, at his pleasure, and can make a future Nothing to become an existent Something. And what should be the medium I wonder that tempted you to think otherwise: Did the nothingness of Angels before their Creation hinder God from making them? Or can nothing have a ruling Power?

Ad 6. Again you stick not at the repeating of the contradiction of a self-originated Future (or Nothing) and think God's Decrees endangered by nothing, because it hath no Cause. What a dread∣ful thing is this Nothing! To be self-originated is to be Something of it self. And if Futurity be nothing, then it is something of it self. And you offer not a Syllable to prove these Contradictions. You add (To what purpose shall Decrees be?) Ans. To produce the thing decreed in its pro∣per time and place, and not to make them some∣thing before they are any thing, nor to make an ens Rationis to be a real extrinseck Entity. You strangely say (To decree such a Futurity is a nullity, for it can never come to pass.) What can never come to pass? Futurity? Say also (To decree Non∣futurity, or that there shall be to us but one Sun, but one Saviour, is a nullity, because Nothing can never come to pass.) What is it for Nothing to come to pass? It is come to pass without a Cause that there is but one Sun to us, but one Saviour, and other Nothings. The Decree or Will of what shall come to pass is no nullity: for it shall all come to pass; and yet the Decree made not the word (shall be) to signifie a real Entity, distinct form or model of the thing that shall be. The Decree that there shall be a World, was fulfilled,

and yet (shall be) was not a being before t〈…〉〈…〉 World, unless it was God's Essence. You Phrase importeth as if Futurity must come to pass as a thing Decreed, and question whether there was a futurity of that futurity, and so in infinitum. For the word (Coming to pass) importeth futurity of futu∣rity, and not eternity. You say [To decree in com∣pliance with it, is below God over All—for it will come to pass whether God decree it or no.] Alas, that Speaking should be so hard an Art! What i•• it to decree in compliance with nothing? Hath it any sence? How is it that Nothing will come to pass? It's true, that Nothing will be Nothing without a Cause, and therefore without a Decree. And therefore let the reverence of God make you consider, whether it be meet for us in the dark to ascribe to God such Decrees of nothing▪ and to number Nothings, and make as many Decrees. Such a dance and game of notions we may more boldly use about our selves than about God, till we know him better. You add (God in decreeing doth not decree the thing into being in the instant of decreeing, but He decreeth the Futurity of it, and if that be nothing, he decreeth nothing.) Ans. Wrong thoughts will have wrong words. All that you should have inferred, is, [That His Decree effe∣cteth nothing till the time come] which is true: For He decreed only to effect it at such a time: But doth it follow, that God decreeth nothing but Futurity, because the thing decreed is not present∣ly done? Thus you must say, That God decreed not the World, nor CHRIST, nor Salvation, but Futurity only. The Decree or Will of God was, That the World, CHRIST, Resurrection, &c. shall be at such a time: (shall be) is no being; and

yet it is a being when existent, which God de∣creed, but his Decree maketh it not a being till it exist. Dr. Twisse will over and over tell you, that God's immanent acts do nihil ponere in objecto. And I have oft told you truly, that you or I little know what we say when we divide God's Eternity into parts, and assign him his praeteritum & futu∣rum. And it would put you hard to it to tell me clearly and surely what God's Eternal Decree is be∣fore the effect exist! our present common-received School-Divinity will call us Blasphemers, if we say, that before the Creation there was any thing but God, and any thing in God but God, and that God had any real accidents: And therefore it saith, that he doth operari per essentiam, and not per accidentia. And therefore that God's Decree before the effect was nothing but his Essence. But it is his Essence denominated (not as such, but) as related to the things decreed, though yet they be not. If you will forsake this common Theo∣logy, and place acts in God, which ex parte agentis, are but Accidents and not his Essence, and say, This is consistent with his Simplicity and Perfection, you will let in a Body of new Divinity, and we shall not know when we have all God's Accidents, no•• how to order them. His freest Acts are his Essen∣tial Will freely acting; but those free acts them∣selves before the effect are nothing but God him∣self. We must not place in God a number of Thoughts, Images, Notions, Accidents, as we do in Man. But your Phrase savoureth of other Thoughts.

Ad 7. Here you are for yea and nay: you will suppose no Propositions in God, and yet you ar∣gue that then, what will remain of a Decree. I said,

But that God knoweth not by Propositions, b•••• yet that he knoweth Propositions. If you hold, That God knoweth by Propositions and Argumen∣tations, say so, that I may know what to speak to. If you hold, That He hath no Decrees, what is it that you plead for? But to answer your Question, God's Decree is not a forming of Pro∣positions in his mind, or any change in himself, or addition to his Being: But it is His simple will that such and such things shall be, emanative, com∣municative, productive of them in their season. There are some that think, that as Time-Divisi∣ons are the measures of imperfect Creatures, and God's Eternity hath none such; so that it is an ascribing Imperfection to God, to say, That he hath Decrees de futuris distinct from a productive Volition, which in the most proper sence should be denominated from the produced Existent as such. But in this I interess not my self, as knowing that we must speak improperly of God or not at all. You say that (It shall be, is a Futurity.) Ans. What's that? A (shall be) is (a Futurity), and (a futurity) is a (shall be.) Ergo a shall be and a futurity is a be∣ing. Would I knew what. But to hope for that from you is too great Presumption. You add (A futurity, a nothing, and to decree nothing is not to de∣cree.) Ans. Say you so? I am glad you say no worse: Then if those be in the right (as most) that think Sin is nothing (no more than Death or Darkness) you will grant that God decreed it not. And if I prove that Futurity ex parte rei, is nothing, you will grant that it needeth no Decree as such. But seeing you are so much on my side, I crave your help to confute those, that otherwise you defend, who make innumerable Nothings the Ob∣jects

of God's Decrees. But yet I would not follow you too far: (Not to give Grace to an Infidel) is nothing. (Not to give the Gospel, not to end the World till the time, not to take away Grace, Gospel, Life, &c.) You say here (in your general) that none of these can be decreed. But then prepare an Answer to your Friends that will take this ill of you. I have fully opened my sence of it else∣where. You say (Abstract futurity from the Decree and it will be nothing.) Ans. If you abstract not Futurity as a real Entity from the Decree, you will abuse God by presumptuous false Conceits: But if you abstract the word shall be) from the humane Conceptus of it, it will not differ from a Conceptus de praesente. And though I more reverence you, I may say of some other Objecters that quib∣ble with arbitrary notions, that if you except Fa∣tuity and Futility, from what they say for the en∣tity of Futurity, it is all nothing. You add (That if in time only the thing actually exist by virtue of the Decree, the Decree is something in time, but eternally it was nothing. That is (God's will to effect any thing is nothing till it do effect it.) Yes, 'tis God's Will so to do, and is that nothing? It is nothing but God's essential will denominated from the res efficienda; but that is not nothing: if God be no∣thing, there is Nothing: There is nothing indeed but God from Eternity. If you think otherwise, tell us what it is. Aureolus indeed pleadeth, That Actus Dei creantis is neither Creator nor Creatura, but quid medium, but few second him, and many confute him. It seems you think of Futurity as our Epicureans, and our new Infidels do of matter, That it is an eternal effect of God as an eternal Cause. I will give you many thanks if you will peruse and

answer Raymundus Lullius's Arguments against t•••• Eternity of any Creature, where he argueth, That whatsoever hath the perfection of Eternity, must needs have other suitable Perfections, and so be God. Is Futurity a more excellent Being tha•• Spirit, Matter and Motion, to be capable of this Divine Attribute? I pray what is the Verity that you say resulteth eternally? Can you forgive me for not loving Confusion? Is it, 1. The verit•• rei futurae? 2. Or the veritas conceptus Divini de rerum futuritione? 3. Or the Verity of a Pro∣position? Are these all one with you? The first being a Metaphysical Verity, is Affectio entis, a•• unum and bonum are: And quod non est, non est unum, verum aut bonum. 2. As to the third, is it a divine Proposition, or a humane? If a di∣vine, prove that God had either concept as vel pro∣latas, eternal Propositions; if he had and you prove it, I never denied the truth of such propo∣sitions. If humane, when there was no man, there was no humane propositions. All that you can say is but what I oft said, That God's Volitions were a ground that would have made such propo∣sitions (These things will be) certainly true, if there had been any such eternal propositions. And as to the second, it is not denied as before explai∣ned. God's Will and Knowledge were certain, but they were but himself, who gave no Being to eternal Futurition out of himself. You ask (How are the Promises, being Propositions, true signs of the Divine Will, where there are none?) Ans. How is the World and signa naturalia the signs of God's Will, and how are Writings and Voices signs of it, if there be no World, Writings o•• Voices in God? God willeth that which is not

〈…〉〈…〉 himself eternally: God willeth Creatures and God willeth Propositions. And these are the ••roducts of his Veracity, when he sendeth them ••y Revelation: and true, because they come from ••im. When his Will is to give the world an 〈…〉〈…〉carnate Saviour, may not the promise of this ••ruly signifie his will, though he have no Pro∣position in his mind, but only a will to give him, ••nd an intuitive Knowledge? But I say again, ••f you can prove, that God thinketh, reasoneth, ••r talketh eternally, and knoweth by terminos sim∣••lices, Propositions and Syllogisms, I will easily confess that all these are true, and yet not grant that ex parte rei, Futurition or Non-futurition, Possibility or Impossibility are any Beings.

Ad 8. You meet with a distinction of [Futu∣rity as nothing, and a Proposition de futuro as something] with an [how so? It signifieth only futurity, and that is just nothing.] Ans. You should pardon a man in my condition, if he be ••oth to write new Books to answer all Object∣ers that know not that a Proposition de nihilo is something. If Atheists say, There is no God, They shall know that they say something: If I say that there are no other true Gods, I say some∣thing. They that say Datur vacuum say some∣thing. You say (But was it not true before:) what is your (it)? The Proposition was not true before it was a Proposition, Concepta vel prolat••: Futurity had not the Metaphysical or Physical verity of an Entity; for it was nothing. The res futura had no such truth; for it was not res dum futura tantum. What mean you then by (it?) I say still if you can prove that there was an Eternal Proposition de future in God, it

was true and was God's Essence; which is no∣thing to our question. You add [Not true before, nor knowable as true.] Ans. You seem by thi•• to intimate that God cannot know what will be by his production, without making Mental or Oral Propositions, and knowing them to be true Must God's Prescience be deplorate, if he know not by your Me••ns and Measures? You may ne•••• say, It must be by Sense, Fantasie and Species▪ as our Souls work in these muddy Brains. God▪s Knowledge receiveth not a constitutive Object from without, as ours doth. It first concurreth with his Will and Power in making all things what they are (All flowing from it, and it recei∣ving from none:) And in s••cundo instanti; it dis∣cerneth all things to be what they are. And whe•• he hath made Propositions, he discerneth the•• to be true. You keep your way and say [Whe•• God declares things to come, he declareth something▪ because there is a Proposition: But when he fore∣knoweth them, he fore knoweth nothing; which is 〈…〉〈…〉 to fore-know.] Ans. 1. When God declareth by Propo••••tions things to come, the Propositio•••• are the Declaration it self and are something; but the things declared are nothing, till they are Why would you confound these? and When he foreknoweth what will be, he knoweth that it is not: Ergo it is not. 3. How prove you, That to fore-know from Eternity that there would be no World till the Creation, or no Deluge, Resur∣rection, &c. till the time, is no fore-knowledge? I do not Dispute it with you, but crave your proof, having said somewhat my self elsewhere upon that Question. You talk of [a thing's be∣ginning to be Future before it's put into a Propositi∣on,

&c.] As if you still begg'd the Question, and took Futurity extra mentem & signa, to be some∣thing ex parte rei. That which is not, is not true. A negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem Est ••ertii valet consequentia, saith Dr. Twisse often. You ask [Is it true because formed into a Proposi∣tion? Then all Propositions are true.] Ans. Is what true? That there is a Futurum? Is not that a Proposition? What is it antecedent to the Pro∣position that you call true? Is it the res futura? That's false. Is it the Realitas futuritionis ex parte ••ei? That is it I deny. Futurum, saith Dr. Twisse, & possibile, are termini diminuentes, signifying that the thing is not. Is it the Conceptus Divinus? If that be by a mental Proposition, it is not antece∣dent to it self; if not, doubtless God's Know∣ledge is true (efficiently, it will make the thing true) and true perfectively and denominatively, knowing things but as they are, and therefore not knowing Futurity Rei to be a Being. If it ••e human Conceptions, they are mental Proposi∣tions, not eternal nor antecedent to themselves. All Propositions that God maketh are true: Be∣cause true Propositions are true, must all be true? Because it is a word or Proposition or Syllogism, which is the Subject of Logical truth, doth it follow that all Words, Propositions or Syllo∣gisms are true?

Ad 9. Possible is a notion relative from God's Power; Futurity from his Will, or any certain Cause. Neither is a real Entity in re.

In the Conclusion I was about to wish that you would have done somewhat that tended to my Edification, and when you had all this while talk'd for the Entity of futurity that you would have deign∣ed

to tell me what it is; if it be anything, why would you not say, what? Is it a Substance or an Accident? What Accident (or mode) or of what Substance? Could you forget that this would be expected from you? And whether Futurity be an∣nihilated or turned into somewhat else when the thing existeth. But I find that you have made a kind of attempt, saying [Things have an esse inten∣tionale in God's will, though not an esse Reale in themselves.] And is this all that we shall have in∣stead of the Definition, that should have gone before, and instead of regarding and Answering what I had said of the Point? 1. Here then you intimate that Futurity hath no esse reale in it self; and it is the esse reale that I denied▪ Why lost you so much Labour. 2. Can you English to any man that takes words for means of understand∣ing things, what it is for [Things to have an esse intentionale in God?] 1. Sure the commmon Doctrine of esse intentionale in man, needs an Oedipus. 2. But alas how shall I know what esse intentionale is in God? 3. Much less how milli∣ons of millions of Nothings have their esse inten∣tionale in God. Qu. 1. Is that esse intentionale any thing real besides God himself? 2. Are such esse's as many in God as the things will be in themselves? Hath God Accidents, and so many millions of millions of Accidents, and yet most simple and immutable? 3. What are all these things in God from eternity in proper language? are they his Volitions or Intellections? And are these so numerous? Or are they Creatures in esse intentionali? Do not you confess that that esse is non-esse as to any Creature? If you mean Pl••••••onick Idea's, are not Idea's and Species, as they

are called, in man, the notes of his Imperfecti∣on, while his Soul knoweth, ut forma, in a Body, as distinct from perfect intuition? I refer you to what I have said of Divine Idea's, and pray you to seign nothing in God without proof. But if you do prove such, forget not the next time, that I denied not the truth of any Divine Idea or Knowledge.

Your concluding line I pardon, and it needs no more. All that is said in this Paper on this point is materially fully answered in my Book; and I even now asked a Friend what I should say to all that object against a Book which containeth sufficient matter of answer to their Objections: And he answered, Not write for every man a new one, but wish them to read the former better.

Pardon my oft repeating to you my sence of Futurity, with which I conclude. To man, Time in various instants, and the narrowness of our understandings, that must have various Concepti∣ons and Organical Notions, make it needful to us to use names, even for things that are not (or nothings). When God (or any certain Cause) tells what will be hereafter, we frame an image of that thing that is not by the help of Words and the similitude of Things that are or have been. Then we put a name on that imagined thing, as if it were: Then we make use in our discourses of that name, and turning a Verb into a Noun, as [it will be] into [Future], and then an Ad∣jective or Participle into a Substantive, [Future] into [Futurity] our poor Fancies run on with it, as if we had by the name made or mentioned some Substance or real Being. When all is no∣thing

but a Relative notion or Ens rationis. The knowledge that a thing will be may be a real knowledge: And instead of denominating the Act we denominate the Object, (which is internally an Image; externally Nothing real) and call it Future, and thence name Futurition: As Futurition signifieth improperly the relation of the mental act to the thing fore-known, it is a real mental act's relation: As the Subject is the thing future, so it is nothing real but a feigned organical Notion, by which we discourse instead of Verbs. The Relatio Conceptus vel nominis, is the relation of a real act. But the relation of the thing future as future is secundum dici, but feign∣ed instead of a Verb. And of God's knowledge, I shall here say no more.

In a word, If you take futuritio rei to be the Name of any immanent eternal Act of God, what∣ever we think of the aptitude of your Phrase, I suppose we differ not about the thing inten∣ded, as long as you hold no eternal Accidents or Composition in God, and that nothing is eternal but himself; which I must think you do in Charity. If you take futuritio rei for the modus or relation of a humane Conception or Asserti∣on de futuris, I suppose we shall not differ de re, nor will you say that it is eternal. 3. If you speak but suppositively, that if there had been such a conceptus or Assertion from Eternity, it would have been true, we differ not. 4. If you take Futurition extra mentem, to be any thing (Substance, Mode, Accident or any Reality or ali∣quid rei) and that from Eternity, I deny it, and say, That they that make an universal Spirit, and they that make Matter and Motion to be eter∣nal

with God, are more excusable, than they that make a thing called Futurity distinct▪ from God; yea, the Futurity of Sin to be eternal, and God the eternal Cause of that eternal Effect.

I purposed at the first glance to have answe∣red the second Paper also about God's decreeing Sin; but when I had read it I was unwilling, 1. Be∣cause it is but too largely answered materially in my Book already, and more fully in old Papers that lie by me, which I cannot transcribe. 2. Be∣cause I hear so much Good of the worthy Author, that I am not willing to be drawn to dispute a Case, which cannot be handled justly, without opening so much Evil in that which I must op∣pose, as will sound harsh towards one that I so much honour. Men are so apt to feel that as touching themselves which is spoken to their Cause. If Hobbes (who wrote the Treatise of Necessity against Bishop Bramhall) had sent me that Paper, I should readily have answer'd it: But here I fear it.

Only I tell the Author, that I have been as strongly tempted that way as most others; and do acknowledge that it is the greatest difficulty in all these Controversies, to conceive, how free will can act otherwise than God doth predeter∣mine it: But I am satisfied in the Solution; and fully satisfied, that the Predeterminant Opi∣nion which I oppose doth certainly inferr the Religion of Hobbes, the denial of Chri∣stianity, and leaves us no Religion; but that Good and Evil, Happiness and Misery are Differences all made by God himself, as Light and Darkness, Angels and Serpents are made to differ by him:

And I am not willing to let go Christianity 〈…〉〈…〉 such Objections as these: And it had been m〈…〉〈…〉 that he had answered what I have said to Alvar•• Mr. Sterry, &c. on this Subject, and taken notice of my Answers to the most of his.

His talk of Casualty is his sum; by which if he mean that which had not a predetermined Cause, Sin is casual, till the Sinner determine his own will. But if he mean, that which is unknown to God, it is not casual: And the Assertion, That such things are not knowable to God, I have con∣futed at large, which he here taketh no notice of.

If I shall find that Necessity make it my duty to give any such Paper a particular Answer, if I have time, I may do it. But I think enough is said of that already, and my leisure from bet∣ter work is small.

RI. BAXTER.