A Christian directory, or, A summ of practical theologie and cases of conscience directing Christians how to use their knowledge and faith, how to improve all helps and means, and to perform all duties, how to overcome temptations, and to escape or mortifie every sin : in four parts ... / by Richard Baxter.

Tit. 2. A fuller resolution of the Cases, 1. Whether the Laws of men do bind the Conscience: 2. Especially smaller and Penal Laws?

THe word [Conscience] signifieth either 1. In general according to the notation of the word, The knowledge of our own matters; Conscire; The knowledge of our selves, our duties, our faults, our fears, our hopes, our diseases, &c. 2. Or more limitedly and narrowly, The knowledge of our selves and our own matters in relation to Gods Law and Iudgement: Iudicium hominis de seipso prout subjici∣tur judicio Dei, as Amesius defineth it.

2. Conscience is taken, 1. Sometime for the Act of self-knowing: 2. Sometime for the Habit: 3. Sometime for the Faculty, that is, for the Intellect it self, as it is a faculty of self-knowing. In all these senses it is taken properly. 2. And sometimes it is used (by custome) improperly, for the Person himself, that doth Conscire; or for his Will, (another faculty).

3 The Conscience may be said to be bound, 1. Subjectively, as the subjectum quod, or the faculty ob∣liged; 2. Or Objectively, as Conscire, the Act of Conscience, is the thing ad quod, to which we are obliged.

And upon these necessary distinctions I thus answer to the first question.

Prop. 1 The Act or the Habit of Conscience are not capable of being the subject obliged; no more than any other act or duty: The Act or duty is not bound, but the man to the act or duty.

2. The Faculty or Iudgement is not capable of being the Object or Materia ad quam, the thing to which we are bound. A man is not bound to be a man, or to have an Intellect, but is made such.

3. The Faculty of Conscience (that is the Intellect) is not capable of being the immediate or nearest subjectum quod, or subject obliged. The reason is, Because the Intellect of it self is not a free-working faculty, but acteth necessarily per modum naturae, further than it is under the Empire of the Will: And therefore Intellectual and Moral habits are by all men distinguished.

4. All Legal or Moral Obligation falleth directly upon the Will only; and so upon the Person as a Voluntary agent: So that it is proper to say, The Will is bound, and The Person is bound.

5 Improperly and remotely it may be said, The Intellect (or faculty of Conscience) is bound, or the tongue, or hand, or foot is bound; as the Man is bound to use them.

6. Though it be not proper to say, that the Conscience is bound, it is proper to say, that the Man is bound to the Act and Habit of Conscience, or to the exercise of the faculty.

7. The common meaning of the phrase, that we are [bound in conscience] o•• that [conscience is bound] is that [we are bound to a thing by God,] or [by a Divine obligation] and that it is [a fin against God to violate it]: So that Divines use here to take the word Conscience in the narrower The∣ological sense, as respect to Gods Law and Iudgement doth enter the definition of it.

8. Taking Conscience in this narrower sense, To ask, Whether mans Law as Mans do bind us in Consci∣ence,* 1.1 is all one as to ask, Whether Man be God.

9. And taking Conscience in the large or General sense, to ask whether Mans Laws bind us in Con∣science, subjectively, is to ask whether they bind the Understanding to know our duty to man? And the tenour of them will shew that: While they bind us to an outward Act, or from an outward Act, it is the man that they bind to or from that act, and that is, as he is a Rational Voluntary Agent: so that a humane obligation is laid upon the Man, on the Will, and on the Intellect by humane Laws.

10. And humane Laws while they bind us to or from an outward Act, do thereby bind us as Ra∣tional-free agents, knowingly to choose or refuse those acts: Nor can a Law which is a Moral Instru∣ment any otherwise bind the hand, foot or tongue, but by first binding us to choose or refuse it

knowingly, that is, conscientiously, so that a humane bond is certainly laid on the mind, soul, or conscience taken in the larger sense.

11. Taking Conscience in the stricter sense, as including essentially a relation to Gods obligation, the full sense of the question plainly is but this, Whether it be a sin against God to break the Laws of man? And thus plain men might easily understand it. And to this it must be answered, that it is in two respects a sin against God to break such Laws or Commands as Rulers are authorized by God to make: 1. Because God commandeth us to obey our Rulers: Therefore he that (so) obeyeth them not, sinneth against a Law of God. God obligeth us in General to obey them in all things which they are authorized by him to command: But their Law determineth of the particular mat∣ter: Therefore God obligeth us (in Conscience of his Law) to obey them in that particular. 2. Be∣cause by making them his Officers, by his Commission he hath given them a certain beam of Autho∣rity, which is Divine as derived from God: Therefore they can command us by a power derived from God: Therefore to disobey is to sin against a power derived from God. And thus the General case is very plain and easie, How man sinneth against God in disobeying the Laws of man, and con∣sequently how (in a tolerable sense of that phrase) it may be said, that mans Laws do or do not bind the conscience (or rather, bind us in point of Conscience;) or by a Divine obligation. Man is not God; and therefore as man, of himself can lay no Divine obligation on us. But Man being Gods Officer, 1. His own Law layeth on us an obligation derivatively Divine (For it is no Law which hath no obligation, and it is no authoritative obligation which is not derived from God). 2. And Gods own Law bindeth us to obey mans Laws.

Quest. 2. BUt is it a sin to break every Penal Law of man?

Answ. 1. You must remember that Mans Law is essentially the signification of mans Will; And therefore obligeth no further than it truly signifieth the Rulers Will.

2. That it is the Act of a Power derived from God; and therefore no further bindeth, than it is the exercise of such a power.

3. That it is given, 1. Finally for Gods glory and pleasure, and for the Common Good (compre∣hending the Honour of the Ruler and the welfare of the society ruled). And therefore obligeth not when it is, 1. Against God; 2. Or against the Common Good. 2. And it is subordinate to Gods* 1.2 own Laws, (in Nature and Scripture) and therefore obligeth not to sin, or to the violation of Gods Law.

4. You must note that Laws are made for the Government of Societies as such universally; and so are fitted to the Common Case, for the Common Good. And it is not possible but that a Law which prescribeth a duty which by accident is so to the most, should meet with some particular subject to whom the case is so circumstantiated as that the same act would be to him a sin: And to the same man it may be ordinarily a duty, and in an extraordinary case a sin. Thence it is that in some cases (as Lent Fasts, Marriages, &c.) Rulers oft authorize some persons to grant dispensations in cer∣tain cases; And hence it is said, that Necessity hath no Law.

Hereupon I conclude as followeth.

1. It is no sin to break a Law which is no Law, as being against God, or not authorized by him (as of a Usurper, &c.) See R. Hooker Conclus. Lib 8.

2. It is no Law so far as it is no signification of the true Will of the Ruler, what ever the words be: Therefore so far it is no sin to break it.

3. The Will of the Ruler is to be judged of, not only by the Words, but by the Ends of Govern∣ment, and by the Rules of Humanity.

4. It being not possible that the Ruler in his Laws can foresee and name all exceptions, which may occur, it is to be supposed that it is his Will, that the Nature of the thing, shall be the notifier of his Will, when it cometh to pass: And that if he were present, and this case fell out before him, which the sense and end of the Law extendeth not to, he would say, This is an excepted Case.

5. There is therefore a wide difference between a General Law, and a personal particular Mandate; As of a Parent to a Child, or a Master to a Servant: For this latter fully notifieth the Will of the Ruler in that very case, and to that very person: And therefore it cannot be said that here is any excepti∣on, or that it is not his Will: But in an Universal or General Law, it is to be supposed that some particular excepted Cases will fall out extraordinarily, though they cannot be named: And that in those Cases, the Rulers will dispenseth with it.

6. Sometimes also the Ruler doth by the meer neglect of pressing or executing his own Laws, permit them to grow obsolete, and out of use: And sometimes he forbeareth the execution of them for some time, or to some sort of persons: And by so doing doth notifie, that it was not his Will that ••t such a time, and in such cases they should oblige. I say not, that all remissness of execution is such a sign: But sometimes it is: And the very word of the Law-giver, may notifie his dispensation

or suspending will. As for instance, Upon the burning of London, there were many Laws (about coming to Parish Churches, and relief of the poor of the Parish, and the like,) that the people be∣came uncapable of obeying: And it was to be supposed, that the Rulers will would have been to to have excepted such Cases if foreseen; and that they did dispense with them when they fell out.

7. Sometimes also the penalty of violating a Law, is some such Mulct or service, which the Ru∣ler intendeth as a Commutation for the duty, so that he freely leaveth it to the choice of the sub∣ject which he will choose. And then it is no sin to pay the Mulct, and omit the Action; because it crosseth not the Law-givers will.

8. Sometimes also the Law may command this principally for some mens sake, which so little concerns others, that it should not extend to them at all, were it not lest the Liberty of them should be an impediment to the obedience of others, and consequently of the common good: In which case, if those persons so little concerned, do but omit the action secretly, so as to be no scandal or publick hurt, it seemeth that they have the implicite Consent of the Rulers.

9. Sometimes particular duties are commanded with this express exception, [Unless they have just and reasonable impediment] (As for coming every Lords Day to Church, &c.): which seem∣eth to imply, that (though in cases where the publick good is concerned, the person himself shall not be Judge, nor at all as to the penalty; yet that) in actions of an indifferent nature in themselves, this exception is still supposed to be implyed, [Unless we have just and reasonable impediments] of which in private Cases, as to the Crime, we may judge.

10. I need not mention the common natural exceptions: As that Laws bind not to a thing when it becometh naturally impossible; or, cessante materia, vel capacitate subjecti obligati, &c.

11. Laws may change their sense in part by the change of the Law-giver: For the Law is not formally to us his Law that is dead and was once our Ruler, but his that is alive and is now our Ruler. If Henry the eighth make a Law about the outward acts of Religion (as for coming to Church, &c.) and this remain unrepealed in King Edwards, Queen Maries, Queen Elizabeths, King Iames his dayes, &c. even till now: As we are not to think that the Law-givers had the same sense and will, so neither that the Law hath the same sense and obligation: For if the general words be capable of several senses, we must not take it as binding to us in the sense it was made in, but in the sense of of our present Law-givers or Rulers; because it is their Law.

12. Therefore if a Law had a special Reason for it at the first making (as the Law for using Bows and Arrows) that Reason ceasing we are to suppose the Will of the Law-giver to remit the obliga∣tion, if he urge not the execution, and renew not the Law.

13. By these plain principles many particular difficulties may be easily resolved, which cannot be foreseen and named: e. g. The Law against relieving a beggar bindeth not, when he is like to dye if he be not relieved; or in such a case as after the burning of London, when there was no Parish to bring him to. A Law that is but for the ordering of mens charity, (to soul, or body, by preaching or alms) will not disoblige me from the Duties of Charity themselves, in cases where Scripture or Nature prove∣eth them to be imposed by God. A Law for fasting will not bind me, when it would be destructive to my body: even on Gods Sabbaths duties of mercy were to be preferred to Rest and Sacrifices.

14. If Gods own Laws must be thus expounded, that [When two duties come together, and both cannot be done, the lesser ceaseth at that time to be a duty, and the greater is to be preferred], mans Laws must also be necessarily so expounded: And the rather because mans Laws may be contradictory when Gods never are so, rightly understood.

15. Where the subject is to obey, so far he must discern which of the Laws inconsistent, is to be preferred: But in the Magistratical execution, the Magistrate or Judge must determine.

E. g. One Law commandeth that all the needy poor be kept on the Parish where they were born or last lived. Another Law saith, that Non-conformable Ministers of the Gospel who take not the Oxford Oath shall not come within five miles of City or Corporation (though they were born there) or any place where they have been Preachers. In case of necessity, what shall they do? Answ. Whi∣ther they shall go for relief, they must discern as well as they can: But whither they shall be carried or sent, the Magistrate or Constable must discern, and judge.

Also Whether he shall go with a Constable that by one Law bringeth him to a place which by the other Law he is forbid on pain of six months imprisonment in the Common Gaol to come to? Answ. If he be not voluntary in it, it is not his fault: And if one bring him thither by force, and and another imprison him for being there, he must patiently suffer it.

16. But out of such excepted Cases, the Laws of our Rulers (as the commands of Parents) do bind us as is afore explained: And it is a sin against God to violate them.

17. Yea, When the reason of the Law reacheth not our particular case and person, yet when we have reason to judge, that it is the Rulers will that all be bound for the sake of some, and the com∣mon order and good will be hindered by our exemption, we must obey to our corporal detriment, to avoid the publick detriment, and to promote the publick good.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Having spo∣ken of this Controversie, in my Life of Faith, as an easie thing, in which I thought we were really agreed, while we seemed to differ, which I called A pitiful Case, some B••ethren (who say nothing against the truth of what I said) are offended at me as speaking too confidently, and calling that so easie which Bishop Sa••der••oa and so many others did make a greater matter of: I retract the words, if they ••e unsuit∣table either to the matter or the Readers: But as to the matter and the truth of the words, I desire the Reader but to consider how easie a case Mr. P. maketh of it Eccl. Pol. and how heinous a matter he maketh of our supposed dissent: And if after all this, it shall appear, that the Non-conformists do not at all differ from Hooker, Bilson and the generality of the Conformists in this point, let him that is willing to be represented as odious and intolerable to Rul••rs and to mankind, for that in which we do not differ, proceed to backbite me for saying that it is a pitiful case; and pretending that we are agreed.
• * 1.2

  It is not Mr. Humph••••y alone that hath written that Laws bind not in conscience to obedience which are against the Publick Good: The greatest Casuists say the same, excepting the case of scandal: He that would see this in them may choose but these two special Authors Bapt. Fragos. de Regimine Reipublicae, & Greg. Sayrus in his Clavis Regia, and in them he shall find enow more c••••ed. Though I think some further Cautions would make it more satisfactory.