Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,

SECT. XXIV. On the other side. (Book 24)

681. ON the other side read but Suarez and Ruiz to save me tran∣scribing, and see what they grant (besides that Ariminens. and many old Schoolmen go as far as the Synodists, as the Dominicans do much further.) Petr. à S. Joseph. Suav. Concord. writing for Scientia Media, summeth up the difference between them and the Thomists (that is, the Arminians and Calvinists) so briefly as is worth the reading: In which he granteth,

1. [That God from eternity antecedently to any absolute foresight of merits (or preparation in us) did freely and of meer mercy elect all those to Glory that are saved:] But denyeth [that God antecedently to the absolute foresight of sin, did absolutely decree to exclude any from glory, or to addict them to eternal punishment: or that the Creation of Reprobates, and all natural or supernatural good conferred on them, are the effect of reprobation.]

2. He granteth that [the Decree of Predestination is certain and im∣movable in three respects: 1. In that just so many shall certainly be saved as God hath predestinated. 2. In that the same species of men shall be saved whom God predestinated to glory: so that both materially and formally, the number of the predestinate is certain. 3. In that by the force of Predestination, anteceding all Merits * 1.1, yea, and Causing them, God giveth to the predestinate, effectual helps of grace, by which they shall infallibly come to glory.]

And is not here a fair concession for peace? And must not the remain∣••ing differences be only 1. About words, 2. Or unsearchable Orders of Gods Decrees and Modes of operation? Read him further, and see.

682. Dion. Petavius the Jesuite is too large to transcribe. Vol. 1. Theol. Dogm. lib. 9. of Predestination is worth the reading; especially to know what the Fathers held of Gods Decrees, who generally agreed, that God * 1.2 decreed none to Hell, but upon foresight of their own sin. Though he himself doth furiously rail at Calvin, and Amyraldus, yet he so far ac∣quitteth all other Calvinists save Beza and Piscator, and a few that he cal∣leth meer fools, that he saith, They have all forsaken his opinion, and instanceth in the whole Synod of Dort, who he saith desert him. And he professeth that Augustines judgement may safely be held, which is it in∣deed, that those now called Calvinists own, except in the point of perse∣verance. See his lib. 10. c. 1. & 9, 10, 11.

But what a plague, livor and faction is to the Church and the owners souls, let but these ugly words of his be witness, lib. 10. cap. 14. p. 728. [Calvinus nocentem nullum, innocentes omnes damnari statuit] When ••e had made Amyrald an impudent lyer, for proving Calvin to think otherwise. O take heed of the spirit of a Sect.

683. Suarez de Auxil. l. 3. cap. 6. about sufficient and effectual grace, * 1.3 (into which all the other controversies fall,) confesseth that [Sufficient grace is that quod satis est ad efficiendum supernaturalem actum, quod tamen non facit, non ex insufficientia auxilii, sed ex libertate Voluntatis: But effectual grace is called such not only ab eventu & effectu, sed etiam quia vires praebet efficacissimas Voluntati, & singularem vim habet ad

agendum.] And is here no ground for Christian Concord in this point?

But of this subject, I must speak more particularly in the Third Part.

684. Bellarmine himself hath enough I think to convince any man, * 1.4 that he must have a subtile contentious wit, that can find any great into∣lerable difference herein between him and the Synod of Dort: (I Write not for them that will revile Gods truth, if Bellarmine do but own it.) De Grat. & lib. arb. li. 2. cap. 9. this is his proposition

[Though a Grace sufficient be given to all, yet no reason from us (or our part) can be given of Gods predestination,—By which we exclude not only Merits properly so called, but also the good use of free-will, o•••••• grace, or both as foreseen of God, though it be not called Merit, but de congruo, and though it be not called a Cause, but a Condition •••••••• qua non praedestinaretur.]

(And what else would you have excluded?) And he goeth on in divers Chapters at large to prove from Scriptures, Augustine, Tradition, Reason, that there is no foreseen Cause or Condi∣tion of predestination in our selves.

685. And I desire the Reader to note his Order of the Decrees (for they must all be medling with the Order of Gods inward acts▪ But he doth i•• most briefly and plainly thus) ib. cap. 9.

[According to our mode of understanding, this seemeth to be the Order of Predestination in Gods mind: 1. God foreseeth that if he make man he will fall with all his posterity; And withal he seeth th•••• he can deliver all or some as he please. 2. He decreeth (or willeth) to create man, and to permit him to fall, and mercifully to deliver some of the number of the fallen, leaving others justly in the mass of per∣dition. 3. He contrived apt remedies for the saving of the elect: I•• which the incarnation and passion of our Saviour hath the first place▪ 4. He approved those remedies, and then chose Christ and us in him, before the Constitution of the World. 5. He disposed, ordained, and in a sort commanded that so it should be done.]

Is not this as high as the Synod of Dort goeth? yea, more rigid than many of the Suffrages? For he mentioneth no giving of Christ, or any remedy at all to any but the Elect, nor carrying the rest any further tha•• the common mass of perdition, before they be forsaken; contrary to what Martinius, Crocius, Molinaeus, the Brittish Divines, and others delive∣red to or in that Synod: And indeed it is unsound.

686. If you say, that he begins with a Scientia Conditionalis. I an∣swer, It's no more than what all sober men will grant de re, that is, that God knew from eternity that if he so made man as he did, he would fall: or, if there were eternal propositions, God eternally knew the truth of this hypothetical proposition, [If I so make man, he will fall.] If this was quid intelligibile, no doubt but God knew it. But de ordine & de nomi∣ne, whether it be fit to parcell out Gods knowledge (and Volitions) into such shreds and atoms, and so denominate them, let them look to it on both sides that trouble us with their divisions.

687. And note Bellarmines further explication

[Of these acts▪ (saith he) the first is of the understanding, the second of the will, the third of the understanding, the fourth of the will, and the fifth of the under∣standing; and in that last the essence of predestination especially con∣sisteth.]

688. Yea, cap. 15. whereas many distinguish predestination to faith or grace, from election to glory, and say that the latter is upon the foresight of faith as a condition, though the first be absolute, he opposeth them

and copiously laboureth to prove

that election to glory is absolute with∣out any foreseen condition in us, as well as that to grace: Though with∣out something in us, we have not a Right to glory: Even (saith he) as if a Physicion were sure that by such a Medicine he can cure a man, and so resolveth to give it him, the Medicine is the Cause that he is cured, but not that it was ascertained by the decree of the Physicion before.

689. And c. 15. ad obj. 2. he proveth Gods certain foreknowledge ••erein, because

[Though all have pro loco & tempore sufficient grace to be converted if they will, yet indeed no man is converted, and no man persevereth, but he that hath the special gift of Repentance and Per∣severance, which is not given to all, but to those only for whom God decreed it.]

689. And to them that say, the Elect can refuse grace, he answereth ••hat

[They can indeed; but it's certain that they will not; because God will call them so as he seeth so congruous, that they may not re∣fuse his call: For thus true grace is refused by no hard heart, because it is given with a purpose to mollifie it. And there is no danger lest God should want skill or arguments, to perswade any man to what he please.]

690. And indeed before de Gratia efficaci li. 1. cap. 12. he tells us, that ••here are three opinions wherein the efficacy of grace consisteth: The first is, that it is called effectual only from the event, through mans con∣••ent: which he disproveth. The second, that it is only efficacious by ne∣cessitating physical predetermination, which he thinks to be an error on ••he other extream: And the third which he defendeth is [that it is effi∣cacious by Gods will that it shall be so, and by the Congruity or moral ••ptitude of inward and outward perswasions and means which God useth with a decree to turn the will.] And who can say that God cannot do this? or if he can, that he doth not? Is here yet any room left for quar∣••elling and bitter censures in this point? * 1.5

691. Lib. 2. cap. 16. he maketh two acts of Reprobation the very same that almost all the suffrages in the Synod of Dort assign, and the same doctrine that Davenant, and the Synod deliver. His first act of Reprobation is Negative, the second Positive;

[1. Non habet Volunta∣tem eos salvandi, 2. Habet Voluntatem eos damnandi:] And as to the first, [Nulla datur ejus causa ex parte hominum, sieut neque praede∣stinationis: Posterioris causa est praevisio peccati.]

They are unmerci∣ful contenders that this much Reprobation will not satisfie.

692. He proveth as the Calvinists do,

[that it was not so much as for original sin foreseen, that God is said to hate Esau; because then he would have hated Jacob also: but it must be referred to the ••eer will of God, that one was loved to salvation, and the other so hated as not to be saved.]

Just as the Synod of Dort saith.

693. Francisc. à Sancta Clara, alias Davenport, a Learned Scotist in his Deus, Nat. Grat. Probl. 1. pag. 3. describing Predestination out of Augu∣stine, Arriba, Scotus, Suarez, &c. saith

[And with all these agreeth the description of Predestination Art. 17. of the English Confession.]

694. And Probl. 2. of the Causes of Predestination he noteth that

[We mean not the Causes of Gods will, ex parte actus volendi, sed ex parte volit••rum, in quantum Deus vult unum esse propter aliud.]

And on that supposition how easie is it to agree?

695. But he addeth

[If you had rather say as Suarez 1. p. l. 2. de praed. c. 1. that also ex parte actus divini (there is a Cause,) it must

be, not as Gods act is absolutely considered, for so it is his essence that hath no cause; but as terminated on the Creature.]

696. Pag. 7. he himself professeth, that when the Protestants say that

[on the part of the Predestinate there is not so much as any merito••••∣ous Cause, Disposition or Condition, they speak but the common opi∣nion of all the School Doctors, taking it properly and in Scripture sen••e.

And what Montague and the Arminians speak of foresight, he disown∣eth, as contrary to Paul, August. Aquin. 1. p. q. 23. a. 5, &c. Scotus, Brad∣wardine, Estius, Smisings,—Yea, he rejecteth Abbot Joachim who denying any Cause of predestination in God, yet asserted a cause of it by an aptitude in the Predestinate and the Reprobate, one being foreseen more humble and prepared for Grace, and the other more proud and unprepared] pag. 5, 6.

697. Yea (ordering Gods Decrees after the usual presumption) be * 1.6 asserteth,

that God first intendeth our blessedness as the end, before he intendeth us grace, faith, &c. as the means: And therefore cannot do it for foreseen faith, &c. Yea, that he first decreed to give us bles∣sedness, before he decreed to create us, as Scotus 3. d. 7. and Ovan•••• ibid. q. 3. a. 2. Yea, that God willeth all this, before he knoweth that it will be, as Scotus 1. d. 39. And that seeing all Gods Volitions of giving any good, are free, without any precedent Cause in man, it must needs be that the Decree of glory and not of grace only, must be without Merit. And he concludeth p. 13. that they have no quarrel here with the Doctrine of the Articles of the Church of England.

698. Probl. 3. he resolveth with Smisings, that the reason why this absolute decree of God consisteth with free-will, is because that God doth not only decree the event, but also the mode, that it shall be freely done: And therefore his decree doth not only consist with Liberty, but maketh it necessary.

699. His feigned order of the decrees is pag. 27. that

1. God decree∣eth to glorifie, 2. To give grace and merits to obtain it, and that defi∣nitively: 3. Then he foreseeth that they will concurr with grace. 4. Then he decreeth the execution, that glory shall be given them by the means of their operations.

And of Reprobation;

1. That God effectually decreeth to do so much as he doth, on his part to give them glory; 2. And also so far to give them grace; 3. Then he foreseeth that they will not co-operate with that grace; 4. He decreeth to permit them to fall into sin; 5. And then decreeth their damnation.]

I would not cite this man if he were a Thomist or Dominican (who are known to go higher than the Synod of Dort, though their reputation at home with their party tempt them to rail at the Calvinists:) But as he is a Scotist, and so of a middle profes∣sion. (Though Dr. Twisse perceived how much their founding Gods fore∣knowledge in his Volitions, advantaged him.)

700. Supposing you to remember the ordo signorum of his Master Sco∣tus before cited, I adjoyn the order Doctoris illuminati (viz. Fra••. Mayronis) in li. 1. d. 41. q. 4. Sunt quatuor signa:

Est ergo pri•••••• in quo Judas & Petrus offeruntur Voluntati Divinae ut neutri: & t•••• Voluntas Divina ordinavit Petrum ad gloriam: nullum autem actum po∣sitivum habuit circa Judam, secundum Augustinum. Secundum signum es•• in quo ordinavit Petrum ad gratiam: & tunc circa Judam nullum act•••• positivum habuit. Tertium signum est in quo relinquuntur sibi ip••••s•••• & uterque cadit in peccatum. Quartum signum est in quo Petrus res••••∣git;

Quia non potest permanere: quia praedestinatus intelligitur ex pri∣mo signo. Judas autem non resurgit; eo quod non habet relevantem in Deo: ideo reprobatur.]

Here you see a Reprobation that is no Act of God, but a non-acting, or is negative quoad actum and not only quoad objectum. And he be∣fore saith out of Scotus and with him [Ideo dico sicut dicit Doctor noster, Quod prius Deus videt merita quam reprobum; licet prius non vide at merita quam eligat:] which is the commonest Doctrine of the Schoolmen and other Papists, as well as Augustines.

701. So D'Orbellis in 1. d. 41. [Et dicunt quidam quod non est alia ra∣tio quare Deus istum elegit, & non illum, nisi quia placet—Eo enim ipso quod placet, ideo rectum est, propter summam ipsius Voluntatis recti∣tudinem—Sic dicit Scotus, quod licet non videatur aliqua ratio praedestinationis à parte praedestinati, aliquo modo prior praedestinatione; Reprobationis tamen est aliqua ratio, propter quam scilicet ista actio ter∣minatur ad hoc objectum & non ad illud:—Cum Reprobare sit Velle Damnare, Reprobatio habet ex parte objecti, rationem, scilicet peccatum finale praevisum—Non videtur autem dicendum conformiter de Praede∣stinatione & Reprobatione; Quia Bona Deo principaliter attribuuntur, Mala autem nobis. Quia tamen▪ Apostolus videtur totum ho•• imperscru∣tabile relinquere, Rom. 9. O altitudo, &c. ideo dicit Scotus quod eligatur opinio quae magis placet; Dum tamen servetur Libertas Divina, absque injustitia. Hoc autem debet fieri absque assertione pertinaci. Rationes namque particulares, propter quas ex parte diversorum Divina infe∣runtur judicia, sunt imperscrutabiles.]

But note, that as to the first part of Reprobation, non velle dare gratiam, Scotus, Mayro, &c. hold it to be nothing, or no act at all.

702. And what D'Orbellis next addeth of Bonaventure setteth us at no further odds. [Bonav. dicit quod licet non sit aliqua ratio Causalis, seu me∣ritoria, praedestinationis à parte praedestinati, (quia siquis posset de con∣digno mereri primam gratiam, tunc Gratia non esset Gratia) Potest ta∣men esse aliqua ratio congruitatis & condeoentiae praedestinationis; Non quantum ad significatum quod est Volitio Divina, sed quantum ad Conno∣tatum quod est Gratia & Gloria. Potest enim dici quod Deus praedestinat istum proper praevisionem bonorum operum ut aliquo modo sunt à libero arbitrio: Licet enim Gratificatio vel Justificatio sit principaliter à Divina Voluntate, hoc tamen est cum cooperatione & praeparatione liberi arbitrii; quia ut Aug. Qui fecit te sine te non justificabit te sine te. Unde cum peccator facit quod in se est, meretur de congruo justificari, seu secundum quid, ex condecentia Divinae liberalitatis.]

But the true meaning of this is no more than Protestants commonly hold, that God giveth special Grace usually to such only as are prepared for it by more common Grace; and so this preparation is quid praevisum in Gods decree, but no Cause of his Act of Volition or decree.

703. And in the next words he granteth, that even this Preparation to special grace, is not alwayes necessary, [Deus tamen sine aliqua praepara∣tione & cooperatione aliquos justificat, ut patet de sanctificatis in utero, & de parvulis post baptismum ad coelum evolantibus; aliis sine baptismo decedentibus—&c.]

704. And though they oft say, that God would have all men saved quantum in se, they mean not, that God doth all to it that he can, but that he maketh all capable of salvation, and so far helpeth them, that the failing shall not be on his part. For so Bonavent. ubi supra in 1. d. 47. a. 1. q. 1. explaineth it, plainly adding, that here Gods

will connoteth not salvation it self, but only the said Capacity and helps.

705. Obj. But many say, that Predestination doth not necessitate the eve••. Answ. Twisse told you before that we are agreed all in this; It inferreth a Logical Necessity Consequentiae, though not a physical Consequentis: As Bonavent. 1. d. 40. q. 2. Ex parte rei evenientis nullam: ex parte De•• praescientis aliquam; scilicet immutabilitatis certitudinem: Yea, as to grace and salvation it is certainly Causal as they confess.

706. Obj. Many say, that a predestinate person may be damned. Answ. Even as D'Orbellis in 1. d. 40. a. 2. [Ista propositio, [Pradestina∣tus potest damnari] est falsa in sensu composito; & vera in sensu divise] Vide explicat. It is unchristian and unmanly to revile men that say the same that we do, meerly through distaste, or because we will not be at the labour to understand them.

707. Obj. We cannot be reconciled to them that give so much to mans free-will. Ans. How much do you mean? It's a dreadful thing to hear some good men ignorantly blaspheme God, as the chief cause of every villany in the World, meerly ••poh a factious prejudice and partial op∣position to other men, whom they never understood! Would it please you to hear that God draggeth men into sin as by the hair of the hea••, when the Devil himself can but allure them? I know it would not. D•• but make it plain as a granted thing, that God doth not Will or Love sin, and do more to Cause it, than the Devil, or the wickedest sinner himself doth, and you can scarce tell how to differ from the greater part of the Schoolmen themselves, or sober moderate Lutherans that are thought to be dissenters. Let it be the Devils work, and no good Christians, to paint God in the shape of the Father of lies and all iniquity: Our God is Holy, and Holiness becometh all that draw near him, and is the mark of all that shall see his face. Dear Brethren, let not us that daily and justly con∣demn our selves for sin, and take such odious titles to our selves, make our selves yet Holier▪ than God, and make God a far greater Lover and Cause•• of sin than we are.

I will add one description of Free-will out of the last named School∣man, D'Orbellis a Scotist, in 2. sent. d. 25. dub. 2. And tell me what the most rigid opposer of Free-will can desire more.

[Q. Whether Free-will be equally in all that have it? Ans. Free-will may be compared 1. To that which it is free from, 2. And to that which it is free to 1. In the first sense, there is a threefold Liberty; 1. From constraint, 2. From sin, 3. From misery. Liberty from sin is not equally in good and bad, nor in man on earth and in Heaven. As Aug. Enchir. That's the freest will, that cannot at all serve sin. And Liberty from misery is not equally in all: But Liberty from constraint is equally in all, because the will cannot be forced. Though in God and the blessed there be a Ne∣cessity of Immutability, yet not of Co-action. And necessity of Immu∣tability, repugneth not Liberty: For the will is called Free simply, not because it so willeth this, as that it can will the contrary: but because that whatever it willeth, it desireth it by its own Empire; Because it so willeth any thing, that it willeth to will it: And therefore in the act of willing, it moveth it self, and useth dominion on it self; And so far it is called Free, though it be immutably ordained to it. * 1.7 2. But if free-will be compared to that to which it is free, viz. To do right (for as Anselm saith, It is a faculty or power to keep rectitude) so it is not equally in all: For this Power is in God of Himself; and in the Crea∣tures received from God: And it is more in the confirmed than the noncon∣firmed,

and in the good than in the bad. And seeing to be able to sin, is a diminution of Liberty; therefore according to Anselm, to be able to sin, is no Liberty nor part of liberty▪ taking Free-will according to the Common Reason of it. But to have power as to the Act which de∣formity is annext to, may well be a part of Liberty, not simply, but of Created Liberty. And so the deformity in the Act more agreeth with free-will as it is a Creature, or as it is of Nothing, than as it is Free.—Dub. 3. Can free-will be compelled? Answ. God can destroy it, but not force it; for that is a Contradiction: But he can well effectually in∣cline it, and make it move it self freely to which part God will. * 1.8

I think this is as high as you can desire. And yet there is nothing in all this, but what both parties may well bear with, and it hath indeed much soundness in it. But here he treateth only about equality of Liberty, but how much of it the unsanctified have, he elsewhere sheweth, and I have oft told you how much the most are agreed in it.

708. To conclude, The heart and summ of all our differences is how to make God the total first Cause of all Good, and not to make him the Cause of sin, and the damner of man for that which he himself insupera∣bly causeth. I hope both sides hold fast both the conclusions (that our sin and destruction is chiefly of our selves, but in God is our help, and our good and happiness is all from Him.) And if they both hold this, it is not the difficulty of joyning them together, and opening Gods unsearch∣able methods, that must disjoynt us, and draw us to withdraw our Love, or contemn each other, or disturb the Churches peace and unity.

709. Gregory Ariminensis and Gabr. Biel have come so near the rigid Dominicans that the Reader may think that they plainly say the same of Gods Causing all the Act of sin, as Alvarez, Twisse and Rutherford say. But let the Learned Reader note these things; 1. That over and over they affirm that though God Cause all the Act of sin, yet he is but the Causa partialis: I like not the phrase my self for the reasons before given; but by this they do greatly differ from the aforesaid Authors: see Greg. 2. d. 34, 35. ar. 3. frequently saying, that God is Causa partialis. And in answering Aureolus ad nonum he thus fully explaineth it:

Dicendum quod Causa dupliciter potest accipi Totalis: Uno modo Totalis totalitate relata ad Causam; id est, sufficiens Causare effectum absque concursu alterius Causae praecise causando sicut Causat: & sic neganda est ista Consequen∣tia: Quoniam nec Deus nec Creatura est sic Totalis Causa actus mali. Nunquam enim talis actus fieret, si De••s non Causaret ••um; Neque etiam si Creatura non causaret, & Deus non aliter causaret, quam nunc de facto causat, concurrendo cum Creatura. Alio modo Totalis totulitate relata ad effectum, id est, totum effectum causaus: Et ejusdem poss••nt esse plures totales Causae: ejusdem enim Volitionis secundum totum est Causa Notitia & etiam Voluntas.

Here note, that 1. He taketh not Causa totalis for the same with Soli∣taria. 2. That he asserteth only, that God causeth the Totum of the Act, but not by a total Causation of it: And that Gods way or sort of Causation is not sufficient to cause it if man concurred not, which they say he freely doth, and could do otherwise.

710. So that these mens way of freeing God from being the cause of sin is like Scotus his; As if (as I before made the similitude) a Fa∣ther to try his Childs obedience, bids him lift up a Stone, which he cannot do of himself; and the Father holdeth his hand and joyneth his strength, yet not ad ultimum posse, but with a purposed restraint so far that if the Child will not put forth his degree of strength,

it shall not be done. But who can comprehend the wayes of Divinè concurse?

711. And it is to be noted, that when Aureolus argueth, that [if God immediately concurr, either he determineth mans act, or man determineth Gods act, or neither; which are all absurd:] here Biel citeth Scotus as holding the third, and answering Neither, as no absurdity. But Greg. Arim. that seemeth to go higher, yet saith, [* 1.9 Juxta modum loquendi ar∣guentis dico quod Deus sequitur determinationem Voluntatis: non qu•••• determinatio Voluntatis fit aliqua Entitas distincta à Voluntate & act•• ejus, quia primo fiat à voluntate—nec intelligendo quod prius natura Vi∣luntas agat actum quam Deus, proprie loquendo de priori natura: Quoni∣am tunc sequeretur quod posset illum agere, Deo non coagente.—Sed ad hunc sensum dico Deum sequi Determinationem Voluntatis; Quoni∣am ideo Deus agit illum actum, quia † 1.10 cum Voluntas agit. Et non ideo qu•••• Deus agit, ideo Voluntas agit: & ideo magis proprie dicitur Deus coager•• Voluntati in talem actum causandi, quam Voluntas dicatur coagere De••.] You see that these Nominals do toto coelo differ from Alvarez, T••isse and Rutherford. (And yet Alvarez would fain be moderate in that one Disputation which Dr. Twisse in a peculiar Digression oppugneth.)

712. And note, that the thing which moved Gregory to go so far as he doth is, Lest God should be denyed to be the Cause of all Natural En∣tity: But if you set before the will, the Creator (or Chief Good) and the Creature (or sensual pleasure) the Act in genere as a Volition is an Entity, or modus entis: But who can prove that comparatively as it is terminated on the Creature, rather than on the Creator, it hath any Natural Entity, more than the act in genere; or any modality which God is not able to give a Creature power to cause, or not cause, witho•••• predetermination from God or any other?

713. Yea, Ariminensis seemeth to mean this himself, when ibid. d. 34, 35. a. 2. ad 5. he saith [Deus ••potest solus actum illum causare, & act•••• odiendi, id est, qui est odium Dei, & mendacium etiam potest causare▪ Non tamen potest causare actum odiendi Deum, seu odium Dei: neq•••• potest Causare Mendacium vel mentiri, neque potest causare actum ••••∣lum; Quare quemcunque actum causaret solus, licet ille nunc sit Odi•••• Dei vel mendacium, vel aliquis actus malus, si tamen Deus solus ill•••• causaret, sicut potest illum causare solus, non esset actus, neque odi••m De•• vel mendacium.] But whatever he thought, I have before answered this difficulty of the Entity of the acts of sin.

I mention Ariminensis judgement the rather, because the Learned Calvinists commend him: And I remember when I once askt Arch-Bishop Usher which of the Schoolmen he most valued as the soundest, he said Greg. Ariminensis.

714. Is not all this doctrine from these men cited conformable to the doctrine of the Synod of Dort? Who in the conclusion name many positi∣ons which they and all the Reformed Churches with them do, toto pect••re detestari, abhorr with all their hearts: Among which one is, Deum n•••••• puroque Voluntatis arbitrio, absque omni peccati ullius respectu vel intuit••, maximam mundi partem ad aeternam damnationem praedestinasse & cre∣asse. And another is, Eodem modo quo electio fons est & causá fidei ac b••∣norum operum, reprobationem esse causam infidelitatis & impietatu: Another is, Multos fidelium infantes ab uberibus matrum innoxios abri•••• & tyrannice in Gehennam praecipitari, adeo ut iis nec Baptismus, nec Ec∣clesiae in corum baptismo preces, prodesse queant.

And it is much to be noted, that in conclusion they desire all men to judge of the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches, not by Calumnies, nor by the Private sayings of some D••ctors, ant••ent or later, but by the publick Confessions of the Churches, •••••• and by the Declaration of this Synod. Therefore not by the extreams of Beza, Piscator, Spanh••m••••s, Twisse and Rutherford; but by what the Articles of the Churches subscribed by the Pastors do contain. Otherwise we shall be far more foolish than the Papists, who will not expose their Church to obioquy or division by standing to the sayings of Alvarez or Molina, or any private Doctor whosoever.

715. And it is notorious to any impartial-pe••user, that the whole fo•••• of the Doctrine of the Church of England, in the Articles, Catechism, Liturgie, Homilies, and all their publick Writings, was drawn up by men of Augustines judgement, who were for absolute Election, and Uni∣versal sufficient Redemption and Grace ad posse, but for no Reprobation but on foresight of sin.

716. And it is greatly to be noted, with grief of heart, that among Good men, it is partly General prejudice, but chiefly the Interest of their Reputation with those among whom they live, which is the great impe∣diment of the Churches Concord. The name of a Calvinist is so hate∣ful among the Papists, that even the Predeterminant Dominicans who go higher than ever Calvin did, (and the Jansenists, who go as high in the main cause, and higher than the Synod of Dort,) do yet find it a matter of necessity to rail at Luther, Zuinglius, Calvin, &c. lest their party should think that they are turned Hereticks. And the Protestants that agree in some points with the Papists, are fain to rack the Papists words, to a worse sense than is meant, lest their fierce opposers should make men believe that they are half Papists, or err with them. And the moderate Calvinists are fain to stretch hard, that they may seem to differ more from the Arminians than they do, lest a self-conceited re∣viler should blot their names with the suspicion of Arminianism. O doleful case of all the Churches! But where Protestants are few and made odious by the Papists, as differing from them further than they do, there Reputation is not so great a temptation; And there they freely confess their concord, where they do not differ. And so in Colloquia Torunensi c. 4. de grat. depuls. Calum. sect. 5, 6. all the Reformed Chur∣ches of Poland with Joh. Bergius the Duke of Brandenburgs Chaplain, and others did profess, [Falso accusamur, quasi Mortis & Meriti Christi pr•• omnibus sufficientiam negemus, aut virtutem imminuamus, cum potius idem hic quod ipsa Synodus Tridentina ses. 6. cap. 3. doceamus, viz. Etsi Christus pro omnibus mortuns sit, non omnes tamen mortis ejus benefici∣um recipere, sed eos duntaxat quibus meritum passionis ejus communica∣tur. Causam etiam seu culpam, cur non omnibus communicetur, nequa∣quam in merito & morte Christi, sed in ipsis hominibus esse fatemur.] Here was no partial interest to make them afraid of being suspected to comply with Papists.

717. I end with this request to all my Brethren who by their averse∣ness to the Doctrine of Common or Universal Grace, do keep open the Churches dangerous wounds, 1. That they will give Scripture leave to rule their judgements, and try whether it be possible to build special Grace, on any other foundation than presupposed common Grace? and whether to deny this, be not to deny the very tenor of the Gospel, and pull up the foundations of our Religion?

2. That they will but read over Davenants two dissertations, and the second Tome (at least) of the Learned Dallaeus his Apology against Spa••∣hemius, that is, The words of an hundred and twenty antient Writers and Councils, beginning at Clemens Romanus, and ending with Theophylact, and sixty three Protestant Divines and Synods (to which I think I could add as many more, that speak more plainly to the point, or near it.) And if after all this they have so great a zeal to contract the Glory of Gods Mercy, and deny his Grace, as that they will cast off the judge∣ment of all the antient Churches of Christ, and so many later, rather than acknowledge it, I shall cease disputing with them, and seek to quench the fire which they kindle in the Churches of Christ by Prayers and Tears.

Notes

• * 1.1

  That is, Rewardable act•• of man.
• * 1.2

  Which he largely shew∣eth in their own words; better than any that ever I saw, and may save the Reader much labour in the investigation of the sense of the Antients herein.
• * 1.3

  See Zumel reciting the opinions of Molina, Bel∣larmine and Suarez de Gratia efficaci, Part ••••••••. pag. 50, 51, &c.
• * 1.4

  I am told to my face that our Doctrine of Abso∣lute Reprobation we have learned from the Pa∣pists; Another professeth that the Jesuits ten of them for one favour the absolute irrespective de∣cree, follow herein, as they think S. Austin, but especially their S. Thomas and Scotus, with all the rabble of rotten School∣men, and the whole tribe at this day of the Dominicans, who are busie Zealots for the Cause, of whose consent some among us are not ashamed to brag. Twisse against Hoard li. 1. pag. 85. This reporter maketh us at one with Jesuites and Dominicans. And yet may we not be so with Protestants?
• * 1.5

  When even Bradwardin•• holdeth, that Gods Voli∣tion of mans act alone (which Bellarmine in∣cludeth) is the effectual unresistible Grace •••• parte Dei operantis.
• * 1.6

  Ruiz de Praedefin. tr. 2. disp. 6. sect. 2. p. 86, 87. Deus pro suo beneplacito de∣crevit ab aeterno efficaciter causare liberas operationes honestas prius ratione quam illas praevideret ut abso∣lute futuras—Unde in∣fallibiliter sequitur liberi arbitrii operatio (neces∣sitate consequentiae:) Pag. 87. 1. Scriptura fi∣dem, sanctitatem & quod∣libet discrimen sanctorum à reprobis, reducit ad electionem gratuitam: 2. Ex vi sortis, &c. 3. Di∣vina electio absque me∣ritis est causa quae dis∣cernit justos ab impiis. Quamvis (n) liberum arbitrium sit secundaria causa s••ipsum discernens, qua potuit resistere vel consentire—Haec tamen liberi arbitrii cooperatio revocatur in Deum ut in primariam causam suaviter praedefinientem. E•• Tr. 3. d. 18. sect. 3. p. 222. Ea merita nihil obsun•• quidditati gratiae quae tanquam ex prima radic•• nascuntur ex prima gratid data absque ullo prorsus merito: At••amen quodli∣bet etiam levissimum & re∣motissimum meritum de congruo, si ex illo nascitur prima gratia, vel propter illud datur, obesse quiddi∣tati gratiae: Yea, he ad∣deth p. 223. Conditio, ratio, vel occasio prorsus separata à merito, impetra∣tione & dispositione, adhuc repugnaret (primae) gra∣tiae: quoniam adhuc ma∣neret debitum connaturali∣tatis, quamvis abesset de∣bitum obsequii.
• * 1.7

  But it were not so, if it were immutably ordain∣ed and moved to sin.
• * 1.8

  But to sin he will not so incline it.
• * 1.9

  Ubi suprae ad 8.
• † 1.10

  I think it should be [Eum.]