Richard Baxter's Catholick theologie plain, pure, peaceable, for pacification of the dogmatical word-warriours who, 1. by contending about things unrevealed or not understood, 2. and by taking verbal differences for real,

SECT. XVIII. A Confutation of Dr. Twisse's Digr. 5. l. 2. sect. 1. Vind. Grat. (Book 18)

575. I Come now to consider of what is said by them that go further about Gods will or Causality as to sin. And because Dr. Twisse hath a peculiar Digression (Vindic. Grat. li. 2. p. 1. Digr. 4.) I will somewhat animadvert upon it. He beginneth [Sententia nostra haec est, Deum hactenus dici posse Velle peccatum quatenus vult ut peccatum ••i∣at—viz. ipso permittente: And so he maketh the question, An Dens Velit ut peccatum eveniat ipso permittente? Arminius thought God willed only his own Permission of the sin: Twisse saith, that he willed that sin should come to pass, God permitting it. Arminius his concession cannot be proved (as I have shewed;) But Twisses must be disproved. And 1. I will give you our Reasons against it. * 1.1

576. Let the Reader remember, that what the Author saith of Gods Willing, he also in the point of Predetermination saith of his working: viz. that he Causeth as much as he willeth: But I pass that by now because I have largely confuted it elsewhere. And to speak to One is to speak to both.

577. 1. All sober Christians are agreed, on what side soever, that God is not the Cause of sin, except some odd presumers who are con∣demned by the generality: One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia, whom the Synod of Dort rejected: Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod. Beza himself (in Rom. 8. 28. & passim) abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy. But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin: Yea more, very much more than wicked men or Devils are: which is not true.

578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second pre-moved pre∣determined Cause of the Act (of Volition and Execution) whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth: But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent: 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin: His saying, Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder, maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin, when they are committed, which they would not be without the Law. 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions. 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat, (and is the first predetermining Cause, even the total Cause, of all that is in the act and all its circum∣stances, without which predetermination it could not be.) So that man doth but will what God first willeth, and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act, as the pen in my hand. 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being, the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result, and hath no other cause.

579. And note here what Estius before cited (after Aquinas) saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat, is all that the Sinner himself doth, when he willeth sin. And therefore it's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin, and willing the event, futurity and existence of it, ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat: (Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction.) For he willeth sin, who willeth the existence of it, or that it be or come to pass.

580. And note, that it is both matter and form, Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat: For it is sin: And forma dat nomen. It is not sin, but by the form of sin. But if they had said otherwise, it had been all one: For he that willeth the fundamentum, relate and corre∣late, * 1.2 willeth the Relation.

581. There is nothing left to be said then, but that God willeth that sin be done, but not as sin, or because it is sin; But this is nothing. For, 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin, but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination, or for seeming good. 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God, so doing is but one of their sins, which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it (and predetermined them to it:) so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God.

582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice, and so do not wicked men, but for wicked ends or in enmity to God; I answer, That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not, but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not: For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat.

583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente, non faciente.

Answ. The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors. For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed. 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstan∣tiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of. 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law: And why then do they put in the word [permittente?] Would not that de∣ceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do, but only permit, when they mean no such thing? For that is my second reason against them.

584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin (which is false:) For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause, he cannot be said to Permit: To do a thing, and move another to do it, will not stand with proper permission.

585. Obj. But God preserveth our own Liberty in acting.

Answ. 1. By Liberty you mean nothing but Willingness as such, that God doth not make mens Nilling to be a Willing or contra in the same act. Which is but to say that God causeth me to Will sin, and not to Will-nill-it? 2. If you mean more, I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will, to Will or Nill contrary to the Volition and ph••sical premoving predetermination of the first cause. 3. But if all this were so, it's no∣thing to the present case; and doth not prove that God is not the Cause of the sin, but only that man is a Cause also, caused by the first Cause; and that God Willeth and Causeth us to sin willingly and freely.

586. 3. By this means they make God equally to Will and Cause our Holiness and our sin: For they cannot possibly tell us what he doth more to Cause our Holiness, than to Will it, and to predetermine the will of man to it, (besides commanding it, which is a moral act, and we speak

only of proper efficiency.) He doth but will that Holiness be, and cause all that hath any entity in it; And so they say he doth about sin.

587. Obj. He loveth our Holiness for it self, and so he doth not sin.

Answ. The first is denyed by themselves, if you speak of Gods end: For they confess that God only is his own end, for which he loveth all things: 2. And his Love is either his efficient or complacential Volition. 1. The efficient which is all that is now in question they must confess is equal to both, if he equally will the existence of both.

Object. But he hath a Complacence in Good only.

Answ. 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own will as efficient. Therefore if sin be the fulfilling of his Will, he hath a com∣placency in it. The formal reason of a pleasing object to God is, as it is the fulfilling of his own Will; And to break his Law they make to be such: ergo, pleasing. 2. But if it were not so, that's nothing to our Case, of the efficient Will.

588. 4. To avoid tediousness, in sum, This opinion seemeth to me, to leave very little or no place for the Christian Religion. For 1. It overthroweth the formale objectum fidei, which is Veracitas Divina, and leaveth no certainty of any word of God: For if he do will and pre∣determine by premotion, ut fiat omne mendacium, quod fit, then we have no way to know that he did not so by the Prophets and Apostles. 2. It maketh the Scripture false, which saith so much of Gods hatred and un∣willingness of sin. 3. It obliterateth the notion of Gods Holiness, which is made the great reason of our holiness. 4. It maketh mans Holiness to be no Holiness, but a common or indifferent thing. 5. It maketh sin, so little odious (as being a Divine off-spring) as will destroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it. 6. It will thereby nullifie all our Godly sor∣row, repenting, confession, and all practice of means against any sin. 7. It will hardly let men believe that Christ came into the world, and did and suffered so much to save men from sin, and to destroy it. 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghost to sanctifie souls and mortifie sin. 9. It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell, and that God will damn men for ever, for that which they did upon his prevolition and predeter∣mination, unavoidably. 10. It seemeth to give Satans description to God, and more. For Satan can but tempt us to sin, but they make God absolutely to will that it be, and physically to predetermine us to it. And so Christ that came to destroy the work of the Devil, the father of lies, malice and murder, should come to destroy the work of God. 11. It tak∣eth away the reason of Church discipline, and purity, and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedness. 12. It would tempt Magistrates accord∣ingly to judge of vice and vertue, good and bad in the Common-wealth.

589. Now to their arguments. 1. Rev. 17. 17. [God put it into their hearts to do his will, and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beast.]

Answ. 1. He that readeth Dr. Hammonds exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome, with the effects, will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark as not to be fit to found such a doctrine on. 2. It was the effect of the sin that God willed, and not the sin. 3. He is not said to put the sin into their hearts, whether pride, covetousness, cruelty, &c. but only to do his pleasure and agree (or make one decree) to give up &c. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, which with their own sins, would have that effect which he willed: If a thief have a will to rob, God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way, where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way.

590. But for brevity, besides what is said, I shall farther direct the ••mpartial Reader, how to answer all such objections: And withall let the ••onfounding cavillers against distinguishing, see, what blasphemy and sub∣version of Religion may enter, for want of one or two distinctions which ••onfused heads regard not.

1. Be sure to distinguish the name of sin, from the nature. 2. And ••emember that no outward act is sin any further than it is Voluntary (by privation or position of Volitions.) 3. Distinguish between the Act as it ••s Agentis, and as it is in Passo. 4. And between the Act and the effect. 5. Between the effect of a single cause and of divers causes, making a compound effect. 6. And between a forbidden object compared with the ••ontrary, and one forbidden object compared with another.

591. And then all this satisfying Truth will lye naked before you. 1. That the same name usually signifieth the sin and the effect of sin; or the Act as Acted and as Received. Adultery, Murder, Theft, usually sig∣nifie the Acts of the Adulterer, Murderer, Thief, as done and as received ••n Passo, and as effecting.

2. That the former only is the sin, viz. first the Volition, Nolition, or Non-Volition, and secondarily the imperate act as animated by the Will: And no more. The reception of this act in Passo is not sin (as such;) nor the most immediate effect of this act: It is but the effect of sin.

3. And you will see that the same effect may have several causes: a Good and bad; And so God may be a cause of that effect, which mans sin also concurreth to cause: And God doth not therefore Will or Cause the sin.

4. And you will see that God may morally cause the effect as it is on this object rather than another forbidden, though both make the act sinful, and yet not Cause it as it is exercised on either of those objects com∣pared with such as are not forbidden.

592. And you will here plainly see that God hath many wayes to Cause the effect without willing or Causing the sin. As for instance, 1. He can do it by adding (as I said before) a good act to the sinners bad one. As when Caiaphas is willing to kill Christ, God can put into Caiaphas's * 1.3 thoughts, the jealousie of the Romans over the Jews, and the visible dan∣ger they are in if they should be thought to have another King: which thoughts in themselves are true and good: So he can put into Pharaoh's thoughts the loss of the Israelites service, which was not sinful of it self.* 1.4

593. And 2. God can set that object before a sinner which he is most inclined to abuse: Which is not to Will his sin: But may proceed from Gods Willing the Effect. As if Absalom be by Pride and Lust enclined to Adultery, his Fathers Wives may be in his eye and way. And God may will to punish David by their passive pollution, without willing his act of sin at all, interior or exterior.

594. 3. And God can remove other objects out of the way, so that this object shall be solitary, or most obvious to the sinner. As if a drunken man were resolved to kill the next he met, God can keep Peter, John, &c. out of his way, and so Judas shall be the next.

595. 4. Yea God can suspend his own intrinsick concurse as to some one sinful act by which it will follow that it will fall upon another ob∣ject. Many other such wayes God hath, which are unknown to us.

596. And if you suppose a man so inclined to Murder or Adultery as that he will exercise it on the next most provoking object, if God now did Cause the Act, as exercised on a forbidden object, compared with another

it were to Cause the sin. But if he only be the moral Cause that he e. g. kill Judas rather than Peter, this is not to Cause sin: For to choose Judas rather than Peter for the object, is no sin: For, as I said, God c•••• do it only by removing Peter, and Willing that he shall be preserved.

597. Suppose a King that hath made Laws against Murder forekno•• that a Robber is waiting in such a Road for a prey, and that a Traytor broke out of Prison will go that way, and so will be rob'd and kill'd, He may will or desire the Death of the Traytor as a punishment; He may restra•••• some that would travail that way before him; and may restrain some that would lay hold on the Robber, or drive him away, that so this Traytor may be killed: And yet only Permit, and not Will at all, the Robbers Will or Ac•• as it is Agentis, but punish him for it, and hate it, and Will only the effect.

598. The next Text cited is, 1 Pet. 2. 8. Whereunto also they were ap∣pointed (viz. to stumble on the rock of offence.) Resp. 1. This hath re∣spect to Luke 2. 34. [he is set for the fall of many, &c.] and of Christs own words, that he that falleth on this stone shall be broken in pieces. And no more can hence be gathered, but that God hath decreed that as a Punishing Judge, 1. He will leave the rejecters of Christ to go on i•• their own sinful way, 2. And that their opposition to him shall be the•••• ruine. So that 1. He doth not speak this of any but the rejecters of Christ that deserved it. 2. He speaketh not at all as willing their sin, but only as one that penally denyeth them further grace. 3. But the thing that he is said to Ordain them to, is not sin, but Ruine the consequent of their sin: The word [stumbling and falling] signifying their destra∣ction.

599. The next Text is, 2 Thes. 2. God shall send them strong delusi∣ons (or the acting of deceit) that they should believe a lye. Answ. Here is nothing signified, but 1. That God shall permit Magicians and false Teachers to vent deceits, 2. And permit wicked men to believe them: which is mentioned as a permitted consequent, and not as an end intend∣ed by God: And the word sending is used because the permission was Penal for their sin. And his punishing-providence might morally cause the deceivers rather to go towards these men than towards others.

600. The next is Rom. 1. 24, 26, 28. God gave them up to uncle••••∣ness, to vile affections, to a reprobate mind, &c.

Resp. Here is nothing at all said but a Penal desertion and permission, and no Will or Cause of sin in God.

601. The next is Act. 4. 28. To do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.

Answ. Here is nothing said of sin at all, but of the effect of it: All that was done on Christ, even all the effect in passo God fore-determined should be done: But the Act ut volentis & agentis he neither willed nor caused as on this forbidden object. And though elsewhere the Doctor deride this answer (that God decreed Christ should dye, or be sacrificed, and yet decreed not that the Jews or any one else should do it,) It is a great and necessary truth: He that willed the effect, and did much him∣self to cause it, willed not the murderers sinful act: And permitting and fore∣seeing it was enough.

602. The next is Isa. 10. 6. and so Amos 16. 17. Prov. 22. 14. 2 Sam. 12. 11. 1 King. 11. 31. & 12. 24. God sends the Assyrian as his rod. Thy Wife shall commit Adultery, and thy Children fall by the sword.] They that are hated of God shall fall therein—] David was foretold his Wives should be vitiated: The ten Tribes fell from Rehoboam: It was of God that he took not good counsel: Pharaohs heart was hardened by God.

Answ. The first is only a Prophesie, and a penal effect of sin, and no∣thing of Gods Willing or Causing sin. And so is the second: Though God can send afflicters by the wayes before mentioned, without willing their sin. The third speaketh only of a penal permission of sin. And the rest all speak only of Gods penal permission of the sin, and his de∣creeing and foretelling the effects of it, and his occasioning the sinner to take one sinful object (not as such, but) rather than another.

603. As the Wind hath its natural course, and so hath the Water, and the Miller Causeth neither of them, but supposing them, doth so set his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient, they shall fulfil his will, and he is the Cause of the effect, viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn: so is it easie for God to use mens sins (permitted) to his ends without willing them * 1.5.

604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reasons: And the first is, be∣cause † 1.6 Permission is a sign of Willingness as well as command: And what is permitted (and that for good) infallibly cometh to pass.

Answ. All this is before confuted. * 1.7 It's false that non impedire effi∣caciter is a sign that one wills the thing. The King that only forbiddeth drunkenness or murder by a Law with penalties, could also lock up or guard some men, and effectually keep them from the sin. And doth he Will it because he doth not so? And it's false that all cometh to pass, that is not hindered.

605. His second argument is spoken very plainly and grosly, viz. [Both sides confess that the substrate act is done, God not only willing it, but effecting it, v. g. Absalom's congress with his Fathers Concubines: Yea not only the congress as an exercised imperate act, but that the Voli∣tion of congress, the internal elicite act, was efficiently and Principally of God: why then should it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done, God willing it, though not effecting it, or any way fail∣ing of his duty? Especially when the Malice and Deformity doth necessa∣rily follow the substrate act, in respect of the Creature though not of God.]

Answ. Hobbes could desire little more. But we vehemently deny that the substrate act is of God as it is morally specified, that is, as it is ex∣ercised on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis: God did not as a principal efficient cause Absalom to Will that Congress with his Fathers Concubines, nor to Act it. The nature of the Wind and Water, and God as the Cause of Nature, cause the wind and water to act, and to act as they do, on their own part: But that they turn this wheel and milstone, and run in this Channel rather than ano∣ther, is long of the Miller. Absalom's Motus qua motus, and qua cupido ordinata, was natural from God: but not as acted hic & nunc towards this object: And the Reception of the Act by that Object supposing his lust and action, might be morally and penally from God.

606. If you here bring forth the common Medusa's head, and tell me, that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature, and so dependent; I confidently answer you for God, 1. No man is in∣jurious to himself: And God did not wrong himself, when by making a Creature with free self-determining Power, he resolved so far (parti∣ally)

to suspend his own operation, so as not to necessitate the will: no more than he wrongeth himself by a Greater suspension, in making no more Worlds or Creatures.

2. You quite mistake: We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx, nor determine it, but terminate it, and determine of that effect which requireth both Causes, God and Man, and cannot be (ordinarily) by one alone, because God hath otherwise appointed. And again I be∣seech the adversaries to note, How great and innumerable changes are made in the world, by the various Disposition of Recipients? The Rose and Vine and Weed and Dunghill, do not at all Change the Action of the Sun: but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cause, that its Act hath such various effects. And it is the Millers work in making a various and special Receptivity in his Channel, Wheels, &c. which causeth the variety of effects. And God hath enabled men Variously and freely to Receive his Influx.

607. His third Argument is, God giveth not that effectual Grace, without which he fore-knoweth sin will not be avoided: ergo he is willing that it be done.

Answ. I deny the Consequent: It only followeth that he doth not Ab∣solutely and effectually Nill it. If the King have several subjects inclined to eat a luscious poyson; And his Children he effectually keepeth from it; one he locketh up, another he committeth to a Keeper, another he keep∣eth the poison from: But to a Traytor he saith, [I once forgave thee, and saved thy life, and I now command thee that thou avoid this poison, and if thou do not, it will torment and kill thee; but if thou wilt take no warn∣ing, take what thou gettest by it.] Can you prove that it is his Will that this man eat the poyson prohibited?

608. Next he citeth Augustines thred-bare sayings, and blameth Aqui∣nas and Arminius for denying his Authority, and commendeth the greater reverence of Bellarmine: And so Anselm, Hugo, &c.

Answ. 1. We stick not on one mans Authority; God holdeth not his Holiness and the Church its Religion on Augustines authority. 2. Au∣gustine hath ten times more plain enough for what I hold: See the places cited in Paul. Eiren. Triad. Patrum. 3. He knew it's like that Estius and many more expound Augustines words as terminating Gods Volition on his own permission, and not on the sin, or fieri. 4. I think plainly that Augustine there spake not of inward Volitions, but outward Acts, and that not as Agentis but in passo or the effects. And so it is true, that no mur∣der, theft, treason, or other effect is produced in the world, but what God positively decreeth shall be produced, either by doing some effects himself (as drowning the world,) or permitting sinners to do them, while he causeth not their act but the Receptivity of the Passum, and so the ef∣fect, &c.

609. Pag. 194. Retorting on Aquin. he thus argueth Because God doth will his own Goodness, therefore it is necessary that God will that sin be done, he permitting it. For it is not to will his essential Goodness, which needeth no acquisition, but he willeth to manifest his Goodness. But the evil of sin is not opposite to the manifesting of Gods Goodness: Yea no∣thing is more * 1.8 conducible to it than this; I say to the manifesting of Gods Goodness by way of mercy in sparing or by way of Justice in pu∣nishing.

Answ. Horresco recitans, 1. Gods Volition of his Essential Goodness is his Necessary Volition. 2. God hath no End to acquire, but alwayes hath his end, and is never without it. 3. If God had necessarily willed

the particular way of manifesting his Goodness, then he doth all things necessarily, and could do no otherwise, and it seems by you could not manifest it without sin. 4. Doth he not manifest his Goodness as much to the Innumerable Glorious Angels, who never sinned? And would it not have been as much manifested to us if we had been as they? 5. The very indetermination of the will, and its mediate Liberty is not the high∣est excellency of his Creatures: It is better than the sensitive Necessity of Bruits, and lower than the confirmed Necessity of the blessed: It is our defectibility. And the excellentest or Best of his works most honour Gods Goodness. 6. Is it not the strongest temptation that men have in this world to doubt of or dishonour the Goodness of God, to think how he permitteth the world to be drowned in wickedness, and be so like to hell? 7. Doth not Christ turn the Prayers of all Christians against your do∣ctrine, viz. that Gods name may be hallowed, his Kingdom come, and his will done on earth as it is in Heaven (which is not by any sin?) 8. Do not your words tempt men to be indifferent to sin, if not to love it, if nothing be more conducible to honour Gods Goodness? 9. Is not that conclusion a great wrong to Christ, Scripture, Ministry and Holiness, as being no more conducible to manifest Gods Goodness than sin is? 10. It is not true that sin is any Cause, or true Means at all of glorifying God or doing any good. It is but a presupposed Evil, by delivering us from which God is glorified. As your eating poyson may occasion the ho∣nour of an Antidote and Physicion: It is no Cause or proper medium of it, but only an occasion, and mischief sine quo non; But if God had not saved us from sin committed, he could have glorified himself in saving us from committing it: God loveth and is glorified most in that which is most like him as his Image, which is, the Holiest sinless soul. To be a medium to Gods glory is to be good: To be as conducible to it as any thing, is to be as good as any thing save God and his glory. But sin hath no Good, much less such good. Why else doth not God equally de∣light in sin, and in the death of the wicked, as in holiness, repentance and our life? seeing all things are for himself, and that which glorifieth him most, is best. 11. Here also confusion causeth mischief: one distinction might have scattered this mist, viz. Between sin indeed and sin in notion. Sin indeed, or essence and existence never did good nor honoured God. Sin in notion or in esse objectivo is no sin, but the Matter of Vertue and * 1.9 Holiness, and doth much good. When you say God knoweth sin from eter∣nity, you'l say with Scotus, that in esse cognito sin was in God from Eternity: But so sin is not sin. David saith, My sin is ever before me, Psal. 51. And we daily Repent of it, and confess it: But this is but to have the Idea or conception of it in the mind, and so it is not sin indeed but the notion of it, which is in esse objectivo. Else it would defile us to think of it, and repent of it; whereas thus sin objectively is the mat∣ter of the grace and duty of Repentance, Hatred, fear, watchfulness, pray∣er, confession, &c. And so sin in esse objectivo as a grace may glorifie God.

610. To Aquin. that saith Malum non est appetibile he saith, that Ma∣lum moris quod opponitur bono, est proprium uniuscujusque; meum malum bono meo—Though the sin of a man willing that which is forbid∣den him be his sin,—yet it followeth not that God may not will this Evil of another: The Reason is, because it is not forbidden to God to will it: wherefore though it be evil and dishonest in man to will it to whom it is forbidden, yet not to God—And seeing that Moral Evil or sin is summè conducibile, chiefly or most conducible to make way to represent

Gods Goodness, this abundantly sufficeth to prove it desirable to God—We say that this evil which we affirm to be willed of God, is not at all evil as it is objected to the will of God, but as to the will of the creature, being forbidden the creature, but not forbidden God.

Answ. Shall we preach thus to the people? Will this Doctrine con∣vert souls to repentance or faith in Christ? 1. The question is not, Whe∣ther to will sin be sin in God? But Whether he will and cause the sin of man? which you sadly assert.

2. Gods Glory is our End, and to forbear things prohibited is but the means: If sin conduce as much as Christ and Holiness to Gods Glory, why may we not desire it sub ratione medii, though not as praeceptum? We must desire that which is most conducible to Gods Glory.

3. Though God be under no Law, his Perfection of Nature and Will is the fountain of all Laws, and instead of a Law to him. And we must be Holy because our God is Holy.

4. It is still false that sin is any Medium to Gods Glory, or desirable, or hath any good.

5. God is Good and delighteth to do good. And he is the Just Ruler * 1.10 of the World: And I would not have Kings take such Justice for a pattern as you describe, as if God vehemently forbad sin, and sent his Son, and Spirit, and Ministers as an Army against it into the World, and will da•••• men for it for ever, and yet willeth and causeth it, as summè conducibils * 1.11 to his Ends, and saith [It is not evil to me, though it be to you. I'le ••••••∣ment you for doing it, though it was by my Will and predetermination.] And what Justice should Kings rather imitate than Gods?

6. Sin is not malum Deo so as to Hurt him, or make him Guilty: But it is, so as to be a Violation of his Laws, and a contempt and dishonour to his Wisdom, Goodness, Greatness, Authority, Justice, Mercy, Truth, &c. If all the World joyned in hating and blaspheming God that made them, though you say, that this is not malum Dei, but malum nostri, and therefore God may will it ut fiat as a desirable thing, we cannot be content with such confusion. Malum is either Physicum vel morale; and either in ali∣quo or contra aliquem. God is not capable 1. Of Physical Evil in him∣self, and therefore we cannot hurt him; 2. Nor of Moral Evil, and there∣fore he can have no sin or malignity. 3. But he is capable objectively of Injury; we can wrong him when we cannot hurt him. 4. And we are ca∣pable of being Reputativè vel moraliter Hurters and destroyers of God, whom we cannot hurt: Because the sinner doth it quantum in se; and therefore is called an Enemy to God. It is no thanks to the wicked that there is a God, who would have none (as to his Holiness and Justice) if it were in his power.

Moreover, God is Good and doth good. And though he made Man freely, yet supposing that he will make him Man (a Rational free agent in his Image to Know and Love him)▪ it necessarily followeth that he must make him Holy. God cannot make a man in the Image of the Devil, and call it his own: As Parents generate Children in their own likeness, so God doth regenerate his own in his Image: He that thought it a good ar∣gument, [What Communion hath light with darkness, Christ with Belial, &c.] would sure have taken our part in this, that God cannot be the Author or Cause of the Image of the Devil, and of the works of darkness.

611. Therefore where he addeth, that God Willeth Malum esse that sin be, as the Matter of exercising his mercy and justice, not as his sin, but tantum vult fieri malum alterius, I deny it with horror as a reproach of Gods holiness. The terminus à quo is not the Materia misericordia vel

justitiae exercendae. God willeth the glory of his Mercy and Justice, in pardoning and punishing foreseen presupposed sin: But he willeth not the sin, but only our deliverance from it, or punishment for it. Suppose (per impossible) that the King had power to restrain all men from offending him, and yet saith, [I will do only what is Congruous to the Rational free nature of my subjects as such, and not all that I can do, and therefore will restrain them only by Laws, except some few beloved ones; but I will honour my Mercy and Justice on offenders.] Can you hence prove, that he willeth, decreeth or loveth ut appetibilia all the Treasons, Rebel∣lions, Murders and Blasphemies that are committed? It is not these that he willeth ut Materiam, but deliverance from these as from the malum à quo. If your prodigal Son be addicted to Robbing, and you could lock him up, but you resolve that you will try him once more, and if he ro•• you will let him suffer imprisonment and come to the Gallows, and then beg his Pardon, that suffering may hereafter be his warning; Here if you choose rightly it is not his Robbing that you will, no not ut sit vel fiat (for you had rather he would forbear:) But only his forsaking it, and his suffering to that end, on supposition that he rob again.

612. Pag. 105. He saith that [By the same reason as God might not will the being of sin, by his permission, he might not permit it.]

Answ. A raw unproved assertion: God might not make an Indifferent free-will, left to its own liberty, with a thousand warnings and helps against sin, unless he may also Desire them to sin. Prove this, else you say nothing.

613. He addeth that sin be or exist is not only Bonum per accidens, be∣cause God will make it the matter of glorifying his mercy and justice; but it is ex natura sua quoddam ordinabile ad Gloriam Dei, & consequenter Bo∣num est ex natura sua in genere conducibilis—

Answ. All unproved and false. 1. Sin is not so much as Bonum per ac∣cidens. 2. God doth not make it the Matter of glorifying himself, but only glorifyeth his Mercy and Justice against it as the terminus à quo, and not by it as the matter, though it may be called an Occasion sine qua non, as to this particular act and way of his said glorification. 3. Much less is it conducible hereto, which implyeth a Medium that hath some natural or moral causality. 4. And least of all is it ex sua natura conducibile. It is not sin, but 1. Some effects or consequents of sin, 2. Our deliverance from sin, and the punishing of sin, which are conducible to Gods glory.

614. Next he insulteth over Aquinas twice, as unhappy and vain in his censures, with a Magna est Veritas & praevalebit: laborare potest, vinci non potest: And argueth that because ex permissione infallibiliter sequi∣tur peccatum, therefore to permit sin is the same as to will that sin shall be ipso permittente.

Answ. 1. It's pity that sin should have so good an Advocate, and Gods Holiness so good an Adversary, through mistake. And that so unhappy a Cause should be managed so confidently and triumphantly, though it's well that it's done so weakly. 2. The falshood of his assertion about permission as general I have opened before. 1. Three sorts of things may be said to be Not hindered (which is all that Permission signifieth.) 1. Things bent to a certain motion, 1. By Natural inclination (as a Stone in the Air to descend) 2. Or by Moral Vitiosity, as the Will of a wicked man. 2. Things meerly indifferent; (1. Naturally, as some think the Air is to motion: 2. Morally: as suppose a Will such, to Good or Evil.) 3. Things averse to that Motion (as 1. Naturally a Stone to ascend, 2. Morally, as the will of an Angel or Saint to hate God, or the will of

a wicked man to Love him.) Also you must distinguish between Not-hin∣dering at all, and not hindering effectually.

And so it's clear, 1. That in the first case, the Motion will be if it be not hindered. But that it is not caused by not-hindering it, but by its proper moving causes. In the second case the consequence of futurity is false: And where the inclinations to good and evil (that is, to superi∣our and inferiour prohibited good) are equal; yea, though antecedently somewhat unequal: Yet bare permission ascertaineth not futurity. 3. Much less in the third case; where the soul must have positive help or provocation. Sure he did not think that all or any ungodly men would in∣fallibly Love God, if God did but Permit them.

But Gods Permitting or not hindering sin may respect divers acts. 1. I•• God continue not his natural support, man will be no man, but be a••••••••∣lated, and so will neither do good nor evil. 2. If God uphold mans n••∣ture, in its Integrity as it was in Adam, and give him not Moral means and helps of Grace, and his natural concurse, Adams sin would have neces∣sarily followed. 3. If God give Adam both such support and means to stand, and do no more, Gods permission would not have inferred the cer∣tainty of Adams sin, when he fell, any more than before: For God withdrew no grace from him which was necessary to his standing. 4. I•• God give a lapsed sinful man Nature and common grace, it followeth not necessarily because God doth no more, that he will commit every sin that he is not further hindered from: but it's certain that he will not do the works to which special grace is necessary. 5. If God give to the faithful the Holy Spirit, and continue his influx necessary to the continuation of the Power and Habits of holy actions, with necessary means, and do no more, this man will do some good and some evil, and though he may be equally said to be Permitted to do this sin as another, yet he may do one and not another. 6. God totally permitteth no man to sin, but hindereth them many wayes, though he hinder not all alike. 7. It's possible for two men to have equal helps to duty and equal hinderances to sin (or the same man at several times,) and yet for one to do the duty and forbear the sin, and the other to commit the sin and omit the duty; As many School∣men have copiously proved. Yet in this case Permission would be the same thing to both.

But if you use the word [Permission] as connoting the Event, then in∣deed you may say that the event (from another cause) will follow. And Gods non-impedition will ab eventu actionis be extrinsecally denomi∣nated Permission in the one case and not in the other. But this is but from your arbitrary use of the word.

615. Next the Doctor assaulteth Durandus who thus argueth, Gods will followeth only his approving Knowledge. But he knoweth not sin approv∣ingly; being of purer eyes, &c. He answereth,

1. God approveth that sin be, though he approve not sin. 2. God willeth the manifestation of his mercy and justice: Ergo, he willeth the existence of sin as that which is necessarily required to it.

To which I reply, 1. The first answer is unproved and false. God ap∣proveth not that sin be. If he did, few wicked men do more, as Esti••s saith: For it is not sin as sin or evil that they will, but that it be for other ends which seem good. 2. He phraseth it with his [ad qu••d necessario, &c.] as if God first willed this manifestation of his Justice, &c. as the end, and then sins existence as the means (yea, the necessary means): But this is false, as I have fully shewed. 1. And his own opini∣on should confute it, that maketh one Decree only de mediis: And this

particular Manifestation being some Acts of God, and not God himself, ••or the Complacency of his Will, must needs be part of the media ad finem ••••timum. 2. And indeed sins existence is not a necessary means willed for ••ods glory: but it is a presupposed mischief, our Deliverance from which •••• punishment for it, is willed for his glory: It is indeed necessary, but ••••ly necessitate existentiae in esse praecognito as a foreseen evil, and so pre∣••pposed to those acts of God which are the Means of his glory.

Therefore his assertion of a Notitia approbationis rei tanquam Bonae in ••nere Conducibilis, etsi non honesti, is detestable.

616. Ibid. p. 196. He again saith, that Though it be dishonest in the ••eature to sin, because forbidden, it is not dishonest in God to will that he •••• it by his permission, it being unice conducibile to his glory—••nsw. 1. Fie upon this conducibile and unicè too. 2. Fie upon this oft ••peated [permittente non efficiente;] It is utterly lusory or immodest: ••or a man that maintaineth that no sinner doth any thing in sinning, but ••hat God as the first total cause predetermined his will to, even as to all ••e entity in act and circumstances imaginable; and that in all omissions, •• was a natural Impossibility to have done one omitted act without this ••edetermining premotion: And for the man that in the next saith that ••alum non est Objectum Volentis aut facientis, but ipsa effectio rei, I ••y for this man yet to say, that the creature effecteth sin, and God effecteth •• not, is too too gross. The common evasion is, that sin is not any ••••ing, and therefore not effectible: But why then do they say, that the ••eature effecteth it? when they have said and defended, that the crea∣••re doth nothing but what God doth, and what he unavoidably maketh ••••m do.

617. Durandus argueth, that Sin cannot be judged convenient by a ••••ght understanding: Ergo, not by God. The Doctor answereth, That ••es own sin cannot be judged convenient, but anothers may. He in∣••anceth 1. When a man willeth that an Usurer lend him money on usury: •• When a Christian Prince willeth a Turk to swear to a League by Ma∣••••met: 3. When God willed that Absalom should defile his Fathers Concu∣••nes. And he addeth, that for us to sin, is contrary to our right rea∣••••n, because it is forbidden and hurtful to us: But for God to will that ••e sin, is not contrary to his right reason, as not forbidden or hurtful •• him.

Repl. 1. No man should will unlawful usury: He that willeth to Bor∣••••w, though he cannot have it without usury, doth not will the usury, ••ut the money non-obstante usura. As he that chooseth to travell with Blasphemer, rather than to go alone in danger, he doth not will his ••lasphemy, but his company, non obstante blasphemia. 2. The same is to ••e said of swearing by Mahomet: It is only the Oath as an Oath that is •••• be willed, and not as by Mahomet; that is not willed but unwillingly ••••dured. 3. Absaloms instance is answered before: God willed only ••avids punishment, and the Passive Constupration as an effect of sin, ••n a foresight of Absaloms active Volition and sin, and not as willing ••is at all.

And we have hitherto thought that Gods holy Wisdom and will is the Cause of his holy Law, and much more against sin than mans is: And that God willeth not, and causeth not the sin of man: And is it now come to ••his, that sin is contrary indeed to our right reason, but not to Gods, because ••e is no subject: You may next say, that Holiness is meet for man, but not ••or God.

618. Pag. 197. Again he is at it, Bonum esse ut sint mala: Quia bo∣num est ut Deus finem sibi praefixum assequatur: At hoc sine intervent•• mali & peccati nullo modo potest.

Repl. 1. It is not per peccatum ut medium, though not sine peccat••. 2. Interventus therefore implyeth a falshood. For in esse cognito sin is antecedent or presupposed to the way of glorifying Justice and Mercy up∣on sinners; sinners are the object: And consequently you must take it (as before proved) for antecedent to the Volition or simultaneous.

619. He urgeth, Oportet haereses esse, ut qui probati sunt manifesti fiant.

Answ. That neither meaneth that men ought to be Hereticks, nor yet that God loveth, willeth or approveth that there be heresies: But only 1. God decreeth to manifest the difference between the sound Christians and the rest: 2. And he foreseeth that there will be heresies. 3. There∣fore he decreeth to try them by the occasion of those heresies which he foreseeth (and hateth.) The same is the case of all tryal by persecuti∣ons: And God willeth not the sin of active per••ecution, but only the ef∣fect or passive part. So that the oportet (by your own confession of it) signifieth no more than a Logical necessitas consequentiae, which ••ore∣knowledge without Volition will inferr.

620. He addeth [Obj. It sufficeth that God permit sin, (and not will it) Resp. But either the existency of sin infallibly followeth the Per∣mission of it, or not: If not, Gods Intention may be frustrate: If yea, What matter is it, whether God will that sin shall be, he permitting, or s•• permit it as that infallibly it will be? so we obtain either of these, it's all one to our cause of predestination.]

Repl. 1. If it be all one, take up with that agreement; and make •••• further difference with them that grant you enough. 2. In case of ve••••∣ment Inclination to a sin, it would follow upon Gods total permission: (but God never totally permitteth sin.) But in other cases, it will not follow: that is, It is not a good consequence, that This or that sin will be done, because God doth no more to hinder it, than that which some∣time hindereth it not. And yet Gods Intention is not frustrate: For •••• will infallibly come to pass, from its proper cause, which God fore∣knoweth: And the consequence is good from his fore-knowledge. And is not that all one, as to the certainty of Gods intentions? 3. You phrase it as if sin followed Gods permission, as a deficient cause, or as that which cannot be otherwise, unless God do more to hinder it, and so we•••• necessary thence necessitate consequentis (or as others call it necessitate ••••∣tecedente) which is false, and oft denyed by your self. 4. The very truth is, Permission is a word of so great ambiguity and laxity, as re∣lating to so many sorts of Impedition, that it is but delusory with•••• much distinguishing, to say sin will or will not follow it. If you restra•• it to a non efficaciter impedire, as is usual, it taketh not away the amb••∣guity much. For still the question is, What must make it effectual, unless you call any impedition effectual meerly ab eventu, whatsoever it be •••• it self.

621. He saith that the Universe would not be perfect, if there wer•• perfect holiness and no sin, and so no pardon or punishment. But •••• giveth us no proof, but confident assertion, at all. I need not say, th•• It would be more perfect if there were no sin; It sufficeth me to say, tha•• It would be as perfect: And so that it is not Necessary to the World perfection, that there be sin or Hell. God could have freely willed the contrary. And Gods Goodness could have been as fully manifested if i••

had so pleased him, and his Holiness too, without sin or Hell. It's un∣pleasing to me, that this good man pleadeth so hard against a necessity of Christs satisfaction for sin, (in another digression) and yet pleadeth as hard for a necessity of sin; As if it were more necessary to Gods Glo∣ry than Christ.

622. It is very observable in all this controversie, that he asserteth pag. 198. [That it's past all controversie, that neither God, nor the most sinful creature, do will any thing, but as Good. And that no man can be instigated to malice (or evil) but only to the Act which is evil; because he that is instigated, is instigated to do something. But to the evil of an act, no efficiency is necessary, but deficience only.] How far this is true or false, I have opened before. I here only note, that he confesseth that he that causeth the Act of sin, (which he saith God doth more than man) causeth all that is causable.

623. Yet p. 199. he saith, Sin is of man only as the cause, when he professeth that man doth nothing but what God doth to cause it (yea, as the first total cause) and that as to Deficiency, man can do no more than he doth without predetermination, which if God withhold, man can no more help it, than make a World. So that all the mysterie of his lan∣guage is this; that because man is under a Law, and God is not, there∣fore man doing the same act as moved by God, must be called the only cause of sin, because it is no sin in God. But, if we spake as plain men ought to do, should it not rather be thus exprest by you [God is the chief cause of sin in man, but not in himself?]

624. Pag. 200, & 201. he hath the same over and over again, that Non abhorret à recta ratione Dei velle peccatum fieri ab hominibus—Quod ex se habet quod conducibile est ad ••onum tanquam Materia scili∣cet, non tantum idonea, sed & necessaria exercendae divinae justitiae & misericordiae: and that this manifestation conjunct with sin is Deo multò appetibilius, than that Good which sin depriveth us of (that is, Holiness:) Because this Holiness is only the Creatures Good, and the other is the Crea∣tors Good. Answ. But as the assertion is all false, so the reason is vain: For if he distinguish the Creator and Creature as subjects, he is quite mi∣staken: For both is the Creatures good, and neither the Creators: For to manifest Justice and Mercy is not Gods Essence as in it self, but his Work of Punishment and Mercy. And the glory of this, is but the resplendent ex∣cellency of it as it is the appearance or Image of God. And all this is in the Creatures Holiness: The Holiness of Christs Humane Nature, and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators, as is his Works of Mercy and Justice; And Gods glory shineth as much in them: And it is the glory of his Goodness, if not of Mercy which preventeth sin and misery: yea, and of Mercy too: For though mercy relate to misery, it is as well to possible misery prevented, as to existe•••• misery removed: And if he speak not of Subjects, but Proprietors, the Bo••um Creaturae is also Creatoris.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Bonavent. in 1. d. 46. q. 3. resolveth this question very plainly and truly [Mala ••ieri nullatenus bo∣num esse potest: sed bene occasio boni: And shewing the difference between Causa, Casus & Occasio, he saith that Causa est proce∣dens & intendens: Casus p••ivat Intentionem sed non operationem: Occasio pri∣vat utrumque. And he distinguisheth Occasion in∣to that which hath rati∣o••••m Acti••i & excitat agentem; and that which hath but rationem passivi, as one by anothers evil exciteth himself to do good. And also between the evil and the ordina∣bility to good. And saith the evil is but the occasio passiva of the good, and the ratio boni quod sub∣sternitur, is occasio aliquo modo activa—Vide locum.
• * 1.2

  Saith Twisse Vindic. Gra••. li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. [Posito quod velit per••ecti∣ones istas manifestare, ne∣cesse est non impediat in∣gressum peccati, sed per∣mittat.] 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mer∣cy and Justice by Laws, and Illuminating men to know them, without ex∣ecution by the occasion of sin? 2. Yet doth he make Christs death un∣necessary and his satis∣faction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our par∣don and salvation ano∣ther way if he would: And is sin better or more necessary than Christs sa∣tisfaction? 3. And me∣thinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physi∣cal, should not give so much to sin, which were it a means (as it is not, but a Passive and oppo∣site occasion) is but a moral means.

  And himself saith page 136. [Permissio peccati proprie medium est asse∣quendi ••inem à Deo praefix∣um: At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum, sive manifestandae Dei mi∣sericordiae, sive justitiae: Media enim ejus sunt na∣turae, ut ad ea facienda, mov••atur quis ex intenti∣one finis.] Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself? But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium, as stone and Timber to an House. And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object, but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude. But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae, it is not so to Christs. Ra∣ther, if a beggar Want a house, is that Want the Materia domus? no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it. Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church, when the Christi∣an simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him. So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propri•• dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordi••, sive i••stiti•• poti••s quam medium: Permissionem vero pec∣cati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum. But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this? 2. Per∣mission it self is nothing (being but non-impedire.) And is nothing, or non-agere, a proper means? But especi∣ally I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed, that it is the Permission of sin, and not the sin, that is the Divine medium (only one saith Praedestinationis, and the other providentia:) And yet they will differ while they agree: And I that differ from both, would agree with both.
• * 1.3

  De hoc vid. Ockam ubi supra.
• * 1.4

  The wise Reader that can impartially receive truth without respect of persons, may find much in Episcopii Institut. Theol. li. 4. sect. 4. de provident. in his answering all these Texts of Scripture, as mis-expounded by some. And his moderate opi∣nion expressed in Con∣clus. 2. in the end of that Section, how far do∣ctrines are or are not damning which subvert the foundation, is lauda∣ble, and his reason very good and clear, (viz. so far as they actually pre∣vail with the will and practice: Even as our faith is saving as effectu∣al and practical, and not as a dead opinion, so is error damning.) I think as he doth.
• * 1.5

  Even Vasq. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. saith that Of mens [non respondere vocationi] God is Causa per accidens, ut removens prohibens, dum negat auxilium efficax congruum. But this is but a Controversie about a Logical name [causa per accidens] which Gi∣bieuf and many others do with as good reason deny to be fitly applica∣ble to God, as to mans sin.
• † 1.6

  Pet. Alliac. Cam. 1. q. 14. A. [Secundum Brad∣ward. & alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae, & quod respectu cujuslibet rei habet Velle vel nolle, nec habet solum non velle; Deus illo modo non per∣mittit mala culpae fieri; sed ideo secundum hunc mo∣dum dicitur permittere, quia non approbat ea, ne•• impedit ea fieri cum poss••t—sed secundum Magi∣strum Deus permittit ea, quia nec vult ea fieri, nec vult ea non fieri; quia si nollet non fierent, sed solum non vult: & per conse∣quens non habet actum vo∣luntatis respectu hujus quod est malum culpae fieri—] Saith Bonaventure, (that plain and honest School∣man) li. 1. dis. 47. dub. 2. Di••••nd••m quod non est sig••um quod De•••• velit illud quod •••••••• ••i••••itur; sed quod velit illud quod ex ••o elicitur.

  Alli••co •••• q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec pr••∣cipit, nec ••••••••, nec con∣sulit, sed indul••••t: & ta∣lis Permissio est signum Vo∣luntatis Dei: quia ali∣quem actum significat in si•• permittente: & ita Deu•• non permittit mala cul∣pae—•••• Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle, nec habet nolle, sed solum non Velle ut flat: Et talis Permissio non est signum Divin•• Voluntatis: quia ••ullum actum Volendi significat in sic permittente: & isto modo secundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae.
• * 1.7

  If he really hol•• with Brad∣ward. li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth, why is it denyed that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale, seeing he permitteth it? But his citation of Bradwardine I think not my self obliged to regard; nor do I co••sent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardin•• than in him. See Alliaco before of Bradward.
• * 1.8

  So Twiss. contr. Armin. pro Junio pag. 91. dis∣senteth from J••niu•• that saith peceatum ad rationem universi facere per accidens, and saith Mibi vero dicen∣dum videtur Peceatum con∣ducibile esse per se ad bonum universi quatenus conducit ad illustrandos tales divi∣nae majestatis radios—And if so, it must per se be Loved of God as Good. Yet contr. Corvin. he saith, that No sober man saith that sin is a medium of the executi∣on of Reprobation, but only the Permission of sin. Reconcile them that can.
• * 1.9

  80 Joh. à Combis compend. Theol. l. 3. c. 1. tells us that sin is profitable three wayes, 1. Ut bene ordinatur, ut fur in pati∣bulo. 2. Propter co-actio∣nem, & amaritudinem. 3. Propter mall considera∣tionem: And many po∣pular Books say the like: But this is but abusive language tending to de∣ceive: As if sin did good, because punishing sin, and repenting of it, and hating it do good: As if hating sin were sin. Thus unhappily is the world troubled by abused words.
• * 1.10

  Of which vid. Gibieus at la••ge.
• * 1.11

  August. de Nat. & Grat. c. 25. fol. 314. Non hoc eis dicimus quod sibi iste (Pelagius) opposuit, ut esset Causa Misericordiae Dei, necessarium fuisse pec∣catum: Utinam non fuisset miseria, ne ista esset mi∣sericordia necessaria. Id. ibid. cap. 31. Et altius Dei consilium fate∣or me ignorare, cur etiam ipsam superbiam, quae in re••••e factis animo insidi∣atur humano, non cito De∣us sanet, pro qua sanan∣da illi piae animae cum lacrymis & magnis ge∣mitibus supplicant, ut ad ••am superandam & quo∣dammodo calcandam & obterendam dextram co∣nantibus porrigat. Even Vasquez the Jesu∣ite saith of Gods deny∣ing men grace, and of non-entities that God willeth them, thus [Non-esse alicujus rei secundum se quat••nus malum quod∣dam ipsius rei est, non placet Deo—Sed sub alia ratione placere potest; nec enim in eo est omnis ratio mali. Nam in non-esse alicujus rei, potest compa∣ratione ad reliquum uni∣versum, vel ad justitiam vel ad poten••iam D••ialiqua ratio boni apparere, ob quā non tantum potest placere Deo, simplici complacentia, sed etiam efficaci volunta∣••••, qua discernat rem illam non facere: Similiter cum Deus alicui negat gratiam suam au•• gloriam non pla∣cet ut malū quoddam ips••••s est, •• Quia sicut non disp••••∣cet persona, sic nec malum illius ut il••ius est placet •••• sed placet sub alio respect••, sub quo etiam non potest non placere: qui•• scili••••t o••tenditur in eo potentia Dei, miser••cordia in elc∣ctos, &c.] By this he will teach men to say so of sin: But 1. He con∣fesseth that this contro∣versie is not of any thing real in God; (as if he had distinct real acts); but only of the extrinse∣cal denomination of Gods Essence. 2. He can give no reason why the malum poenae of a ••rea∣ture as such may not ••e willed of God, as much as non-entity, though not finally for it self. 3. Non-entity hath not omnem rationem mali, but it is enough that it hath nullam rationem boni. 4. It is the imperfect conception of man that taketh Nothing to be any way Good. A n••ga∣tione subjecti ad negatio∣nem modi valet argumen∣t••m: Non-entities are no true modes of the Universe. It is impro∣per to say that Gods Power, Wisdom or Mer∣cy is glorified by any nothing or non-entity: It is by some being that God is glorified. 5. It's a contradiction to say Voluntate efficaci vult ali∣quid non esse: How is that efficax quae nihil efficit?—But God doth effi∣caciously hinder many inclined agents to act according to their incli∣nation. And that impe∣dition may be a Positive act. So disp. 95. c. 9. he saith that the end of Gods Permitting sin, is often∣dere divitias gratiae suae & liberalitatem qu•• usus fuit erga praedestinat••s: de∣negans congruas vocatio∣nes reprobis, ostendit prae∣destinatis, easdem vocati••∣nes, quibu•• fu••runt ad glo∣riam praeparati, grat•••• omnino ipsis fuisse dona∣tas. But 1. Mans act comparing himself with another is quid reale, & v••lltum à Deo: And the proposition [that the other hath no grace] is quid reale, or ••ns rationi••. But nothing declareth nothing. ••. If Gods will be his simple essence, on∣ly diversly denominated from effects and objects, how can nothing denomi∣nate it but as non-effici∣ent or not-willing? In∣deed it might denomi∣nate a Nolition existen∣tiae, if an Act of Gods were necessary to hin∣der existence; but not where non-efficere is e∣nough.

  Antonine better saith, l. 1. §. 17. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Ut, quantum ad Deos attinet ac suggestiones, adjutationes, inspirationes ab ipsis profectas, nihil obstet omnino quo minus juxta naturae praescriptum confestim vivam, nisi ipse tandem in culpa sim, qui Deorum submonitiones, & tantum non claras praece∣ptiones, neutiquam obser∣vem.

  I marvel the Doctor in∣sisteth not on his own great Reason, viz. Futuri∣ty is eternal, and there∣fore hath an eternal cause, which is God: And he that willeth the futurity of sin, willeth the sin, that is, that sin shall be. This seemeth stronger than all the rest, if the antecedent were true: And so he might prove that the futurity of the very form of sin is God: For nothing is eternal but God: But the futurity of the form of sin (according to these men) is eternal (or ab aetern••): Ergo it is God. But saith excel∣lent Le Blank de Con∣cord. lib. cum decret. 1. n. 55, 56. Praesertim nullo modo probare possum quod Gu. Twis••us pluri∣bus locis asserit, Decretum Dei & ejus Voluntatem esse solam & unicam Causam futuritionis cujuslibet e∣ventus: e. g. inobedientiae Adami, &c. At inquit do∣ctus ille vir, Futuritionis quae ab aeterno fuit, nulla Causa dari potest quae ab aeterno non fuit. Resp. Hoc supponit futuritionem esse aliquid reale à re ipsa di∣stinctum, & quod causam aliam habeat quam res ipsa futura: At hoc falsis∣simum: Nam futuritio nil aliud est quam respectus quidam rationis & extrin∣••eca denominatio rei futurae—Recte ponitur arg••∣mentum, Ab aeterno nihil fuit praet••r Deum: Ac pro∣••••de futuriti•• quae ab aeterno fuisse dicitur vel nihil reale fuit, vel fuit ipse Deus.—Quod est Causa cur res in tempore existat, idem plane Causa est cur res ab aeterno exti∣tura fuerit. Sicut quod Causa est quod res ali∣quando fuit, Causa est cur in aeternum dicetur praete∣rita—Ad effectum futu∣rum sufficit Causa futura, sicut ad praeteritum suf∣ficit Causa praeterita—This is plain and easie truth.