A discourse of wit by David Abercromby ...

SECTION I. What is meant by that which Men usually call Wit? (Book 1)

1. That the things we are most acquain∣ted with, we least understand.

2. How few are the true Notions we have of the most obvious things.

3. Several specious definitions of Wit.

4. Its best and most accurate description.

5. That Beasts are not to he denied all sort of Wit and Reason.

TIs seemingly improbable, yet very true, that the things we are most acquainted with, we least know. Thus Light, than which, nothing in the whole Creati∣on is more conspicuous, is as impene∣trable to the dim Eyes of our Un∣derstanding, as 'tis visible and obvious to those of our Bodies. Thus Time

so generally known and discours'd of, is as obscure unto me, if not more, than Eternity it self. What more visible than Colours? Since we see nothing else; yet if I consult for re∣solutions sake, Phylosophers, I shall make no more of their most satisfa∣ctory Answers, than that they are, (at least to my weak understanding) meer occult qualities, un je ne scay quoy, or I know not what. So far these Great Men, though deservedly reputed not ordinary Wits, fall ne∣vertheless short, of the true Orgine, and Mechanism of the most known and visible Objects. The Wind I feel, and am extreamly sensible of, especi∣ally when boisterous, and blows hard; what it is, whence it comes, why it is so changeable; and yet in some parts of the World so constant, why it moves sidewise and Horizon∣tally (as they speak) and not Perpen∣dicularly, or from the Circumference to the Centre on a strait Line, I never yet could reach, and thought

always the Laudable Endeavours of such as have undertaken to give us an account of those hidden, though most visible Phinomena's, altogether unsuccessful.

2. What I have said of Light, Time, Colours, &c. and whatever we are most conversant with in the Works of the Creation, I shall with a no less ap∣pearance of Reason, apply to our present Subject: For what the La∣tines call, Ingenium the French, L'es∣prit, the English, Wit, is a thing so generally known, that there are few but pretend to be acquainted with it, and not to want it, or not to have received as great a measure of it, as the very wittiest sort can pretend to; for nothing more true than this common Word, Qui velit ingenio cedere rarus erit. Yet even those, on whom Nature has bestow∣ed it most Liberally, are put to a stand, and know not what to an∣swer, if you press them to determine what in realty it is. But pretending

sometimes to know more than really they do, and being resolved to say any thing rather than nothing, they will endeavour to put you off with great and empty Words, Splendid Descriptions, Tedious Tautologies, affected Metaphors, and whatever may seem a sufficient Veil to their Ig∣norance. What is it then we com∣monly call Wit? I confess, I never either read or heard any thing on this Subject, that looks like a satisfa∣ctory Resolution of this Question: And perhaps what I shall set down here, will prove far short of the thing I aim at. For I am of Opinion, we do so little understand the Na∣ture of things, that we cannot confi∣dently boast yet of any true Noti∣on, or Definition. Yea, I hold that this very Definition of Man, Homo est Animal rationale, so familiar in the Schools, is near as imperfect as this, Homo est Anima rationalis, Man is a rational Soul. My Reason for this as∣sertion, is because the latter Propo∣sition

presents to my Understanding nothing but what is in some Sence true, though not all the Truth: For a man indeed is a rational Soul, tho' something else. The former, besides its obscurity, gives me just grounds to suspect its containing more than the Truth; I mean, that this ratio∣nal Soul, which in the Second Pro∣position, I conceieve, in a manner free from matter, is really material, as depending on an Organical Body, as to its first being, conservation, and functions. For if you take a∣sunder this Notion, and consider it in every respect, you shall find that this reasoning faculty, supposed to be in man, is never exerted without the concurrence of the matter, or of some material Phantasm. The contrary whereof is a prerogative granted only to those perfect Spirits, the antient Phylosophers called Dae∣mons, and by the Grecians Angels, who by the priviledge of their most refined Nature, are happily freed

from that gross and massie substance, which our Souls, how Spiritual soe∣ver they be, are clogg'd with, in this Mortal Life.

3. I cannot then pretend to give you a true and genuine Notion of Wit, but an imperfect, and rude inchoate description thereof, yet so general and comprehensive, that it contains all such Creatures, as without any violence done to the Word, we may truely call Witty. Yet shall I not say with a great Man of this Age, that Wit is, un je ne scay quoy, I know not what: For this would be to say no∣thing at all, and an easie answer to all difficulties, and no solution to any. Neither shall I call it a certain Liveliness, or Vivacity of the Mind inbred, or radicated in its Nature, which the Latines seem to insinuate by the word Ingenium; nor the subtlest operation of the Soul above the reach of meer matter, which perhaps is mean't by the French, who concieve Wit to be a Spiritual thing, or a Spi∣rit

L'esprit. Nor with others, that 'tis a certain acuteness of Undestanding, some men possess in a higher degree, the Life of discourse, as Salt, with∣out which nothing is relished, a Ce∣lestial Fire, a Spiritual Light, and what not. Such and the like Expressi∣ons contain more of Pomp than of Truth, and are fitter to make us talkative on this Subject, than to en∣lighten our Understandings. But what then is Wit? To hold you no lon∣ger in suspence, Wit is either a senceful discourse, word, or Sentence, or a skilful Action. This Notion, though short, being as you see, disjunctive, is up∣on this account the more compre∣hensive: Where ever then you shall meet with Sence in discourse, &c. Dexterity and Skill in Actions, there, and no where else you shall meet with Wit. As this is so clear, that it needs no more proof than the Sun needs Light, so I leave it untouch't, and to your own Meditation, as a self-evident Principle, I shall only

say, that Sence is so necessary for meriting the Honourable Name of a Virtuoso, and a true Wit; that Men without this advantage are deserved∣ly not only reputed not Witty, but meer Fools, and senseless: Yet do I not mean that every kind of Sence in our discourse, allowes our Discourse to be stiled Witty else the number of Wits would be fargrea∣ter than we are commonly aware of: Yet certain it is, there are but few true Wits, in comparison of those that have Sence enough, not to be meer Fools. We speak then here not of Sense only, but of Sencefulness, nei∣ther of a dead, and down right flat Sence, for nothing more com∣mon, but rather of a Lively one, as being animated by a certain Tour not usual to the duller sort. This sort of Sence is not unlike to a bright and polish'd Diamond, the other may be represented to us by a Brute, and unpolish'd one: They are both of the same Substance, not

of the same Value, both of the same matter, not of the same form, I mean of the same Light, Splendour and Brightness.

4. As to the other part of this Description, wherein I mention a dexterous or skilful Action as a piece of Wit, I confess ingeniously, I de∣sign'd by this Addition to declare, that I am not so great an Admirer of mankind, as to think that no other material Substance, but that which is congenial to my self, may be, and deservedly too, called Witty. Phy∣losophers may pretend what they please, unless they prove themselves Semideos, to be more than Men, they shall never convince me that they are otherwise differenced than in Speech and Figure, from those living Creatures, we call commonly Beasts; and which I have always conceived to be in reality, Animalia rationalia, rational Catures, but of a lower Rank, and less perfect than Men.

Neither shall any Man laugh me out of this Phylosophy with their innate instinct, which in the judgement of common understanding, is their first inward Mover, and the sole princi∣pal of all their Actions. For unless you understand by this Instinct, God himself, which would be no less sur∣prising, than Deus e Machina, and be∣sides no satisfactory answer, you will I hope confess 'tis nothing else but an obscure and insignificant Word, in∣vented only to heighten that too vain conceit we have of our own nature, by depressing that of other inferiour Creatures. For Men considering the wonderful, and most skilful, and ini∣mitable Actions of Apes, Elephants, Swallows, Bees, Dogs, &c. were loath to allow them to be endowed with some kind of Reason, as if they should thereby range themselves among the Beasts. Yet being forced to give some account of these undoubted peices of Wit we daily observe in that lower sort of living Creatures, they call'd

subtily their most ingenious Actions, the Products not of Reason, but of Instinct; whereby, if they under∣stood nothing else, but an inferiour sort of Reason, and in some par∣ticulars far below that of the more perfect and rational Creatures, they were only guilty of a wilful and af∣fected obscurity: But if they intended by this harsh Word an entire exclusi∣on of all true reasoning, they pre∣tend more, than ever they did or could well prove, as I could easily de∣monstrate, if it had not been done by others. They were in vain afraid alrea∣dy that if they granted once the use of Reason to other Inferiour Creatures, they should not be sufficiently distin∣guished themselves, and far enough removed from their Condition, as if besides Shape and Speech, the dif∣ferent degrees of Reason could not make a separation wide enough between Men and Beasts: For though 'tis most true, that, Simia quicquid agat, simia erit, a Beast at

the best will always be but a Beast: Yet I never understood why we should deny some share both of Reason and Wit to several of those inferiour Crea∣tures, that do things we can neither imitate, nor account for, without granting them, in some measure, this reasoning faculty, we would feign Monopolize to our selves. I would not then stile him an Extravagant, who should conceive as much Reason and Wit in an Ape, a Dog, Fox and Elephant, as in some Men, though not meer Fools. However no man can deny, what chiefly I here aim at, that Wit is not the Prerogative of Mankind alone. A Spiders Web in my conceit, is no less, if not more ingeniously contrived, than the Wea∣ver's. I conceive in a Honey Comb, with Pleasure and Admiration, a ve∣ry acurate, and regular piece of For∣tification; the wonderful Texture and groundless Foundation of a Swal∣lows Nest, do represent to me more art, than ever I could be yet sen∣sible

of in the structure of the greatest Louvers.