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TO treat of this Subject, by such Arguments only as may be drawn from Reveal'd Religion; or to mix these and such as may be brought from Natural Reason, together, wou'd be to raise the greatest Prejudices in those Persons who are most concern'd: For they who undertake to defend the Lawfulness of Self-Murther, (of which there are many in this Age) proceed chiefly upon Natural Principles, and will not hear∣ken
to any Thing from Revelation till these are answered: Wherefore my De∣sign at present is, to consider this Action, according to the Principles of Natural Rea∣son only.
To this purpose it might perhaps be thought necessary by some People, to prove in the first Place the Being of a God: But since this has been both readily allow'd, and studiously maintain'd, by the most con∣siderable Advocates of Self-Murther, I shall take it to be granted; and, upon this Sup∣position, endeavour to prove, that Self-Murther is naturally unlawful.
BY Self-Murther, I mean a Man's de∣priving himself of Life wilfully and ad∣visedly. For the proving this Act to be unlawful, we are to consider what Hu∣mane Life is: From whence Man receives it: Where the absolute Propriety or Dominion of it is to be plac'd: And to what End it was be∣stow'd.
Man consists of a Rational Soul and Bo∣dy united together naturally. Humane Life is the Result of this Vnion. There was a Time when neither Soul, nor Body, had any Being; therefore the Soul cou'd not be the Cause of it self; much less cou'd the Body be so. But the Being of each,
and the Union of both, and the Continua∣tion of the same Union, must be owing to that All-wise, All-mighty, Vniversal Cause, which is called God. This I sup∣pose will easily be granted; and if so, it will lead us to the fixing the true Propriety or Dominion over Humane Life, the abso∣lute and lawful Power to dispose of it.
All absolute Propriety is either Original or Derivative; each of which is twofold, of Men, or of Things. In the present Argu∣ment, the Life of a Man is the Man, and not a Thing; he that destroys the Life of a Man, destroys a Man; and he that de∣stroys a Man, destroys the Life of a Man: However, one of these may be of use to illustrate the other; and if we know by what means Original Propriety of Things is acquired, we may the more easily disco∣ver, whether Man has any Original Proprie∣ty of his Life, or no.
Original Propriety of Things comes, by taking possession of that which belongs to no body; or which has been forsaken by those to whom it did belong; or else, by making or producing something out of that which is no Bodies; which last seems to give the best Title of Propriety, as be∣ing not only the possessing, but the giving a kind of new Being to the Thing: Now,
I. Man cannot have the Original Propriety of himself, by any of these ways, because he could not make himself, nor can he be ever so derelinquished or forsaken by the great Cause of his Being, as to remain indepen∣dent and absolute; but while he is, he must belong to the same Cause, thro' which he at first was; besides, he cou'd not take possession of himself before he was, nor cou'd he be at the same time both the Per∣son taking possession, and the Person pos∣sessed. If Man then has not the Original Propriety of himself, no other Creature can pretend to it, and therefore it remains only that it should be in God: And in Him indeed it is in the strictest manner, not by producing him out of that which was no Bodies, but by making him out of that, which he created out of nothing; and by being independent Himself; and not only causing, but sustaining, and comprehend∣ing all Things.
II. As to any derivative Propriety, or Dominion which Man may be suppos'd to have of his Life; if we consider such Propriety as absolute and independent, which it must be, if it gives him a Right to dispose of his Life as he pleases; he can have no such Propriety neither, because
this is contradictory both to the Nature of God and Man.
1. This cannot be derived from any but God; but God cannot divest himself of such absolute Dominion or Propriety, be∣cause this wou'd make Man from the time in which God shou'd do this, so indepen∣dent, that God would have no further Right over his Life; and therefore cou'd not in any Case threaten him with Death, nor command him any Duty under the Penaity of any Punishment: In a word, this wou'd hinder God from being Omni∣porent; for he cannot be so, who has not a Power over all, whether Persons or Things.
2. Altho' we shou'd suppose that God shou'd part with his Original Propriety, and derive it to Man; yet Man is not ca∣pable of receiving it. Hecou'd not by the condition of his Nature subsist alone in the absolute Propriety of his Life one moment; because he can no more conserve Life, than he can begin it; * 1.1 the Conservation of any thing, is the continuation of the Production of it: Wherefore nothing but the same Power
which began Life at first, can continue it af∣terwards. No Man, nay, not all Mankind can contribute the least to this purpose, by making any of those things which are ne∣cessary for the continuing of Life; not the meanest part of his Food, not a Grain of Corn, or a Blade of Grass; nor has any one the Art or Skill so to digest such Food when taken into the Body, as to adapt it to the support of Life, nor so to distribute it that it shall be turn'd into the Substance of all those parts of the Body, as Bones, Nerves, Flesh, Blood, Spirits, which are necessary for the continuation of it; nor lastly, to order the whole distribution so with relation of every part to every other, as to make up that Harmony wherein Li•…•…e consists.
Wherefore as God cannot derive this absolute Propriety to Man in regard of his Omnipotence, so cannot Man receive it in regard of his natural dependance upon Him: But Life continued is as fully God's Propriety, as Life first bestow'd; and therefore it must be an Act of the greatest Injustice for any Man to cut it off by Self-Murther.
From hence we may clear a mistake which People may be very apt to fall into by Life's being so frequently call'd the Gift
of God. If by this they mean that it is of God's Free-will and Goodness that it is be∣gun and continued to Man, or that it is given him for his use only, they are so far in the right: But if they think that the Word Gift signifies here an actual transfer∣ring of Right to any thing; the ceasing of Propriety in one Party, and the beginning os it in the other, as this concerns hu∣mane Life, it is a great mistake; because as God can never cease giving, so Man can never cease receiving; never be in full, in∣dependent possession of it the least mo∣ment; and consequently never have the absolute Propriety of it.
Besides, this cou'd not be such a Gift as conserr'd absolute Propriety, because the Civilians tell us, that for the making of a Gift valid, as there must be Donatio on the one side, so there must be Acceptatio on the other; for if the first should be sufficient without the last, then it might be in the Power of the Giver to undoe the Receiver. Now when God bestowed Life upon Man, there was no acceptation necessary for Man, nor could there possibly be any such acceptation; and therefore Man has no absolute Propriety of his Life deriv'd to him from God, by way of Gift.
1. No Acceptation was necessary from Man, because this was an Act of absolute Dominion, and Supreme Power, whereby God has a Right to create what he pleases without the Consent of the Creature: Not but that this Act of Supreme Power was also an Act of Supreme Goodness, in re∣gard of the great Benefit which Life may be to Man if He pleases, and therefore did not want His Consent.
2. There cou'd not possibly be any such thing as Acceptation in this Case as the ground of absolute Propriety by Gift, be∣cause there being no Propriety without some Act of the Free-will Antecedent, as to the choice of accepting or rejecting (as has been said,) and Life being before Free-will it self, it was impossible that this Choice shou'd be made: This Argument Aquinas starts; and it is improv'd afterwards by † 1.2 one of the most eminent of his Follow∣ers, who assures us that Man can have no absolute Propriety of his Life; because whatever falls under Man's Dominion, must be something that may be made use of for the benefit
of Man as already possess'd of Free-will, and consequently of Life; therefore Life it self, and those things which contribute naturally to the Being of Man, cannot fall under Man's Domi∣nion: Neither can the Power of Free-will it self do so, which altho' it be after Life, yet must be before any Dominion, because it is the very Foundation of all Dominion whatsoever; and this (says he) is the true and solid Proof that no Man has any absolute Propriety or Dominion over his Life.
What then! shall we say that Man has no Right at all? No Power over himself or his Life? If this were so, how could he venture it at any time, or expose it to dan∣ger? What has been said, does not im∣ply this. He has a Right over it in some sense, that is, a Right of Vse, but not a Right of absolute Propriety, a Right to employ it for that end for which he receiv'd it: (which shall be shewn more at large im∣mediately) and upon this account, has he also a Right to hazard Life; but this being never to be exerted, but when Life is cer∣tainly in Danger, it amounts to no more than a Right of preserving it; which is a Duty rather than a Privilege, and therefore cannot be supposed to inferr, of all Things in the World, any Power or Liberty to de∣stroy it.
There are some Inferences which might be drawn from this Head to establish God's absolute Propriety of Life; but these de∣pending upon the End or Design of Life, may, I believe, be brought in better, at the conclusion of the next Chapter.
IT having appear'd that the most wise God is the Author, and therefore the Su∣preme Proprietor of Life, we may be assured for the same reason that Life is directed to some End; for nothing can be more inconsi∣stent with infinite Wisdom, than to make the least part of the Creation, much more the best, to no purpose.
Accordingly, the wisest Men of all Ages have acknowledged, and maintained that there is some such End, though they have not agreed in what it consists: Some have reckoned it to consist in * 1.3 the following of V∣niversal Reason; others in the following of Ver∣tue;
others again in the following Nature; or in the following God. Towards the Disco∣very of this, we may, I think, lay down these things as certain.
I. That whatever the End of humane Life is, what Disputes soever there may be concerning it; it is not the destroying it; since nothing can have Being given to it, only in order to the not being.
II. That the End of humane Life must be something, which it is in every Man's Pow∣er to perform, otherwise this wou'd detract both from the Goodness and Wisdom of God; and therefore it cannot depend upon any thing without us, as Wealth, Ho∣nour, or the Pleasures of Sensation, or the obtaining whatever * 1.4 seems good to any one, or avoiding whatever seems evil to him, for none of these things are at the absolute command or disposal of Man; wherefore that which is the universal End of every Man's Life, must be something which depends only upon every Man's self, and which no Events or outward Cir∣cumstances can hinder him from observing, if he will.
III. The End of Life must be answera∣ble to that degree of Capacity which the Crea∣ture has in respect of other Creatures. Life is common to Beasts as well as Man; the End of their Being, is to live, because by the Faculties which they are endowed withal, they are capable of no more, than what is proper for the promoting of this; but Man is capable of more, because en∣dowed with nobler Faculties; and there∣fore must have a nobler End than they, and consequently a greater degree of Hap∣piness.
These things being granted, the best way to discover the True End of Man's Life will be to consider Humane Nature atten∣tively, according to that Rank which it bears in Vniversal Nature: To this pur∣pose it may be of some Use to examine what may be the true meaning of that Maxim, which was in so much Credit a∣mong the ancient Greeks and Romans, viz. The following Nature.
The Word Nature is sometimes a very general Term, and then signifies that Course which the great Creator did put the whole World to act in; sometimes in a more li∣mited sense, it signifies that Rule which he gave to each Creature to act by, for the
fulfilling of that particular End for which it was made, in proper Harmony and Consent with the Vniverse. Thus not only Beasts, but Plants, even Stones and Minerals, and every Element, may be said to follow Nature: Yet since there are different Faculties appropriated to each of these, by which they excel each other accordingly; and as Beasts excel Plants by Sensation, so Man excels them by Reason: The true sense of the following Nature, and the true End of all created Beings is the working according to the utmost of their Capacities, or according to that Superiour Faculty or Power wherewith they are endowed, and by which they are distinguished from one another. To bring this particular∣ly to Man; the utmost Capacity of Beasts de∣pends upon the Faculties or Powers of Sen∣sation: The utmost Capacity of Man depends upon the Powers of a Rational Soul. Now Beasts act by necessity, they follow directly where-ever sense does lead; but Man is a voluntary Agent, able to discover of himself what is his Duty, and to follow this of Choice, not of Necessity: Wherefore there must be two principal Fountains of Man's Actions, namely, Knowledge and Free-will. Again we must distinguish concerning Knowledge; for this is of various kinds, according as its Objects are; that which is
concern'd in the present Question is the knowledge of those Rules and Laws by which our Actions ought to be guided, the knowledge of our Duty, as usually divided according to its three chief Objects, God, our Neigh∣bour, and our selves: This Knowledge; so much of Reason as this implies, is easie to be attain'd unto by the meanest Capacities; for tho' there are three Objects about which Humane Actions are chiefly concern'd, yet this variety does not hinder the clear∣ness of Man's Knowledge, as to the Funda∣mentals of his Duty, towards each particu∣lar Object. For instance, who can be ig∣norant? Or who must not consent imme∣diately? That the Supreme Being to whom we owe Life, and all Things, ought to be honour∣ed; or that we ought to do by others as we wou'd be done by our selves; or that we ought not to injure our Health, or act against our Know∣ledge, or do any thing to impair, much less to destroy those Faculties by which we excel other Creatures: These are Truths which are so plain and self-evident, that the very men∣tion of 'em is Demonstration; and there∣fore no Man can plead Ignorance in this Case, or that his own Reason tells him other∣wise.
This then is the first Fountain of hu∣mane Actions, knowledge of Duty: And such
Knowledge being to be attain'd unto by Reason alone, and yet to be attain'd easily by every Man's Reason, such Knowledge being the Perfection of that noble Faculty, I desire leave to distinguish it in the fol∣lowing Discourse (when I mention the End of Life) by the Word REASON.
But yet the easiness of this Knowledge wou'd signifie nothing unto Man, unless the Will did put it in Execution: It must be readily applied, and reduc'd to Action, or else our Duty wou'd remain unper∣form'd: Thus, 'tis not sufficient for a Man to know that God must be honour'd, that his Neighbour is to be us'd as himself, or that he ought to do himself no Injury, un∣less this were put in practice, by his being pious, just, patient, temperate, &c. Wherefore the Compliance of the Will with that which it knows to be its Duty, is the chief thing to be taken care of. The Vices of Men come not so much from want of Knowledge or Reason in this Case, as from want of such Compliance: And the true Notion of a weak Man, is not so much from his being ig∣norant of his Duty, as from his not doing what he knows to be so. On the other side, that which makes a good Man, is not greatness of Knowledge, but the bending of his Will vigorously in all Circumstances
whatsoever to the doing what he knows is his Duty. And therefore the doing so, is that which has obtain'd the venerable Name of VIRTVE; for VIRTUE is the force and vigour of the FreeWill, through which the Soul complies chearfully and gladly with what it knows to be Duty: Which force or vigour takes different Names ac∣cording to its different Objects (above-men∣tioned) and is call'd Piety, Justice, Benefi∣cence, Constancy, Temperance, &c.
If this is allow'd, it will not be difficult to show wherein Man's true Happiness con∣sists; for this is the natural result of what has been said, 'tis that Rest or Ease which the Soul enjoys after it has mov'd regularly and vigorously in the doing of its Duty. 'Tis the sweet Fruition which it is blest withal up∣on the just sense of the proper Vse of its Free Will, and its having faithfully discharged the End for which it was made; which it being impossible to do otherwise, than by Rea∣sons showing what is Duty; and Free Will's obeying accordingly, I conclude that the true End or Design of humane Life, is THE FOLLOWING OF REASON BY VIR∣TUE.
I will not contend but that the following of Reason m•…•…ght possibly signifie as much, as the following of Reason by Virtue; be∣cause
the Word Following seems to imply an Act of Free-will; and if this be accord∣ing to Reason, as to the Government of humane Actions, (which is the thing meant all along) it must be Virtuous; so, per∣haps, the following of Virtue only, might include the other too: However, since these two Expressions have been us'd and taken in different Senses heretofore, and may still be liable to Exception; since it is necessary to fix the End of Life, which I shall have occasion to refer to so often in this Discourse, in some particular Terms or other: I thought it most convenient to make use of these, and hope that the doing so will not be look'd upon as any Affectation.
This then is that which I take to be the great End of Humane Life, which I shall * 1.5 further confirm, when I come to consider the Objections which may be rais'd against it. Wherefore to apply this to our present purpose, from what has been said may be inferr'd,
1. That since there is certainly some End or other for which Man has Life; whether it be the same End or no which we have assign'd, thus far we may be as∣sur'd that Self-murther is unlawful upon
this Account, because by this Act, Man positively renounces that End, and destroys irrecoverably the means of obtaining it.
2. If the true End of Humane Life, is Man's working according to the utmost of those Faculties by which he excels other Creatures, the following of Reason by Virtue; then it is impossible that any one who does so, any good Man, shou'd ever be inclin'd to destroy his Life; because the worse his Cir∣cumstances are, the nobler Compass shall his Free-will have to follow its Reason by several Virtues; and the more it does so, the more it must be satisfied with it self, and therefore cannot at the same time be in∣clin'd to destroy that very Satisfaction by Self-Murther.
From hence also some Inferences may be drawn for the confirming of what was said above, concerning Man's having no abso∣lute Propriety of his Life. As,
1. If there be a certain End of Humane Life, then there must be also certain Rules or Laws, which Man must be bound to ob∣serve in the pursuing of that End; which Laws being founded in Nature, and not depending upon Man's Choice or Consent, oblige him whether he will or no. If there are such Laws as these (some of which are
above-mentioned) which Man is thus in∣dispensably oblig'd to observe, while he has Reason left, then he cannot have such an absolute Propriety of Life, as to destroy it when he pleases.
2. If there be such Laws as these, all Laws suppose Reward and Punishment, otherwise they wou'd be to no pur∣pose. Now when Man is in the State of Nature, he cannot be made to suffer any Pu∣nishment for transgressing any Law of Na∣ture; he cannot be suppos'd to punish him∣self, and no body else has any Right to pu∣nish him; wherefore there must be another State, wherein he must be liable to account for the use which he has made of Life; and if so, he cannot possibly have any absolute Propriety of that, which he is not only ac∣countable for every moment that he has it, but also liable to Punishment for the misuse of it, and much more for the destruction of it.
3. Supposing that Man had a derivative Propriety of his Life from God; yet if there be a certain End for which Life was be∣stowed, that Propriety cannot be absolute, because it must be conditional; nor can it ever become absolute by the ceasing of the Condition, because the Condition can never be perform'd so fully as to be cancell'd. The
Condition here is the same with the End of Life, the following of Reason by Virtue. There can be no Circumstances of Life where this is not absolutely necessary. A Man can never have done being reasonable or virtuous; never fulfil this End so far as to have liberty to destroy himself; unless we will say, that the more a Man has of Reason, the greater Right he would have to renounce it; and the better use that he can make of Life, the more liberty he would have of not living at all.
I shall conclude what has been said con∣cerning the Propriety which God has reserv'd to himself of Humane Life, and the End for which Man has it from him, with ob∣serving that both these have been acknow∣ledg'd by the wisest Philosophers. For Instance,
* 1.6 Plato makes Socrates to say, That the Gods have a peculiar Care of us: That Man is one of those Things of which they have reserv'd to themselves a particular Propriety. From which he infers, That as a Man wou'd be angry with his Slave if he shou'd kill himself without his leave, and wou'd punish him if he cou'd for so doing, so perhaps, says he, God wou'd deal with Man if he should kill himself,
unless he himself imposes a Necessity upon him, as he does now upon me; meaning as to his drinking the Poison after that he had been condemn'd to die. * 1.7 Pythagoras, to shew the Unlawfulness of destroying God's Pro∣priety, and forsaking the End for which Life was given, lays it down for one of his Rules, That no Man ought to quit his Station, without the express Command of his Superiour Officer; that is, of God, as Cicero explains it. And he also representing the Tran∣sport of young † 1.8 Scipio Aemilianus, when he saw his Grandfather Africanus, and his Father Paulus, and other Roman Heroes ap∣pear to him in a Dream in a Place of Hap∣piness and Glory, and burnt with a youth∣ful Ardour and Impatience to come to 'em, He makes his Great Father reply to him It must not be so, unless the God, to whom belongs this vast and glorious Circumference that you behold; unless that God sets you at li∣berty himself from that Body which he has con∣fin'd you to, there can be no Entrance hither; wherefore, my dear Publius, you, and all good Men, must be contented to retain your minds within your Bodies, nor remove out of humane Life, without his Command who gave it you,
left you shou'd seem guilty of deserting the Post, which God has assign'd to you as you are Men: But follow Justice, Scipio, follow Piety, as this your Grandfather, and I did before you. Such a Life as that, is the direct way to Heaven, says that great Man, not the kil∣ling of ones self, though even out of Impa∣tience of arriving thither.
HItherto we have considered Man as Single and Independent from Hu∣mane Laws, and show'd that as he is so, Self-Murther is an Act of Injustice towards God, by destroying that which is his alone; and also both towards God and towards a Mans own self, by the positive and wilful refusal of performing that end for which he received Life, and in which his happiness truly consists. Let us in the next place, for a further confirmation of the unlawful∣ness
of this Act, consider Man as a Mem∣ber of Civil Society.
And this we ought to do with the greater attention, because, though it may be con∣venient in some respects to consider him in the individual, and in the state of Na∣ture, yet this is only Notional; he can∣not be so as to any part of the World which we have to do withal, nor can he be so at any time but to his great Misfortune, for as 'tis necessary for his Security, that he should be under some Government, so is it likewise necessary, for the Perfection of his Nature: for his having a larger and a nobler compass for his Reason and his Virtue; there being several Virtues which cannot be exercis'd by Man when alone, but which owe their being to Society.
If then we consider Man in this manner, his Obligations to preserve Life are still more; both as the end of Life is enlarg'd, (the good of others, as well as his own being concern'd in it) and as he has then less to do with his Life, (the use of it being more at others disposal) than when he was consider'd in the state of Nature: Be∣cause he has not then the same Authority to defend himself which he had before, but is bound in most Cases to have recourse to the Magistrate for this purpose. Besides,
by enjoying the benefit of Protection in any Government, he must be supposed either tacitly or expresly to have consented in a mutual Agreement of Offence and Defence for the maintaining of the same Protecti∣on; which being chiefly for the preserva∣tion of Life, as Self-Murther must be un∣lawful, so it must be absurd. But that which is most considerable and sufficient of it self to prove Self-Murther to be unlaw∣ful, is, that this may prove destructive to the very Being of Society, as will appear if we consider the Reasons following.
1. Because this wholly destroys the best Measure of mutual Kindness and Justice, that which is generally confess'd to be one of the chiefest and plainest Laws of Na∣ture; namely the doing to others as we would be done to our selves: The greatest injury that can be done to another is the Mur∣thering of him; now if a Man has the liberty to Murther himself, the measure of Justice in the most important Concerns towards others is broken; nor can it sig∣nifie any thing to say, that this is done out of love to ones self, because it may be pre∣tended that it may be done out of love to another too, yet no one sure will ever al∣low this as a reasonable pretence for the Murther of his Neighbour.
2. This wou'd utterly destroy the force of Humane Laws; Man's having a right or power to kill himself, when he thinks siting, wou'd make void all Obligation to Humane Laws, as to the threats of Punish∣ment, without a dread of which no Law wou'd signifie any thing: The greatest Punishment that Humane Laws can threa∣ten is Death; now if Men have Authori∣ty to kill themselves, and be taught and perswaded that they have so, and be en∣couraged by the Examples of others, which will not be wanting, when Men are so perswaded; the threats of Death will be despis'd as to the disgrace or torment of it when publick, because they may bring it upon themselves with ease and privacy at home, and therefore they will not be oblig'd to any Duty, by the fear of this, much less by the fear of any thing else; but wou'd Rob, Ravish, Murther, &c.
3. Whatever the Reasons are, in rela∣tion to Civil Society, for which the Mur∣ther of another is forbidden; the same hold and perhaps with greater force, as to the Mur∣thering of ones self; those Reasons are chiefly the having no Authority, the depriving the Publick of a Subject, the impossibility of making any Equivalent Satisfaction. The two first of these are of the same force as to the
Murthering of ones self, the third seems to be of much greater; for he that Mur∣thers another may make some satisfaction as to publick Justice, by the forfeiture of his own Life, and he that forfeits his Life publickly upon this Account makes some amends to the State, under which he lives, by deterring others from committing the same Crime by the Example of his Punish∣ment; whereas on the contrary, he that Murthers himself, not only evades all satis∣faction to the Publick as to the paying Per∣sonal and Sensible Punishment; but in so doing gives encouragement to others to com∣mit the same: Wherefore Self-Murther may be a greater Crime in regard of the Pub∣lick, especially if it be a publick Person, than the Murthering of another Man; and if so is undoubtedly forbidden by that Law of Nature, Thou shalt not kill: otherwise that Law would be very imperfect, and reach only to the lesser Crime, and permit the greater.
Lastly, For a Man to have a right to kill himself when ever he pleases, must be destructive to Civil Government; because this Right must be Vniversal: One Man may exercise it as well as another; and since no publick rule can be given to show when, in what circumstances of Adversity, (which
are more or less felt by different Men, ac∣cording to their different Portions of Rea∣son or Vertue, their Courage or Constitu∣tion) since, I say, no publick rule can be given to all Men to prescribe the Case ex∣actly wherein it shall be reasonable and lawful to put this Right in Execution; every Man must be left to judge for him∣self, that is, to be led as his own Passions or Appetites guide him. After this rate great numbers may make themselves a∣way, which by Example and Custom may grow still greater and greater, till the Publick is weaken'd not only by the loss of several of its Members, but also by the check and stop which there must be upon all Business, and Trade, Trust in one another; since the strictest Obligations to this purpose may be thus evaded.
Add to this the misery of the Family particularly concern'd, the horrid sense which such an Act imprints upon the best Mens Minds, the general Aversion which it causes, and consequently the shame of the Relations and Acquaintance of the Self-Murtherer, and very often too the Confusion and Desolation of the forsaken Widow or Orphans; all which must be of ill Consequence to any State, especially if the Fact is frequently committed.
But lest this should give any colour for the plausible pretence of Compassion which is commonly made use of by those who are concern'd in the Coroner's Inquest upon such Occasions, I cannot but observe by the way, that all Kindness or Generosity to∣wards particular Persons, though they be nearest Relations, is unwarrantable, which is prejudicial to that Love and Duty which is owing to the Publick, especially when People are actually intrusted by the Publick, and sworn to report impartially, without be∣ing mov'd by any Passion whatsoever, what their judgment is concerning a mat∣ter of Fact. It may be as injurious to our Country to elude the Design of a Law out of Pity as out of Revenge; and as to Perjury, if we consider it in it self, 'tis as absurd to be guil∣ty of it through Generosity as Bribery, though it may too justly be suspected, that in these Cases the latter generally has a greater In∣fluence than the former. But of this more hereaster. * 1.9
These are the Reasons which make me conclude that Self-Murther is unlawful, if Man be considered as a Member of any Civil State; which are all of 'em of greater force, if it be also positively forbidden by the
Laws of the State, which I take to be of great Consideration in this part of the Ar∣gument. As for the Exceptions or Objecti∣ons, that are made to this third Divi∣sion, * 1.10 they also shall be considered in their turn.
BY what has been said has been shewn, the Absolute Propriety which God has of Humane Life, the end for which Man receives it, both in regard to himself, and in regard to those with whom he is joyn'd in Civil Society. In the next place we should enquire by what means God secures this Propriety to himself, for Man's ob∣serving of this end.
This he does by fixing in him the Princi∣ple of Self-Preservation. This is the most Vniversal Law of Nature, it running through every part of the Creation, as is confest by
the Stoicks * 1.11 especially, who are our chief∣est opposers in the present Argument; but it belongeth particularly to Man, for as the end of Humane Life is of the noblest kind, and Gods Propriety of it of the greatest va∣lue. As Man is furnish'd with better means to preserve his Life, so must he be more strict∣ly bound to do it than any other Creature. Yet some People by imputing too much to this Principle, or by observing it without due regard to the end of Life, have caus'd it to be run down and despis'd as the base pretence of Knavery and Cowardice; whereas there wou'd not be any danger of either of these, if they wou'd but carefully di∣stinguish between the means and the end of Humane Life. Self-Preservation is the chief means by which God secures his Propriety of Humane Life, for Man's obtaining of the great end for which he received it.
Though Self-preservation is the first Principle by which Man does act, (be∣cause Life must first be, before any use can be made of it) yet this is not the only mea∣sure of Man's Actions, but as soon as he comes to the Knowledge of the End of Life, his Actions are to be guided by that
Knowledge. Thus tho' Infants endeavour to preserve themselves before they have any use of Reason; yet afterwards when they come to have this, and to fol∣low it by Virtue, then this great end of Life takes place according to its dignity, and is to be chiesly regarded; and Self-pre∣servation remains of force only as 'tis sub∣servient to this end and consistent with it.
Wheresore since I suppose this end to be the following Reason by Virtue, and make this Precedent in dignity, and more to be regarded than Self-preservation, which is only the means subservient to it; there can be no fear of encouraging either Cowardice or Knavery upon account of it; because he that preserves Life only to this very end, that he may follow Reason by Virtue, can never do any thing contrary to Reason or Virtue, upon the account of Self-preservation.
Indeed that unbounded Authority which Mr. Hobbs * 1.12 gives to what he calls Right of Nature, under which Self-preservation is in∣cluded, opens a very wide door to the worst consequences of Knavery or Cowardice; For, he says, that this is the Liberty each Man hath to use his own Power as he will him∣self
for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently of doing any thing, which in his own Judg∣ment and Reason he shall conceive to be the apt∣est means thereunto. This Latitude of Right of Nature in order to Self-preservation seems to be the ground of most of his Er∣rours concerning Civil Society, and may well be the occasion of the basest Acti∣ons.
But we do not value Life at that rate: For Life is but a thing indifferent in its own Nature; wherefore to love or hate it meerly upon its own account, is equally unrea∣sonable: The just value or contempt of it de∣pends upon the use that is made of it, in the fulfilling or neglecting the end of it.
If a Wise Man has a Summ of Money lent him, he will use it (without any in∣jury to his Benefactor's right) to his own and his Friend's Advantage; so will the same Man do with Life; yet such a summ may be misused two ways, either through Covetousness, which will cause a Man to do all the foulest things imaginable to en∣crease or secure it; or else through Prodiga∣lity, which will make him throw it away with the greatest Rashness: Cowardice is the Covetousness of Life, (consider'd only
for itself without the End of it;) Self∣murther is the extreme act of Prodigality of it, but with this Aggravation, the Prodi∣gality of what was graciously lent to Man, to the most noble and most glorious End; by the best and greatest of all Benefactors, even God himself.
To return then to the Objection above∣mention'd; as it would be unreasonable to say, that the affirming, a Man ought not to be a Prodigal did infer, that he ought to be Covetous: So 'tis sull as unreasonable to pretend, that because we affirm that Self-preservation ought to be observ'd, we would have Men turn Knaves or Cowards in order to the doing so. By no means; for as it was said before, The true end of Life is the following of Reason by Virtue, Life may be hazarded in order to this end, and Death may be suffer•…•…, rather than act against it; but suffer'd always from others, never from one's self.
Moreover, as People strive to disgrace Self-preservation, by the Imputations above-mentioned; so they cry up the Con∣tempt of Life, on the other side, as the great∣est Courage and Magnanimity: But he that knows what the right end of Living is, will keep this in his Eye in all Events, and therefore will neither value nor despise Life,
but only as it is more or less consistent with his Duty: And this is true Magnanimity; this will make him scorn to do an ill Thing to save Life; because this would be to destroy the very end for which he had Life: the doing well. On the other side, this will hinder him from throwing away Life, by Self∣murther; because whatever his Condition is; the performing of the end of Life, can never be out of his Power.
Wherefore nothing can be more absurd, than that Contempt of Life, which is so very much affected by some People; which injudicious Poets very much con∣tribute too: What than to have a He∣ro strutting and ranting against Life; when either he has made it miserable by his Folly, or is incapable of making a proper vse of it by his Ignorance: Not to know what to do with Life, is not to know what to do with Reason. There are a great many Men in the World, who despise the Slavery of Re∣flection and Forecast, and depend only up∣on the gross Enjoyment of the present Mo∣ment. And then whenever they meet with opposition or disappointment, (which they must needs do often) they quarrel with Life, and are for parting with it im∣mediately; whereas it is not Life, but they who are in Fault. Life is always pleasing,
when Reason is faithfully obey'd; when this is forsaken, Life indeed is worth nothing: But then who is it that makes it so? Yet still, after all, when it is become so worthless, Self-murther is not necessary; because the Cause of its being worthless may be reme∣died, if the Person concern'd pleases; and he can no sooner understand for what Reason Life is despicable, but that he may make it quite otherwise, by pursuing the true end of it.
Furthermore, to confirm this Contempt of Life, they plead the Examples of Regu∣lus, and others, who have suffer'd Death with all Calmness and Magnanimity. But will any Man venture to say seriously, that these great Men behav'd themselves as they did out of Contempt of Life, or despi∣sing, or neglecting Self-preservation. This would be the greatest Detraction.
* 1.13 There seems to be always a poorness and meanness of Spirit in such Insinuations and Reflections as these; Life is a Thing of no Value: That Death is the way to Ease; and the Pain not great, nor lasting, &c. How much greater would it be for a Man to acknowledge, that he is not insensible of
the Terrors of Death, and yet to shew at the same time, that he is ready to suffer all, rather than trangress against that end for which Life was given him, by committing any one Crime. Wherefore when we con∣sider the settled and calm Resolution of any great and innocent Man, at the point of violent Death, let it not be said, that he was glad to die out of any Contempt of Life: But allow him to have had a natural regard to Life, and then his parting with it upon the Account of Vertue, will be truly Glo∣rious.
By what has been said may appear the Unreasonableness of several Passages which are frequently to be met with∣al in the Writings of the Stoicks and † 1.14 Epicureans, and which have been re∣ceived with much applause by some Peo∣ple; who are pleas'd to see Life represen∣ted
as a dull Business, not worth a Man's Care, where the same Thing comes over and over again: Because their own is so. ‖ 1.15 Seneca has a remarkable Passage to this purpose; where, speaking of one Marcel∣linus's volu•…•… Death: He tells us, He was perswaded to it by a Friend of his, a Stoick, a very extraordinary Person, espe∣cially as to his Courage, who talk'd to him to this purpose: Be not concern'd, dear Marcellinus, as if you were consulting about a Matter of any great importance; Life is no such mighty Business. Your Slaves live as well as you, and so do Beasts too—Consider how long you have been doing the same Thing over and over, Eating, Sleeping, &c. This is the narrow Circle which we are always Run∣ning—This indeed is a very dull Circle for a Philosopher to be always Running; for this is an Account of the Life of a Beast, and not of a Man: But the End of humane Life is of a Nobler Kind; to regulate and improve a Man's own Actions; to do good to Mankind; to be grateful and dutiful to the gracious Author of his Being; and for this to be exalted to a State of unerring Reason, and consum∣mate
Vertue. 'Tis true, Sensation has but a narrow Compass, its Objects are very few and very gross; and therefore not only come quickly Round, but become duller and duller the oftener they do so. But nothing can bound the noble Range of Reason; and when this is faithfully obey'd, no Satiety ever attends the sweet Applause of a good Conscience; but as the Progress of Reason is Endless, so the Pleasure of Vertue is Immortal.
I shall conclude this Chapter with the Authority of a * 1.16 Person, who is very much esteem'd by the Gentlemen who are chief∣ly concern'd in this matter.
The Opinion which makes so little of Life is ridiculous; for 'tis our Being, 'tis all we have: Things of a nobler and more elevated Being, may indeed accuse this of ours; but it is against Nature to contemn and make little account of our selves, 'tis a Disease particular to Man, and not discern'd in any other Creature, to hate and despise it self.
HAving thus laid down those natural Principles, from which Self-mur∣ther may be prov'd unlawful, from the Right which God hath reserv'd to himself over hu∣mane Life; from the End or Design for which Man received it; and this too, whether he be consider'd as in the State of Nature, or as a Member of Civil Society. Having also •…•…hew'd the Rise and Extent of the Principle of Self-preservation, and in what respects hu∣mane Life may be justly valued, or despised; I come now to Enquire who those are which embrace the contrary Opinion, and have held and maintain'd Self-murther to be Lawful.
Among the Ancients, the Stoicks were the most considerable; yet they recom∣mended it to the World more by the Au∣stere Practice of some popular Vertues, than by any solid Arguments, or indeed any re∣markable
Attempts to prove it Lawful: Yet what they have offer'd * 1.17 shall be consider∣ed at large, and compar'd with their other Principles.
This has been pretended to more parti∣cularly by † 1.18 a Gentleman of our own Country, with much shew of Learning and Reason, in a Treatise intitled, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Which, by the great Character of the Author, rais'd afterwards upon better Grounds, by the Agreeableness of the Ar∣gument to the present Age, and by its having passed some Years unanswer'd (as far as I can understand) has been highly esteem'd by some People.
There are some few more, both Ancient and Modern, that have scatter'd among their Writings something upon the same subject, whom I shall refer to upon Oc∣casion. But 'tis with these I shall be most concern'd, and chiefly with the latter; not that I pretend a particular Answer to eve∣ry Thing which he has said, they who peruse that Treatise will find that this is not necessary; I shall only chuse out such Arguments as being drawn from natural Principles, any ways oppose what I have laid
down, or seem otherwise to have most weight in them: According to the Method which I have already observ'd, I shall draw up the most considerable Objections which I have met withal, I mean in the Author above mention'd particularly under these Heads.
1. Such as are made against Self-preser∣vation, as confess'd to be a Law of Nature, in general.
2. Such as are brought against it, with relation to God's Propriety of Humane Life: and, either deny this Propriety, or else al∣lowing it, suppose that Man may kill him∣self Lawfully, by God's Dispensation, Dis∣mission, Call, or Summons.
3. Such as suppose another end of hu∣mane Life, instead of that above-men∣tioned, which they affirm may cease: And when it does so, that the Obligation of Self-preservation may cease also.
4. Such as relate to what has been said concerning Man, as a Member of Civil Society.
* 1.19 1. As to such Objections as are made against Self-preservation in general. † 1.20 He tells us in the first Place, That though
Self-preservation is of natural Law, yet that natural Law is so general, that it extends to Beasts more than to Vs; because they cannot compare Degrees of Obligation, and Distinctions of Duties and Offices, as we can.
Here in the first Place 'tis observable, that we have it acknowledged, That Self∣preservation is a Law of Nature. The same is also consessed by the Stoicks, as we ob∣serv'd before. That this Law extends to Beasts as well as to us, is true; so does it to Creatures inferior to them; that they ob∣serve it better than we do, is also true: But that they are more obliged to observe it than we are, which I suppose is meant by its extending to Beasts more than to us, is a great Mistake. The Law indeed is general, but the Obligation to observe it, is more or less, according to the Rank which each Creature bears in the Crea∣tion, and according as it is qualified to obey it: Wherefore since the end of humane Life is to follow Reason by Virtue; since by the same Power of Reason, Man is fur∣nished with better means to preserve his Life to this great End; he must be more obliged to the Observation of this Law, than other inferior Creatures. And where the Law is plain, and acknowledged on all sides, as that of Self-preservation is here. As
there can be no occasion for comparing of Degrees of Obligation, or of any Distinctions of Offices and Duties; so the making Use of these, proves always prejudicial to the Law: For when Men are thus shewing their Parts, they generally distinguish away their Duty. This also is the Argu∣ment of a prejudic'd and partial Temper: For in these Cases the Law is first broken; (at least in Intention) and then People raise up a Number of little Niceties and Di∣stinctions, to escape in the Dust of them: As if Reason were given them to evade Obedience to Laws, though never so much acknowledged, and not to promote it. This it was necessary to observe, be∣cause what this Learned Author says here, is to make way for all that he says after∣wards. And thus he goes on.
* 1.21 Self-Preservation does not illimittedly, rigorously, and urgently bind; but that by the Law of Nature itself, Things may, yea must, neglect themselves for others.
‖ 1.22 Rectified Reason only belonging to us, in∣structs us often to prefer publick and necessary Persons, by exposing our selves to inevitable Destruction; from which he concludes † 1.23 That
Self-preservation is not so of particular a Law of Nature, but that it is often transgress'd Na∣turally.
This is attempted to be proved again, by comparing Deserting and Destroying one's self, and by showing, that they are the same Thing: After which he would have it, that * 1.24 Deserting one's self is Lawful in many Respects. As when a Man puts himself upon a Jury: Or when a Man may chuse to repel Force by Force: When he attends an Executioner: When he practises consuming Penances; ‖ 1.25 Or, When he stands mute at the Bar. † 1.26 This latter Case, says he, seems to be justified by Church and State; and that for so low a Respect, as the saving of a Tempor al Estate, or escaping the Ignominy of another Death.
These Instances are of divers Kinds, and may be thus divided:
1. Into such as relate directly to Civil Society, which shall be consider'd here∣after.
2. Such us concern Religion; as that a Man may desert himself by consuming Penan∣ces. Which is not true, if consuming to such a Degree as to destroy Life; but this does not belong to the Argument in hand.
3. As for those others which remain, it cannot be proved from any of them, that Desertion of one's self is Lawful, or that Self-preservation may be transgress'd Na∣turally upon this account. For Example; whereas it is said, That a Man may choose to repel Force with Force in the State of Nature; this is by no means so, when Life is ap∣parently in danger; or that a Man deserts him∣self by attending an Executioner; this can∣not be, because he has forfeited his Life to the Publick, and that too by his own Con∣sent, if he has taken his Tryal. Nor does he desert his Life who puts himself upon a Jury; but on the contrary, endeavours to preserve it, by the Privilege which that Ancient and Excellent Law allows him. Some have also brought Instances of Soldiers and Seamen, as seeking Death lawfully; or as hast∣ning their Deaths upon lawful Motives; and therefore without any Breach of this Law of Self p•…•…servation. But nothing can be more weak than this: Ask the Soldier, or the Sea-man, whether they seek Death, or no; and they will confess that, on the contrary, they seek a Liveli∣hood: If not, why do the bravest of them oppose those who would bring them Death so vigorously?
But to shew the unreasonableness of such Pretences, I will propose a Case much stronger than any of these; in which, notwithstanding the Law of Self-preserva∣tion shall not be infringed, but most strictly observ'd. Vpon a Shipwreck, ma∣ny Leagues from any Land, ten Persons get into the Long-boat, who being dri∣ven backwards and forwards for many Days, and their Provision all spent; agree to cast Lots who shall be first eaten, and continue to do so, till but two are left; Was this Lawful? Yes certainly; Is not this then a plain Breach of the Law of Self-pre∣servation so often mention'd? Not at all; but rather the Observing it in the best manner: Because if this Course had not been taken, there would have been certain Death to them all in a few Hours, either by Famine, or by Killing one another. In this Case, it was lawful for them not only to put their Lives upon the Hazard of Ten to One, but upon equal Hazard, as the Two last must do. Because a Hazard of Death upon the hardest Terms, is better than a Cer∣tainty of it. All this then being done, as the using the best, the only way to preserve Life, and consequently in each Man's own Defence, can be no Breach of the Law of Self-preservation; the same Account may
be given of several other pretended In∣stanc•…•…s of Desertion of one's self. They first suppose some Case in which Man is brought into great Hazard of Life; but this Hazard they conceal, or pass over slight∣ly: And then if he incur any danger in order to preserve it; they call this Deser∣tion of one's self, and transgressing the Law of Self-preservation; Whereas the do∣ing so, is the most faithful and diligent Obser∣vation of it that can be possibly.
As for the other Instance of Desertion; When any Person accused stands mute at the Bar, which is said to be allowed by our Church and State, and therefore brought to prove the Reasonableness of Destroying one's self: First, this is truly deserting of a Man's self; so far he is in the Right, because 'tis the refusing the means of avoiding Con∣demnation, or of obtaining Mercy after∣wards, and running voluntarily into a more painful Death, than any which he can fear. But then secondly to say, That this is justifi∣ed by our Church and State is very strange; because the Person who is thus obstinate, is condemned to suffer the greatest Punish∣ment for this very Crime of being so.
'Tis the excellency of the Laws of Eng∣land, above those of other Nations, that as they have the greatest tenderness in the
case of Life, so they have the greatest care in the case of Propriety. Now whereas some Men may not value their own Lives so much as their Childrens welfare; and where∣as the publick Good is above all private Con∣siderations: It has been thought •…•…it by our prudent Ancestors, to deter such Persons from great Crimes, not only by the forfei∣ture of their Lives, but also by the forfei∣ture of their Estates: But then again to shew the regard which they had to Propriety, these could not be forfeited without Con∣viction, and Conviction could not be with∣out Pleading, wherefore to make them plead a more dreadsul Death (* 1.27 as the Name im∣ports, if duly put in Execution) than any which the Law requires if they should be found guilty upon Pleading, is threatned for their Obstinacy; so that the Law does not leave it to a Mans choice; thus, If you will stand Mute, and will be prest to Death, you shall save your Estate; the Estate is not under any Consideration as to the intent of the Law in this Case, but the obstinacy of refusing to Plead, which being punished so dreadfully, nothing can be greater detraction, than to say, That the deserting of ones self in this manner, is
not only allowed but justified in this Nation. These general and mixt Objections be∣longing to Man partly as in the state of Nature, and partly as a Member of Civil Society, not knowing how to rank under any particular Head, I thought it most convenient to bring in here, and perhaps they may not be altogether unserviceable to the illustrating of that which is to fol∣low.
WE come next to consider such Argu∣ments as contradict the Propriety which God has of Humane Life: This is op∣posed very little directly, as being too ma∣nifest; yet as it is one of the chief things upon which the Controversie depends; many offers have been made to evade it.
Thus 'tis said, † 1.28 that though no body is pro∣perly Lord of his Life, though we have not Do∣minion 〈◊〉〈◊〉 have Vsum, and it is •…•…ful for us to lose that when we will. But how lose it? not sure by d•…•…roying the thing it self; a Man may surrender any thing to the right Owner, which is lent him, and, provided it be in good Condition, be no longer ac∣countable for it; but Self-killing is destroy∣ing Life, and destroying is certainly a very strange way of surrendering. ‖ 1.29 Suppose a Man of Quality should lend a considerable Sum of Money to one of his Servants to whom he took a sancy, which might turn if he wou'd to his certain and very great ad∣vantage; and this Fellow should run to a Gaming-•…•…use and play it away immedi∣ately, and his Lord should expo•…•…late with him for doing so; would it not be a very odd answer for him to say, that though he had not the Dominium of the Money, yet he had the Vsum of it, and it was lawful for him to lose that when he would. The Application is easie.
Again he says, * 1.30 If the reason why 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 not kill our selves be because we are not Lords of our own Lives, but only God: Then the S•…•…
cannot take away our Life, for that is no more Lord of our Life than we are. The State is not Lord of any Mans Life, by any full Dominion over it, but accidentally: When the publick Life, the being of the Govern∣ment is concerned: And then it has such a Power over each Corrupted and Disobedi∣ent Subject, as each Man has over any Corrupted Limb, and may cut it off for the Preservation of the rest, before the Contagion reaches the Vitals of the State: And this Power in both Cases is derived from God, who though he reserves to him∣self the full Propriety of Life, yet he must be suppos'd to allow Man the means necessa∣ry to preserve Life: Which sometimes can∣not possibly be done otherwise, either in Natural or Political Bodies than by Ampu∣tation.
The next Argument is somewhat Ob∣scure, 'tis in these Words, † 1.31 If in this Case there were any Injury done to the State, then certainly it were in the Power of the State to Li∣cense a Man to do it; for this in the State were but Cedere in Re Sua, which any Man may lawfully do.
Here two things are suppos'd if I am not mistaken.
1. That there can be no Injury com∣mitted, unless against Propriety; and therefore if the State has no Propriety of Man's Life, it can be no Injury to it for a Man to destroy his Life. This is not so; 'tis injurious to hinder or pre∣vent the use of a thing as well as to de∣stroy the Propriety of it. The State has the use of each Man's Life: The performing the End for which Life was given to every Man is of great advantage to the Publick, and to hinder it of this Advantage, or of this Use, to deprive it of it for ever is an Injury to it. Or else,
2. It is suppos'd that the Publick has a Propriety of each Man's Life, that in right of this it may give leave to any Per∣son to kill himself, and then the doing so cannot be injurious to it; but this is also a mistake: For the Publick has no Propriety of any particular Innocent Man's Life: No Lawful Power over it, unless it be to de∣send it: Therefore for the Publick to give any Man licence to destroy himself; wou'd be to usurp God's Power; to grant more than it has it self; † 1.32 and also to contradict the very End for which it has any Power at all; the great design of all Society, name∣ly
the Security and Preservation of each particular Man's Life.
There is another Argument that I have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 seen to this purpose. I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that has Power over his own Liberty, has Power over his own Life; a Man has Power to sell himself for a Slave.
1. There is a great difference between Liberty and Life, therefore it does not sol∣low, that is a Man has power over the one he has the same over the other: Liberty is but a Condition of Life, a very desirable one indeed, yet not to be preferred before Life it self, because the end for which Life is given, may be pursued amidst the greatest •…•…ry, and no Liberty of the Body can be of equal value with the noble and un∣bounded Liberty of the Mind.
* 1.33 2. No Man can part voluntarily with his Liberty, unless for want of Sustenance, in extreme Necessity, that is in order to preserve Life, and then this is rather a Duty than a Privilege; he is bound to do so to preserve Life, even at the Pain, the Shame, the Misery of Servitude: And if so, how can it be ever reasonably concluded, that because a Man must part with his Liberty
to preserve his Life, therefore he has a right to throw that Life away?
Another Argument perhaps may be raised from the Celebrated Story of the two generous Friends Damon and Pythias, to this purpose. No Man can lawfully give the se∣curity of his own Life for another Mans appea∣rance at a certain Day, unless he has a full Pro∣priety of his Life. One of the two above∣mentioned gave this Security for the other: And this seems to have been approved of in Ancient times, as the most Learned * 1.34 Gro∣tius observes; but then 'tis absolutely con∣demned afterwards by him: For though this Security might have been accepted in a few Places, yet it was not so long, no•…•… is any where at this Day; and for this Reason, because it cou'd not be lawfully given, nor reasonably taken when forfeit∣ed, nor can any Rule of strictest Friend∣ship require a Man in the State of Nature to die positively for his Friend. This I mention the rather, because it is one of the Reasons the † 1.35 Stoicks assign for the law∣sulness of Self-murther: Hazard his Life he may in some Cases for him, as other things may be hazarded, of which we have
the use only; but destroy it positively he can∣not; because he has no absolute Propriety of it.
Lastly 'tis said, * 1.36 As I do not offend the Laws provided against Thieves, when I embezel my own Money, and cut my own Purse; nor that against Incendiaries if I burn my own Woods: So am not I under the Lash of those made against Murther∣ers for having depriv'd my self of my own Life. Not to insist that such Actions as these are Signs of Folly or Madness, and therefore that such Persons Estates may be begg'd, or that they ought to be with-held by force from doing thus: No Man can possess his Life in such a fulness of Propriety as he may his Estate, as has been shewn ‖ 1.37 above; the absolute Propriety of Humane Life is in God, and this Propriety is as much in∣jur'd by a Man's destroying his own Life as another Persons.
Man as to his Life is only in the Nature of an Vsufructuary, who has no lawful Power to impair the Estate he possesses, much less to alienate or destroy it. And this is one Reason why all Intemperance either of Passion or Appetite is Unlawful; because this impairs the Faculties of the
Mind or Body; this is committing waste upon the Estate; How much more then must it be unlawful to destroy it wholly and irrecoverably by Self-Murther.
I cannot call to mind any other Argu∣ments which have been brought directly against God's having the Propriety or abso∣lute Dominion of Humane Life; 'tis more usual to allow it to be so in a general way, and then run to distinctions, pretend that God himself doth dispence with this Right, that he often dismisses People from their at∣tendance upon Life, and summons and calls 'em to him. In which Cases, say they, Self∣murther being not only permitted but requir'd, must be lawful. This the Stoicks signified by their * 1.38 reasonable Exit: The Door being open, and their encouraging People to walk out: Kill themselves accordingly.
The same distinctions the Author of Biathanatos makes use of. As to Dispensa∣tion that Learned Gentleman grounds it upon this, † 1.39 that no Law can be squared for all Events. Athing, says he, which universal∣ly consider'd may be in it self profitable or ho∣nest, may by reason of some Event become dis∣honest
or hurtful, neither of which can falt. within the reach, or under the command of any Law; in which Cases a Men may be the Bishop or Magistrate to himself, without an express Dispensation from God.
* 1.40 When I may justly part with Life it is by Summons from God, and cannot then be impu∣ted to any Corruption of my Will, Velle non creditur qui obsequitur imperio, yet I ex∣pect not a particular Inspiration or new Com∣mission, &c.
To † 1.41 Josephus's Argument, the same with Plato's ‖ 1.42 above mention'd, That a Ser∣vant which runs from his Master, though ne∣ver so severe, is punished by Law, how much more if (by Self-murther) he runs away from so indulgent a Master as God: He re∣plies, * 1.43 That the Servant runs not from his Master but to him in this case, and at his Call obeys his Voice. Again, † 1.44 This is not to usurp upon God's Authority, or to deal with anothers Servant; if I become his Servant, his Dele∣gate, and his Commissioner in doing this, when he can be no other way so much glorified.
‖ 1.45 If they say God concurs to no Evil: We say, nothing is so evil but that it becomes good if God command it, and that this (viz. Self-mur∣ther)
is not so naturally evil, that it requires a special Commission from God, but as it be∣comes good if he commands it, so it becomes in∣different if he remove the Reasons with which the Precept against it is Conditioned.
There is one Passage in Cicero to the same purpose, † 1.46 Cato went out of Life as one that was glad of the opportunity, for the God who rules within us forbids our departure hence without his Command; but when that God himself gives just Cause, as he did to Socrates, Cato and many others. A wise Man will cer∣tainly be glad to depart out of this State of Dark∣ness into that of Light: Not that he may break Prison for that the Laws forbid, but walk out of it being called, and dismiss'd by God as by some lawful Magistrate.
The summ of all which is to this pur∣pose.
1. That though it be true that God has the Absolute Propriety of Humane Life, in which Regard indeed Man cannot lawfully destroy it: Yet if God dispences with this Right of Propri∣ety, and calls or summons him out of Life, he may depart lawfully (viz. by Self-Murther)
2. That there is no need of Particular Com∣mission, or Extraordinary Manifestation of
God's Will to this purpose, but only of his removing those Reasons upon which the Obliga∣tion of preseving Life was founded.
This is that which the Stoicks scatter up and down their Writings to reconcile this Act with Submission to Providence, which they diligently maintain, and which is Collected and Improv'd by our Author in the several Places above mentioned. Before I Answer this particularly, I desire the Reader wou'd take Notice,
1. That whatever is said in any of these Places concerning the removing the Reasons, or the ceasing of that End for which Life was given, shall be debated more particularly in the next Chapter, and but just touched upon here, as not being wholly to be avoided.
2. As to what is insinuated here con∣cerning God's Glory, though this does not fall under the present Argument, yet that this is always best promoted by observing of his Laws; that there can be no Case imagined, nor is there any pretended, but only glanc'd at by this Author artificially in general terms: Wherein a Man can be irresistably forc'd to forsake his Reason and his Virtue, and so detract from God's Glory: Or where in it will not be more for his Glory to suffer
Death from others, than from himself. But of this more perhaps hereafter.
This being premised I shall in Answer to what is said above shew these three things:
I. That according to the Account which this Learned Gentleman gives of Dispensation, and according to the Nature of the Law of Self-preservation, there can be no need at any time of such Dispensation for this Law.
II. That in a Case of this Nature wherein Propriety of the greatest Importance is concern'd: Where an Error can never be recover'd; and where it is confessed, that there is a Law to secure it; no Dispensation can be sufficient but what comes from the Proprietor, the Law-gi∣ver himself; and which must evidently and un∣deniably appear that it did so, by some plain and positive Manifestation of his Will.
III. That no such natural Manifestation of God's Will is or can be assign'd, whereby Man may be fully assured that he is dismissed, call'd or summon'd by God from Life.
As to the first, it is observable that Self∣preservation is allowed to be Law of Na∣ture: And yet affirmed that it may be de∣spensed
withal upon this account: † That a thing which is universally Profitable or Honest, may by reason of some particular Event, be∣come Dishonest or Hurtful; and when it does so, the Reason (or End) which is the Soul and Form of the Law ceases. This can never have place in any Law of Nature, parti∣cularly Self-preservation grounded upon God's Propriety, and the End of Humane Life already mention'd; because as there can be no time wherein it can be dishonest or hurtful (if we mean morally so) to avoid do∣ing wrong to God, to the Publick, and to our selves; so there can be no time where∣in it can be destructive or hurtful (in the sence asoresaid) to follow Reason by Virtue; there can be no Event, I say, wherein it will not be a Man's Duty, and wherein it will not be in his Power to act thus, and therefore it can never be necessary that this Law should be dispensed withal.
Besides, the Word Law is too general as us'd here; the Law which we are speak∣ing of is Law of Nature, and confest to be so; there may be Dispensations from Obedience to Humane Laws, which are limitted to particular Actions, and which through the weakness of Humane Pru∣dence cannot be fitted exactly to all E∣vents; but then 'tis observable, that all such
Dispensations are supplemental rather than destructive to that Law concern'd, tending more effectually to the same end which that Law did, assisting and promoting it in a better manner, which end is always the Preservation of Mankind, of each parti∣cular Person, as far as is consistent with the whole, and not the Destruction of any one.
If it be said, That the very End of Life which I have assign'd is inconsistent often with this Law of Self-preservation, and destructive of God's Propriety, it frequently happening that Men endanger their Lives, nay certainly incur Death, the more strictly and faithfully that they follow Reason by Virtue, and therefore that there must be some sort of Dispensation as to the observing of this End.
1. To this I Answer, There is no nece•…•…ty of this. That which I suppose to be the end of Humane Life is so excellently fu•…•…ed to the Nature of Man, that it not only promotes his happiness, his well-being, but certainly contributes to the prolong at•…•…on of his Being at the same time; the following of Reason by Virtue, including the regulating of Mens Passions and Appetites, making 'em Temperate and Peaceful, Just and B•…•…cent, &c. All which, if Duly observed, by
any number of Men, wou'd certainly pro∣long Life, as well as Happiness: Wherefore if Life becomes in danger upon this Ac∣count, and good Men suffer Death for the sake of their Virtue; this is accidental, not through any natural defect in that end of Life, or because it contradicts Self-preservation, and is destructive to God's right over it; but through the fault of unreasonable Men, who will not act by the same Rule, but make the indulging of their Appetites and Passi∣ons to be the only end of their Lives; and therefore have no sense of Justice or Good∣ness towards others.
2. When Men suffer Death upon the account of Virtue, this does not prove any Dispensation needful as to Self-preservati∣on, as though they brought their own Deaths upon themselves; they wou'd live if they might be permitted; but they wou'd not forfeit their Reason and their Virtue to preserve Life, because these were the things for whose sake alone Life was be∣stow'd; and the observing of which is the most proper way which God design'd by Nature to preserve Life by, and if it is not pre∣serv'd accordingly, 'tis through the Crimes of such as invade it, not any of their own.
But supposing that a Dispensation might be reasonable in some particular Case; yet,
II. When Propriety of the greatest Impor∣tance is concern'd; where the Law that secures it is confess'd and acknowledg'd; where a mistake may be easily committed, and yet can never be recover'd; no Dispensation can be sufficient but such as comes from the Proprietor, the Law∣giver himself; and which evidently appears by some plain and positive Manifestation of his Will to do so.
Propriety is of so nice and tender a Na∣ture, that when it is to be made over, all the care imaginable is us'd, that the doing so may appear plainly and undeniably to be Voluntary; therefore not only several outward Actions, but also several Wit∣nesses of those Actions are requir'd upon such Occasions. Now if this be so where things of very little Importance are concern'd, how much more reasonable must this Cau∣tion be where God himself is the Proprietor, so good, so gracious, so just, so powerful a Being! and where Humane Life is the thing in Question; in which so many Per∣sons may be concer•…•…d, and which may be of such unspeakable value to him that has it; if the end of it were faithfully observ'd; for
what can make Man more Happy, or more Glorious? What can exalt him higher above the rest of the Creation, or nearer to the Divine Nature, than the continual disco∣very of Eternal Truth, and the regulating of his Passions and Desires accordingly, than the improving of others by Example and Information, and being the Help and Pleasure of a great part of Mankind. Life is the opportunity of being all this; shall that then be rashly thrown away by Self-murther? Espe∣cially since Mistakes in other matters may be recover'd again, at least some amends be made for them; but here the Errour is Irre∣coverable; the Offender is incapable of making any Satisfaction: Wherefore who that con∣siders this can suppose, that 'tis sufficient for any Man to * 1.47 think that he may despence with himself, or to fansie that God has con∣stituted him his Officer or Commissioner. How does this appear? Produce the Warrant, prove the Commission by undeniable Au∣thority, and then, but not otherwise, then let it be obey'd.
Nor is it sufficient to say in this Case, That although it shou'd be an Error to kill ones self upon such an Opinion, yet this is
such an Errour as may proceed from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 good Conscience; because where the P•…•… priety is doubtful, and yet the thing i•…•… Question actually alienated, it can be no good Plea to say, that this was done with Inte∣grity: No Mistake can be excusable where there is no Authority to venture; and yet in this Case the Propriety is not doubtful, but acknowledg'd to be Gods; and in the Act of Self-Murther the same Propriety is not only alienated but destroy'd; and therefore ther•…•… can be no just Plea for the Lawfulness of so doing, but the plain and express Mani∣festation of God's Will, and this can be had no other way than by evident Revela∣tion; because no Warrant, but such as is above Nature, can be sussicient to de∣spence with Law of Nature.
If it be said that Natural F•…•…vents are the Manifestations of God's Will, that when such Events as loss of Liberty or Senses, In∣curable Pain, Poverty or Disgrace, come up∣on a Man; any * 1.48 one of these is a sussicient proof that God dismisses, calls or sum∣mons that Man from Lise. This brings me to the next thing I proposed to shew.
III. That no Natural Event is such a Manifestation of God's Will, whereby any Man can be assur'd that he is called, dismissed or summon'd from Life; or that God has chosen him himself for his Commissioner or Officer to destroy it.
There is no Event indeed, but is a Ma∣nifestation of God's Will. The worst Events are so, as much as the best; but to what end are they so? that we should bear them with Patience and Humility, is not be a∣voided by lawful means, not that we should decline them, refuse 'em, or run away from them, by any means though never so un∣lawful.
And since the Manifestation of God's Will against a known Law of Nature must be clear and distinct, as has been shown; how can it be demonstrated to be so from any of the Events above mention'd? the great difficulty, or rather the impossibility of this will appear if we consider the following Reasons.
1. That many Thousand Persons have suffer'd under the same Events, and with∣al to such a degree, as to be very willing, very desirous to die; and yet som of these have ever thought, and none of them have been ever fully satisfy'd that these were any
signs os God's dismissing, summoning, or cal∣ling them from Life: How then can any one particular Person be assured that they are so to him? Or why should he suppose, that he alone can discern farther into the Will of God against a Confest and Establish'd Law, by any occasional and natural Event, than so many Persons (many of which may be reasonably allow'd to be greater and wiser than himself) cou'd do, by the very same: Especially since,
2. These very Events, upon which he grounds his Authority, have been fre∣quently chang'd in a short time, and such as are directly contrary, as sound Health, great Riches and Honour, been long en∣ioyed by the same Persons; all which had been lost if they should have thought sit∣ing to have Murthered themselves.
3. That which is naturally unlawful or evil in it self, (as Self-murther is in re∣gard of God's Propriety, &c.) can never be supposed to become Lawful upon the account of any Event whatsoever that is Natural: Now all Pain, Poverty, &c. has its natural Causes, and consequently cannot be a sufficient Dispensation to destroy Life.
4. Furthermore, as to the end of Hu∣mane Lise, no such Events as we have been speaking of can be look'd upon as Dispen∣sations
from the pursuing of this end; be∣cause this is naturally farther'd by these very Events; and the greatest Calamities have been the occasion of waking Reason, and making the Soul exert it self in several Virtues, which otherwise it could not have practised. There is a kind of deformity in Storms and Tempests, and Winter comes in unpleasantly after the Warmth and Fruitfulness of the other Seasons; yet these are as necessary to the World, as they were, to Purge the Air, to destroy hurtful Weeds and Insects, and to dispose the Earth to Answer the returning Spring: Something of the same kind is full as necessary to humane Nature, to set the Soul in Motion, after the soultry Calms of Ease and Luxury: * 1.49 A great Mind improves upon oppositi∣on, it Sparkles and Rejoyces under those Calamities which wou'd oppress others, and slames out to the World in brighter Glory. Wherefore to suppose that such E∣vents as we have been speaking of, are Dispensations or Dismissions from Life, is to •…•…ay, either that there are no such Virtues as Con•…•…ancy, Patience, and Fidelity; and that •…•…od dispenses with us as to the practising any
such Duties at all: or else that he does so when we have the greatest occasion for them, when they are nearest to their highest Perfection, and may be practis'd most Gloriously.
5. But after all, the very Being alive; though under the worst Events that can possibly be imagin'd, is a direct Contra∣diction to any such Call, Summons or Dispen∣sation, as above-mention'd: Because as our Lives were first from God; † 1.50 so the con∣tinuation of them depends wholly upon him: No Man cou'd preserve himself one Moment without the Concurrence of his Providence, if he thought •…•…itting to with∣draw that Concurrence, there wou'd need no other manifestation of his Will; because Life wou'd cease immediately. Where∣fore while there is Life, there is no room to suppose that God gives leave to any Man to kill himself; because I say, his Being at all is nothing but the Effect of Gods Will, and therefore while he is; 'tis absurd to sup∣pose that God Will's that he should not be.
These Reasons I hope may be sufficient to show that no Man can have any assu∣rance from any Natural Event, that God does resign his Propriety of humane Life, or
Call, or Summon any Man out of the World by Self-murther; and the importance of the •…•…ing in Question; the impossibility of recovering the Mistake; the great In∣justice towards God and Man; and the sad Consequences that may, nay must follow; ought to awaken Men upon this occasion, while they have any Reason left, and make 'em weigh every Motive exactly and impartially: Especially since it may so justly be fear'd in these Cases, that every Man's Reigning Passion, his Fear, his Pride, his Impatience, &c. may be his God; and the rash impulses of these be taken for Divine Suggestions, Calls or Dispensations, as it has often hap∣pen'd even to such as have been great Men, in the decay of their Strength and Reason. * 1.51 Zeno, the Father of the Stoicks, living to a very great Age, happen'd one day to stumble and hurt his Finger, where∣upon he cry'd out to this purpose, I ac∣knowledge your Summons, O ye Gods, and I obey; and immediately went home and hang'd himself. If those Events which Melancho∣•…•…y Men take for God's Calls or Dispensations were examin'd, they wou'd seldom be found to be more reasonable than this.
FRom Exceptions, Limitations, and Dispensations of this Law, they come at last to tell us directly, that there are some Cases in which it wholly ceases; and then a Man becomes Master and Disposer of him∣self.
* 1.52 No Law is so Primary and Simple, but that it fore-imagines a Reason upon which it was founded; and scarce any Reason so constant, but that Circumstances may alter it; in which Case a private Man is Em∣perour of himself, sui juris. And he whose Conscience is well temper'd and dispassion'd as∣sures him, that the Reason of Self-Preservation ceases in him, may also presume, that the Law
ceases too, and may do that then which otherwise were against the Law.
Self-preservation which we confess to be the foundation of general natural Law, is no o∣ther thing than a natural Affection and Appe∣tition of Good, whether true or seeming.—Now since this Law of Self-preservation is ac∣complish'd in attaining that which conduces to our Ends, and is (i. e. seems) good to us.—If I propose to my self in this Self-homicide, a greater Good, though Imistake it; I perceive not wherein I transgress the general Law of Nature, which is an Affection of Good, True or Seeming; and if that which I affect by Death be truly a greater Good, wherein is the other stricter Law of Nature, which is recti∣fied Reason, violated?
I will first give a short Answer to every one of these Propositions in the terms here made of use; and in the same order that they lie; afterwards I will represent the strength of the Argument accord∣ing to the best of my Judgment in other terms; such as seem to me more clear and plain, such as I have met withal in other Authors or Discourse; and then endeavour no answer it more fully.
1. The Reason upon which the Law of
Self-preservation is founded, * 1.53 has been shown to be twofold; 1. The preserving of God's Propriety of every Man's Life, and that 2. with regard to the End for which Life was given. This Reason is so Con∣stant, that no Circumstances whatever, unless a plain and undeniable Manifestation of God's Will, can ever alter it.
2. Conscience, which is the last Judg∣ment of upright Reason, as it considers hu∣mane Actions in the State of Nature, must be guided by what is allow'd to be the Law of Nature, which Self-preservation is allow'd to be; where there is no Law, Rea∣son may Act alone, but where there is 'tis bound to obey it; and its doing so proves Conscience to be well temper'd, and dispas∣sion'd; but it may justly be doubted whe∣ther 'tis really so or no, when it looks out for a Reason for the ceasing of a confest Law.
Moreover 'tis impossible that an upright Conscience, which acknowleges that the Reason of this Law is, the preserving of God's Propriety of humane Life, to the end above mention'd, can ever assure any Man that such an end is really ceased; as has been shown at large in the last Chapter.
Wherefore this Learned Gentleman, being sensible of this: Proposes another end of this Law, such as is very convenient indeed for his purpose, and may cease whenever any Man thinks sitting; and this is Good, True, or Seeming.
3. If Self-preservation be an Appetition of Good, True or Seeming; this must be at least of such a sort of good as is or seems proper to preserve Life. If we consider Self-preserva∣tion alone, without the moral end of it, this cannot be accomplish'd by attaining that which conduces to any other end, or seems good to Man in any other respect, than as it wou'd preserve Life: Wherefore it is im∣possible for any honest Man of very ordinary Understanding to mistake to such a Degree, as to look upon Self-murther as such a good; because this implies a Contradicti∣on, and wou'd make that to be the end of a Law which is the utter destruction of it; for this wou'd be to argue in this man∣ner, the Law of Self-preservation is accom∣plish'd in attaining that which seems good to us; Self-homicide (i. e. Self-destruction) may seem good to me, therefore the Law of Self∣preservation may be accomplish'd by my Self∣destruction.
4. These two Words End and Good are of too large and doubtful a Signification; that which conduces to our ends, and is good to us, does not always accomplish the Law of Self∣preservation; that which conduces to the true end of Life, the following of Reason by Virtue, accomplishes indeed the Law of Self-preservation; because it not only im∣proves the Mind, but prolongs Life, and therefore is truly good to us. But there are many other Ends of humane Actions, as many as we have Passions and Appetites, which become not only unworthy of our Reason, but destructive of our Life; as well by the manner of our pursuing 'em, as the measure of our enjoying them; and there∣fore what ever they seem, whatever Shape or Beauty our Passions give them, are so far from being Good, that they are directly cer∣tainly Evil; and being so, can never accomplish the Law of Self-preservation.
These things will appear more clear, if in the next place we suppose the Ob∣jection above mention'd to be made in these or the like Words
To follow Nature has been allow'd to be the best rule of humane Actions by the wisest Men of all Sects. 1. To follow Nature, is to seek to be happy. 2. My happiness consists in obtain∣ing that which seems good to me, and avoiding
that seems evil. 3. I and no other am to be the Judge in this Case; therefore if Life by the want of any Good, in which I place my Happi∣ness, becomes an Evil, and Death seems good to me, I do but follow Nature in killing my self, and the Law of Self-preservation is not trans∣gressed, but gives place or ceases naturally.—For the Answering of this Argument clearly, I will make use of this Method.
1. I will show what is meant by following Nature.
2. In what Happiness or Misery, Good or Evil, as to humane Life, do really consist.
3. The unreasonableness of every particular Man's being left to himself to follow what seems Good or Evil to his private Judgment, and to dispose of Life accordingly.
1. What is meant by following Nature? Though some Account of this Maxim has been * 1.54 already given, yet being very much in request at present, and the Mistakes concerning it the occasion of other Crimes as well as this of Self-murther, it commonly happening that they who talk loudest of Nature and Reason understand
'em least, or act against 'em most; it is re∣quisite to say something farther of it; and if in so doing I should repeat any thing that I have said before, let the Reader think, either that I wou'd save him the trouble of turning back again, or knew not how to express my self better.
The Word Nature is sometimes a very general Term, and signifies that Order which the great Creator put the whole World to move in; sometimes, in a more limitted sence, it signifies that Rule which he gave each Creature to follow, for the fulfilling of that particular End for which it was made, in proper Harmony and Consent with the Universe; so that the Word Nature rises in its signification ac∣cording to the several Degrees of the Cre∣ation; and by following Nature must be meant, the obeying it according to that par∣ticular Power which distinguishes one Creature from another. This Beasts do by Sensati∣on, this Man shou'd do by Reason: That great, that God-like Faculty which is gi∣ven us to discern Good and Evil, and to regulate our Passions and Appetites by Virtue accordingly. Wherefore for Man to follow Nature, is the very same, with the End of Life, to which Self-preserva∣tion
is subservient, * 1.55 as has been shown, namely the following of Reason by Virtue.
They who indulge their Passions and Appetites, who live only by Sensation, do not follow Nature as Men, but as Beasts; nay 'tis not near so well with 'em. Sen∣sation in Beasts preserves them, they obey no Appetite to excess, and therefore to term Intemperance Beastliness is no less than Detraction, for 'tis really Manliness, (humane Nature Corrupted) where Rea∣son enslav'd to Appetite is kept to the vile Drudgery of serching in more and more of its gross and earthly Object, till Sensa∣tion it self sinks down gorg'd and suffoca∣ted under it.
Did we follow Nature as faithfully as Beasts do, by observing that which is our chief Faculty, we shou'd be happy and pre∣serve our Being, as carefully and successful∣ly as they do theirs; but instead of this we rashly destroy it; or fondly overlay it: And by the Intemperance of our choicest En∣joyments, act as foolishly against Sensation, as against Reason.
That the wisest Men of all Sects, took thisto be the meaning of following Nature,
or living according to it, will appear to any one that consults their Writings of Morality; particularly the Stoicks. Thus they tell us.
* 1.56 That to live according to Nature, is to live according to Man's particular, Nature, and the Nature of the Vniverse, doing no∣thing which that Common Law, which runs through the whole Creation, Right Reason, forbids: Which Law is the same with Jove, the disposer and manager of all things.
† 1.57 To follow Reason and to follow Nature is one and the same thing to a Rational Crea∣ture.
‖ 1.58 To live according to Nature is to live ac∣cording to Virtue, for Nature leads us to this, says Cleanthes.
This is confirm'd by that Excellent Wri∣ter Philo the Jew: * 1.59 This, says he, (speak∣ing of obeying God) is that end of humane Actions; the living according to Nature, which is so much celebrated by the greatest Philoso∣phers, for this is done when the Mind, entring the path of Virtue, treads in the steps of Right Reason, and follows God, ever mindful of his Commands, ever observing 'em all strictly both in Word and Deed.
Yet perhaps it may be Objected, That this account of following Nature is too gene∣ral, * 1.60 some things are natural to the Species, and others to the particular Person; and there∣fore when Cicero consulted the Oracle, he had this Answer, FOLLOW YOUR OWN NATURE. He that follows his own Reason in what appears to him Good or Evil, in embracing the first and avoiding the latter, though he may be mistaken, follows his own Nature: Accordingly if he cannot obtain that in which he places his Happiness, and his Life becomes miserable upon this Account, he follows Nature who lays it down.
To this it may be reply'd, That to sol∣low ones own Nature cannot be any Exemp∣tion from what was said before; nor is the Account which has been given there, too general; for as to what relates to the End of Life; the following of Reason by Virtue, this belongs equally to humane Nature in Ge∣neral, forasmuch as all Men are Rational. Either then by this is meant, the same with the following of humane Nature, which is the Rule by which all Mankind is to Act; or else we must suppose that
there is a particular Rule or Law given to every individual Person, different from the rest of the same Species, which he alone is bound to follow: But this would be more unreasonable than if we should say, That every Subject of the Emperour of China was not bound by the General Laws of that Country; but that he had a particular private Law by which he was bound to Act, and that too often in direct opposition to the other.
2. By following ones own Nature perhaps was meant the same with Zeno's Maxim, * 1.61 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which I think may be rendred the living Conformably, or Con∣sistently; i.e. the being the same in Opini∣on, Humour, Manners, the having ones Life all of a Piece, whatsoever comes to pass; which they also call'd † 1.62 Decorum: As if a Man were of an easie and obliging Temper, that he should be the same in Adversity as well as Prosperity, Sickness and Health, to the meanest poorest Man as to the greatest Potentate. If of a grave austere Way, which was that which they
chose; he should carry that on through the worst Events, and nothing be able to alter him; the maintaining either of these, or any other particular Character, may be call'd the following of ones own Na∣ture; but though Men may choose dif∣ferent ways of Behaviour, according to their Fancy or Constitution, yet this must still be grounded upon the former Univer∣sal Maxim, the living according to Nature, as Humane and Reasonable; otherwise the Character, whatever it was, wou'd be vi∣cious, and then 'twou'd be so much the worse to maintain it, and equally absurd, whether a Man was always Affably or Surlily the same, if always in the wrong; so that this regards only the outside the Dress of Virtue, the particular Fashion which she is to appear in: Let Men be sure of her first by following Nature as Hu∣mane in general, and then they may give her what appearance they please by follow∣ing their own Nature. This will be further explain'd in the Answer to the next part of the Objection abovemention'd. * 1.63
3. By following ones own Nature, some
will have meant the following a particu∣lar Opinion or Humour; the indulging that particular Appetite or Passion, which by E∣ducation, Example or Constitution has got the ascendant, which brings me to the re∣maining part of the Objection. To follow Nature is to seek to be Happy, Happiness con∣sists in obtaining that which seems Good to me, and avoiding that which seems Evil; I and no other must be the Judge of this; wherefore if Life becomes an Evil, and Death a Good to me, by the want of any thing in which I place my Happiness, or by the suffering any thing in which I place my Misery, I do but follow Nature in killing my self, and the Law of Self-preser∣vation is not transgress'd by my doing so, but ceases naturally. This was propos'd to be Answer'd by shewing these two things.
1. In what Happiness or Misery, Good or Evil, as to Humane Life, did really con∣sist.
2. The unreasonableness of every Man's be∣ing left to himself to follow what seems Good or Evil to him, and to dispose of Life accord∣ingly.
As to the first, Happiness truly cons•…•…s in the observing the End of Life, which has been so often mention'd: As this is
* 1.64 done more or less Men are proportiona∣bly Happy, as 'tis omitted proportionably Miserable: But in the common acceptation of the Word, Happiness signifies the en∣joyment of a Man's desires whatever they are; and for any one to say that he cannot be happy without such or such a thing, which is not in his Power; and that the Good or Evil of his whole Life depends up∣on it, signifies nothing but the vehemence of that Man's desires; not that there is any real Happiness in obtaining it, or Misery in sailing of it; it proving most commonly quite contrary, that the more a Man enjoys what he vehemently desires, the more miserable he is afterwards; and then † 1.65 forsooth Life seems an Evil to him, and amidst the Discontent and Vexation which comes upon him at the sense of his Folly, and the just reproof of his Reason. He tells you very Philosophically, that he does but follow Nature in delivering him∣self from what is Evil: When he has been acting against Nature, against good Sense (for that is humane Nature) all the while;
and when he has done so, instead of re∣covering the way which he has lost, and beginning truly to follow Nature, he deserts it wholly and irrecoverably, and offers the greatest and most positive Violence to it by Self-murther.
But the Mistakes concerning Happiness or Misery are grounded upon the Mistakes concerning Good and Evil, and therefore 'twill be necessary to take a short view of them.
As Humane Life consists of two parts, the Soul and Body; so what is good must be consider'd in a twofold manner, as it relates to the Soul or to the Body.
1. As it relates to the Soul, the Regula∣ting and Improving of the Mind; which we suppose to be the End of humane Life: This is usually called Moral Good, and the contrary Moral Evil. Or else,
2dly. As it relates to the Body, the Health or the Preservation of it; for which End the several ways of Perception, common∣ly call'd Senses, were ordain'd; by which notice is given to Reason, what is most proper to maintain this Union and preserve Life, or what is most likely to destroy it; this is commonly call'd Sensitive Good, and the contrary Sensitive Evil.
To bring this to the Matter in hand, supposing that Good, True or Seeming were a proper Rule and End of humane Actions: There are but two sorts of Good, as has been shown, Moral or Sensi∣tive; but through which of these is it, that Self-murther can appear Lawful.
If Moral Good tends not only to the improvement of the Mind, but also to the prolonging of Life; if nothing is Sensitive Good but that alone which is reported by the Senses to be proper to preserve Life, then it must be absurd to destroy Life upon the pretence of either of these Goods, and to do so must be Evil, both as to Moral Evil, and Sensitive also; and therefore highly against Nature.
To this let me add, that the only reason why any thing is naturally Evil to the Body, is as it contributes to the separation of it from the Soul, which is done positively and violently by Self-murther. Nature is the Course, the Order which God put the Creature to move in: To break off that Course violently must certainly be against Nature, and what is so cannot be Lawful.
But here again it may probably be Ob∣•…•…ted, That if the End of humane Life, as •…•…t has been assign'd by me, is the following of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by Virtue•…•… Whose Reason must this
be? Must not every Man be guided by his own Reason? and consequently will not his Virtue consist in following that which seems Good to him, and avoiding that which seems Evil to him?
This brings me to consider, Lastly,
The unreasonableness of every Man's being left to himself to follow that which seems Good or Ev•…•…l to him, and to dispose of Life accord∣ingly.
There must be a certain End or Design for which Life was given, as the Rule of humane Actions, otherwise the World wou'd be in Confusion. The several things which the wisest men of Old have offer'd as this End of Life, I have en∣deavoured to comprehend under these Words, THE FOLLOWING REA∣SON BY VIRTVE: I hope it will not be expected that I should weigh out how much Reason, to a Scruple, will serve to this purpose; because all Men readily assent to such Principles as these, as self-evident; That no wrong or injury ought to be done; that a Man has no right to destroy what is not his, especially if it be allow'd him only for his Advantage and Improvement; that whatever destroys humane Society is to be avoided; that whatever contributes to the pre∣serving and improving of the Faculties, which
are peculiar to Man above other Creatures, ought to be embrac'd. These Principles I suppose are plain to every Rational Creature, and allow'd fit to be observ'd by the Virtues of Justice, Temperance, &c. Or should any Man be suppos'd to be ignorant of any of them in Lapland or new Holland; yet there is no danger of this in civiliz'd Countries, especially this wherein we Live; nor are they deny'd by such as are chiefly against us in this Argument, but acknowledg'd and maintain'd by 'em, and pointed out and required to be observ'd by humane Laws: Wherefore if there can be no ig∣norance as to these Fundamental Princi∣ples; and if there can be no want of Power to observe and practise 'em, to what purpose is it to plead for particular Reason, and for the privilege of Judging for ones self? A Man cannot do so safely, without some Rule, and that Rule must be universal publick Reason; and unless every private Man's Reason be squar'd accordingly it can never be right; but if it be squar'd accordingly, then it ought not to be contended for as private Reason.
As Man is oblig'd to follow that Nature which is common to him with the rest of Mankind, so he is oblig'd to follow that Reason which is so too: I mean as to the
Fundamental Rules of humane Actions: He may make use of his own Reason per∣haps in finding out means to observe these Rules, to observe them I say, not to break them; one of the chief of which is the pre∣serving of Life: As in all well formed Go∣vernments one Law extends to all, for the common Good; so is it in the Govern∣ment of the World, which is order'd by Infinite Wisdom: And therefore 'twou'd be as absurd to plead for particular Reason, as a privilege to act against natural Principles, as it wou'd be to desire it as a privilege to act against just humane Laws.
Reason when loudly boasted, and zea∣lously contended for, by particular Men, against any Ancient and Establish'd Rule, shou'd always be suspected: It shows some uneasiness under that Rule, which if en∣quir'd into, and examin'd with the Per∣son concern'd, wou'd be found to be a∣gainst some particular Interest or Inclination, which had gotten the ascendant •…•…ver him: In these Cases when every Man talks of Reason, he means his own, his own sorry share, and that too perhaps very much vitiated and corrupted; thus you shall see reason of all Complections, Melancholy, Phlegmatick and Sanguine Reason; for when this is once enslav'd by any Appe∣tite
or Passion it takes the Colour of it, and then whatever is the object of each Man's Desires; whatsoever is his particular me∣thod of compassing it, or measure of enjoying it, is call'd Reason. Thus this Godlike faculty is made frequently the pretence of the greatest Absurdities in our Actions, as well as Discourse; and it may be observ'd, that People always plead it most that most offend it; pretending the most faithful Duty to this Sovereign Power, and yet all the while impudently warring against it in its own Name.
Hence it is that seeming Good and seem∣ing Evil are made to be the Rule of hu∣mane Actions, and the following of them the End of humane Life; the measure of its being Good or Evil, and Preserv'd or Destroy'd accordingly: Whereas to act according to seeming Good or seeming Evil can never be allow'd but in the case of sud∣den or extream Necessity, or Panic Fear, when the Soul has not the Power or Leasure to bring its Actions or Resolutions to the Rule of right Reason, or to examine what is real∣ly Good, or really Evil; and then we ought to observe that this is allow'd but upon one Account neither, and that is the preserving of Life, and therefore is a very strange Argu∣ment for the Destroying of it.
But after all that can be said, seeming Good and seeming Evil are sloating and un∣certain things, and therefore can never be the Rule or End of Living; because as they can be no certain measure themselves, so they must destroy it as to all other things; for to suppose this, is not only to let a Man loose to any Object that he pleases, but also to hinder his obtaining of any one, while a new seeming Good may be starting continually, and so a warm Head shall be sure never to want Game: And Life thus employ'd wou'd be given to a very extraordinary End indeed; especially if we consider that the Event of this must prove not only fatal to a Man's self, but may do so by degrees to all that are near him; nay must do so to all Mankind. For if seeming Good is sufficient to justifie our Actions, what Crime can ever be justly laid to any Man's charge? As there is no Errour that pleases under the notion of Falshood, so there is no Wickedness that pre∣vails upon the Mind as it appears Evil; but as there is seeming Truth in the one, so there must be seeming Goodness in the other: Accordingly, he that Robs, Ra∣vishes, Murthers, may plead that he did so only because it seem'd good to him and that in so doing he did but follow Nature; but
if this be to follow Nature, if the ground of General Natural Law is nothing but the appetition of Good, True or Seeming, then how absurd are all Humane Laws, and how unnatural are all Courts of Justice? In a Word, to give a Man up to act by seeming Good and seeming Evil, is to let him loose to his own Will and Pleasure, to grant him Wildness instead of Liberty, and to make Life depend upon this, is to tell him he may destroy himself whenever he thinks fitting.
HItherto I have endeavour'd to An∣swer those Objections, which might seem to oppose what I had said to prove Self-murther Vnlawful; as Man was con∣sider'd in the State of Nature: I come now to examine some others which are brought against what has been said to confirm the
same, as he is a Member of Civil Society.
First, I must say something to that which was * 1.66 above mention'd, as an Instance of deserting ones self Lawfully.
† 1.67 Self-preservation doth not so rigorously, and urgently, and illimitedly bind, but that by the Law of Nature it self, things may, yea must, neglect themselves for others, of which the Pelican is an Instance. Another In∣stance he gives of Bees too, from whence he infers, ‖ 1.68 That as this natural Instinct in Beasts, so rectisied Reason belonging only to us, instructs us often to prefer publick and necessary Persons, by exposing our selves to inevitable Destruction.
* 1.69 We may Lawfully dispossess our selves of that, without which we can have no hopes to sustain our Lives; as in a Shipwreck a pri∣vate Man may give his Plank to a Magistrate, and the Examples of Codrus, Curtius and the Decij, and the Approbation of the greatest and the wisest Nations, in the Ho∣nours which they paid to their Memory, are usually brought in upon this occasiou; this is to prove that the Law of Self-preser∣vation may be dispenc'd withal in regard of serving the Publick; and therefore that it
may be so as reasonably in any Man's private Concern, even to the degree of Killing himself: Or thus, there is no dif∣ference (as to Self-preservation) between a Man's Killing himself upon account of the Publick, or his own account; now he that dispossesses himself upon the publick Account, to save a publick Person: Of that, without which he can have no hopes of saving his own Life, Kills himself.
To this may be Answer'd, 1. That the use of Instinct in Beasts is to Preserve them. It was given them to this End alone, instead of Reason; therefore it is a Con∣tradiction to affirm, that any Beast, Bird, or Insect destroys it self by Instinct, and the Instances here brought to prove this are Fabulous.
2. That the more Reason is rectify'd in Man, the more he will understand to what End he receiv'd Life, and how little Authority he has to dispose of it; and therefore the more carefully will he obey the Law of Self-preservation, and this particularly upon the Consideration of what he owes the Publick.
3. That the Law of Self-preservation may not be wilfully broken, even upon the Account of the Publick. No Man has naturally any Authority to destroy himself
for his Country, designedly and p•…•…ively; but to hazard his Life only.
As to the Instances of Codrus, Curtius, and the Decij, what they did was ground∣ed upon a Religious or Superstitious Per∣swasion; which they obey'd as Supernatu∣ral, and therefore cannot be us'd to prove what is Naturally Lawful.
The Instance of giving a Magiftrate a Plank in a Shipwreck, implies only great hazard of Life, not positive Destruction of it; because there is a possibility of escap∣ing left; and because the intention is not to die, to abandon all care of ones self, but to take care of another first: To make this more plain I will show,
1. What Authority the Publick Power, where-ever 'tis plac'd, has to require any Person to hazard his Life, and what War∣rant that Person has to hazard it accord∣ingly.
2. The difference between extreme Ha∣zard and Self-murther.
1. What Authority, &c. In this Con∣sideration I shall have no regard to any one particular State, but only enquire into the End of Government or Civil Society in General, and this with all Submission
imaginable. The end of Civil Govern∣ment is, I suppose, the promoting the same things for many Men together, upon which their true Happiness depended, as consider'd singly in the State of Nature: this is usually call'd the Publick Good, that is, each Man's Private Good as he is Man, consider'd collectively, and with regard to the General Welfare. Private Good be∣ing twofold, as hath been shown, Moral and Sensitive; the object of humane Laws must be twofold also, Virtue and Propriety, and the promoting and securing these in Peace from all Enemies, either from with∣out or within any Political Body seems to be the true natural end of Civil Society.
Now as there is Publick Good to be se∣cur'd, so in order to this, there must be Publick Power over every particular Sub∣ject, lodg'd in one or more Persons, ac∣cording as the Form of the Government is; and lest this Power should be either Dangerous or to no Purpose, there must be also Publick Judgment, the Result of the Debates of Wise and Upright Men, to limit it and direct it.
Furthermore, whereas every particular State must be consider'd as one Political Person; in which respect the being of any State is to be look'd upon as the Publick
Life, and the Well-being of the same State, the Publick Health: So it must be supposed that the Publick Power must be such, as is proper and requisite to de∣fend these, and consequently that it must extend to Particular Life, whenever the Publick Life is any ways in danger.
Now this may be endanger'd two ways, either 1st. By Enemies within the State, Corrupt and Vicious Men, who obstruct and break the Laws, and insect others; in which Case the Publick Power extends to the actual Destruction of such particular Mens Lives, as being necessary for the Preservation of all the rest. Or 2dly. It may be endanger'd from outward Ene∣mies; other Governments that would En∣slave or Destroy it: In which Case the Publick Power extends to the obliging such as it thinks fitting to hazard their Lives, when 'tis necessary for the Publick Preservation: To hazard, I say, not posi∣tively destroy themselves, (as when a blow is made at a Man's Head, he may lift up his Arm to defend it, venture the breaking of it, not positively break it, which he has no right to do) and necessary it may be suppos'd, sufficiently to warrant any Man's Obedience, when the Publick Judg∣ment declares that it is so.
But the chief Question is, from whence this Power is deriv'd to the Publick, by whom it was granted.
Some suppose it to be granted by Man himself, upon a kind of compact for Pro∣tection; but though Pro•…•…tion may be one great End of this Power; yet it is ge∣nerally agreed, that this Power cannot be conserr'd on the Publick by every particu∣lar Man; because God alone has the ab∣solute Propriety of humane Life: Man has no such Power himself, and what he has not, he cannot make over to another. Mr. Hobbs will have it to come from Man, but then to decline this Objection, and se∣cure his darling Principle of Self-preserva∣tion, he says, This is not done by Man's transfer•…•…ing any right of his own, but by laying down the right which he has to hurt others. His own Words are these, * 1.70 The Subjects did not give their Sovereign that Right; but only in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own as he should think fit for the Preservation of them all; so that it was not given but left to him: If I take this right, this is a very odd distinction; for if a Man has any right to hurt others for his own Preserva∣tion;
then as he is bound to Preserve him∣self, so he is bound to retain that Right; and yet if he lays it down, he parts with it as much as if he actually gave it away.
He told us just before, * 1.71 That in the making of a Common-wealth every Man gives away the Right of defending another, but not of defending himself. In several Places † 1.72 he repeats and inculcates this, that no Man can ever part with the right of defending himself; no, not after Lawful Tryal and Con∣demnation: If this be so, How can he lay down the right which he has to hurt o∣thers, since by so doing he must be left in a great measure defenceless, and liable, by his own Consent, not only to be hurt, but to be actually destroy'd, as in all Capital Punishments.
Wherefore, not withstanding Men chuse to struggle thus, rather than have any thing to do with God, while they frame their Political Systems: Yet it seems plain that such a Power as we are speaking of can be deriv'd from no other but God, who alone having the absolute Propriety of all humane Life, can alone have the right to give some Men Power over the Lives of
others; and who having fram'd Man in such a manner, that Civil Society is ne∣cessary for his Security and Improvement, and yet such Society not to be preserv'd without such a Power, must upon these Considerations, and also as he is a wife and just Being; and as he who wills the End must will the Means necessary to that End; must, I say, be supposed to grant to the Magistrate such a Power; a Power to hazard Life himself, and to oblige others to do so, in defence of the Pub∣lick.
From what has been said may appear, that the Power or Authority which any Government has to require Men to hazard their Lives for the Publick Good is derived from God himself, that the time and man∣ner of doing this depends upon the Pub∣lick Judgment; and that Man is thus warranted for hazarding his Life accord∣ingly.
To return then to the Instance above∣mention'd, of a Man's giving a Magistrate his Plank in a Shipwreck: If a Man may hazard his Life for the Publick Good, then if there be some particular Person, in whom the Publick Power and Publick Judg∣ment is lodg'd, from whom all the Springs of Action derive their Motion, who is in
effect the Life, the Soul of the whole Body, and in whom the Liberty and Pro∣perty (as we love to speak) of many Millions centers and may be lost; and among the rest his Life also, who shall be concern'd for this Publick Persons safety; then we may conclude, that any Man may hazard his Life even to the utmost danger to preserve such a Person; yet in these Cases we are to remember Life is only hazarded not aban∣don'd, much less positively destroy'd; and that for such extreme hazard Men may justly suppose that they have Authority from God himself, as they are Members of any Civil Government.
And though the danger be great, yet 'tis very seldom that Men fall into certain Death upon these Accounts, as might be shown easily.
But suppose it should be so, yet in this Case an honest good Man does not mind any thing but to do his Duty, to pur∣sue faithfully the End for which Life was given; and if Life should be lost in this pursuit, this is not his desire, nor his fault; 'twas not his aim to die, but to do as he ought; nay gladly wou'd he have lived had Life been consistent with his Virtue; but when this came in Question, both Death and Life became indifferent, and
though he Chooses neither, he accepts rea∣•…•…y of either, as they offer themselves in his way to his Duty.
This I find confirm'd by the School-men in a harder Case than any above-menti∣on'd. Suppose a powerful Tyrant shou'd bring the last City of any State to the greatest Extremity, by all the sad Conse∣quences of a long and prosperous Siege; as loss and wearine•…•…s of Men, Famine, Contention, Corruption; and no hopes of Succour shou'd be left; suppose that after this, he shou'd refuse all Articles of Submission, and shou'd threaten Destructi∣on by Fire and Sword, unless they deli∣ver'd upto him some one particular innocent Person. This City (say they) * 1.73 may not •…•…ly deliver him up, though they know him to be Innocent; but that very Person may deliver up himself, and yet without being guilty of de∣stroying himself, because, as abovesaid, his chi•…•… end is the doing so much Good, not the Dying; his particular intention, his design that he had in view continually was to save his Country; and this being the only means which was left, he resolves to incur the greatest dan∣ger to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 purpose; and yet in all this is positive
only as to the doing of his Duty, and far from being positive as to the destroying of his Life. To compleat this Argument let us now see,
2. How great the difference is between this and Self-murther, and consequently how unreasonably the one is made a plea for the other.
He that hazards Life for the Publick does this in obedience to the Laws both of God and Man; he that destroys his own Life does this in disobedience to the Laws of both; the first by observing the true End of Life, does what God and Nature pri∣marily design'd as most proper to preserve Life, and if he loses it 'tis by the violence of others; the latter neglecting the true End of Life destroys it wilfully by the most positive act of injustice to God, his Country and him∣self; the first only hazards Life, the latter chooses Death; if the first happens to die 'tis against his will, if the latter lives 'tis against his; and as to the Publick, the one •…•…es for it, the other dies against it; not only by de∣serting it, but by breaking its Laws, and encouraging others to do so, and also by enervating the srri•…•…st ties of Kindness, Trust and Justice, which may end at last in the total dissolution of any Govern∣ment; the Comparison might be carried
further, but this may be sufficient to show the unreasonableness of this Conclusion, That because a Man may give a Magistrate his Plank in a Shipwreck therefore he may Murther himself.
The next Objection is to this purpose, That if Self-murther is unjust in regard of the Publick, 'tis because it loses a Member; † 1.74 but this may as well be said of all those who retiring themselves from Functions in the Common∣wealth, defraud the State of their Assistance, and attend only their own Ends. ‖ 1.75 If the Person be of necessary use to the State, there are in it some degrees of Injustice, but yet no more than if a General of much use shou'd retire into a Monastery. To this may be Answer'd.
1. That one of the Reasons why Self∣murther is unjust to the Publick, but not the only one; is its losing a Member.
2. The Instance here given does not come up to the point; for a General may not lay down his Commission without leave, when he is necessary for his Countries Service; but he may justly be punish'd if he refuses to Act. Yet suppose a Man may retire from Pub∣lick Affairs to attend his own Ends; Is this
as much damage to the Publick as Self∣murther? He that attends his own Ends, (if by this be meant his particular Interest as to his Family) contributes to the Pub∣lick Good, and may do so very considera∣bly, though never so much retir'd: How∣ever the causes of his Retirement may al∣ter, and then he may serve the Publick again upon Necessity; or shou'd he not, he may serve and assist his particular Friends and Relations, improve his Know∣ledge and his Fortune, be an Example of Virtue, and in many other respects observe the end for which Life was given; and this sure cannot be the same with the put∣ting a Man's self into an unalterable incapa∣city of doing any good at all, by the wil∣ful and positive destruction of Life.
To this it may perhaps be reply'd, That here Strength and Vigour is requir'd, Health of Body and Activity of Mind; but suppose a Man by * 1.76 extreame Age or Infirmity, by loss some Sense or some Limb, shou'd be made incapa∣ble of serving the Publick, had not he as good be gone as stay to no purpose, may not he leave the World if he pleases when he is become good for nothing.
This Supposition seems to be ground∣ed upon a very gross sence of serving the Publick; as if States-men were to be cho∣sen by the breadth of their Shoulders, and strong and sizeable Men were as necessary for the Council Table as the Guard Room; for if Men be past Reason the Dispute is at an end, but if they are capable of using it, why should old Age be objected, unless Maturity and Experience shou'd be dis∣advantages? When Reason is lost, no Man can be accountable for Self-murther, or any other Action, yet even then we pre∣serve Life carefully in Ideots and Madmen at the Publick Expence; either in hopes of their recovery, or to learn to value Rea∣son as we ought, or to praise the giver of it, so that there is scarce any Wretch but may be some way or other beneficial to the Publick, even by his being alive alone; how much more may he be so when Rea∣son remains, and that too so highly valued and well understood, that Men will choose sooner to part with Life than re∣main depriv'd of the glorious advantage of it? Or if this shou'd not be allow'd, what Rule can be given? What de∣gree of Age or Insirmity can be fix'd, when Men shall be judg'd to be good for nothing, and permitted to Murther them∣selves
accordingly? Such a thing (if possi∣ble) might prevent it indeed, since Men wou'd be apt to live in despite of all their Miseries, rather than buy the privilege of Self-murther at so dear a rate, as to be judg'd by others, and be oblig'd to ac∣knowledge themselves, that they are good for nothing.
But while Reason remains, as I said before, this is impossible, and many In∣stances may be given of Persons who have done their Country the most considerable Service under all these Calamities above∣mention'd, nay at the very time of Death it self. The whole Senate of Rome had once so basely degenerated as to surrender up tamely their Liberty and their Glorj, in that dishonourable Peace which they had unanimously resolv'd to conclude with Pyr∣rhus: * 1.77 When Appius Claudius who had been absent from Publick Assairs, through extreme Age, Blindness and Lameness, for many Years, as soon as he heard of it, caus'd himself to be carried to the House, and bravely upbraided them with their Cowardice and Persidiousness to their Coun∣try: What Man had ever such appearan∣ces
of being past serving the Publick, or being good for nothing; and yet how vigo∣rous was his Soul in so decrepit a Body? One wou'd think the Genius of Rome, chas'd out from the degenerate Senate, had retir'd for shelter under the Ruins of this great old Man. 'Tis certain that if he had not had so many Insirmities he wou'd have been less regarded, but the fight of these made his Zeal surprizing; rais'd their Attention with their Admira∣tion, and gave every Word a peculiar force to restore them to their Courage and their Reason as unanimously as they had re∣bell'd against both before: This made * 1.78 his Infirmities numbred in after Ages a∣mong his Trophies, and Coecus a more glo∣rious distinction than Asiaticus, Africanus, &c. for they who had those Titles, only added Vast and Luxurious Provinces to their Country, which prov'd the Destruction of it at last; but Appius conquer'd its most
dreadful Enemy, and sav'd it, for that time, from it self. † 1.79 The great Father Paul a few Minutes before his Death, after he had been long weaken'd by Age and Sickness, had three Cases of very great Importance sent to him, by the Senate of Venice, to each of which he gave his Opi∣nions, and that wise Assembly follow'd them accordingly. In these Instances there was not only a complication of Calamities, but Death it self, had almost taken Possessi∣on, and yet neither, made them past serving of the Publick.
What shall be pretended then for the loss of any one Sense? as the Stoicks do; Shall this be taken for a certain Sign of being past doing good? And consequent∣ly a reasonable Plea for Self-murther; and shall that be acted accordingly? Had it been so always, how much Instruction and Delight wou'd Mankind have been depriv'd of, had Home•…•…—Nay had Milton done so, the World had lost that admirable Poem? Oh, had he made but as good use of his Eyes!
'Tis true few Persons are qualified for such great Performances, but these In∣stances
may shew that such Calamities, as above-mention'd, do not make all Men past serving of their Country, or good for nothing; and that if such Pretences were allow'd for Self-murther in one Person, they must be so in another; and if so, that this may prove very hurtful to any State, nay possibly to the whole World.
But after all, it may be further Object∣ed, If a Man has leave from the Publick to Murther himself, he does it no Injury; this leave has frequently been granted by the Ro∣man Senate, and at † 1.80 Marseilles a Vessel of Poison was kept ready at the Publick Charge, for those to whom they gave Permission to Murther themselves. This Custom may be of use to us so far in this Argument as to prove that these People thought that no Man who liv'd in a Civil State had right over his own Life, but the Publick had a claim to it, which is very true in its proper Li∣mitation; but then this was not such a claim as is grounded upon absolute Propriety; such as gives a Power to dispose of any thing when and how it pleases; because the right which the Publick has over particular Life is only for security of Publick Life, ground∣ed upon Self-defence, and never to be made
use of but in extreme Necessity; as for the cutting off a corrupted part, or for the opposing open Violence: Wherefore this Right being grounded only upon this Foun∣dation, for any Political Body to pretend to give leave to any Innocent Person to kill himself, is as absurd as for any Man to give his right Hand leave to cut off his lest when it ails nothing, or to wound him∣self in any other sound part. In a Word; this wou'd be both Folly and Vsurpation, for had the Publick this absolute Right, all Complaints of Tyranny and Oppression wou'd be very unreasonable?
But after all what do such Instances as these signifie to Vs, or to any Nation which does not grant the same Permission: If the Matter were to be determin'd by Humane Laws; we of this Nation (not to menti∣on others) are forbid it under the strictest Penalties.
But here our Author tells us again, * 1.81 If our Law be severe in punishing of it, and that this Argument has the more strength, because more Nations concur in such Laws: It may well from hence be retorted, that every where Men are inclinable to it, which establisheth much our Opinion, says he, considering that none of
those Laws, which prescribe Civil restraints from doing it, can make it Sin; and that Act is not much discredited if it be therefore Evil, because it is so forbidden, and binds the Con∣science no further but under the general Precept of obedience to the Law or the Forfeiture.—Here are three things advanc'd;
1. That the General Concurrence of Na∣tions in any Law proves a General Inclina∣tion in Mankind to the committing of the thing forbidden; and therefore that that thing is Natural. This I think is very strange! All Nations concurr in severe Laws against Murthering of Princes, Husbands, Fathers, against betraying Forts, Ships, &c. Now does this prove a General Inclination of Peo∣ple to these Crimes? No certainly; but it proves a general abhorrence and detestation of em, and the ill Consequences of 'em to Man∣kind; and therefore is an undeniable Argu∣ment of such things being unnatural.
2. We are told that none of those Laws which prescribe Civil Restraints from doing it (i. e. Self-Murther) can make it Sin, and the Act is not much discredited if it be therefore Evil because it is so forbidden.
The Law of any Land does not make Self-murther to •…•…e a Sin or Evil, but found
it so, 'tis really so by the Law of Nature, as I hope has been shewn; 'tis declar'd to be so by positive Laws, to put Men in mind of it, to save 'em the trouble of reasoning it out, and to deter 'em from committing it, by the threats of immediate Punish∣ment; and that which was thus founded in Nature, and afterwards commanded by Man's Law brings a new obligation upon the Conscience, for if † 1.82 humane Laws concerning things indifferent in their own Nature (which forbid an Action which a Man might be otherwise free to do, or command one which he might be other∣wise free to omit) do oblige us, as every one allows, then how much more must they do so when they forbid a thing which is not indifferent but naturally unlawful, and which a Man was oblig'd to sorbear before; and so on the contrary: If this be so, that must also be a mistake which is assirm'd.
3. That humane Laws which forbid Self∣murther bind the Conscience no further, but un∣der the General Precept of Obedience to the Law, or else to the Forfeiture.
When a Civil Punishment is affixt to that
which is a Natural Evil, a Man is not left at liberty to choose to suffer the one for act∣ing the other; particularly in the Case of Self-murther; because a Man was oblig'd in Conscience before the humane Law was made, and because the Punishment (in this Case especially, of all others) is by no means adequate to the Crime; besides if a Man may choose the Punishment, then the Law of Man instead of enforcing the Law of Nature, wou'd only be the conve∣nience of evading it. Wherefore as this distinction is unjust, so is it most pernici∣ous to all Civil Governments.
Yet after all; supposing that it should be lawful to chuse the Civil Punishment, for the committing that which is Naturally E∣vil: How shall this reach the Offender, as to Self-murther? This can affect him no o∣therwise, than as to his Dead Body, or his Posterity; and therefore how false is this Pretence at the Bottom? And how base is this detestable Action? whereby a Wretch breaks the Laws of God and his Country, and exposes his best and dearest Friends, his next Relations, nay his Children often, to suffer the Punishment due to his Crime. If in excuse for this it shou'd be said, That such People may be suppos'd to satisfie themselves with hopes of the Punish∣ments
being escapt by their Heirs, either through Friendship, Compassion, Bribe∣ry, &c. If, I say, this shou'd be alledg'd, then certainly it is very well worthy of Consideration, whether the putting of those Laws duly and constantly in Execution, which are provided in this Case, wou'd not be of very great force to put a stop to this Evil? The Consideration of shame alone † 1.83 did this heretofore in the Case of the Milesians, and the Romans also un∣der Tarquinius Priscus: Our Laws then may do this more effectually; which al∣lowing but the same Burial which other Felons have, and requiring the Forfeiture of the Personal Estate, have not only the Natural tye of shame, but a much stronger, that of tenderness to their Posterity, to re∣strain such Rash and Melancholy Crea∣tures by.
And this leads me to apply my self par∣ticularly to the Coroner and his Inquest up∣on these sad Occasions. For although some∣what of this kind has been done lately by an ingenious * 1.84 Author; yet the Nature of his Design (I suppose) not suffering him to enlarge upon it, there seems to be room left for something to be added.
I will first then give some Account of the Duty of the Coroner and his Jury, and what the Law directs, and upon what Grounds, (as I have been inform'd) in this Case: And asterwards show the unreafona∣ble•…•…s of those Prejudices or Pretences which Men are apt to be sway'd by, not∣withstanding these great Obligations.
As to the first, When the Coroner has notice, that any one is come to a violent and untimely Death; he is to Summon and Impannel a Jury out of the Neighbour∣hood, and administer this Oath to 'em.
You shall Swear, that you shall well and tru∣ly inquire, and true Presentment make of all such matters and things as shall be given you in Charge, on the behalf of our Sovereign Lord the King, touching the Death of A. B. So Help you God.
As to the Matters and Things here men∣tion'd, these are Explain'd farther to them by the Coroner in his Charge; Then they are to find out the manner of the Persons Death, whether by Drowning, Strangling, Wounds received, or otherwise; whether by ano∣ther or himself, if by himself, whether he was Felo de se, or non Compos mentis.
And to this End they are to be directed and assisted by the Depositions of those whom the Coroner Summons to give Evidence, or by the hearing of the Councel, which is sometimes brought upon these Occasions. What is meant by being non Compos; the Law informs them, that it is the deprivati∣on of Reason or Vnderstanding: Such a state of the Mind wherein there is a Cessation from Exercising the Discursive Faculty. That there are four sorts of Persons which the † 1.85 Law looks upon to be non Compos. 1. An Ideot or Natural Fool. 2. One that has been of Good and Sound Memory, but by the Visitation of God has lost it. 3. A Lunatic who has Intervals. 4. One who becomes Mad, by his own Act, through Excessive Drinking. Upon the Verdict of non Compos the Goods and Chartels of the Deceas'd are to be enquir'd after, valu'd immediately, as if they were to be sold and deliver'd to the Kings use; and the Body refus'd Christian Burial. The reason of which Punishment is said to be, * 1.86 because Self-murther is an Offence a∣gainst Nature, it being the Property of e∣very thing to preserve it self; against God,
for that it offends his Commandment; a∣gainst the King, for that he loses a Subject, and an ill Example is given to the rest. All which have been explam'd and enforc'd in the former part of this Treatise.
We may see here the Authority, by which the Coron•…•…r and his Jury Act, the Nature of their Duty, and the great Trust re∣pos'd in them, as also the Laws Interpre∣tation of non Compos, the Punishment that is threaten'd, and the Ground and Intent of the Law: All Which every one of the Jury is oblig'd to observe by the sacred Bond of a Solemn Oath; and this one wou'd suppose might be sufficient to cause any honest Man to make true Presentment, deliver in his Verdict in such a Case Im∣partially; yet it is found to be otherwise by Experience. Wherefore.
2. I come to shew the unreasonableness of those Prejudices and Pretences by which Men are usually sway'd in this Matter; and in so doing I shall not look upon my self (being to talk with another sort of People now) to be consin'd to Natural Principles only.
1. Is a General Supposition that every one who kills himself is non Compos, and that no body wou'd do such an Action un∣less
he were Distracted; this will be found unreasonable if we consider,
1. That if this were really so, then it wou'd be to no purpose for the Law to ap∣point any enquiry to be made in such Cases: If a Man may not be suppos'd to be in his Wits when he lays violent Hands upon himself, to what intent is the Summoning in of so many Men, the giving them a Solemn Oath, examining Witnesses, hear∣ing Council; all this supposes the Case doubtful; but according to that Opinion all this is vain and impertinent, because they have nothing left to judge of.
2. If this were so, then our Laws are not only Impertinent but Vnjust, by affix∣ing a Punishment to such an Act, as the Person that commits it cannot help: He that is Distracted knows not what he does, and therefore is not Accountable for this or any other Deed; since then the Laws of this Nation, and of many others of great Reputation for Wisdom and Justice (as shall be shewn immediately) have ordain'd a Punishment for this Action, it is plain that they thought it might possibly be committed Wilfully, and Advisedly; and if so, 'tis Confidence and Presumption for any private Person to suppose the contrary.
3. This will appear farther if we consi∣der the several Explications of the Words Non Compos above-mention'd, particular∣ly the third concerning •…•…naticks: If a Per∣son known to be Lunatic several Years, be also known to have had several Intervals, he shall be liable to the Law, unless it be plainly prov'd that he was distemper'd at the very time of killing himself: How much more if a Man has never been known to have been Lunatic at all. As to the •…•…th. sort of Madness above-menti∣on'd, the Law does not look upon this as an Excuse for any Crime committed in that Condition; because it was the Parties own voluntary Act to bring himself into it. However this may be of Use to judge of other kinds of Madness by: Which People may be suppos'd to be affected withal in this Case; it very seldom appears that they who destroy themselves have had the same or as great signs of Distraction, as are frequently caus'd by excessive Drinking, or supposing they may have had so, yet let the Ju∣ror consider whether this may not be caus'd as much through the Parties own fault as the other; whether he did not bring upon himself, or give way to the beginning of his Discontent; whether he
did not wilfully foment and increase it, and at last stubbornly persist in it. Let him also consider whether he wou'd have ex∣cused the same Person for killing another Man, upon those very signs of Madness which move him now to excuse him for killing himself: I believe this may be one good Rule for an honest Juror to walk by, espe∣cially since the killing of ones self has been shewn above, to be rather worse in re∣gard of the Publick, than the killing of another Man.
Yet after all, how oft does it appear in these Cases, that the Person concern'd did give plain and certain Signs of a good Understanding (I mean Naturally, not Morally so) by some Circumstances of his Death or other: Some have enquir'd what was the easiest way of Dying, or where to place the Weapon best; others have us'd much cunning and contrivance to procure the Instrument, have kept it long by them, and warily chosen a pro∣per Time and Place to make use of it; o∣thers again have made their Wills, or settled their Affairs otherways; taken leave of their Friends solemnly, sent those out of the way that might have hinder'd them; these and such like Circumstances are Arguments of Deliberation and Advi∣sedness,
and prove sufficiently that such a Person was Compos Mentis.
If it be Moral and not Natural Madness that is here meant, not only he that com∣mits any other great Crime, but he that subverts a Lawful Government, by a long train of well laid Designs, though he cannot be suspected of any Natural de∣fect of Understanding, yet is as much Mad in this sense as any one that kills himself can be suppos'd to be; and yet sure this wou'd not be allow'd as an Excuse for so doing. But this sort of Madness does not fall under the Coroners Inquest in the present Case: Moral Madness is the misapplication of the Understanding, not the total Deprivation of it, and the Question here is not whe∣ther the Understanding was misapply'd, but whether there was any Understanding left at all: This brings me to some other kind of Pretences, which are caus'd chiefly,
2. By mistaking the Subject of their en∣quiry, and making themselves Judges of that which does not belong to them; their Duty consists in enquiring well and truly how the Person came by his Death, if by himself, whether he was felo de se, or non Compos, and in making true Presentment accordingly. This is what they are Sworn
to do; but instead of this they are apt to run out beyond their Bounds, and consi∣der what the Event of their Verdict will be, either as to the Forfeiture, or the Per∣son Deceas'd.
I. As to the Forfeiture, they are some∣times mightily concern'd about this; What will become of it? Upon whom shall it be bestow'd? Upon such perhaps as do not want it, or among so many that it will do 'em little or no Good; whereas in the lump it might be of great advantage to the next Heirs: Why is not Charity due to them as much as meer Strangers, &c. To this may be reply'd,
1. That which is thus forfeited devolves to the Lord Almoner, the distributer of His Majesties Alms, according to his Di∣rection; and therefore they ought to be satisfy'd that it will be dispos'd of Judici∣ously and Faithfully.
2. Supposing the worst, what is this to the Coroner or any of his Jury; the Law has not made them Judges in this matter, or given them Authority to consider what will be most convenient and proper to be done with that which is Forfeited, or who are the best Objects of Charity: They are call'd to Judge of matter of Fact by what
they see and hear. Let 'em remember their Oaths, they are not Sworn to be Cha∣ritable but to be Just, to enquire well and truly, diligently and impartially concern∣ing the Fact, and to give their Judgment according to their Conscience; and there∣fore a good Man ought to be upon his Guard against such Insinuations as these, and to take care lest his Charity shou'd absurdly corrupt his Justice; absurdly I say, for he that is Just, (in Criminal Causes especially,) is Charitable in the Noblest way; for whilst his Impartial Sentence deters others from committing the same Crime, his Charity extends not only to all the Innocent and Virtuous of the Present Age, but to late Posterity.
Again some run out beyond their Li∣mits and fall into Mistakes, by consider∣ing the Event of their Judgment as to the Parties Reputation, and their being Guilty of Vncharitableness in this regard; they think that to bring him in Felo de se, wou'd be to pronounce him damn'd, therefore that they ought to Judge Charitably, especially, since they cou'd not see into his Heart, or discover his last thoughts.
This wou'd not need an Answer, but that Ignorant, though well meaning Peo∣ple are often concern'd upon these Occasi∣ons,
and apt to receive such Scruples from Cunning Solicitors, that are always busie about them, if the Chattels are worth the saving: Therefore something must be said to it.
1. Then the Jurors bringing in the Deceas'd Felo de se, does not pronounce him damn'd at all, this he leaves to God alone; whatever his Judgment of the Fact is, it can be neither the better nor the worse for him in the next World; his Im∣partial Verdict does not alter the Nature of the Fact: If he thinks him Guilty, yet he does not contribute to his being so, and what he thinks; he is oblig'd to declare by Lawful Authority; and if he does not so, is Guilty himself of Breach of Trust to∣wards his Country, and of Perjury to∣wards his God.
2. As to the seeing into his Thoughts, the difficulty of doing so, and the Judg∣ing Charitably upon this Account: This seems very little to the purpose: In indiffe∣rent Actions, or such as will bear a double Interpretation; we ought to beware how we Judge to the disadvantage of our Neighbour, especially when not call'd by Lawful Authority; but where a Man is so call'd; where there is a Notorious Trans∣gression of the Law, as in the present Case,
the Fact is so evidently Evil, that there needs no weighing of the thoughts, or searching of what kind they were; espe∣cially since, when a Person is found to have kill'd himself, the Question is not what his Thoughts were, but whether he had any Thought at all, that is whether he was Mad or no?
Yet after all, though I have hitherto apply'd my self to the Jury, 'tis certain that their Verdict depends much upon the Coroner, and 'tis his fault chiefly if the Laws which provide against Self-murther, are cluded; 'tis he that Summons whom he pleases to be of the Jury, and to these he gives what Charge he pleases; the Exami∣nation of the Witnesses, the Summing up the Evidence is done by him: So that un∣less there happen to be upon the Jury Men of Conscience, Courage and Understand∣ing (which may easily be avoided if the Coroner thinks sitting) they will be apt to be led by him implicitly. And there being no Fee allow'd upon Felo de se, the Verdicts being for the King; and a Gratu∣ity seldom wanting when it is for the Heirs; 'tis no wonder that the Return is generally Non Compos.
But if these Papers shou'd ever fall in∣to the Hands of any of these Gentlemen;
I intreat 'em to Consider seriously the trust that is repos'd in them, they being Cho∣sen by the Freeholders of their several Counties, as Parliament Men are; and what the Consequence will be (even to after Ages) of the breach of such Trust: And to themselves especially, if they be∣lieve any thing of another World: For to omit the Suspicions of Corruption which I am very loath to improve; what∣ever the Motive is, through which the Design of any Law is Eluded; the Con∣sequence will be much the same: If a Law be made to restrain a dreadsul Sin, which is withal very pernicious to the State, and such or such a Punishment is ap∣pointed to this End; if this Law becomes of no force by that very Persons Preventing the Punishment, who is intru••••••d by his Country to see the Law Executed: Let this be done out of Compassion, Generosity, or what you please; all the increase of the Sin forbidden, so hainous in its own Na∣ture, and so pernicious to the Publick, he will have a share in; and if he be guilty of Perjury, if he betray his Country, not only in the Present Age, but is false to Posteri••y also: What will it signifie that this was done out of Charity or Generosity to one or two Persons, who perhaps did not
need it: Or if they did never somuch, how preposterous must that Charity be, which to assist a sew, as to Temporal Conveni∣ences, shall contribute to the Damnation of many Souls, and make a Man venture through Treachery and Perjury to hazard his own.
If these Considerations, and others of the like kind, should not prevail with these Persons so much as immediate Pu∣nishment: The Lord Chief Justice of the Kings Bench, for the time being, is, as I am told, the chief Coroner of England, enquiries into Failures of this kind, may be made in that Court, and this Consi∣deration ought to terrifie every one who shall be thus concern'd, especially at this time, since that Important Trust was never discharg'd with more profound Knowledge of our Laws, and with greater Integrity than at Present.
HAving laid down those Natural Prin∣ciples upon which I suppose Self∣murther to be Unlawful, and answer'd such Objections as seem'd to be of greatest strength; I once thought that my task was almost over; but there are some Persons who do not much relish those Arguments which are drawn from the Nature of Things; but are determin'd chiefly by Custom and Example, though rarely un∣derstood: And led away by mistaken No∣tions of Courage, Honour. Liberty, or the like. Such as these, notwithstanding all that has been said, will scarce yield that this Act is Unlawful; for say they, have not People of all Ages and Nations been inclin'd to it? Has it not been requir'd by Positive Laws, as well as allow'd by An∣cient
Custom? Has not the greatest and bravest Nation in the World afforded us in∣numerable Examples of it? Did not the most Wise and Virtuous Sect of all the Philosophers teach and practise it; and were ever such Honours paid to any mor∣tal Man as were to Cato upon this Ac∣count? If Cowardice, Disgrace and Sla∣very are to be hated and avoided; if Cou∣rage, or the love of Honour or Liberty are to be esteem'd and pursu'd: Then cer∣tainly in many Cases Self-murther may be not only Lawful but highly Commendable: This may serve for a short View of what remains to be done; and first the business of this Chapter shall be, to enquire con∣cerning the Authority of Examples, par∣ticularly those which are alledg'd to prove Self-murther to be Natural. To return then to our Author, he tells us, that
* 1.87 Another Reason which prevails much withme, and delivers it from being against the Law of Nature, is this, That in all Ages, in all Places, upon all Occasions, Men of all Con∣ditions have affected it, or inclined to do it.
† 1.88 All Histories afford not so many Exam∣ples, either of cunning or subtile Devices, or
of forcible or violent Actions, for the safeguard of Life as for destroying.
Again, * 1.89 Self-homicide seems to me to escape the breach of any Law of Nature, because both express Litteral Law, and Mute Law, Custom hath Authorized it, not only by suffering and connivency, but by appointing it.
There is no way of Arguing so fallaci∣ous as that which depends upon Example, though there is none that is more Popular. They who resist Reason out of Vanity, or are not capable of it through Ignorance, are quickly taken with Examples, be∣cause they are govern'd by Inclination on∣ly; and 'tis but throwing open some Hi∣story before them, and then whatever their prevailing Passion is, they may very easily, sit it with an Example. But every Man of sense will quickly see how unreasona∣ble this is; for since humane Actions must be try'd by some Rule, whereby their Goodness or Badness may be discover'd; the Example ought to be brought to this Test: The thing in Question shou'd first be prov'd to be Just and Lawful, and then Examples may be of use to illustrate it, to bring what was in Idea into Mait•…•…r of Fact, and by making Reason as it were Visible, awake and stir up the Will by the
Natural Beauty of the thing, the possibility of performing it, and the Applause which has follow'd, to act accordingly; and when this is done, a well dispos'd Soul strikes in readily, and imitates and improves with Vigour and Alacrity: Wherefore, if what has been said be really true, if Self∣murther has been try'd by the Law of Nature, and been shewn to be unlawful upon so many Accounts, whether Man be consider'd in the Individual, or as a Member of Civil Society; we ought not to be concern'd what Appearance soever there seems to be of Examples to the con∣trary; yet since whatever is apt to de∣ceive ought to be laid open, and it has been thought sitting to insist upon this kind of Authority, I will shew more particularly, that supposing Examples, were in them∣selves good Arguments, yet those which are alledg'd upon this occasion, wou'd not prove Self-murther to be Natural.
As for what this Learned Gentleman says, that all Histories do not afford such Instances of Cunning or Force for the Preserving of Life, as for the Destroying of it: I must take leave to say, that this may be found otherwise by the Reading of any one History in the World, all the Remarkable Effects either of Force or
Fraud implying a desire of Life. The Ex∣amples which he brings are of several kinds. * 1.90
1. Such as are drawn from particular Persons, of which many are Fabulous, as that of Homer: Others such as suffered Death to maintain their Virtue, and for the Publick, as Regulus, Codrus; or Per∣sons scandalous, as Comas, Festus: As for the Gladiators they did not prove any de∣sire of Death as Natural: These were of two sorts, Forc'd or Voluntary; they who were forc'd to be Gladiators, (as Captives in War) fought for their Lives or Liber∣ties; they who chose to be so, fought for Applause, and after all, many despis'd this Applause, to ask their Lives of the People; many others had theirs given for a Re∣ward of their Skill and Courage, which they gladly accepted; wherefore no In∣stance in the World could be more im∣proper than this to prove Self-murther Natural.
2. The next kind of Examples are more General, † 1.91 such as are drawn from the Customs of whole Nations, or from the ‖ 1.92 Connivency or appointment of humane Laws.—Here I must desire that
two things must be observ'd, 1st. That in the alledging of Examples of this kind a great difference should be made between Nations; many being so Ignorant and so Savage that it would be very strange to fetch the Principles of right Reason from among them: Po•…•…phyrius says, * 1.93 Some Peo∣ple are grown so wild and brutish that to quote their Customs would be to scandalize humane Nature; the Instances which he gives are very proper for our Purpose. The Massa∣getes, says he, reckon those unhappy who die a Natural Death, and therefore Eat their dearest Friends when they grow Old.—The Tibarenians break their Necks down a Preci∣pice.—The Bactrians throw them alive to their Dogs; and Strasanor, Alexander's Lieutenant, had almost lost that Province for end•…•…vouring to break this Custom.—The S•…•…cythians bury the dearest Friends of the Deceas•…•…d with them alive, or slay 'em upon the Funeral Pile. Wherefore when we quote Nations for Examples, we ought first to have a particular regard to their Condition, their Learning, their Wisdom and their Virtue; and should be sway'd least of all by those, who are in either of the wide extreams of Luxury or Barbarity.
2. In the next place, secondly, we ought to enquire carefully into the ground and occasion of the Custom which is pleaded; whether it be founded upon some Religi∣ous or Superstitious Principle, or encouraged by some Political Consideration; any of which if it be, it ought not to be alledg'd as meerly Natural. By these two Rules let us examine the Instances which are here brought, and first that of the Gauls. Our Author says, That
* 1.94 In Caesar's time for one who dy'd Na∣turally, there dy'd many by this devout Violence; there are some whom he calls De∣votos and Clientes, or Soldurios which always when the Lord dy'd, Celebrated his Funeral with their own. Caesar says, that in the Me∣mory of Man no one was found that ever re∣fused it. This is not Reported Candidly; the matter was thus, upon Adcantuannus's Sallying with 600. Men which did great Execution: Cesar says, That it was the Custom among the Gauls for People to devote themselves to some great Man up∣on this Condition, that on the one side they were to enjoy in Common all the Benefits of Life: On the other side if any Violence was offer'd to him, and their Defence or
Assistance necessary, they were either to dye with him or save him, or if not kill themselves afterwards; this alone is that which he says, * 1.95 no one ever refused: From whence 'tis plain,
1. That this was a League Offensive and Defensive, only for the preserving of Life, on both sides: The one for Nourishment and De∣fence against Hunger, the other for Defence against Violence, these Men did not affect Death, but Life: Death was the Bond of their Fidelity to their Friend and Lord; if this had not been dreadful to 'em, it could not have been any tye upon them; if it was dreadful: It could not be natu∣rally desir'd, though they brought it upon themselves.
2. This being put in practice, not when the Lord dy'd of any Distemper, but only when he was Kill'd; and most of his Cli∣ents who were to defend him being slain with him, (as must be supposed) it can∣not be true, that many dy'd thus, for one that dy'd a Natural Death.
To this may perhaps be added the Cu∣stom of the Ancient Goths and Vandals,
who used to cast themselves down steep Rocks into a Bay which they call'd Odin's Hall: * 1.96 This Odin or Wodin was their God of War, had humane Sacrifices of∣fer'd to him, and was suppos'd to appear and invite his Votaries into † 1.97 Balhalden, i. e. Pluto's Palace, or perhaps Baal's Hall: These Ignorant People supposed that this Gulph led down to this Hall, and that for this haste which they made they should be Feasted and Rewarded there, made them∣selves away out of a Religious Principle, and yet in no other manner than by throw∣ing themselves down this Precipice.
The next considerable Instance is of the Samanaei, Priests in great request among the Indians, who, he says, ‖ 1.98 studied ways how to die when they were in perfect Health; these were an Order of Religious Men who professe•…•… Poverty, renounc'd all Food of Flesh, or any Living Creature; liv'd in continual Retirement, and when they had purg'd their Souls in this manner, thought they might give them case; but this was thro a Religious Principle, and therefore not Natural, nor put in practice
by those of that Nation who were not of the same Order.
There are other Instances of the Indians in History, * 1.99 Curtius speaks of a sort of Wise Men among them, that burnt them∣selves alive, for which he gives this Rea∣son, that they reckon'd Fire (which they Worship'd perhaps for a God, as the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 did) Polluted by dead Bodies: Thus Calanus burnt himself in the presence of Alexander; and † 1.100 Strabo speaks of an Indian that came upon an Embassy to Augustus, who afterwards upon his Return at A∣thens, though in perfect Health and Pro∣sperity, burnt himself publickly, to do Honour to his Sect and Country among the Stiocks and other Philosophers there, as is most Probable. But that which is observable here is that their voluntary dying was in but one particular way, namely by Fire, which was grounded upon a Religious Opinion, that the Soul was purg'd by that Element from that Pollution which it had contracted in the Body, and then convey∣ed by it upwards to its place of Happiness: Thus we are told by the ‖ 1.101 learned Critic
Eustatius, That the Grecians burnt their Dead, to shew that the Divine part of Man being born upwards by the Fire mingled with the Heavens, and for this reason, says he, the Gymnosophists burnt themselves alive, as Alexander's Calanus did: * 1.102 In the same way the Samanaei dispatch'd them∣selves.
In some Countries it was the Custom to † 1.103 kill whatever was dear to the Person Deceased, according to his Condition, as Dogs, Horses, Slaves, Relations. In after times, they who foresaw they should be kill'd, driven by necessity, and withal encourag'd by some superstitious Perswa∣sion of being Rewarded for their Fidelity, killed themselves. From hence, and from the Opinion of the Gymnosophists asoresaid, came 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Custom of the Womens burning themselves with their Husbands, which is very Ancient, ‖ 1.104 and was undoubtedly encou∣rag'd
by the Men in those Countries where they had several Wives, that they might be the more secure from the revengeful Jea∣lousie of the Women, and their implaca∣ble Rage, when any one thought her self slighted; and the better attended in their Sickness: All their Lives, depending upon their Husbands: But since the Men did not so, unless such as were acted by a superstitious Principle; since the Women that were not Married did no such thing, since no Self-murther, excepting that by Fire, was ever allow'd by these People; none of these Instances can prove that it is Natural.
But to come nearer home, we are told, that * 1.105 among the Ceans unprofitable old Men Poison'd themselves; among the Athenians Condemn'd Men were their own Executioners by Poyson; and among the Romans often by Blood lettings.
As to this Custom of the Ceans, which is related at large by † 1.106 Val. Maximus, who was an Eye Witness of it, and which gives occasion to ‖ 1.107 Montaign to write a Chapter up∣on this Subject. * 1.108 Strabo says it began upon
the account of some great Famine, wherein a Law was made that the Aged of both Sexes should die in that manner, that their might be Provision for the Younger, who were more able to defend their Coun∣try.
The Athenians suffered Criminals to take the Cup which the Executioner pre∣pared and brought 'em according to the Sentence of Condemnation, at a certain hour, to take it, I say, and drink it, which if they refus'd to do, the Officers stood ready to force it down; but did this wise People by this or any other way en∣courage Self-murther? quite contrary, there being * 1.109 a Law against it, by which the Right Hand, as suppos'd acting it, was cut off, and the Body thrown out unburied; and in the same manner was it Punish'd in Thebes and other Cities of Greece; and how Contemptible soever this may seem, nothing was more Infa∣mous: Such as Robbed Temples and Be∣trayed their Country being used in the same manner; nay this was the greatest Punishment according to the Superstition of those Times, they being of Opinion
that the Ease and Happiness of the Soul de∣pended upon the Burial of the Body, as Vir∣gil * 1.110 animamque; sepulcro—Condimus.—
By what has been said hitherto, it may appear that although we should hearken to Examples in this matter, yet those which have been alledg'd here are either such as are Fabulous or Misrepresented, or such as though never so true, yet being ground∣ed upon some Religious or Superstitious Perswasion, cannot be of any force to prove Self-murther to be Natural.
But that which is brought out with the greatest Pomp upon this Occasion is the Example of the Roman Nation: No People in the World had ever so much Courage and Honour: No Nation rose to such a height by Learning and by Arms: None had greater Men in every thing that is admirable, or more sit to be Masters of the World, and yet never did so many kill themselves of any Country as of this. This great and popular Prejudice may be lessened by considering these three things.
1. At what time the Romans were rec∣kon'd to be at the height of their Vir∣tue.
II. When Self-Murther began to be in Request among them, and the Causes of its being so:
III. What was the Judgment of their greatest Men; and what Laws they had concerning it.
I. At what time the Romans were reck∣on'd to be at the height of their Virtue. During the second Punick War, Rome im∣prov'd in its Virtue: The Defeats they re∣ceiv'd from Hannibal at first increas'd the Love of their Country, and awak'd that great Genius to Action, which began to be enervated after the War with Pyrrhus, and which had been employ'd before, up∣on their little neighbouring States only; and while Hannibal himself, as well as the Savage Nations which he led, suffered un∣der the Luxury of Capua; Temperance, Probity, Honour, Discipline, Courage, encreased among the Romans, both in the City, and the Army; 'till at last they con∣quered this formidable General, and brought the Carthaginians to what Terms they pleased. But immediately upon the Peace with them, the War with Macedon broke out, which ended not only in the Subduing of all Greece, but great Part of Asia, and then was it that the Roman Con∣quests
began to prove most fatal to them∣selves: For upon the Return of the Army from these Countries, Foreign * 1.111 Luxury was first brought among them: This quickly begat Prodigality, and that made way for Bribery and for private Ambition: And this was so notorious at the Siege of Numantia, that Jugurtha learnt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his Fiends there how to practise upon the Ro∣mans, and buy their Armies and their Senate afterwards: Yet •…•…notwithstanding they were thus disposed, still their Rival Car∣thage was a Check upon them; and they durst not launch out, and be so bad as they fain would have been, for fear of this an∣cient Enemy: This was the Reason why that Great and Upright Statesman Scipio Nasica, was always against the destroying of Carthage; which Cato urged so passio∣nately, as to obtain at last, to the utter Ruine of the Roman Virtue, as National; as all the Historians afterwards lament con∣tinually.
† 1.112 The first Scipio opened the Way to the Ro∣man Power, the latter to their Luxury; for
when the Dread of Carthage was removed, and their Rival in Empire destroyed, they revol∣•…•…ed from Virtue, and run over to Vice, not by degrees, but as down a Precipice.
And that Judicious Author Salas•…•…: * 1.113 While the Commonwealth increased by Labour and Justice, Great Kings and Barbarous Nations were subdued: But when Carthage the Rival of the Roman Empire was once demolished, Fortune began to rage and confound all. things, &c.
Now the Macedonian War was about 550 Years, ab V. C. and the other about 60 Years after: During these 600 Years, Self-Murther was rarely practised among the Romans; and when it was, but by Women only, or Persons of no Note, or those who were infamous: The Unhappy Lucretia Feronia a Vestal found with Child. Appius Claudius, in the Case of Virginia, and by some Numbers together, upon oc∣casion of the † 1.114 Slavery of building the Common Shore, under one of the Tar∣quins, and upon the Detection of the horrid Practices in the Baccanalia: ‖ 1.115 Yet in this Pe∣riod of Time lived the most Vertuous Men, Men of the clearest Courage, and most unspotted Honour, that ever Rome had: Men whose Virtues were to great,
that that Empire was not only founded but raised upon them; for tho' it was af∣terwards that it over-run so great a Part of the World, yet this was very little due to the Publick Virtue of those Times, but was rather the Effect of that Motion, which the Active and Noble Genius of this Age gave it; and which was so vigorous, that nei∣ther the Softness of Luxury, the Timorous∣•…•…ss of Ease and Interest, nor the Blood of the best and bravest Citizens of Rome, could 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or deaden it for many Years: And yet it will not (I suppose) be preten∣ded, but that some particular Persons were liable to the same Misfortunes in those Days, which others were afterwards, tho' the Nation it felt in general was not so: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Capitolinus, Regulus, and others, were exposed to barbarous and disgraceful De•…•…ths. Age, Poverty, Loss of Senses, and of Friends, extreme Pain, or what∣ever Pre•…•…ences are made use of for this Act, were certainly as common then as ever they were afterwards; yet none of these were looked upon in those Days as the reasonable Ca•…•…ses of Self-Murther, or as the God's 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or calling Men out of Life, as some of them began to talk after∣wards.
2. I am to shew when, and for what Reasons this came into Request: At the very same time, that Corruption of all other Kinds did: For with the Vices of Greece and Asia, came in the Philosophy of the Stoicks, as shall be shown more at large immediately; which striking in with the Temper of the Romans, and being very convenient for the Misery and Cruelty of succeeding Times, was eagerly received by them; and in the Proscriptions of Ma∣rius, Sylla, Cinna, how violently did it begin to work, and how many made away themselves? I do not doubt, but that Hannibal's's killing himself gave some Cre∣dit to this manner of dying, as Cato's did more, afterwards: But what is particularly observable, is, that the more vicious and luxurious the Romans grew, the more were they inclined upon any Calamity to Self-Murther. And this Seneca himself confesses even in the midst of his Recom∣mendations of it: * 1.116 I send you not to History: (meaning for Examples of it) Consider these Times we live in, of whose Softness and Effeminacy we complain; even now you may meet with Men of all Degrees, in all Circum∣stances,
of all Ages, that have cut off their Evils by voluntary Death.
3. As for what the most considerable Writers among the Romans thought of this Ma•…•…ter, many of them living in such a treacherous and bloody Age as that of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Caligala, Claudius, Nero, and suffering under the Tyranny of these Mon∣sters, embraced the Stoick Philosophy, as the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 support of their Misfortunes; and withal looking back with Sighs and Wishes upon the Time of the Republick, honour'd the Memory of those who they suppos'd died for it in this manner, and 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 them: This was the Rea∣son why no Man had ever more Applau∣•…•…rs, or more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 than Cato; and this made most of the Writers of those 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to commend this way of dying, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Lucan, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Maximus. But they who liv'd sooner in a more learned and •…•…udicious Age, and who were wholly disengag'd from these Principles, or chose out of them what was really good, without thinking themselves obliged to embrace and defend every thing they taught; never recom∣mended Self-Murther to the World, but rather condemned it, or else are silent con∣cerning it. Cicero, the best Philosopher,
as well as the best Orator, is positively a∣gainst it, upon a very Solemn Occasion, as I have shewn at large * 1.117 before—And Macrobius has a very Learned Dis∣course upon that Place, according to the Principles of Plotinus: But Virgil pursues it to the next World, and appoints a par∣ticular Place of Punishment for it there. † 1.118
And indeed his whole Inimitable Poem is against it; for if the Destruction of ones Country, if the loss of the best Friends, Banishment, Shipwreck, or any other Ad∣versity were a reasonable Cause of Self∣murther, Aeneas might have made use of it as justly as ever any one did; but his Piety and his Courage supported him a∣gainst so great an Act of Weakness and Injustice, and in the worst Extremities the Poet furnishes him with ‖ 1.119 admirable 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which Preserve the Hero as carefully from himself as from his Enemies. No body in all that Incompa∣rable Poem is brought in killing them∣selves,
but only Dido and Amata, two Unfortunate and Despairing Women: And when he picks out several of the most Famous Romans, to do Honour to his Country, and to make good that great and noble Character of it, which he begins at those excellent Lines, † 1.120 Ex∣cudant alij, &c. When, I say, to this purpose, he mentions the Decij, Drusi, Scipio's, Brutus, Camillus, Torquatus, Fa∣britius, Curius, Cato, Cossus, &c. it is ob∣servable that there is not one of all these who kill'd himself: The Decij indeed dy'd voluntarily, but upon a Superstitious Per∣swasion; they devoted themselves as a Sacrifice for their Countries Safety, and therefore come not within the present Ar∣gument; the Cato mention'd here was the Elder, as Servius Judiciously remarks, ‖ 1.121 to whom also as is observ'd by the same Critic * 1.122 that Excellent Line belongs, worth all pliny's Panegyric.
Wherefore if Virgil was a proper Judge,
who were the greatest of all the Romans, if not one of those whom he Celebrates as such, did ever kill themselves, the Exam∣ples of others who did so, ought not to be of any Authority. The same Observation may be confirm'd by the choice which Manilius † 1.123 also makes of several Great Romans to the same purpose; only I think he speaks of the latter Cato. To these I may add Martial, (if it be worth the while) who declares against this Act more than once.
Nor was this only Condemn'd by the Judgment of their greatest Men (sor who can stand in Competition with Cicero and Virgil) but was expressly Prohibited by the Ancient Roman Laws. Tarquin pu∣nish'd those who Murther'd themselves, by exposing their Bodies Naked, as they did the most Infamous Criminals: The same Servius, above-mention'd, tells us upon Amata's ‖ 1.124 hanging herself, that they who did so were forbidden Burial by the Pontifical Books. This is also confirm'd by an ancient Inscription, which being of a very particular kind I shall insert the greatest part of it.
By this it appears, that one Baebius Ge∣mellus gave a piece of Ground, as a Bury∣ing-place, for those to whom the Law deny'd Burial, and whose Memory was counted Infamous, viz. Bauds, or Whores, and Soldiers, that had been broken for Misdemeanours, and Self-murtherers; the first sorts were Odious and Infamous among the Ancient Romans, a Warlike and Modest Nation; and with these Self-mur∣therers are joyn'd in the same Note of In∣famy, which was the greatest that they could lay upon any Offender after Death: But as the Stoic Philosophy prevail'd, these
Laws were either favourably interpreted, or quite neglected; and one while it was usual for 'em to ask the Senate leave to kill themselves, and not * 1.126 allow'd other∣wise.
* 1.127 And though many became their own Executioners by Blood letting, as this Author observes, yet this does not prove, that the Romans thought it either Natural or Lawful for any Man whatever to kill himself. They who did thus were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 before, it was reckon'd an Act of Grace from the Tyrants they suffer'd un∣der, to let 'em chuse their own Deaths, which if they did not, some Officer was ready to dispatch them. Besides by this means they sav'd their Estates which were Forfeited when they were put to Death Publickly; which though Tacitus calls pre∣tium festinandi, was but an accidental Ad∣vantage to Self-murtherers, not a Reward propos'd for their making hast. The Law to deter the Committing of great Crimes, ordain'd that such as were put to Death by the Executioner shou'd forfeit their Estates, aswell as their Lives: They who kill'd them∣selves
evaded this part of the Law, by not falling under any Publick Execu∣tioner; not that there was any positive Law that he that kill'd himself shou'd save his Estate, as some who are not ac∣quainted with Tacitus's way of Writing have thought.
To summ up what has been said upon this Head, if Self-murther was not pra∣ctis'd by the Romans, during the first six hundred Years; if this was the time wherein they were at the height of their Virtue; if not one of those, who accord∣ing to the Opinion of the most Judicious Virgil, were the greatest Glory to their Country, did ever kill himself; if both he and Cicero were against it in their own Judgments; if there were several Laws by which it was severely Punish'd among them; then the Example of this great Nation is rather against Self-murther than for it: This perhaps may be further con∣firm'd by that which is to follow.
I mention'd just now the Stoic Philoso∣phy, as one great Cause why Self-murther began to prevail among the Romans, in the decay of that Glorious Republick. The next Objection which rises in our way is grounded upon the Doctrine of this Sect, who being in great Reputation of Old for
their Learning, Wisdom, and strict Mora∣lity, and whose Books falling often into our Hands when we are young, and leaving lasting Impressions upon many People, require a particular Examination.
AFter several of the Wits of Greece had spent their time in useless Gues∣ses, and vain Disquisitions, concerning such things, as whether false or true, cou'd serve very little to the insluencing of Mens Actions: Socrates the most discerning and the least corrupted Soul that ever saw by the Light of Nature, shew'd 'em a more prositable and more noble use of humane Reason, made it to look first into it self, and to regulate those Passions and Appetites, that were grown so great an Injury, and so just a Scandal to it: This was a very tender
Point, and yet this wonderful Man, by the sweetness of his Temper, by his Easiness and Affability, by his acknow∣leging that he knew nothing; prevail'd upon a great many to hearken to him; and by his Death, which was more Glori∣ous, more Exemplary, if possible, than his Life, won over many Thousands more.
What he thus successfully began bad other Advantages from those two great Men Plato and Xenophon, who had been his Scholars, and who recommended their Masters Principles to the World with all the happy Advantages of Eloquence, in such a clear Method and prevailing Stile as represented naturally the Calmness of his Mind, and the Sweetness of his Con∣versation: This made his Followers mul∣tiply and grow Famous by the Names of Academicks and Peripateticks, whose Te∣nents differ'd very little, under two great Leaders Plato and Aristotle.
But of those who heard Socrates with Admiration, one of the chief was Anti∣sthenes, * 1.128 who us'd to walk every Day forty Furlongs for this purpose, that which pleas'd his humour most was to hear him Discourse of Patience, Constancy, Forti∣•…•…ude,
and Freedom from all Passion what∣soever; this hit so very much with his se∣vere and crabbed Temper, that without vegarding what Socrates Discours'd of Meek∣ness, Humility, and Affability, and his con∣tinual Example of whatever cou'd be Ex∣cellent in those Virtues; he fasten'd upon the former alone, in a short time set up for himself, and became the Founder of the Cynics.
But the Doctrine both of Plato and A∣ristotle lost ground immediately after their Decease; they who succeeded Plato in the Academy, besides their want of his great Abilities, his Elevation, Sagacity and Politeness, came short of him in his Vir∣tues, being guilty of Covetousness and great Enormities. Aristotle who died a∣bout Twenty four Years after him, en∣joyn'd his Friend Theophrastus to conceal his Books, which was done carefully for many Years; during which time his Fol∣lowers in the Lycaeum taught only by Tra∣dition, which made his Opinions liable to be Adulterated, and such as were Genuine to lose very much of their Spirit and Vigour: While the Academy and Lycaeum were un∣der these disadvantages, two very great Genius's appear'd much about the same time, Epicurus and Zeno; the first was for
advancing a new Principle of Morality, and indeed a very strange one, as com∣monly understood; which was Pleasure: And conformably to this he new dress'd up the Systeme of Democritus, and us'd the Gods worse by his manner of owning them, than Anaxagorus had done by dis∣carding them entirely: In all Ages the Natu∣ral Systeme has been fitted to the Moral one, and where-ever you sind Libertinism en∣courag'd, under the popular pretence of asserting the right of humane Reason, there you will meet with a world ready made to the purpose, and God, and Providence excluded, for fear of being injurious to the Liberty and Property of humane Nature.
But Zeno took a very different way, he had heard Crates many Years, yet cou'd not allow of the Brutality and Immodesty of the Cynics, and therefore went over to Xenocrates and Polemon, the Successors of Plato, these he sollowed very much in his Principles, but still retain'd the severity of the others in his Manners.
From Plato he taught the being of one God, Supream over many others, and that the World was Govern'd, and Man∣kind particularly, by his Providence: And though he and his Followers mention Fate frequently, yet this signifies generally on∣ly
that Series of second C••••••ses, that Me∣thod which is observ'd by God in the Ad∣ministration of that Providence.
He taught further, that the first Princi∣ple in humane Nature, was the preserving of ones self; that Nature recommended us to our selves in the strictest manner, as Cicero makes Cato speak at large; that the End of humane Life, and the measure of all our Actions, was the following of Na∣ture. This Maxime was common to all the Platonists.
But Zeno resolving to set up a new Sect, though without any Reason, as Cicero proves excellently † 1.129; though he durst not reject this Principle which was so readily embrac'd by every body, yet he endea∣vour'd to give it a new turn, to weaken and obscure it by many Niceties and Di∣stinctions, and so make way for several of his Principles, especially that of Self-mur∣ther, which were otherwise too plainly inconsistent with it.
And here I intended once to give a particular Account of this matter, but it growing unavoidably longer than I expect∣ed, and full of their Contradictory Subtle∣ties
and Absurd Distinctions; and having already stated ‖ 1.130 the true meaning of this Principle, I think it may suffice to direct such as are curious to Cicero's 3d and 4th. Books de Finibus, and to Plutarch's Dis∣courses against the Stoics.
Having resolv'd then (I say) to retain this Principle, and yet in spite of it adhere to that of Self-murther also. They assign'd in the next place five just Causes (as they call'd 'em) for putting it in * 1.131 Execution. 1. For ones Country, 2. ones Friend, 3. great Pain, 4. loss of Senses or Limbs, 5. incurable Diseases; some add extreme Poverty or Disgrace. These are some of the Chief things which they call'd Indiffe∣rent, neither Good nor Bad in themselves; and therefore below the concern of their Wise Man, and yet they made these the chief measures of the Reasenableness of Self-murther.
Furthermore they taught that their Wise Man, i. e. any one that followed their Principles strictly, * 1.132 cou'd not possibly be deceiv'd in his Opinion, therefore never ought to repent or change his Mind;
that all Mankind, except themselves, were Madmen and Fools; and equally so, inso∣much that there wou'd not have been the least difference between Socrates and Any∣tus, had they liv'd after Zeno, and neither of them bee•…•… Stoics; but as for them∣selves, they were all Kings, Wise Men, Rich, Beautiful, above the World, and equal to the Gods. To fortifie themselves in this strange Vanity they taught further, that a wise Man ought always to observe the same Method, keep the same Manners, Looks and Appearance; that all Faults were equal, that all Passions were alike blameable, therefore that a Stoic ought neither to ask Pardon, nor grant Forgiveness.
And that their Manners might be an∣swerable to their Opinions; they added that a wise Man ought to be austere; that Truth was the more wholesome, though less pleasing for its roughness: This Zeno re∣tain'd from his first Masters the Cynics, and encourag'd in opposition to Epicurus, and withal to prevail upon the People by the old yet still successful Cheat of Plain-deal∣ing; as if it were necessary for Sincerity to be Savage, and a Philosopher must un∣avoidably forgoe his Humanity in order to be Virtuous; nay, as if Virtue to re∣commend her self to the World, wou'd
chuse rather to appear in a Brutal than a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 form.
This sullen contracting of themselves, stissen'd 'em by degrees into Stubbornness, instead of Constancy, and whilst by the vain Rants in which they celebrated their own Merits, and madly mixt the God with the Beast, whilst their Pride, I say, made 'em undertake and prosess what they cou'd not compass and maintain; as soon as they met with any great Calamity, they forgot all their sine Harangues of Patience, Honour, Courage; turn'd short and fell upon them∣selves in a Rage, and seem to have reserv'd this Principle of Self-murther as a back Door, to use their own Metaphor, by which they poorly stole away, when they coul•…•…d not carry on the Cheat any longer.
Thus we see the Rise of this Sect, Com∣pounded of the Principles of the Platonists and the Manners of the Cinics, and how contrary Self-murther is to their Doctrines of Providence, Self-preservation, things indisserent; and pretended Apathy, and no∣thing but the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of their Pride and Stubbornness.
As to its prevailing among the Romans; this was much about the time above-men∣tion'd, when that Famous Republick arri∣ve'd to the highest pitch of its Glory, though
not of its Powerer: Zeno flourish'd about the 129th. Olympiad, the beginning of which was about the 489th. Year from the Build∣ing of the City; the first of his Followers that I meet withal, of any esteem among the Romans, was Panaetius, who was the Master of Scipio Aemilianus, the Younger Africanus, about Fourscore Years after Zeno.
To know the means by which it came to prevail, it will be necessary to consider the Particular Genius of the Roman Nati∣on. After the Expelling of their Kings, the Publick Good seems to have been the V∣niversal End of all their Actions: This they pursu'd with a noble Emulation, and with an egual contempt of Danger and Self-Interest; to this it was that they sacrifi•…•…d not only their Ease, their Wealth, but e∣ven their * 1.133 Children sometimes. † 1.134 Justice and Goodness prevail'd among them, not more through Law than Nature; whatever Quarrels and Debates they had: Were with their Enemies; they contended with one another about Virtue only; Magnisicent in their Publick Devoti•…•…; Frugal at Home; Faithful in their Friend∣ships:
All which was strengthen'd and consirm'd by their great and general re∣gard to Religion, which continu'd till they sell into Avarice, Luxury, Bribery, and till the base Senate it self became saleable: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 worth the while, says that excellent •…•…istorian, when one has consider'd the Houses and Villa's built now a days like Ci•…•…ies, to visit the Temples of the Gods, which were rais'd by our Ancestors, the most Religious of Mankind; but they adorn'd the Altars with their Piety, and their Houses with the Glory of their Actions; nor ever took away any thing from those they Conquer'd, unless the Power of doing Wrong. But now Oppression, &c.
* 1.135 Indeed no People in the World was ever so inclin'd to be Religious; all Publick Basiness, the meeting of their Assemblies, the choice of their Magistrates, the engag∣ing with their Enemies, depended upon Re∣ligious Observations, which how •…•…reasonable fo•…•…ver 〈◊〉〈◊〉 themselves, were diligently con∣sulted, and faithfully obey'd. Their Ge∣nerals, their Mag•…•…trates, the greatest 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they eve•…•… had in Peace or War, had as much regard to these, (excepting one or two 〈◊〉〈◊〉) as the common People.
And here I cannot but observe by the way, what awkard Imitators of the Romans some People are, who study that Com∣mon-Wealth only in its decay; embrace the Vices and Opinions (as this of Self∣murther) which occasion'd or attended the Ruin of it; and in the first place think it necessary to be Atheist's, in order to be good Republicans.
Conformable to this were their Man∣ners, Plain and Sincere, Inflexible in their Resolutions, Grave in their Deportment, severely Virtuous; this was the Masculine Air which they gave, that noble Constan∣cy, that Probity, that Honour, which distinguish'd 'em from the rest of Man∣kind, and made 'em truly greater before they Conquer'd the World, than after it.
The Roman Nation being of this tem∣per, were naturally prepar'd to receive the Stoic Philosophy, especially not being prepossest by any other.
For though Pythagoras had liv'd and grown Famous in one part of Italy, yet the Romans who were given wholly to Arms, seem'd to have heard little or no∣thing if him, or to have minded any thing of this nature, till Greece being subdu',d and Macedon reduc'd into a Province, they
sent their Sons to Study at Athens, where by their Natural temper they soon chose out the Stoics, from all the other Sects, to follow.
At the same time this Philosophy appear'd in Rome it self with great Advantages, by Panaetius, who was entertain'd in the Fa∣mily of the Scipio's, and grew into much Veneration among the Romans, upon ac∣count of the great Virtues of Scipio Aemi∣lianus, which were suppos'd to be owing to his Instructions, and Conversation; having mention'd this great Man, it will not be wholly foreign to my purpose, and perhaps some relief to the Reader, to make a little stand and take a short view of him. P. Cor. Scipio who deseated •…•…an∣nibal, had but one Son, who was of a very infirm and sickly Constitution, which hindred both his medling with publick Assairs, and his having any Children; but * 1.136 attending his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the Expedition against Antiochus, and being taken Prisoner by him, and Conversing with many of the Learned 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in his Court (where he was nobly us'd) was † 1.137 one of the first of the Romans who had any
〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Politer sort of Learning. At his Return, lest the Name of the Scipio's should fail, he adopted one of the Sons of Paulus Aemilius, who was the same Person we speak of, who had the Courage, and all the other Virtues of the first Africanus, as well as of his own Father; and after many Glorious Victories in Spain, in one of which he ‖ 1.138 k•…•…ll'd the Champion of the Enemies in a single Combate; after the Destruction of Numantiae; was chosen out for the Rasing of Carthage, that Ancient Rival of the Roman Power.
But all lhis while, after the Example of his Father by adoption, he mingled the mil∣der Studies of Letters with those of War; his Tent entertain'd Philosophers as well as Officers; and Panaetius and Polybius constantly attended him, the one the best able to regulate his Actions according to Virtue, the other the best qualified to Re∣cord'em. Paterculus * 1.139 an Author of vory great Wit and Integrity, when he did not write too near his own times, gives this Character of him, that no Man ever laid out the Intervals of Business more Elegantly, that he was the most Eminent of his Age for all En∣dowments
of War or Peace; that in his whole Life he never spoke, did, or thought a thing thing that was not Commendable. This Panae∣tius, though a prosest Stoic, had nothing † 1.140 of the Sowerness and Sullenness of that Sect, and theresore did not corrupt the mild and generous Temper of Scipio and Laelius, but rather made 'em more Humane. He despis'd the Mores•…•… as well as the Pedantry of that Sect, was cl•…•…arer in his Discourse, gentler in his Carriage than the rest of them, and had a respect for Plato, Xenocrates, Aristotle and Theophrastus: 'Twas with this Panaetius, with Polybius, with 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and with Te∣rence, that this great Man us'd to retreat out of Town, in his latter Days, to avoid the Corruption of the Times, then begun and spreading a pace; and when I consider him thus, so well skill'd to make the best use of Life in all Events; Bold and Active in War, Gentle and Studious in Peace, re∣tiring from the noise of his own Fame, encompass'd by the most ingenious Friends, and the most able and saithful Counsellors; and Virtue and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 carefully cherish'd, in the midst of the 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 and the greatest Courage; when I consider him in these
Circumstances, I cannot but think him the Wisest, the Best, the Happiest of all the Romans, and that in some respects; the Retirement of Scipio Aemilianus is to be prefer'd before the Court of Augustus.
Thus did the Stoic Philosophy come re∣commended to the Romans, and appear'd at first so Beautiful in these Men that it cou'd not well be resisted; but if it then prevail'd through choice, it quickly grew necessary for them afterwards; for they were forc'd to call it to their assistance, in its roughest and most frightful shape, in the dreadful Calamities which they fell into, under the Bloody Tyranny of Marius, Sylla, &c. ‖ 1.141 as I observ'd before; then was it that Self-murther began to be in vogue; then was it made use of by the Luxurious and Cowardly, as well as by the Brave; all seeking for 〈◊〉〈◊〉, by voluntary Death, from the horrid Barbarities of those Times, and though the Stoic Philosophy lost some Ground in the Calm and Peaceful Reign of Augustus, yet it regain'd it again with greater Reputation than ever, under 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and continued so to do under his immediate Successors; for then the great∣est part of the People of Quality (as a
Modern Critic * 1.142 observes) turn'd Stoics to enable themselves to support with Con∣stancy, the incertain Humour of that Jea∣lous Dissembler.
But the chief Advantage which the Principle of Self-murther had in that Age, and which remains very dazling to this Day, in some Mens Eyes; it drew from the Writings of three great Men, that were Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, and An∣toninus; all well stor'd in other Respects, with excellent Rules for the improvement of Mens Manners, with noble dis∣coveries of Reason, and great encou∣ragements to Virtue; it will be necessary to compleat the removal of this Prejudice, to take a short view of each of these Per∣sons, and shew by a few Instances drawn out of their Books, how inconsistent this Doctrine of Self-murther is with those other things which are there deliver'd.
Seneca is the first in time, and who by the Ingra•…•…tude and Injustice of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in his Death, as well as by his Writings, has ac∣quired great Reputation; but how justly upon this last 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that great Judge 〈◊〉〈◊〉 will tell us; † 1.143 He was not very exact
in his Philosophy; but a not able Prosecutor of Vice: He has many excellent Sentences, and many things worth the Reading, relating to Mo∣rality; but most of them are corrupted by his Style, and that the more dangerously, because he abounds with pleasing Faults. You would hear∣tily wish, says he, that he had written with is own Wit, but then that it had been guided by another Man's Judgment. He is so very fond of every thought, that he always forgets his Argument to drop his Wit, and yet through Affectation of saying things pretily, he says a great many very sillily; for In∣stance, * 1.144 Injuriosum est rapto vivere, at con∣tra pulcherrimum rapto mori; here the Wit is as slat as the Argument is false; for what is raptum can never be be pulcrum; some∣times indeed he has something noble, but it seems to be against his will. While he aims at something extravagant which he is not able to reach: His thought becomes reasonable and just by chance; 'tis lofty, but he intended it to be out of sight; 'tis regular and great, but had he succeeded in his aim, it had been Monstrous and Gygantick; while he is speaking of the most solemn parts of Philosophy, and has just wound you up into a Veneration of him, he often falls
into a Frolick of a sudden, and starts aside in some jirking Period, and makes you asham'd of the Attention you have given him: In a Word to declaim against Luxu∣ry in a perfum'd stile, to talk of nothing but Mortes meras, as he says of himself in Effeminate Harangues, to offer a few Points instead of Arguments, may entertain per∣haps for a while, but never, never per∣swade: Nay, there seemsto be agreat deal of Reason in what a Modern Author says of him, * 1.145 I never read his Writings without an Opinion quite contrary to that which he would recommend to me; if he would perswade me to Poverty, I long for Riches: His Virtue frigh∣tens me, &c. It would not be difficult if this were a proper place to make this G•…•…od by several Instances; but my Sub∣ject consines me to such alone as are Con∣tradicttory to Self-murther. First let us hear him, as to matt•…•…r of Extreme Pain; He denies that a wise Man can ever be other∣wise than Happy though in greatest Torments; that since Happiness consists in being Virtu∣ous, and Virtue consists in bearing Pain or Torture well; he that does so, which a Stoic always will, must be Happy. Epicurus, he tells us, says, That a wise Man might cry,
in * 1.146 Phalaris's Bull, How sweet is this? The same wrote to his Friend upon his Death Bed thus, † 1.147 This is the last and most hap∣py Day of my Life, and yet he was Tor∣mented at that Moment, with the Stran∣gury and an Vlcer in his Bowels; upon which he reflects, this Voice was heard in the very shop of Pleasure. Why should this then seem incredible among those that profess to obey, not Pleasure, but Virtue?
In another place ‖ 1.148 he admires one De∣metrius for calling a Quiet Life, without any incursions of Fortune, a dead Sea; to have nothing to stir you up, to whet and try the firm∣ness of your Mind upon, is not, says he, Tran∣quility, but being becalm'd. Altalus the Sto∣ic us'd to say, I had rather be in Fortunes Camp, than in her Lap: Suppose I am Tor∣tur'd, I bear it bravely, why then till well. I am put to Death, yet still I suffer valiantly, why that is well too. Epicurus would tell you 'twas delicious; but I will not apply so esfeminate a Word to so glorious a thing. I am Burnt, but not Conquer'd; why then should not this be Desirable, rather than Dreadful? I do not mean the being Burnt, but the being Vncon∣querable: Nothing is so admirable, so lovely as Virtue; whatever she commands us to suffer
is not only Good but Desirable. This is one of his most common Topics; and yet ex∣traordinary Pain is one of the chief Causes which Stoics assign for the reasonableness of Self-murther.
If we consider him also as to the Gods, sometimes we sind him very Reasonable and Submissive. Thus * 1.149 I do not obey God so much, as assent to 〈◊〉〈◊〉: It is by choice and not neceslity, that I follow him. Nothing shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 befal me that I will receive discontented∣ly, or with a malancholy look. There is no kind of Tribute, but what I will pay readily; yet all the things which Men use to groan under, and tremble at, are but the Tribute of Life, &c.
† 1.150 'Tis best to endure what you cannot mend, and follow that God without murmuring, who orders all things: He is but an ill Souldier that with groans obeys his General; wherefore let us receive his Orders Cheerfully, and cry out in the Words of Cleanthes:
Lead on O Destiny! and thou O Jove, Whatever you ordain, behold I move. I follow gladly—should I shrink—yet still Lead on: I follow though against my Will.
So let us live (says he) and so speak, that Fate may find us prepar'd and chearful; that Mind is great indeed which resigns it self up to God, but that is little and degenerate which is always struggling, always thinking amiss of the Government of the World; and will be for the correcting of the Gods, rather than it self. This is very solid, take it alone, but joyn the Principle of Self-murther to it, and it can mean nothing; but he does not al∣ways keep in these Bounds, to give one Instance only. Speaking of Philosophy, * 1.151 By this, says he, you shall not only excel all Mankind by much; but the Gods shall not much excel you. Wou'd you know the only difference between you and them? 'tis this, they will live longer.—Nay there is something in which respect a wise Man (a Stoic) exceeds God: For his Wisdom is owing to his Nature not himself: How glorious a thing is it to have the Weakness of a Man, and yet the Security of a God—Such stuff as this is very Con∣sistent with Self-murther, for when a Man has lost his Wits he is accountable for no∣thing. But how very unlike himself is this Man? How full of Palpable Contra∣dictions, and therefore how little to be regarded?
The next eminent Stoick among the Romans was 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a Man of an hum∣ble Mind, and most virtuous Life. As much above Seneca in all other respects, as he was below him in his Fortune: For he was a Slave, lame, and exceeding poor; and yet had sufficient amends made him by Providence for all these Evils, by the Greatness of his Understanding, and his Virtue, as two ancient Greek Verses, design'd for his Statue, tell us,
A Slave I was, and in my Body maim'd, As Irus poor; yet by the God's esteem'd.
* 1.152 Tho' the Principle of Self-murther is •…•…tter'd up and down those Discourses, which are collected by his Followers; we may from hence observe that he labour'd under three of those things once, Poverty, Lameness, and Slavery; which the Stoicks reckon'd to be reasonable Causes for kil∣ling ones self, yet he liv'd to a great Age: And this seems owing very much to that lively sense which he had of God's Good∣ness, and that perfect Submission where∣with he receiv'd all the Dispensations of his Providence: Thus Arian represents
him breaking out into a Rapture of Gra∣titude.
* 1.153 If we had any Common Sense, says he, what shou'd we do else, either in Publick or Pri∣vate, than sing Hymns to God, magnifie and praise him? Ought we not when digging, plow∣ing, or eating, to do this?—And since most Men are too dull or ignorant to do so, shou'd there not be some one that shou'd discharge this Office for the rest?—What then can I do better, a lame and decrepit Old Man, than celebrate my God? Were I a Nightingal, I wou'd do as a Nightingal, or a Swan, what became a Swan; but as I am endow'd with Reason, I will always Praise God. This is my Duty, and this I will perform while I have my Being, and to the same Employment exhort you all. If a Criple, a Beggar, a Slave cou'd do thus, who can ever be excusable for being In∣grateful to Heaven?
Thus too as to Submission to God: Did I ever murmur at the Methods of thy Provi∣dence? I was Sick (so were others too indeed) when thou thoughtest fitting; but I was so wil∣lingly: I was Poor too, as thou wouldst have it, but I was so gladly. I never bore any Office, and because thou wouldst not have me, I never desired it; but didst thou ever know me D scon∣tented
upon this Account? Did not I always approach thee with a chearful Countenance, ready to obey thy Commands? Wouldst thou have me be gone, I am ready to obey. I render thee all thanks imaginable that thou hast vouch∣safed to let me thus long behold thy Works, and concur withal the Dispensations of thy Provi∣dence: O may Death find me meditating upon these things, Writing or Reading such things as these.
* 1.154 Dare to lift up thy Eyes to God and say, Vse me hereafter however thou pleasest; I am of the same mind with thee, and perfectly in∣different as to all Events. Lead me whereever thou thinkst fitting. Give me what part thou pleasest to Play, whether a Magistrate or a Private Person, a Rich or a Poor Man, at Home or in Banishment: I will defend thy Providence before Men, in every one of these Events, and demonstrate the Nature and the reasonableness of them. O wondrous force of Reason! What brighter Beams were ever darted from the Light of Nature? but alas to what purpose can they shine when joined with the Principle of Self∣murther? What force of Eloquence can ever Reconcile Resignation and Rebellion, Dependance and Despair?
To these let me add the Emperour An∣toninus, who was one of the wisest and the best, as well as one of the greatest Men of all Antiquity; there is a Natural Sweetness and Goodness which runs thro' all his Writings, which softens the rough air of Stoicism, not but that they always retain the dignity of his Quality. Sometimes he ex∣ceeds Epictetus in the Solidity of his thoughts, always keeps up to him, and never falls into the Rants or Levities of Seneca: One of the chief things that he thanks the Gods for, was the doing good to others; this was his Study as much as the Improvement of himself. And this not only the meanest of his Subjects, but his worst Enemies found, as soon as he could be made sensible that he had any, for although he was ever fond of forgiving Injuries, yet he was one of the last that discover'd them: * 1.155 The best way of Reve•…•…ge, says he, is not to become like him who Injuries you: Delight and please thy self in this one thing alone, the pas∣sing continually from one Act of doing good to Mankind to another, after God's Example. Did God ever intrust so much Power so well, or was he ever Represented better? but let us hear him in Relation to the Subject in 〈◊〉〈◊〉,
Speaking of what he had learnt from his Relations, Friends, or Masters: * 1.156 Apol∣lonius, says he, taught me to be always free, to be unalterably Constant, to have regard to nothing else, no 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the least, but right Rea∣son, to be evermore the same in acutest Pains, loss of Children, or tedious Diseases.
‖ 1.157 Remember thou art old, says he to him∣self, and suffer not thy Reason, thy Principal Part, to serve any longer; to be mov'd back∣ward and forward by any Passion; nor to take ill thy present Destiny, or decline thy future.
† 1.158 Let every Action and every Thought be such as if thou wert just leaving Life, and if there be Gods to leave it can be no harm; for they cannot intend their Creatures any Mischief; If there be not Gods, or if they take no care of humane Affairs: To what purpose is it to live in such a World, as is without Gods, or without Providence; but there are Gods, and they do take care of Mankind, and have put it into their Power not to fall into any of those things which are really Evil, &c.
* 1.159 Be thou (my Soul!) like unto some Pro∣montory, upon which the Billows beat continu∣ally; but that remains unmov'd, and forces 'em to fall off on either side, and slide gently into a
Calm. Shall I cry out poorly, Unhappy me, whom this or that befals; and not rather say, Happy me, who am able to bear it; who am neither shockt with what I feel now, nor frighten'd with what may come hereafter; such an Accident might have happen'd to any one as well as me, but no body cou'd have born it so well as I. Why shou'd I call any thing Unhappiness, which cannot reach or injure Humane Nature? Search into thy self impar∣tially, Can that which has hefalln thee, make thee less Temperate, less Modest, less Knowing, or less Prudent? Can it hinder thee from being Just or Generous? If not, remember when any Accident inclines thee to be discontented, Re∣member I say, that the thing which befalls you is really no Vnhappiness in its own Nature; but that you are able to support it undauntedly is a real and great Happiness.
* 1.160 He that runs away from his Master is a Fugitive: The Law is our Common Master, he that declines obeying that runs away from it; and thus does that Man who Murmures, Rages, or Trembles at what has been, is, or shall be done; by him who Governs all things; who is that Law which distributes, to every one of us, the several parts of our Obedience. I cou'd easily produce more Instances, for they
are to be met withal in almost every Page of his Book; if I did not think these 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 how Inconsistent 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 the other things which he 〈◊〉〈◊〉
〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 observable, that this great Man seems to be sensible of this himself; He never inculcates this Principle with that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Violence which the others do: He cou'd not quit it wholly, as he was a Stoic, it being the Characteristic of that Sect, yet he mentions it but twice or thrice, I think in all his Book, and that too in so short and slight a manner, that he seems to be asham'd of it, and to be Conscious how Contradictory this was to that Sub∣mission to Providence, that Magnanimi∣ty and Constancy in all Events, which he recommends continually, and indeed it was impossible that it should take any root in so excellent a Temper: His great Regard to the Gods, his Natural Good∣ness and Moderation, made his Mind yield readily to all the Dispensations of Providence: Whereas the Vain, the Stub∣born and Obstinate Mind, as it is quick∣ly incens'd, so it snaps short immediately, and breaks rather than yields, even to God himself.
Thus I have given an Account of the first Rise of the Stoic Philosophy, shew'd the Time when it began to appear among the Romans, the Causes of its Progress; how the Principle of Self-murther in particular, come to be in Request, and to be put in Execution; how Inconsistent this is with the other Principles of that Sect, and particu∣larly with what is taught by those Three Authors, whose Authority has Recom∣mended it so much to the World; and if what has been said is true, as any one that Questions it may easily find if they will Examine the Authors which I have referr'd to, which I intreat them to do; then this great Prejudice, grounded upon the Doctrine and Example of this Wise and Virtuous Sect, ought not to sway any lon∣ger with them.
HAving thus given some Account of the Roman Nation, and of the Phi∣losophy of the Stoics, the way lies the more open to consider the Case of Cato's Death; who was so great an Ornament to both, and whose Example is so much pleaded in the behalf of Self-murther.
Nothing is more reasonable than that one or more ill Actions shou'd escape the Censure of Posterity; under the Splen∣dour of a great many good ones; but the Perverseness of some People will not allow of this, who being given to think out of the way, and maintain dangerous Paradoxes, are always searching into the Lives of great Men, to pick out something to justi∣fie their Pretences.
Wherefore though it be a very ill office to disturb the Ashes of the Dead, and to call in Question those Encomiums, which
have long since ripen'd into Glory, yet when such Authorities shall be thus dan∣gerously abus'd, and great Names brought in instead of sound Arguments, it is ab∣solutely necessary to enquire into the Matter of Fact, as well for the Vindicati∣on of the Dead, as the Information of the Living.
Of all the Examples that are brought for Self-murther, Cato is the most Consider∣able; wherefore in order to the making a right Judgment of this Matter, it will be necessary to do these things
1. To form a just and true Idea of him, by considering his particular Temper, and what it was that distinguish'd him from other Men.
2. To consider him as he stood in Rela∣tion to Caesar.
3. To Examine exactly the several Cir∣cumstances of his Death, and from these shew the true Causes of it: And when this is done,
4. To inquire into the Reasons usually given for its being so much applauded, and assign the true ones.
I. We are to form a just Idea of him, &c. To this End we are to consider in
the first Place, That he liv'd in such an Age, wherein the Common-wealth was at the very worst; the lower sort as well as the higher were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Luxury, and by their Expe•…•…sive Vices 〈◊〉〈◊〉 open to the Brihe∣ry and Corruption of the Ambitious: The Laws and Liberties of Rome, the Publick Good which their Ancestors had Studied and Improv'd with so much Glory, were quite forgotten; and several Parties form'd to usurp, not defend the Govern∣ment; Places of greatest Trust and Au∣thority were sold Publickly, and they who bought 〈◊〉〈◊〉 made haste to be whole again by selling Truth and Justice. Among these Corr•…•…ptions Cato grew up untainted in his Integrity, not to be work'd upon by the Impunity, or rather the Reputation of these Crimes, nor to be frighted by being left single and alone; but bravely opposing himself against the Enemies of his Coun∣try, notwithstanding the Pride and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of their Wealth or Power: Indeed never was there a more sincere Lover of the Publick Good; never did any Man incur so many Dangers to hinder the passing of Factious and Destructive Laws: No bo∣dy found out so soon the Ambitious Designs of Pomp•…•…y and Caesar, no one oppos'd 'em so long, though back'd by the Bribed Senate
and Multitude at home, and by two Victo∣rious Armies abroad. Notwithstanding he was sometimes pull'd out of the Rostrum, Pelted with Stones, threaten'd by the Sol∣diers, dragg'd towards Prison; he continu∣ed still to upbraid the Magistrates with their Corruption, and the People with their Dull∣ness: In a Word, if we consider Cato in private, none was more Chaste, more Up∣right, more Studious of Virtue; if we behold him in Publick, none was more Couragious to accuse and condemn the Guil∣ty, and to Protect the Innocent. Yet his hu∣mour was always Austere and Rigid, of which he gave very early Signs by his Voice, Looks and Actions; he was seldom observ'd so much as to Smile when he was a Boy; he was slow to Learn, Spoke lit∣tle; was not to be terrify'd into any thing which he had not a mind to, as appear'd by his settled Look and sullen Silence; when one of his Uncles Friends held him out of the Window, and threatend to let him fall. * 1.161
This Temper prepar'd him so much for the Stoic Philosophy, that † 1.162 one says very well of him, he was a Stoic by Constitution; and
therefore when he once came to Study it; he embrac'd it so cagerly, and overshot himself so much, while he aim'd to excel all others that Profest it, that this which improv'd others did him harm; and the Philosopher was plainly a Disadvantage to the Roman. For this made him Obstinate rather than Constant, Morose instead of being Grave, and Soure when he wou'd be most Sincere: His Humour was not only always overcast, but sometimes broke out upon his best Friends in indecent Passions; his Temper was rather Stiff than Steady, for he was as Inflexible in the Wrong as in the Right; he withstood Compassion as re∣solutely as Bribery, and avoided common Decency as much as Flattery; he would come into the Forum with nothing but his under Garment on, and that loose, his Bosom and his Feet bare, and in this Con∣dition sit upon the Bench when he was Praetor; and pass Sentence of Death upon those of the best Quality: Ptolemy King of Egypt being at Rome, and desiring to speak with him, he sent back word, as he was upon the Close-stool, that he might come to him, if he had any thing to say to him. When he return'd from Cyprus, and the Consuls, Praetors, and all the Senate came out in Procession to the Tiber Bank, to receive
him with the greatest Honour, he minded 'em not in the least, row'd by 'em, and Landed higher.
This give a suspicion of his setting too great a value upon his Actions, and being liable to something of vain Glory, especi∣ally when upon Cicero's taking away the Tables from the Capitol, wherein that which had pass'd during the Tribuneship of Clodius, (who was advanc'd to that Office unduly, and who was the most In∣famous Wretch of that Profligate Age) was Recorded; he made him return 'em a∣gain, because his Expedition to Cyprus wou'd otherwise have been forgotten; which says a Learned Historian * 1.163, he valued himself upon extremely, and desir'd of all things to have that con∣firm'd.
His opposing the Agrarian Law which Caesar past, (by outrageous Violence) and yet afterwards Swearing to defend it, wou'd have made any one hope that he might have abated something of his rigid Hu∣mour for the Publick Good; but this he wou'd never be perswaded to, but reject∣ed the offer which Pompey made of Mar∣rying
his Daughter, which wou'd have pre∣vented his Assinity with Caesar, and the League with Crassus, which immediately followed: Afterwards, when it was still in his Power to make amends for this false step, and he own'd that no way could save the Liberty of Rome but his being Consul; he refus'd to apply to the People in the usual manner as other Candidates always did, and for this very Reason † 1.164 only, lost it; by these Passages, and many others which I cou'd add, it must appear that this great Man had his Failings, that he was not al∣together free from Vanity, that his Stub∣bornness was injurious not only to his Friends, but to his Country.
II. Let us consider him in the next place in relation to Caesar; never were any two Persons in the World more con∣trary ‖ 1.165 in their Humours and Manners, Caesar was Polite, Assable, Courteous, de∣sirous of Power by any means whatever, Praising, Giving, Helping, Obliging; which opposition of Temper was enough to breed Enmity between any two Men,
engag'd often in the same Place, and a∣bout the same Affairs; but this was great∣ly encreast by Family Injuries, Caesar's Intimacy with Servilia, Cato's Sister, being the talk of all Rome; this Cato himself was confirm'd in by an odd Accident: During one of the Debates concerning Catiline's Conspiracy, Caesar receiv'd a Billet in the Senate-house; Cato who had insinuated before that he had been privy to their Pro∣ceedings, and thinking something might be in that Paper to that purpose, demand∣ed to see it; but only found in it some∣thing very kind from his Sister, which made him throw it at him in a Rage, cal∣ling him Drunkard: The hatred which was thus grounded, increas'd to such a de∣gree afterwards, that he mov'd that Caesar shou'd be given up to the Galls, oppos'd him suriously in every thing: Caesar on his side writ a bitter Invective against him, wherein he ridicul'd his Austerity, and reproach'd him for several Vices. This, if we consider how desirous of Glory, and how very much inclin'd to Passion Cato was, (no Man ever more, notwithstand∣ing his being so severe a Stoic) must needs have mingled his private Enmity with his concern for the publick Good; and out of this in great measure was it that he sided
with Pompey, who he knew had the same Designs upon the publick Liberty which Caesar had.
After the Battle of Pharsalia, he went into Africa, hearing that Pompey was re∣tir'd that way, and meeting with the news of his Murther upon that Coast, consults with Scipio and Juba about op∣posing Caesar in Africa; leaves them the Command of the Field, and puts himself into Vtica, which he made a Magazine, and where he soon receiv'd the news of their defeat.
III. And now we come in the next Place to consider the Circumstances of his Death, which require particular Attention, in order to the judging of the reasonable∣ness of it.
As soon as the news of the Defeat at Thapsus, was consirm'd by Letters from Scipio and Juba, he endeavour'd to per∣swade the People of Vtica to resist Caesar; but finding 'em averse to it, and not to be trusted, he gives 'em an account of the Stores; and upon this, Feuds encreasing between the Italians and Africans in the Town, and both being in danger from the Numidian Horse that had sled thither from the Battle, he endeavours to pre∣serve
one Party from another, beseeching some of the Horse, even with Tears, not to leave the Roman Senators, that were with him, to the Persidiousness of the Africans.
I will not suppose that his great Spirit was broken upon this occasion, or that this sudden mildness of Temper, which never appear'd in his whole Life in Publick be∣fore, was the effect of any thing but kind∣ness and good nature towards that People who had admitted him into their City; but it is plain that if he had then made use of something of that steddy Resolu∣tion wherewith he had oppos'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Caesar in the Forum formerly, it might have been of greater benefit to his Party.
Afterwards hearing that Caesar marched towards him and Lucius Caesar offering to intercede for him, he refuses it; telling him, * 1.166 If I wou'd save my Life, I ought to go my self, but I will not be beholden to the Tyrant for any Act of his Injustice; and 'tis unjust for him to pretend to pardon those as a Lord over whom he has no Lawful Power. This is full of Personal and Passionate ha∣tred: However he perswades his Son to
go to him. He took also great care to disswade his Friend Statilius, who was a Stoic, a great Imitator of Cato, and a * 1.167 known Caesar-hater, (as Plutarch calls him observably) from laying Hands upon himself: After this he sups according to his Custom, but there arising a Stoical Questi∣on concerning Liberty, he maintains it with so much heat, as to give suspicion to his Friends that he design'd to Murther himself, which made his Son steal away his Sword: Afterwards retiring into his Chamber, he encreases their fears by ta∣king leave of his Son and Friends, and embracing them in a more passionate man∣ner than usual; when they were gone he takes Plato's Dialogue of the Soul, and Reading it, calls for his Sword, but no body bringing it, when he had ask'd for it twice or thrice, he calls for all his Servants, •…•…alls into such a Rage, and strikes one of them with so much Violence that he wounds his own Hand, and in such a manner too, that it hindred him from killing himself out-right afterwards; then he cry'd out aloud that his Son and his Servants had betray'd him to the Enemy, Naked and Disarm'd; upon which his
Son and Friends running in Weeping, and Embracing him, he starts up and looking fiercely upon them, crys, When and were was it that I lost my Vnderstanding? Why does not some body forsooth teach me what I ought to do, that I must be disarm'd and not suffer'd to take my own Measures?—And you dutiful, Sir! why do not you tye your Fathers Hands behind him, that Caesar when he comes may find me Helpless and Defenceless?—As If I want∣ed a Sword, when I can die, if I thought sit∣ting, by stoping my Breath a little, or dash∣ing my Brains against the Wall; upon this his Son going out Weeping, he turns to the two Philosophers Demetrius and Apol∣lonides, who only were left with him; And are you too of opinion, says he, that a Man of my Age ought to be forc'd to Live, and do you sit here to watch me, or do you bring any new Reason why Cato despairing of any other means of Safety, ought to accept it from his Enemy? If you do, let me hear it, that throw∣ing off those Principles according to which we have hitherto Liv'd, and being made more wise by Caesar, we may be the more beholding to him, &c. After this they going out, and the Sword being brought him, he cry'd now I am my own: Read over Plato's 〈◊〉〈◊〉 twice more, and about break of Day Stabs himself. But this not being suffici∣ent
to kill him, and the Wound being bound up he rends it open again, pushes back the Surgeons, tears his Bowels in peices with his own Hands, and Expires: That which is most strange in all this is, his Reading Plato's Phaedo so often, be∣cause there is not one Passage in it to en∣courage Self-murther, but many against it; nay, the whole is so; for no one that admires the Death of Socrates, can ever die like Cato.
Montaigne quarrels with those who im∣pute Cato's Death to fear of Caesar, or to vain Glory; Senseless People says he, * 1.168 he would rather have perform'd an handsome, just and generous Action, to have had Igno∣•…•… for his Reward, than for Glory. I do not think Cato indeed was ever capable of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his Courage was perfectly Roman, and never fail'd his Integrity, and if he was capable of vain Glory in some Passages of his Life, I cannot see any ground for the least Imputation of it in his Death. This was owing much to his inflexible Temper, and to that Sect which he profest even to Ostentation: But it is to be suspected that his hatred to Caesar was the chief cause of it; that this mislead his Judgment, made him
give all for gone too soon, and drove him in∣to those strange Passions which he fell into before he Stabb'd himself, and that furious Rage in which he Expir'd afterwards: Sta∣tilius who strove to imitate him in all things, is said to have been a profest Caesar∣hater, all his last Words are full of Caesar, and I do not doubt but every one will grant that if Pompey had been in Caesar's Circum∣stances, Cato would have remov'd some whither, and not have kill'd himself; and this was the thing he should have done, not surrender'd himself up to Caesar, or sent to treat with him; this indeed had been below his Character, but retir'd and pre∣serv'd himself for a better Opportunity of serving his Country; whereas by giving way to his Passion and private Resentments he contributed greatly to the ruin of it.
IV. This brings me to enquire into the Reasons which are usually given for his Death being so much applauded; and to assign the true ones.
It is generally supposed that Cato dy'd for the Liberty of Rome, and this is one of the chief Grounds upon which the Enco∣miums of him were rais'd in after Ages: But it prov'd quite otherwise, for next to Pompey's Death, Cato's was the greatest
blow that his Party ever receiv'd; upon the News of it, Juba, Scipio and Petreius kill themselves immediately, and Afranius surrendred, who was afterwards Slai•…•…. These great Men had a dependance upon his Wisdom, Honour and Reputation; their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Troops offer'd to obey him; Juba cou'd have rais'd another Army immedi∣ately, or all of them might have gone over into Spain to Pompey's Son. Cato's Speech to the People of Vtica is very Re∣markable. That if they continu'd firm a∣gainst Caesar they wou'd avoid his Contempt, and the sooner find his Mercy; that Caesar was perplext in many difficult Affairs; that all Spain had declar'd for the younger Pompey; that Rome had not yet taken the Yoak wholly, but was ready to shake it off upon the first opportunity; that it had fallen lower and yet rais'd it self. This was all very true, but then it was as true to him as to them, and since they rejected it, he ought to have follow'd it: And if he had done so, how many more tryals might he have had for the Liberty of Rome, Africa had not been wholly lost at that time, the younger Pompey would have had more time to have strengthned himself, or had he gone to him with those excellent Commanders Petreius and Afranius, 'tis very probable
that Caesar might have lost that Battle, which was the most doubtful and most bloody that he ever fought; and which he gain'd only through the folly of Labienus; or after that he might have retir'd into some place unknown, for the Roman Empire was not extended to that degree then, or ever after, that there was no place to re∣tire to, no means of evading Tyrants fury but Self-murther: And though he could not have prevented Caesar's greatness, yet he wou'd still have been a curb upon him, and at least have made him use his Fortune more moderately; nor was it long before Opportunity did offer it self to recover again his Countries Liberty.
I do not think that Cato wou'd have been drawn into the Conspiracy against Caesar; I believe his great Mind was not capable of consenting to the Murthering even of his mortal Enemy in so base a manner; but afterwards he might possibly have joyn'd with them, supported the Virtue of Bru∣tus, and restrain'd the Fury of Cassius a∣gainst Anthony and young Octavius, and wou'd have been in all respects a great strength to their Party, for notwithstand∣ing Brutus's Character, his Ingratitude to Caesar lost him many Thousand Romans that would gladly have come in to Cato.
Wherefore if we consider these things impartially, though it is commonly said in Justification of Cato's Self-murther, that he dy'd for the Liberty of Rome, 'tis plain that he stabb'd it himself; yet not purposely but accidentally, in such a manner as a Man that resolves himself a Mischief, might in his rage stab his own Father that cling'd about him.
There is one thing by which Cicero wou'd prove that Cato ought to have dy'd in this manner, and that is Decorum, * 1.169 which is the same with maintaining a Character; a certain likeness between all our Actions, an unalterable equability of Life: And this is grounded upon the dif∣ference between Universal and particular Humane Nature, of which something has been said above; This difference of particu∣lar Natures, which forms the several Cha∣racters of Men, is of that force, says he, that sometimes one Man ought to kill himself, and yet another in the very same Circumstan∣ces ought not; For was † 1.170 not Cato's Case the very same with those others who surrendred themselves to Caesar in Africa? and yet per∣haps
it would have been blameable in them to have kill'd themselves, because their Manners were gentler and easier; but as Nature had given Cato an incredible Gravity, and he had confirm'd this by a perpetual Constancy, and had always remain'd unmoveable in what he had once resolv'd and undertaken; it became him rather to die than to see the Tyrants Face.
Here this great Man seems to give in too much to the Principles of the Stoics; upon which (though well corrected in o∣ther places) that excellent Treatise is founded: They laid down in the first place, that a wise Man cou'd not possibly be mistaken; upon this they advanc'd, That such a Man ought never to change his Opinion, or way of Living or Acting, but be always the same: Now if the first cou'd have been true, the latter wou'd have been reasonable; but alas! it is far from being so, the wisest and the best of Mankind may err in his Opi∣nions and consequently in his Actions; and therefore nothing can be more dangerous, than to mantain that a Man ought never to alter. 'Tis true Levity and Inconstancy are great and unmanly Faults; but next to the not being in any Errour at all 'tis the greatest Wisdom to get out of it quickly; and the doing so is no more Levity and
Inconstancy than when a Man has mistaken his way, and is running upon a Precipice, 'tis Levity and Inconstancy to turn back again. To persist in an Errour is Stupidity; this is the Constancy the Deco∣rum of Brutes; but to get out assoon as possible, not only becomes the Dignity of humane Nature, but improves it in the highest manner, since every Errour we leave the more we have of Truth, and conse∣quently partake the more of God himself.
Decorum is the Beauty which is reflected from Vertuous Actions, the first care shou'd be concerning the Actions, that they be Virtuous, and the Decorum will follow na∣turally; but when People mind this first, 'twill be always of ill Consequence. To observe a Resolution steadily is so much the worse, if the Resolution be not just, and is no more than being positively in the wrong, wherefore it should have been prov'd first that Self-murther was Lawful, for if it be not so, no Plea can be weaker than that of Decorum, which in this Case is nothing more than habitual Stubbornness and profess'd Injustice; and as for the Evil which is pre∣tendod here for Cato's dying; Namely, the seeing the Tyrants Face; this was not necessa∣ry; he might and ought to have sav'd him∣self with the other Senators, and strug∣gled
still against all Opposition, for the Publick Good, as I said before; and then Rome might have receiv'd him with open Arms, as she did Terentius Varro, after the Battle of Cannae, though lost by his Rash∣ness, because he did not despair of her Safe∣ty; or if she had not, he had still observ'd Decorum, in the best the noblest way; for Duty will be always decent, and nothing else can be truly so.
This Passage of Cicero's puts me in mind of what I said concerning him a∣bove, when I brought him in against Self-murther: He is so directly in his Som∣nium Scipionis, as Macrobius shews suffici∣ently: * 1.171 That Excellent Piece was writ∣ten before Cato's Death; when his Judg∣ment was Free. Afterwards Cicero being of the same Party that Cato was, and be∣ing carry'd away with that Torrent of Ap∣plause which that Age run into. He makes all the shifts he can to palliate and excuse his killing of himself, and is very hard put to it to do so, as may appear from the Instance which we have been just now discoursing of; and his making Socrates's Case and his the same, 1. Tuscul. quaest. than which nothing can be
more unreasonable; but if any Body should be so zealous in this matter as not to be sa∣tisfy'd with this; his Authority shall be wav'd if they please.
To conclude this Point, if it be ask'd af∣ter all, What shall we say to those Encomi∣ums which were given to this great Man? How could so many People be in the wrong? How could his Death ever have been so much Applauded if not Reasonable and Lawful? The true Causes of this great Applause were,
1. That he was a Man really of the great∣est Probity, Honour, Integrity, Courage, the truest Lover of his Country that can be found in any History, that the Faults of his Life were fewer, and the Excellen∣cies brighter than any other Example can afford.
2. That upon this Account the Cha∣racter of the other Cato, which was very great, sunk into his, and in after Ages what was said of the Former was attribu∣ted to the Latter.
3. That as to his Death, there are some Actions which become Famous not for their being Reasonable, but for their happen∣ing at a particular time; Cato kill'd him∣self just upon the alteration of the Roman Government; He dy'd with the Roman
Liberty most certainly, whether he dy'd for it or no, and the more that Liberty was miss'd, the more was his Death Applauded; the two great Revolutions of the Roman State, the Birth and Death of that Glorious Republick was attended by the Self-murther of two most Virtuous Persons, which being Celebrated with so many Encomiums, has deceiv'd many People; but the Virtues of their Lives conceal'd the Errours of their Deaths, and the Publick being so far con∣cern'd in them, ran away with their Ap∣plause, which Posterity has receiv'd from Age to Age without much Examina∣tion.
From what has been said I hope it doth appear, that as no Example of Self-mur∣ther ought to sway with us, either upon account of the Romans Practice, or the Doctrine of the Stoics, so this of Cato in particular ought not to be of any Autho∣rity in this Case.
OTher Pretences there are for Self-mur∣ther which are grounded upon mista∣ken Notions of Courage, Honour and Liberty; the first of which is Courage.
In so Warlike an Age and Nation as this is, it might perhaps be taken amiss, for any one to enquire what Courage is: But that they who abound most in any thing that is commendable, always bear the Examination of it best.
Here we meet with our Author again, who is more Lofty than usual upon this Occasion. * 1.172 When I frame to my self, says he, a Martyrology of all which have perished, by their own means, for Religion, Country, Fame, Love, Ease, Fear, Shame; I blush to see how •…•…aked of Followers all Virtues are in respect of this Fortilude, &c. The 〈◊〉〈◊〉
(as he calls it) follows consisting chiefly of Thieves, Minions, Gladiators.
As to the Causes of this Fortitude which he mentions here, to omit at pre∣sent what relates to Religion, what con∣cerns dying for ones Country, has † 1.173 been spoken to at large, the Motive of Fame shall be consider'd in the next Chapter, as also that of Shame. But how the killing of ones self upon the account of Ease, Love, nay Fear too, shou'd be Instances of Fortitude is very strange.
By Fortitude here I suppose meant the same with what is call'd Courage. This being generally look'd upon as a great Virtue, and Self-murther believ'd to be an Effect of it: It will be necessary to make a particular enquiry into it, not on∣ly for the clearing of this Mistake, but several others rising from the same Root.
1. Let us see what is the Nature, Ob∣ject and use of Courage, particularly as Rational and Humane.
2. What the Mistakes are concern∣ing it, and what are probably the Causes of them. And this being done I shall shew,
3. That Self-murther is not the Effect of true Courage.
1. As to the Nature of it, Courage is only the Effect of an active and vigorous heat in the Heart as its Name imports in many Modern Languages, which Heat sends forth many brisk and lively Spirits which diffuse themselves through the whole Body and prompt it to Action; so that this is Common to other Creatures as well as Man; and therefore not any Vir∣tue naturally, the Virtue of it depends upon the goodness of the Object, and proper use of it.
2. As to the Object: All Objects work upon Creatures which have Life either under the Notion of Good, or under the Notion of Evil (as to things indifferent our Passions are not concerned about them:) As to what is or seems Good, if this is easie to be obtain'd, the very Ap∣pearance of it is sufficient to make the Soul reach after it without any occasion for Courage; and if we cou'd imagine a Man to be wholly at ease, to abound in all things he can wish for, and to be se∣cure in the enjoyment of them, such a one wou'd have no need of Courage, and therefore it wou'd languish and die away
by Degrees. But on the other side, if any thing presents it self as an obstacle in the way to that which we take to be Good, or if any thing which we take to be Evil threatens us with danger, then the Soul looks out and views the Enemy, and ac∣cording as it finds its strength prepares to attack or resist it; from whence it appears that the proper Object of Courage is Evil. Thus a Modern Author, * 1.174 Fear is the Opinion of hurt from the Object, Courage is the hope of avoiding that Hurt by Resistance. Or as another, † 1.175 Courage is a Power of the Soul which employs the Forces of the Mind to over∣come Evils, or to put a stop to 'em. From whence we also come to a knowledge of
3. The proper use of Courage, namely to Attack or Resist what is Evil.
What has been said hi•…•…herto may be∣long to Beasts as well as Man, the proper use of Courage, as belonging to Man, consists in the promoting that End for which he receiv'd Life; the use of Courage in Beasts is to preserve Life, but since Li••e was given Man to a more excellent End, as has been shewn; whatever Springs there are in Humane Nature, of which
Courage is one of the Chief, must be sup∣pos'd to be intended, as subservient to this End, and therefore the Justness and Re∣gularity of their Motion, must be mea∣sur'd by it accordingly. First then hu∣mane Courage ought to be inform'd truly concerning its Object, to have a right and certain knowledge of its being Evil, which Reason will quickly discover: Secondly it ought to Attack or Resist that Evil in such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 manner, limited and directed by such Virtues as may hinder it from interfering with any part of our Duty towards God, our Neighbour, or our selves. This makes Courage to be founded upon Justice, and directed by it, otherwise it wou'd be Evil it self.
It has been said already that Courage is twofold, either such as Attacks or such as Resists Evil. Let us bring both of them to these Rules.
1. As to that part of Courage which consists in Attacking Evil, the measure of this is, that the Evil be real which we attack, that it be attack'd with * 1.176 Justice; from whence it follows that a Man's
Courage ought not to be the Instrument of his Ambition, his Covetousness, An∣ger, or Revenge; for these will make him not only fancy Evil where there is none, but attack it in such a manner as is most unjust: In this regard Beasts use their Courage better than Men, they al∣ways do it in defence of Life, to supply their Hunger, or to escape Death, when threaten'd some other way. But Man employs it against Man, when Life is far from being in danger, only to usurp over him; and therefore this kind of Courage is rarely employed by good Men, unless upon extreme Necessity; and yet even where such Necessity requires it, it must be always closely attended by Justice and Goodness, without which it would be no∣thing but injurious Insolence.
Yet commonly speaking there is seldom any thing in the World less regarded than Justice, by those who value themselves most upon this kind of Courage; pushing Courage as some call it, and what is most strange, although the World sut•…•…ers so much by it, there is nothing that it is more apt to admire.
Hence it is that Impudence and Cruelty, Noise and Madness, want of Sence as much as Virtue, Oaths, Violence, Rash∣ness,
Revenge, Injuring Man, and Bla∣spheming God is so often counted Cou∣rage.
These Mistakes begin early, they are some of the first Effects of the Baseness, and Degenerateness of humane Nature. Men either out of Cowardize, Worship what they fear, or else Admire it, because they find the same Principles in them∣selves, by which it usually Acts, as Pride, Ambition, Covetousness, Revenge; and would be glad to have it as an Instrument to compass such Ends as these aim at: This ill grounded Admiration is nourish'd af∣terwards by the Honour and Titles which are given to this successful Injustice, as such an one the Conquerour, or the Great; and by some Characters in Heroic Poetry. But Conquerour is generally a Fatal Title, the Badge of Absolute Slavery, and is gene∣rally selt more by the Heroes own Country than those which he adds to it.
And what should be meant by such an one the Great? The great Promo∣ter of Arts and Sciences, the great En∣courager of Virtue; No, the great In∣vader and Destroyer of Mankind: Or what are many of the Heroes of Poetry if stript of the Ornaments of Numbers, Wit and Eloquence, and consider'd in
themselves? Besides how oft is the Poet misunderstood and thought to Paint a Demi-God, when he intended perhaps a Centaur.
Thus Alexander himself seems to have been misled, when coming to Achilles's Tomb, * 1.177 he is said to have cry'd out, O happy Youth who hadst such a Poet as Homer to Re∣cord thy Deeds. This false Admiration be∣trayed him into one of the worst Actions of his Life, the dragging the † 1.178 Gallant Batis Governour of Gaza round that Town, as the other had done Hector, on∣ly for having defended it Faithfully and Honourably.
Homer indeed was an Admirable Poet, he always drew to the Life whatever the Original was; he represents Thersites Na∣turally, so does he Achilles too, but this was the worse for him; for Achilles was nothing but an insolent Bravo, Lustful, Passionate, Inexorable, Barbarous; Ho∣mer's design in that Poem was to shew, the ill Consequences of Dissention among Ge∣nerals of several Governments in the same intre•…•…t. A lasting Lesson for Greece, which was divided into several little States. Not
〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 for a Pattern to be 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 and Insolence broke that 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 was the Death of so many 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉. Indeed few Heroes would 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 to their Poets or Historians 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 did 'em Justice. These are the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Mistakes concerning this sort 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Courage, which imposes upon Man∣kind, first by its Noise and Splendor, and afterwards often enslaves them.
I have been the more particular in this matter, because this lawless Arrogance, which is often sowr'd into a surly Brutish∣ness, after it has been long Injurious to Man, and Insolent to God, when any thing hap∣pens cross to it, and it is Check'd or Con∣troul'd by Providence, is very apt to fly out into Rage and Indignation, and be∣cause it cannot reach that, falls upon it self, and so becomes one of the most com∣mon Causes of Self-murther; which ig∣norant People take to be an Effect of Courage accordingly.
2. The other part of Courage consists in the resistance of Evil. And is that firmness and constancy of Mind, where∣by it supports it self undauntedly under all Calamities, this is the more noble sort of Courage; because a Man cannot be un∣just here towards his Neighbour, or to∣wards
his God; for this consists in the bearing of all Events with Patience, whe∣ther they be Poverty, Pain, Loss of Sen∣ses, Friends or Children, Disgrace, &c. Some one of which, at least, befal most Men sometime or other, and therefore every one ought to be provided with this kind of Courage, whatever he is with the other, because there are much fewer Evils that require being resisted by Violence, than by Patience: This then is that Forti∣than which the Soul should have al∣ways ready to retire unto, when it is sur∣prized by sudden Evils; and then it is, then chiefly that it has the most glorious opportunity of discovering it self; for what nobler Idea can we form of humane Nature, than to consider it beset by seve∣ral Evils at once, attack'd in its Body, Reputation, and Estate, and yet undaunt∣ed: And though left singly and alone, Arming it self with Resolution, Patience, and Constancy; whatever has been said of the Vulcanian Arms of Old, such as these are Impenetrable indeed, because well wrought and tempered by deliberate Reason, by God himself, and bestowed by him upon the greatest and the best Men only. But alas! though this part of Courage is so necessary to Mankind, yet
it is least regarded, because 'tis against the wild Appetites and Passions which are indulg'd by the other; it has no Noise, Pomp and Ostentation, which glitter splendidly upon Corrupted Fancies; but is Calm, Easie, Regular and Modest, as all the Steps of Virtue, when guided by right Reason are.
If this is a right Account of Courage then,
3. Self-murther cannot be any Genuine or Natural Effect of it, in which of these Senses soever we take it, for,
1. That which makes the difference between Brutal and Humane Courage is Reason and Justice; now Self-murther has been shown at large to be highly a∣gainst these, to be an Act of the greatest Injustice, and therefore in this Regard cannot be the Effect of Courage as Hu∣mane and Rational; nor can it be the Effect of Brutal Courage properly so call'd, because there is no Beast, though never so remarkable for Courage, that ever de∣stroys it self; this will appear more plain if we consider,
2. The proper object of Courage which is Evil, I will not stay to show here how often Evil is falsely Represented and Mag∣nisied, or how many ways it is mistaken,
but supposing that to be really Evil which Men take to be so; yet in the Case of Self∣murther, the Soul instead of attacking or resisting what it takes to be Evil, flies a∣way from it; and therefore this Act is no more an Argument of true Courage than the rushing into a Torrent, the leaping down a Pit or Precipice in a Panic Fright, is so.
If Courage is the attacking or resistance of Evil, as has been shewn, then Death must be look'd upon as an Evil, before any Man can be suppos'd to shew his Courage by killing himself; for where there is no Evil, there can be no occasion for Courage. Death can never be an Evil but when Life is casie and happy, and look'd upon as a great Good; this makes it so honourable for People of Quality who abound in Wealth and Power, and all such things as make Life desirable, to hazard theirs for the Publick. But to them that kill them∣selves, Life cannot seem Good but Evil: And when Life becomes an Evil, through great Pain, Poverty, Disgrace, &c. then Death must be look'd upon as Good pro∣portionably; and if so, there can be no Courage in running to it. But on the contrary, 'tis the part of a brave Man, when Life becomes an Evil to him, not to
fly to Death, but to turn Head and en∣gage with the Misfortunes of Life; for here lies the Enemy as Caesar told his frightn'd Souldier, An unhappy Life is the Field for true Courage and Magnanimity; whereas the killing of ones self is plainly to decline the Combat, to convey ones self away, out of the reach of the Eneny, to pass from a state of Misery, into a state of Ease or Indolency at least, as they sup∣pose; and this sure can be no great Argu∣ment of Courage.
That which is most apt to deceive Peo∣ple upon this Account, is the Notion which the World generally has of Death, as the greatest of all Evils, that it takes us through a Thousand Pains and Tortures from our Friends and Relations, our Projects and Possessions, and all the Enjoyments of the World: All which Terrours are increas'd by the sight of the Death of some dear Friend or near Relation; for then humane Nature Starts and Trembles at the Ghastly looks and Convulsions of Expiration.
These are the things which make Peo∣ple grow up in a detestation of Death, and this is still augmented the more happy they are in their outward Circumstances; Wherefore they who kill themselves may
seem indeed to such People to have a great deal of Courage, because these run volun∣tarily into that which they abhor as the worst of Evils; whereas the Notion of Life and Death is quite contrary in such unfortunate Creatures; 'tis some Pain, some discontent that drives them to this Violence; upon account of which Death, as I said before, becomes the Good, and Life the Evil; therefore as it wou'd be true Courage in Health or Prosperity to suffer Death, rather than commit a Crime: So in Sickness or any Adversity it would be the same, to undergo Life rather than be guilty of Self-murther; for he who parts with Life, because he thinks himself Un∣happy; parts with nothing but what he is griev'd withal. He only lays down his Burthen, quits his Virtue, his Arms, for fear of the Enemy, and where can be the Courage of this; even Sardinapalus and Nero, cou'd desert their Station in this manner; and why not with as much Bravery as any other can pretend to, In a Word, when the Heart gives way to Evils and Asslictions, when Hope is gone and Despair enter'd, Men may make themselves away out of tenderness and softness; there being little or no Pain to be selt in Voluntary Death; especially if
Men will take but as much care as Brutus did, to place the Weapon right, or as the Emperour Adrian to have the Mortal Place mark'd out exactly.
What, shall we say then, that all Men are Cowards that kill themselves? No; but that this particular Act has naturally more of Cowardice than Courage in it, and is in those who have signaliz'd their Courage an act of Revenge or Indignati∣on; and therefore though some Men of Courage have kill'd themselves, yet since the Nature of Courage consists in resisting Evil, and Self-murther is the flying from Evil; since many Women and Slaves, many Effeminate Men and Notorious Cowards, many for Ease or Fear, as our Author himself confesses, have kill'd them∣selves. Self-murther ought not to be look'd upon as the natural effect of Cou∣rage.
To confirm what has been said, I shall call several Persons of unquestionable Au∣thority.
The Character of Hercules is certainly perfect as to Courage; and yet Euripides representing him in the greatest Affliction that ever Man could suffer through his own Fault; his Wife and Children lying Murther'd round him, by his own
Hand in his Madness: At first he has thoughts of killing himself, but immedi∣ately he checks himself with the Consi∣deration; * 1.179 that he will not have his Courage question'd by doing so; that whoever cannot bear great Calamity will not dare to meet his E∣nemy in the Field. Wherefore he resolves to expect his Death boldly, and not to force it upon himself.
† 1.180 Another tells us, that to die wilfully for Poverty, Love, or any Grievance, is so far from being any sign of Courage, that it is meer Cowardice; for to avoid what is grievous, is nothing but Softness and Esseminacy; for no body chooses such a Death because 'tis Honoura∣ble, but because it frees him from an Evil which he cannot bear; and to be so affected is Cowardice.
‖ 1.181 'Tis the part of a brave Man, rather to despise Death, than hate Life. Cowards often undervalue their Being, only to avoid what is troublesome; but true Courage tries all things.
* 1.182 Let me add one more, 'tis not law∣ful
nor becoming a Man of Courage to bend under his Destiny and not embrace whatever happens undauntedly; but run poorly away from it. This was the great Brutus who thus condemn'd Cato's Death, when cool and deliberate, and before he doubted whe∣ther Virtue was any thing but an Aery Name; * 1.183 When he came to do so, no wonder that he kill'd himself.
THe next pretence for Self-murther is Honour. There is nothing I think that is more generally pretended to than this, excepting Wit only; and yet this seems to be as little understood as that; Honour People find is something that is commendable, though what it is they cannot tell; therefore every one being de∣sirous to have their Actions pass for ho∣nourable; the Word is strain'd to as many Significations as they have Inclinations; often 'tis taken for some particular Quali∣ty, which is thought to belong more to one degree of Men, or to one Sex, than another: Thus in Women Chastity is Honour, in Men of high birth Truth and Justice, in Soldiers Courage, in Tradesmen punctual Payment; but since these several Qualities may be attended by great Vices: Since these things are truly
as commendable in one Person as an∣other and equally required in all People, this is but a very imperfect account of Honour.
For this must be something which con∣cerns all Mankind, and therefore humane Nature it self must be considered before we can come to any knowledge of it. The perfection of Humane Nature, and the great end of Humane Life has been shewn to be the following of Reason by Virtue; therefore what I said of Courage before, must be said of Honour now, that the excellency of it consists in the promoting of this End; now though whatever is an hindrance to this is call'd by the general Name of Evil, yet all Evil does not ap∣pear in its own natural shape, but often puts on the form of Good, and so works and insinuates it self into Man by his Pas∣sions and Appetites; wherefore Honour seems to be that Principle whereby the Soul is secur'd against both these kinds of Evil, in the quiet pursuit of the End of Life. And thus perhaps it may be de∣scrib'd.
Honour is an Elevation of the Soul, upon the sence of its Preheminence above the rest of the Creation, in regard to that great End of its being, the following of Reason by Virtue; a firm
Resolution to observe it; and agenerous disdaln of all Pleasure or Profit, all loss or danger, of whatever the World can promise or threaten; of whatever is dreadful or delightful in com∣parison of doing so—So that this is the greatest excellency of Man's Nature, 'Tis a Spirit drawn off from the noblest parts of humane Reason, 'tis that God within us, as the Stoics speak; that divine Power which di∣rects Man's Free-will, follows him diligently through every part of his Duty; Regulates his Knowledge and his Courage, and hinders the one from falling into Injury, and the other into Knavery.
1. This I take to be the first and most important meaning of the Word Honour, as it is an inward Principle of Action, and depends wholly upon ones self.
2. There is another signification of this Word Honour, as it depends upon other People, and is something of the same Nature with Reputation but above it. Reputation is esteem from supposed Excel∣lencies, when we say such an one is repu∣ted so and so.
Honour is Praise, Respect, Veneration, upon a clear Knowledge, a certainty of such Excellencies, and when this is given by many Men it is call'd Glory, so that Honour is twofold inward or outward:
But the last depends chiesly upon the Per∣sons that are to bestow it.
The outward Honour which is truly Valuable, is the Image of inward Honour reflected back in the Applause of Good and Wise Men, upon a Man's observing faithfully the true end of Life, and making always a right use of those Powers by which he excells all other Creatures; in follow∣ing impartial Reason by steady Virtue, what ever Dangers threaten or Pleasures slatter. Thus Cicero who understood this very well, though he was a little too forward to help himself to it, tells us that Glory (which is of the same Nature with Ho∣nour, though of a larger Extent) is * 1.184 something of substance, like solid Imagery, not the slight shadowing of fading Colours; 'tis the concurrent praise of Good Men; the impartial Verdict of such as are able Judges of Excellent Virtue. So that where there is excellent Virtue for the Foundation, on the one side and where Men are qualified with Know∣lege and Integrity on the other; the Ho∣nour which is given by such is solid and lasting, like the Statues of the Gods, and
all other no better than the slight daubing of fading Colours which decays immedi∣ately.
But because the love of Honour includes the fear of Dishonour, and no Man can be desirous of Praise, but he must have a proportionable Aversion to Disgrace, it will be necessary also to observe from whence this comes, this must be from acting quite contrary to what was said above from forsaking the true end of Life, from refusing to follow Reason by Virtue, and de∣serting it wilfully to obey Vice; the re∣sult of this is first inward Disgrace, when the Soul abhors it self, and hates the sight of its own folly; and this when known, becomes outward Disgrace, which truly consists in the concurrent dispraise of good Men: But then we should take notice that though this is a great Evil, and though a Man may happen to fall into it, yet he may recover his Reputation or Honour again by taking the contrary Course, and following of his Reason by Virtue, and that the sooner, because good Men, upon whose Verdict Disgrace de∣pends will be always ready to acquit o∣thers of blame upon reasonable Grounds, and glad to believe and proclaim their change.
If this then be an Account of Honour, how can it be pretended that it shou'd ever require a Man to Murther himself, for first as to inward Honour; if this be an Ele∣vation of the Soul, rais'd upon a just sense of the Advantages which Man has above other Creatures, in the Powers of Know∣ledge and Free-will, and the excellent end which they are given for; and if it be a firm Resolution of pursuing that End, What can be more contradictory to this than Self-murther? What can it signifie to Man to have such Preheminences, nay to be made to any purpose at all, if the noblest Principle in his Nature shou'd teach him to decline that purpose; if that which was plac'd in him to support and improve his Being, shou'd require him not to be at all? Again if Honour be the generous disdain of whatever is Terrible or Dangerous in the way to our perform∣ing the true end of Life, and if it is always in a good Man's Power to perform this End? What Circumstances can be of such a kind, so Evil, so Painful, Dange∣rous or Dreadful, wherein Honour can put a Man upon killing of himself? Lastly if this be the guard which is to follow the Soul diligently through every part of its Duty, as to the chief Objects of it, God,
our Neighbour or our selves; how can it ever perswade a Man to such an Act as is the highest Injustice to every one of these? Whoever considers inward Honour which is the most worthy of a great or good Man's care in these respects; he will find nothing more against Self-murther than this; so likewise as to outward Honour, if this consists in the praise of good Men, grounded upon excellent Virtue, and if nothing is truly Disgrace, but what comes from the same Persons, for forsak∣ing the true End of Life; and if this though forsaken may be recovered again when the Party concern'd pleases, then how can any Man kill himself to avoid Disgrace, especially since killing himself is an Act of the greatest Injustice in the Judgment of the best Men; and there∣fore the doing so must be increasing of Disgrace rather than avoiding it: Where∣fore whether we consider inward or out∣ward Honour, neither of these can ever require a Man to Murther himself; and therefore I suppose that, whenever this is said to be done upon this Account, it is either meer Pretence, or else proceeds from some mistake concerning one or both of these kinds of Honour. Let us see then what these may probably be.
Some Men are deceiv'd by reckoning Honour nothing but a greatness of Mind, Elevation of the Soul, without considering upon what Grounds it ought to be rais'd, and by what Rules directed when it is so, from whence instead of any just Grandeur they sall into insolent Haughtiness, and this encreases upon the value which they set upon themselves, and that value is nourish'd by their choosing out some one Virtue asfecting the observation of it in a more extraordinary manner than other People do, which makes 'em run over the bounds of what is sit and just, as far as the Idle or the Cowardly fall short of 'em: Montaign says very well, that * 1.185 the Virtue of the Soul does not consist in the flying high, but in walking orderly. But these Gentlemen are contented with nothing but what is † 1.186 extravagant; their Actions like the thoughts of young Poets are a∣bove the ken of Reason, too lofty to be Regular, too sublime to be Understood. Thus they become Prodigal instead of being Liberal, sollicit Danger rather than resist it, and despise Justice as much
as Cowardice: And this running 'em into great Inconveniences, making them to be obnoxious to humane Laws, or to fall in∣to Poverty, Sickness or Disgrace; they know not how to be controul'd; repine un∣der the ill usage which they think they suf∣fer from God and Man, and foolishly ima∣gine to be reveng'd of both by falling upon themselves.
Others again have taken up a particular Principle, proclaim'd it to the World, boasted of it at several times; as for In∣stance this of Self-murther, they have often maintain'd in Company, that it was reasonable in such and such Cases, and then falling into the same Cases them∣selves, think that they are obliged in Honour to put it in Execution.
But if Self-murther is unlawful in so many respects as has been shewn * 1.187, what can be more Absurd than for a Man to think it more Honourable to continue in the Wrong than to change for the Right * 1.188, and to be a Martyr to Errour by his own Hand, only for the Reputation of Constancy and Perseverance in it.
But that which is the greatest occasion
of Errour in this matter is the immoderate desire of Applause; the neglecting the Principles of Virtue upon which inward Honour is form'd, and aspiring impati∣ently to outward Honour only, and not only so, but mistaking the Persons who are to bestow it; and therefore endea∣vouring to please the most and not the best; the very same is done likewise in relation to Disgrace; this is that fatal Rock upon which many great Spirits have been cast away, and therefore there never was any considerable Moralist, but has cautiously warn'd People of it, and endeavoured carefully to recal them to consider the Dictates of Reason and Conscience, and inward Honour, to Reverence themselves and not the Multitude, and to do well for their own sakes without any regard to common Praise or Disgrace.
And indeed it might be enough to cure this, to consider attentively, how much a Man must undervalue himself in order to be rais'd in this manner; he that courts any one must endeavour to humour and please him; now this cannot be done but by being like him, by levelling a Man's self both to his Capacity and Incli∣nation, by renouncing his own Judgment and following what he takes to be the
others that is by counterseiting both Igno∣rance and Vice: When any one of the Multitude is to be Courted. But who wou'd do this for publick Fame, who wou'd rake for Reputation so very low? This is no less than to invert the Nature of things, to make the Lees of Mankind the Fountain of all Honour, * 1.189 and sorce its foul and heavy stream to mount upwards. And yet this is not the way of the World in matters of much less Importance than those which we are speaking of: Virtue and a good Conscience. In Building or Paint∣ing, in Musick or Poetry the sensible Artist does not appeal to the Multitude, but is contented with the Applause of the few skilful only: Shou'd not a Man then who has a just sense of his Duty, and who is conscious to himself of obeying his Reason faithfully by Virtue; shou'd not such a one be as well satisfy'd in his few Applauders as he that excells in any Art or Science.
Many Men indeed are apt to be de∣ceiv'd by the noise, the bulk of a vast
Multitude; but can Number alter the Nature of things, or shall it be put to the Vote what is Good and Evil? A great many Men may be the stronger, as Beasts are when they gather into a Herd, but not the wiser nor the better Judges of Virtue, or Dispensers of Honour; and the best way to remedy this Errour wou'd be to take out the first Man that we meet with∣al in the Crowd we Adore, and to weigh his Education, Capacity and Honesty.
Wou'd you trust such a thing as this with a Secret? Wou'd you ask his Advice in any matter of Importance, the put∣ting out your Money, disposing of a Child, &c? No certainly; and yet 'tis of such Unites as these, that the Numbers which are so courted, or so fear'd, are compos'd. 'Tis these whom Men would scorn to have Judges of their Wit, that they make the Judges of their Actions, and up∣on whose Verdict as to Honour or Disgrace they make their Reason, their Consciences, and their Lives depend. There is no Man that reflects upon this, but will allow how very much they are mistaken, who pay this strange deference to the World, it being almost impossible but that they who do so must be guilty of all other E∣•…•…ormous Crimes as well as Self-mnrther.
Wherefore let the distinction between in∣ward and outward Honour be always carefully observ'd; let all good Men despise the lat∣ter in comparison of the former; for if this depends upon the Multitude, 'tis below their care; if it depends upon the best of Men, it does not want it; because it will naturally follow upon the acting accord∣ing to the Principles of inward Honour, and if these Principles be faithfully ob∣serv'd, they can never lead to Self-mur∣ther; Because inward Honour is the guard of the great End of Life, and therefore can never prompt any Body to destroy it, it at∣tends constantly upon impartial Reason, and follows it not by one but every Vir∣tue, and therefore its Course is always Re∣gular and even; it blesses the mind with a just and lasting Applause, makes it dear to it self, and generally to all the World, and therefore must hinder and pre∣vent Self-murther rather than promote it.
But if this shou'd not be sufficient to give some Gentlemen satisfaction in this matter, I will suppose an Objection to this purpose. A Man's Honour ought to be dearer to him than his Life; he may be abus'd to that degree as to forfeit his Honour if he shou'd bear it; and therefore he ought rather to kill himself; especially since Women them∣selves
have done the same. Lucretia kill'd herself upon a Point of Honour, so did Cleopatra to a∣void the disgrace of being led in Triumph; and both gain'd Immortal Applause for doing so. How much more shou'd any Man of Ho∣nour do the same; especially since there may be Cases •…•…uch harder than theirs were: For In∣stance, a Man born Nobly, bred a Soldier, &c.—I will Answer first this Objection, with its Instances, and then consider the particular Case afterwards: 'Tis said here first, that a Man's Honour ought to be dearer to him than his Life, very True; if Honour be taken here for that inward Principle which secures Man in the doing of his Duty. Honour in this sence ought to be dearer to a Man than Life, that is, he ought to suffer the worst Extremities, even Death it self, rather than act against it; but then it is absurd for any Man to destroy his own Life upon this Account; be∣cause this kind of Honour is always in his own Power, and cannot be forc'd from him unless he consent.
If outward Honour be meant here, that is Reputation, this ought not to be dearer to him than his Life; because it wou'd then be dearer also than the great End of Life. Dearer than his Duty; and he must Sa∣crisice both his Reason and his Virtue to
maintain his Reputation; and that too among the worst of Men.
2. 'Tis said here, a Man may be abus'd to that degree as to forfeit his Honour if he shou'd bear it: This cannot be as to the first sence of Honour, for that will never be in danger if he be Innocent, how much soever he is abus'd; Power and Injustice may oppress Virtue, and a Man of the nicest Honour may be Unfortunate, but yet this Honour may be encreased by the manner of his bearing of his Misfortune, by his Deportment under great Injuries; to Kill ones self rather than bear 'em; is to be unjust to God in the highest manner, because another is unjust in a small matter to me; and this sure cannot be Honoura∣ble in the first sence; but indeed is nothing but an Act of Impotent Indignation and Revenge, of Pride, Cowardice and De∣spair, and therefore cannot be Honourable in the latter neither.
Nor is the Objection assisted by these Instances. The first of these indeed may justly raise Compassion in all that read her Story, and never had any Person more Statues rais'd to her; but it does not fol∣low that because Lucretia's Death was much Applauded therefore it was Lawful or is to be imitated.
It was Applauded by the Romans, for being the accidental occasion of Rome's Liberty, and of the great Glory it rose to afterwards; and other Nations consented to this Applause, as they heard her Case, out of Compassion and Generosity, which is due most to those who fall into mistakes only through too severe and nice a sense of Honour: Far be it then from me to search farther into this matter. No, let the Garlands which have been hang'd over her Tomb by Chaste Wives and Virgins remain forever unshaken and unviolated: Let all the Wit that has been shewn in her Praise pass for Reason; but then let me entreat such as are most Zealous to vindicate the manner of her Death, to consider what has been said already, to prove such an Act unlaw∣ful, and withal to remember the Occasion of her using her self so; and allow at least, that it ought not to be imitated, but in just the same Circumstances; and then whe∣ther her living wou'd have been an Incou∣ragement for Unchastity or no, (as the poor Lady thought) I am confident that her Death will not be any dangerous cause of Self-murther.
But for Cleopatra, she is very ill join'd with the other; the Example of her Death, ought no more to befollowed than the Ex∣ample
of her Life; she kill'd her self as is commonly suppos'd upon a point of Ho∣nour: To be faithfull to Anthony, and to avoid the Ignominy of being led in Tri∣umph.
As for the first Pretence, she was the ut∣ter ruin of that Roman, she engag'd him in a War with his own Country; lost the Fight at Actium by her flying away, when Anthony was as likely to Conquer as Caesar. Afterwards foolishly believing that Caesar was in Love with her, which she desir'd of all things, betrays 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Frontier Town of Egypt to him, and to make her own terms the better, occasi∣ons the Death of Anthony * 1.190 purposely, by a false Rumour of her own; after this she endeavours to make Caesar fall in Love with her at an interview, which finding to be to no purpose she kills her self.
2 As to her killing her self to avoid being led in Triumph. Had she been careful of her Honour in the former part of her Life it wou'd not have suffer'd in this. That Custom of the Romans was Barbarous and Unjust, and the strangest Scene of Vanity, Licentiousness, and base Insulting, in the World; but the Dis∣honour
of it depended much upon the Character and Demeanour of the Person that was led in Triumph; therefore it has not been always Ignominious to those who have been thus expos'd; when Ar∣sinoe, Cleopatra's younger Sister, a Virtu∣ous Lady, was us'd so by Julius Caesar, the Multitude was softened into Pity and Compassion at the sight, and immediate∣ly reflected upon their own Condition, * 1.191 that they were in effect as much Slaves as she; and that great Man was never so much overseen, both as to his Politicks and Generosity, as in gratifying Cleopatra at so dear a rate: So might it have been with Cleopatra her self too, had she been as Virtuous as she was Great. For where is the Crime of being Oppress'd, or the Shame of being Unfortunate? How cou'd the Multitude have ever dishonour'd her? Had not her own Infamy ran before her? What a strange niceness of Honour is it, not to scorn to commit the foulest Vices, and yet to scorn to hear of them: Honour is truly lost when an ill Action is commit∣ted, not when it becomes known, and there∣fore it is very Ridiculous, though very Common, to be easie as to the first, and
scrupulous as to the latter; for this is to make Secrecy the measure of Good and E∣vil; and no Vice dishonourable but only when it is discovered; where Virtue suffers publickly the Honour of the Publick suf∣fers, this is Infamous to the State, not to the Person that is injur'd; whose Honour may be encreas'd by suffering as they should do: But where Honour is first ble∣mish'd by enormous Crimes 'tis too late to be tender of it as to Publick Disgrace, or to think to redeem it by Self-murther; for this is not only a great Crime it self, but a Confession of all those which are laid to the Parties Charge. And though Cleopatra was so tender in this matter, yet other Persons of unquestionable Courage and Honour underwent the same Misfor∣tune. Not only Perseus, but Jugurtha, whose Wit and Courage gave the Romans so much trouble, did so; nay Ventidius, the faithful Friend of Anthony, was first led in Triumph himself, and afterwards by a strange change of Fortune Triumph'd over the Parthians, the most dreadful E∣nemy the Romans ever had. But to op∣pose one Queen to another, Zenobia con∣tended Personally with Aurelian for the Empire of the World, and fought with the same Spirit with which her Secretary
Longinus wrote. And yet when she had satisfied whatever Honour requir'd as to Action, she made use of it to bear her Ad∣versity with as great a Mind as she did her Prosperity; and therefore she did not Murther her self when she was to be led in Triumph; but carry'd it so as to be consider'd with Admiration, and liv'd in Rome it self with great Respect many Years after.
Let me add one Instance my self, of great niceness of Honour, and that is Sporus. * 1.192 He was married publickly to Nero, under the Name of Sabina, Saluted by the Titles of Sovereign Lady, Queen and Empress; nay the Cities of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (to their Immortal Honour) offered Sacrifice for their having Issue.
Yet this Person being commanded af∣terwards by Vitellius when he came to the Empire, to appear on the Theatre in the dress and manner of a Ravish'd Maid, chose rather to kill himself, because he cou'd not bear the Disgrace, as the * 1.193 Histo∣rian says; what niceness of Honour cou'd ever exceed this? and how great a Credit was this Person, as well as his Husband Nero, to all Self-murtherers?
Thus much to the first part of the Ob∣jection and the Instances brought to sup∣port it. Let us come next to the Particu∣lar Case that is brought to the same End, which is thus introduc'd. How much more shou'd any Man of Honour do the same, especi∣ally since there may be Cases much •…•…arder than theirs were; (I have had one put to me much to this purpose) A Gentleman born Nobly, and bred a Soldier, having gain'd much Honour by many great Actions in his Countries Service, is afterwards by the Ingratitude and Jealousie of his Prince, accus'd falsely of some foul Crime, and Condemn'd to suffer a Pub∣lick and Shameful Death; the Question is, Whether such a one after he has stood his Trial, and done what he cou'd to clear and save himself, shou'd tamely expect the Death which he sees is Inevitable, let his Enemies have their Will over him, and be the Scorn and Derision of the Multitude: Or not rather disappoint their Malice and Contempt, and vindicate his Honour by killing of himself. I confess I am of Opinion that he ought not to do the latter by any means: For the Reasonable∣ness of which,
1. Let us see what may be the Character of a Man of Honour: (the Ignorance whereof so often misleads People in other Cases as well as this:) according to what
has been said above, He is one who has a just and regular Elevation of Soul; whose Eye is always sixt steddily upon his Duty, and who disdains equally whatever Threatens or Flatters to draw him from it: One who is ever glad to be doing good to all Men, and abhors Cunning and Oppression as much as Cowardice. Or if we take Honour for Publick Reputati∣on: He despises all but that alone which comes from Good and Wise Men; yet he prefers his Duty before this also; he values a Good Con∣science above a Good Name, and therefore would be as Virtuous in a Desart, as in the midst of Prying Multitudes; nay would not be guilty of an unjust Action, though he shou'd he sure that it wou'd be conceal'd from God as well as Man; much less to gratisie any Revenge, or to avoid any Disgrace.
Now, though the Instance is given here in a So•…•…dier, and many are apt to think, as well as those Gentlemen themselves, that they ought to be more concern'd to vin∣dicate their Honour than other People are, I do not see any ground for this: If what I have said of Honour before, and also just now, (and chiefly to prevent this mistake) be duly observ'd; nay although Courage alone shou'd be the Standard of Honour, as some of them are inclin'd to believe,
and they shou'd think themselves bound to observe stricter measures in regard to this, than the rest of the World; yet this is not to be vindicated by Self-murther in the Case before us, as shall be shewn im∣mediately.
2. The chief ground of this Plea is, That such a one has stood his Trial, that he has done what he cou'd to clear himself, and for all that is unjustly Condemn'd: But nothing of this alters the Case, this does not give a Man more right over his Life than he had before; and one sort of Injustice is not to be return'd by another: If Man is unjust to me, what excuse is that for my being unjust to God? Socrates was Con∣demn'd unjustly if ever Man was, yet he refus'd * 1.194 to save himself by flying out of Prison at his Friends entreaty; because he reckon'd it against the Laws of his Coun∣try, and unjust to do so. How much more would he have thought it unjust to have evaded the Sentence by Self-murther; for this is an Act of the highest Injustice, and what is so can never be Honourable; where∣sore a Man of Honour in these Circum∣stances, is not to be sway'd by Opinion, nor to be hurry'd away by Passion; but to
enquire calmly and seriously what right he has to destroy himself. It has been shewn that he has none at all; but supposing that he has ever had such a right, yet if he has stood his Trial, he will find this rather lessen'd upon this Account than encreas'd; sor in all Trials there is a tacit Agreement between the Party and the Court to stand the Issue, that if he be found Innocent he shall be discharg'd: If not, submit to•…•… Punishment: Wherefore upon the Prisoners being found Guilty in Capital Causes, his Life becomes the Pub∣licks immediately; 'tis forfeited by Com∣p•…•…ct as some Amends for his Crime, and therefore he must be unjust if he evades the paying of that Forfeiture by Self-mur∣ther: And what the sense of Civil Go∣vernments in this Case is, appears; in that most of them, if not all, make no di∣stinction between the Life of an Innocent Man, and the Life of an Offender under 〈◊〉〈◊〉; but he that kills the lat∣ter shall as certainly be put to Death as he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 kills the former. And though this perhaps may seem the less Crime because 〈◊〉〈◊〉 prevents Death but a few Days or Mi∣nutes; this makes no difference; be∣cause the unlawfulness of Self-murther consists not in the hindering of a Per∣son
from living such or such a time, but in usurping a Power which we have no right to, in destroying that which is not our own, and so breaking the Laws of Nature; and this may be done as much by a Man's hindering himself from living a few Minutes, as many Years: In a Word, since what is Unjust cannot be Honourable, since Self-murther after Con∣demnation is rather more unjust than it would have been before. A Man of Honour cannot be oblig'd to kill himself, in de∣fence of his Reputation in such Circum∣stances.
If it be said that the Common People have not this Notion of Honour, that something is due to them 〈◊〉〈◊〉 truely I think nothing at all, much less Life it self, nay Honour too; for if a Man does an unjust thing to satisfie the Multitude, and to preserve his Credit among them, he Sacrifices true Ho∣nour to an empty Name; and yet the Multitude it self, to do it Justice, is seldom so bad a Judge of Praise and Disgrace, as to reckon a Man's Honour, in such Cir∣cumstances as we have been speaking of, vindicated by killing of himself; for by Honour here must be meant either his In∣nocence or his Courage.
But as to the first, If a Man is Con∣demn'd unjustly, the best way that is left to prove his Innocence, is such a Behaviour as is the Natural Effect of it, a noble dis∣dain of the Injustice which he suffers under, a generous indifferency as to Life or Death; and of what the World says or thinks; a perpetual calmness of Tem∣per, settled Aspect, &c. These will pre∣vail very much even upon the worst sort of People, whose Malice begins to be sa∣tisfy'd or tir'd at the time of Execution, and who are inclin'd then to believe both the Looks and Words of dying Men; and indeed there is such a Majesty in calm Re∣solution, such a Beauty in undaunted In∣nocence, as checks and controuls insensi∣bly the rudest Insolence, and changes the Opinion of the most Prejudic'd Specta∣tors; whereas he that kills himself under Sentence of Death, confirms the Justice of his Condemnation; and is look'd upon as Guilty by the Laws of most Nations and particularly our own.
As to the Second: Self-murther is not the proper way to vindicate the Re∣putation of Courage in such Circumstan∣ces, it being generally look'd upon as an Act of Despair: Humane Courage con∣sists either in the offering of just Violence,
whereas this is the most unjust as has been shewn; or else in the resisting of great E∣vils, whereas this is the declining of them as has been also shewn; the greater the Evil is under which a Man Labours, the greater must his Courage be that resists or supports it; wherefore a Publick and Ignominious Death, being confest to be a greater Evil, to a Soldier especially, than any he has met withal before. His Cou∣rage must be shewn, if he places his Ho∣nour in this alone, in the resisting it ac∣cordingly. A Man may have been bred in War, been in many Battles and Seiges, and yet never have march'd to any cer∣tainty of Death, or rarely have been upon such Service, where 'twas an even chance whether he came off or no: Besides upon these occasions the number of Compani∣ons and Spectators, the certainty of Glory if they behave themselves well, and the heat of the Action animates 'em mightily, and inflames their Courage. But to be dragg'd slowly along through the Rab∣ble, Bound and Guarded; to be dragg'd thus to certain Death, to the Death of a Common Malefactor, is a very different Case; to undergo this with Constancy is the Test of true Courage indeed, and argues greater Bravery than can be shewn
in the Field. He who yields to Affli•…•…tion, says the Author above mention'd, * 1.195 shews that they that inflict it are greater than himself, but he who braves it; shews that it is not in the Po∣wer of any thing but Guilt to make him Trem∣ble 〈◊〉〈◊〉. This induces me to beleive that Passive Courage is much more Noble than what is Active; for one who Fights gallantly in the Field in the Front or View of an Army, is assisted by the Example of others, by hope of Reward of Victory, and needs not much to fear that Death which he may shun as probably as meet: But he who in a Noble Quarel adorns the Scaffold whereon he is to suffer, evinces that he can master Fate, and makes Danger less than his Courage, and to serve him in ac∣quiring Fame and Honour: so that if by Ho∣nour be meant Innocence or Courage, this is much better vindicated by a Noble Car∣riage under Barbarous Injustice, than by killing ones self in order to avoid it. But suppose it shou'd not be so, suppose the Multitude shou'd insult and deride a Brave and Innocent Man; Will any Person that is Innocent or Brave, so Born, so Bred, as one that we are speaking of, vouchsafe 'em any regard? Will not his Mind be employ'd in a nobler way? And since
there must be a Place for the Reward of injur'd Innocence, since a Good Consci∣ence affords the best Acclamations: What do the Words and Actions of the thought∣less and inconstant Multitude signifie; to mind what they do or say wou'd be as un∣reasonable, as to be concern'd whether it wou'd be soul or fair Weather at the time of Execution.
3. As to the remaining part of the Plea for Self-murther in this Case, the preventing his Enemies having their Will over him, and disappointing their Malice; this I am sure is no Masculine Reason: This I believe indeed is the Cause why many Men destroy themselves in such Cases: Anger, Despight, Rage, Envy and Re∣venge drive 'em to this unjust Action, and put 'em upon disappointing their Enemies Malice, with as much Malice of their own; an excellent temper of Mind to leave the World in! But if an Enemy shall not drive me to an unjust thing by any Flattery or Re∣ward, shall his ill usage do so? This wou'd be to fulfill his Will effectually, to glut his Malice even to a kind of Luxury, for his Wili is, that you should Fret and Tor∣ment your self under what he makes you suffer, his Will is, that People should think you Guilty; that the Credit which you
gain'd formerly shou'd be lessen'd by your poor Behaviour at last, all which wou'd be gratify'd by Self-murther: But if you wou'd disappoint his Malice, (though a∣las that is but a base Motive to the doing any part of ones Duty) continue in the same Virtue which first rais'd his Envy and Hatred; march with the same steddy Pace through the ingrateful Multitude, with which thou used'st to do against their Enemies,; Pity them with the same great∣ness of Mind wherewith thou didst defend 'em, and deprive 'em of a Triumph, by maintaining still the same Character, and being even in Death a Conqueror. So Re∣gulus went to embrace certain Death a∣midst a Thousand Torments. With such a Mind Scaevola expos'd his Arm to the Flames; and many others in this man∣ner have turn'd their Persecutors Barbarity upon themselves, and shaken their ill got∣ten, or ill us'd Power more, by the calm Bravery of their Deaths, than Thousands cou'd have done in the Field: All Histories will afford Instances of this kind. In a Word, this is most certain, that there never was a great Innocent Man put to Death Publickly, but that the Power who caus'd this, wou'd have been hearti∣ly
glad, that he wou'd have prevented it by being the Murtherer of himself.
Thus I have gone through this Pretence also; more to comply with some particular Persons, than out of any real Necessity that there is of such Proofs; since all depends upon what was said at the begin∣ning of this Treatise concerning Self-mur∣thers being an Act of Injustice; and if so, whatever may be pretended upon the account of Honour: If Honour be any thing of a Virtue, it can never require that which is unjust, and consequently it can never be the occasion of Self-murther.
WHen Cato was at Supper with some of his Friends the Evening before he kill'd himself, one of the Stoics Paradoxes, That a Good Man alone was Free, and that all Bad Men were Slaves, happen∣ing to fall into the Discourse, he maintain'd it with so much Earnestness and Heat, That Plutarch says, Every Body perceiv'd plainly, that he had resolv'd to free himself from the Troubles he was in, by putting an end to his Life in some violent manner: This would not be a Paradox in it self, unless it were join'd with Self-murther: Good Men alone are free, and always free, while Good: They
maintain their Liberty by observing the Dictates of Reason, and following the End, for which they receiv'd Life, which gives Peace, Joy, and lasting Happiness; and this is true Liberty: On the other side, ill Men by deserting the same Dictates, and renouncing the same End, fall into Trou∣ble, Anxiety and Remorse, which is the worst Slavery: Now if Cato himself was free in this sense, as to his being a good Man; then what occasion had he to die to obtain further Liberty? If he had occa∣sion for it, then he must own that he was an ill Man, a Slave, or in unavoidable danger of being so, which a right Stoic cou'd never be. Or if by being Free be meant the doing what one will; an ill Man is as much free in this Respect as a good Man; nay more so, for a good Man wou'd not be free to do an unjust thing: And that Self-murther is an Act of Injustice in the highest degree has been shewn all along: Yet this is the thing which is continually pre∣tended as a reaf•…•…nable ground of this Action; and the Writings of the Stoics abound with Exhortations to make use of such Liberty. Seneca is the boldest and forwardest upon this Occasion. * 1.196 What∣ever
your Evils are (says he) look which way you will, and you may find an end of them. Do you see that Precipice there? that's the way down to Liberty: Do you see that Sea, that River, that Well? there's Liberty at the Bot∣tom: Behold that blasted, wither'd Tree, every Branch of it bears Liberty. † 1.197 The Eternal Law of Nature has done nothing better than that it has given us but one way of coming into Life; but many to go out of it. Why should I wait still the Cruelty of Man or Sickness; when I can walk out of Life through the midst of Torments, and but shake my self and be free from all Adversity? This is the only thing we cannot complain of Life for; it stays no Body: Does Life please you? Live on: Does it not please you? Return to the place from whence you came: You have been let Blood to Cure the Head-ach; Your whole Body may be eas'd in the same manner; and even a little Lancet will open the way to great Liberty. This is as much as to say, that whatever we are able to do we may do, whatever is in our Power is Lawful: After this rate, all Right and Propriety, all Justice and Fide∣lity, can signify nothing; for what is there that has been allow'd to be Evil, by the Consent of all Mankind, let it be Sacrilege, A∣dultery,
Perfidiousness, Treachery, Theft, but may become Lawful (according to this) if we have but the opportunity of commit∣ting it: For Instance, Suppose a Man should be entrusted by a Friend with the manage∣ment of a great Estate, and left in Posses∣sion of a Palace richly Furnish'd, many Jewels, much Money, &c. During his Friends absence, he falls into great Mis∣fortunes, is very hardly us'd by those he has to do withal; and upon this grows Discontented and Melancholy; when acci∣dentally some Philosophical Acquaintance comes in; and having heard his Case, talks to him to this purpose: Since the Soul affects Freedom naturally, why shouldst thou be a Slave to Poverty? Turn thine Eyes which way thou wilt, and the way to Liberty lies open: Do you remember where you are? Do you see this rich Furniture? All the Walls here are hung with Liberty: Do you see that Iron Chest? There's Liberty in the bottom of it: Do you re∣member such a Diamond or such a Locket? In how small a compass does great Liberty lie? Tou toyl Day and Night to satisfie your Creditors: You must be a Slave to the Ingratitude of such a false Friend, or the Extortion of this and that Vsurer, when Providence has plac'd Liberty so very near you, that no more is requir'd but to stretch out your Hand to accept of it. I do not
doubt but this would seem very strange to any honest Man; and yet where things are equally unsawful the Case is the same; Hu∣mane Life is God's own Propriety, 'tis en∣trusted to Man only for a certain End, and therefore he has no more Liberty to destroy it, than to break any Trust, or commit any Act of Injustice whatsoever; and Nature's having put it into our Power to go out of Life when and how we please, is no more an Argument that we may lawfully do so, than her putting it into our Power to Steal, Ravish, or Murther any one else. There must certainly then be some great Mistakes in this matter; and therefore in order to dis∣cover them, and shew how inconsistent Self∣murther is with true Liberty, if rightly un∣derstood: Let us suppose this Pretence to be drawn up in this or the like manner.
Liberty is one of the most Glorious Attri∣butes of God; Man is said to be like God in respect of this, Particularly; and therefore no∣thing ought to be more dear to him than his Li∣berty. If this be so, then when this Liberty is lost by any great Calamity, it must be extreme Cowardice, or extreme Dulness, to drag about a Decrepit Body, or an Afflicted Mind, and to chuse to continue poorly under this Slavery; when God and Nature still leave him so much
Liberty, as to set his Soul Free whenever he pleases.
Observe, The Word Liberty here is a very doubtful Term, having several Sig∣nifications, the using of which promiscu∣ously occasions great Obscurity and Confu∣sion, which are the chief Advantages of this Pretence: Sometimes it signifies that Liberty which Man has over his own Acti∣ons by the freedom of his Will: Some∣times it signifies the Liberty of the Body as well as the Mind, and these two, as like∣wise the Slavery which regards each of these, are often us'd the one for the other. Sometimes again Liberty signifies some Authority or Power which Man is suppos'd to have to destroy himself in some particu∣lar Circumstances though he be ty'd up in all others. Lastly it signifies that Ease or Freedom from any Trouble, Grief or Pain, which the Soul is suppos'd to be let out in∣to by Self-murther, according to which se∣veral Significations, I will consider,
1. That Liberty which is deriv'd from God to Man, in what Respects Man is like God in the freedom of his Will, and as to the Power which he has over his own
Actions, and show that Self-murther is not warranted by such Liberty.
2. I will shew the difference between the Liberty and Slavery of the Soul and Body; and inquire whether any Evil, which oppresses the Body, can be de∣structive to the Liberty of the Soul.
3. That no Man upon the Account of any Calamity, particularly upon Account of any extreme Sickness or Pain, has any Liberty or Authority to destroy himself.
4. That by so doing, the Soul instead of enjoying any Liberty wou'd fall into a State of utmost Slavery.
I. As to the Liberty which is deriv'd from God to Man: 'Twas said that this is one of the most Glorious Attributes of God; and that in this Respect it is that Man is particularly like him: God is absolutely Free; for he is Infinite: Infinity must be per∣fect Liberty, because nothing can be more Free than that which has no Bounds. And yet the Liberty of infinite Power, is always attended with infinite Wisdom, and infinite Goodness, without these Almighty Liberty wou'd be only Dreadful; but these make it the Ground of our Trust and Confidence, and render it Adorable; wherefore if we con∣sider God, not only in his Essenoe, but also
in his Works; since every Work of his must be to some excellent End or other; the means he huses to Act by, must also be most Excellent; and that particular kind of Method (if I may so speak) which he observes for the bringing what he intends to pass, must be a kind of Rule or Law to him. He cannot do otherwise than he does, because what he does is the Effect of infinite Wisdom, measur'd by the rectitude of his own Per∣fection: and therefore always best. Yet this sets no Bounds to his Liberty, because it is impossible that he shou'd ever will to do otherwise, than only just as he does; and he who always does whatever he wills must re∣main always Free.
But Man's Liberty, is very different, as he is a finite Creature; it can be perfect on∣ly according to its measure, and that mea∣sure must be proportionable to his particular Nature: Now the Nature of Man consists of a Rational Soul and Body, his Liberty therefore must be twofold; that which re∣gards the Soul, or that which regards the Body: As to the first, which is our present Subject, this must be according to the chief Faculties of the Soul, Knowledge and Will; Man's Will is free, it has the full Power or Liberty, to Act without any Necessity or Compulsion; but since this Will can act on∣ly
according to what Man knows, (it be∣ing impossible that any one should will any thing whereof he has no Knowledge) the extent of humane Liberty, must be pro∣portionable to humane Knowledge. Again, the Objects of humane Knowledge, as it con∣cerns Mans Actions, are moral Good or E∣vil, and the Freedom of Man's Will lies in choosing the one and refusing the other. Now •…•…ince humane Knowledge is not only of small Extent, but liable to Errour, and to mistake Good and Evil, since also there are several Passions and Appetites which are apt to further this mistaking; God has sixt such Principles in Man as represent the Method of his own Acting, and are self evident. where∣•…•…ore Man's likeness unto God, does not con∣sist in the boundle•…•…s Liberty of his Will, but in his Wills being conformable to the Will of God; and then is his Will chiefly so when it concurrs with those first Principles, or Laws of Nature above-mentioned, That is fol∣lows readily his Reason by Virtue.
Yet still this is no lessening or restrain∣ing of Man's Natural Liberty. Infinite Liberty observes some measures for the attaining the Ends of Infinite Wisdom; the measures which are here given to Man to walk by, are the same with those, they •…•…re the Marks and Bounds of what is fit and
just, they represent the Method of God's own Acting, as I said before, and good Me∣thod always promotes the End it is con∣cern'd about; it is the nearest and the plain∣est way to it; and therefore wou'd be the choice of every wise Man; and what is choice must be wholly consistent with Liberty; these Principles by reason of their Divine Original, and their Natural sorce and e∣nergy are frequently called theCommand∣men•…•… of God (even without regard to Revelation) the Obedience to which has been Celebrated by Philosophers as the greatest and noblest Liberty. Thus one * 1.198 tells us, That to serve God is not only better than Liberty, but than Empire it self. † An∣other crys out, and he was a Slave too, No one can have pretence to any Authority over me now; I am made free by God; I have learnt his Commandments, 'tis not in the Power of any thing upon Earth to enstave me. If it be said that these very Men tell us, that ‖ 1.199 Li∣berty is the Living how we Will: By the Word Will they always meant the * 1.200 Rational Will,
the Irrational vehemency of it, they called Lust, (the doing what one lists) thus Ci∣cero, in the Place above, Who is he that lives as he will, but he that follows that which is right, and rejoyces in his Duty. Let us first will what we ought, and then we may safely do what we will; but to follow every first Impulse, every 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of hasty Passion, un∣der the pretence of being free, always ends in lowest Slavery; for if we consider those who refuse being directed by any Natu∣ral Notions of Good and Evil, or to be obliged by any first Principles or Laws of Nature, while they are so nice of their Li∣berty as to refuse any Rule or Guidance: How many severe Tyrants do they blind∣ly submit to? Though like some Luna∣ticks in the midst of their Chains, they fan∣cy themselves Sovereign Princes. Can any Man pretend to be Free while his Rea∣son is made to Serve? And does it not serve most basely in such People, at the beck of every Lust and Passion; is it not forc'd to fetch and carry in more and more of the vicious Object; to be drudging always to Sensation; to provide to glut this or that Appetite, or to administer to this or that Passion; this is the glorious End of that Liberty of following their own Reason; which is so much affected by many Peo∣ple
who will be riding over Hedge and Ditch, rather than be impos'd upon by a bea∣ten Road, and throw away their Rudder and their Compass in order to Sail freely.
Arbitrary Power, which is so univer∣sally hated, is nothing but Lawless Li∣berty of Acting: When Princes usurp this, we call 'em Tyrants; and yet what we abhor in our Governours, we admire in our selves: When alas! if it be usurpt by particular Persons, they fall into worse slavery than Kingdoms do. Both are preserv'd free, not by being without any Law at all; but by acting steadily accord∣ing to such Laws, as are the Dictates of right Reason. There is a remarkable Pas∣sage in * 1.201 Philo Judaeus to this purpose. As among Cities such as are rul'd by the Arbitrary Will of one or few Men fall into Slavery; where∣as such as have Laws for their Guardians and Governours continue free: So it is among par∣ticular Men; as many as Anger, Covetous∣ness, or any other Passion rules over, are all Slaves; but as many as are Govern'd by Law are Free; I mean the unerring Law of right Reason, not such as is imprinted by this or that Man on Lifeless Paper, it self Lifeless; but
that which is Eternal, and engraven upon Man's Immortal Mind, by the Divine Immor∣tal Nature: Wherefore I cannot but wonder (as he goes on) at the Stupidity of some dull Wretches, who will grant that whole great Cit∣ties, such as Athens and Lacedaemon, pre∣serve their Liberty only by observing the Laws of Solon and Lycurgus, and yet will not allow that wise Men may preserve theirs, while they obey right Reason, which is the Ground of all Law. What this Excellent Author calls Stupidity and Dulness is to be met withal very commonly now a days among the greatest pretenders to Wit, Sense and In∣tegrity, and most confident Asserters of humane Liberty; nor indeed have there been Creatures of this kind wanting in any Age. The Speech which the Tribune Duronius made to the common People of Rome upon the occasion of the Senates pro∣posing some sumptuary Laws to restrain the extravagant Luxury of Entertain∣ments, argues the same noble Zeal. * 1.202 Ro∣mans, says he, we are now come to have Bri∣dles put upon us, which are not to be endur'd; you are ty'd and fetter'd in bitter Bonds of Ser∣vitude: The Senate are passing a Law to force you to be Frugal; but let us abrogate this old rusty
Imposition; for what signifies Liberty, if a Man may not perish by Luxury if he thinks sitting. This was an admirable Advocate for one sort of Self-destruction; what the rest say is built upon the very same Grounds, and amounts in effect but to this: Who has the Property of my Life but my self? And what does Property signifie if I may not have the Liberty to do what I will with my own? The first of these has been shewn at large to be a mistake, and then it must follow of course that the latter is so. But certainly no two things in the World have ever been so much mistaken as Liberty and Property, as these are the tumultuous crys of the Rab∣ble in disorder'd Governments; so are they the loud Pretences of wild Passions in Irre∣gular Men: He that desires what he can∣not, nay ought not to obtain; calls all Op∣position (be it never so just) to those de∣sires Slavery; and the breaking through this Opposition (though by ways never so unjust) he calls Liberty. Thus Men of free thought, that is, who despise any Rule or Guide to think by; must needs despise any Rule to act by; and consequently break all Laws Divine and Humane: But if this is Liberty, then how hard is it that Flames shou'd ever be abridged of their Natural Liberty, or that the Freedom of any De∣luge
shou'd be restrain'd by Banks or Shores; these wou'd not have worse Ef∣fects in the greater Worid, than the other has in the less; for not to nu•…•…ber up all the Inconveniences which the Publick suffers from these free thinking Gentlemen; what does this Liberty end in at last, as to themselves, but in Gouts, Palsies, Rheu∣matisms, &c. as to one part of their fanci∣ed Property; and in Shame, Anxiety, Fu∣ry and Despair as to the other, till at last being weary of a Life which they have so miserably misus'd, they as miserably de∣stroy it.
That which has made me say so much upon this Head is, that this pretence is the Ground of most other Crimes, as well as Self-murther. But to sum up what has been said, and to apply it to that in parti∣cular.
1. Since God himself, who is absolutely free, chooses to act always according to some Method, which is a Rule to Himself, the same with right and eternal Reason; and yet His Liberty is not prejudic'd by acting so; then although Man is oblig'd to act by some Rules, Laws, or. Principles; yet since they issue out from the same Foun∣tain of Eternal Reason; this is not any Prejudice to his Natural Liberty.
2. Since it has been prov'd that these are some of those Rules, viz. That the end for which a Creature is made, or has Life given him, ought to be observ'd; that Gods Propriety ought not to be desiroy'd; that whatever may prove destructive to Civil Society, ought to be avoided. And since the killing of ones self has been prov'd to be a direct breach of every one of these Rules; then it fol∣lows, that Mans Natural of Liberty, can be no just 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for Self-murther. The same Argument will serve also against all unwarrantable hazarding of Life, and running into great and unnecessary dangers, especially by Duelling: Likewise against all Vices of Excess and Intemperance, which concerning a Man's own Person on∣ly, seem to be within the bounds of his Natural Liberty.
II. In the next place I am to shew the difference between the Liberty and Slavery of the Mind and Body; and whether any Evil that oppresses the Body can be de∣structive to the Liberty of the Soul.
As Man consists of a Soul and Body, his Liberty must be consider'd in Relation to both: Man's Liberty as to his Soul or Mind consists, in the free use of its Faculties, Vnderstanding and Will, in such a manner
as was just now shewn; his Slavery as to his Mind consists in the losing the free use of these, and in their subjection to Irre∣gular Passions and Appetri•…•…es. Man's Li∣berty as to his Body consists in the free use of its Powers, as to Motion and Sensation; and his Slavery as to this, in the Abridg∣ment of this Motion, or in its being at anothers disposal: In the decay of Sensati∣on, or in its becoming greivous to him, in Pain and Torture.
* 1.203 Now if we consider the Dignity of Hu∣mane Nature, Man's Liberty must depend upon the Mind chiesly; for when all is done, the Mind is the Man; Mens cujusque, is est quisque; the Body is but of very small Consideration in comparison of the other; the Body may be enslaved without a Man's own sault; it being liable to out∣ward force, as well as inward decays of Nature; but still the Mind may continue free: This cannot be enslav'd but by a Man's own fault, and when it is so, its Liberty may be recover'd again if the Person pleases; and therefore there can be no occasion of Self-murther upon this Account Plotinus † 1.204 gives admirable di∣rectious
in this case. He tells us, that ther•…•… are two kinds of Death, a Philosophical and a Natural one; that the first was in our Power, but not the latter; that if Men would be free from any Evils of Life, they may be so, by dying Philosophically; and this says he, is the only voluntary Death, that is commendable; that which we bring our selves to by Reason, not by Poison; by Prudaence, not by any Weapon.
As to that part of the Question, Whe∣ther any Evil that oppresses the Body may be destructive to the Liberty of the Mind? This has been in part answer'd. The Li∣berty of the Mind consists in the use of Reason, some Evils of the Body, as ex∣treme Pain and Sickness, may destroy the use of Reason; and cause Madness, and then the Liberty of the Mind is destroy'd indeed.
But while Reason remains, Liberty must remain also; the Mind cannot be enslav'd though beset by various Evils, till it basely surrenders up to 'em; no more than a City is enslav'd, when 'tis only beseig'd and defends it self valiantly; nay not so much, since the Avenues of Reason (in those who are adult especial∣ly) cannot be shut up; but on the con∣trary the greater the Evils are which beset
the Body, the more may the Mind enlarge its Liberty, by the practising of several Virtues, which it would not have had the opportunity of exercising otherwise: All Virtues are the different ways of the Souls exerting its Power, according to the Dictates of right Reason: Wherefore if the Evils of the Body give it greater oppor∣tunities to exert this Power, and require with∣al, that it should be exerted with greater strength and vigour; then these Evils will be so far from abridging its Liberty, that they will rather enlarge it. For the more Vir∣tues is has to practice, the more different ways must it have to move in, the wider must its range and compass be, and conse∣quently the greater its Liberty.
And as to the Case of extreme Pain in particular, which is so commonly pleaded upon this occasion. The Liberty of the Bo∣dy indeed may be lost, it may be confin'd, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and tortur'd by Tyrants or Dis∣cases; but unless this should cause Mad∣ness, it would not destroy the Liberty of the Mind: It must be confess'd the Union of the Body and Mind is very close, and all Perception ends in the Soul, and there∣fore the Pains of the Body may be very grievous to it; but though very grievous, yet rarely to such a degree as to prove de∣structive
to its Reason: Extreme Pain is the truest test of a great and upright Mind, but although it may force a Man to La∣ment, it need not to Rebel, it may affect him with Sorrow, but not cast him down into Despair; and where Reason struggles faithfully to retain its Power: Courage, Ho∣nour, Justice, Constancy, and great Examples, will be called in to help to resist what is sen∣sitive Evil, rather than a good Man should fall into what is morally so; rather than he should be guilty of an unjust Action, to fly from Pain; when this is only Co•…•…ardise and Weakness, though colour'd over with the Plausible name of Liberty.
When Pain is encreas'd to such a degree as to destroy Reason, the dispute is at an end; but let Men have a care lest they should fancy or grant themselves to be Mad, only through Impatience, and indulg'd Passions; and then afterwards make use of their Reason to contrive their Self-destructi∣on.
If you cry out as 'tis usual, that the Pain is too great to be endur'd, that you cannot possibly bear so much torture: What do you mean by this? that it will kill you, or that you have not strength and patience to undergo it. If it will kill you, what need of Self-mur∣ther? the more violent the Pain is, the
more short will it be; and if a Tyrant in∣slicts it, how much better is it, as Good Darius said, * 1.205 To die by anothers Wickedness than by your own? If you mean the latter, trust Nature, she will assist you to bear: Pain is always most acute when new, the Powers of Sensation are blunted by de∣grees, by their Objects pressing too vio∣lently upon them, and continual labour under Pain will harden the sense of Feel∣ing, and deaden Perception: No one can know his strength unless he will try it; the force of deliberate and well weighted Resoluti∣on is incredible, and has supported the Weak and the Guilty in the most dreadful Tor∣ments; Shall Women be able to suffer so much in Child-birth? Could the Spartan Boys bear whipping to Death before their Altars, without a Groan? Nay, have the greatest Villains mock'd their Executioners? Could such a Wretch as Ravillac, or he that shot one of the Princes of Orange, smile amidst all the Artisices of Torture? and shall not Innocence and Virtue be able to support a good Man, under the ordinary calamities incident to humane Nature? If submissi∣on to Providence, Perseverance in Duty,
Constancy and Patience are Virtues; when are these to be practised unless in extremi∣ties? But it may be said, the Disease is in∣curable, the Pain is without intermission, and therefore what good can a Man do by suffering on, but only expose humane Nature, and render it Contemptible; not at all, but rather quite Contrary; who can pronounce a Disease, like to last, incurable? and how oft have the best Physicians been deceived in this mat∣ter? And as to intermission, suppose there should be none, where the Pain is inter∣mitting; Constancy and Patience must be intermitting too, and return only by fits as the Distemper does; but when the Pain is continual, Virtue is continual also; and yet not in danger of being long upon Duty; because extreme continual Pain will quick∣ly dissolve Nature, and discharge the Soul; and this Consideration might be sufficient to support a Man under such Circumstan∣ces, without Diogenes's Dagger to give him Liberty: For if the Soul be imprison'd and enslaved, when in a tortur'd or diseased Body, then let it look upon every Pain as a step towards its Freedom, as the bursting of some Chain, or the falling off of some Fetter; and as every Limb grows weaker, and every Sense decays, let it collect its sorces cheerfully, and rejoice at these hap∣py
beginnings of La•…•…ful and Eternal Liber∣ty. And as to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, this is not worth Consideration in comparison of ones Du∣ty, yet a good Man need not fear it; He will rather do credit to humane Nature, than expose it by his 〈◊〉〈◊〉: * 1.206 Seneca says, he will not leave his Body but when it begins to assect his Mind, and then he well jump out of it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from a 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 •…•…ouse; this is a very low thought, and would not be pardon∣able, but that He make some amends for it in another place; † 1.207 where he says, that he who was great before he fell, is not the less great for being fallen, but is as far from Con∣tempt as the Ruins of Temples are, which the Religious adore as much as when they were standing: Though Holy Temples yield to Time, yet they cannot crush the God that was Worshipt in 'em by their fall; no more can a decaying Body oppress an upright Mind: And while the Mind is not op∣press'd it cannot be contemptible. There is a Beauty in Constancy and Fortitude which shines through all the Deformities of Death; for at such times 'tis not the Body, but the Soul that is to be regarded; and therefore what if the Body be pale, weak and wasted away, yet if the Mind
continues the same, unshaken and undaun∣ted; all the signs of outward Decay, are but the marks of inward Virtue, the Tro∣phies of the Souls Strength and Victory, and more proper to cause Admiration than Contempt; Which of Scaevola's Arms would an Ancient Roman have reckon'd most comely, that which was shrivel'd up, lame and deformed with Scars, or that which was whole and strong? Sure braw∣ny Limbs and a good Complexion are not Essential to Virtue. Nay even the last Minutes of a great Man shall be benefi∣cial, the very sight of his Calamities shall be full of Instruction, so that while he has Breath he shall never be past doing good.
All the excellent modern Buildings of Italy (if I may use this allusion once more) are owing to a few remains of the Ancient Roman Structures, which notwithstanding the injuries of many Years, and many de∣vastations, retain still some thing of their former Beauty and Magnisicence; the same use might be made of the Decays of great Men in extreme Age, or Pain, or Sickness: They are not indeed what they were, but still they are more than others are; what is left is regular and great, and sufficient to form in us an Idea of what is lost, and to teach
us by the Rules of Proportion, to im∣prove our selves accordingly: But a great and good Man's Example is as necessary in Death as Life; we are to study as much how to Die as how to Live: Where then can we receive so much Instruction for this purpose as in the Deaths of such Men? and if so, when can they be ever past do∣ing good? But I will not insist farther up∣on this: Let the Stoics, who are the great Defenders of Self-murther, be Judges in this matter, if we look into their Writings, we shall find it inculcated continually; the Pains of the Body can never have any influence upon the Liberty of the Mind. That their wise Man is above the taking notice of any outward Evil, that he is at perfect Ease in the midst of Tortures. Nay, they reckon it no less than a Crime to own the least sense of Pain, and indeed grant more in that respect than we desire, and yet after all make Pain by a strange Contradiction one of the chief Causes of Self-murther.
〈◊〉〈◊〉 The next thing which I propos'd to speak to was, Whether any Man upon account of extreme, A•…•…iction, especially Pain or Sickness, has Liberty or Authority to Destroy himself.
Not only the Stoics heretofore, but some others since, have been inclined to think that he has; thus one tells us, * 1.208 God gives us leave enough to part with Life, when he is pleased to reduce us to such a condition, that to Live is far worse than to Die. The Rule which is here given, whereby we are to judge when we have this leave, is; when God is pleased to reduce us to such a Condition, that to Live is far worse than to Die. But this will be found very insussicient to this purpose; if we examine the Particulars; it supposes these two things.
1. That there may be some Condition of Life far worse than Death.
2. That 'tis God that reduces the Suf∣ferer to such a Condition.
As to the first, before we can compare things rightly, we must understand exactly the terms by which they are represented: Life as Humane, implies the union of the Soul and Body; Death is the dissolution of that Union; the condition of Life, which is supposed here to make it far worse than Death, is extreme Pain; now the fallacy lies in not mentioning the manner of this Dissolution which may be Violent, or Na∣tural, and the consequences of it: To a good
Man indeed, Life in extreme Pain, is far worse than Natural Death; and this is a proper Argument for such Men, not to sear such a Death: But the Death which we are speaking of, is a Death of Self-murther; which should have been particularly ex∣press'd, and then the Question would be, Whether a Life of extreme Pain, is far worse than a Death of Self-murther?
Now to judge truly of this, we should not only consider the time of the Dissolution, or the Pain that accompanies it, (which in Self-murther may be little or none) but also what is to sollow: For if we should look upon Death here, only as the separation of the Soul and Body, with∣out any farther prospect, then this Com∣parison, that to live in extreme Pain is far worse than to die, would be impertinent; because Death in this sense, would be no more than the ceasing to be, the utter end of all Sensation; and if so, what a nota∣ble discovery would it be to say, that the continuation of extreme Pain, is far worse than the cessation of it; or that it is far worse to seel great Misery, than not to seel any thing at all: Wherefore to give some ground for the Comparison, as Life supposes some State or Condition; so Death must likewise, and therefore that
which follows afterwards must he in included in the Word. If this then be granted, let Life be never so miserable, through extreme Pain and Torture; yet before a Man con∣cludes, that this is worse than a Death of Self-murther, Let him consider seriously, Whether any thing follows after Death? Whether Self-murther is naturally unlaw∣ful? if it be, Whether it will not be punish'd hereafter? and if so, Whether that Punish∣ment will not exceed both as to the degree of Pain and the duration of it; that parti∣cular Pain which he would avoid? Nor is it sufficient to say, upon this occasion, that you cannot tell whether there shall be any Future state or no; you never met with any demonstration from Natural Princi∣ples that there is, or that you do not be∣lieve any thing of it; this I say is not e∣nough, the Self-murtherer ought to demon∣strate that there is none; nothing can ac∣quit him from an Action of this kind, but plain and undeniable Certainty, and this I am sure cannot be had; but rather the contrary: And in a Matter of this Con∣sequence, it might be sufficient without any farther arguing, to stop any Man's Hand, to consider this alone: That the greatest part of Mankind, in all Ages, at least ten Thousand to one, has held some
Future State. And then what a folly must it be upon the pretence of Incertainty, to run such a hazard against so much odds? To rush violently into Death unlawfull, when that which is lawful is so very near; (I mean in the case of extreme Pain or Sickness) and for the avoiding a short time of Misery here, venture the being a Thousand times more Miserable here∣after.
But still they may insist, That if God gives one leave this will not be; and he gives me leave enough when he is pleas'd to reduce me to extreme Pain, &c. This brings me to the second part of this Rule, namely, that 'tis God that reduces Man to such a Condition, that is, that he is the sole or chief cause of the Misery he groans under, by some extra∣ordinary Effects of his Providence, with∣out any fault of the Sufferer: To this I answer, 1. That this is very rarely so, but the sufferings of extreme Pain or Sickness, especially in those who are most inclin'd to Self-murther are generally through their own fault. 2. That though they were not but the plain effects of extraordinary Pro∣vidence; yet no Man can conclude reaso∣nably from hence, that God gives him leave or liberty to destroy himself.
1. It is very seldom that God is the on∣ly or chief cause of Man's suffering thus, or that he pleases to reduce him to extreme Pain and Misery, without any fault of the Sufferer, especially those who are inclined to Murther themselves; because their Passions are high and uncontroulable: They despise the Laws of God and the thoughts of a Future State, and therefore are commonly the chief cause of their own Misery; 'tis their own folly that puts such and such second causes into such a motion, as naturally produce such Effects, as great Poverty, Just Disgrace, Painful Sores, and Torturing Diseases; and then if Life be∣comes worse to any one of these than any Death; he must blame himself alone: Wherefore nothing can be more unreason∣able than for such People to be always lay∣ing the fault upon Providence, and to pretend to quarrel with Life, crying out 'tis to no purpose to Live any longer; that Life is not worth the while in such Circumstances, &c. Alas! they foolishly misuse Life, they wast their Bodies as well as their Estates; and when they feel the natural Effects of doing so, they wisely discover that Life is not worth the while; whereas this discovery comes too late; it might and should have been made much sooner; for to instance
in such a Life as has often ended in Self-mur∣ther: When every Hour was grossly a∣bus'd; when the Mornings were wasted in Sleep, or sickly Qualms; when the After∣noons were thrown away in false Ceremo∣ny, inventing or spreading fresh Scandal, in endeavouring to impose upon Virtuous Women, or being effectually impos'd upon by Lewd ones: When the Nights were spent in Gaming, Prophaneness, Drunkenness, Lust, Quarrellings, Murther; then Life indeed was not worth the while, not worth the being continu'd amidst so much toyl of Folly, and so much drudgery of Lewdness; but when nothing but the common Effects of such a Life are felt in Pain or Sickness; for a Wretch to tell you gravely, that Life is not worth the while, is Absurd and Ridiculous; nay 'tis false too, for even the sad remains of such a Life are valuable if rightly employ'd; and that very Evil, whether it be Sickness or Pain, for which they hate and despise it, may, by forcing them to break off ill Acquaintance, and compelling them to be Temperate and Retir'd; give them time to think (if they ever are capable of doing so) and restore them by degrees, to themselves, and to their God.
2. Supposing that Men were not the Causes themselves of such Evils falling upon them, but that they were the plain Effects of God's particular Extraordinary Providence; as when a Temperate Virtu∣ous Man, born of Virtuous Parents, is taken suddenly, in a middle Age, with most violent Pains, falls into tormenting and incurable Diseases, breaks out in pain∣ful and loathsome Sores; and at the same time has violent sits of the Cholick or the Stone; supposing all this, I say, yet it can∣not be reasonably concluded from hence, that these are any Signs or Tokens of God's giving him leave to destroy him∣self. For the Reasons following.
1. Though these great Evils are caus'd by God's particular Providence, yet they come upon the Party in a Natural way, they may have their Causes assign'd by skilful Men, without any recourse to Mi∣raculous Power: If so, then since Self-mur∣ther has been proved to be naturally unlaw∣ful, no Event which is Natural can be a sufficient sign to assure any Person, that God gave him leave to do that which is against Nature. * 1.209
2. Pain can be no certain sign of God's giving Men leave to Kill themselves, be∣cause there can be no degree of it fixt, no particular time settled, when they can judge assuredly that it is so; and therefore People must be left to their own Fancies, to destroy themselves when they think fit∣ing, according as they are led by their Cowardice, or their Discontent: Pain, as I said before, is most acute at first, when the Disease strugles with Nature in its strength, and before it has actually overcome it, the Sensation of it grows less and less, as the parts affected are weakned, and it be∣comes Incurable: When then can a Man suppose that God gives him leave to Kill himself upon the account of Pain? when it is most Violent? but then 'tis Curable: When it becomes Incurable, as the Stoics taught? but then a Man is past the worst of it; and Natural Death draws nearer and nearer. Beside People feel Pain diffe∣rently according to their different Hu∣mours, or Dispositions of Mind, the same Man will sometimes bear much more, when he has been pleas'd and his Affairs go on well in other Respects, then when he is cross'd by Accidents and Disappoint∣ments; therefore to make Pain the sign of God's giving a Man liberty to Kill himself,
and to leave every one to judge when it is so, is to leave Mankind to their own Fancies; and then one might destroy him∣self as well for a small fit of the Tooth∣ach, as another for the most violent fit of the Stone. Add to this how many others have been in the very same Circumstances of Pain as you are; you will not deny but that some of them have been as Wise, as Learned as your self, and as desirous to die too; and yet they have not kill'd them∣selves, they have not taken extreme Pain to be any sign of God's giving leave to do so, and therefore how can you be ever satisfy'd that this is such a sign to you, which they could never understand to be so to them † 1.210?
But to give farther scope in this Matter; suppose that extreme Pain should not be only caused by God's Particular Provi∣dence, but also in a miraculous and pre•…•…er∣natural manner; yet this would not be any sign that God gives the Sufferer any leave to destroy himself: Because,
1. This would imply a Contradiction in God's acting, 'twould suppose him to will, and to will not, the very same thing at the very same time. It has been already shewn * 1.211
that the continuation of Life is as much owing to God, as the beginning of it; if this be so, then as long as a Man lives, let it be in extreme Pain, Natural or Mi∣raculous, or in what ill condition soever; so long 'tis certain that it * 1.212 is God's Will that he should Live: If it were not, that which is the cause of his Pain, would put an end to his Life, the first Moment it came upon him. How then can it appear from any Circumstances of Life, though never so dreadful, that God gives a Man liberty to destroy Life? This must be impossible, because he alone continues that very same Life; without him it could not subsist one Moment in Pain, any more than in Ease; and therefore since it does so, 'tis plain that he Wills that the Person should Live on, not Kill himself. And a good Man would be apt to reflect thus with himself in such Circumstances; as I at first was; so I still am, by the Will of God alone: He continues my Life as truly in this Torment, let it be Natural or Mira∣culous, as he did heretofore: If He would have me die, I should do so instantly, without any need of my own Hand, or of his manifesting his Will to give me leave,
but since I do not, I find I have no such leave, and therefore I will struggle on, and whether in Life or Death conform my self the best I can, to the Will of God.
I might add farther, That extreme Pain, though brought upon a Man by particu∣lar Providence, nay even by Miracle, can∣not be any sign of such leave; because by Providence is meant the Wise and Re∣gular course of God's working; and con∣sequently supposes him to work always for some End: That his working in this man∣ner by extreme Pain, &c. cannot be to this End only, that Man should destroy himself, as by the last Argument appears; that there are other important Ends of such Events, namely the Punishment of the Wicked, the Improvement of the Good, and the Examples necessary to be given to the World of God's Justice on the one side, of Patience, Constancy, Humility, &c. on the other; that whatever the end of God's Providence is in this case; whe∣ther any of these, or any other, 'tis certain that very End is defeated by Destroying ones self; and therefore we cannot suppose that extreme Pain can be any sign of leave for so doing: But what has been said may suffice to shew the Unreasonableness of this pretended Rule for Self-murther, viz.
When God is pleas'd to reduce us to such a Condition, that to Live is far worse than to Dye.
And whereas 'tis said slightly, that God gives a Man leave enough: This shews their mistrust of what they say, and that they are conscious that no such leave can be prov'd; for what leave can be enough in this Case? Let any one that is thus tempt∣ed consider the Nature of the Fact in Question, and the Importance of it; that without this leave 'tis the Destruction of God's own Propriety, the Rebelling a∣gainst his Providence, the positive Re∣nouncing that end sor which Life was given, the committing that which is De∣struc•…•…i•…•…e to Civil Government, to Hu∣mane Nature; and withal that a mistake in this Case can never be recover'd: Let him consider this, I say, and what he has just now read, and then perhaps he will own that no leave can be enough, but what is given by direct and evident Revelation.
'Tis true after all, extreme Pain is the most dreadful Condition of Humane Life, and the severest Trial of a good and great Mind; 'tis true, it may be so excessive, that all Reasoning of this kind may be to no purpose, and Arguments concerning God's Propriety, or the End of Humane
Life, or Civil Society, cannot be much at∣tended to, in a violent sit of the Cholick, or the Stone; when Reason it self shall be often overcome, and the best Soul di∣sturbed into Madness. All this is true, but the Question is not whether a Man may not lose his Reason through extreme Pain? if it were it would be readily grant∣ed; but the Question is, Whether a Man has any Liberty given him to destroy him∣self upon the account of extreme Pain, while his Reason still remains; This I suppose he has not for the Reasons above mentioned; Nay Madness it self has not this Liberty; for if a Mad-man kills himself, he is not Excusable upon account of any Liberty which he had to do so more than other People, but because he knew not what he did: Nor are these Papers design'd for the perusal of People in extreme Pain; but rather for those in perfect Health, to pre∣pare them (if perhaps they are capable of doing so) to undergo it if it should be their Lot: And if they shall happen to be convinc'd when they are in Health, that Self-murther is unlawful even in extreme Pain; this will influence their Minds when they come to suffer it, they will not ven∣ture to do what they were once satisfy'd was unlawful, though they are not then
able to run through the several Particulars upon which their Conviction was ground∣ed.
The last signification of the Word Li∣berty, is that Ease which the Soul enjoys after it is separated from the Body; in Re∣lation to which I am to shew,
IV. That as Man has no Liberty or Authority granted him to destroy himself, upon account of extreme Pain, or Sick∣ness, so if he presumes to put this in Exe∣cution, to obtain Ease or Liberty, the Soul instead of enjoying any such Liberty, will fall into a state of Great Slavery: This will require the making out these two things.
1. That there will be another State af∣ter the separation of the Soul from the Body, wherein it shall be accountable for its Actions, and as they are Good or Bad be Rewarded or Punish'd accordingly.
2. That Self-murther being one of the worst Crimes, shall be liable to a propor∣tionable Punishment.
The first of these, That there shall be a State, &c. is very seldom deny'd by those who acknowledge the Being of a God; and is readily granted, nay vigorous∣ly maintain'd, by the Gentleman with
whom I have been chiesly concerned; however it is necessary for the compleating of this Design, to offer some Arguments for the Proof of it, and to remove some Objections which are usually made against it. Yet what shall be done to this pur∣pose, shall be only what may be naturally drawn from those Principles which I laid down at the Beginning; for if those be true, then this will follow of course; if there is a God who reserves to himself the Propriety of Humane Life, the Supreme and Absolute Dominion over us: If Life is imparted and continu'd to Man for a particular End, and if Rules and Laws are given him for the pursuing and obtain∣ing that End; if the•…•…e Laws may be bro∣ken here unpunish'd, and a Man become the more unhappy the more faithfully he observes them; if a Man is capable of doing more good than he can receive an adaequate Reward for in this Life, and if he is capable of Committing more Evil than he can receive a full Punishment for; if those Faculties which give him this Capacity, and which distinguish him from all other Creatures, suggest to him naturally Reward and Punishment, and fill him with Hopes and Fears accord∣ingly: Then it will be allow'd by any
sensible and unprejudic'd Person, that it does appear, even by the Light of Nature, that there must be such a State hereafter; Let us consider each of these Reasons a little more particularly:
1. As to that Propriety which God re∣serves to himself over Humane Life, that Absolute Dominion which he holds and exercises over Man; this (considering withal the Nature of Man,) is an Argu∣ment that he will take an account of his Actions hereafter. 'Tis true all other Crea∣tures owe their Being and Preservation to God, as well as Man, and are as much sub∣ject to his Dominion as he is; but the diffe∣rent Frames of Creatures shew that God will exercise his Dominion differently: Beasts act by Instinct not by Reason; by Necessity, not Choice; and therefore per∣form that End for which they were made, and their being so framed is a plain Decla∣ration that God will not exercise any Judi∣cial Power over them: But Man has Reason and Liberty to follow it, he knows his Duty; has Natural Principles to direct him in it; freedom of Will to chuse whether he will be so directed or no, and commonly refuses to be so; and therefore
acting contrary to the End of his Being and doing so through his own fault; God who gave him such a frame, and who re∣tains an Absolute Propriety and Domini∣on over him, must either do all this to no purpose, or else call him to account here∣after: Cou'd it be prov'd that God left us wholly to our selves, after he put us into the World, and that we had no Natural Rules to act by, or that we could maintain and prolong our Beings without his Assi∣stance; there might be some ground for doubt in this Matter; but since it is quite contrary, since we have an * 1.213 inseparable dependence upon him, since he has given us such Frames or Natures on the one side as prove us to be accountable, and has re∣tain'd such a Propriety and Sovereignty over us on the other, as gives him a Right to require an account of our Actions; 'tis certain that he will, nay that he † 1.214 must re∣quire it accordingly.
2. This will appear more Plain if we come to consider the next Principle which I laid down at the ‖ 1.215 beginning, that Life
was imparted to us for a particular End; for if Man is indispensibly oblig'd to pur∣sue that End, then this Obligation is a proof that there must be a Future State, and that for these Reasons sollowing.
1. Because every End supposes some Rules or Laws to be observ'd for the ob∣taining of it. Now whatever the End of Humane Life is, whether it be the following of Reason by Virtue or no, 'tis certain it is from God, and therefore the Rules or Laws which are necessary for the pursuing of it, must be from him likewise: Now any Law given to a free Agent, without any Punishment annex'd to it, or without pro∣per Provision made for the Executing of that Punishment, wou'd justly call in Que∣stion the Wisdom of the Lawgiver; and therefore we cannot suppose that the Laws which God gives to Man by Nature, shou'd be defective in this Respect; and yet we see frequently that all such Punish∣ment is escap'd in this Life: If we consider Man in the State of Nature, whatever Crimes he commits against himself; for Instance, as to any Excess or Intemperance, * 1.216 no other has any right to punish: Nay, if we consider him as a Member of Civil
Society, Humane Laws cannot always reach that which is naturally Evil; for not to insist upon the many Designs and Contrivances of Lust, Envy, or Revenge, before they are put in Executi∣on: How many evade Punishment after they have been Executed, [and that very insolently] by Interest or Authority? A Powerful Offender, or Corrupt Magistrate, may make the threats of Positive Laws, how just or how severe soever, to signifie nothing: Wherefore, either there must be no End at all of Humane Life, or there must be no such Rules or Laws of Nature, as are necessary for the obtaining of this End; or these must be without any Sanction, or that Sanction must be to no purpose, or else there must be another State, wherein those who transgress such Laws now, with∣out any Punishment, shall receive what is their due hereafter.
2. The different Events which befal those Persons which pursue or forsake the End for which Humane Life was given, shew also, that if we believe that there is a God, there must be a Future State: They who are least careful to pursue the true End of Life; or rather, who most indu∣striously forsake it, are often most Happy, as to all Appearances, and grow Great and
Wealthy, and live in Peace and Honour: On the other side, they who pursue this End most saithfully, are exposed to great Sufferings; their Virtues are often to their Disadvantage; their Humility, Patience, and Generosity encourage Insolent and Violent Men to injure and oppress them; and their Constancy and Integrity brings them some times to Barbarous and Bloody Deaths. So that Man's indispensible Du∣ty, and his Happiness as to this World, are often inconsistent, and therefore we must conclude, either that God is Unjust or Un∣wise in proposing such an End of Man's Being, as may make it Miserable, nay as may prove the Destruction of it; or else that there must be another State, wherein those who pursue or forsake this End most, shall be Rewarded or Punish'd more e∣qually.
3. Man is capable of doing so much Good by the pursuing of this End, that he cannot receive an adequate Reward in this Life, and is capable of doing so much Evil by acting against it, that he cannot be made to suffer an adequate Punishment, and therefore there must be another State for both these Purposes.
As to the first, A Man may make so great a Progress in Knowledge and Vir∣tue,
and be so very Good himself, that by his Example and Instruction, especially if he have Interest and Power in the World; he may retrieve many from Ignorance and Vice; he may be the occasion of such good Laws, or of making such Provision for the Unhappy, as may extend to Future Ages: What a Blessing is a Wise and Good Prince, that faithfully emploies his Time and his Power for the benefit of his Subjects? Now, what Reward can this World afford that can be any ways pro∣portionable to such a Persons Virtue, e∣specially if we consider, that the more Rational and Virtuous any Soul is, the more it must be above whatever belongs to Sensation, that is, whatever Wealth, Ho∣nour or Pleasure this World can offer it. 'Tis true the Pleasures of a good Consci∣ence, look something like a proper Re∣ward in such cases; but alas! what are these without the prospect of a better State; and how much must they be check'd and damp'd continually by the consideration of the shortness and incer∣tainty of this only Being?
As to the second, A Man may commit so much Wickedness; he may be guilty of so many Murthers; he may spread such pernicious Principles, as by destroying the
Belief of a God, and enervating the force of Humane Laws, may let loose the most furious Passions, and wildest Appetites; and this may end not only in the Misery of the Present Age, but infect the Future; and what Mischief is not a Vicious Tyraut capable of doing? The worst Pu∣nishment that can be inflicted in these Cases must end in Death; but how incon∣siderable is that, though caused by the most exquisite Torments, if compared with such Crimes, and many others which may easily be supposed? Wherefore since Man is capable of doing more Good or Evil than he can receive an adequate Re∣ward or Punishment for in this Life; we must either accuse that God who made him so, of want of Wisdom, Goodness, or Justice, or else allow that there shall be another State, &c.
If we consider also the vast Capacity of Humane Nature, the excellency of those Faculties whereby Man is qualify'd for pursuing his proper End; How much they set him above all other Creatures; how they suggest to him naturally Future Hap∣piness and Misery, and fill him with Hopes and Fears accordingly; this also will af∣ford us other Arguments to the same pur∣pose.
1. As to that great degree of Capaci∣ty which Man has in regard to other Crea∣tures, and the Excellency of those Facul∣ties, by which he is distinguish'd from them * 1.217: To what purpose were these if there were no other Life but this? In∣stinct and Sensation would do the busi∣ness of Self-preservation as well in Man as in Beast, without the great Endowments of Reason and Freewill, by the misuse of which Man has a possibility of making his Life both more miserable and short than they can theirs; so that these Powers which he values himself upon so much, wou'd not be only Supersluous, but greatly to his Disadvantage; wherefore as the very placing of these Faculties in Man, by a Wise and Sovereign Being, shew that he was made for a greater End, than only to continue such a time here; so if we ob∣serve the Operations of them, we shall find that they aspire to something greater than this World can afford, that we have a Capacity too great to rest satisfy'd with the choicest Enjoyments here, that our Reason teaches us to despise them, and raises us to Desire more Noble Objects,
and more solid and lasting Happiness, * 1.218 Had God intended this Life as the only Scene of Man's Happiness, he would have sitted and proportion'd his Capacity accordingly; he would have made him to acquiess in such Enjoyments as he found here, and not have dispos'd him naturally to think of another State, and to long af∣ter it; and therefore since he has done so, we may be assur'd, that there will be an∣other State answerable at least to such Conceptions. * 1.219
2. This is also Evident from the Natu∣ral sense of Evil, and of Guilt upon com∣mitting it, and the fears which attend it; otherwise Man would be the most wretch∣ed of all Creatures to no purpose: There is no Creature that feels Remorse upon sense of Guilt, or that dreads Punishment accordingly, but Man alone; and since this dread may increase to a very great de∣gree, by the niceness of his Reflection, and the tenderness of his Conscience; there is no Creature that can possibly be so mi∣serable as Man; and if this is to no pur∣pose, then there is not a Beast, an Insect that perishes, but has greatly the advan∣tage
of this Reasoning Creature, this Lord of the World, as he has flatter'd himself to be for so many Ages: Since then it is cer∣tain that Man has such Notions; and that God who dispos'd the frame of his Na∣ture in such a manner, as to receive 'em early, and retain 'em strongly, is All∣wise, Good and Just: It cannot be imagin'd that he did this in Vain, or only to Disturb and Torment him; for as it would not be agreeable to Infinite Wisdom to do any thing to no purpose; so it would by no means consist with Insinite Goodness to fix such Principles in the Noblest of his Creatures, as must serve to no other End, but to make him more miserable than any of the rest.
These Reasons, I hope, may suffice to prove to any Unprejudic'd and Impartial Person, who acknowledges that there is a God; the Necessity and Certainty of a Future State of Reward and Punishment, and that too according to Natural Principles. As for those Objections that are usually made upon this Occasion, That the distin∣ction of Good and Evil depends only upon Hu∣mane Laws; that the Hopes and Fears of Fu∣ture Reward and Punishment are not Natural, but the Inventions of Politicians to manage Mankind, and support Government; and that
this is prov'd by those, who having had the Sence and Courage, to assert their Natural Liberty, have never been troubled with any thing of this kind; nothing can be more Unreasonable than this; for first it is plain by the consent of Nations, that the distinctions of Good and Evil, (which are generally the same) are sounded in Nature; that the force which they have upon Men's Minds is ancienter than Government it self; as being from Right Reason, which is co-eternal with God: As Cicero tells us,
Nor, says he, * 1.220 if there had been no Written Law against Rapes in Tarquin's Reign; would his Son Sextus, when he forc'd Lucretia, have sin'd the less against this Eternal Law; because this was Reason it self; rising from the very Nature of Things, and prompting Us to Good, and restraining Us from Evil ac∣cordingly; which did not then first be∣come Law, when 'twas written down; but oblig'd from its beginning, which was the same with that of the Divine Mind it
self.So that the Goodness of Humane Laws, depends upon their being deriv'd from this Eternal Fountain; they do not of themselves determine what is Good and Evil; but only declare what was so before; to save People the pains of disputing about their Duty, and to promote it by the threats of immediate Punishment: But of all Pretences, that sure is the weak∣est, which would insinuate, that the No∣tions of Good and Evil, and the Hopes and Fears which are the effects of them, are owing only to the Craft of Politicians, and are not Natural, but meer Fiction: For this very Objection (which supposes 'em ne∣cessary for Government) proves the con∣trary; for if Civil Government is abso∣lutely necessary for Man's Happiness; if such Government cannot be preserv'd without such Notions; then we must either say that Man was made so imperfect as not to be furnish'd with such Notions; such Principles and Rules as are absolutely necessary for him; that what was thus omitted by God, was supply'd by the Cun∣ning of Crafty Men; or that God suffers his Creatures to be impos'd upon by their Bre∣thren, to be fill'd with vain Hopes, and tormented with vain Fears, and that too
often to their present disadvantage: Or else we must grant that these Notions, which are necessary for the general good of Mankind, and are also generally embrac'd by them, must be Natural. In a Word, nothing sure can be more reasonable than this; Man cannot be happy without Ci∣vil Society; Civil Society cannot be sup∣ported without Man's Passions and Appe∣tites are restrain'd, these cannot be re∣strain'd without the Hopes and Fears of a Future State; these Hopes and Fears are generally entertain'd by Man, and do re∣strain him; and therefore as they are Na∣tural, they must be True, and there is a Future Sate accordingly.
Nor does it signify any thing in this case to boast of Wit and Courage, Asser∣ting of Natural Liberty, and the being free'd by these means from these Notions. What was the Opinion of the Greeks and Romans in this Case? were not these Peo∣ple as Famous for their Wit as for their Arms? and wou'd it not be as Ridicu∣lous for any single Man to oppose his Sence as his Courage, against them; and how is Man's Natural Liberty endanger'd by these Notions, when it depends upon the direction and assistance of such Principles, as are founded on them, as has been shewn
in the first part of this Chapter: Or suppo∣sing that some Gentlemen, even that one in a hundred (which I am sure is many more than I need grant) had wholly extin∣guish'd any such Notions; does it follow from hence that there is no such at all, or are those few a better Argument of what is Natural to Man, than so many Thou∣sand of others? What if there be some few that are Deaf or Blind, or that have be∣sotted themselves by their Vices; shall we conclude from hence, that Stupidity or Blindness are Natural, and that Seeing and Apprehending are signs of Mens being out of order? Though a Man should be free from all sense of Evil and fear of Future Punishment; this would be no better Ar∣gument, that such a Persons Soul was in its proper and natural State, than the Bo∣dies being free from all Pain would prove that it was in perfect Health. Pain is the effect of some Violence offer'd to Nature, in order to put it upon its Guard; as the Soul has an outward sense of it, by the Body, that it may resist or avoid whatever is hurtful to that, so it has an inward sense of it, in an ill Conscience, that it may avoid what may prove hurtful to it self also: Now as it would be very strange for any one, upon his loss of Feeling in any Part,
from a Gangrene or Dead Palsey, to argue that 'twas unnatural for any Man to have the sense of Feeling in that Part; so is it no less strange for any one, that has lost these Notions of Good and Evil, Reward or Punishment in a Life to come, to tell you considently that they are unnatural; for all that this proves is only, that such a Persons Mind is distemper'd, that it does not exert its Faculties in a natural way; that is, in the same way that the generali∣ty of Mankind do; for 'tis from hence that we must judge of Humane Nature, not from the temper or report of one or few Persons; and if so, then these Notions which are so General must be Natural, and therefore certain; because whatever is of Nature, is of God.
There needs no further Answer to the Objections against a Future State, or any further proofs for it, where the wisest of the Philosophers concur with us so Universal∣ly. The belief of this was the Foundation of those Excellent Discourses which were written by these Antient Sages; and therefore we may find the Immortality of the Soul, and a Future State continually Inculcated, by the greatest of them; this too was the ground of that greatness of Mind, that Justice, Courage, Temperance, and
Piety of the Greeks and Romans: 'Twas this that gave Socrates that Calmness and Tranquility in his last Minutes, under the most barbarous Injustice; and made him as casie in his Death, as ever lawful Mo∣narch was at his Coronation: And 'tis to those Excellent Authors, * 1.221 which give an account of this Great Man, that I remit the Reader for further satisfaction; or if happily what has been said shall be suffici∣ent, then there will I suppose be no great difficulty in the remaining Point.
2. That Self-Murther being one of the worst Crimes, shall have a Punishment proportionable; and consequently he that makes use of this to obtain Ease or Liber∣ty, shall fall into a state of great Misery or Slavery.
To make this appear we need only to produce the Opinions of some of the Great∣est Men in this Matter; and consider brief∣ly the Grounds of Punishment and Re∣ward in General, and the Nature of this Crime in Particular.
For the First, Virgil describing the A∣boad and Condition of Self-murtherers in that Place above-mention'd, * 1.222 shews it to be unspeakably worse than the Evil which they sled from; while he crys out,
—Quam vellent, aethere in alto Nunc & pauperiem, & duros perferre labores!
This was according to the Doctrine of Plato; and therefore Macrobius discoursing upon that Passage of Cicero, which I quo∣ted before † 1.223, That there could be no entrance into a State of Happiness for those who Kill'd themselves; says ‖ 1.224 it was the Opinion of Plotinus, an Eminent Platonist; That no Death could be Rewarded but what was Natu∣ral; and that Death alone was Natural, where the Body left the Soul, and not the Soul the Body. Besides (as he adds farther) the Soul shall be Rewarded according to that Perfection which it arrives to in this Life, therefore Death is not to be hastned, because it can never be so perfect, but that it may receive addition; tho' a Man may have risen to a very high Pitch of Goodness and Virtue; yet he may rise higher s•…•…ill; wherefore he that cuts off his Life, cuts off his Improvement; and so despises the Re∣ward
which is propos'd to him, which being a great Contempt of the Proposer, must be the oc∣casion of severe Punishment. To these let me add an Excellent Author * 1.225 of our own, who makes the first Man (upon his Wife's advising to kill themselves in their great Di∣stress) to argue thus from the Light of Nature.
But the Reasonableness of this will be more plain, if we consider what must be the Ground of Reward and Punishment in General; and the Nature of the Crime be∣fore us. What is it then that shall make the Soul to be admitted into a State of Li∣berty, Ease or Happiness; but the endea∣vouring
faithfully to fulfil that End for which Life was bestow'd, by performing every part of its Duty towards God, our Neighbour, or our selves; and this too notwithstanding the worst Evils and Ca∣lamities which can possibly befall us: On the other side, what shall expose the Soul to the Slavery of extreme Torment, but the forsaking of this End, the refusing to submit to the Will of God, the Injuring our Neighbour, and encouraging others to do so; now if the doing any one of these things must make a Man liable to Punish∣ment, what must it do to be guilty of them all, and much more by Self-murther. For this is the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 destruction of God's par∣ticular Propriety, the Positive Renouncing that End for which he gives Man Life; the do∣ing what is destructive to Civil Society, the Overthrowing the Laws both of God and Man; to Rebel against Providence, and break out into Eternity: Self-murther is the do∣ing all this, and what is still more, the do∣ing it wilfully and advisedly and therefore what Punishment shall be due to it?
I hope the greatness of this Crime ap∣pears so plain by this time (every Argu∣ment which has been us'd for the proving it unlawful, proving this also) that no new Arguments will be requir'd of me to de∣monstrate
it; and therefore I shall only confirm this by these two Considerations.
1. That this is the least capable of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of any ill Action whatsoever; or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 'tis the positive 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of it: 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 been allow'd as a most 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 Duty, by the Light of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, by which 'tis plain also, that 〈◊◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊◊〉 for something that is past; and of Resolution of not doing the same thing for the time to come; but the Gentle∣man with whom we have had so much to do, after he has brought in a maim'd ac∣count of Repentance, under the covert of a venerable Name, viz. * 1.226 This is true Re∣pentance, to do no more, to speak no more, those things whereof you Repent; and not be ever Sin∣ning, and ever asking Pardon; tells us, such a Repentance as this our Case is capable enough of: Was ever any thing so trivial? What kind of Repentance? Why a Man is capable of keeping the Resolution of Killing himself no more, after he has once done so: Can this be in earnest? but this is absurd as to both parts of Repentance, for this is either Sorrow for what is past, sup∣poses some thing to have been done amiss; whereas here Repentance goes beforehand,
and the Person is reckon'd to have confess'd the Crime before he has committed it; or else 'tis Resolution against doing something that is Evil; but how can this be, when the Person is Positively resolv'd for it; this is strange trisling with a Mans Own Con∣science, and with God; and what can be more provoking than to know the Evil of an Action, to foresee that it wants Repen∣•…•…ance; to be sensible that it ought to be ab∣horr'd and avoided, and yet to do it for all that. If it be said that a Man may have time to Repent afterwards, and that he may possibly contrive his Death according∣ly: Alas? what hopes can he draw srom hence? to design sirst positively to commit that which one acknowledges to be Evil; and to design to ask forgiveness when 'tis commit∣ted, is an undeniable Evidence, that a Man transgresses Presumptuously against the Light of his own Reason; for the more necessary that he thinks Repentance is, the more clear sense must he have of the Evil of the thing which he is about to do, and therefore the greater must his Punishment be.
2. The Person who is guilty of Self-mur∣ther can receive no Punishment in this World, which he can be sensible of; and therefore shall be punish'd the more here∣after.
I have shewn already * 1.227 that among other things which prove the unlawfulness of Self-murther, 'tis a greater Crime in re∣spect of the Publick than the Murther of another Man; because some satisfaction may be made for that, especially to the Pub∣lick, by the forfeiture of the Persons own Life, and by the terrour of his Example: But in Self-murther there can be nothing of this; the Offender evades all sensible Pu∣nishment; he makes no Satisfaction consi∣derable for despising and breaking the Laws of his Country, and encouraging others to do so: He brings Horrour, Confusion, Infamy, (and Poverty often) upon his forsaken Family, and yet does it often up∣on this very Account, that he cannot be Pu∣nish'd here, and therefore will undoubted∣ly suffer in a more dreadful manner here∣after.
Thus I have considered the several Sig∣nifications of the Word Liberty, as a pre∣tence for Self-murther; and shewed what that Liberty is in General, which Man has as to his own Actions: That no Evil which oppresses the Body can be destructive (while Reason remains) to the Liberty of the Soul: That no Sickness or Pain what∣soever
can be any sign that God gives the Sufferer Liberty to destroy himself: That he who does so to obtain Liberty or Ease from any such Evils, shall fall into a state of greater Slavery; and therefore that Li∣berty, in what sense soever, is an unreasona∣ble pretence for Self-murther.
And now I have gone through what I propos'd, laid down the Principles upon which I take Self-murther to be unlawful: Answer'd such Objections as I thought most strong against them; and withal ex∣amin'd those General Prejudices by which People are usually misled in this Matter: I will not trouble the Reader with any more particular view of what has been said; If he wants this, he may have it by turning back to the Contents.
But hitherto we have been led only by Natural Reason; if the Principles which we have argued from, were brought to what is revealed to us in the Holy Scriptures, the unlawfulness of this Act would quick∣ly appear more Plainly: For as to God's Propriety in Man: There we may find in how wonderful a manner this is increas'd by the Death of our Crucifi'd Lord, who purchas'd
us by his Blood, made us Members of his Body, uniting us to Himself by his Holy Spirit: Thus too, as to the end of Humane Life; there our Reason is instructed what to believe, and our Wills what to do, and en∣courag'd to obey accordingly by the assi∣stance of the same Spirit: And although we may see there, that the best of Men, in the following of this End, shall be expos'd to great Afflictions, to Poverty, Sickness, Dis∣grace, nay sometimes to Death it self; yet we may see also the great advantages of such Sufferings, by the improvement of ourSouls, and the increase of our Reward: And a∣bove all, for the enabling us to undergo them in their worst Extremes; we have there set before us the most Excellent Exam∣ple of Patience, Constancy, and Humi∣lity in the meek and forgiving Son of God: What Contempt or Disgrace, what Tor∣ture of the Body could ever equal what He Suffer'd in his Death? What Sorrow and Anxiety, what Torments of the Mind, could ever be compar'd to what He felt in the Garden, and yet with what Duty and Resignation did He submit to all? O my Fa∣ther, if it be possible let this Cup pass from Me; nevertheless not as I will but as thou wilt. These Blessed Words alone, if rightly consider'd,
might afford, in what Circumstances soe∣ver, the most Sovereign Preservative against this dreadful crime of Self-murther. But Arguments of this kind may (if it be found necessary) be insisted upon more conveniently hereafter.
Greg. de Valent. T. 1. Dis. 8. q. Secund.
22 dae. q. 64. Artic. 5. ad 3m. Greg. de Valentia, Tom. 3. Disp 5. Quaest. 8. punct. 2. It. qu. 10. punct. 1. Quod cadit in Humanum Dominium oportet esse aliquid quod per Liber•…•… Arbitrii usum possit usurpari, &c.
Diog. Lacrt. in Zen. Antonin. L. 5. §. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 19. Senec. de Vita Beata. §. 8. 15. & alib. See Chap. 7. following.
See Chap. 7.
Chap. 7.
In Phaed. Sect. 5.
In Caton. Maj.
Vid. Somnum Scipionis.
Chap. 8.
See Chapt. 8.
Diog. Laert. in Zen. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Cicer. de •…•…nib. lib. 3. de Offic. l. 1. Sen. Ep. 121.
Leviath. Part 1. Chap. 14.
* See •…•…more Chap. 15.
Vid. Epist. 77. Cogita quam di•…•… jam idem facias; 〈◊〉〈◊〉, cibus, libido: per hune circulum curritur.
Montaign's Essays, Book 2. Chap. 3.
See Chap 10.
Dr. Donn•…•…, afterwards Dean of Paul's.
* See Chap. 6, 7, 8.
Dr. Donne's B•…•…. p. 44. Edit. Lond, 1648.
Ib.•…•…p. 46.
p. 47.
p. 56.
This he calls his chief Strength, p. 116.
p. 131.
p. 24.
Peine forte & Diere.
B•…•…. pag. •…•…2
Ibid.
See Chap 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
Ib. p, 113.
See more to this purpose Chap. 8.
* Apud Balth. Gomes, de potest. in •…•…ipsum, lib. 1. cap. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 4.
De Jure. B. & P. l 2. c. 21. Sect. 11.
Vid. Diog. Lacrt. in Zenon.
Montaigne lib. 2. chap. 3.
Chap. 1.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Diog. in Laert. Zen. See Plotinus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arian. in Epict saepiss.
p. 48.
Biath. p. 108.
Jos. de bel. Jud. Lib. 3.
Chap. 2. p. ••••.
p. 110.
p. 112.
p. 149.
Liber 1. Tuscul. Quaest.
Biath. p. 4•…•…. Ib. p. 112.
So the Stoicks taught always. Diog. Lacrt. ut Sup. p. 195. & Lips. Manuduct. ad Stoic. Phil. lib. 3. Di•…•…ert. 22 •…•…3. & Olympiodor.
Antonin, lib. 4. §. 1. ib. lib. 10. §. 29.
See Chap. the 1st, pag. 6.
Diog. Laert. in Zen.
Biath, p. 47.
Chap 4. p. 30.
Chap. 2.
See Chap. 2. p. 16. 17.
Diog. Laer. l. 7. p. 185.
Antonin. lib. 7. Sect. 8.
Diog. Laer. ib.
Philo 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
Dr. Donne p. 45. 41. Epist. Sen. Lip. man. ad St. Phil. l. 2. D. 17.
Or that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Diog. Laer p. 185
Ci•…•…ero de Offic. lib. 1.
See more to this purpose, Chap. 11•…•…
See Chap. 2. p. 17.
Ridiculum est ad mortem cu•…•…re tadio vitae, cum •…•…nere vitae, •…•…t •…•…lum ci•…•… ad mor•…•… effeceris. Sen. •…•…pilt. 24.
Chap. 5. p. 44.
Biath. p. 46.
p. 47.
p. 128.
•…•…viathan part 2. chap. 28. page 162.
Ib. p. 161.
Leviath. part 1. chap. 14.
〈◊〉〈◊〉 de Valen•…•… Tom. 3. Disput. 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 8. Punct. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
Biath. p. 111.
Ib. p. 113.
As the Stoicks. See Chap. 10.
Vid. Plut in Diss. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Et Val Max. l. 8. c. 14.
There is a short view of this great Man in an Inserip•…•…tion, which the Learned Agostine says is worth a Treasure Dial. 9. Which begins thus.
Il Senato fece tre dimande intorno un Publico impor tantissimo negotio. Vita del Padre Paolo.
See Valer. Max. lib. 2. cap. 1.
Page 94, 9•…•….
Vid Sanderson. de conscient. praelect. 5. Sect. 10.
Biath. p. 96.
Occasional Paper, Numb. 10.
4th. Reports, 124. 6.
Plowden. 261. 6.
Biath. p. 50. Sect. 3.
p. 51.
Biath. p. 72. 73.
Biath. p. 51, 52, 53.
p. 54.
p. 73.
〈1 line〉〈1 line〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c.
Biath p. 53.
Neq, adhu•…•… hominum memoria repertus est quis∣quam qui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 interfecto, cujus amicitiae se devovisset mori 〈◊〉〈◊〉. lib. 3. de bello Gal.
Sir W Temples Miscel. p. 241.
Vid Stephan Com∣ment in Saxon. Gram•…•…at. lib. 6. p. 55.
Vide Porphy∣•…•… 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. lib. 4.
Inquinari putant ignem nisi qui Spirantes recipit. Q. Curtius lib. 8.
〈◊〉〈◊〉. lib. 15.
Ad lib. 1. Iliad.
Thus also Quintilian Declam. 10. speaking of the Soul, cum exonerata membris levi se igne lustaverit petit sedes in astra. So Porphyrius says of the Saman•…•… above∣mention'd.
The Reason of this servi•…•…s 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ad lib 3. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. That the Soul never continuing in the Body, after the the B•…•…oo was run out, it was suppos'd that it delighted in Bloody Victims after its Separation.
〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad 5. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 verba Famulumne parentis. Item. Cicero 5. Tuscul.
Donne. lib. 10.
Val. Max. lib. 2. cap. 1.
Mont. lib. 2. cap. 3.
Strabo. lib. 10.
See Aristot. lib. 5. Ethic.
See Servius there, lib. 3. Aen.
Vel. Patere. lib. 2.
Bell. Catil.
Plin. lib. 36.
Liv. lib. 39.
Epist. 24.
Sup. Cap 2.
Aen. lib. 6.
Aen. 6.
Aen. l. 8. Ut supra dixi∣mus Censorium signisicat non Uticensem. Servius ad lo∣cum. Though Montaign misapplies it to the other, lib. 1. chap. 35.
Astron. lib. 1.
Aen. lib. 12.
See the rest in Spons Miscell. Erudit. Antiquitatis. Sect. 7. p. 264.
Quintil. Declam. 4. Qui Causas Voluntariae Mortis in Senatu non reddiderit, insepultus 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
† Tacit. lib. 6. Annalium. Promptas ejusmodi mortes 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 faciebat, &c.
Diog. Laert. in Anthist.
Lib. 4. de finibus.
Cap. 2. & 7. sup.
See Diog. La•…•…tins. it Ciceron. pro Muraena. it li. 3. & 4. de 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
See Diog. La•…•…tius. it Ciceron. pro Muraena. it li. 3. & 4. de 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
Salut. Bell 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
‖ Salut. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
〈◊〉〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 large 〈◊〉〈◊〉, lib. 37.
〈◊〉〈◊〉. in 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉.
Appian, Alexandrin de bel Hispan.
Paterc. lib. 1. cap. 12.
〈◊〉〈◊〉. Cicer. de 〈◊〉〈◊〉. lib. 4. in item 〈◊〉〈◊〉. pro 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
Chap. 9.
〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. fur la Philosophie cap. 11.
〈◊〉〈◊〉. lib. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. cap. 1. 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉, &c
Epist, 70.
St. Evremonts Essaies, part. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
Ep. 66.
Ep. 92.
Ep. 67.
Ep. 96.
Ep. 107.
Ep. 53.
* Apud Aul. Gellium, lib. 2, cap. 19.
Arrian Epict. lib 1 cap 16.
Ib. lib. 2. cap. 16.
Lib. 6. Sect. 5.
Lib. 1. Sect. 5.
Ib. Sect. 16.
Lib. 2. Sect. 8.
Lib. 4. Sect. 31.
Lib. 10. Sect. 23.
See Plutarch, in his Life.
Le jeune Caton fut stoicien par pur 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Rap. Reflex. sur 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Philos. cap. 10.
Dion. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. lib. 39. Item Plutarch. In Cicer. & Catone.
Dion 〈◊〉〈◊〉. lib. 41.
See the Characters of these two great Men excellently drawn by Salust. Bell. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
Plut in 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
〈1 line〉〈1 line〉.
〈◊〉〈◊〉. 1. cap. 36.
Cicero de Ossicijs, lib. 1. Sect. 31.
Montaign is very much pleas'd with this Passage, lib. 2. cap. 11.
Chap. 9.
Donne. pag. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
Chap. 8.
Hobb's Leviath. p. 1. chap 6.
De la Chamb. Char. des pa••sions, vol. 2. cap. ••.
Ea animi el•…•…tio quae in periculis cernitur, si Justitia vaca•…•…, in vitio est—Ita{que} probe dehnitur à Stoicis Fortitudo, Virtus propugn•…•…ms pro aquitate. Cicero de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. 1.
Cicero pro Archia Poeta.
Quint. Curtius. lib. 4.
Eurip. Hercul. Furens, Act. 4.
Apollon. Rhodius Nicom. lib 3. cap. 8.
Quintus Curtius, lib. 5. Sect. 11.
See •…•…rot. de J. B. & P. lib. 2. cap. 19 Sect 5.
Besides these, see Josephus's Speech, lib. 3. de Bell. Jud.
Gloria est solida quaedam res & expressa non adumbra∣ta, ca est consentiens laus honorum, incorrupta vox bene Judi∣cantium de excellente Virtute. Tuscul. Quest. lib. 3.
Essays lib. 3. cap. 2.
See more to this purpose, Chap. 11. concerning De∣corum,
〈…〉〈…〉
If Publick Honour were a thing of Value the Mul∣titude would not have it to bestow; for it is not reasonable to think that Providence would deposit things precious in such Hands. It must chuse it Servants very ill, if these are its Stwards. Mackenzie ag. calum. p. 34.
See Dion Caslias, lib. 51.
Dion Cass. lib. 4.
Dion Cassius. •…•…iber 63, & 65.
Dion Cassius. •…•…iber 63, & 65.
See Plato's Crito.
Moral Galantry, p. 122
Seneca, de Ira. Lib. 3. Sect. 15.
Epist. 70.
Philo Judaeus. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
Tuscul. Quaest. lib. 4. Voluntas est quae quid cum ratione desidrat; quae autem adversa Ratione incitata ve∣hementius; ea libido est.
In his Treatise to prove, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
Valer. Maximus. lib. 2. cap. 4.
* Vid. Somnium Scipionis.
Apud Mac•…•…obium, lib. 1. cap. 13.
Forsitan mireris quod vitam non siniam: Alicno scelere quam meo, mori malo. Q. Curtius. lib. 5. cap. 12.
〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
De Consol. ad Helviam.
Mont. lib. 2. chap. 3.
See Chap. 6. p. 69.
Chap. 6. p. 68.
Chap. 1. p. 7.
Chap. 6. p. 61.
See pag. 6, 7, 8.
See that Excellent Treatise: A Practical Discourse con∣cerning Future Judgment, from pag. 6. to pag. 14.
Chap. 2.
Vid. pag. 20. Sup.
Vid. pag. 13, 14. sup.
See that late Learned and Ingenious Discourse Con∣cerning The Certainty and Necessity of Religion In Gene∣ral. Pag. 142, &c.
See that late Learned and Ingenious Discourse Con∣cerning The Certainty and Necessity of Religion In Gene∣ral. Pag. 142, &c.
Nec si Regnante Lue. Tarquinio nulla erat Romae Scripta •…•…ex de stupris; idcirco non contra illam legem sempiter∣•…•…am Sext. Tarq. vim Lucretiae attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Natura, & adrecte faciendum impellens. & à delicto avocans; qu•…•… non tum denique incipit lox esse cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est, orta est autem simu•…•… cum montos divina. Lib. 2. de Legibus.
Plato and Xenophon: See this also clearly, copiously and solidly prov'd in the Treatise above-mentioned, viz. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Practical Discourse of Future Judgment. Likewise in the 2d. Part. Vol. 1. Chap. 5. Sect. 2. Of the Christian Life, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that Late Eminent Divine Dr. Scot.
AEn. 6.
p. 22, Sup.
Macrob; lib. 1. in Som. Scip. Cap, 13,
Milton's Paradise Lost. lib. 10.
See Biath. pag. 32.
Sup. pag. 26, 27,