Aristotle's Rhetoric, or, The true grounds and principles of oratory shewing the right art of pleading and speaking in full assemblies and courts of judicature / made English by the translators of The art of thinking ...

Aristotle's RHETORIC TO KING Alexander. (Book 4)

BOOK IV. (Book 4)

CHAP. I.

Aristotle to Alevander wishes Health and happiness.

UNderstanding by thy Letters, thy great desire that we should send thee the Precepts and Method of Political Arguments, it was not slothfulness that made me thus long delay; but that I might make such enquiries, before I set Pen to Paper, for my own Information, that I might write to thee more accurately then ever any Person has yet done, who has labour'd upon this Subject. And I did well in so doing. For as it is thy

study to excel others in sumptuousness of Royal Habit, and Magnificence, so is it our endeavour to furnish thee with the most noble Efficacy and force both of Reason and Argument. Seeing it is much more noble and King-like, to have a Soul endu'd with Vertue, then to behold a habit of Body adorn'd with pompous Vestments. For it is absur'd, that he, who excels all others in renown for his great Atcheivements, should give place in Eloquence to Persons of the mean∣est rank; especially not being ignorant, that they who live under Democracies, refer all things to the People; but they who live under the Domi∣nion of a single Monarch, refer all things to Reason and Judgment. For as the Common Law in free Cities always aims at the Noblest end; so may thy Eloquence direct those that are sub∣jected under thy Command, to what is good and profitable. For the Law, as I may so say, is but a certain Speech, limited by the consent of the City, commanding how every thing ought to be done. Add to this, that it is not unknown to thee, how we have alway made it our business to excel those who make a right use of Reason, choosing to act according to the Rules of it; but that we have always had in de∣testation those who act without Reason, which produces nothing but Cruelty and Bestiality. Her which reason we have chastis'd the wicked glory∣ing in their Vices, and have commended the generous, making their Vertues known, to Bliss, to admiration and Imitation. Thus we have found out a way to divert future Calami∣ties, and to enjoy present felicity. By which means we have avoided imminent Distresses,

and acquir'd absent profit. For as a life not sub∣ject to pain is to be preferr'd, so is right and sound Reason to be advanc'd above all things. Nor art thou to be ignorant, that Examples govern most men, some the Law, others thy Life, and Rational conduct. Therefore as thou surpassest all, both Greeks and Barbarians, it is to be thy chief endeavour, that they who study these Examples may take from thee the Fair Impression, and strive to be partakers of thy vertues.

Moreover, there is nothing in Man more ap∣proaching to Divinity, then to advise and Con∣sult. Therefore it behoves thee not to spend thy time in trivial and superfluous things, but with all diligence to learn the Celestial Art of Consultation. For what man in his Wits will deny, that to act unadvisedly is a sign of Mad∣ness; but that to act according to Reason, is a mark of Prudence. And therefore we see all the best Governments among the Greeks consulting first, and long debating, before they fall to Action. Nay even they of most esteem among the Bar∣barians observe the same Method, knowing that the Consideration of useful and advantagious, arising from Reason, is the Bulwark and preser∣vation of Honorable Undertakings. But I fear being too prolix in these matters least I should seem too much to boast my self, especially in things that need no proof, but are so apparent to all Men.

Wherefore setting all these things aside, I shall only insist upon such as it behoves us to discourse of as long as we live, as being that which makes the grand difference between us and all other li∣ving

Creatures; to which if we attain, we shall also differ in Excellency from all other Mortals, as receiving from Heaven the greatest Honour which the Gods bestow on Men. For if other Creatures have the use of Desire, Anger, and other Affections, yet there is no other Creature has the use of Reason except Man. Wherefore it would be the absurdest thing in the World, if in this alone being the most happy of all Crea∣tures, we should through negligence forsake such a Guide to well-living. Therefore I admonish thee, again and again, though of thy self sufficiently thereto enclin'd, diligently to embrace the Phi∣losophy of Eloquence. For as the Body is pre∣serv'd by Health, so is the Mind preserv'd by Discipline and sound Learning. For so guided and conducted, thou canst not err in the manage∣ment of thy grand Affairs, but shalt be able to defend and preserve what thou has purchas'd by thy vertue. Again, if it be so delightful to see with the Eye, certainly it must be much more pleasing to discern with the sight of the Mind. For as a General is the preserver of his Army, so Eloquence, being joyn'd to Wisdom, is the Pi∣lot of humane Life.

I have receiv'd thy farther Commands, That no man living beside, shall take this Book in band: well knowing, that as Parents bear a grea∣ter Affection to Children begot upon their own bodys, then to such as are supposititious; in like manner, they who apprehend some more then ordinary invention in themselves, are carry'd on with a greater fervency, to perfect what they have once begun. For some men will hazard death for their Inventions, as soon as for their Children. Tho

the Parian Sophisters, so call'd, because they do not bring forth, through slothful negligence de∣spise their low Inventions, and sell 'em for mo∣ny. For which reason I earnestly exhort thee, so to observe and defend these Precepts of Elo∣quence, that as they grow in years they may not be ravish'd from thee by any mans wealth, but may live with thee Vertuously and Honoura∣bly; and when they come to full maturity, may obtain Immortal Honour.

CHAP. II.

Of Ratiocinations.

THere are three sorts of Political Ratiocina∣tions, Deliberative, Demonstrative, and Ju∣dicial. Of these there are seven Species, Per∣swasion, Disswasion, Praise, Dispraise, Accusa∣tion, Defence, and Question, either as to its self, or to something else. And we make use of these in Popular Harangues, in Pleadings concerning Contracts, and in private discourse. Of all which we may speak that which is most adapt and pro∣per, if we enumerate their Efficacy, their Use, and Practicability. First therefore let us dis∣course of Perswasion and Disswasion (of which there is most use in Popular Harangues, and private converse.)

Generally therefore, Perswasion, is an exhor∣tation to elect, to speak, or act. Disswasion is the Impeding from election, from speaking, or

acting. Which being thus defin'd, he that per∣swades must shew those things, to which he ex∣horts, to be either just, or legal, profitable, ho∣nest, delightful or easily practicable. If not, he must make 'em appear to be possible, if he ex∣horts to difficult things, and make it out that they are necessary. He that disswades must make the contrary appear; as that they are unjust, ille∣gal, useless, unpleasing, dishonest, and impossible to be accomplish'd: if not, that they are difficult, troublesome, and not necessary. For all actions participate of these things, so that he who has neither of these Propositions, wants Arguments.

Now I shall endeavour to define every one of these, and to shew, how we may be sufficiently furnish'd with all these for Arguments. There∣fore the unwritten custom of All, or Most, is but just in the definition of what is honest, what infa∣mous; as to honour our Parents, to love our friends, and be greatful to our Benefactors. For such pre∣cepts as these are not Commanded by the written Laws, but by unwritten Custom and the Common Law of nature. These therefore are just things.

The Law is the Common consent of a City, commanding in Writing, how we ought to act in such and such particulars.

Profitable, is the Conservation of present bene∣fits, the acquiring of absent benefits, or the warding off present evils, or the prohibition of threating Inconveniences. This must be divided, as to present Persons, into Body and Soul, and things external. To the Body are profitable Strength, Beauty, Health. To the Soul, Fortitude, Wisdom, Justice. External things are Friends, Mony, Lands. The contrary to which are un∣profitable.

Profitable to a Commonweal are such things▪ as these, Concord, War-like force, Mony, Revenues, many and slout Allies, and such like; the contrary to which are unprofi∣table. Honest things are such, as from which some splendor or illustrious honour flows upon those who have acted honourably. Delightful things are those which affect us with gladness; easie things are those which are accomplish'd in a shore time, with little labour and expence; possible things are those, which are to be done in na∣ture. Necessary things are those which are not at our disposal to do or let alone; but are acted as it were by a certain divine or humane neces∣sity. Of all which we might draw Arguments in abundance, from what has been already said, or from their like, or contraries, and from those things already adjudg'd either by the Immortal Gods, or by famous and celebrated men, or by the Judges, or by our Adversaries.

Thus we have shewn what is just: and Like to just is much the same. For as we esteem it just, to obey our Parents, it is also expedient, that Children should imitate the noble acts of their Predecessors: and as it is but just to be grate∣ful to our benefactors, so it is like to just, not to injure those from whom we have receiv'd no harm. Now it is requisite that we make the Example perspicuous from the contraries. For as it is just to punish those who have highly of∣fended; so it but just to be grateful to our bene∣factors. Now what has been adjudg'd just by celebrated Persons, is so to be deem'd. For not only we our selves prosecute our Enemies, and seek their mischeif, but the Athenians and Lacedae∣monians

adjudge it to be just. In this manner frequent use makes a thing just. For where it is profitable, the Sentence a giver ought to recite the Law, Then what is like the written Law: which may be much of the same na∣ture. For as the Law-giver desires that Rob∣bers should be severely punish'd, for the same reason Impostors and Deceivers are also to be punish'd; for they likewise rob the Understanding. And as the Law-giver appoints the next of kin to be Heirs to those that dye without Children, in like manner ought I to be Master of the goods of the freed Servants. For being next of kin to the deceased that set the Servant free, it is but just that I should be Master likewise of all his goods. In this manner therefore is like to legal taken; but the contrary thus. For if the Law forbids that what belongs to the Law should be privately distributed, it is apparent that all they that make such a partition do unjustly to all in whose behalf the Law-giver made the Law. For if the Law Commands us to honour those that faithfully and justly preserve and ma∣nage the Common Treasury, the same Law deems worthy of punishment those that wast and dissipate the publick stock. Thus it is appa∣rent what is legal from Contraries: but from things adjudg'd in this manner. For I do not only say this present Law was made upon these grounds by the Law-giver; but former Judges, by the report of Lyschidas, decree'd several things like to those by me already related.

What profitable is, we have already defin'd: but there is also like to profitable; for as it is advantageous in War that the Stoutest and most

Magnanimous should be plac'd in the Front of the Battel, so is it of great advantage to a Com∣monweal, that the most prudent and most just should govern the Multitude; and as men that are in health ought to be wary to preserve them∣selves from sickness, so is it requisite for Cities that are in Peace and concord, to beware of Sedition.

From Contraries Profitable will be thus made manifest. For if it be profitable to honour good and vertuous Citizens, it may be as much to ad∣vantage, to punish bad Citizens. And if it be to our disadvantage to fight singly against the Thebans, it may be for our advantage to asso∣ciate our selves with the Lacedaemonians, and so to make War upon the Thebans.

Profitable also may be thus taken from the judgment of celebrated Men. For the Lacedaemo∣nians, when they had vanquish'd the Athenians, thought it would be for their advantage not to enslave their City. And the Athenians, when they could have raz'd Lacedaemon to the ground, thought it would be more to their advantage to let it stand.

CHAP. III.

What things are are to be consulted.

VVE shall once more define how many, of what nature, and what things are to be consulted, as well at Council-Board, as in

Public Assemblies. For if we distinctly under∣stand every one of these things, the things them∣selves will afford us words for every Consultation. Breifly then, Consultation is to be had concern∣ing seven things; either about Religion, or Laws, or Political Preparations, or of Leagues against other Cities, or of War or Peace, or of the Public Revenue.

Now let us divide every one of these, and let us consider in what manner we are to make use of Oration concerning any of these things. Of Ceremonies there is not much to be said; for we either say they are to be continu'd as they are, or that they ought to be more sumptuous, or else that some of the Pomp is superfluous, If we say they are to be continued as they are, we are to find out reasons from what is just, and then to alledge how unjust it is to alter any thing from the ancient and Establish'd Customs of the Country. How all the Prophesies command men to perform the Sacred Ceremonies accord∣ing to ancient Customs and Use. That that worship is chiefly to be observ'd which was esta∣blish'd by those that first built Citys, and erect∣ed Temples to the Gods.

From Profit we may argue, That it will be more for the distribution of Money, both pri∣vately and publickly, that the ancient Sacrifices be continu'd; That it creates a confidence in the Citizens one of another, and consequently makes 'em more bold and daring. For the Citizens seeing the Souldiers feasting and performing their Military Sacrifices, shake off their former fears, as being Ambitious to be of the Number.

From honest, by alledging those Ceremonies

to be the occasion of several Friendly Meetings among vertuous Society.

From delightful, if there be any Variety in the Ceremonies. From possible, if there be nei∣ther want nor excess.

Therefore when we consult about things that have been long establish'd, we must take into consideration what things have been already said and their Resemblances, and then as the na∣ture of the things will bear, to discourse upon the several recited Subjects.

But when we advise to make the Sacrifices more pompous, then we bring proper Arguments to prove that it may be lawful to change the Customs of our Country; alleadging, that to add to what is already, is not to abrogate, but to adorn the settl'd constitution. Then, that it is probable the Gods will be the more Propitious to us, when they see that we give 'em greater honour: then, that our Fathers did not always ob∣serve the same Ceremonies, but varied accord∣ing as times and Seasons and their Prosperity admitted; and thereupon made particular changes both in public and private worship. And again, that it is requisite so to do, if any profit, splen∣dor or pleasure will thence arive to the Common weal; in regard we order our Cities, as we do our private Houses.

If the debate be about reducing the Sacrifices to a meaner Condition, then our Oration must be adapted to the Season, by urging that the Condition of the City is Lower then formerly: Then, that the Gods are better pleas'd with de∣votion then Gaudy Pomp. Then, that both Gods and Men will condemn the Stupidity of

those that do any thing beyond their power. Then, that the public Expences are not at the disposal of men, but according to their Prosperity or Ad∣versity. Now then, that we may know how to propose and Establish those things that appertain to the best way of Sacrificing, we are to consider, that that is the best Sacrifice, which is made to the Gods piously and holily: Moderate, as to Ex∣pences; profitable, as to War; but splendid for shew. Now thou shalt behave thy self piously toward the Gods, if the Customs and Consti∣tutions of thy Country be not infring'd; mode∣rately as to expences, if all the presents that are made be not consum'd at once. Profitably for the War, if Infantry and Cavalry feast and main∣tain their pastimes together in their Arms: splen∣didly for shew, if there be a magnificent use made of Gold and other precious Ornaments which are not consum'd and wasted. And thus from these things shall we agree about the chiefest Ornaments that concern the Gods: and out of what we have already said, we may plainly un∣derstand after what manner we are to discourse concerning the several sorts Sacrifices.

In the same manner we may frame Arguments in reference to the Laws and civil Constitutions. For the Laws, as we have already briefly hinted, are the public consent of the Commonweal, which determines in writing, and commands how every one is to act in such and such particulars. Now for making of Laws in Democracies, the meaner Magistrates are many, and chosen by Lot, which prevents Sedition: But the Superiour Ma∣gistrates, by the suffrages of the People. For thus the People having in their Power to confer Ho∣nonrs

upon they please, will never envy those that accept it: and they who are most eminent, will be most diligent to exercise Probity and Sincerity, knowing they shall gain by being in esteem with the People. And thus much concerning the Electi∣on of Magistrates in Democracies.

As to what concerns the other part of Popu∣lar Administration, to speak briefly, This must be observ'd, That the Laws prohibit the Mul∣titude from gaping after the substance of the Wealthy; and the rich to a willing Munificence in public Offic's. Which may be done, by decree∣ing to the Rich certain peculiar honours in lieu of their Expences bestow'd upon the Public: as by preferring Husbandmen before poor Artists, and Masters of Ships before Ordinary Water-men. Also there ought to be a severity in the Laws to prevent neglect of Tillage, and the publishing the Estates of the deceas'd, with great Penalties upon the Contemners of these Statutes. Also there ought to be allow'd some public place of Scpulture for those that are slain in the Wars, and their Children ought to be brought up at the public charge, till they come of Age. Such Laws as these become a Popular Govern∣ment. In Oligarchies; the Laws ought to distribute the Power equally to all that partici∣pate in the Government. Of these Magistrates the most are chosen by lots, the cheifest private∣ly by Suffrage, with Oaths and a very great ex∣actness. And in an Oligarchy there ought to be the greatest punishments ordain'd upon those that go about to offer injury to any of their fel∣low Citizens. For the Multitude is not so much concern'd for being depriv'd of the Magistracy

as they are offended when abus'd and injur'd. It is requisite also to be very diligent in compo∣sing the differences of one Citizen with another, and never to suffer the Multitude to meet toge∣ther in any noted place; for such Assemblies ce∣ment the Multitude, and dissolve the Oligarchy. And thus much as to what is to be observ'd and desir'd in all Civil Constitutions.

Now he that would defend his cause by the Law, must shew that it is equal among the Citi∣zens, that it is agreeable to the rest of the Laws, that it is for the Peace of the City, for the ad∣vance of the Public Tributes, for the honour of the City, and that it will encrease the Power of the City; and whatever else to this effect. And then the Opponent must consider first whether the Law be common to all, whether agreeable or contrary to the rest of the Laws, whether profitable as the other alledg'd, or hurtful. Now as concerning Allies and Leagues against other Cities, Leagues must be made according to pub∣lic contracts. Allies are to be sought for, ac∣cording to the Condition of the times, when they that seek Assistance are weak of themselves, or that they are threaten'd with some War, and therefore a League must be made with others who they think will forsake their side in time of War. And these are the cheif reasons that induce men to make Leagues. Now he that would perswade the making of a League uses these Arguments, That it is Seasonable, that the People are a just and generous People, that they are already well affected toward us, that they are our Neighbours and Powerful. But if all these things cannot be alledg'd, then to urge as many as can be.

He that would disswade the entring into a League, must shew that it is needless at this time, that the People are not to be trusted, and that they have ever born us a grudge, that they live at a distance, and that they are in no capa∣city to assist us in time.

If the Question be whether to make War or Peace, Arguments are deduc'd from the Causes. Now the Causes of War are, For that now is the time to take our Revenge upon those that injur'd us before; or being now provok'd either in reference to our selves or our Kindred, or our Benefactors; or to assist our Allies unjustly invaded, or for the common benefit, for ho∣nour, or to enrich our selves, or for any other cause of the same nature. Therefore when we would exhort our Hearers to War, we ought to comprehend as many of these causes as we can, and to shew that the most of those things that ren∣der War successful, auspiciously appear to favour the exhorted. For all men become Victorious by the favour of the Gods, which we call Good Fortune, or through Multitude or strength of Bodies, through Riches, prudence of the Gene∣ral, stout Associates, and opportunity of strong holds. Therefore from these or Arguments like to these, which are most congruons to the mat∣ter, we may 'exhort the undertaking a War, extenuating the strength of our Adversaries, and extolling our own.

On the other side if we desire to prevent a War, first those reasons are to be found out, by which we may demonstrate, that the Injuries are very slight, or none at all that induce us to War, that the War cannot be advantagous,

and then the Calamities attending War are slightly to be run over. Then we are to shew, that all the Advantages which procure Victory are on the Enemies side.

If we would exhort the Surceasing a present War, then the first thing to be urg'd is, That they who are in their wits, will never stay till a misfortune happen, but will endeavour to make Peace while they are Victorious, and may pro∣cure it upon the best Terms. Then, because it is the chance of War, that they who win at first loose at last: but that it is the nature of Peace to preserve the vanquish'd, and that thereby the Victor enjoys the fruits of the War. Then repeat the many and various changes that are wont to happen in War. Thus are they to be exhorted who have the better. But they who have miscarry'd in the War are to be perswaded to give over another way: that is, by reasons drawn from the chances themselves that have befallen 'cm; and the miseries they endur'd be∣fore, when they refus'd Peace: and then, that it is better to part with a small Portion, then to hazard the whole at one throw. Breifly we ought to understand this, that men are wont then to give over War, when they believe their Ene∣mies desire what is just, or that any Quarrel happens between them and their Allies, or that they are weary of the War, or that they are a∣fraid of their Adversaries, or that they begin to fall out among themselves.

As for what concerns the public Revenue, First we are to consider whether any of the pub∣lic Lands be neglected; which neither yeilds any Revenue, nor yet is consecrated to the Gods. As

there are some public Lands neglected which would yield good profit, were they either sold or set out to private Persons. But if there be no such thing, of necessity Taxes must be lay'd; and the Poor must pay the Tribute of their Bodys, the Rich must find Money, the Tradsemen Armes. And thus much for Propositions in de∣liberative Arguments.

CHAP. IV.

Of Arguments in the Encomiastic kind.

THE Encomiastic kind (to speak breifly) is an amplification of the Pre-elections, Deeds, and Speeches of illustrious men, and a concilia∣tion of things absent. Dispraise on the other side is the obscuring of Men illustrious; and the extolling men of no worth. Now those things deserve praise which are just, which are legal, which are profitable, which are honest, which are delightful, and which are not easily accom∣plish'd. Now he that applauds must make out by reason, that there is something in that man, or in his Actions which was done by him, or which proceeded from him; or which happen d from this, or was done for the sake of this, or was not perform'd without this. And he that would dispraise any Person must make out the contraries to be in that Person.

Which happen'd from thence, as thus. Through diligent exercise of the Body Victories happen;

through sloth men fall into distempers. Again; by the study of Philosophy men become more smart 〈◊〉〈◊〉 prudence. But negligence brings 'em to want necessaries.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 was done for the sake of this; as thus. Mor∣tals endure many hard labours, run through many dangers, that they may be immortaliz'd by their fellow Citizens; and others strive for nothing more, then to gratifie those they love. Or was not perform'd without this, as thus. Victo∣ries at Sea cannot be won without Seamen; nor can men be drunk without drink.

If we go about to amplifie or extenuate, we must shew that many good or bad things were acted by such a Person. In the next place some∣thing is to be brought in by way of Metaphor, that has been so adjudg'd; if by way of Praise, that which is good and laudable: if in discom∣mendation, that which is bad. Then produce what has been said by thy self, and compare together the best that has been spok'n by thy self, with the worst that has been said by the Oppo∣nent; by which means thou mayst shew the thing adjudg'd to be great.

The third way is to counter-compare the greatest thing said by thy self, with the least of those things that fall under the same Idea; for so shall the greatest thing said by thy self appear. As men of middle Stature appear to be taller, when measur'd together with those that are lower.

Or Amplification may be made in this man∣ner. If this be adjudg'd a great good, the con∣trary to it must be a great Evil. In like man∣ner, if it be adjudg'd a great Evil, the contrary

to it must be a great good. We may also mag∣nifie good or bad things in this manner, if we shew by ratiocination, and riveting several things together, as how he premeditated many things, how he design'd to act many things; how he acted a long time; how never any one under∣took the like before; how afterwards he acted with those that never any did; how, willingly; how of set purpose and by foresight; how if we should all do like this man, we should be hap∣py or miserable. And he that makes Similes must collect together, and appropriating the one to the other must amplifie in this manner. As if a man be mindful of his friends, 'tis very probable that he honours his Parents. And he that honours his Parents, 'tis as probable, that he is a lover of his Country. In a word if we shew the Person to be the Author of many things, either good or bad; many things will appear to be great. Moreover the thing will appear what it is, being either divided into parts, or spok'n generally; and which way it will ap∣pear greatest, that way it is to be spok'n. Ex∣tenuations are handl'd the quite contrary way, as when we demonstrate the Person to be the Author of nothing at all, or at least of things very mean and Paltry.

Amplifications are useful also upon other Oc∣casions; but especially in Applauses and Encomi∣ums, and discommending and vilifying.

CHAP. V.

Of Accusation and defence.

ACcusation is the displaying of Injuries and Crimes.

Defence is the sreeing a Mans self from Injuries and Crimes of which he stands either accus'd or suspected.

Now in regard both kinds have the same force and efficacy, of necessity the accuser when he de∣claims against wickedness, must lay open the Actions of the Defendant to be unjust and vile, and pernicious to the whole Body of his fellow Citizens. But when he accuses of folly; then he must shew the Actions of the Criminal to be unprofitable even to himself, infamous, unplea∣sant, and which were impossible to be accomplish'd. These and such like are the Arguments against vain and wicked People. The Accuser is also to observe this, what punishments are set upon e∣very Crime, and what Acts of Injustice are fina∣ble by the Judges. When the Law then has determin'd the punishment, this is first to be con∣sider'd by the Accuser, that he make out the fact to be perpetrated. And when the Judges understand the Accusation, the Injuries and Crimes of the Adversaries are to be aggravated, and it is cheifly to be made out, that he Com∣mitted the Fact, willing, of malice fore thought, and not by chance, but with great and preme∣ditated

Preparation. But if this be not possible to be done, or that you rather think that the Ad∣versary will acknowledge, that he was in some fault, or that he did it by chance, or that he did it with a good intent, then to incense the Audi∣tory you must alledg, that it did not become the guilty, after they had committed a Crime to Plead that they mistook through Imprudence, but to have consider'd before he acted. Or that if he acted Imprudently, or did it by chance, he ought to be fin'd so much the more, because of his Chance and his Imprudence, then he who never plead∣ed any such Plea. Besides that the Law does not acquit those who have acted Imprudently, but leaves 'em to punishment, least they should do an Injury to others by mistake. And he may farther urge that if such a Plea should be admit∣ted, it would prove an incouragement for others to play the Villains; for that then they might take their opportuni•••• to do any mischeif in regard they may escape punishment by pleading mistake, or imprudence. And this is the way to prevent compassion and forgiveness in the Hearers. And these are the formes of Accusation according to it's several parts. Defence consists of three Me∣thods. For either he must deny the doing what he is accus'd of; or if he be compell'd to make his defence he must endeavour to prove the Fact lawful, honest and profitable; or if he cannot do that; that it was done unadvisedly, or by accident, or that the Injury was inconsiderable. Then distinguish between reall Injustice, Im∣prudence and Miscarriage. For to act premedi∣tately is to do Injustice; to act through ignorance is only a bare offence; what is committed not

willingly but by the Instigation of others, or by miscarriage, in regard such things are not acted upon due consideration, they are only to be at∣tributed to misfortune: in regard that none act wickedly and advisedly, but wicked men; but to offend and miscarry in Actions, was not only particular to himself but common even to the Judges themselves and all other men.

The Defendant must also consider what crimes are punish'd by the Law, and what Trespasses are finable. And when the Law determin'd the Punishment, he is to shew, that either he has committed no fact at all, or that he has done justly and according to Law. And where the Trespass is only finable, he is to extenuate the offence, as of little consequence, that the in∣jury was small, and unwillingly done.

CHAP. VI.

Of Questions.

A Question is the Exhibiting of Pre-election, Deeds, or Actions contrary one to another, or to another manner of life. He then that asks a Question must demand, whether the words or the actions, or the pre-elections differ one from another. Now the method is this. To look back into the time past, and consider, whether any one being formerly a Friend, afterwards became his Enemy, and then whether a friend again to the very same person; or has done any other unfriendly act

out of malice; or would do, if he had an Op∣portunity, contrary to what were formerly done by him. Then observe, if speaking now, he speak contrary to what he spoke before by him∣self, or contrary to what was reported before, and now said: also, whether he speak con∣trary to what he had spoken before, or would not, if he had an opportunity. Also we are to add to the other honest Studies and dili∣gences of the Querent, the contrarieties in the Life of the Person to whom the Question is put. And whoever thus manages the questioning part, shall not omit any manner of putting a Question. And thus all the parts of questioning being di∣vided, they are to be made use of severally as occasion requires, or intermixing their force and abilities together, for they contain great variety. Nevertheless they communicate one with ano∣ther, as they are made use of, and are of the same nature with the different forms of Men. For they are partly alike, and partly unlike, as well in their Aspects as in their Senses. There∣fore having thus determin'd the several Species's, and what they want, let us now enumerate how many ways they are to be made use of.

CHAP. VII.

FIrst therefore, Just and Legal, Profitable and Honest, as we divided 'em before, are agrea∣ble to all the Species. But in perswasion we chiefly make use of these.

In the second place Extenuation and Aggra∣vation are of necessity profitable beyond all the the rest: but their chiefest use is in Encomiums and vilifying Orations. In the third Place Pro∣bations, which we are constrain'd to use in all Parts of Orations; but chiefly in accusations and defences. For such things as those are most contro∣verted.

There are also Anticipations, Petitions, Re∣petitions and Tautologies, Prolixity of Oration, Mediocrity of length, Brevity of speaking, and Interpretation.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Probation.

TO begin therefore from Probations; of these there are two sorts. For some are pro∣duc'd from the words themselves, some from these matter and some from the men? others are fix'd to the things said and done. For

probables, Examples, Conjectures, Enthymemes, Sentences, Signs, Arguments and Proofs are ga∣ther'd from the men themselves, from the words and from the matter. Additional Proofs are Witnesses, Oaths and Questions.

Probable, which we call a Probable Proposition, is that which when we have declar'd to the Hearers, they retain the Examples of the thing spok'n in their minds: as if one should say, he wishes his Country may Flourish, his Friends may prosper, and misfortune to his Enemies, they might collectively seem Probable. For e∣very one of the Hearers has the same Sentiments probably with the Person that utters these wishes. And therefore we are to observe this diligently always in our Orations, whether we have left the Auditors conscious of the thing of which we discours'd to 'em. For it is most likely that they give greatest credit to those things.

Probable is divided into three sorts. The one is when in our Orations we comprehend the Passions or Affections generally incident to all men, as well when we accuse as when we defend. As when any Person despises, or fears such a one, or does the very same thing several times, or is again affected with pleasure, greif or de∣sire; or is void of desire; or is wealthy, or affected with any other Passion to which out Souls or Bodies, or Senses are Subject. For these and such like perturbations of the mind, are known to the Hearers. And these are those things which being naturally Incident to men, must be comprehended in our Ora∣tion.

The Second Part is the custom of Probabilities,

which every one frames according to the gene∣ral Uses.

The third sort is Gain. For many times for the sake of Gain, forcing nature, we bid adieu to our own Inclinations.

Which things being thus determin'd, both in perswading and disswading, we are to demon∣strate upon the things required, that the thing to which we exhort, or to which we are a verse, is according to what we have said. Or else that the things which are like to this matter, were done as we said, either the most or all. In re∣ference to Things therefore, Probable is thus to be taken; in reference to men especially in Accusa∣tions, if it may be done, you are to shew that the adverse Party has committed this Fact for∣merly or at least, such as were like it. Endeavour also to shew that it was for his advantage to do these things. For most men adoring profit, imagin that other men do all things for the sake of profit. If therefore you can wrest any Pro∣babilities from the adversaries themselves, make your Collection in that manner; which if it can∣not be done, then infer from things like to those which men are accustom'd to do. For Example, 'tis a young man whom you accuse, and there∣fore prove him to have done those things which men of his Age are accustom'd to do. For Si∣militude of Actions will cause what you said a∣gainst him to be credited. For by reason of his familiarity with those young men of his own Age, he will be thought to allow himself the same Indulgences with his friends, especially if any man shall make his Comrades appear to be such as you say he is.

As for them that are upon the defensive part, it behoves them to shew that neither he, nor any of his friends ever acted formerly any of those things of which they are accus'd, and that they could be no advantage to him. Or if it be ap∣parent, that he has done the same before, then let him lay the offence upon his Age, or bring some other Arguments to lesson his miscarriage. Let him say that it neither could be advantage∣ous to him, nor now.

But if nothing of this nature were committed by him, but that some of his friends did some such things, let him plead the Injustice of being accus'd for the Facts of others; and then let him shew that the rest of his Companians are sober and moderate young men. For so the Accusation will become dubious.

If it shall be said, that some others like Him have committed the same Facts, let him urge, that because certain others appear to have done the same thing, 'tis no Argument he has commit∣ted those things of which he stands accus'd. And thus he that denies himself to have done any of those things of which he is accus'd must defend himself by Probabilities. For so shall he weaken the Probability of the Accusation.

But if he is compell'd to confess, let him them compare his own with the customary practises of many, alledging that most or many, do as he happen'd to do, but if that be not possible to do, let him fly to unfortunate miscarriage or Impru∣dence for Refuge and beg for Pardon, making use for advocates of all the Common perturba∣tions of the mind, which put us beside our Reason, as Love, Anger, Wine, Ambition and

the like. And this is the most artful Method of Probability.

CHAP IX.

Of Examples.

EXamples are like Actions other where done, and contrary to those of which we now speak. And they are to be made use of when he that affirms a thing, promises to make it out when it seems not to be very pro∣bable, at what time reciting another Action, like to that recited by himself, so done as he affirms it, that so the more credit may be given to his words.

Of Examples the••e are two sorts. Some are according to Reason, others beside Reason. Ex∣amples according to Reason are easily believ'd; but such as are not according to reason seldom or never gain credit. As if a man should say the Rich are juster then the Poor, and brings for Ex∣ample certain just Actions of Rich men. These and such like Examples seem to be according to Reason, in regard most men believe the Wealthy to be juster then the Poor. But if on the other side, another Person brings Examples of Rich men doing Injury for love of Money, bringing an Example that it is not so agreeable to Pro∣bability, he shall lessen the Argument against the Rich. In like manner another Person brings Example of a thing that seems according

ing to Reason; That the Laced••emonians or A∣thenians being reinforc'd with a great Multitude of Allies, vanquish'd their Enemies, and thence will perswade the Auditors to court many Allies; These Examples are according to Reason. For all men believe that Multitude very much con∣duces to Victory. But if any one will under∣take to shew that Multitude is not the cause of Victory, he must make use of such Examples as are beside Reason, as when the Athenian Fugi∣tives with fifty men, and one Tribe, e••countring a much greater Multitude, assisted by the Lacedae∣monians their Allies, regain'd their own City. And again, But the Thebans, when the Laced••e∣monians assisted by the whole force of the Pelo∣ponnesians, invaded Baeotia, withstood their Ene∣mies alone, and utterly defeated the Laced••••moni∣ans. Again, But Dio Sayling to Syracuse with three thousand men, vanquish'd Dionysius that had five times his Number. Also the Corin∣thians, when they Sayl'd with nine Galleys to ay'd the Syracusans, drave the Carthaginians out of the City, though they had possession of the Town and the Haven with a hundred and fifty ships. Breifly, such Examples as these, that seem contrary to Reason, are often objected in Consultation to those Examples that seem much more rational.

This is therefore the nature of Examples, and they are to be us'd both ways. When we speak of things that are done according to Reason, we shew how such and such things were accomplish'd in such a manner. But when we offer Examples that seem contradictory to Reason, we shew how such and such things, though rashly undertaken

had a prosperous Issue. But they that speak against these Examples, ought to shew how these successes happen'd, and then to urge, that they rately fall out, but the other Examples frequent∣ly. And this is the use which is to be made of Examples. But when we offer Examples con∣trary to reason, we are to collect the most we can, and then to affirm, that the one as well as the other frequently happen.

Now we may produce Examples not only from these things, but from their Contraries; as if we were to shew, that some through their covetous∣ness toward their Allies have lost their Friend∣ship, and then proceeding, say, But we would have been more equal and more liberal to our Allies, and so have preserv'd their friendship a longer time. And again, as if after we had shewn, that others because they undertook the War, be∣fore they were well provided for it, were van∣quish'd, we should they say, But let us go well provided to War, for then we may have more certain hopes of success. We may also take many Examples as well from things past, as from the present affairs. For most things are partly like, partly unlike one to another. Where∣fore we need not fear to have store of Examples to refute those that are offer'd by others.

CHAP. X.

Of Conjectures.

COnjectures are whatever are done contrary to those things concerning which the Dis∣course is, and wherein the Discourse it self con∣tradicts it self. For the most Auditors, by those contrarieties which happen contrary to reason of the Common course of Action, conjecture, that there is nothing of sound and solid in those things which are said or done. And a man may make several Conjectures, by observing whether the Opponents Oration contradict it self, or whe∣ther the thing it self be contraty to the Discourse of the Speaker.

CHAP. XI.

Of Enthymemes.

ENthymemes are those things which are not on∣ly contrary to Reason and Practice, but to all other things beside. And a man may make use of many, handling them as in the Questioning Kind, observing whether the Discoure contra∣dict it self, or whether the things transacted be contrary to Justice, to the Law, to what is profitable, to Probability, to the Genius of the

Speaker, or to the nature of the Transactions. Therefore such Enthymemes are to be chosen ac∣cording to the contraries. Now the contraries to these are such as we ought to assume for our selves, shewing that our Actions and our Words are contrary to what is unjust, illegal, unprofi∣table, to the manners of wicked men, and in a word to every thing that is evil. All which ought to be spoken breifly and in few words. And in this manner we may frame many En∣thymemes, and make the best use of 'em.

CHAP. XII.

Of a Sentence.

A Sentence (to speak breifly) is the declaration of a man's proper opinion in all things.

Of Sentences there are two sorts. The one Credible, the other Paradoxical. When we speak a thing that deserves to be credited, there is no reason to be given. For neither is what is said unknown, neither does any Person contra∣dict it. But when a Paradox is spoken, the rea∣sons are in few words to be given, to avoid Lo∣quacity and the misfortune of not being believ'd. Now those Sentences are always to be spoken that are most consentaneous to the present affairs, lest what is utter'd should seem forc'd and im∣proper. And we may deduce many Sentences, either naturally, or from Hyperboles, or by way of Paromoiosis.

Natural Sentences are these, No man, in my opinion, who is unkill'd in Affairs, can be a shrewd Commander. And again, It is the duty of Prudent men, to study the Examples of things past, that they may avoid inconsiderate Errours.

Sentences from Hyberboles are these. It is much more dangerous to admit of Theives then Robbers, for the one take our money from us privately, the other openly.

By way of Paromoiosis or Similitude, these; They that steal our Money, in my opinion, do the same, as they who betray Cities. For both being trusted, they 'em, injure those that entrust. And again, They that are unjust, to me seem to be like Tyrants. For they never think they deserve punishm nt for the Injuries they do to others; but where they believe others to be offenders, they spare for no Torments. And these, if they owe me any thing, never repay it; but if I owe them any thing, they exact both the Principal and In-terest.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Signs.

A Sign is the other of the other, not every thing of every thing, nor all of all, but what uses to be before the thing, or with the thing or after the thing. And the sign is not only of the thing being, but not in being. In like manner, that which never was done is the sign not only of the thing done, but of that which was never done.

Now of these Signs some cause us to think, others to know, and in the next place those that beget the most probable opinion. Nor can we want plenty of these Signs, to speak summarily, taken singly and separately from every thing said, d ne or seen, from the greatness or smallness of those things which happen to us, either good or cvil; Also from the Testimonies, from the favourers of us or our adversaries, from them themselves, from the Prosecutions, from the times and seasons, and from many other things.

CHAP. XIV.

Of an Elenchus.

AN Elenchus or convincing Argument is that which cannot be otherwise then as we say. And it is taken from things naturally ne∣cessary to be as we say; or what the Opponent says▪ and from such things as are naturally possible or impossible; which of therefore naturally of ne∣cessity must be. As that living Creatures stand in need of Victuals; and the like. As we say, Of necessity those that are whipp'd must confess what those that lay on command 'em. Also naturally we say, 'tis impossible such a little C••••ld should steal so much Money: as not be∣ing able to bear it, and go away with so much weight. Or if the adversary should aver it to be impossible, if he should but tell us at what time we sign'd the contract at Athens: For we

are able to prove, that at that time we were absent in some other City. In a word, we have already discours'd of all manner of Proofs, and how they are to be taken from Speech, from business, and from men themselves. Now let us consider how they differ one from ano∣ther.

CHAP. XV.

Of the difference between Probable and Example, &c.

PRobable differs from Example in this, that the Hearers themselves have a notion of Probability; but Examples are brought from things as well contrary as similar. Conjectures are compos'd of contraries both in Speech and Practise. And Enthymemes differ from conjecture is a certain Repugnancy between the word and the deed. But Enthymemes remove the contra∣dictions concering other Ideas. Or else because it is not for us to comprehend a Conjecture un∣less there be some repugnancy between things and words: but an Enthymeme offers it self e∣very where and upon every thing.

Sentences differ from Enthymemes; for that Enthymemes consist of Repugnancies only; but Sentences may be utter'd as well with Repug∣nancies, as simply themselves by themselves.

Signs differ from Sentences and all other things before mention'd in this, for that all the other

things create an opinion in the Hearers; but some Signs will cause the Judges rightly to apprehend. Bes••••••s, it never happens to the rest, that we can abound in many; But we may produce many Signs. An Elenchus differs from a Sign in this, that some Signs only create an opinion in the Hearers; but an Elenchus teaches and confirms 'em in the Truth.

Now let us see what may be oppos'd to these. The opinion of the speaker is the declaration of his Sentiments touching such or such matters. And it is requisite that he shew himself experi∣enc'd in those things concerning which he dis∣courses; and that he should demonstrate how much it concerns him to speak the Truth con∣cerning such matters. And then let him make out that the Oppoment knows nothing of the matters which he undertakes to discourse of, and that his opinion is as frivolous. Which if it may not be said, then let him urge, that some∣times the most experienc'd may be in an Errour; or that it is not for his interest to speak the Truth concerning these matters.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Testimony.

A Testimony is a voluntary Confession of a known Thing. Now of necessity it must be either probable or improbable or doubtful to be believ'd: and in like manner the witness must be

either credible, or not to be believed or of doubt∣ful Credit. Now when the Testimony seems probable and and the Witness true, the Testi∣monies need no Epilogues, unless for Decorum's sake you would make use of any Sentence or Enthymeme.

But if the Witness be suspected, then it must be urg'd that he has given his Testimony neither out of Affection, for fear of Torment, nor for hopes of Gain, and that it is no way advantagi∣ous to him to testifie an untruth: For the utmost he can expect can be but a small profit: but to be convicted of a Perjury is a dangerous thing, considering the Punishments which the Law in∣flicts upon Bribery and Perjury: and thus we shall render the Witnesses Credible.

They that contradict the Witnesses are to detract from their Lives and Conversations, and to enquire into the Testimony, whether it be credible, or to contradict both at once, and to detect at once all the Vices and Enormities of the Witness and his Procurers. It is also to be en∣quir'd into, whether the Witness be a friend to him for whom he gives his Testimony, or if he haveany dealings with him; or whether he be an Enemy to him against whom he gives his Testi∣mony, or whether he be a poor man. For such as these may be suspected to swear false either for favour or fear, or in hopes of a Reward, for all which the Law has provided punishment. And therefore we may add at the same time, that it would be an absurd thing for the Judges who are bound to judge according the Law, to believe such men as the Law will not believe.

Now there is a way of stealing a Testimony,

which is this. Bear witness for me, O Calliches: By the Immortal Gods not I: for do what I could, he would needs do these Things. And therefore giving a false Testimony upon the sentence, he shall not be lyable to the Punishment inflicted upon a false Witness. But if the Adversary do any such thing, we presently lay open his foul Play, and order him to attest the Writings.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Rack.

THE Rack is the unwilling Confession of a guilty Person. And therefore when we de∣sire an ample and strong Confession, we may urge, that private Persons about most serious mat∣ters, Cities in case of greatest Discoveries, draw and make out proofs by the Torture of the Rack, and therefore the Torture of witnesses procures the best Evidence. For sometimes it may be advan∣tageous for a Witness to tell an untruth, but it is less for the Advantage of those thatare tortur'd to tell the truth. For then their pain will be the sooner over. But when we would make proofs by Tor∣ture invalid, we must first alledge, how they that are Rack'd are Enemies to those by whom they are delivered up, and therefore many speak false against their Masters: and then because many times they confess to their Tormentors whatever comes uppermost, and any thing but the Truth, to be out of their pain. Then it is

to be made out, that some freemen, to be rid of their Torments, have confess'd untruths against themselves: and therefore it is more likely that Servants should confess lyes against their Masters, to avoid the torture both of the Body and Mind, which they are never put to suffer that can frame a cunning peice of falshood.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Oaths.

AN Oath is an Asseveration utter'd with di∣vine Reverence, that wants proof. And therefore when we would enlarge upon it, we are to say, That certainly no man would forswear himself, either for fear of divine Vengeance, or of loosing his Reputation among men.

But when the Adversary flies for Sanctuary to an Oath, we are to urge, that they who will not stick to do as he has done, will not scruple a false Oath. For he that impiously thinks he can deceive the Gods, believes he may easily escape the punish∣ment of Perjury among Men.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Anticipation.

ANticipation is that, by which, while we Anticipate the ill opinions of the Hearers, and the Reasons of those that would Contra∣dict us, we remove the Difficulties that lye in our way. And thus we are to prevent the ill opinions of the Hearers.

But you may perhaps admire, that a Person so young in years as my self should undertake to speak concerning things of this High Nature. Or thus, Let no man meet me with a Sowre and Morose Countenance, because I undertake to advise ye in those things, concerning which some others have been so free with ye in their discourses.

And thus having prevented the ill will of the Hearers, we are then to bring our Reasons to shew, that we do well in speaking or advising; alleadging the want of Orators, the greatness of the Dangers, or the Public benefit, or any o∣ther Seasonable Reason.

If Nevertheless the Hearers are uneasie, it behoves us to speak breifly, either by way of Sentence or Enthymeme, That it is the absur lest thing in the world to come here to debate what is best to be done; and now when you are unwilling to heare the speaker, to think we can ever debate right. Again, That there can be no better way, then either to stand up and consult together, or else

giving ear to those that advise, to put it after∣wards to the vote, when every man has given his opinion.

This is the way to make use of Anticipaci∣tion in Popular Harangues. And the same Method must be us'd in Pleadings at the Bar: as for Example, to prevent the Disgust and Mu∣tiny of the Auditors, we may begin our Ora∣tion thus. Is it not assur'd, that when the Law-giver has ordain'd every one of the adversaries to have two Orations in his behalf, that you the Judges of the Law and by the Law, should not be willing to hear so much as one Oration, and that such a one as with all foresight has well study'•• so well for your Information, that bearing it you cannot Judg amiss? And yet you to be so remiss, as not deign∣ing to hear the beginning, you believe you know the whole merits of the Cause already. Or thus.

The Law-giver ordaines the Victory to him that has by an equal Number of Voices; how is it that you are so contrary in your Judge∣ments, that you will not hear the defences of the accus'd? The Law-giver, because those that fly are in most danger, allows 'em this Preroga∣tive of most Voices; but you cherish those that accuse in Security, and astonish those that come from the Jaws of fear and danger to make their defences.

Thus if the Disturbance be at the beginning: if afterwards in the middle of the Oration, or if but few, they may be thus check'd; That it is but just they should be now a little attentive, lest they should hinder others from judging truly, but when they have heard him out, then to do what they thought fit.

But if the whole Multitude seem discontented, then not to check the Judges, but to find fault with himself, by confessing himself in an Errour and beging Pardon. Also we may beseech the Judges to hear us with a favourable Ear. In a word, we are to reconcile our selves to the Audi∣tory, by speaking briefly; with short Sentences, and pithy Enthymemes; and by shewing that their Disturbance is Repugnant to Law, to Ju∣stice, and the Public benefit.

Now to Anticipate what may be said by the adversaty, these expressions may be concenient according to the Information we have. As thus, And perhaps he will bewail his own Penury, of which not I, but his own manner of Living is the Occasion. And again, I know he had urg'd this or that, But, &c. And thus we are to Antici∣pate what has been spok'n strenuously; for though the Reasons in his preceding Oration were never so vailid, they will not so seem, when thus lessen'd by him that comes after.

If we are to reply, and the adversary has al∣ready anticipated us, then are we thus to coun∣ter-anticipate. But this man has not only utter'd many falshoods of me before ye, but knowing he should by me be certainly refuted, he has scanda∣liz'd my Oration by Anticipation, to prevent your giving me that attention which he so humbly beg'd of you: Or, Least I should have the Liberty by speaking before ye, to wipe off those Aspersions which he has lay'd upon my Oration. But I am apt believe, that it rather behoves ye to hear my Oration from my self, then from my adversary. Or if the Accuser has hinted this before, Which I say are shrew'd Signs that he has spoken nothing

of Truth or Solidity. Thus Euripides of Phi∣loctetes.

But I must tell ye, though you think that I Have lost the Cause, by his suggesting still That I have done the wrong; it is your part To let me make my own Concerns appear, And let him his own business only mind.

CHAP. XX.

Of Petitions.

APetition, is when the speaker begs some∣thing in his Orations from the Hearers. And these Petitions are either just or unjust. Just, as when we beg attention, or a favourable con∣struction of our words. It is also just to beg to be assisted according to the Law, or not to de∣cree any thing against us contrary to the Law, or to beg Pardon for any thing that is amiss. But if we desire any thing that is contrary to the Law, then it is unjust: and we have thus distinguish'd 'em, that when we understand which desires are just, and which unjust, we may make a right use of 'em; and know when the adverfary desires any thing of the Judges that is unlawful.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Repetition.

REpetition is a Concise Commemoration of what has been said. And this is to be made use of either at the end of the Parts, or at the Conclusion of the whole Oration. Now we sum up the matter in Heads either by way of Retiocination, or by way of Election, or by way of Question, or Enumeration. By way of Ratiocination thus; I should doubt what they did, were it not manifest that they left us first. But it was prov'd that they came with an Army toward our City, not doing any thing that they promis'd.

By way of Apology thus. I have shew'd how they were the first that brake the League, and first set upon us, when we warr'd with the La∣cedemonians, designing cheifly to enslave our City.

By way of preelection, thus, But we are to remember, that we never suffer'd any harm since we made a League with these People: for frequent∣ly assisting us, they hinder'd the Lacedaemonians from wasting our Territories, and now they con∣tinue to bring us much Money.

By way of Question, thus. I would wil∣lingly ask 'em why they do not pay us our Trihutes? For they cannot say, they want Money; who are known to receive so much Money every year out

of the Place. Nor can they say, they have spent much Money upon the Administration of the Government; for manifestly they have expended less then any of the Handers.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Irony.

AN Irony is, when we know one thing and dissemble another. We must not say, that these men, who boast they have done us so much good, have been the People that have done us all this mischeif. But when we call things by con∣trary names, then thus. The••e good men were they that did the mischeif to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Confederates; but we wicked People, they that did 'em all the kindness. And thus by way of Commemo∣ration we use these Repetitions either at the Conclusion of the parts, or of the whole Ora∣tion.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Speaking Quaintly.

TO speak Quaintly, this is one Place: as when we speak Enthymemes either entire or by halves; so that the Auditors may com∣prehend the half; to which purpose we ought to include Sentences. And these pithy sayings

we are to disperse into all the parts of the Ora∣tion, never altering the words, and never utter∣ing the same in the same Sentence.

But he that would be prolix in his Orations, must divide the matter into parts, and then teach the nature and use of every thing contain'd in each part, both in private and in Common, and to declare at large his Colours and Pre∣tences.

If yet we would spin out the Oration more in length, we must make use of many words to express every particular, and make Repetiti∣ous in every part of the Oration, only let e∣very Repetition be Concise. But at the end of the Oration rammass all the Particulars of which before you had discours'd particularly and distinctly together into one heap: and thus may we prolong our Orations. But if we study Conciseness▪ we must comprehend the whole mat∣ter in one word: some few Copulatives may be us'd, but most things are to be joyn'd into one: all Repetitions taken out of the parts, and on∣ly repeated in the Conclusion.

If we study Mediocrity, then to cull out the chiefest of the Parts, and discourse only upon that. We are also to make use of the middle sort of words, neither the longest nor the short∣est; not of many about one thing; but in the middle between both. Nor must we wholly take away our Epilogues out of the middle parts, nor use 'em in all the parts: but where we de∣sire the Hearers to take most notice, there to use 'em in the end.

But if we would write a facetious Oration, take care to observe and assimilate the nature of

the words to the nature of men. Which may be done, if we consider which are the greatest, which the most accurate, which the interme∣diate both of Natures and Customs.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Disposition of Words.

THE Figures of words are three, Simple, Compound, and Metaphorical. The one terminates in a Vowel, and ends in a Vowel by Syllables. The second begins from a Mute, and ends in a Mute. The third binds Mutes and Vowels together.

There are also four orders of words; the one places parallel, or else separates like words: the second makes use of the same words, or changes 'em into others: the other calls the thing by one or more words: the other names Transactions in order, or else passes 'em by.

CAAP. XXV.

Of Interpretation.

INterpretation is first to be divided into two parts, and then to be made perspicuous. We divide Interpretation into two parts thus. First, That he is able to do both this and that other. Secondly, That this man can, the other

cannot Thirdly, That this man can do both this and that. Fourthly, That neither he nor the other can. Fifthly, That he can, but the other cannot. Sixthly, That one is able to do the other thing, but that the other is not able to do the other thing.

First, He can do both this and the other thing▪ too; Thus. But I was not only the Author of these things in your behalf, but hinder'd Timothe∣us, who was ready to march against ye.

Secondly, This man cannot, the other can; as thus. Your Embassadours cannot, but this man, who is a friend to the Spartans, is able to do your business.

Thirdly, This man can do both this and that too: He has not only shew'd himself most stout and valiant in War, but for Counsel and Advice he gives way to none.

Fourthly, Neither he nor another can. Thus; Neither he nor any other of his fellow Citizens with a small force can dislodge the Enemy.

Fifthly, But he can, the other cannot; As thus. He is vig••rous in his strength, but I am weak in body.

Sixthly, He himself can do that other thing, but the other cannot do the other thing; as thus. I that stand at the Helm am able, but he that has the Oar in his hand will never be able.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Dilucidation.

IN the first place, give to all things their own Proper Names, avoiding Ambiguities. Be∣ware of placing the Articles in their right and Proper Places; least the Composition be confus'd, nor disorderly, To the Conjunctions spoken before, add the following Copulatives: as thus. I was present, where I appointed; but he who said he would come, came not. Again, as when the same Copulative follows, For thou wert the cause of those things, and of these thou also.

Confusion of words is thus. 'Tis a hard case for this man to strike this man; for it is not clear which was the Person that strook.

How the Articles are to be properly plac'd from hence observe. This man this man injures. This is clear in the Greek, where there is a distinction of Nominative and accusative; but not in Eng∣lish, where the Verb must come between.

Sometimes one word has two significations; but that signification is to be applv'd, which is most Proper to the sense••, and which the series of the discourse requires.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Antitheta, Aequates.

ANtitheta are those things which both in name and Efficacie, are contrary to their Opposites, or either the one orthe other.

Contrary both in name and words, thus; For it is not ••ust, that t••i•• m•••• en••o••ing my ••∣stat▪ should gro•• Rich; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 t••at I b••i••g depriv'd of my own, sho••ld ••e thus miserably Poor.

Contra•••• in name only, as thus. Let the Rich ••nd ••••p••y give to the Poor and Miserable: Contrary in Efficacy thus. I cur'd this man when he lay sick, but he has done me the greatest injuries Imaginable. Here is a contrariety in the deed, not in the words. So that the nea∣test Antithesis is both in name and thing.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of Equation.

EQuation is when two even clauses are pro∣nounc'd: and thus many small clauses may be equal to a few great ones, and equal in Big∣ness to equal in Number. And this is the form of Equation, Either for want Money, or through the greatness o•• the War. For these Clauses are neither like nor contrary, yet are they e∣qual one among another.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Paromoiosis, or like Caden••ies.

PAromoiosis is that which is bigger then Equa∣tion: For it does not only make Clauses even, but a like, and of like words; as thus

Bring a desire equal to that Imitation of Oration which becomes thee: But chiefly the Conclusions of the words are to be alike. Now those are like words, that confist of like Syllables, wh••rein most Letters are the same as in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; or as in the English Warm, Harm, Charm, Arm. Or as if we should say, This clink the Close is now left off by us in Prose, And so we pass again to Exordiums.

CHAP. XXX▪

Of Exordiums.

THE Exordium, is a Preparation of the Auditors, and a Summary Declaration of the Subject to those that know it not, that they may understand the subject of the Discourse, and give Attention to it; and as far as we are able, to desire their favourable Constru∣ction of our words.

In making our first proposition to the hearers, thus; I stood up, to advise, how we should carry on the War against the Syracusans. Or, I stood up to shew, that it did not behove us to assist the Syra∣cusans. And this a brief summing up of the Matter.

Now how to perswade to attention, we shall best know from hence, if we understand what words and subjects most provoke our attention. Now we are generally most attentive when we consult either about great things, or terrible

things, or things familiar to us. Or when the Orator tell us they will demonstrate to us, how just, how honest, how useful, how easie to be accomplish'd those things are to which they ex∣hort us: or request the Auditory to hear 'em with Attention. Therefore as they themselves use to deal by others, so likewise we choosing out of the premises, the most proper to the business in hand, and making 'em clear to the Hearers, shall gain their Attention.

Then we shall acquire their favour and good Will, observing first how they stand affected to our selves in particular, whether kindly or mo∣rosely, whether well or ill. If they are benevo∣lent, it will be needless to speak of benevolence, but if we must needs take notice of their kindness, we ought to speak briefly with an Ironie in this manner. How great has been my affection to this City; and how often, by my perswasion, you have acted with great profit ad advantage; and how just I have shewn my self to r e Public, rather choosing to ex∣pend of my own, then to be a Debtor to the Common∣wealth, I d••em it ne••aless to put ye in mind, who know it so well already; now therefore if you will be rul'd by me, I shall endeavour to shew ye, how ye may do well.

But if the Hearers are neither opposite, nor well dispos'd, we may tell 'em, That it is but just and useful, that they should be kind to such and such Citizens, and discourage those who have as yet given no experiment of themselves. Then we may stroke the Auditory with an Encomium, That they have always been accustom'd to pass their iudments gravely and justly.

Also Extenuations may be us'd; as thus: I stood

up, not confiding so much in my Eloquence, but be∣lieving I should offer that which would be for the benefit of the Public.

But as for those that are obnoxious to Accu∣sations, of necessity either themselves, or the matter of which they discourse, or the Oration it self must contain the Accusations. Now these Scandals are drawn either from the time past or present. If any suspicion be had of any, from the time past, then make use of Anticipa∣tion towards the Auditors. Nor am I ignorant, that I lye under some kind of Scandal among ye: But I shall make all those appear to be false. Then make a short Apology in the Exordium (if thou hast any thing to say for thy self, or in repeal of the Judgments) for if a man lie under any Scan∣dal privately or publickly, judgment will surely follow, or else has been already, or else the Ac∣cusers will not take judgment; and we must then say that the thing was unjustly adjudg'd; or that we were injur'd by our Enemies: or if this be not so probable; that it ought to suffice for us, who had then the worst of it, and that it is un∣just, since the Matters are already decreed, to bring the Accusations upon the Stage again.

But if the Sentence be likely to prove notorious, then alleadge thy self prepar'd to answer all Ac∣cusations in this most honourable Assembly, and that if thou hast done the Commonwealth any injury knowingly and of set purpose, thou art ready to suffer. If the Enemies do not insist violent∣ly, then bring the Argument of conjecture, That because they believe they have accus'd us false∣lv, therefore they desist from their Prosecution. For it is not probable that they should refuse to

have Judgment given, had they brought a real Accusation. Also we ought at the same time to inveigh against Calumny, letting the world know how venomous, how pernicious, and of how many mischiefs it is the common Cause: and how many men have been ruin'd by false Accusations. We may also declare how idle a thing it is for those that consult the common safety not to hear what is said by all, and then to consider what they hear, but to lye festring the Accusations of particular persons. And therefore for thy part, thou art to declare and promise, that thou wilt offer nothing but what is just, honourable, and profitable.

Accusations from the present time are brought against Orators, first for their Age. For if they be either too young or too old, the Auditory is offended. Or if the Orator speak without inter∣mission, for them he seems to take too much bu∣siness upon him, though he never spake before, and he seems to speak for some private end, that harangues contrary to the common custom.

For these things, excuses and pretences must be alledged by the younger person, from want of Advisers, or that he has not chosen any Sub∣ject, but what may become his Age, as the Gym∣nasium, Horses, Armes, Warlike preparations, all which Subjects are proper for Youth to han∣dle.

He may also insist, that if his years do not per∣mit to be as yet so wise, howe're, that he may have acquir'd it by study and diligence: and he may do well to intimate, that by his failing no man suffers but himself, but if it be profitable what he says, the whole Nation will receive the Benefit.

A Person superanunated, brings his excuses likewise from the want of Advisers, and his own sufficiency; from the greatness and novelty of the dangers that threaten. Or if he be one that has frequently advis'd, from his Experience; and from the shame it would be, that he who had so often advis'd, should not now be permitted to speak.

These are reproaches as to the Person; but there are other as to the Matter. When the Ora∣tor perswades quiet to those who have done no injury, or those that are Superiour in Power, or to make an ignominious Peace, or perswades a niggardly Parcimony as to the Sacrifices to the Gods.

Here Anticipation must be made use of to∣wards the Auditors, and the Causes of these things must be referr'd either to Necessity or Fortune, or the Times, or some particular Advantage; and alledge, that not the Advisers, but the things themselveves are the occasion of the Acci∣dents.

Now the Oration accuses in Popular Haran∣gues, when it is either long, or too Antique, or not over probable. If prolix, the reason must be ascrib'd to prolixity of the Subjects. If ancient, yet that it is at this time seasonable; if not proba∣ble, promise to make it appear true in the pro∣gress of the Oration.

And thus we are to constitute our Popular Harangues; but how shall we order 'em? If there be no exception against the Matter nor the Orations, expose the Proposition presently at the beginning: then request attention and benevolent Audience. But if there be any Exceptions, we

are to anticipate the Auditory, bringing first our Apologies, and Excuses as briefly as we can, and requesting the favour of the Hearers.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Narration.

AFter all this, there is a necessity that either we relate or call to mind past Transactions, or that we declare present Actions, or that we fore∣tell such as are to come to pass hereafter. If then we were to repeate the Transctions of an Embas∣sie, it would behove us to relate all things that were said perspicuously, that first the Gran∣deur of the Oration might appear. For this would be only a bare Narrative, where no other Figure of speech would interfere. So that if any miscarriage happen'd, the Hearers may believe that it did not fall out through any negligence of ours, but for some other Cause. But if it fell out according to our expectation, they may not believe it happen'd by Chance, but by means of Industry and Sedulity. And this they will the more easily believe, seeing that if they were not present at the Transaction of Affairs, they may observe by our Alacrity in the delivery of our Relation, that we have not left out any thing, but that we accurately give an accompt of every thing. But in a Popular Harangue, when we either call to mind things past, or make a re∣lation of the present Affair, or foretell what is to come, we are to do these things, briefly, per∣spicuously,

and not with probability. Perspicu∣ously, that the Hearers may understand what is said; Briefly, that they may remember what is spoken; faithfully, lest before we haveconfirm'd our Oration by proofs and legality of Proceed∣ings, the Hearers should reject our Relation. We shall perspicuously make appear either from words, or from the business it self. From the business it self, if we do not relate the Matters confusedly and out of order, but such as were first done or to be done, in the first Place: and the rest afterwards in their Order; and not forsaking the Order which we have propos'd to our selves, to fall up∣on another thing.

In Words we shall be perspicuous, when we re∣late the Transactions in words proper to the Matter; and if we place our words according to the common custom, and not confusedly or prefunctorily; but always observing a Cohe∣rency.

In Brevity we shall be perspicuous, if both from things and words we cut off those things which are not necessary to be spoken; leaving only those things, which if they should be taken away, the Oration would be obscure and diffi∣cult to be understood. We shall be thought faithful, and to be credited, if we bring Reasons, by which the things that are said to be done may seem to be probable. And as for those things that are like to fall under too great a Censure of Improbability, to lay 'em quite aside. But if of necessity they must be spoken, the Orator must relate the things upon his own knowledge, and reserving 'em to the Proper place of refutation, where he intends to handle

other things that are intermix'd, must promise in the Progress of his Oration to make 'em out to be true, pretending first to make out other things more difficult; which being, done, there is no Question but they will believe the rest. Which is the way to cure the Incredulity of the Hearers.

CHAP. XXXII.

AN no w we shall order these Narrations, Manifestations and Predictions after a threefold manner. For if the Actions of which we discourse be few, and notorious to the Hearers, we must joyn the Relation to the Ex∣ordium, least that part being plac'd separately should seem too short.

But when the affairs are very many and un∣known, it is requesite that Relations be join'd to every one, and that we make 'em out to be just, profitable and honest, by which means we may not only make a bare Relation without any Variety, but take the Ears of the Hearers. But if they be Actions but of a middle con∣cernment, then the Relation, or the Manifesta∣tion, or the Prediction must be plac'd in the Exordium, as part of the Body of it; which may be done, if we Prosecute the Relation from the beginning of it without intermission, not taking in any thing, but barely and nakedly relating the things themselves.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of Confirmation.

OF necessity, Confirmation must follow next, to confirm the Relations foregoing by just and profitable Proofs, as•• we promis'd before to do. Seeing then we are to make our Relations closely connex'd together, the most proper Proof for Popular Harangues are to be drawn from the Custom of things, from Example, from Com∣memoration, and from the Opinion which all men conceive of the Orator. And if we happen upon any other Proofs, they are to be made use of.

Now these Proofs are thus to rank'd. First, the opinion concerning the Speaker. Which if it cannot be done, then first the usual Custom of things; where we must shew, That the things by us related, and the like to them, usually were wont to be done in this manner; and then we must bring Examples: and if there be any thing of Similitude with those things which we have spok'n, we must not omit it. Those Examples also are to be made choice of, which are both agreeable to the matter and to the Auditory; and next in place or time. But if there be none such, then from such other things as are of greatest importance and most notoriously kown. After this, we must make use of Sentence. For we are to terminate these parts where Probabili∣ties and Examples were handl'd, with Enthymemes and Sentences. And this is to be done for the confirmation of matters.

But if credit be immediately given to the Re∣lation, we may omit the Proofs themselves, and deduce the Confirmation of the Actions before rehears'd from assertions of just, legal, useful, pleasant, easie, possible and necessary. And if it be so, just is to be plac'd in Front; proceed∣ing with what is like to just, what contrary to just, and what has been adjudg'd to be just.

Examples are also to be brought like to those things by thee averr'd to be just. And you will have many things to say from those things by every one in particular suppos'd to be just, and from those things so deem'd in the same City where the Oration is deliver'd, as also in several other Cities, concluding in the end with Sentences, and midling Enthymemes, differing one among another, if the part be prolix; and if we de∣sign to recollect, making use of a concise Re∣petition. But if it be of a moderate length, with a Recapitulation, puting an end to that part, we may begin another. As for Example;

That it is just for us to assist the Siracusans, I believe to be sufficiently made out by what we have said. Now that it will be also for our advantage, I shall endeavour to shew ye. And then again, as to Profit and Advantage, the same Method is to be observ'd, as has been taught in reference to Just, adding to the end of the part either a Re∣petition or a Conclusion, and then beginning a∣gain with what remains behind: And this is the way to joyn one part to another, and so finish the whole contexture of the Oration. At last having by Proofs sufficiently confirm'd the thing which thou wouldst perswade, then Sum∣marily with Enthymemes, Sentences, and Flourishes,

it behoves thee to shew, that it is unjust, disad∣vantagious, infamous, and unpleasant to act o∣therwise; adding a breif Antithesis, that it is both just, profitable, honourable and delightful to follow thy Counsel and Advice, closing up the whole with certain grave and pithy Sen∣tences.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of Anticipation.

ANticipation is when we endeavour to vilifie the objections that have been made a∣gainst what has been said by us. Therefore it behoves us to lessen the objections of the ad∣versary, and extol our own Assertions; to which purpose it will be requisite to compare one with one, if thine be the greater, or more with more, or one with many, or many with one: and when we have done this, we must conclude with Repetitions, and the fore mention'd Colours and Flourishes of Ratiocination, Enumeration, Election, Interrogation and Irony.

CHAP. XXXV.

Several manners of Perswasion.

BUT now, if we were to perswade the giv∣ing assistance either to private Persons or to Cities; Brevity will be most convenient: and if any acts of Friendship, Favour, or Pity have

formerly past between them and the Auditors, it will be well remember'd. For men are apt to assist those who have been formerly so affected toward 'em: and have a kindness for those from whom, or from whose friends, either themselves or their Relations have receiv'd any kindness, or so believe. Now if we find that any thing of this has been done, it is to be urg'd to excite Compassion. It is also to be made out, that they either do or may or are like to suffer un∣justly▪ unless they are assisted by the Auditory.

If these Places are wanting, we are to prove 'em destitute of all those Felicities that other men enjoy, and that they never can be able to arrive at any thing of a happy Condition, un∣less the Auditory take pity upon 'em. And thus we incite to Compassion.

But we divert from pity by alledging the contraries, laying open the whole business, and by Proofs demonstrating to the Auditory, that what they go about to do is unjust, illegal, per∣nicious, infamous, &c.

But he that would contradict the Perswasions of others, must lay down in his Exordium the Assertions of his adversary, which he designs to oppose; what else he has to say must be done in several Prologues by themselves. After the Prologues, he is to prove every one of the said Assertions to be either false, or unjust, or il∣legal, or pernicious, nor consentanous to what the adversary exhorts. Which he must do by proving his Allegations of Falshood, Injustice, Illegality, Perniciousness, &c. And this is the cheifest way of Disswasion.

But if this be not to be done, then make use

of what remains: as if the adversary Demonstrate the thing to be just, endeavour thou to prove it infamous, or unprofitable, or irksome, or impossible, or whatever else may be proper to thy purpose▪

If the adversary demonstrates the thing to be profitable, do thou prove it to be unjust, or bring whatever other objection may stand thee in stead: magnifying thy own, and clouding the Arguments of thy adversary. Nor will it be amiss to make use of Enthymemes and Sen∣tences, and at length to sum up all in a Recapi∣tulation, having first refuted the Anticipations of the Adversary.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of Praise and Dispraise.

IN praising and dispraising we are to order our Proems after the same manner as in the Deliberative kind. After the Proem we are to divide the benefits external to vertue, and the benefits internal in vertue. The benefits ex∣ternal to vertue are Health, Strength, Beauty, Wealth. Internal vertues are Wisdom, Justice, Fortitude, and the more noble Sciences. Now we praise those things that are scated and inherent in vertue. But as for the Strong, the Healthy, the Rich, the Beautiful and the High born, we do not applaud them, but we say that they are happy. Which things being diligently con∣sider'd, we order the Genealogy in the first place: for that, both as to men, and all other Creatures

is in the first place either noble or ignoble. And therefore we rightly begin the praises either of men or of any other Creature from their de∣scent. But when we design to extol any affecti∣on, or thing, any Oration, or Estate, we praise what is most worthy Commendation in them.

From the Stock we derive our Encomiums thus. If his Progenitors were famous, we are to enu∣merate every one from the first of the race to the Person living, and of every one make some re∣markable Observation. If the first were persons of Industry, and men of Renown, and that the rest were Persons never noted for any worthy Acts, we are to extol the first, and pass by the rest, pretend∣ing that by reason of the great number of his An∣cestors, thou wilt not be tedious in ennumerating the whole Line besides that it cannot be un∣known to all men, that they who are born of generous Parents, generally tread the footsteps of their Fore-fathers. But if the first Progenitors were men of ill Fame, and the Father and Grand∣father Persons of Renown, the first are to be omitted under pretence of Prolixity: and the last are to be applauded, not doubting but the Progenitors of such Persons were equal in value to them. But if there were nothing of Splendid Ancestry, praise the Person himself for his own Generosity and Bravery, adding, that all men are well born who are born to Vertue; and that they are to be preferr'd before all others, who are born to be the Ornaments of their own Parentage, and give lustre to their Ancestry; for that many times Persons born of Noble Parentage, dege∣nerate.

The same Method is to be used in vilifying the Parentage of any Person.

When we come to the Actions of the Person whom we applaud, we are first to begin with his Justice, then commend him for his Prudence, next for his Fortitude; and in every Encomium, it will not be amiss to use many words, to render the Oration Splendid and Magnificent.

In villyfying, Ironies are of great use, and to deride the Adversary in those things for which he chiefly magnifies himself.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of the sorts of Questions.

INterrogation is chiefly useful against Contra∣dictions. And they that Interrogate must begin in the same manner with those that are accus'd. Where when we have brought proper pretences at the beginning for so doing, we are then to proceed to Interrogate. Now the Proper pretences in Ci∣vil Assemblies are, that we do not do it for con∣tentions sake, but to make the matter plain to the Auditory; and because the Adversary first began with us. Now in private Disputes we are to alledge the Enmities, or the ill manners of the Persons interrogated, or their Affection to the Adverse party. In public Disputes we must al∣ledge Legality, Justice and Public profit.

The Proem thus fram'd out of these, and things like these, after we have propounded in order every one of the things done, said, or

thought, we must make our Interrogations, and shew how they are contrary to Justice, to Law, to publick and private Profit; and then we must consider all together, whether they are contrary to themselves, to the Manners of good men, or such as seem to be so.

But to avoid prolixity in ennumerating every one particularly one by one, how much the more we prove the Persons interrogated to be averse to ingenious Studies, to good Actions, or good Manners, by so much the more shall we render 'em obnoxious to the Auditors. Nor must we interrogate with a severe and morose Counte∣nance; but a mild and winning Aspect. By which means the Orators will avoid all pretence of Scandal, and their Orations will be the more acceptable to the People.

When we have diligently interrogated as much as is needful, and enlarg'd upon the Questi∣ons, then it will be requisite to sum up all at the conclusion, for the satisfaction of the Auditory.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

The Peroration.

NOW then it behoves those that speak and write, to deliver their Orations according to the Actions, and to accustom our selves to make use of all these things promptly and rea∣dily. How then to speak Artificially both in private and public Disputes, and in Converse with others, we have here the most, and the most Artifi∣cial

assistances. But an Orator must not only be careful of his Words, but of his Life, to adorn it with the Idea's afore mention'd. For the care of a mans Life and Conversation avails as well to per∣swasion, as to the gaining of Esteem and Repu∣tation. First then, we are to divide things ac∣cording to the division of true Discipline, what is to be handl'd in the first, and what in the second, what in the third, and what in the fourth place. Then we are to make those preparations which are necessary for the Auditors, as in the Chap∣ter of Exordiums. For we may win favour to our Persons if we keept constant to our Professions, and preserve the same friends while we live; not wavering in our Studies, but still following the same course. We shall render the Auditors at∣tentive, if our Subjects be always Important, Ho∣nourable and Profitable. Now having made the Au∣ditory both kind and attentive, when we come to propose our Matter, whatever contains the diswa∣sion from Evil, and the perswasion to Good, they will readily and easily admit, as being for their advantage, or else reject the contrary. Now to render thy Oration brief, perspicuous and profita∣ble, this is to be done. Thou shalt quickly con∣clude if thou doest not design to act all toge∣ther, but the first, first of all, and the next in order. Thou wilt be perspicuous, if thou makest an end of one thing before thou passest to another.

Thy Oration will be probable, if thou doest not act any thing contrary to thy own Genius, and the good opinion had of thee; and if thou dost not pretend the same Persons to be both thy Friends and Enemies.

Of Proofs, we are to make choice of those

which we know to be so proper to accomplish our business, that we are able to explain 'em to others: but as for such as we have not real know∣lege of, to take those as they most frequently happen. For thou shall act most securely in things of this nature, if thou art guided by custom.

In Disputes with the Adversary, if we con∣tend by way Oration, we must make out our Proofs out of those things that are spoken.

But if the Dispute be about Contracts, we are to proceed according to the Laws both writ∣ten and unwritten, with the choicest witnesses, and at a time perfix'd.

And in the Conclusion we shall the better im∣print into the Memory of the Auditors, what has been spoken, if we make a brief and summary Repetition.

Of our Actions we shall put 'em in mind, when we handle the same again, or like the for∣mer.

We shall win the good will of the Auditory, if we act those things by which they have receiv'd, or do or are like to receive any Benefit. And we shall act great things if we undertake Actions that are the Causes of many and honorable events. And these are the Preparations we must make toward a vertuous Life: the former Treatises concern'd the Exercises of Eloquence.

FINIS.