CHAP. 20.
That euery kind of error is not sinne: neither because we often erre in some things, all assent in matters is to be abrogated and taken away, as the Academical Philosophers would haue it.
YEt can I not certainely set downe, whether it may bee called an error, when a man hol∣deth a good opinion of an euill man, not knowing what he is in manners and conuersation: or else when, in stead of those things which wee discerne by our corporall senses, the like are presented vnto vs, beeing either spiritually perceiued, as it were, with the body; or bodily percei∣ued, as it were in the spirit. Page 50 Much like vnto that which the Apostle Peter beleeued to be sor indeed, when he thought he saw a sight, beeing suddainely deli∣uered out of prison and fetters by the angel: or in corporall things, when that which is hard, is accounted easic; or that sweet, which is sower: or that which is vnsauourie, to be pleasāt in smel: or else that it thundreth, when a chariot runneth: or when one man is taken for another, two beeing alike; which oftentimes happeneth in twins; whereupon the Poet affirmeth, that mista∣king in such cases, is an accepta∣ble error in Parents. And so whe∣ther many other things of like condition, be to be pronounced sinnes. This question, though it be most knottie and intangled, hauing troubled the heads of the subt〈…〉t Academiees, yet haue I vndertaken to vnfould it; that is to say, Whether a wife man ought to giue his approbatiō of any thing to 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 he should allow Page 51 of falshood for truth; seeing all things, as they do affirm, lie either hidden in the secrets of nature, or els be ambiguous & vncertaine. Whereupon I composed three Books, when I was first conuer∣ted, to take away those stūbling blocks, which stood in the dore (as it were) to withstand me. Also the despaire of finding out the truth, was to be remooued, the same beeing fortified by their reasons & arguments. With thē therefore, all error is accounted sin: which they defend to be ine∣uitable, •nles euery mans parti∣cular approbation in any thing, be vtterly suspēded. For, they do hold that mā to be in error, who∣soeuer assenteth vnto things vn∣certaine, affirming that nothing subiect vnto the eie of mā•s cer∣tain & infallible; because ther is no sensible difference betweene falshoode and truth in outward appearance; although some∣times, that falleth out to bee truth, which seemeth to bee the same, a positiō maintained with Page 52 most impudent, though ingeni∣ous arguments. Howbeit, with vs in diuinitie, it is said, that the righteous man liueth by faith. But, if assent and approbation be taken away, faith also is destroy∣ed. Because, without approbati∣on or allowance, wee beleeue in nothing. And those inuisible things concerning our saluati∣on, bee most true and certaine, though they be vnseene; which, if they be not beleeued, it is im∣possible to come to euerlasting life, which is not otherwise but eternall. I know not therefore, whether we may say as they say, who bee so farre from thinking that they shall liue for euer, as they know not whether they do liue while they be in this world: wherein they doe plead igno∣rance, although it bee a thing which they cannot but know. For, there is no man admitted in reason to say, that hee knoweth not whether hee liueth or not; because, if hee bee not a liuing Page 53 creature, hee hath no sense or vnderstanding at all: because, not onely to know, but also not to know, be properties incident onely to the liuing. Howebeit, in denying that they doe liue, they would seeme to preuent error: when as in very deede, by that matter of error, they are cō∣uinced as by a consequence, that they beleeue hee cannot erre which liueth not. As therefore, it is not onely true, but also very certaine, that wee liue; so like∣wise bee many things true and very certaine, whereof for vs to giue allowance and approbati∣on, God forbid but that it should bee rather accounted wisdom, than madnesse in vs.
