Saint Augustine his enchiridion to Laurence, or, The chiefe and principall heads of all Christian religion a most profitable booke to all those which desire to haue a most compendious briefe of Augustines doctrine, out of Augustine himselfe, when he was old, being repurged, by the old manuscript, of many faults and vnusuall wordes, wherewith it formerly flowed.

Of Faith and Hope what they are, and what difference & agree∣ment there is betweene them.

CHAP. 5.

The first thing in Christian re∣ligion is Faith: and the last is the full sight of Gods pre∣sence, Iesus Christ beeing the end of Faith.

WHen the minde is first of al seasoned with faith, which worketh by charity, it procee∣deth by good life at length to come to a visible knowledge and sight of God; in which place, to the godly and pure in heart, there is a knowen and vnspea∣kable beauty; the full sight and contemplation whereof, is ac∣counted the highest happinesse. And this is that indeede which may satisfie you in your desire to know, What is the first, and what the last in religion, which hath his beginning in faith, and con∣summation in Christ. This is al∣so the summe and effect of the generall definition of religion. And to know Christ, is the true and proper foundation of Ca∣tholike faith. For an other foun∣dation, saith the Apostle, No mā can lay, other then that which is already laid, which is Christ Ie∣sus. Neither is this therefore to be denied to be the proper and onely foundation of Catholike

faith, because some heretiques are deemed to holde vpon the same ground that we doe. For, if those things which pertaine to Christ, bee diligently conside∣red, Christ is to bee found in all Heretickes but onely in name, who would bee called Christiās, though Christ indeed dwelleth not in them. Which to demon∣strate, is too long a worke, be∣cause all kinds of heresies were then to be specified; either those that were, they which now bee, or else might bee vnder the title of a christian: And so should it be also tedious to discourse of the truth it selfe particularly, and in all points thereof. Which dispu∣tation, would make so many vo∣lumes, as it would seeme infinite and endlesse.

CHAP. 6.

Sound doctrine may with more fa∣cility and breuity be deliuered, than heresies confuted.

THou therefore desirest at my hands an Enchiridion, that is to say, a thing which may bee comprehended in your hands, and not load a Librarie. To re∣turne therefore to these three things; namely, Faith, Hope, and Charitie, by which we affirmed that God was to be worship∣ped; it is easily declared, what it is wee must beleeue, what wee must hope for, and what wee are to affect or loue. But how it may bee defended against the detra∣ctions and slaunders of those which hold varietie of opinions, that is a doctrine of greater la∣bour and circumstance. For the accomplishment whereof, the hand must be filled, not with a short Enchiridion, but the breast inflamed with a vehement affe∣ction.

CHAP. 7.

In the Apostles Creed and the Lords Praier, those three prin∣cipall positions touching the ser∣uice of God; namely, Faith, Hope, and Charitie, be contai∣ned, and most briefly deliuered.

FOr this matter looke vpon the Creede, and the Lords praier: Then the which, what is there to bee heard or read, of greater breuitie, or what more easily committed to memorie? Because therefore, mankinde in respect of sin, was pressed down with the heauy burthen of mise∣rie, and stood in neede of Gods mercie; and that the Prophet foreseeing the time of Gods fa∣uour, saith, And euery one which calleth vpon the name of God, shall besaued: for this cause was the Lords praier vsed. Howbeit, the Apostle after hee had cited that Propheticall testimony, to set

forth the mercy of God; hee forth-with laieth down this al∣so, saying, How can they call vp∣on him, of whom they haue not be∣leeued? For which cause the Creed was deuised. In which two wordes, looke vpon these three things: Faith beleeueth, and Hope and Charitie bee our Orators. But, without faith, these two cannot be; by which reason faith also is a partie in our petiti∣ons. Whereupon it is said, How shall they call vpon him, of whom they haue not beleeued?

CHAP. 8.

What difference there is betweene Hope and Faith: of what things Faith doth consist, and of what also Hope: Also what Christi∣an Faith did properly apprehēd. Finally, that the knot and bond of these three vertues, namely. Faith, Hope, and Charity, was not to be seuered or diuided a∣mongst themselues.

NOw what can be hoped for, which is not beleeued? But yet on the contrary, something may bee beleeued, which is not hoped for. For which of the faithfull doe not beleeue that there be punishments ordained for the wicked? yet doth he not hope to taste therof. Which pu∣nishments who so beleeueth may fall vpon himselfe, and is inwardly troubled with the hor∣ror thereof, in the vanishing cō∣ceit of his own minde; that man is more rightly said to feare, in this case, then to hope. Which two wordes, Lucan distingui∣shing, doeth thus describe them;

The feareful man may yet haue hope.

Howbeit, on the other side, it is not so properly spoken by an o∣ther Poet, though he be the bet∣ter in reputation:

If I could hope for no more griefe but this.

Finally, diuers in the rules of Grammar doe borrow this word

for an example, to shewe how improperly it is vsed; who say, he vsed that word sperare (which is to hope) for, or in stead of ti∣mere, which is to fear. Ther is a faith therefore, both of euill things & of good; because both good and bad be beleeued, and that with a cheerefull, and not a fearefull faith. There is a faith al∣so of things past, things present, and things to come. For, we be∣leeue that Christ died, which is already past. We beleeue that he sitteth at the right hand of his father, which is at this instant. We beleeue that he shall come to iudge; a thing that shall be. A. faith, likewise, of things apper∣taining to our selues, and also of things concerning other men. For euery man beleeueth that he had a beginning, and therefore that hee was not from euerla∣sting; whereof there bee many semblable instances. Neither do we onely beleeue many, things! touching other men in matter

of religion, but likewise also of Angels. Hope also is not but of good euents; and not also, but of things to come: properly like∣wise concerning him, who is thought to put a trust and confi∣dence in the same. Which being so, Faith is to bee distinguished from Hope, as well by a diffe∣rence agreeing with reason, as with the sense of the word. For, as touching those wordes, non videre, that is to say, not to see; in that sense, Faith and Hope be all one. For in the epistle to the He∣brewes, which testimony the fa∣mous defenders of the Catho∣lique doctrine haue vsed, Faith is said to be a knowledge of things which be not seene. Although on the other side, when any man shall say, that he beleeued not, either wordes, witnesses, or any reasons; but things present, which he plainely saw (that is to say, grounded his faith thereup∣on) seemeth not to be so absurd, ••s that he may be rightly repre∣hēded

in the sense of the Word; out of the which, it may be said vnto him, Thou didst see, there∣fore thou didst not beleeue. Wher∣upon may be gathered, that it is no consequence, that the thing is not to be seene, which is to be beleeued. But indeede, wee doe more properly call that faith, which, as the sacred scriptures haue taught vs, is of things inui∣sible. Touching Hope also, the Apostle saith, that that hope is no hope at all, which is of things visible. For to what ende doth a man hope in those things which he seeth? But, if wee hope for those things which wee see not, we patiently tarry in expectance thereof. Whereas the godly doe beleeue, that good things shall fall vnto their portion: it is as much to say, as they bee hoped for of the good. But now, what shall I say of Loue, without which, Faith is of no force? for indeed, Hope cannot bee with∣out Loue. Finally, as the Apostle

Iames saith, The very Diuels doe beleeue, and tremble: howebe it, they neither hope, nor yet loue; but rather feare, in belieuing that the same shall come to passe hereafter, which wee doe hope for, and affect. For which cause, the Apostle Paul doth allow of that faith, which worketh by loue, and which also cannot bee without hope. To conclude therefore, neither loue can bee without hope, nor hope without loue; nor either of them without faith.

CHAP. 9.

For the vnderstanding of Christi∣an Faith, the tedious and darke knowledge of naturall causes is not needfull; but only the know∣ledge of that cause, which is the efficient of all things, the same beeing God, that trinitie; that is to say, the Father, Sonne, and Holy Ghost.

WHen the question is there∣fore,

What we ought to beleeue in matter of religion; in this case, the nature of things is not so cu∣riously to be looked into, as it is of them, whom the Greekes call Naturall Philosophers. Neither let it be fearefull to any Christi∣an, if hee bee ignorant in some thing, touching the force and number of the elemēts, the mo∣tion, order, and effects of the pla∣nets, the celestiall globe, the kinds and natures of liuing crea∣tures, hearbs, stones, springs, ri∣uers, mountaines; as also of the distances betvveene places and times, the signes of imminent stormes, and sixe hundred the like matters, which they haue found out, or else doe impute to their ovvne inuention: Because they haue not been the Authors of these things, albeit they vvere inducd vvith excellent vvits, fer∣uent in desire, full of leasure, dis∣couering some things by hu∣mane coniecture, and other things againe, by historicall ob∣seruation;

and in those things also, which they do appropriate to their owne inuention, they do in most matters rather guesse at them, then knovv them certain∣ly. It is enough for a Christian to beleeue, that the cause of all things which bee created, either in heauen, or vpon earth, visible or inuisible, is not othervvise then of the goodnesse of the Creator, which is the onely and true God: and that there is no nature, which either hee himselfe is not, or else is not deriued from him: himselfe beeing the Trini∣tie; that is to say, the father, and the sonne begottē of the father; and the Holy Ghost proceeding from the same father; hovvebeit one and the selfe same spirit, as vvell of the father, as of the sonne.

CHAP. 10.

All things were created good of God, howbeit not without their mutation or change, ne yet ab∣solute, nor of one corresponden∣cie amongst themselues.

OF this absolute, correspon∣dent, & vnchangeable good Trinitie, all things vvere crea∣ted, beeing yet in themselues, neither absolutely, semblably, or vnchangeably good; hovvbe∣it, euery one of them particular∣ly good, and beeing also vnited, they are likevvise in that vniuer∣sall body, or masse of all-toge∣ther, exceeding good: Because of this generalitie and all-toge∣ther, that vvonderfull beauty of the vvorld is composed.

CHAP. 11.

The reason why God doth suffer euils to raigne in the world. That euill is none other thing then a priuation of naturall goodnesse, which priuation is not a thing of it selfe.

IN which matter, that also which is called euill, beeing vvell marshalled, and rightly placed, doth more visibly com∣mend those things which be cal∣led good, to the end they might be more plausible and commen∣dable, beeing compared vvith those things which be euill. For neither vvould the omnipotent God (which the infidels also doe confesse) in as much as himselfe is vniuersally good, by any meanes suffer any euill to bee in his ovvne vvorkes; but that also his omnipotency and goodnesse is such, as that he maketh that e∣euill to be beneficiall vnto vs.

For God, either in reforming, or in punishing of the integritie of nature, beeing corrupted and vi∣tious, doeth turne it to the good of man. By which meanes conse∣quently that which is euill, shall not be a perpetuall blemish; be∣cause it is not any thing when it is purged & remooued. For, what other thing is that which is cal∣led euill, than a priuacion of that which is tearmed good? For it fa∣reth, as it is in the bodies of li∣uing creatures, wherein to be in∣fected vvith diseases, and hurtes, is nothing els, but to vvāt health: Neither doeth it fall out, when there is a remedie applied, that those euils which had gotten possession of the bodie (that is to say, diseases and hurts) should re∣mooue from thence, and remain or be else-where; but rather that they should haue no beeing at all. For, that which is called a dis∣ease or hurt, is not any substance or matter of it selfe, but rather a corruption or infection of a car∣nall

substance. Seeing therefore flesh is onely that which is called substance, certainely there is some good whereunto those e∣uils be accidentall; that is to say, priuations of that good, which is called health. Euen so, whatsoe∣uer faults be in the minde, they bee the priuations of naturall goodnesses. Which, when they be cured, they be not translated to any other place: but they which had a locall beeing, haue now no beeing at all, seeing they shall not haue any place or abode in that which is cured and made whole.

CHAP. 12.

Albeit all creatures, as they be natures, be made good by God; yet, because they be not immu∣tably good, certain of them may bee corrupted. And that their corruption or vice, is nothing els, but a losse, or depriuation of that good which God did graft

in them: insomuch, is wheresoe∣uer there is left no sparke of naturall goodnesse, there like∣wise is there abiding no corrup∣tion, neither is sin or vice pre∣dominant & solely remaining.

ALl natures therefore, because God their creator is abso∣lutely good and perfect, bee also good. Howbeit, because they be not like as their maker is, abso∣lutely and vnchangeably good; therefore may that good which is in them, be both decreased & increased. But that diminution of good, is that which is called euill: although notwithstāding, howsoeuer it bee diminished, something consequently remai∣neth and is abiding still, if na∣ture be not vtterly extinguished, whereof it hath a beeing, and is nature still. For howsoeuer, and in what quantitie or measure so∣euer nature is yet liuing, that good which is called nature, cā∣not be vtterly consumed, vnlesse

nature her selfe be vtterly extin∣guished and consumed: & there∣fore is nature worthily com∣mended. Further, if that be in∣corruptible, then without all question, is shee much more praise-worthy. Now, when it is corrupted, that corruption ther∣of maketh it therefore euill, be∣cause it depriueth and spoileth it of all goodnesse whatsoeuer. For, if it bereaue it not of any good, it is not consequently ob∣noxious or hurtful: but it is hurt∣full in depriuing it of that which is good. As long therefore, as na∣ture is corrupted, so long is it possessed of a good, whereof it is againe dispossessed. By which reason, if there bee a dramme of good remaining, which cannot be cleane put out; then without all doubt is nature also incor∣ruptible. And againe, if it be sub∣iect to continuall corruption, there is also a permanent good, whereof that corruption hath a power to depriue it. Which na∣turall

facultie, if that which is called euill, shall vtterly and wholy consume; by that reason, there shall bee no good at all a∣biding, because nature also is dead and extinguished. Corrup∣tion therefore cannot vtterly a∣bolishe and consume that which is good, but by the consumption also of nature. All that which is called nature therefore, is good; beeing great and diuine, if it ca∣not be polluted: and on the o∣ther side, little and weake, if it be subiect to infection: and yet can it not be absolutely denied to be good without note of folly and ignorance. Which thing, called nature, i••ut bee vtterly extingui∣shed by corruption, neither can that corruption also haue any continuance, as hauing no being where no nature is left to har∣bour or entertaine the same.

CHAP. 13.

Two strange positions maintained contrary to the vulgar opinion: the one, that there can bee no e∣uill said to be there, where there is not any good: and the other, that good is called euill; that is to say, one and the selfe same thing is both good and bad.

BY this agument, there is not any euill, if there be not any good. But good which is void of euill, is absolutely good. On the other side, in whom euill hath gotten a possession, in that per∣son, good is either more or lesse polluted: neither can there bee by any means, any euill, where ther is no good at all. There is a great mysterie therefore herein: as wherein, because all nature, in as much as it is nature, is of it selfe good, it can haue none o∣ther meaning or construction, beeing said to be a nature that is

polluted and euil, but that which is good, is also euill: and that cō∣uertibly it cannot be euill, which is not likewise good. Because all which is called by the name of nature, is good: neither should a∣ny thing become euill, if the thing it selfe which is euill, had not an essence, nature, or being. There can therefore bee none e∣uill, if there be no good. Which assertion, though it may seeme absurd, yet the coherence of this argument, doth as it were with∣out euasion, driue vs to this con∣clusion. And we must take heed, lest we stumble vpon that saying of the Prophet, where we reade, Woe be vnto them which say that good is euill, and that euill is good: who say that sweet is sower, and sower sweet: who call darkenesse light, and light darkenesse. But yet God doth say, that an euill man out of the treasure of his owne heart, doth bring forth euils. Now what is an euill man, but an euill nature, because mā is that which

we call nature? And if man bee in some measure good, or a kind of good, because hee is nature; what other thing is an euil man, but an euill good? Howbeit, when wee separate and distin∣guish these two properties, wee doe also find, that he is not ther∣fore euill, because he is a man: nor therefore good, because hee is sinfull: but good, in as much as he is a man and euill because he is a sinner. Whosoeuer therefore affirmeth, that man, as he is man is euill, or saith that that which is called good, is euil, he incurreth the sētece of the Prophet saying, Woe vnto thē which say that good is euill. For he doth depraue the work of God, which is mā; & cō∣mendeth the fault of man, which is sinne. For all nature, although it is vitious, is good, in as much as it is nature: & euill, in as much as it is polluted and corrupted.

CHAP. 14.

Good and euill, which be in them∣selues repugnant, may (contrary to the rules of Logicke) stand together, and be in one and the selfe same thing; yea and euill may spring out of that which is good.

WHerefore in these contra∣ries which be called good and euill, that rule of Logicke faileth; affirming, that two cotra∣ries cannot stand together in any one thing. For there is no firma∣ment clowdy and cleere at one instant: no meat or drinke sweet and sower together: no mans body white and blacke in one & the selfe same place: no beauty & deformity in one face at once. Which thing is obserued in ma∣ny and almost in all contraries, that they cannot be in any one thing together. Now, seeing no man doubteth that good & euill be contraries, so may they not

onely be together; but also euils cannot simply be without good things, or but in things which be good: although on the contrary, things which be good may bee without euils. For a man, or an angel, may bee not vnrighteous, because vnrighteousnes cannot be in any but either in a man, or in an angel. And these two con∣traries be so combined, as if ther were not good, wherein euill might dwell, euill should haue no beeing at all. Because corrup∣tion should not haue any sub∣iect, not onely where to abide, but also from whence it may spring, and haue a beginning, except there were something that might be corrupted. For, if good were not, neither should there be corruptiō, which is none other thing than a banishmēt of that which is good. Euils therfore take their roote frō goodnesses, and bee not at all but in things that be good; neither hath any nature of euil any other foudatiō

For, if it should consist of it selfe, no doubt it should be good, as it is a nature; and beeing an vn∣corrupted nature, should becom either a notable good, or else could not possibly bee a nature subiect to corruption, except it were also good in some mea∣sure, and that good in like sort blemished with corruption.

CHAP. 15.

He doth meete with a double ob∣iection: the one drawne from the words of Christ, the other from the obseruation of nature it selfe.

NOw, when we say, that euils doe spring originally from things that be good, let it not be taken to be repugnant to the saying of Christ, affirming, that a good tree cannot bring forth e∣uill fruits: for, as it is truely said, a Grape cannot be gathered from thornes, because a grape cannot

spring out of them; And so by the selfe same reason, as an euill tree cannot yield good fruits: no more can an euill wil or disposi∣tion, yield good workes. How∣beit, good ground may, as wee see, beare both grapes, and also thornes. In like maner, from the nature of man which is good, may spring both a will that is good, and a will that is badde. Neither hath that will, which is euill and vitious, any other roote originally, but from the good nature of an angell, or of a man. Which thing, Christ himselfe, in that place where he speaketh of a tree and fruits, most plainely sheweth. For, he saith, Either make the tree good, and the fruit thereof good; or make the tree had and the fruit bad. Giuing vs ther∣by a sufficient caueat, or exam∣ple, that euill fruits grow not of a good tree, nor good of an euil: and yet both these trees may grow in that ground, to which ••e directed his speech.

CHAP. 16.

How farre forth the knowledge of naturall things is necessarie for vs, to the obtaining of true feli∣citie.

WHich matters standing thus as they doe although that verse of Vi••gill doth like vs very well, saying:

Right happy doe I, co••nt that man, Of things the reasons giue that can;

Yet doe we not, think it enough and sufficient for the attainment of felicitie, to know the causes of the wonderfull corporall moti∣ons of the world (namely, the mo∣tions of the planets, and the reuo∣lutions of the celestiall globes and spheres) which causes lie hidden in the inscrutable bowels of na∣ture namely,

What makes the earth to quake, What swels the Ocean maine,

Where of the bowels beeing broke, Do fall into their ioynts again:

With many other things of like nature; but rather we ought to search out the causes of good & euill: and that also, so farre-forth as it is in mans power and facul∣tie in this life, beeing full of er∣rors and miseries. For, we are to direct our course to that marke of felicity, where no miserie shal afflict vs, nor any error intrappe vs. For, if the causes of corporall motions were so needfull for our instruction, then ought there none to bee preferred before the reasons of the health of our own bodies. Wherein beeing igno∣rant our selues, seeing wee seeke vnto Physicians to knowe the same, who then doth not see a reason, how patiently to content himselfe with his owne blinde∣nesse and ignorance in that, which to mortal creatures is vn∣seene, as touching the secrets of heauen and earth?