St. Augustine, Of the citie of God vvith the learned comments of Io. Lod. Viues. Englished by I.H.

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Title
St. Augustine, Of the citie of God vvith the learned comments of Io. Lod. Viues. Englished by I.H.
Author
Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo.
Publication
London :: Printed by George Eld,
1610.
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Subject terms
Christianity and other religions -- Early works to 1800.
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http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A22641.0001.001
Cite this Item
"St. Augustine, Of the citie of God vvith the learned comments of Io. Lod. Viues. Englished by I.H." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A22641.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 16, 2024.

Pages

Varro his reduction of the finall good out of all these differences vnto three heads and three definitions, one onely of which is the true one. CHAP. 2.

THerefore in these three sorts of life, the contemplatiue, the actiue, and the mixt, if our question be, which of these we should obserue, we doe not med∣dle with the finall good, but with the easie or hard attainement of that good, which accompanieth those three seuerall courses: for beeing attained, the finall good doth immediatly make the attainer blessed. But it is neither contemplation, nor action, nor these two proportioned together, that maketh a man blessed for one may liue in any of these three fashions, and yet bee farre wide from the true course to beatitude. So then, the questions touching the end of goodnesse, which distinguish all those sects, are farre different from those of society of life, Acade∣micall vncertainty cynicall cariage, and that of the three courses of conuersati∣on, Philosophicall, politique, and neuter. For none of all these doe once meddle with the natures of good and euill. Wherefore Varro hauing recited the last foure, whereby the whole summe of opinions amounteth to two hundred eigh∣ty eight, because they are not worthy the name of sects, in that they (a) make no mention of the good that is chiefly to be desired, he leaueth them all, and re∣turneth to their first twelue, whose controuersie is about the maine point, Mans chiefe good: out of these will he gather one direct truth, and shew all the rest to be false. For first he remooues the three sorts of life, and they carry two parts of the number with them: so there remaines but ninety sixe. Then go the Cynikes, and they carry forty eight with them: so there remaineth but forty eight, then send away the new Academikes with their parts, so there remaines but thirty sixe. And then the sociall conuersation, with the multitude that it brought, so there remaines onely twelue, which no man can deny to be twelue seuerall sects. For their onely difference is the highest parts of good and euill. For the ends of good being found, the euills lye directly opposite. So these twelue sects are pro∣duced by the triplication of these foure, Pleasure, rest, both, and (b) natures pri∣mitiue affects and habites, which Varro calleth Primogenia. For they all are made

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eyther vertues inferiours, and desired onely in respect of her, or her superiours, and shee desired onely for their sake: or equalls, and both are affected for their owne sakes: thus doe they accrew vnto twelue seuerall positions. Now of these foure heads, Varro taketh away three: pleasure, rest, and both vnited: not that he disprooues them, but that they are already included in the fourth: namely the first positiues of nature, as well as many things more are, and therefore what neede they keepe a number in this ranke? So then of the three remaining deduc∣ted from the fourth head, his discourse must wholy be framed, to know which of them is the truth: there can bee but one true one by reason, bee it in these three, or in some other thing, as wee will see afterwards. Meane time let vs briefly see Varro's choise of the three: which are these; Whether Natures first posi∣tiue affects, bee to bee desired for vertues sake, or vertue for theirs, or both for them selues.

L. VIVES.

THey (a) make no] For though their true vse seeme to hinder, or further the chiefest good, yet haue they no essentiall reference there-vnto. (b) Natures primitiue] As health, strength, perfection of the sences, freedome from sorrow, vigor, beauty, and such like: like vn∣to which are the first seedes of vertue in our mindes, which if depraued opinions would suffer to come to maturity, they alone were sufficient to guide vs to beatitude.

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