Of the quality of mans will, vnto with all affections, good, and bad, are subiect. CHAP. 6.
BVt the quality of mans will, is of some moment, for if it be bad, so are all those motions, if good, they are both blamelesse, and praise-worthy: for there is (a) a will in them all: nay they are all direct wills: what is desire, and ioy, but a will (b) consenting to that which wee affect: and what is feare, and sorrow, but a will contrary vnto what we like? But when we consent to the desire of any thing, that is desire, and when wee consent in enioying any thing, this is delight: •…•…o, when wee dislike a thing, and would not haue it come to passe, this will, is feare: when we dislike it being come to passe, this is griefe or sorrow. And this accor∣ding to the variety of the things desired and avoided, as the will consents, or dislikes so are our diuersity of passions. Whereof a Man that maketh GOD a•…•…d no•…•… Man the steeres-man of his life, ought to loue good: and consequently, to hate euill: and because none is euill by nature, but all by vice: hee that liueth af∣ter Gods loue, oweth his (c) full hate vnto the Euill: not to hate the man for his * 1.1 vice, nor to loue the vice for the man, but hate the vice and loue the man: for the vice being cured, hee shall finde no obiect of his hate, but all for his loue.
L. VIVES.
(a) A Will] The Stoickes hold that onely to bee 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (which Tully translates will) when a thing is firmely and constantly desired, therefore it is defined, a desire of any thing * 1.2 with reason which is in a wise man only: but that which is against reason, is called a lust, or an inordinate desire beeing resident in all fooles. The Peripatetiques call both these wills, the one good and the other badde: the controuersie (as I said else-where is but verball. For the Stoickes call affects wills also, nor skilleth it whether Will, follow Na•…•…e or Reason: for it is e∣uer-more Will, though that be properly called Will, wherein is that freedome of election, and is harbour to Vice, or Vertue. (b) Consenting] To beleeue a thing to bee, or not to bee, is no consent, or dissent, but Knowledge, Faith, or Opinion, (Arist. in Analyt. Posterior.) but to will, or not to will in any thing that belongs to the will, which perteineth to the minde, and as it were, appoints and decrees what is to be done or not done. (c) Full hate] Explayning that of the Psalme 139. 22. I hate them with a perfect hatred.