L. VIVES.
FOrtune (a) Nor fate] Seeing Augustine disputeth at large in this place concerning fate, will diue a littlle deeper into the diuersity of olde opinions herein, to make the •…•…est more plaine. Plato affirmed there was one GOD, the Prince and Father of all the rest, at whose becke all the gods, and the whole world were obedient: that al the other gods, & celestial ver∣tues, were but ministers to this Creator of the vniuerse: and yt they gouerned the whole world in places and orders by his appointment: that the lawes of this great God were vnalterable, * 1.1 and ineuitable, and called by the name of Necessities: No force, arte, or reason, can stoppe, o•…•… hinder any of their effectes: whereof the prouerbe ariseth: The gods themselues must serue ne∣cessity: But for the starres, some of their effects may be auoided by wisdome, labour or indust∣ry, wherein fortune consisteth: which, if they followed certaine causes, and were vnchangea∣ble, should bee called fate, and yet inferre no necessity of election. For it is in our powre to choose, beginne, or wish, what wee will: but hauing begunne, fate manageth the rest that fol∣loweth. It was free for Laius (saith Euripides) to haue begotten a sonne, or not: but hauing begotten him, then Apollo's Oracle must haue the euents prooue true which it presaged. Th•…•… and much more doth Plato dispute obscurely vpon, in his last de repub. For there hee puttes * 1.2 the three fatall sisters; Necessities daughters, in heauen: and saith that Lachesis telleth the soules that are to come to liue on earth, that the deuill shall not possesse them, but they shal rather possesse the deuill: But the blame lieth wholy vpon the choise, if the choise bee naught, GOD is acquit of all blame: and then Lachesis casteth the lottes. Epicurus de∣rideth all this, and affirmes all to bee casuall, without any cause at all why it should bee * 1.3 thus or thus, or if there bee any causes, they are as easie to bee auoided, as a mothe is to bee swept by. The Platonists place Fortune in things ambiguous, and such as may fall out diuer∣sely: also in obscure things, whose true causes, why they are so o•…•… otherwise, are vnknowne: so that Fortune dealeth not in things that follow their efficient cause, but either such as may bee changed, or are vndiscouered. Now Aristotle (Phys. 2.) and all the Peripatetikes * 1.4 after him (Alex. Aphrodisiensis beeing one) is more plaine. Those things (saith hee) are casuall, whose acte is not premeditated by any agent: as if any man digge his ground vppe, to make it fatte, finde a deale of treasure hidden; this is Fortune, for hee came not to digge for that treasure, but to fatten his earth: and in this, the casuall euent, followed the not ca∣suáll intent. So in things of fortune, the agent intendeth not the end that they obtaine, but it falleth out beyond expectation. The vulgar call fortune, blinde, rash, vncertaine, madde, and brutish as Pacuuius saith: and ioyne Fate and Necessity together, holding it to haue 〈◊〉〈◊〉 powre both ouer all the other gods and Ioue their King himselfe. Which is verified by the Poet, that said, What must bee, passeth Ioue to hold from beeing, Quod fore paratum 〈◊〉〈◊〉, id summum exuperat Iouem. For in Homer, Ioue lamenteth that hee could not saue his sonne Sarpedon from death, the fates constrayning him to die: and Neptune greeues that hee coul•…•… not hinder Vlisses his returne home, and reuenge the blindnesse of his sonne Ciclops, Fate ha∣uing decreede the contrary: and Iupiter in Ouid saith.