St. Augustine, Of the citie of God vvith the learned comments of Io. Lod. Viues. Englished by I.H.

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Title
St. Augustine, Of the citie of God vvith the learned comments of Io. Lod. Viues. Englished by I.H.
Author
Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo.
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London :: Printed by George Eld,
1610.
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Christianity and other religions -- Early works to 1800.
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http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A22641.0001.001
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"St. Augustine, Of the citie of God vvith the learned comments of Io. Lod. Viues. Englished by I.H." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A22641.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 16, 2024.

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Whether necessity haue any dominion ouer the will of man. CHAP. X.

NOr need we feare that (a) Necessity which the Stoikes were so affraid off, that in their distinctions of causes, they put some vnder Necessity and some not vnder it, and in those that did not subiect vnto it, they g•…•… our wils also, that they might bee free though they were vrged by necessity. But if that bee necessity in vs, which is not in our power, but will be done do what wee can against it, as the ne∣cessity of death; then is it plaine, that our wills are subiect to no such necessity, vse we them howsoeuer, well or badly: For we do many things which wee could not do, against our wils. And first of all to will it selfe: if we will a thing, there is our will; If we will not, it is not. For we cannot will against our wills. Now if necessity be defined to be, that whereby such a thing musts needes fall out thus, or thus, I see no reason we should feare, that it could hinder the freedome of our wills in any thing. (b) For we neither subiect Gods being, nor his praesciences vnto necessity, when wee say God must needes liue eternally, and God must needes fore-know all thinges; no more then his honour is diminished, in saying hee cannot erre, hee cannot die; He cannot do this, why? because his power were lesse, if he could doe it, then now it is in that he cannot. Iustly is he called almighty, yet may hee not * 1.1 dye nor erre: He is called almighty because he can do all that is in his will, not because he can suffer what is not his will; which if he could he were not almigh∣ty. So that he cannot do some things, because he can do all things. So when wee say that if we will any thing of necessity, we must will it with a freedome of will, tis•…•… true: yet put we not our wil vnder any such necessity as depriues it of the free∣dome. So that our wils are ours, willing what•…•…vve will, and if we will it not, neither do they will it: and if any man suffer any thing by the will of another against his own will, his will hath the own power still, & his sufferance commeth rather frō the power of God then from his own will: for if hee vvilled that it should be other wise, and yet could not haue it so, his will must needes bee hindered by a greater power: yet his will should be free still, & not in any others power, but his that wil∣led it, though he could not haue his will performeds: wherfore what-soeuer a man suffereth against his wil he ought not attribute it vnto the wils of Angels, Men, or any other created spirits, but euen to his who gaue their wils this power. So then, (c) our wils are not vse-les, because that God fore-seeth what wil be in them: he yt fore-saw it what-euer it be, fore-saw somwhat: and if he did fore know somewhat, then by his fore-knowledge there is som-thing in our vvils: Wherfore vve are nei∣ther compelled to leaue our freedom of will by retayning Gods fore-knowledge, nor by holding our willes freedome to denie GODS fore-knowledge; GOD forbid vvee should: vve beleeue and affirme them both constantly and truly, * 1.2 the later as a part of our good faith, the former as a rule for our good life: and

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badly doth hee liue that beleeueth not aright of GOD. So God-forbid that wee should deny his fore-knowledge to be free, by whose helpe wee either are or shall bee free. (d) Therefore law, correction, praise, disgrace, exhortati∣on, and prohibition are not in vaine: because hee fore-knew that there should bee such: They haue that power which hee fore-knew they should haue: and prayers are powerful•…•… •…•…o attaine those thinges, which hee fore-knoweth that hee will giue to such as pray for them. Good deedes hath hee predestinated to reward, and euil to punishment. (e) Nor doth man sinne because God fore-knew that he would sin: nay, therfore it is doubtlesse that he sinneth, when he doth sin, * 1.3 because that God, whose knowledge cannot be mistaken, fore-saw that neither fate nor fortune, nor any thing else, but the man himselfe would sin, who if he had not bin willing, he had not sinned: but whether he should be vnwilling to sinne, or no, that also did God fore-know.

L. VIVES.

THa•…•… (a) a necessitie] Me thinketh (saith Tully) that in the two opinions of the Philosophers th•…•… 〈◊〉〈◊〉 holding fa•…•…e the doer of all things, by a very law of necessity (of which opinion Demo∣critus, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Aristotle were) and the other exempting the motions of the wil from this law: Chrysippus professing to step into a meane, as an honorable arbitrator betweene them, inclineth rather to those that stand for the minds freedom. De fato. lib. Therfore did Oenomaus y Cynike say, that Democritus had made our mindes slaues, and Chrysippus halfe slaues, Euseb. de * 1.4 praep. Euang. l. 6. Therin is a great disputation about Fate: The Stoikes bringing all vnder fate, yet binde not our mindes to any necessity, nor let them compel vs to any action. For all things come to passe in fate by causes precedent, and subsequent, but not principall and perfect: the first of which doe bu•…•… assist vs in things beyond our power, but the later do effect that wt is in our 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Plutarch relating the Stoikes opinion, saith that they hold the euents 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thin•…•… to haue a diuerse originall: some, from that great necessity; some from fate, some from li∣berty of will some from fortune, and chance particular. They follow Plato indeed in all their doctrine of fate. Which •…•…lutarch both witnesseth, and the thing it selfe sheweth. But whereas they say y all things comes of fate, and that in fate there is a necessity, then they speake of the prouidence and wil of God. For as we haue shewen they called Ioue fate, and that said Pron•…•…, that prouidence, wherby he ruleth all fate like-wise. (b) We neither subiect] The Platonists say the gods must needs be as they are, and that not by adding any external necessity, but that na∣turall one; because they cannot be otherwise; being also voluntary, because they would bee no otherwise. Wherfore I wonder at Plinius Secundus his cauillation against Gods omnipotency, that he cannot do al things, because he cannot dye, nor giue him-selfe, that he can giue a man, death. It is vnworthy so learned a man. Nay he held it a great comfort in the troubles of this life, to thinke that the gods somtimes were so afflicted, that like men, they would wish fo•…•… death and could not haue it: he was illuded (bee-like with the fables that maketh Pluto grieue at his delay of death as Lucian saith: Et rector terrae quem longa saecula torquet. Mors dilata de∣um * 1.5—Earths god that greeued sore, his welcome Death should be so long delayed.—(c) O•…•… wils ar•…•… not] A hard question, and of diuers diuersly handled: Whether Gods fore-knowlede im∣pose a necessity vppon thinges? In the last chapter I touched at somthings correspondent: Many come out of the new schooles, prepared fully to disputation with their fine art of combinati∣ons, that if you assume, they will not want a peece to defend, and if you haue this, they wil haue that, so long till the question be left in greater clouds then it was found in at first: as this p•…•… case, God knoweth I will run to morrow, suppose I will not run, put case that, suppose ye othe•…•… And what vse is there of these goose-traps? To speake plainly with Augustine here, a man sin∣neth not because God knoweth that he wil sin: for he need not sin vnles he list: and if he do not, God fore-knoweth that also: or as Chrysostome saith vpon the Corinthians. Christ indeed saith, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is necessary that scandal should be, but herein he neither violateth the will, nor inforceth the life, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fore-telleth what mans badnesse would effect: which commeth not so to passe because God fore-saw 〈◊〉〈◊〉 but because mans will was so bad: for Gods praescience did not cause those effects, but the corrupti•…•… * 1.6 of humaine mindes caused his praescience. Thus far Chrysostome interpreted by learned Donat•…•… And truly Gods praescience furthereth the euent of any thing, no more then a mans looking o•…•…

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furthereth any act: I see you write, but you may choose whether to write or no; so is it in him: furthermore all future things are more present vnto God, then those things which we call pre∣sent are to vs for the more capable the soule is, it comprehendeth more time present. So Gods essence being infinite, so is the time present before him: he, the only eternity being only infinite. The supposition of some future things, in respect of Gods knowledge, as wel as ours, hath made this question more intricate then otherwise it were. (d) Therfore law] This was obiected vnto them that held fate to be manager of all euents: since that some must needs be good, and some bad, why should these be punished and those rewarded, seeing that their actions (being neces∣sities and fates) could neyther merit praise nor dispraise? Again should any bee animated to good, or disswaded from vice, when as the fate beeing badde, or howsoeuer, must needes bee followed? This Manilius held also in these wordes.

Ast hominum mentitanto sit gloria maior, Quod c•…•…lo gaudente venit, rursus{que} nocentes, Odcrimus magis, in cul•…•…am, penas{que} creatos. Nec resert scel•…•…s vnde cadat, scelus esse fatendum est H•…•…c q•…•…{que} est sic ipsum expendere fa•…•…um: &c.
Mans goodnesse shines more bright, because glad fate, And heauen inspires it: So the bad we hate Far worse, 'cause •…•…ate hath bent their deeds amisse. Nor skils it whence guilt comes, when guilt it is Fates deed it is, to heare it selfe thus sca•…•…. &c.
But wee hold that the good haue their reward, and the bad their reproch, each one for his free actions, which he hath done by Gods permission, but not by his direction. (e) Nor doth man] His sin ariseth not from Gods fore-knowledge, but rather our knowledge •…•…iseth from this sin, For as our will floweth from Gods will, so doth our knowledge from his knowledge. Thus much concerning fate, out of their opinions, to make Augustines the Playner.

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