Obseruations vpon the fiue first bookes of Cæsars commentaries setting fourth the practise of the art military in the time of the Roman Empire : wherein are handled all the chiefest point of their discipline, with the true reason of euery part, together with such instructions as may be drawn from their proceedings, for the better direction of our moderne warres / by Clement Edmunds.

OBSERVATIONS VPON THE THIRD BOOKE OF CAESAR HIS COMMENTARIES. (Book 3)

THE ARGVMENT.

THis Commentarie beginneth with an Accident, which happened in the latter ende of the former sommer; wherein the Belgae had so leane a haruest: and then it proceedeth to the warre betweene Caesar and the Veneti; Crassus and the Aquitani; Titurius Sabinus and the Curiosolitae: And Ti∣tus Labienus, with the Treuiri.

CHAP. I.

Sergius Galba, being sent to cleere the passage of the Alpes, was besieged by the Seduni and Veragri.

CAESAR taking his iourney into Italie,* 1.1 sent Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion, and part of the horsemen vnto the Nan∣tuates, Veragri & Seduni: whose territories are extended from the riuer Rhone, and the lake Lemanus, vnto the tops of the highest Alpes. The ende of this voyage was chiefely to cleare the Alpes of theeues and robbers, that liued by the spoile of passen∣gers that trauelled betweene Italie and Gallia: Galba hauing or∣der, if he found it expedient to winter in those partes, after some fortunate incounters and the taking of some castles and holdes, he concluded a peace, and resolued to place two cohortes of his legion, amongst the Nantuates; and himselfe to winter with the other cohortes, in a towne of the Veragri, named Octodurus. This towne being sited in a narrow valley, and incircled about with mightie high hils, was deuided by a riuer into two partes, whereof he gaue one part to the Galles, and the other he chose for his wintering campe, and fortified it about with a ditch and a rampier. After he had spent many daies of wintering, and giuen order, that corne should be brought thither for prouision; he had intelligence vpon a sudden, that the Galles, in the night time, had all left that part of the towne that was allotted vnto them; and that the hils which hung ouer the valley, wherein the towne stood, were possest with great multi∣tudes of the Seduni, and Veragri. The reasons of this sudden commotion were cheefly

the paucitie of the Roman forces, not making a compleat legion; for as much as two cohorts wintered amongst the Nantuates: besides many particulars, that were wan∣ting vpon necessarie occasions. And to make them more contemptible in regard of themselues, the place affoorded such aduantage, that they were perswaded by reason of the steepe decliuitie of the hill, that the Romans would not indure the brunt of the first assault: besides this, it greeued them exceedingly to haue their children taken from them, vnder the title of hostages; and the Alpes, which nature had exempted from habitation, and placed as boundes betweene two large kingdomes, to be seased vpon by the Roman legions, and vnited to their Prouince.

Vpon these aduertisements, Galba not hauing as yet finished the fortification of his campe, nor made prouision of corne and forrage for the winter season, in that he little feared any motion of warre, being secured of their amitie, and obedience, both by ho∣stages and rendrie: he presently called a councell of warre, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which councell the mindes of many were so amazed, with the terrour of so vnexpected a danger, when they beheld the hils pestered with armed sol∣diers, the passages taken and intercepted by the enemie, and no hope left of any suc∣cour or reliefe, that they could thinke of no other waie for their safetie, then leauing behind them their baggage and impediments, to sallie out of their campe, and so to saue themselues by the same waie they came thither: notwithstanding the greater part concluded, to referre that resolution to the last push; and in the meane time, to attend the fortune of the euent, and defend the campe.

THE OBSERVATION.

WHich aduise although at this time sorted to small effect; yet it better suted the valour of the Romans, and sauoured more of tempered mag∣nanimitie, then that former hazard, which argued the weakenesse of their mindes, by their ouer hastie and too forward resolution. For as it imported greater danger, and discouered a more desperate spirit, to breake through the thickest troupes of their enemies, and so by strong hand to saue themselues by the helpe of some other fortune; so it manifested a greater ap∣prehension of terrour, and a stronger impression of feare, which can affoord no∣thing but desperate remedies: for desperate and inconsiderate rashnes riseth soo∣ner of feare, then of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the dan∣ger with a lesse troubled eie and qualified the terrour of death with the life of their spirite, reseruing extremitie of helpe to extremitie of perill, and in the meane time attended what chances of aduantage might happen vnto them, vp∣on any enterprise the enemie should attempt; I say, they so gaue greater scope to fortune and inlarged the boundes of changing accidents.

CHAP. II.

The enemie setteth vpon the wintering campe: Galba ouerthroweth them.

THE councell being dismissed,* 1.2 they had scarce time to put in execu∣tion such thinges, as were agreed vpon for their defence: but the enemie at a watchword giuen assaulted the campe, on all sides with stones and dartes, and other casting weapons: the Romans at first when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vaine any weapon which they cast from the rampier; but what part soeuer of their campe seemed to be in greatest danger, and want of helpe, thither they came with succour and reliefe; but herein they were ouermatched. For the enemie being spent and wearied with fight, when∣soeuer anie of them gaue place and forsooke the battell, there were alwaies fresh combatants to supplie it: but the Romans by reason of their small number, had no such helpe. For their extremitie in that point was such, that no man was permitted neither for wearinesse nor woundes, to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And hauing thus fought continually the space of sixe houres, when both strength and weapons wanted, the enemie persisting with greater furie to fill the ditch and breake downe the rampier, and their hopes relying vpon the last expectation: P. Sex. Baculus the Primipile of that legion, whom we said to be so sore wounded in the Neruian battell, and Caius Volusenus Tribune of the souldiers, a man of singu∣lar courage and wisedome, ranne speedily to Galba and tolde him, that the only waie of safetie was to breake out vpon the enemie, and to trie the last refuge in that ex∣tremitie. Whereupon they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the sol∣diers to surcease a while from fighting, and onely to receiue such weapons as were cast into the campe; and so to rest themselues a little and recouer their strength: and then at a watchword to sallie out of their campe, and laie their safety vpon their vertue; which the souldiers executed with such alacritie and courage of spirite, that breaking out at all the gates of the campe, they gaue no leasure to the enemie to consider what was done, nor to satisfie his iudgement touching so vnexpected a no∣ueltie. And thus fortune being suddenly changed, they slewe more then the third part of 30000, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to staie vpon the hils neere about them.

OBSERVATIONS.

WHich strange alteration liuely describeth the force of noueltie,* 1.3 and the effectuall power of vnexpected aduētures: for in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romans defended the campe, and the Galles charged it by assault, the victorie held constant with the Galles, and threatned death and mortality to the Romans. Neither had they any

meanes to recouer hope of better successe, but by trying another waie; which so much the more amazed the Galles, in that they had vehemently apprehen∣ded an opinion of victorie, by a set fight continuing the space of sixe houres, without any likelihood of contrarietie, or alteration. Which practise, of fru∣strating a dessigne intended by an indirect and contrary answere, serued the Ro∣mans oftentimes to great aduantage; as besides this present example, in this Commentarie we shall afterward read, how Titurius Sabinus defeated the Vnel∣los, with the same stratagem; and ouerthrew them by eruption and sallying out, when they expected nothing but a defensiue resistance from the rampier. From whence a commander may learne, to auoide two contrarie inconueniences, ac∣cording as the qualitie of the warre shall offer occasion: first (if other thinges be answerable, which a iudicious eie will easily discouer) that a sallie made out at diuers portes of a holde, will much mitigate the heate of a charge, and controll the furie of an enemie. And on the other side, he that besiegeth any place what aduantage soeuer he hath of the defendant, may much better assure himselfe of good fortune, if he appoint certaine troupes in readines to receiue the charge of any eruption, that the rest that are busily imploied in the assault may prouide to answere it, without disorder or confusion. Which order, if the Galles had ta∣ken, they had not in likelihood so often been deceiued.

CHAP. III.

Galba returneth into the Prouince: the Vnelli giue occasion of a new warre.

THE enemie being thus defeated,* 1.4 Galba was vnwilling to trie fortune any further; and the rather for that he wanted both corne and forrage: and therefore hauing burned the towne, the next daie he returned towardes the Prouince, and without let or resistance, brought the legion safe into the Nantuates; and from thence to the* 1.5 Allobrogae, and there he wintered.

After these thinges were dispatched: Caesar supposing for manie reasons, that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further feare of anie new warre, the Belgae being ouerthrowen, the Germans thrust out, and the Seduni amongst the Alpes subdued and vanquished; in the beginning of the winter, as he went into Illyricum, hauing a great desire to see those nations: there grewe a sudden tumult and dissention in Gallia vpon this occasion. Pub. Crassus wintering with the seuenth legion in Aniou neare vnto the Ocean, and finding scarcitie of corne in those partes; he sent out the Prefects of the horsemen, and Tribunes into the next cities to demaund corne, and other prouisions for his legion, of whom Titus Terrasidius was sent vnto the* 1.6 Venelli, Marcus Trebius to the* 1.7 Curiosolitae, Q. Velanius, and Titus Silius to the* 1.8 Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest authoritie amongst all the maritimate nations in that coast, by reason of their great store of shipping, with

which they did trafficke into Britanie, and exceeded all their neighbour states in skill and experience of sea-faring matters; hauing the most part of such as vsed those seas, tributaries to their state: These Veneti first aduentured to retaine Silius and Velani∣us, hoping thereby to recouer their hostages which they had giuen to Crassus. The fini∣timate cities induced by their authoritie and example, for the same reason, laide hold vpon Trebius and Terrasidius; and sending speedie ambassages one vnto another, coniured by their Princes and chiefest magistrates, to approue their fact by common consent, and to attend all the same euent of fortune; solliciting also other cities and states, rather to maintaine that libertie, which they had receiued of their Ancestors, then to indure the seruile bondage of a stranger.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THe circumstance in this historie, which noteth the sudden breaking out of warres, when the course of thinges made promise of peace: sheweth first,* 1.9 what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse, in calculating the natiuitie of After-chances; which so seldome an∣swere the iudgment we giue vpon their beginnings, that when we speake of hap∣pinesse, we finde nothing but miserie: and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part, which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not maruel, if when almost all nations are at oddes, and in our best conceites, threa∣ten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace; or if peace be in speech, soothing the world with pleasing tranquilitie, and through the vncertainty of our weake probabilities, promise much rest after many trou∣bles: there follow greater wars in the ende, then the former time can truely speake of. Which being well vnderstood, may humble the spirits of our hautie polititians, that thinke to comprehend the conclusions of future times, vnder the premisses of their weake proiectes, and predestinate succeeding ages, accor∣to the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of, shall breake the maine streame of our iudgment, and falsifie the Oracles which our vnderstanding hath vttered. And it may learne them withall, how much it importeth a wise commander, to preuent an euill that may crosse his dessigne, (how vnlikely soeuer it be to happen) by handling it in such manner, as though it were necessarily to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it selfe both the causes of his being; and the direct meanes to resist the repugnancie of a contrarie nature: and so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THis practise of the Veneti may instruct a circumspect Prince in cases of this nature, to haue a more watchfull eie ouer that Prouince or city, which shall be found most potent and mightie amongst the rest, then of any other inferiour state of the same nature and condition: for as example of

it selfe is of great Authoritie,* 1.10 making improbabilities seeme full of reason, espe∣cially when the intention shal sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerfull meanes, and graced with the Acte of superi∣our personages: it must needes be verie effectuall to stirre vp mens mindes, to approue that with a strong affection, which their owne single iudgment did no waie allow of. And therfore equalitie bringeth this aduantage to a Prince, which differencie can not affoord, that albeit example doe set on foote any rebellious motion, yet no supereminencie shall authorise the same.

CHAP. IIII.

Caesar hauing aduertisement of these new trou∣bles; hasteth into Gallia and prepareth for the warre.

ALL the maritimate states being by this meanes drawne into the same conspiracie,* 1.11 they sent a common ambassage vnto Crassus; that if he would haue his men againe, he must deli∣uer vp the hostages, which he had taken from them. Whereof Caesar being certified by Crassus, in as much as he was then a great way distant from his Armie, he commanded Gallies and shippes of warre to be built vpon the riuer* 1.12 Loier, which run∣neth into the Ocean; and that Gallie men, Mariners, and Shipmasters should be muste∣red in the Prouince: which being speedely dispatched, assoone as the time of the yeare would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacie, vnderstanding of Caesars arriuall, and considering how haynous a fact they had com∣mitted, in detaining the ambassadours and casting them into yrons, whose name is held sacred and inuiolable amongst all nations: prepared accordingly to answere so eminent a danger, & especially such necessaries, as pertained to shipping & sea-fights.

THE OBSERVATION.

FRom hence I may take occasion,* 1.13 briefely to touch the reuerent opi∣nion, which all nations, howe barbarous soeuer, haue generally conceiued of the qualitie and condition of ambassadours: and what the groundes are of this vniuersall receiued custome, which in all a∣ges, and times hath held Authenticall. And first we are to vnderstand, that all man kinde (as indued with the same nature and properties) are so linked toge∣ther in the strict alliance of humane society; that, albeit their turbulent and dis∣agreeing passions (which in themselues are vnnaturall, as proceeding from cor∣ruption and defect) driue them into extreme discord and disunion of spirit, and breake the bonds of ciuill conuersation, which otherwise we do naturally affect:

yet without a necessarie entercourse and trafficke of societie, we are not able to keepe on foote the very discord it selfe, in tearmes of reason and orderly pro∣ceeding, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion, & go to wrack, for want of these mutuall offices performed by messengers: so streight are the bondes of nature, and so powerfull are the lawes which she enacteth. And ther∣fore if it were for no other end, which might sort to the benefit of either partie, (as there are many good vses thereof) yet to holde vp the quarrell and keepe it from falling, making war, according to the grounds of reason, the entercourse of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made a law, ought as religiously to be obserued, as an Oracle of our owne beliefe. Secondly, for as much as the ende of warre is, or at the least should be, peace: which by trea∣tie of mutuall messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no peo∣ple may seeme so barbarous, as to maintaine a warre; which onelie intendeth bloud, and proposeth as the chiefest obiect, the death and mortality of mankind, no way respecting peace and ciuill gouernment: such as refuse the entercourse of messengers, as the meanes of amitie and concord, are iustly condemned in the iudgment of all nations, as vnworthie of humane societie. Last of all, it is an iniurie of great dishonour, and deserueth the reward of extreme infamie, to reuenge the master his quarrell vpon a seruant, and punish ambassadours for the faults of their state: considering that their chiefest dutie consisteth in the faith∣full relation of such mandates, as they haue receiued, which may as well tende to the aduancement and honour of that cittie, to which they are sent; as to the dishonour and ruine of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire warre or peace; the free libertie, and holy order of ambassadours, is reuerently to be respected, and defended from brutish and vn∣naturall violence.

CHAP. V.

The proceedings of either partie, in the entrance of this warre.

THE Veneti conceiued great hope of their enterprise,* 1.14 by reason of the strength of their situation: for as much as all the passa∣ges by land were broken and cut off, with armes and creekes of the sea; and on the other side, nauigation and entrance by sea was so troublesome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether vnacquainted with the chanels, and shelues of the coast. Neither did they thinke that the Roman Armie could long continue there without corne, which was not to be had in those quarters. And if it happened, that the course of thinges were carried contrarie to this probable expectation; yet they themselues were strong in shipping: whereas the Romans had

none at all: Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallowes, Portes and Ilands of that coast, where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should finde the vse of Nauigation in that narrow sea, to be farre different from that, which they were ac∣customed vnto,* 1.15 in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution, they fortified their townes, stored them with prouision, and brought all their shipping to Vannes; against whom, Caesar (as it was reported) would begin to make warre, taking the Osisimi, Lexouij, Nannetes, Ambiuariti, Morini, Menapij, Diablintres, as consorts and par∣takers in this quarrell. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motiues stirred vp Caesar to vndertake this war: as namely, the violent detaining of the Roman knights: their rebellion, after they had yeelded themselues by rendrie, and giuen hostages of their loialtie: the conspiracie of so manie citties, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other nations and states to the like insolencie. And therefore vnder∣standing, that almost all the Galles were inclining to noueltie and alteration, and of their owne nature, were quicke and readie to vndertake a warre; and further, consi∣dering that all men by nature desired libertie, and hated the seruile condition of bon∣dage: he preuented all further insurrections of the other states, with the presence of the Roman forces: and sent Titus Labienus with the Caualrie, vnto the* 1.16 Treuiri, that bordered vpon the Rhene: to him he gaue in charge, to visit the men of Rhemes and the rest of the Belgae, to keepe them in obedience; and to hinder such forces, as might peraduenture be transported ouer the riuer by the Germains, to further this rebellious humour of the Galles. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus, with 12 legi∣onarie cohortes, and a great part of the horse to go into Aquitaine, least there might come any aide from those nations. He sent also Q. Titurius Sabinus with three legi∣ons, vnto the Lexouij, Curiosolitae, Vnelli, to disappoint any practise which rebelli∣ous mindes might intend. And making D. Brutus chiefe Admirall of the nauie, he gaue him in charge, to make towardes Vannes, with what speede he could: and hee himselfe marched thitherward with the rest of the foote forces.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN the first booke, I obserued the authoritie which the Roman lea∣ders had to vndertake a warre, without further acquainting the senat with the consequence thereof: in this place, let vs obserue the care and circumspection, which the Generals had, not to vndertake a troublesome and dangerous warre vpon a humor, or any other slender motion: but diligently waighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the perill and hazard of the warre, with the good and consequence of the effect; informed their iudgments of the importance of that action; and so tried whether the be∣nefit would answere their labour. And thus we finde the reasons particularly de∣liuered, that moued Caesar first to vndertake the Heluetian warre: and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrell with Ariouistus: then followeth the necessitie of that warre with the Belgae; and nowe the motiues which induced him to this with the maritimate cities of Bretaine: and so consequently of his passage into Germanie, or what other enterprise he attempted: which he laieth

downe as the groundes and occasions of those warres, and could not be auoided but with the losse and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further, let vs obserue the meanes he vsed to preuent the inclination of the Galles, and to keepe them in subiection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into diuers quarters of that continent; and so setling the wauering dis∣position of the further skirtes, with the waight of his Armie, and the presence of his legionarie souldiers, which he sent readie to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not breake out to the preiudice and diminuti∣on of the Roman Empire, and the good successe of his proceedings: besides the aduantage, which he gained in the opinion of the enemie; whom he so little fea∣red concerning the vpshot of that quarrell, that he had dispersed the greatest part of his Armie vpon other seruices, the rest being sufficient to end that war.

CHAP. VI.

The maner of their shipping, and their sea-fight.

THE scite,* 1.17 of almost all these cities was such, that being built in pointes and promontories, they could not at full sea, which happened alwaies twise in 12 houres, be approched by foot for∣ces, nor yet with shipping neither; for againe▪ in an ebbe, the vessalles were laid on the ground, and so left as a praie to the enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the sea, with mounts which they raised equal to the wals of the town, and were at the point of entering & taking it: yet the towns∣men hauing such store of shipping, would easily conuey, both themselues and their cariages, into the next townes, and there helpe themselues with the like aduantage of place. And thus they deluded Caesar the greatest part of the sommer: for the Ro∣man fleete by reason of continuall windes and foule weather, durst not aduen∣ture to put out of the riuer Loier into so vast a sea, wherein the hauens and roades were fewe, and farre distant one from another, and the tides great. The shipping of the Galles was thus built and rigged: the keele was somewhat flatter then the Ro∣man shipping, the better to beare the ebbes, and shalowes of that coast: the foredecke was altogether erect and perpendicular: the poupe was made to beare the huge∣nesse of the billowes, and the force of the tempest. And in a word, they were alto∣gether built for strength: for the ribbes and seates were made of beames of a foote square, fastned with yron pins of an inch thicke: in steed of cables, they vsed chaines of yron; and raw hides and skins for sailes, either for want of linnen or ignorant of the vse thereof, or because sailes of linnen would hardly serue to carrie ships of that burthen.

The meeting and conflict of the Roman nauie, with this kinde of ships was such, that they onely excelled them in celeritie and speedie nimblenes, with force of oares; but in all other thinges, either concerning the nature of the place, or the dangers of the foule weather, were farre inferiour vnto them: for the strength of them was

such, that they could neither hurt them with their beake-heads, nor cast a weapon to anie purpose into them, by reason of their altitude, and high built bulkes. And if anie gust chanced in the meane time to rise, that forced them to commit themselues to the mercie of the weather, their shipping would better beare the rage of the sea; and with greater safetie shelter it selfe amongst flats and shallowes, without feare of rockes or any such hazard: of all which chances the Roman nauie stood continually in danger.

OBSERVATIONS.

ANd here,* 1.18 let it not seeme impertinent to the argument which we handle, considering the generall vse which we Insulairs haue of na∣uigation, briefly to set downe the most eminent causes of the flow∣ing and ebbing of the sea, as farre forth as shall seeme necessarie to the knowledge of a souldier: which, albeit may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret; yet for as much as they stand for true principles of regulari∣tie, and well approued rules in our Arte of nauigation, let vs take them for no lesse then they effect, and giue them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those forged circles in the heauens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in conceit and supposal; yet for as much as they serue to direct our knowledge to a certainty, in that variety and seeming inconstancie of motion, we esteeme of them as they effect, and not as they are.

Considering then the globe of the world, as it maketh a right spheare (for in that position, the Naturalistes chiefly vnderstand celestiall influence to haue operation in this liquid element of the water) it is deuided by the Horizon and Meridian into foure quarters: the first quarter is that, betweene the east hori∣zon and the noone meridian, which they cal a flowing quarter: the second, from the noone meridian, to the west horizon; which they make an ebbing quarter: the third, from the west horizon to the midnight meridian; which they likewise call a flowing quarter: and againe, from the midnight meridian to the east ho∣rizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of heauen. The instruments of these sensible qualities, and contrarie effects, are the sunne and the moone, as they are caried through these distinct partes of the heauen. And although ex∣perience hath noted the moone to be of greatest power in warrie motions; yet we may not omit to acknowledge the force, which the sunne yeeldeth in this miracle of nature.

First therfore we are to vnderstand, that when the moone or the sunne begin to appeare aboue the right horizon, and enter into that part of the heauen which I tearmed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount vp to their meridian altitude; so it increaseth vntill it come to a high floud. And againe, as those lightes passing the meridian, decline to the west, and runne the circuit of the ebbing quarter: so the water decreaseth and returneth againe from whence it came. Againe, as they set vnder the west ho∣rizon

and enter into the second flowing quarter; so the sea beginneth againe to flow, and still increaseth vntill they come to the point of the night meridian: and then againe, it refloweth, according as the sunne and moone are carried in the other ebbing quarter from the night meridian, to the east horizon.

And hence it happeneth that in coniunction or new of the moone,* 1.19 when the sunne and the moone are caried both together in the same flowing, and ebbing quarters; that then the tides and ebbes are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the moone, when these lightes are caried in opposite quarters, which we haue described to be of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing; that then in like manner the tides are great: forasmuch as both these Planets, through the symbolising quarters wherein they are carried, doe ioyne their forces, to make perfect this worke of nature in the ebbing and flowing of the sea. And contrariwise, in a quadrate aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the moone, when as the moone is caried in a flowing quarter; and at the same instant, the sunne doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of nature doth necessarily require: then are the tides lessoned, as dailie experience doth witnesse.

And for as much as both the right horizon and the meridian also, deuide e∣uerie diurnall circle, which either the sun or the moone maketh in their reuolu∣tions, into equall parts; it followeth that euery tide is continually measured with the quantitie of 6 houres: and therfore that which Caesar here saith, must needs be true, that in the space of 12 houres, there are alwaies 2 high tides. And least any man should imagine, that euery inland citie, standing vpon an ebbing and flowing riuer, may take the computation of the tide according to this rule: let him vnderstand that this which I haue deliuered, is to be conceiued principally of the sea it selfe; and secondarily of such portes and hauens, as stand either neare or vpon the sea: but where a riuer shall run many miles from the sea, and make many winding meanders, before it come to the place of calculation; it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought conuenient to insert in these discourses touching the ebbing and flowing of the sea, as not impertinent to martiall knowledge.

Concerning the shipping of the Romans,* 1.20 whereof posteritie hath onely re∣ceiued the bare names, and some fewe circumstances touching the manner of their Equipage, the Critickes of these times haue laboured to set foorth a fleet, answerable to that, which the tearmes and title mentioned in historie seeme to report: but yet the gaine of their voyage doth not answere their charge. For manie men rest vnsatisfied, first touching the names themselues, whereof wee finde these kindes,

Names

• Longas.
• Onerarias.
• Actuarias.
• Triremes.
• Quadriremes.
• Quinqueremes.

The first we may vnderstand to be Gallies or ships of seruice: the second ships

of burthen: the third, ships that were driuen forward with force of oares, and the rest sounding according to their Names; for I dare not intitle them with a more particular description. Nowe whether these Names Longas and A∣ctuarias, were a seuerall sorte of shipping by themselues; or the generall Names of the Quadriremes, Triremes, and Quinqueremes, for as much as eue∣rie kinde of these might be called both Longas and Actuarias, as it yet remai∣neth in controuersie: so it is not much materiall to that which wee seeke af∣ter. But that which most troubleth our sea-Critickes, is in what sense they maie vnderstand these vocabularies, Triremes, Quadriremes, and Quinqueremes, whether they were so tearmed in regard of the number of rowers, or watermen that haled continually at an oare, as the custome of the Gallies is at this daie; or otherwise, because a Trireme had three orders of oares on either side, a Quadrireme foure, and a Quinquereme fiue: whereof they tooke their distin∣ction of Names.

Such as holde,* 1.21 that a Trireme had on each side three rankes of oares, and so consequently, of a Quadrireme and Quinquereme; alleadge this place of Li∣uie, to make good their opinion. In the warres betweene Rome and Carthage, Laelius meeting with Adherball in the straightes of Gibraltar, each of them had a Quinquereme, and seauen or eight Triremes a piece, the current in that place was so great that it gaue no place to Arte, but carried the vessailes accor∣ding to the fall of the Billow: in which vncertaintie the Triremes of the Car∣thaginean, closed with the Quinquereme of Laelius: which either because she was pondere tenacior, as Liuie saith, or otherwise, for that pluribus remorum or∣dinibus scindentibus vertices facilius regeretur; in regarde of the pluralitie of bankes of oares, which resisted the billowe and steamed the current, she sunke two of the Triremes, and so got the victorie. From hence they proue, that a Quinquereme had plures remorum ordines, then a Trireme had; and therefore it tooke the name from the pluralitie of bankes of oares, and not from the num∣ber of men that rowed at an oare.

But the contrarie opinion doth interpret Ordo Remorum, to be a couple of oares one answering another, on each side of the vessaile, which we call a paire of oares: So that a Quinquereme being far greater and longer then a Trireme, had more paires of oares then a Trireme had, and those oares were handled with fiue men at one oare, according to the vse of our Gallies at this daie.

But to leaue this,* 1.22 and come to their manner of sea-fights, wee must vnder∣stand that the Romans, wanting the vse of Artillerie and managing their ships of warre with force of oares, failed not to make vse of their Arte, in their con∣flictes and incounters by sea: for all their shippes of seruice, which we tearme men of warre, carried a strong beake-head of yron, which they called rostrum, with which they ranne one against another, with as great violence and furie, as their oares could carrie them. And herein Arte gaue great aduantage; for he that could best skill to turne his ship, with greatest celeritie, and so frustrate an offer; or with speedie and strong agitation follow an aduantage: commonly got the victorie.

In the battell,* 1.23 which D. Brutus had with the Massilians, we reade that two

Triremes charging the Admirall, wherein Brutus was one at the one side, and the other at the other; Brutus and his Marriners so cunningly handled the mat∣ter, that when they should come to the hurt, they speedily in a trice of time, wound themselues from betweene them, and the two Triremes met with such a carriere one against another, that one brake her beakehead, and the other split with the blowe.

For this skill and fortune withall, Euphranor the Rodian was of great fame in Caesars time; although his ende found too true the saying of the Historian, that Whom fortune honoureth with many good haps, she oftentimes reserueth to a harder destinie; as other seamen besides Euphranor, can truely witnesse.

This first brunt being ended: when they came to grapple and boording one of another, then the art and practises of their land seruices came in vse: for they erected turrets vpon their deckes, and from them they fought with engines and casting weapons, as slinges, arrowes, and piles; and when they entered, they fought with sword and target. Neither did the legionarie souldier finde any dif∣ference, when he came to the point, betweene their fight at sea and that at land: sauing that they could not be martialed in troupes and bandes, in regard wherof the sea seruice was counted more base, and dishonourable; and the rather, in as much as it decided the controuersie, by slinges and casting weapons: which kinde of fight was of lesse honour, then buckling at handy-blowes.

CHAP. VII.

The battell continueth: and Caesar ouer∣commeth.

THE maner of their fightes being this,* 1.24 as I haue described, nei∣ther Brutus, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his nauie, knewe what to doe or what course of fight to take: for the shipping of the Galles was so strong, that the beake-head of their Quinque∣remes could performe no seruice vpon them: and although they should raise turrets according to their vse, yet these would not equall in height the poupe of the enemies shipping, so that there∣in also the Galles had aduantage: neither had they any meanes, whereby they might foile so great a nauie, which amounted to the number of 230 shippes of warre. One thing there was amongst their prouisions which stood them in great steed: for the Ro∣mans had prouided great sharpe hookes or sickles, which they put vpon great and long poles, these they fastened to the tackling which held the maine yarde to the mast; and then haling away their ship, with force of Oares, they cutte the said tackling, and the maine yard fell downe: Whereby the Galles, whose onely hope consisted in sayling and yare turning of their ships, lost at one instant▪ both their sailes and the vse of their ship∣ping: And then the controuersie fell within the compasse of valour, wherein the Ro∣mans exceeded the Gals; and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of Caesar

and the whole Armie, no valiant act could be smothered in secret; for all the hilles and clifts, which affoorded neare prospect into the sea, were couered with the Roman Armie.

Their maine yardes being cutte downe, and the Romans indeuouring with great furie to boord them, failed not to take manie of their ships: which the Galles percei∣uing, and finding no remedie nor hope of resistance, began all to flie, & turning their ships to a forewind, were vpon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no waie at all. Which fell out so fitly for the Romans, that of so great a nauie, verie few through the helpe of the euening escaped to land, after they had fought the space of 8 houres: with which battell, ended the warre with the Veneti, and the rest of the ma∣ritimate nations. For all sort of people both young and olde, in whom there was ei∣ther courage, counsell, or dignitie, were present at this battell, and all their shipping was taken and lost; so that such as remained, knew not whither to go, nor how to de∣fend their townes any longer: and therefore yeelded themselues to Caesar, in whom he vsed the greater seueritie, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous people, not to violate the law of nations: for he slew all the Senat with the sword, and solde the people for bondslaues.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN this battell I chiefly obserue the good fortune,* 1.25 which vsually atten∣deth vpon industrie: for amongst other prouisions, which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the vse of this war, they had made readie these hookes, not for this intent wherin they were imploied, but at all oc∣casions & chances, that might happen, as seruice able complements rather then principall instruments: and yet it so fell out, that they proued the only meanes, to ouerthrow the Galles. Which proueth true the saying of Caesar, that indu∣strie commaundeth fortune and buyeth good successe, with extraordinary la∣bour: for industrie in action is as importunitie in speech, which forceth an as∣sent beyond the strength of reason; and striueth through continuall pursuit, to make good the motiues, by often inculcations; and at length findeth that dispo∣sition, which will easily admit whatsoeuer is required: In like manner diligence and laboursome industrie, by circumspect and heedefull cariage, seldome faile either by hap or cunning, to make good that part wherein the maine point of the matter dependeth. For euetie action is intangled with many infinite adhe∣rents, which are so interessed in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherentes, some of them are by wisedome, foreseene; and directed to that course which may fortunate the acti∣on: the rest being vnknowne, continue without either direction or preuention, and are all vnder the regiment of fortune; for as much as they are beyonde the compasse of our wisest reach, and stand in the waie either to assist or disaduan∣tage: Of these, industrie hath greatest authoritie; in as much as she armeth her selfe for all chances, whereby she is said to command fortune.

CHAP. VIII.

Sabinus ouerthroweth the* 1.26 Vnelli, with the manner thereof.

WHILE these things happened in the state of Vannes,* 1.27 L. Titurius Sabinus entereth with his forces, into the con∣fines of the Vnelli, ouer whom Viridouix was made chiefe commander, hauing drawne the* 1.28 Aulerci and the* 1.29 Ebu∣ronices, with a great number of vagabondes and theeues into the same conspiracie: Sabinus incamping himselfe in a conuenient place, kept his souldiers within the rampier. But Viridouix, being lod∣ged within lesse then two miles of Sabinus his campe, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battell gaue him oportunitie to fight if he would: which Sabinus re∣fused in such sort, that he began not onely to be suspected by the enemie of cowardice, but to be taunted with the reprochfull speeches of his owne souldiers; which opinion of feare being once setled in the mindes of the enemie, he vsed all meanes to increase it, and caried it so wel, that the enemie durst approch the verie rampier of the campe. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the Generall, to fight with an enemie of that strength, but vpon some good oportunitie, or in a place of aduantage. In this generall perswasion of feare, Sabinus chose out a subtile witted Gall, whom he perswaded with great rewards, and further promises, to flie to the enemie, and there to carrie himselfe, according to the instru∣ctions, which he should giue him. This Gall, comming as a reuolter to the enemy, laide open vnto them the feare of the Romans: the extremitie that Caesar was driuen into by the Veneti; and that the night before, Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces secretly out of his campe, and to make all the haste he could to relieue Caesar. Vpon which aduertisement, they all cried out with one consent, that this oportunity was not to be omitted; but setting apart all other deuises, to go and assault the Roman campe. Many circumstances perswaded the Galles to this resolution; as first the lingering & doubt which Sabinus had made, when he was offered battell: secondly the intelligence which this fugitiue had brought: thirdly the want of victuals, wherein they had bin negligent and vnaduisedly carelesse: fourthly the hope they conceiued of the warre of Vannes; and lastly, for that men willingly beleeue that which they would haue come to passe. The force of these motiues was so strong, that they would not suffer Virido∣uix, nor the rest of the captaines, to dismisse the councell vntill they had permitted them to take Armes, and go to the Roman campe. Which being granted, they gathe∣red rubbish and fagots to fill vp the ditch, and with cheerefull harts, as though the vi∣ctorie were alreadie gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped, which was the toppe of a hill rising gently from a leuell, the quantitie of 1000 pa∣ces: hither the Gals hasted with all expedition; and to the intent the Romans might not haue so much time, as to put on their armour, the Galles for haste ran themselues out of breath.

Sabinus incouraging his souldiers, gaue the signe of battell, and sallying out at two seuerall gates of his campe, it fell out that through the oportunitie of the place, the wearines and vnexperience of the enemie, the valour of the Roman soldier and their exercise in former battels, that the Galles could not indure the brunt of the first in∣counter; but presently tooke themselues to flight, of whom verie few escaped. And so it happened that at one time, Sabinus had newes of the ouerthrow at sea; and Caesar of Sabinus victory by land. Vpon these victories, all the cities and states yeelded them∣selues to Titurius: for as the Galles are prompt to vndertake a warre; so are they weake in suffering, and impatient of the consequents and calamities thereof.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis practise of a counterfeit feare was often put in vse by the Roman leaders,* 1.30 as well to disappoint the expectation of an enemie, as to draw them into an inconuenience, & so to defeat them of their grea∣test helpes in time of battell. Caesar comming to succour the campe of Cicero made such vse of this Art, that he put to route a great Armie of the Galles, with a handfull of men: which I will referre vnto the place, where it is particularly set downe by Caesar.

The chiefest thing in this place, which brought them to their ouerthrow, was disappointment: for it is a thing hardly to be digested in businesses of smal consequence, to be frustrated of a setled expectation, when the minde shall dis∣pose her selfe to one only intent, and in the vpshot meete with a counterbuffe to crosse her purposes, and so defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entertained: how much more then in things of such importance, when we shall proceede in a course of victorie, and humour our conceites with that we wish and would haue to happen; and in the end meete, either with bon∣dage or death; must our best wittes be appauled? hauing neither respite nor means, to thinke how the euill may be best preuented. Which the wise Romans well vnderstood, and counted it no dishonour to be reproched with shamefull cowardice, by such as knew not the secrets of wisedome; while they in the meane time foresaw their good fortunes, shrowded vnder the cloake of a pretended distrust.

Let these examples instruct a leader, so to take the oportunitie of any such fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefest points of order and dis∣cipline, as well for the better effecting of the dessigne, as for his owne safety and the securitie of his Armie. For order is as the sinewes and strength of martiall discipline, vniting the particular members into the firme composition of a well proportioned bodie: and so it maketh it more powerfull then any number of disunited partes, how able or infinite soeuer. I might here alleadge infinite ex∣amples to confirme this truth: but let the battell of Drux serue for all; wherein the protestantes ouercharging the catholike Army, followed the retrait so hard, that they quickly became masters of the field: and then neglecting martiall dis∣cipline, fell in confusedly with the broken multitude, to make the victorie more

glorious by slaughter and mortalitie: the Duke of Guise all this while bouged not a foot: but in vnexampled patience kept his regiment close together, and would not suffer them to rescue their general that was taken, vntill the regiment of the Prince of Condie was likewise dispersed and broken; and then perceiuing no difference of order, betweene the Victor Protestant, and the vanquished Ca∣tholike; he dissolued that terrible cloud that had hung so long in suspence, and so changing the fortune of the daie, that he tooke the chiefest of their Princes prisoners, with little or no losse of his owne men: so powerfull is order in the deedes of Armes, and of such consequence in obtaining victorie. And thus we haue first seene the inconueniences, which a counterfet feare well dissembled, may cast vpon a credulous and vnaduised enemie, when pretence and appea∣rance hath brought them into an errour, which their owne credulitie doth after∣ward auouch: and secondly, what strength and safetie consisteth in order; and how powerfull it is to throw downe, and to set vp.

CHAP. IX.

The Proceedings of Crassus in Aquitanie.

AT the same instant of time it happened also,* 1.31 that Pub. Crassus comming into Aquitania, (which both in regard of the large extension of the countrey, as also for the multitude of the inha∣bitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and considering that he was to make warre in those partes, where L. Valerius Preconius the Legate was slaine, and the Armie ouer throwen; and where Lucius Manilius was faine to flie with the losse of his cariages; he thought that his affaires required no meane diligence: and therfore hauing made prouision of corne, and mustered many Auxiliarie forces, and sent for many valiant and prudent men from Tolouse and Narbone, he caried his Army in∣to the confines of the* 1.32 Sontiates, which was no sooner knowne but they leuied great forces both of horse & foote, and with their horse charged vpon the Romans in their march: which being easily repelled, as they followed the retrait, the infanterie of the Galles shewed it selfe in a valley as it laie in ambush. These setting vpon the Ro∣mans renewed the battell, and there the fight continued hot a long time; the Sonti∣ates being animated with the former victories, saw all the hope of Aquitanie re∣lie vpon their vertue: and the Romans on the other side, desired to shew what they were able to doe of themselues, without their grand Captaine, and vnder the con∣duction of a young souldier: At length the enemy ouerwaged with prowesse, and wearied with woundes, betooke themselues to flight; of whom the Romans slewe a great number. And then marched directlie to the towne of the Sontiates, and laid siege vnto if; the siege grew hot on both sides; the Romans approched the walles, with vines, turrets and mounts: the townesmen defended themselues some time, by sallying out; sometimes, by vndermining the mounts and fortifications, wherin the Aquitani are very skilfull. But when they perceiued the industry of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they intreated Crassus to accept their rendry:

which being granted, and al the armie intending the deliuery of their Armes; Ad∣cantuanus their chiefe magistrate, fled out in the meane time at an other port of the citie, with 600. deuoted companions whom they called Soldurij: but as they attemp∣ted to escape, the soldiers that kept that part of the fortification, as they signified his cuasion by a clamour and shout, the rest be tooke themselues to armes; and so repel∣led him againe into the towne, where he desired to bee taken in the number of the submissiue multitude. Crassus hauing taken hostages of them, went into the con∣fines of the Vocontij.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THese skilfull and experienced men, which Crassus sent for out of all the Cities in Aquitaine,* 1.33 were those, whom the Romans called Euocati: such as were free from warfare, and exempted by their lawes from gi∣uing their names in musters, either by reason of their yeares, or the magistracy which they had borne, or for some other causes, which gaue them that priui∣ledge: And in that regard were sent for by letters, intreating their assistance in the cariage of that war, as men wel acquainted with the nature of such businesses. Their places were nothing inferiour to the Centurions, for aduise and direction, although they had no part in command or authority.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN this fight we may further obserue, their maner of defence against Mountes, and Caualieros; which we find chiefly to bee mines. Iose∣phus in the Iewish warre saith, that the Romans hauing raised an ex∣ceeding high mount, the Iewes vndermined the same with such Art, that as they digged vnderneath; they supported the mount with huge props and planks, that it might not shrinke: and watching a time of greatest aduantage, they set all the timber worke, which vnderpropped the mount, on fire, which ta∣king fire with the helpe of brimstone and pitch, the mount fell vpon a sodaine, to the great terrour and amazement of the Romans.

At the siege of Auaricum,* 1.34 we find how the Galles by vndermining, did take the earth from the mount, as fast as it was caried vnto it by the Romans; and so kept it from rising, and made it vneffectuall. But if it were for the most parte made of woode, or other combustible matter, they sought then by all meanes to burne it; as it happened at the siege of Massilia: and oftentimes when both burning and vndermining failed, they confronted it, with an other mount with∣in the walles, to disappoint the disaduantage by equall contesting of it; and so made it vnprofitable. Concerning mines, this much may I saie, without preiu∣dice to that Art: that the chiefest points to be respected are these: First, the true distance to a dessigned place, which is best got by instrument and helpe of Geometrie, where other markes of certainty are wanting: secondlie, the direction of the myne, that wee may not erre in our course which the com∣passe affoordeth: thirdlie, the strengthening of the mine with timber worke,

if neede require: lastly, the countermining and crossemeeting: All which parts haue very many circumstances, and require a larger discourse, then may bee thought pertinent for this place.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe strange contract betweene these Soldurij, and their chiefetaine, may wel deserue a place amongst these obseruations, especiallie con∣sidering the obligatorie conditions, which either party stood bound to obserue: for the Captaine was to make his Soldurij partakers of all his happines in this life; in regard whereof, they were to take part of whatso∣euer ill chance or disaster shoulde happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensuall miserie, tooke hold of their head, these deuoted were tied voluntarilie to follow him the selfe same way: neither in any memory was there ouer man found, that refused to die, if he to whom he was deuoted, chanced to be slaine. Which bloudy league of amitie, as it was repugnant to the course of nature, multiplying particular destinie to a generall calamitie: so was it dan∣gerous in a well ordered state, if the ringleader were either ambitious, or sought to practise any thing contrarie to good gouernement: for hee himselfe would presume much vpon the assistance of his Soldurij; and they on the other side, must needs wish well to his attempts that were so interessed in his life & death.

CHAP. X.

The Galles raise new forces, against Crassus.

THe barbarous Galles were much troubled,* 1.35 that a towne of that strength should so soone bee taken; and therefore they sent am∣bassadours into all quarters, coniured one with another, confir∣med their couenants with mutuall hostages, and leuied what power they were able to make: sending for aide out of Spaine, and from other states that bordered vpon Aquitaine; at the comming of these forces they began to make warre, with a great power, and with many soldiours of great fame. For they appointed such leaders as had seene the experience of Sertorius his warres, and were great in the opinion of men, for their skill and knowledge in the arte militarie; these according to the cu∣stome of the people of Rome, beganne to take places of aduantage, to fortifie their campe, and to intercept the Romaines from free passage of conu••ies and necessary en∣tercourses. Which when Crassus perceiued, and considering withall that his owne forces were so few, that hee could not well dismember them vpon any seruice or ad∣uantage; and that the enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and left not∣withstanding, a sufficient garison in his campe; by which meanes their corne and prouision would in time grow scarce, and the enemy waxed euery daie stronger: he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to giue them battel.

The matter being referd to a councel of warre, when hee vnderstoode that all men were of the same opinion, he appointed the next daie to giue them battaile; and in the dawning putting his men in a double battaile, and placing the Auxiliarie forces in the middest, he attended to see what the enemy would doe. The Galles, although they were persuaded, that they might aduenture battel both in regard of their mul∣titude and ancient prowes of warre, as also in respect of the paucitie of the Romains; yet they though it better to blocke vp the passages, and so cut off all cariages, and conuoies of corne; and so the victory would follow without bloudshed: and if the Ro∣mans for want of corne should offer to make a retreit, they would then set vpon them as they marched, wearied with trauell, and heauilie laden with their burthens. This resolution being approued by the whole councell of the Galles, when the Romans im∣battailed their forces, they kept their men within their campe.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis Sertorius had followed the faction of Marius and Cinna,* 1.36 and when Sylla had ouerthrowne both the elder and yonger Marius, hee fled into Spaine, and there maintained the quarrell on foote against Pompeie and Metellus; and ouerthrew them in many battels: but in the end was trecherously slaine by Perpanna at a banket. He was a man of great spirit, and of admirable dispatch; and vnder him were these captaines brought vp, which Caesar commendeth for their skil in armes.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN histories,* 1.37 propounding to our consideration the deedes and moni∣ments of former ages, we may obserue two especiall meanes, which the great commanders of the world haue entertained to atchieue victory, and ouermaster their enemies: the first by cunning and wise cariage of a matter, before it come to triall by blowes: the second, by forceable meanes & waging of battel; the one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the soule; and the other depending vpon the strength and ability of the body. Concerning the first, it hath euer bin held more honorable, as better suting the worth of the spirit and the diuine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the aduerse part may be weakened by wit, and preuented in the proiects of their better fortunes, by anticipation of meanes and occasions, & so through aduantages taken from their owne proceedings, to be driuen to that exigent, which may determine of the controuersie before they come to blowes, & con∣clude the matter by tearmes of arte, taken from the directions of good proui∣dence. For to speake a truth,* 1.38 the action of battel, as it is the last part in that fa∣cultie; so it is the worst in regarde of christian duty, and better fitteth the pro∣geny of Lamech his second wife, which the Diuines do note to be borne to the ruine and destruction of mankind, then the children of grace, whose ioy con∣sisteth in peace and loue.

Caesar in the first of the ciuill warres respected the same thing, but from o∣ther grounds: for hauing shut vp Afranius, and Petreius in a place of disaduan∣tage, and might haue cut them off without further trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the victorie comming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captaines that were earnest vpon the enemie: Cur etiam secundo praelio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritos milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur? And this course did these Galles take, which vnder Sertorius had learned the Romaine Arte, and the Romaine indu∣stry; and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romains at their owne weapon. This first meanes is principally to be imbraced, as the safest waie in these vncertaine and casual euentes: for that which resteth vpon corporall strength, and maketh execution the meanes to a conclusion, is verie terrible euen to the better party, full of hazard and of little certaintie. For it were a miracle of fortune neuer heard of yet, so to carrie a battaile vpon what aduantage or meanes whatsoeuer, that the victor army shoulde buie so great a fortune without bloudshed or losse of men; and erect a Trophee to honour at the sole cost of the enemy, without losse or expence of his owne treasure. And for the vncertaintie in a battell, who knoweth not what infinite chances and changes may happen in euery small moment of time, to turne the fortune of the day to this or that party, and make both sides vnconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and feare, ioy and sorrow? and therefore Caesar thought it not best to tempt the waie-wardnes of fortune, when by other meanes he might obtaine his desires. This I say is chiefely to be im∣braced, if our meanes wil affoord vs that happinesse: but howsoeuer I holde it wisedome so to entertaine this course of victorie, that we omit not the chiefest helpes of furtherance when it commeth to blowes, but to thinke of this con∣quest by arte and wit, as necessarie, if our meanes will serue vs to compasse it; and of the other, as necessarie whether we will or no: for the historie maketh it plaine, that when Brutus found himselfe destitute of meanes to vndertake that course of victorie, which proceedeth from prouidence and discreete cariage; hee then betooke himselfe necessarilie to the latter, and by the helpe of battell, sought to free himselfe from those disaduantages, into which the Galles had brought him.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

I Obserue further out of this place,* 1.39 that what course soeuer be taken, a discreet leader wil not easily forgo an aduantage, without great assu∣rance of a better fortune: nor change the certainty of a benefit, vp∣on probabilities of other hopes, vntill it haue paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to performe. For so he might forgo his fortune by presuming too much vpon the fauour of future chances, which are oftner seene to crosse our purposes, rather then to further the way which is taken.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

FVrther I obserue, this double battell to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for their vsuall manner was, to make a triple battell, that the first might haue a second, and a third helpe: but where their number would not affoord that commoditie, they then made two battels, that there might be the succour of a second supplie. But they neuer fought with one single battell, for ought that may bee gathered by their histories.

THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

THe last thing which I obserue,* 1.40 is the place, where Crassus bestowed the Auxiliarie forces, in the disposition of his troupes to battell; which is here said to be, in mediam Aciem: for as their Armies were diuided into three battels; so euerie battell was deuided into three partes; the two cornets, and the battell, wherein these Auxiliarie forces were in this seruice bestowed: of these he afterward saith, that in as much as he durst not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to serue the Romans in time of battell, with stones and weapons, and to carrie earth and turfe to the mount. The reason why suspected troupes are placed in the battell, rather then in either of the cornets, is, for that the battell hath not such scope to fling out, or take aduantage of place to doe mischiefe, as the corners haue: for wheresoeuer there hath beene set battels fought, the strength of their armie consisted alwaies in the cornets, as the two principall instruments of the battell; and as long as these stood sound, the victorie went alwaies certaine on that part: for the cor∣nets kept the enemie both from incompassing about the bodie of their Armie, and had the aduantage also of charging vpon the open side of their aduersarie. At the battell of Cannas Hanniball put the weakest of his forces in the battell, and aduancing them towards the enemie, left the two cornets behind: so that, when the enemie came to charge vpon the battell, they easily beat them backe, and as they followed the retrait fell in betweene the two cornets, wherein the strength of the Armie consisted, and being by them incompassed on each side, were defeated and ouerthrowen. And thus we see the aduantage which a Ge∣nerall hath, when his two cornets stand firme; although the battell shrinke in the incounter. Hanniball in the battell he had with Scipio in Africke, placed the strangers in the front and in the rereward, according peraduenture as he found their number and the vse of their Armes, which are circumstances to be consi∣dered in this case, and depend rather vpon the iudgment of a generall, then of anie prescription that can be giuen in this matter.

CHAP. XI.

Crassus taketh the campe of the Galles: and with their ouerthrow endeth that warre.

CRASSVS vnderstanding their drift,* 1.41 and finding his men willing to set vpon their campe, incouraged his soldiers; and to the contentment of all men, went directly to the place where they were lodged: and as some began to fill vp the ditch; and others with casting weapons to beate the Galles from the rampier, he commanded the Auxiliarie forces, of whom he had no great assu∣rance, to bring stones and weapons to the soldiers that fought, and to carrie earth and turfe to the mount; that so they might make a shew of fighting. And on the other side, as the enemy began valiantly to make resistance, and to caste their weapon from the higher ground, to the great hurt of the Roman souldier; the horsemen in the meane time riding about the campe of the Galles, brought worde to Crassus that the rampier at the Decumane port, was not fortified with such diligence, as they found it in other places, but would admit an easie entrance. Crassus dealt ear∣nestly with the commanders of the horse, to incourage their men with great promises and rewardes; and instructed them what he would haue done: they, according to their instructions, tooke foure cohorts that were left in the campe, and carrying them a further waie about, that they might not be discouered by the enemy; while all mens eies and mindes were intent vpon the fight, they speedely came to the place of the for∣tifications, which the horsmen had found to be weake, which being easily broken down, they had entered the campe before the enemie could well tell what was done. And then a great clamour & shout being heard about that place, the Roman legions renu∣ing their force, as it falleth out alwaies in hope of victorie, began to charge them a fresh with great furie: the Galles being circumuented on each side, and despairing of their safetie, casting themselues ouer the rampier, sought by flight to escape the dan∣ger. But for as much as the country was open and champion, the horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of 50000 there scarce remaineth the fourth part.

THE OBSERVATION.

FRom this place Brancatio taketh occasion to dispute,* 1.42 how an enemie that is strongly incamped, and for some aduantage will not remoue, may be dislodged, whether he will or no. A point of great cōsequence, in matter of warre: and therefore deserueth due consideration. Con∣cerning which he laieth this downe for a maxime, that all forts and strong holds are taken by the foot, and that campes and lodgings are taken by the head: By

which is meant, that he who purposeth to winne a fortresse well manned and prouided, must first get the foot and take hold of the ditch; and then sease him∣selfe vpon the rampier, and so get the place: for he saith, that mounts and emi∣nent eleuations are of little vse against fortresses or sconses, vnlesse they ouertop them; which may be easily preuented by raising the parapet of the fortresse in front, and the curtaine in flanke, according as the enemy shall carie his mounts aloft; and so they shall neuer come to ouertop the holdes. But all campes and lodgings are taken by the head: That is, by mountes and eleuations, which by the aduantage of their height command the champion. For he holdeth it im∣possible, to raise a mount within the campe in so short a time, to contest that, which the enemie shall make without. This foundation being laide, he procee∣deth to discouer a waie, how to raise a mount maugre the enemie, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillerie, or murther them all within their trenches. And this he taketh from Caesar at the siege of Gergobia.* 1.43 The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like vnto the line which the Geo∣metricians call Helicall; by this double ditch, he maketh his approch to anie place of most aduantage, where he maie in a night, raise a mount high enough for the ordinance to plaie vpon any quarter of the campe. The censure of this practise, I referre to our iudicious souldiers, which may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in Brancatio himselfe. This much I dare affirme in the behalfe of these workes, that they were of high e∣steeme amongst the Romans, when daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to finde out the readiest meanes, both for security and victorie. And if our souldiers could be brought to taste the commoditie of these workes, either by perswasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practises: but our men had rather flie vpon desperat aduentures, and seeke victory in the iawes of death, then to cleare all hazard, with paines and diligence.

CHAP. XII.

Caesar vndertaketh the warre with the Menapij and Morini.

AT the same time also,* 1.44 although the sommer was almost at an end, yet for as much as all Gallia was in peace, and the* 1.45 Morini only with the* 1.46 Menapij stood out in armes, and had neuer either sent ambassadour, or otherwise treated of peace; Caesar think∣ing that warre might quickly be ended, lead his Armie into their country. At his comming, he found them to carrie the wars farre otherwise, then the rest of the Galles had done: for vnder∣standing that the greatest nations of Gallia, which had waged battell with the Ro∣mans, were beaten and ouerthrowen; and hauing whole continents of woods and bogs in their territories, they conuaied both themselues and their goods into those quarters:

Caesar comming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortifie his campe, not disco∣uering any enemy neare about him; but as his men were dispearsed in their charges, they suddenly sallied out of the woods and assaulted the Romans; but being speedely driuen in againe with the losse of manie of them, as the Romans followed them farre into the woods, had some few of their men slaine. The time that remained, Caesar re∣solued to spend in cutting downe the woods; and least the souldiers might bee taken vnawares, while they were busied in that worke, he caused them to place all the trees which they cut downe, on either side of the Armie; that they might serue for a de∣fence, against sudden assaultes. A great quantitie of ground was thus rid within a few daies; so that their goods and cattell was taken by the Romans: but they them∣selues were fled into thicker woods. At which time there happened such a continuall raine, as forced them to leaue of the worke; and the souldiers could no longer indure, to lie in tentes of skins: and therefore Caesar, after he had wasted and spoiled their country, burned their townes, and their houses; he carried backe his Armie, and pla∣ced them in such citties to winter in, as were subdued by the late warres.

OBSERVATIONS.

THe Irish rebels, hauing the like commoditie of woods and bogs, doe entertaine the like course of warre, as the Morini did with Cae∣sar: the meanes which he vsed to disappoint them of that practise, was to cutte downe the woods, which if it be thought monstrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of warre; let them consider that the Roman discipline wrought greater effectes of valour, then can bee made credible by the vse of these times. For besides their exquisite discipline, which of it selfe was able to frame patterns of vnexampled magnanimitie; their industrie was admi∣rable in the execution thereof, and carried it with such vncessant trauell, that the souldiers thought it great happines when they came to wage battell with the enemie; and could haue meanes to quit their continuall trauell, with the ha∣zard of their liues. Neither let it seeme strange, that the Romans vndertooke to cut down the woods; but rather let vs admire their facilitie in so difficult a taske: for as the historie witnesseth: magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili cele∣ritate: a great quantitie of ground was rid in a few daies with incredible speede. And after the woods were cut downe, they tooke more paines in placing it on each side of the legions, to hinder anie sudden assault, then they did in cutting it downe: which deserueth as great admiration, as the former part. There is an∣other place in the sixt booke of these Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such warres, and may serue to acquaint vs with that which Caesar did in these difficulties.

The Eburones or the men of Liege, had the like commoditie of woods and bogges, and made vse of them in the warre they had with Caesar: The matter (saith hee) required great diligence, not so much in regard of the perill of the whole Armie, (for there could no danger come from an enemie that was frigh∣ted and dispersed) as the safetie of euerie particular souldier, which in part did

pertaine to the welfare of the whole Armie. For the desire of bootie caried ma∣nie of the souldiers farre from the bodie of the Armie: and the woods being full of vnknowne and secret passages, would not suffer them to go either thicke together or close imbattailed. If he desired to haue the warre ended, and the race of those wicked men to bee rooted out, hee must of force make manie small companies, and deuide his men into many bodies: but if hee would haue the maniples to keepe at their ensignes, as the discipline and custome of the Roman Army required; then the place was a shelter and defence to the enemie: neither did they want courage to laie ambushments, and to circumuent such as they found alone, stragling from their companies. In these difficulties, there was as much done as diligence could doe; prouiding rather to be wanting in the of∣fensiue part (although all mens mindes were set on fire with reuenge) then to hurt the enemie with the losse of the Roman souldier. Caesar sent messengers to the bordering states, to come out and sacke the Eburones, and they should haue all the praie for their labour: that the life of the Galles rather then his legi∣onarie souldiers might be hazarded in those woods; as also that, with so great a multitude, both the race and name of that people might bee quite extingui∣shed.

There are many particularities in this relation, which concerne the true mo∣tion of the Irish warres, which may be better obserued by such as know those warres by experience, then by my selfe that vnderstand them onely by relation: and therefore to preuent such exceptions, as my rule shall make of the parallell in these two cases: I will leaue it to be done by themselues. And thus endeth the third Commentarie.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Caesar.
• * 1.2

  Caesar.
• * 1.3

  The force of nouelty tur∣ning the for tune of a bat∣tell.
• * 1.4

  Caesar.
• * 1.5

  Sauoiens.
• * 1.6

  Le Perche.
• * 1.7

  Cornoaille in Bretaine
• * 1.8

  Vannes.
• * 1.9

  The weakenes of our iudge∣ment in re∣gard of the knowledge of future times.
• * 1.10

  The Autho∣rity of exāple.
• * 1.11

  Caesar.
• * 1.12

  Ligeris.
• * 1.13

  The groundes of that reue∣rent opinion which is held of ambassa∣dors.
• * 1.14

  Caesar.
• * 1.15

  Lendriguer. Lysieux. Nantes. Aurenche. Leondoul. Cities in lit∣tle Britaine.
• * 1.16

  Triers.
• * 1.17

  Caesar.
• * 1.18

  The causes of the ebbing and flowing of the sea.
• * 1.19

  Spring tides.
• * 1.20

  The manner of their ship∣ping.
• * 1.21

  Lib. 27.
• * 1.22

  Their maner of sea-fights.
• * 1.23

  Lib. 2. de bello ciuili.
• * 1.24

  Caesar.
• * 1.25

  The force of industrie.
• * 1.26

  La Perche.
• * 1.27

  Caesar.
• * 1.28

  Rhone.
• * 1.29

  Eureux.
• * 1.30

  The vse which the Romans made of a counter∣feit feare. Lib. 5.
• * 1.31

  Caesar.
• * 1.32

  Euocati.
• * 1.33

  Euocati.
• * 1.34

  Lib. 7. de bel∣lo Gall.
• * 1.35

  Caesar.
• * 1.36

  Sertorius.
• * 1.37

  Two meanes to atchieue victorie and to ouermaster their enemies
• * 1.38

  Tubalcaine by war and Naamah by the floud.
• * 1.39

  Not to forgo an aduantage
• * 1.40

  The place where suspe∣cted forces are best be∣stowed in bat¦tell.
• * 1.41

  Caesar.
• * 1.42

  Lib. 3. Auertimento secundo.
• * 1.43

  Lib. de bello Gallico.
• * 1.44

  Caesar.
• * 1.45

  Terouine
• * 1.46

  Cleue and Gueldres.