Obseruations vpon the fiue first bookes of Cæsars commentaries setting fourth the practise of the art military in the time of the Roman Empire : wherein are handled all the chiefest point of their discipline, with the true reason of euery part, together with such instructions as may be drawn from their proceedings, for the better direction of our moderne warres / by Clement Edmunds.

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Title
Obseruations vpon the fiue first bookes of Cæsars commentaries setting fourth the practise of the art military in the time of the Roman Empire : wherein are handled all the chiefest point of their discipline, with the true reason of euery part, together with such instructions as may be drawn from their proceedings, for the better direction of our moderne warres / by Clement Edmunds.
Author
Edmondes, Clement, Sir, 1566 or 7-1622.
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At London :: Printed by Peter Short, dwelling on Bredstreet hill at the signe of the Starre,
1600.
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Subject terms
Caesar, Julius. -- De bello Gallico. -- English. -- Abridgments.
Military art and science -- Early works to 1800.
Rome -- History -- Republic, 265-30 B.C. -- Early works to 1800.
Gaul -- History -- Gallic Wars, 58-51 B.C. -- Early works to 1800.
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http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A21131.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Obseruations vpon the fiue first bookes of Cæsars commentaries setting fourth the practise of the art military in the time of the Roman Empire : wherein are handled all the chiefest point of their discipline, with the true reason of euery part, together with such instructions as may be drawn from their proceedings, for the better direction of our moderne warres / by Clement Edmunds." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A21131.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 7, 2024.

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CHAP. VIII.

Caesar carieth his Armie to the Territories of the Bellouaci, Ambiani and the Neruij.

CAESAR taking for pledges the chiefest of their cittie,* 1.1 vpon the deliuerie of all their Armes, receiued the Suessones to mercie: and from thence led his Armie against the Bellouaci;* 1.2 who hauing con∣uaied both themselues and their goods into the towne, called Bratis∣pantium, and vnderstanding that Caesar was come within fiue mile of the place, all the elder sort came foorth to meete him, signifying

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their submission, by their lamentable demeanour. For these Diuitiacus became a mediator (who after the Belgae had broken vp their campe, had dismissed his Hedu∣an forces and was returned to Caesar) the Hedui (saith he) haue alwaies found in the Bellouaci, a faithfull and friendly disposition to their state: and if they had not beene betraied by their nobilitie, (who made them beleeue, that the Hedui were brought in bondage by the Romaines, and suffered all villanie and despight at their handes,) they had neuer withdrawne themselues from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the Romaines. The authors of this counsel, perceiuing into what great mi∣serie they had brought their countrey, were fled into Britanie: wherfore not onelie the Bellouaci, but the Hedui also in their behalfe besought him to vse his clemencie towardes them. Caesar in regarde of the Hedui and Diuitiacus, promised to receiue them to mercie; but forasmuch as the state was verie great and populous, hee de∣manded 600. hostages: Which being deliuered, and their armour brought out of the towne,* 1.3 he marched from thence into the coast of the Ambiani, who without fur∣ther lingering, gaue both themselues and al that they had into his power. Vpon these bordered the Neruij, of whom Caesar found this much by inquirie, that there was no recourse of marchants vnto them; neither did they suffer any wine, or what thing else might tende to riot, to bee brought into their countrey: for they were persua∣ded, that by such thinges their courage was much abated, and their vertue weake∣ned. Further, he learned that these Neruij were a sauage people, and of great va∣lour, often accusing the rest of the Belgae, for yeelding their neckes to the Romaine yoake, openly affirming, that they would neither sende ambassadors nor take peace vpon any condition.

Caesar hauing marched three daies iourney in their countrey,* 1.4 he vnderstood that the riuer* 1.5 Sabis was not past ten miles from his campe; and that on the further side of this riuer, all the Neruij were assembled together, and there attended the com∣ming of the Romaines: with them were ioined the Attrebatij, and Veromandui, whom they had persuaded to abide the same fortune of warre with them. Besides, they expected a power from the Aduatici; the women and such as were vnmeete for the fielde, they bestowed in a place vnaccessible for any armie, by reason of fens and bogs, and marishes. Vpon this intelligence, Caesar sent his discouerers and Cen∣turions before, to choose out a fit place to incampe in.

Now whereas many of the surrendred Belgae, and other Galles were continuallie in the Romaine army, certaine of these (as it was afterward known by the captiues) obseruing the order which the Romaines vsed in marching, came by night to the Neruij and tolde them, that betweene euerie legion went a great sort of cariages; and that it was no matter of difficultie, assoone as the first legion was come into the campe, and the other legions yet a great way off, to set vpon them, vpon a suddaine, before they were disburdened of their cariages; and so to ouerthrowe them: which legion being thus cut off, and their stuffe taken, the rest would haue smal courage to stande against them. It much furthered this aduice, that, forasmuch as the Neruij were not able to make any power of horse, that they might the better resist the caual∣rie of their borderers, whensoeuer they made any roade into their marches; their manner was to cut yong trees halfe asunder, & bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughes in breadth, and with thornes and briers planted between them, they made them so thicke, that it was impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or passe through them; so that, when by this occasion, the passage of the Ro∣maine army must needes be hindred, the Neruij thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected.

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[illustration]

CAESARS march where in euery Legion had his Cariadges in front

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[illustration]

CAESARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand

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The place which the Romaines chose to incampe in, was a hill, of like leuell from the top to the bottome, at the foot whereof ran the riuer Sabis: and with the like le∣uell, on the other side, rose an other hill directly against this, to the quantity of 200. paces; the bottom whereof was plaine and open, and the vpper part so thicke with wood, that it could not easilie be looked into: within these woods the Neruians kept themselues close, and in the open grounde, by the riuer side were onely seene a fewe troupes of horse, and the riuer in that place was about 3. foot deepe,

Caesar sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power; but the ma∣ner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Neruii: for in∣asmuch as the enemy was at hand; Caesar (as his custom was) led 6. legions alwaies in areadines, without burthen or cariage of any thing, but their armes: after them hee placed the impediments of the whole army. And the two legions which were last in∣rolled were a rereward to the army, and garded the stuffe.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis trecherous practise of the surrendred Belgae, hath fortunatelie discouered the maner of Caesars march,* 1.6 as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no smal con∣sequence in martiall discipline, being subiect to so many inconueni∣ences, and capable of the greatest arte that may be shewed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet cariage of a march;* 1.7 by this circumstance it may bee gathered, that Caesar principally respected safetie: and secondly conueniency. If the place affoorded a secure passage, and gaue no suspicion of hostilitie, hee was content in regarde of conueniency, to suffer euery legion to haue the ouer∣sight of their particular cariages, and to insert them among the troupes, that e∣uery man might haue at hand such necessaries as were requisite, either for their priuate vse or publike discipline. But if he were in danger of any sodain attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy; hee then omitted conuenient disposition, in regard of particular vse, as disaduantageous to their safety: & cari∣ed his legions in that readines, that if they chanced to be ingaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march, or incumbrance of their cari∣ages receiue the charge, in that forme of battell, as was best approoued by their military rules, & the ancient practise of their fortunate progenitors.

The old Romains obserued likewise the same respects, for in vnsafe & suspec∣ted places,* 1.8 they caried their troupes agmine quadrato, which as Liuie seemeth to note, was free from all cariage and impediments, which might hinder them in any sodaine alarum. Neither doth that of* 1.9 Hirtius any way cōtradict this inter∣pretation, where he saith, that Caesar so disposed his troupes against the Belloua∣ci, that 3. legions marched in front, & after them came al the cariages, to which the 10. legion serued as a rereward; & so they marched, pene agmine quadrato. * 1.10Seneca in like maner noteth the safety of agmen quadratū, where he saith, that where an enemie is expected, wee ought to march agmine quadrato, readie to fight. The most material consequence of these places alleadged is, that as ofte as they suspected anie onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing

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differed from their vsuall maner of imbattailing; and therefore it was called ag∣men quadratum, or a square march, inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts, as were obserued in quadrata Acie. For that triple forme of imbattailing, which the Romaines generally obserued in their fights, hauing respect to the di∣stances between each battel, contained almost an equal dimension of front and file: and so it made Aciem quadratam; and when it marched, Agmen quadratum.

Polybius expresseth the same in effect,* 1.11 as often as the place required circum∣spection; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the cariages: for he saith that in time of danger, especially where the countrey was plaine and Chāpion, and gaue space & free scope to cleere themselues, vpon anie accident, the Romains mar∣ched in a triple battel, of equal distāce one behind an other, euery battel hauing his seueral cariages in front: And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy, they turned themselues according to the oportunity of the place, either to the right or left hande, and so placing their cariages on the one side of their army, they stood imbattailed ready to receiue the charge.

The contrary forme of marching, where the place afforded more security, & gaue scope to conueniency,* 1.12 they named agmen longum; when almost euery ma∣niple or order, had their seueral cariages attending vpon them, & stroue to keep that way which they found most easie, both for thēselues & their impediments. Which order of a march, as it was more commodius then the former, in regard of particularity, so was it vnsafe and dangerous, where the enemy was expected: And therfore Caesar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta, for marching, when they were deluded by Ambiorix,* 1.13 longissimo agmine; as though they had receiued their aduertisements from a friend, and not from an enemy.

And albeit our moderne wars are far different, in quality, frō them of ancient times;* 1.14 yet in this point of discipline, they cannot haue a more perfect direction, then that which the Romaines obserued, as the two poles of their motions, sa∣fety and conueniency: whereof the first dependeth chiefely vpon the prouident disposition of the leaders; and the other wil easily follow on, as the commodity of euerie particular shal giue occasion.

Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can bee taken then that maner of imbattailing, which shall be thought most conuenient, if an ene∣my were present to confront them? for a well ordered march must either carie the perfect forme of a battell, or containe the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receiue that perfection of strength, which the fittest disposition can affoord it. First therefore, a prudent and circum∣spect leader, that desireth to frame a strong and orderly march, is diligentlie to obserue the nature and vse of each weapon in his army, howe they may be pla∣ced for greatest vse and aduantage, both in respect of their different and con∣curring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this knowledge will consequentlie inferre the best and exactest disposition of imbattailing, as the said forces are capable of; which if it may be obserued in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactnes of imbattailing wil not admit conuenient cariage of such necessarie adiuncts, as pertaine to an armie; the inconuenience is to bee relieued, with as little alteration from that rule, as in

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a warie iudgment shall be found expedient: that albeit the forme be somewhat changed; yet the principles and ground wherein their strength and safetie con∣sisteth, maie still be retained.

Neither can any man well descend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exemplifie the practises of manie great and experienced commanders; what sort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rereward, in what part of the Armie the Munition marched, and where the rest of the cariage was be∣stowed, according as their seuerall iudgments thought most expedient, in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that obserued this rule before prescribed, did seldome miscarrie through an vnsafe march. Let a good Martialist well know their proper vse in that diuersity of weapons in his Armie; how they are seruiceable or disaduantageous, in this or that place, against such or such an enemie: and he will speedily order his bat∣tell, dispose of his march, and bestow his cariages, as shall best fall out both for his safetie, and conueniencie.

Caesars custome was, to send his Caualrie and light armed footmen, before the body of his Armie, both to discouer and impeach an enemie; for these troupes were nimble in motion and fit for such seruices: but if the danger were greater in the rereward then in the front, the horsemen marched in the tayle of the Armie, and gaue securitie where there was most cause of feare. But if it hap∣pened that they were found vnfit to make good the seruice in that place, as of∣tentimes it fell out, and especially in Africa against the Numidians: he then re∣moued them, as he best found it conuenient, and brought his legionarie soul∣diers, which were the sinewes and strength of his forces, and marched continu∣ally in the bulke of the Armie, to make good that which his horsemen could not performe. And thus he altered the antique prescription, and vniformitie of cu∣stome, according as he found himselfe best able to disaduantage an enemie, or make waie to victorie.

Notes

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