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THE OBSERVATION.
I Maie here take an occasion, to speake somewhat concerning the au∣thoritie of the Roman Generals, which we see to be verie large, con∣sidering that Caesar of himselfe, without any further leaue of the Se∣nate and people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this histo∣rie) did vndertake a warre of that consequence, and put in ieopardie the Legi∣ons, the Prouince, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia. Wherein we are to vnderstand, that when the state of Rome did allot the gouernment of any Prouince to a Proconsull, they did likewise recommend vnto him the care∣ful managing of such accidents, as might any way concerne the good of that re∣giment. For considering that such causes as may trouble a well ordered gouern∣ment, are as well external and forraine, as internall and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had beene to small purpose to haue giuen him onely autho∣ritie, to maintaine a course of wholesome gouernment at home, and no meanes to take awaie such oppositions, which forraine accidentes might set vp against him: And so we see that Caesar vndertooke the Heluetian warre, in regard of the safetie of the Prouince: And this againe with Ariouistus, least the Germans should so multiplie in Gallia, that the Prouince it selfe might at length bee in∣dangered. Neither had their Generals authoritie onely to vndertake these wars, but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to treat, capitulate, compound, or what els they thought conuenient for the ad∣uancement of the common weale, did wholy rest vpon their direction: repub. bene gesta, being the stile of the warrant for all their actions. Neither may we thinke that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerfull in the course of businesses, as that which absolutely commandeth without control∣ment, and proceedeth according to the oportunity of time and occasion, fur∣ther then either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore when∣soeuer the Roman affaires were distressed and driuen to an exigent, they created a Dictator that had regiam potestatem, such an absolute command, that whatsoe∣uer power rested either in the Consuls, or in the Tribunes, in the Senate or in the people, it gaue waie to the greatnes of that magistrate; that there might be no let or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute command could establish, for the good of the common weale. And yet not∣withstāding this absolute gouernment, they attributed such power to the course of humane actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted vpon dissolute and vnfortunate leaders, they seemed to acknowledge that no man, how circum∣spect soeuer, could promise more then likelihoods or probabilities of good for∣tune, as farre forth as his meanes and industrie could atchieue it. For olde M. Fabius, pleading for the life of his gallant sonne, and opposing the rigor of Papyrius the dictator with examples of antiquity, saith: Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem vnquam atrociorem fuisse in eos qui temeritate atque inscitia exercitus amisissent, quam vt pecunia eos multaret: ca∣pite