Mikrokosmographia a description of the body of man. Together vvith the controuersies thereto belonging. Collected and translated out of all the best authors of anatomy, especially out of Gasper Bauhinus and Andreas Laurentius. By Helkiah Crooke Doctor of Physicke, physitian to His Maiestie, and his Highnesse professor in anatomy and chyrurgerie. Published by the Kings Maiesties especiall direction and warrant according to the first integrity, as it was originally written by the author.

QVEST. X. VVhether the Braine hath any sense.

IT is a notable Controuersie amongst Physitians, whether the Brain haue any sense or no. That it hath sense it may bee demonstrated by authoritie, experi∣ence and reason. Hippocrates in his Booke De vulneribus capitis, resolueth that it hath sense where he saith, That the braine about the sinciput doth soonest * 1.1 and especially feele any inconuenience that is either in the flesh or in the bone. Galen in his booke De plenitudine. The Braine (saith he) and the spinall marrow are accounted a∣mongst those things which haue sense. And if in a frensie no paine be felt, it is because the mind is disquieted Againe in his book Odoratus organo he attributeth to the Brain manifest sense. Moreouer experience and sense do confirme the some. Galen in the 4. chapter of * 1.2 the aforesaid book, telleth a storie of a certaine man whom hee commanded to snuffe vp into his nose, and to receiue at his mouth Nigella, Gith or Pepperwort finely beaten and * 1.3 mingled with old oyle, who thereupon felt a great gnawing in his braine. Which (saith he) is a manifest argument that some of that Nigella went into the ventricles of the Brain, and cleauing to the Pia mater or thin Membrane, or else haply in the Braine it selfe, was the cause of that paine.

Againe, reason seemeth to perswade the same. The Braine is the fountaine and o∣riginall of all sense, and therefore it selfe must need be sensible, because by it all other parts haue sense. For it is an axiome in Logicke, Propter quod vnumquodque est tale, & illud ma∣gis tale. That for which any thing is such or such, must needs it selfe be more such or such. Fur∣thermore, vnlesse the Braine had sense, it could not rouse it selfe vp to the expulsion of that which is offensiue: for in sternutations or sneezings, and fits of the Epilepsie or falling∣sicknes, how should the Braine bee moued and shaken to exclude and auoyde the humour or vapour by which it is vellicated or goaded vnlesse it felt the affluence thereof?

Contrarily, the opinion of those who determine that the Braine hath no sense, may also be confirmed by authoritie, experience and reason. Aristotle in the 17. chapter of his 3 * 1.4 booke De historia Animalium; And in the 7. capter of his second booke de partibus Animal: writeth, that the Braine and the marrow haue not sensum tactus the sense of feeling. Galen in the 8. chapter of his first book De causis sympto. The Braine (saith he) was ordained by na∣ture, not to haue sense but to communicate the faculty of sensation to the instruments of the senses. In his third booke De causis sympt hee calleth the Braine an Organe without sense.

Experience, then which nothing is more certain, conuinceth the truth of this position. * 1.5 For when the Braine is wounded the patient doth not feele although the substance therof be pressed with a sharpe probe, no not if some of it be taken away, which thing is very or∣dinary for Physitians and Chyrurgions to obserue.

Finally, it may be demonstrated by reasons. Euery Organ (saith the Philospoher) * 1.6 must be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that is, without any externall quality. So in the Christaline humor of the eye there is no colour, in the eare no sound, in the tongue no sauour; and the skin which is the Iudge of those qualities which moue the sense of touching is it selfe of a moderate temper. So the braine is the seate of the common sense and iudgeth of all sensation, and therefore must it selfe be without sense.

Moreouer, the braine ought not to be sensible, for if it were hauing his scituation vp∣permost and like a cupping glasse drawing and supping vppe the exhalations of the lower parts it would by their affluence perpetually be payned.

Finally, the substance well nigh of all the bowels is insensible, as of the liuer the spleene, the lungs, &c. and therefore the substance also of the braine is insensible.

To this opinion we rather subscribe then to the former, following therein Galen in his first booke de causis Symp. where he is not of opinion that the braine hath sense, but one∣ly that it can discerne the differences of sensible things.

Those things which are brought to proue the contrary assertion, seeme to me now to * 1.7 be very light. Hippocrates sayde that the braine did feele those iniurtes that were in the flesh and in the bone, that is to say, it is affected and altered by them. So the same Hippocrates saith in his Aphorismes that the bones do feele the power of cold, that is, they are altered by cold. Wherefore he vseth the word Sense in that place abusiuely. Galen attributeth sense to the braine. It is true, yet not to his marrowy substance which is the fountaine and originall of all the Animall faculties, but to the Pia mater or thin membrane which insinu∣ateth it selfe deepely into the corners thereof. As for that logicall Axiome, it is only true in these causes which we call Homogeny, and those also conioyned. For the Sunne be∣ing of it selfe not hot yet heateth all sublunary things. And whereas they say that the brain is shaken in the exclusion of that which is hurtfull, and thence would prooue that it is sen∣sible; wee answere, that there is seated in euery particular part a naturall power to expell that which is hurtfull; which power is sometime ioyned with Animall sense, sometimes * 1.8 also it is without the same. So the bones haue a power of excretion, and the flesh almost of all the bowels being insensible, is yet apprehensiue of those things that are hurtful, yea expell them also and driue them forth. There are in the nature of things certaine Sympa∣thies and Antipathies.

Fernelius in the tenth Chapter of the 5. booke of his Physiologia hath diuised a new and vncouth opinion concerning the motion and sense of the braine. He conceiueth that all * 1.9 motion is from the marrow of the braine, and all sense (saith hee) floweth from the Me∣ninges or Membranes: because the body of the braine is perpetually mooued, & yet hath no sense at all; on the other side the membranes that incompasse it are of themselues im∣moueable, especially the Dura mater, and yet their sense is most exquisite. So in the dis∣eases which we call Dilirium, that is, an aberration of the minde and in the Letargy which

are affects of the Braine there is no paine at all: but if a sharpe humor or vapour be trans∣ported into the Membranes, then is the patient as it were on the racke.

Furthermore, the spine and all the nerues haue their marrow from the braine and the same inuested with membranes: al which haue the same power and nature which they receiued from their originall. Therefore the fore-part of the braine is the originiall of sense, the backepart the beginning of motion and the menings or membranes are the be∣ginning of touching. Those nerues that are fullest of marrow are the instruments of mo∣tion, but those are the instruments of touching which are for the most part deriued from the meninges.

These are Fernelius words, wherein, saith my Author, by the fauor of so great a man, I finde some things that cannot be warranted. First he saith that all voluntarie motion * 1.10 floweth from the Marrow because the Marrow is perpetually mooued, as if the motion of the Braine and of the Nerues and Muscles were alike. The motion of the Braine is Naturall consisting of a Dyastole, a double rest and a Systole for the generation of Ani∣mall spirits, but the motion of the Muscles and the Nerues is voluntary.

Furthermore, we are not to thinke that the Nerues are so much the fitter for moti∣on * 1.11 by how much they haue more marrow; rather we beleeue the contrary, that the har∣der Nerues are fitter for motion and the softer for sense, because sensation is a passion but motion an action; we know also by experience that the Opticke Nerue which is the softest of all the Nerues hath more Marrowy substance then the Nerue of the seconde Coniugation, yet the Opticke is the Nerue of Sense, the other the nerue of Motion.

Add heereto, that Motion should bee rather ascribed to the Membranes then to the Marrow, because the Marrow melteth away but the Membrane is stretched & con∣tracted: so the Nerues of children are weake and soft and vnfit for motion. To all these let vs add the authority of Galen in the third chapter of his seuenth Book de Placitis Hip. & Platonis, where he saith, that the faculties of Motion and Sense are only conteined in * 1.12 the Marrow of the Braine and that the Membranes were made to cloath and norish the Marrow & for no other vse.

We conceiue therefore that this Paradox although it be witty, yet will not holde at the Touchstone, and therefore we determine that the Marrow of the Braine is with∣out all sense and Animall motion, and yet is the fountaine and originall of all Animall * 1.13 Sense and motion. Of Sense, because it perceyueth the representations and receyueth the impressions of all sensible things. Of Motion, because it dispenseth and affoordeth al that power and command for the auoyding of that which is noxious, and prosecution of that which is profitable; from whence it commeth to passe that when the Braine is il affected the inferior parts haue neither Sense nor Motion.

Notes

• * 1.1

  That the brain hath sense. The authori∣ty of Hyppo∣crates. Of Galen.
• * 1.2

  Experience.
• * 1.3

  Reason.
• * 1.4

  The contra∣ry opinion.
• * 1.5

  Experience.
• * 1.6

  Reasons.
• * 1.7

  Answere to the argumēts of the former opinion.
• * 1.8

  How the braine appre∣hend that which is hurtfull.
• * 1.9

  Fernelius. new opinion.
• * 1.10

  Fernelius his first error.
• * 1.11

  Second.
• * 1.12

  The authority of Galen.
• * 1.13

  The Braine hath neyther sense nor mo∣tion, and yet is the original of both.