The triall of vvitch-craft shewing the true and right methode of the discouery: with a confutation of erroneous wayes. By Iohn Cotta, Doctor in Physicke.

CHAP. I. Of naturall knowledge, and how it is solely acquired, either by Sense, or Reason, or by artificiall and prudent coniectation.

AS there is one onely Infinite, which hath created all things finite: so is there one onely finite, most neerely like vnto that Infinite, which is wisedome and know∣ledge in men & Angels. The knowledge which is giuen to Angels, is only known to God & Angels. The knowledge which is giuen to man, is knowne by man, limited measured and confined. It is therefore by the most wise Philosophers and fathers of former times, & the Sages of later times and ages agreed, by a generall consent & harmony of the same truth, that all things which are allotted man to know or vnder∣stand, are by two waies, or instruments solely to be atchiued or hoped. The first of these is the inward vnderstanding:* 1.1 the second is the outward sense: The vnderstanding hath know∣ledge diuers waies. First immediatly, by an inbred Idea & vn¦derstanding of certaine generall notions common vnto all

men, and in them, and with them borne. This, though in∣tellectual, may bee in some sort assimulated vnto that na∣turall instinct in bruit creatures; by which, when they come first into the world, yet immediately by the direction of Nature, they refuse, and flie from that which is euill and harmefull, and seeke and know that which is needfull vn∣to their life and preseruation. Secondly, the vnderstan∣ding hath knowledge by ratiociation, by the discourse and vse of reason. By this ratiocination, we doe in many things gaine a * 1.2 certainety of knowledge; in other some a proba∣bility and likelihood onely of certainety, yet oft-times in a very great neerenesse * 1.3 and affinitie with certaintie. Knowledge likewise commeth by the outward senses, which doe certainely and vndoubtedly informe the vnder∣standing concerning their seuerall proper obiects, where the facultie is sound, and the instruments of sense, and the outward meanes of conueyance are rightly disposed.

Among these fiue senses, the fight and hearing, the eye and eare, are the most excellent and chiefe wayes of multi∣plication and increase of naturall knowledge. Besides these wayes of knowledge; namely, the inward and the outward sense, there neuer was, nor euer can be enumeration of any other. For this cause the Philosophers haue diuided all things that are incident vnto mankinde, to know or vnder∣stand; either vnto such things as immediatly * 1.4 in their very first thought or mention do proue themselues, & at the first consideration or sight are euident vnto all men; or such as are directly inferred and necessarily proued by other pro∣positions, or such as by prudent ghesse onely and likely con∣iecture giue a faire probability of truth and certainty. Such things as immediatly proue themselues, and are vndoubted, in their first view, are subiect either to the sense onely, or vn∣to the vnderstanding onely. Such things as are only proper to the sense, and thereto immediatly and properly subiect, are things seene, heard, touched, tasted, smelt; as colours, fi∣gures, lineaments, sounds, musike, hardnesse, softnes, drines, moisture, roughnesse, smoothnesse, sowre, sweete, diuersity of

odours and the like: in which, without the vse of the fiue sen∣ses, men cannot be sensible or know any thing in this inferi∣our world vnder the heauens. Such things as are subiect vn∣to the vnderstanding onely, and not vnto the sense, and im∣mediatly proue themselues, are generall notions and recep∣tions, inseparably fixed in the vnderstanding of all men. Of this kind are these positions in Philosophie. All things that are made, haue their matter, a 1.5 out of which they were made, haue their speciall formes and difference, by which they are a part that they are: and lastly to that being, which they are, are risen from that which they were not. Likewise, these po∣sitions in Logicke: Euery proposition is true or false, affir∣matiue or negatiue, and extendeth generally vnto all vnder the same kinde, or to some particulars, or to a singular, or is indefinite. Likewise, in Arithmaticke these: One is no num∣ber, one cannot be diuided, or is indiuisible; foure is more then two. Likewise, in Physike these: Euery man is sicke or healthfull, or a neuter: Contraries are cured by contraries, as heat by cooling, cold by heating, moysture by drying, drynesse by moysting. As in these named Sciences, so in all other; there are the like generall notions, immediatly at the first view proouing themselues vnto the vnderstanding, and euery man in common sense and reason, immediatly consen∣teth vnto their truth; and he that denieth it, or seeketh proofe thereof, is esteemed iustly made, or voyd of reason.

There are other things also subiect vnto the vnderstan∣ding onely, which do not immediatly vpon the first view or consideration (as the former) proue themselues, but are pro∣ued by others more cleere and euident then themselues; as this proposition. The motion of the heauens is not infinite. This is not manifest vnto euery man at first view, but requi∣reth another more manifest then it selfe, to make it manifest thus: That which hath a certaine limitted course, circum∣uolution and motion, cannot be infinite; but Astronomie for many thousands of yeares hath discouered the courses, peri∣ods, reuolutions, and set perambulations of the heauens, and therefore the motions of the heauens cannot be infinite. It

may here easily be obserued, how the first position being vn∣able to proue it selfe, another more manifest doth giue it light, and doth deduce it vnto that, which doth so immedi∣ately proue it selfe vnto common sense, and reason, and ob∣seruation of all ages and times, that no idiot can be ignorant, or will deny it.

Thus hath bin manifested, how some things are immediat∣ly vnderstood in the very first consideration & view: some are proued by themselues, some not proued by themselues, but made euident by others. As many things are in the for∣mer kinds & seuerall maners manifested, and euidently pro∣ued vnto reason, sense, or vnderstanding: so are there many things neither by themselues nor by other euident, neither to the vnderstanding and reason, or to the outward sense at the first apparent, but remaine ambiguous and doubtfull. In these things certainty of knowledge by manifest proofe fai∣ling, there remaineth no other refuge, but prudent and artifi∣cial coniecture, narrowly looking & searching thorow pro∣babilities, vnto the neerest possibilitie of truth & certainty.

Fom hence doe arise excellent vses and benefits vnto vn∣derstanding, though not so farre forth ofttimes gained, as is desired vnto all priuate ends, yet so farre forth, as maketh wise and vnderstanding men excell and shine before others. Hence it commeth to passe that in doubtfull cases, counsels and attempts, one man is seene and knowne to ouer shine an other, as much as the glorious Sunne doth his ecclipsed si∣ster, the Moone. Hence haue issued so many noble and he∣roike Vertues; Sagacitie, exquisitnesse of iudgement, Pru∣dence, Art, in the administration of high affaires. For, al∣though in probabilities are no euident certainties, yet doe they so farre forth oft-times aduantage and aduance vnto the knowledge of certainety, that it is almost equall vnto certainty, and doth perswade and settle discreete resolution and disposition in all affaires. In this consisteth the height, the tope, the som of Art, and the perfection of all humane knowledge, aboue or beyond which, no man could euer soar or leuell. By this light onely the former mentioned meanes

failing, is oft times gained much excellence of natural know∣ledge to man, beyond and without which the eye and sight of knowledge in man is sealed vp, his vnderstanding dark∣ned, and cannot know many hidden things. And thus to him that rightly doth meditate and consider, it is vndoubtedly cleere and certaine, how the Creator and infinite Prince of all principles hath founded the beginning & end, the power and posse of all knowledge, vpon one of the former waies of inuestigation, beside which there is no naturall knowledge to be expected. Philosophie as yet neuer found other * 1.6 waies vnto that infinite number of all Arts and Sciences, so admi∣rably flourishing thorow so many ages of the world. For this cause the most excellent & prime Philosopher, Aristotle, reiecteth whatsoeuer cānot be found by Sense, or proued by reason, as spurious. Likewise Ptolomie hath bounded the true Art of Astronomie within fatum Physicum, within a necessi∣tie in Nature, and to distinguish it from superstition (wher∣with curiositie vsually defileth or intangleth it) doth limit it intra conuenientem naturae modum, that is, within proportion and measure answerable to Reason and Nature. For this cause also, all true Philosophers haue determined the two onely instruments of all true Arts, to bee Reason and expe∣rience, which Galen doth call the two legges whereupon the Art of Physike doth consist. And therefore in the second chapter of his Finitiones medicae, he saith, Optimus is est Me∣dicus, qui omnia in Medicina recta agit ratione, that is, hee who doth all things in his subiect of Physike, according to right rule of reason, is the most excellent Physicion.

From hence also all true Artists haue defined Art to bee, Habitus cum ratione factiuus, that is, a settled habilitie, and promptnesse of action, and operation according to reason. Vpon this ground others haue built other true rules and obseruations, concerning true and lawfull Arts. Therefore (saith Galen) ars non est ex ijs quorum neutiquam est potestas, Isagog. chap. 5. that is, Art is not of such things as cannot be accomplished. Which is worthy noting, to distinguish prestigious and supposed Arts from true Art. To this o∣thers

likewise haue added another obseruation, that is; that Art is imployed about such things as are in reason profita∣ble and not vaine. So saith Scaliger, exercit. 37. Sect. 31. Ars non est de rebus inutilibus. It is yet further obserued vpon the same ground, that true Art doeth not confound or cloud it selfe in mists, but reduceth vnto order, light and reason, things dissipate, confused, and out of order and reason (as Cicero affirmeth) Ars res diuulsas dissolutasque conglutinat, & ratione quadam constringit. Vpon the same grounds diuers renowmed common weales haue expelled all false and forged Arts: as, Necromancy, Aeromancy, Ge∣omancy, with other sortiligous Diuinations. Vpon the same reasons, diuers Emperors, Kings, Kingdomes and Lawes, haue exploded, censured, and condemned all such as vnder pretext of the wholesome Arts of Astrono∣my, Mathematikes, and the like, haue runne into foolish curiosities, impostures, and deceitfull practises. Iustinian the Roman Law-giuer and Emperour, his lawes are extant to this purpose. Likewise Tiberius his Decrees for the expul∣sion of counterfeit Mathematicians and Magicians. And Vlpian in his booke de Mathematicis & Maleficis, testi∣fieth the publication of their goods, and their inhibition by the Emperours from communion with other Citizens so much as in fire or water. And as Reason, good Lawes, Kingdomes, Nations, and Common-weales haue distin∣guished ingenuous, liberall, true and profitable Artes, and Sciences builded vpon reason, trueth and vnderstanding; from base, ignoble, vnprofitable, needlesse, curious, and er∣ronious Artes: so hath the holy Scripture both iustified, sanctified, and commended the one, and condemned, and nominated with rebuke and shame the other. The first is euident, Exod. 3. verse 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. where Almightie God doeth testifie concerning the knowledge and skill of workmanship in gold, siluer, and stone, that hee gaue it by his Spirit vnto Bezaleel, and Aholiab, who were workmen according to knowledge and vnderstanding in that lawfull Art, profitable vnto the building of Gods house. The se∣cond

is manifest, Actes 19. verse 19. where it is in their due commendations recorded, that those who before vsed and practised vaine and curious Arts, when they were by the preaching of the Apostles truely conuerted, in token of their vndissembled repentance, they absolutely renoun∣ced and disclaimed their vaine learning, and openly burnt their bookes, though valued at an high rate and rich price.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Scalig. de Subtil. Ex∣ercit. 307. sect. 22.
• * 1.2

  Omnis syl∣••gismus, vel ••egularis, & ••ecta ratioci∣••atio est vel ••emonstrati∣••, vel diale∣••tica, Aristot. ib. Analyt.
• * 1.3

  Dialecticus ••llogismus, ••el ratiocina∣••o expropo∣tionibus Di∣lecticis, vel ••robabilibus, ••cet non cer∣••vt demon∣••ratius, syl∣••gismus, ta∣••en vera in∣••cia consti∣••it, ideo{que} est ••rarum opi∣ionum fons, ••ristot ibid.
• * 1.4

  Hinc Syllo∣••smi perfecti 〈◊〉〈◊〉 imperfecti ••tio ex Ari∣••o••.
• a 1.5

  Materiam, Forman. Priuationem.
• * 1.6

  Quod non est secundum naturam, non contine••ur a Scientia, Arist. Anal. poster.