A table of humane passions With their causes and effects. Written by ye Reuerend Father in God F.N. Coeffeteau, Bishop of Dardania ... Translated into English by Edw. Grimeston Sergiant at Armes.

Of the Number of Passions. CHAP. 2.

AS they that haue treated of the Nature of the Winds haue writ∣ten diuersly, some setting foure, others eight, some e∣leauen, and some two and

thirty, to the which they assigne diuers points in the horizon: So the Philosophers which discourse of the Passiōs of the Soule, agree not of the number, some naming more, some lesse. Yea there was an Ancient affirmed, that as there are many Passions, whereof we know the names, so there are an infinite num∣ber which we know not.

Wherefore hee compared man to one of the monsters of antiquity, which they re∣present vnto vs, composed of the members, and formes of diuers creatures: for that his Cupidities and Passions are so prodigious, and so many in number, as they are able to amaze any one, that shall iu∣diciously consider of the mul∣titude and diuersity.

First of all, there were some which haue beleeued, that as there were foure chiefe winds which excite diuers stormes, be it at land or sea; so there are foure prin∣cipall Passions which trouble our Soules, and which stir vp diuers tempests by their irre∣gular motions, that is to say Pleasure, Paine, Hope, & Feare: and in truth these foure haue as it were the Empiry ouer all the rest, which propound themselues as the obiects of their motions; for whatsoe∣uer men do, either they feare or desire, or afflict them∣selues, or are contented; which be the effects of these Passions. Others will haue onely two, that is to say, Pleasure and Paine; and some assigne but one, and that is

Loue, to the which they refer all the rest as to their center and roote. Others haue multi∣plied them, and haue made twelue, and some eleauen. Amidst this diuersity of opi∣nions, that is the tr••est which is receiued at this day, and imbraced by all those that make an exact professi∣on of Philosophy: that is to say, that there are eleauen primitiue and generall Pas∣sions, whereof all the rest are but as it were budds and branches. These generall Passions are, Loue, Hatred, De∣sire, Flight, Pleasure, Paine, Feare, Courage, Hope, Despaire and Choller. And thus the Philosophers finde out the number. Of Passions, say they, some regard the good or e∣uill absolutely and simply

considered. And these be∣long to the Concupiscible pow∣er. Others regard the good or euill accompanied with some difficulty, and they ap∣pertaine vnto the irascible: those of the Concupiscible pow∣er, are six in number, whereof three haue for their obiects the good, that is to say, Loue, Desire, and Pleasure; and the other three haue for their ob∣iect the euil, that is to say, Ha∣tred, Flight, and Paine: for pre∣sently that the obiect which hath the forme of good, offers it selfe vnto the Concupiscible power, shee presently feeles herselfe surprized, and Loue is framed. If this obiect bee present, she receiues Pleasure and Delight: if it bee absent, she is toucht with a Desire to enioy it. And in like man∣ner

as soone as the obiect presents it selfe vnto the selfe same power, vn∣der the shew of euill, it doth presently stirre vp a ha∣tred contrary to loue: and if during this horror it bee ab∣sent, then Flight or Au••rsion, contrary to desire discouers it selfe: but if it bee present, she then conceiues griefe. In this manner we finde out the number of the passions which reside in the concupiscible pow∣er: those of the irascible are but fiue, as feare, courage, hope, des∣paire, and choller: for if the obiect which hath some shew of good, presents it selfe being accompanied with dif∣ficultie, and that man con∣ceiues with himselfe that notwithstanding all that, it is in his power to obtaine

it, then hope is framed; but if there bee no likelyhood, despaire pulls him back and diuerts him. And touching that which regards the good wee enioy, there is no passion in the irascible that con∣cernes it, seeing that which is in our power is not ac∣companied with any difficul∣ty, neither is it needfull the irascible shoulde mooue or worke for this subiect. But if the euill which presents it selfe, be ful of horror and dif∣ficulty, it must either be pre∣sent or absent; if it be absent, it excites courage or feare; Cour••ge, if wee striue to sur∣mount it; and feare, if we ap∣prehend it as too doubtfull. If it bee present, it inflames choller which carries vs to re∣uenge, to repell the iniurie

that is done vs. And thus wee finde out the number of the Passions of the irascible power, the which with the six of the Concupiscible, make e∣leauen in a••l. But wee must remember, that notwith∣standing this determined number, yet wee finde as it were a swarme of others, which notwithstanding take their beginning, and spring from these, as we haue obser∣ued. In this number the Philosophers put Bitternes, En∣uy, Emulation, Shamefastnes, Impudency, Mercy, Humanity, and a thousand others which were too long to relate. But for that there are some, without the knowledge whereof this treaty were im∣perfect, wee will speake of them according the exi∣gence

of the subiect, when occasion shalbe offered: here it shall suffice to obserue, that as the generall Passions, re∣gard their obiects without any restriction, but that of good or euill, which presents it selfe; so the more particular Passions, contained vnder these generall, regard the same obiects limitted to some speciall condition: as for example, Desire taken ab∣solutly is a generall Passion, which regards the obiect of good, without any other li∣mitation then vnder the ap∣parance of good: but if wee come to prescribe bounds to this good, and that wee con∣sider it vnder the forme of some particular good, be it of H••nor, of Riches, of Beauty, or of any other thing; the desire

must also bee limited, and then it shall bee a desire of honor, which is called ambi∣tion; or a desire of riches, which we call couetousnes, or a desire of beauty, the which attributes vnto it selfe, the name of the gender, and is called loue. And the like may bee sayd of the other limita∣tions of this obiect: so as these Passion of Loue, Riches, and Honor, are more particu∣lar Passions then the desire, which is as it were their gen∣der and spring. So griefe taken absolutely is a Passion, which regards the obiect of euill in its generall extent, without any other limitati∣on then that of euill. By reason whereof if this obiect come to bee restrained by vs to some speciall condition, as

to the misery or prosperity of another man, or to our owne infamy; then this griefe shall also be limited and re∣strained, and shall become a griefe for another mans mis∣fortunes, and then it shalbee a compassion; or it shal bee a griefe for another mans pro∣sperity, and then it sha••bee called an indignation or an enuie and despight: or else it will become a griefe for our owne infamy, and then it is a shame, and so of the rest. These Passions may bee infi∣nite vnder the diuers limita∣tions of obiects which are in∣finite, and therefore they can hardly bee rancked vnder a cert••ine science: neither haue they particular names, but borrow them from the limi∣tation

which the obiect giues them; yet there are some which haue their pro∣per names, as Enuy, Iealousie, Compassion, Shame: but the rest many times carry the name of their Genders.

In the meane time a que∣stion is heere propounded, whence it comes that consi∣dering the obiect of the Con∣cupiscible appetite, which con∣taines the good and euill sim∣ply taken, that is to say, with∣out shew of any difficulty ad∣ded vnto it; wee haue put ioy as a Passion, which ariseth from the presence and enioy∣ing of the good, and griefe as a Passion which growes from the present euill which can∣not be auoided; and yet con∣sidering the obiect of the Irascible power, which com∣prehends

the good which cannot be obtained but with difficulty, and the euill which cannot be auoyded but with paine, wee haue not set any Passion that riseth from the enioying of that good, or from the presence of that e∣uill which cannot bee eschu∣ed. Whereunto we answere, that this difficulty were al∣lowable, if these two appetits had their actions separated one from another; but they are alwayes vnited, and march ioyntly to the pursuit and enioying of good, and to the flight and auoyding of euill. So as the Irascible ap∣pitite neuer stirres but ioynt∣ly with the Concupiscible, for that it is ordained to succor and assist it, whensoeuer there appeares any difficulty in the

obiect which he is to pursue or auoyd. In regard where∣of, notwithstanding any diffi∣culty that may be incounte∣red in the fight or pursuite of this obiect, yet when it is obtained or auoyded, all the paine or difficulty which did enuiron it, vanisheth away, and is dispersed. It is not therefore necessary to ascribe any other Passions, which grow from the enioying or flight of this obiect, then the same which arise from the enioying or flight; when as there is no apparent difficul∣tie which doth crosse the possession or make the auoy∣ding difficult: and to the end wee may the better know what order these two appe∣tites obserue in the executi∣on of their offices, wee may

thus represent their moti∣ons, and the order of the Pas∣sions which are framed in the one, and the other. As soone as any obiect presents it selfe vnto the sensible power, vn∣der the forme of an apparent good: as for example, the beauty of a faire Hellen, whether that the acquisition be accōpanied with any dif∣ficulty or not, this beauty doth first of all stirre vp a passion of loue, from the which presently doth grow a desire which makes him seeke to enioy her; and if in this pursuite there appeare no difficulty, the possession wil be obtained without the assistance of the irascible appe∣tite, whence will arise ioy or pleasure. But if during the heate of desire, there appeares

any difficulty to obtaine it, then if the Concupiscible appe∣tite were not assisted, it would be danted with the least dif∣ficulty that should present it selfe, and would cease to de∣sire the thing, or striue to en∣ioy it: for this reason the Iras∣cible to preuent this, causeth hope to arise to succour the concupiscible, which supports desire and makes him striue to attaine vnto it; and in this case it breedes no other ioy then that which had succee∣ded if it had bin obtained without any difficulty, consi∣dering that the enioying makes him forget all the pre∣cedent paines. But from the beginning and breeding of desire, or during the whole continuance thereof, bee it with hope, or without expect∣tance

of the enioying of the obiect, if it appeares to bee a thing absolutely impossible to enioy, then not to suffer desire to consume it selfe in a vaine pursuite, the Irascible stirres vp despaire, to the end the Concupiscible power may not spend it selfe in a designe which cannot succeed. And in like manner if an obiect presents it selfe vnto the ap∣petiue power, vnder the forme of euill, as for example, a po∣werfull enemy prepares him∣selfe to wrong vs, then first of all hatred riseth in vs, and makes vs apprehend the euill which doth threaten vs ap∣parantly, and then inclines vs to seeke the meanes to a∣uoyd it, bee it in putting our selues in defence, or in reti∣ring our selues and seeking

some shelter for this storme, or else in auoyding it by some other meanes, the which breeds in vs the Passion of flight, by the which wee vn∣derstand no other thing here▪ then our striuing to flie the euill. But in case that in this seeking of meanes to auoyde it there appeare not any dif∣ficulty, then the irascible pow∣er doth not trouble it selfe to assist the concupiscible. And for that to escape a danger and to auoyd a mischiefe is a kind of good, this happening it begets ioy. As on the o∣ther side if we fall into a mis∣fortune which threatens vs, although there appeare not any difficulty in the auoy∣ding, it will cause griefe. But if whilst I seeke meanes to a∣uoyd the storme which

threatens me, I finde that I cannot doe it without paine and difficulty; then for that the least obstacles amaze and hinder the concupiscible pow∣er which neuer striues to sur∣mount them, the irascible excites courage which goes to succour it, and supports the motion of this Passion, which wee terme flight or auersion from the thing, vntill the euill bee wholy auoyded and dispersed; and then ariseth the same ioy which had hap∣pened if it had not incounte∣red any of these difficulties. And if amidst this resistance and striuing of courage, the euill doth notwithstanding ariue, then griefe is framed after the same manner as if this accident had happened without any incounter or dif∣ficulty.

But if whilest wee seeke the meanes to auoyde the euill, wee discouer much difficulty to preserue our selues, and that there appro∣cheth an eminent danger to our persons, then the irascible doth succour vs with feare, which makes man discreet and aduised, to the end that his too great hardines may not precipitate him into the danger which hee would a∣uoyd. Besides al this, when as the obiect which presents it selfe vnder the forme of good, seemes at the same instant impossible to be attained vn∣to, then not onely hope dies, but euen desire is banisht, so as the first Passion which then springs vp in vs is despaire, which the irascible stirres vp, to the end there should

grow no vaine desire, for that naturally no man desires things which are impossible, and vaine and vnprofitable actions are enemies to na∣ture.

As for the contrariety which may bee found betwixt some of these Passi∣ons, we must vnderstand that this contrariety may be con∣sidered after two manners, that is to say, either by rea∣son of the diuers motions of the appetite which is inflamed; as for example, wee say that hope and despaire are contra∣ry Passions, not in respect of their obiects, seeing they both regard the apparant good, vnder the condition of difficult obtaining, but by reason of the diuers motions they excite by their nature

in the appetite, for that hope striues to seeke and enioy the obiect, and despaire to flie from it and auoid it. Whence it growes that if we compare hope and cour••ge, we shall find them contrary Passions, not in regard of the motion of the app••tite, seeing that both agitate and stirre vp the spi∣rit, and serue it as a spurre to make it more ready in the pursuit of th••ir obiect, but in respect of the obiect, for that hope lookes to the appa∣rent good, and courage to the euill.

In like manner fe are and despaire are contraries, by reason of their obiects, and not in regard of their moti∣ons, for that both serue ra∣ther to retire and stay the striuing of the appetite, then

to excite and stirre it vp. Next, desire and flight are contrary Passions, by both reasons together, considering that the one hath the good for obiect, and the other the euill. And moreouer desire stirres vp the appetite to seeke the obiect, whereas flight makes it retire to auoyd it. We may make the same com∣parisons of the rest of the Pas∣sions. But this will appeare more plainely when wee shall treat of them in particular.