The first book of Tullies Offices translated grammatically, and also according to the propriety of our English tongue; for the more speedy and certain attaining of the singular learning contained in the same, to further to a pure Latin stile, and to expresse the mind more easily, both in English & Latine. Done chiefly for the good of schools; to be vsed according to the directions in the admonition to the reader, and more fully in Ludus lit. or Grammar-schoole

Chap. 58.

T. hauing finished the first maine que∣stion concerning honesty, to wit, how Duty may be deri∣ued from the foure chiefe fountaines thereof, and also whether the thing to be deliberated of be honest or disho∣nest; cōmeth now to the second que∣stion, arising from the comparing of honest things a∣mongst themselues: viz. Of two honest things propounded whether is the more honest: which point hee sheweth as be∣fore, to haue bin omitted by Paneti∣us.

Secondly, he giueth the reason heereof: That all honestie springeth from out of these foure foū∣taines,

viz Prudēce, Iustice, Fortitude, Temperance; that in the making choice of what du∣ties wee are to per∣forme, we vse oft to compare these a∣mong them selues. And 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hee teach∣eth, that those du∣t•…•…es are more agree∣able to nature w^ch spring from our communitie with others, viz. from Iustice, then those which are fetched from prudence; and so to bee preferred before them.

This he confirmeth by sundry argumē•…•…s from the necessitie of humane societie, from which the du∣ties of Iustice doe proceede. Which societie he sheweth to be so necessarie, That if a wise man should happen on such a life, that hee

should be inriched with all abundance of good things, and should haue both abilitie & lea∣sure enough to con∣template and consi∣der of all things worthy the know∣ledge of mortall man; yet if his soli∣tarinesse, should be such that hee could not see a man, hee would wish much rather to die then to liue.

Secondly, frō that wisedome which is called in Greeke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and in La∣tine sapientia, from which these duties of Iustice & com∣munitie are likewise deriued:

This wisedome he sheweth to bee the princesse of all ver∣tues, and distinct from that which is called in Latine pru∣dentia, & in Greeke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which

is defined thus, viz A knowledge of things, meet to bee desired or eschew∣ed:

Where as this wise∣dome called sapien∣tia is the knowledg of diuine and hu∣mane things, wher∣in is contained the cōmunity of Gods and men, and their societie amongst themselues.

Whence hee reaso∣neth thus:

If that vertue of wisdom from which these duties pro∣ceed be the greatest and as it were the princesse of all ver∣tues, that then these duties flowing frō it must needs be the greatest also. And that they doe pro∣ceede hence, hee proueth further; for that the contempla∣tion and knowledge of nature is mai∣med

and vnperfect, if no performance of deeds follow•…•…: which performance he declareth to ap∣peare especially in defending the com∣modities of others, and so appertaineth to the societie of man-kind; & ther∣fore to bee prefer∣red before meere knowledge.

Thirdly, he proueth it by the examples of the best disposed men; who vse to cast aside all duties of getting know∣ledge, whatsoeuer, that they may helpe their countrie in a∣ny extreame perill. For example, he as∣keth this question, who there is so stu∣diously set in sear∣ching out the nature of things, if tidings should be brought him of a suddaine,

of some great im∣minent perill of his countrie, which hee might bee able to preuent; though he were contemplating matters most wor∣thie of all other to be knowne, which would not yet cast aside all those stu∣dies: yea although hee thought hee should bee able by his searching, to number the starres, and to measure the greatnesse of the world.

And moreouer, for that hee would not onely doe this for his countrie, but euen in the verie cause of the perill of his parents, or friendes. Whence he concludeth eui∣dently againe, that

the duties of Iustice appertaining to the profit of mankinde, then which nothing can bee dearer vnto vs, are to be prefer∣red before duties of knowledge.

Fourthly, hee fur∣ther demonstrateth it by other generall ensamples in this kind. As,

First, in that they whose studies and whole life haue bin spent in seeking out the knowledge of things, yet haue not withdrawne themselues from in∣deuouring to in∣increase the com∣modities of men. As those who haue instructed many, to make them the bet∣ter citizens, & more profitable to the

commonweales. Of this sort hee gi∣ueth sundrie ensam∣ples: as,

1. Of Lysias the Pithagorean philo∣sopher, who instruc∣ted Epaminondas of Thebes.

2. Of Plato, who taught Dion the Si∣racusian, and many other haue done the like.

3. Hee sheweth for himselfe, that what∣soeuer benefit hee had brought to the commonweale (if he had brought any at all) he had attai∣ned vnto it by bee∣ing himself instruc∣ted by teachers, and so furnished with learning.

Secondly, in that such doe not onely instruct them that are desirous of lear∣ning, whilst they

are aliue and pre∣sent with them; but they also effect the same euen after their death much more effectually, by the monuments of their learning left behinde them.

Thirdly, in that they omit no point which might con∣cerne the lawes, cu∣stomes & discipline of the common∣weale: so that they may seeme to haue imployed all their leasure for the be∣nefit of posteritie.

Thus hee sheweth, that they being gi∣uen to the studies of learning, bestowed all their wisedome and vnderstanding for the good of the commonweale, and so did euer preferre duties belonging to the societie of men.

Fourthly, he proo∣ueth it by this in∣stance▪ That for this cause alone it is bet ter to speake copi∣ously, so it be wise∣ly, then to meditate most wittily with∣out vtterance.

Because meditation serueth only within ones selfe, but elo∣quence serueth for the good of all with whom we conuerse, and many others. Fiftly, because wee could not deuise nor effect matters sowel alone as with others. This hee proueth by a fit si∣militude taken from Bees: That as they swarme together, not to the ende to make combs, but being thus swar∣ming by nature doe make their combs more ea•…•…ily; euen so and much more al∣so, men being of a

sociable nature, do vse their cunning in doing and deuising much the better & more speedily.

Sixtly, in that know ledge separate from iustice or imploy∣ment for the com∣mon good, remai∣neth fruitlesse and barren. And so like∣wise fortitude or va∣lour separate from humane societie & friendship, viz if it be not vsed for the good of others, is nothing else but sa∣uagenesse & cruel∣ty. Whence he con∣cludeth, Duties ap∣pertaining to the societie of men to

bee far greater then the studies of know ledge.

Lastly, he answereth an obiection of som, who affirmed, that wee vse duties appertaining to so∣cietie, for our owne necessitie (for that wee could not ef∣fect nor attain with out others, those things which na∣ture might desire) & not for the good of others.

Wherevnto hee an∣sweres; That if this were true, then if a man had all things necessary for liuing, ministred (as it were) by the grace of God, with∣out any labour or helpe of others; if the same man were of a good wit, hee omitting all other businesse would

wholy imploy him∣selfe in knowledge and science.

But he teacheth that this is false; Because euen such a man would still flie soli∣tarinesse, and seeke some companion for his studies, and would desire still both to teach and learne, to heare and speake.

And therefore vp∣on all these groūds he concludeth this point, That euerie dutie which apper∣taineth to the main tenance of humane societie, is to be pre∣ferred before such as consist in know∣ledge and science.