The first book of Tullies Offices translated grammatically, and also according to the propriety of our English tongue; for the more speedy and certain attaining of the singular learning contained in the same, to further to a pure Latin stile, and to expresse the mind more easily, both in English & Latine. Done chiefly for the good of schools; to be vsed according to the directions in the admonition to the reader, and more fully in Ludus lit. or Grammar-schoole

Chap. 42.

Tully (still going on to set out more fully the nature of comlinesse, and the fountaine thereof) teacheth.

1. That enerie one har•…•… by nature, as it were two persons.

The one of them common; which is in that wee are all partakers of reason and of that excel∣lency whereby we surmount brute beasts: & from this hee sheweth that both all honestie & comlinesse are deri∣ued, & the way of finding out Dutie.

The other proper: to wit, that which is properly assigned to euerie one in re∣gard of the speciall constitution both of his body and minde, and therein the speciall differen∣ces amongst men.

This hee noteth by experience,

1. In the bodies, for that we see som to excell in swift∣nesse for running, others in strength

•…•…or wrastling, some hauing in their coū∣tenances a maiesty, others being amia∣ble.

2. By experience in the mindes, & that therein also are grea∣ter varieties and dif∣ferences.

This he proueth by sundry particular examples, and first, amongst them∣selues: as,

That there was much pleasantnesse of speech in L. Phi∣lippus, but greater and more of sette purpose in C. Caesar L. his sonne.

Likewise at the same time, that there was in M. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sus, though but a young man, a sin∣gular grauity; much mirth in Caius Le∣lius; In Scipio his familiar friend grea ter ambition with more austeritie.

Secondly, amongst the Grecians, as he had heard by re∣port; As that So∣crates was sweete & pleasantly concei∣ted, and also of a merry discourse, an Eironist in all his speech.

Contrarily, that Pi∣thagoras and Peri∣cles were of greater esteeme, yet with∣out any mirth at al.

So amongst great Captaines: as, that Haniball of Car∣thage was very sub∣tle; Q. Maximus one of their owne Captaines, very cū∣ning

in concealing his purposes, dissi∣mulation, plotting and preuenting the deuices of the ene∣mie.

And that among the Grecians, The∣mistocles the Athe∣nian Captaine, and Iaso the Pherean are renowned for the like.

Finally, that Solon the lawgiuer is fa∣mous for policy; & namely in that act, where in to the end, that his life might both be safer, and he do the better ser∣uice to the cōmon weale, hee fained himselfe mad.

Sundry other ex∣amples hee brings

to this purpose not vnlike to the for∣mer, to shewe the great varietie of dis∣positions amongst men.

As that there are some plaine and o∣pen hearted, ene∣mies to all deceipt:

Others who can in∣dure any thing, serue any man, so they may obtaine their desire: as Syl∣la, M. Crassus, and Lysander the Lace∣demonian; though Callicratides, who succeeded Lysander in the admiralty of the nauie, was of a contrarie dispositi∣on.

Others excelling in curtesie of speech, and in affabilitie; so as thogh they were verie great men, yet could frame them∣selues to the com∣mon sort so, as to winne the hearts of all; like as they had seene in the Catuli both in the father and the sonne, and also in Q. Mutius Mancinus.

The like hee shew∣eth to haue bin re∣ported of P. Scipi∣o Nasica, tho his father, otherwise a worthie mā (as who auenged the mis∣chieuous enterpri∣ces of Tiberius Grachus) yet had no affabilitie of speech at all.

No nor Xenocrates who was the verie sagest of al the Phi∣losophers, and for that cause a great & famous man.

And thus hee shew∣eth that there are innumerable diuer∣sities of natures and dispositions; yet not to be dispraised.

Now in these seue∣rall varieties and all other hee giueth this rule;

That euerie ones owne proper gifts are carefully to bee maintained; thogh not any such quali∣ties as are vicious, yet all such gifts as are naturall, and whereby that com∣linesse which wee seeke may be retai∣ned more easily.

And so long as wee striue not against that nature which is vniuersall, that each of vs follow our own proper na∣ture.

Whence hee teach∣eth this as a second lesson; That al∣though there might be other grauer & better studies to be followed of vs, yet that we are to mea∣sure & limitour stu∣dies by the rule of nature, to doe no∣thing against it.

Because it doth not auaile to fight a∣gainst nature; or to pursue any thing▪ w^ch we haue no hope by nature to 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

And that heereup∣on it appeareth more fully wherein true comliness con∣sisteth; that we do

not any thing as it were, against na∣ture; but onely that whereto we are fit∣ted by it.

Because, if wee euer follow nature, wee shal be able to keep an euen and a con∣stant course, both of our whole life▪ & of e•…•…erie action; then which there is nothing more com ly: whereas if wee imitate the nature of other men omit∣ting our owne, wee cannot keepe that euennes•…•…e which we ought.

This hee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 plaine by a certaine similitude:

That as wee are to vse that speech one∣ly, which is known vn•…•…o vs, lest chop∣ping in Greeke or other strāge words (as some do) we be worthily scoffed at;

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so wee are to keepe an euennesse in all our actions & our whole life, that no contra•…•…ietie appear at all.

Again, he teacheth that the differences of natures are of so great power, that that may bee com∣mendable in one, which should bee faulty in another.

As for example: that one man ought to lay violent handes vpon himselfe, w^ch should be reproue∣able in others in the same cause.

This hee instanceth in M. Cato slaying himself, rather then to yeeld vp himself to Cesar in Africke as others did; wher∣as it had bin faultie in the rest of them, to haue done the like, because their liues had bin more

pleasant, and their maners more mild: yet in him it is cō∣mended, for that he was of such an vn∣credible grauitie by nature, and had confirmed the same by perpetuall con∣stancie, and al•…•…o had euer remained in this determinate re∣solution, that hee would rather die, then behould the tyrants race.

2. In comparing the faults of Vlysses and Aiax together: That whereas this was an honour to Vlysses to haue in∣dured the things w^ch he did, in his long trauels, and that he had beene able to yeelde himselfe to do seruice to wo∣men, as to Circe & Calipso, (if they were worthie to be named women) & to shew himselfe so affable & curteous

to all; yea after his returne home, so to indure the contu∣m•…•…ly of slaues and wenches, to the end that hee might at∣taine to that which he desired: yet con∣trarily this is Ajax his honour, that he being of an vncon∣querable courage by nature, had ra∣ther die a thousand deaths▪ then to en∣dure such contume∣lies or iniuries from any.

Hence hee conclu∣deth, that we are ne∣cessarily to weigh what gifts each of vs hath properly, & to vse the same a∣right; and not to

haue a desire to tr•…•…e how other mens gifts would become vs: because that e∣specially becometh euerie one, which most properly be∣longeth vnto him And secondly, hee aduis•…•…th each man to knowe his owne disposition, and to shew himself a sharp iudge of his owne vertues, and vices; and so to chuse and follow that course which is fittest for him.

This also he vrgeth by a reason taken from players; Lest they should seeme to haue more discre∣tion heerein then wee.

Because they chufe not the best inter∣ludes to act; but those that are fittest for them, in regard of their pronuntia∣tion,

or gesture, and which they can per∣forme the best; as hee sheweth in sun∣drie particulars:

Whence hee infer∣reth againe what an absurd thing this is, that a player should see that on the stage, which a wise man cannot in his life.

And so shutteth vp this point, That we are chiefly to la∣bor in those things whereunto wee are most apt.

Yet here he giueth two cautions.

1. That if at any time necessitie shall inforce vs vnto those things to w^ch we ar not apt by na∣ture; that then wee specially vse all care,

meditation and di∣ligence that we may performe them, if not comlily, yet with as little vncō∣linesse as may be.

2. That we do not so much indeuour to attaine the ver∣tues to which wee haue no aptnesse by nature; as to shun those vices to which wee are by nature strongly inclined.