Of wisdome three bookes written in French by Peter Charro[n] Doctr of Lawe in Paris. Translated by Samson Lennard

CHAP. XX. The first part of outward euils.

VVE will consider these outward euils three waies, in * 1.1 their causes, which shall be declared in this chap∣ter; afterward in their effects; lastly in themselues distinctly, and particularly euery kinde of them: And we will giue ad∣uice and meanes in them all, by vertue to be armed against them.

The cause of euill and hatefull accidents, which happen to vs all, are either common and generall, when at the same in∣stant they concerne many, as pestilence, famine, warre, ty∣ranny. And these euils are for the most part scourges sent of God, and from heauen, or at least the proper and neerest cause thereof we cannot easily know: Or particulars, and those that are knowne, that is to say, by the meanes of ano∣ther. And so there are two sorts of euils; publike and pri∣uate. Now the common euils, that is to say, proceeding of a publike cause, though they concerne euery one in particu∣lar, are in diuers kinds, more or lesse grieuous, weightie, and dangerous, than the priuate, whose causes are knowne. More grieuous, for they come by flockes and troopes, they assaile more violently, with greater stirre of vehemencie and furie: they haue a greater concurse and traine: they are more tem∣pestuous, they bring foorth greater disorder and confusion. Lesse grieuous: because generalitie and communitie seem∣eth to mitigate, and lessen euery mans euill. It is a kinde of comfort not to be alone in miserie: it is thought to be rather a common vnhappinesse, where the course of the world, and the cause is naturall, than personall affliction. And indeed those wrongs which a man doth vs, torment vs more, wound vs to the quicke, and much more alter vs. Both these two haue their remedies and comforts.

Against publicke euils, a man ought to consider from whom, and by whom they are sent, and to marke their cause. * 1.2 It is God, his prouidence, from whence commeth and depen∣deth an absolute necessitie, which gouerneth and ruleth all, whereunto all things are subiect. His prouidence, and desti∣nie, or necessitie, are not, to say the truth, two distinct laws in essence, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, neither are they one. The diuersi∣tie is only in the consideration and different reason. Now to murmure, and to be grieued at the contrarie, is first of all such impietie, as the like is not elsewhere found: for all things doe quietlie obey, man only torments himselfe. And againe it is a folly, because it is vaine and to no purpose. If a man will not follow this soueraigne and absolute mistris willinglie, it shall cary all by force: ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus ferre mor∣talia, nec perturbari ijs, quae vitare nostrae potestatis non est: in regno nati sumus, deo parere libertas est.

Desine fata deûm flecti sperare querendo.

There is no better remedie, than to applie our willes to the will thereof; and according to the aduice of wisdome to make a vertue of necessitie. Non est aliud effugium necessitatis, quàm velle quod ipsa cogat. In seeking to contend or dispute against it, we doe but sharpen and stirre the euill. Laeto animo ferre quicquid acciderit quasi tibi volueris accidere: debuisses enim vel∣le, si scisses ex decreto Dei fieri. Besides we shall better profit our selues, we shall do that which we ought to do, which is to follow our generall and soueraigne, who hath so ordeined it. Optimum pati, quod emendare non possis; & deum, quo authore cuncta proueniunt, sine murmuratione comitari. Malus miles est qui imperatorem gemens sequitur. And without contestation to allow for good whatsoeuer he will. It is magnanimitie of cou∣rage to yeeld vnto him. Magnus animus qui se Deo tradidit. It is effeminacie and dastardlines to murmure or complaine, pusillus & degener, qui obluctatur, de ordine mundi male existi∣mat, & emendare mauult Deum quàm se.

Against those priuat euils, which do proceed from the act of another, and which pierce vs more, we ought first well to * 1.3 distinguish them, lest we mistake them. There is displeasure, there is offence. We often conceiue ill of another, who not∣withstanding hath not offended vs neither in deed nor will,

as when he hath either demaunded, or refused any thing with reason, but yet was then hurtfull vnto vs: for such causes it is too great simplicitie to be offended, since that they are not offences. Now there are two sorts of offences, the one cros∣seth our affaires against equitie; this is to wrong vs: the o∣thers are applied to the person, who is contemned by it, and handled otherwise than it ought, be it in deed or in word. These are more grieuous and harder to be indured, than any other kind of affliction.

The first and generall aduice against all these sorts of euils, is to be firme and resolute, not to suffer himselfe to be lead by * 1.4 common opinion, but without passion to consider of what weight and importance things are, according to veritie and reason. The world suffereth it selfe to be perswaded and lead by impression. How many are there that make lesse account to receiue a great wound, than a little blow? more account of a word, than of death? To be briefe, all is measured by opi∣nion: and opinion offendeth more than the euill; and our impatience hurts vs more, than those of whom wee com∣plaine.

The other more particular counsels and remedies are drawne first from our selues, (and this is that we must first * 1.5 looke into.) These pretended offences may arise of our owne defects and weaknesse. This might be a follic grounded vp∣on some defect, in our owne person, which any one in deri∣sion would counterfait. It is follie to greeue and vex himselfe for that which proceedeth not from his owne fault. The way to preuent others in their scoffes, is first to speake, and to let them know, that you know as much as they can tell you; if it be that the iniurie hath taken his beginning by our de∣fault, and that we haue giuen the occasion of this abuse, why should we be offended therewith? for it is not an offence, but a correction, which he ought to receiue, and make vse of as a punishment. 3. But for the most part it proceedeth of our owne proper weaknesse, which makes vs melancholie. Now he ought to quit himselfe of all those tender delicacies, which makes him liue vnquietlie, but with a manly courage, strong and stoutlie to contemne, and tread vnder foote the indiscre∣tions and follies of another. It is no signe that a man is sound,

if he complaine when one toucheth him. Neuer shalt thou be at rest if thou frame thy selfe to all that is presented.

They are also drawne from the person that offendeth. We * 1.6 represent in generall the maners and humours of those per∣sons with whom we are to liue in the world. The most part of men take no delight but to do euill, and measure their power by the disdaine, and the iniurie of another. So few there are which take pleasure to do well. He ought then to make ac∣count, that whether soeuer we turne vs, we shall finde those that will harme, and offend vs. Wheresoeuer we shall finde men, we shall finde iniuries. This is so certaine and necessarie, that the lawyers themselues, who rule the trafficke and af∣faires of this world, haue wincked at, and permitted in distri∣butiue and commutatiue iustice many escapes in lawe. They haue permitted deceit and hinderances euen to the one halfe of the iust price. This necessitie to hurt and offend, commeth first of the contrarietie, and incompatibilitie of humours and willes, whereof it commeth that a man is offended without will to offend. Then from the concurrence and opposition of affaires, which inferreth that the pleasure, profit, and good of one, is the displeasure, dammage, and ill of others; and it can∣not be otherwise, following this common & generall picture of the world, if he who offendeth thee is insolent, a foole, and rash (as he is, for an honest man neuer wrongeth any) where∣fore complainest thou, since he is no more his owne man, than as a mad man? You can well indure a furious man without complaint, yea, you will pitie him; an innocent, an infant, a woman, yee will laugh at them: a foole, a drunken man, a cholericke, an indiscreet man in like sort. Wherefore when these people assaile vs with words, we ought not to answere them: we must hold our peace, and quit our selues of them. It is an excellent & worthie reuenge, and greeuous to a foole, not to make any account of him, for it is to take away that pleasure which he thinketh to haue in vexing vs, since our silence condemnes his simplicitie, and his owne temeritie, is smothered in his owne mouth: if a man answere him, he makes him his equall, and by esteeming him too much, he wrongs himselfe. Malè loquuntur, quia bene loqui nesciunt, faci∣unt quod solent & sciunt, malè quia mali, & secundum se.

Behold then for conclusion the aduice and counsel of wis∣dome: we must haue respect vnto ourselues, and vnto him * 1.7 that offendeth vs. As touching our selues, wee must take heed we do nothing vn woorthy and vnbefitting our selues, that may giue another aduantage against vs. An vnwise man that distrusteth himselfe, growes into passion without cause, and thereby giues incouragement to another to contradict him. This is a weakenesse of the minde, not to know to con∣temne offence: an honest man is not subiect to iniurie: he is inuiolable: an inuiolable thing is not onely this, that a man can not beate, but being beaten, neither receiueth wound nor hurt: This resolution is a more strong bulwarke against all accidents; that we can receiue no euill, but of our selues. If our iudgement be as it ought, we are inuulnerable. And ther∣fore we alwaies say with wise Socrates, Anitus and Melitus may well put me to death, but they shall neuer inforce me to doe that I ought not. Moreouen, an honest man, as he neuer giueth occasion of iniurie to any man, so he cannot endure to receiue an iniurie. Laedere enim laedique coniunctum est. This is a wall of brasse, which a man is not able to pierce; scoffes, and iniuries trouble him not. Touching him that hath offen∣ded vs, if you hold him vaine and vnwise, handle him accor∣dingly, and so leaue him: if he be otherwise, excuse him; Imagine that he hath had occasion, and that it is not for ma∣lice, but by misconceit and negligence; he is vexation enough to himselfe, and he wisheth he had neuer done it. Moreouer, I say, that like good husbands we must make profit and commoditie of the iniuries that are offered vs. Which wee may doe at the least two waies, which respect the offendor & the offended. The one, that they giue vs occasion to know those that wrong vs, to the end we may the better flie them at another time. Such a man hath slandered thee, conclude presently that he is malicious: and trust him no more: The other, that they discouer vnto vs our infirmity, and the means whereby we are easilie beaten, to the end we should amend and repaire our defects; lest another take occasion to saie as much or more. What better reuenge can a man take of his enemies, than to make profit of their iniuries, and thereby better and more securely to manage our affaires?

Notes

• * 1.1

  1 The distin∣ction and comparison of euils by their causes.
• * 1.2

  2 The aduice against pub∣licke euils. Prouidence. Destinie.
• * 1.3

  3 The distin∣ction. Of priuat euils.
• * 1.4

  4 The aduice against them in generall.
• * 1.5

  5 Particular aduisements drawne from our selues.
• * 1.6

  6 Of those who offend.
• * 1.7

  7 The conclu∣sion of these counsels & with the rule of wisdome.