Of wisdome three bookes written in French by Peter Charro[n] Doctr of Lawe in Paris. Translated by Samson Lennard

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Title
Of wisdome three bookes written in French by Peter Charro[n] Doctr of Lawe in Paris. Translated by Samson Lennard
Author
Charron, Pierre, 1541-1603.
Publication
At London :: Printed [at Eliot's Court Press] for Edward Blount & Will: Aspley,
[1608?]
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Subject terms
Ethics -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A18501.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Of wisdome three bookes written in French by Peter Charro[n] Doctr of Lawe in Paris. Translated by Samson Lennard." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A18501.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 22, 2025.

Pages

CHAP. I.
Of Prudence in generall.

PRudence is with reason put in the first rancke, as the ge∣nerall Queene, superintendent, and guide of all other ver∣tues, * 1.1 auriga virtutum; without which there is nothing good, beautifull, fit, and decent; it is the salt of our life, the lustre, the ornament, the sauce or seasoning of our actions, the square and rule of our affaires; and in a word, the Arte of our life, as Physicke the arte of our health.

It is the knowledge and choice of those things we must * 1.2 either desire, or flie; it is the iust estimation & triall of things; it is the eye that seeth all, that directeth and ordaineth all. It consisteth in three things, which are all of one ranke; to con∣sult and deliberate well, to iudge and resolue well, to conduct and execute well.

It is a vniuersall vertue, for it extendeth it selfe generally to all humane things, not only in grosse, but by peecemeale to * 1.3 euery particular thing, & is as infinite, as are the indiuiduals.

It is very difficult, both by reason of the aforesaid infinit∣nes, for the particulars are without knowledge, as without * 1.4 number, si qua finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt; and of the great vncertaintie and inconstancie of humaine things, which are the greater by reason of their accidents, circum∣stances, appertenances, dependancies, times, places, persons; in such sort, that in the change of one only, and that the least circumstance, the whole thing it selfe is altered: And likewise in the office thereof, which is the gathering together and tem∣perature of contrarie things, the distinction and triall of those that are like one another; the contrarietie and resemblance hindereth much.

It is very obscure, because the causes and iurisdictions of things are vnknowne, the seeds and roots are hidden, and such * 1.5 as the nature of man cannot find, nor ought to seeke after. Oc∣cultat

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eorum semina deus, & plerunque bonorum malorum{que} cau∣sae * 1.6 sub diuersa specie latent. Moreouer, fortune, destinie, (vse what words you will) a soueraigne secret, and vnknowne power and authoritie hath alwaies the aduantage, and main∣taineth it against all counsels, foresights, and preuentions whatsoeuer: whereby it many times comes to passe, that the best counsels haue the worst issues, that one and the same counsell doth very happily succeede to one, vnhappily to a∣nother, in one and the same case, and with one and the same man, things went luckily yesterday, vnluckily to day. It is an opinion iustly receiued, that we ought not to iudge of coun∣sels, nor of the sufficiencie and capacitie of persons by the e∣uents. And therefore one answered those well that maruelled and were astonished at the ill successe of their businesse, con∣sidering with how wise and mature deliberation they were vndertaken, That they were masters of their deliberatiōs, not of the successe of their affaires: for that was in the power of fortune, which seemeth to sport it selfe with all our fairest de∣signments & counsels, ouerthroweth in a moment that which hath a long time been proiected and deliberated, and seemeth to be strongly fortified, choking, as they say, our artillarie. And indeed fortune to shew it authoritie in all things, and to abate our presumption, not being able to make men wise, that are not apt thereunto, maketh them neuerthelesse happie in despite of vertue, whereby it many times comes to passe, that simple men bring to a happie end great matters both publike and priuate. Prudence then is a sea without either bottome or brinke, and which cannot be limited and prescribed by precepts and aduisements. It doth but compasse things and goeth about them, like a darke cloude, many times vaine and friuolous.

Neuerthelesse it is of such weight and necessitie, that alone and of it selfe it can do much, and without it all the rest is no∣thing, * 1.7 no not riches, meanes, force, vis consilij expers mole ruit sua, Mens vna sapiens plurim vincit manus. Et multa quae na∣tura impedita sunt, consilio expediūtur. And the principall cause of this necessitie is the peruerse nature of man, the roughest and hardest to tame of all other creatures; Impatiens aequi, ne∣dum * 1.8 seruitutis; and which must be handled with arte and in∣dustrie,

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for it doth not more willinglie set it selfe against any, than against those that would contemne it. Now Prudence is the arte to handle it, and a gentle bridle, that holdeth it within * 1.9 the compasse of obedience.

Now though the seed of Prudence, as of other vertues, be in vs by nature, yet it is acquired and learnt more than any * 1.10 other, and that in some sort by precepts and aduisements; this is the Theorick: but much better and principally (though with more time) by experience and practise, which is two-fold: the one, and the true, is that which is proper and perso∣nall, whereof it takes the name; this is the knowledge of those things which we haue seene and handled: the other is strange by the acte of another; this is historie which we know by re∣lation or by reading. Now experience and vse is more firme and more assured; vsus efficacissimus omnium rerum magister, the father and mistris of the artes, but more long; it is old, seris venit vsus ab annis, more difficult, painefull, rare. The knowledge of historie, as it is lesse firme and assured, so is it more easie, more frequent, open and common to all. A man is made more resolute and assured at his owne charges, but it is more easie at the charge of another. Now from these two pro∣perly, Experience, and Historie, doth Prudence arise, vsus me genuit, mater peperit memoria, seu memoriae anima & vita hi∣storia.

Now Prudence may and must be diuerslie distinguished * 1.11 according to the persons and the affaires. In regard of the per∣sons there is priuate prudence, whether it be solitarie and in∣diuiduall, which can hardlie be tearmed prudence; or soci∣able & Economical among a small companie, and prudence publike and politike. This more high, excellent, difficult, and vnto which those foresaid qualities do properlie belong; and it is two-fold, peaceable, and militarie.

In regard of the affaires, forasmuch as they are of two sorts, the one ordinarie, easie; the other extraordinarie. These are accidents which bring with them some new difficultie and ambiguitie. A man may likewise say that there is an ordinarie and easie prudence, which walketh according to the lawes, customes, and course alreadie established, another extraordi∣narie and more difficult.

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There is likewise another distinction of prudence both in respect of the persons, and of the affaires, which concerneth * 1.12 rather the degrees, than the kindes thereof, that is to say, pro∣per prudence whereby a man is wise, and taketh counsell of himselfe; the other borowed, whereby a man followeth the counsell of another. The wise say that there are two sorts and degrees of wise men; the first and chiefest is of those that haue a cleere insight into all things, and know of themselues how to finde the remedies and helps; but where are these to be found? Doubtlesse they are rare and singular: the other is of those that know how to take, to follow, to make vse of the good counsels of another; for they that know neither how to giue, nor to take counsell, are fooles.

The generall and common aduisements, which belong to all sorts of prudence, all sorts of persons and affaires, hath [ 9] beene touched and briefly deliuered in the second booke, and they are eight; first, knowledge of the persons and affaires; secondly, estimation of things; thirdly, choice and electi∣ons; * 1.13 fourthly, from them to take counsell vpon all; fiftly, temperature betweene feare and assurance, confidence and diffidence; sixtly, to take all things in their season, and to sease vpon the occasion; seuenthly, to carrie himselfe well, with industrie and fortune; lastly, discretion in all. Wee must now handle the particulars, first of publike wisdome, which respecteth the persons, afterwards of that which re∣specteth the affaires.

Of the politike prudence of a souereigne to gouerne states. THE PREFACE.

THis doctrine belongeth to souereignes and gouernours of states. It is vncertaine, infinite, difficult, and almost impossible to be ranged into order, to be limited and prescri∣bed by rules and precepts: but wee must endeuour to giue some small light, and briefe instruction thereof. Wee may referre this whole doctrine to two principall heads, which are the two duties of a souereigne. The one comprehendeth and intreateth of the props and pillars of a state, principall &

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essentiall parts of publike gouernment, as the bones and si∣newes of this great bodie, to the end that a souereigne may prouide for himselfe and his state; which are seuen principall, that is to say, knowledge of the state; vertue; maners and fa∣shions; counsels; treasure; forces and armes; alliances. The three first are in the person of the souereigne, the fourth in him and neere him, the three latter without him. The other is to act, well to employ and to make vse of the aforesaid meanes, that is to say, in grosse, and in a word, well to go∣uerne and maintaine himselfe in authoritie, and the loue both of his subiects and of strangers, but distinctly; this part is twofold, peaceable and militarie. Behold heere summarily and grossely the worke cut out, and the first great draughts that are to be handled heereafter. We will diuide then this politicke matter, and of state, into two parts; the first shall be of prouision, that is to say, of the seuen necessarie things; the second, and which presupposeth the first, shall be of the action of the prince. This matter is excellently handled by Lipsius, according as he thought good: the marrow of his booke is heere: I haue not taken, nor wholly followed his method, nor his order, as you may already see in this ge∣nerall diuision, and more you shall heereafter: I haue like∣wise left somewhat of his, and added something of my owne, and other mens.

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