Of wisdome three bookes written in French by Peter Charro[n] Doctr of Lawe in Paris. Translated by Samson Lennard

CHAP. XIIII. Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities, reason, inuention, veritie thereof.

THis humane Spirit, and Oeconomie of this great and high intellectuall part of the soule, is a depth of obscuritie, full of creeks and hidden corners, a confused and inuolued laby∣rinth, and bottomlesse pit, consisting of many parts, facul∣ties, actions, diuers motions, hauing many names, doubts and difficulties.

The first office thereof, is simply to receiue and apprehend the images and kindes of things, which is a kinde of passion [ 1] and impression of the Soule, occasioned by the obiects and the presence of them: this is imagination and apprehension.

The force and power thereof, to feed, to handle, to stirre, [ 2]

to concoct, to digest the things receiued by the imagination, this is reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

The action and office, or exercise of this force and power, [ 3] which is to assemble, conioyne, separate, diuide the things receiued, and to adde likewise others: this is discourse, rea∣soning, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quasi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

The subtile facilitie, and cheerefull readinesse to doe all [ 4] these things, and to penetrate into them, is called Spirit, In∣genium; and therefore to be ingenious, sharpe, subtile, pier∣cing, is all one.

The repetition and action of ruminating, reconcocting, [ 5] trying by the whetstone of reason, and reworking of it, to frame a resolution more solide: this is iudgement.

The effect in the end of the vnderstanding: this is know∣ledge, [ 6] intelligence, resolution.

The action that followeth this knowledge and resolution, [ 7] which is to extend it selfe, to put forward, and to aduance the thing knowen: this is will. Intellectus extensus & pro∣motus.

Wherefore all these things, Vnderstanding, Imagination, [ 8] Reason, Discourse, Spirit, Iudgement, Intelligence, Will, are one and the same Essence, but all diuers in force, vertue and acti∣on: for a man may be excellent in one of them, and weake in another: and many times he that excelleth in Spirit and sub∣tiltie, may be weake in iudgement and soliditie.

I let no man to sing, and set forth the praises and greatnesse * 1.1 of the Spirit of man, the capacitie, viuacitie, quickenesse thereof: let it be called the image of the liuing God, a taste of the immortall substance, a streame of the Diuinitie, a cele∣stiall ray, whereunto God hath giuen reason, as an animated sterne to moue it by rule and measure, and that it is an instru∣ment of a compleat harmonie; that by it there is a kinde of kindred betwixt God and man, and that he might often re∣member him, he hath turned the root towards the heauens, to the end he should alwayes looke towards the place of his natiuitie: to be briefe, that there is nothing great vpon the earth but man, nothing great in man but his spirit: if a man ascend to it, he ascendeth aboue the heauens. These are all pleasing and plausible words whereof the Schooles do ring.

But I desire that after all this we come to sound and to stu∣dy * 1.2 how to know this spirit, for wee shall finde after all this, that it is both to it selfe and to another a dangerous instru∣ment, a ferret that is to be feared, a little trouble-feast, a te∣dious and importune parasite, and which as a Iugler & plai∣er at fast and loose, vnder the shadow of some gentle motion, subtile and smiling, forgeth, inuenteth, and causeth all the mis∣chiefs of the world: & the truth is, without it there are none.

There is farre greater diuersitie of spirits than of bo∣dies, * 1.3 so is there likewise a larger field to enter into, more parts and more formes or fashions to be spoken of: we may make three classes or formes, wherof each one hath many degrees: The first which is the lowest are those weake, base, and al∣most brutish spirits, neere neighbours to beasts themselues, whether by reason of the first temper, that is to say, of the seede and temperature of the braine, either too cold or too moist, as amongst other creatures fishes are the lowest, or by reason that they haue not been in some sort remoued and re∣viewed, but suffered to rust, and grow dull and stupid. Of these wee make no great account, as being vnfit to be order∣ed and setled into any certaine and constant societie; because both for their owne particular they cannot possibly endure it, and it were necessary they should alwaies be vnder the tu∣ition of another, this is the common and base people, qui vi∣gilans stertit; mortua cui vita est; prope iam viuo atque videnti; which vnderstands not, iudgeth not it selfe. The second which is the highest, are those great and rare spirits, rather diuels than ordinary men, spirits well borne, strong and vi∣gorous. Of these kinde of people, there was neuer age yet could tell how to build a common-weale. The third which is the middle, are all those indifferent spirits, whereof there are infinite degrees: of these almost is the whole world com∣posed. Of this distinction and others, heereafter more at large. But we are to touch more particularly the conditions and nature of this spirit, as hard to be knowne, as a counte∣nance * 1.4 to be counterfeited to the life, which is alwaies in mo∣tion.

First therefore it is a perpetuall agent, for the spirit cannot be without action, but rather then it will, it forgeth false and

phantasticall subiects, in earnest deceiuing it selfe, euen to it owne discredit. As idle and vnmannured grounds, if they be fat and fertile, abound with a thousand kinds of wilde and vn. profitable hearbs, vntill they be sowed with other seeds; and women alone without the company of men, bring foorth sometimes great abundance of vnformed, indigested lumps of flesh: so the Spirit, if it be not busied about some certaine obiect, it runnes riot into a world of imaginations, and there is no folly nor vanity that it produceth not; and if it haue not a setled limit, it wandreth and loseth it selfe. For to be eue∣ry where is to be no where. Motion and agitation is the true life and grace of the Spirit, but yet it must proceed from else∣where, than from it selfe. If it be solitary, and wanteth a sub∣iect to worke on, it creepeth along and languisheth; but yet it must not be enforced. For too great a contention and inten∣tion of the Spirit ouer bent, and strained, deceiueth and trou∣bleth the Spirit.

It is likewise vniuersall, it medleth and mingleth it selfe with all, it hath no limited subiect or iurisdiction. There is * 1.5 not any thing wherewith it plaieth not his part, as well to vaine subiects and of no account, as high and weighty, as well to those we can vnderstand, as those we vnderstand not: For to know that we cannot vnderstand, or pierce into the marrow or pith of a thing, but that we must sticke in the bone and barke thereof, is an excellent signe of iudgement; for sci∣ence, yea truth it selfe, may lodge nere vs without iudgement, and iudgement without them, yea to know our owne igno∣rance, is a faire testimony of iudgement.

Thirdly, it is prompt and speedy running in a moment * 1.6 from the one end of the world to the other, without stay or rest, stirring it selfe and penetrating through euery thing, Nobilis & inquieta mens homini data est, nunquam se tenet; spar∣gitur vaga, quiet is impatiens, nouitate rerum laetissima. Non mi∣rum ex illo caelesti spiritu descendit, caelestium autem naturasemper in motuest. This great speed and quicknesse, this agility, this twinkling of the eie, as it is admirable, and one of the greatest wonders that are in the spirit, so it is a thing very dangerous, a great disposition and propension vnto folly and madnesse, as presently you shall heare.

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By reason of these three conditions of the spirit, that is, a perpetuall agent without repose, vniuersall, prompt and sud∣den, it hath beene accounted immortall, and to haue in it selfe some marke, and sparkle of diuinitie.

The action of the Spirit is alwayes to search, ferret, con∣triue * 1.7 without intermission; like one famished for want of knowledge, to enquire and seeke, and therefore Homer calles men 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. There is no end of our inquisitions: the pur∣suites of the spirit of man are without limits, without forme: the food thereof is double ambiguitie; it is a perpetuall mo∣tion without rest, without bound. The world is a schoole of inquisition; agitation and hunting is it proper dish: to take, or to faile of the pray, is another thing.

But it worketh and pursueth it enterprices, rashly, and irre∣gularly, without order, and without measure, it is a wandring * 1.8 instrument, mooueable, diuersly turning; it is an instrument of leade and of wax, it boweth and straitneth, applieth it selfe to all, more supple and facill than the water, the aire, flexibilis omni humore obsequentior, & vt spiritus qui omni materia facili∣or vt tenuior; it is the shoo of Theramenes, fit for all. The cun∣ning is to finde where it is, for it goes alwayes athwart, and crosse, as wel with a lie, as with a truth: it sporteth it selfe and findeth a seeming reason for euery thing; for it maketh that * 1.9 which is impious, vniust, abominable in one place, pietie, iu∣stice and honour in another: neither can we name any law or custome, or condition, that is either generally receiued of all, or reiected; the marriage of those that are neere of blood, the murther of infants, parents, is condemned in one place, law∣full in another. Plato refused an embrodered and perfumed robe offered him by Dionysius, saying that he was a man, and therefore would not adorne himselfe like a woman. Aristip∣pus accepted of that robe, saying the outward acoutrement can not corrupt a chaste minde. Diogenes washing his cole∣warts and seeing Aristippus passe by, sayd vnto him, If thou knewest how to liue with colewarts, thou wouldest neuer fol∣low the Court of a Tyrant. Aristippus answered him, If thou knewest how to liue with Kings, thou wouldest neuer wash colewarts. One perswaded Solon to cease from the bewailing the death of his sonnes, because his teares did neither profit

nor helpe him. Yea therefore, sayth he, are my teares iust, and I haue reason to weepe. The wife of Socrates redoubled her griefe, because the Iudges put her husband to death vn∣iustly: What, saith he, wouldest thou rather I were iustly condemned? There is no good, sayth a wise man, but that, to the losse whereof a man is alwayes prepared, In aequo enim est dolor amissae rei, & timor amittendae. Quite contrary, faith an∣other, we embrace and locke vp that good a great deale the more carefully, which we see lesse sure, and alwaies feare will be taken from vs. A Cynique Philosopher demanded of An∣tigonus the King, a dram of siluer. That, sayth he, is no gift fit for a King. Why then giue me a talent, sayth the Philoso∣pher. And that, saith the King, is no gift fit for a Cynique. One sayd of a King of Sparta that was gentle and debonaire, Hee is a good man euen to the wicked. How should hee be good vnto the wicked, saith another, if he be not wicked with the wicked. So that we see that the reason of man hath many visages: it is a two-edged sword, a staffe with two pikes, Ogni medaglia ha il suo riuerso. There is no reason but hath a con∣trary reason, sayth the soundest and surest Philosopher.

Now this volubilitie and flexibilitie proceedeth from ma∣ny [ 11] causes; from the perpetuall alteration and motion of the bodie, which is neuer twice in a mans life in one and the same estate; from the obiects which are infinite, the aire it selfe, and the serenitie of the heauen,

Tales sunt hominum mentes quali pater ipse Iuppiter auctiferas lustrauit lampide terras,

and all outward things: inwardly from those shakings and tremblings which the Soule giues vnto it selfe by the agitati∣on, and stirreth vp by the passions thereof: insomuch that it beholdeth things with diuers countenances; for whatsoeuer is in the world hath diuers lustures, diuers considerations. Epictetus sayd it was a pot with two hands. He might better haue sayd with many.

The reason heereof is, because it entangleth it selfe in it * 1.10 owne worke like the Silke-worme: for as it thinketh to note from farre, I know not what appearance of light, and imagi∣narie truth, and flies vnto it: there are many difficulties that

crosse the way, new sents that inebriate and bring it forth of the way.

The end at which it aimeth is twofold, the one more com∣mon and naturall, which is Trueth, which it searcheth and * 1.11 pursueth; for there is no desire more naturall than to know the trueth: we assay all the meanes we can to attaine vnto it, but in the end all our endeuours come short; for Truth is not an ordinarie bootie, or thing that will suffer it selfe to be got∣ten and handled, much lesse to be possessed by any humane Spirit. It lodgeth within the bosom of God, that is her cham∣ber, * 1.12 her retiring place. Man knoweth not, vnderstandeth not any thing aright, in puritie and in trueth as he ought: appea∣rances doe alwayes compasse him on euery side, which are as well in those things that are false as true. We are borne to search the truth, but to possesse it, belongeth to a higher and greater power. Truth is not his that thrusts himselfe into it, but his that runnes the fairest course towards the marke. When it falles out that he hits vpon a trueth, it is by chance and hazzard, he knowes not how to holde it, to possesse it, to distinguish it from a lie. Errours are receiued into our soule, by the selfe same way and conduit that the truth is; the spirit hath no meanes either to distinguish or to chuse: and as well may he play the sot, that telles a trueth as a lie. The meanes that it vseth for the discouerie of the truth, are reason and ex∣perience, both of them very weake, vncertaine, diuers, waue∣ring. The greatest argument of truth, is the generall consent of the world: now the number of fooles doth farre exceed the number of the wise, and therefore how should that gene∣rall consent be agreed vpon, but by corruption and an ap∣plause giuen without iudgement and knowledge of the cause, and by the imitation of some one that first began the dance.

The other end lesse naturall, but more ambitious, is Inuen∣tion, * 1.13 vnto which it tendeth as to the highest point of honor, to the end it may raise it selfe and preuaile the more: this is that which is in so high account, that it seemeth to be an i∣mage of the Diuinitie. From the sufficiencie of this inuenti∣on, haue proceeded all those works, which haue rauished the whole world with admiration; which if they be such as are

for the publike benefit, they haue deified their Authours. Those works that shew rather finenesse of wit than bring profit with them, are painting, caruing, Architecture, the art Perspectiue, as the vine of Zeuxis, the Venus of Apelles, the image of Memnon, the horse of A••••ain, the woodden pi∣geon of Architas, the cow of Myron, the flie and the eagle of Montroyall, the spheare of Sapor King of the Persians, and that of Archimides with his other engins. Now art and inuen∣tion * 1.14 seeme not onely to imitate Nature, but to excell it, and that not only in the indiuiduum or particular (for there is not any bodie either of man or beast, so vniuersally well made, as by art may be shewed) but also many things are done by art, which are not done by nature: I meane besides those compo∣sitions and mixtures, which are the true diet, and proper sub∣iect of art, those distillations of waters and oiles, made of sim∣ples, which Nature frameth not. But in all this there is no such cause of admiration as we thinke; and to speake proper∣ly and truly, there is no inuention but that which God reuea∣leth: for such as we account and call so, are but obseruations of naturall things, arguments and conclusions drawen from them, as Painting and the art Opticke from shadowes, Sun∣dials from the shadowes of trees, the grauing of seales from precious stones.

By all this that hath before beene spoken, it is easie to see * 1.15 how rash and dangerous the spirit of man is, especially if it be quicke and vigorous: for being so industrious, so free and vniuersall, making it motions so irregularly, vsing it libertie so boldly in all things, not tying it selfe to any thing; it easi∣ly shaketh the common opinions, and all those rules where∣by it should be bridled and restrained as an vniust tyranny: it will vndertake to examine all things, to iudge the greatest part of things plausibly receiued in the world, to be ridicu∣lous and absurd; and finding for all an appearance of reason, will defend it selfe against all, whereby it is to be feared that it wandreth out of the way and loseth it selfe: and we can not but see that they that haue any extraordinary viuacity and rare excellency (as they that are in the highest roofe of that middle Classis before spoken of) are for the most part law∣lesse both in opinions and maners. There are very few of

whose guide and conduct a man may trust, and in the liber∣tie of whose iudgements a man may wade without temeritie, beyond the common opinion. It is a miracle to finde a great and liuely spirit, well ruled and gouerned: it is a dangerous sword which a man knowes not well how to guide; for from whence come all those disorders, reuolts, heresies and trou∣bles in the world, but for this? Magni errores non nisi ex ma∣gnis ingenijs: nihil sapientiae o diosius acumine nimio. Doubtlesse that man liues a better time, and a longer life, is more happie and farre more fit for the gouernment of a Common-wealth, sayth Thucydides, that hath an indifferent spirit, or some∣what beneath a mediocritie, than he that hath a spirit so ele∣uated and transcendent, that it serues not for any thing but the torment of himselfe and others. From the firmest friend∣ships do spring the greatest enmities, and from the soundest health the deadliest maladies: and euen so, from the rarest and quickest agitation of our soules the most desperate reso∣lutions and disorderly frensies. Wisdome and follie are neere neighbors; there is but a halfe turne betwixt the one and the other; which we may easily see in the actions of madde men. Philosophie teacheth, that Melancholy is proper to them both. Whereof is framed the finest follie, but of the finest wit? And therefore, sayth Aristotle, there is no great spirit without some mixture of follie. And Plato telleth vs, that in vaine a temperate and sound spirit knocketh at the doore of Poetrie. And in this sense it is, that the wisest and best Poets doe loue sometimes to play the foole, and to leape out of the hindges. Insanire iucundum est, dulce desipere in loco: non potest grande & sublime quidquam nisi mota mens, & quamdiu apud se est.

And this is the cause why man hath good reason to keepe it within narrow bounds, to bridle and binde it with Religi∣ons, * 1.16, Lawes, Customes, Sciences, Precepts, Threatnings, Pro∣mises mortall and immortall, which notwithstanding yet we see, that by a lawlesse kinde of libertie it freeth it selfe, and escapeth all these; so vnruly is it by nature, so fierce, so opi∣natiue: and therefore it is to be led by art, since by force it can not. Natura contumax est animus humanus, in contrarium at{que} arduum nitens, sequitur{que} faciliùs quam ducitur, vt generosi * 1.17

& nobiles equi melius facili fraeno reguntur. It is a surer way gently to tutor it, and to lay it asleepe, than to suffer it to wan∣der at it owne pleasure: for if it be not well and orderly go∣uerned, (as they of the highest classis which before we spake of) or weake, and soft and pliant (as those of the lower ranke) it will lose it selfe in the libertie of it owne iudgement: and therefore it is necessary that it be by some meanes or other held backe, as hauing more need of lead than wings, of a bri∣dle than of a spurre; which the great Lawyers and Founders of States did especially regard, as well knowing, that people of an indifferent spirit, liued in more quiet and content, than the ouer-quicke and ingenious. There haue been more trou∣bles and seditions in ten yeeres in the only citie of Florence, than in fiue hundred yeeres in the countreys of the Helueti∣ans and the Retians. And to say the trueth, men of a common sufficiencie are more honest, better citizens, more pliant, and willing to submit themselues to the yoke of the lawes, their superiours, reason it selfe, than those quicke and cleere sight∣ed men, that can not keepe themselues within their owne skinnes. The finest wits are not the wisest men.

The Spirit hath it maladies, defects, tares or refuse as well * 1.18 as the body and much more, more dangerous and more incu∣rable: but that wee may the better know them, we must di∣stinguish them: Some are accidentall, and which come from * 1.19 elsewhere, and those arise from three causes; the disposition of the bodie, for it is manifest that the bodily maladie which alter the temperature thereof, do likewise alter the spirit and iudgement; or from the ill composition of the substance of * 1.20 the braine, and organs of the reasonable Soule, whether it be by reason of their first formation, as in those that haue their heads ill made, either too round, or too long, or too little, or by accident of some blow or wound. The second is the vni∣uersall contagion of vulgar and erroneous opinions in the * 1.21 world, wherewith the Spirit being preoccupated, tainted, and ouercome, or which is worse, made drunken, and mana∣cled with certain fantasticall opinions, it euer afterwards fol∣loweth & iudgeth according to them, without regard either of farther enquiry, or recoiling backe: from which danger∣ous

deluge all spirits haue not force and strength to defend themselues.

The third much more neere, is the maladie and corrupti∣on * 1.22 of the will, and the force of the passions, this is a world turned topsie turuy: the wil is made to follow the vnderstan∣ding as a guide and lampe vnto it; but being corrupted and seased on by the force of the passions (or rather by the fall of our first father Adam) doth likewise perhaps corrupt the vn∣derstanding, and so from hence come the greatest part of our erroneous iudgements: Enuie, Malice, Hatred, Loue, Feare, make vs to respect, to iudge, to take things others than they are, & quite otherwise than we ought, from whence commeth that common crie, Iudge without passion. From hence it is that the beautifull and generous actions of another man are obscured by vile and base misconstructions, that vaine and wicked causes & occasions are feined. This is a great vice and a proofe of a malignant nature and sicke iudgement, in which there is neither great subtiltie nor sufficiencie, but malice e∣nough. This proceedeth either from the enuy they beare to the glorie of another man, or because they iudge of others ac∣cording to themselues, or because they haue their taste alter∣ed and their sight so troubled, that they cannot discerne the cleere splendour of vertue in it natiue purity. From this selfe same cause and source it commeth, that we make the vertues and vices of another man to preuaile so much, and extend them farther than we ought, that from particularities wee draw consequents and generall conclusions: if he be a friend, all sits well about him, his vices shall be vertues: if he be an enemie or of a contrary faction, there is nothing good in him: insomuch that we shame our owne iudgement, to smooth vp our owne passions. But this rests not heere, but goeth yet far∣ther; for the greatest part of those impieties, heresies, errours in our faith and religion, if we looke well into it, is sprung from our wicked and corrupt willes, from a violent and vo∣luptuous * 1.23 passion, which afterwards draweth vnto it the vn∣derstanding it selfe, Sedit populus manducare & bibere &c. quod vult non quod est credit, qui cupit errare: in such sort that what was done in the beginning with some scruple and doubt, hath

beene afterwards held and maintained for a veritie and reue∣lation from heauen: that which was onely in the sensualitie, hath taken place in the highest part of the vnderstanding: that which was nothing els but a passion and a pleasure, hath beene made a religious matter and an article of faith: so strong and dangerous is the contagion of the faculties of the Soule amongst themselues. These are the three outward cau∣ses of the faults and miscariages of the Spirit, iudgement and vnderstanding of man, The body, especially the head, sicke, or wounded, or ill fashioned; The world with the anticipated opinions and suppositions thereof; The ill estate of the other faculties of the reasonable Soule, which are all inferiour vnto it. The first are pitifull, and some of them to be cured, some not: the second are excusable and pardonable: the third are accusable and punishable for suffring such a disorder so neere them as this is; those that should obey the law, to take vpon them to giue the law.

There are other defects of the Spirit, which are more natu∣rall vnto it, and in it. The greatest and the root of all the rest * 1.24 is pride and presumption (the first and originall fault of all the world, the plague of all spirits, and the cause of all euils) by which a man is only content with himselfe, will not giue place to another, disdaineth his counsels, reposeth himselfe in his owne opinions, takes vpon him to iudge and condemne o∣thers, yea euen that which he vnderstands not. It is truly said, that the best and happiest distribution that God euer made, is of iudgement, because euery man is content with his owne, and thinkes he hath inough. Now this malady proceedeth from the ignorance of our selues. We neuer vnderstand suffi∣ciently and truly the weaknesse of our spirit: but the greatest disease of the spirit is ignorance, not of Arts and Sciences, and what is included in the writings of others, but of it selfe, for which cause this first booke hath beene written.

Notes

• * 1.1

  2 The generall description & commen∣dation of the Spirit.
• * 1.2

  3 The dis∣praise.
• * 1.3

  4 Diuersitie of distinctions of the spirit. See hereof more Chap. 39.
• * 1.4

  5 The particu∣lar descrip∣tion.

  Agent per∣petuall.
• * 1.5

  6 Vniuersall.
• * 1.6

  7 prompt and sudden.
• * 1.7

  8 The action of the Spi∣rit.
• * 1.8

  9 It worketh rashly.
• * 1.9

  10 Reason hath diuers faces.
• * 1.10

  12 The reason of this in∣tanglement.
• * 1.11

  13 The end is verity which it can nei∣ther attaine nor finde.
• * 1.12

  Reade before Chap. 9.
• * 1.13

  14 The second end Inuen∣tion.
• * 1.14

  The praise of inuen∣tion.
• * 1.15

  15 The Spirit very dan∣gerous.
• * 1.16

  16 It must be bridled, & why.
• * 1.17

  Seneca.
• * 1.18

  17 The defect of the spirit.
• * 1.19

  Accidentall proceeding from three causes.
• * 1.20

  1. The body.
• * 1.21

  2. The world.
• * 1.22

  3. The passi∣ons.
• * 1.23

  Exod. 31. 2. Paral. 15. 3. Reg. 15. August. lib. 2. De ciui∣tate Dei.
• * 1.24

  18 Naturall.