The six bookes of a common-weale. VVritten by I. Bodin a famous lawyer, and a man of great experience in matters of state. Out of the French and Latine copies, done into English, by Richard Knolles

THE FIRST BOOKE OF A COMMONWEALE.

CHAP. I ¶ What the principall end is of a well ordered Commonweale.

A Commonweale is a lawfull gouernment of many families,* 1.1 and of that which vnto them in common belongeth, with a puissant soueraigntie. This definition omitted by them which haue written of a Commonweale, wee haue placed [ C] in the first place: for that in all arts and actions, it beho∣ueth vs first to behold the end, and afterward the meanes to attaine therunto. For a definition is nothing else than the very end and scope of the matter propounded, which if it be not well and surely grounded, whatsoeuer you build thereupon must together and in a moment fall. And yet oftentimes it falleth out with many, that hauing propounded vnto themselues certaine ends, yet can they not attaine vnto the end by them desired; no more than the vnskilfull archer who shooteth farre and wide from the marke he aimed at, whereas he which shooteth markeman like, although he misse somewhat the marke, yet shall he shoot neerer than he, neither shall [ D] he want the commendation of a good archer, hauing performed what a skilfull archer should haue done. But he which knoweth not the end of the matter he hath in hand, is as farre from the hope of attaining thereunto, as he is from hitting the marke, which shooteth at randon, not knowing whereat. Wherefore let vs well examine the end, and euery part of the definition by vs before propounded. First we said that a Com∣monweale ought to be a lawfull or rightfull gouernment: for that the name of a Com∣monweale is holy, as also to put a difference betwixt the same, and the great assemblies of robbers and pirats, with whome we ought not to haue any part, commercement, so∣cietie, or alliance, but vtter enmitie. And therefore in all wise and well ordered Com∣monweales,* 1.2 whether question be of the publike faith for the more safetie to bee giuen; [ E] of leagues offensiue or defensiue to bee made; of warre to bee denounced, or vnder∣taken, either for the defending of the frontiers of the kingdom, or for the composing of the controuersies and differences of Princes amongst themselues; robbers and pirats are still excluded from all the benefit of the law of Armes. For why? Princes which gouerne their States by their owne lawes, and the lawes of nations, haue alwayes diui∣ded their iust and lawfull enemies, from these disordered, which seeke for nothing but the vtter ruine and subuertion of Commonweales, and of all ciuill societie. For which cause, if ransome promised vnto robbers for a mans redemption, bee not vnto them

accordingly payed, there is no wrong done: for that the lawes of Armes ought nei∣ther [ F] to be communicated vnto them, neither are they to enioy the benefit of those lawes, which lawfull enemies being taken prisoners, or free men enioy. Yea the lawes do permit him that is taken of robbers, not therby to loose his libertie; but that he may neuerthelesse make his will, and do all other lawfull actes: which for all that was not in former time lawfull for them to doe, which were taken by their iust enemies. For that he which was fallen into the hands of his lawfull enemies, by the law of nations did to∣gether with his libertie loose also all such power as he had ouer his owne things. Now if a man should say, that the law commaundeth to restore vnto the robber his pawne, his things committed vnto thee vpon trust, or what thou hast of him borrowed; or to repossesse him, beeing by force thrust out of a possession, neuer so vniustly by him ob∣tained; [ G] there is thereof a double reason: the one, for that the robber in submitting him∣selfe vnto the Magistrat, and shewing his obedience vnto the lawes, in demaunding justice, deserueth to be therein regarded: the other, for that this is not so much done in fauour of the theefe or robber, as in hatred of him which would vnconscionably de∣taine the sacred thing left to his trust, or by way of force proceed to the gaining of that which he might by course of justice haue otherwise obtained. Of the first whereof we* 1.3 haue examples enow, but none more memorable than that of Augustus the Empe∣rour, who caused it to be proclaimed by the sound of the Trumpet, that he would giue ten Sestertiees vnto him which should bring vnto him Coracotas, the ring leader of the theeues and outlawes in Spaine: which thing Coracotas vnderstanding, of his owne [ H] accord presented himselfe vnto the Emperour, and demaunded of him the promised reward: which Augustus caused to be paid vnto him, and so receiued him into his fa∣uour, to the intent that men should not thinke, that hee would take from him his life, to deceiue him of the reward promised; or yet violate the publike faith and securitie with him, who of himselfe offered himselfe vnto the triall of justice: albeit hee might haue justly proceeded against the fellon, and so haue executed him. But he that should vse such common right towards pirats & robbers, as is to be vsed against just enemies,* 1.4 should open a dangerous gap to all vagabonds, to ioyne themselues vnto robbers and theeues; and assure their capitall actions and confederacie, vnder the vaile of justice. Not for that it is impossible to make a good Prince of a robber, or a good King of a [ I] rouer: yea, such a pirat there hath beene, who hath better deserued to be called a King, than many of them which haue carried the regall scepters and diadems, who haue no true or probable excuse of the robberies and cruelties which they cause their subiects to endure. As Demetrius the pirat by way of reproach said to Alexander the great,* 1.5 That he had learned of his father no other occupation than piracie, neither from him receiued any other inheritance than two small frigots▪ whereas he which blamed him of piracie, roamed about neuerthelesse, and with two great armies robbed the world without controlment, albeit that he had left him by his father the great and flourishing kingdome of Macedon. Which frank speech so moued Alexander, not to the reuenge of the iust reproach giuen him, but vnto commiseration, with a certaine remorse of [ K] conscience: in so much that he pardoned Demetrius, & made him general ouer one of his legions. And not to go further for examples, in our age Solyman the great Sultan of the Turks, with great rewards allured vnto him Hariadenus Aenobarbus, Dragut Reis, & Occhial, three of the most famous pirats of our memory; whom he made his Admirals, and great commaunders at Sea; by their strength to confirme his owne power, and to keepe vnder the other pirats, then roaming all about the seas, and so to assure his traf∣fique.* 1.6 Truly by such allurements to draw arch pirats into good order, is, and shal be al∣waies commendable: not onely to the end, not to make such people through dispaire

to inuade the State of other princes, but also by their meanes to ruinate and bring to [ A] naught other pirats, as enemies to mankind: who although they seeme to liue in neuer so much amitie and friendship together, and with great equalitie to diuide the spoile, (as it is reported of Bargulus and Vitriatus, the arch pirats) yet for al that they ought not to be of right called societies and amities, or partnerships; but conspiracies, robberies, & pillages: neither is that their equal parting of the spoile, to be tearmed a lawful diui∣sion, but a meere robberie: for that the principall point wherein consisteth the true marke and cognisance of amitie in them wanteth, that is to wit, right gouernment, according to the lawes of nature. And that is it, for which the auncient writers haue called Common weals, Societies of men assembled to liue well and happily together. Which as it may serue for a description of a Citie, so can it not stand for a true defini∣tion [ B] * 1.7 of a Commonweale, as hauing in the one part thereof too much, and in the o∣ther too little: three principall things especially to bee required in euery Common∣wealth, wanting in this description, that is to say, the family, the soueraigntie, and those things which are common to a Citie, or commonweale: joyning hereunto also, that this word, Happily, as they vnderstand it, is not necessarie: for otherwise vertue should haue no prize, if the fauourable wind of prosperitie still blew not in the poope thereof, which a good man will neuer consent vnto. For a Commonweale may be right well gouerned, and yet neuerthelesse afflicted with pouertie, forsaken of friends, besieged by enemies, and ouerwhelmed with many calamities: vnto which estate Cicero himselfe confesseth him to haue seene the Commonweale of Marseils in Prouince to haue fal∣len, [ C] at such time as it was by Caius Caesar triumphed vpon: which he saith to haue bene the best ordered and most accomplished that euer was in the world, without excepti∣on. And so contrariwise it should come to passe, that a Citie, or Commonweale, fruitfull by situation, abounding in riches, flourishing, and well stored with people, re∣uerenced of friends, feared of enemies, inuincible in arms, strong in fortification, prowd in buildings, triumphant in glorie, should therefore be rightly gouerned, albeit, that it were surcharged with all villanies, and grounded in all maner of vices. And yet neuer∣thelesse most certaine it is, that vertue hath not a more capitall enemie, than such a per∣petual successe as they cal most happy; which to ioine together with honesty, is no lesse difficultie, than to combine things by nature most contrarie. Wherfore sith that we [ D] may without reproach want other things; as also without praise abound therein: but that vertues we cannot without great imputation want; or be with vices polluted with∣out infamie: it must needs follow, that those things which are thought to make the life of man more blessed, that is to say, riches, wealth, large territories and possessions, not to be of necessitie required vnto well ordered Cities, and commonweals: so that he which will looke further into the matter, must as little as hee may decline from the best or most perfect state of a Commonweale. For as much as by the goodnes of the end we measure the worth and excellencie, as well of Cities and Commonweals, as of all other things: so that by how much the end of euery Citie▪ or Commonweale is better or more heauen-like, so much is it to be deemed worthily to excell the rest. Yet [ E] is it not our intent or purpose to figure out the onely imaginary forme and Idea of a Commonweale, without effect, or substance, as haue Plato, and Sir Thomas More* 1.8 Chauncelor of England, vainely imagined: but so neere as we possibly can precisely to follow the best lawes and rules of the most flourishing cities and Commonweals. In which doing, a man is not bee iustly blamed, although hee fully attaine not vnto the end hee aimeth at, no more than the good Pilot, by force of tempest driuen out of his course; or the skilfull Physitian ouercome with the force of the maladie, are the lesse esteemed: prouided, that the one hath yet in the cure well

gouerned his sicke patient; and the other in his course, his ship. [ F]

Now if the greatest felicitie and happinesse of one citisen, and of a whole Citie,* 1.9 be all one and the selfe same, and the chiefe good of both consisteth in those vertues which are proper vnto the mind, and are onely conuersant in contemplation (as they which in wisedome are said to haue farre excelled the rest, haue with great agreement affirmed) it must needs follow also, those citisens and people to enioy true felicitie, which exercising themselues in the sweet knowledge of things naturall, humane, and diuine, referre all the fruits of their contemplation vnto the almightie God, and great Prince of nature. If we then confesse this to be the principall end of the most blessed and happy life of euery one in particular, we conclude, that this is the felicitie and end also of a Commonweale. But for as much as men of affaires, and Princes, are not in [ G] this point agreed, euery man measuring his good by the foot of his pleasures and con∣tentments; and that those which haue had the same opinion of the chiefe felicitie of a man in particular, haue not alwayes agreed, That a good man and a good citisen are not all one; neither that the felicitie of one man, and of a whole Common weale are both alike: this hath made that we haue alwaies had varietie of lawes, customs, and decrees, according to the diuers humors and passions of Princes and gouernours. Most men thinking the life of man to be but base, if his endeuours should bee onely directed vnto necessitie, and not also vnto pleasure, and ornament: they would (I say) account it a miserable thing to dwell in poore cottages couered with turfe, or in strait cabins and lodges to shrowd themselues from the iniury of the weather. But for as much as [ H] the wise man is in a sort the measure of right and wrong, of truth and falshood; or as it were an inflexible rule: and they which are thought to excell all others in iustice and wisdom, with one consent affirme the chiefe good of euery one in particular, and of all in common, to be but one, and the same; we also putting no difference betwixt a good man, and a good citisen, measure the chiefe felicitie and happinesse of euery particular man, and of all men in general, by that most beautifull and and sweet contemplation of high matters, which we before spoke of. Albeit that Aristotle sometimes following* 1.10 the vulgar opinion, seemeth doubtfull in setting downe the chiefe good thing, and not well to agree in opinion with himselfe; as thinking it necessarie vnto vertuous actions to ioyne also wealth and power: yet when he reasoneth more subtilly thereof, placing [ I] the chiefe good and felicitie of man, in Contemplation. Which seemeth to haue giuen occasion vnto Marcus Varro to say, That the felicitie of man consisteth in a mixture of action and contemplation together: whereof this may seeme to haue bene the reason, For that as of one simple thing, the felicitie is simple; so of things double or compound, the felicitie is also double and compound. For the goodnesse of the bo∣die consisteth in the health, strength, agilitie, comlinesse, and beautie thereof: but the goodnesse of the mind, that is to say, of that facultie or power which is the true bond of the bodie and vnderstanding together, consisteth in the due obedience of our desires vnto reason, that is to say, in the action of morall vertues: whereas the chiefe goodnes and felicitie of the vnderstanding and mind it selfe, consisteth in the intellectuall ver∣tues, [ K] that is to say, Wisedom, Knowledge, and true Religion: Wisedome, concerning worldly affairs; Knowledge, concerning the searching out of the secrets of nature; and Religion, the knowledge of things diuine. Of which three vertues, the first seeth the difference betwixt good and euill, the second betwixt truth and falshood, and the third betwixt true holinesse and impietie: and so altogether containe what is to be desired, or to be fled from. In which three vertues, true wisedome consisteth, better than which God hath not giuen any thing vnto man: For that it cannot be taken from vs by theft, consumed by fire, or lost by shipwrack; but is of it selfe sufficient to make men, other∣wise

destitute and bare of all other things, happie; and that not euery one in particular [ A] onely, but euen altogether also. Yet for all that shall a citie be much more blessed and fortunate, which encreased by these vertues, shal haue also sufficient territorie, and place capable for the inhabitants; a fertill soyle to plant in, with beasts and cattell sufficient to feed and cloath the people with; and for the maintenance of their health, the sweet disposition of the heauens, temperate and fresh ayre, plentifull and wholsome water, also matter fit for building and fortification, if the countrey of it selfe bee not safe and strong enough against the iniuries both of the weather and the enemy. These are the first beginnings of a growing commonweale, viz. That those things be first prouided* 1.11 for, without which people can in no wise liue; and then after that, such other things as wherewith men liue the more commodiously and better, as medicines to cure disea∣ses, [ B] mettals wherwith conuenient tools may be made for workmen, & armes for soul∣diers, not onely to repulse, but also to take reuenge vpon the enemie and robber. And for as much as the desires of men are insatiable, after that those things are prouided for which are necessarie, as also those which are profitable; it lusteth vs also to seeke after, and to abound with vaine delights and pleasures, that so we may more sweetly & plea∣santly liue. And as we haue no care of nurturing our children, before that they by con∣venient education being growne, become capable both of speech and reason; no more regard haue cities also for the conforming of manners, or searching after the know∣ledge of naturall and diuine things, before they haue gotten such things as must needs be had to feed and defend their citisens; but are with meane wisedome content to re∣pulse [ C] their enemies, and defend their people from iniurie. But the man that hath got all things needfull for him to lead a safe and happy life withall, if he be well by nature,* 1.12 and better by education instructed, abhorreth the companie of loose and wicked men, sorteth himselfe with the good, and seeketh after their friendship: and afterwards when he feeleth himself cleane & free frō those perturbations and passions which trouble and molest the mind; and hath not set his whole hope vpon his vaine pelfe, hee at great ease beholdeth the chaunges and chances of the world, the vnstaidnesse and diuersitie of mens maners, their diuers ages, and conditions; some in the height of power and so∣ueraigntie; others in the bottome of calamitie and woe: he then studiously beholdeth the mutations, risings, and downfals of Commonweals; and wisely ioyneth things [ D] forepast, vnto those that are to come. After that, turning himselfe from mens affaires vnto the beautie of nature, he delighteth himselfe in beholding the varietie of natures worke in plants, liuing creatures, and minerals, hee considereth of euery one of them, their forme, their strength, and excellencie: yea he seeth the successiue transmutations of the elements themselues one into another, the singular Antipathie and contagious∣nesse of things, the wonderfull order and consent of causes; whereby the things low∣est, are ioyned vnto the highest, they in the middle vnto both, and so in briefe all to all: as also whereof euery thing tooke beginning, whether it returneth againe, when and how it shall take end; what in things is mortall and transitory, what immortall and e∣ternall: and so by little and little, as it were with the swift wings of contemplation [ E] carried vp into heauen, wondreth at the brightnesse of the notable starres; the power, placing, distance, and vnequall course of the heauenly bodies; and so the good agree∣ment and as it were most sweet harmonie of the whole world, and of euery part there∣of: so rauished with a wonderfull pleasure, accompanied with a perpetuall desire to see the causes of all things, he is still caried on, vntill hee bee brought vnto God, the first cause, and gouernour of all this most faire and beautifull worke: whither when hee is once come, he sta•…•…eth to search further, seeing that he is of an infinite and incompre∣hensible essence, greatnesse, power, wisedome, and beautie, such as cannot either by

tongue be expressed, or by any mind of man conceiued: yet so much as in him is hee [ F] prayseth, extolleth, and with great deuotion honoureth, that so great brightnes of the diuine Maiestie, which by such heauenly contemplation draweth him vnto the true glorie, and chiefe end of all goodnesse. For by these meanes men seeme in a manner to haue obtained the most goodly knowledge of things naturall, ciuill, and diuine, and the very summe of humane felicitie and blisse.

If therefore we iudge such a man wise and happie, as hath not gotten store of com∣mon wealth and pelfe, but the knowledge and vnderstanding of most excellent things, and remote from the rude capacitie of the vulgar people: how much more happie ought we to iudge a commonweale, abounding with a multitude of such citisens, al∣though* 1.13 it contented with strait bounds, contemne the proud wealth and pleasures of [ G] the greatest cities, which measure their greatest felicitie, by their greatest delights, or by their aboundant wealth and store, or by the vanitie of their glory? Neither yet for all that doe we make that chiefe good of a man, or of a common weale, to be a thing confused, or mixt: For albeit that man be composed of a bodie which is fraile and mor∣tall, and of a soule which is eternall and immortall; yet must it needs be confessed the cheiefe goodnesse of man to rest and be in that part which is more excellent than the rest, that is to say, the Mind. For if it be true (as true it is) that this our bodie is com∣pact and framed of flesh and bones, to serue the soule; and our desires to obey reason: who can doubt the chiefe felicitie of man wholy to depend of the most excellent ver∣tue thereof, which men call the action of the mind? For although Aristotle, accor∣ding [ H] to the opinion of the Stoiks, had placed the chiefe goodnes of man in the action of vertue; yet he the same man was of opinion, that the same action was still to bee re∣ferred vnto the end of contemplation: otherwise (saith hee) the life of man should bee more blessed than that of the Gods, who not troubled with any actions or businesse, enioy the sweet fruit of eternall contemplation, with a most assured repose and rest. And yet not willing to follow the doctrine of his maister Plato, and also accounting it* 1.14 a shame to depart from the opinion by himselfe once receiued and set downe; for as much as he at the first had put the blessed life in action; he afterward with great ambi∣guitie of words, hath placed the chiefe felicitie of man, in the action of the mind, which is nothing else but contemplation: to the intent he might not seeme to haue put the [ I] chief good, both of men and commonweals, in things most contrary vnto themselues; motion (I say) and rest, action and contemplation. And yet hee neuerthelesse seeing men and commonweals to be still subiect vnto motion, and troubled with their neces∣sary affaires, would not plainly put that chiefe good or happinesse which we seeke af∣ter, in contemplation onely; which for all that he must of necessitie confesse. For all beit that the actions whereby mans life is maintained, as to eat, to drinke, to sleepe, and such like, are so necessarie, as that a man cannot long want them: yet is no man so sim∣ple, as in them to put mans chiefe good or felicitie. The moral vertues also are of much more worth and dignitie than they: for that the mind by them (or by the vertue di∣uine) purged from all perturbations, and affections, may bee filled with the most sweet [ K] fruit and cleare light of contemplation. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, the morall vertues to be referred vnto the intellectuall, as vnto their end. Now that can in no wise be called the chiefe good or happinesse, which is referred vnto a farther thing, better and more excellent than it selfe: as the bodie vnto the soule, appetite vnto reason, motion vnto quiet rest, action vnto contemplation. And therefore I suppose that Marcus Varro, who deemed man his chiefe good to bee mixt, of action and contem∣plation; might (in mine opinion) haue more aptly and better said mans life to haue need of both; yet the chiefe good and felicitie thereof to consist in contemplation:

which the Academicks called the sweet, and the Hebrews the pretious death; for that [ A] it doth in a sort rauish the mind of man from out of this fraile and vile bodie, and car∣rieth the same vp into heauen. Yet neuertheles true it is, that a commonweale cannot long stand if it be quite or long time destitute of those ordinary actions which con∣cerne the preseruation of the peoples welfare, as the administration and execution of iustice, the prouiding of victuals, and such other things necessary for the life of man; no more than can a man long liue whose mind is so strongly rauished with the contem∣plation of high things, that he forgetteth to eate or drinke, and so suffereth the bodie with hunger and thirst to perish, or for lacke of rest to die.

But as in this fabrick of the world (which we may cal the true image of a perfect and* 1.15 most absolute commonweale) the Moone, as the soule of the world, comming neerer [ B] vnto the Sunne, seemeth to forsake this perspirall and elementarie region; and yet af∣terwards by the coniunction of the Sunne, filled with a diuine vertue, wonderfully im∣parteth the same vnto these inferiour bodies: so also the soule of this little world, by the* 1.16 force of contemplation rauished out of the bodie, and in some sort as it were vnited vnto the great * 1.17 Sun of vnderstanding, the life of the whole world, wonderfully light∣ned with diuine vertue, with that celestiall force maruelously strengtheneth the bodie, with all the naturall powers thereof. Yet if the same, become too carefull of the bodie, or too much drowned in the sensuall pleasures thereof, shall forsake this diuine Sunne; it shall befall it euen as it doth vnto the Moone, which shunning the sight of the Sun, and masked with the the shadow of the earth, looseth her brightnesse and light, by [ C] which defect many fowle monsters are engendred, and the whole course of nature troubled: and yet if the Moone should neuer be seperated from the coniunction of the Sunne, it is most certaine that the whole frame of this elementarie world should in right short time be dissolued and perish. The same iudgement we are to haue of a well ordered commonweale; the chiefe end and felicitie wherof consisteth in the con∣templatiue vertues: albeit that publick and politicall actions of lesse worth, be first and the fore-runners of the same, as the prouision of things necessarie for the maintenance and preseruation of the state and people; all which for all that we account farre inferi∣our vnto the morall vertues, as are also they vnto the vertues intellectuall; the end of which, is the diuine contemplation of the fairest and most excellent obiect that can [ D] possibly be thought of or imagined. And therefore we see that Almightie God who with great wisdome disposed all things, but that especially, for that he appointed only six dayes for vs to trauell and to do our businesse in, but the seuenth day he consecra∣ted vnto contemplation and most holy rest, which onely day of all others hee blessed* 1.18 as the holy day of repose and rest, to the intent we should imploy the same in contem∣plation of his works, in meditation of his law, and giuing of him praises. And thus much concerning the principall end and chiefe good of euery man in particular, as also of all men in generall, and of euery well ordered commonweale: the neerer vnto which end they approach, by so much they are the more happie. For as we see in par∣ticuler* 1.19 men, many degrees of worldly calamitie or blisse, according to the diuers ends [ E] of good or bad that they haue vnto themselues propounded; so haue also common∣weals in a sort their degrees of felicitie and miserie, some more, some lesse, according to the diuers ends they haue in their gouernment aimed at.

The Lacedemonians are reported to haue alwayes bene valiant and couragious* 1.20 men; but in the rest of their actions iniust and perfidious, if question once were of the common good: for that their education, their lawes, customs, and manners, had no other scope or end than to make their people couragious to vndertake all dangers, and painfull to endure all manner of labour and toyle; contemning all such pleasures and

delights, as commonly effeminate the minds of men, and weaken their strength, refer∣ring [ F] all their thoughts & deeds, to the encreasing of their state. But the Romane com∣monweale hauing flourished in iustice, farre passed the Lacedemonians; for that the Romans, besides that they were passing couragious, had propounded also vnto them∣selues* 1.21 true iustice, whereunto, as to a marke they addressed all their actions. Where∣fore we must so much as in vs lyeth endeuour our selues to find the meanes to attaine or at least wise to come so neere as we possibly can, vnto that felicitie wee haue before spoken of, and to that definition of a Commonweale by vs before set downe. Wher∣fore prosecuting euery part of the said definition, let vs first speake of a Familie.

CHAP. II. [ G] ¶ Of a Familie, and what difference there is betweene a Familie and a Commonweale.

A Familie is the right gouernment of many subiects or persons* 1.22 vnder the obedience of one and the same head of the family; and of such things as are vnto them proper. The second part of the definition of a Commonweale by vs set downe, concerneth a Familie, which is the true seminarie and beginning of euery Commonweale, as also a principall member thereof. So that [ H] Aristotle following Xenophon, seemeth to me without any pro∣bable cause, to haue diuided the Oeconomicall gouernment from the Politicall, and a Citie from a Familie: which can no otherwise be done, than if wee should pull the members from the bodie; or go about to build a Citie without houses. Or by the same reason he should haue set downe by it selfe a treatise of Colleges, and Corporati∣ons; which being neither families nor cities, are yet parts of a Commonweal. Wher∣as we see the Lawyers, and law makers (whome we ought as guides to follow in rea∣soning of a Commonweale) to haue in the same treatise comprehended the lawes and ordinances of a commonweale, corporations, colleges, and families; howbeit that they haue otherwise taken the Oeconomicall gouernment than did Aristotle; who defi∣neth [ I] it to be a knowledge for the getting of goods: a thing common vnto corporati∣ons and Colleges, as vnto Cities also. Whereas we vnder the name of a Familie, do comprehend the right gouernment of an house or familie; as also the power and au∣thoritie the maister of the house hath ouer his people, and the obedience to him due: things not touched in the treatise of Aristotle and Xenophon. Wherefore as a familie well and wisely ordered, is the true image of a Citie, and the domesticall gouernment,* 1.23 in sort like vnto the soueraigntie in a Commonweale: so also is the manner of the go∣uernment of an house or familie, the true modell for the gouernment of a Common∣weale. And as whilest euery particular member of the bodie doth his dutie, wee liue in good and perfect health; so also where euery family is kept in order, the whole citie [ K] shall be well and peaceably gouerned. But if a man shall be crosse and froward vnto his wife, if the wife shall be about to take vpon her the office of her husband, and not shew her selfe obedient vnto him; if both of them shall account of their children as of seruants, and of their seruants as of beasts, and so tyrannise ouer them; if children shall refuse the commands of their parents, and the seruants of their maisters; who seeth not no concord to be in that house, no agreement of minds and wils, but all full of strife, brawling and contention? Seeing therfore the way to order wel a citie, leaneth & resteth in the good gouernment of families, as it were vpon certain proper founda∣tions:

it behoueth vs first to haue an especiall regard and care for the good ordering [ A] and gouernment of families.

Wee said a Commonweale to bee a lawfull gouernment of many families, and of such things as vnto them in common belongeth, with a puissant soueraigntie. By the word, Many, you may not in this case vnderstand two, as for most part we do; for see∣ing that the law requireth at the least three persons to make a College, we according to the Lawyers opinion account three persons also, besides the maister of the house, ne∣cessary to make a familie; be they children, or slaues, or men enfranchised, or free borne men which haue voluntarily submitted themselues vnto the maister of the house or fa∣mily, who maketh vp the fourth, and is yet neuerthelesse a member of the family. But for as much as •…•…milies, Colleges, Companies, Cities, and Commonweals, yea, and [ B] mankind it selfe would perish and come to end, were it not by martiages (as by certaine Seminaries, or nurseries) preserued and continued, it followeth well that a family can∣not be in all points perfect and accomplished without a wife. So that by this account* 1.24 it commeth to passe, there must be fiue persons at least to make vp an whole and en∣tire familie. If therefore there must needs bee three persons, and no fewer, to make a* 1.25 College, and as many to make a familie, beside the maister of the houshold and his wife; wee for the same reason say three families and no fewer to bee necessarie for the making of a Citie, or Commonweale, which should be three times fiue, for three per∣fect families. Whereupon (in mine opinion) the auncient writers haue called fifteene a people, as saith Appuleius, referring the number of fifteene vnto three entire families. [ C] For albeit that the maister of the family haue three hundred wiues, as had Salomon King of the Hebrews; and sixe hundred children, as had Hermotimus king of the* 1.26 Parthians by his multitude of wiues; or fiue hundred slaues, as had Crassus; if they bee all vnder the commaund of one and the same head of the familie, they are neither to be called a people nor a citie, but by the name of a family onely: Yea although hee haue many children, or seruants maried, hauing themselues children also; prouided al∣waies, that they be vnder the authoritie of one head, whome the law calleth father of the family, although he yet crie in his cradle. And for this cause the Hebrews, who al∣wayes show the proprietie of things by their names, haue called a family 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not for that a family containeth a thousand persons, as saith one Rabbin, but of the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, [ D] which signifieth an head, a Prince, or Lord, naming the familie by the chief therof: bet∣ter as I suppose than did the Greeks, of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or the Latines of Famulis. But what should let (may some man say) three Colleges, or many other particular assemblies without a familie to make a Citie, or Cōmon weale, if they be gouerned by one soueraigne com∣maund? Truly it maketh a good show, and yet for all that is it no Commonweale: for that no Colledge, nor bodie politique can long stand without a familie, but must of it selfe perish and come to nought.

Now the law saith, that the people neuer dieth, but a thousand yeare hence to be the same that it was before▪ although the vse and profit of any thing granted vnto a com∣mon weale be after an hundred yeare extinguished, and againe reunited vnto the pro∣prietie, [ E] which proprietie should otherwise be vnto the Lord thereof vaine and vnprofi∣table: for it is to be presumed, that all they which now liue wil in the course of an hun∣dred yeares be dead, albeit that by successiue propagation they be immortal; no other∣wise than Theseus his ship, which although it were an hundred times changed, by put∣ting in of new plancks, yet still retained the old name. But as a ship, if the keele (which strongly beareth vp the prow, the poup, the ribs, and tacklings) be taken away, is no longer a ship, but an euil fauoured houp of wood: euen so a Commonweale without a soueraintie of power, which vniteth in one body all the members and families of the

same is no more a common weale, neither can by any meanes long endure. And not [ F] * 1.27 to depart from our similitude: as a ship may be quite broken vp, or altogether consu∣med with fire; so may also the people be into diuers places dispersed, or els be vtterly destroyed, the Citie or state yet standing whole; for it is neither the wals, neither the persons, that maketh the citie, but the vnion of the people vnder the same soueraigntie of gouernment, albeit that there be in all but three families. For as an Emot is as well to be called a liuing creature, as an Elephant: so the lawfull gouernment of three fami∣lies, with a soueraigntie of power maketh as well a common weale, as a great signiorie. So Rhaguse one of the least signeuries in all Europe, is no lesse a common weale, than are those of the Turkes, the Tartars, or Spanyards, whose Empires are bounded with the same bounds that the course of the Sun is. And as a little familie shut vp in a small [ G] cottage, is no lesse to be accounted a familie, than that which dwelleth in the greatest and richest house in the citie▪ so a little king is as well a Soueraigne as the greatest Mo∣narch in the world. So Vlisses, whose kingdome was contained within the rock of Ithaca, is of Homer as well called a King, as Agamemnon: for a great kingdome (as saith Cassiodorus) is no other thing than a great Commonweale, vnder the gouernment of one chiefe soueraigne: wherefore if of three families, one of the chiefe of the families hath soueraigne power ouer the other two, or two of them together ouer the third, or all three ioyntly and at once exercise power and authoritie ouer the people of the three families; it shall as well be called a Commonweale, as if it in it selfe comprehen∣ded an infinite multitude of citisens. And by this meanes it may chaunce, that one fa∣milie [ H] * 1.28 may sometimes be greater and better peopled then a common weale: as was wel said of the familie of Aemilius Tubero, who was head of a family of sixteene of his owne children, all maried, whome he had all vnder his power, together with their children and seruants, dwelling in the same house with him. And on the contrary part, the grea∣test* 1.29 Citie or Monarchie, and the best peopled that is vpon the face of the earth, is no more a common weale or citie, than the least. Albeit that Aristotle saith, the citie of Babylon (whose circuit in a square forme was so great, that it could scarce on foot bee gone about in three dayes) was to bee called rather a nation, than a common weale, which ought not, as he saith, to haue more than ten thousand citisens in it at the most: as if it were any absurditie to call an infinite number of nations, and dwelling in diuers [ I] places, gouerned by one soueraigne commaund, by the name of a Commonweale. By which meanes the citie of Rome (more famous than which was neuer any) should not* 1.30 deserue the name of a Commonweale, which at the foundation thereof had not aboue 3000 citisens; but in the time of Tiberius the Emperor, had cessed in it fifteene millions, besides an hundred and ten thousand others dispersed almost throughout the world: not accounting the slaues, the number of whom was ten times greater: and yet in this number were not comprised they of the Prouinces subiect vnto the Empire of Rome, neither the confederat cities, or free nations, who had their Commonweals in soue∣raigntie diuided from the Roman Empire. Which soueraigntie of gouernment is the true foundation and hinge whereupon the state of a citie turneth: whereof all the ma∣gistrats, [ K] lawes, and ordinances dependeth; and by whose force and power, all colleges, corporations, families, and citisens are brought as it were into one perfect bodie of a Commonweale: albeit that all the subiects thereof be enclosed in one little towne, or in some strait territorie, as the commonweale of Schwitz, one of the least of the confe∣derat Cantons of Suisers; not so large as many farms of this * 1.31 kingdom, nor of greater reuenue: or els that the Commonweale hath many large prouinces and countries, as* 1.32 had the Persians, which * 1.33 is reported to haue had an hundred twentie seuen prouinces from the vttermost part of India, vnto the sea of Hellespontus: or as is now also the

commonweale of the Aethiopians, wherein are fiftie prouinces, which Pau. Iouius [ A] without reason calleth kingdomes; albeit that they haue not but one king, one king∣dome, one Monarch, one Commonweale, vnder the puissant soueraigntie of one and the same Prince whome they call Negus.

But beside that soueraigntie of gouernment thus by vs set downe, as the strong foundation of the whole Commonweale; many other things besides are of citisens to be had in common among themselues, as their markets, their churches, their walks,* 1.34 wayes, lawes, decrees, iudgements, voyces, customs, theaters, wals, publick buildings, common pastures, lands, and treasure; and in briefe, rewards, punishments, sutes, and contracts: all which I say are common vnto all the citisens together, or by vse and profit: or publick for euery man to vse, or both together. That is also a great com∣munitie [ B] which ariseth of colleges and corporations of companies, as also of benefits both giuen and receiued. For otherwise a Commonweale cannot be so much as ima∣gined,* 1.35 which hath in it nothing at all publick or common. Although it may so be, that the greatest part of their lands be common vnto the citisens in generall, and the least part vnto euery one of them in particular: as by the law of Romulus, called Agraria, all the lands of Rome, at that time containing eighteene thousand acres, was diuided * in∣to* 1.36 three equall parts, whereof the first part was assigned for the maintaining of the sa∣crifices; the second for the defraying of the necessarie charges of the common weale; and the third was equally diuided among the citisens; who being in number but three thousand, had to euerie one of them allotted two acres: which equal partage long time [ C] after continued with great indifferencie, for Cincinnatus the Dictator himself 260 yeres after had no more but two acres of land, which hee with his owne hands husbanded. But howsoeuer lands may be diuided, it cannot possibly bee, that all things should bee common amongst citisens; which vnto Plato seemed so notable a thing, and so much* 1.37 to be wished for, as that in his Commonweale he would haue all mens wiues and chil∣dren common also: for so he deemed it would come to passe that these two words, Mine and Thine, should neuer more be heard amongst his citisens, being in his opi∣nion the cause of all the discord and euils in a Commonweale. But he vnderstood not that by making all things thus common, a Commonweale must needs perish: for no∣thing can be publike, where nothing is priuat: neither can it be imagined there to bee [ D] any thing had in common, if there be nothing to be kept in particular; no more than if al the citisens were kings, they should at al haue no king; neither any harmonie, if the diuersitie and dissimilitude of voyces cunningly mixed together, which maketh the sweet harmony, were al brought vnto one and the same tune. Albeit that such a Com∣monweale should be also against the law of God and nature, which detest not onely incests, adulteries, and ineuitable murders, if all women should bee common; but also expresly forbids vs to steale, or so much as to desire any thing that another mans is. Whereby it euidently appeareth this opinion for the communitie of all things to bee erroneous, seeing Commonweals to haue bene to that end founded and appointed by God, to giue vnto them that which is common; and vnto euery man in priuat, that [ E] which vnto him in priuat belongeth. Besides that also such a communitie of al things is impossible, and incompassible with the right of families: for if in the familie and the citie, that which is proper, and that which is common, that which is publick, and that which is priuat, be confounded; we shall haue neither familie nor yet Commonweale. In so much that Plato himselfe (in all other things most excellent) after he had seene the notable inconueniences & absurdities which such a confused communitie of all things drew after it, wisely of himselfe departed from that so absurd an opinion, and easily suf∣fered that Commonweale which he had attributed vnto Socrates to be abolished; that

so he might more moderatly defend his owne. But some will say, that the Massagets [ F] had all things in common: yet they which so say, confesse also euery one of them to haue had his pot, his sword vnto himselfe, as also must they needs haue their priuat apparell and garments also; for otherwise the weaker should bee still spoiled of the stronger, hauing his garments still taken from him.

Wherefore as a Commonweale is a lawfull gouernment of many families, and of those things which vnto them in common belongeth, with a puissant soueraigntie: so is a Familie the right gouernment of many subiects or persons, and of such things as are vnto them proper, vnder the rule and commaund of one and the same head of the fami∣lie. For in that especially consisteth the difference betwixt a Commonweale and a Fa∣milie:* 1.38 for that the maister of a familie hath the gouernment of domesticall things, and [ G] so of his whole familie with that which is vnto it proper; albeit that euery house or fa∣mily be bound to giue something vnto the Commonweale, whether it be by the name of a subsidie, taxe, tribute, or other extraordinarie imposition. And it may bee that all the subiects of a Commonweale may liue together in common, in manner of Colle∣ges, or companies, as did in auncient time the Lacedemonians, where the men apart from their wiues and families, vsed to eat and sleep together by fifteene and twentie in a company: As also in auntient time in Creet, all the citisens of all sorts men and wo∣men, young and old, rich and poore, alwaies eat and dranke together; and yet for all that, euerie man had his owne proper goods apart, euery one of them still contribu∣ting what was thought expedient for the defraying of the common charge. Which [ H] thing the Anabaptists in our time began to practise in the towne of Munster, hauing commaunded all things to be * 1.39 common, excepting their wiues (of whom they might haue many) and their apparell, thinking thereby the better to mainteine mutuall loue and concord among them: in which their account they found themselues farre decei∣ued. For they which admit this communitie of all things, are so farre from this good agreement of citisens among themselues, which they hope thus to maintaine, as that thereby the mutuall loue betwixt man and wife, the tender care of parents towards their children, and their dutifulnesse againe towards them, and in briefe the mutuall loue of neighbours and kinsmen among themselues, is quite extinquished; all the kind bond of bloud and kindred (than which none stronger can be imagined for the friend∣ship [ I] and good agreement of citisens) being by this meanes taken away. For that which thou shouldest dearely loue must be thine owne, and that also all thine: whereas com∣munitie is of the Lawyers iustly called of it selfe, the mother of contention and discord. Neither are they lesse deceiued, which think greater care to bee had of things that bee common, than of things that be priuat; for wee ordinarily see things in common and publick to be of euery man smally regarded and neglected, except it be to draw some* 1.40 priuat and particular profit thereout of. Besides that, the nature of loue and friendship is such, that the more common it is, or vnto moe diuided, the lesse force it is of: not vnlike to great riuers, which carry great vessels, but being diuided into small branches, serueth neither so keep back the enemie, neither for burthen: in which maner loue al∣so [ K] diuided vnto many persons or things, looseth his force and vertue. So the lawfull and certaine gouernment of a familie, diuideth euery priuat mans wiues and children, seruants and goods, from all other mens families; as also that which is vnto euery par∣ticular man proper, from that which is to them all common in generall, that is to say, from a Commonweale. And withall in euery well gouerned Commonweale we see the publick magistrat to haue a certaine especiall care and regard of the priuat goods of orphans, of mad men, and of the prodigall: for that it concerneth the Commonweale to haue their goods preserued vnto them to whome they belong, and that they be not

embeseled. As in like case the lawes oftentimes forbiddeth a man to procure, to alie∣nat, [ A] or to pawne his own goods or things, except vpon certain conditions, as also vnto certaine persons▪ for that the preseruation of euery priuat mans goods in particular, is the preseruation of the Commonweale in generall. And yet neuerthelesse although* 1.41 lawes be common to al, it is not inconuenient, but that families may haue their certaine particular statutes for themselues and their successors, made by the auntient heads of their families, and confirmed vnto them by their soueraigne Princes. As we haue ex∣ample in the most honourable nation of the Saxons, amongst whome are many fami∣lies, which vse certaine their owne priuat lawes, quite differing both from the lawes of the Empire, and from the common lawes and customs of Saxonie. And betwixt the dukes of Bauaria, and the Counties Palatines there are also their particular lawes, as [ B] well for the lawfull succession in the inheritance of their houses, as in the right of the Electorship, which is in these two honourable houses, alternatiue, by the auntient de∣crees of their predecessors: which laws & customs the duke of Bauaria, with great in∣stance required to haue renewed at the diet of the Empire at Auspurge, in the yere 1555 which is not so in the other families of the Electors. Betwixt the houses also of Saxo∣nie and Hess, are their domesticall and proper laws * 1.42 confirmed vnto them by the Em∣perour Charles the fourth, and Sigismund. In like maner it was decreed betwixt the houses of Austria, and Bohemia, that for lack of heirs male, the one of them should suc∣ceed into the inheritance of the other, as we see it is now come to passe. And not to go further than this * 1.43 Realme, I haue seene a charter of the house of Laual granted by the [ C] King, and confirmed by the Parliament of Paris, directly contrarie to the customes of Aniou, Britagne, and Mayne, wherein the most part of their inheritance lie: by which Charter the first inheritor (able to succeed) is to enioy all, being not bound to giue any thing vnto his coheirs, more than the moueables; with charge, that the heire male shall beare the name of Guy de Laual; or of Guionne, if she bee an inheritrix, and the armes plaine. In like manner in the houses of Baume, Albret, and Rhodez, the daugh∣ters by the auntient lawes of their auncestors, were excluded both in direct and colla∣terall line from inheriting, so long as there were any males in what degree soeuer; deri∣uing as it were into their families, the law Salique, vsual vnto the Princes of Sauoy. Such lawes of families, which the Latines had also, and called them Ius familiare, were made [ D] by their auncestors and chiefe of their families, for the mutuall preseruation of their in∣heritance, name, and auntient armes; which may in some sort well be suffered in some great and honourable families: which priuat lawes and customs by vs thus spoken of, haue oftentimes preserued from destruction, not onely families, but whole common weals; which was the cause that in the diet at Auspurge in the yeare 1555, the Princes* 1.44 of the Empire after long ciuill warre, wisely renewed the auntient lawes of great houses and families, as hauing well perceiued that by that meane the Empire was to be prefer∣ued from ruine, and the state of Almaigne from a generall destruction. Which for all that, is not to take place in other obscure and particular base families, to the intent that the publick lawes, so much as is possible, should be vnto all men common and the selfe [ E] same. For it is not without great cause to bee suffered, that the lawes of priuat families should derogat from the customes of the countrey, and so, much lesse from the gene∣rall lawes and ordinances. Neither are they which come after, by this law of families by their grand-fathers, & great grand-fathers made, contrarie to the common customs and lawes, further bound than they themselues shall thereunto giue their consent. For which cause the successors of the house of Albret, of Laual, and of Montmorency ob∣tained decrees from the Parliament of Paris, contrarie to the auntient charters of their predecessors; for that they were contrary vnto the customes of those places, when

question was of the successions of Laual, of the Countie of Dreux, and of Montmo∣rency, [ F] which they would make indiuisible, contrarie to the custom of the Viscomptie of Paris: For it beseemeth that the customes of families should bee subiect vnto the lawes, in like maner as the heads of families are subiect vnto their soueraigne Princes. Much lesse are the lawes of families and kindreds, allowed by the decrees of the Ro∣mans, to be be suffered, least for the priuat the publick should be neglected: as Camil∣lus complained with Liuie, * 1.45 What (saith he) if the sacred rites of families may not in time of warre be intermitted, pleaseth it you that the publick sacrifices and Roman gods should euen in time of peace be forsaken? For it was a law of the twelue tables conceiued in these words, Sacred priuat Rites, firme be they for euer: which M. Tul∣lius translated into his lawes. And thus much in generall, concerning the similitude [ G] and difference of a Common weale and Familie: now let vs discourse also of the sin∣gular parts of a Familie.

CHAP. III. ¶ Of the power of an Husband ouer his Wife, as also of the mutuall duties betwixt them: and whether it be expedient to renew the law of diuorcement or not.

ALL assemblies of men lawfully ioyned together, whether they be Families, Colledges, Vniuersities, or Commonweals, are kept together and preserued by the mutuall duties of comman∣ding [ H] and obeying: for as much as that libertie which nature hath giuen vnto euery one to liue at his owne pleasure, bound within no lawes, is yet subiect vnto the rule and power of some other. All which power to commaund ouer others, is either* 1.46 publick or priuat: The power publick, is either free from law, as is theirs which hold the chiefest place of soueraigntie; or els restrained by law, as is the power of the Ma∣gistrats, who although they commaund ouer priuat men, are yet themselues subiect vnto the commaunds and laws of others their superiours. The power priuat, consi∣steth either in the heads of families, or in corporations, or colledges, where all by a ge∣nerall consent, or the greater part, commaundeth ouer the rest. But the domesticall [ I] * 1.47 power is of foure sorts: viz. The power of the Husband ouer his Wife, the power of the Father ouer his children, the power of the Lord ouer his slaues, and the power of the head of a Familie ouer his mercenarie seruants. And for as much as the right and lawfull gouernment of euerie Commonweale, Corporation, Colledge, Societie, and Familie dependeth of the due knowledge of commaunding and obeying; let vs now speake of euery part of commaunding in such order as is by vs before set downe. For naturall libertie is such, as for a man next vnto God not to be subiect to any man liuing, neither to suffer the commaund of any other than of himselfe; that is to say, of Reason, which is alwaies conformable vnto the will of God. This naturall commaundement* 1.48 of Reason ouer our affections and desires, is the first, the greatest and most antient that [ K] is: for before that one can well commaund ouer others, hee must first learne to com∣maund himselfe, giuing vnto Reason the soueraigntie of commaund; and vnto his af∣fections obedience: so shall it come to passe that euerie one shall haue that which of right vnto him belongeth, which is the first and fairest iustice that is; and that where of the common Hebrew prouerb grew, That euery mans charitie should first begin of himselfe: which is no other thing than to keepe our affections obedient vnto Reason. This is the first law of naturall commaund, which God by his expresse commaunde∣ment * 1.49 established, as we see in the speech which God had both vnto her that was the

first * 1.50 mother of vs all; as also against him who first defiled himself with his brothers [ A] bloud * 1.51. For that commaund which he had before giuen the Husband and his Wife, is two wayes to be vnderstood; first literally for the power the Husband hath ouer his Wife, and then morally for the commaund the soule hath ouer the bodie, and reason ouer affection. For that reasonable part of vnderstanding, is in man as the Husband; and Affection, as the Woman: For before God had created Eua, it was said of A∣dam, Male and female created he them * 1.52. Wherefore the woman in holy writ is of∣tentimes taken for affection: but neuer more than with Salomon, who so liued as a man vnto women most kind; but so writ, as if he had bene vnto them a sworne ene∣mie, whereas he thought nothing lesse, all that his speech being to bee vnderstood of mans vnreasonable desires, as well declareth the wise and graue Rabbin Maymon * 1.53. [ B] But leaue we the morall discourse vnto Philosophets and Diuines to dispute of, and let vs take that which belongeth vnto ciuill policie, and speake of the power the Husband hath ouer the Wife, as proper vnto this our question. By the name of a Wife I vn∣derstand a iust and lawfull Wife, and not concubine, which is not in the power of him that keepeth her; albeit that the Roman lawes call it mariage, and not concubinage,* 1.54 if the concubine be franke and free: which all nations haue of good right reiected, and as it were by secret consent abrogated, as a thing dishonest and of euill example. Nei∣ther doth this power that the Husband nath ouer his Wife extend vnto her that is but betrothed, vpon whome the betrothed man may not lay his hand; which hath euer bene lawful vnto the Husband, both by the Ciuil and Canon law: yea if the be∣trothed [ C] man shall lay violent hand, or force her that is to him affianced or betrothed, he shall therefore by right suffer capitall punishment. But what if by consent of the man and of the woman, contract of mariage be made by words of the present time, be∣fore they know one another; for that, the law calleth iust marriage: I am for all that of opinion the power of an Husband not to be yet gotten by such a contract, except the Wife haue followed her Husband: for as much as by the decrees of the Diuines and Canonists (whose authoritie is in this matter the greatest) as often as question is made of the right of mariages, scarce any regard is had of such mariages betwixt man and wife, except it be of fact consumat, by the mutuall couiunction of their bodies; which by the consent of many nations is expresly receiued, as often as question is made of en∣ioying [ D] of such commodities as are to be gained by mariage. But after that lawful con∣iunction* 1.55 of man and wife (which we haue spoken of) the Wife is in the power of her Husband, except he be a slaue, or the sonne of the maister of the Familie, who haue no authoritie ouer their wiues, & much lesse ouer their children; which although their married father were manumised, should yet fall into the power of their grandfather. The reason whereof is, for that a Familie should haue but one head, one maister, and one Lord: whereas otherwise if it should haue many heads, their commaunds would be contrarie, one forbidding what another commandeth, to the continuall disturbance of the whole familie. And therefore the woman by condition free, marrying her selfe vnto the maister of the families sonne, is in the power of her father in law, as is also the [ E] free man marrying himselfe vnto the maister of the families daughter, in the power of another man if he go to dwell in the house of his Father in law: albeit that in all other things he enioy his right and libertie. Neither seemeth it a thing reasonable, that is by the Roman laws ordained, That the married daughter, except she be before by her Fa∣ther set at libertie, although she haue forsaken his house and dwell with her Husband, shall not yet for all that be in the power of her Husband, but of her father: A thing contrary vnto the law of nature, which willeth, That euery man shuld be maister of his owne house, (as saith Homer) to the end that he may be a law vnto his familie: and re∣pugnant

also vnto the law of God, which commaundeth the Wife to forsake fa∣ther [ F] and mother to follow her Husband; and also giueth power vnto the Husband to confirme or breake the vowes of his Wife. Wherefore that law of the Romans is* 1.56 worthily abrogated, and especially with vs: for that the custome generally exempteth the married woman out of the power of her father; as was likewise in the Lacedemo∣nian Commonweale, as Plutarch writeth, where the married woman saith thus; When I was a daughter I did the commaund of my father, but since that I am marri∣ed, it is my Husband to whome I owe mine obeysance: for otherwise the wife might tread vnder foot the commaundement of her Husband, and acquit her selfe when shee saw good vnder the guard of her father. Now the interpretors of this Roman law haue vsed many cautions to auoid the absurdities and inconueniences following, if the [ G] wife should not be subiect to her husband, vntill she were set at libertie by her father. Yet in that point the lawes of all people agree with the lawes of God and nature, That* 1.57 the wife ought to be obedient vnto her husband, and not to refuse his commaunds not repugnant vnto honestie. One Italian Doctor there is of opinion, That the wife is not in the power of her husband: but for that of his assertion so singuler and absurd, hee hath brought neither reason nor authoritie, there hath bene none so fond to follow the same. For it is certaine by the law of Romulus, that the husband had not onely the commaund of his wife, but also power of life and death ouer her, in foure cases, without* 1.58 any forme of judiciall processe against her: that is to wit, for Adulterie, for suborning of a child, for counterfeiting of false keyes, and for drinking of wine. Howbeit the ri∣gor [ H] of those lawes were by the kindnesse of husbands by little and little moderated, and the punishment of adulterie committed to the discretion of the parents of the wife: which began to be renewed & again put in practise in the time of Tiberius the Empe∣rour; for that the husband putting away his wife for adulterie, or himselfe attainted* 1.59 with the same crime, the offence remained vnpunished, not without the great reproach of their kindred, who in auncient time (after the manner of the Romans) punished the adulterous women with death, or with exile. And albeit that the power of the hus∣band ouer his wife was much diminished, yet neuerthelesse by the oration * 1.60 which Marcus Cato the Censor made vnto the people in defence of the law Oppia (which tooke from women their habilliments of collours, and forbad them to weare aboue [ I] one ounce of gold) it appeareth that the women were al their liues in the gouernment of their fathers, their brethren, their husbands, & next kinsmen, in such sort, as that with∣out their leaue or authoritie, they could make no contract, or yet doe any lawfull act. This Cato the Censor flourished about 550 yeares after the lawes of Romulus: and 200 years after, Vlpian the Lawyer writeth, That Tutors and Gouerners were wont to be giuen to women and orphans; but when they were married, that then they were in the hand of the man, that is to say in the power of the husband. And if any should say That he diuided the title of persons that are in the power of others, from them that are in the power of others; it followeth not thereof that wiues were in the power of their husbands, but was by him so done, to show the difference of power the husband hath [ K] ouer his wife, the father ouer his children, and the lord ouer his slaues. And what doubt is there but that this word Hand, signifieth oftentimes power and authoritie? the Hebrews, Greeks, & Latines, hauing alwaies so vsed it, as when they say, The hand of the King▪ and, To come into the hand of the enemie. And Festus Pompeius, speaking of the husband bringing home his wife, vseth the word Mancipare, a word proper vnto slaues: which word we yet vse in many our customes and lawes, where question is of the emancipating of women. But to make it plaine, this power of husbands ouer their wiues to haue bene common vnto all people, we will by two or three examples de∣clare

the same. Olorus King of Thracia compelled the Dacians ouercome by their [ A] * 1.61 enemies, to serue their wiues, in token of extreame seruitude, & of the greatest reproach that he could deuise to doe them. We read also that by the lawes of the Lombards the woman was in the same subiection that the auntient Romans were, and that the husbands had all power of life and death ouer their wiues▪ which they yet vsed in the time of Baldus, not yet 260. yeares ago▪ And not to seeke farther, what people had euer so great power ouer their wiues as had our auncestors? The French men (saith * 1.62 Gaesar) haue power of life and death ouer their wiues and children, in like manner as ouer their slaues: and beeing neuer so little suspected to haue wrought their husbands death, are to be tortured by their owne kinsmen, and being found guiltie are by them to be cruelly executed, without any further authoritie from the Magistrat. But for [ B] * 1.63 drinking of wine it was much more manifest that it was cause sufficient by the Roman lawes for the husband to put his wife to death; wherein all the * 1.64 auntient writers agree; which was not only the custome of the Romans, but also (as Theophrastus wri∣teth) of the auntient inhabitants of Marseiles•…•… in Prouinde, and the Milesians, who vsed the same law against their w•…•…es that had drunke wine▪ iudging that the disordered desires of the woman subiect to wine, would also make her drunke, and so afterwards* 1.65 an adultresse▪ We also find that the power giuen vnto the husband by the law of R•…•…∣mulus, To put his wife to death for adulter•…•…e, without the authoritie of the Magistrar▪ was common to all Greece, as well as to the Romans▪ For the law of Iulia which gaue leaue onely vnto the father to kill his daughter together with the adulterer, being taken [ C] in the deed doing▪ and not otherwise, was made by Augustus the Emperour aboue se∣uen hundred yeares after the law of Romulus: And yet by the same law it was permit∣ted vnto certaine persons to do the same that the father might, against their adulterous wiues: a right small punishment being appointed for the husband▪ who besides the per∣sons in the law excepted, had killed the adulterours taken in the fact. But the publick punishment of adulterie derogateth nothing from the power of the husband▪ in other* 1.66 sorts of corrections ouer his wife, not extending vnto death▪ which is vnto husbands forbidden. After that Theodora the Empresse hauing got the maisterie ouer Iustinian the Emperour her husband, a blockish and vnlearned Prince▪ when she had made al the lawes she could for the aduantage of women against their husbands▪ she amongst [ D] others also changed the paine of death for adulterie, into the note of 〈◊〉〈◊〉: as did also in auntient time the Athen•…•…ians▪ excommunicating the adulterors•…•…▪ with the note also of infantie, as we read In the Pleas of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which seemeth but a thing •…•…i∣diculous, considering that the note of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cannot take any honour from her which hath already lost the same, and is altogether de famed▪ 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that vpon the matter she•…•… re∣•…•… altogether vnpunishe•…•…, & that for such a crime as the law of God * 1.67 punishe•…•…h with the most •…•…igorous death that then was▪ (that is to say with stoning) and which the auntient Aegyptians punished a•…•… 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 with cutting off the •…•…ose of the woman, and the mans priuities. But in other crimes which more concerned the husband 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the publicke state; and deser•…•…ed not death power is by the consent•…•… all men 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [ E] vnto the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and to chastice his wife, so that it be sparingly done▪ and within measure. And to the end that lius band•…•… should not abuse the power the law gaue them 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their wiues▪ they had an action against•…•… their husbands▪ in case of euill 〈◊〉〈◊〉; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 •…•…oward vsage▪ which was afterward by the law of Iusti•…•…an taken away▪ and a •…•…∣tie dec•…•…eed against them that had giuen the cause of the seperation▪ which were espe∣cially grounded vpon 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and poi•…•…ning attempted▪ but not hauing taken effect. Yet notwithstanding the decree of Iustinian, it is by our custome permitted vnto the wife wronged or euill entreated by her husband, to require seperation. And yet 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all

that is no action of iniurie to be suffered betwixt the husband and the wife (as some [ F] * 1.68 would haue it) and that for the honour and dignitie of marriage; which the law hath had in so great regard, that it permitteth not the husband, or any third man to haue an action of •…•…elonie against the wife, although she haue embeseled or purloyned all her* 1.69 husbands moueables. But as no loue is greater than that of marriage, (as saith Arte∣m•…•…dorus) so is the hatred of all others most deadly, if it once take root betwixt man and wife; as was well declared by Leo Embassadour from them of Bizance vnto the Athe∣nians, whome when they in a great assembly had laughed to scorne for his small sta∣ture, Why (said he) do you laugh at me a dwarfe, seeing my wife is much lesse than my selfe, and scarce so high as my knee; who pleased, although wee lie in a verie little bed, yet falling out the one with the other, the great Citie of Constantinople is too [ G] little for vs two? Which his pleasant speech serued wel to the matter he had in hand, which was to persuade the Athenians vnto peace; which is not easie to doe betwixt the husband and the wife, especially if one of them hath once sought after the life of the other. And for that cause the law of God concerning diuorcement (which was after∣wards* 1.70 common to all people, and yet at this present is vsed in Affrick, and in all the east) gaue leaue to the husband to put away his wife, if she pleased him not, with charge that he might neuer take her againe, and yet might well marrie another; which was a meane to keepe the insolent wiues in subiection, as also to represse the anger of the wayward husbands; for what woman (except she were an arrant whore) would bee so desirous of a man, as to marry an husband that without any iust or probable cause had [ H] put away his wife. Now if it shall seeme to any an vnreasonable thing, to bee lawfull for a man to put away his wife, for no other cause but for that hee liketh her not, I will not greatly striue, either therefore depart from the law now with vs in vse. Yet nothing seemeth vnto me more pernitious, than to constraine the parties so in dis∣like to liue together (except they will) to declare the cause of the diuorcement they de∣sire,* 1.71 & also wel proue the same before the Iudge: For in so doing, the honor of the one or of both the parties is hazarded▪ which should not so be if neither of them were enfor∣ced* 1.72 to proue the cause of the diuorce vnto the Iudge. As did in auncient time the He∣brews, and yet do at this present also, as we see in their Pandects, where is described the lawful act of diuorcement, & the bil of diuorcement which Rabi Ieiel of Paris gaue vn∣to [ I] his wife the xxix. of Octob. in the yere from the creation of the world * 1.73 5018. Ano∣ther example thereof is also extant in the Epitome of the Hebrew Pandects▪ collected by the Lawyer Moyses de Maymon in Chaldea, where the Iudge of the place hauing seene the special procuratiō, & the act of him that had put away his wife in the presence of three witnesses, adioyneth thereunto these words, That he did purely and simply di∣uorce her, and without any cause showing, giuing them both leaue to marry whome they should see good. In which doing the woman was not dishonoured, but might with safe reputation marrie with another •…•…ortable to her owne qualitie. And albeit that the Athenians admitted no diuorcement, except the cause were first proued before the Iudges, yet seemed it to all good men to be a thing of great daunge•…•…: insomuch that [ K] * 1.74 Alcibiades fearing the publick scandall tooke his wife openly complaining before the Iudges, and carried her away home vpon his shoulders. More indifferently delt the auncient Romans, in ioyning no cause at all vnto the bill of diuorcement: as is to be seene when Paulus Aemilius put away his wife, whome he confessed to be very wise,* 1.75 honest; and nobly descended; and by whom he had also many faire children: but when his wiues friends complaining vnto him, would needs know of him the cause of the di∣uorce, he showed them his shoo▪ which was very handsomly and well made; and yet said he, none of you but my selfe feeleth where this shoo wringeth mee▪ But what if

the cause seeme not sufficient vnto the Iudge? or be not well proued? is it therefore [ A] meet to enforce the parties to liue together, in that societie which is of all other the straitest▪ hauing alwaies the one the other the obiect of their griefs stil before their eies. Truly I am not of that opinion: for seeing themselues brought into extreame serui∣tude,* 1.76 feare, and perpetuall discord, hereof ensue adulteries, and oftentimes murthers and poysonings, for the most part to men vnknowne; as it was discouered in Rome, before the law of diuorcement (first made by Spurius Caruilius, about 500. yeares after the foundation of the citie) a woman being apprehended and conuicted for poysoning her husband, accused other her companions in the fact, who afterward by mutuall accusa∣tions appeached seuentie others of the same crime for poysoning their husbands, who were all therefore executed: which how much the more is it to bee feared where di∣uorcements [ B] are altogether forbidden? For both the Greek and the Roman Empe∣rours, willing to take away the often vse and easinesse of diuorcements, and to amend the auncient custome, ordained no other penaltie than the losse of the dowry, or of the other matrimonial conuentions, vnto the partie that shuld be the cause of the diuorce. Anastasius also suffered diuorcement, by consent of both parties, to bee made without any penaltie or punishment: which was by Iustinian the Emperour, or rather Theodo∣ra his wife forbidden. Now of that which we haue alreadie said, euery man as I sup∣pose, may of himselfe iudge which is most expedient for a Commonweale.

But what change or varietie of lawes soeuer in such diuersitie of Commonweals, there was neuer law or custome that exempted the wife from the obeysance, and not [ C] onely from the obeysance, but also from the reuerence that shee oweth vnto her hus∣band; in such sort that the law permitteth not the wife to sue her husband without the leaue of the Magistrat. But as nothing is greater, better, or more necessarie for the pre∣seruation not of Families only, but of Commonweals also, than the honest obedience of wiues towards their husbands, as saith Euripides: so beseemeth it not the husband vnder the shadow of this power, to make a slaue of his wife. And wheras Marcus Var∣ro* 1.77 is of opinion that slaues ought rather to be corrected with words than with stripes; much more ought the wife to be, whom both God and mans law doth call his house∣fellow. So Homer bringing in Iupiter reprouing his wife Iuno, and seeing her rebelli∣ons, vseth great threats, but proceedeth vnto no further extremities. And Cato com∣monly [ D] reputed to be a sworne enemie vnto women, did neuer beat his wife, reputing that to be as it were a sacrilege; but vsed so to maintaine the power and dignitie of a husband, as that he had his wife alwaies at commaund: which he shal neuer do which of a maister is become her companion, & afterward her seruant, & of a seruant her very slaue. As was of old obiected vnto the Lacedemonians, who called their wiues their* 1.78 Ladies and Mistresses: which the Romans did also, not the priuat men only, but euen* 1.79 their Emperors themselues, in the declination of their Empire; who at length together with their domesticall gouernment lost also their publick soueraigntie. Albeit that* 1.80 such women as take pleasure in commaunding their effeminat husbands, are like vnto them that had rather to guide the blind, than to follow the wise and cleere sighted. [ E]

Now the law of God, and the holy tongue, which hath named all things according* 1.81 to the true nature and proprietie thereof, calleth the husband Bahal▪ that is to say, Lord and maister; to show that vnto him belongeth the soueraigntie to commaund. The lawes also of all nations, to abate the pride of women, and to make men know that they ought to excell their wiues in wisedome and vertue, haue ordained that the honor and glorie of the wife should depend of her husband, as of the Sunne: in such sort that if the husband be noble, he enobleth his base wife; but if the wife beeing nobly borne marry a man of base degree, shee looseth her nobilitie, albeit that of auncient time

there haue bene many and yet are, which take their nobilitie and gentrie from their [ F] mothers, and not from their fathers; as the Lycians, the Delphiens, the Xanthiques, the Ilienses, and the Capadocians: whether it were for the vncertaintie of their fathers, or for that they had lost all their nobilitie in the warres; as in Campagne; where the wines (for the cause aforesaid) ennoble their bale husbands and their children; as also among the Indians in Calecut, the kings euen yet▪ and the Nobilitie which they call Naires haue scarce at any time their owne children inheritors of their kingdome or goods▪ but the children of noble women although they be bastards: yet for all that the interpretors of the law hold▪ that it ought not so to be done either by custome or de∣crees; for the generall agreement of almost all people to the contrarie, as Herodotus hath long ago written. And therefore it is most right that the wife should follow the [ G] Condition, Countrie, Familie, Dwelling, and beginning of her husband: and in case that her husband be an exiled or banished man, yet is the wife bound to follow him, wherein all the interpretors both of the Canon and Ciuill law agree. All lawes and customes also haue made the husband maister of his wiues actions, and to take the profit of all the lands and goods that to her befall: and suffer not the wife to stand in iudgement either as plaintiue or defendant, without the authoritie of her husband; or at least without the authoritie of the Iudge who may giue her authoritie so to do in the absence of her husband, or he refusing so to doe. All vndoubtfull arguments to shew the authoritie, power, and commaund that the husband hath ouer his wife▪ by the lawes both of God and man: as also of the subiection, reuerence, and obedience which [ H] the woman oweth vnto her husband, in all honour and things lawfull. Yet I doubt not, but that women in their matrimoniall contracts haue sometimes vsed to couenant not to be in any thing subiect vnto their husbands▪ but for as much as such couenants and agreements are contrarie to the lawes both of God and man, as also vnto publick honestie, they are not to bee obserued and kept▪ in such sort, as that no man can there∣vnto to be bound by oath.

CHAP. IIII. ¶ Of the power of a Father, and whether it be meet for the Father to haue power of life [ I] and death ouer his children▪ as had the auntient Romans.

THe right gouernment of the Father and the children, consisteth in the good vse of the power which God (himselfe▪ the Father of na∣ture) hath giuen to the Father ouer his owne children: or the law ouer them whom any man adopteth for children vnto himselfe: and in the obedience, loue, and reuerence of the children towards their Fathers. This word Power, is common vnto all such as haue power to commaund ouer others; either publickly or priuatly. So the Prince (saith Seneca) hath power ouer his subiects, the Magistrat ouer priuat men▪ the Father ouer his chil∣dren, the Maister ouer his schollers, the Captaine ouer his souldiers, and the Lord ouer [ K] * 1.82 his slaues. But of all these the right and power to commaund, is not by nature giuen to any beside the Father, who is the true Image of the great and Almightie God the Father of all things, as saith Proclus the Academick. Plato also hauing first in certaine chapters set downe lawes concerning the honour of God▪ saith them to bee as a Pre∣face to the reuerence which the child oweth vnto the Father, vnto whome next vnto God he is beholden for his life, and for whatsoeuer thing els he hath in this world. And as the Father is by nature bound to nourish his children according to his abilitie▪ and to instruct them in all ciuilitie and vertue: so the children also when they are once grown

vp are bound, but with a much more straiter bond, to loue, reuerence, serue, and nou∣rish [ A] * 1.83 their Father, and in all things to shew themselues dutifull and obedient vnto them, and by all meanes to hide and couer their infirmities and imperfections, if they see any in them, and neuer to spare their liues and goods to saue the life of them by whome they themselues tooke breath. The which bond, albeit it bee sealed with the seale of nature, and engrafted in euery one of our minds, and carrieth with it a readie executi∣on: yet so it is neuerthelesse, that to show the greatnes thereof there can be no greater argument, than the first commaundement of the second table, which alone of all the* 1.84 ten Commaundements propoundeth a reward vnto children which honour their pa∣rents: although no reward be vnto him due that doth but his dutie: and so much the lesse, for that there is no more religious a decree in all the lawes both of God and [ B] man; neither any curse greater in holy writ, than against him who wickedly laughed at the naked priuities of his Father. Neither is it maruell if wee in holy Scripture read* 1.85 * 1.86 of the contentions and strife of the sonnes among themselues, for the getting and foregaining their Fathers blessing; as they which feared more their curse than death: As young Torquatus who cast off by his Father, slew himselfe for sorrow. And that is it why Plato saith, that aboue all things we must haue care of the cursings and blessings that the Fathers giue vnto their children: for that there is no prayer that God doth more readily heare, than that of the Father towards his children. If children then bee so straitly bound to obey and reuerence their parents? what punishment then deserue they that are vnto them disobedient, irreuerent, or iniurious? what punishment can be [ C] great enough for him which shall presume to lay violent hand vpon his Father or Mo∣ther? for against him that shal murder either of them, there was neuer yet Iudge or law maker that could deuise torment sufficient for a fact so execrable: although that by the law Pompeia, a punishment be appointed rather new and strange, than fit for such a crime. And albeit that we haue seene one in our memorie (who had caused his Fa∣ther to be slaine) torne with hot yron tongs, afterwards broken vpon the wheele, and so at last (being yet aliue) burnt: yet was there no man which did not more abhorre the wickednesse of his villanie, than the horror of his punishment, and which said not that he had deserued more than he had yet suffered. Also the wise Solon; when hee had made lawes for the Athenians, being asked why he had appointed no punishment a∣gainst [ D] him which had killed his Father; answered, That he thought there was no man so wicked as to commit so horrible a fact: which was grauely answered: for the wise law maker should neuer make mention of an offence which is not at all, or but very lit∣tle knowne, for feare he should not seeme so much to forbid the fact, as to put the wic∣ked in remembrance thereof. But if the crime be great and execrable, he must neither colour it by sufferance, as forgotten, neither point it out vnto the eye with his finger; but by circumstances and propounding of the punishments of like facts, deterre the wicked from such hainous offences. As we see the law of God hath not appointed a∣ny punishment against him that murdereth his Father or his Mother, neither against him that beateth either the one or the other (as doth the law Seruia, which condem∣neth [ E] them to death for such a crime) yet giueth it full power and authoritie vnto the Father and Mother to stone the disobedient child, so that it be done in the presence of the magistrat, to whome for all that it belongeth not to enquire of the truth thereof, or to examine the matter: which was so decreed least the Father should in his anger secretly kill his sonne. As was one in hunting slaine by his Father, whose wife he had defiled: which thing when Adrian the Emperour had vnderstood, said, That so to kill was not the part of a Father, but of a theefe or murtheret: for that the greatest profit of punishment is, that it be exemplarie vnto all. Another part of the law of God * 1.87 wil∣leth,* 1.88

That the child which reuileth his Father or mother should die the death: the exa∣mination [ F] whereof is not left vnto the parents, but to the Iudges themselues, to the in∣tent that the offence should not remaine vnpunished. For so great is the loue of the fa∣ther* 1.89 and of the mother towards their children, that they would neuer (if they might) permit the Iudges to determine of the life of their children, although they had bene of them mortally wounded. As not long agoe it happened with vs, that a Father ha∣uing receiued a deadly wound of his sonne, whome he would haue lightly corrected; and fearing least his sonne apprehended by the magistrat should die for it, ceased not euen to his last gaspe to crie out vnto his son, by speedie flight to saue his life: whom for all that being afterward taken, and confessing the fact, the Iudges condemned to be hanged from an high beame for a time by the feet, with a great stone about his neck, [ G] and so afterwards to be burnt quicke. We haue also another example of our time, of a Mother who would rather endure to be reuiled, wronged, beaten, and troden vnder foot by her owne sonne, than to complaine of him vnto the Iudge; vntill that at length he in most beastly manner discharged his bellie into her pottage: with which fowle fact the Iudge moued, condemned him to make her an honorable amends, and to aske her forgiuenesse: from which sentence hee appealed vnto the parlement of Toulouze, where the former sentence was reuersed as not iust, and the sonne condem∣ned to be burnt quick; the most wretched mother in vaine complaining and crying* 1.90 out against the rigor of the lawes and seueritie of the Iudges, protesting that she did par∣don him, and that she had not of him receiued any iniurie at all. And Seneca speaking [ H] of a Father who but thrust his sonne out of his house; O with what griefe (saith hee) doth the Father cut off his owne limmes! what sighes doth he fetch in the cutting! how often doth he mourne for those limmes cut off! and how often doth hee wish to haue them againe!

All this that I haue said, and the examples of fresh memorie by me produced, serue* 1.91 to show that it is needful in a well ordered Commonweale, to restore vnto parents the power of life and death ouer their children, which by the law of God and nature is gi∣uen them, the most auntient law that euer was common vnto the Persians, vnto the people of the vpper Asia, as also vnto the Romans, the Hebrews, the Celtes, and in vse in all the West Indies, vntill they were conquered by the Spaniards: otherwise wee [ I] must neuer hope to see the good orders, honour, vertue, or antient glorie of Common∣weals reestablished. For Iustinian the Emperour deceiueth vs in saying that no people had such power ouer their children as had the Romans: For we haue the law of God, which ought to be holy and inuiolat among all people; wee haue the testimonies of* 1.92 the Histories both Greeke and Latine, whereby it is sufficiently to be vnderstood, the Hebrews, Celtes, and Persians to haue had the same power ouer their children that the Romans had. The French men (saith Caesar) * 1.93 haue power of life and death ouer their wiues and children, as well as ouer their slaues. And although that by the law of Ro∣mulus power was giuen vnto the husband, for foure causes onely to kill his wife: yet neuerthelesse by the same law, full power was giuen vnto the Father to dispose of the [ K] life and death of his children, without condition or exception thereunto adioyned; and that whatsoeuer they got, was not theirs, but their Fathers: Which power the Ro∣mans had not only ouer their own children, but also ouer the children of other men by them adopted. Which power was about 260 yeares after ratified and amplified by the lawes of the xij Tables, which gaue power also vnto the Father to sell his children: and in case they had afterward redeemed themselues, or were set at libertie by such as had bought them, they might yet sell them againe, and so the third time. The like whereof in all points is to be found in the Westerne islands, as we read in the Historie

of the Indies. And yet at this present amongst the Moscouits and Tartars (whom the [ A] auncient Historiographers called the Asian Scythians) it is lawfull for the Father to sell his sonne foure times, after which if he shall redeeme himselfe he is for euer free. By meanes of this fatherly power the Romans long flourished in all honour and vertue; and oftentimes was their Commonwealth therby deliuered from most imminent de∣struction, when the fathers drew out of the Consistories their owne sonnes being Tri∣bunes, publishing laws tending to sedition. As amongst others Cassius threw his sonne* 1.94 headlong out of the Consistorie, publishing the law Agraria (for the diuision of lands) in the behoofe of the people, and afterward by his owne priuat iudgement put him to death, the magistrats, Sergeants, & people standing thereat astonied, & not daring to withstand his fatherly authoritie, althogh they wold with al their power haue had that [ B] law for the diuision of lands. Which is sufficient proofe, this power of the father not onely to haue bene sacred and inuiolable, but also to haue bene lawfull for him either by right or wrong to dispose of the life and death of his children, euen contrarie to the will of the magistrats and people. Also when * 1.95 Pomponius the Tribune of the people, had for diuers causes accused Torquatus vnto the people, and amongst other things had charged him that he too much oppressed his sonne with countrey labour: so it fell out that the sonne himselfe going vnto the Tribune, and finding him in bed, setting his dagger vnto his throat, caused him to sweare to desist from further prosecuting of the accusation against his father. So the Tribune comming againe into the Con∣sistorie least he might seeme to vse collusion with Torquatus, whome he had before ac∣cused, [ C] now excused himselfe vnto the people for not presenting his accusation, by the oath extorted from him: which the people vnderstanding, would not suffer him to proceed therein any further. By which two examples a man may iudge that the Ro∣mans in their estate, made greater reckoning of the power of the father, than of the lawes themselues, which they called Sacred: by which the head of him was vowed to Iupiter, who had onely attempted in offensiue manner, but to touch the * 1.96 most holy Tribunes bodie. For they were of opinion that domesticall iustice and power of fa∣thers, were the most sure and firme foundation of lawes, honour, vertue, pietie, where∣with a Commonweale ought to flourish. Neither was it maruell if in the Roman Commonwealth we see such rare examples of reuerend dutie of children towards their [ D] parents, as are not els where to be read of: one I haue amongst a thousand alreadie* 1.97 spoken of; and another such there is, as that Painters euen vnto these times vse there∣with to embellish their Tables: that is to wit, of the daughter which secretly gaue sucke vnto her father condemned to be pined to death (which neuer suffereth the healthfull man to liue past the seuenth day) which act of piety the Gaoler hauing perceiued, gaue the magistrats to vnderstand thereof; which by them reported vnto the people, not onely obtained her fathers pardon, but also found such grace as that in the selfe same place in perpetuall remembrance of the fact, they built a Temple dedicated vnto Pietie. Yea the very vnreasonable beasts haue a naturall feeling of this kind dutie, and are seene to feed their parents now growne weake with age: but especially the Storke, [ E] which the holy tongue * 1.98 (which nameth things according to their secret proprieties) calleth Chasida, that is to say, dutifull and charitable; for so much as shee nourisheth her father and mother in their age. And albeit that the father be in dutie bound to instruct his children in all vertues, but especially in the feare of God: yet if hee shall forget his dutie, are not the children therefore excused of theirs: albeit that Solon the lawmaker contrarie vnto reason, hath by his lawes acquited the sonne from the nourishing of his father, if he haue taught him no trade or occupation whereby to get his liuing. But the right instruction of children (than which nothing can be deuised more profitable

or better in a Commonweale) dependeth of that fatherly power which I haue before [ F] spoken of. For publick iustice taketh no knowledge of the disobedientnesse & vnreue∣rentnesse of children toward their parents, neither of their other vices, which disorde∣red libertie bringeth their young years vnto, as dicing, drunkennesse, whoredome: and albeit that punishment be appointed against such offences, yet neuerthelesse the poore parents carefull of their reputation and credit, neuer are to complaine of their children vnto the Magistrat, neither accuse them; and yet the power to punish them is taken from them: so that children now standing in no feare of their parents, and much lesse of God doe for most part escape the iudgement of the magistrat, who commonly puni∣sheth but slaues and such others of base condition.

But impossible it is that the foundation of a Commonweale being euill laid, (that is [ G] * 1.99 to say, the bringing vp of children •…•…nd families) any thing that is firme and sure should be thereupon built. Besides that, the contention, strife, and discord, which we daily see amongst brethren and sisters, were easily appeased and extinguished whilest the father yet liued, their marriages not taking from him this power ouer them: and albeit that he had set at libertie them that were maried, & departed out of his house, to keep house by themselues, (which they easily did not) yet neuerthelesse the remembrance of the re∣uerend duty they ought vnto their parents for euer remained fast imprinted in the harts and minds of the children. Wherefore should wee then maruell the magistrat to be troubled with so many sutes, and those for most part betwixt the husband and the wife, betwixt brethren and sisters; yea and that more, is betwixt parents and their chil∣dren? [ H] but that the wife, the children, and seruants, are all loased from the domesticall power of their ancestors. So the fatherly power being by little & little diminished vp∣on the declination of the Roman Empire; so also shortly after vanished away their an∣tient vertue, & al the glorie of their Commonweal: and so in place of pietie & ciuilitie, ensued a million of vices and villanies. The first staine, and beginning of taking away* 1.100 the power of life and death from parents, proceed from the ambition of the Magistrats, who seeking to encrease their iurisdiction, & by little and little drawing vnto them the deciding of all matters, extinguished all domesticall powers: which happened especial∣ly after the death of Augustus Caesar; at which time wee read the magistrats to haue bene almost alwayes occupied in punishing of such as had murthered their parents. [ I] As we read in Seneca, who directing his speech vnto Nero, saith, We haue seene more murtherers of their parents executed in fiue yeares of thy father, than were euer in all ages accused since the foundation of Rome. Now to him that will looke neerer into the matter, it is no doubt, but that if one or two that haue murthered their fathers haue bene executed, ten others haue escaped mans punishment; the health and life of pa∣rents being subiect to a thousand daungers, except their children either by the feare of God, or the goodnesse of their owne nature, be kept within the bounds of their dutie; neither ought it seeme straunge vnto any man, that Nero made no conscience to kill his mother, neither repented him to haue killed her, for that it was a thing common: the cause whereof Seneca giueth not, which was, for that the father to chastice his son [ K] must then go to the magistrat to accuse him, which the auntient Romans could neuer endure. For Quintus Fuluius the Senator in the time of Cicero, of his owne authority put to death his sonne, for taking part in the conspiracie of Cateline. And in the time of Augustus, Tatius the Senator being about to proceed against his sonne in a capitall crime, requested Augustus home to his house, who being come thither, tooke not vpon him the place of a Iudge (as saith Seneca) but of a priuat man, as come onely to giue counsell. We see also that by the law Pompeia, made against parricides, all they which are next of kinne are bound to the penaltie of the law, except the father. Yet it suffici∣ently

appeareth, that in the time of Vlpian and Paul the Lawyers, the power that fathers [ A] had of life and death ouer their children lay then in a sort buried and forgotten: for that one of them saith, The father must accuse his sonne before the Iudge: and the other, That the children are not of right to complaine, if they be by their fathers disin∣herited, considering that in auncient time (saith he) they might put them to death. Both of them flourished in the time of Alexander Seuerus. And yet is there no expresse law to be found which hath taken from parents the power of life and death, before the time of Constantine the great: neither did that law of Constantine directly in expresse tearmes abrogat the old lawes: Dioclesian the Emperour but a little before Constantine hauing decreed that the Iudge ought to giue such sentence against the sonne as the fa∣ther was willing vnto. Now it is manifest by the law, that a positiue law cannot bee [ B] * 1.101 abrogated by any custome, be it neuer so old; except it be repealed by a contrary law, carrying expresse derogation with it: otherwise being in force and readie to be againe put in vse: insomuch that it was necessarie that certaine lawes of the xij. tables by long custome out of vse, yet for all that should by a new law bee abrogated: which was done at the motion of Aebutius, in whose time the fathers power of life and death, yet kept their children with in the compasse of their dutie. But when the children in the time of Constantine had by the sufferance of their fathers by little and little shaken off that power and authoritie of their fathers, they obtained also of the same Emperour, That of their mothers inheritance their fathers should haue but the vse and profit, and they themselues the proprietie, which their fathers might not alienate. And afterwards [ C] they likewise obtained of Theodosius the yonger, That the proprietie of all manner of goods in generall howsoeuer they came by them, should belong vnto the sonnes, the vse and profit thereof onely being left vnto the fathers; so that they could not alienat the proprietie, neither in any sort dispose thereof: yea and with vs not onely the vse and profit of such goods, but not so much as the bare vse is left vnto the father, which hath so puffed vp the hearts of the children, as that they oftentimes commaund their parents, by necessitie constrained to obey them, or to die for hunger.

Iustinian also would not that children should be set at libertie by their parents with∣out* 1.102 their owne consent, that is to say, without some bountie which the father ought to giue vnto his sonne: when as yet for all that in old time emancipation or setting at li∣bertie, [ D] was the reward of the childs kindnesse and dutifulnes towards his parents. Here∣of proceeded that filthie buying and selling of emancipation betwixt fathers and their children: insomuch that such things as the father had giuen vnto the sonne in reward of his emancipation, remained vnto him for gaine; neither was he bound to commu∣nicat the same with his brethren, or to haue any whit the lesse therefore of his fathers inheritance, except the same were expressely comprehended in the lawfull act of eman∣cipation: which they also yet vse amongst vs, which haue the Roman decrees for lawes. But if the sonne hath learned any gainefull trade, or is by trafficke in marchan∣dise become rich, and giueth something vnto his father that setteth him at libertie, it is counted vnto the father for the right he should haue in the goods of his son dying be∣fore [ E] him, so that he can claime no part therein, although it be not at all expressed in the act of the sonnes emancipation; or yet be expressed that such gift vnto the father yet liuing, should be not let wherefore he should the lesse haue the whole right of the law∣full inheritance, his sonne dying before him. For why? that whatsoeuer it is that is gi∣uen to the father, is accounted as giuen him for his lawfull part: so that by this means the father is in worse state than the sonne, who for all that both by the lawes of God and man is bound to nourish his parents so long as they liue, the father not being bound by the law of Romulus to nourish his sonne, but vntill he be seuen yeares old. And al∣though

Lawyers goe farther, neuerthelesse to make it plaine that parents are not [ F] bound to feed their children, it was neuer by any law permitted for children to sue* 1.103 their parents for their food, but by the leaue of the magistrat by humble request be∣fore obtained. Besides all these indignities, Iustinian hath exempted all Senators, Bi∣shops, & Consuls from the power of their fathers: as in like case them also which enter into houses of Religion. And in countries also where we vse Statute laws, besides those we haue spoken of, they haue also exempted out of their fathers powers them that are married, or haue beene out of their fathers houses by the space of ten yeares: which hath caused the Italian Lawyers to write that the French men are not in the power of their fathers: as in truth there remaineth nothing thereof, but the imaginarie shadow, when as the father authoriseth his children vnto lawfull acts, as to redeeme [ G] lands of inheritance, which the father himselfe hath sold, or to take a possession doubt∣full, or for the trade or traffique of marchandise: in which case the Iudge without the kings letters royall at the request of the father may set at libertie his sonne. And albeit that Philip of Valois set at libertie his sonne Iohn, to giue vnto him the dutchie of Normandie: yet such his emancipation serued to no purpose, no more than those which were ordinarily made; seeing that neither the giuer, neither he to whome the thing was giuen, neither the thing it selfe giuen, were subiect vnto the Roman ciuill law: nor that the fathers (in countries gouerned by customs) had any thing to do with the goods of their children.

But the fathers thus dispoiled of their power, and of the goods got by their children, [ H] * 1.104 it is yet by many demanded, If the sonne may of right defend himselfe, or withstand his father, offering him violence? Neither haue there wanted some which were of opi∣nion, That the sonne might of right so do: as if in that there were no difference whe∣ther the father or any other should offer him violence. But if it be so that the souldior which had onely broken the vine trunchion of his Captaine, beating him by right or wrong, was by the law of armes to be put to death: then what punishment deserueth the sonne which layeth hand vpon his father? Yea some haue passed further, and writ∣ten that the sonne might kill his father, if he were an enemie vnto the Commonweale.* 1.105 But in mine opinion that is not vnlawfull onely for any man to doe, but impietie also for any man so to write: for these men in so doing propound not onely pardon vnto [ I] parricides, but giue leaue also vnto others to presume to do the like, secretly encoura∣ging them to commit so detestable a fact, vnder the color of the publick profit: wher∣as an antient author saith, That no fault so great canby the father be committed, as that the same should with his murther be reuenged. O what a number of fathers should be found enemies vnto the Commonwealth, if these resolutions should take place? And what father is there which in the time of ciuill warre could escape the hands of his murtherous child? For men know well that in such warres the weakest goeth to the wals, and they that get the vpper hand make all traitors whom they list. And in other wars not onely they are iudged traitors which haue giuen vnto their enemies help and counsell, but also they which haue sold them armour, corne, or other victuals. As by [ K] the laws of England, to aid the enemie in any sort whatsoeuer, is accounted high trea∣son. Which points of treason I see not to be distinguished by these interpretos of the Roman law. But by these resolutions, that is come to passe which posteritie will not* 1.106 beleeue: as that a banished man of Venice, hauing brought to Venice his owne fa∣thers head, who was banished as well as himselfe, demaunded and obtained also in re∣ward of his so exectable a murther, the honours and rewards by the Venetian lawes due; viz. His returne into his countrey, his goods, his children, and the liberties of the citie, before taken from him. But happily it had beene better that the citie of Venice

had bene swallowed vp with the sea, than to haue giuen a reward vnto so great and de∣testable [ A] a villanie. Henrie the second the French king, tooke in good part the excuse of Maximilian king of Bohemia in the yere 1557, in that he had refused to giue safe con∣duct vnto the duke of Wittemberg, ambassadour for the French; confessing that it was indeed against the law of nations, but that yet neuerthelesse he durst do no other for disobeying of his father. Now if it be lawfull to violat the lawes of nations rather than to disobey our father in so small a matter; what iust excuse can there bee, or rea∣son giuen for the killing of ones father? Wherefore I thus resolue, That there can be no iust cause for which a man may lawfully lay violent hand vpon his father. And albeit that such killing of ones father be in it selfe a fowle fact, yet fowler is the reward there∣of; but of all other things most fowle and pernitious it is to allow reward for the same, [ B] for that by prounding such rewards for killing of a mans father, neither brethren can be in safetie from being murthered by their brethren; neither the nighest kinsmen for being slaine one by another. As indeed it chaunced in the yeare 1567 that Sampetre Corse was slaine by his owne cosin germaine; for which he had giuen him in reward ten thousand crownes, which the Senat and people of Genua had caused to be leuied for him. But how much better were it to follow the example of Cicero, who thought it better as it were in silence to passe ouer the selfe same questions moued by the two auncient Philosophers Antiochus and Antipater, as a place too slipperie and daunge∣rous. Ioyning hereunto also, that the law of the Romans it selfe forbiddeth any re∣ward to be propounded vnto banished men for the killing of theeues: howbeit that [ C] Adrian the Emperour would haue him pardoned that had killed a theefe. Where∣fore I thus conclude, That princes and law makers should measure the power and au∣thoritie of parents, according to the law of God; whether they be their lawful, or na∣turall children, or both together; so that they be not conceiued in incest, for such the lawes both of God and man haue alwaies had in detestation.

Now if some shall obiect it to be a thing dangerous, least some furious or prodigall* 1.107 fathers should abuse the goods or liues of their children, vnder colour of their fatherly power: to him I aunswere, that the lawes haue for such men prouided guardians, and taken from them that power ouer another man, considering that they haue not power ouer themselues. And if the father be not sencelesse or mad, hee will neuer without [ D] cause kill his sonne, seeing that he willingly chastiseth him not though he deserue the same. For so great is the loue and affection of parents towards their children, that the law neuer presumed that they would do any thing to their disgrace, but all to their ho∣nour and profit. Wherefore the parents are euer thought to be free from all fraud in their childrens affaires, whome to encrease with riches and honor, they doubt not of∣tentimes to forget the lawes both of God and man. And for this cause the Father ha∣uing slaine his sonne, is not by the law Pompeia subiect to the paine of parricides: for why? the law presumeth that he would not without good and iust cause so doe; and hath priuatly giuen power vnto him to kill the adulterer and his daughter found in the fact together. All most certaine and vndoubted arguments, whereby it is to be vnder∣stood, [ E] that parents cannot abuse the power of life and death ouer their children; nei∣ther that if they could, yet would they. But haply some man will say, there haue bene many which haue abused the same to the vnworthy death of their children; yet bring no example therof: Let vs grant some such to haue bene: should therefore a good law giuer leaue a good law vnmade for the inconueniences which some few times ensue thereof? It being a common saying in the law, That of such things as seldome happen the lawmaker ought to take no care. And where euer was there a law so iust, so natu∣ral, or so necessarie, that was not subiect vnto many inconueniences? So that he which

would abrogat al laws for some few absurdities ensuing of them, should not leaue one [ F] of them, as Cato the greater wisely reasoned. In briefe (I say) that the natural loue of fa∣thers and mothers toward their children, is impossible and incompatible with so great cruekie, as is the vniust killing of their children: and that the greatest torment that a father can endute, is, to haue either by right or wrong killed his sonne. As in fact it chaunced in our memorie, in the countrey of Aniou, that a father desiring to chastice his sonne, whome running from him he could not ouertake, hauing by chaunce with∣out any such purpose slaine him with a blow vpon the head, with an hard clod of earth which he threw after him, forthwith for griefe hung himselfe, although no man knew any thing therof. Which things the antient Aegyptian law giuers wel vnderstanding, appointed no other punishment against him that had wrongfully or without cause [ G] slaine his sonne, but for the space of three daies after to bee shut vp together with the dead bodie of his sonne so by▪ him slaine: For they thought it a thing detestable, for the death of the sonne to take away the life of the father, from whome he had receiued his. Yet might one say, that if fathers had the power of life and death ouer their chil∣dren, they might constraine them to do something hurtfull vnto the Commonweale: Whereunto I aunswere first, that that is not to be presumed; and then that although it were so, yet that the lawes had therefore wisely prouided, hauing at all times exemp∣ted the children out of the power of their fathers, in that which concerned the pub∣lick State. As also Fabius Gurges gaue vs well to vnderstand, who being Consull, and seeing his father a priuat man mounted on horseback comming towards him, [ H] commaunded him by one of his sergeants to alight, which he did, doing honour vnto his sonne, and bidding him in such sort to proceed to defend the Consuls dignitie. And so farre hath it bene from wise fathers to commaund their children any thing that might be hurtfull to the Commonweale, as that there haue bene some of them found to haue put them to death for transgressing the publick lawes: as first did Brutus his two sonnes, and after him L. Torquatus the Consul, who hauing caused his sonne to triumph in his campe for vanquishing his enemie in combat, presently after caused his head to be struck off, for that he had fought with him contrarie to his commandement and contrarie to the law of armes. There is yet one obiection concerning the chil∣drens goods, which if they should be in the full disposition of the fathers, they might [ I] without cause disinherit some, and enrich others: whereunto mine aunswere is, That the lawes haue therefore also prouided, by offering iustice vnto children disinherited; and propounding the causes of lawfull disinheriting. Howbeit that the auntient law of the Romans is more commendable, which neuer permitted the child by way of action to impugne his fathers will and testament; but onely by the way of request, and speaking of his dead father in all humilitie all honour and reuerence, leauing all the matter vnto the discretion and conscience of the Iudge. But after that the Pretors, who could not make any man heire vnto his father, yet by their decrees gaue possession of the goods (the force of which possession, was almost the same that it was to be appoin∣ted heire,) & that the magistrats had bound certain definit portions vnto the children; [ K] then forthwith began the parents by little and little to be contemned of their children, & their death by them longed for. Which thing was the cause that one of the Ephori of the Lacedemonians made a law * concerning the making of Testaments, where∣by* 1.108 it was lawfull for euery man to bequeath his goods as he pleased▪ (when as before, the libertie of making of Wils was by long custome taken away) alledging that the pride and insolencie of children against their parents was so by the feare of disinheri∣ting to be restrayned. But if any man shall account it better for inheritances to be con∣ferred by the appointment of the lawes than by Testament, I will not striue with

him therefore, seeing it is by the law of God * 1.109 set downe that children should not by [ A] assentation and flatterie rather than by their kind duties preuenting their fathers inheri∣tances, spoyle themselues of their mutuall and brotherly loue: but yet why vse we not the same diuine law * 1.110 which giueth vnto the father the power of life and death ouer his children.

We haue before said▪ fathers to haue had that power of life and death ouer them* 1.111 also whome they had adopted: in like manner as they had ouer them whom they had in lawfull matrimonie begotten: and although the lawes of adoption were by the new lawes of Iustinian almost abrogated; yet I thinke no man doubteth but that the law of adoption was of so auntient right, & so common also almost vnto all people, as that it deserueth to be againe called into vse. Wee see the most auntient people to haue had [ B] it in singuler estimation: as we read Iacob himselfe to haue adopted Ephraim and Ma∣nasses * 1.112 his nephewes, (albeit he had twelue children yet liuing, who had diuers others also) and gaue them part of the land which hee had by force of armes conquered. Which to haue hene before also in vse with the Aegyptians, is manifest by Moyses, whome the kings daughter▪ * 1.113 adopted for her owne. Wee see also Theseus to haue bene solemnly adopted by Aegeus king of Athens, who made him his successor in the State, albeit that he was but his base sonne: After which time all the Athenians which had base children by Athenian women, were constrained to adopt them, and to cause them to be registred as their lawfull children, and to leaue them their part and porti∣on of their goods as they did vnto the rest of their children. For why? they accoun∣ted [ C] none a bastard but him that was begotten of a father or a mother, being a straunger▪ albeit she were a woman of neuer so great honour. As also all the people of the East made little •…•…no difference betwixt the children that they had by their wiues and their handmaids. For Iacob the Patriarch made like reckoning of those which hee had by his wiues, and of those which he had by his handmaids: although that Sara had dri∣uen out of his fathers house the child begotten by the handmaid, * least he should haue had part in the lawfull inheritance. And Diodorus * 1.114 also writeth, The children of the Aegyptians begotten of their bondwomen, to haue had as great prerogatiue as the rest that were begot in lawfull marriage. For why? it was lawfull for them to haue as ma∣ny wiues as they would; as it was also vnto the Persians & all the people of Asta•…•… and [ D] almost onely the Germans of all the barbarous nations (as saith Tacitus) had euery one* 1.115 of them but one wife. Thus hauing confirmed the matter by course of historie, it fol∣loweth by consequence all the children of one and the same father to haue bene in his power, were they adoptiue or not. But the Romans of auntient time made no more account of their base children than of meere straungers▪ neither were they compelled to adopt them, as were the Athenians, neither to bequeath them any thing by their will, neither had they any power ouer them. Which seueritie of the lawes was yet moderated in the raigne of Theodosius and Arcadius. And afterward it was ordained by the Emperor Zeno, that such base children should be accounted for legitimat, by the marriage of their father afterwards ensuing with their mother. And that more is Ana∣stasius [ E] decreed that all bastards should by adoption be reputed legitimat▪ but first Iu∣stinus, and after him Iustinian abrogated that decree, and shut the gate against bastards, to the end that euerie man should desire to haue lawfull wiues and children; and that auntient houses, and the rights of successions and inheritances should not bee altered and troubled by the adoption of bastards: the rights of adoption neuerthelesse yet still remaining, which had bene receiued to supplie the defect of nature; and whereof the auntient Romans had had so great esteeme, as that the adoptiue fathers had the same power of life and death ouer their adoptiue children, that they had ouer their

owne: which was the true cause that women could not adopt children before the [ F] edict published by Dioclesian, considering that they themselues were in the perpetuall power of their parents, husbands, or neere kinsmen: as also in Greece it was not lawful for them to adopt, as writeth the Orator Isaeus. So then the right of adoptions, enno∣bled by the Romans (and especially after that they had extended the frontiers of their Empire more than euer before) other people also had it so much the more in regard: the Gothes, (I say) the Germans, the French, the Saliens; as we see in the lawes of the Ripuaires, where they vse the word Adfatinir for adopter: holding their adoptiue chil∣dren in the same degree that they did their owne naturall and lawfull children, in the right of their succession into their inheritance: For by the auntient custome of the Romans they were both indifferently called vnto their fathers inheritances as his [ G] heirs. For so we read in Cassiodorus, that Theodoric king of the Gothes, adopted the king of the Herules: and that Luitpr and king of the Lombards adopted the sonne of Charles prince of Fraunce, by cutting his haire, although he had sonnes of his owne in lawfull marriage begotten: as did in auntient time Micipsa king of the Numidians, adopting Iugurtha his base sonne, albeit he had two lawfull children of his owne, and leauing his kingdome equally diuided amongst them three: when as yet the first and chiefe cause of adoptions was to supplie the defect of nature; that he to whome nature had altogether denied children, or at leastwise male children, might by the authoritie of the law haue that defect supplied. As Scipio Africanus hauing no more children but Cornelia the mother of the Gracchi, adopted the sonne of Paulus Aemilius, after∣wards [ H] called Africanus the younger, whome he left the inheritor not of his name on∣ly, but of his goods also. And so also Caefar the Dictator, hauing no children of his foure wiues, more than Iulia, which was married to Pompeius, adopted Octauius his si∣sters sonne, whom by his will he made heire of three parts, with charge that he should beare his name; whereby his owne fathers name was taken away, and hee knowne by the name of his adoptiue father. And he againe hauing no children but Iulia (whome he called the Impostume of his house) adopted Caius and Lucius his sisters sonnes bought at home of their father Agrippa, according to the auntient manner: who after∣ward dead also without issue, he adopted Tiberius, who adopted Caligula: so did Clau∣dius adopt Nero, vnto whome Galba succeeding without children, * 1.116 adopted Piso be∣fore [ I] his armie, which custome was afterwards kept in the adoption of * Aurelianus* 1.117 the Emperour; as would Iustinian the Emperour haue adopted Cosroe king of Persia, which he refused; supposing (though yet falsly) the way vnto the Empire to bee by that meane shut vp. * 1.118 We read also that the Emperour Nerua for lacke of children adopted Traian; & he Adrian; who afterward adopted Antoninus Pius; and not con∣tented to haue adopted so good a man, charged him also whilest he yet liued, to adopt Aelius Verus, and Marcus Aurelius, surnamed the Philosopher, to the intent the Em∣pire should not want the most vertuous Emperours that euer were. But this last ha∣uing begot Commodus heire apparant to the Empire, (but the most vitious man that might be) was about to haue adopted another more worthie of the Empire, had hee [ K] not bene otherwise persuaded by his friends. For that almost no man vsed to adopt others, if he had legitimat children of his owne. For which cause Claudius the Empe∣rour was euil spoken of, for being persuaded by the inticement of Agrippina his second wife, he had adopted Nero her sonne, hauing sonnes and one daughter by his former bed, who were afterwards slaine by Nero. But to leaue straungers which are infinite, and to come to our owne domesticall examples: Lewes duke of Aniou and brother to king Charles, was for want of heire adopted by Ioane (who of her incontinencie was in reproach called Lupa) who in the right of that adoption left vnto him the kingdome of

Naples, hauing reiected her nephew Alphonsus king of Aragon, whom she had before [ A] by consent of, the * 1.119 Pope adopted. Afterwards also Rene of Aniou, Lewes his nephew, was adopted by Ioane the yonger queene of Naples for want of children. And at the same time as it were, that is to say, in the yere 1408, Henry duke of Pomeran was adop∣ted by Margaret D'wolmar queen of Denmark, Sweden, & Norway, to succeed her in the same kingdoms. And not long after, Henry the fift king of England was adopted, not by Charles the sixt then distracted of his wits, but by his wife: who by her new son in law, caused Charles her owne sonne to be denounced incapable of the Crowne, albe∣it that he were a right wise and vertuous Prince. But Iustinian the Emperour willing to remedie such abuses, ordained that adoptiue children should neuerthelesse not faile to enioy the inheritance of their owne naturall or lawfull fathers; for that their adop∣tiue [ B] fathers would oftentimes vpon small occasion cast them off againe, whereby it came to passe that they went without the inheritance of both their fathers: yet did he wrongfully take away the right of the fathers power, which was the onely marke of adoption, which taken away, nothing more remained. Now it were much better to prohibit adoptions to them, which had sonnes either naturall or legitimat: & in case they had none, that the adoptiue children should succeed in all the right of their owne naturall and lawfull children. Truely by our custome it is lawfull for euerie man to adopt: yet no preiudice is thereby made vnto the next of kin, or them which should lawfully inherite: for that more cannot be giuen or bequeathed vnto the adoptiue sonne, than to him that is a meere straunger: and yet that the father might for all that [ C] receiue the profit of the adoption; whereof Scipio Africanus the Great, in his time complained in the Oration which he had vnto the people of his Censureship: as also after the publication of the law Iulia Pappia, which gaue great priueledges vnto them which had children: they which had none adopted some (to haue the benefit of the lawas, to be capable of some Magistracie or office) and in short time after they had once gained that they sought for, cast off those their adoptiue children againe, so abu∣sing the law. As contrariwise Clodius beeing a noble man borne, caused himselfe to be adopted by a man of base condition, that so discharged of his Nobilitie, hee might bee made Tribune of the * people; but hauing got that office, caused himselfe presently to* 1.120 be set at libertie by his adoptiue father: Which the Senat vnderstanding, decreed that [ D] from thenceforth they which were adopted should not enioy the priuiledge of any publick office: neither that any man should vnder the colour of such children as hee had adopted obtaine any magistracie or honour vnto himselfe; neither hinder substi∣tution made for want of children; neither to haue the benefit of any conditionall lega∣cies, or couenants made or conceiued in hope of children; nor that for such adoptiue children, such donations should be void, as were by the law it selfe to be reuoked when the donatour had any children, either naturall or legitimat; nor that by the adoption of male children, women should be kept from their lawfull inheritance, from which they by the law are wont by the male children to bee excluded; neither that the word Sonne added vnto the lawes, testaments, or other lawfull acts was to be extended vnto [ E] them whome we adopt: all which deceits it is good to cut off, and yet not to extin∣guish the right of adoptions; and at the least to leaue vnto the adoptiue father his fa∣therly power, to keepe in obedience his adoptiue sonne. And thus much of the se∣cond part of a Familie, concerning the power of a father ouer his children, and of their mutuall duties. Now let vs likewise speake of the third part also.

CHAP. V. [ F] Of the power of a Lord or Maister ouer his Slaues, and whether Slaues are to be suf∣fred in a well ordered Commonweale.

THe third part of the gouernment of a Familie dependeth of the power of the Lord oues his Slaues, and of the Maister ouer his ser∣uants; and in their mutuall duties one toward another. For the* 1.121 very name of a Familie, came of Famulus and Famulatio, for that it had in it a great number of Slaues: and so of the greatest part of them that are in subiection in the Familie, men call all the whole houshold a Familie; or els for that there was no greater meanes to gather wealth than by slaues [ G] and seruants, which the Latines call Famuli, the auntients not without cause haue cal∣led this multitude of Slaues and seruants a Familie. And Seneca willing to show of what moderation a Master ought to be toward his Slaues, saith our ancestors to haue called the head of a Familie, Father of the Familie, and not Lord. And for that the whole world is full of Slaues, excepting certaine countries in Europe (which since also by little and little receiue them) it is needfull here to reason of the power of Lords and Maisters ouer their Slaues, and of the profits and disprofits which may redound vnto a Commonweale, if slauery should againe be called into vse: a question of great mo∣ment not for Families and societies onely, but for all Commonweals also in generall.

Now euery Slaue is either naturall, that is to wit, begotten of a woman Slaue, or [ H] made a Slaue by law of armes; or by some crime committed (whome men call a slaue* 1.122 to punishment) or one which hath for money departed with his libertie, or hath plaid away his libertie, as did in auntient time the Almans: or else such an one as hath vo∣luntarily vowed himselfe to be a perpetuall Slaue vnto another man; as was the man∣ner of the Hebrewes. The prisoner in warre was Slaue vnto the vanquisher, who was not bound to put him to his ransome, if it were not otherwise agreed vpon; as it was in auntient time in Greece, that the Barbarian prisoner taken in warre, might bee put to the chayne, and kept as a Slaue; but as for the Greeke, that he should be set at libertie in paying for himselfe a pound of gold. The like law almost was made amongst the Po∣lonians, * 1.123 where it was decreed by the States, That all enemies taken prisoners in iust [ I] wars, should remaine Slaues vnto the vanquishers, except the king would pay two Flo∣rins for euery head. But he that had paid the ransome of any prisoner, was bound to set him at liberue, hauing againe receiued his money: otherwise he might keepe him, not as his Slaue▪ but as his prisoner; according to the most auntient law of the Greeks, which from them deriued vnto the Romans▪ was afterward in vse with all nations. As for debtors, prisoners vnto their creditors, although it were lawfull by the law of the twelue Tables, to diuide them in peeces amongst their creditors, giuing to some more, some lesse, according to the proportion of euery mans debt, if they were not able to* 1.124 pay: yet for all that so it was, that if he had one creditour, he could not take from him his life, and much lesse his libertie, a thing much dearer than life. For the father might [ K] well sell, chop, and chaunge his children, yea and take away their liues also, but yet could not take away their liberue: for the good and noble hart would alwaies rather chuse to dye honestly, than vnworthly to serue as a base Slaue. And that is it wher∣fore the law of the twelue Tables (which adiudged the debtor not able to pay, vnto the creditor) was shortly after at the request of Petilian Tribune of the people, taken away, and a decree made, That from that time forward the debtor should no more bee adiudged vnto his creditor, or diuided in peeces among his creditours, neither by them for his debt be detained; yet reseruing vnto the creditor power to ceise vpon his goods,

or by other way of iustice to come by his debt, so as he saw he might by reason: which [ A] law continued firme and inuiolat 700 yeares, vnto the time of Dioclesian, who caused the same law afterward to be published vpon paine of death.

And thus much concerning all sorts of slaues: for as for them which are taken by theeues or pirats, or by false titles are sold for slaues, they continue neuerthelesse free, and in tearms of right may do all lawfull acts. As for other domestical seruants, which for wages or without wages do their seruice, they cannot by contract or agreement* 1.125 whatsoeuer, doe any thing preiudiciall to their libertie: neither in receiuing any lega∣cie vpon condition be it neuer so little seruile: neither can the slaue himselfe when hee is manumised, promise vnto his lord that hath set him at libertie, any thing preiudiciall vnto his libertie, other than the seruices ordinarie & agreeable vnto all such as are en∣franchised. [ B] And this is it for which the Arrests of the Parlement of Paris haue often∣times disanulled the contracts of seruants free borne, which haue bound themselues vp∣on a paine to serue certaine yeres: which neuertheles they yet do in England & Scot∣land, where the maisters after the terme of seruice expired, comming before the Iudges* 1.126 of the places, enfranchise their seruants, & giue them power to weare their caps; which was the auntient marke of a slaue newly enfranchised, to couer his shauen head vntill his haire were growne: which gaue occasion vnto Brutus after that Caesar was slaine, to cause certaine money to be coined * with the impression of a cap vpon it; as hauing set* 1.127 at libertie the people of Rome. And after the death of Nero, the common people went vp and downe the streets with caps vpon their heads, in signe of their libertie. And [ C] king Eumenes after the death of Mithridates, comming to Rome, and with his cap on his head entring the Senat, acknowledged himselfe to hold his libertie by the people of Rome. Now albeit that domesticall seruants be not slaues, and that they may do such acts of libertie as free men may, bee it in iudgement or out of iudgement; yet are they not as simple mercinarie men which labour for their daies wages, ouer whome* 1.128 he that hath hired them hath neither power nor commaund, nor any manner of cor∣rection, as the maister hath ouer his domesticall seruants, who owe seruice, honor, and obedience vnto their maisters, so long as they are in his house, and may with mode∣rat discretion chastice and correct them. For domesticall seruants ought to re∣uerence their maister, and do them all honest seruice and duties: wherof, for that they [ D] haue a mutuall comportment one of them towards the other, and belong vnto morall discipline, we will not in this place reason.

But as concerning Slaues, there are two great difficulties, not yet resolued vpon: the* 1.129 one, Whether slauerie be naturall & profitable to a Commonweale, or contrarie vn∣to nature, and vnprofitable? the other, What power the lord of right ought to haue ouer his slaue. Concerning the first point, Aristotle is of opinion that the seruitude* 1.130 of slaues is of right naturall: and to proue the same, We see (saith he) some naturally made to serue and obey, and others to commaund and gouerne. But Lawyers, who measure the law not by the discourses or decrees of Philosophers, but according to the common sense and capacitie of the people, hold seruitude to be directly contrarie vnto [ E] nature; and do what they can to maintaine libertie, still interpreting such things as are obscure and doubtfull (whether it be in the lawes, or in testaments, in couenants, or iudgements) so in fauour of libertie, as that they giue no way either to lawes or to te∣staments: And if so be that the force of the lawes be so great and so plaine as that they may not swarue from them▪ yet do they protest that bitternesse of the lawes to dis∣please them, calling it hard and cruell. But of these two opinions wee must chuse the better. Now many reasons there bee to proue that seruitude is profitable vnto the Commonweale, and also agreeable vnto nature: For euery thing that is contrarie vn∣to

nature, is of no long continuance: and if you would force it against nature, yet will [ F] * 1.131 it of it selfe againe returne vnto the naturall course thereof; as is plainly seene in all naturall things. But seruitude seemeth to haue taken the beginning thereof immediat∣ly after the generall deluge; and euen so soone as any forme of a Commonweale was to be seene, and so hath alwaies euer since continued: and although seruitude in these latter times was left off, for about three or foure hundred yeares, yet is it now againe approued, by the great agreement and consent of almost all nations; yea the people of the West Indies, which are three times greater than all Europe, who neuer heard speech of the lawes of God or man, haue alwaies bene full of slaues; neither hath there bene any Commonweale in the world, which hath not had slaues in it: yea the holiest men that euer liued haue vsed them: yea and that more is, in euery Common∣weale [ G] the lord had power ouer the goods, the life and death of his slaue, except some few, where the Princes and lawmakers haue something moderated this power. Now like it is not, that all people and nations in euerie place, so many kings and princes, so many lawmakers (men for their vertue and experience most famous) would with so great consent, and so many worlds of yeares, haue receiued slaues, if it had bene a thing repugnant vnto reason and nature. And what can be more agreeing vnto curtesie and naturall reason, than after victorie obtained, to saue them whome thou hast taken pri∣soners in iust warre, to giue them meat, drinke, and cloathing, & with great charitie to releeue them? & for so great benefits to exact of them only their seruice & labor? is it not much better than in cold bloud to kill them? And this was the first beginning of [ H] slaues. Now whereas it agreeth also with the lawes of God and man, that he that hath not wherewith to pay for the fault by him committed, should be punished in his bodie; is it not better and more curtesie to haue him kept to labour in the publicke works? whereof such were also called seruants to paine, another kind of seruitude. In like sort, he that shall vniustly lie in wait for another mans goods, life, or state; what doubt is there but that he is a verie theefe and robber▪ and deserueth death? Then is it not con∣trarie vnto nature, to saue him for labour, in stead of putting him to death: for the word Seruant, commeth of sauing, albeit that some vnskilfull Grammarians reprehend Iu∣stinian in so saying. Now if it were contrarie vnto nature, that one man should haue power of life and death ouer another, there should be neither kingdoms nor seigno∣ries, [ I] which were not contrarie vnto nature, seeing that kings and monarches haue the same power ouer their subiects, be they lords or slaues, if they once fall into any capi∣tall crime.

These arguments haue some good show to proue that seruitude is naturall, profi∣table,* 1.132 and honest, but it may well be answered. I confesse that seruitude is well agreeing vnto nature, when a strong man, rich and ignorant, yeeldeth his obedience and seruice vnto a wise, discreet and feeble poore man: but for wise men to serue fools, men of vn∣derstanding to serue the ignorant, and the good to serue the bad; what can bee more contrarie vnto nature? except a man should thinke it reasonable for a wise counsellour to be ouertuled by his foolish Prince; or a sober and temperat seruant to bee gouerned [ K] by his bedlem and riotous Maister. As for them that thinke it a charitable courtesie, in* 1.133 vniust warres to haue saued the liues of their prisoners whome they might haue killed, it is the charitie of theeues and pirats, who brag themselues to haue giuen life vnto them whome they haue not depriued of life. For oftentimes it commeth to passe in vniust warres, (as are for most part those that are made by the mightie) that good men are most miserably and shamefully enforced to serue the wicked. And if the vanqui∣shed haue wrongfully and without cause (as theeues) made warre, why then put they them not to death? why take they not of them exemplarie punishment? why take they

them then vnto mercie, seeing that they are theeues. As for that which is said, That [ A] seruitude could not haue continued so long if it had bene contrarie vnto nature: true it is in things meerely naturall, which according to their naturall proprietie follow the immutable ordinance of God: but hauing giuen vnto man the choice of good & euill, it chaunceth oftentimes to the contrarie; him to chuse the worse, contrarie to the law both of God and nature: in whom his corrupt opinion hath so great power, that it pas∣seth in force of a law, of greater power than nature it selfe; in such sort, that there was neuer so great impietie or wickednesse, which hath not bene esteemed for vertue and godlinesse. Let one example serue for many. We know right well that there can be no more cruell or detestable a thing than to sacrifice men, and yet there are almost no people which haue not vsed so to doe, who all for many ages couered the same with [ B] the vaile of pietie and religion: as yet vnto this our age they of Peru and Brasiles doe, and certaine other people vpon the riuer of Plat; vnto which so prophane sacrifices our auncestors for all that with great deuotion resorted. With like pietie and deuoti∣on the Thracians also vsed to kill their fathers and mothers, growne weake with age, and so afterwards did eat them, to the end they should not languish with sicknes, nor being dead become meat for wormes; as they aunswered the Persian king. Neither must we say that there were none but the auntient Gauls that sacrificed men; which indeed they did vnto the time of Tiberius the Emperour: for long time before, the* 1.134 Amorits and Ammonits vsed to sacrifice their children: neither was it a solemnitie among the Barbarians onely, as generally among the Scythes (as Plutarch writeth) but [ C] also among the Greeks (in whome ciuilitie nor onely rested, but euen from whome it was vnto all other nations deriued): for Achilles (as Homer reporteth) sacrificed vnto his dead friend Patroclus with the slaughtar of men * 1.135 Themistocles also in the Persian warre, sacrificed three men; as did the Persian king at the same time twelue: neither could Iupiter Licius (as is reported) be otherwise appeased but by the slaughter of man, led by the ambiguitie of an old Oracle, and of the Greeke word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which without accent signifieth either Light, or a Man. M. Tullius detesteth our auncestors, for that they sacrificed with mans blood: but that he spoke as an Orator, and as best ser∣ued his cause: for M. Varro attributeth it to all the people of Italie: as also the manner of vowing in the sacred spring time to haue bene, that whatsoeuer man or beast was that [ D] yere first borne should be sacrificed. A man might also bring for example * 1.136 Iephte general of the armie of the Israelites, who is reported to haue sacrificed his daughter vnto al∣mightie God, much about the same time that Agamemnon king of the Greeks sacrifi∣ced his daughter Iphigenia * 1.137 (whereof some well learned men haue made Tragedies) although that he sacrificed nothing vnto God but the virginitie of his daughter; as the Hebrew text plainly declareth; and as Rabbi Leui, and the other Hebrew interpetors all agree. How beit other people did the like with great pietie and deuotion: which proueth well that we must not measure the law of nature by mens actions, bee they neuer so old and inueterat: neither thereof conclude, that the seruile estate of slaues is of right naturall: as also much lesse to attribute it to charitie, or to courtesie, that the [ E] people in auntient time saued their prisoners, taken in warres, whome they might haue slaine; to draw a greater gaine and profit from them as from beasts. For who is hee that would spate the life of his vanquished enemie, if he could get a greater profit by his death than by sparing his life? Of a thousand examples I will produce but one. At the siege of Ierusalem vnder the conduct of Vespasian, a Roman souldier hauing found gold in the entrails of a Iew that was slain, made his companions therwith acquainted, who forthwith cut the throats of their prisoners, to see if they had also swallowed any of their crownes; so that in a moment there were slaine * 1.138 aboue twentie thousand of

those Iewes. O faire example of charitie towards captiues! But say some, they are [ F] nourished, they are well entreated for their seruice: but how I pray you are they nou∣rished? and for what seruice doing? Cato the Censor (reputed the best and wisest man of his time) after that he had drawne all the seruice and profit he could from his slaues, euen vntill they were growne crooked with age, so that he could wring nothing more from them, set them then to sale to such as would giue most for them, to draw yet from them the verie price of their blood which yet remained in them, least he should be enforced to nourish them for nought, now growne impotent with age, or else bee faine to kill them, or to set them at libertie; in such sort that the poore slaues in recom∣pence of all their seruice made, were drawne to the gallows by their new masters: not yet so happie as Pallas her mule in Athens, which growne old went about whither she [ G] list vnhalt•…•…ed, no man daring in her old age to load or charge her. And whereas there is nothing more holy or more naturall giuen by God vnto mankind, than mariage; yet so it is, that it was not permitted vnto slaues: yea in case that a free man taken captiue had a child lawfully begot by his wife; if the father died in the hands of the enemie, al∣though the mother returned into her libertie, yet neuerthelesse was the child reputed illegitimat.

What should I rehearse the execrable and profuse filthinesse of both sexes, which* 1.139 the poore slaues heretofore were and yet are enforced to endure and suffer? But as for crueltie showed vpon them, it is incredible that we read, and that a man might speake of, if but the thousand part thereof were written: for Authors would thereof say no∣thing, [ H] if good occasion were not giuen; and we haue not but the histories of the most ciuill people that euer were in the world. For they were enforced to till the ground in * 1.140 chaines (as yet they do in Barbarie,) and to lie in dungeons, the ladders being drawn vp from them, as they yet do in all the East▪ for feare they should be lost, or that they should set fire on the house, or otherwise kill their maisters. Now as for euerie light of∣fence of the slaue, except he were of great price, it was so rigorously punished, as that to haue broken a glasse was vnto him death: as for example, the Emperour Augustus being at supper in the house of Vedius Pollio, it chaunced one of the slaues to breake a glasse; who hauing done no other fault but that (as saith* 1.141 Seneca) was forthwith drawn vnto a pond of Lampreis, which were fed with mans flesh: whereat the poore slaue [ I] crying out, fled vnto the feet of Agustus, entreating him, not for his life, but that hee might not after he was put to death be eaten vp of those fishes, for hee found himselfe worthie of death for the glasse he had broken: but the common opinion was, that the soule of the drowned neuer passed ouer into the* 1.142 Elysian fields; or els that it died to∣gether with the body: as Synesius writ of his companions sailing to Alexandria, who in a tempest sodainly risen, seeing the outragious violence of the Sea, drew their swords to cut their owne throats, so to giue way vnto the soule, which they thought otherwise to be in daunger to be drowned together with the bodie: so much the poore slaue feared to be eaten vp of the fishes. But Augustus moued with compassion (as saith Seneca) pardoned the slaue, causing all the rest of the glasses to be broken, and the pond to bee [ K] filled vp. Yet Dion the Historiographer, reporting the same historie, saith that Augu∣stus could not obtaine pardon of Pollio for his slaue, neither to haue commaunded the pond of Lampries to haue bene filled vp, than which nothing was more pretious amongst the Remans: which for all that seemeth to haue bene more probable, seeing that Seneca confesseth Augustus to haue bene therwith contented, neither to haue bene therefore angrie with his friend Pollio. And to shew that this was no new matter more than two hundred yeares before,* 1.143 Quintus Flaminius a Senator of Rome, caused one of his slaues to be slaine, for no other cause but to gratifie and please his Bardache,

which said that he had neuer seene a man slaine. Now if it chaunced the maister to be [ A] flame in his house, by whomsoeuer that it was, all the slaues that at the same time were vnder the same roofe, were put to death euerie mothers son. As chanced at the murther of Pedanius great Pretor of Rome▪ when question was made of putting to death al his slaues, following (as saith Tacitus) the auntient custome, the common people being for* 1.144 the most part men enfranchised, fell in mutinie, for that they knew well the murtherer was but one, & yet neuerthelesse there must be put to death 400 of his slaues, all inno∣cent of the fact: neuerthelesse the matter being debated in the Senat, it was there resol∣ued, That the antient custome shuld be kept, & so accordingly al the slaues were put to death. Her passe the murthering of slaues, enforced to kill one another in the lists, or to be torne with wild beasts, so to giue pleasure vnto the people, and to breed in them a [ B] contempt of death. And although the law Petronia had forbidden slaues without cause to be cast vnto the wild beasts: yet was it neuer obserued, no more than the edict of the emperour Nero, who was the first that appointed commissioners to heare the com∣plaints* 1.145 of slaues: and after him the emperour Adrian ordained that inquisition should be made against such as had maliciously without cause slaine their slaues: how beit that long time before they were culpable as murtherers, by the law Cornelia: but that was holden in no regard, and all that the poore slaues could do to saue themselues from the fury of their maisters, was to flie vnto the images of the gods, or of the emperours. For neither the temple of Diana in Rome, which king Seruius (himselfe the sonne of a slaue) had appointed as a sanctuarie for slaues; neither the image of Romulus, which [ C] the Senat had of long time appointed for the selfe same purpose; neither the Sepulcher of Theseus at Athens; neither the image of Ptolemee at Cyrene; neither the temple of* 1.146 Diana at Ephesus, could defend the slaues from the furie of their angrie lords and ma∣sters. Howbeit that by the law of the Ephesians the slaue which without iust cause had fled vnto the temple of Diana, was againe restored vnto his master, being before sworne not therefore to entreat him euill: but if the cause of his flight were iust, then was he ta∣ken from his master and made seruant to Diana: except women, who might not enter into her temple. But Tiberius of all other tyrants that euer were, the most craftie in his old age, appointed his image for a sanctuarie, propounding capitall punishment vnto all such as should by violence draw any slaue from the same; to the intent that by that [ D] meane the slaues might for the least occasion come to accuse their masters, yea euen of high treason. Insomuch that as Seneca writeth, a certaine Senator fearing to bee be∣wraied of his slaue, craued pardon of Tiberius for that he had but bene about to touch his chamber pot with a ring vpon his finger, wherein the image of Tiberius was en∣grauen. In such sort, that the images of the emperours, but especially of tyrants were as snares to entangle the magistrats in, who oftentimes secretly murthered their slaues, for hauing recourse vnto the images, so soone as they were returned thence. But the law of God had therefore much better prouided, appointing euerie mans house for a sanctuarie vnto the slaue flying from his master, forbidding to restore him againe vnto his maister whilest he was yet in choller. For all masters are not of like discretion to [ E] Plato, which said to his slaue, That he would sharply haue corrected him, but that hee was angrie: whereas the Germans (as Tacitus saith) neuer punish their seruants or chil∣dren but in their rage, and that as if they were their enemies. Thus we see the liues of masters not well assured against their slaues; and the liues of slaues much lesse against their masters. For who could assure himselfe of his life, or of his goods in the time of the tyrannie of Sylla, who had proposed thirtie Sesterties vnto free men, and vnto bond men liberty, as a reward if they should discouer their masters, or bring in the head of any one of them that were by him proscribed? In which feare the citisens were, vn∣till

that threescore thousand of them being slaine, and so the state in a manner againe [ F] appeased, a certaine slaue yet presented vnto Sylla the head of his lord & master, whom Sylla for so doing according to his promise set at liberty, but by and by after caused him to be cast headlong from the rocke Tarpeia. At such time also as persecution grew hot against the Christians, there was no Christian master but was in daunger of his life, or els glad to set at libertie his slaues. But the feare of persecution once ceasing, the lords and masters themselues became tyrants ouer their slaues.

So the state of Families and Commonweals is alwaies in daunger of trouble and ru∣ine,* 1.147 by the conspiracie of slaues combining themselues together: all Histories being full of seruile rebellions and warres. And albeit that the Romans were right great and mightie, yet so it was that they could not let the slaues to rise against the state in al the [ G] townes of Italie except Messana: and afterwards for all the lawes they could make, they could not preuent but that threescore thousand slaues rise in rebellion vnder the conduct of Spartacus, who in set battaile ouerthrew three armies of the Romans. For it is most certaine, that in euerie country whatsoeuer, there was at least ten slaues for one free man: as it is easie to iudge by the musters taken in Athens, where for twentie thou∣sand citisens were found ten thousand strangers, and foure hundred thousand slaues. And Italie (victorious ouer all nations) had many moe, as a man may perceiue by the Oration of Cassius the Senator, whereby he persuaded the Senat for the confirming of Sylla his decree: We haue at home (said he) whole nations of slaues much differing among themselues in manners, fashions, language, and religion. And namely M. [ H] Crassus alone had fiue hundred slaues, who daily brought in vnto him the profit of their gainfull arts and trades; besides them whome he imployed in his ordinarie and domesticall seruice. Milo also in one day set at libertie 300 slaues, least they should haue bene put to torture to depose concerning the death of Clodius Tribune of the people. And that multitude of slaues was it for which the Roman Senate, desirous to put a difference in the habit of slaues, to the intent to haue them knowne from free men: one of the grauest Senators dissuaded the same, showing the daunger like to en∣sue thereof, if the slaues should begin to enter into the number of themselues; for that so they might easily dispatch themselues of their maisters, for the easinesse of their rising into rebellion, and the difference of their habits. Vnto which daunger Africke & some [ I] part of Spaine should be subiect, if there were such a multitude of slaue as in times past: for that they marked their slaues in the face, which they did not in auntient time, except such of them as were villanous and sturdie knaues, who were thereof called Stigmatic; who at any time beeing manumised, could for all that neuer enioy the full fruit of their libertie or the priuelege of citisens: marking the rest vpon their armes. And this was it for which the Lacedemonians seeing their slaues to multiply exceedingly aboue the citisens (for the hope their masters gaue them of libertie which could get most children, and for the profit euery man drew out of them in particuler) made a decree that three thousand of them such as had the most able bodies should bee taken vp for the warres: whome so pressed out, they forthwith caused to be all in one night slaine, [ K] and that so sodainly and secretly, as that no man knew what was become of them, more than they which had the doing of the matter.

Now this feare that Cities and Commonweals had of their slaues, was the cause* 1.148 that they neuer durst suffer them to beare armes, or to be enrolled in their musters, and that vpon paine of death: and if by necessitie they were constrained to take their slaues, they at the same time freely set them at libertie. As did Scipio Africanus the Greater, who after the great ouerthrow of Cannas manumised 300 of his slaues, al able bodies. Howbeit that Florus writeth, That arms were giuento 8000 slaues; which we also read

to haue bene done in the confederat warre. But Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia fin∣ding [ A] himselfe vnable to withstand the multitude of his enemies, as also of his slaues, his citisens being for the most part slaine; in his so great necessitie proclaimed libertie to al such slaues as were able to pay fiftie crownes for their heads: in which doing he proui∣ded himselfe both of souldiors and money. Yea not so much as the effeminat people of Asia vsed their slaues in warres, except the Parthians, who might not by their lawes manumise their slaues, whom they made almost as much of as of their children: wher∣by they grew into such a multitude▪ that in their armie wherwith▪ they put to flight the power of M. Antonius, consisting of fiftie thousand men, there was but 4500 free men, as we read in Iustin: yet had they no cause to rebell, being of their masters so well en∣treated. But as for other people they were so mistrustfull of their slaues, as that some∣times [ B] they would not haue them to serue in their gallies before they were enfranchi∣sed: as did Augustus, who at one time set at libertie twenty thousand to serue him in his gallies. And for feare they had▪ least they should conspire together against the state, to keepe them alwaies busied in other mechanicall arts, Lycurgus amongst the Lacede∣monians, and Numa Pompilius in Rome, forbad their owne citisens to vse any manuall occupation. And yet they could not so well prouide, but that euer there was some one or other desperat man, who propounding libertie vnto slaues, still robbed the State. As Viriatus the Pirat, who made himselfe king of Portugall: Cinna, Spartacus, Tacfarinas,* 1.149 and Simon the son of Gerson, captaine of the Iewes, who all of base companions made themselues great lords, by giuing libertie vnto the slaues that followed them. And the [ C] ciuill warres yet continuing betwixt Augustus and M. Antonius, was not to be seene but fugitiue slaues stil on the one side or the other: in such sort, as that after the discom∣fiture of Sex. Pompeius, there were found thirtie thousand slaues which had taken part with him, whome Augustus caused to be apprehended through his dominions, and by a prefixed day to be againe restored vnto their masters, commaunding the rest to bee hanged that had no masters to lay claime vnto them; as we read in Appian. And in truth the power of the Arabians grew by no other meanes. For as soone as Homar one of Mahomets licutenants, had begun to raise warre in Arabia, and promised liber∣tie vnto the slaues that should follow him, he drew such a number after him, that in few yeares they made themselues lords of all the East. The fame of which libertie, and [ D] the conquests made by those slaues, so encouraged the slaues of Europe, that they be∣gan to take vp armes, first in Spaine in the yeare 781, and afterward in Fraunce in the time of Charlemaigne, and of Lewes the godly; as is to bee seene by their Edicts then made against the conspiracie of slaues. And after that also Lothaire the sonne of Lewes, hauing lost two battels against his brethren, called the slaues vnto his aid with promise of libertie: who afterwards gaue the ouerthrow vnto their masters in the yere 852. When sodainly this fire took such hold in Germanie, where the slaues hauing ta∣ken vp armes, so troubled the state of the German princes and cities, that Lewes king of the Almans was constrained to raise all his forces to subdue them.

And this was the cause that the Christian princes by little and little released their [ E] * 1.150 seruitude, and enfranchised their slaues, reseruing onely vnto themselues certaine serui∣ces, and the auntient right of succession, if their enfranchised slaues should chance to die without issue: a custome yet in vse in all the lower Germanie; as in many places in Fraunce, and England also. For as yet many remembrances of bondage remaine in the Christian Commonweale: as is to be seene in the lawes of the Lombards & Ripuaires whereby slaues could not haue their iust libertie, or alienat their goods, vntill they had bene twice manumised: and oftentimes the lord or master ioyned vnto the act of in∣franchisment, That it was done for the health of his soule. For they which first laid the

foundation of the Christian Commonweale, had nothing in more regard, than to [ F] find the means how Christian slaues might be set at liberty: so that in hope therof ma∣ny of them oftentimes became Christians; & their masters for the health of their souls were content so to enfranchise them. Wee also read in the Histories of Africk, how that Paulinus bishop of Nolo, after hee had sold all his goods to redeeme Christian slaues, at last (which a man would wonder at) sold himselfe also vnto the Vandales for his brethren. And hereof came the manumission of slaues made in churches before the bishops. Whereof, in the raigne of Constantine the Great, ensued such a multitude of poore and needie men, who had nothing but their libertie to liue vpon (of whome the most part would do nothing, and the rest could do nothing) as that cities were with nothing more charged than with them. Hereof, began the almes-houses, and [ G] * 1.151 hospitals, for the reliefe of little children, of the aged, of the sicke, and of them that could not labour, to be erected and endowed by the Christian princes, at the requests of the bishops. Hereof S. Basil in his sermons complaineth, that the cries and gronings of the poore and weake were in the Churches confounded and mingled with the songs and prayers of the Priests. Much about which time Iulian the Apostata in despite of the Christians* 1.152 exhorted the Pagan bishops by the example of the Christians to the building and endowing of almes-houses and hospitals for the reliefe of their poore. And for that poore men set at libertie, did oftentimes lay forth their children to bee brought vp of the charitie and liberalitie of the Christians: Gratian made a law, That the children so exposed and left vnto the world, should be slaues vnto them that had [ H] so nourished and brought them vp. And not long after, Valens the Emperour by an Edict gaue power to euerie man to take vp the vagrant and idle persons, and to cause them to serue them as slaues; forbidding also and that vpon paine of death, any to goe into the woods or deserts there to liue as Her•…•…ts; of whome he caused a great num∣ber which had contrarie to his Edict so gone out, to be executed; to the intent to cut off idlenesse, and to draw euerie man vnto labour. But after that Idolatrie began to decay, and the Christian religion to encrease, the multitude of slaues began also to di∣minish; and yet much more after the publishing of the law of Mahomet, who set at li∣bertie all them of his religion. To the imitation of whome, the Christians also so frank∣ly set at libertie their slaues, as that all seruitude and slauerie seemed in that age to haue [ I] bene shut vp with the West Indians, wherein the Christians had shaken off from their necks all bondage, about the yere 1250: yet for all that, that there were slaues in Ita∣lie in the yeare 1212, it is euident, as well by the lawes of William king of Sicilie, and Frederick the second Emperour; as also by the decrees of the bishops of Rome, Ale∣xander (I say) the third, Vrban the third, and Innocentius the third, concerning the mar∣riages of slaues, which the Lawyers call Contabernia, or keeping of companie together: which Alexander was chosen Pope in the yeare 1158, Vrban in the yeare 1185, and Innocentius in the yeare 1188. Whereby it is euident, the Christian Common▪ weale to haue bene cleere of slaues since the yeare 1250, or there about. For Bartholus* 1.153 who flourished in the yeare 1300, writeth that there were no slaues in his time; and [ K] that by Christian lawes men might no more sell themselues, vnderstanding the Edicts made by the Christian princes: which when Nicholas the Sicilian, otherwise called the Abbot of Panormo had learned of Bartholus, he thought it a thing well worth the no∣ting. Neuerthelesse we read in the Historie of Polonia, that euerie prisoner taken in good warre, was then and long time after slaue vnto him that had taken him, if the king would not pay two Florins for his head, as I haue before said: and yet at this present the subiects bound vnto the soyle whereon they were borne, which they call Kmetos, are in the power of their lords, who may at their pleasure kill them, and not bee called

into question therefore: and if so be that they kill another mans subiect, then are they [ A] acquited by paying ten crownes; the one moitie to the lord, and the other moitie vnto the heires: so as we read in the lawes of Polonia; which are the like in the kingdoms of Denmarke, Sweden, and Norway. But it is more than 400 yeares agoe, since that Fraunce suffered in it any true slaues. For as for that which we read in our histories, that Lewes Hutin, who came to the crowne in the yeare 1313 (the selfe same time that Bartholus liued) set at libertie all slaues for money▪ to defray the charges of his warres;* 1.154 that is, as I take it, to be vnderstood of manumised men, which we call Mort-maines, whome we euen yet at this present see to be set at libertie by the kings royall letters pa∣tents, from that bond of seruitude wherby they are prohibited to marrie a wife, or to alienat their goods out of the territories of their Patron. So also we are to vnderstand [ B] the edict of Charls the fift the French king, wherin in cities euery 70 families, in country villages euerie hundred families, and euery 200 heads of slaues, were be charged with a man at armes; which they should not haue done if they had bene in the possession of another man, & accounted as another mans goods. So it is also to be vnderstood that is written of Humbert Dauphin, who at the same time by one edict enfranchised all the slaues of Dauphine, and commaunded the same to be enrolled in the publick acts and lawes of the countrey. The same curtesie vsed Theobald countie d'Blois towards his slaues, in the yeare 1245. To this also belongeth that which wee read of Sugerius ab∣bot of the couent of S. Dionyse, who set at libertie his manumised slaues, so that they chaunged their dwelling. And also the auntient decree of the Parliament of Paris, [ C] whereby it was permitted to the bishop of Chalons, by the consent of his Chapiter, to enfranchise his slaues. Charles the seuenth also comming to the crowne in the yeare 1430 enfranchised diuers persons of seruile condition. And in our memorie king Hen∣ry the second by his letters pattents enfranchised them of Burbonnois, in the yere 1549. By whose example also the duke of Sauoy did the like in all his countries, in the yeare 1561. All which we see done in the great fauour of libertie. Whereas otherwise the Prince, of his owne lawfull power could not enfranchise another mans slaue, and much lesse the magistrat, what intercession soeuer the people should make: neither could he so much as giue vnto him that was by another man enfranchised, so much as leaue to weare a ring of gold, without the consent of his patron. For Commodus the Emperour [ D] by his edict tooke from all them their rings of gold, who had obtained that priueledge of the prince without leaue of their Patron: neither would he haue it any thing preiu∣diciall vnto the Patron, that his enfranchised slaue had obtained of the prince this pri∣ueledge, albeit that the prince had restored him to the state of a free borne man: which was a far greater matter than to haue obtained the priueledge to weare a ring of gold: which albeit that it belonged vnto the prince onely to grant, yet so it was neuerthelesse in the time of Tertullian, that the patrons had in a manner got that power vnto them∣selues,* 1.155 giuing vnto their enfranchised slaues a ring of gold and a white gowne, in stead of yron giues and whips, causing them so attired to sit downe at the table with them, and to beare their name. And at last Iustinian himselfe by a generall edict restored all [ E] them that had bene slaues enfranchised vnto the state of free borne men; so that for the confirmation thereof they needed not afterwards any the princes charter. Which law for all that we vse not: for in* 1.156 this realme he must of necessitie obtaine the prince his letters patents, which haue alwaies vsed to restore vnto manumised men and of ser∣uile condition, the state of free borne men, and to blot out all the staine of their old sla∣uerie; which letters were woont to be both requested and obtained without the leaue of the patron: who for all that may lay hands vpon such goods of his enfranchised slaue as were got before he was set at libertie wheresoeuer they be; as not long since

was adiudged by the court of Paris: as for such things as they get afterwards they may [ F] hold them to themselues; and hauing no children, by their testaments bestow them vpon whome they please. I haue seene the lord of the White Rocke in Gascongue claime to haue not onely a right ouer his manumised subiects, and also that they were bound to trimme his vines, to till his grounds, to mow his meddows, to reape and thresh his corne, to carrie & recarrie whatsoeuer he should command them, to repaire his decayed house, to pay his ransome, and also the foure accustomed payments vsed in this realme; but also that if without his leaue they should chaunge their dwelling places wherein they were borne, or depart out of his land, hee might lead them home againe in an halter: vnto all which the aforesaid seruices his manumised people yeel∣ded, sauing vnto the last, which by a decree of the Parlement of Tholouze was cut off, [ G] as preiudiciall vnto the right of libertie. Truly they whome the Polonians call Kme∣tons, are not compelled to do their patrons so great seruice; but yet suffer things much grieuous: for that any man may kill them for the small paiment of ten crownes, and their lord may so doe for nothing. And in former time it was lawfull amongst the Indians by all meanes to tyrannise vpon their seruants, which were in number infinit, yea and to kill them also; vntill that Charles the fift by a law which he made comman∣ded then all to be free. But in Fraunce, although there be some remembrance of old seruitude, yet is it not lawfull there to make any slaue, or to buy any of others: Inso∣much that the slaues of strangers so soone as they set their foot within Fraunce be∣come* 1.157 franke & free; as was by an old decree of the court of Paris determined against [ H] an ambassador of Spain, who had broght a slaue with him into France. And I remem∣ber that of late a Genua marchant hauing brought with him vnto Tholouze a slaue whome he had bought in Spaine, the hoast of the house vnderstanding the matter, persuaded the slaue to appeale vnto his libertie. The matter being brought before the magistrats, the marchant was called for; the Atturney general out of the records show∣ed certaine auntient priueledges giuen (as is said) vnto them of Tholouze by Theodo∣sius the Great, wherein he had granted, That slaues so soone as they came into Tho∣louze should be free. The marchant alledging for himselfe that he had truly bought his slaue in Spaine, and so was afterward come to Tholouze, from thence to goe home to Genua, and so not to be bound to the lawes of Fraunce. In the end hee requested [ I] that if they would needs deale so hardly with him, as to set at libertie another mans slaue, yet they should at least restore vnto him the money hee cost him: whereunto the Iudges aunswered, That it was a matter to be considered of. In the meane time the marchant fearing least he shou•…•…d loose both his dutifull slaue and his money also, of himselfe set him at libertie, yet couenanting with him that he should serue him so long as he liued. Yet for all that, those priueledges which they of Tholouze boast to haue bene granted them by Theodosius, seeme not to haue bene so, seeing that Narbona a true Colonie of the Romans, and the most auntient that was in Fraunce, Lectore, Nysmes, Vienne, Lyons, Arles, Romans, and many others, which were also Roman Collonies, no nor Rome itselfe the verie seat of the Empire, had not any such priue∣ledge. [ K] And thus much concerning the enfranchising of slaues.

But now here might a man say, If it be so that the Mahometans haue enfranchised all the slaues of their religion, which hath course in all Asia, and almost in all Africke,* 1.158 with a good part of Europe also; and the Christians haue semblably done the like (as we haue before showed:) how commeth it to passe that yet the world is so full of slaues and slauerie? For the Iewes may not by their lawes haue any slaue of their own nation, neither by the lawes of the Christians may they haue any Christian. Truely all in that swerue from the law of God: For the law of God forbiddeth any slaue to

be made by the order of the Israelites amongst themselues, except that any of them [ A] shall of his owne accord giue himselfe in bondage to another, and suffer▪ his eare to be* 1.159 bored through to a post with an aule: truely it adiudgeth the debtors vnto* 1.160 the credi∣tors, and suffereth the Iewes to bee sold for pouertie: yet the same law commaun∣deth them at the seuenth yeare to be set at libertie. And although a man haue enthra∣led himselfe, and suffered himselfe to be thrust through the eare with an aule, insomuch that he be bound to perpetuall seruitude: yet neuerthelesse all the interpretors of the law affirme, That in the yeare of Iubiley he shall againe recouer his libertie, except he had rather againe serue than become free. But such bondslaues as were borne of those kind of slaues which had of their owne accord giuen themselues into bondage, they were in the fiftith yeare to be set free: at which time the law by* 1.161 the sound of [ B] trumpet denounceth libertie vnto all manner of slaues. Yet doth the law permit them to haue straungers, of another nation and religion than their owne, in perpetuall bon∣dage; and that their posteritie and nephews might vse the same right against straun∣gers, that straungers might against the Isiaelites: than which kind of slaues Iulian the Emperour writeth none to haue bene better. You see (saith he) how willingly the Syrians serue other nations: and contrariwise what a loue of libertie is in the people of the Celtes. But the Iewes when they had bought any straunge bond▪slaues of the Christians, or of the Pagans, they instructed them in their owne religion, and so cir∣cumcised them: which thing Traian by a speciall law forbad: and albeit that they had yeelded vnto their lords or maisters religion, yet neuerthelesse they enforced them [ C] still to serue: Whereas by* 1.162 the law it was prouided, that such straungers as being cir∣cumcised had receiued the law of God, should enioy the same priuiledges and benefits that the natural citisēs did. The same law (saith it) shal be vnto the stranger & the citisen. That is it that God by the Prophet Ieremie* 1.163 complaineth of, Slaues not to be set at li∣bertie according to the law: and therefore a most heauie bondage to hang ouer the maisters heads from their enemies. Hereupon also Philip the French king draue the Iewes out of his kingdome, confi•…•…cating their goods, for that contrarie vnto the law they circumcised Christians, and tooke them vnto themselues into bondage for slaues. The like deceit we see the Mahometans to vse, whose manner is to circumcise and to instruct in their religion such Christians as they haue taken in warre, or bought of pi∣rats, [ D] or at leastwise their children, whome neuerthelesse they compell to serue with all their children and posteritie. Whose example the Portingals following, compell the bondmen whome they haue bought out of Africke, to abiure the Mahometan religi∣on, and instructing them in the Christian religion, cause them neuerthelesse with their children and ofspring to serue them in perpetuall slauerie: so that now whole droues of slaues are sold and that openly in all parts of Portugall, as if they were beasts. In like manner the Spaniards hauing brought the Neigros vnto the Christian religion, keepe them neuerthelesse and all their posteritie for slaues. And albeit that Charles the fift had by a generall edict made in the yeare 1540 set at libertie all the slaues of the West Indies, neuerthelesse a sedition there rising through the couetousnesse and insolencie of [ E] them that were in greatest power, Gonsales Pizzare gouernor of that prouince reuolted from Charles: whose power when Lagasca had discomfited, and for publike example had caused him to be beheaded together with the chiefe men of that rebellion, hee ac∣cording to the edict, set at libertie all the slaues; yet with condition, that they should still serue their patrons. And yet for all that it could not be brought to passe, but that Lagasca returning into Spaine, these late enfranchised men fell againe into their slaue∣rie: and especially for the profit which their lords and masters were▪in hope to haue by the selling of them: to the imitation of the Portugals, who first called in againe Serui∣tude,

now for many worlds of yeares buried in forgetfulnesse in Europe; and are in [ F] * 1.164 short time like enough to disperse the same ouer all Europe, as it is now alreadie begun in Italie. For now a good while ago Africa and Asia, and the Easterne part of Europ also haue accustomed to nourish and bring vp in euery citie, stocks of slaues, in like ma∣ner as if they were beasts, and of them to make a great marchandise and gaine. For within this hundred yere the Tartars (a kind of Scythian people) in great number with fire and sword entring into the borders of Moscouia, Lituania, and Polonia, carried away with them three hundred thousand Christians into captiuitie. And not long ago euen in our memorie, Sinan Bassa hauing taken the Ifle of Gozo neere vnto Mal∣ta, led away with him 6300 Christians, and all the inhabitants of Tripolis in Barbarie, which he sold in Graecia. So that it is not to be maruelled that the captaine of the [ G] Turkes Ianizaries, and either of his Chauncellors (whome they call Cadelesquiers) vse euerie one of them at their entrance into their office to receiue of the prince three hun∣dred slaues. For as concerning the Turkes Pretorian souldiors, and those youths which are taken from the Christians as tribute, and are called tribute children, I neuer accounted them for slaues; seeing that they are enrolled in the princes familie, and that they alone enioy the great offices, honours, priesthoods, authoritie and honour; which nobilitie extendeth also vnto their nephewes in the fourth degree, and all their posteritie afterward beeing accounted base, except by their vertue and noble acts they maintaine the honour of their grandfathers: For the Turkes almost alone of all other people measure true nobilitie by vertue, and not by discent or the antiquitie of [ H] * 1.165 their stocke; so that the farther a man is from vertue, so much the farther hee is (with them) from nobilitie.

Wherefore seeing it is proued by the examples of so many worlds of years, so ma∣ny inconueniences of rebellions, seruile warres, conspiracies euersions and chaunges to haue happened vnto Commonweals by slaues; so many murthers, cruelties, and dete∣stable villanies to haue bene committed vpon the persons of slaues by their lords and masters: who can doubt to affirme it to be a thing most pernitious and daungerous to haue brought them into a Commonweale; or hauing cast them off, to receiue them againe? Now if any man shall say, That the rigour of the lawes may by for∣bidding, and seuere punishment moderat the cruelty of maisters ouer their slaues: [ I] What law can there be more iust, more strong, and indifferent, or better than the laws* 1.166 of God, which hath so wisely prouided as to forbid to chastise slaues with whips (which the Roman lawes permitted) and willeth the slaue to be enfranchised, if his maister shal breake any lim of him? which law Constantine the Emperour afterward approued. But who shall prosecute the suite against the lord for the death of the slaue? who shall heare the complaint? who shall exact due punishment therefore? shall hee that hath nothing to do therwith? considering that tyrants hold it for a rule in policie, That one cannot be too seuere vnto his subiects, so to keepe them low and obedient. But the Spaniards (some will say) entreat their slaues courteously, teach them, and bring them vp, yea and that much more kindly than they do their hired seruans: and they againe [ K] on their part serue their lords and masters with all chearefulnes and loue incredible. But concerning the Spaniards it is a common saying, That there are no maisters more courtious than they at the first; as generally all beginnings are pleasing: so also it is most certaine, That there is no greater loue, than the loue of a good slaue towards his lord: prouided that it meet with an humor agreeing with it selfe. For which cause the law of God (in mine opinion) hath so wisely prouided that no man should serue a per∣petuall seruitude, but he which hauing serued seuen yeres, and so well tasted the humor and disposition of his master or creditor, had consented to bee his slaue for euer. But

sith there are so few men one like vnto anothe•…•… and contrariwise the varietie and [ A] naturall disposition of them infinit, what law giuer can vnto them all prescribe one ge∣nerall edict, law, or rule. The auntient prouerb, which saith, So many slaues, so many enemies in a mans house, showeth right well what friendship, faith and loyaltie a man may looke for of his slaues. Of a thousand examples of antiquitie I will recite but one, which happened in the time of Iulius Pontanu•…•…, who reporteth, That a slaue seeing* 1.167 his lord absent, barred the gates, and hauing shamefully abused his mistresse, bound her, tooke his maisters three children, and so going vp to the highest place of the house, see∣ing his maister comming home, first cast downe vnto him vpon the pauement one of his children, and after that another: the wofull father all dismaid, and fearing least hee should throw downe the third likewise, with prayers and teares besought the slaue to [ B] spare him that was yet left, promising him forgiuenesse for that hee had alreadie done, and libertie also if he would but saue that third. Which his request the slaue yeelded vnto, vpon condition that he should cut off his owne nose: which he chose rather to doe; than to loose his child. But this done, the slaue neuerthelesse cast downe the third child also; and so at last to take that reuenge of himself, which his lord thought to haue done, cast headlong downe himselfe also. And not to be tedious, I omit poysonings, murders, burnings, and many other mischiefes oftentimes euerie where done by slaues. But these inconueniences, you will say, are counteruailed and recompensed with other mutuall profits; for that by receiuing in of slaues we cut off the infinit number of vaga∣bonds and bankrupts, who after they haue deuoured al, would pay their creditors with [ C] * 1.168 bils: & that by that means might be driuen away such a multitude of rogues & naugh∣tie doers, which eat vp whole townes, and as drones sucke the hony from the bees: ioyne also vnto this, that of such idle mates, theeues and pirats furnish themselues; be∣sides that, famine and euil prouision for the poore, draw into townes all populer disea∣ses; for the poore we must nourish and not kill, although it be in a sort to kill them, to refuse to nourish them (as saith S. Ambrose.) These reasons beare some show of truth.* 1.169 For as concerning debtors, if they be not able to pay, God his law commaundeth them to be adiudged to their creditors for seuen yeares, but yet not into perpetuall bondage▪ howbeit that the law of the twelue tables, practised in all the West Indies, and in the greatest part of Africke, will that they remaine still prisoners vnto the creditors, vntill [ D] they be fully satisfied. For they which haue taken away from debtors in ciuil cases the benefit, to leaue vnto their creditors all such goods as they had, and command them to be committed not to their creditors, but to prisons, as the Turkes do; seeme to mee to take away not onely from the creditors, but also from the debtors, all power to keepe themselues, yea and their liues also, as taking from them the meane for them to trauell, and to gaine to acquit themselues. But as for theeues and pirats, there was neuer in any time moe than when the multitude of slaues was encreased: For that the slaue not able to endure slauerie, and at length breaking from his maister, was alwaies constrained to be a theefe or a pirat, not being able to endure his maister, neither to show himself be∣ing marked, nor to liue hauing nothing to liue vpon. A better example whereof can∣not [ E] be than that of Spartacus the fensor, who at one time assembled out of the verie bowels of Italie three score thousand slaues; when as at the same time aboue foure∣score thousand pirats with nine hundred saile of ships were rouing ouer all the Medite∣rannean, and had with so great forces taken 400 cities vpon the sea coast; as that the Roman Empire was both by land and sea as it were beset with theeues and robbers. But the wise law giuer is not hee that driueth robbers out of the Commonwealth, but he that suffereth them not therein to enter: which may easily bee done without that direfull slauerie, so dreadfull vnto states and cities; by erecting in euery towne and ci∣tie

publick houses for poore children, where they may learne diuers trades and occu∣pations, [ F] as they do 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Paris, hio•…•…s, and Venice, and other well gouerned towns, where Seminaries of Artiz•…•… are brought vpto the great benefit of the Commonweale. But in such places as wherein slaues are now alreadie receiued, I am not of opinion to haue them altogether and •…•…pone time set at libertie, as Charles the Emperour did at Peru: for that so they hauing nothing to liue vpon, nor occupation to gaine by, and deligh∣ted with the sweetnesse of idlenesse and libertie, would take no paines: in such sort that the most part of them died for hunger: but the best way is, by little and little to enfranchise them, hauing before their enfranchisement taught them some occupati∣on whereby to releeue themselues. Now if some shall say, That no man is a good master, but he that hath before bene a good seruant: I say that to be an opinion euill [ G] * 1.170 grounded, although it be right auntient: for there is nothing that doth more discou∣rage and ouerthrow, (and if I may so say) a bastardise a good and noble mind, than ser∣uitude; or that doth more abate the naturall maiestie of good natures to commaund ouer others, than to haue bene once a slaue. Salomon also the maister of wisedom saith in his Prouerbs, That there is nothing more intollerable, than when a slaue is become a maister, or a handmaid a mistresse: which he referreth not only vnto a more misticall sence; as when our intemperat desires beare rule ouer our reason: but vnto him also which so dainly passeth from one extremitie to another; as from seruitude to com∣maund. But if it be true that reason and the law of God is alwaies and euerie where to take place, and that it was not shut vp only within the bounds of Palestine: why should [ H] not that law so profitably & so wisely made by God himselfe, concerning slauerie & li∣bertie, stand in force, rather than that which was by mans wisedom deuised? Howbeit that the Tartars (which are by many thought to bee descended from the ten tribes of Israel) haue alwaies enfranchised their slaues at the end of seuen yeres: yet with conditi∣on that they should depart out of their country: which condition was first by Papinian (the great lawyer) reiected, but afterwards by him againe receiued; but beeing ioyned vnto enfranchisments; is accounted as if it were not written at all. And thus much con∣cerning the power of a maister ouer his slaue, and whether slaues are to be suffered in a well ordered Commonweal. But now that we haue sufficiently, & yet also as briefly as was vnto vs possible, entreated of a Familie, & of all the parts therof, which is the foun∣dation [ I] of the whole cōmonweale; let vs now likewise also speak of a Citisen & a City.

CHAP. VI. ¶ What a Citisen is, and how much Citisens differ from Citisens, and how much from strangers: what also is to be vnderstood by the name of a Towne, a Citie, and of a Com∣monweale.

WHat we haue before said concerning a whole Familie, and euery part thereof, containeth in it the beginning of all Commonweals. And as foundations can of themselues stand without the forme of an house, be∣fore [ K] the walles be built higher, or any roofe laid vpon them: so also a Familie can of it selfe be without a Citie or a Commonweale: and so can also the maister of a Familie vse his power and command ouer his houshold with∣out depending of the power of any other man: as they say there are many such fami∣lies in the frontiers of the kingdomes of Fes and of Marocco, and in the West Indies: but a Commonweale can no more be without a Familie, than a Citie without houses, or an house without a foundation. Now when the maister of the Familie goeth out of his owne house where he commaundeth, to entreat and trafficke with other heads

of Families, of that concerneth them all in generall, he then loaseth the title of maister, [ A] head, and lord, to be a companion, equall and fellow like with others, leauing his fami∣lie to enter into a Citie, and his domesticall affaires to entreat of publick; and in stead of a lord calleth himselfe a Citisen, which is no other in proper tearmes than A free* 1.171 subiect holding of the soueraigntie of another man. For before there was either Citie or citisen, or any forme of a Commonweale amongst men, euerie master of a familie was a maister in his owne house, hauing power of life and death ouer his wife and chil∣dren: but after that force, violence, ambition, couetousnesse, and desire of reuenge had armed one against another, the issues of warres and combats giuing victorie vnto the one side, made the other to become vnto them slaues: and amongst them that ouer∣came, he that was chosen cheefe and captaine, vnder whose conduct and leading they [ B] had obtained the victorie, kept them also in his power and commaund as his faithfull and obedient subiects, and the other as his slaues. Then that full and entire libertie by nature giuen to euery man, to liue as himselfe best pleased, was altogether taken from the vanquished, and in the vanquishers themselues in some measure also diminished, in regard of the conquerour; for that now it concerned euerie man in priuat to yeeld his obedience vnto his chiefe soueraigne; and he that would not abate any thing of his libertie, to liue vnder the lawes and commaundement of another, lost all. So the word of Lord and Seruant, of Prince and Subiect, before vnknowne vnto the world, were first brought into vse. Yea Reason, and the verie light of nature, leadeth vs to beleeue very* 1.172 force and violence to haue giuen course and beginning vnto Commonweals. And al∣beit [ C] that there were no reason therefore, it shal be hereafter declared by the vndoubted▪ testimonies of the most credible historiographers, that is to say, of Thucydides, Plu∣tarch, Caesar, & also by the laws of Solon, That the first men that bare rule, had no grea∣ter honour and vertue, than to kill, massacre and rob men, or to bring them in slauerie. These be the words of Plutarch. Yet haue we more also the witnesse of the sacred hi∣story, where it is said, that Nimroth the nephew of Cham, was the first that by force and violence brought men into his subiection, establishing his kingdome in the countrey▪ of Assyria: and for this cause they called him the Mightie hunter, which the Hebrews interpret to be a theefe and robb•…•…. Which thing also Philo the Iew, and Iosephus by their testimonies confirme, viz. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by his wealth and power to haue first exerci∣sed [ D] tyrannie. Wherein it appear 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Demosthenes, Aristotle, and Cicero, to haue mista∣ken* 1.173 themselues, in following the errour of Herodotus, who saith, That the first kings were chosen for their iustice and vertue; and haue hereof faigned vnto vs I wot not what heroicall and golden worlds: an opinion by me by most certaine arguments and testimonies elswhere refelled; seeing that the first Cities and Commonweals, long be∣fore the time of Abraham were full of slaues: as also not long agoe the Westerne islands did swarme with them at such time as the Spaniards subdued them: a thing that could not possibly be, but by extreame violent forcing the free lawes of nature. And it is not yet past seuentie yeares that the people of Gaoga in Africke had neuer felt or heard of any king or lord whatsoeuer, vntill that one amongst them a trauell or [ E] had in his trauell seene and noted the maiestie of the king of Tombut: and thereupon conceiuing a desire to make himselfe a king also in his owne countrie, hee at first to be∣gin withall, killed a rich marchant; and so possessed of his horses armes and mar∣chandise, diuided them amongst his nie kinsfolks and friends, acquainted with his pur∣pose; by whose aid he by force and violence subdued now some, and after others, kil∣ling the richest, and ceasing vpon their goods: in such sort that his sonne became rich with the robberies of his father, made himselfe king, whose successor hath so continu∣ed after him in great power, as we read in Leo of Africke. This was the beginning of

the kings of Gaoga, which in short time greatly encreased. [ F]

And thus much concerning the beginning of Commonweals, which may serue to manifest the definition of a Citisen, by vs before set down, to be true, which is no other thing to say, but A free subiect holding of the soueraignitie of another man. A free subiect* 1.174 I say, for albeit that a slaue be much more subiect vnto the commaund of the highest authoritie than a free man; yet so it is, that al people haue alwayes with their common consent agreed, That a slaue is no Citisen, and in questions of right is accounted no* 1.175 bodie; which cannot truely be said of mens wiues and children, who are free from all seruitude and bondage; albeit that their rights and liberties, and the power to dispose of their owne goods, be from them in some sort cut off by the domesticall power: in sort that a man may say, that euerie Citisen is a subiect, some small part of his libertie [ G] being diminished by the maiestie of him to whome he oweth obeysance. But euerie subiect is not a Citisen, as we haue said of a slaue; and may also so say of a stranger, who comming into an other mans segniorie, is not receiued for a Citisen, hauing not any part in the rights and priueledges of the Citie; neither is to bee accounted in the number of friends, allies, or coallies, who are not altogether straungers, (as the Lawyer saith) neither enemies also. Howbeit that the Greeks of old called straungers enemies, as also did the Latines, which Cicero hath noted out of the law of the twelue tables;* 1.176 The mildnesse of the word (saith he) mitigating the hardnesse of the thing: and they were called enemies which had conspired against the state. And it may well bee also that those whom we yet by a common word cal Hotes, or Hostes, were in antient time [ H] nothing els but straungers. But men haue since corrected the proprietie of words, the forme of speech still remaining: for the Greeks haue called their enemies 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as men making warre vpon them; and straungers 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifieth not pilgrims (as saith Acursius) but straungers, be they another mans subiects, or themselues soue∣raignes in their owne countrey.

Now amongst them whome we said to be subiects vnto publick empires and so∣ueraigne power; some are naturall, some are naturallised; and of them which are na∣turall* 1.177 some are free borne, some are slaues, and these slaues being set at libertie, in an in∣stant become Citisens, whereas straunger slaues be not so. Yet true it is that the en∣franchised slaues in Greece were not admitted to be Citisens, although that they were [ I] of the same countrie, and naturall subiects. For the request of Demosthenes the Ora∣tor, which he made vnto the people after the great ouerthrow at Cherronaea, That all the inhabitants of Athens, as well the enfranchised as others, might be accounted Citi∣sens; was reiected and denied, for feare least the enfranchised men (of whom there was a great multitude) should become lords of their estate, and with the number of voyces exclude the naturall Citisens from all honours and promotions; which the greatest number still carried away: which thing the Romans at the first not regarding, had al∣most before they were aware fallen into the power of the enfranchised men, had not Fabius Maximus in good time foreseene the matter, and thrust the multitude of the en∣franchised men, before dispersed amongst all the tribes, into foure tribes apart by [ K] themselues; to the intent that one and thirtie tribes of the free borne men and auntient Citisens, might stil with the number of voices preuaile: for they counted not in Rome their voices by the poll, as in auntient time they did at Athens, and now doe also at Venice; but by degrees and centuries, in the assemblies of their great estates; and by lines or tribes, in their lesse estates. And for that it so great a matter was without sediti∣on done by the onely wisedome of Fabius the Censor, he tooke the surname of Maxi∣mus (or of the Greatest:) in which doing he amended the errors of Appius the Censor▪* 1.178 who had dispersed the enfranchised and naturallised Citisens (the issue of slaues and

straungers) amongst all the tribes of the free borne men: yet afterwards (notwithstan∣ding [ A] the order taken by Fabius) it was granted vnto the Citisens enfranchised, that they might enroll one of their sonnes beeing fiue yeares olde or more in the tribe or line of their patron: But when those foure tribes of the enfranchised Citisens seemed yet too puissant and strong, it was decreed, That there should by lot one tribe bee drawne out, wherein all the enfranchised Citisens should giue their voyces. And this was the state of the enfranchised Citisens, vntill the ciuill warre betwixt Marius and Sylla, at which time the people at the motion of Pub. Sulpitius made a law, That the enfranchised Ci∣tisens should from that time forward be againe diuided amongst all the tribes, which was the first and principall cause of the ruine of that Commonweale. Wherefore as of slaues some are borne, some are made; so also of Citisens some are made, some are [ B] borne: the naturall Citisen, is he that is free of that wherein he is borne; whether he be borne but of one of his parents a Citisen, or of both of them Citisens. True it is that of* 1.179 auntient time (and yet at this present also in diuers Commonweals) to bee a Citisen it was needfull to haue both father and mother Citisens, as in Greece, otherwise they cal∣led them Bastards, or Mungrels, which were but Citisens on the one side, and could not themselues neither their children be partakers of the greatest benefits or offices in the Commonweale, which they called Archontes, as saith Demosthenes in his Oration against Neaera, albeit that many (as Themistocles himselfe) were thereinto secretly ente∣red. But in the time of Pericles fiue thousand of them were sold slaues, who had born* 1.180 the countenance of Citisens. And Pericles himselfe hauing lost his children that were [ C] right Citisens, made request vnto the people, That his sonne might be enrolled among the Citisens, which sonne he had begot at Athens of his wife being a straunger. Wee also read that the Romans made a Collonie of foure thousand Spaniards, whome the Romans had begot of Spanish women, for that they were not true Citisens. But after∣ward it tooke place that he should be a Citisen whose father was a citisen: and in many places it is sufficient for the making of a citisen, that his mother was a citisen. For the place maketh not the child of a straunger (man or woman) to be a citisen: and hee that was borne in Africk of two Roman citisens is no lesse a citisen, than if hee had bene borne in Rome. Now the made or naturallised citisen is he who hath submitted him∣selfe vnto the soueraigntie of another, and is so receiued into the number of citisens. [ D] * 1.181 For the citisen of honour onely, who for his merits towards the Commonweale, or of* 1.182 speciall fauour hath obtained the right and priueledge of a citisen, cannot of right bee called a citisen, for that hee hath not put himselfe vnder the power of of anothers commaund.

Wherfore of many citisens, be they naturals, or naturallised, or els slaues enfranchi∣sed (which are the three meanes that the law giueth to become a citisen by) is made a Commonweale, when they are gouerned by the puissant soueraigntie of one or many rulers: albeit that they differ among themselues in lawes, language, customes, religi∣ons, and diuersitie of nations. But if all the citisens be gouerned by the selfesame lawes and customes, it is not onely one Commonweale, but also one very citie, albeit that [ E] * 1.183 the citisens be diuided in many villages, townes, or prouinces. For the enclosure of wals make not a citie, (as many haue written) no more than the wals of an house make a familie, which may consist of many slaues or children, although they bee farre distant one from another, or in diuers countries, prouided that they bee all subiect vnto the commaund of one head of the familie: So say we of a Citie, which may haue many townes and villages, which vse the same customes and fashions, as are the Bailiwicks, or Stewardships of this realme: And so the Commonweale may haue many cities and prouinces which may haue diuers customes, and yet are neuerthelesse subiect vnto the* 1.184

command of their soueraigne lords, and vnto their edicts and ordinances. And it may [ F] also be that euery towne and citie may haue certaine priuileges in particuler, which are not common vnto them of the suburbes; and the suburbs also may haue certaine pre∣rogatiues which are not common vnto the villages, nor to the inhabitants of the open countrie; who are yet neuerthelesse subiects of the same Commonweale, and citi∣sens of their citie; yet are they not for all that burgesses: for the word citisen hath I know not how a more speciall signification with vs, than hath the word Burgesse: and is properly the naturall subiect, who hath the right of a corporation, or colledge, or* 1.185 certaine other priueledges, which are not common also vnto the burgesses. I haue said the naturall subiect, for that the subiect naturallised although hee dwell in the towne, and enioy the right of a burgesse, is yet called in many places a burgesse: & the [ G] other is called a citisen, who enioyeth a certaine particular priueledge proper vnto free borne citisens. As in Paris there is none but naturall citisens, and borne in Paris, that can be Prouost of the marchants. And in Geneua a burgesse cannot be Syndic, or Se∣nator of the priuie counsell of xxv, which a citisen may well be: which is also vsed a∣mongst the Swissers, and all the townes of Germanie.

And thus much briefly concerning the difference of subiects, citisens, burgesses, and straungers; as also concerning a Commonweale, a Citie, and a Towne. But for as much as there is neither Greeke nor Latine, nor any other writer that I haue seene, which haue vsed these definitions, it is needfull by lawes and by examples to make plaine that which I haue before said, being otherwise of it selfe obscure. For we often∣times [ H] see great quarrels and controuersies to arise as well betwixt princes, as citisens of the same towne or citie amongst themselues. For not vnderstanding the difference of these words, yea they from whome wee ought to expect the true resolutions of these things, are themselues oftentimes farre wide, mistaking a citie for a towne, a Common∣weale for a citie, and straungers for citisens. But they which write of a Commonweale without knowledge of the law, and of the common right, are like vnto them which go about to build faire high houses, without any foundations at all. Aristotle hath defined* 1.186 vnto vs; A citie to be a multitude of citisens, hauing all things needfull for them to liue well and happily withall: making no difference betweene a Commonweale and a ci∣tie: saying also, That it is not a citie if all the citisens dwell not in one and the selfe same [ I] place: which is absurditie in matter of a Commonweale; as Iulius Caesar in his Com∣mentaries well declareth, saying, That euerie citie of the Heluetians had foure villages, or cantons. Where it appeareth that the word Citie, is a word of right or iurisdiction, which signifieth not one place or region, as the word Towne, or Citie; which the La∣tines call Vrbem of Vrbo, that is to say of aratio, or plowing: for that as Varro saith, the compasse and circuit of cities was marked out with the plough. It is also certaine in question of right, That he which hath caried out of the citie, that which was by the law forbidden to be carried out, and hath carried the same into another citie or towne of the same prouince; is neither to be said to haue caried the thing out of the citie, neither to haue offended against the law. Yea the doctors go farther, saying, That hee hath [ K] not done contrarie vnto the law, that hath transported the thing forbidden into any other citie or towne subiect vnto the same prince. And albeit that writers oftentimes confound both, taking sometimes the one for the other, as the greeks oftentimes vse the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the Latines the word Ciuitas for a towne, a citie, or the right of citisens, for that the generall which is the citie, comprehendeth in it the particular, which is the town: yet so it is, that they abused not the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as we see that Cicero hath well kept the proprietie both of the one and of the other: for the word* 1.187 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifieth properly a towne, wherof came the word astuti, which with the Greeks

signifieth as much as doth with the Latines Vrbani, for that the inhabitants of townes [ A] are commonly in their behauiour more ciuill and gratious, than are the pesants or rude countrey men: for the word Ciuilis, which we call ciuill, was not of the auntient La∣tines receiued for Vrbanas, that is to say courteous, or after the manner of the citie. And least any man should thinke them to be rashly confounded, and to be but a question of words, and not of matter: it may be that a towne may be well built and walled, and that more is well stored also with people, and furnished with plentie of all things nece∣cessarie to liue withal, & yet for all that be no citie, if it haue not laws and magistrats for to establish therin a right gouernment (as we haue said in the first chapter) but is more truely to be called an Anarchie than a citie. And so contrariwise it may be, that a towne may be in all points accomplished and haue the right of a citie, and of an vniuersitie, [ B] and well ruled also with lawes and magistrats; and yet neuerthelesse shall it not bee a Commonwealth: as we see the townes and cities subiect vnto the seignorie of Ve∣nice, which are no Commonweals no more than the townes in the prouinces subiect and tributarie vnto the citie of Rome were of auntient time no Commonweals, nei∣ther enioyed the right or priuiledge of Commonweals; but the citie of Rome it selfe onely, which had great priueledges and prerogatiues against them all in generall, and against euery one of them in particuler: albeit that the lawes speaking, of the other townes, doe oftentimes vse this word (Citie) but that also vnproperly, for Traian the emperour writing to Plinie the yonger, Proconsul of Asia, denieth the citie of the Bi∣thynians to haue the right of a Commonweale, in being preferred before other priuat [ C] creditos in the right of a pledge, and that truely. For why? that was proper vnto the citie of Rome, and to them to whome they had especially giuen this prerogatiue, as was onely the citie of Antioch in all the Roman Empire. So wee see that a towne* 1.188 may be without a citie, and a citie without a towne, and neither the one nor the other of necessitie a Commonweale: and that more is, one and the same citie may still bee kept in the whole and entire state of a citie, the wals thereof being laid flat with the ground, or it quite abandoned by the citisens; as did the Athenians at the comming of the Persian king, vnto whome they left their towne, putting all themselues vpon the sea, after they had put their wiues and children in safetie amongst the Trezenians; fol∣lowing therein the counsell of the Oracle, which had aunswered them, That their citie [ D] could not be saued but by woodden wals: which Themistocles interpreted, That the citie (which consisteth in the lawfull bodie of citisens) could not be saued but by ships. In like manner it happened also vnto the inhabitants of Megalopolis, who vnderstan∣ding of the comming of Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia, all voyded their towne, which for all that was no lesse a towne than before; yet was it then neither citie nor Commonweale: in sort that a man might say, That the citie was gone out of the towne. So spake Pompey the Great, after he had drawne out of Rome two hundred Senators, and the better part of the citisens, and so leauing the towne vnto Caesar, said thus, Non est in parietibus respublica, The Commonweale is not in the wals. But for∣asmuch as it had in it two sorts of partakers, and that the citisens diuided into two parts [ E] had put themselues vnder the protection of two diuers heads, they now seeme of one Commonweale to haue made two. Wherfore by these words Citie, Towne, Com∣monweale, Colledge, Court, Parish, Familie, are signified the right of these things. And as oftentimes it hath bene iudged that the church being without the wals of the citie, and the parishioners within the citie, that they should enioy the right of citisens, as if the parish were within the compasse of the wals: so also is it to bee iudged of a citie. Neither let it seeme vnto any man straunge, that I stand something the longer vppon this matter; if he but remember what importance the lacke of knowledge of these

things was long ago vnto the Carthaginensians. For at such time as question was [ F] made in the Senat of Rome, for the rasing of Carthage: the report thereof being brui∣ted abroad, the Carthaginensians sent their ambassadors to Rome, to yeeld themselues vnto the mercie of the Romans, and to request the Senat not vnworthily to rase that their citie one of the fairest of the world, famous for the noble acts therof, an ornament of Rome it selfe, and a monument of their most glorious victories. Neuerthelesse the matter being long and throughly debated in the Senat, it was at last resolued vpon, That for the safetie of the Roman empire Carthage should bee destroied, as well for the oportunitie of the place, as for the naturall persidiousnesse of the Carthaginensians themselues, who had now alreadie made warre vpon the allies of the Romans, rigged vp a number of ships contrarie to the agreement of peace, and secretly stirred vp their [ G] neighbour people vnto rebellion. The matter thus resolued vpon, the Carthaginensi∣an ambassadors were sent for into the Senat, vnto whome aunswere was giuen by the Consull, That they should continue in their faith and fidelitie vnto the Senat and the people of Rome, and in pawne thereof to deliuer vnto the people of Rome three hundred hostages and their ships: in which doing they should haue their citie safe, with all their rights, priueledges and liberties, that euer before they had enioyed. With this answere the ambassadors returned merily home. But by and by after commission* 1.189 was giuen vnto Scipio Africanus the yonger, To go in all hast with a fleet to Car∣thage, and with fire and sword to destroy the towne, sauing the citisens and all other things else that they could carrie out of the towne. Scipio ariuing in Africke with his [ H] armie, sent Censorinus his lieutenant to Carthage, who after he had receiued the promi∣sed hostages together with the Carthaginensian ships, commaunded all the people of Carthage to depart out of the towne, yet with free leaue to carrie out with them what they would, and to build them a citie further off from the sea, or elswhere to their best liking. With this strait commaund of the lieutenant the Carthaginensians astonished, appealed vnto the faith of the Senat, & of the people of Rome, saying, That they had promised them that their citie should not be rased: to whome it was aunswered, That the faith giuen vnto them by the Senat should in all points be kept; but yet that the ci∣tie was not tied vnto the place, neither vnto the wals of Carthage. So the poore inha∣bitants were constrained to depart and abandon the towne vnto the fire, which was [ I] set vpon it by the Romans, who had not had it so good cheape, had the ambassadors before vnderstood the difference betweene a towne and a citie. As oftentimes it chan∣ceth that many embassadors ignorant of the law of armes, and of that which right is, do euen in matters of state commit many grosse faults. Although that Modestinus writeth, That Carthage was no more a citie after it was rased, and that the vse and pro∣fit left vnto the citie, was in this case extinct aboue an hundred yeares before: but hee was in the same errour wherein the ambassadours of the Carthaginensians were, vnto whome all their rights, prerogatiues, and priueledges were reserued. The like errour was committed in the agreement made betwixt the Cantons of Berne and Friburg, in the yeare 1505, wherein it was agreed, That the amitie and alliance betwixt those two [ K] Commonweals should be for euer, and so long to endure as the wals of both the cities should stand. Neither are we to stay vpon the abuse which is ordinarily committed, or vpon the acts of greatest importance of them, which call one and the same thing a towne, a citie, and an vniuersitie: as some say of Paris, and certaine other places, calling that the citie which is contained in the Isle, and the vniuersitie the place wherein the colledges stand, and all the rest the towne, when as the towne it selfe is contained with∣in the compasse of the wals and suburbs: howbeit that wee herein follow not the pro∣prietie of the law, calling it the towne and suburbs, for the diuers priuiledges graunted

vnto them by diuers kings; and the vniuersitie the bodie of all the burgesses of Paris [ A] together: but the citie the coniunction or ioyning together of the towne it selfe and the liberties, as also of the men vsing the same lawes and customes, that is to say the coniunction of the prouostship and of the countie of Paris together: which abuse is growne, for that of auntient time all the towne was not but the isle inuironed with wals, and the riuer about the wals, so as we read in the Epistle of Iulian, gouernour of the West empire, who made his ordinarie residence in Paris; the rest of the citie that now is being then in gardens and arable land.

But the fault is much more, to say, That he is not a citisen, which is not partaker of the offices of gouernment, of giuing of voices in the consultations of the people, whe∣ther* 1.190 it be in matters of iudgement, or affaires of the state. This is the definition of a ci∣tisen, [ B] which Aristotle hath left vnto vs by writing, which he afterward correcting him∣self,* 1.191 sayeth it not to haue place put in the popular state only. Now he in another place himselfe confesseth that definition not to be good which is not generall. Small appa∣rance also is there in that he saith in another place, The noble to be more a citisen than the base, and the inhabitant of the towne rather than the plaine country peasant; and that as for the yong citisens, they as yet but grow as nouices, whilest the elder citisens decay; and that they of the middle age are the entire citisens, and the other but in part. Now the nature of a definition neuer receiueth diuision; neitheir containeth in it any thing more or lesse than is in the thing defined. And yet neuerthelesse that description of a citisen that Aristotle hath giuen vnto vs, is defectiue and lame, not being aptly to be [ C] applied euen vnto the popular estate, seeing that in the Athenian estate it selfe which had no peere for the libertie and authoritie of the people, the fourth ranke or degree of citisens being more than three times as great as all the rest of the people, had no part in the offices of gouernment, or in iudgements. So that if we will receiue the definition of Aristotle, we must needs confesse, that the greater part of the naturall bur∣gesses of Athens, were in their owne Commonweales strangers, vntill the time of Pericles. And as for that which he saith, The noble to be alwaies more citisens than the base and vnnoble, is vntrue, not onely in the popular estate of the Athenians, but also in the popular Commonweals of the Swissers, and namely in Strasbourg, where the nobles (in the qualitie of nobles) haue no part in the offices of state and go∣uernment. [ D]

Wherefore it is better and more truly said of Plutarch, That they are to bee called* 1.192 citisens that enioy the rights and priueledges of a citie. Which is to be vnderstood ac∣cording to the condition and qualitie of euerie one; the nobles as nobles, the commo∣nets as commoners; the women and children in like case, according vnto the age, sex, condition, and deserts of euery one of them. For should the members of mans bodie complaine of their estate? Should the foot say to the eye, Why am not I set aloft in the highest place of the bodie? or is the foot therefore not to be accounted amongst the members of the bodie? Now if Aristotles definition of a citisen should take place, how many seditions, how many ciuill warres, what slaughters of citisens would arise [ E] euen in the middest of cities? Truly the people of Rome, for no other cause departed from the Senators, than for that they enioyed not the same authoritie and priueledges that the nobilitie did; neither could it otherwise be appeased than by the meane of the fable of the members of mans bodie, whereby the graue and wise Senator Agrippae reconciled the people vnto the Senators. For Romulus the founder of the citie of Rome, excluded the people from the great offices of commaund, from the offices of priesthood, and from the augureships; commaunding the same to be bestowed vpon such onely as were descended from them whome he himselfe had chosen into the Se∣nat,

or els from them whome he had afterwards ioyned vnto them. And this new [ F] people hauing vanquished their neighbours, enforced many of them to abandon their owne countrey and customes, to become inhabitants and citisens of Rome, as they did the Sabines. Afterwards hauing vanquished the Tusculans, the Volscians, and Herniques, they agreed together that the vanquished should haue part in their offices, and voices also in the assemblies of their estates, without any other chaunge either in their law or customes; who for that cause were not called citisens, but municipes (as who should say, Men made partakers of their immunities) yet indeed lesse esteemed and honoured than the Romans themselues, albeit that their estate were vnited vnto that of the Romans. As we see that Cateline descended of the auntient familie of the Sergians in Rome, and so a naturall Roman, by way of disgrace obiected to M. [ G] Tullius Cicero, That he was but a new vpstart of Arpinas. And that was the cause that many municipiall townes chose rather to vse the Roman lawes than their owne, to become true citisens of Rome, vntil the time of Tiberius the emperor, who vtterly took away the verie shadow of the popular libertie which Augustus the emperour had yet left; hauing remoued the popular assemblies from the people vnto the Senat: at which time the municipiall townes of Italie refused the priueledges of the citie of Rome, whereat the emperour Adrian maruelled (as saith Aul. Gellius) but without cause, for that they seeing the popular honours and offices to be all in one mans bestowing, they thought it now better to vse their owne lawes than others.

Thus we see two sorts of citisens differing in priueledges, that is to wit, the Roman [ H] * 1.193 citisen, and the municipiall or countrey citisen. Now the third sort were the Latines, who had at the beginning threescore townes, but were afterward augmented with twelue Latine Colonies, who after long warres made peace with the Romans vppon condition, That they should liue after their own maners and customes, and yet should be made citisens of Rome, whosoeuer of them should remoue his dwelling into the citie, hauing yet left behind him some lawfull issue at home in the countrey. Yet when many of them fraudulently abused this agreement, & gaue their children vnto the citi∣sens of Rome in adoption, or vnder the colour of seruitude, to the intent that by them forthwith againe set at libertie, they might in a moment enioy the liberties and priue∣leges of the citie; order was taken by the law Claudia, confirmed by a decree of the [ I] Senat, and edict of the Consuls, That all the Latines which had so by craft obtained the freedome of the citie, should be constrained againe to returne into the Latine cities: which thing was done at the request of the Latine cities themselues. And so is that to be vnderstood that Boetius writeth, The Romans sent into the Latin Colonies, to haue lost the liberties of the citie: as also that which Titus Liuius saith, The Roman Colo∣nies sent to Puteoli and Salerne by the decree of the Senat, to haue bene no more citi∣sens: which is not further to be vnderstood or extended, but to their right for giuing of voices, by that meanes now taken from them. So were they of Reims, of Langres, of Saintonges, of Bourges, of Meaux, and of Autun, free people of Fraunce, allies of the Romans, and citisens also, but without voice (as saith Tacitus) before that it was per∣mitted [ K] vnto them to haue states and honourable offices in Rome. And those of Au∣tun were the first that had the priueledge to bee Senators of Rome, and therefore called themselues Brethren vnto the Romans: howbeit that the Auuergnats tooke vnto them the same priueledge & title, as descended from the Troians (as saith Lucan.) Now it is not to be doubted, but that that the Roman Colonies were true and natural citisens of Rome, drawne out of the Roman blood, vsing the same lawes, magistrats, and customes; the true markes of a true citisen. But the further that these Colonies were distant from the citie of Rome, the lesse they felt of the glorie and brightnesse of

the sunne, and of the honours and offices which were diuided among the citisens and [ A] inhabitants of Rome: insomuch that the inhabitants of the Roman Colonies at Lyon, Vienne, and Narbone, thought themselues verie happie to haue gained but the priueledges of the Italians, who were of auntient time the allies and confederats of the Romans, enioying the honourable freedome of citisens, and yet without chaunging either of their owne lawes or customes, or loosing any point of their liberties. And forasmuch as the Romans, holpen by the strength & power of their friends and allies, had subdued diuers other nations, and yet suffered not those their friends and compa∣nions* 1.194 to be admitted to sue for the honours and honourable offices in the citie; there∣of rise the confederats warre in all Italie against the Romans, which neuer tooke end vntill that after much harme on both sides both done and receiued, the libertie of the [ B] citie of Rome was by the law Iulia graunted vnto * 1.195 all Italians, some few onely excep∣ted. For the cities of Italie were called some Colonies, some Allies, some of them of the Latines, and some of the Italian iurisdiction, and all of them different. And that is it for which Titus Liuius saith, I am inde morem Romanis Colendi socios, ex quibus alios in* 1.196 ciuitatem, at que aequum ius accepissent: alios in ea fortuna haberent, vt socij esse quam ci∣ues mallent. viz. Now since that time the manner of the Romans was to honour their fellowes, of whome some they tooke into the citie, and into like freedome with themselues: othersome they had in that estate, as that they had rather to haue them their fellowes, than citisens with them. And hereof proceeded that speech of Tiberi∣us the emperour, in the Oration which he had in the Senat, which is yet seene engra∣uen [ C] in brasse in Lyon. Quidergo? Num Italicus Senator prouinciali potior est? What then? Is an Italian Senator better than the prouinciall Senator? As if he would haue said them both to haue bene Senators alike. And yet the same emperour excluded the Frenchmen which had obtained the freedome of the citie of Rome, from suing for the honours or offices thereof. Whereby is better to be vnderstood that which Pli∣nie writeth, Spaine to haue in it 470 townes; that is to wit, 12 Colonies: 3 of citisens of Rome, 47 of them which had the freedome of the Latines: 4 of Allies, 6 of them that were enfranchised, and 260 tributaries. And albeit that the Latines were so straitly allied vnto the Romans, as that they seemed to be verie citisens; yet neuerthelesse that they were not so, it is to be well gathered by that saying of Cicero: Nihil acerbius Lati∣nos [ D] ferre solitos esse, quam id, quod perrarò accidit, a Consulibus iuberi ex vrbe exire. viz. The Latines vsed to take nothing more heauily, than that which but verie seldome times happened, To be commaunded by the Consuls to void the citie: for as for other straungers we read, them to haue oftentimes bene driuen out of the citie. In briefe, such was the varietie of priueledges and prerogatiues amongst them which were con∣tained within the Roman empire, besides their confederat and free people, as that al∣most no one thing was so proper vnto the Roman citisens in generall, as that the ma∣gistrats and gouernours might not proceed in iudgement against them in matters con∣cerning* 1.197 their life and libertie, without the peoples leaue. Which prerogatiue was by the tribunitiall law Iunia graunted to all the citisens of Rome, after that the people had [ E] expulsed their kings, and was called, The holy Law, being oftentimes after reuiued and confirmed by the Valerian Consull laws, at diuers times made by the Consuls Publius, Marcus, and Lucius, of the honourable familie of the Valerians: and last of all by the Tribunitiall law Sempronia, and Portia, where to meet with the proceedings of the magistrats and gouernours, who encroached vpon the iurisdiction of the people, and proceeded oftentimes against the people, without yeelding thereunto, there was the penaltie of treason annexed vnto the law; for that those lawes were oftentimes bro∣ken by the magistrats. And at such time as Cicero was about to haue commaunded

the Roman citisens priuie to the conspiracie of Cateline to be strangled in prison: Cae∣sar [ F] desiring to dissuade the matter in the Senat, said, Our auncestors imitating the ma∣ner of the Grecians, did punish and correct their citisens with stripes; and of men con∣demned tooke the extreamest punishment: but after that the Commonwealth was growne strong, the law Portia and other lawes were prouided, whereby for men con∣demned banishment was appointed. Which law Cicero hauing transgressed, was therefore not onely driuen into exile, but also proscribed, his goods confiscated, his house (esteemed to be worth fiftie thousand crownes) burnt, and a temple built in the plot thereof, which the people at the motion of Clodius their Tribune, commaunded to be consecrated to Libertie: wherewith the magistrats terrified, durst not but from that time forward with lesse seueritie proceed against the Roman citisens, yea euen af∣ter [ G] that the popular state was chaunged. And that is it for which Plinie the younger, Proconsull of Asia, writing to Traian the emperour, concerning the assemblies made by the Christians in the night, to the disquiet of his iurisdiction: I haue (saith he) many in prison, amongst whome there are certaine citisens of Rome, whom I haue put apart for to send them vnto Rome. And S. Paul at such time as he was drawne into questi∣on, as a seditious person, and a troubler of the common quiet; so soone as he perceiued that Felix the gouernor would proceed to the triall of his cause, he required to bee sent vnto the emperour; saying, That he was a citisen of Rome, for that his father being of the tribe of Beniamin, and borne at Tharsis in Caramania, had obtained the right of a Roman citisen: Which so soone as the gouernour vnderstood, hee surceased to pro∣ceed [ H] any further in the matter; and sent him to Rome, saying, This man might haue bene set at libertie, if he had not appealed vnto Caesar. Whereas otherwise if hee had not bene a citisen of Rome, the gouernour would haue proceeded in the matter, seeing the countrey of Palestine was before brought into the forme of a prouince. As in like case Pontius Pilat, gouernour of the same countrey, was constrained to condemne Christ Iesus as a tributarie subiect of his prouince, whome for all that hee seemed to haue bene willing to haue deliuered out of the hands of his enemies, and from all pu∣nishment, if he could well in so doing haue auoided high treason, which the people threatned him with: Which the gouernour fearing, least he should seeme to haue any thing therein offended, sent the whole processe of the matter vnto Tiberius the empe∣rour [ I] (as saith Tertullian.) For if the municipiall magistrats of the Iewes had had soue∣raigne power and iurisdiction, they would not haue sent him back againe vnto the go∣uernour, crying That he had deserued the death, but that they had not the power to proceed thereunto against him. For the municipiall magistrats of prouinces had not any iurisdiction, more than to commit the offendors into safe keeping, for feare of the present daunger, and to receiue cautions, or to giue possession, and sometimes to appoint tutors vnto poore orphans: but in criminall causes, had no power or authori∣tie, neither ouer the citisen of Rome, neither ouer the straunger or prouinciall subiect, or ouer others that were enfranchised; but onely ouer their flaues, whome they might at the vttermost but with stripes correct. For as for the iurisdiction giuen to them that [ K] had the defence of townes, they were established by Valentinian three hundred and fif∣tie yeares after. Whereby it is to be gathered, all power and authoritie for the execu∣tion of iustice to haue bene giuen to the Roman gouernours, and their lieutenants in their prouinces, and taken from the rest. For they but deceiue vs, which thinke the Iewes priests, for the qualitie of their priesthood to haue made conscience to con∣demne to death our Sauiour Christ Iesus, as if by their religion they had bene hindred so to do; and hereupon haue concluded, That churchmen ought not to giue iudge∣ment that carried with it the execution of blood: which proceeded of the igno∣rance

of fantiquitie: For it is euident that before the land of Palestine was brought in∣to [ A] the forme of a prouince, it had but the Senat of the Iewes, consisting of 71 persons, composed in part of priests and Leuites, who had the power of condemning offendors to death, as the Chaldean interpretor plainly sheweth, and the Hebrew Pandects more plainely than he.

Wherefore this was the greatest and chiefest priueledge proper to the citisens of* 1.198 Rome, That they could not by the magistrats be punished either with death or exile, but that they might still from them appeale; which libertie all the citisens of Rome enioyed. The other Roman subiects which had not this priueledge, were not called citisens: yet thereof it followeth not, that to speake properly they were not indeed citi∣sens, and according to the true signification of a citisen: for they must needes be citi∣sens, [ B] or straungers, allies, or enemies, seeing that they were not slaues; for so much as they were contained within the bounds of the Roman empire. But we cannot say that they were allies, for that onely free people which defended the maiestie of their estate, were called the fellowes or allies of the Romans: neither could it bee said that they were enemies or straungers, seeing that they were obedient subiects, and that more is, paid tribute vnto the Roman empire: wee must then conclude that they were citisens; for it were a verie absurd thing to say, That the naturall subiect in his owne countrey, and vnder the obeysance of his soueraigne prince, were a straunger. And that is it for which we haue said, That the citisen is a franke subiect, holding of the soueraigntie of another man. But the prerogatiues and priueledges that some haue more than others, [ C] maketh vs to call some of them citisens, and others tributaries. Yet we read that the emperour Augustus was so iealous of these priueledges, that hee would neuer giue the right of a Roman citisen vnto French men, for any request that his wife Liuia could make vnto him; yet for all that, not refusing to ease them from paying of tributes: nei∣ther liked he well of it, that his vncle Caesar had together & at once giuen the freedome of the citie, vnto that legion which he had raised of Frenchmen, and in generall to all the inhabitants of Nouocome: and blamed also M. Antonius, for that he had for mo∣ney sold the freedome of the citie vnto the Sicilians. Neuerthelesse the succeeding princes kept not with so great deuotion the rights and priueledges of the Roman citi∣sens. Antonius Pius by a generall edict gaue the freedome of the citie of Rome vnto [ D] all the citisens of the Roman empire (slaues alwaies excepted) that so the citie of Rome might be the commmon countrey of all nations. Wherein hee seemed in a sort to imitat the example of * 1.199 Alexander the Great, who called the whole world but one citie, and his campe the chiefe fortresse thereof. But Antoninus contented himselfe with the Roman world. And albeit that the citie, or rather the grant of the immuni∣ties of the citie seemed so to be communicated vnto all, yet were the priueledges of ci∣tisens diuers, some alwaies enioying more than others; as is to bee seene not onely in the Commentaries and answeres of the great lawyers, which flourished after Antoni∣nus* 1.200 Pius, but also in the edicts of other princes. For Seuerus more than fiftie yeres af∣ter Antoninus was the first that gaue the priueledge to them of Alexandria, that they [ E] might be made Senators of Rome: but the other Aegyptians could not be made citi∣sens of Rome, except they had before obtained the freedome of the citie of Alexan∣dria. Which well sheweth, that the greatnesse of the priueledges make not the subiect therefore the more or lesse a citisen. For there is no Commonwealth where the citi∣sen hath so great freedome, but that he is also subiect vnto some charge: as also the no∣bilitie, although with vs exempted from taxes and tallages, are yet bound to take vp armes for the defence of the Commonweale and others: and that vpon paine of their goods, their blood, and life. For otherwise if the largenesse of prerogatiues and priuile∣ges

should make a citisen, then verely straungers and allies were to bee called citisens, [ F] seeing that oftentimes greater and larger priueledges are giuen vnto strangers or allies, than to citisens themselues: For why? the freedome of the citie is oftentimes for an honour giuen vnto straungers, who yet for all that are bound vnto no commaund or necessarie duties. As the Swissars gaue the freedome of their citie first to Lewes the ele∣uenth,* 1.201 and so afterwards vnto the rest of the French kings. So Artaxerxes king of Persia, gaue the freedome of the citie vnto Pelopidas (and all his posteritie) entreating of alliance with him. So the Athenians made free of their citie Euagor as king of Cyprus, Dionysius the tyrant of Sicilie, and Antigonus and Demetrius kings of Asia. Yea that more is, the Athenians gaue vnto all them of the Rhodes the freedome of their citie: and the Rhodians with like courtesie vpon the agreement of the league, made all the [ G] Athenians citisens of their citie, as we read in Liuie: which league was called, The treatise of Comburgeosie. What manner of league that was made betwixt the Valesi∣ans, and the fiue little Cantons in the yeare 1528; and betwixt the Cantons of Berne and them of Friburg, in the yeare 1505; and againe betwixt them of Geneua & them of Berne in the yeare 1558: the force of which leagues was such, as that there should be a mutuall communication betwixt them both of their citie and amitie: and in case that any of the confederats forsaking his owne citie, had rather to goe vnto the citie of his fellowes and confederats, he should presently become a citisen and subiect of the other citie, without any new choyce or speciall letters of his naturalisation or enfran∣chising. But the freedome of any citie giuen for honour sake vnto any, bindeth no [ H] man vnto the commaund thereof; but him which forsaketh the dwelling place of his natiuitie or citie, that so he may come into the power of another prince: For neither were those kings whom we haue spoken of; neither Hercules, or Alexander the Great, when they were made honourable citisens of the Corinthians, subiect or bound vnto their commaunds; in such sort as that the right of a free citisen was vnto them but as a title of honour. Wherefore seeing it impossible for one and the same person to bee a citisen, a stranger, and an allie; it may well be said that the priueleges make not a citi∣sen, but the mutuall obligation of the soueraigne to the subiect, to whome for the faith and obeisance he receiueth, he oweth iustice, counsell, aid, and protection, which is not due vnto strangers. [ I]

But some may say, How can it then bee, that the allies of the Romans, and other people gouerning their estate, were citisens of Rome (as those of Marseilles and of Austun?) Or what is that which M. Tullius crieth out: O the notable lawes, and of our auncestors by diuine inspiration made and set downe, euen from the beginning of the Roman name, That none of vs can be the citisen of more than one citie: (for dissi∣militude of cities must also needs haue diuersities of lawes) nor that any citisen can against his will be thrust out, or against his will be detained in the citie. For these are the surest foundations of our libertie, Euery man to bee master both of keeping and of leauing of his right and libertie in the citie. And yet he the same man, before had said it to be a thing granted vnto all other people, that euerie man might be a citisen of many [ K] cities: with which errour (saith he) I my selfe haue seene many of our citisens, igno∣rant men, led; to haue at Athens bene in the number of the judges, and of the Areopa∣gi, in certaine tribe, and certaine number, when as they were yet ignorant whether they had obtained the libertie of that citie; and to haue lost this, except they had by the law made for the recouerie of things lost, againe recouered the same. Thus much hee.

But first to that which he writeth concerning the Athenians; that law of Solons was long before abolished, which admitted not a straunger to the freedome of a citisen

of Athens, except he were banished out of his owne countrey: at which law Plutarch [ A] wondreth aboue measure; not foreseeing that to haue bene done of Solon, to the end (as it is like) That no man should enioy the immunitie and priueleges of a citisen of Athens, and that popular prerogatiue which the people had, except he were bound vn∣to the commaund and lawes of the Athenians. But he which is against his will detai∣ned vnder the commaund of a straunge citie, hath without doubt lost the right of his owne citie: which can in no wise be applied vnto those kings whome wee haue before spoken of, or yet to the Rhodians which had ordained the freedome of the Atheni∣ans. Wherefore this is it, as I suppose, that M. Tullius meant (for why, hee well agreeth not with himselfe) That he which was indeed a true citisen of Rome, that is to say, which was bound vnto the Senat and the lawes of the people of Rome, could not [ B] be bound vnto the commaund of another citie. As Pomponius Atticus borne in the citie of Rome, being a Roman citisen, and of the honourable order of the knights, who for his loue towards the Athenians, was thereof called Atticus (and vnto whome three of the Roman emperours referred the beginning of their discent) refused the freedome of the citie of Athens offered him by the Athenians; least (as saith Cornelius Nepos) he should haue lost the freedome of the citie of Rome: which is true in regard of the true subiects and citisens; but not in the citisens of honour, which are not indeed subiects: neither in respect of them which are citisens of diuers cities, vnder the power of one and the same prince, a thing lawfull vnto all euen by the Roman law. For although one may be the slaue or vassall of many maisters or lords, yet can no man be the subiect of [ C] diuers soueraigne princes, but by the mutuall consent of the princes; because that these are vnder no mans commaund, as are they vnto whome seruice is by turne done by slaues, who may by the magistrats be enforced to sell their slaue, except the seruile la∣bours, which cannot at once be done to them all, be by turnes done by the slaue. And this is the point for which we oftentimes see warres betwixt neighbour princes, for the subiects of their frontiers, who not well knowing whome to obey, submit themselues sometimes to the one and sometimes to the other: and oftentimes exempting them∣selues from the obeisance of both two, are ordinarily inuaded and preyed vpon by both the one and the other. As the countrey of Walachie hauing exempted it self from the obeisance of the Polonians, hath become subiect vnto the Turks; and afterwards sub∣mitting [ D] it selfe vnto the kings of Polonia, paied tribute neuerthelesse vnto the Turke, as I haue learned by the letters of Stanislaus Rasdrazetoski sent to the c•…•…nstable of France, bearing date the 17 of August 1553. Neuerthelesse there are many people vpon the frontiers, which haue set themselues at libertie, during the quarrels of princes, as it is come to passe in the low countrey of Leige, of Lorraine, & of Burgundie: where there are more than twelue subiects of the French king, or of the empire, or of Spaine, who haue taken vpon them the soueraigntie. Amongst whome Charles the fist reckoned the duke of Bouillon, whome he called his vassall: and for that he was his prisoner in the yeare 1556, at the treatie made for the deliuerance of prisoners, hee demaunded an hundred thousand pound for ransome; for that he called himselfe a soueraigne prince. [ E] But there are well also others beside the duke of Bouillon: & to go no further than the marchesse of Burgundie (which is called, The forbidden countrey) six princes haue so∣ueraigne power ouer their subiects, which the mutual wars betwixt the French and the Burgundians haue by long prescription of time brought forth. And in the borders of Lorraine, the counties of Lume & of Aspremont haue taken vpon them the right and authoritie of soueraigntie. Which hath also happened vpon the borders of England and Scotland, where some particular men haue made themselues great commaunders within this twenty or thirty yeres, against the antient agreements. For, for to meet with

such enterprises, the English and the Scots had of auntient time agreed, That the [ F] Batable ground, (that is to say a certaine part of the countrey so called, vpon the fron∣tiers of both realmes, being fiue miles long, and two miles broad) should neither be til∣led, built, or dwelt vpon; howbeit that it was lawfull for both people there to feed their cattell: with charge that if after the sunne setting, or before the sunne rising, any of their beasts were there found, they should be his that so found them: which was one of the articles agreed vpon by the states of Scotland, in the yere 1550, and sent to Hen∣rie the second the French king, as was by him prouided. But where the soueraigne lords are good friends, as the Swissers of the countrey of Lugan, and the other territo∣ries which belong in common to all the lords of the league, whither they send their of∣ficers euerie Canton by turne: there the subiects are not reputed to bee the subiects of [ G] diuers soueraignes, but of one onely, which commaundeth in his order; in such sort as that one of them seeke not to encroach vpon the others. Whereof rise a sedition betweene the seuen Cantons Catholick, and the foure Protestants, in the yeare 1554, the Catholicks desiting to chastice the inhabitants of Lugan and Louerts, who had se∣perated them from the church Catholike: and the Protestants hindring them so to do, and were now vpon the point to haue taken vp armes the one against the other, if the Cantons of Glaris, and Appenzell, who allow of both religions, had not together with the ambassadour of the French king, interposed themselues, and so pacified the matter. Now therefore the full and entire citisen or subiect of a soueraigne prince, can bee no more but a citisen of honour of another seignorie. For so when as we read that king [ H] Edward the first gaue the freedome of citisens vnto all the inhabitants of base Britaine; that is to be vnderstood for them to enioy the liberties, exemptions and freedoms, that they of the countrey enioyed. So say we also of the Bernois, and the inhabitants of Geneua, who call themselues by their treaties of alliance, Equall, and by their letters Combourgeses. For as for that which Cicero saith, That the citisens of Rome might* 1.202 at their pleasure leaue their freedome of citisens, to become citisens of another citie: nothing was vnto them therein more lawfull, than that was in like case vnto all other people lawfull also: and that especiallie in a popular estate, where euerie citisen is in a manner partaker of the maiestie of the state, and doe not easily admit strangers vnto the freedome of citisens. As in Athens, where to make a straunger free of their citie, [ I] there must of necessitie 6000 citisens, by their voices in secret giuen consent therunto. But in such places and countries as wherein tyrants rule, or which for the barrennesse* 1.203 of the soile, or intemperature of the ayre are forsaken by the inhabitants; not onely the citisens, but euen the strangers also are oftentimes by the princes of such places prohi∣bited to depart, as in Moscouia, Tartaria, and Aethiopia; and that so much the more, if they perceiue the stranger to be ingenious and of a good spirit, whome they detaine by good deserts, or els by force, if he would depart: in stead whereof hee must buy it deare, or right well deserue of the Commonweale, that shall get his freedome of a citi∣sen amongst the Venetians or Ragusians, or such other free states. And although that by the Roman law euerie man might giue vp his freedome; and that in Spaine it is [ K] free for euery man to remoue elswhere, and to be enrolled into another citie, so that it be done by protestation to the prince: yet hath it and shall bee alwayes lawfull to all princes and cities, by the right of their maiestie and power to keepe their citisens at home. And therefore princes in making of their leagues, protest that they will not re∣ceiue any the subiects or vassals of their confederats into their protection, freedome, or priueleges, without their expresse consent. Which is conformable vnto the auntient clause of the Gaditane confederation reported by * 1.204 Cicero: Ne quis faederatorum a po∣pulo Romano ciuis reciperetur, nisi is populus fundus factus esset; id est auctor. viz. That

none of the confederats▪ should of the people of Rome be receiued for a citisen, except [ A] that people so confederat had bene the ground, (that is to say, the author thereof.) For therein lieth the state of that cause: for that Cornelius Balbus was a citisen of a confede∣rat citie, & therfore could not contrarie to the league, by Pompeius be made a citisen of Rome without the consent of the confederats. The same Cicero writeth also in the leagues of the French with the Romans to haue bene excepted, That none of them should of the Romans be receiued for a citisen. The same laws we yet at this present vse. For althogh that the Swissers are with vs ioined in a most strait bond of amity & frend∣ship: yet neuerthelesse is the same clause conceiued in that league, which was with them made in the yeare 1520. And againe at such time as the fiue lesser Cantons of the Swissers made a league of alliance and amitie amongst themselues, it was excepted [ B] that no citisens of the confederats should be receiued; or if they should desire the free∣dome of another citie, they should not otherwise obtaine it, except they would dwell* 1.205 in the countrey, their land and goods remaining as before. And besides these leagues, there is no prince which hath not taken the like order. So that oftentimes the subiect dare not so much as to depart out of the countrey without leaue, as in England, Scot∣land, Denmarke, and Sweden, the noble men dare not to goe out of their countrey without leaue of the prince, except they would therefore loose their goods: which is also obserued in the realme of Naples, by the custome of the countrey. As also it was forbidden by the emperour Augustus to all Senators to goe out of Italie without his leaue, which was alwaies right straitly looked vnto. And by the ordinances of Spaine [ C] it is forbidden the Spaniards to passe ouer into the West Indies, without the leaue of the king of Spaine: which was also of auntient time forbidden in Carthage, when Han∣no their great captaine had first discouered the islands of the Hesperides. And by the* 1.206 decrees of Milan, it is not lawfull for any subiect to receiue the freedome of any other citie; or to enter into alliance or league with any other princes or Commonweales, without the expresse leaue of the Senat of Milan. And that more is, we see oftentimes that it is not permitted vnto the subiect, so much as to change his dwelling place, albeit that he depart not out of the seignorie and obeysance of his soueraigne prince: as in the dutchie of Milan, the subiect comming to dwell in the citie of Milan, or within a certaine circuit of Milan, must first haue leaue so to doe; and also pay vnto his prince [ D] three duckets. We also find that it was in auntient time forbidden the Bithynians (subiects vnto the Romans) to receiue any other subiects into their towne, or to giue vnto them the freedome of a citisen, as they oft times did, to decline the iurisdiction of others, or to ease them of paying of customes and tributes due: in which case the law commaundeth, That he which hath so chaunged his dwelling should beare the charges of both places; which was also decreed by the kings, Philip the faire, Iohn, Charles the fift, and Charles the seuenth. Howbeit that the decree of Philip the long would, That the Prouost or bailiefe of the place, assisted with three burgesses, should receiue into the freedome of their citie, whosoeuer of the kings subiects as would, pro∣uided, That within a yeare and a day he should in the same citie into which hee remo∣ued, [ E] buy an house of the price of 60 soulz Paris at the least; and to signifie the same by a sergeant, vnto the lord vnto whome the iurisdiction of the place wherein he dwelled belonged; and after that, that he should dwell in the same citie whereinto he was recei∣ued for a citisen, from the first of Nouember, vnto the 24 of Iune; and yet paying the like tax or tribute that he did before he remoued, so long as hee dwelleth in that new freedome; and without declining the iurisdiction for any suit commenced against him three months before.

And albeit that it be lawfull for euerie subiect to chaunge the place of his dwelling,

yet is it lawfull for no man to forsake his natiue countrie; and much lesse for them [ F] * 1.207 which are enrolled and tied to the soyle, whome we call Mort-maines, who of aunti∣ent time might not chaunge their dwelling place without speciall leaue. And so gene∣rally a man may say in tearmes of right, That the freedome of a citisen is not lost, nei∣ther the power of a prince ouer his subiect, for chaunging of the place or countrey; no more than the vassall can exempt himselfe from the faith and obedience hee oweth vnto his lord; or the lord without iust cause refuse to protect and defend his vassall, without the consent of one to the other, the bond betwixt them being mutuall & reci∣procall. But if the one or the other haue giuen their expresse or secret consent; or that the subiect forsaking his prince, hath yeelded himselfe vnto the protection of another prince, by the sufferance of the first, without contradiction, he is no more bound vnto [ G] the obeisance that he oweth him: neither can otherwise than as a stranger afterwards returne into the former citie. For princes oftentimes by large gifts or priueleges draw* 1.208 into their countries ingenious straungers; whether it be so to weaken their neighbour princes, or for the better instruction of their owne people, or so to encrease their wealth and power, or els for their immortall fame and glorie which they hope to get in ma∣king the towns and cities by them built, more renowned with the multitude of citisens and plentie of all things. So Theseus by proposing the libertie of the citie to all stran∣gers, made the citie of Athens most famous of all the cities of Greece. So Alexander the Great by granting of great priueleges, least the city by him built at the mouth of the riuer Nilus (which he after his owne name called Alexandria) the greatest, and best tra∣ded [ H] of all the cities of Aegypt. So king Lewes the eleuenth gaue the priueleges of the citie of Burdeaux to all straungers whether they were friends or enemies (except the English) so that they dwelt within the towne. So Frauncis the Great, founder of the ci∣tie by him built at the mouth of the riuer Sequana, which they call The Port of Grace, proponing immunitie from all tributes, to all them that should dwell therein, in short time made it a most populos citie. Neither should the citie of London abound with so great wealth, nor such a multitude of citisens, had not Richard king of England pro∣posed vnto straungers all the immunities graunted vnto the citisens: so that they had dwelt ten yeares in the citie: which space of time for the obtaining of the libertie of the citie, most part of the Swissers and Germans, indifferently propounded to al strangers: [ I] a thing well agreeing with the Roman lawes. True it is that more or lesse time is re∣quired in one place then in another, according to the commodiousnesse of the place, or the greatnesse of the priueleges. As in Venice to obtaine the grant and priueledges of a simple citisen (without hauing any other interest in the state, except in certain meane offices) a man must haue dwelt foureteene yeares within the citie. They of Ferrara were content with ten yeares, so that the inhabitants had all the meane while borne the same burthen with the citisens. And yet it sufficeth not to haue dwelt in another mans countrey the time prefined in the customes, to obtaine the freedome of a citisen; if the* 1.209 straunger do not demaund the citisens right and freedome, and be thereinto also recei∣ued: for it may bee that the straunger would not for any thing chaunge his prince, [ K] howbeit that his affaires hold him out of his owne countrey. For howbeit that ma∣ny be of opinion, that a man hauing staid the prefixed time in another mans countrey, without hauing obtained letters of naturalising, is yet capable of testamentary legacies: they in that agree in fauour of testaments, and especially of charitable legacies giuen vnto poore straungers, who are alwaies as much to be fauoured as the widdowes and orphans. But to obtaine the full right and priueledge of a citisen, it sufficeth not to haue dwelt the time appointed by the decrees and ordinances of the place, if a man haue not both demaunded and obtained the same. For as a gift is to no purpose, except

that both he which giueth, and he to whome it is giuen agree, the one in giuing and the [ A] other in receiuing: so neither is he made a citisen that would not; neither if he would could he so be, either of the princes interposing themselues. For which cause those Consuls, of whome the one was by an he•…•…ald at armes yeelded vnto the Numantines; and the other to the Samnites, for that they had without the commaundement of the people made peace with the enemies▪ left not therefore to bee citisens of Rome: be∣cause they were not receiued by the enemies. Which question for all that could not yet be fully decided, for the different opinions of Brutus & Scaeuöla betwixt themselues. For when the Consull yeelded to the Samnites, returning to Rome was come into the Senat, the Tribune of the people compelled him to go out of the Senat: howbeit in fine the Senat by decree declared, That hee had not lost the right of a citisen of [ B] Rome, being refused by the enemie: howbeit that in truth he was not onely depriued of the right of a citisen, but also made a slaue of the enemies, by the decree of the peo∣ple, for hauing without their leaue capitulated and treated of peace with the enemies: and ought to haue bene againe restored by the people. Neuerthelesse the milder opi∣nion of the Senat interpreted that the depriuing of him of his freedome was conditio∣nall, as in case that he were of the enemie receiued. But if so be that a straunger doth enen against his will retaine the rights of his owne citie, when as hee yeelded himselfe vnto the power of another prince, by whom he is refused: much more doth he retaine the same when he requireth not the right of a straunge citie: and then when it hath bene offered him, hath refused the same: and much lesse if he haue not bene presented [ C] vnto the strange prince, neither hath of him required letters of his naturalising, but one∣ly to stay in his countrey as a straunger the time prefixed by the decrees. Whereby is decided the difficultie and doubt which the Senat of Naples made, and therin resolued nothing; that is to wit, If he that had dwelt all his life in a strange countrey should en∣ioy the right and freedome of a citisen in his owne countrey. And many there be, that thinke he ought not to enioy the same; saying, That regard is to be had to the place of his long dwelling: but I am of opinion (if mine opinion may take place) That hee ought neuerthelesse to enioy the priueledge of a free citisen, if he haue not by consent of his prince expresly renounced it, or els done some fact contrarie to the dutie of a na∣turall subiect. Neither am I alone of this opinion. For the the court of parliament of [ D] Paris, by decree made the xiiij of Iune, in the yeare 1554 adiudged that a French man hauing dwelt fiftie yeares in Venice, continued yet still subiect to the French king, and was receiued vnto the succession of his next kinsmen: hee hauing in the meane time done no harme against his countrey, neither committed any crime for which he ought to loose his libertie, neither hauing refused to come being called home by his prince; nor yet requested the freedome of the citie of Venice to haue bene giuen him. For as for secret consent it ought to hurt no man, being esteemed as no consent in things pre∣iudiciall, except it be by word or deed plainly expressed: especially when wee may otherwise interpret the mind of him that hath not declared the same. Whereby it is to be vnderstood what is to be iudged of the question propounded: which the court of [ E] Burdeaux all the judges being assembled together could not determine. As whether a Spaniard borne and brought vp in Spaine, and yet the sonne of a French man (which French man had alwaies dwelt in Spaine, & expresly renounced the place of his birth) being come into Fraunce there to make his perpetuall residence, ought to enioy the priueleges of a citisen, without letters of his naturalizing? Neuerthelesse I am of opi∣nion that he is a straunger, for the reasons before alleged, and that he ought not to en∣ioy the priuelege of a citisen; sauing vnto the prince to reforme it if it shall so seeme good vnto him. And if a straunger which hath obtained letters of his naturalising out

of his owne countrey, and yet will not there dwell, he looseth the right he there preten∣deth: [ F] for that the lawes suffer not a double fiction. And for this cause Lewes the xij. the French king thrust out from the right of free citisens all straungers, who had obtai∣ned of him letters of their naturalising, and were retired out of his realme home. For by our customes he that will get the freedome of a citisen, must obtaine the princes let∣ters to that purpose, and hauing obtained them, pay his fine vnto maisters of the re∣ceipt.

These reasons show not onely the difference that is betwixt a citisen and him that is none, but also of citisens amongst themselues; and that if we follow the varietie of priueleges to iudge of the definition of a citisen, there shall bee fiue hundred thou∣sand of definitions of citisens, for the infinit diuersitie of the prerogatiues that citisens [ G] haue one against another, and also ouer straungers: seeing that it is oft times better in* 1.210 the same citie to be a straunger, then a citisen, especially in such cities as are oppressed with the crueltie and insolencie of Tyrants. As in Florence many citisens requested Cosmus the new duke to be reputed and esteemed as straungers, by reason of the liber∣tie of straungers, and thraldome of the citisens, which they obtained not: and yet hee allured fiftie straungers to sue for the freedome of the citie, putting them in hope of the great offices and commaunds: whereby it was brought to passe, that from those fiftie citisens so made, he extorted fiftie thousand crownes, confirmed the authoritie of the new citisens gotten by deceit, and thereby brake the power of the conspirators against him. So in auntient time the Venetians empouerished and brought low by [ H] the warres against the Genowayes, and fearing the rebellion of many subiects, with a few of the great states, sold the right and priueledge of a gentleman of Venice vnto three hundred citisens, so to strengthen themselues with their goods, their force, and counsell, against the power of the people. It is then the acknowledgement and obe∣dience* 1.211 of the free subiect towards his soueraigne prince, and the tuition, iustice, and de∣fence of the prince towards the subiect, which maketh the citisen: which is the essenti∣all difference of a citisen from a straunger, as for other differences they are casuall and accidentarie; as to haue part in all or certaine offices or benefices; from which the straunger is debarred as it were in euerie Commonweale. As for offices it is cleere. And although the Bishops of Rome haue of long time attempted to giue all benefices [ I] to all men as of right: yet haue princes oftentimes reiected those ambitious decrees of the Popes. I except the kings of Spaine, of all others the most obedient seruants of the Bishops of Rome, who not without great reward obtained by the decree of Sixtus Bishop of Rome, That beuefices should not be bestowed vpon straungers. And so in Boulongne la Grace, where the Pope is soueraigne lord, the offices and benefices are not giuen but to the naturall inhabitants and subiects. The like whereof is done also in all the seignorie of Venice. But the Swissers haue farre otherwise proceeded than by way of agreement, who by a law made in the yeare 1520, decreed the Popes Buls and Mandats, whereby he had not doubted to giue benefices vnto straungers, to bee pub∣lickly torne, and they that vsed them to be cast in prison. And by the lawes of the Po∣lonians [ K] also euen from the time of Casimire the Great, vnto the raigne of Sigismundus Augustus, straungers were kept farre from all benefices; which thing also the Ger∣mans by couenants, of late wrested from the Popes: in which couenants they of Mets were also comprised, and so iustly by their letters complained vnto Charles the ix the French king, those couenants to bee broken by the craft of the Bishops of Rome.

Another priueledge there is also graunted more vnto citisens than to straungers, in that they are exempted from many charges and payments, which the straunger is con∣strained to beare: as in auntient time in Athens the straungers payed a certaine speciall

tribute for the right of their dwelling place, which they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: whereas the ci∣tisens [ A] were free from all impositions. But the most notable priueledge that the citisen had aboue the straunger, is, that he had power to make his will, and to dispose of his* 1.212 goods, according to the customes; or leaue his neerest kinsmen his heires; whereas the straunger could do neither the one nor the other, but his goods fell vnto the lord of the place where he died. Which is no new law in Fraunce, as the Italians com∣plaine, but a thing common also vnto the kingdome of Naples, of Sicilie, and all the East, where the Grand Signior is not onely heire vnto the straungers, but also to his Timariots, for their immouables; and to his other subiects for the tenth. As in aunti∣ent time in Athens, the common treasure receiued the sixt part of the inheritance of straungers, and al their slaues borne in the citie: wheras in Rome the rigour was much [ B] greater (the common treasure swallowing vp all the inheritance of straungers.) And albeit that where Diodorus saith, The Aegyptians and Romans to haue suffered the heires of straungers to succeed them: he spoke therein like a straunger himselfe with∣out regard; for it is most certaine, that it was no way permitted for a straunger to dis∣pose of his goods, neither to receiue any thing by the testament of a citisen of Rome, the common treasure carrying away the succession: whereof our laws are ful. Which we may also iudge by the oration of Cicero, who to show that Archias was a citisen of Rome, saith amongst other things, That he had by his testament disposed of his goods. And himself in his own cause to giue men to vnderstand that the decree of banishment made against him at the sute of Clodius the Tribune, was of none effect: What Roman [ C] citisen is there (saith he) that hath made any doubt to leaue me what hee pleased by his testament, without regard to the decree of my banishment. The selfe same argument vsed also Demosthenes, to proue that Euxithenés was a citisen of Athens: Haue not his next of kinne (saith he) recouered the inheritance of their father that suruiued? And like as in Fraunce, and in England, particular lords take vnto them the inheritance of straungers which die within their iurisdiction: so the Romans also after the manner of their auncestors, tooke vnto them the heredetarie goods of straungers, whome they had receiued into their protection, being left at Rome, which they called, The right of application. And that is it for which they said in Rome, That the right to make a will and testament was onely granted to a citisen of Rome. Whereby it is plaine that [ D] right of application, or of Albinage (as some call it) to haue beene most auntient, and common as well to the Greeks and Romans, as to other people also, vntill that Frede∣rick the second had derogated from the same by his edict, which was but euill kept: For he gaue leaue to all straungers dying within the compasse of his empire, by their testament to dispose of their goods; or if they dyed intestat, to leaue their next of kin their heires. But the force of that law is euen in Germanie it selfe nothing, and much lesse in Italie, where straungers are much worse dealt withall than in Fraunce. For by our customes it is permitted vnto the straunger to get in this * realme all the goods* 1.213 mouable and immouable that he can, and them whilest he yet liueth, to sell, giue, ex∣chaunge, or dispose of by contracts made with men yet liuing, according to his owne [ E] pleasure; and for a small sum of money, as for some twentie or thirtie crownes paid into the common treasure, to obtaine letters of naturalisation, and the right of a citisen; so that he may by his will giue legacies, or appoint such an heire as himselfe pleaseth. But in many countries of Germanie, and by the generall custome of Bohemia, it is not suffered straungers to haue one foot of land. As in like case in Italie it is forbidden all* 1.214 straungers to get any immouables in proprietie, as in the duchie of Ferrara it is a for∣mall custome. And that more is, by the custome of Perouze, it is forbidden to trans∣fer vnto a straunger not onely the proprietie, but euen the possession of any immo∣uable.

And by the custome of Milan it is not permitted vnto the straunger, so much [ F] as to haue the vse and profit of any thing immouable, and that vpon paine of confis∣cating the reuenew with the inheritance; forbidding inheritours also to marrie with straungers, vpon like paine of confiscating their goods. And that which more vniust is, it is not lawfull for the creditor being a straunger, to take his debtors immouables or land, for default of paiment assigned vnto him, but that he must within the yere againe cleere his hands thereof; which causeth the creditor oftentimes to sell his land vnder∣foot, or for little, especially if the naturall inhabitants feare or loue the debtour. And not long since, by the ordinance of the emperour Charles the fift, all straungers are em∣barred from the succession of the subiects of Milan. By the custome of Venice also it is lawfull to bind a citisen to a stranger, yet by that bond are not the heirs bound, more [ G] than for so much profit as came vnto them thereby; quite contrarie vnto the Roman ciuill law. And by the custome of Brixia in Italie, a woman married vnto a straunger cannot transferre her immouables vnto straungers, neither the value thereof, neither di∣rectly, or indirectly. See now the good entertainment that straungers haue in Italie; whereof they haue no occasion to complaine of Fraunce, seeing that in England the subiects cannot pawne their lands vnto their creditors being straungers: whereof the ambassadors of forraine nations haue oftentimes complained to haue reason of their debtors: yet suffer they the next of kinne to enioy the goods and money of the straun∣ger. The contrarie whereof is done in Lituania, Moscouia, Tartaria, and all the Tur∣kish empire: in which place the goods of straungers dying there, are confiseat in like [ H] manner as in Fraunce: where neuerthelesse it is permitted to straungers if they die out of Fraunce, to make a will, and to appoint his children borne in Fraunce his heires, so that their mother be not a stranger. And as for the clause commonly ioyned vnto the letters of their naturalisation: Modo haeredes sint Regnicolae, the judges haue so inter∣preted it of straungers dwelling in Fraunce, who are preferred before them that are neerer of kinne dwelling out of the realme, in the succession of the naturalised straun∣ger: for otherwise it is requisit to make the straungers children to succeed, for that they were borne in France, and of a free citisen, or naturall subiect. But the children of stran∣gers borne in Fraunce, enioy their fathers inheritance, not by will (which is not lawfull for strangers to make) but as from him dying intestat, if their mother be a free woman [ I] when the inheritance descendeth. And more than this, it is graunted by our kings of an extraordinarie bountie vnto such marchant strangers as frequent the fairs of Cham∣pagne and Lyon, That none of their goods, if they die in the meane time shall be con∣fiscated: which right the English marchants enioy also in Guienne. But as for them of the low country of Henault & Artois, of the townes of Amiens, Cambray, & Turnay, they are in the same state that citisens be, for so much as concerneth the right of succes∣sion: and that the edicts of our princes, and iudgements giuen, haue oft times proued yet so as that the same should also be lawfull for vs, that was for them. The companies also of marchants of those cities which stand vpon the Baltique sea, haue obtained the same, or greater priueledges, now euer since the time of Lewes the younger, and more [ K] solemnly confirmed by king Charles the eight: which a few yeares agoe were sent to king Charles the ninth (by Danezay the French ambassadour, vnto the king of Den∣marke) to be by him renewed. And yet this priueledge granted vnto those marchants, extendeth not vnto other strange marchants, which haue obtained the right of citisens, as hath bene adiudged by the priuie counsell. Of which so many and so great priuele∣ges, by our kings graunted vnto straungers, our marchants could obtaine none in all Graecia, Asia, or Africa. For in our time when as Crozile a rich marchant of Tours, di∣ing, had left behind him almost two hundred thousand crownes, nothing thereof came

vnto his neerest kindred, all the same being by the Turkish emperor giuen vnto Abra∣ham [ A] the chiefe of the Visier Bassaes.

There is yet another difference (besides those we haue alreadie spoke of) betwixt citisens and strangers; for that citisens by the auntient law Paetilia and Iulia, may for∣sake* 1.215 their goods, leauing them in satisfaction vnto their creditors, which the straun∣ger may not doe: for otherwise it should bee lawfull for strangers, for their aduantage to sucke the blood and iuice of the subiects, and afterward to pay them with papers, al∣though there be not fewer of these bankrups than of them that forsake their goods. This also a citisen differeth from a straunger, that the straunger in euerie place before he can plead in action, either reall or personall, must put in caution for the paiment of that which shall bee adiudged. Which caution our citisens, except they haue before [ B] plaid bankrupt, or forsaken their goods, are not bound to performe. But in a personall action, whether the defendant be a citisen or a straunger, he is not bound to put in cau∣tion to pay the thing that is adiudged, as was in auntient time determined, as well in the court of Rome, as in the court of Paris. But the same court hath departed from the opinion of our auncestors, and adiudged it to be a thing reasonable, that the straunger whether he be plaintife or defendant, should put in caution to pay the thing that is ad∣iudged. But there is one difference which is and hath alwaies bene common to al peo∣ple, that is to wit, the right of marque against strangers, which hath no place against the subiects: for which cause the emperour Frederick the second, sent backe vnto the states of the empire, those which demaunded the right of reprisall against the subiects of the [ C] empire. And in briefe the straunger might be driuen out of the countrey, not onely in time of warre (for then we dismisse the ambassadours themselues) but also in time of peace; least the naturall subiects manners should by the euill companie of straungers be corrupted: for which onely cause Lycurgus seemeth to haue forbidden the Lacede∣monians* 1.216 his subiects without leaue to depart out of his kingdome, or to haue the vse of gold or siluer; as the East Indians of China forbid their subiects vpon paine of death from receiuing of straungers: so to meet with the enterprises that the straunger might make against another mans estate. Wherefore Cicero well foresaw not what harmes hang (as it were) ouer our heads from straungers, when as he writ, They do euil which forbid straungers their cities, and cast them out, as with our auncestors Penuu•…•…, and of [ D] late Papius: For by such straungers, who for the most part are banished men, the good manners of the naturall subiects are corrupted. But if warre be proclaimed against the prince, the straunger may be detained as an enemie, according to the law of armes: whereas otherwise he might not be staied, if he had not otherwise bound himselfe by contract, or by some offence by him committed.

Now if the straunger shall against the will, or without the consent of his owne prince▪ submit himselfe vnto the power of another prince, and be of him also receiued* 1.217 for his subiect; yet hath his owne prince still for euer power ouer him, and authoritie to lay hands vpon him as vpon his fugitiue seruant; yea although he come as an am∣bassadour sent from his new prince. For so the emperour Theodosius the Great pro∣nounced [ E] Danus the tyrant to be a rebell vnto his maiestie, and cast in prison his ambas∣sadours, being subiect to his power. So the emperour Charles the fift did the like against the ambassadours of the duke of Millan his subiect, whom he detained prisoner, at such time as he vnderstood the duke his maister to haue entred into league with the other princes, and to haue proclaimed warre against him. And howbeit that the news there∣of being come into Fraunce, Granuellan, Charles his ambassador, was by the kings com∣maundement there likewise imprisoned, yet was hee forthwith againe deliuered, so soone as it was vnderstood that the ambassadors and heralds of Fraunce, England, and

Venice, were with safe conduct sent out of Spai•…•…e. Neither seemeth Charles in so do∣ing [ F] to haue violated the law of nations, or to haue done any thing against the law: see∣that the Romans did with greater seueritie punish the fugitiue subiect, than they did the verie enemie. And the best excuse that the Imperials could find to excuse the mur∣ther done vpon the persons of Rincon and Fregosi•…•…s the French ambassadors toward the Turke, was, That the one of them was a Spaniard, a naturall subiect of the empe∣rours, and the other a Genoway vnder his protection, both sent in the seruice of his enemie; the bruit being giuen out, that they went to raise new warres against him: how beit that the emperour would not auouch the murther, but promised to do iustice vpon them that had done the same, if they should fall into his power. But doe the sub∣iect what he can, yet can he not exempt himselfe from the power of his naturall soue∣raigne, [ G] * 1.218 albeit that he become a soueraigne prince in another mans countrey: no more than Philip Barbarius a slaue, who being for his vertue become Pretor of Rome, being pursued and chalenged by his maister, was yet glad to agree with him for his libertie. For in that the lawyers all agree, That the subiect in what place soeuer he bee become soueraigne, may by his prince be called home. As not long since Elizabeth queene of England called home againe vnto her the earle of Lineux, together with his son, who but a little before had maried the queene of Scots; for not obeying of which her com∣mand, she confiscated their goods, for that contrarie to the custome of that realme, they had without leaue departed out of England, and maried contrarie to the queenes com∣maundement. For the subiect wheresoeuer he be, is bound to the lawes of his prince [ H] conceiued, concerning his person; in such sort, as that if the subiect be forbidden to con∣tract or to alienat, the alienations are void, albeit that he make them in a forren country, and of such goods as he hath without the territorie of his owne prince: and if the hus∣band being out of his owne countrie, giue any thing vnto his wife, contrarie to the commaundement of his prince, or the customes of his countrey, such a donation is no∣thing worth: for that the power to tie and bind a subiect, is not tied vnto places. And for this cause princes haue accustomed to vse mutuall requests one towards another, either to call home their subiects, or to enforce them to obey, in such places as where∣in they haue not power to commaund: or els by mutuall denouncing of their griefes themselues to lay hand vpon straungers, vntill that they doe obey them. For when the [ I] marquesse of Rotelin, who had the tuition of the duke of Longueuille, was sued vnto to suffer the controuersie of Neu•…•…chastel to be decided before the judges of the court* 1.219 of Requests at Paris: the lords of Berne reuoked the cause, for that iudgement was to be giuen by them, of lands contained within the precinct of their country. See here the principal differences of subiects and citisens, from strangers; leauing the particular diffe∣rences of euerie countrey, which are in number infinit. As for the differences of subiects amongst themselues▪ there are in many places no fewer, or happely moe than▪ betwixt the subiects and the straungers (whereof we haue much spoken before) as not onely of the difference of the nobilitie among themselues, but of the difference betwixt the no∣bilitie and the vulgar people also. But particularly to prosecute how much the vulgar [ K] people differ among themselues, with such other things as appertaine vnto the sex, age or state of euerie man, were a thing almost infinit.

Now to make the matter short, it may be that of right among citisens, some be ex∣empted from all charges, taxes, and imposts, whereunto others are subiect: whereof wee haue infinit examples in our lawes. As also the societie is good and auailable,* 1.220 where some of the associats haue part in the profit, and yet beare no part of the losse. And that is it for which we see the diuision of citisens or subiects into three estates, that is to say▪ the Spiritualtie, the Nobilitie, and Commonaltie, which is obserued al∣most

in all Europe. And beside this so generall a diuision, there bee other more spe∣ciall [ A] in many Commonweales, as in Venice the gentlemen, the citisens, and the com∣mon people: in Florence before it was brought vnder one prince, they had the great ones, the common people, and the reseall menie. And our auntient Gauls had their Druides, their Chiual•…•…ie▪ and the vulgar people. In Aegypt the priests, the souldiers, and the a•…•…ans; as we read in Diodorus. Also the aun•…•…ent law giuer Hippodamus, diui∣ded the citisens into souldiors, handie crafts men, and labourers; & hath without cause bene blamed by Aristotle; as we read in the Fragments of his ordinances. And albe▪* 1.221 it that Plato enforced himselfe to make all the citisens of his Commonwealth equall in all rights and prerogariues; yet so it is, that he diuided them into three states; that is to wit, into Gouernours, Souldiors, and Laborers: which is to show that there was neuer [ B] Commonweale, were it true, or but imaginarie, or the most popular that a man could thinke of; where the the citisens were equall in all rights and prerogatiues; but that al∣waies some of them haue had more or lesse than others.

CHAP. VII. ¶ Of them that are vnder protection, and the difference betwixt Allies, Stran∣gers, and Subiects.

WE haue now alreadie told what difference there is betwixt Subiects, Ci∣tisens, and Straungers: let vs now also speake of Allies, and first of them [ C] which are in protection; for that there is not one of them which haue written of a Commonweale, which haue rouched this string; which for all that is the most necessary for the vnderstanding of the states of Com∣monweales. The word of protection in generall extendeth vnto all subiects which are* 1.222 vnder the obeysance of one soueraigne prince or seignorie; as we haue said▪ That the prince is bound by force of armes, and of his lawes, to maintaine his subiects in suretie of their persons, their goods, and families: for which the Subiects by a recipro•…•…all obli∣gation owe vnto their prince, faith, subiection, obeysance, aid, and succour. This is the first and the strongest protection that is. For the protection of maisters towards their slaues, of patrons towards their enfranchised, of lords towards their vassals, is much [ D] lesse than that of princes towards their Subiects: insomuch that the slaue, the enfran∣chised, the vassall, oweth faith, homage, and succour, vnto his lord; but yet that is after his owne soueraigne prince, to whome he is a bound Subiect▪ the souldior also oweth obeysance and succour vnto his captaine▪ and by the law deserueth death, if hee defend him not at his need. Yet in all treaties and actions of peace betwixt princes & people* 1.223 in amitie and friendship ioyned together: the word of Protection is special, importing not any subiection of him that is in protection, neither commaund of the protecture towards his adherents, but onely an honourable and reuerent respect of the adherents towards their protector, who hath taken vpon him their defence and protection, with∣out any other impeachment of the maiestie of the adherents ouer whome the Prote∣ctor [ E] hath no power at all. So that the right of protection is well deemed to bee the greatest, fairest, and most honourable of all others that are amongst princes. For the* 1.224 soueraigne prince, the maister, the lord, the patron, draw vnto themselues great profit and obedience, for the defence of their subiects, their slaues, their enfranchised, and vas∣sals: but the Protector is to content himselfe with the honour and acknowledgement of his adherent, seeing that of all duties of courtesie, none is greater, than as euerie man standeth in most need of helpe, so to giue him the greatest relief•…•…; neither of so great kindnesse to accept any other reward than thanks: for if hee couenant for any

thing farther, he looseth the name of a Protector. For as he which lendeth vnto ano∣man [ F] part of his goods or trauell, if he receiue any gaine or profit thereby, he is no more to be called a lender, or that his doing to be tearmed a lending or pleasuring, but a meere mercinatie gaining: so he which hath liberally promised to doe any thing for another man, is without any hire by the law bound to accomplish his promise: and the reason is, for that vnto dutie no hire is due. Neither is there any band of promise stron∣ger, or more effectuall, than that which is made to defend the goods, the life, the honor of the weake against the stronger, of the poore against the rich, of the good distressed against the violence of the wicked. And that is it for which Romulus, founder of the ci∣tie of Rome, setting in order the state of his subiects, to keepe them all at peace and vni∣tie among themselues, assigned vnto euery one of the hundred gentlemen, or Senators [ G] that he had chosen to be of his priuie counsell, a certaine number of his other meaner subiects, to be by them maintained vnder their protection and safegard; holding him accursed and execrable, who should leaue the defence of any his adherents. And the Censors marked them with the note of infamie, that had forsaken their adherents. The law also of the xij tables in that case carrieth with it the paine of excommunication, as in these words: If the Patron deceiue his Client let him be accursed. Yet Plutarch wri∣teth, The clients to haue giuen money to the bestowing of their patrons daughters: which I remember not to haue bene elswhere written; for in so doing they should haue cosened their clients: but it may bee that he mistooke clients, for men enfranchi∣sed; who albeit that they be both called clients or adherents, yet is the bond of the en∣franchised [ H] greater towards their patrons that set them at libertie; than is that of the free borne clients, who had no patrons but aduocats, who defended the causes of their clients. How beit with vs the patrons exact money of their enfranchised clients, the better to bestow their daughters, which is like enough to haue come from the Ro∣mans vnto vs. Now when that forren people saw the Roman clients or adherents to be safe from the iniurie and oppression of the more mightie, not onely euery particular man, but men euen generally, yea whole cities and prouinces yeelded themselues into* 1.225 the protection of the Senators. For so the house of the Marcelles had in their prote∣ction the citie of Syracusa, the Antonies had likewise the citie of Boulongne la Grasse: and so others afterwards tooke vpon them the protection and defence of others also. [ I] Yea the straungers in like case, that frequented the citie of Rome, had also their prote∣ctors, who by the law of application or patronage, tooke vnto •…•…hem whatsoeuer the straunger dying in the citie possessed. And of these same Romans that filled Fraunce with the multitude of their Colonies, it is like this law of protection, which of the ad∣uocats and not of the clients, they cal the law of Auoison, or Auouerie to haue taken▪ be∣ginning. But the enfranchised clients differ much from the free borne clients, albeit* 1.226 that they be both called clients, for the likenesse that is betwixt the one and the other) but especially in this, that the enfranchised clients may from their libertie be againe re∣duced into slauerie, if they shall be proued to haue bene vngratefull vnto their patrons whereas the free borne clients cannot so be. The enfranchised clients are constrained [ K] also to helpe their patrons with their labours: wheras the free borne clients are bound to reuerence their protectors or aduocats, and to do them mutuall kindnesse, but not seruile seruice or labour: neither if they haue done any thing to deceiue their patrons do they therefore loose their libertie: beside that the patrons suruiuing may by the law take part of the goods of their enfranchised clients: whereas the aduocats, or protectors can take nothing of the goods or inheritance of their free borne clients or adherents.

And although there be so many things common to the free borne clients, with the vassals or adherents, as that they are almost accounted for one, yet is there great diffe∣rence

betwixt them. For the vassall is bound with all fidelitie to honour and reuerence [ A] * 1.227 his lord, to helpe him being in daunger, and to do him all the kindnesse possible: and if so be that he shall deceiue his lord, disgrace him, perfidiously abiure him, or giue him the lye: hee by and by looseth therefore his fee, which escheateth vnto his lord by the right which the lord hath against his vassall in such case: whereas from the vndutiful or vnkind client, or adherent, nothing can at all be taken. Moreouer if the vassall hath without any exception giuen his faith vnto his lord, or acknowledge no man greater than him; whether he be sworne or not, he is bound vnto the subiection & command of him the same his lord and prince: whereof he cannot be said to be discharged, al∣beit that he neuer so much renounce his fee: whereas the client or adherent standeth not in these tearmes, being in nothing subiect to his aduocat or protectour. The vas∣sall [ B] also whether he be a king or pope, or whatsoeuer els oweth faith and seruice vnto the lord of whome he holdeth his fee, except he renounce the fee: whereas the free borne client or adherent, whether he be prince or priuat man, is free from all seruice and commaund of his more mightie aduocat or protectour. In briefe the right of a* 1.228 vassall age seemeth in a manner to be but new, and before the comming of the Lom∣bards into Italie vnknowne: whereas the law of protection is most auntient and be∣fore the time of Romulus, who borrowed it of the Greeks: for it was long before vsed in Thessalie, Aegypt, Asia, and Sclauonia, as we read in auntient writers: that so the weaker might be the safer from the violence or iniurie of the more mightie. The vas∣sall also receiueth inheritance and fees of his lord, from whose fealtie and obesance [ C] which he oweth vnto him, he cannot bee exempted, albeit that the soueraigne prince should raise the fee of his vassall depending of him into a countie, dutchie, or principa∣litie, as hath beene adiudged by the decree of the parliament of Paris. Whereby it is to be vnderstood them to erre and be deceiued, who out of Cesars Commentaries in∣terpret them whome he calleth Soldurios et deuotos, to be vassals, seeing that hee hath made no mention of their fee, without which they cannot so be, ioyning thereunto al∣so, that they were indeed true and naturall subiects: for that their liues, their goods, and their persons, were consecrated vnto their lord: which is the true marke of subiection, which the vassals owe onely vnto their soueraigne prince, not in the qualitie of vassals, but in the qualitie of naturall subiects, who ought to runne the same fortune with their [ D] prince, and to liue and die for him if need bee, albeit that the vassall bee more specially bound, than the other subiects.

All which things tend to this purpose, that it may plainely be perceiued, what and* 1.229 how much difference there is betwixt the rights of patronage, vassallage, and protecti∣on, which we see to bee of many for the likenesse among themselues confounded. For the vassall and the adherent owe their fidelitie vnto their lord and protector; and the one of them are reciprocally bound vnto the other, albeit that the lord be not bound by expresse word to giue his oath of fidelitie to his vassall, as the protector ought to his client or adherent, and so solemnly to keepe all the treaties of protection. The lord and the vassell also ought to deliuer solemne letters of their mutuall obliging of them∣selues [ E] the one to the other: like as the protectour and the adherent, are bound to giue letters of protection the one of them to the other: but especially if one soueraigne prince vpon a league made, receiue another soueraigne prince into his protection, which are to be renewed either of the princes dying. For the right of protection be∣longeth not vnto the heires, except the same be in the league so comprlsed: and bee it neuer so prouided for, yet neuerthelesse either of the princes being dead, it is needful for his successor by lawfull acts to professe his protection, & to haue the league renewed. But to make more manifest the matter of protection betwixt soueraigne princes,

whereof we are to entreat: it seemeth that the soueraigne prince or people, which hath [ F] put it selfe into the protection of another, is become his subiect. And if he be a subiect, then is he no more a soueraigne, and his subiects shall also be the subiects of the prote∣ctor. And what subiection would a man haue greater, than to put himselfe into the protection of another man, and to acknowledge him for his superiour? For protecti∣on* 1.230 betwixt great princes, is nothing else but the confederation and alliance of two princes, or soueraigne lords, wherein the one acknowledgeth the other for superiour; whome he bindeth himselfe to obserue and reuerence, and into whose protection hee is receiued, so to be the safer from the iniurie of some other more mightie: also when the subiect of a prince retireth himselfe into the territorie of another prince, hee is like∣wise in his protection; in such sort, as that if he be pursued after by the enemie, & taken [ G] prisoner in the territorie of another soueraigne prince, hee is not prisonet of him that pursueth him, but of him into whose territorie he hath fled: as was iudged by the law of armes at the interparle of peace, which was betwixt the French king & the emperor Charls the fist, in the yere 1555, when question was made of the imperial prisoners that the French had taken in the countie of Guynes, which was then in the subiection of the English; it was maintained by the Chancellor of England, That they could not be detained as prisoners, being taken in the territorie and protection of the English: how∣beit that the contrarie might be said: for albeit it was not permitted to pursue or take prey in another mans territorie, yet it is lawfull hauing raised it in his owne territorie, to pursue it into another mans ground: which yet suffereth this exception, If the lord [ H] of the ground forbid him not so to do: as did the lord Grey, gouernour of Calais and Guines, who comming in the time of the pursute, was said to haue taken the flying Spaniards into his protection, although that they were carried away by the French. Now in this case the word Protection, is not taken in proper signification; for there is no protection, if there be no conuention: and the strange prince cannot take another princes subiect into his protection without the consent of his owne prince, as wee shall hereafter declare.

But yet before let vs determine the propounded question, Whether a soueraigne* 1.231 prince submitting himself vnto another soueraigne prince, looseth the right of his own soueraigntie; and whether he become subiect to the other? For it seemeth that he is [ I] no soueraigne, acknowledging a greater than himselfe. Neuerthelesse I am of opinion that he continueth still a soueraigne, and not a subiect. And this point is decided by a law, whereof there is not the like, and hath in diuers readings bene altered: but we fol∣low the originall of the Pandects of Florence, which hold, That soueraigne princes who in treatie of alliance acknowledge the protectour to bee greater than themselues, are not yet for al that their subiects. I doubt not (saith the law) but that allies, and other people vsing their libertie are not straungers vnto vs, &c. And albeit that in the treatie of confederats and allies, by vnequall alliance, it be expresly said, That one of them shall respectiuely regard the maiestie of the other; that maketh not that hee should bee therefore his subiect, no more than our adherents and clients are lesse free than our [ K] selues, although they be not equall with vs, neither in goods, power, nor honour. And the ordinarie clause inserted into the treaties of vnequall alliance in these words, Comi∣ter maiestatem conseruare (that is to say, curteously to preserue the maiestie of the grea∣ter) importeth no other thing, but that betwixt the princes allied, the one is greater and more honourable than the other; and that the lesser allies should in al modestie respect the greater. So that it euidently appeareth, that protection importeth not subiection,* 1.232 but the superioritie and prerogatiue of honour. And the more cleerely to vnderstand this point, and the nature of treaties and alliances, we may say that all treaties amongst

princes are made either with friends, enemies, or newters. The treaties betwixt ene∣mies, [ A] are made to haue peace and amitie, or truce, or to compose warres begun for seignories or for persons, or to redresse the iniuries and displeasures of one of them against the other, or for traffick and hospitalitie that might bee betwixt enemies du∣ring the time of truce. As for the others which are not enemies, the treaties which are made with them, are either by alliance equall, or vnequall: in this the one acknowledg∣eth* 1.233 the other to be superiour in the treatie of alliance; which is in two sorts, that is to wit, when the one acknowledgeth the other to be his superiour for honour, and yet is not in his protection: or els the one receiueth the other into protection, and both the one and the other is bound to pay a certaine pention, or to giue certaine succours; or els owe neither pention nor succours. As for allies by alliance equall, which the La∣tines [ B] call Aequo foedere, the qualitie is vnderstood, when the one is in nothing superiour* 1.234 vnto the other in the treatie: and that the one hath nothing aboue the other for their prerogatiue of honour, albeit that the one must do or giue more or lesse than the other for the aid that the one oweth vnto the other. And in this sort of treatie, they haue alwaies entreated of amitie, traffique, and hospitalitie, to harbour the one with the other, and to traffique together with all kind of marchandise, or some certaine kindes onely, and at the charge of certaine imposts agreed vpon by the treaties. And both the one and the other alliance is of two sorts, that is to wit, defensiue onely, or defensiue* 1.235 and offensiue; and yet may be both the one & the other, without exception of person, or with the exception of certaine princes: and the most strait alliance is that which is [ C] both defensiue and offensiue, towards all, and against all; as to be a friend to friends, and an enemie to enemies; and so most commonly order is taken, and treaties of mariages one of them had with the other. But yet the alliance is more strong, when as one king is allied with another king, realme with realme, and one man with another man; as were in auntient times the kings of Fraunce and Spaine, and the kings of Scotland and Fraunce. And that was it for which the ambassadours of Fraunce aunswered Ed∣ward the fourth, being driuen out of the realme of England, That the king could not giue him aid, for that the alliances of Fraunce and England were made with the kings, and the realmes, in such sort that king Edward chased out of his realme, the league con∣tinued with the realme and the king that therein raigned: the effect of which words [ D] was this, with such a king, his countries, territories, and seignories: which words are as it were in all treaties expressed. But these treaties ought also to bee published in soue∣raigne courts or parliaments, and ratified by the estates, by the consent of the Atturney generall, as was decreed in the treatie made betwixt king Lewes the eleuenth, and Ma∣ximilian the arch duke, in the yeare 1482. The third sort of alliance is that of neutrali∣tie, which is neither defensiue nor offensiue, which may be betwixt the subiects of two* 1.236 princes being enemies; as those of the Franche-countie haue alliance of neutralitie with the house of Fraunce, and are assured in time of warre: in which alliance was also comprised the countrie of Bassigny, by the decree of Bade in the yeare 1555, in confir∣ming with the king the renouation of the neutralitie for the Franch-countie. And all [ E] these aforesaid alliances are perpetuall, or limited to a certaine time, or for the life of princes, and some yeares more, as is alwaies in treaties of alliance agreed vpon betwixt the kings of Fraunce, and the lords of the leagues.

And thus much for the generall diuision of all the treaties which are made betwixt princes, vnder the which are comprehended all the particular alliances. For as for the diuision of the Roman ambassadors, at the enterparle of peace betwixt them and An∣tiochus the great, it is verie short. Liuie saith, Tria sunt Genera foederum, vnum cum bello victis dicer entur leges: alterum cum pares bello aequo foedere in pacem & amicitiam veni∣rent:

tertium cum qui hostes nunquam fuerunt in amicitiam foedere co•…•…unt, qui neque di∣cunt [ F] neque accipiun•…•… leges. There are (saith he) three kinds of leagues or confederati∣ons; one, when as lawes and conditions are appointed to them that be in battell ouer∣come: another when men in warre equall come together in like league into peace & friendship: the third, when as they which neuer were enemies, by league ioyne in ami∣tie, who neither giue nor take lawes. All the others, which are neither subiects nor al∣lies, are either coallies, or enemies, or newters without alliance or hostilitie, who all ge∣nerally, if they be not subiects (bee they allies, coallies, enemies, or newters) are straun∣gers. The coallies are the allies of our allies, which are not for all that our allies, no* 1.237 more than the companion of our associat is ou•…•… companion; who yet neuerthelesse either in generall or speciall tearmes, are alwaies in all leagues comprised. As the lords [ G] of the three confederats of the Grises, the antient allies of the Swissers, were in expresse tearmes comprised in the treatie of alliance made in the yere 1531, betwixt king Fran∣ces the first of that name, and the Swissers, in qualitie of coallies. But in the yeare 1550 they were allies vnto the house of France, and comprised in the treatie of alliance re∣newed betwixt king Henrie and the Swissers, in qualitie of allies by alliance equall, in like degree and pension with the Swissers, that is to wit 3000 pound, for euerie league or confederacie, to take away the partialitie that was betwixt the one and the others. For although the Swissers were allied with the league of the Grises, by alliance equall by the treatie made betwixt the Grisons and the seuen little Cantons, in the yeare 1498: so it was yet neuerthelesse that they constrained the lords of the leagues of the Grises to [ H] obey the decrees made in their diets, if it should be there otherwise determined; which was like to haue broken the alliance betwixt the Grisons and the Swissers, in the yeare 1565, for no other cause, (as said the Grisons) than to make the Swissers to know that they were their equals in alliance: but the truth is, that the emperour practised vnder hand, and gaue eleuen thousand crownes vnto certaine of the most factious of the Gri∣sons, to make head, as they confessed afterwards being put to torture, and were con∣demned in a fine of ten thousand crownes; as I haue learned out of the Commentaries and letters of the French ambassadours, which then was sent vnto the Grisons. Wee haue also example of them of Geneua, who were comprised in the treaties of alliance made betwixt the house of Fraunce and the Bernois, in whose protection they then [ I] were; and so were since the yeare 1527, vnto the yere 1558, that they exempted them∣selues out of protection, and entreated in alliance equall, and haue alwaies in alliance bene comprised in the qualitie of coallies.

But as those alliances which are defensiue and offensiue towards and against all per∣sons* 1.238 without exception, are of all others the straitest and strongest: so also there is no alliance more vnsure or weaker, than the simple alliance of commerce and traffique which may be euen betwixt enemies: which although it may seeme to bee grounded vpon the law of nations, yet we see it oftentimes to bee forbidden by princes in their own countries, least their subiects should riotously abuse the store of things broght in, or be pinched with the want of things carried our. And for this cause princes haue in [ K] this respect vsed particular treaties, & granted certaine special priueleges & liberties: as in the treaty of commerce or traffick betwixt the house of France & the porttowns of the Easterlings, & the Milanois with the Swissers; wherein they are by the treaties of commerce bound to deliuer a certain quantitie of graine, at a certain price expressed in the said treaties, which the French ambassadors would oftentimes haue broken, for the doubt that the Swissers made to enter vpon the Milanois, enemies vnto the French, for feare the transportation of corne shuld haue bene forbidden: which when the gouernor of Millan had done, in the yeare 1550, the Swissers were vpon the point to haue made

alliance defensiue with the Millanois, or at leastwise to haue had them excepted [ A] amongst the confederats as newters. The force of which league was, that such as were in the same league excepted, could not become prisoners to any the confederats; when as yet for all that straungers, although they were no enemies, were by the law prisoners to them that tooke them: For so Pomponius writeth vnto Quintus Mutius: For (saith he) if we haue neither friendship nor hospitalitie, nor league of amitie with any nation, these truely are not enemies: yet what thing soeuer of ours falleth into their hands be∣commeth theirs; insomuch that a free man borne of ours, by them taken, becommeth their slaue; and so likewise it is, if any thing come from them to vs: thus much he. But this law we now vse not, for regard of that curtesie which ought to bee betwixt man* 1.239 and man. But by the name of enemies we vnderstand them vnto whome we, or they [ B] vnto vs, haue publickly denounced warte; or els without any denuntiation haue of fact made warre vpon vs: as for the rest they are to be deemed of, as of theeues or pi∣rats, with whome we ought to haue no societie or communitie. In auntient time also there was a treatie of alliance to haue iustice done them in a straunge citie, as we read in the books of the Grecians; but at length by the great consent and agreement of all na∣tions, the port of iustice hath by little and little bene still opened, as well to strangers as to citisens.

But in euerie alliance, league, confederation, or conuention whatsoeuer, it behoueth* 1.240 that the lawes of maiestie be vnto euerie prince or people reserued safe and vntouched: for otherwise the one should fall into the power and mercie of the other; as the weaker [ C] oftentimes are by the power & might of the stronger enforced to receiue lawes; which is not so in the treaties of alliance equall: wherein euen little cities are in the indifferent lawes of leagues equall vnto most mightie kings and people, being not bound either to obserue the maiestie of their more mightie confederats, or to giue them place. As a man may see in that treatie of alliance made betwixt the kings of Persia, & the seigno∣ri•…•… of Thebes: For albeit that the Persian empire was bounded almost with the same bounds that the course of the sunne was, viz▪ from the riuage of Hellesponrus vnto the remotest parts of India; and that the citie of Thebes was enclosed but in strait wals, and the countrey of Beotia; yet for all that were they both in the league of their alliance equall. Now where we said, that in alliance of protection, the protector hath [ D] a prerogatiue of honour; that is not to be vnderstood onely, that hee ought to be the chiefe allie, as was Lewes the eleuenth the French king with the Swissers, who did him that honour aboue the duke of Sauoy, who was before the chiefe: For alwayes the soueraigne prince be he neuer so little, in alliance equall, is maister in his owne house, and holdeth the first place aboue all other princes comming into his countrie: but if the protector himselfe come, he is the first both in sitting and all other honours.

But here might one say, Why should allies in league defensiue & offensiue against all without exception, vsing the same customes, the same lawes, the same state, the same diets, be reputed straungers one to another? Wee haue hereof example of the Swissers, who are allied amongst themselues, with such alliance as I haue said, since [ E] the yeare 1315; yet say I neuerthelesse that such alliance letteth not, but that they are still straungers one vnto the other, and maketh not that they are one citisens to the* 1.241 other. We haue also hereof example of the Latines, and the Romans, who were al∣lies in league defensiue and offensiue, vsed the same customes, the same armes, the same language, and had the same friends and enemies: Whereupon the Latines maintai∣ned, that it was and ought to be one and the selfe same Commonweale; and therfore by their ambassadours demaunded to haue their part in the estate & offices of Rome, as had the Romans themselues. S•…•… societ•…•…s (said they) equatio iuris est, si socialis exerci∣tus

illis est quo duplicent vires suas; cur non omnia aequantur? cur non alter ab Latinis [ F] Consuldatur? Vbi pars virium, ibi & imperij pars est. And immediatly after, Vnum po∣pulum, vnam rempublicam fieri aequum est. Tum Consul Romanus. Audi Iupiter haec scelera: peregrinos Consules, & peregrinum Senatum in tuo templo, &c. If societie (said they) be an equalitie of right, if they haue their allies armie, whereby they double their strength: why then are not all things made equall? why is not one of the Consuls cho∣sen of the Latines? where part of the strength is, there should also part of the gouern∣ment be. And immediatly after, It is but right that there should bee but one people and one Commonweale. Then said the Roman Consull, Heare ô Iupiter these vil∣lanies, straunge Consuls, and a straunge Senat in thy temple, &c. So hee calleth them straungers which were allied vnto the Romans with the strongest alliance that was [ G] possible to deuise, insomuch that they seemed to be all of one and the selfe same citie. Yea Festus teacheth vs the Municipes (or enfranchised men) not to haue bene citisens: whose words we haue thought good here to set downe: Municip•…•…um id genus homi∣num dicitur, qui cum Romam venissent, neque ciues Romani essent, participes tamen fue∣runt omnium rerum ad munus fungendum vnà cum Romanis ciuibus, praeterquam de suf∣fragio ferendo aut magistratu capiendo: sicut fuerunt Fundani, Formiani, Cumani, Acer∣rani, Lanuuini, Tusculani, qui post aliquot annos ciues Romani effecti sunt. Al•…•…o modo id ge∣nus hominum dicitur, quorum ciuitas vniuersain ciuitatem Romanam venit, vt Aricini, Cerites, Anagnini. Tertio definiuntur ij qui ad ciuitatem Romanam it a venerunt, vt Mu∣nicipia essent suae cuiusque ciuitatis coloniae, vt Tiburtes, Praenestini, Pisani, Arpinates, [ H] Nolani, Bononienses, Placentini, Sutrini, Lucenses. That kind of men (saith hee) is called Municipials, who comming to Rome and being no citisens, were yet partakers of all things together with the Roman citisens, except in giuing of voyces, and bearing of of∣fices; as were the Fundani, the Formiani, the Cumani, the Acerrani, the Lanuuini, and the Tusculani, who after certaine yeares were made citisens of Rome. And otherwise that sort of men is so called also, whose whole citie came into the citie of Rome; as the Aricini, the Cerites, and the Anagnini. And thirdly they who so came vnto the citie of Rome, as that the Colonies of euerie citie were accounted Municipials; as were the Tiburts, the Praenestini, the Pisani, the Arpinates, the Nolani, the Bononienses, the Placen∣tini, Sutrini, and Lucenses. [ I]

Now many I see to be in the same errour, as that the Swissers for like reason are all* 1.242 but one Commonweale: and yet it is most certaine that they be thirteene Common∣weals, holding nothing one of another, but euerie one of them hauing the soueraignty thereof diuided from the rest. In former time their countrey was but one member of the German empire, gouerned by the emperours deputie. The first that rebelled were the inhabitants of Schwits, Vri, and Vnderuald, who treated of alliance both defensiue and offensiue, in the month of December, in the yeare 1315: whereof the first article* 1.243 was, That none of them should more admit the commaund of any prince, or endure any soueraigne prince ouer him. And afterwards in the yeare 1332 alliance was made of foure Cantons, which were called the foure townes of the wood, viz. Vri, Schwits, [ K] and Lucerne. And in the yeare 1351, Zurith entred into alliance with these foure. And in the yeare 1352 Zug was also receiued with these fiue; and the yeare following Berne. And afterwards in the yeare 1393, was made the treatie of Sempach (after that the nobilitie of the Swissers was by the commonaltie discomfited and ouerthrowne) wherein they of Zurich, Lucerne, Berne, Soleure, Zug, Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, and Glaris, entred into alliance defensiue and offensiue; which they renewed in the yeare 1481. Basill was also receiued in the yeare 1501: Schaffuse also and Apenzel in the yeare 1513, Mulhouse in the yeare 1520, Rotwill in the yeare 1519. The Valesians also

in the yeare 1528, with whom beside the auntient treatie, a particular treatie was made [ A] betwixt them and the Bernoies for league defensiue. Bienne also entred into league offensiue and defensiue with the Bernoies, in the yere 1352, after that they had exemp∣ted themselues out of the power of the bishop of Basill their soueraigne prince. All which treaties of alliance, the abbat of Orbez, ambassadour for the French king vnto the Swissers, hath let me see. Whereby a man may not onely note the pluralitie of Commonweals, but the diuersitie of alliances also. For they of Berne may summon the three little Cantons of Vri, Schwits, and Vnderuald, vnto their succour, by vertue of their first league: and they of Zurich and Berne, may reciprocally summon the one the other: they of Lucerne may of eight Cantons summon fiue: And the three little Cantons of Schwits, Vri, and Vnderuald, may summon all the rest of the Cantons vn∣to [ B] their aid, if they chaunce to be inuaded, and that for diuers causes. The assemblies of al the Swissers, except the Rhaetians, them of Geneua, and the Valesians, are holden euerie yeare: and whatsoeuer is decreed by the greater part of the ambassadours of the cities, bindeth them all in particular, and the lesser part of the whole in common. The last that entred into the league vnder the protection of the Bernois, were they of Gene∣ua.* 1.244 All these allies, confederats, and coallies, made two and twentie Commonweales, with the abbat of St. Gal a soueraigne prince; all seperated in soueraigntie, and eue∣rie one of them hauing their magistrats apart, their state apart, their bursse, their de∣maine and territorie apart. In briefe, their armies, their crie, their name, their money, their seale, their assemblies, their iurisdiction, their ordinances in euerie estate diuided. [ C] And if one of the Cantons of themselues get any thing, the rest haue no part therein: as the Bernoies haue well giuen to vnderstand: For since they entred into the league, they haue ioined vnto their own domesticall gouernment little lesse than fortie towns, vpon whome they leuie men and money, and giue vnto them lawes: ouer which the other Cantons haue no power at all: as was iudged by Frauncis the first, the French king, by them chosen arbitrator in this matter. They of Basil also, when in the yeare 1560 they had lent fiftie thousand crownes vnto the French king, they tooke the Can∣ton of Soleure to themselues in caution▪ but hauing by the common aid of al the Can∣tons taken in the bailiwike of Lugan, with certaine other lands beyond the moun∣taines; euerie Canton by turne one after another, sent thither their magistrats and go∣uernours, [ D] for the administration of iustice▪ that so vnto euery Canton of the Swissers might be reserued their right and due. The towne also of Bade, where they common∣ly hold their yearely assemblies or diets, is common vnto eight Cantons, which after the victorie of Sempech ioyned in league together. It is also (as I suppose) wel known vnto all men, how that they are not all of one and the same religion, but to bee therein diuided, and had therfore oftentimes taken vp arms one of them against another, if the French king had not wisely prouided therfore; as well for the sincere loue and affecti∣on hee bare vnto them, as for the notable interest hee had to maintaine them in peace: for that of their health and welfare the securitie of Fraunce seemeth almost wholy to depend. [ E]

But vnto manie it may seeme, that they altogether make but one estate, considering that, that which is decreed in their diets in common, bindeth euerie one of the Can∣tons,* 1.245 and the lesser part of them all: as the seuen Cantons Catholike gaue well to vn∣derstand vnto the foure Cantons Protestants, at the diet holden in September, in the yeare 1554, insomuch that the common countrie situat beyond the mountaines, diui∣ded in religion, and gouerned by the magistrats that euerie Canton sendeth thither by turne; it chaunced that the seuen Cantons Catholike caused them of the common countrey to bind themselues not to chaunge the religion Catholike: and so following

the same obligation would afterwards haue proceeded against them of the religion [ F] there, against whome the cantons protestants opposed themselues, and were now rea∣die to haue entred into armes, had not the ambassadour of Fraunce stept in betwixt them, and wisely pacified the matter: yet for all that with this prouiso, That the com∣mon subiects of the religion should be punished (for chaunging their religion, contrary vnto the league) if the greater part of the cantons should be of that opinion, and that the cantons catholike should neuerthelesse redeliuer the letters obligatorie of the com∣mon subiects. By which meane their differences were againe well appeased. Wher∣unto the cantons of Glaris and Apenzel serued in good stead; who indifferently recei∣ued both the one and the other religion, and made as it were an equall counterpoise be∣twixt the one of them and the other. So that it appeareth that the greater part of the [ G] cantons bindeth the lesse, and euerie one of them in particular. Yea and that more is, none of the cantons may haue alliance with any prince whatsoeuer without the whole* 1.246 consent of the rest. As the cantons protestants hauing made alliance with Philip the Landgraue of Hessen, and the seignorie of Strasburg, in the yeare 1532, were by the rest of their allies enforced againe to depart from the same. As in like case the cantons catholike were compelled to renounce their new alliance made with the house of Au∣stria. And albeit that the fiue cantons catholike Lucerne, Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, and Zug, had made alliance with Pope Pius the fourth, for the defence of their religion; yet could they not with any rewards (were they neuer so great) be enduced to renew the same with his successours. But when treatie was had, for alliance to bee made betwixt [ H] Frauncis the first, the French king, and the Swissers, nothing more letted the same, than the opposition of the cantons protestants; who before instructed in the new religion, and persuaded by the earnest sermons of Zuinglius their preacher, who affirmed it to be vnlawfull for them to serue straunge princes in their warres, preuailed so much, that his followers and countrie men would no other wise make alliance with the king, but by the way of peace and friendship onely. But the leagues renewed with Henry the se∣cond, they of Basil and Schaffuse, with the catholike cities, ioyned themselues vnto the French, not in league of friendship onely, but in giuing of their aid also: when as for al that, they of Zutic and Berne, in the yeare 1554, forbad their subiects vpon paine of death to serue the French king in his warres. And the same yere the gouernors of the [ I] canton of Vnderuald, requested by the cardinall of Trent, That by their leaue hee might leuie certaine men in their countrey; forbad their subiects in generall, vppon paine of death, and confiscation of their goods, to go to serue any other prince than the French king: which are all vndoubted arguments to shew, that among the Swissers there are as many Commonweals as there are cities or cantons. In like case the three confederat cities of the Grisons, which consist of fiftie companies or fellowships, haue their gouernments diuers one from another; and yet as oft as they haue their assem∣blies, the greatest citie of the Grisons vseth to send thereunto eight and twentie depu∣ties, the second twentie foure, and the last fourteene: with power, that whatsoeuer the greatest part of these their deputies shall agree vpon, in matters concerning their com∣mon [ K] societie, shall bind euery one of them in particular: and sometimes also in matters of greater importance all the people assemble themselues. Wherefore they are de∣ceiued, which of those three cities would make one Commonweale. For common assemblies and meetings, common demaines, common enemies and friends, make not the same Commonweale; no not although they haue the same bourse, or certaine common treasure: but the soueraigntie of power that euerie one hath to commaund or restraine their subiects: as in like case, if many heads of families should become part∣ners of all their goods, yet should they not therefore make one and the selfe same fami∣lie.

The same opinion we may haue of the alliance contracted betwixt the Romans [ A] and the rest of the townes of Italie, combined in league both offensiue and defensiue, against all men without exception: who yet neuerthelesse were diuers Common∣weales, diuided both in their assemblies and soueraigntie. The like we may say of the league of the seuen townes of the Amphictioniques, who had their meetings and so∣ueraigntie diuided: to whose example most of the townes and seignories of Greece afterwards entred into the same league and confederation, for the deciding of their con∣trouersies: and euerie yeare euery seignorie sent their ambassadours and deputies vn∣to the common estates, where the greatest affaires, proceedings, and differences, be∣twixt the princes and seignories, were determined by their deputies, whom they called Myrios: by whom the Lacedemonians were condemned to the seignorie of Thebes, [ B] in the summe of thirtie thousand crownes: and for not obaying the decree, were condemned in double thereof: for that contrarie to the treatie of peace, they had sur∣prised the castle of Cadmee. The Phocences also afterwards when they had robbed the holy treasure at Delphos, were by the decree of the Amphictioniques, enioyned to restore the money by them so euill taken out of the temple: for default of which doing, all their country was adiudged vnto the treasurie of the temple: so that if there were any person which shewed himselfe disobedient vnto the decrees of the Amphi∣ctioniques, he therefore incurred the indignation of all Greece.

Here might one say, That all Greece was but one Commonweale, considering the power of the Amphictioniques: and yet neuerthelesse there were almost as many di∣uers [ C] Commonweales, as cities, holding nothing one of them of another, neither of the states of the Amphictioniques; but that they had so promised one to another, as prin∣ces haue accustomed to promise among themselues, and to chuse their allies for their arbitrators: which neither the Lacedemonians, nor the Phocenses had done, neither could against their wils be of right thereunto enforced. Yea the Phocenses to giue the Amphictioniques to vnderstand that they had no power ouer them, pluckt downe and tore in peeces the decrees of the Amphictioniques, fastened vnto the pillers of the temple of Delphos. Yet true it is, that Philip king of Macedon (beeing himselfe none of the league) tooke hereupon occasion to denounce the sacred warre vnto the Pho∣censes, and to ruinat their state: and in recompence therof obtained the place and pri∣ueleges [ D] of the Phocenses: the Lacedemonians being also excluded out of the league of the Amphictioniques, for hauing giuen vnto them succours. The like league almost we also find to haue bene amongst the auntient Gaules, as is to bee seene in the Com∣mentaries* 1.247 of Caesar, where he saith, That Vercingentorix chosen their generall, caused all the states of Gaule to be assembled. And albeit that the lords of Autun, of Char∣tres, of Gergoye in Auuergne, and of Beauuois, held nothing one of them of another; and that the seignorie of Bourges was in the protection of Autun; and those of Viar∣ron in the protection of Bruges, and so consequently the other townes in like sort: yet so it was, that all the princes and seignories passed their differences by the decrees and iudgements of the Druydes; vnto whose censure if they refused to obey, they were [ E] by them excommunicated, and so of euerie man shunned, as men of all others most detestable. And yet is it most manifest that these Commonweales which I haue spo∣ken of, had their soueraignties diuided one of them from another, the territories of their cities certainely bounded out, and euery one of them their owne proper state and maiestie.

But it may also happen, that to become but one estate, one Commonweale, & one seignorie, when the partners of one league doe agree in the same soueraigntie: a thing not easie to be iudged; if a man looke not neere into it. As the league of the Achaeans

was not at the first but of three cities, diuided in estate, assemblies, and soueraigntie; al∣lies [ F] * 1.248 by alliance equal, both defensiue & offensiue: who hauing the same enemies & the same friends, yet at the beginning kept euery one of them vnto themselues the maiesty of their owne citie. But being troubled with continuall warres, and enforced to hold their often assemblies, they by little and little became so straitly vnited together, that in fine they became but one Commonwealth composed of many: and in tract of time drew vnto their estate all the townes and cities of Achaia and Morea, they all retaining still the first name of the Achaeans. As it happened vnto them of the league, whome* 1.249 they call Swissers; for that the canton of Schwits, the least of all the rest, was the first that reuolted, after that they had slaine their gouernor. And as the Achaians were called the correctors of tirants; so also the Swissers (to their great praise) carried this title [ G] of honour. The townes also of the kingdome of Naples, after the massacre of the Pi∣thagorians, being much troubled, and not knowing vnto whome to haue recourse, cast themselues into the protection of the Achaians. But the author and meane of all these cities, to make one and the same Commonweale, was Aratus, who procured it to be decreed by the estates, That euerie yere one chiefe generall should bee chosen to commaund in their warres, and to gouerne their estates: and hee was prince of the Achaians, that is to say, the first that called together their assemblies. And whereas before euerie citie sent their ambassadours and deputies with instructions vnto the as∣semblie of the Achaians (as the Swissers vse to doe) there to giue their voyces delibe∣ratiue: Aratus brought to passe, that the assemblie of the ambassadours and depu∣ties [ H] so sent, should make choyce of ten principall men, whome they called Demiurges, who alone had voices deliberatiue, and power to resolue, to determine, and decide mat∣ters of state: therest of the ambassadours and deputies hauing onely voyces consulta∣tiue. These two points gained, there by little and little grew vp an Aristocraticall Commonweale, in stead of diuers particular Monarchies, Aristocraties, and popular Seignories: many tyrants partly for loue, partly for feare, being drawne thereunto. Now all the spoyle of the enemies, and conquests made by the generals, were not any one cities, but belonged to them all. So that at length such was the vnion and consent of the confederats, that all the townes of Achaia and Morea being made subiect, vni∣ted, and incorporat vnto the state of the Achaians, vsed the same lawes, the same right, [ I] the same customes, the same religion, the same tongue, the same language, the same dis∣cipline, the same manners, the same money, the same weights and measures, as saith Po∣lybius. The kings of Macedon entred also into this league; yea the two Philips, An∣tigonus, and Demetrius, were chosen chiefe captaines of the Achaians, holding neuer∣thelesse their realme seperated apart from the seignorie of the Achaians. And the Ro∣mans knowing well that they could not possibly conquer Greece, the league of the Achaeans standing whole, gaue commaundement vnto Gallus their Proconsull, by all meanes possible to doe what he might to breake the same; which hee not in vaine at∣tempted. For diuers cities complaining vnto the states, that vnder colour of a league and alliance equall, they had taken from them the managing of their estate and soue∣raigntie; [ K] and assuring themselues of the aid of the Romans, reuolted from the commu∣nitie of the Achaians: to meet wherewith, and to stay the other cities from doing the like, Aratus obtained commission from the states to enforme against these rebels: af∣ter which the cities before reuolted, put themselues into the protection of the Ro∣mans; yet with prouiso, that their estate and soueraigntie should remaine vnto them still. But when the power of the Romans seemed vnto the rest of the Achaeans inuin∣cible, they for the safegard of their libertie, entred into amitie with the Romans also; yet with condition, That the Lacedemonians, whome the Romans had in a manner

drawne from the state of the Achaeans, should from thenceforth be vnder the protecti∣on [ A] and power of the Achaeans, except in case concerning the life or goods of a Lacede∣monian citisen, wherewith the Achaeans might not meddle. Which was by the Ro∣mans most subtilly done: that so there might still be matter of perpetuall discord and ciuill warre betwixt the Lacedemonians and the Achaeans. For if the Lacedemonians had bene altogether in power of the Achaeans, they had with their wealth greatly aug∣mented the strength of the associats: and on the other side if the Romans should haue left them altogether free, it was to be feared least they should together with their won∣ted valour, haue recouered their auntient Commonweale also. The like deceit they vsed also against the Aetolians, which was another estate and league diuided from the* 1.250 Achaeans, composed of three cities, who had also their estate, assemblies, & soueraign∣tie [ B] diuided; but in fine, following the example of the Achaeans, they of three Com∣monweals allied with alliance equall, both defensiue and offensiue, established one Ari∣stocratical Commonweale, mannaged by the states of the three confederats, & by one common Senat, wherein was president one chiefe captaine euery yeare chosen. The* 1.251 like we may say of the three and twentie cities of Lycia, which established one Aristo∣craticall Commonweale, like vnto that of the Achaeans; sauing that the deputies of the greater cities had in their generall assemblies three deliberatiue voices, the meaner ci∣tisens two, and the rest but one; as saith Strabo: and moreouer out of the estates they chose a captaine generall, whome they called the Lyciarque, and so the other magistats and judges of all the cities also. Other alliances also and leagues there were of the thir∣teene [ C] * 1.252 cities of Ionia, of the twelue cities of Tuscanie, and of the fortie seuen cities of the Latines, strongly made by alliance equall, both defensiue and offensiue, holding their assemblies of their states euerie yeare, and chusing also sometimes (but not euer) a chiefe captaine or generall, especially in time of warre: and yet neuerthelesse the so∣ueraigntie of euerie citie continued in the estate of it selfe, as doth the Swissers. For al∣beit that the citie of Rome was entred into league with the Latines, and that Seruius Tullius, and Tarquin the proud king of Rome, had bene chosen chiefe captaines of the league of the Latines; yet so it is neuerthelesse, that euerie citie kept still the assemblies and soueraigntie thereof: and yet the kings of Rome lost nothing thereby of their ma∣iestie. Now it seemeth at the first show, that such leagues of cities were like vnto those [ D] of the Achaeans: but the like thereof there is not one, except those of the Aetolians: and at this present the estate of the empire of the Germans, which we will in due place show to bee no monarchie, but a pure Aristocratie, composed of the princes of the empire, of the seuen electors, and the imperiall cities. Yet this is a thing common to all confederat cities, that in time of warre they haue vsed to make one generall cap∣taine, euery yeare to be chosen, or els once for all. For as the seignorie of the Achaeans chose for their captaines the kings of Macedon, Antigonus, and Philip the second; and the league of the Aetolians made choice of Attalus king of Asia, as saith * 1.253 Liuie; and likewise the Latines, of the kings of Rome, and other their neighbour princes▪ so also the electors haue oftentimes chosen straunge princes, as Henrie of Lutzemburg, Al∣phonsus [ E] the tenth, and Charles the fift, kings of Castile; who although they were soue∣raignes in their owne realmes, were yet neuerthelesse subiects to the empires, as cap∣taines* 1.254 in chiefe. For as a captaine in chief, being not soueraigne to them that haue cho∣sen him, maketh not them of the league to be one Commonweale: so also he chaun∣geth in nothing the estate and vnion of the Commonweale whereunto hee is called. So Philip Valois the French king, was chosen generall of the ecclesiasticall forces, as we see in that league which was made betwixt Philip Valois, & Henry count Palatine, who was afterwards of the Germans chosen emperour. And not long since Adolphus vncle

to the king of Denmarke, was chosen chiefe captaine of the league of the Hauns cities. [ F] The Venetians also as oft as they are to make warre, haue vsed to make choyce of any straunge generall, rather than of a citisen of their owne. But the German emperours take vpon them a stile of much higher qualitie than of Captains in chief, or Generall; auoching themselues not onely to bee cheife captaines and magistrats, but euen mo∣narchs also: which whether it be so or no, we will in due place declare. They pretend also to haue power to commaund not onely the princes of the empire, but euen them also who hold of them nothing. For it is not long since that the emperour Ferdinand sent his ambassadours vnto the Swissers, to the end they should not receiue Grombach, nor the conspiratours his adherents, banished out of the empire: which thing, when the emperour seemed by his letters rather to commaund than to request; the Swissers [ G] (a free people) were therewith not a little moued. And before that also, Morlet Musa ambassadour for the French king vnto the Swissers, certified the king, How that the gouernour of Milan (as hauing such charge from the emperour) had forbidden the car∣dinall of Syon to enter into league with the French king, for that hee was a prince of the empire: of which his commaund the cardinall made no great account, but without regard of his prohibition made alliance with the French king; from whome he recei∣ued twelue hundred pounds pention yearly. True it is, that in all the leagues of the Swissers with forren princes, the empire is alwayes excepted, if there be not thereof ex∣presse* 1.255 mention made. And for that cause Guiche the kings ambassadour to the Swis∣sers had thereof expresse charge (as I haue seene by the instructions that were giuen [ H] him) to make mention of the emperour in the treatie of alliance, of the yere 1521. For the Germans grounded themselues vpon a maxime, in vertie whereof the emperour Sigismund caused the Swissers to take vp armes against Frederick of Austria, to the pre∣iudice of the alliance made with the house of Austria: presupposing that the empire was superiour vnto the Swissers, and that in all treaties of alliance, the right of the su∣periour is still to be excepted, although there be thereof no expresse mention made. Which is certaine, for as much as concerneth the lawes of maiestie; but the Swissers confesse not that the emperor hath any superioritie ouer them, and much lesse the em∣perour, subiect to the states of the empire. It is also true, that by the treatie made betwixt the eight auntient cantons, there is an expresse clause, whereby the cantons of Zurich, [ I] Berne, Schwits, and Vnderualden (as hauing sometime bene part of the German em∣pire) declared, That for their part they entended to comprehend in that treatie the ma∣iestie of the sacred empire, the right whereof they purposed not to preiudice by that treatie of alliance. And within a few yeares aftet, the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Lu∣cerne, Vri, and Glaris, in the name of all the cantons of the Swissers, sent their ambas∣sadours to obtaine the confirmation of their auntient priueledges, of Ferdinand, then holding a diet of the states of the empire, at Ausburg. And by the treaties of alliance made betwixt the sacred empire and the cities of the cantons, it is expresly articulated, That they should not giue any aid vnto any straunge prince, to make warre vpon the territorie of the empire; as I haue learned by a copie of the letters of the emperour [ K] Charles the fift, written to the lords of the cantons; whereby hee complaineth, That their subiects ioyned with the forces of the French king, had entred vpon the territo∣ries of the empire, contrarie to the expresse tenour of the alliance that they had with the empire. And not long after, he by other letters demandeth of the lords of the can∣tons to punish their subiects, who had inuaded the territories belonging to the house of Austria, contrarie to the hereditarie alliance made betwixt the princes of the house of Austria and the Swissers, in the yeare of Grace 1467, and renewed in the yere 1501, in which league, the See of Rome, the Pope, and the empire, are excepted: and a yere∣ly

pention set downe, of two hundred florins to be yeately paid vnto euery canton. [ A] Which alliance was againe renewed by the xiij cantons, at the diet of Bade holden the xx day of Iuly 1554. As for the league betwixt the said lords of the cantons, and the French king, it was onely a league defensiue, for the preseruation of the states of the allies, and not for the inuading of forreners: which are the true reasons for which the Swissers are withholden to inuade the territories of the empire, and of the house of Au∣stria; and not for the right of any preheminence, or superioritie that the empire hath ouer them. Which is also yet more expresly verified by the treatie of alliance, renew∣ed betwixt the French king and the lords of the cantons, in Iune 1549, out of which are excluded all such as are not subiect to the Swissers, nor vse not the German tongue. And that is it for which Charles the fift, the emperour, laboured by all meanes to make [ B] agreement with the Swissers, that the dukedome of Millan, with the kingdoms of Na∣ples and Sicilie, might be comprised in the hereditarie treaties of alliance, made with them for the house Austria: which the Swissers •…•…latly refused to grant in the yere 1555. The same we may iudge of the cities of the Grisons, rent from the German empire, who sufficiently declared themselues to bee in nothing bound vnto the edicts of the empire, or of the emperor; in that they would not accept euen of a German prince by the emperor appointed to be their bishop: but the 3 cities of the Grisons, being at vari∣ance among themselues, about the choice of their bishop▪ the Swissers by the authority of the league, taking vpon them to be arbitrators of all controuersies arising betwixt the confederat cities, without any regard had to the prouision of the pope, or confirma∣tion [ C] of the emperour appointed him to be bishop which was chosen by the Chapiter, subiect to the Grisons; and decreed, that from that time forward hee should be bishop whome the league of the Cadde should make choyce of.

Now seeing that our reasoning is of leagues, and of lawes of armes, question might* 1.256 be made, Whether it be lawfull for subiects to entreat of any particular league or alli∣ance among themselues, or with other forren princes, without the leaue or consent of their owne soueraignes? Such alliances, and especially with strangers princes haue vsed to embarre, for the euill consequences that might ensue thereon: and namely the king Catholike by expresse edicts hath forbidden all his subiects so to do. And at such time as Lewes of Fraunce, duke of Orleance (he which was slaine at Paris) was charge with [ D] many matters, nothing was more grieuously obiected against him beeing slaine, than that he had secretly entred into league with Henrie duke of Lancaster. Yet for all that the princes of the empire thinke it lawfull for them so to doe: and for their owne safe∣tie to enter into league of alliance, both among themselues, and with other forren prin∣ces, so that it be done without the preiudice of the German empire. For whatsoeuer leagues are by them otherwise made, are void and of none effect. But when the em∣pire is excepted, the emperour himselfe is not therefore excepted, as hath oftentimes but neuer more plainely bene vnderstood, than in the league which many of the Ger∣man princes made with Henrie the second, the French king, at Chambort, for the de∣fence of the German empire, against the emperour Charles the fift, in the yeare 1552. [ E] In which league they acknowledged king Henry for their superiour, promising curte∣ously to reuerence his maiestie; and so by their common consent made him generall of their warres, calling him The Protectour of Princes, and of the libertie of the em∣pire. And in the yeare 1559 the like alliance both defensiue and offensiue was made betwixt the king of Sweden, the marques Assemberg, the duke of Brunsuich, the duke of Cleue, the prince of Orange, the countie Aiguemont, and diuers other imperiall townes on the one part, and the king of Denmarke, the duke of Saxonie, the Land∣graue of Hesse, the duke of Holste, the duke of Bauyere, the towne of Nuremberg, the

bishops of Wirciburg, and Bamberg the towne of Lubec, and diuers other, with Sigis∣mund [ F] Augustus king of Polonia, on the other part. Yea the emperour Charles the fift himselfe made particular alliance with the duke of Bauaria, and other the catholike princes, to chuse his brother Ferdinand king of Romans. And a little after also the league of Franconia was made betwixt the house of Austria, the duke of Bauaria, the three bishops of Franconia, the archbishop of Salisburg, and the cities of Nuremberg and Ausberg. And Ferdinand also king of the Romans, for the catholike religion sake made a particular league with the bishop of Salisburg against the protestants, in the yeare 1556. Wee haue seene also the league which was called The league of Sueuia, to haue made alliance offensiue and defensiue for 40 yeares, without excepting any thing sa•…•…e the empire. And the like league also betwixt the Sea townes, which they cal [ G] the Vandales, that is to wit, Lubech, Hambourg, Vimare, Rostoc, Bresme, Suid, impe∣riall townes, chusing for their chiefe captaine Adolph vncle to the king of Denmarke, who was not any way subiect to the empire. Yet in all these leagues was euer excep∣ted the maiestie of the German empire. Yea that more is, the nobilitie of Denmarke entred into a league defensiue with Sigismund Augustus king of Polonia, & the towne* 1.257 of Luec, against the king of Denmarke himselfe: greater treason than which none could haue bene deuised, if the king of Denmarke had the highest power ouer his people, and were an absolute soueraigne: of which matter, and of all the law of armes wee will in due place reason: but first it behoueth vs to speake of maiestie, or Soue∣raigntie. [ H]

CHAP. VIII. ¶ Of Soueraigntie.

MAiestie or Soueraigntie is the most high, absolute, and perpetu∣all* 1.258 power ouer the citisens and subiects in a Commonweale: which the Latines cal Maiestatem, the Greeks 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; the Italians Segnoria, and the Hebrewes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, The greatest power to commaund. For maiestie (as Festus saith) is so called of migh∣tinesse. [ I] For so here it behoueth first to define what maiestie or Soueraigntie is, which neither lawyer nor politicall philosopher hath yet defined: although it be the principall and most necessarie point for the vnder∣standing of the nature of a Commonweale. And forasmuch as wee haue before defi∣ned a Commonweale to be the right gouernment of many families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetuall power: it resteth to be decla∣red, what is to be vnderstood by the name of a most high and perpetuall power. We* 1.259 haue said that this power ought to be perpetuall, for that it may bee, that that absolute power ouer the subiects may be giuen to one or many, for a short or certaine time, which expired, they are no more than subiects themselues: so that whilest they are in [ K] their puissant authoritie, they cannot call themselues Soueraigne princes, seeing that they are but men put in trust, and keepers of this soueraigne power, vntill it shall please the people or the prince that gaue it them to recall it; who alwaies remained seased thereof. For as they which lend or pawne vnto another man their goods, remaine still the lords and owners thereof: so it is also with them, who giue vnto others power and authoritie to iudge and commaund, be it for a certaine time limitted, or so great and long time as shall please them; they themselues neuerthelesse continuing still seased of the power and iurisdiction, which the other exercise but by way of loane or borrow∣ing.

And that is it for which the law saith, That the gouernour of a countrey, or lieute∣nant [ A] of a prince, his time once expired, giueth vp his power, as but one put in trust, and therein defended by the power of another. And in that respect there is no difference betwixt the great officer and the lesser: for otherwise if the high and absolute power graunted by a prince to his lieutenant, should of right be called Soueraigntie, he might vse the same against his prince, to whome nothing was left but the bare name of a prince, standing but for a cipher: so should the subiect commaund his Soueraigne, the seruant his maister, than which nothing could be more absurd: considering that in all power graunted vnto magistrats, or priuat men, the person of the prince is alwaies to be excepted; who neuer giueth so much power vnto another, but that hee alwayes kee∣peth more vnto himselfe; neither is euer to be thought so depriued of his soueraigne [ B] power, but that he may take vnto himself the examination and deciding of such things as he hath committed vnto his magistrats or officers, whether it be by the way of pre∣uention, concurrence, or euocation: from whome he may also take the power giuen them by vertue of their commission or institution, or suffer them to hold it so long as shall please him. These grounds thus laid, as the foundations of Soueraigntie, wee conclude, that neither the Roman Dictator, nor the Harmoste of Lacedemonia, nor the Esmynaet of Salonick, nor he whom they cal the Archus of Malta, nor the antient Baily of Florence, (when it was gouerned by a popular state) neither the Regents or Viceroyes of kingdoms, nor any other officers or magistrats whatsoeuer, vnto whom the highest, but yet not the perpetual power, is by the princes or peoples grant commit∣ted, [ C] can be accounted to haue the same in Soueraignty. And albeit that the antient Di∣ctators had all power giuen them in best sort that might be (which the antient Latines called Optima Lege) so that from them it was not lawfull to appeale▪ and vpon whose creation all offices were suspended; vntill such time as that the Tribunes were orday∣ned as keepers of the peoples libertie, who continued in their charge notwithstanding the creation of the Dictator, who had free power to oppose themselues against him; so that if appeale were made from the Dictatour, the Tribunes might assemble the peo∣ple, appointing the parties to bring forth the causes of their appeale, & the Dictator to stay his iudgement; as when Papirius Cursor the Dictator, condemned Fabius Max the first, to death; and Fabius Max the second had in like manner condemned M•…•…∣nutius, [ D] both Colonels of the horsemen, for that they had fought with the enemie con∣trarie to the commaund of the Dictator; they were yet both by appeale and iudge∣ment of the people acquited. For so saith Liuie, Then the father of Fabius said, I call* 1.260 vpon the Tribunes, and appeale vnto the people, which can do more than thy Dictatorship▪* 1.261 whereunto king Tullus Hostilius gaue place. Wherby it appeareth that the Dictator was neither soueraigne prince, nor magistrat, as many haue supposed; neither had any thing more than a simple commission for the making of wa•…•…e▪ the repressing of sedi∣tion, the reforming of the state▪ on instituting of new officers. So that Soueraigntie is not limited either in power, charge, or time certaine. And namely the ten commissio∣ners established for the reforming of customes and lawes; albeit than they had absolute [ E] power, from which there was no appeale to be made, and that all offices were suspen∣ded, during the time of their commission; yet had they not for all that any Soueraign∣tie; for their commission being fulfilled, their power also expired; as did that of the Dictators. So 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hauing vanquished the enemie, forth with discharged him∣selfe of the Dictatorship, which he had not had but fifteene dayes, Seruilius in eight dayes, Mamercus in one day. And the Dictator was also named, not by the Senat, or the people, neither by the magistrats, or request made vnto the people; nor by any laws which were alwayes necessarie to the creating of officers, but by an interrex, or a king

created for a time, borne of honourable blood: for why, it was not enough for him to [ F] be a noble Senator onely, that should name the Dictator. Now if one should say, that Sylla was by the law Valeria made Dictator for threescore yeares: I will aunswere as Cicero did, That it was neither Dictatorship nor law, but a most cruell tyrannie; where∣of for all that he discharged himselfe the fourth yere after he was made Dictator, when as he with the blood of the citisens had quenched the flames of the ciuill warres; ha∣uing yet still in the meane time reserued vnto the Tribunes their free power to oppose themselues against his authoritie. And although Caesar fortie yeares after had inuaded the perpetuall Dictatorship together with the libertie of the people, yet left hee vnto the Tribunes of the people, their power to oppose themselues against his proceedings: but when as before, Pompeius being Consull, the verie name of the Dictatorship was [ G] taken out of the Commonweale, and Caesar, contrarie to the law of Pompeius, had pro∣cured himselfe by the law Seruia, to be created Dictator, hee was by the conspiracie of the Senators slaine in the middest of the Senat. But let vs graunt an absolute power without appeale or controlement, to be graunted by the people to one or many to mannage their estate and entire gouernment: shall wee therefore say him or them to* 1.262 haue the state of Soueraigntie, when as hee onely is to bee called absolute soueraigne, who next vnto God acknowledgeth none greaterthan himself? wherefore I say no so∣ueraigntie to be in them, but in the people, of whom they haue a borrowed power, or power for a certaine time, which once expired; they are bound to yeeld vp their au∣thoritie. Neither is the people to be thought to haue depriued it selfe of the power [ H] thereof▪ although it haue giuen an absolute power to one or moe for a certaine time: and much more if the power (be it giuen) be reuocable at the pleasure of the people, without any limitation of time: For both the one and the other hold nothing of them∣selues, but are to giue account of their doings vnto the prince, or the people of whome they had the power so to commaund: whereas the prince or people themselues, in whome the Soueraigntie resteth, are to giue account vnto none, but to the immortall God alone.

But what if such absolute power as we haue spoken of, be giuen to one or moe for nine or ten yeares? as in auntient time in Athens the people made one of the citisens* 1.263 their soueraigne, whome they called Archon. I say neuerthelesse that hee was no [ I] prince, neither that the Soueraigntie of the state rested in him: albeit that hee was a so∣ueraigne magistrat, but yet countable of his actions vnto the people, his time beeing expired. Yet might one say, What if that high & absolute power which we haue spo∣ken of, were giuen to one or moe▪ for a yere, with condition not to giue any account at* 1.264 all for their doings▪ For to the Cnidiens euery yeare chose 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of their cirisens, whome they called Amymones, that is to say, Men without imputation, with such soueraignty of power, as that they might not be called to account for any thing that they had done, neither during the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of their charge, nor after that the same was expired: I say yet for althat, that the soueraigntie of the state was not in them▪ seeing that they were bound at the yeares end to restore againe vnto the people, the authoritie they were put in trust [ K] withall; the Soueraigntie still remaining with the people, and the execution thereof with the Amymones, whome a man might well call soueraigne magistrats, but not simple Soueraignes: For the one was the prince, the other the subiect; the one the lord, the other the seruant; the one the proprietarie and seised of the Soueraigntie, the other neither proprietarie nor possessed thereof, neither holding any thing thereof, but as a feoffer or keeper in trust.

The same we may say of the Regents of Fraunce, created for the infancie, furie, or* 1.265 absence of the king, whether the edicts, mandats, and letters pattents, be signed and sea∣led

with the signe and seale of the Regents, and in their name (as they did before the [ A] law of Charles the fift the French king) or els that it be done in the name of the king, and the mandats sealed with his seale: for in that there is little or no difference at all: seeing that whatsoeuer is done by the atturney, the lord allowing the same, may well be thought to be done by the lord himselfe. Now the Regent is the true protectour of the king and of his kingdome: for so the good countie Theobald called himself Pro∣curatorem regni Francorum, that is to say, Protectour of the kingdome of Fraunce. So when a prince giueth absolute power to a Regent, or to a Senat, in his presence, or in his absence, to gouerne in his name; albeit that the edicts or letters of commaund go in his or their name, yet is it alwaies the king that speaketh or commaundeth. So we see* 1.266 that the Senat of Milan or Naples, in the absence of the king of Spaine hath absolute [ B] power to dispatch all mandates in his name: As a man may see by the decree of the emperour Charles the fift in these words. Senatus Mediolanensis potestatem habeat con∣stitutiones principis confirmandi, infirmandi, tollendi, dispensandi, contra statuta, habilitati∣ones, prerogationes, restitutiones faciendi, &c. A Senatu ne prouocari possit, &c. Et quicquid faciet, parem vim habeat vt si à principe factum ac decretum esset: Non tamen possit deli∣ctorum veniam tribuere, aut liter as salui conductus reis criminum dare. That is to say, The Senat of Milan hath power to confirme the constitutions of the prince, as also to infirme the same, to disanull them, to dispense with them contrarie to the statutes, to make enablements, prerogatiues, and restitutions, &c. No appeale shall be made from the Senat, &c. And whatsoeuer it shall doe, shall haue like force as if it were done or [ C] decreed by the prince: yet may it not graunt pardon for offences committed, or giue letters of safe conduct vnto parties conuicted. This power almost infinit, is not giuen vnto the Senat of Milan and Naples, in any thing to diminish the maiestie of the king of Spaine, but altogether to the contrarie, to ease him of his care and paines: ioyne hereunto also, that this power how great soeuer it be, is to be reuoked at the pleasure of him that gaue it.

But suppose that such great power be giuen to a kings lieutenant, or the gouernour* 1.267 of a countrey for tearme of his life, is not that a soueraigne and perpetuall power? For otherwise if we should interpret that onely to be a perpetuall power which shall neuer haue end, there should be at all no soueraigntie, but in the Aristocraticall and [ D] popular state, which neuer dieth except it be vtterly rooted out. Or if we vnderstand the word, Perpetuall, in a monarch for him and his heires, there should be few perpetu∣all soueraigne monarches, seeing there bee but few that be hereditarie; so that they which come to the crowne by way of election, should not be soueraignes: wherefore we must vnderstand the word Perpetuall, for the tearme of the life of him that hath the power. Now if the soueraigne and annuall onely, or which hath a certaine prefixed and limited time to rule, chance to continue his gouernment so giuen him, beyond the appointed time; that must either be by the good liking of him that gaue the power, or els by force: if by force, it is called tyrannie; and yet neuerthelesse the tyrant is a so∣ueraigne: as the violent possession of an intruder is in nature a possession, although it [ E] be contrarie to the law, and they which had the possession before are so thereof dissei∣sed: but if such a magistrat continue his soueraigne power by the good liking of the superiour that gaue it him, wee will not therefore say that hee is a soueraigne prince, seeing that he holdeth nothing but by sufferance; and that a great deale the lesse, if the time be not limited, for in that he hath nothing but by commission during pleasure: and he that so holdeth his power, is neither lord nor possessor therof. Men know right well, that there was neuer greater power giuen to magistrat next vnto his prince, than* 1.268 that which was of late yeares graunted to Henrie of Fraunce, duke of Aniou, by king

Charles the ninth his brother, for it was most great and perpetuall, without any excep∣tion [ F] of the regall power: yet for all that one cannot say that it was soueraigne, inas∣much as he was called Leiutenant General for the king, So long as it shall stand with our good pleasure, ioyned vnto it in his letters patents: which wel declareth a power but du∣ring pleasure. Which power of lieutenancie (as of all other magistracies) ceaseth in the presence of the prince.

But what shall we then say of him to whom the people haue giuen absolute power* 1.269 so long as he liueth? in this case we must distinguish: If such absolute power bee giuen him purely and simply without the name of a magistrat, gouernour, or lieutenant, or other forme of deputation; it is certaine that such an one is, and may call himselfe a So∣ueraigne Monarch: for so the people hath voluntarily disseised and dispoyled it selfe of [ G] the soueraigne power, to sease and inuest another therein; hauing on him, and vppon him transported all the power, authoritie, prerogatiues, and soueraignties thereof: as if a man should by pure gift deliuer vnto another man the proprietie and possession that vnto him belongeth: in which case such a perfect donation admitteth no conditions. In which sort the regall law is by the lawyer said to haue bene made in these words,* 1.270 Cum populus ei & in eum omnem potestatem contulit: when as the people conferred vnto him, and on him all their power. But if the people shall giue all their power vnto any one so long as he liueth, by the name of a magistrat, lieutenant, or gouernour, or onely to discharge themselues of the exercise of their power: in this case he is not to be accounted any soueraigne, but a plaine officer, or leiutenant, regent, gouernour, or [ H] guerdon and keeper of another mans power. For as the magistrat, although hee make a perpetuall lieutenant, and hath no care of his own iurisdiction, leauing the entire exer∣cise thereof vnto his lieutenant, yet for all that, it is not in the person of the lieutenant that the power lyeth to commaund, or iudge, neither the exercise and force of the law: but if he passe beyond the power vnto him giuen, it is to none effect; if his doings bee not ratified, liked, and approued by him that hath giuen the power. And for this cause king Iohn of Fraunce, led prisoner into England, after his returne thence, solemnly rati∣fied all the acts of Charles the Dolphin, his eldest sonne, made regent in his absence, to strengthen and confirme the same, so farre as should be conuenient and needfull. Be it then that a man either by commission, or institution, or by delegation, for a certaine [ I] time, or for euer, exercise the power of another man: he that so exerciseth this power, is not therefore a soueraigne, although that by his letters of commission or deputation he be not called a protector, lieutenant, regent, or gouernour: no not, albeit that such power be giuen him by the customs and lawes of the countrey, which should be much* 1.271 stronger than election. As by an auntient law amongst the Scots, the entire gouern∣ment of the kingdome was committed vnto him that was neerest of blood vnto the king in his minoritie, or vnder the age of xxv yeares, yet with charge that all things should be done in the kings name: which law was long ago abrogated, for the danger might grow vnto the young king, by his nigh kinsmen affecting the kingdome: for which, Caesar thought it lawfull for a man to become villanous. [ K]

Now let vs prosecute the other part of our propounded definition, and show what these words, Absolute power, signifie. For we said that vnto Maiestie, or Soueraigntie* 1.272 belongeth an absolute power, not subiect to any law. For the people or the lords of a Commonweale, may purely & simply giue the soueraigne and perpetuall power to any one, to dispose of the goods and liues, and of all the state at his pleasure: and so af∣terward to leaue it to whome he list: like as the proprietarie or owner may purely and simply giue his owne goods, without any other cause to be expressed, than of his owne meere bountie; which is indeed the true donation, which no more receiueth condition,

being once accomplished and perfected: as for the other donations, which carrie with [ A] them charge and condition, are not indeed true donations. So also the chiefe power giuen vnto a prince with charge and condition, is not properly soueraigntie, nor pow∣er absolute; except that such charge or condition annexed vnto the soueraigntie at the creation of a prince, be directly comprehended within the lawes of God and nature. As it is at the inuesting of the Tartar king. For the great king of Tartarie beeing dead, the prince and the people to whome the right of the election belongeth, make choice* 1.273 of one of the kinsmen of the dead king, which they thinke best of (prouided that he be either his sonne or his nephew) and hauing placed him in a throne of gold, the bishop (after a solemne song sung according to the manner of their auncestours) turning his speech vnto the king, in the name of the people, saith thus, Wee pray thee, and charge [ B] thee to raigne ouer vs: to whom the king aunswereth, If you will haue me so to doe, you must be readie to performe whatsoeuer I commaund; whomsoeuer I appoint to be slaine, you shall slay him presently, and into my hand you shall commit the whole estate of the kingdome: whereunto the people aunswere, Bee it so: after which the king continuing his speech, saith, My word shall be my sword: whereunto the people giueth a great applause. This done, he is taken out of his high throne, and set vpon the ground vpon a bare boord, vnto whome the bishop againe turning his speech, saith, Looke vp vnto heauen and acknowledge almightie God, the king of the whole world: and behold also this table whereon thou sittest below: if thou rule well, thou shalt haue althings according to thy harts desire; but if thou forget thy dutie and calling, thou shalt be cast head∣long [ C] downe from thy high seat, and dispotled of thy regall power and wealth, bee brought so low, as that thou shalt not haue so much as this boord left thee to sit vpon. This said, hee is lifted vp on high, and by all the people proclaimed king of the Tartars. This so great a power giuen by the people vnto the king, may wel be called absolute and soueraigne, for that it hath no condition annexed thereunto, other than is by the law of God and nature commaunded.

The same or like forme of inuesting we may also see to haue bene sometimes vsed in* 1.274 realmes and principalities, descending by succession. But the like is not to that of Ca∣rinthia, where yet at this present neere vnto the citie of St. Vitus, in a meddow is to be seene a marble stone, whereunto a countrey pesant vnto whom that office of right be∣longed, [ D] stept vp, hauing vpon his right hand a blacke cow, and on his left a leane euill fauored mare, and all the people about him; towards whome he that is to be created duke commeth marching, with a great number of lords, all apparelled in red, and his ensignes displayed before him; all in good and seemely order, except the new duke himselfe, who is apparrelled like a poore shepheard, with a sheephooke in his hand: whome the clowne vpon the stone seeing comming, crieth alowd in the Sclauonian tongue, Who is that (saith he) that commeth marching so proudly? whereunto the people aunswere, That it is their prince: then demaundeth he, Is he a iust iudge? seeketh hee the good of his countrey? is he free borne? is he worthie of that honour? and withall religious? Hee is, saith the people, and so shall hereafter be. Then the peasant giuing the duke a [ E] little blow on the eare, goeth downe from the stone, and is for euer after free from all publique charges: so the duke mounting the stone, and brandishing his sword, promi∣seth vnto the people, To be a good and a iust man: and in that habit goeth to heare masse; which in solemne manner done, he putting off his shepheards apparrell, and attired like a prince, goeth vp to the stone againe, and there receiueth the homage and oath of fidelitie of his vassals and subiects. True it is, that in auntient * 1.275 time the duke of Carinthia was the emperours greatest Huntsman: but since that the empire fell into the house of Austria, wherunto that dukedome belonged, both the name of the Great

Huntsman, and the old maner of inuesting the duke grew out of vse, and the duchies [ F] of Carinthia, Stiria, and Croatia, with the counties of Cilia, and Tirol, remaine anne∣xed vnto the dukedome of Austria.

As for those things which are reported concerning the inuesting of the king of Ar∣ragon,* 1.276 they are long since growne out of vse; but this wee haue heard them to haue wont to bee done: The great magistrat of Arragon, whome they call the Chief Iu∣stice, thus said vnto the king: We which are vnto thee in vertue nothing inferiour, and in power greater than thy self, create thee our king; yet with this condition, that one amongst vs shall still haue more power and commaund than thy selfe. Wherein he is deceiued that so writeth, the king to haue bene then chosen of the people; a thing that neuer was there done. For Sanctius the Great by force of armes draue the Moores out [ G] of the kingdome of Arragon, after they had seuen hundred yeares possessed the same: after which time his posteritie of both Sexes, held that kingdome by inheritance. And also Peter Belluga, who most exactly writ of the kingdome of Arragon, denieth the people to haue any right in chusing the king; but when the line of the king vtterly saileth. That were also a new and more absurd thing, that the king of Arragon should haue lesse power than the states of Arragon, seeing that the same author Belluga saith, That the states might not assemble themselues without the kings expresse commaun∣dement; neither being assembled, might depart without leaue giuen them from the king. That were also more absurd and ridiculous, that such speech should bee vsed by the magistrat, vnto him that was now crowned, sacred, and receiued a king by right [ H] of succession, who also placed and displaced the same great magistrat whensoeuer hee list. For the same author writeth, Martin Didato the greatest magistrat, to haue beene placed in that office by the queen of Aragon, in the absence of Alphonsus her husband, king of Arragon and Sicilia; and also by her againe discharged of the same office. And albeit that by sufference of the king, that great magistrat or justice of Arragon, de∣termineth of the processe and controuersies betwixt the king and his people: as it is al∣so in England sometime by the high court of Parliament, and sometime by the magi∣strat, whome they call the Lord Chiefe Iustice of England, and by all the judges of this * 1.277 realme, and in all places: yet neuerthelesse so it is, that the great justice of Arra∣gon, and all the estates remaine in full subiection to the king, who is no wayes bound [ I] to follow their aduice, neither to consent to their requests, (as saith the same doctor) which is generall to all estates of a monarchie, as saith Oldard, speaking of the kings of Fraunce and Spaine, Who haue (saith he) absolute power. Yet true it is, that none of these doctours tell vs, what absolute power is. For if wee shall say, that hee onely hath absolute power, which is subiect vnto no law; there should then bee no soueraigne prince in the world, seeing that all princes of the earth are subiect vnto the lawes of God, of nature, and of nations.

So to the contrarie it may be, that some one subiect may be dispensed withall, and* 1.278 absolued from all the laws, ordinances, and customes of his Commonweale, and com∣maundement of the magistrat; and yet be neither prince, nor soueraigne. Example [ K] we haue of Pompey the great, who was dispensed withall from the lawes for fiue yeres, by expresse decree of the people, published at the request of of Gabinius the Tribune, at such time as extraordinarie power was giuen him to make warre against the pirats: neither is it any new thing or straunge thing to dispence with a subiect for his obe∣dience to the lawes, seeing that the Senat sometimes so dispenced without the consent of the people: vntill the law Cornelia published at the request of a Tribune, whereby it was ordained, That no person should be exempted out of the power of the laws, nor dispenced withall by the Senat, if he had not at the least the consent of two hundred

Senators. For by the law of the twelue tables, it was forbidden vpon paine of death [ A] to graunt any priueledge but by the great assemblies of the people; but that law was euill executed, being still infringed by the Senat. Yet he that is so exempted from one law, or moe, or all lawes, is for all that alwaies in the subiection and obeysance of them which haue the soueraigntie: yea although he bee for euer absolued from all the lawes of his countrey. As Augustus, who although he was the prince of the people of Rome, that is to say, the chiefe in that Commonweale, yet faigning himselfe to be in∣feriour to the people in generall, he oftentimes propounded questions vnto the people, as if the people, and not Augustus, should make the lawes: and at the chusing of ma∣gistrats, would shake the citisens by the hands, that so hee might commend them that stood for the offices vnto the people. But it behoueth him that is a soueraigne not to [ B] be in any sort subiect to the commaund of another: which thing Tiberius wisely mea∣ning in these words, reasoned in the Senat concerning the right of soueraigntie, saying that The reason of his doings were no otherwise to be manifested, than in that it was to be gi∣uen* 1.279 to none: whose office it is to giue laws vnto his subiects, to abrogat laws vnprofita∣ble, and in their stead to establish other: which hee cannot do that is himselfe subiect vnto lawes, or to others which haue commaund ouer him. And that is it for which the law saith, That the prince is acquitted from the power of the lawes: and this word the Law, in the Latine importeth the commaundement of him which hath the soue∣raigntie. Wee also see that vnto all edicts and decrees there is annexed this clause, Notwithstanding all edicts and ordinances whereunto we haue derogated, and do derogat [ C] by these presents: a clause which hath alwaies bene ioyned vnto the antient lawes, were the law published by the present prince, or by his predecessours. For it is certaine, that* 1.280 the lawes, ordinances, letters pattents, priueleges, and grants of princes, haue no force, but during their life, if they be not rati•…•…by the expresse consent, or at least by suffe∣rance of the prince following, who had knowledge there of, and especially of the priue∣leges. As when Bartolus was sent ambassadour vnto Charles the fourth, the German emperour, for the confirmation of the priueleges of the citie of Perouze, hee obtained the same, yet with condition, That they should so long haue force, vntill they were re∣uoked by the succeeding emperours: vnto whom for all that, no preiudice could haue bene done, although that clause had not bene put to: which was the cause that Mi∣chael [ D] Del Hospital chauncelour of Fraunce, constantly refused, yea euen at the request of the queene, to seale the priuileges by Charles the ix. graunted vnto S^t. Maur des Fos∣sez, for that they carried with them a perpetuall enfranchisment and immunitie from taxes, which is contrarie to the nature of personall priueledges, and tended to the di∣minishing of the power of his successours, and could not be giuen vnto corporations or colleges, which liue for euer, but for the life of the prince that graunted them onely, although the word (perpetuall) were thereunto adioyned. Which for all that if they were graunted vnto corporations or colleges, by a popular or Aristocraticall state, must needs bee for euer, or at leastwise so long as that popular or Aristocraticall state should continue. And for this cause Tiberius the emperour, successour to Augustus, [ E] would not that the priueledges graunted by the dead emperours, should bee of any ef∣fect, if their successors had not confirmed them: when as before the priueleges granted by princes, if they were not limited vnto a time certaine, were accounted as giuen for euer. Wee also see in this * 1.281 realme, that at the comming of new kings, colleges and corporations require to haue their priueleges, power, and iurisdiction confirmed; yea the verie parliaments and soueraigne courts, as well as other particular officers.

If then the soueraigne prince be exempted from the lawes of his predecessors, much lesse should he be bound vnto the lawes and ordinances he maketh himselfe: for a

man may well receiue a law from another man, but impossible it is in nature for to giue [ F] * 1.282 a law vnto himselfe, no more than it is to commaund a mans selfe in a matter depen∣ding of his owne will: For as the law saith, Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quae a vo∣luntate promittentis statum capit, There can be no obligation, which taketh state from the meere will of him that promiseth the same: which is a necessarie reason to proue euidently that a king or soueraigne prince cannot be subiect to his owne lawes. And as the Pope can neuer bind his owne hands (as the Canonists say;) so neither can a so∣ueraigne prince bind his owne hands, albeit that he would. Wee see also in the end of all edicts and lawes, these words, Quia sic nobis placuit, Because it hath so pleased vs: to giue vs to vnderstand, that the lawes of a soueraigne prince, although they be groun∣ded vpon good and liuely reasons, depend neuerthelesse vpon nothing but his meere [ G] and franke good will. But as for the lawes of God and nature, all princes and people* 1.283 of the world are vnto them subiect: neither is it in their power to impugne them, if will not be guiltie of high treason to the diuine maiestie, making warte against God; vnder the greatnesse of whome all monarches of the world ought to beare the yoke, and to bow their heads in all feare and reuerence. Wherefore in that wee said the so∣ueraigne power in a Commonweale to be free from all lawes, concerneth nothing the lawes of God and nature. For amongst the Popes, * 1.284 hee that of all others best knew the lawes of maiestie or soueraigntie, and had almost brought vnder him the power of all the Christian emperours and princes, said him to be indeed a soueraigne that was able to derogat from the ordinary right (which is as I vnderstand it, from the laws of his [ H] countrey) but not from the lawes of God or nature.

But further question maybe, Whether a prince bee a subiect to the lawes of his* 1.285 countrey, that he hath sworne to keepe, or not? wherein wee must distinguish. If the prince sweare vnto himselfe, That he will keepe his law: hee is no more bound to his law, than by the oath made vnto himselfe: For the subiects themselues are not any way bound by oath, which they make in their mutuall conuentions, if the couenants be such as from which they may by law shrinke, although they be both honest and rea∣sonable. But if a soueraigne prince promise by oath to keep the lawes which he or his predecessours haue made, he is bound to keepe them, if the prince vnto whome hee hath so giuen his word haue therein any intrest; yea although he haue not sworne at [ I] al: But if the prince to whom the promise was made haue therin no intrest, neither the promise nor the oath can bind him that made the promise. The like we say, if promise be made by a soueraigne prince vnto his subiects, or before hee bee chosen; for in that case there is no difference, as many thinke: not for that the prince is bound to his laws, or by his predecessours; but to the iust conuentions and promises that hee hath made, be it by oath, or without any oath at all; as should a priuat man bee: and for the same causes that a priuat man may be releeued from his vniust and vnreasonable promise, as for that it was too grieuous, or for that he was by deceit or fraud circumuented; or in∣duced thereinto by errour, or force, or iust feare; or by some great hurt: euen for the same causes the prince may be restored in that which toucheth the diminishing of his [ K] maiesty, if he be a soueraigne prince. And so our maxime resteth, That the prince is not subiect to his lawes, nor to the lawes of his predecessours: but well to his owne iust and reasonable conuentions, and in the obseruation whereof the subiects in generall or particular haue intrest. Wherein we see many to be deceiued, which make a confusi∣on of lawes, and of a princes contracts, which they call also lawes: as well as he which calleth a princes contracts pactionarie lawes; as they tearme them in the state of Ar∣ragon, when the king maketh any law at the request of the people, and receiueth there∣fore any money or subsidie; then the Arragonians say that the king is vnto that law

bound, but not so vnto other lawes: and yet neuerthelesse they confesse that the prince [ A] may derogat from the same, the cause of the law ceasing: which to bee true, as it may by reason and authoritie be confirmed, so was there no need of money, or of oath, to bind the soueraigne prince, if it concerned his subiects (to whome he had promised) to* 1.286 haue the law kept. For the word of a prince ought to bee as an Oracle; which loo∣seth his dignitie, if his subiects haue so euill an opinion of him, as not to beleeue him except he sweare; or else to be so couetous, as not to regard his promise except there∣fore he receiue money. And yet neuerthelesse the maxime of right still standeth in force, That the soueraigne prince may derogat vnto the lawes that hee hath promised and sworne to keepe, if the equitie thereof ceased, and that of himself without consent* 1.287 of his subiects: yet true it is, that a generall obscure or doubtfull derogation, in this case [ B] sufficeth not, but that there must bee a derogation in words speciall. But if there bee no probable cause of abrogating the law he hath promised to keepe, he shall do against the dutie of a good prince, if he shall go about to abrogat such a law: and yet for al that is he not bound vnto the couenants and oathes of his predecessours, further than stan∣deth with his profit, except he be their heire. And for this cause the states of Arragon complained to king Alphonsus, for that he for gaine had altered and chaunged the money of Arragon, to the great preiudice of the subiects, and marchants straungers, contrarie to the promise made by Iames the first, king of Arragon, in the yeare 1265, in the moneth of August, and confirmed by king Peter, in the yeare 1336, who swore vnto the estates neuer to chaunge the money; in recompence wherof the people had [ C] promised euery one of them euery seuen yeares to pay vnto him a maruedie, if they were in goods worth fifteene maruadies. Now the kingdome of Arragon discendeth by inheritance vnto the heires, both males and females; but the effect of the contract betwixt the prince and the people ceasing, as the subsidie for which the kings of Arra∣gon had made that order which I haue said, the king was no more bound to keepe his promise: then were the people to pay the subsidie vpon them imposed.

We must not then confound the lawes and the contracts of soueraigne princes, for* 1.288 that the law dependeth of the will and pleasure of him that hath the soueraigntie, who may bind all his subiects, but cannot bind himselfe: but the contract betwixt the prince and his subiects is mutual, which reciprocally bindeth both parties, so that the one par∣tie [ D] may not start therefrom, to the preiudice, or without the consent of the other. In which case the prince hath nothing aboue the subiect, but that the equitie of the law which he hath sworne to keepe, ceasing, he is no more bound to the keeping thereof, by his oath or promise, as we haue before said: which the subiects cannot do among themselues, if they bee not by the prince releeued. The soueraigne princes also wel ad∣uised,* 1.289 will neuer take oath to keepe the lawes of their predecessours; for otherwise they are not soueraignes. But then might some man say, Why doth the German empe∣rour, who hath a preheminence aboue all other Christian kings, before he be crowned sweare betwixt the hands of the archbishop of Cullen, to keepe the laws of the empire, the golden Bul, to establish iustice, to reuenge the pope, to keepe the catholike faith, to [ E] defend the widdowes, the fatherlesse, and poore? Which forme of oath, wherewith the emperour Charles the fift bound himselfe when he was crowned, cardinall Caietan is said to haue sent vnto the pope, whose legat he then was in Germanie. Whereunto I aunswere, that the emperour is subiect vnto the states of the empire; neither taketh vpon him the soueraigntie ouer the princes electours, nor ouer the estates; as we shall in due place declare. And if a man say, That the kings of the Epirots in auntient time swore, that they should raigne well and orderly according to the lawes and customs of the countrey, and the subiects also on their part swore to defend and maintaine their

king, according to the lawes and customes of their countrey: I say yet notwithstan∣ding [ F] all these oathes, that the soueraigne prince might derogat from the lawes, or fru∣strat and disanull the same, the reason and equitie of them ceasing. The oath also of our kings, which is the fairest and shortest that can be, containeth nothing in it concer∣ning the keeping of the lawes and customes of the countrey or predecessours. The words I will set downe, as they be taken word for word out of the librarie of Rheims, out of an auntient booke, which thus beginneth Iuliani ad Erigium Regem Anno 1058 Henrico Regnante 32 iiij. Calend. Iunij. Ego Philippus Deo propiciante mox futurus Rex* 1.290 Francorum, in die ordinationis meae promitto coram Deo & sanctis eius, quod vnicuique de nobis commissis canonicum priuilegium, & debitam legem atque iustitiam conseruabo, & defensionem adi•…•…uante Domino quantum potero exhibebo: sicut Rex in suo regno vnicui∣que [ G] Episcopo & Ecclesiae sibi commisse per rectum exhibere debet: populo quoque nobis cre∣dito, me dispensationem legum in suo iure consistentem, nostra auctoritate concessurum. viz. The booke of Iulian Erigius, Anno 1058, in the xxxij. yeare of the raigne of Henrie the first, the fourth of the calends of Iune. I Philip, by the grace of God forthwith to become king of Fraunce, on the day of my inuesting, doe promise before God and his Saints, that I will keepe canonicall priueledge, with due administration of law and iu∣stice, to euerie one committed to our charge: and by the help of God to the vttermost of my power defend them, in such manner as a king in his kingdome ought of right to giue vnto euerie bishop & church committed vnto him: & by our authoritie to grant vnto the people committed vnto vs, the execution of the lawes remaining in force. I [ H] know that which is found in the librarie of the Beauuais is like vnto this, and the oath of the same Philip the first: but I haue seene another in a little auntient booke in the Abbay of S. Allier in Auergne, in these words; Ie iure au nom de Deiu tout puissant, & promets de gouuerner bien et deuement les subiects commis en ma garde, & faire de tout mon pouuoir iudgement, iustice, et misericorde: I sweare by the name of the Almighty God, and promise well and duly to gouerne my subiects committed to my charge: and with all my power to doe them iudgement, iustice, and mercie. Which seemeth to haue bene taken from the prophet Hieremie, where he saith, I am the great eternall* 1.291 God, which do iudgement, iustice, and mercie; and in which things I take singular pleasure. Which formes of oathes shew plainely vnto the eye, that the oathes contained in the [ I] booke lately printed and published by the title of Sacre Du Roy, are much changed and altred from the auntient forme. But both in the one and the other oath, a man may see that there is not any bond for the soueraigne prince to keepe the lawes, more than so farre as right and iustice requireth. Neither is it to be found that the auntient kings of the Hebrewes tooke any oath: no not they which were anointed by Samuel, He∣lias and others. But some take a more precise oath, such as is the oath of Henry the 3 king of Fraunce, and of Polonia. Ego Henricus Rex Poloniae, &c. Iuro Deo omnipoten∣ti, quòd omnia iura, libertates, priuilegia publica & priuata iuri communi non contraria, Ec∣clesijs,* 1.292 principibus, Baronibus, nobilibus, ciuibus, incolis, per meos praedecessores Reges, & quoscumque principes Dominos, Regni Poloniae iustè concessa, & quae in interregno decreta [ K] sunt seruabo, iusque omnibus incolis more maiorum reddam. Ac si quidem (quod absit) Sacramentum meum violauero nullam nobis incolae Regni obedientiam praestare tenebun∣tur, &c. sic Deus adiuuet. viz. I Henrie king of Polonia, &c. Sweare vnto almightie God, that I will keepe all the lawes, liberties, publick and priuat priueleges, not contra∣rie to the common law, iustly graunted vnto churches, princes, barrons, noble men▪ ci∣tisens, or inhabitants, by the kings my predecessours, or whatsoeuer other princes, lords of the kingdome of Polonia: as also all such things as were decreed in the time of the vacancie of the kingdome: and that I will administer iustice vnto all the inhabitants

of this kingdome, after the manner of our auneestours: And if I shall violat this mine [ A] oath (which God forbid) then the inhabitants of this kingdom shall be bound to yeeld vnto vs no obedience, &c. And so God helpe vs. But this forme of oath sauoureth not of royall maiestie, but the condition of a meaner prince, such an one as (amongst others) is chiefe in a Commonweale.

But touching the lawes which concerne the state of the realme, and the establishing thereof; forasmuch as they are annexed & vnited to the crowne, the prince cannot de∣rogat* 1.293 from them, such as is the law Salique: & albeit that he so do, the successor may alwaies disanull that which hath bene done vnto the preiudice of the laws royall; vpon which the soueraigne maiestie is stayed & grounded. Yet might one say, That Henry the 5, king of England & France, marying Katherine of France, sister to Charles the 7, [ B] took an oath to keep the high court of parliament in the liberties & soueraigntie ther∣of; and to cause iustice to be administred in the realme, according vnto the customes and lawes thereof. See the words of the decree agreed vpon for to make him succes∣sour vnto the crowne of Fraunce, the xxj of May, in the yeare 1420. I say they caused him to take such an oath, for that he was a straunger come to a new kingdome; from which the lawfull inheritour was excluded by a decree of the Parliament of Paris, gi∣uen for default and conrumacie; for the murther committed vppon the person of Iohn duke of Burgoigne, which was by sound of trumpet pronounced at the marble table in the presence of the princes. But as for generall and particular lawes and customs, which concerne not the establishing of the state of the realme, but the right of men in [ C] priuat, they haue not vsed to haue bene with vs otherwise chaunged, but after generall assemblie of the three estates of Fraunce well and duly made; or of euery bailiwike in particular: not for that it is necessarie for the king to rest on their aduice, or that hee* 1.294 may not do the contrarie to that they demaund, if naturall reason and iustice so require. And in that the greatnesse and maiestie of a true soueraigne prince, is to bee knowne; when the estates of all the people assembled together, in all humilitie present their requests and supplications to their prince., without hauing any power in any thing to commaund or determine, or to giue voice, but that that which it pleaseth the king to like or dislike of, to commaund or forbid, is holden for law, for an edict and ordinance. Wherein they which haue written of the dutie of magistrats, & other such like books, [ D] haue deceiued themselues, in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the prince; a thing which oft times causeth the true subiects to reuolt from the obedi∣ence which they owe vnto their soueraigne prince, & ministreth matter of great trou∣bles in Commonweals. Of which their opinion, there is neither reason nor ground, except the king be captiue, furious, or in his infancie, and so needeth to haue a protector or lieutenant appointed him by the suffrages of the people. For otherwise if the king should be subiect vnto the assemblies and decrees of the people, hee should neither bee king nor soueraigne; and the Commonwealth neither realme not monarchie, but a mee•…•… Aristocratie of many lords in power equall, where the greater part commaun∣deth [ E] the lesse in generall, and euery one in particular: and wherein the edicts and lawes are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth, but in the name and au∣thoritie of the states, as in an Aristocraticall Seignorie, where hee that is chiefe hath no power, but oweth obeysance vnto the commaundements of the seignorie: vnto who me yet they all and euerie one of them faigne themselues to owe their faith and obedience: which are al things so absurd, as hard it is to say which is furthest from rea∣son. So when Charles the eight, the French king, being then but about xiiij. yeres old, held a parliament at Tours, although the power of the parliament was neuer before* 1.295 no•…•… after so great as in those times, yet Relli, then speaker for the people, turning

himselfe vnto the king, thus beginneth his oration, which is yet in print extant. Most▪ [ F] high, most mightie, and most Christian king, our naturall and onely lord, we your humble and obedient subiects, &c. Which are come hither by your commaund, in all humilitie re∣uerence and subiection present our selues before you, &c. And haue giuen mee in charge from all this noble assemblie, to declare vnto you the good will and hartie desire they haue with a most firme resolution and purpose to serue, obey, and aid you in all your affaires, com∣maundements and pleasures. In briefe, all that his oration and speech is nothing els but a declaration of all their good wils towards the king, and of their humble obedience and loialtie. The like speech almost we see was also vsed in the parliament at Orleans▪ vnto king Charles the ninth, when he was yet but scarce eleuen yeares old. Neither are the parliaments of Spaine otherwise holden, but that euen a greater obedience & a [ G] greater loialtie of all the people in generall, is giuen vnto the king, as is to bee seene in the acts of the parliament holden at Toledo by king Philip, in the yeare 1552, when he was yet scarce full xxv▪ yeares old. The aunswers also of the king of Spaine vnto the* 1.296 requests and humble supplications of his people, are giuen in these words, We will; or else, We decree and ordaine; and such other like aunsweres, importing the refusall or consent of the prince: yea the subsidie that the subiects pay vnto the king of Spaine, they call seruice. Wherby it appeareth them to be deceiued, which say that the kings of Arragon cannot derogat from the priueledges of the states, by reason of the priue∣leges giuen them by king Iames, in the yeare 1260, and confirmed in the yeare 1320. For as the priueleges was of no force after the death of the king, without the confirmation [ H] of his successours: so also the same confirmation of the rest of the kings following was necessarie, for that by the law no man can raigne ouer his equals. And albeit that in the parliaments of England, which haue commonly bene holden euerie third yeare; there the states seeme to haue a verie great libertie (as the Northerne people almost all breath thereafter) yet so it is, that in effect they proceed not, but by way of supplicati∣ons and requests vnto the king. As in the parliament of England, holden in October,* 1.297 1566, when the estates by a common consent had resolued (as they gaue the queene to vnderstand) not to entreat of any thing, vntill she had first appointed who should suc∣ceed he•…•… in the crowne: She gaue them no other aunswere, But that they were not to make her graue before she were dead. All whose resolutions were to no purpose with∣out [ I] her good liking: neither did she in that any thing that they required. Now also the estates of England are neuer otherwise assembled (no more than they are in this realme of Fraunce, or Spaine) than by parliament writs, and expresse commandements proceeding from the king. Which showeth verie well that the estates haue no power of themselues to determine, commaund, or decree any thing; seeing that they cannot so much as assemble themselues; neither beeing assembled, depar, without expresse commaundement from the king. Yet this may seeme one speciall thing▪ that the laws made by the king of England, at the request of the states, cannot bee againe repealed, but by calling a parliament of the estates: Which is much vsed and ordinarily done, as I haue vnderstood by M. Dale, the English ambassadour, an honourable gentleman [ K] * 1.298 and a man of good vnderstanding, who yet assured me, that the king receiued or re∣iected the law as seemed best vnto himself: and stucke not to dispose therof at his plea∣sure, and contrarie to the will of the estates: as wee see Henry the eight to haue alwaies vsed his soueraigne power, and with his onely word to haue disanulled the decrees of parliament▪ albeit that the kings of England are not otherwise crowned, but that they must sweare inuiolatly to keepe the lawes and customes of the land: which how that oath is to be vnderstood, I referre you to that which wee haue before reported. But here might some obiect and say▪ That the estates of England suffer not any extraordi∣nary

charges and subsidies to be laid vpon them, if it be not first agreed vpon and consen∣ted [ A] vnto in the high court of parliament: for so it is prouided by an auntient law of Ed∣ward the first, king of England, wherewith the people as with a buckler hath bene of∣tentimes seene to defend it selfe against the prince. Whereunto mine aunswere is, That other kings haue in this point no more power than the kings of England: for that it is not in the power of any prince in the world, at his pleasure to rayse taxes vpon the people, no more than to take another mans goods from him; as Philip Commines wisely shewed in the parliament holden at Tours, as weread in his Comentaries: and yet neuerthelesse if the necessitie of the Commonweale be such as cannot stay for the calling of a parliament, in that case the prince ought not to expect the assemblie of the states, neither the consent of the people; of whose good foresiight and wisedome, next [ B] vnto God, the health & welfare of the whole state dependeth: but concerning all sorts of taxes and tributes, more shall be said in place conuenient. True it is, that the kings of England, since the time of Henrie the first (as we read in Polidore) haue as it were al∣waies accustomed euery third yeare to demaund of the people an extraordinarie subsi∣die, which is for the most part graunted. As in the parliament holden in Aprill, in the yeare 1570, the queene of England by the consent of the estates, drew from them fiue hundred thousand crownes (as the like whereof is sometime also vsed to bee done in Spaine) from which manner of tribute she had now many yeares before abstained. Now here might some obiect also, That the estates of England haue power to con∣demne,* 1.299 as king Henrie the sixt was condemned by the estates, to be kept prisoner in the [ C] Towre of London. I say that that was done by the ordinarie judges of England, the lords spirituall and temporall of the vpper house, at the request of them of the neather house; who presented also a bill of request to the vpper house, in the yeare 1571, ten∣ding to the end, that the earles of Northumberland, and Westmerland, & other con∣spiratours, might be declared to haue incurred the paines contained in the lawes of the land, made against them that were guiltie of treason. Which showeth well that the estates in bodie together haue neither power nor iurisdiction, but that the power is with the judges of the vpper house, as should be, if the parliament of Paris assisted by the prince and peers, should be from the estates in bodie together seperated, to iudge of themselues of great matters. [ D]

But yet there remaineth another difficultie to resolue vpon, concerning the afore∣said estates of England, who seemed to haue power to commaund, resolue, and decide of the affaires of state. For queene Marie hauing assembled them for the passing of the articles of agreement concerning the mar•…•…iage with king Philip: after many di∣sputes and difficulties proposed, in fine, the conclusion of the treatie was made the se∣cond day of Aprill in the yeare 1554, in forme of a decree conceiued in the name of the estates, in these words: The articles aforesaid, and that which dependeth thereof, seene and considered of, by the estates assembled in parliament, holden at the palace of Westminster, it hath bene said, That concerning the disposition and collation of all be∣nefices and offices, they are reserued vnto the queene; as also of all the fruits, profits, [ E] rents, reuenews of her countries, lands, and seignories, the queene, as sole and alone shall enioy the royaltie and soueraignetie of her said realmes, countries, lands, and sub∣iects, absolute, after the consummation of the mariage; so that the said prince shall not pretend by the way of the courtesie of England, any claime to the crowne or soue∣raigntie of the realme, nor to any other rights, preheminences, or authorities: That all mandats and letters pattents shal passe vnder the name of the said prince and queene iointly: which letters signed with the hand of the queene alone, and sealed with the great seale, shall be auailable: but being not signed by the said queene, shall be void and

to none effect. I haue willingly set downe the ratification at large, to show that the [ F] soueraigntie wholly without diuision belonged vnto the kings of England, and that the estates had but the view thereof: For the ratification of the estates, no more than of a court, a parliament, a corporation, or colledge, sufficeth not to show the power to commaund, but rather their consent to strengthen the acts, which gtherwise might haue bene called into some doubt, after the death of the queene: or in her life time by the magistrats and officers of the realme, opposing themselues against her. Wherfore we conclude the maiestie of a prince to be in nothing altered or diminished by the cal∣ling together or presence of the states: but to the contrarie his maiestie thereby to bee much the greater, & the more honorable, seeing all his people to acknowledge him for their soueraigne: albeit that in such assemblies, princes not willing to reiect their sub∣iects, [ G] graunt, and passe many things, whereunto they would not otherwise yeeld their consent, if they were not ouercome by the requests, prayers, and iust grieuances of the people, anfflicted and vexed oftentimes without the knowledge of the prince, who yeeldeth many things vnto them all, which he would deny vnto them in particular; or at leastwise not so easily graunt them: either for that the voyces of euerie one in parti∣cular, are lesse heard, than of al together: or for that the prince at other times common∣ly vseth to see but by other mens eyes▪ and to heare but by other mens eares and re∣ports: whereas in parliament hee seeth and heareth his people himselfe, and so enfor∣ced with shame, the feare of religion, or his owne good disposition, admitteth their iust requests. [ H]

So wee see the principall point of soueraigne maiestie, and absolute power, to con∣sist* 1.300 principally in giuing laws vnto the subiects in generall, without their consent. And not to speake of straunge countries, we haue oftentimes seene in this realme of Fraunce* 1.301 certaine generall customs abolished by the edicts of our kings, without the assembling or consent of the estates: when the iniustice of the same is plainely to be seene; as the custome of this realme, commonly vsed in euery place, concerning the succession of mothers vnto the goods of their children, hath bene chaunged without assembling of the estates, either in generall or particular. Which chaunging of customes is no new thing, for since the time of Philip the faire, the custome generall in this realme, which suffered not him that was ouerthrowne in sute, to be condemned in charges also, was [ I] disanulled by edict, without assembling the estates. And the generall custome which forbad to receiue the testimonie of women in ciuill causes; was abolished by the edict of Charles the sixt, without calling together of the estates. For it behoueth that the soueraigne prince should haue the lawes in his power, to chaunge and amend them, ac∣cording as the case shall require; as saith the lawyer Sextus Cecilius: euen as the master pilot ought to haue the helme alwaies in his hand, at discretion to turne it as the we∣ther or occsion requireth: for otherwise the ship might oftentimes perish before hee could take aduice of them whome he did carrie. Which is a thing necessarie, not onely vnto a soueraigne prince, but sometimes vnto a magistrat also, the necessitie of the Commonweale so requiring, as we haue said of Pompee, and of the Decemuiri. And [ K] for that cause Augustus after he had ouerthrowne Marcus Antonius at Actium, was by the Senat absolued from the power of the lawes, albeit that he as then was but chiefe of the Commonweale, and no soueraigne prince, as we shall in due place declare. And after that Vespatian the emperour was also exempted from the power of the lawes, not by the Senat onely, but onely by the expresse law of the people as many thinke, and as yet it is to be found engrauen in marble in Rome: which the lawyer calleth the law Royall, howbeit that it hath no great probabilitie, that the people which long time before had lost al their power, should giue it to him that was stronger than themselues.

Now if it be profitable that the soueraigne prince, for the good gouernment of an [ A] estate, should haue the power of the laws vnder him; then it is more expedient for the gouernour in an Aristocraticall estate; and necessarie for the people in their popular estate: for the monarch is diuided from the people; and in the Aristocraticall state, the lords or gouernours are diuided from the commonaltie and vulgar people; in such sort as that in both the one & other Commonweal, there are two parties, that is to wit, he or they that hold the soueraigntie on the one part, and the people on the other; which causeth the difficulties which are betwixt them for the rights of soueraigntie, which cease in the popular estate. For if the prince or lords which hold the estate be bound to obserue the laws, as many think they are, and that they cannot make any law without the consent of the people, or of the Senat; it cannot also bee againe by law repealed, [ B] without the consent of the one or of the other: which can take no place in a popular estate, seeing that the people make but one bodie, and cannot bind it selfe vnto it selfe. But, Why then (will some say) did the people of Rome sweare to keepe the lawes? That was first begun by Saturnius the Tribune of the people, that so hee might the more straitly bind the Senators to the lawes by him made: which Dio Nicaeus writeth to haue bene afterward done in all lawes. But it is one thing to bind all together, and to bind euerie one in particular: for so al the citisens particularly swore to the obserua∣tion of the lawes, but not all together; for that euery one of them in particular was bound vnto the power of them all in generall. But an oath could not be giuen by them all: for why, the people in generall is a certaine vniuersall bodie, in power and nature [ C] diuided from euery man in particular. Then againe to say truly, an oath cannot bee* 1.302 made but by the lesser to the greater, but in a popular estate nothing can bee greater than the whole body of the people themselues. But in a monarchie it is otherwise, where euerie one in particular, and all the people in generall, and (as it were) in one bo∣die, must sweare to the obseruation of the lawes, and their faithfull alleageance to one soueraigne monarch; who next vnto God (of whome he holdeth his scepter & pow∣er) is bound to no man. For an oath carrieth alwaies with it reuerence vnto whom, or in whose name it is made, as still giuen vnto a superiour: and therefore the vassall gi∣ueth his oath vnto his lord, but receiueth none from him againe, although that they be mutually bound the one of them vnto the other. [ D]

But if it be so, that a soueraigne prince next vnder God, is not by oath bound vnto any, why did Traian the emperor standing vpright, before the Consul sitting, solemnly sweare to the keeping of the lawes? That seemeth to haue beene so done by him for two causes, the one, for that hauing gotten the Consulship, together with his principa∣litie, he swore as the Consuls did at their entrance into their Consulship; as also al the new magistrats did the first of Ianuarie, after they had sacrificed in the Capitoll: The other reason was, for that the Roman emperours at the first had not any soueraigne power, but were onely called princes, that is to say, the chiefe men in the Common∣weale; which fo•…•… me of a Commonweale, is called a principalitie, and not a monarchy:* 1.303 but a principalitie is called a certaine forme of an Aristocratie, wherein one is in honor [ E] dignitie and place, aboue the rest: as amongst the Venetians: For the Roman empe∣rour or prince, at the first was in honour aboue the rest, but not in power: howbeit that in truth the greatest part of the Roman emperors were indeed tyrants. Which is well to be vnderstood, for that which happened in the raigne of Caligula the cruell tyrant,* 1.304 who hauing bid certaine forten kings and allies of the people of Rome to supper, and question there at the table arising about their honour and greatnesse; hee to stay their strife, rapt out this verse, taken out of Homers Iliades;

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. [ F]

Good it is not to be ruled by many, One king, one lord, if there be any.

And it missed but a little (as saith Suetonius) but that hee had euen then chaunged* 1.305 his principalitie into a monarchie, and set a crowne vpon his owne head. For in a prin∣cipalitie the prince or chiefe magistrat, who is aboue the rest, is yet no soueraigne; as we shall hereafter show in the Commonweals of the Venetians, and of the Germans. And albeit that many of the Roman emperors, had taken vpon them the soueraigntie, and by diuers sleights wrested from the people their libertie; yet neuerthelesse it was no* 1.306 maruell if Traian, one of the best princes that euer liued in the world, swore (as is afore∣said) [ G] to keep the laws, although he in the name of a soueraigne prince were exempted; to the end by his own example to moue his subiects to the more carefull obseruing of them: but neuer one of the emperours before him so swore to the obseruing of the lawes. And therefore Plinie the younger, who in a pannegiricall oration, set forth the praises of that most worthy prince, speaking of the oath of Traian, crieth out in this sort, A great noueltie (saith he) and neuer before heard of, hee sweareth by whome wee sweare. And after that in the declination of the empire, Theodoric desirous to gaine the fauour of the Senat and people of Rome, followed the example of Traian, as wee read in Cassiodore, Ecce Traiani nostri clarum seculis reparamus exemplum; iurat vobis per quem iuratis, Behold (saith he) we renew the example of our Traian, famous through [ H] all ages; he sweareth vnto you, by whome you your selues sweare. And like it is, that other princes haue vsed the same custome, of taking the like oath at their coronation, although they haue the soueraigntie by the right of succession. True it is, that the kings of the Northerne people take such oathes as derogat from their soueraigntie: As for example, the nobilitie of Denmarke withstood the coronation of Frederick, in the moneth of August, in the yeare 1559, vntil that he had solemnly sworne that he should not put any noble man to death, or confiscat his goods, vntill he were iudged by the Se∣nat; and that all noble men should haue iurisdiction & power of life & death ouer their subiects, without appeale; and that the king should haue no part in their fines or con∣fiscation of their goods; and also that the king should not giue any office without con∣sent [ I] of the counsell: which are all arguments, that the king of Denmarke is no abso∣lute soueraigne. But this oath was first drawne out of the mouth of Frederick this mans grandfather, at such time as he made warre against Christierne king of Denmark (who was driuen out of his kingdome, and after long banishment returning, at length died in prison, wherein he had liued twentie fiue yeares) and was afterward confirmed by Christierne father of Frederick, who tooke the same oath. And to the end hee should not violat, or breake the same, the nobility to that purpose treated a league with the towne of Lubec, and Sigismundus Augustus king of Polonia, who also himselfe seemes not to haue much more power ouer his owne subiects than hath the king of Denmarke ouer his. [ K]

But of two things the one must be: that is to wit, the prince that sweareth to keepe* 1.307 the lawes of his countrey, must either not haue the soueraigntie; or els become a periu∣red man, if he shall abrogat but one law, contrarie vnto his oath: whereas it is not only profitable that a soueraigne prince should sometimes abrogat some such lawes, but also necessarie for him to alter or correct them, as the infinit varietie of places, times, and persons shall require. Or if wee shall say the prince to be still a soueraigne, and yet ne∣uerthelesse with such condition, as that he can make no law without the aduice of his counsell or people; he must also be dispensed with by his subiects, for the oath that

he hath made for the inuiolat obseruation of the laws; & the subiects againe which are [ A] obliged & bound vnto the lawes, be it in particular, or in generall, haue also need to be dispensed withall by their prince, for feare they should bee periured: so shall it come to passe that the maiestie of the Commonweale▪ enclining now to this side, now to that side, sometimes the prince, sometimes the people bearing sway; shall haue no certaintie to rest vpon: which are notable absurdities, & altogether incompatible with the maie∣stie of absolute soueraigntie, & contrarie both to law & reason. And yet we see many, euen them that thinke themselues to see more in the matter than others, which main∣taine it to be most necessarie, that princes should be bound by oath to keep the laws & customs of their country. In which doing they weaken & ouerthrow all the rights of soueraign maiesty, which ought to be most sacred & holy, & confound the soueraign∣tie [ B] of one soueraigne monarch, with an Aristocratie, or Democratie: whereby it com∣meth to passe, that many princes, seeing that power to be taken from them, which pro∣perly belongeth vnto them, & that men would make them subiect to the laws of their country, dispense in the end, not only with those their country laws, but euen with the laws of God & nature, making account of them all alike, as if they were bound to nei∣ther, but of both discharged. But to make all this matter more plaine to be vnderstood,* 1.308 we will by examples make manifest that before said. Wee read it thrice repeated in Dan. that by the customs of the Medes & Persians, the laws by their kings made, were immutable & irreuocable; & albeit that the king of the Medes would haue exempted the Prophet Daniel, from the punishment of death, which by the edict which hee had [ C] broken was to haue bene inflicted vpon him; yet was he by the princes forbidden so to doe, who shewed him, that the edict by him made could not by the law of their countrey be reuoked: wherunto when the king euen against his will (as should seeme) had assented, Daniel was accordingly condemned vnto the beasts, and so cast vnto the hungrie lions. If then the greatest monarch vpon earth could not derogat from the lawes by himselfe made; the grounds of maiestie and soueraigntie by vs before laid, must needs faile: and that not onely in a monarchie, but in a popular state also: as was that of Athens, whereof Thucydides speaking, showeth that the warre of Peloponesus* 1.309 began for a law made by the Athenians, whereby the Megariens were forbidden to come into the port of Athens; wherein the Megariens complained vnto their allies [ D] and friends themselues to be wronged and the lawes of nations violated: whereupon the Lacedemonians sent their ambassadours to Athens, to request the Athenians, that that law might be againe repealed. Wherunto Pericles then in greatest grace & autho∣ritie with the people, aunswered the ambassodours, That by the expresse lawes of their auncestours, the lawes once made and confirmed by the people, and so hanged vp vp∣pon the common pillar, might neuer be taken away. Which if it were so▪ the people was bound not to their owne lawes onely, but euen to the lawes of their predecessours also. And that more is, Theodosius the emperour would not that the lawes by himself made, should be of any force, except they were confirmed by the generall decree of the whole Senat. In like maner also by the decree of Lewes the eleuenth, the French king, [ E] concerning the institution of knights of the order, in the eight article, it is expresly said, That the king shall vndertake no warre, nor other thing whatsoeuer of great impor∣tance, concerning the high estate of the Common weale, without know∣ledge thereof giuen vnto the knights of the order, so to haue and vse their aduice and counsell. And for that cause, as I suppose, the edicts of our kings are of none effect, vn∣till they be read, published, verified, and registred in parliament, with the consent of the great Atturney generall, and the approbation of the court. And in England it is by* 1.310 auntient custome receiued, that lawes concerning the state of the Commonweale

should take no place, except they were authorised by the Estates assembled in the high [ F] court of Parliament.

These reasons, although they seeme probable, yet are they not sufficient to proue the rule concerning Soueraignetie, before by vs set downe, not to be true: For, as for* 1.311 that which was obiected concerning the law of the Medes, and authoritie of the king in abrogating of the lawes; it is manifest that it was false, and by the courtiers his ene∣mies deuised against the life of Daniel: who grieuing to see a man for his wisdome and royall discent honourable, and yet a stranger, to be in greater grace and fauour with the king than themselues, and exalted in their countrey in degree next vnto the king, made that false allegation of the strength of their lawes against him, with whose accusation the king deceiued, or els to proue if Daniels God could saue him from death, caused [ G] him to be cast vnto the hungrie lyons. But hauing in him seene the wonderfull power and mercie of God towards his seruants, he gaue Daniels enemies to bee deuoured of the same lyons: wherein the end well shewed, the king to haue beene aboue the lawes of his countrey. In like sort Darius Memnon at the request of a young Iewish ladie re∣uoked* 1.312 the decree whereby he had appointed all the nation of the Iewes to be vtterly rooted out. As for that which Pericles answered vnto the ambassadours of the Lace∣demonians, he therein respected not so much the truth, as the shew thereof, that so ta∣king occasion of warre, which he sought after, he might frustrate the accusations of his aduersaries, and danger of the law, as Timaeus and Theopompus haue truly written, and Plutarch hath not denied. And that was it for which hee said to the Lacedemonian [ H] ambassadours, That the edicts once hanged vpon the pillars, might not be taken away: which his sophistication the ambassadours returned vnto him againe, with a Lacede∣monian quip, saying, That they desired not to haue the edict taken away from the pil∣lar, but onely the table turned. For if the lawes of the Athenians had bene immutable, why had they such varietie, and infinit multitude of lawes, which they were wont to establish at the continuall motion of their magistrats, & to abrogat the old, that so the new might take place? But that Pericles therin abused the Lacedemonian ambassadors, it is manifest by the oration of Demosthenes against Leptines, who had preferred a re∣quest vnto the people, to the end that by a perpetuall and irreuocable edict it might from that time forward bee forbidden vpon paine of death, to present any request vnto [ I] the people for the obtaining of any priueledge or exemption, and the like paine to bee inflicted vpon him that should so much as speake for repealing that edict. Wherein Demosthenes hardly withstood Leptines, & so wrought the matter, that his request was receiued, hauing manifestly showed the people by consenting to this law, to be dispoi∣led not onely of the prerogatiue that it had to graunt exemptions and priueledges to such as should well deserue of them, but also of the power to abrogat lawes by them made, if the necessitie of the Commonweale should so require. They had also a popu∣lar action, concerning the breaking of lawes, which was commenced against them that would haue the people to passe any edict contrarie to the lawes before receiued; as one may see in all the orations of Demosthenes: but yet that neuer letted, but that the [ K] new and profitable lawes were still preferred before the old vniust lawes. And in like case the generall edict, wherein it was decred, That the offendors fine once adiudged and set downe by the people, might not in any wise bee forgiuen or abated; was yet many times reuoked, and that once in fauour of Pericles himselfe, and another time in fauour of Cleomides and Demosthenes, who by di•…•…ers iudgements of the people, had bene euerie one of them condemned in a fine of* 1.313 thirtie thousand crownes. They say also in this realme of Fraunce, the fine once being paid, be it right or be it wrong, is ne∣uer* 1.314 againe to be restored: and yet we see oftentimes the contrarie, and the same to bee

againe recouered. It is then a formalitie which is and hath alwaies beene in euerie [ A] Commonweale, that the law makers to giue vnto their lawes the greater weight and authoritie, ioyne thereunto these words of course, Edicto perpetuo & irreuocabili san∣cimus, &c. By a perpetuall and irreuocable decree we ordaine. And with vs in the be∣ginning* 1.315 of euery law, Vniuersis praesentibus & futuris: which words are added to the eternall memorie of posteritie, least the law should by any be infringed. And the more to shew the difference of the lawes, such as be made for perpetuitie, are with vs sealed with greene waxe, and strings of greene and purple silke: whereas vnto the temporary Edicts are put neither strings of silke, nor greene waxe, but yellow onely. And yet for all this, there is no law which is perpetuall, no more than were those of the Greekes and Romanes, who in making their lawes, commonly vsed to ioyne thereunto this [ B] clause, Vt nec per Senatum, nec per populum, lex infirmari possit: That the law might not either by the Senate or the people bee weakened: which wordes if they imported a perpetuitie, why did the people almost in the same moment that it had established a law, againe abrogate the same. Concerning which matter, Cicero writing vnto his friend Atticus: Thou knowest (sayth he) the Tribune Claudius to haue decreed that his law should hardly, or not at all, by the Senate or the people be infringed. But it is sufficiently knowne that regard was neuer had vnto this clause: Vt nec per Senatum nec per populum lex infirmari possit: for otherwise (sayth he) one should neuer see law repealed, seeing that there is no law which carieth not this clause with it: from which men yet doe ordinarily de∣rogate. Thus much he. Which is yet more plainely to be vnderstood out of the Ora∣tion [ C] of Fabius Ambustus against the intercession of the Tribunes of the people, who maintained, that the people could not chuse both the Consuls of the nobilitie, for that by a law before made it was ordained, That one of the Consuls should be still chosen out of the people: Fabius alledged the law of the twelue Tables in these words, Quod postremum iussit populus id ratum esto, What the people shall last decree, let that stand for good.

So we see the Medes, the Persians, the Greeks, the Latines, to haue vsed the same forme and cautions, for the establishing of their edicts and lawes, that our kings doe: who vnto the lawes by them made, oftentimes ioyne this clause: Without that there∣from can by vs, or our successors be derogated. Or els, without regard hauing vnto any de∣rogation, [ D] which from this present we haue declared to be of none effect. And yet no man can so make a law vnto himselfe, but that he may depart therefrom, as we haue before said. Wherefore the repeales and derogations of the former edicts and lawes, are almost alwaie subiect vnto the latter edicts and derogations. And therefore Solon did wisely, who would not bind the Athenians to keep his lawes for euer, but conten∣ted himselfe to haue them kept for an hundred yeares: and yet neuerthelesse hee yet li∣uing,* 1.316 and present, suffered (though against his will) the greatest part of them to bee chaunged.

But that publication or approbation of lawes in the assembly of the Estates or par∣liament, is with vs of great power and importance for the keeping of the lawes; not [ E] that the Soueraigne prince is bound to any such approbation, or cannot of himselfe make a law without the authoritie or consent of the States or the people: but yet it is a courteous part to do it by the good liking of the Senat, as saith Theodosius, which* 1.317 Baldus enterpreted not to be a thing so much of necessitie, as of courtesie: as that is al∣so a speech well beseeming soueraigne maiestie, for a prince to professe himself bound vnto the lawes of himselfe that raigneth. And certainely there is nothing better, or more beseeming a prince, than by his deeds and life to confirme those lawes which hee himselfe hath made: for that is of greatest force, for the honour and obedience of the

subiects towards their prince: as contrariwise nothing is more daungerous for the [ F] contempt both of the prince and of the lawes▪ than without iust cause to breake or infringe that which thou hast commaunded: as an auntient Roman Senatour said, Leuius est, & vanius, sua decreta tollere quam aliorum, It is more lightnesse and va∣nitie* 1.318 to take away a mans owne decrees, than the decrees of other men. But it is one thing for a man so to doe willingly and of his owne accord, and another thing to bee bound by bond or oath so to do it.

But what if a prince by law forbid to kill or to steale, is hee not bound to obay his* 1.319 owne lawes? I say that this law is not his, but the law of God and nature, whereunto all princes are more straitly bound than their subiects: in such sort as that they cannot be from the same exempted, either by the Senat, or the people, but that they must bee [ G] enforced to make their appearance before the tribunall seat of almightie God: For God taketh a straiter account of princes than of others, as the maister of wisdome Sa∣lomon himselfe a king, hath most truly written. Whereunto well agreeth that saying of Marcus Aurelius, who for his desire of knowledge, was called the Philosopher: The magistrats are iudges ouer priuat men, princes iudge the magistrats, and God the prin∣ces. This is the opinion of 2 great princes, esteemed of all other the wisest; vnto whom we wil ioine the third, Antigonus king of Asia, who hearing a flatterer say, that al things were lawfull for kings: Yea, said he, forbarbarous kings and tyrants. The first that vsed this kind of flatrerie, was Anaxarchus towards Alexander the Great, whome hee made to beleeue, That the goddesse Iustice, was still at the right hand of Iupiter, to shew that [ H] princes could do nothing but that was right and iust: Of which their iustice he shortly after made proofe, for being fallen into the hands of the king of Cyprus, he was by h•…•…s commaundement with hammers beaten to death vppon an anuill. But how much more truely did Seneca say to the contrarie, Caesaricum omnia licent, propter hoc minus licet, When all things are vnto Caesar lawfull, euen for that are they lesse lawfull. And therefore they that generally say, that princes are not subiect vnto lawes, nor to their owne conuentions, if they except not the lawes of God and nature, and the iust con∣tracts and conuentions made with them, they do great wrong both vnto God and na∣ture, in that they make not the speciall exemption to appeare; as men say in matters of priueleges. So Dionisius the tyrant of Sicilie, said to his mother, That he could di∣spence [ I] with the lawes and customes of Syracusa, but not with the lawes of nature. For as the contracts and testaments of priuat men, cannnot derogat from the decrees of the magistrats, nor the decrees of the magistrats from the auntient customes, nor the aun∣tient customes from the generall lawes of a soueraigne prince: no more also can the lawes of soueraigne princes alter or chaunge the lawes of God and nature. Where∣fore the Roman magistrats did notably, who vnto the end of all their requests & laws which they propounded vnto the good liking of the people, commonly annexed this clause, Si quid ius non esset E. E. L. N. R. eius ea lege nihilem rogaretur, that is to say, That if any thing were therein contained that was not iust and reasonable, they by that law requested nothing. But of all others they are most absurd, which say, That a [ K] soueraigne prince can decree nothing against the lawes of God and nature, without most apparant reason. For what apparant reason can there be diuised, for which wee ought to breake the lawes of God? And hereof proceed such paradoxes as this, That he whome the Pope hath dispensed withall for the lawes of God, is sufficiently assured before God: which how true it is let others iudge.

There resteth yet another obiection, by them obiected which with more reason* 1.320 examine matters. If princes (say they) be bound vnto the lawss of nature, that is to say, of vpright reason: and that ciuill lawes be (in all things) agreeable vnto right and rea∣son,

it must needs thereof follow, that the prince is also bound vnto the ciuil laws. And [ A] to that end they alleage that saying of Pacutius vnto Theodosius the emperour, Tantum tibi licet quantum per leges licebit, So much is lawfull for thee to do, as thou maiest by law doe. For the plainer aunswering of which doubt, we must thus distinguish: That* 1.321 the lawes of a soueraigne prince, whereof question is made, concerne either that which is publick, or priuat, or common to both: and generally when question is, it is either of that which is profitable and not honest, or of that which is honest and not profita∣ble, or is both profitable and honest; or els of that which is neither of both. And that I call honest, which is agreeing vnto the equitie of nature; vnto which naturall equitie it is manifest all princes to be bound, seeing that which nature teacheth, is altogether comprehended in the law of nature, whereunto euery prince is bound to obey: nei∣ther [ B] is such a law to bee called a ciuile law, albeit that the prince cause it to bee publi∣shed, but rather the law of nature. And with so much the more reason, when the law is both honest and profitable. But if that which is by law commaunded, bee neither honest nor profitable, although of such things there ought to be no law; yet may the prince bind his subiects vnto those lawes, whereunto he is not himselfe bound, if they haue no dishonour or dishonestie ioyned with them. For there bee some things ho∣nest, some things dishonest, and some in a meane betwixt both. But if profit repugne against honestie, it is good reason that honestie should take place. As Aristides the iust, to whom Themistocles was commanded to communicat his deuice, aunswered, That the counsell of Themistocles was profitable to the Commonweale; but yet in his [ C] iudgement dishonest: the Athenians hearing so much, enquired no farther after the matter, but decreed that his profitable counsell to be reiected. But here when we rea∣son of a Commonweale, we must speake according to the common manner; which our speech is not to be examined according to the subtiltie of Philosophers: for they set downe, nothing to be profitable which is not honest, neither anything to bee ho∣nest which is not iust: but that old custome is growne out of vse, so that of necessitie we must make a difference betwixt things honest, and things profitable. But if that which the prince by his law commaundeth, be not honourable, but profitable, he him∣selfe is not by that law bound, although his subiects be, so that nothing bee therein contained contrarie to the lawes of God and nature: and such lawes the prince may [ D] at his pleasure abrogat, or from them derogat, and instead of them make others, either more or lesse profitable: for things honest, iust, and profitable, haue their degrees of more and lesse. If then it be lawfull for a prince amongst lawes profitable, to make choice of them that be more profitable; so also amongst lawes iust and honest, he may chuse out them that be most vpright and honest, albeit that some therby receiue pro∣fit, and some others losse; prouided that the profit be publicke, and the losse particular: and yet if the prince shall otherwise decree, it is not lawfull for the subiect to breake the laws of his prince, vnder the colour of honestie, or iustice: as if the prince in time of fa∣mine, forbid the carrying out of victuals (a thing not only profitable to the Common∣weale, but oft times also iust and reasonable) he ought not to giue leaue to some few to [ E] carry thē out, to the preiudice of the common state, & of other marchants in particular; for vnder the colour of profit that these flatterers and scrapers carrie things, many good marchants suffer losse, and all the subiects in generall are famished: and yet ne∣uerthelesse the famine and dearth ceasing, it is not yet lawfull for the subiect to trans∣gresse the edicts of his prince, and to carrie out victuals, vntill the law forbidding the same, be by the prince abrogated, no not though there seeme neuer so great occasions for the transgressing of the law: as that now the citie is full of victuall, and all other things necessarie; and that the law of nature persuadeth vs to giue reliefe vnto distres∣sed

strangers, in letting them haue part of such good things as it hath pleased God to [ F] send encrease of more in one countrey than in another: for as much as the power of the law that forbiddeth, is greater than the apparant equitie, the show whereof euerie man might pretend to his desires, except the prohibition in the law be directly against the lawes of God and nature.

But so sometimes things fall out, as that the law may be good, iust, and reasonable,* 1.322 and yet the prince to be no way subiect or bound thereunto: as if he should forbid all his subiects, except his guard and garrison souldiors, vpon paine of death to carrie wea∣pon, so to take away the feares of murders and seditions; he in this case ought not to be subiect to his owne law, but to the contrarie, to be well armed for the defence of the good, and punishment of the euill. The same we may say of other edicts and lawes [ G] also, which concerne but some part of the subiects; which edicts and lawes are called priueleges, and are iust in respect of certaine persons, or for a certaine time, or place; or for the varietie of punishments which depend alwaies of the lawes; albeit that the for∣bidding of offences is proceeding from the lawes of God and nature. Vnto which edicts and lawes the princes are not any way bound, further than the naturall iustice of the same hath place; which ceasing, the prince is no more therunto bound, vntill the prince haue abrogated the same. For it is not onely a law of nature, but also oftentimes repeated amongst the lawes of God, That we should be obedient vnto the lawes and ordinances of such princes as it hath pleased God to set to rule and raigne ouer vs, if their lawes and decrees be not directly repugnant vnto the lawes of God and nature, [ H] whereunto all princes are as well bound as their subiects. For as the vassall oweth his oath of fidelitie vnto his lord towards & against al men, except his soueraigne prince; so the subiect oweth his obedience to his soueraigne prince, towards and against all, the maiestie of God excepted, who is the absolute soueraigne of all the princes in the world.

Out of this resolution we may draw another rule of estate, that is to wit, that the so∣ueraigne* 1.323 prince is bound vnto the contracts by him made, bee it with his subiect, or with a straunger: for seeing he is the warrant to his subiects of the mutuall conuenti∣ons and obligations that they haue one of them against another: of how much more reason is he the debter of iustice in his owne fact, and so bound to keepe the faith and [ I] promises by himselfe giuen and made to others? As the court of parliament at Paris writ backe vnto king Charles the ix, in the moneth of March, in the yeare 1563, That his maiestie alone could not breake the contract made betwixt him and the clergie, without the consent of the clergie; and that for this reason, For that he was himselfe the debtor of iustice, and so bound to giue euerie man his right. Which putteth mee in remembrance of a resolution concerning the vpright dealing of princes, worthy to be engrauen in letters of gold, in their lodgings and pallaces; which is, That it ought to bee accounted amongst things which by chaunce seldome happen, if a prince fayle of his pro∣mise;* 1.324 and that it is not otherwise to be presumed. For that of his promise there is a dou∣ble bond; the one for the naturall equitie thereof: for what can be more agreeing vn∣to [ K] naturall equitie, than to haue iust promise kept? The other, for the honour of the prince himselfe, who is bound to keepe his promise, although it be vnto his losse; for that he is the formall warrant to all his subiects, of the faith that they haue amongst* 1.325 them; as also for that there is no more detestable crime in a prince, than to bee false of his oath and promise. And that is it for which the soueraigne prince ought alwaies in iustice to bee lesse respected or releeued than his subiects, when question is of his pro∣mise. For if a prince haue once bestowed an honour or an office vpon a man, it is dee∣med, that he may not without iust cause take it againe away from him; but a particu∣lar

subiect may: and so it is ordinarily iudged. And wheras by the law the patron [ A] might without cause take his fee from his vestall; yet was it not lawfull for the prince so to doe. Whereby it is well to be perceiued, the doctors of the Canon law to erre, and to be deceiued, who deny a prince to be bound to his owne conuentions or agree∣ments, otherwise than with a naturall bond: for that say they, euery bond is proper vn∣to the ciuill law; which their errour is to be remoued: For who can doubt, but that the bond is of the same nature with the couenant? Wherefore if the couenant be na∣turall, and common to all nations, the bonds and actions arising thereof must needs consequently be of the same nature also. But no couenant almost, neither any obliga∣tion or bond can be deuised, which is not common both vnto the law of nature and nations. But let vs graunt some couenants to proceed from the meere ciuill law; yet [ B] * 1.326 who dare to deny a prince to be more straitly bound euen vnto such ciuill couenants, and promises, than are the priuat subiects themselues? yea and that in so strait a maner as that he cannot with all the absolute power he hath derogat from the same? For so almost all the learned lawyers are of opinion and accord. And what maruell? seeing God himself is bound vnto his promises. For so he plainly protesteth with the prophet Hieremie, Call together vnto me (saith he) all the people of the earth, that they may iudge betwixt me and my people, if there be any thing that I ought to haue done, which I haue not done. Let vs noth therefore call into question those things wherof many doctors haue doubted. As whether a prince be bound vnto the couenants which he hath made with his subiects? whereat we need not to maruell, seeing that out of the same fountaine is [ C] sprung, that no lesse straunge position: that a prince may of right, without any iust cause enrich himselfe with another mans losse: an opinion repugnant vnto the lawes both of God and nature. But how much more vprightly was it of late iudged in the court of Paris, that the prince might giue his intrest vnto the partie condemned; but not the intrest of another man. And that in confiscations creditours are by right first to be preferred, The same court also by another decree determined, That the prince might derogat from the ciuill lawes, so that it were done without preiudice to any par∣ticular mens right: which is to confirme the resolutions which wee before haue set downe, concerning the absolute soueraignetie. And Philip of Valois, by two testa∣ments which he made in the yeare 1347, and 1350, (which are in the treasurie of France [ D] in a coffer, intituled The testaments of kings, number 289) ioyneth a clause derogato∣rie vnto the lawes of his countrey, from which he protested himselfe to be discharged, as not vnto them bound. The like protestations he also vsed, when hee gaue vnto the queene his wife certaine treasure, and priuat lands, contrarie vnto the lawes: with aswel his prodigall gift, as also that his derogation from the lawes of his countrey, are yet ex∣tant in the publick records. Howbeit that Augustus the emperor thought it not good for himselfe in like case to vse the like libertie in his Commonweale, but being willing to giue vnto his wife Liuia, that which he could not by reason of the law Voconia, hee requested to be dispensed with all from that law by the Senat (although that it was not needfull for him so to haue done, considering that he was long time before in all other [ E] things dispensed with from the lawes) to the intent the better to assure his gift, for that he was not a soueraigne prince, as we haue before showed. For otherwise hee had not bene any way bound so to doe; as it was in most strong tearmes iudged by a decree in the court of Paris, in the case of Philip the second, the French king, That he was not bound vnto the customes of the ciuil law, at such time as they which were next of kin∣dred would haue redeemed of him the countie of Guynes: howbeit that many both thinke and write, the prince to be bound to that law: for that they thinke that law to be common to all nations, and not proper to any citie: and yet then the which law the

Romans themselues (in some cases) thought nothing more vnreasonable. But our an∣cestours [ F] * 1.327 would not haue euen their subiects bound vnto the Roman lawes; as we see in the auntient records, that Philip the faire, erecting the parliament of Paris and Mon∣pellier declared, That they should not be bound vnto the Roman laws. And in the ere∣ction of Vniuersities, the kings haue alwaies declared, That their purpose was to haue the ciuill and canon laws in them publickly professed and taught, to make vse therof at their discretion, but not that the subiects should be any way bound therunto, least they should seeme to derogat from the lawes of their owne country by aduancing the laws of straungers. And for the same cause Alaricus king of the Gothes, forbad vpon pain of death, any man to allege the Roman lawes contrarie to his decrees and ordinances. Which M. Charles du Moulin (my companion, and ornament of all lawyers) mista∣king, [ G] is therefore with him verie angrie, and in reproach calleth him therefore barba∣rous: howbeit that nothing was therein by Alaricus decreed or done, but that which euerie wise prince would of good right haue decreed and done: for subiects will so long both remember, and hope for the gouernment of strangers, as they are gouerned by their lawes. The like edict there is of king Charles the faire, and an old decree of the court of Paris, whereby we are expresly forbidden to alleage the laws of the Romans, against the lawes and customes of our auncestours. Yea the kings of Spaine also haue vpon capitall paine forbidden any man to alleage the Roman laws, in confirmation of their owne laws, (as Oldrad writeth.) And albeit that there were nothing in the lawes and customes of their countrey which differed from the Roman lawes, yet such is the [ H] force of that edict, that all men may vnderstand that the judges in deciding of the sub∣iects causes, were not bound vnto the Roman lawes: & therfore much lesse the prince himselfe, who thought it a thing daungerous to haue his judges bound vnto straunge lawes. And worthy he is to be accounted a traitor, that dare to oppose straunge lawes and straunge decrees against the lawes of his owne prince. In which doings when the* 1.328 Spaniards did too much offend, Stephen king of Spaine forbad the Roman lawes to be at all taught in Spaine▪ as Polycrates writeth: which was more straitly prouided for by king Alphonsus the tenth, who commaunded the magistrats and judges to come vnto the prince himselfe, as often as there was nothing written in the lawes of their coun∣trey concerning the matter in question. Wherein Baldus is mistaken, when hee wri∣teth [ I] the Italians to bee bound to the Roman lawes; but the French no otherwise than so farre as they should seeme vnto them to agree with equitie and reason. For the one are as little bound as the other; howbeit that Italie, Spaine, the countries of Pro∣uince, Sauoy, Languedoc, and Lyonnois, vse the Roman lawes more than other peo∣ple: and that Frederike Barbarussa the emperour, caused the books of the Roman laws to be published and taught: the greatest part whereof haue yet no place in Italie, and much lesse in Germanie. But there is much difference betwixt a right, and a law: for a right still without commaund respecteth nothing but that which is good and vp∣right; but a law importeth a commaundement. For the law is nothing els but the commaundement of a soueraigne, vsing of his soueraigne power. Wherefore then as [ K] a soueraigne is not bound vnto the laws of the Greeks, nor of any other stranger what∣soeuer he be, no more is he bound vnto the Roman laws, more than that they are con∣formable* 1.329 vnto the law of nature; which is the law whereunto (saith Pindarus) all kings and princes are subiect. From which we are not to excepteither the pope or the em∣perour (as some pernitious flatterers do) saying, That those two viz. the pope and the emperour, may of right without cause take vnto themselues the goods of their subiects.* 1.330 Which opinion the Canonists themselues, the interpretors of the popes law detest, as contrarie to the law of God: whereunto for all that they ioine this euill limitation, in

saying, That they may yet do it of their most high and absolute power and authority, [ A] as they tearme it: which is as much as if they should say it to bee lawfull for them to rob and spoyle their subiects, oppressed by force of armes: which law, the more migh∣tie vse against them that be weaker than themselues, which the Germans most rightly call, The law of theeues and robbers. But pope Innocent the iiij himself, most skilfull in both the lawes, saith that most high and absolute power, to bee able but to derogat from the ordinarie law▪ whereas they would haue such absolute and soueraigne pow∣er to extend to the abrogating of the lawes of God and nature. For what is more religiously by Gods lawes forbidden, than to rob and spoyle other men of their goods? what thing do we read more often repeated, than to keepe our hands from other mens things? yea we are by the most holy Decalogue commaunded, not so much as [ B] to desire that which is another mans. Now certainly it is a greater offence to infect princes with this doctrine, than it is to rob and steale. For pouertie commonly causeth theeues to seeke after other mens goods: but they that maintaine such opinions, show the lion his clawes, and arme the prince so instructed, to pretend vnto his outrages, this goodly show of Law and Iustice: who by nature naught, & made worse by instructi∣on: so prouing to be a tyrant, maketh no question most shamefully to confound and breake all the lawes both of God and man: and afterward enflamed with corrupt de∣sires and affections, which altogether weaken the more noble parts of the mind, hee quickly breaketh out from couetousnesse to vniust confiscations, from lust to adulte∣rie, from wrath to murder. So that as thunder is indeed before the lightning, although [ C] it be latter heard: so also an euill prince, corrupted with these pernitious & pestilent opi∣nions, peruetting iustice, causeth the fine to runne before the accusation, and the con∣demnation before the iudgement. Howbeit it is an in congruitie in law, to say that* 1.331 a prince can do any thing which is not agreeing with honestie; seeing that his power ought alwaies to be measured with the foot of iustice. For so said Plinie the younger vnto Traian the emperour, Vt enim foelicitatis est posse quantum velis: sic magnitudinis velle quantum possis, As it is (saith he) in thy happinesse to be able to doe what thou wilt; so beseemeth it thy greatnesse, to will what thou maist. Whereof may be gathe∣red, that a prince can do nothing that is fowle or vniust. It is also euill done, to say, that a soueraigne prince hath power by violence to take away another mans goods, [ D] to rob, to commit adulterie, or to do euill, seeing that so to doe, is rather an impoten∣cie, or feeblenes, proceeding from a weake mind ouercome with impotent lust and de∣sire, rather than any soueraignty. Now then if a soueraigne prince may not remoue the bounds which almightie God (of whom he is the liuing & breathing image) hath pre∣fined vnto the euerlasting lawes of nature: neither may he take from another man that* 1.332 which is his, without iust cause, whether it be by buying, by exchaunge, by confiscati∣on, by league with friends, or peace made with enemies, if it cannot otherwise bee con∣cluded than by priuat mens losse; whose goods princes oftentimes permit the enemies to enioy, for the generall welfare of the subiects and of the Commonweale: howbeit that many be not of this opinion, but would that euerie man should keepe his owne; [ E] and that no publick diminution should be made of any priuat mans goods, or that if publicke necessitie so required, it were againe to bee made goodby the whole state: which opinion I like well of, if conueniently it might so be done. But forasmuch as the welfare of priuat men, and all the goods of the subiects are contained in the health of our country, it beseemeth priuat men without grudging to forgiue vnto the Com∣monwealth, not onely their priuat displeasures, and iniuries receiued from their ene∣mies, but to yeeld also for the health of the Commonweale, their goods. For peace hath for the most part some hard measure in it, which is againe recompenced with the

publique profit: and this law doth all people vse, that in conclusions of peace, not on∣ly [ F] publick things are recompensed with publike, and priuat things with priuat; but both with the mutuall profits and detriments of both. And yet I see many great mai∣sters of both lawes, both to be, & to haue bene of opinion, that in those leagues where∣in it is excepted, that no question should be made of the losse on both sides receiued, such exception should be void, neither to be any thing preiudiciall vnto priuat men: howbeit that we vse it otherwise; for in the peace of Peronne, made for the deliuerance of Lewes the xj the French king, prisoner vnto Charles earle of Burgundie, it was in one article prouided, That Seigneur de Torci should not execute the sentence of the* 1.333 court of Paris against the lord of Saneuses. And therefore is Thrasibulus (and that not vnworthily) commended, that hauing ouerthrowne and driuen thirtie tyrants out of [ G] the citie of Athens, he caused the law of forgetfulnesse to be proclaimed. Wherein was contained the forgetting of all priuat iniuries and losses receiued in the late ciuill warre: which was also afterwards proclaimed in Rome, after that Caesar was s•…•…aine in the Senat, at the treatie made betwixt the conspirators on the one side, and Caesars par∣takers on the other. Yet is it by all meanes to be enduoured, that mens harmes recei∣ued, should be recompensed with other mens profits, and so as neere as may bee euery man to haue his owne, which if it cannot be done without tumult and ciuill warres, we must defend the possessors of other mens things, although they hold them wrongfully, vntill the right honours may be satisfied out of the common treasure: or if the com∣mon treasure be exhausted, to borrow money to content them. As did Aratus, who [ H] hauing restored his countrey to liberrie, after it had for the space of fiftie yeares bene oppressed with tyranny, restored also sixe hundred banished men, whose lands & goods had bene by the tyrant confiscated. Yet would hee not the possessors of those lands, which the tyrants had vniustly taken from those citisens, to be spoyled therof: for that much thereof was lawfully bought and sold, and much of it holden in dowrie, so that it could not be done without a most daungerous turmoile in the state. Wherefore he bound all the citisens by oath, That they should keep peace and amitie vntill such time as he returning out of Aegypt, should then take order for all things. For hauing there borrowed threescore thousand crownes of K. Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, he returned into his countrey, and pri•…•…ing the land, so wrought the matter, that some made choice to [ I] take money and leaue the land; and other some thought it better to take mony them∣selues, than to recouer againe that which had beene before their owne. Wherefore these causes that I haue said ceasing, the prince cannot take nor giue another mans goods, without the consent of the owner. And in all gifts, grants, immunities, and pri∣ueledges, this clause is still annexed, Sauing alwaies our owne right: and the right of other men: Which clause added vnto the inuestiture of the dutchie of Milan, which Maxi∣milian the emperour made to king Lewes the xij, was the occasion of new warres, for the right which the Sforces pretended to the dutchie, which the emperour could not nor would not giue away. And this clause although it be left out, is yet supposed to be still put in: for that euen the emperour would he neuer so faine, can no otherwise giue [ K] or graunt any other thing to any bodie. For that which the common people common∣ly saith, All to be the princes, is to be vnderstood concerning power and soueraigntie,* 1.334 the proprietie and possession of euerie mans things yet reserued to himselfe. For so saith Seneca, Ad reges potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos proprietas, Vnto kings be∣longeth the power of all things, and vnto particular men the proprietie. And a little after, Omnia rex imperio possidet singuli dominio, The king in power possesseth all* 1.335 things: and priuat men as owners. And for this cause our kings by the lawes and de∣crees of Court, are bound to void their hands of such lands as are fallen vnto them by

way of confiscation (if they be not simplie and without meane holden of the crowne) [ A] to the end that the patrons of them that were proscribed, should loose nothing of their right in the lands confiscated. And if the king be debtor to any priuat man his subiect, he is therefore oft times sued, condemned, and enforced to pay the debt. But that straungers aswell as subiects, and all posteritie may know of what integritie our kings haue bene, and with what moderation they haue borne themselues towards their sub∣iects, let this be for example, That the king himselfe in the yere 1266, was by the iudge∣ment of the court of Paris, condemned to pay vnto the curat, the tyth of the fruits euen of his garden of pleasure. So when another of our kings had by the negligence of his aduocat, made default of appearence at his day; hee by ordinarie course requested to haue that negligent ouersight pardoned: which the kings request the court of Paris [ B] denied, as appeareth by the decree of the court, in the yeare 1419. But no such strict proceeding is vsed against priuat men, who alwaies in such case are againe restored in∣to the state they before were. And albeit that subiects vnder xxv yeares old, almost in all priuat iudgements vse to be againe restored into the state they were, by the priue∣lege of their age; yet our kings although but children, are neuer so restored by the be∣nefit of their age, but in all iudgements are deemed to bee of full age. And yet the Commonweale neuerthelesse is alwaies reputed to be in minoritie: which is to aun∣swere them which are of opinion, That the Commonweale ought not to be restored; in that they confound the patrimonie of the prince, with the Commonweale, which is alwaies in a monarchie diuided: but all one in a popular or an Aristocraticall state. [ C] With this stoutnesse of courage the magistrats bare themselues towards our kings, & with this moderation also did our kings reuerence iustice, preferring still in all sutes the Commonweale before priuat men, and priuat men before princes. There is also extant in the records of the court of Paris, a iudgement giuen against king Charls the seuenth, wherein he was condemned to suffer a wood of his to bee cut downe which hee had neere vnto the citie of Paris, for the publike vse in generall, and the vse of euerie one of the citisens in particular: and that more was, the price thereof was set downe for him in the decree, whereunto a priuat subiect could hardly haue bene driuen. Then was it plainely to be seene how much a king differed from a tyrant: for when this Charls the vij had driuen the English forces out of the hart of Fraunce, and easily taken the citie [ D] of Paris (which confederated with the English, had wrested the scepter out of this kings hand) he was so farre from reuenging of his receiued iniuries, that hee vsed the citisens most curteously, and showed himselfe more obedient vnto the judges than priuat men haue vsed to be. When at the same time Philip Maria, duke of Milan, hauing op∣pressed the Commonweale with taxes and tributes, embarred also his ports and riuers, in such sort as that none of the citisens without his leaue could passe or trauell thereby, but that first they must therefore pay money.

Thus we haue hitherto showed in what sort a soueraigne is subiect vnto the lawes* 1.336 and conuentions by him made with his subiects: Now it resteth for vs to see whether he be subiect vnto the contracts and promises of the kings his predecessours; and whe∣ther [ E] such his obliging be compatible with soueraigne maiestie or not. Which in few words to discusse, passing ouer a multitude of nice questions which might bee made in this matter: I say that a prince is bound vnto the couenants of his auncestors as well as other priuat heirs, if his kingdome come vnto him by inheritance, or bee giuen him by testament being not next of kinne: as Ptolemee king of Cyrene, Nicomedes king of Bithynia, Attalus king of Asia, and Eumenes king of Pergame, by their wils appointed the people of Rome to inherit their kingdomes. But what if a kingdome be by will gi∣uen vnto the next of kinne? as Henry the eight by his will left the kingdome of Eng∣land

to his son Edward the sixt: and substituted vnto him his sister Mary, and vnto her [ F] Elizabeth her sister, who all successiuely enioyed the kingdome. In this case wee must distinguish, whether the appointed heire will accept the state in the qualitie of an heire by testament appointed; or renouncing the succession of the testator, demaundeth the crowne by vertue of the custome and law of his countrey. For in the former case the successour is bound vnto all the hereditary obligations and actions of his predecessors, as if he were a priuat inheritour: but in the second case, he is not bound vnto the dome of his predecessour, albeit that his predecessour were thereto sworne. For neither the oath nor the obligation of the dead predecessour, bindeth the successour in the law, more than so farre as the obligation made by the testatour tendeth to the good of the Commonweale, and so farre he is bound. And therefore king Lewes the xij, when he [ G] was demaunded the artillerie lent vnto Charles the eight, answered, That he was none of Charles his heire. So of late king Francis the second, to like effect writ his letters vnto the lords of the Swissers, demaunding of him his fathers debts, the copie whereof taken out of the records, bearing date the xix of Ianuarie 1559, I haue here set downe as followeth, viz. Although that we be not bound to pay the debts of our most honourable* 1.337 Lord, and dead father: for that we haue not taken vpon vs this crowne by right of inheri∣tance as his heire, but by the royall law and custome generally obserued euen from the first institution thereof, which bindeth vs not, but onely to the obseruing of such confederations and treaties, passed and made by the kings our predecessors, with other forren princes and Commonweales, for the good and profit of this crowne. Neuerthelesse desiring to discharge [ H] the credit and conscience of the said our dead lord and father, wee are resolued to discharge his lawfull debts, &c. Onely this requesting you, to moderat the interest, in such sort as you haue vsed, according to the lawes and customes of your countrey, and that no greater be of vs exacted. Which his request the Swissers by their common decree approued, so that whereas before they had taken of our people so deepe intrest, as euery sixt yeare came almost to as much as the principall, (which is twice so much as they doe in Fraunce) they brought it downe to a third part, which commeth to so much as the principal but in twentie yeares. But that our kings were not bound vnto the bonds of their prede∣cessours, the court of Paris determined, viz. In the yeare 1256. Wherefore they are greatly deceiued, which receiue as from an oracle the formall and conceiued words of [ I] the oath which the bishops of Rheims haue at their pleasure not long since deuised, which our kings at their coronation now vse. For after that the archbishop of Rheims hath set the crowne vpon the kings head, the twelue peers of Fraunce putting to their hands, he saith vnto him these words, Stay you here (saith he) and the kingdome which you haue before vntill now holden by succession from your father, now from henceforth hold as the true heyre thereof, put into your hands by the power of almightie God, and by the iust deliuerie thereof, which we the bishops and other the seruants of God here presently make vnto you. An honest speech if it were true. But I thinke no man doubteth, but that the king euen before his consecration enioyeth both the possession and proprietie of the kingdome, not by inheritance or his fathers right, and much lesse by the bountie of [ K] the bishops or peers, but by the royall law and custome of the realme, as was long since decreed by * 1.338 a decree of the French men, That no man should thinke the power of the king to depend of the pleasure of the bishops: not for that the Senat euer doub∣ted of the power of the king before his coronation; but that those vaine quirkes of the bishops might be vtterly refelled. For it is an old prouerbe with vs, That the king* 1.339 doth neuer die, but that so soone as he is dead, the next male of his stocke is seised of the kingdome, and in possession thereof before he be crowned, which is not conferred vn∣to him by succession of his father, but by vertue of the law of the land; least the succes∣sion

of the kingdome should be vncertaine, then which nothing can be more daunge∣rous [ A] in a Commonweale. Wherefore let vs this hold, that the king which is by law∣full right called vnto his kingdome, is so farre bound vnto the couenants and promises of the kings his predecessours, as is for the good of the Commonweale: and so much the more, if the contracts were made by the consent and good liking of the people in∣generall, or of the states, or high court of parliament: which it is not onely seemely for a king to keepe, but also necessarie, although it be hurtfull vnto the Commonweale, considering that it concerneth the faith and obligation of his subiects. But if the soue∣raigne prince hath contracted either with strangers, or with his subiects, for such things as concerne the Commonweale, without the consent of them wee haue before said, if any great harme redound vnto the Commonweale by such contract, it is not reason [ B] the lawfull successour to be therunto bound: and much lesse if hee haue obtained the kingdome by election: For that he holdeth nothing from his predecessor, as he should doe if he held his state by resignation, for then he should be bound vnto the contracts and promises of his predecessours, except it were expresly otherwise excepted. But by what right soeuer the prince shal haue receiued his kingdome, whether it be by law, by testament, by election, or by lot, it is reason that the successours should performe all such contracts of his predecessor, as redounded to the profit of the Commonweale: for otherwise it should be lawfull for him contrarie to the law of nature, by fraud and indirect meanes to draw his owne profit out of others harmes: but it much concerneth a Commonweale, so much as in it lieth, to preserue and keepe the publike faith, least in [ C] the extreame daungers thereof, all the meanes for the reliefe thereof should be shut vp. And thus are to bee vnderstood, those things which the court of Paris decreed in the yeares 1256, and 1294, viz. The king not to be bound vnto the couenants and agree∣ments of the former kings his predecessours: their opinion being reiected, which say, That a soueraigne prince is to be thrust out of his kingdome, if he performe not the te∣stament of the former prince his predecessor: without putting the difference of prince∣ly successions, by vs before put, but vtterly confounding the succession of princes.

But what needeth (might some man say) this distinction in succession of princes? see∣ing that all princes are bound and subiect vnto the lawes of nations, whereof contracts and testaments do depend. Which is not so if wee speake of all contracts and testa∣ments [ D] in generall: but admit that to be true, yet there of it followeth not, that a prince is more bound vnto the laws of nations, than vnto his owne: and that so far as they agree with the laws of God and nature: wherunto all that we haue said concerning the obli∣ging of princes, is to be referred. For as for the laws of nations, if they be any of them vniust, the prince may abrogat them by the law of his realme, & forbid his subiects to vse the same: as we said before of seruitude and slaues: which by a daungerous ex∣ample, by the law almost of all nations brought into Commonweales, were againe by the wholsome decrees of many princes well agreeing with the lawes of nature taken away: which being said of one thing, may also be extended vnto other things of like condition: prouided alwaies, that nothing be done contrarie to the lawes of God and [ E] nature. For if iustice be the end of the law, and the law is the worke of the prince, and the prince is the liuely image of almightie God; it must needes follow, that the law of the prince should be framed vnto the modell of the law of God.

CHAP. IX. [ F] ¶ Of a Prince tributarie or feudatarie: and whether he be a soueraigne Prince: and of the prerogatiue of honour amongst Soueraigne Princes.

THis question deserueth a speciall Chapter by it selfe, for that it hath no communitie with the auntient markes of Soueraigntie, which were before the right of Fees, vsed in all Europe and Asia, and yet more in Turkie than in any place of the world: where the Timari∣ots hold not the Fees they haue to serue in the warres, but so long as pleaseth the king of the Turkes, who giueth them no longer but for tearme of their liues: which haue them with condition, that in time of warre the Ti∣mariots [ G] shall of their owne charge without any pay bring such a number of horsemen and horses, as is appointed in the subsidie bookes, according to the proportion of the rent of the fees, which they cal Timar, which is to say in their language, the Vse and pro∣fit, deriued as I suppose of the Greeke word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and the word Timar signifying with them the honourable vse and profit, which is the true nature of Fee, to bee free from all tribute or base charges. And for this cause the vassall in the auntient law of the Lombards, is called Leude, which is to say, franke and free: Aldius and Alda, af∣franchised, from whence the words Alaudium and Laudimia are deriued, signifying the honourable rewards woont to be giuen to the lord of the fee, taking the oath of fealty of his vassall. But hauing thus much said for the explanation of these words, let vs pro∣ceed [ H] vnto our purpose.

We haue said here before, him to be an absolute soueraigne, who next vnto al∣mightie God, is subiect vnto none: neither holdeth any thing next vnto God, but of his owne sword: For if he be enforced to serue any man, or to obey any mans com∣maund (be it by his owne good liking, or against his will) or if he hold of another man, he looseth the title of maiestie, and is no more a soueraigne, as saith a certaine Poet:

Esse sat est seruum, iam nolo * 1.340 vicarius esse: Qui Rex est, Regem Maxime non habeat.

To be a slaue it is enough, I will not serue a slaue: [ I] Who is a king, friend Maximus, no other king must haue.

If they then which hold in fealtie and homage haue no maiestie or soueraigntie, there should be but few soueraigne princes to be found. And if were graunt that they which hold in fealtie and homage, or that are tributaries, be soueraignes, wee must by the same reason confesse, the vassall and his lord, the master and the seruant, to be equal in greatnes, power, and authoritie. And yet the doctors of the law hold that the dukes of Milan, Mantua, Ferrara, and Sauoy, yea euen and some Counties also are soue∣raignes:* 1.341 which altogether differ from those things which wee haue before said of the right of maiestie and soueraigntie. Wherefore it is requisit for vs more exquisitly to [ K] entreat of these matters, whereof dependeth the principall point of soueraigntie, and the prerogatiue of honour amongst princes, which they esteeme as a thing vnto them most deare of all things in the world.

Wee said before in the Chapter of Patronage (which we otherwise call Protecti∣on) that princes which are in protection, if they haue no other subiection, hold yet their maiestie and soueraigntie, although they haue enred into inequal alliance, where∣by they are bound to acknowledge their protectors in all honour. But there is great difference betwixt them which are in simple protection onely, and them which hold

in fealtie and homage. For the client, or he which is the simple protection of another [ A] * 1.342 prince onely, acknowledgeth his patron his superiour, in the league of their confedera∣tion, but no further than the dignitie of the person and place requireth: but the vassall, or he which holdeth in fealtie and homage, is glad not onely to acknowledge his lord for his superiour, but is enforced also in humble wise to giue vnto him his faith and du∣tie, or els to forgo his fee. When I say fealtie & homage, I meane the oath of fidelity, the submission, the seruice, and dutie of the vassall, which he is by the tenour of his fee bound to giue vnto his lord.

Which that it may be the better vnderstood, we will make nine degrees of inferi∣ours,* 1.343 in respect of their superiours: beside him who next vnto almightie God, acknow∣ledgeth none superiour vnto himselfe. The first sort, is of such princes as are in the [ B] protection of him whose maiestie they obserue and reuerence, and commonly giue themselues into his protection, so to bee the safer against their most mightie enemies. The second, is of such princes as acknowledge a superiour in their confederation, vnto whome they vse to pay a tribute or pension, so by his helpe and aid to bee the safer: which deserueth not to be called patronage, because it is mercenarie, whereas vnto kind dutie no reward is due. The third is, of such princes as being overcome by the more mightie, haue of him receiued peace, who yet keepe their maiestie and soue∣raigntie, with condition, courteously to reuerence the maiestie of the victor, and to pay vnto him a yearely tribute, for which they are from him to receiue neither prote∣ction nor aide. And albeit that these seeme to be more charged than they which are [ C] but in protection; yet is it so, that in effect they are greater, for in paying the tribute they haue promised for their peace, they are acquited, and haue nothing to doe with any other for the defence of their estate. The fourth sort is of them which are them∣selues kings, and freely exercise their soueraigntie ouer their owne subiects; but yet are vassales or feudataries to some other prince for some fee, bee it greater or bee it lesse, which they from him receiue. The fift sort, is of them which are not kings, neither haue any soueraigntie, but are become vassals for their fee, and are simply called meere vassals, who are bound to defend the honour of their lord, and to take vp arms for him, but not at all times, nor against all men. The sixt sort are they whom wee call liege vassals, who are not naturall subiects vnto the prince, but hauing giuen him their [ D] faith, are bound to defend his dignitie and honour, and for his defence to take vp armes without exception; yet not alwaies, nor in all places, but so farre forth as the profit of the fee, or the contract of their vassallage extendeth. The seuenth sort are they whom we call subiects, whether they be vassals or tenants, or such as hold no land at all, who are bound to fight for the honour and defence of their prince as well as for themselues, and to haue the same enemies and the same friends that he hath. The eight sort is of them, which in former time deliuered from slauerie, yet retaine a certaine kind of serui∣tude, as doe they which are tied vnto the soyle, and are of vs called Mort-maines. The last sort are the right slaues. This distinction of the degrees of subiection, I haue made to take away the confusion that many make of the subiect with the vassall; and of the [ E] simple vassall with the liege man; and hold, that the liege man oweth all obedience vnto his lord towards and against all men; and that the simple vassall reserueth his su∣perior: and yet neuerthelesse there is but the subiect onely which oweth his obey∣sance. For the vassall, be he liege or simple, if he be not a subiect, oweth but the seruice and homage expressed in his inuestiture, from which hee may without fraud exempt* 1.344 himself, by yeelding vp his fee: but the naturall subiect, which holds in fee, in farme, or fee simple, or be it that he hold nothing at all that he can call his owne, yet can hee not by any meanes without the consent of his prince exempt himselfe from the personall

obligation wherewith he is vnto him bound, as we have before declared. The simple [ F] vassall is bound but once in his life to giue his oath of fidelitie vnto his lord: and such a vassall it may be as is neuer bound to giue his oath: for that the fee may bee without any such obligation of giuing his faith, as is to be seene in the old lawes of fees, (con∣trarie to that which M, Charles du Molin hath both thought and writ) but the subiect whatsoeuer is alwaies and in all places bound to give his oath, and so oft as it shal please his soueraigne prince to require it: yea although he were a bishop without any tem∣poralitie at all. As for the liege man, it is not requisite that he should bee subiect vnto the lord of whom he holdeth: for it may be, that he may be a soueraigne prince, hol∣ding some seignorie of another prince in liege, fealtie and homage: it may also be, that he may be the naturall subiect of one prince, and liege man to another, by reason of his [ G] fee: or well the simple vassall of one Lord, without being subiect or liegeman to ano∣ther: and naturall subiect to another, to whome he is iusticiable, and yet holdeth of him neither fee nor reuenew. For the vassall of a vassall is not for that, either vassall or subiect of the same lord, if it bee not in regard of the same fee. But it is needfull to explaine that we haue said by examples.

We find that the kings of England haue giuen their liege faith and homage vnto the kings of Fraunce for all the countries which they hold on this side the sea, except the counties of Oye and Guynes: And yet neuerthelesse they held the kingdomes of England and Ireland in soueraigntie without acknowledgement of any other prince whatsoeuer. But after in the yeare 1212 they made themselues vassals vnto the Pope [ H] and the church of Rome, and not onely vassals, but also tributaries: beside the annuall gift of smoke money, of auntient time graunted by Ine king of England, in the yeare 740, & augmented by Etelpe, which they called S. Peters pence. For it is found, that Iohn king of England, by the consent of all the counties, barrons and lords of the land, made himselfe vassall vnto the pope and church of Rome, and vowed to hold the realmes of England and Ireland of him in fealtie and homage, with the charge to pay the yearely rent and reuenew of a thousand markes for euer, vpon Michaelmas day, be∣side the Peter pence, which I haue spoken of: & gaue his faith and homage vnto the legat of pope Innocent the third, in the yeare 1213, in the presence of his chauncelor, the archbishop of Canterburie, foure bishops, sixe counties, and many other great lords. [ I] The Bull was made in autentique forme, whereof I haue seene the copie in a regi∣ster of the Vatican, taken out by the commaundement of chauncelour du Prat, when he was Legat. And albeit that Sir Thomas More, chauncelour of England, was the first that maintained the contrarie: yet so it is, that in the same time, and vntill that king Henrie the eight reuolted from the pope, in the yeare 1534, the yearely reuenew and tribute was alwaies paied. But that is worth the noting, that the act of fealtie and ho∣mage, giuen vnto pope Innocent the the third, importeth that Iohn then king of Eng∣land, humbly requested forgiuenesse of his sinnes of the popes legat. Whereby it is plaine, that patronage of the bishop of Rome to haue bene by him sought for, to exte∣nuat the horrible murder which he had cruelly committed vpon the person of young [ K] Arthure his brothers sonne, duke of Britaine, and lawfull successour to the crowne of England; least otherwise he should haue bene therfore excommunicated by the pope. Whereas Philip Augustus, king of Fraunce, for the same cause had confiscated the du∣chies of Normandie, Guyenne, Aniou, Touraine, le Maine, & all the countries where∣vnto he pretended any right, on this side the sea: which the kings of England held by fealtie and liege homage of the king of Fraunce; and yet had the chiefe soueraigntie* 1.345 ouer the realmes of England, Ireland, and Scotland. For first Constantine king of the Scots, with the rest of the nobilitie of that country, did fealtie and homage to Adelstan

king of England; and after that Baliol king of Scots did fealtie and homage also to the [ A] king of England, declaring himselfe to hold the kingdome of Scotland vnder the pro∣tection of the English, excepting the xxxij Islands of the Orcades, which then & after∣wards also were holden in fealtie and homage of the kings of Norway; and owe vnto the new king comming to the crowne ten markes of gold, as was agreed betwixt the kings of Scotland and Denmark, to end the warres, which were renewed for the same isles, in the yeare 1564; as I haue learned by the letters of M. Danzai, ambassador for the king in Denmarke. Howbeit the kings of Scotland which raigned after Baliol, re∣nounced their homage vnto the English, neither acknowledging them for their supe∣riours, or yet to be vnto them vassals. And albeit that Dauid king of Scots did what he could with his subiects to consent that the kingdome of Scotland might bee holden [ B] of England in fealtie and homage: yet so it was, that he remained nine yeares in pri∣son, and by the treatie made betwixt Edward the third his brother in law, and him, it was agreed, that he should be set at libertie, without any more obtained from his estates but that he should liue in amitie and friendship with him. As for the realme of Ireland, it is not long since it receiued the English gouernment, excepting yet the earle of Ar∣gueil, who seemed alwayes to keepe the state of soueraigntie.

So might we say also of the king of Denmarke, who is a soueraigne prince in part* 1.346 of the kingdome of Norway, without acknowledging any prince for his superiour whatsoeuer; and yet holdeth part of the duchie of Holsatia of the emperour in fealty and homage: in which sort he in auntient time held the countrey of Denmarke, which [ C] was but a plaine dukedome, when Canutus duke of Denmarke yeelded fealtie and ho∣mage vnto the emperour Lothaire, and afterward to the emperour Frederike the fift: who first of all sent vnto Peter duke of Denmarke the sword and the crowne, and ho∣noured him with royall dignitie; yet with condition, That hee should for euer yeeld vnto the emperour fealtie and homage: howbeit that his posteritie afterwards reuol∣ted from the empire. And yet neuerthelesse these whome I haue named, beeing no subiects, neither acknowledging the greatnes of any prince, but in respect of the fees* 1.347 that they hold of other princes, are acquitted of their fealtie homage and seruice, by gi∣uing vp their fee without fraud. I say without fraud, for that it is not lawfull for the vas∣sall to forsake his lord and patron at his need, although he would renounce his fee: al∣beit [ D] that there be no other penaltie but the losse of fee appointed for him who in time of warre forsaketh his lord; for that he doth an irreparable preiudice vnto his honour, which for euer remaineth engaged for so foule a fact, as to haue forsaken his lord in time of daunger: seeing that by the oath of fidelitie the vassall, but especially the liege vassall ought to aide him, were it against his owne brethren and children. Yea some lawyers are of opinion, that he ought to aid his lord and patron, euen against his owne father: wherein I can in no wise agree with them, for that the first and chiefe fidelitie is due vnto our parents. But if the vassall be also a subiect, hee looseth not onely his fee and honour, if he forsake his soueraigne prince at his need, but euen his life thereon dependeth: seeing that it is death euen for a common souldior, not to defend his cap∣taine [ E] in battell. Wherefore we are not to maruell, if Iohn de Montfort, and Peter, dukes of Britaigne would neuer yeeld their fealtie vnto the French kings without exception, as their liege men for the dukedome of Britaigne: about which matter the chauncelors of Fraunce and Britaigne were twice at debate before the kings, Charles the fift, and Charles the sixt. And albeit that these two kings caused two acts to be produced, con∣cerning the fealtie and homage done by the dukes of Britaigne, to Philip the victorious and Lewes the eight: yet for all that, the dukes would not doe their homage as liege men, but were receiued doing their simple homage onely. True it is, that the liege

homage yeelded to Lewes the eight, was not but for the life of him that did it, as appea∣red [ F] by the act, without binding of his successours. And the other act which is of yong Arthure, was not pure and simple, but onely conditionall; as to be restored by Philip the victorious, vnto the territories and segnories from which he was embarred; which he did not. Now such is the force and nature of true and lawfull acts, as not to admit any time or condition, and the act of fealtie and homage of all other acts the least. But the end of the controuersie was, that the simple oath of Iohn and Peter should bee ta∣ken, least they should seeme to bee the liege vassals of the French: although both those dukes ought of right to haue bene depriued of the fee of the dukedome of Bri∣taigne, for that they had renounced the French king their lawfull patron. Neither is* 1.348 there any doubt, but that in truth the auntient counties of Britaigne were true subiects [ G] and liege men vnto the kings of Fraunce (as is to be seene in the histories of Gregorie bishop of Tours) and being reuolted, were subdued by Charlemaigne, and afterwards by Lewes the deuout, to whome they did homage, and yeelded all obeysance with hostages; as a man may see in the histories of Floard and Girald, whome some call Vi∣tald, the nephew of Charlemaigne. And againe for another rebellion against Charles the Bauld, in the yeare 1359, they were accused vnto the estates, of treason, & so con∣demned and executed: which could not haue taken place but against the naturall sub∣iect, for treason against his soueraigne prince. And after that Herispo countie of Bri∣taigne, doing his fealtie, and with a great summe of money giuen appeased Charles the Bauld: as had also before him duke Iudicael pleased Dagobert. Neither is it true, or [ H] like to be true, that Clodoueus, who had bounded the kingdome of Fraunce with the Pyrenei Mountaines, both the seas, and the riuer of Rheine; or Charlemaigne that had in many places vanquished infinit numbers of the barbarous nations, and had sub∣dued Spaine, Italie, Hungarie, Germanie, the Saxons, them of Pomerland, the Polo∣nians, and Russians, and had extended his empire euen as faire as Scithia, would haue receiued the dukes of Britaigne, euen in the bowels of Fraunce, as companions of the French empire. And admit that by the fauour of any the French kings, they obtai∣ned respite of homage, that could not be preiudicial vnto the kings their successors, and much lesse vnto the crowne of Fraunce. And that more is, in the treaties betwixt the kings of Fraunce, and the first dukes of Normandie, it is expresly set downe, That the [ I] counties of Britaigne, should be vassals vnto the dukes of Normandie, vnto whome they had oftentimes giuen their fealtie and homage: which could nor possibly haue bene, if they had not bene vassals and liege men vnto the crowne, seeing that the dukes of Normandie had giuen their fealtie and liege homage vnto the kings of Fraunce, & the counties of Britaigne vnto the dukes. And if true it be, that the vassall can neuer prescribe for his fealtie and homage against his lord; how then can the subiect prescribe for his subiection against his prince? So the Seneschall of Renes (a man verie well learned) cannot abide that Peter de Dreux prince of the blood, surnamed Maucler, had acquited the soueraigntie of Britaigne vnto the kings of Fraunce, seeing that hee was vassall and naturall subiect vnto the king: and yet neuerthelesse, in yeelding the ho∣mage, [ K] had reseruation to make lawes, to graunt pardons, to call parliaments, to take the* 1.349 benefit of confiscations euen in cases of high treason, the regall rights in churches, and feofments of trust. By which arguments not onely probable, but also necessarie, I am persuaded to write the dukedome of Britaigne, now euen from the times of the first kings of Fraunce, to haue bene a prouince of the kingdome of France, although Ar∣gentraeus otherwise thinke. Yet is it worth the noting that Iohn Montfort and his suc∣cessors, although they went about to haue rent the dukedome of Britaigne from the kingdome of Fraunce, yet as counties of Montfort and Virtus to haue alwaies yeel∣ded

their fealtie vnto the French kings, without exception, as we read in the records, al∣though [ A] that they still exercised in the countries of Britaigne certaine roialties granted them by the king.

There is then great difference betwixt him which holdeth simply in fealtie and ho∣mage (being himselfe no soueraigne, nor subiect vnto him which is lord of the fee) and him which is soueraigne of a countrey, and yet vassall to some other lord for some fee; as of him which is in protection onely, or which is tributarie vnto a prince, ha∣uing soueraigntie ouer his subiects, or which is himselfe a naturall subiect. Wherfore* 1.350 we conclude, that there is none but he an absolute soueraigne, which holdeth nothing of another man; considering that the vassall for any fee whatsoeuer it be, be hee Pope or Emperor, oweth personall seruice by reason of the fee which he holdeth. For albe∣it [ B] that this word Seruice, in all matter of fees, and customes, is not preiudiciall vnto the naturall libertie of the vassall; yet so it is, that it importeth a certaine right, dutie, honor and reuerence that the vassall oweth vnto the lord of the fee: which is not indeed a seruitude reall, but is annexed and inseperable from the person of the vassall, who can∣not be therefrom freed, but by quitting his fee: prouided yet, that hee bee no naturall subiect of the lords of the fee, from whome he cannot discharge himselfe by renoun∣cing his fee.

Now when I say, that homage and personall seruice is inseperable from the vassall;* 1.351 that is so true, as that the vassall cannot acquit himselfe thereof by his deputie or attur∣ney, as was permitted by the auntient lawes of fees; which in this point is abrogated [ C] in Europe, and Asia; yea and in Italie it selfe from whence the lawes of fees (as many thinke) first tooke their beginning. For Lewes Sfortia, gouernour of Lombardie, sent his Agent into Fraunce, to king Charles the eight, to haue obtained of him that his ne∣phew the duke of Milan might by him be receiued to do his homage by his deputie for the duchie of Genes: whereunto the king would not condescend. And when que∣stion was made of taking of fealtie and homage of the marques of Salusse, the court of Paris decreed, That his deputie shuld be admitted in his name, if the king so thought it good; for that the marques pretended himselfe to be sicke: yet with that condition, that so soone as he was able he should come and doe it himselfe in person. The same hath also bene oft times iudged in such like cases. But contrariwise the lord of the fee [ D] may constraine his vassall to yeeld his fealtie and homage vnto his deputie, as is com∣monly vsed. But if the vassall be yet vnder age, or so young as that he yet wanteth vn∣derstanding, he is to be borne with for doing of his fealtie and homage, vntill he be of age to do it, except it pleaseth the lord of the fee to receiue it by his deputie: As did king Lewes the xj, who by Philip Commines his ambassador receiued fealtie & homage of the mother of young Galeas duke of Milan, for the duchie of Genes, the duke her sonne being vnder age, and paying fiftie thousand ducats for reliefe. And for the same cause in the treatie made betwixt Lewes the eleuenth, and Maximilian archduke of Austria, in the yeare 1482, in the 56 article it was expresly set downe, That the subiects on both parts should be receiued to do their homage by their atturneies, which other∣wise [ E] they should haue bene constrained themselues in person to haue done, if they had not bene sicke, or had some other iust and reasonable let; or that it was some bodie collegiat. For it much concerneth the honour of the lord and patron, whether homage be done vnto him in the person of a king his vassall, or by some oeher base atturney or deputie. And for this cause it was agreed in the treatie of Amiens, made betwixt Phi∣lip the faire the French king, and Henrie king of England, in the yeare 1303, That the king of England should himselfe in persom come to do his fealtie and homage without exception, if he were not otherwise letted by sicknesse without deceit: in which case

he should send his eldest sonne to doe the fealtie in his stead. And by another treatie [ F] made in the yeare 1330, betwixt Philip Valois, and king Edward the third, it was also said, That the king of England should in person come to doe his fealtie and homage, if he were not without fraud by sicknesse letted; which ceasing, hee should then also come. And by the treatie of peace, made in the yeare 1259, betwixt Lewes the ninth the French king, and Henrie the second, king of England, it is expresly declared, That the king of England should in person himself yeeld his fealtie & liege homage vnto the French king. Which liege homage (as they tearme it) is of that force, as that the per∣son of no prince, pope, or emperour, is therein excepted. Now the forme of the ho∣mage declared by the treatie, in the yeare 1331, betwixt Philip Valois the French king, and Edward the third, is this: The king of England hauing his hands ioyned, and put [ G] * 1.352 betwixt the hands of the French king, the Chauncel or of Fraunce for the French king, shall thus say vnto the king of England, Thou shalt become a liege man to the king of Fraunce, who here is, as duke of Guyenne, and peere of Fraunce, countie of Poitou, and Mon∣strueil, and shalt promise to beare vnto him faith and loyaltie: Whereunto the king of England shall say, I consent thereunto: Then the king of Fraunce shall receiue the king of England into his fealtie with a kisse. But the oath of Charles the king of Nauarre was more religious, when he yeelded his fealtie vnto Charls the fift, the French king, in the yeare 1370: for that he was not onely the French kings vassall, but his subiect also, vnto whome hee promised his faith and loialtie towardes and against all men, which could liue or die: albeit that he was then soueraigne king of Nauarre, and pre∣tended [ H] a right vnto the soueraigntie of Berne, which yet resteth vndecided. The forme of the simple homage done by Iohn de Montfort, Arthure the second, and Peter the se∣cond, dukes of Britaigne, is like, excepting the word Liege man. But for vassals which be also subiects, the forme of fealtie is more religious & precise, for that they are bound with a double bond, whereas the forren vassals are not so. For the king of England, Edward the third being come to Amiens to doe his homage vnto the king of Fraunce, refused to ioyne his hands betwixt the hands of the king, and so returned into his king∣dome, where it was sixe moneths debated betwixt the French kings commissioners, and the assembly of the estares, about the resolution for the forme of the homage: in fine, king Edward thought it better to follow the prescript forme, than to loose so many [ I] benefits as he then enioyed in Fraunce. But if the vassall be also a naturall subiect vn∣to his lord and patron, he is bound to lay by his sword, his gloues, his hat, his cloke, his spurres, and vpon his knees to put his hands ioyned together, into the hands of his prince, or of his deputie, and so to take his oath: and by the custome of this realme, if it pleaseth not the lord, he is not bound to be present, or to kisse his vassall; but may (if he so please) being present, see him in forme, as we haue aforesaid, giue his fealtie and ho∣mage to some small officer, or before his house, by kissing the hammer of his doore. But by the customs of Vermandbis, the vassall is bound to do his fealtie vnto his lord being present; but if he be absent, it is sufficient for the vassall being present, to cause it to be done by his atturney, least the honour of the vassall should bee impaired by the [ K] basenesse of the person of his lords atturney. But if the vassall haue thirtie heires, euery one of them is constrained to yeeld his fealtie vnto his patron requiring the same: as was long since prouided by the decree of Philip the Victorious, the French king, in the yeare 1209. Yet some vse another custome.

Shall we then say, a Vassall (that is to say another mans man) although he at home* 1.353 enioy a kingdome, to haue a soueraigne maiestie and power? Shall we call him that is bound to doe most vile seruices, (and to vse the words of fealtie) him that serueth ano∣ther man, shall we call him, I say, a soueraigne prince? And that is it for which manie▪

honourable princes had rather to loose and forgoe right great seignories, and their [ A] most rich fees, than to serue such a slauerie. And othersome againe, to the contrarie, would not sell their soueraigntie for any thing in the world. As the prince of Orange refused of king Lewis the eleuenth, ten times so much as his principalitie was worth, which stood him in more than hee receiued profit thereby: And for the same cause Edward the third, king of England, in the first article of the treatie of Bretigni expresly excepted, that all royalties should be giuen vnto himselfe in those countries which he had by inheritance in Fraunce; least he should for them haue beene enforced to haue yeelded fealtie and homage vnto the French kings. Neither for any other cause did Stephen, Vayuod of Valachia, reuolt from the kings of Polonia, but for that the king of Polonia had caused his tent to be cast wide open at the same very instant that the [ B] Vayuod was therein doing vnto him his homage, that so he might be seene of all men in doing of it. Which s•…•…ie disgrace the Vayuod tooke in very euill part: which is not to be maruelled at in so great a lord as he, if wee doe but consider, that Calisthenes the nephew of Aristotle chose rather to loose his life, than after the Persian guise, in hum∣ble and deuout manner vpon his knees to honour Alexander the Great: albeit that Alexander courteously tooke them vp with a kisse that so honoured him. Which was also an vsuall thing with the Romane emperours, when they gaue vnto the kings that were in their protection, their scepters and diademes. For so Tiridates king of Arme∣nia being come to Rome, humbled himselfe vpon his knee before the emperour Nero, whom Nero taking by the hand, lift him vp, kissed him, and taking his turbant from off [ C] his head, set thereon a royall crowne, and caused him to sit on his right hand. For albeit that the kingdomes were giuen by the Romane emperours without reseruation of fealtie or homage, yet so it was, that the kings laying aside their scepters and crownes, of their owne accord serued the Romane emperours, some as seruitors in their cham∣bers, othersome called themselues but the Romane stewards, as Adherball king of Numidia tearmed himselfe nothing but the steward of the people of Rome. And Eu∣menes king of Pergame after the discomfiture and death of Mithridates king of Pon∣tus* 1.354 came to Rome, and with a cap vpon his head (in token of his late recouered liber∣tie) thanked the people of Rome for the same. But Prusias king of Bithynia as oft as he went into the Senate, commonly kissed the threshold of the gate, calling him∣selfe [ D] the Senates slaue: albeit that he was neither subiect nor tributarie, nor so much as in the Romanes protection, but ioyned vnto them in equall confederation. All these honours, were they neuer so great, proceeding from their owne voluntarie will, did little or nothing at all diminish the maiestie of a soueraigne prince, as doth that forme of homage which is seruile and constrained, and which the Tartars, Persians, and Turkes esteeme to bee the true seruice of a very slaue. And truly Solyman the Turkish king was about to haue restored Iohn king of Hungarie into his kingdome in the yeare 1555, with condition to haue holden the same of him in fealtie and ho∣mage, without other subiection (as he by a Chiaus his embassadour, certified Sigis∣mundus Augustus king of Polonia) if king Ferdinand, who pretended the kingdome [ E] of Hungarie to belong vnto himselfe by inheritance, had not letted him so to doe; as I haue seene by the letters of Sanislaus Rosdrazeroski, a Polonian, written to Anne Mommorancie constable of Fraunce the same yeare 1555. And for this cause Francis the French king to hinder that Charlet of Austria should not bee chosen emperour, declared vnto the princes, Electors of the Empire, that the maiestie of the Empire should be much debased, if they should of his vassall make their head and Emperour: wherewith the emperour not a little moued, and afterwards at the battell of Pa•…•…ie ha∣uing taken him prisoner, would neuer consent vnto his deliuerance, vntill hee had quite

discharged the Low countries from the fealtie and homage wherein they were before [ F] bound vnto the French.

But it seemeth that it is not enough to say, that Charles of Austria was vassall vnto the crowne of Fraunce, but that he was thereunto a liegeman also; and not onely a* 1.355 liegeman, but euen the French kings naturall subiect; as borne & brought vp in Flan∣ders, then a prouince of the French kingdom: although many think the citie of Gaunt the natiue place of Charles, and the cities vpon the sea coast to haue bene excepted. For the earles of Flaunders were alwaies accounted peers of Fraunce, euen from the first beginning of that kingdome: and the soueraigne roialties thereof, alwaies before reser∣ued vnto the same, but especiallie at the solemne treatie of Arras betwixt Charles the se∣uenth and Philip the second duke of Burgundie. Also Charles the fift beeing chosen [ G] emperour, asked leaue of Francis the French king, that hee might leuie of his subiects the subsidie graunted him at Arras, in the yeare 1520; whereunto the kings aunswere was, That he would therein do what he might, without diminishing in any thing the right of his crowne: as I haue seene by the instructions giuen to M. De la Roche-Gaucourt at such time as hee was sent ambassadour into Spaine. Although that greater causes might haue beene alleaged, which might haue stayed Ger∣man princes from the election of Charles the fift. For Charles of Austria was as then* 1.356 not onely the vassall, liegeman, and naturall subiect to the king of Fraunce, but also a liegeman vnto the pope and the church of Rome, for all the countries, lands, and seig∣nories that he then held, except that which he held of the crowne of Fraunce, or of the [ H] empire; howbeit that he as then held nothing of the empire, but the lands neere vnto the Rhene, and Cambray: For Arnold the last of that name, countie of Burgundie, gaue it with the other countries to the emperor Conrade the second, in the yeare 1205, and after that, the emperour Charles the fourth gaue it to Charles the sixt, the Dol∣phin, by fealtie and homage, as appeareth by the inuestiture thereof in the treasure of Fraunce, the copie whereof we haue out of the records. But at such time as he profes∣sed* 1.357 himselfe to be the liegeman of the bishop of Rome, in his fealtie giuen for the king∣dome of Naples, he then promised by his oath, not to take vpon him either the charge of the German empire, if he were chosen emperour by the German princes; either of the dukedome of Milan; and with these conditions gaue his fealtie and homage vn∣the [ I] pope: which is not to be thought any new clause, but an auntient condition, ioy∣ned vnto all the acts of fealtie and homage giuen vnto the pope by the kings of Na∣ples and Sicilie, since the time that pope Vrban the fift, therin inuested Charles of France brother vnto king Lewes. And in the inuestiture of that kingdome, made by Innocent the fourth, vnto Edmond the sonne of Henrie king of England, in the yeare 1255, the copie whereof we haue written out of the Vatican records, are these words, Ego Hen∣ricus, Dei gratia Rex Angliae, nomine Edmundi filij nostri Regis Siciliae, plenum & lige∣um vassallagium facio ecclesiae Romana. viz. I Henrie, by the grace of God king of England, in the name of Edmund our sonne, king of Sicilie, yeeld full and liege ho∣mage vnto the church of Rome, &c. And in the act of fealtie and liege homage gi∣uen [ K] by Robert king of Sicilie, in the 1338, he by oath promised neuer to receiue the im∣periall crowne, neither the dukedome of Milan, nor any seignorie whatsoeuer in Tus∣canie, vpon paine of the losse of all such right as he might pretend vnto the kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie. The like is also found giuen by Charles king of Naples, in the yeare 1295: and by queene Ione in the yeare 1348, as I haue read in the register of the Vatican. And for this onely cause pope Iulius the second refused to inuest Ferdi∣nand king of Arragon, Charles the fift the emperours grandfather by the mothers side, in the kingdome of Naples, but vpon the conditions I haue aforesaid: and a yearely

rent of eight thousand ounces of gold, or of foure score thousand crownes, which the [ A] * 1.358 kings of Naples were bound to pay euerie yeare, and a white ambling gelding, beside the aid expressed in the inuesture, with reseruation of the countie of Beneuent. Which their obligation was of such consequence vnto the popes, that so soone as they de∣nounced warre vnto any, the kings of Naples were straight wayes in armes for the de∣fence of the Church of Rome. So Alphonsus king of Naples, at the denuntiation of pope Sextus, made warre vpon the state of Florence, for that they had hanged the Car∣dinall of Pisa, the popes Legat a latere in his pontificalibus. And in our time pope Paulus the third by his Ambassadour Alexander Farnesius, summoned the emperour Charles the fift, being then with a great armie in France, to make peace with the French king, so with their vnited forces to make warre vpon the Protestant princes, as was [ B] agreed vpon in the first article of the treatie of Soissons, made in September in the yere 1544: which haply the emperour would not haue done (hauing had his armie but a lit∣tle before by the French men ouerthrowne in Italie, and now with doubtfull euent ma∣king warre in Fraunce) if he had not bene liege vassall vnto the pope, & by him threat∣ned to loose the kingdoms of Naples and Sicilie, as he was well giuen to vnderstand. Which the pope did, not so much moued with the publike calamitie or troubled estate of the Church, as with the power of Charles, wherewith he was like to haue sub∣dued most part of Europe, had hee not bene letted by the armes and power of the French. And albeit that in the yeare 1528, by the treatie made betwixt pope Clement the vij and his Cardinals, besieged in the castle S. Angelo on the one side, and the em∣perour [ C] Charles the fift on the other, it was set downe, That the kings of Naples should for euer be acquited of the yerely rent of 8000▪ ounces of gold, and of all the arearages, which amounted vnto great summes: yet so it was, that all the rest of the pointes of the auntient inuestiture, still stood in their former force and vertue. But euer since, the German emperours haue well knowne, and the pope better, (seeing Rome sacked, and himselfe put to ransome of 400000 duckets, after he had released the fairest rights of S. Peters demaine) what daunger it was to make choice of the vassall of a soueraigne prince, and the natural subiect of another, to be head of the Empire: For with the for∣ces of Germanie he brought downe the pope, and with the popes power hee ruinated the princes of Germanie. And albeit that by the imperiall title hee held the duchies of [ D] Milan, of Gelders, and other seignories of the empire, yet so it is, that hee was the popes antient vassall & liege man, and so consequently to him first bound, & that more strait∣ly vnto the Church than to the empire. Ioine hereunto also, that the popes haue since* 1.359 this 300 yeres pretended that the emperor may not take vpon him the empire, but ha∣uing before of them receiued the imperiall crowne; as pope Pius the fift by his Legats sharply rebuked the emperour Ferdinand, for that he had not of him receiued the im∣periall crowne, which his brother Charles had not before doubted so to receiue; and had by excommunication compelled him so to doe, had hee not by the intreatie of king Philip his kinsman, and of the French king, otherwise appeased.

But heresome man will say, How could it be that the emperor Charls the fift, should [ E] * 1.360 be liegeman vnto the pope, the French king, and the empire? seeing that no man can be liegeman vnto many lords, although he haue many fees holden of them all separat∣ly: For his faith and aid is due to one alone, and him the first and chiefest, without ex∣ception of any man liuing. And in case he be the vassall of many coheires for one and the same fee, he is liegeman vnto them all together, but not to any of them separatly, considering that his fealtie cannot be diuided; neither can he do his liege homage vn∣to one of them without exception, for the concurrence of the rest: yet truer it is, his fealtie to be due vnto one onely of his patrons, whome he shall make choice of, if that

his patrons cannot agree, or els to them altogether; and that law we now vse. For the [ F] condition of the vassall ought not to be made more hard, than if there were vnto one man, but one heire; but it should be much harder if he should bee enforeed to doe many duties, many seruices, and many times to giue his faith: and that much more the liege vassall, who cannot giue vnto manie his faith seuerally, without exception.

I here vnderstand the liege homage properly as it is to bee vnderstood in the lawes of Fees; for that our auncestors haue abused this word Liege, in all their auntient trea∣ties of alliance and oathes that they made: I remember that I haue seene 48 treaties of alliance, which our kings Philip the v, and Charles the v. vj. vij. and Lewes the xj, made with the three electors on this side the Rhine, and diuers other the princes of the em∣pire, wherein they by oath sworne betwixt the hands of the kings deputies, solemnly [ G] promised to serue them in their warres against all men, except the emperour, and the king of the Romans; vowing to be their vassals and liege men, more or lesse; some cal∣ling themselues councellours, some other pentioners, all liege vassals: except the Arch∣bishop of Treuers, Elector of the empire, who no otherwise called himselfe, but the kings confederat, and not his vassall, although he receiued his pention from the king, as did the other princes; who for all this held nothing of the crowne of France, but were nothing but pentioners vnto the French kings, to whome they gaue their oath to aid them, at their charge, vpon the conditions expressed in their oathes. Onely the oath of the duke of Guelders, and countie of Iuliers, I will for example set downe, that thereby men may iudge of the rest, in Latine conceiued in these words, Ego deuenio vassallus li∣gius [ H] Caroli Regis Francorum, pro ratione quinquaginta millium scutorum auri, ante festum D. Rhemigij mihi soluendorum, &c. viz. I become liege vassall of Charles the French king, for the summe of fiftie thousand crownes of gold, to be paid vnto mee before the feast of S. Rhemigius, &c. This oath bore date in Iune, in the yeare 1401. Yea, euen betwixt kings themselues leagues were oftentimes conceiued in such words, as that the one of them professed himselfe to be the others vassall. As in the league made be∣twixt Philip of Valois the French king, and Alphonsus king of Castile, in the yeare 1336, it is said, That they should giue and receiue fealtie and homage the one of the other: which proceeding but of the ignorance of their ambassadours, is now better vnder∣stood, as but an abuse of the words Vassall and Liege: the oathes also of the kings pen∣tioners, [ I] and their treaties, carrie no more such words.

Wherefore againe to returne from whence we haue a little digressed. I say then,* 1.361 that the emperour Charls the fift could not yeeld his liege fealtie and homage vnto the pope without exception, considering that he was liege man, peere, and naturall subiect vnto the French king, and that the seruice and homage is inseparable from the person. And admit he were not the kings subiect, but his liege man, or not his liege man but his vassall onely; yet so it is, that in tearmes of right the liege homage is due vnto the most auntient, and that the vassall ought to serue his most auntient Lord. But if the lords be equall, and yet at variance amongst themselues for the seruice, hee oweth aid neither to the one nor to the other: For that in matter of seruices or seruitude, the [ K] seruice (for the indiuisible nature therof) is letted by the concurrence of them to whom it is to be done. For amongst equals the condition of him which forbiddeth (the ser∣uice) is better: howbeit that in question of simple alliance, the aid is due vnto him that is wronged and inuaded in his countrey against the other common allie which maketh warre vpon him, as it commonly falleth out if the assailant haue no iust cause, and that after denuntiation to him giuen by the common allies to come to some reasonable agreement, he refuse so to doe.

But most certaine it is, that the naturall subiect ought alwayes to preferte his natu∣rall

lord aboue all, if he bee present; as him to whome he is first bound, & from whom [ A] he cannot exempt himselfe. And therefore in the decrees of king Lewes the eleuenth, and of Philip the second, duke of Burgundie, made for the order of Fraunce, the xiij article, and for the order of the golden Fleece, the ix article, it is set downe, That the knights of what prince soeuer it be, ought to aid their naturall lord, whose liege men they are, and the countrey wherein they were borne, against him that shall make war vpon them, without any blemish to their honour; prouided that their naturall lord be there in person, and not otherwise, and that they signifie so much vnto the chiefe of the order whereof they are knights. Whereby it appeareth that the emperour Charles the fift could not giue his faith vnto the electors of the empire, but with reseruation of his fealtie vnto the French king, and afterward vnto the Pope. For beside the king∣dome [ B] of Naples and Sicilie, holding of the pope immediatly and without meane, hee was also his vassall and liege man for the kingdome of Arragon, as I haue red in the re∣cords taken out of the Vatican▪ where the graunt giuen by Peter king of Arragon is set downe in these words, Ego Petrus Dei gratia Rex Arragonum, Comes Barcinonae, Do∣minus* 1.362 Montispessulani, cupiens praeter Deum, principali beati Petri, & Apostolicae sedis pro∣tectione mu•…•…ri, tibi reuerendissime pater, & Domine summe Pontifex Innocēti, & pro te, sacrosanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, & Apostolicae sedi, offero regnum meum: illudque tibi pro re∣medio animae meae primogenitorum meorum constituo censuale, vt annuatim de Camera Re∣gis ducenta quinquaginta Massimitinae Apostolicae sedi reddantur: & ego ac successo∣res mei, specialiter & fideles & obnoxi teneamur: hac autem lege perpetua seruandum fo∣rum [ C] decerno, quia spero & confido, quod tu & successores tui, quali beati, Petri manibus in regem duxeris solemniter coronandum. Actum Romae anno Christi 1204. In English thus: I Peter by the grace of God king of Arragon, Countie of Barcelona, Lord of Montpe∣lier, desiring next vnto God to be strengthened with the principall protection of bles∣sed S. Peter and the Apostolicall See; do offer vnto thee most reuerent father and high Lord, Pope Innocent, and for thee vnto the most holy Church of Rome, and to the Apostolicall See, my kingdome; and the same for the health of my soule and of my predecessours, I make vnto thee tributarie, so that out of the kings chamber shall bee yerely paied vnto the Apostolical See, two hundred & fifty Massimitines, & that I and my successors shall be especially bound to be (vnto you) faithfull and subiect; and by [ D] this perpetuall law decree a court to be kept: for that my hope and trust is, that thou & thy successors shalt lead vs as it were with the hands of blessed Peter, to be solemnly crowned king. Enacted at Rome in the yeare of Christ 1204. So that kingdome of Arragon was by the Arragonian kings offered vnto the Bishops of Rome, least they should for their enormities and murders haue bene well beaten. But the kingdomes of Sardinia and Corsica, was by the popes giuen vnto the kings of Arragon (as the popes guise is bountifull to giue that is none of their owne) for which kingdome the Empe∣rour was also liege man vnto the Pope, as I haue scene by the inuestiture thereof made vnto Peter the third, king of Arragon, in this sort, Pontifex Max de fratrum suorum as∣census,* 1.363 dat in feudum regnum Sardiniae & Corsicae, proprietatē ecclesi•…•… Romanae &c. Per ca∣pam [ E] Auream te praesentialiter inuestimus, &c. Ita tamen quod tu & successores tui, praesta∣bitis homagium ligium, vassallagium plenum, & fidelitatis iuramentum, &c. Et centū equi∣tes armatos, & vno equo ad arma, & duobus equitaturis adminus per quēlibet, & quinta∣gentis peditibus terrae vestrae de Arragonia, cum gagijs per trimestre, a die quo intrabūt ter∣rā Ecclesiae, &c. Et in super censum duorū milliū marcarū argenti bonorum, & legaliū stre∣lingorū: vbicun{que} fuerit Romanus Pontifex in festo▪ beatorus Petri & Pauli, annis singulis, sub poena excommunicationis post quatuor menses, &c. & post tertium terminum non sol∣ueris, tu haeredes{que} tui, a dicto regno Sardiniae & Corsicae cadetis ex toto, & regnum ad Ro∣manam

ecklesiam reuertetur. viz. The great bishop by the assent of his bretheren, doth [ F] giue in fee the kingdome of Sardinia and Corsica, the inheritance of the church of Rome, &c. And we personally therein, inuest thee by a cape of gold, &c. yet so as that thou and thy successours shall therefore giue liege homage, full vassalage, and oath of fidelitie, &c. And an hundred armed horse-men, and one horse for seruice, and two furnitures at the least for euery one, and fiue hundred foote-men of your country of Aragon, with pay for three moneths from the day that they shall enter into the ter∣ritorie of the church, &c. And moreouer the rent of two thousand markes of good and lawfull sterling money, wheresoeuer the pope shall be in the feast of the bles∣sed Apostles, Peter and Paul, euerie yeare, vpon paine of excommunication after foure moneths, &c. and if after the third time thou shalt not pay it, thou and thy [ G] heires from the said kingdome of Sardinia and Corsica, shall altogether fall; and the same kingdome shall againe returne vnto the church of Rome. And after that, Iames king of Aragon, did also like homage at Valence, betwixt the hands of the popes legate, in the yeare 1353, with reseruation vnto the pope of appeales, put in by the clergie, and abolishing of the lawes and customes brought in by the kings of that country. I finde also that Ferdinand, and after him Alphonsus, kings of A∣ragon, did the like fealtie and homage in the yeare 1455. And in the publike records of the court of Rome, are to be seene the names of the vassall kings set downe in this or∣der: the kings of Naples, Sicilia, Aragon, Sardinia, Hierusalem, England, Ireland, and Hungary. And this is the old description of such princes as 380 yeres ago, yeelded their [ H] fealtie & homage vnto the bishops of Rome. And since the kingdom of Portugall, was* 1.364 by the valour of Henry of Benonia, taken from the Moores, the kings thereof made themselues vassalls vnto the bishop of Rome, and payd the yearely tribute of two thousand duckats into the bishop of Rome his treasure. And therefore Innocent the fourth, bishop of Rome, by his letters admonished the princes of the kingdome of Por∣tugall, to appoint ouerseers to their prodigall king, who should also take vpon them the gouernement of the kingdome. And as for the Islands of the Canaries, Nigaries,* 1.365 and the Gorgonides; the emperour holdeth them also of the pope. We also reade, that Lewes king of Spaine, did fealtie and homage vnto the pope, in the yeare 1343, with charge to pay yearely into the chamber of Rome, foure hundred florines of the [ I] weight and coine of Florence. And as for the remainder of the westerne Isles, and of Peru, it is certaine that pope Alexander the sixt, diuiding the new world betwixt the kinges of Castile and Portugall, expresly kept vnto himselfe the inheritance, the iu∣risdiction and soueraignetie thereof, by consent of the two kings; who from that time made themselues his vassalls, of all the purchases and conquests by them already gai∣ned, and that they should from that time forward, gaine or make, as the Spaniards themselues haue written. In like manner pope Iulius the second, gaue vnto Ferdinand king of Spaine, Charles the fift, his grandfather by the mothers side, the kingdomes of Granado and Nauarre; when he had driuen the Moores out of the one, and Peter D'Albret out of the other, vpon condition to hold them by fealty and homage of the [ K] church of Rome. For albeit that Charles the fift, the emperor pretended right vnto the kingdome of Nauarre, by reason of the donation to him made by Germaine D'Foix, se∣cond wife vnto king Ferdinande: yet so it was, that his ambassadours and deputies, when they came to the conference, seeing that their donation to want sure foundation, doubted not to pretend the popes interdictions, as the surest stay of their most vniust rapines. And the cause of the interdiction was, for that Peter Albret, king of Nauarre, would not at the command of pope Iulius the second, breake faith and friendship with Lewes the xij, the French king, who was first called father of his country, when as hee

was king Lewes his liege vassall, and no way bound vnto the pope. So that there re∣mained [ A] * 1.366 no kingdome, no not any little territorie or peece of ground, which Charles the emperour held not by fealtie aud homage, or whereof he could call himselfe a so∣ueraigne. For as for the Islands of Maiorca and Minorca, they were long time before reunited vnto the kingdome of Aragon, after that they were taken from the heires of Iames the Fortunate. And in the Low-countries, he had nothing which was not of ne∣cessitie holden of the crowne of France, or of the empire. And albeit that our princes haue by diuers leagues, granted the principalitie of Flanders and Artoise vnto Charles the emperour, yet remaineth there a country in Burgundie, which they call the coun∣tie of Charrolois, the proprietie whereof belongeth vnto the king of Spaine, but the soueraignetie thereof vnto the French king, and is by the king of Spaine holden in fe∣alty: [ B] so that euen for that, he is to ackdowledge himselfe to be our kings vassall. As for* 1.367 the kingdome of Castile, no man doubteth (which hath but looked into the Spanish affaires) but that the kingdome of Castile by inheritance, descended vnto king Lewes the ix. of France, in the right of Blanch his mother: yea, and the nobilitie of Castile by solemne acts, which are yet extant in the records of France, inuited king Lewes to haue taken vpon him his mothers kingdome. Howbeit I doubt not, but that the Spaniards will reply, that Blanch, the daughter of Lewes the ix. married the king of Castile, vpon condition that all such right vnto the kingdome, as might haue fallen vnto her father, should now be giuen vnto his sonne in law: which thing Lewes could not doe vnto the preiudice of his successours; without the consent of the states: ioyning therevnto [ C] also that the French kings daughters or sisters, when they are bestowed and married, can receiue nothing but money of the royall possessions of the crowne of France▪ And albeit that some may thinke that the French king might giue those lands vnto his daughter, as not yet vnited or incorporate into the crowne of France; yet neuerthe∣lesse there is yet extant in the records of France, a league made in the yeare 1369, be∣twixt king Charles the fift and Henry king of Castile, then driuen out of his kingdome, whereby I haue seene, that Henry promised as well for himselfe, as for his successours, to become vassall, and to hold his kingdome of Castile, of the kings of Fraunce: for that by the meanes of the king of France, he was againe restored into his kingdome. Seeing then that the kingdome of Castile is hereditarie descending vnto the heires [ D] both males and females, the successours of Henry are bound vnto his deedes and pro∣mises. True it is, that the promise of Henry had not power to preiudice his successours, neither the estates of Castile, without the consent of whom, the treatie was made, if the realme of Castile had not beene hereditarie. But of the kingdome of Fraunce, it is otherwise to be thought and determined. And therefore it was by the wise resolued, that Phillip the Faire, the French king, could not make Arthur duke of Britaine, vas∣sall vnto the king of England, without the dukes consent; except he would by the same right, giue vp his kingdome of France vnto the king of England, which he could by no soueraigne power doe, without the consent of the estates of France. For otherwise, his yeelding of it vp, should be to none effect or purpose, no more then that of king Iohn [ E] of Fraunce, made vnto the king of England in the treatie at Calais, wherein he with∣out* 1.368 consent of the states, yeelded vnto the king of England, all the right and title he had in the kingdome of France: which was againe disanulled by the treatie of Char∣tres, whereby the king of England refused that right giuen vnto him by such yeelding vp. The same is to be thought of the league of Tricasse, wherein Charles the sixt, with∣out the consent of the states, yeelded the kingdome of France vnto Henry the fi•…•…t, king of England. And therefore pope Martine could by no request of the English, be per∣swaded to ratifie that league, but called Charles the seauenth, sonne to Charles the sixt,

by the name of the French king: for that the kingdome of Fraunce is neither deuol∣ued [ F] by right of succession, (which they tearme from one intestate,) neither by testa∣ment, neither by resignation, but by vertue of the law royall, from which the kings themselues cannot derogat without the consent of the estates; which is not so in the kingdomes of Spaine, England, Scotland, Naples, and Nauarre.

But cannot the imperiall title (may some man haply say) make him a soueraigne which is another mans vassall? As the prince or the people making a slaue a magistrat seemeth thereby to haue also enfranchised him; whereof there is no doubt, if he be the princes or the peoples slaue; for otherwise it is not lawfull either for the prince, or for the people, to dispose of another mans seruant: so neither haue the German princes any power ouer other mens citisens or subiects, such as was Charles the fift. Ioyne hereun∣to [ G] * 1.369 to also, that the imperiall title of the emperour carrieth with it no soueraigntie: albeit that the emperour writing vnto the princes of the empire, vse these wordes, Wee com∣mand you, &c. You shall do this, &c. which other princes do not toward their own sub∣iects: yea and that more is, that the princes electors carrie the titles of Butlers, Esquiers, and Tasters to the emperour, yet the soueraigntie of the empire resteth not in the per∣son of the emperour, but in the assemblie of the states of the empire, who are able to giue law vnto the emperour, and to euerie prince of the empire in particular, in such sort as that the emperour hath not power to make any particular edict, neither peace nor warre, neither to charge the subiects of the empire so much as with one impost, nor to call or dismisse the diets of the empire, without the consent of the princes. And [ H] that is it for which the emperour Maximilian the first, at the diet of Constance, holden in the yeare 1507, said vnto the estates (the popes legat then vrging that the imperiall crowne was both to be requested and receiued of the pope,) That to take the imperiall crowne of the pope was but a needlesse ceremonie, seruing to no purpose; considering that the imperiall authoritie and power depended of the estates of the empire: which in due place we will more particularly declare.

Whereby a man may easily iudge, that there are few or none absolute soueraigne* 1.370 princes. For the Venetian Commonweale excepted, there are no princes or Com∣monweals in Italie, which hold not of the empire, the pope, or the crowne of Fraunce: which concerning the kingdome of Sicilie and Naples, we haue alreadie declared. As [ I] for the duke of Milan he is a naturall vassall of the empire, from which hee taketh his* 1.371 inuesture, and thereto payeth reliefe: for which the emperour Maximilian the first, in lesse than xv, or xvj yeares space, drue thence vnto himselfe, aboue three hundred thou∣sand pounds: For king Lewes the twelfth at one time paid therfore an hundred thou∣sand pounds: and the Sforces had it no better cheape. For they which are now called dukes of Milan, in the remembrance of our auncestors, that is to say about an hundred and fiftie yeares agoe, were called but lieutenants, and the citie it selfe but the ordinarie chamber of the empire. And so namely Iohn Galeace the second, and Barnabas his bro∣ther, in the inuestiture which they had from the emperour Charles the fourth, are sim∣ply called lieutenants of the empire. And Galeace the first being accused for charging [ K] the subiects with subsidies, without the emperours leaue, was by a decree from the em∣perour sent prisoner vnto the castle of Modene; where after he had of long time liued, he at length died; whose sonne Actius being by the emperour Lewes of Bauyere put into his fathers place, for the summe of an hundred thousand crownes, obtained of him the first title of a prince, in the yeare 1338. And after that, Galeace the third, father in law to Lewes duke of Orleans, payed vnto the emperour Fredericke the third, an hundred thousand florines, for the honour and title of a duke, in the yeare one thousand three hundred ninetie seuen.

So say we also of the duke of Mantua, who acknowledgeth himselfe to hold of the [ A] * 1.372 Germaine empire, and to be also a prince thereof.

As for the duke of Ferrara he confesseth euen at this present to hold part of his seig∣norie,* 1.373 euen Ferrara it selfe, of the pope, and therefore payeth a yearely rent or fee into the popes coffers. For not long ago, viz. in the yeare 1372, the marques of Este was by pope Gregory first established his lieutenant in the city of Ferrara, reseruing vnto the church fealtie and homage, iurisdiction and soueraigntie; with condition also, that he should yearely pay ten thousand florens of gold into the chamber of S. Peter, and to find an hundred men at armes paied for three monethes, for the defence of the Church of Rome, so often as need should require, as I haue learned out of the Vatican records. And as for Rhegium and Modene, he acknowledgeth him to hold them of the em∣pire: [ B] albeit that pope Iulius the second maintained them to be the Church fees, and in that quarrell made warres vpon the Ferrariens and the French king, who gaue them aide: as also to haue the entire reuenue of the fee, beeing before diminished by pope Alexander the sixt, in marrying his base daughter Lucrece vnto the duke Alphonsus. And true it is, that the French kings long since tooke vpon them the defence and pa∣tronage of the prince of Ferrara, since the time that Borsus, first duke of Ferrara, acknow∣ledged himselfe liege vassall vnto Charles the sixt, and therfore it was vnto him permit∣ted, that those dukes of Ferrara might beare the armes of Fraunce, the publike acts whereof yet remaine in the records of Fraunce.

As concerning the Florentines, they of long time haue pretended libertie against the [ C] * 1.374 empire, for the payment of sixe thousand Florines vnto the emperour Rodolphe. As al∣so do the Genowayes, who as they say, were by the same emperour enfranchised. How* 1.375 be it that afterwards they hauing receiued great harme from the Venetians, gaue them∣selues into protection vnto king Charles the sixt, the French king: and not long after vnto the duke of Milan, who receiued them vpon condition that they should therefore do fealtie and homage vnto the French kings.

In like case they of Luca paied vnto the emperour Henrie the fift, twelue thousand Florines to be enfranchised; Sienna ten thousand; And Peter Gambecourt payed twelue thousand vnto the emperour Charles the fourth for the seignorie of Pisa.

But these were not true alienations, nor exemptions from subiection; but rather [ D] simple graunts and gifts, with certaine priueleges to gouerne their estate, vnder the obei∣sance* 1.376 of the empire. It was not also in the power of the emperours, neither of any prince whatsoeuer, to alienat any thing of the publike demaine, and much lesse of the rights of the soueraigne maiestie, but that it was alwayes in the power of the successour to lay hand thereon againe, as it is lawfull for the lord to lay hold vppon his fugitiue slaue. As the emperour Maximilian, hauing thrust his armie into Italie, with the pow∣er of king Lewes the xij, and hauing brought a great feare vpon all the cities of Italie, gaue them well to vnderstand: At which time the Florentines sent their ambassadors vnto him, to yeeld vnto him fealtie and homage for their estate, and to obtaine of him the confirmation of their priueleges, which cost them fortie thousand ducats. And al∣beit [ E] that Cosmus duke of Florence, by force of armes made himselfe lord of Sienna: yet so it was, that he tooke the inuestiture therof, & yeelded therfore sealtie & homage vnto the king of Spaine, as perpetuall lieutenant of the empire. Which is sufficient reason to show, that they of Sienna were not before enfranchised or exempted from the empire; or if they were, why did then pope Iulius the second pay thirtie thou∣sand ducats to Maximilian the emperour, to redeeme of him the libertie of Sienna, to the intent to inuest therein * 1.377 the duke of Vrbin. And yet neuerthelesse all that letted not, but that the duke of Florence, which had conquered it by force of armes, was con∣strained

to take the inuestiture thereof of the king of Spaine, and to pay therefore [ F] sixe hundred thousand crownes, which afterwards the king of Spaine would haue againe repayed vnto the duke of Florence, to haue restored Sienna into the former estate; which he would not do, being enformed that the king of Spayne would haue giuen it to the duke of Parma, to reunite Placence and Parma vnto the duchie of Mi∣lan, from whence they had bene before distracted. And how then could the German emperours, which are subiects vnto the estates of the empire, alienat the demaine and rights of soueraigntie, in giuing the rights of soueraigntie vnto the cities of Italie, or li∣bertie vnto the tributarie people; seeing that the absolute soueraigne prince cannot so do? no not so much as to distract one clod of the publike land, much lesse to giue away the proprietie. For kings and other great princes (to say truely) haue not the pro∣prietie [ G] of the publike demaines, nay not so much as the whole vse and profit: for that* 1.378 contenting themselues with the bare vse, the rest belongeth vnto the common-weale. And for that cause the Emperour Charles the fourth, granting the confirmation of the priuileges to them of Perouze, ioyned thereunto this clause, Quoad vi•…•…eret: So long as he should liue. And yet for all that pope Iulius the second tooke that towne from the Baillions, and put it vnder the obeysance of the Church, from whence it was said to haue bene taken. And how could the cities of Italie, or duke of Florence, haue any absolute soueraigntie, seeing that for all differences and controuersies concerning their estates, frontiers, demaines, and tenures, they plead the same before the emperour, or at least wise in the imperiall chamber, where their causes are decided, and they enforced [ H] to doe as is there adiudged. And albeit that they of Genes, who seemed to hold lesse of the empire than any one of the other townes of Italie, where by the marques of Fi∣nall (whome they had driuen out of his estate) summoned before the emperour Ma∣ximilian the second, in the yeare 1559: and that they would receiue the emperour as an arbitratour, and not as a judge or a superiour: yet so it was, that the emperour ta∣king vpon him the authoritie of a iudge, caused them before warned, to be summoned, and when that after many peremptorie edicts they made not their appearance, he pro∣nounced sentence against them, and by an herault at armes threatned to proscribe the territorie of Genes if they obeyed not his censure. Now most certaine it is, that there is none but the cities and townes which hold of the empire, that can be proscribed by [ I] * 1.379 the imperiall proscription, whether it be by sentence of the emperour, or by decree of the imperiall chamber. For the imperiall chamber could not haue proscribed Minde, Munster, Magdeburg, and others, had they not bene contained within the bounds and power of the German empire: much lesse could the emperour haue proscribed Genes, if it had not bene within the power of the Germans. And therfore when they of Genes had appealed from the interlocutorie sentence of Maximilian vnto the pope, they afterwards renouncing their appeale, yeelded to the sentence, acknowledging the iurisdiction and soueraigntie of the empire. And so at length the emperour gaue sen∣tence for the marques, acknowledging himselfe to be a vassal vnto the German empire, whome they of Genes would haue had to haue bene thiers. And since that the mar∣ques [ K] hath by that definitiue sentence bene maintained in possession of his marquisat, as I haue seene by the letters of Signior D'la Forest, embassadour for the king, dated at Vi∣enna the xviij of Iuly, in the yeare 1560: which iudgement the emperour gaue after he had seene the opinions of the lawyers of foure vniuersities. And not long after they were by another sentence of the same emperours, giuen in the moneth of Iuly, in the yeare one thousand fiue hundred sixtie foure, condemned in a processe which they had against Anthonie Flisque, by them banished, who ouerthrew them by an appeale made vnto the emperour.

Which things although they bee so plaine as that there ought thereof to bee no [ A] doubt, but that the cities of Italie on this side the riuers Rubicon and Tiber, excepting some few, are contained within the bounds of the German empire, & so haue of them∣selues no soueraigntie; yet is the same made more euident by the generall consent of all the lawyers of Italie, who deny it to be lawfull for any cities of Italie to make any lawes or customes, contrarie or derogatorie to the Roman laws, published by the com∣maundement of the emperour Frederick. And that the cities of Italie either had no right of soueraintie at al, or else renounced the same, it is manifest by that league which was made in the citie of Constance; for in that league among such priueleges as are confirmed vnto the cities of Italie, the rights of soueraignty are expresly excepted. And therfore Alexander Imolensis of all the lawyers of his time the most skilful, saith, A cer∣taine [ B] iurisdiction to be thereby giuen vnto the cities of Italie; but not the rights of ma∣iestie or soueraigntie to be therefore vnto them graunted, and that euen for that reason, for that the cities doubting or disagreeing about their right, the emperours were wont to appoint them judges and commissioners for the deciding of their controuersies.

Much lesse therefore may the imperiall townes and cities contained within the* 1.380 bounds of the German empire, pretend themselues to haue any soueraigntie, albeit that we see certaine of them to boast of a certaine show of libertie, which they of old receiued from the emperors; as Nuremberg from the emperour Fredericke the first; Isne from Otho the third; Egre from Lewes of Bauyere: yea and some of them there were, which not able longer to endure the hard bondage of their lords, princes of the [ C] empire, set themselues at libertie, as did the cities of Vlme, Brunswic, Lubec, and others: but that which they call libertie, is but an old vacation from certaine seruices, and an immunitie from customes and tributes graunted by the emperours, without any im∣peachment to their maiestie. And therefore those cities which I haue spoken of, ho∣nour the maiestie of the German empire, receiue from it lawes, obey the magistrats thereof, accept of the decrees of the imperiall chamber, and of the assemblies of the empire: and not onely publique and priuat iudgements of princes and cities among themselues, but also the priuat iudgements of particular men are decided by the impe∣riall chamber, if appellation be made from the sentence which exceedeth the summe of fiftie crowns. Seeing therefore that the imperiall chamber may of the power of it selfe [ D] confirme or disanull the iudgements of princes or cities, it must needs follow, that nei∣ther those prinees nor cities haue the power of soueraigne maiestie: For as a certaine Poet (I know not who) saith,

Rescindere nunquam Dijs licet acta Deûm.

It is not lawfull for the Gods the acts of Gods t'vndoe.

As for the Swissers Commonweals, we said before, them to haue bene rent from the* 1.381 German empire, as oppressed with the tirannnie of their gouernours: and yet they so honour and reuerence the maiestie of the German empire, as that they in generall re∣quested [ E] of the emperour Ferdinand, to haue the libertie of their priueleges vnto them confirmed: which is a certaine forme of auntient fealtie, and acknowledgement that they hold their libertie of the empire. And albeit that some there be on this side the Rhene, which vaunt themselues to haue soueraigne power ouer their subiects, yet must they needs be the subiects and vassals either of our kings, or of the German empire. For there is no man which knoweth not (if he remember the antiquitie of the French) that all the countrey of Loraine, and the realme of Arles, after the death of the three chil∣dren of Lothaire were diuided betwixt the emperour Charles the Bauld of Fraunce,

and Lewes king of Germanie his brother. As Vitald, Floard, and Lambert the best [ F] antiquaries do in their histories at large declare. Now so it is that the vassall can neuer prescribe for his homage towards his lord, nor the subiect against the iurisdiction of his prince; and that the graunts and sufferances of the emperour, and the kings of France could not preiudice either the crowne or the empire: wherfore we must conclude these possessours of this maiestie by sufference, to bee subiects and vassals either vnto ou•…•… kings, or to the German empire.

And albeit that many thinke the duke of Loraine to be an absolute soueraigne, by* 1.382 reason of the Armes that he beareth, being an armed arme, saying, as it should seeme, That he holdeth nothing but of the sword: yet neuerthelesse so it is, that in his title he calleth himselfe a prince of the empire; which is indeed to acknowledge the imperiall [ G] maiestie. Ioyne thereunto also, that he hath vsually receiued judges from the imperial chamber, and submitted himselfe to the iurisdiction thereof. For as for that that hee is the last among the German princes, nor in their ceremonies holdeth not the place of the auntient dukes of Loraine; that is, for that he holdeth but a little, viz. scarce the sixt part of the auntient duchie of Loraine (a prouince of the German empire) which containeth all that countrey which lyeth betwixt the riuer of the Maze and the Rhene. And therefore the dukes of Brabant, and the German emperours, called themselues dukes of Loraine. So the emperour Charles the fourth, in the league which he made with Iohn the French king, calleth himselfe duke of Loraine. But this countrey which now is called Loraine, is a part of the German empire and the duke himselfe a vassall [ H] of the empire. For Stephen countie of Boulongne, was in that dukedome inuested by the emperour Henrie the first, and for that cause acknowledged himselfe a vassall of the empire, in the yeare 1019. And Frederick of Loraine countie of Vaudemont, duke Charles being dead without heire male, before Sigismund the emperour and the fathers assembled at Constance, claimed that dukedome of right to belong vnto him, as next of kin; for that it was an imperiall fee, whereof Isabel duke Charles his heire, who had married Renat duke of Aniou, was not (as he said) capable: which Renat denyed it not to be an imperiall fee, but shewed many such imperiall fees to haue descended vnto the daughters. And afterward the title comming to be tryed by the sword, Renat be∣ing ouerthrowne and taken prisoner by Frederick, could not be before deliuered, vntill [ I] that he had married his daughter Yoland vnto Anthonie the sonne of Frederick, with condition, that if Renat died without heires male, the duchie of Loraine should descend vnto the heires of Frederick, & so vnto the house of Vaudemont, as it is come to passe.

Now if so it be that the dukedome of Loraine be an imperiall fee, comprehended* 1.383 within the bounds of the German empire: neither the lord of Lumes nor the countie of Aspremont, who are contained within the precinct of Loraine, can chalenge vnto themselues any right of soueraigntie, as they haue done, seeing that it is plaine by the law, that he which hath a limited territorie, hath but the same right ouer euerie one of his subiects which are within the compasse of his territorie, that hee hath ouer them all in generall; except it appeare, him by some speciall priuiledge to be free and from the [ K] generall expresly exempted. By which reason all such as pretend a soueraigntie, being enclosed within the bounds and territorie of another man, may bee thereof debarred: which a man cannot so easily iudge of them, which in the frontiers of kingdomes, take vpon them a kinde of soueraigne power; as do the fiue lords or princes in the confines of Burgundie, whome both the free counties, and the dukes haue oftentimes chalenged for their vassals: and for the soueraigntie of whome, at such times as they had taken vp armes, they obtained of the generals of both parts, that in the meane time they beeing free might be as newters, vntill the euent of the warre had decided the cause: and so at

length abusing the long possession of soueraigntie, made of that their right, which [ A] they had but by sufferance, a perpetuitie: but as we haue oftentimes before said, so wee must hereafter oftentimes say, That neither the right of soueraigne maiestie, nor the* 1.384 right of libertie, can by the client or vassall be prescribed against: and much lesse if it be withholden by concealement or by sufferance. In like sort the countrey of Bearne, be∣twixt the confines of Fraunce and Nauarre, which the kings atturney generall in the court of Paris maintained to be a prouince holden of the crowne of Fraunce, and disal∣lowed of the plea of the kings atturney of the parliament of Thoulouze, who had con∣fessed it not to hold of the crowne, in the yeare 1505; which although it remaine vn∣decided, yet the king of Nauarre for all that by sufference holdeth it in soueraigntie. In like case the principalitie of Dombes was maintained by Lizet the kings atturney, [ B] to hold in fee of the crowne of Fraunce, and that the duke of Sauoy had no power to giue it to the empire, vnder the colour of being the emperours lieutenant, which hee showed to be done in the most wofull times of the ciuill warre, when as the dukes of Orleans and Burgundie had drawne all the whole kingdome into parts, in the yeare 1398: in like manner the princes of East Frizeland, and they which hold the territory betwixt England and Scotland, which they call the Batable ground: as also the ab∣bot of Gosen, betwixt Metz and Pont a Mousson, who holdeth the abbey and twenty fiue villages, in title of soueraigntie, without acknowledging any superior lord whatso. euer: as also the lords of Beauieu, willing to exempt▪themselues from the crowne of Fraunce, yeelded themselues vnto the empire, and so by the duke of Sauoy, the empe∣rours [ C] lieutenant, were receiued into the protection of the empire, from which they also by little and little exempted themselues, without acknowledging either duke, king, or emperour for their soueraigne.

As for the dukes of Sauoy, the Italian doctors with one common errour haue hol∣den* 1.385 them to haue absolute power and soueraigntie, and to haue so beene iudged by the decree of the parliament of Sauoy: a thing altogether contrarie vnto the office of a lieutenant and vassall. And also Osazque the first president of Piemont writeth, That the dukes of Sauoy haue obtained this power of the emperors, which they could not haue as lieutenants of the empire; as Felinus the best interpretor of the law hath most truly written. For what can be more contrarie vnto soueraigne maiestie, than to pro∣fesse [ D] ones selfe to be another mans deputie or officer, (for so the name of a lieutenant doth signifie) or from whom shouldest thou think thy selfe to haue the power of soue∣raigntie in that prouince wherein thou thy selfe bearest rule? But euen the dukes of Sa∣uoy themselues confesse, and all their histories declare, this prouince of the German em∣pire which is now called Sauoy, to haue bene a fee of the same empire, erected into a countie (holden of the empire in fealtie) by Henry the fi•…•…t; and afterwards into a duchie by the emperour Sigismund. And euident it is the dukes alwayes heretofore, and not long since duke Charles restored vnto his countrey, to haue yeelded fealtie and homage vnto the emperour: and two yeares after, viz. in the yeare 1561, to haue sent speciall letters of atturney vnto the countie D'Arques chiefe chamberlaine to the emperour, to [ E] obtaine for him of the emperour another inuestiture: for because that that which hee had before taken at Ausburg, seemed not vnto him in sufficient good forme, as I haue seene by the letters of M. D'la Forèst, ambassadour for the king vnto the emperour. But an hard matter it was to make such a forme as should be vnto him good; for that it seemeth that the title or qualitie of a perpetuall lieutenant, doth preiudice not only vn∣to soueraigntie, but also vnto the qualitie of a feudatarie & proprietarie in those lands which he holdeth of another man, if it bee not by a doubtfull or improper kind of speech.

The dukes of Saxonie and the counties Palatine are also perpetuall lieutenants of [ F] * 1.386 the empire; but that is in the emperours absence, to doe iustice vnto the princes and imperiall townes, yea euen against the emperour himselfe, (as shall in due place bee declared) and to all them which are of their gouernment: which is a personall office, and not belonging vnto lands; neither can he that taketh vpon him the qualitie of a deputie, lieutenant, o•…•… gouernour, be feudatarie or proprietarie of those seignories that he holdeth of him whose lieutenant he is. And so the title of perpetuall lieutenantship ought to haue relation vnto other countries, without the terrritorie and demaines of his countrey of Sauoy: which neither the Swissers, nor other princes of Italie & Ger∣manie could endure, and much lesse the French king, who holdeth nothing of the empire, whereby he might be iusticiable to the lieutenants of the empire. Ioyne here∣unto [ G] also, that the Emperour Charles the fourth made Charles the sixt Dauphin of Vi∣ennois,* 1.387 his perpetuall lieutenant, the xiiij day of Ianuarie, in the yeare 1378. And for that he was but nine yeares old, he gaue him the priuelege of his age, by a most ample and gracious charter, whereunto hang seales of gold, which I haue read in the records of our kings. But withall made him perpetuall lieutenant of the kingdome of Arles, (excepting onely the countie of Sauoy) and that more is, gaue him power of life and death ouer the subiects of the empire; with power also to conferre honors, to impose and raise taxes, and from the same to exempt whome he saw good, to receiue appeales made vnto the emperour, to make peace and warre, to giue laws vnto the subiects, and to disanull and abrogat the same, and such other like. This lieutenancie was for all the [ H] kingdome of Arles, which extended from the mountaine Iura (commonly called saint Claudius mount) and the riuers Araris and Rhodanus, vnto the Alpes, and the sea of Genes; all which the imperials haue alwaies pretended to be holden of the empire. But the earles of Prouince haue long since exempted themselues from the German em∣pire, amongst whome was Raymund the last, one of whose daughters was married vn∣to Lewes the ninth, the French king, and the other vnto Charles duke of Aniou, by which meanes the countie of Prouence is come to the house of Aniou, & from thence by the bountie of countie Renat, vnto the crowne of Fraunce. Albeit that Philip Va∣lois* 1.388 the French king, had bought of the emperour Henrie the fi•…•…t, the soueraigntie of all the realme of Arles, without excepting either the countie of Sauoy, or the principality [ I] of Oreng, or Beiauieu, which was afterwards giuen to Lewes duke of Burbon; either of the countie of Prouence, which was then in the house of Aniou; either of the franke countie, which was giuen to Philip the hardie, by the emperour Charles the fourth, in the yeare 1362, being deuolued to the empire for want of heires male. And the sale of soueraigntie of the said kingdome of Arles, was made for the summe of three hundred thousand markes of siluer, with promise to cause it to be ratified by the princes of the empire, who afterwards consented thereunto: of which their confirmation the em∣perour gaue Iohn king of Bohemia suretie, who sold also the towne of Luques vnto the same king, for an hundred and fourescore thousand florines of gold, in the yeare 1330. The contracts, ratifications, and quittances, are yet in the treasurie of Fraunce to bee [ K] seene, from whence I haue the exemplifications conferred with the originals, wel wor∣thy to haue bene seene of them who were deputed for the affaires of Sauoy, in the yeare 1562. But that me thinke well worth the marking, that in the deedes of bargaine and sale, are comprised all the lawes of soueraigne maiestie, which the German emperours giue vnto themselues in all the prouinces of the kingdome of Arles: wherein are con∣tained the Sauoians, they of Belloioci, they of Prouence, they of free Burgundie, which the emperour Charles the fourth gaue to Philip duke of Burgundie to bee pos∣sessed in the imperiall right, the issues male of the counties fayling. Whereby it is ma∣nifest

the French kings to haue the right of soueraigne maiestie ouer all the people of [ A] the kingdome of Arles, and not therefore to owe any fealtie or homage vnto the Get∣man empire.

And at the same time as it were the emperour Lewes of Bauatia made Edward the* 1.389 third, king of England his perpetuall lieutenant; and by his letters pattents gaue him power to make lawes, and to administer iustice to all the subiects of the empire: and that all the subiects of the empire should obey him, and in his name to yeeld vnto him fealtie and homage: which was an occasion rather sought for, than offered, for him to make warre vpon the French king, who then held Cambray and the castles of Creue∣ceur, and Payerne, members of the empire: for that by the auntient leagues made be∣twixt the French kings and the emperours, it was prouided, That they should not one [ B] of them take any thing from the other, or molest one the others sublects; as was decla∣red vnto king Edward by the imperiall princes allied with him, and then assembled in the towne of Hale: which is a most certaine argument that the kings of Fraunce hold* 1.390 nothing of the empire; neither that the emperours haue any right in that kingdome. Which is also expresly set downe in the contract of purchase of Philip Valois, which I haue here before rehearsed, which beareth this clause: And the kings and realmes of Fraunce shall continue in their priueleges, enfranchisments, and liberties, that they haue al∣wayes holden against the German empire, whereunto they are in nothing subiect. Which was well giuen the emperour Sigismund to vnderstand, at such time as he of his imperi∣all power would haue made the countie of Sauoy duke, in the towne of Lyons▪ against [ C] whome the kings officers there so opposed themselues, as that hee was glad to get him out of the kingdome, at libertie to vse his owne power, which he did in great choller and displeasure. And this was done by the expresse commaundement of the king, Charles the sixt, to couer two notable errors that had bene before committed: the one passing by sufferance, in that the emperour Sigismund being magnifically receiued at Paris, and as beseemed the kings vncle, had place in a royall seat in full parliament; and the other, that afterwards he was suffered to make Seneschal D' Beaucaire knight; al∣though the court had in this last point admonished the king, that vnto him onely it be∣longed to make knights in his owne kingdome; as it had twice before bene solemnely iudged by two decrees against the counties of Flaunders and Neuers. Which I haue [ D] the more willingly noted, to show the errour of Alciat, who hath maintained, that the* 1.391 French king is subiect to the empire; which is a wilfull errour or ingratitude, conside∣ring the entertainment he had in Fraunce to teach and write the truth: which I thinke not to haue proceeded from him of ignorance, but in fauour of the emperour Charles the fift, who drew him to Pauie, and there doubled his salarie: or els to the imitation of Bartholus, author of that errour, who writ the same things of the French kings that Al∣ciat did: at such time forsooth as he was by the emperour Charles the fourth of a ba∣stard not onely made legitimat, and by him ennobled, but power also giuen him to take the benefit of age to him and his, which should professe to teach the lawes, with armes also answerable vnto his dignitie and honour: viz. a Lyon Azure in a field Argent. [ E] For which so many and so great benefits he writ all them to be heretikes, which should deny the German emperour to be lord of all the world: which hee seemeth to haue gathered of the words of Antoninus Augustus, vnto the law Rhodia; I am (saith he) the lord of the world, and law of the sea: which words seeing they were spoken but for ostentation sake, and for the augmenting of his honour, lesse need to bee refuted; see∣ing that the Roman empire when it was at the greatest, (which was in the time of* 1.392 Traian the emperour) contained scarce the thirtieth part of the world, and that the German empire is not now the tenth part of the Roman empire. And yet the empe∣rour

Sigismund sick of that incurable disease of ambition, sought to haue brought euery [ F] mans gouernment vnder his, although he was in that his hope much deceiued. For intruding himselfe to haue made the duke of Lituania a king (whose countrey lieth aboue two hundred leagues from the frontiers of the empire of Germany) hee sent him a crowne and a sword, which for all that the duke refused, neither thought it good to chaunge the name of the Great Duke (whereby he was called) although he had of him∣selfe shaken off the seruile yoke of the Tartars, least in so doing hee might seeme to haue attributed his power and soueraigntie vnto the Germans.

We see also that the Germaine Emperors haue sent the royall Crownes vnto the* 1.393 Dukes of Polonia, before they were by the Pope suffered to beare the Royall title; which they refused: and yet certaine it is, that the Kings of Polonia neuer held any [ G] thing of the Empire. Oftentimes indeed the Germaines haue attempted to haue subdu∣ed the Polonians, whose vaine attempts the Polonians haue not onely repulsed, but also ioyned vnto their kingdom the countries of Silesia and Prussia, both rent from the body of the Germaine Empire. Which when the Prutenian knights had taken in euil part, and thereof oftentimes complained to the states of the empire, yet the emperors thought it not good for to attempt any thing against the Polonians, by whom they had knowne the imperiall armies to haue been many times repulsed and ouerthrown. And yet for all this, the Polonians refused not to take their royall scepters from the bi∣shops of Rome. True it is that the bishops of Rome of long time striue with the Ger∣maine* 1.394 emperours for the soueraigntie and chiefe gouernment of the Christian Com∣monweale, [ H] and as chiefetaines of the faction, drew all the Christian princes and cities into armes; so that many cities and Commonweales, especially in Italie, were at such mortall hatred amongst themselues, as that they receiued not greater harme from the enemies of the Christian religion and name, than they did from one another. Neither wanted there some which writ in earnest, al Christian kings to be the bishop of Romes clyents and vassals; and in case that they were foolish, furious, or prodigall, that they might haue ouerseers appointed ouer them by the pope: which we haue before said, to haue been done by pope Innocent the fourth, against the king of Portugall. And al∣be it that pope Innocent said, That his meaning therein was not in any thing to preiu∣dice the regall power, in appointing such an ouerseer; yet did not his sayings at all agree [ I] with his dooings. Pope Vrban the fift also made no doubt, to make legitimate Henry the bastard king of Castile, so to thrust out of his kingdom his brother Peter, borne in lawfull wedlocke: who therevpon, by the power of the French, was not onely thrust out of his kingdom, but s•…•…aine also by his bastard brother. Some there haue been also* 1.395 which haue passed further, saying that the pope hath in power iurisdiction ouer the emperour; but ouer all other kings and princes really and indeed: excepting ouer the French king, whom the canonists themselues confesse, indeed, and ofright to acknow∣ledge none greater than himselfe vnder God. Which Belluga a Spanish doctor, and Oldrade the beautie of his time do also better declare, saying that the French king nei∣ther in fact nor of right acknowledgeth any prince of the world superiour vnto him∣selfe. [ K] But these great clearks which thus giue the popes power ouer other princes, haue no better reason for that they say, than the authoritie of pope Gelasius, who hath written, That the pope hath power to dispoyle all kings and princes of their soueraign∣tie and power. And some others there be which haue maintained, That appeales may be made from all people and princes vnto the pope, That there is none but the empe∣rour and the pope which can reuoke their owne decrees, and deptiue other kings and princes of their soueraigntie and rule; That there is no prince but hee, vnto whom the pope hath confirmed his principalitie: And that which of all other is most absurd,

that hee of himselfe may giue priueleges, exemptions, and immunities vnto another [ A] princes subiects contrarie to the decrees and lawes of all princes; and that he is the on∣ly and supreme vmpiere and judge of all mans lawes. And what maruell if he rule ouer princes, which commaundeth ouer angels? For so truely Clement V. P. M. doubted not to commaund the angels. Yea some there be that haue written, That so often as the pope shall put this clause to his rescripts, De plenitudine potestatis, Of the fulnesse of our power: so oft doth he therein derogat from the lawes of all princes. And al∣beit that some haue holden also, That we must rest vpon that that the pope saith, with∣out farther enquire of the veritie therof; yet so it is neuerthelesse, that Baldus hath writ∣ten, That a man may say vnto him, Salua reuerentia vestra, By your reuerences leaue. And vpon the maxime set downe by the canonists, That the pope can do all: the diuines [ B] graunting it to be so, do yet more subtilly, and as it were in two words moderat the same, Claue non errante, The key not erring. And forasmuch as it is euery good subiects part to maintaine the greatnesse and maiestie of their owne princes, I will not enter into the disputes of Iaques de Terranne the popes chamberlaine, nor of Capito, nor of M. Charles du Moulin, and others, who haue oftentimes ouershot themselues either of set purpose, or els pressed with violent passions, haue vnawares entred into matter of religion, and so carried away either with loue or hatred of the pope, haue filled their writings with raylings. Whereas I here speake not but of temporall soueraigntie, which is the subiect that I entreat of, (whereof they speake not) to the end it may be vn∣derstood, who be absolute soueraigne princes; and whether the other princes be subiect [ C] vnto the emperour, or the pope, or not.

For at the beginning, after that pope Gregorie (he which first called himselfe the ser∣uant* 1.396 of the sernants of God) had obtained of Phocas emperour of Constantinople, the prerogatiue ouer all the bishops; his successours after turning the spirituall power into the temporall, by little and little still encreased their power, in so much that the princes as wel for the fear they then had towards God, as for the dignitie of the prelacie, began to reuerence them much more than in former times; but much more after that the em∣pire of the East began to decline, which was after that the popes had by their inter∣dictions forbidden the people of Italie their obedience vnto the Constantinopolitan emperours, or to pay them any tribute; vpon occasion taken, that Leo the emperour, [ D] surnamed Monomachus, or the Image breaker, and also Thomas the emperor, had cau∣sed the images of Saints to be cast downe and broken: wherewith the people moued, and enraged with the authoritie of the bishop of Rome, slew Thomas in the temple of Saint Sophia. Wherefore the power of the Greeke empire being weakened in the East, by the incursions of the Barbarians; and the Greeke emperors out of hope againe to recouer Italie; the kings of Lombardie then also doing what they might to make themselues lords of all Italie, and the popes also on their parts no lesse desirous to haue therein a share, and finding themselues too weake to make their partie good against the Lombard kings, vppon this difference cast themselues into the pro∣tection of the kings of Fraunce, who then were the greatest Monarches of Christen∣dome; [ E] wherein they were not of their hope deceiued. For hereupon, Pipin Grande* 1.397 M_r. of Fraunce (a man of great wealth and power, who then disposed of all the affaires of the realme) with a great army passing ouer the Alpes, ouerthrew and discomfi∣ted the power of the Lombards, and afterward going to Rome, was the first that gaue vnto pope Zacharie, part of the seignorie of Italie, who had before crowned him king of Fraunce, forbidding the peeres and people of Fraunce to make choyce of any other for their kings but of the house of Pipin, hauing publikely pronounced king Childerike for his sottishnesse to bee vnable for the gouernment. Whereunto the people of

Fraunce made so much the lesse resistance, for that Pipin then had the nobilitie and the [ F] armie of Fraunce at commaund: and for that the pope (who as then was esteemed as a God vpon earth) was the author thereof, vnto whome Pipin had before solemnly pro∣mised, and giuen him letters pattents thereof, That if hee should become victorious ouer the Lombards, he should giue vnto the Church of Rome the Exa•…•…chat of Ra∣uenna, which contained thirtie cities, and the prouince of Pentapole, which contained sixteene cities moe: which he after the victorie performed, laying the keyes of the said cities vpon Saint Peters altar: yet reseruing vnto himselfe and his successours in the crowne of Fraunce, the soueraigntie of both the prouinces; and that more is, power also to chuse the popes. Whereunto the pope not onely willingly graunted, but al∣most persuaded Pipin to take vppon him the name of an emperour: which title none [ G] then vsed, but the emperours of Constantinople. But Pipin being dead, the Lombards againe tooke vp armes, to the great disquiet of the popes, who againe had recourse vn∣to the French kings, as vnto a most sure sanctuarie. Whereupon Charles, Pipin his sonne (for his many and worthy victories surnamed the Great) with a strong army pas∣sing the Alpes, not onely ouerthrew the king of the Lombards, but euen their king∣dome also: and hauing surely established the power of the Roman bishops, was by them called Emperour: and they againe by Charles so long as he liued, all chosen bi∣shops of Rome. But after the death of this Charlemaigne, they which were of great credit in Rome, caused themselues to be chosen pope by the clergie, whether it were* 1.398 for the distrust they had to obtaine that dignitie of the kings of Fraunce, hauing no fa∣uour [ H] in the court; or through the negligence of the French kings, who had thereof no great care; or that it was by reason of the great ciuill warres which arose betwixt the children of Lewes the Gentle, wherewith the French kings busied, lost the prerogatiue they had in chusing of the chiefe Bishop. Yet Guitard, a good antiquarie, who liued in the same time writeth, 3 popes successiuely to haue come into France to excuse them∣selues to Lewes the Gentle, That they had beene by the clergie of Rome constrained to accept of the papal dignitie, beseeching him to confirme the same: which he either as a man not desirous of glorie, or els fearing to prouoke the clergie (being then in great au∣thoritie) did: of which his error he afterwards though to late full sore repented him; be∣ing by the colledge of cardinals constrained to yeeld vp his c•…•…owne, & to make himself [ I] a monke, and the queene his wife a nunne, shut vp apart from her husband in a cloister with other nunnes, who yet were againe afterwards deliuered by the princes and no∣bilitie of Fraunce, (disdaining to see the pride of the clergie) and so againe restored vnto their former honours.

But after the death of this Lewes the Gentle (who was emperour of Fraunce, of Ger∣manie, and of the greater part of Italie, and Spaine) the empire was diuided into three kingdomes, which the brethren Charles the Bauld, Lothaire, and Lewes, euerie one of them held in title of soueraigntie, without acknowledging any superioritie of one ano∣ther; and againe, the kingdom of Lothaire was diuided amongst his children into three parts: vnto one fell the kingdome of Loraine, vnto another the kingdome of Arles, [ K] and to the third the kingdome of Italie: Lewes holding Germanie, and Charls the em∣perour, Fraunce. So their diuided power began to decay, and the wealth of the bi∣shops of Rome greatly to encrease: they now succeeding one another by way of ele∣ction, and in nothing acknowledging the maiestie of the French kings, as they ought to haue done: which came to passe especially in the time of pope Nicholas the first,* 1.399 who better vnderstood to mannage matters of state than had his predecessours, and was the first that vsed the rigour of excommunication against princes, hauing excom∣municated Lothaire the younger brother of Lewes king of Italie. But the children of

Lothaire being afterwards dead without issue, those three kingdomes which I spoke of, [ A] viz. of Loraine, Arles, and Italie, were diuided betwixt their vncles, Charles and Lewes. Wherefore Lewes king of Germanie gouerned Italie, which fell vnto his part, by his lieutenants and deputies; whose power was not such asto withstand the popes, but that* 1.400 they still by little and little extended their power and gouernment: which especially hapned at such time as Guiscard the Norman had subdued the kingdome of Sicilie and Naples, taken from the Greekes and Moores; who to weaken the power of the Ger∣mans, and to raigne himselfe the more safely in Italie, ioyned hands against them with the Bishops of Rome. But the posteritie of Guiscard being dead without heires male, left the kingdome of Naples and Sicilie vnto a woman their heire; married vnto the German emperor Frederick the second, who going into Italy, there to confirme his [ B] power, made choice of another pope (one of his own fauorites) than was he whom the colledge of cardinals had before chosen: which was pope Innocent the fourth, a man both for his birth and learning famous; who driuen out of Italie, and comming into Fraunce (the popes surest sanctuarie) and strengthened with the wealth and power of Lewes the ix, the French king (whether it were for reuerence of him the pope so so∣lemnly by the cardinals chosen, or to weaken the power of the Germans) excommu∣nicated the emperour Frederick the second: who seeing himselfe thereby become odi∣ous vnto all men, & himselfe like to be forsaken euen of his own subiects, & great tro∣bles arising also against him in Italy, fearefully returned into Germany, hauing obtained absolution of pope Innocent, by yeelding vp his authoritie and power for any more [ C] creating of the bishops of Rome, leauing the kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie vnto his base sonne Manfred, who was also excommunicated by pope Vrban the fist: who not yet so contented, called in Charles of France, duke of Aniou, brother to king Lewes the ix, whome he inuested in the aforesaid two realmes of Naples and Sicilie, reseruing vn∣to the See of Rome the countie of Beneuent; fealtie, homage, iurisdiction, and soue∣raigntie for the rest; with a yearely and perpetual fee of eight thousand ounces of gold, as we haue before said. After which time the house of Arragon, which by right of kin∣dred* 1.401 succeeded the posteritie of Manfred, being alwaies at oddes with the house of Aniou, and so in continuall warres for these kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie; and see∣ing it not possible for them to recouer them so long as the pope was their enemie, they [ D] •…•…ound meanes to gaine the popes fauour, and so made themselues the popes vassals, not onely for the kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie, but also for the kingdomes of Arra∣gon, Sardinia, Corsica, Maiorque, and Minorque: which they partly did also for to ob∣taine the popes pardon for their offences, as we haue before said. The bishops of Rome in the meane time out of the troubles of these two great houses, encreasing their owne power and profit, peaceably enioyed the territorie about Rome, Spolet, and Beneuent, with a good part of Tuscanie, by vertue of the donation which wee haue before spoken of.

As for the citie of Rome, sometimes mistresse of the world, they brought it vnder* 1.402 their obeysance, hauing by little and little oppressed the libertie thereof, no man gain∣saying [ E] them. Albeit that Charlemaigne hauing conquered Italie, expresly commaun∣ded that it should remaine in full libertie, with power left vnto the inhabitants to go∣uerne their estate, which the Roman bishops had also by their oathes confirmed; as Augustine Onuphre the popes chamberlaine writeth, and as it well appeareth by the Vatican records.

Now if there were any soueraigne prince that were a tyrant, or an heretike, or that* 1.403 had done any notorious crime, or not obeyed the popes commaund; hee was by the pope forthwith excommunicated: which was occasion enough to cause his subiects

to reuolt from him, and to arme other princes against him which was so excommuni∣cated; [ F] who then had no other meane left to be againe receiued into fauour, but to make himselfe feudatarie to the Church of Rome, and the popes vassall. As I haue be∣fore said of Iohn king of England, who made himselfe vassall to Innocent the third, for the murther committed in the person of young Arthur duke of Britaine. And aug∣mented also the feodall rent of England, for the murder committed by the commaun∣dement of the king of England, in the person of Thomas Archbishop of Canterburie. As in like case it chaunced for the murther committed in the person of Stanislaus arch∣bishop of Guesne, by the commaundement of the king: for which the pope excommu∣nicated the king, and tooke the roiall title from the kings of Polonia; enioyning also their subiects therefore (as some haue written) to shaue their heads behind, in such sort [ G] as we yet see them to doe: which whether it be true or no, I dare not to affirme, nei∣ther could the Polonians tell me the cause thereof when I asked it of them: but ma∣nifest it is by auntient records, that after the murther of that bishop, the kings of Polo∣nia all thought they had the power of soueraigne maiestie, yet were they called but by the name of dukes, vntill the time of Lucold duke of Polonia, who receiued the royall crowne and title, of pope Iohn the xxij, vpon condition to pay into the popes coffers a certaine yearely tribute, which is yet at this day paid for the lampe of Saint Peter, as we* 1.404 read in their histories. And beside those kingdomes which wee haue spoke of, viz. England, Arragon, Naples, Sicilie, Hierusalem, Polonia, Sardinia, Corsica, and the Ca∣naries, all feudataries or tributaries vnto the popes, or els both together; they haue al∣so [ H] pretended the soueraigntie of the kingdome of Hungarie, to belong vnto them, and so it is comprised in the Catalogue of the Chauncerie of Rome. And I haue seene in the Vatican Register, an act dated in the yeare 1229, whereby Ladislaus the first, king of Hungarie, promiseth his obedience vnto pope Benedict the xij, and acknowledgeth that he ought to receiue the crowne at his hands. And by another act of Ladislaus the second, king of Hungarie, excommunicated for the disobedience by him committed against the popes Legat; for to haue his obsolution, he bound himselfe to pay yeare∣ly into the popes chamber an hundred markes of siluer; which obligation beareth date the yeare 1280. Yet in the same Vatican register, dated in the yeare 1308, where∣by it appeareth also, the barons of Hungarie to haue sharply opposed themselues [ I] against the popes Legat, alleaging Saint Stephen the first king of Hungarie, to haue re∣ceiued his crowne of the pope, and that they would not endure the pope to haue any such prerogatiue ouer them: and yet neuerthelesse they letted not, but that the king by themselues chosen, might if so pleased him cause himselfe to bee crowned by the pope. And in the end of that act are many decrees of the popes legat, concerning the state of that kingdome, with prohibitions to the kings of Hungarie for alienating any the de∣maines of the crowne: which may seeme to haue bene the cause that Andrew king of Hungarie, was by Honorius the pope cited to Rome, to show why he had alienated part of the publike demaines. Innocentius also the third expresly enioyned the king of Hungarie to fulfill his dead fathers vow; threatning if he should refuse so to doe, to de∣priue [ K] him of his kingdome, and to giue it to him that was next of kin. Which a man need not to thinke strange in those times, seeing that at the same time wee see the pro∣hibitions made by the pope vnto the counties of Tholouze, (and inserted into the De∣cretals) that they should not raise any new charges vpon their owne subiects. As for the kingdome of Hierusalem and Syria, wonne by Godfrey of Buillon and his allies, it is manifest that he therefore professed himselfe to be the popes vassall, and to hold it of him by fealtie and homage: besides that we find it comprised in the Catalogue of the feudatarie kings of the church of Rome. And as concerning the Grand Masters of the

honourable order of S. Iohn Hierusalem, which was composed of eight sundtie people [ A] * 1.405 of diuers language, they were alwayes inuested by the pope, and yet do fealtie and homage vnto the popes for the soueraigne power which they haue ouer the knights of their order: albeit that they did homage also vnto the emperour Charles the fist, for Tripolis in Barbarie, before it fell into the hands of the Turke: as now also they doe at this present vnto the king Catholike, for the isle of Malta, which was vpon that condi∣tion giuen them.

And as for the kingdome of Nauarre, vnder the colour of excommunication taken* 1.406 from Peter Albret, we said before, that it is by the kings of Spaine holden of the popes of Rome by fealtie and homage. And not many yeares ago pope Pius the fift would vnder the same colour of religion, haue taken also the rest that was yet left, from Ione [ B] queene of Nauarre, hauing caused her to be cited to Rome; and afterward for default and contumacie, causing her by his commissioners to bee condemned: had not king Charles the ix taken vpon him to protect her, as being his subiect, vassall, and neere kinswoman: which he gaue all Christian princes to vnderstand, vnto whose maiestie the proscription of that most honourable queene might well haue seemed preiudiciall.

For many were of opinion that the pope was absolute soueraigne lord of all the kingdoms of Christendome. And in our age, at such time as Henry the eight, king of England, was reuolted from the pope, the earle of Aisimund, an Irish man, sent letters vnto Henry the second the French king, (the copie whereof I haue taken out of the re∣cords) whereby he offered himselfe to become his subiect, if he should of the pope ob∣taine [ C] the soueraigntie of the kingdome of Ireland, which we said to haue bene vnder the fealtie of the bishop of Rome, since the time of Innocent the third. They haue also pretended themselues to haue the soueraigntie of Mirandula, and of the counties of Concorde, Rege, Modene, Parma, & Placence, for which the popes Iulius the second and third, both of them made great warres against the French king, when as yet it was most manifest those cities to depend of the German empire. Of Parma, and Placence there is no doubt; and the rest they confesse Maud the countesse to haue had by inhe∣ritance, holden by fealtie of the emperours, which she gaue to the church of Rome.

Now if we graunt the aforesaid cities might haue beene giuen vnto the bishop of* 1.407 Rome, and to haue bene indeed giuen, as the bishops themselues vaunt; they must also [ D] confesse themselues to haue bene vassals vnto the German empire. But for that it see∣med a dishonour to the bishop of Rome, which said himselfe to haue power ouer all princes, to be accounted a vassall and client of the emperours; they said (but falsly) the soueraigntie of all the cities of Italie, which were within the dominions of the Church of Rome, to haue bene by the emperours graunted vnto the bishop of Rome. And to exempt themselues, they produce a donation which I haue read in the Vatican register without date or name of bishop, whereby Otho the emperour (but which Otho it is not said, when as there haue bene foure of that name) doth giue vnto the church of Rome Pisaurum, Ancona, Fossabrum, and Ausun. Other letters pattents also there is of the emperour Otho the fourth, vnto pope Innocent the third, conceiued in these words, [ E] Ego Otho quartus rex Romanorum semper Augustus, tibi domino meo papae Innocentio tertio, tuis{que} successoribus ecclesiae Romanae, spondeo, polliceor, & iuro, quod omnes possessio∣nes Ecclesiae, &c. I Otho the fourth, king of the Romans, alwayes victorious, do auow, promise, and sweare, to thee my lord pope Innocent the third, and to thy successours of the church of Rome, that all the possessions of the Church, &c. And that which fol∣loweth after, containeth a most copious confirmation of all the lands and cities which then were in the dominion or patrimonie of the church of Rome, whether they were giuen by the emperours themselues, or by any other lords or princes whatsoeuer: in the

number of which cities are these contained: Comitatus Perusiae, Reatae, Saluiae, Interamnae, [ F] Campaniae, nee non Roman, Ferrariam, &c. Marchiam, Anconitanam, terram Comitisse Matildis & quecunque sunt circa Rodicofanum vsque Ceperanum, exerchatum Rauenne, Pentapolim cum alij terris, &c. The same forme of confirmation is in the Vatican re∣cords to be seene, both of Rodolph the emperour, and Charles the fourth, bearing date the yeare 1289, and 1368, importing that they also out of their aboundance gaue vnto the pope and to the church of Rome so much as should be needfull, and all that which Henrie the fift his grandfather had before giuen and confirmed vnto the church, that so all the occasions of discord which had before bene betwixt the emperors & the popes, might be altogether taken away. So that if these donations be good, the popes are exempted from their fealtie and homage due vnto the emperours, by reason of the fees [ G] that they hold and which are members of the German empire. But if the emperours could not without the consent of the princes and cities of the empire, giue away the publike territories and rights of soueraigntie; and that the imperiall and publike terri∣tories cannot be encroached vpon; and much lesse the right of soueraigntie and pa∣tronage, whose authoritie for euer ouer the subiects and vassals cannot bee prescri∣bed against; it must needes follow, the popes to bee the vassals of the German em∣pire.

The same we may say of the election of the bishops of Rome, which the German* 1.408 emperours pretend of right to belong vnto them. For the emperour Frederick the second to haue absolution from pope Innocent the fourth, caused to be deliuered vnto [ H] him his letters pattents, sealed with a seale of gold, dated the yere 1229: whereof I haue seene the extract, and of his empire the seuenth, and of his raigne in the kingdome of Sicilie the xxij. Whereby he entirely renounceth the right of election which he had in the creating of bishops, vsing these words, Illum abusum abolere volentes, quem qui∣dam praedecessorum vt electiones libere fiant & c•…•…nonice, Wee willing to abolish that abuse which some of our predecessours were knowne to haue exercised in the ele∣ctions of prelats, graunt that those elections may be freely and canonically made. By which words he seemeth to renounce not onely the creation of the bishop of Rome, but all other bishops also. Howbeit that in truth that right of chusing of the popes be∣longed to the kings of Fraunce, and not vnto the German princes, who haue but vsur∣ped [ I] the name and title of emperours, got by the prowesse and force of Charlemaigne king of Fraunce, and by him left vnto his successors the kings of Fraunce, and not vn∣to the kings of Germany: for so they were called in all the auntient treaties and histo∣ries of Germanie and Fraunce, and not emperours, except those which were crowned by the popes. But after that the power of the German kings was farre spred in Italie, they then sought to vsurpe vnto themselues that right of chusing of the bishops of Rome: whether it were for the encreasing of their owne wealth and power, or for to take away the ambition and foule corruption then vsed in voyces giuing, and in their elections. For the emperour Henrie the third thrust out of his papacie Gregorie the sixt, chosen pope by the clergie, and set Clement the second in his place; and after∣wards [ K] * 1.409 compelled the clergie to sweare, not from thenceforth to admit any into the pa∣pacie, without the consent of the German emperours; as we haue learned out of the Vatican records. But Clement the second being dead, the colledge of Cardinals sent ambassadours vnto the emperour to appoint whome hee thought good to bee pope, who appointed Pepon, afterwards called Damasus the second; who dead, the clergie againe sent ambassadours vnto the emperour, for the creating of a new pope: who sent vnto them Brunon, otherwise called Leo the ix: and after him Victor the second. After whose death the clergie made choyce of Frederick, and after him of Alexander the

second: which when the emperour Henry the fourth vnderstood, he sent them Cadol [ A] bishop of Parma for pope, who although he were so receiued in all Lombardie, yet was he thrust out by pope Alexander. After Alexander succeeded Hildebrand, other∣wise called Gregorie the seuenth, chosen also by the clergie, who vpon the grieuous paine of excommunication, forbad all lay men to bestow any Ecclesiasticall liuings or benefices vpon any whomsoeuer: And also excommunicated the emperour Henrie the fourth, for disobeying his commaundement in creating of bishops in Germanie. Wherewith the emperour moued, and with his armie passing ouer the Alpes, chased this Gregorie the seuenth out of the citie, who had holden the papacie eleuen yeares, and placed in his stead Clement the third, who held that dignitie seauenteene yeares, against foure popes successiuely chosen by the clergie. After whose death Henrie the 5 [ B] the emperour made Bourden pope; without regard of whom, the clergie neuerthelesse made choice of Calistus the second a Burgundion, who draue out Bourdin, before no∣minated by the emperour: and by a decree made at Wormes, enforced Henrie to sweare neuer more to take vpon him to bestow any spirituall liuings vpon anie: yet with condition, that he might be in the assemblies of the Bishops assistant, if he thought it so good. Which decree of the emperour Henry the fift is yet extant in the Vatican records, in these words, Pro salute animae meae dimitto Deo & sanctis Apostolis Petro & Paulo, sanctaeque Ecclesiae Catholicae, omnem inuestituram per annulum & baculum, & concedo in omnibus ecclesijs quae in imperio meo sunt, Canonicam fieri electionem. For the health of my soule I remit vnto God and the holy Apostles Peter and Paule, and [ C] to the holy Catholique Church, all inuestiture to bee made by Ring and pastorall staffe, and do graunt Canonicall election to be made in all the Churches which are in mine Empire. Neuerthelesse 229 yeares after, the Emperour Lewes of Bauaria cre∣ated Nicholas the fift bishop of Rome: Iohn the two and twentith, a Frenchman, then •…•…itting as pope at Auignion, who peremptorily citied the emperor to appeare before him and for default & contumacie, pronounced sentence of excommunication against him: The emperour likewise on the contrarie side summoned the same pope Iohn to come before him, saying the bishops of Rome to be subiect vnto his edicts and com∣maunds, as emperour: and by sentence giuen at Rome, where Nicholas the Antipape held his seat, depriued Iohn of his papacie. Which Nicholas afterwards retiring him∣selfe [ D] vnto Pisa, was by the citizens there betraied into the hands of pope Iohn his mor∣tall enemie at Auignion, where he shut vp in prison, for sorrow languished to death: and the emperour excommunicated, and therefore detested of all men, was forsaken of his subiects. And this was the eight emperour whome the bishop of Rome excom∣municated:* 1.410 after whose fall the German emperours thought it not good afterwards to attempt any thing against the bishops of Rome. But to the contrarie the emperour Charles the fourth gaue out his letters pattents, in the yeare 1355, whereby he acknow∣ledgeth vnto pope Innocent the fift, That although hee were chosen emperour by the princes, yet that he ought to take the confirmation of his election, and the imperiall crowne of him the pope; beginning in these words, Post pedum oscula beatorum, &c. [ E] After the kissing of your blessed feet, &c. Which words we see still repeated in all the emperours letters vnto the bishop of Rome, euen from the time of Lewes of Ba∣uaria, vntill now.

There is also extant in the Vatican, the forme of the coronation of the emperors,* 1.411 and by the emperour Charles the fourth approued; but no where more seruile seruices: where amongst other ceremonies, the emperour is as a subdeacon to minister vnto the pope whilest he is saying masse; and after diuine seruice done, to hold his stirrop whilest he mounteth to horse, and for a certaine time to lead his horse by the bridle: with di∣uers

other ceremonies at large set downe in the Vatican records, which it is needlesse [ F] here to rehearse. And yet one thing more is worth the marking which is not in the re∣cord expressed, which is, that the emperour to receiue the imperiall crowne, must goe to seeke the pope wheresoeuer he be, and to follow him if hee chaunce to remoue; as did the emperour Charles the fift, who being come into Italie, with hope to haue gone vnto the* pope at Rome, being aduertised of his departure thence to Bononia, was* 1.412 glad thither to follow him: that so the dutie of an inferiour prince towards the maiesty of his superiour might the more plainely be perceiued. But after the death of Charles the fift, Ferdinand the emperour could not obtaine, that the pope should in his absence ratifie his election; but was oftentimes by the pope threatned, That hee would take such order for him, as that he should haue nothing to doe with the affaires of the Ger∣man [ G] empire: neither would he admit the emperours lawfull excuse, vntill hee was by the requests and meditation of the French king, and of the king of Spaine appeased: which the German princes tooke in euill part, seeing they had promised vnto Ferdi∣nand to imploy their whole power for the defence of the ma•…•…estie of the empire, against that the popes enterprises; as I haue learned by the letters of the kings ambassadour,* 1.413 dated at Vienna, in Iuly 1559. And to show a greater submission of the emperours vn∣to the popes, the subscription of the emperours letters vnto the pope, is this, Ego manus ac pedes vestrae sanctitatis deosculor, viz. I kisse the hands and feet of your Holinesse. So vsed alwayes the emperour Charles the fift to subscribe to his letters, when he writ vnto pope Clement the seuenth. Which he did not vpon a faigned courtesie, but indeed in [ H] most humble and seruile manner kissed the popes feet, in the open sight of the people, and the greatest assemblies of many noble princes, at Bononia, Rome, and last of al at Marsielles in Prouence, where were met together the pope, the emperour, the kings of Fraunce and Nauarre, the dukes of Sauoy, of Buillon, Florence, Ferrara, Vitemberg the Grand Master of Malta, with many other princes and great lords, who all kissed the popes feet, except the dukes of Buillon and Vitemberg, Protestant princes, who had forsaken the rites and ceremonies of the church of Rome. In farre more base* 1.414 sort did that duke of Venice humble himselfe (who of the Venetians themselues is cal∣led a dog) for that he with a rope about his necke, and creeping vpon all foure like a beast, so craued pardon of pope Clement the 5. But nothing was more base, than that [ I] which almost al historiographers which writ of the popes affairs, report of the emperor Fredericke the second▪ who to redeeme his sonne out of prison, lying prostrat vpon the ground at the feet of pope Alexander the fourth, suffered him to tread vppon his head, if the histories be true. Whereby it is well to be perceiued, the maiestie of the Empe∣rours,* 1.415 by the power (should I say) or by the outragiousnesse of the Bishops of Rome, to haue bene so diminished, as that scarce the shadow of their antient maiestie seemeth now to remaine. They also say themselues to be greater than the emperours, and that so much greater, as is the Sunne greater than the Moone: that is to say, six thousand six hundred fortie and fiue times, if we will beleeue Ptolomee and the Arabians. And that more is, they haue alwaies pretended a right vnto the empire: for the imperiall [ K] seat being vacant, they haue giuen the inuestitures vnto them which held of the empire, and receiued of them their fealtie: as they did of Iohn and Luchin, vicounts of Milan, the imperiall seat being emptie in the yeare 1341, who are in the records called vassals of the church of Rome, and not of the empire; and are forbidden their odedience vn∣to Lewes of Bauaria the emperour, who was then excommunicated, as we haue before said. For which cause the Canonists haue maintained, that the emperour cannot giue vp his imperiall dignitie vnto any, but vnto the pope: for which they yeeld this rea∣son, That the emperours haue their soueraigntie of men, and the popes of God:

howbeit that both of them, as all others also in general, are of right to attribute all their [ A] power vnto almightie God. Neuerthelesse the emperour Charles the fift worne with yeares and sicknesse, resigned his imperiall dignitie into the hands of the princes ele∣ctors, and sent vnto them his resignation by the prince of Orenge. But howsoeuer the Bishop of Rome pretended to haue a soueraigntie ouer all Christian princes, not only in spirituall, but also in temporall affaires; whether they got it by force of armes, or by the deuotion and graunt of princes; or by long possession and prescription: yet could not our kings euen for any most short time endure the seruitude of the bishop of Rome, nor be moued with any their excommunications, which the popes vsed as fire∣brands to the firing of the Christian Commonweales. For these the popes interdicti∣ons,* 1.416 or excommunications, were wont with other nations, to draw the subiects from [ B] the obedience and reuerence of their prince: but such hath alwaies bene the loue of our kings towards their people (and so I hope shall be for euer) and the loyaltie of the people towards their kings: that when pope Boniface the eight saw himselfe nothing to preuaile by his excommunication, nor that the people were to be drawne from the obedience of their king, after he had publikely excommunicated Philip the Faire, he in like maner excommunicated all the French nation, with all them which tooke Philip for a king. But Philip hauing called together an assemblie of his princes, and other his nobilitie, and perceiuing in his subiects in generall a wonderfull consent for the defence of his state and soueraigntie: he thereupon writ letters vnto Boniface (which are com∣mon in euerie mans hand) to reproue him of his folly: and shortly after sent Nogaret [ C] with his armie into the popes territorie, who tooke the pope prisoner, (giuing him well to vnderstand that the king was not his subiect, as he had by his Bull published) but see∣ing him through impatiencie to become furious and mad, he set him againe at libertie. Yet from that the popes interdiction, the king by the aduice of his nobilitie and Senat, appealed vnto a generall councell, which had power ouer the pope, abusing the holy cities. For the king next vnto almightie God had none his superiour, vnto whom he might appeale: but the pope is bound vnto the decrees and commaunds of the coun∣cell. And long tims before Philip the Victorious, and his realme being interdicted by pope Alexander the third, who would haue brought him into his subiection: answe∣red him by letters, That he held nothing of the pope, nor yet of any prince in the [ D] world. Benedict the third, and Iulius the second, had vsed the like excommunication against Charles the seuenth, and Lewes the twelfth (who was called the Father of his countrey) that so as with firebrands they might inflame the people to rebellion: yet failed they both of their hope; the obedience of the subiects being in nothing dimi∣nished, but rather increased: the Bull of excommunication which the popes legat brought into Fraunce, being by the decree of the parliament of Paris openly torne in peeces, and the legat for his presumptuousnesse cast in prison. And not long after Iohn of Nauarre, who called himselfe countie Palatine, when he had made certaine publike notaries in Fraunce, and made legitimat certaine of his bastards, by vertue of the au∣thoritie which he had (as he said) from the pope, he was therfore by a decree of the par∣liament [ E] of Tholouze condemned of treason. True it is, that they which haue thought better to assure the maiestie of the kings of Fraunce against the power of the pope, haue obtained the popes buls whilest they yet sate in the citie of Auignion▪ to bee ex∣empted from their power. And namely there is in the records of Fraunce a Bull of pope Clements the fift, whereby he not onely absolueth Philip the Faire and his sub∣iects from the interdiction of Boniface the eight, but also declareth the king and the realme to be exempted from the popes power. Pope Alexander the fourth also gaue this priuilege vnto the realme of Fraunce, That it could not for any cause bee inter∣dicted▪

which was afterward by seuen popes successiuely confirmed, viz. by Gregory [ F] the viij. ix. x. xj, Clement the fourth, Vrban the fift, and Benedict the twelft; whose bul•…•… yet remaine in the records of Fraunce: which yet seeme vnto me not to encrease, but rather to diminish the maiestie of our kings, who were neuer in any thing beholden vnto the popes. And that more is, the court of parliament of Paris, hath by many decrees declared that clause, Auctoritate Apostolica, By the authoritie Apostolicall:* 1.417 vsually inserted into the popes rescripts sent into France, to be void, meere abusiue, and to no purpose: and therefore it behoueth him, that would helpe himselfe by any such the popes rescript, to protest in iudgement, That he would not any way take benefit of that clause. By all which things it is plainely to be vnderstood, not onely the kings, but the kingdome of Fraunce also, to haue bene alwayes free from all the popes pow∣er [ G] and commaund. For as for that which Iohn Durand himselfe a French writer, saith, That the French kings are subiect vnto the pope, so farre as concerneth their oath, it needeth no refuting; as by him written being bishop of Mende, and at such time as vn∣der the color of oathe ioined vnto contracts, the ecclesiastical iudges drew vnto them∣selues the hearing and determining of all matters: which their iugling craft was both by the kings edicts, and the decrees of the high courts of parliament, long since met withall, and taken away. But if the French king shall in his owne priuat name contract with the pope, he may voluntarily and of his owne accord bind himselfe vnto the popes iurisdiction, which we read to haue bene done by Philip Valois, at such time as he borrowed the summe of three hundred and thirtie thousand florines of gold, of [ H] pope Clement the sixt, which is an ordinarie clause in all obligations, in which sort the pope himselfe might aswell as a priuat man be bound also. But this money the pope may seeme also not to haue lent without reward; but beeing himselfe of the house of Turene, it may be thought that he for this summe so lent, procured of the king the great priueleges which the counties of Turene yet at this day enioy. Yea but I know some to pretend, that the French kings ought to receiue their royall crowne at the hands of the pope: for that king Pipin so receiued it at Saint Denise in Fraunce, of pope Zacha∣rie: as though one act in discontinued solemnities, and of so great consequence, could giue a right, or establish a perpetuall law: which it cannot do in the getting of the least discontinued seruice; but by the prescription of 100 yeres: albeit that in truth the king [ I] leaueth not to bee king, without any coronation or consecration, which are not things of the soueraignty. And that no man can deny, but that if the donation of the exarchat of Rauenna & Pentapolis, one of the fairest countries of al Italie, be made by the kings of Fraunce vnto the popes, and the church of Rome; it is also holden of that crowne of Fraunce: seeing that the confirmation of the seignories so giuen, was requested of Lewes the Gentle, successour to Charlemaigne: which confirmation Carolus Sigonius, a most skilfull man in the antiquities of Italie, writeth himselfe to haue seene and read. Wherefrom a man may draw two most certaine arguments; The one, That the donation was made by the predecessours of Lewes the Gentle: And the other that the soueraigntie of the seignories so giuen, was yet reserued: For otherwise there should not [ K] haue needed any of king Lewes his confirmation; considering that king Pipin had by law of armes wonne those territories from the emperours of Constantinople, & ther∣fore might of right both giue them by himselfe so wonne, and also appoint lawes vnto them so by him giuen. Albeit that the Constantinopolitan emperour sent ambassadors into France vnto Pepin, to haue had him to haue infringed & reuoked the said donatiō: which they could not of him obtaine, but returned as they came; as is to be seene in the histories of Floardus and Sigonius. And that more is, Augustinus Onuphrius the popes chamberlaine, who had diligently searched all the Vatican records (speaking of the

popes) confesseth, that the exarchat of Rauenna, Romandiola, the duchie of Vrbin, [ A] and part of Tuscanie, were giuen to the Church of Rome. But hee speaketh not of that which I haue read in the extract of the Vatican register, viz▪. Iohn, surnamed Digi∣torum, to haue written in letters of gold, the donation pretended to haue bene made by Constantine: in the end whereof are these words, Quam fabulam longi temporis men∣dacia finxit; which words I thought not good in any thing chaunge: as being much stronger arguments than those of La•…•…. Valla, to conuince the lies of Augustin Egubin, who of purpose to deceiue, hath forged in Greeke the donation of Constantine, to giue it the more credit; whose deceit is easie to be refuted both by the manner of the stile, and the knowledge of antiquitie: and is sufficiently refelled by Sigonius and Onuphrius both Italians. Which is also well iustified by the epistle of pope Iohn, written in the [ B] yeare 876, who therein confesseth the great largeses and donations bestowed vpon the church of Rome by Pipin, Charlemaigne, and his successours: and by the auntient marble table, which is yet to be seene at Rauenna, wherein are these words contained, Pipinus Pius primus amplificaendae ecclesiae v•…•…am aperuit, & exarchatum Rauennae cum am∣pliss. The rest of the inscription time hath defaced. And thus much concerning the greatnesse and soueraigntie of our kings.

I will not here touch the greatnesse and soueraigntie of the Negus of Aethiopia* 1.418 commonly called Prester Iohn, whome Paeu. Iouius writeth to haue fiftie tributarie kings vnder him, or (to say better) gouernours of Prouinces, which yeeld vnto him not onely their ordinarie tributes, but also their fealtie and homage, and that in greater humilitie, [ C] than verie slaues do vnto their lords: as a man may see in the historie of Francis Alua∣res a Portugall, who dwelt sixe yeres in Aethiopia, and yet neuerthelesse they are cal∣led kings without cause, because they be no absolute soueraignes, seeing that they be but tributaries, yeelding fealtie and homage vnto another man.

As for those princes which are no Christians, I haue nothing to say, for the small as∣surance* 1.419 we haue by the writings and reports of others, much differing among them∣selues. Yet neuerthelesse so it is, that in one chapiter of the Alcoron, it is expresly for bidden all the Musulman (that is to say the right beleeuing) princes, to call themselues lords, except their Caliph or great bishop their great prophet Muhamed his vicar. By meanes of which prohibition the Mahometan bishops haue vsurped absolute soue∣raigntie [ D] aboue all their princes, giuing kingdomes and principalities, to whome they thought good, in name and title of gouernments: which may be also the cause that no Musulman prince weareth a crowne vpon his head: albeit that before the most aunti∣ent kings of Asia and Afrike did weare crownes. And namely Ioiada the high priest, hauing consecrated Ioas king of Iuda, set a crowne vpon his head. But the Musulman princes think that chapter not to haue bene made by Muhamed their law giuer, but by their Caliphes, (who of many diuers corrupt Alcorans made but one, long time after the death of Muhamed, defacing the rest, and for the augmenting of their maiestie, to haue bene into their Alcoran by them inserted. But at such time as three of their great bishops had for the desire of soueraignty, at one time taken vpon them the name of the [ E] great Caliph, the princes of Persia, the Curdes, the Turkes, the Tartars, the Sultans of Aegypt, the kings of Marocco, of Fez, of Telensin, of Tanes, of Bugia, and the people of Zenetes, and of Luntune, exempted themselues from the obeysance of the Caliphs, to hold their kingdomes in soueraigntie: as also the kings of Tombut, of Guynee, of Gaoga, and other kings, which dwell more into the hart of Afrike, who know not the Caliphes commaund, neither acknowledge any greater than themselues: except they* 1.420 which hold in fealtie and homage of the king of Portugall, as the kings of Calecut, of Malachie, of Cambar, and of Canor, whomethey haue compelled so to do, and to pay

them tribute; hauing also subdued all the sea coast of Afrike, and of the East Indies, and [ F] almost in infinit number of places built fortresses; yea and in the island of Ormus euen vnder the nose of the Persian king, hauing built a most strong castle, and straitly exa∣cting tribute and custome of such as passe that way, or chaunce to arriue in the Persian gulfe; and had done the like in the red sea, had not Barnagas gouernour of that coast, and the king of Aethiopia his subiect, cut the Portugals in peeces, and rased the fortres∣ses which they had begun to build, vnder the colour of alliance and amitie contracted by Lopes ambassadour for the king of Portugall, with the king of Aethiopia, in the yere 1519. And yet for all that certaine it is, that the king of Portugall was of auntient time feudatarie or vassall vnto the king of Castile, and the kingdome of Portugall a mem∣ber* 1.421 of the kingdome of Castile: which for the greater part holden by force by the [ G] Moores, was giuen to Henrie, brother to Godfrey of Buillon, in marriage with the base daughter of Alphonsus king of Castile: from whome are descended all the kings of Portugall, since this foure hundred and fiftie yeares, vnto Henrie the Cardinall, who last raigned: hauing (of long) exempted themselues from the soueraigntie of Castile, and holding diuers kings their tributaries and feudataries, of whome Emanuel was the greatest, and for his martiall prowesse amongst the rest most famous; who vanquished the aforesaid kings, and caused them to pay him tribute. For there are now no feuda∣tarie kings in Asia, or Africa, which are not also tributarie; howbeit in auntient time the kings of Persia, and the Romans, hauing subdued kings vnto their empire, for most part made them to become their tributaries: as for such fealtie and homage as is of [ H] vassals exacted, they knew not what it ment. For Philip the second, king of Macedon, being by the Romans ouercome, they graunted him peace vppon condition, that he should pay them into their common treasure, a certaine yearly tribute; which Per∣seus, Philip his sonne, afterwards refusing to pay, drew vpon himselfe a great and heauy warre, to his owne vtter destruction. And yet oftentimes such tributarie kings had others tributarie vnto themselues, who had also power of life and death, and other roi∣all soueraignties ouer their owne subiects. So the kingdome of Dauid was contained within the bounds of Palestine, and yet he enforced the neighbour kings to pay vnto him tribute, his posteritie neuerthelesse not long after yeelding tribute vnto the Aegyp∣tians, and the Assirians. So the kings of Slauonia, and the Commonweale of Car∣thage [ I] vsed the like authoritie and right ouer the princes vnder their dominion, that the Romans exercised ouer them, enforcing them to bring their yearely tributes into their treasuries.

Yet is there difference betwixt a tribute and a pention: for a pention is paid in re∣spect* 1.422 of fealtie, or in time of warres to receiue aid against our enemies: but a tribut is giuen, thereby to haue peace; howbeit that he which receiueth such a pention, com∣monly boasteth of it, as of a tribute: as the kings of England called the pention of fif∣tie thousand crownes, which Lewes the xj paid vnto them by the treatie of Piqueni, by the name of a tribute; vntill that Elizabeth the daughter of Edward king of England was married vnto Charles the eight, king Lewes his sonne. Howbeit that Philip Comi∣nes [ K] denyeth it to haue bene either pention or tribute; yet needes it must bee either the one or the other. So the Grand Signior calleth the German emperour his tributarie, for the pention which he payeth euerie yeare for the peaceable enioying of a part of Hungarie. The Venetians also, the Genowayes, the Ragusians, the kings of Algiers and of Tunes, in his letters and in the conuentions of peace, he calleth by the name of his great friends and allies, but accounteth them indeed his tributaries. But the great Precop Tartar, who in auntient time was soueraigne of all the realmes from Volga to Boristhenes, held all the princes and lords of those countries as his vassals and tributa∣ries,

who not onely kneeled before himselfe, but stood before his ambassadours sitting: [ A] For so the Knez of Moscouie behaued himselfe before the ambassadours of this▪ Tar∣tar prince, and was therefore of other princes commonly called but by the name of a duke: howbeit that the dukes of Moscouie, for this and diuers other such indignities cast off the seruile Tartars yoke, in the yeare 1524. And the first that reuolted from them was B•…•…silius the first, who called himselfe The Great Chamberlaine of God, and* 1.423 King of Moscouie: and so he which at this present raigneth, in despight that other prin∣ces tearme him but a duke, stileth himselfe The Great Emperour: as in truth he in power either excelleth, or is equall vnto the greatest kings his neighbours, excepting the kings of the Turkes▪ albeit that the right of soueraigne maiestie be not defined by the spati∣ousnesse of places, or the greatnesse of countries, as if that might make a prince either [ B] * 1.424 more or lesse soueraigne: as Eumenes being ouerthrowne, and hauing nothing left him of his owne more than the castle wherein he was besieged, yet when as he was to treat of peace with Antigonus king of Asia (who as he was in power, would also in honor haue seemed to haue bene his superiour) answered, That he * 1.425 acknowledged no man greater than himselfe, so long as he had his sword in his hand.

And yet among soueraigne princes there is a certaine prerogatiue of honour due* 1.426 vnto the more auntient Monarches and Commonweals, although they bee in wealth & power inferior vnto them that be more new or of later time: as we see amongst the xiij Cantons of the Swissers, who are all soueraignes, acknowledging nether prince nor monarch in the world for their soueraigne: the Canton of Zurich in all their assem∣blies [ C] * 1.427 hath the prerogatiue of honour: For their deputie as a prince in the name of all the rest of the Cantons, receiueth and dismisseth the ambassadours of other kings and Commonweals; and vnto him onely it belongeth to call a generall assemblie of all the states of the Cantons, and againe to dismisse the same; albeit that the Canton of Berne be much greater and stronger: Next vnto them of Berne, are Lucerne, and Vri, albeit that they are defended neither with wals nor ditches, no more than are the Schwits, and Vnderuald, which follow in order vnto them of Vri: then follow after them Zug, Glaris, Basill, Friburg, and Soleurre. Now haply a man may say, That this is done according to the time that euerie Canton entred into their alliance: which is not so; for by their treaties it appeareth, that the first that entred in that confederati∣on [ D] and alliance were they of Vri, Schwits, Zug, and Vnderuald.

Sometimes also the more auntient Monarches and Commonweals lose their pre∣rogatiue of honour; as when they put themselues into the protection of latter princes,* 1.428 or yeeld themselues tributaries: in which case it is most certaine, that they are alwaies lesse than the other into whose protection they put themselues, or vnto whome they pay tribute. As it chaunced almost to all kings and princes which sought the protecti∣on of the Romans: whereas others which were come into equall alliance with them, as the Hed•…•…i, were in their leagues called their confederats, their equals and brethren: and yet for all that, they in truth and effect were inferiour vnto them in honour. And verily Augustus the emperour showed himselfe wonderfull ceremonious and difficult [ E] in the honours which he bestowed on kings and princes, allies and vnder the protecti∣on of the empire of Rome; making Tetrarques, inferiour vnto Ethnarques, and these inferiours vnto kings; and the more auntient allies of the Romans, superiours vnto the rest that came into their alliance after them. And albeit that the Romans in the flouri∣shing time of their popular estate, seemed not much carefull of such ceremonies of dig∣nitie and honour which is of kings and princes more regarded, yet did Q. Martius Philippus their ambassadour show himselfe therein curious: Who contending with Perseus king of Macedon, which of them shuld come ouer the riuer vpon the frontiers

of Macedon, vnto the other: and Perseus for that he was a king, refusing to come ouer [ F] vnto the Roman ambassadour, the ambassadour yet by sweet speech drew him ouer: Which he did (as he said vnto the ambassadors of the allies and confederats there pre∣sent with him) to show that the honour of the Romans was greater than that of the Macedonian kings; who for all that would in nothing giue place vnto the Romans. Yet was there a greater cause than that, which Martius, or els Liuie omitted, which was forthat Philip the father of Perseus had vpon conditions, receiued peace of the Romans and also paid vnto them tribute; which his father Philips act, if he had disliked, he should not haue medled with the kingdome: although that he was otherwise vnworthy ther∣of, who his father yet liuing, had aspired vnto his inheritance: and being but borne of a concubine, had slaine his brother borne in lawfull marriage. But after that hee [ G] ouerthrowne and vanquished by Paulus Aemilius▪ had lost the hope of his kingdome▪ he writ letters vnto Aemilius, generall of the Roman army, yet stiling himselfe a king: which his letters the Roman generall reiected, and would not vouchsafe to open them, except he first renounced his roiall dignitie, which can onely agree vnto him which hath a soueraigne power, subiect to no other princes commaund.

And for the same cause Francis the first the French king declared vnto Cardinall Bibiene the popes legat, that the pope his master ought not to suffer the emperour Charles the fift to call himselfe king of Naples and of Sicilie, seeing that he was but the Popes vassall. Whereof the legat gaue aduertisement vnto Iulian Cardinall de Medi∣ces, who was afterwards pope; to the end that that title might haue beene rased, which [ H] as he certified him by his letters, was by the charters of fealtie, forbidden the kings of Naples to take: whereas for all that, in all the records which wee haue got out of the Vatican, that is not onely not forbidden, but the name and dignitie of the king of Na∣ples and Sicilie expressely set downe, as namely in the inuestitures of Charles of France, of Carobert, and of Iohn. So many times ambassadours euill instructed in their masters affaires, through ignorance commit therein many notable defaults. And by the same reason we should take the royall title of a king from the king of Bohemia, who hol∣deth his kingdome in fealtie and homage of the empire; and not for that it is so little, as many haue written, that it is for that cause no kingdome, which were to measure kings by the elne: but it is, for that the countrey of Bohemia was by the emperour [ I] Fredericke the first, for title of honour onely erected a kingdome, without preiudice vnto the right or soueraignetie of the empire. But to say truth, this title agreeth vnto none that is another mans vassall, nor hath nothing of his owne in title of soueraign∣tie. And it maybe, that for this cause pope Pius the fourth gaue not the royall title to* 1.429 Cosmus duke of Florence, albeit that he would very gladly haue so done: whereof the emperour Maximilian the second, being by the French embassadour aduertised, not vnfitly replied, Italia non habet regem nisi Caesarem: Italy hath no king but the emperor. Although that be to be vnderstood of the maiestie of the German empire (whereof the Florentine state dependeth) & not of the emperour, who is himselfe subiect vnto the estate of the empire: albeit that all christian princes giue him the prerogatiue of honor, [ K] next vnto the pope, whether it be for that he is chiefe of the German empire, or els hath got it by long prescription of time. So also next vnto the emperour, all other princes haue vsed to giue this prerogatiue of honour vnto the French kings; not only for the long possession thereof, but also for that in all the world (whether you looke among the Christians, or the Tartars, the Turkes, the Ethyopians, the Indians, or Barbarians) is not to be found so auntient a kingdome, or such a continuall discent of kings of the same stocke and line as is among the French kings. And therefore Baldus (being him∣selfe an Italian Lawyer and a subiect of the empire) sayth well, That the French king

carieth the crowne of glorie aboue all the kings, who haue alwaies giuen him that [ A] preheminence of honour. And there is also yet extant an epistle of pope Gregories vn∣to king Childebert, the beginning whereof is this: Quanto caeteros homines regia ma∣iestas antecellit, tanto caeterarum gentium regna, regni vestri culmen excellit: by how much the royall Maiestie excelleth other men, by so much doth the Maiestie of your kingdome excell the kingdomes of other nations. As in truth this prerogatiue is vnto him due: for the Germane emperours themselues cannot denie, but that the German empire was sometime a prouince and member of the auntient kingdome of Fraunce, conquered by the prowesse of Charlemaigne king of France, and power of the French nation: but afterwards rent againe from the same, being giuen in partition to Lewes of France, yongest son to Lewes the Gentle, at such time as Charles the Bauld the French [ B] emperour held the imperiall seat of the empire: Howbeit that yet neuerthelesse the Germane princes the Othons, by the graunt of the Roman bishops hauing got the im∣perial title, haue by little & little through the ignorance of our embassadors vsurped & taken vnto themselues this prerogatiue of honour aboue the French kings. As in like case the king of Spaine not many yeares agoe would haue preuented our kings ambas∣sadours: but was at the request of M. Nouuaille, ambassadour for the French king, by a decree of the Venetian Senat embarred so to doe, in the yeare 1558: and so likewise afterwards by a decree of the pope, giuen by the consent of all the colledge of Cardi∣nals: where the pope said with a lowd and cleare voyce, That the French kings had beene alwayes the auntient protectours of the church of Rome, and that the fairest [ C] and fruitfullest prouinces of the kingdome of Spaine, had bene dismembred and rent from the kingdome of Fraunce: than which nothing could in that kind haue beene more truely spoken; for by our kings, the authoritie of the bishops of Rome hath bene deliuered from contempt, their wealth encreased, and their power confirmed.* 1.430 Wherein the pope also in some sort amended the errour committed in the councell of Trent; where Mendoza the Spanish ambassadour, preferring himselfe and taking place before the French ambassadour (which then was M. Lansac, assisted with the M. M. of Ferrier & Faut) was to haue bin compelled to haue departed from the coun∣cell, or els to haue kept the auntient order of ambassadours, and so to haue followed the French ambassadours: who withstanding the Spanish ambassadors presumption, [ D] requested that he might not so inuert the order of the ambassadours: saying, that other∣wise he would himselfe forsake the Councell, and cause the French bishops to depart thence also. Whereunto the Spanish ambassadour craftily answered, That as he would not go before the French ambassadour, so would he not be enforced to follow him; and so tooke his place by himselfe apart from all the rest of the ambassadors. Yet notwithstanding these two former decrees which I haue spoken of, the Spanish ambas∣sadour not long after at Vienna in Austria, earnestly requested of the emperor, That he might goe in the same degree and order with the French ambassadour; or that they might at leastwise go formost by turnes (as did the Roman Consuls, who had the pre∣heminence, the twelue sergeants, and power to commaund, successiuely, each of them [ E] his day) which Henrie the second the French king hearing of, writ againe to his ambas∣sador, That prerogatiue of dignitie to be of so great moment and consequence, as that nothing therein was by him to be said or done more than he had commission for. And Ferdinand the emperour not willing to offend either the one or the other, thought it good to forbid them both from comming together, either vnto sermons or other pub∣like* 1.431 assemblies. The Senat of Polonia troubled with the same difficultie, thought it not good to preferre one ambassadour before another, neither to preferre them by turnes, or yet to make them equall: but decreed of all ambassadours in generall, that

as euery of them first came into the frontiers of the kingdome of Polonia, so should [ F] they be first in order heard. And so accordingly M. De Monluc bishop of Valence (who for his wisedome and dexteritie for mannaging of matters of estate, had beene fifteene times ambassadour) hauing by great celeritie preuented the Spanish ambassador, had also first audience; wherewith the Spanish ambassadour offended, would as then say nothing: as I haue vnderstood by M. de Nouuaille abbot of Belle-iste, a man of great honour and vertue; who then was also ambassadour into Polonia, as he now is at Constantinople. But before the yeare 1558, neuer Christian prince made question of the preheminence of the French ambassadours before them of Spaine: and name∣ly the English men alwayes preferred them before the Spaniard; albeit that they had bene auntient allies and friends vnto the one, and enemies vnto the other. As after the [ G] death of queene Marie, in the chapter holden by the knights of the most honourable order of the Garter, vpon Saint Georges eue, in the yeare 1555, concerning the confer∣ring* 1.432 of honours, it was decreed, That the French kings place should be aboue the rest, next vnto the prince on the right hand; where before was the place for Spaine, while king Philip was married vnto the queene. And the next day after being Saint Georges day, a day of great solemnitie vnto the knights of that order, a seat was accordingly re∣serued for the French king, on the right hand next vnto the prince: and another on the left hand for the king of Spaine, next vnto the emperours seat on the same side, be∣ing then emptie. And afterward in the time of Charles the ix, the queene of England caused to be sent vnto him the banner of Fraunce, of the same stuffe and greatnes that [ H] her owne was, as the king was aduertised by M. de Foix then his ambassador there; and in the roll or Catalogue of these knights, which is signed euerie yeare by the queene, the French kings name is euer the first, next vnto her owne.

But to take away these difficulties and ielousies betwixt princes, about their honors, which are otherwise ineuitable and daungerous: it is declared in the xiij article of the ordinances of king Lewes the xj, touching the order of knights, that they should bee placed according to the time of their receiuing into the order, without prerogatiue of king or emperour. For euerie soueraigne prince who is neither tributarie, vassall, nor in the protection of another, may as seemeth vnto him best in his owne countrey be∣stow the prerogatiues of honour vpon whomsoeuer hee pleaseth, and to reserue the [ I] chiefe place vnto himselfe. We know right well that the Venetians, the Rhagusians, the Genowayes, the Moscouites, and the Polonians, are in league with the great Turk, and yet hath he alwaies giuen the prerogatiue of honour vnto the French king, calling him in his letters the Greatest, and the Greatest among the most Great Princes of the Christians: & stileth himselfe The greatest of all Princes, and the chiefe Sarrach or Prince of the Musulmans; that is to say, Chiefe Prince of the right beleeuing or faithfull, which last prerogatiue of honour the Christian princes themselues haue giuen him by their letters: and as for the first title it seemeth himselfe to haue taken it from the auntient* 1.433 emperours of Constantinople, who bare in their armes foure B. which we call Fusills, wherby thesewords are signified; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, [ K] that is to say King of kings, raigning ouer kings. Which was the title that the kings* 1.434 of Babilon in auntient time tooke vpon them also, as we may see in Ezechiel, who cal∣leth the great king Nabucodonosor 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that is to say, King of kings; for that all the kings of Asia were vnto him tributaries: after which the kings of Persia hauing ouer∣come the kings of Asiria, as Esdras writeth, vsed the same title: & after them the Parthi∣an kings also, as Dion writeth, that Phraates the king of Parthia called himselfe King of kings. But neither feudatarie kings which hold all their territories of others; neither dukes, marquesses, counties, or other like princes can of right vse the title of soueraigne

maiestie, but only of his Highnesse, his Serenitie, or his Excellencie, as wee haue before [ A] said. Wherfore seeing that princes Tributaries, and Feudadaries, are not to be accoun∣ted absolute soueraignes; neither they which are in the protection of others: let vs now speake of the true markes of Soueraigntie, thereby the better to know them who they be that be such.

CHAP. X. ¶ Of the true markes of Soueraigntie.

SEeing that nothing vpon earth is greater or higher, next vnto God,* 1.435 than the maiestie of kings and soueraigne princes; for that they are in [ B] a sort created his lieutenants for the welfare of other men: it is meet diligently to consider of their maiestie and power, as also who and of what sort they be; that so we may in all obedience respect and reuerence their maiestie, and not to thinke or speake of them other∣wise than of the lieutenants of the most mightie and immortal God: for that he which speaketh euill of his prince vnto whome he oweth all dutie, doth iniurie vnto the ma∣iestie of God himselfe, whose liuely image he is vpon earth. As God speaking vnto Samuel, of whome the people of Israel had vnaduisedly asked a king, It is not thee (saith God) but me whome they haue despised.

Now to the end that one may know him that is such an one (that is to say a Soue∣raigne [ C] prince) we must know the markes, which are not common vnto other subiects also: for if they were common vnto others, than should there be no soueraigne prince. And yet they which haue writ best of or concerning a Commonweale, haue not suffi∣ciently and as it ought, manifested this point, than which none is more plentifull or more profitable in the discourse of a Commonweale▪ whether it were by them for flatterie, for feare, for hatred, or by forgetfulnesse omitted. For when Samuel had de∣nounced him king whome God had before chosen, and consecrated him before the people, as if he had but come by chaunce; he is reported to haue writ a booke of the power and Soueraigntie of a king, which the Hebrew priests haue written to haue bene by their kings suppressed and rent, that so they might more freely tyrannise ouer [ D] their subiects. Wherein Phi. Malancthon in mine opinion is deceiued, who hath* 1.436 thought those things which Samuel spoke vnto the people, concerning the crueltie or insolencie of tyrants, to belong vnto the right of soueraigne maiestie: Whereas hee in that his Oration vnto the people, would haue reclaimed them from the alteration and innouation of the state, and to haue beene better aduised. Will you (saith he) know the custome of tyrants? It is to take away the goods of their subiects, and to dispose of them at their pleasure; to take the tenth of their labours, to rauish other mens wiues, to take from them their children to abuse them, or to make of them their slaues: For the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which hee vseth, signifieth not lawfull rights in that place, but mens customes and manner of doing. For otherwise the good prince Samuel should in all his speech [ E] be contrarie vnto himselfe: for in giuing of an account before the people, of the charge that God had giuen him ouer them; Which of you (saith he) is it amongst you that can accuse me of euill, or say that I haue taken of him either gold or siluer, or other present what∣soeuer? Whereunto all the people with great applause and acclamation gaue him this prayse, That he had neuer done them wrong, nor taken any thing of any person whom∣soeuer. Should then this good prince being of so great integritie, godlinesse, and iustice, as he is reported to haue bene of, haue pronounced the cruelties, insolencies, and adul∣teries of Tyrants, as lawes of Soueraigntie for princes to imitate? And amongst the

Greekes there are none, who haue any thing written concerning the lawes of Soue∣raigntie, [ F] except Aristotle, Polybius, and Dionysius Halicarnasseus, who haue writ with so great breuitie and obscuritie▪ as that they seeme rather to haue propounded the questi∣on, than to haue declared what was to be thought thereof, as not therein well resol∣ued themselues. For there are (saith * Aristotle) three parts of a Commonweale, the* 1.437 one to take aduice and councell, the other to establish magistrats and officers, and eue∣rie man in his charge, and the third to administer and execute iustice. Here (in mine opinion) or else no where he seemeth to speake of the right of Soueraigntie; for that a Commonweale can by no meanes receiue that diuision, as it were of the whole into parts, except the soueraigne gouernment were also spoken of. Nether hath * 1.438 Polybius▪ also determinatly defined or set downe the rights and marks of Soueraigntie: but in [ G] speaking of the Roman Commonwealth, he saith, That their estate was mixt of the Power royall, of the Aristocraticall gouernment, and the Popular libertie: seeing (saith he) that the people made lawes and officers; the Senat▪ disposed of the prouinces and common treasure, receiued and dismissed ambassadours, and had the mannaging of the greatest affaires; the Consuls held the prerogatiue of honour, in royall forme and qua∣litie, but especially in warres, wherein they were all in all. Wherein it appeareth, that he hath touched the principall points of Soueraigntie, seeing that they vnto whom he attributeth the same, had the chiefe gouernment of the Commonwealth. But Diony∣sius* 1.439 Halycarnasseus seemeth thereof to haue written better, and more plainly than the other. For he saith, That king Seruius, to take away power from the Senat, gaue power [ H] to the people, to make and abolish lawes, to determine of peace and warre, to place and displace officers, to heare the appeales of all the magistrats. And in another place spea∣king of the third trouble which happened in Rome, betwixt the nobilitie and the peo∣ple, he saith, That Marcus▪ Valerius the Consul showed vnto the people, that it ought to* 1.440 content it selfe, to haue the power to make lawes, to chuse officers, to receiue appeales from all the magistrats, and so to leaue the rest vnto the Senat. Since which time the lawyers haue amplified these rights, and they of later time, much more than they be∣fore them, in the treaties which the call The rights of Regaltie, which they haue filled with an infinit number of particularities, such as are common vnto dukes, counties, ba∣rons, bishops, officers, and other subiects of soueraigne princes: in such sort that they [ I] call dukes soueraigne princes, as the dukes of Milan, Mantua▪ Ferrara, and Sauoy: yea* 1.441 euen some counties also dukes subiects, being all or most part blinded with this errour; which hath in it a great appearance of truth. For who is there that would not deeme him to be a soueraigne, which giueth lawes vnto his subiects, which maketh peace and warre, which appointeth all the officers and magistrats of his countrey, which impo∣seth tributes, and at his pleasure easeth whome he seeth good: which hath power of life and death, and in briefe to dispose of the whole Commonweale. All which they before rehearsed, haue power to doe: and what more can a man desire in a Soueraigne prince? For all these are the markes of Soueraigntie. And yet neuerthelesse we haue* 1.442 before shewed that the dukes of Milan, of Sauoy, of Ferrara, of Florence, and of Man∣tua, [ K] hold all of the empire: and that the most honourable title that they haue, is to be princes and deputies of the empire: we haue also said that they haue their inuestiture from the empire: and that they yeeld their fealtie and homage vnto the empire: in briefe that they are naturall subiects of the empire, and borne in the territories subiect vnto the empire. Then how can they be absolute soueraignes? For how should hee be a soueraigne, which acknowledgeth the iurisdiction of another greater then him∣selfe? of one which reuerseth his iudgements, which correcteth his lawes, which chasti∣seth himselfe, if he commit abuse? We haue before shewed that Galeace the first, vi∣count

of Milan▪ was accused, attainted, conuinced, and condemned of treason by the [ A] emperour, for hauing without leaue raysed taxes vpon his subiects, and that hee there∣fore died in prison. And if any of them shall contrarie vnto the lawes, by force; suffe∣rance, or by vsurpation take vpon them the soueraigntie; are they therefore soueraigns? or shall they prescribe against the fealtie and obedience which they owe vnto their prince? Seeing that they confesse themselues but princes and deputies of the empire. They must then renouce the titles of princes and dukes, of Highnesse and Excellencie, & stile themselues kings, to vse the title of soueraigne maiestie, which they cannot doe, without reuolting from the empire; as did Galuagno vicount of Milan, who therefore endured the grieuous punishment of his rashnesse. We haue also shewed that the ci∣ties of Lombardie were subiect vnto the empire. In briefe we had declared also the [ B] intollerable absurdities that should ensue, if the vassals should be soueraignes, especially when they haue nothing but what they hold of another: and that this were nothing else but to make the subiect equall with his lord, the seruant with his maister: he that receiueth the law, with him that giueth the law, him that oweth his obedience vnto him that is to commaund, which seeing they are things impossible, wee may well conclude that dukes, counties, and all they which hold of another man; or that re∣ceiue law or commaundement from another, be it by force, or otherwise by contract, are in no wise soueraignes.

The same opinion we haue of the greatest magistrats, of kings Lieutenants general,* 1.443 Gouernours, Regents, and Dictators; what power so euer they haue, if they be bound [ C] vnto the lawes appeales, and commaund of an other man, they are not to be accounted soueraigns. For it behoueth that the markes and recognisances of soueraigntie be such, as that they cannot agree to any other, but to a soueraigne prince: for otherwise if they be to be communicated with subiects, a man cannot say them to be the true markes of soueraigntie. For as a crowne if it be broken in peeces or opened, looseth the name of* 1.444 a crowne; so soueraigne maiestie looseth the greatnesse thereof, if any way bee opened to tread vnder foot any right thereof; as by communicating the same with subiects. And for this cause in the exchange made betwixt king Charles the fift, and the king of Nauarre, for the territories of Mante and Meullan, with Montpellier, wherin the royall rights are articulated, they are said all wholly and alone to belong vnto the king. It is [ D] also by the common opinion of the lawyers manifest, that those royall rights cannot by the soueraigne be yeelded vp, distracted, or any otherwise alienated; or by any tract of time be prescribed against: and therefore Baldus calleth them Sacra Saerorum, of Sacred things the most Sacred: and Cynus Indiuidua, things inseparable, or not to bee diuided. And if it chance a soueraigne prince to communicat them with his subiect,* 1.445 he shall make him of his seruant, his companion in the empire: in which doing he shall loose his soueraigntie, and be no more a soueraigne: for that he onely is a soueraigne, which hath none his superiour or companion with himselfe in the same kingdome. For as the great soueraigne God, cannot make another God equall vnto himselfe, con∣sidering that he is of infinit power and greatnes, and that there cannot bee two infinit [ E] things, as is by naturall demonstrations manifest: so also may wee say, that the prince whom we haue set down as the image of God, cannot make a subiect equall vnto him∣selfe, but that his owne soueraigntie must thereby be abased; which if it be so, it fol∣loweth that the administration of iustice, which Aristotle maketh the third part of a Commonweale, is not the true marke of soueraigntie; for that it indifferently agree∣eth almost to all magistrats aswell as to the prince: neither in like sort to make or dis∣place officers; for that the prince and the subiect haue both this power; not only in ap∣pointing the officers seruants at home, and in time of warre, but euen of the officers,

and magistrats themselues, which commaund in peace or in warre. For we read that [ F] the Consuls, in auntient time created the militarie Tribunes, who were as marshals in the armie, and he whome they called the Interrex created the dictator, and the dicta∣tor appointed the collonel of the horsemen: & in euery Commonweale where iustice is giuen with fees, the lord of the fee may at his pleasure appoint officers, and without cause displace them againe, if they haue not their offices in recompence of some their deserts. The same opinion we haue of punishments and rewards, which magistrats or captaines inflict or giue vnto them that haue deserued the same, aswell as the soue∣raigne prince. Wherefore it is no true marke of Soueraigntie to giue reward, or to in∣flict punishment vnto such as haue so deserued, sith it is common both to the prince and the magistrat: albeit that the magistrat haue this power of the prince. It is also no [ G] marke of Soueraigntie to haue power to consult of the affaires of the state, which is the the proper charge of the priuie Councell, or Senat of a Commonweale; which is al∣wayes diuided from him which is therein soueraigne; but especially in a popular estate where the soueraigntie lieth in the assemblie of the people, which is alwaies an enemy vnto wisedome and good councell. Whereby it is to be perceiued, not any one thing of those three wherein Aristotle said a Commonweale to consist, to be the true marke of Soueraigntie.

As for that which Dionysius Halycarnasseus saith of Marcus Valerius the Consull, in the Oration which he made vnto the people of Rome, for the appeasing of the trou∣bles then risen betwixt the Senat and them; That the people ought to content them∣selues [ H] to haue the power to make lawes and magistrats; that is not sufficient to declare a Soueraigntie of power in them, as I haue before declared concerning the magistrats. Yea the power to make lawes is not the proper marke of Soueraigntie, except we vn∣derstand thereby the soueraigne princes lawes; for that the magistrat may also giue lawes vnto them that are within the compasse of his iurisdiction, so that nothing be by him decreed contrarie to the edicts and lawes of his soueraigne prince. And to mani∣fest this point, we must presuppose that this word Law, without any other addition, sig∣nifieth The right commaund of him or them, which haue soueraigne power aboue others, without exception of person: be it that such commaundement concerne the subiects in generall, or in particular: except him or them which haue giuen the law. Howbeit [ I] to speake more properly, A law is the commaund of a Soueraigne concerning all his* 1.446 subiects in generall: or els concerning generall things, as saith Festus Pompeius, as a pri∣uilege concerneth some one, or some few: which law if it bee made by the priuie councel, or Senat of a Commonweale, it is called Senatus consultum, as the priuie coun∣cell:* 1.447 or decree of the senat. But if the vulgar people made any such commaund, it was called Plebiscitum, that is to say, The commaund of the meniall people: which af∣ter many seditions and sturs, betwixt the Nobilitie and the common people, was in the end called a law. For the appeasing whereof all the people in the assemblie of the great estates, at the request of M. Horatius the Consull made a law, that the Nobilitie and the Senat in generall, and euerie one of the people in particular, should bee bound to [ K] keepe the decrees and lawes which the common people should make, without appea∣ling therefrom; or that the Nobilitie should haue any voyce therein. But forasmuch as the nobilitie and the Senat made small account of such the peoples decrees and or∣dinances; the aforesaid law was afterward renewed, and againe published, at the in∣stance of Q. Hortentius and Pub. Philo Dictators: From which time forward such the peoples decrees were no more called Plebiscita, but simply laws, whether they concer∣ned euery man in particular, or all men in generall. As for the commaundements of the magistrates, they were not called lawes, but onely edicts. For an Edict (as

M. Varro defineth it) is the commaund of a Magistrat; which his commaund bound [ A] * 1.448 none, but them which were of his owne iurisdiction; prouided alwaies that such his cōmands were not contrary vnto the ordinances of the great magistrats, or to the laws and commaundements of his soueraigne prince, and were no longer in force than the magistrat pleased, or had charge. And for that all the magistrats were annuall in the Roman Commonweale, there edicts had not force but for one yeare at the most. And therefore they which succeeded in the same office, were either to allow or reuoke the edicts, by their predecessors before made: & if so be that they were against the laws, or for longer time than the magistratie of him that made them, then were they to none effect: which when C. Verres did, he was in these words accused by Cicero, Qui pluri∣mum (inquit) edicto tribuūt, legem annuam appellāt, tu plus edicto complecteris, quàm lege, [ B] They that attribute most (saith he) vnto an edict, cal it but an annual law; but thou com∣prehendest more in an edict, than in a law. And for that the emperour Augustus, hauing oppressed the liberty of the cōmonweal, called himself but Imperator (that is to say chief captain & Tribune of the people) he called also his own decrees by the name of edicts: but such as the people made at his request, he called them Leges Iuliae; which maner of speech the other emperors after him vsed also; in such sort, that this word Edict, is by lit∣tle & litle taken for a law, especially when it commeth out of the mouth of him which hath a soueraigne power; be it for one, or for al, be it an edict perpetual or onely proui∣sionall. Wherefore they abuse the words, which call edicts which are proper vnto ma∣gistrats by the name of laws: but in what sort soeuer that it be, there are none but so∣ueraigne [ C] princes, which can giue laws vnto their subiects, without exception, be it in ge nerall or in particular. But here might some man obiect, That the Senat of Rome had* 1.449 power to make laws, & that the more part of the greatest affaires of estate, in peace or war, were in the power of the Roman Senat to determine of▪ But what the authority of a Senat is, or ought to be in euery Commonweale, we shal in due place declare. But by the way to answere that that is obiected, I say, that the Senat of Rome, from the expul∣sion of the kings, vntill the time of the emperours▪ had neuer power to make law, but onely certaine decrees and ordinances: which were not in force past a yeare, wherewith for all that the common people were not bound, and so much lesse the whole body and estate of the people. Wherein many are deceiued and especially Conan, who [ D] saith, That the Senat had power to make a perpetuall law: for Dionysius Halycarnasse∣us, who had diligently read the Commentaries of Marcus Varro, writeth, That the de∣crees of the Senat had not any force, if they were not by the people confirmed: and albeit that they were so confirmed, yet if they were not published in forme of a law, they then had force but for one yeare. No more than the citie of Athens, where the decrees of the Senat were but annuall, as saith Demosthenes in the Oration which hee made against Aristocrates: and if it were a matter of importance, it was referred vnto* 1.450 the people to dispose thereof as they thought good: which Anacharsis the philoso∣pher seeing merily said, The wise and graue propound matters at Athens, and fooles and mad men resolue thereof. And so the Senat in Rome did but consult, and the people [ E] commaund: For so Liuie oft times saith, Senatus decreuit, populus tussit, The Senat hath decreed, and the people commaunded. Yet true it is, that the magistrats, and name∣ly the Tribunes, oft times suffered the decrees of the Senat, in a maner to haue the force of lawes, if the matter seemed not to impare the power of the people, or to be preiu∣diciall vnto the maiestie of the estates in generall. For so properly the auntient Ro∣mans said * 1.451 Imperium in magistratibus, auctoritatem in Senatu, potestatem in plebe, maie∣statem in populo inesse dicebant, Commaund to be in the magistrats, authoritie in the se∣nat, power in the meniall people, and maiestie in the people in generall. For the word

Maiestie, is proper vnto him which stirreth the helme of the soueraigntie of a Com∣monweale. [ F] * 1.452 And albeit that the law Iulia concerning maiestie made by the people at the request of Augustus, hold him guilty (Laesaemaiestatis, or as we say) of treason, which striketh a magistrat in the execution of his office: and that sometime the Latine histo∣riographers, yea and the lawyers themselues also giue the title of maiestie vnto the Consull and Pretor; as in saying, Maiestatem consulis, maiestatem praetoris, The maie∣stie of the Consull, the maiestie of the Pretor: yet is it but improperly spoken, neither by our lawes is he guiltie laesae maiestatis, that hath hurt a prince, a duke, a countie, or a magistrat: but he onely that hath violated the person of a soueraigne prince. And so by the lawes of Sigismundus Augustus king of Polonia, made in the yeare 1588, it is set downe that the crime Laesae maiestatis, should take no place further than his owne [ G] person; which is according to the true signification of laesa maiestas. And for this cause it seemeth that the dukes of Saxonie, of Bauaria, of Sauoy, of Loraine, Ferrara, Flo∣rence, and Mantua, put not into their stiles of honour, this word Maiestie, contenting themselues with the title of Highnesse: and the duke of Venice with the addition of* 1.453 his Serenitie, who (to speake properly) is but a verie prince, that is to say, the first, for hee is nothing else but the first of the gentlemen of Venice: and hath no more aboue the rest of the Senators, than the chiefe place and dignitie of the Commonweale in all their assemblies, wherein he sitteth as chiefe; and the concluding voyce into what cor∣poration* 1.454 or colledge he come, if there be any question of voyces. And as in Rome the edicts of the magistrats bound euery man in particular (so that they were not contrary [ H] to the decrees of the Senat) and the decrees of the Senat in some sort bound the magi∣strats (if they were not contrarie to the ordinances of the common people) and the or∣dinances of the common people were aboue the decrees of the Senat; and the law of the whole bodie and estates of the people, was aboue all the rest: euen so in the Ve∣netian Commonweale, the decrees of the magistrats bind euerie man in particular, ac∣cording to the precinct and iurisdiction of euerie magistrat: but the corporation and colledge of the Decemuiriis aboue particular magistrats: the Senat is aboue the De∣cemuiri, and the great Councell (which is the assemblie of all the gentlemen of Venice) hath the power of soueraigntie, containing the Senat, and all the rest of the magistrats, within the power of the commaund thereof, in such sort, that if the Decemuiri bee di∣uided [ I] with euen voyces, they appeale vnto the councell of the Sages, consisting of xxii, who if they cannot agree, the Senat is assembled, and if the matter concerne the high points of soueraigntie, as is the maiestie of the Commonweale, then it is referred vnto the great Councell. And therefore when any thing is decreed by the Decemuiri these words are ioyned vnto the decree, In consiglio Di Dieci: whereunto if the colledge of Sages be ioyned, there is also commonly added, Con la Giunta, but if it be a decree of the Senat, it is declared in these words, In Pregaidi: but if it be in the great assemblie of the gentlemen of Venice, these words are commonly adioyned thereunto, In Consi∣glio Magiore. For in these three corporations or colleges, are almost all things dispat∣ched which belong vnto their lawes, their customes, and Commonweale, except such [ K] matters which the Septemuiri (the most secret councell of the State) vse by themselues to determine. It is therefore but by sufferance that the Decemuiri or the Senat make decrees and ordinances, which for that they are found iust and reasonable, they passe sometime into the force of law, as did the edicts of the auntient Roman Pretors, which if they were equall and iust, their successours kept them: and so by tract of time were receiued as lawes; yet for all that was it alwayes in the power of the new Pretors to make others: neither were they bound to obserue or keepe them of their predecessors. But Iulian the lawyer gathered a great number of such of these edicts of the former

Pretors, as he thought best, and after that he had interpreted them, and brought them [ A] * 1.455 into ninetie bookes, he gaue the same vnto the emperour Adrian for a present; who in recompence of so great a worke, made him great Prouost of the citie of Rome, and thereby made way for his nephew Didius Iulianus, afterwards to aspire vnto the Ro∣man empire. Adrian himselfe also perswaded the Senat, that not onely the edicts which Iulian had gathered, but other his owne writings should bee taken for lawes, which he confirmed also by his authoritie, and yet neuerthelesse still held the name of edicts, which hath deceiued many, who haue accounted those lawes as Pretors edicts. So also Iustinian the emperour, to the example of Adrian, by decree commaunded ma∣ny things which the lawyers had after Iulian written vnto the Pretors decrees (after they had bene by him as he thought good corrected) to be receiued for laws, the name [ B] of edicts still remaining, being yet indeed nothing lesse than edicts, but lawes aswell as those which euery soueraigne prince in his owne Commonweale by the decrees of his lawyers and courts, hath commaunded to be receiued for lawes; as it oft commeth to passe in this realme, that the kings seeing diuers ordinances and decrees of parliament most equall and iust, haue confirmed the same, and caused them to be published, and to passe in force of lawes; to show that the power of the law lyeth in him that hath the soueraigntie: and which giueth force vnto the law by these words, Sancimus Iubemus, We ordaine and commaund; which are words proper vnto soueraigne maiestie, as saith the Consull Posthumius, in the oration which he made vnto the people, Nego iniussu populi quicquam sanciri posse, quod populum teneat, I deny that any thing can bee [ C] ordayned without the peoples commaund, that can bind the people. The magistrat also presenting his request vnto the people, for the enacting of a law, commonly began with these words, Quod bonum, faustum, foelixque sit vobis ac Reipub. velitis, Iubeatis, Will you, and commaund you, that which may be good, happie, and fortunat, to you, and the Commonweale. And in the end of the law are still these words, Si quis ad∣uersus eafecerit, &c. If any man shall do against these things, &c. Which they called Sanctio, that is to say an ordaining or enacting, declaring the punishments or rewards due vnto them that should keepe or breake the law: which are speciall formalities and proper vnto the maiestie of them which had the power to make the law; but neuer vsed by the Senat in their decrees, nor by the magistrats in their edicts. Ioyne hereun∣to [ D] also, that the penaltie annexed vnto the lawes of a soueraigne prince, is farre different from that which is ioyned vnto the decrees or ordinances of magistrates, or of corpo∣rations and colledges, which haue certaine limited penalties and fines, for the most part concluded by a mercement or forfeit of money, or with whipping chere: For there is none but the soueraigne prince, which can vnto his edicts ioyne the paine of death, as it hath bene also forbidden by an auntient act of parliament, and the clause of arbi∣trarie punishment ioyned vnto the ordinances and decrees of magistrats and gouer∣nours, which euer inclusiuely extended vnto death.

Wherefore let this be the first and chiefe marke of a soueraigne prince, to bee of* 1.456 power to giue lawes to all his subiects in generall, and to euerie one of them in particu∣lar, [ E] (yet is not that enough, but that we must ioyne thereunto) without consent of any other greater, equall, or lesser than himselfe. For if a prince be bound not to make any law without consent of a greater than himselfe, he is then a verie subiect: if not with∣out his equall, he then hath a companion: if not without the consent of his inferiours, whether it be of his subiects, of the Senat, or of the people, hee is then no soueraigne. And as for the names of Lords and Senators, which wee oftentimes see ioyned vnto lawes, they are not thereunto set as of necessitie to giue thereunto force or strength, but to giue vnto them testimonie and weight, as made by the wisedome and discretion of

the chiefe men, so to giue them the better grace, and to make them to bee the better re∣ceiued; [ F] and not for any necessitie at all. For we find the most auntient edicts of Saint Denys in Fraunce, of Philip the first, and of Lewes the Grosse; whereunto the names and seales of the Queenes Anne and Adella, as also of Robert and Hugh are annexed: And namely in the twelft yeare of the raigne of Lewes the Grosse, and of Adella the sixt.

Now when I say that the first and chiefe marke of Soueraigntie is for the prince to* 1.457 be of power to giue lawes vnto all his subiects in generall, and to euerie one of them in particular: these last words concerne priuileges, which only belong vnto soueraigne princes to graunt, and particularly to others, to whome they be graunted. A priuilege I call a l•…•…w made for one, or some few particular men: whether it bee for the profit or [ G] disprofit of him or them for whome it is graunted. For so speaketh Cicero, Priuilegi∣am* 1.458 de meo capite latum est, A priuilege was made concerning my life, he meaneth the law made against him by the common people at the motion and instigation of Clodi∣as the Tribune, (to haue him called to account for certaine citisens put to death con∣trarie to their appeale, about the conspiracie of Cateline) which he in many places cal∣leth Lex Clodia, or a Law made by Clodius, whereof he oftentimes most grieuously complained, both in the Senat and before the people, saying, That by the law of the xij Tables it was forbidden any priuileges to be graunted, but Comitijs Centuriatis, that is to say, in the generall assembly of the whole bodie of the people. For so be the words of the law, Priuilegia nisi comitijs centuriatis ne irroganto; qui secus faxit capital esto, Pri∣uileges [ H] let them not be graunted but in the greatest assemblies of the people; and hee that shall otherwise do, let it be vnto him death. As for such priuileges as bring profit and commoditie to them to whome they be graunted, they are more truely called be∣nefits. And in this all that haue written of Royalties agree, that it belongeth not to any, but vnto a Soueraigne, to graunt priuileges, exemptions, immunities, and to di∣spence with the edicts and ordinances of other former princes: howbeit that priuile∣ges in monarchies haue not bene vsed, but onely for the tearme of the life of the mo∣narch himselfe that graunted them: as Tiberius the emperour made them all to know which had obtained any priuileges from the emperour Augustus, as Suetonius writeth. But now if any shall obiect vnto me, the magistrats themselues to discharge men often∣times [ I] of the lawes: and the Senat of Rome to haue so oftentimes done. I will aun∣swere him as did Papinian the lawyer, That we are not to consider what is done at Rome, but what ought indeed to be there done. For by the tribunitiall law Cornelia, the Senat is forbidden to discharge any Roman of the lawes, except there were two hundred of the Senators▪ present: which exemption from the laws seemeth also to haue bene gran∣ted vnto the Senat, by reason of the difficult assembling of the whole people.

But some man may say, that not onely the magistrats haue power to make edicts and lawes, euerie one according to his authoritie and iurisdiction, but also that particu∣lar men make customes, both generall and particular. Which customes haue almost the force of lawes, and yet depend not of the iudgement or power of the soueraigne [ K] prince, who as he is maister of the law, so are particular men maisters of the customes. Whereunto I answere, that custome by little and little take force; and in many yeres* 1.459 by the common consent of all or most part; but the law commeth forth in a moment and taketh strength of him which hath power to commaund all: custome creepeth in sweetly and without force, whereas the law is commaunded and published with power, yea and oftentimes contrarie to the good liking of the subiects. For which cause Dion Chrisostome compareth the law to a tyrant, and custome to a king. More∣ouer the power of the law is much greater than the power of custome: for customes

are by lawes abolished, but not lawes by customes; it beeing alwayes in the autho∣ritie [ A] and power of the magistrat againe to put in execution such lawes as are by cu∣stome almost out of vse. Custome also propoundeth neither reward nor punishment, whereas the law alwayes carrieth with it either the one or the other, if it be not a law permissiue, which easeth the penaltie of another law: and in briefe custome hath no force but by sufferance, and so long as it pleaseth the soueraigne prince, who may make thereof a law, by putting thereunto his owne confirmation: whereby it is to be scene, that all the force of lawes and customes lieth in the power of him that hath the soue∣raigntie in a Commonweale.

This then is the first and chiefest marke of Soueraignty, to be of power to giue laws* 1.460 and commaund to all in generall, and to euerie one in particular; which cannot bee [ B] communicated vnto subiects. For albeit that a soueraigne prince giue power to any one to make lawes, of such strength and vertue as if he himselfe had made them: as did the people of Athens to Solon, and the Lacedemonians to Lycurgus: yet were these lawes neither the lawes of Solon nor Lycurgus, who were but as commissioners and procurators for them which had giuen them that charge; but they were the lawes of the Athenians, and Lacedemonians: neither had these lawes had any force, had not the people by their consent authorised the same. They indeed wrot those lawes, but the people commaunded them; they composed them, but the people enacted them. And almost alwayes in a Popular or Aristocraticall state, the lawes tooke name of him which propounded or engrossed the same, who was nothing els but the simple procu∣rer [ C] thereof: the confirmation of the same being from him which had the soueraign∣tie. So when the Decemuiri by the people created at Rome for the making of lawes without appeale, had sent ambassadours into Greece, to amplifie their lawes, and in xij tables comprehended the best of them, they commaunded all the people to bee called together, to behold and consider of those lawes publikely set vp: and so at length after three Faire dayes (the vsuall time appointed for the establishing of laws) the people in their greatest and generall assembly, commaunded, or rather enacted them to stand for laws. But vnto what power it belongeth to make a law, vnto the same also it appertai∣neth to abrogat or derogat from the same. Vnder this power of making & of abroga∣ting of the law, is also comprised the declaration & correction of the same, when it is so [ D] obscure, that the magistrats vpon the cases propounded find contratietie or intollerable absurdities, yet may the magistrat according vnto right and reason also interpret the laws, & encline them either vnto lenitie or seueritie: so that he beware that in bending them too much, he breake them not; yea although that they seeme vnto him hard or vniust: but let him heare what Vlpian saith, Duralex, sic tamen scripta est, An hard law* 1.461 (saith he) but so it is written: which if the judge shall presume vnder the colour of equi∣tie to breake, he is by the law condemned of infamie. So ought the law called Laetoria, (or rather Praetoria) to be vnderstood, which Papinian reciteth, without naming of the author. Wherby it is permitted vnto the Great Praetor of the citie of Rome, to supply, to correct or amend the laws: which must (as we said) be moderatly & in a measure [ E] done: for if a man should otherwise vnderstand it, it should thereof follow, that a simple magistrat should be aboue the lawes, if hee might at his will and pleasure alter and in∣fringe the same: and also that he might bind both the people and the prince vnto his edicts; which we haue before showed to be a thing impossible.

Vnder this same soueraigntie of power for the giuing and abrogating of the law, are* 1.462 comprised al the other rights & marks of soueraignty: so that (to speak properly) a man may say, that there is but this only mark of soueraigne power, considering that all other the rights thereof are contained in this, viz. to haue power to giue lawes vnto all and

euerie one of the subiects, & to receiue none from them. For to denounce warre vnto [ F] * 1.463 the enemie, or to make peace with him, although it seeme to be a thing different from the name of the law, yet is it manifest these things to bee done by the law, that is to say by the commaundement of the soueraigne power. So also is it proper vnto soueraigne maiestie, to receiue the subiects appeales from other, and the greatest magistrats, to place and displace the greatest officers, charge or exempt the subiects from taxes and subsidies, to graunt pardons and dispensations against the rigour of the law, to haue power of life and death, to encrease or diminish the valour and weight of the coyne, to giue it title, name, and figure: to cause all subiects and liegemen to sweare for the kee∣ping of their fidelitie without exception, vnto him to whome such oath is due: which are the true markes of soueraigntie, comprised vnder the power of being able to giue a [ G] law to al in generall, and to euery one in particular, and not to receiue any law or com∣maund from any other, but from almightie God onely. For a prince or duke who hath power to giue lawes vnto all his subiects in general, & to euery one of them in particu∣lar, is yet no soueraigne, if he receiue his power from the emperour, the pope, or the king, or any other greater than himselfe: or yet haue a companion in his gouernment, a companion I say, for that he seemeth in a manner to haue a superiour or maister, which hath a companion, without whose helpe and consent hee can commaund and doe nothing: much lesse is he a soueraigne, if hee bee another mans lieutenant or deputie.

But forasmuch as the word Law, is too general a marke, it is the more expedient par∣ticularly [ H] * 1.464 to specifie the rights of Soueraigntie, comprised (as I haue said) vnder that so∣ueraigne law; as to denounce warre, or treat of peace, one of the greatest points of so∣ueraigne maiestie: for that oftentimes it draweth after it the ruine, or assurance of a Commonweale; which is to be verified not onely by the law of the Romans, but of al other nations. And for that there was more daunger to be feared from warre, than from peace, it was lawfull for the common people of Rome, to commaund peace, but if question were for making of warre, it might not be decreed, but in the greatest assem∣bly of all the states together, vntill such time as that the meniall people had also full power to make lawes. And therefore was it that warre was decreed against Mithri∣dates by the law Manilia, against the pirats, by the law Gabinia, against Philip the se∣cond, [ I] king of Macedon, by the law Sulpitia: peace was also made with the Carthagi∣nensians, by the law Martia. And for because Caesar had without commaund of the people made warres in Fraunce, Cato Vticensis was of opinion in the Senat, that the ar∣mie was to be called home, and Caesar for his presumption deliueted vnto the enemie. In like case the estates of the people of Athens determined of warre and peace. As a man may see by the war by them decreed against the Megarians, against the Syracusi∣ans, and against the kings of Macedon. I here but briefly set downe certaine examples of two of the greatest and most famous popular Commonweales that euer yet were: For in a regall state there is none (as I suppose) which doubt all the power of peace and warre to be in the king: insomuch as that for any man to attempt euen the [ K] least thing therein without the kings commaund, is vnto the dooer thereof dangerous, if the king might thereof haue before bene aduertised: and what charge soeuer that they giue vnto their deputies or commissioners, to entreat of peace or of alliance, yet consent they vnto nothing, without the aduertising of the king; as was to be seene in the last treaty of Cambray, betwixt the French king & the king of Spain; the cōmissioners on the kings behalfe writ to him from howre to howre, the whole proceedings both of the one part and of the other. But in popular or Aristocraticall estate, we oft times see that after the warre is once denounced, it is then managed by the aduise of the Senat, or

priuie counsell onely: yea and sometimes by the aduice of one onely captaine also: [ A] * 1.465 for that nothing is more dangerous in warre, than to haue the secret pollicies thereof reuealed: which must needes be, if the people haue therein to doe. And therefore we read in the Greeke and Latine histories the designes and enterprises of warre to haue beene still managed by the wisdome and direction of some one or other captaine, or in case that the matter were of greater importance and consequence, by the counsell of the Senate, without any more speaking thereof vnto the people, after it was once by the peoples commaund denounced and proclaimed against this or that enemie. But if one should say, warre to haue beene oftentimes denounced by the advice of the Se∣nate, without the consent or commaund of the people: I confesse it to haue sometimes indeed so happened and fallen out, but yet very seldome: and that the Senate in so do∣ing [ B] did vsurpe the maiestie of the people: which was the cause, that the Tribunes of* 1.466 the people, and faithfull keepers of their libertie, oftentimes interposed themselues to crosse the matter, as we see in Liuie, where he sayth: Controuersia fuit vtrum populi iussu indiceretur bellum, an satis esset S. C. peruicere Tribuni, vt Q. Consul de bello adpo∣pulum ferret, omnes Centuriae iussere. Controuersie was (sayth he) whether war should be denounced by the commaundement of the people: or els that the decree of the Se∣nate was sufficient, but the Tribunes preuailed; so that Quintus the Consull propoun∣ded the matter vnto the people, which all the assembly of the people commaunded. Howbeit, that the Senat it selfe would not ordinarily denounce war, except the people had before so decreed, As T. Liuius speaking of the second Carthaginensian war, sayth, [ C] Latum inde adpopulum vellent iuberent, populo Carthaginensi bellum indici: It was after∣ward* 1.467 propounded vnto the people, whether they willed and commaunded war to be denounced vnto the people of Carthage. And in another place, Ex S. C. populi iussu bel∣lum* 1.468 praenestinis indictū. By a decree of the Senat, by cōmandement of the people war was proclaimed against them of Praeneste. And againe, Ex authoritate patrum populus Pa∣laepolitanis* 1.469 bellum fieri iussit, The people following the authoritie of the Senat, com∣maunded* 1.470 warre to be made against them of Palaepolis. And afterward, Populus bel∣lum fieri Aequis iussit, The people commaunded warre to be made against the Aequi. And at such time as warre was to be vndertaken against the Samnites, Patres solemni* 1.471 more indicto decreuerunt, vt ea de re adpopulum ferretur, The fathers after the solemne [ D] manner decreed, that concerning that matter it should bee referred vnto the people: Where Liuie in calling it the solemne manner, declareth it to haue bene a thing so vsed to be done. And so against the Herniques, * Populus hoc bellum frequens iussit, The* 1.472 people in great number commaunded this warre. And against the Vestines, * Bellum ex authoritate patrum populus aduersus vestinos iussit, The people following the autho∣ritie of the Senators commaunded warre to be made against the Vestines. The like manner of denouncing warre was also amongst the Tarentines, so long as their popu∣lar state endured. For so saith Plutarch, Ex authoritate Senatus populum Tarentinum Romanis in ferri bellum iussisse, The people of Tarentum following the authoritie of the Senat, to haue commaunded warre to bee made against the Romans. And Liuie [ E] speaking of the Aetolians, which were gouerned by a popular gouernment, saith it to haue bene by their lawes forbidden, that any thing should bee determined concerning peace and warre, but in the Panaetolian and Pylaican counsell. And for that the nobi∣litie of Polonia, Denmarke, and Sweden, pretend the right of Soueraigntie to belong vnto them, it is not lawfull for their kings without their authoritie and consent either to denounce warre, or to vndertake it being denounced against them, except in case of urgent necessitie, according to the order of Casimire the great. True it is that in Rome concerning peace the Senate oftentimes determined thereof without the consent of

the people; as we may see in all the treaties of peace betwixt the Romane and the La∣tines: [ F] and in the confederats warre the Senate passed all the treaties of peace and alli∣ance without the people, viz. in the tumult and vprore of Italie: least the hard assem∣bly of the people, and danger of delay, might haue brought some detriment vnto the Commonweale. Yea sometimes the generals and great commaunders in the warres, of themselues determined of peace and warre, without the commaundement of the* 1.473 people or Senate, especially if the warres were in some countrey a farre off: as wee see in the second warre of Carthage, the three Scipioes made all the treaties of peace and alliance with the people and princes of Spaine and Affricke, without the aduise of the Senat. Yet true it is, that the Senate, yea and oft times the people authorised their acti∣ons, and ratified their treaties, after that they were made: and if they were in anie thing [ G] preiudiciall vnto the estate, had ofthem no regard. In which case the hostages and cap∣taines yeelded vnto the enemie, were at their owne perill to answer the matter. As the Consull Mancinus, who for that the peace he had made with the Numantines, was re∣iected and not ratified by the Senate and the people, was himselfe deliuered unto the* 1.474 enemie. And that is it which a certaine Senatour of Carthage, as Liuie reporteth by way of exprobration obiected vnto the Romane embassadours, saying, Vos cum Lu∣ctatius Consul primò nobiscum fedus icit, quia neque authoritate Patrun, nec populi iuss•…•… ictum erat, negastis vos eo teneri. Itaque aliud foedus publico consilio ictum est. You at such time as Luctatius the Consull first made peace with vs; for that it was made without the authoritie of the Senat, or commaundement of the people, said you were not ther∣unto [ H] bound: and therefore another peace was by your common councell made. And the same author speaking of Manlius the Proconsull of Asia saith, Gallograecis bel∣lum illatum, non ex Senatus authoritate, non populi iussu: quod quis vnquam de sua senten∣tia facere ausus est? Warre was made vpon the Gallogrekes, neither by the authority of the Senat, nor the commaund of the people, which what man durst of himselfe euer do? But this was Orator like spoken by the aduersarie against Manlius being absent; for that it was sometime so done, we haue by examples declared. Spurius Posthumius the Consull, also being himselfe with his armie shut vp in the Straits and rockes of the Appennin mountaines, in daunger with hunger to perish, before hee could haue heard from the Senat or the people, what they would haue had him to haue done; to deliuer [ I] himselfe and the Roman armie out of those straites, of himselfe made peace with the enemie, though vpon verie hard and dishonourable conditions. But when he with his armie disarmed, was returned to Rome; the Senat and the people reiected the peace with the conditions by him accepted. Yea Posthumius the Consull himselfe, in the as∣sembly of the people said, Cùm me seu turpi, seu necessaria sponsione obstrinxi, qua tamen, quando iniussu populi facta est, non tene tur populus Romanus, nec quicquam ex ea praeter Corpora nostrae debentur Samnitibus, dedamur per faeciales nudi vinctique, Seeing that I haue bound my selfe, whether it be with a shamefull or a necessarie promise and agree∣ment, wherewith for all that the people of Rome is not bound, forasmuch as it was without their commaundement made, neither is there any thing thereby vnto the [ K] Samnites due, more than our bodies; let vs naked and bound be so yeelded vnto them. So the Consull called it not a treatie of peace, but a simple or necessarie promise. And in truth the enemies had caused the Consull and all the captaines and lieuetenants of the army to sweare, and further taken sixe hundred hostages, al which they might haue put to death, if the people would not confirme the agreement taken; in which making they yet committed one grosse ouersight, in that they bound not all the souldiers in the armie by oath to returne into those straits and enclosures of the mountaines, and euen into the same state they were before, or els to yeeld themselues all prisoners, in case the

people would not confirme the agreement by them made; which had they done, no [ A] doubt but that the Senat and the people would haue sent them againe into the same state they were, as they did the Consull, with the sixe hundred sworne hostages, whom for all that, the Samnites refused to receiue of the herauld. For in like case after the great ouerthrow by the Romans receiued at Cannas, when Hanniball had sent eight thousand souldiers, there taken prisoners, to Rome, to redeeme their libertie with the ransome of a pound of gold for euery head; and that the Senat would not agree there∣unto, but decreed, that they should either become the enemies slaues, or die: the Con∣suls charged those souldiers, before the appointed day to returne vnto the enemie; who all obeyed their commaund, but one, who by a craftie wile sought to delude the oath, before by him giuen vnto the enemie for his returne; whome the Senat for all that [ B] sent bound hand and foot vnto Hannibal. Or if it had seemed too hard a thing vnto the Senat, to haue yeelded the whole army being sworne vnto the Samnites, they would vndoubtedly yet haue confirmed those hard conditions of peace by them agreed vpon. As did Lewes the xij, the French king, in the treatie made at Dijon by the lord Trimouille with the Swissers, giuing them hostages of the chiefest men of his ar∣my, with condition that the Swissers might put them to death, if the king should not ratifie the agreement with them made. As did the duke of Aniou vnto the hostages which those which were besieged in the castle of Eruall had giuen him: when he saw that Robert Knolles, captaine of the castle, being arriued within the castle, after the agree∣ment, would by no meanes suffer the castle to be surrendred, saying, That the besieged [ C] without him could couenant nothing: and so also caused the prisoners that he had ta∣ken to be beheaded▪ For otherwise, if it were lawful for captains to entreat or conclude of peace at their pleasure, without expresse commaundement or ratification, they might bind both people and soueraigne princes, vnto the pleasure and appetite of their enemies, and such hard conditions as they pleased: a thing most absurd and vnreasona∣ble, seeing that a common aduocat may not in the least matter of another mans, come to agreement, without expresse charge from him whome it concerneth.

But some may say, that these rules take no place in Venice, where the Senat doth wholly discerne and determine of peace and warre, neither amongst the customes of the Swissers and Grisons, which are popular estates. And in the conuersion of the [ D] Florentine Commonweale, from the nobilitie vnto the popular estate, it is in one arti∣cle especially prouided, that the people shall haue to do with nothing, but with making of lawes, creating of magistrats, and the common treasure; as for peace and warre, and other things concerning the soueraigntie of the state, should be wholly in the power of the Senat. Whereunto we haue before said, that Popular and Aristocraticall estates* 1.475 cannot if they would, well manage martiall affaires, for the hard assembling together of the people: and in case that the people might be at all times assembled, yet were it a thing of great perill and daunger, to haue those things which ought of all others to bee most secret in a Commonweale, the councels (I say) of peace and warre, reuealed and made knowne vnto the Vulgar people: which therfore were of necessitie to be left vn∣to [ E] the Senat, yet the power of peace and warre cannot be taken from the nobilitie or people in either state, the soueraigne maiestie thereof saued. And albeit that the peo∣ple giue the charge thereof vnto the Senat, yet a man knoweth right well, that the commissions and mandats which are giuen out for such purpose, depend of the autho∣rity of the people, and vnder the peoples name are put in execution by the Senat, which is but the peoples procurator and agent, taking authoritie from the people, as all other their magistrats doe. As for monarchies, it is without any question that the resoluti∣on of peace and warre dependeth of the soueraigne prince, if the estate bee a pure mo∣narchie,

For the kingdome of Polonia, Denmarke, Sweden, and Norway, as they are [ F] states changeable and vncertaine, as the nobilitie is stronger than the prince, or the prince than the nobilitie: the resolution of peace and warre so dependeth of the nobi∣litie, as that the state seemeth to be rather Aristocraticall than regall. And therefore the names of their dukes, marquesses, counties, gouernours, and councellors, commonly to be in their leagues expressed, and their seales thereto annexed: as the peace betwixt the Polonians and the Prussians, made by king Sigismundus Augustus was sealed with an hundred and three seales of the nobilitie of his countrey: neither was there fewer in the act of the lawfull creation of king Henry to be king of Polonia.

The third marke of Soueraigne maiestie is to be of power to create and appoint* 1.476 magistrats, than which no more certaine signe can be, especially the principall officers, [ G] which are not vnder the commaund of other magistrats. This was the first law that Tublius Valerius made after the expulsion of the kings out of Rome: that the magi∣strats should be chosen and appointed by the people. Which selfe same law was pub∣lished also by the Venetians, at such time as they first assembled into the Gulfe, for the establishing of their state, as Contarenus writeth: than which law there is none more religiously kept by the Senat and the Venetian people. Yet much better is it kept in monarchies, where all is gouerned by one, and where the greatest, the meaner, yea and the least offices of all, as of Porters, Sergeants, Clarkes, Trumpeters, Criers, which in the Roman state were placed and displaced by the Roman magistrats are prouided for by order from the prince, euen vnto the meanest offices. I haue said the appointing of [ H] princes officers, that is to say, of the chiefe magistrats, for there is no Commonweale, where it is not permitted vnto greater magistrats, as also to many corporations and colledges, to make certaine meniall officers vnder them: as I haue before showed of the Romans. But yet that they doe by vertue of the office, which they hold, and as proctours created with power, to substitute other their deputies vnder them. We see also that clients and vassals, albeit that they hold their iurisdiction of some soueraigne prince in fealtie and homage, haue neuerthelesse power to establish judges and officers in their iurisdiction: but yet this power is giuen them by some soueraigne prince. For no doubt dukes, marquesses, counties, barons, and lieutenants of countries, were no other of their first institution but judges and officers; as we shall in due place declare. [ I] But sometimes in a popular estate power is giuen unto the greater magistrats to create the lesser; as we read that the people of Carthage had a custome to make fiue magi∣strats,* 1.477 for to make choyce of the hundred and foure magistrats of the Commonweale; as they do also at Nuremberg, where the Censors which are chosen of the great Councell, chose the new Senators, and that done, giue vp their charge. The Senate which is of xxvj, making choyce of the eight Auntients: and afterward of the xiij of the seuen Burgamasters, and of the xij Iudges for ciuill causes, and fiue for criminall. Neither is this any new matter; but an old and auntient fashion. For Aristotle writeth, the people of Carthage to haue vsed to chuse fiue men, who according to their discre∣tion still made of the hundred and foure magistrates: which was also a thing ordinarie [ K] vnto the Roman Censors, who by their discretion supplied the number of the Sena∣tors, which the Consuls did before by the sufferance of the people, who from the be∣ginning made them, as Festus Pompeius saith. And sometime the dictators were for that purpose onely made to supply the number of the Senators. As Fabius Buteo named Dictator by the Consull Terentius, following the decree of the Senat, made choyce at one time of an hundred seuentie seuen Senators, in stead of them that were dead. Howbeit that to speake properly, a Senator is no magistrat, as we will show in the discourse concerning the Senat. But howsoeuer that it was, whether it were the

Consuls, the Dictators, or Censors, that made choice of the Senators, & so supplied the [ A] Senat, they did it not but by the power of the people, which was also to be reuoked at the peoples pleasure. So may we also say of the Turkes Cadelesquires, which are as the kings two great Chauncelours, who haue power to place and displace all the Cadies and Paracadies, that is to say, the judges and their deputies. And in Aegypt, in the time of the Sultans gouernment, before it was by Selymus the first conquered, the great Edegnare, which was a Cunstable to the Sultan, had power to place all the other offi∣cers: as had in auntient time the Grand M. of the Pallace in Fraunce. And it is not long ago but that the chauncelour of Fraunce had power at his pleasure to bestow all offices which had none, or but some little fees, viz. of some three or foure crownes at the most: which was reuoked by king Francis the first. And albeit that alwaies the [ B] chauncelor, the great Edegnare, and the Grand M. of the pallace, had all their power from the kings and Sultans, as by them placed: yet was so great power verie daunge∣rous vnto the former kings and Sultans, which by little and little haue since beene cut so short, as that in the raigne of Charles the seuenth, the verie baylieffes and seneschals were placed by the prince, who before were wont to be placed by the maiors, whose lieutenants they were. Sometime also it may be that magistrats, corporations, or col∣leges, haue power to nominat and chuse the principall magistrats: as we read in the re∣cords of the court of Paris, that by a law made in the yeare 1408, it was decreed that the officers of the high court of parliament should be made by election; and so therevpon commaundement was giuen vnto the chauncelour to go into parliament for the ele∣ction [ C] for the offices vacant. Which law was againe reuiued by king Lewes the xj, in the yeare 1465. And after him in the time of Charles the eight, not only the presidents, the kings councellors, and aduocats, were made by election, but euen the kings attur∣ney generall (who is the onely man of all the body of the court, which oweth not oath but to the king alone: albeit that the atturneyes of other parliaments, which he calleth substitutes, take their oath in the court) was chosen also by the suffrages of the court: In the yeare 1496. But yet all their letters of prouision & confirmation of their electi∣ons into their offices, then were, and yet are, alwayes graunted by the king▪ without whose confirmation their election was to no purpose. Which may serue for aun∣swere to that which one might say, that Arthure duke of Bretaigne, was chosen Cun∣stable [ D] of Fraunce, by the voyces of all the princes, of the great Councell, and of the parliament in the yeare 1324. For albeit that the king Charles the sixt, was then di∣straught of his wits, & that the seales of France had in them not the image of the king, but of the queene onely: yet neuerthelesse the said new constable taking vpon him the gouernment of the kings sword, and of the French armie, being sworne to the keeping of the lawes, at the same instant acknowledged himselfe to hold his office and power in fealtie and homage of the king: so that all authoritie and power to commaund, may well seeme to flow and be deriued from the fountaine of the prince onely.

Yet may some say that the Great Palatine of Hungarie, who is the greatest magi∣strat* 1.478 of that kingdome, and the kings lieutenant generall, is chosen by the estates of the [ E] countrey: it is true; but yet his prouision, institution, and confirmation, belongeth vn∣to the king, who is the chiefe head and author of his power. Howbeit that the estates of the kingdome of Hungarie, yet pretend to haue the right to make choyce of their kings; the house of Austria maintaining the contrarie. And it seemeth that the kings haue by sufferance passed it ouer, that the estates should still haue the chusing of the great Palatine, so to cause them to forget the election of the king. Whereunto for all that they haue beene so obstinatly wedded, as that they haue thosen vnder the co∣lour of protection, to put themselues vnder the Turkes slauerie, rather than to haue this

power for the choyce of their kings (by the house of Austria) wrested from them. It is [ F] not therefore the election of great officers which declareth the right of so∣ueraigntie; but the princes approbation, ratification, and confirmation, without which the magistrat is of no power at all. Yet if such creation of magistrats were by the founders of Commonweales, and law makers, so giuen vnto the people, or col∣leges, as that they could not from the people or colleges be taken, then truly the prince should not haue the right of soueraigne maiestie or power: for that the magistrats pow∣er were not to be attributed vnto the prince, but to the people; as by little and little it happened vnto the kings of Polonia. For when as by a law made by Sigismundus Augustus, all the magistrats of euerie countrey, were to be chosen by the particular states of euery gouernment; the maiestie of the kings, who also raigned by the good [ G] liking of the people, was therby much impaired. Which confirmation of magistrats so chosen, is no new thing; for euen from the time of the Gothes we read in Cassiodo∣rus, that Theodoricus king of the Gothes, gaue his letters of confirmation vnto the of∣ficers whome the Senat had chosen; vsing these words in his letters directed vnto the Senat, for one whom they had made a Senator, Iudicium vestrum P. C. noster Comita∣tur* 1.479 assensus, Our consent, Reuerent fathers, doth accompany your iudgement. Now seeing that power to commaund ouer all the subiects of a Commonweale belongeth vnto him that holdeth therein the soueraigntie; it is good reason also that all magi∣strats should acknowledge their authoritie to proceed from him.

But now let vs speake of the fourth marke of Soueraignetie, that is to wit, of the Last [ H] * 1.480 Appeal, which is and alwayes hath beene one of the most principall rights of soue∣raignetie. As a man may see after that the Romaines had driuen out their kinges: not onely the last Appeal, but euen all Appeales from the Magistrates, were by the Law Valeria reserued vnto the people. And for that the Consuls and other Magistrates of∣tentimes gaue small eare vnto them that did appeal vnto them, the same Law was of∣ten times* renewed: and by the Tribunitiall law Duillia the paine of death adioyned* 1.481 there vnto, for him that should oppose himselfe against the same; which Law Liuie calleth the foundation of the popular libertie: albeit that it were euill executed. The same Law was yet more straitly kept in Athens, where the last Appeal was reserued vnto the people, not onely from the Magistrates of the citie, but euen from the Magi∣strates [ I] of their allies and fellowes also: as the writings of Zenophon and Demosthenes do right well declare. The same Law Contarenus writeth to haue been the first that was by the Venetians made for the establishing of their Commonweale: viz. That all men might freely appeal from the Magistrates, vnto the Graund counsell of the peo∣ple. Nether was Francis Valori Duke of Florence for any other cause slaine, then for not hauing giuen way vnto the Appeal, made from him vnto the Great counsell of the people, by three Florentines by him condemned to die, and so notwithstanding their appeal by him executed. But some may say, that not onely this Duke at Florence, but at Rome the Dictators, and other Magistrates also oftentimes put to death con∣demned citisens, notwithstanding their appeal made vnto the people, as is in many [ K] histories to be seene. Whereof there was an heauie example made by the Senate of Rome, which caused the remainder of the Legion sent to Rhegium being taken and brought to Rome, to be whipped and afterward beheaded without regard of the ap∣peales by them made vnto the people: or to the intercessions of the Tribunes exclai∣ming, the sacred Lawes concerning Appeales to be violated, and troden vnder foote. Whereunto in briefe I aunswere, as did Papinian, That we ought not to rest our selues vpon that they doe at Rome, but on that which ought to bee there done. For it is most certaine, that a man might appeale from the Senat vnto the people: and that or∣dinarily

the opposition or intercession of one of the Tribunes, stayed the proceedings [ A] of the whole Senat; as we haue before touched. And the first that gaue the power vnto the Roman Senat to iudge without appeale, was Adrian the emperour, for the edict of Caligula, whereby he gaue power to all magistrats to iudge without appeale, tooke no place. And albeit that Nero decreed, that they which without cause had appealed vnto the Senat, should be punished with like punishment, as if they had ap∣pealed vnto his owne person: yet forbad he not men to appeale from the Senat vnto himselfe, although he had referred the appeales from all the magistrats vnto the Senat. But this aunswere seemeth directly contrary vnto that we haue before said. For if no appeale were to be made from the Senat vnto the emperour, but that the last appeale was vnto the Senat, then was not the last appeale the true marke of soueraigntie. Ioine [ B] also hereunto, that the Great master of the Pallace, whome they called Praefectum Prae∣torio, gaue iudgement without appeale, receiuing also the appeales of all the magistrats and gouernours of the empire, as sayth Flauius Vopiscus: as in euery Commonweale* 1.482 we see certaine courts and parliaments which gaue iudgement without appeale; as the eight parliaments in Fraunce, the foure courts in Spaine, the imperiall chamber in Ger∣manie, the councell at Naples; the fortie at Venice, the Rota at Rome, the Senat at Milan; and so the greater courts of other cities, who heare and decide either all or most part of causes, both publike and priuat, without appeale: and in all the imperiall townes, duchies, and counties, depending of the empire, no appeale is to be made vnto the imperiall chamber, in criminall causes once iudged by the magistrats of the prince, [ C] or of the imperiall cities: whereby it appeareth the last appeale not to belong onely vnto the right of soueraigne maiestie. Whereunto I aunswere, vnder the name of Appeale, to be also contained requests made vnto the prince, which the law call Ciuill Supplications: so that when we may not appeale from the sentence of the greater ma∣gistrats, yet may we by way of request put vp our supplications vnto the prince, which hath moued many of our late lawyers to say, Ciuill supplications to belong vnto the right of soueraigne maiestie: and albeit that almost alwaies the decrees are againe iud∣ged by the same judges, as oft as request is made vnto the prince concerning a iudge∣ment giuen▪ yet is it in his wil & power either to receiue or reiect the request▪ and often∣times hee calleth the cause vnto himselfe therof to determine, or to reuerse that which [ D] hath bene done; or else remitteth it vnto other judges, which is the true marke of so∣ueraigntie and last appeale, wherein the maiestie of the prince or people doth most ap∣peare: forasmuch as it is not lawfull for any magistrat or judge to chaunge or amend their iudgement once giuen or recorded, without leaue of their soueraigne prince, and that vpon paine of false iudgement. And if so bee that the soueraigne prince would* 1.483 make an edict, that none of his subiects should appeale from any of his magistrats, or preferre any request vnto himselfe against their iudgements, as the emperour Caligula was about to haue done: yet neuerthelesse should it alwaies be lawfull for the subiects to appeale, or to exhibit their requests vnto the prince: For that the prince cannot so bind his owne hands, or make such a law vnto himselfe; either prohibit his grieued [ E] subiects from comming vnto him with their humble supplications and requests: For that such edicts concerning appeales and iudgements, are but ciuill decrees and lawes wherewith the prince cannot be bound, as we haue before said. For which cause it seemed a new and absurd thing vnto the Senat of France, and especially vnto Michael del' Hospital, that the commissioners appointed to proceed against the president of Al∣lemand, forbid him by a decree made against him, to come within twentie leagues of the court, so to cut him off from the meanes to preferre his petitions; which the king himself could not of right take from his subiect, althogh it were in his power to grant or

reiect his request being once made vnto him knowne. We see also, that in all graunts [ F] of publike lands by way of pention, with power and iurisdiction vnto the children or neere kinsmen of the house of Fraunce, and generally in the erection of duchies, mar∣quisats, counties, and principalities, fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraigntie, are still reserued: that sometime there is onely reseruation made of appeale and soueraign∣tie: as in the declaration made by king Charles the fift, to Iohn duke of Berrie, bearing date the third of March, in the yeare 1374: wherein is also fealtie and homage compri∣sed. For it is certaine that the duchie of Berrie was then the portion giuen vnto the duke of Berry with the charge of rights royall, and reuersion to the crowne for want of heires male: as I haue learned by the letters of graunt, which are yet in the treasurie of Fraunce. We see also the like declaration of Philip Archduke of Austria, (Charles [ G] the fifts father) made to king Lewes the twelft, and another of him the same, in the yeare 1505: wherein he acknowledgeth and professeth himselfe readie to obey the decrees of the parliament of Paris, in regard of the countries of Artois and Flaunders, and of other lands which he held of the king; and not to forbid them of those countries to ap∣peale vnto the court at Paris. And in the treatie of Arras, made betwixt▪ king Charles the seuenth, and Philip the second, duke of Burgondy, there is expresse reseruation made of fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraigntie, for those lands which he and his aun∣cestors held in fee of the crowne of Fraunce. Neither did Charles the fift the French king take any other occasion to make warre against the English men, than for that their English magistrats and gouernors which had the gouernment of Aquitaine, vnder the [ H] fealtie of the French, would not heare the subiects appeales. At which time the court of Paris commaunded the king of England to be summoned, and for default of appearance pronounced sentence against him: whereby the duchie of Aquitaine was for that cause confifcated vnto the king, as is to bee seene by the decree of the parlia∣ment of Paris, giuen the xiiij of May, in the yeare 1370. For otherwise if a soueraigne prince shall remit vnto his vassall the right of appeale and soueraigntie; which is vnto himselfe due, he maketh him of a subiect a soueraigne prince; as did king Francis the first, discharging the duke of Loraine of all fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraign∣tie, for the castle of Chasteler vpon the Maze in the yeare 1517. But when hee suffe∣red the same duke in soueraigne manner without appeale to gouern in the duchie of [ I] Bar; and that the dukes, officers, and magistrats afterward abused their permissiue au∣thoritie, as in absolute soueraigntie, the kings atturney generall thereof complained vn∣to the king, aduising him not to suffer the rights of his soueraigne maiestie to be so im∣paired. Which thing Anthonie then duke of Loraine vnderstanding, and after him Francis his sonne, by recognisance in autentique manner declared, that their purpose was not in any thing to derogat from the fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraigntie that they ought unto the crowne of Fraunce, by reason of the said duchie; and that they had not therein vsed soueraigne iustice but by sufferance: which letters of recogni∣sance are in the publique records to be seene, and were afterward exhibited vnto the priuie councell, in the yeare 1564, in the raigne of Charles the ninth, who by all means [ K] sought by a most gratious and large charter to haue giuen vnto Charles then duke of Loraine, the soueraigntie of the duchie of Bar: but all in vaine, forasmuch as the king can by no meanes alienat from himselfe, the rights belonging vnto his soueraigntie, no not the high court of Paris assenting thereunto, although the power and authoritie of that court may where the king is, seeme to be nothing; in the presence of whom all the power and authoritie of all magistrats cease.

Wherfore the best & most expedient way, for the preseruation of a state is, neuer to giue any marke or right of soueraigntie vnto a subiect, and much lesse vnto a straunger:

for that is one step and degree to mount vnto his soueraigne maiestie. And therefore [ A] * 1.484 it was long doubted in the councell, whether power and authoritie without appeale, should be graunted vnto Francis duke of Alencon (who had made mee master of the requests and one of his councell) in that his dukedome; as had before bene graunted vnto the auntient dukes there. And although he were the kings best and most louing brother, yet one of the atturneyes generall was so bold as to say in full councell, That it were better to bring in twelue courts of parliament, than to suffer that, albeit that that iurisdiction was for a short time granted, and extraordinarie judges by the king appoin∣ted; with reseruation of appeales, in many cases and causes, as also with exception of fealtie and homage. Wherein our auncestors much offended, who with too much facilitie (should I say, or necessitie) graunted the same iurisdiction vnto the dukes of [ B] Normandie. For by this meanes the dukes of Britaigne and Burgundie reuolted from our kings vnto the kings of England; for that such judges were denied them, as had bene granted vnto the dukes of Alencon: taking it grieuously themselues, in the name of their magistrats to be summoned vnto the court at Paris, there to haue those things reuersed which their magistrats had vniustly determined; althogh sometime they were things of right small weight and importance; whereof the dukes of Britaigne complai∣ned both vnto king Philip the Faire, and Philip the Long, who by their letters patents sent vnto the court of parliament in February 1306, and in October 1316, declared that their meaning was not, that the duke of Britaigne or his officers, should bee called be∣fore them into the court; but in question of soueraigntie, or in case they should deny [ C] to doe iustice, or els had giuen false iudgement.

The same we are to thinke of all the princes and cities of Germanie, from whome euen in priuat iudgements men may iustly appeale vnto the imperiall chamber, if the matter exceed the summe of 50 crowns, or if any controuersie be betwixt the cities and princes themselues. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, neither the German princes, nor cities to haue in them the right of soueraigntie: For that it is a capitall crime, euen trea∣son it selfe, to appeale from a soueraigne prince, except he appeale as did that Greeke (whosoeuer he was) who appealed from Philip king of Macedon euill aduised, vnto himselfe being better aduised. Whice manner of appeale Lewes of Burbon, prince of Conde vsed also from the interlocutorie sentence of Francis the second, the French [ D] king, which he hauing vnderstood the cause, is said to haue giuen against him in the priuie councel: Which manner of appeale Baldus the great lawyer alloweth as good▪ and to be receiued. And well it would beseeme the maiestie of soueraigne princes to behold and follow the example of that Macedonian king, who receiued the appeale; or if they would needs that their decrees whatsoeuer should stand fast and irremouable, because they would not seeme vnconstant or variable, that then they should do as did the same king to Machetas, who of his owne goods recompensed him, for that hee had vniustly condemned him in, without chaunging of his former decree and iudgement.

From this marke of Maiestie, and benefit of supreame Appeale, dependeth also the [ E] * 1.485 power to grant grace and pardon vnto the condemned, contrarie to iudgement giuen, and to the rigour of the lawes; be it for life, be it for goods, be it for honour, or recal∣ling from banishment: for it is not in the power of the magistrats or judges, how great soeuer that they be, to graunt the least of these things vnto the condemned person, or of themselues, to alter any thing of the iudgements by them once giuen. And albeit that the Proconsuls and gouernours of prouinces, had as much power in their iurisdi∣ction, as had all the magistrats of Rome together: yet so it was, that it was not lawfull for them so much as to restore him whome they had but for a time banished (as wee

read in the letters of Plinie the younger, gouernor of Asia vnto Traian the emperor) [ F] and much lesse giue pardon vnto men condemned to die: which is most straitly for∣bidden all magistrats in euery Commonweale, be it well or euill ordered or gouerned. And albeit that Papirius Cursor, the dictator, may seeme at the request of the people to haue giuen pardon to Fabius Max. collonell of the horsemen, for hauing giuen battle contrarie to his commaund, although he had slaine xxv thousand of the enemies: yet neuerthelesse in effect it was the people which gaue the pardon: albeit that they most instantly besought the dictator to pardon the fault: Which they themselues might at the same time haue done, but yet had rather to request it of Papirius, than to take the guiltie person from him against his will. For Fabius vnderstanding himselfe in his ab∣sence to be by the dictator condemned, appealed vnto the people: before whom Papi∣rius [ G] defended his iudgement, as iustly giuen against Fabius: which a man of his vertue and seueritie would not haue done, if an appeale might not haue bene made from the dictator, vnto the people: and that in it was the power of life and death. Sergius Gal∣ba the Orator also, in like iudgement by Cato the Censor, attainted of treason, tooke his refuge vnto the people, who moued with his teares, and embracing of his children, pardoned him. Whereupon Cato said, That Galba had beene well whipped, had hee not taken himselfe vnto his teares and his children. The same power of life and death had also the people of Athens, as appeareth by Demosthenes, and Alcibiades, who both condemned, were afterward by the people pardoned, and againe restored both vnto their goods and honour. And amongst the Venetians it is not lawfull for any their [ H] magistrats, no not for the duke himselfe, the Senat, or the Decemuiri, to graunt pardon vnto the condemned: for that is left vnto the discretion of the great councel of the Ve∣netian gentlemen onely. The Decemuiri before abusing their power by sufferance, graunted pardons, and neuerthelesse was order taken in the yeare 1523, that the coun∣sell of the Sages, which are in number xxij, should therein be assisting vnto them: and that the pardon should take no place, without the generall consent of them all: but at length in the yeare 1562, the councell was forbidden at all to meddle, or to haue to doe in that matter. And albeit that the emperour Charles the fift, in the erection of the Senat at Milan, graunted thereunto all the markes of soueraigntie, as vnto his lieute∣nant and deputie in his absence, comming verie neere vnto absolute soueraigntie: yet [ I] so it is, that hee still reserued vnto himselfe the power to graunt pardon and mercie vn∣to the condemned; as I haue learned by the letters patents by him graunted: which hath bene a thing right straitly obserued and kept in all Monarchies. And although that in Florence during the popular state, the eight men without all right had vsurped the power to graunt pardons: yet was that power againe restored vnto the people by Sodorin, after the chaunge of the state. As for other kings they haue still thought nothing more royall, than to deliuer the condemned from death: neither do they suffer the judges or magistrats of other dukes and princes, to examine the letters graunted by the king for the restoring of the condemned: although that they exa∣mine the pardon graunted. And albeit that king Francis the first had giuen vnto his [ K] mother power to graunt pardon vnto the condemned: yet for all that the court of Pa∣ris, hauing taken order to haue it showed vnto the king, that it was one of the fairest markes of soueraigntie, which could not be communicated vnto a subiect without impairing of his maiestie: the Queene mother thereof aduertised, renounced this* 1.486 priuilege, and restored the letters patents vnto the king, before they were of her requested. For indeede that prerogatiue could not of right bee graunted vnto the French Queene, neither any other the proper markes of Soueraigntie.

And albeit that the Roman lawes say that the empresse is dispensed with from all

edicts and lawes: yet that taketh no place in this realme of Fraunce; yea there is [ A] found a decree in the records of the court, in the yeare 1365, in Iuly: whereby the queene was condemned to lay downe in the court the money of her demaunded, whi∣lest the matter was in tryall; that the creditor might demaund it so laid downe vppon good caution giuen: which by the Roman law is a meere iniurie, so to begin sute of execution. I find also that king Charles the sixt, gaue power to M. Arnald de Corbie, chauncelour of Fraunce, by letters pattents, the xiij of March, in the yeare 1401, to grant pardons vnto the condemned, some of the great Councell being present with him▪ but that was at such time as the chauncelours were almightie, hauing all in their owne hands: and that king Charles the sixt was then not in the power of himselfe but of others, by reason of his maladie. [ B] * 1.487

Now if any man shall obiect and say, That in auntient times the gouernours of pro∣uinces gaue pardons, as we yet may see by the custome of Henault, and of Daulphinie: as also that the bishop of Ambrun, by autentique charters pretended this power. Here∣unto I aunswere, that such customes and priuileges, wrongfully wrested and exported from our kings, were of good right abrogated by an edict of king Lewes the twelft. And if such priuileges be of no force: so may we also say their confirmations to bee of no more strength. For the confirmation is neuer any thing worth, if the priuilege bee of it selfe naught. Now must it needes be naught, for that it cannot bee sepera∣ted from the crowne. For as wee haue before said, that the priuileges by princes euen lawfully graunted, cannot stand good for euer: so the rightes of Soueraigntie, [ C] which cannot by the kings themselues bee graunted vnto any, without giuing away of ther Scepter and kingdome, can much lesse being granted, bee by them con∣firmed.

As for Gouernours, Deputies, Lieutenants generall of Soueraigne princes, it is another reason; for that they haue not that power by priuilege, or by office, but by commission, as the deputies or lieutenants of their princes. But in the state of a well ordered Commonweale, this power of Soueraigntie ought not to bee giuen to any, neither by commission, neither by title of office, except it bee for the establi∣shing of a Regent in his gouernment, for the great distance of places; or for the cap∣tiuitie of Soueraigne princes: or for that they are furious; or else in their infancie▪ [ D] As it was done by Lewes the ninth, who for his tender yeares, was by the estates of Fraunce committed to the tuition of his mother Blanche of Castile; after that she had giuen certaine princes for assurance that shee should not giue the tuition of him to any other person. So the gouernment of the kingdome was committed vnto Charles the fift, as Regent during the captiuitie of his father king Iohn. And in the captiuitie of Francis the first, Louise of Sauoy his mother, tooke vppon her the protection of the kingdome committed vnto her by the king her sonne▪ with all the royalties thereof, in the title of Regent. And the duke of Bedford Regent in Fraunce, king Charles the sixt being there distraught of his wits.

But heer may one say vnto mee, that notwithstanding the decree of Lewes the xij. [ E] * 1.488 the chapiter of the church of Roan pretendeth alwaies to haue priuiledge to graunt pardon in the fauour of S. Romane: the day before whose feast, it forbiddeth all the judges, yea and the parlament of Roan it selfe, to execute or put to death any one of such as then be condemned; (as I haue seene it put in practise being in commission for the Prince, for the generall reformation of Normandie) and for that the court not∣withstanding the chapiters pardon, had after the feast caused to bee put to death one, which it had before the feast condemned: the chapiter thereof greeuously complay∣ned vnto the king; hauing to friend one of the princes of the blood▪ the parlament

sent also their deputies, amongst whom Bigot the kings attourney was verie earnest in [ F] his oration in the Senat for the abuse, and encroaching vpon the kings maiestie: but the fauour of the great bishops more preuailing then reason, that priuilege was for all that he could say or do with the publike shame and losse continued: but was since ta∣ken away by king Henry the third. This priuilege had great affinitie with that which* 1.489 was giuen vnto the Vestall virgins at Rome, which was to giue pardon vnto him that was going to execution, if any one of the Vestal virgins by chaunce happened to meete him, as saith Plutarke in the lyfe of Numa. The like custome whereof is yet kept in Rome, for if a condemned man there meet a Cardinall, he is thereby deliuered from punishment. But I deeme that to bee most pernitious in the priuilege of S. Romane, that no man could enioy the benefit thereof which had but lightly offended: but he [ G] onely that had done the most execrable villanies that were possible to be found, such as the king vsed not to pardon, that such offences as could nether by the lawes of God nor man, nor by the fauour of Princes be pardoned, might yet vnder the colour of S. Romanes priuilege be remitted and forgiuen. But that is ioyned with the grea∣test impietie to thinke the pardon to be so much the more acceptable to Cod, by how much the fact committed is the more haynous or detestable. But I am of opinion (sa∣uing alwaies the better iudgement) that no soueraigne Prince, nether yet any man* 1.490 a▪ liue can pardon the punishment due vnto the offence which is by the law of God death, no more then he can dispence with the law of God, wherevnto he is himselfe subiect. And if it be so, that the magistrat deserue capitall punishment, which dispen∣seth [ H] with the law of his king▪ how shall it be lawfull for a soueraigne prince, to dispence with his subiect from the law of God? And further if the Prince him selfe cannot giue away the least ciuill interest of his subiect, or pardon the wrong done vnto an other man: how can he than pardon the wrong done vnto almightie God? or the murther wilfully committed; which by the law of God is death, for all the pardon he can giue. But then wherein (might a man say) should the princes mercie show it selfe or appeare? if it could not show grace vnto the punishment appointed by the law of God? Wher∣unto I aunswere, that there are meanes plentie, as in pardoning bloodshed committed by chaunce, or in defence of a mans selfe, or in mitigating the rigour of the positiue ciuill lawes: as if the prince should vpon paine of death forbid a man to beare armes, [ I] or to carrie victuals vnto the enemie; pardon shall yet well be bestowed vpon him that hath borne armes for the defence of himselfe onely; or on him which con∣strained by pouertie, hath sold victuals deere vnto the enemie, to releeue his owne great necessitie. Or whereas by the law the punishment for theft is death, the good prince may conuert that punishment into the restitution of foure fold, which is the pu∣nishment by the law * of God appointed. But the wilfull murderer You shall take him* 1.491 (saith the law) from my sacred altar, neither shalt thou haue pitie on him, but cause him to dye the death: and afterwards I will stretch forth my great mercies vpon you. Neuerthe∣lesse the Christian kings on that day which they commaund to bee most holy kept, as on Good Friday, vse for most part to pardon some one man or other, condemned of [ K] * 1.492 most horrible and notorious crime. Now pardons graunted to such villaines drawe after them plagues, famine, warres, and ruines of Commonweales; and that is it for which the law of God saith, That in punishing them that haue deserued to dye, they shall take away the cause from among the people: for of an hundred villaines there commeth scarce two of them into the triall of iustice: and of those that come, the one halfe of them for want of proofe and of witnesses escape vnpunished: and then if when they are proued princes graunt vnto them pardon, what exemplarie punishment shall there be for offences and villanies committed in the Commonweale? And many of∣fendors,

when they cannot of their owne prince obtaine grace and pardon, interpose [ A] the fauour of some other forren prince, who becommeth an intercessour for them. Whereof the States of Spaine complained vnto king Philip, presenting vnto him a re∣quest, to the end he should aduertise his ambassador in Fraunce, no more in the behalfe of the French king, to request pardon of the king of Spaine, for the condemned men which had retired themselues out of Spayne into Fraunce: for that hauing obtained pardon, they many times slew the judges, who had before condemned them. But of* 1.493 all the graces and pardons that a prince can giue, there is none more commendable, than when he pardoneth the iniurie done against his owne person: and of all capitall punishments none is more acceptable vnto God, than that which with most seueritie is executed, for the wrong done vnto the maiestie of himselfe. But what then are we for [ B] to hope for of the prince, which most cruelly reuengeth his owne iniuries, and pardo∣neth the wrong done to others; and especially those which are directly done to the dishonour of almightie God.

Now that which we haue said concerning the grace and pardon graunted by a soue∣raigne prince vnto men condemned, is to the vttermost to be extended, euen vnto the preiudice of the great lords, vnto whome the confiscation of the offendours lands or goods by law or custome belong, who are not to be receiued to debate or impugne the pardon graunted by the prince; as by decree of parliament hath bene adiudged. Now many there be, which draw the grace of the princes gracious restitutions vnto priuat iudgements: as when a man is for want of councell deceiued or cosoned; or reque∣steth [ C] the benefit of his minoritie, which in many cities and Commonweals are proper vnto soueraigne princes: but yet are not the markes of soueraigne maiestie, except on∣ly the legitimating of bastards, of fees, and such like: for why the rest were partly by the magistrats hauing vnderstood the cause, and partly by the lawes and customes vsually graunted. For in the lawes of Charles the vij and Charles the viij, it is expresly commaunded vnto the judges, in deciding of causes, not to haue any regard of the de∣crees of forraine courts, further than they should with equitie agree: which by this common clause vnto all decrees in this realme commonly annexed (Si satis superque apparet, If it shall sufficiently, and more than sufficiently appeare) is declared. Which clause if it be not ioyned vnto the decree, the magistrat hath but to vnderstand of the [ D] fact; the punishment thereof being reserued vnto the law, and the pardon vnto the so∣ueraigne prince. And that is it for which Cicero crauing pardon of Caesar for Ligarius saith, I haue oftentimes pleaded with thee before the iudges, but I neuer said, for him whom I defended, Pardon him my lords, he was deceiued, he thought it not, if euer hee do so againe, &c. So children vse to say vnto their parents, of whome they craue pardon: But before the iudges we say, That the crime is for euill will forged, the accusor is a slanderer, the witnesses false and subborned. In which words he plainely shewed▪ that Caesar hauing soueraigne power, had also the power of life and death, (and so to graunt pardon) which the jud∣ges had not.

Now as for liege fealtie and homage, it appeareth, that it is one of the greatest rights [ E] * 1.494 of soueraigntie; as we haue before declared: in respect of him to whom it is due, with out exception.

As for the right and power to coyne money, it is of the same nature with the law,* 1.495 and there is none but he which hath power to make a law, which can appoint the va∣lue, weight, and stampe of the coyne: which is well to be vnderstood by the Greeke and Latine worde; for the Latine word Nummus▪ seemeth well to haue beene de•…•…iued of the Greek word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For nothing is in a Commonweale of greater consequence next vnto the law, than the value, weight, and stampe of the coyne; as we haue in a spe▪

ciall treatise declared: and in euerie well ordered Commonweale, none but the soue∣raigne [ F] prince hath power to appoint the same. As we read they did in Rome, when the value of the Victoriat was appointed and set downe, it was done by an expresse law of the people. And albeit that the Senat by decree to ease the publike necessitie, made the halfe pound of copper as much worth as the pound; and a while after the quarter, as much worth as the pound, vntill that the ounce was valued as much worth as the pound: yet all this was done by the consent of the Tribunes, without which nothing that the Senat had therein decreed was of any force. And after that, Constantine the emperour made a law, That they which had coyned false money should be punished as men guiltie of high treason: which law all princes haue most straitly kept, taking vnto themselues the confiscations of false coynes, excluding all others, which haue any [ G] claime thereto. With like punishment also are they to be punished, which without the princes leaue coyne good money. And albeit that many particular men in this realme, had in auntient time priuilege to coyne money, as the countie of Touraine, the* 1.496 bishops of Meaux, Cahors, Agde, and Ambrun, the counties of S. Paule, of Marche, Neuers, Blois, and others: yet for all that king Francis the first, by a generall edict took away all those priuileges: which could not indeed be graunted: but beeing graunted, were by the law made void: ioyning hereunto also, that they were not to endure, but for the life of them that graunted them, as we haue before showed in the nature of pri∣uileges: howbeit that this marke and right of soueraigntie ought not in any sort to be at all communicated vnto a subiect. As it was well declared to Sigismundus Augu∣stus, [ H] king of Polonia, who in the yeare 1543, hauing giuen priuilege vnto the duke of Prusse, to coyne money: the estates of the countrey made a decree, wherein it was comprised, that the king had no power to giue away that right, as beeing inseparable from the crowne. For which selfe same reason the Archbishop of Gnesne in Polonia, and the Archbishop of Canterburie in England, both chauncelours, hauing obtained the same right and priuilege from their kings, were thereof againe depriued. And for this cause all the cities of Italie holden of the empire, which had of the former empe∣rours obtained this priuilege of coyning of money; in the treatie at Constance gaue vp the same vnto the emperour, excepting them of Luca, vnto whom in fauor of pope Lucius the third, their countrey man; the emperour at his request graunted that priui∣lege. [ I] We read also, that the principall occasion that Peter king of Arragon tooke hold of, to driue Iames king of Maiorque out of his kingdome was, for hauing coined money; pretending that he had no right nor power so to doe. Which was also one of the occasions that Lewes the xj tooke hold of, to make warre vpon Francis duke of Britaigne, for that hee had stamped a coyne of gold, contrarie to the treatie made in the yeare 1465. And the Romans when as they suffered money of Brasse, and siluer to be coyned in all their prouinces, yet did they forbid any to be there coyned of gold, re∣seruing that still vnto themselues. Howbeit that Iohn duke of Berry had priuilege of Charles the fift, the French king, to coyne money of both mettals; who because hee would not any thing therein offend, caused peeces of gold to bee coyned with the fi∣gure [ K] of a sheepe vpon them, of the finest and purest gold that euer was either before or since coyned in this realme.

Yet is it not to be omitted, that though the prince contrarie vnto the law, shall giue to any man power to stampe money, that the worth and valour thereof stil dependeth of the soueraigne prince; in such sort, that they which so coyne the same, haue no other profit thereby but the stampe onely; where of princes do wonderfully vaunt and glo∣rie. But of auntient time in the Roman Commonweale, whilest it was a popular state, the Triumuiri Monetales, or masters of the mint, coyned the money with such a stamp

or marke as they themselues thought good, with their names & these letters thereup∣pon, [ A] III Viri, A. A. A. FF. which Caulis baileiffe of the mountaines interpreteth, Aere, Argento, Auro, Flauo, Ferunto: but more truely thus, Trium viri, Auro, Argento,* 1.497 Aere, Flando, Feriundo. And truely Seruius king of the Romans was the first that there stamped an heauy coyne of brasse, with the figure or impression of an Oxe vpon it, to the imitation of Theseus king of Athens, who had coyned money with the* 1.498 same figure or marke, and the figure of an Owle. Whereby it appeareth the Greeke and Latine princes of old, not to haue bene touched with that vaine desire of glorie, wherewith other princes were tormented: and wherafter the kings of Asia and Affrike most greedily longed. The first that coyned money in Greece with his owne image* 1.499 thereon, was Philip king of Macedon: which peeces of money were therof called Phi∣lippaei; [ B] therein imitating the Persean kings, who called their peeces of gold first stam∣ped with the image of Darius, by the name of Dariques. Whereof king Darius was so ielous (as Herodotus writeth) as that he caused Ariander gouernour of Aegypt to bee beheaded, for hauing stamped the money with his owne image. As for the same cause also the emperour Commodus beheaded his minion Pecenninus. And also king Lewes the xij hauing left all the power and right of Soueraignty vnto the Genowayes, whom he had ouercome, forbad them neuerthelesse to stampe their money with any other marke or figure, than with his owne image, in stead of the forme of a Gibbet, which they before gaue, and yet giue vpon their money, as the marke of iustice.

Now if the power of coyning money be one of the rights and markes of Soue∣raigntie; [ C] * 1.500 then so is also the power to appoint measures and weights; although that by the customes receiued there is none so pettie a lord, which pretendeth not to haue this right. Whereby it commeth to passe, that by the infinit varietie of weights and* 1.501 measures, the Commonweale taketh no small harme. Which was the cause that the kings Philip the Faire, Philip the Long, and Lewes the xj had resolued, that there should be in this kingdome but one manner of weight and measure: and now the commissi∣oners appointed for that purpose, by comparing them together, had made euen all the measures and weights of this realme, and brought the matter to good effect, had not king Lewes by death bene taken away, before it was fully perfected: yet the booke whereby the same might more easily be brought to passe, is yet extant in the court of [ D] accounts: howbeit that the execution thereof proued more difficult than was thought it would haue done, by reason of the great contention, and sutes that thereof arise. Ne∣uerthelesse we read in Polybius, that the same was wel executed in all the cities of Acha∣ia,* 1.502 and Morea, where they had not but like money, like weights, like measures, cu∣stomes, lawes, religion, officers, and gouernment.

As for the right to impose taxes, or imposts vpon the subiects, is as proper vnto so∣ueraigne* 1.503 maiestie, as is the law it self: not for that a Commonweale cannot stand with∣out taxes and tallages, as the President the M. hath well noted, that taxes were not le∣uied in this realme, but since the time of Saint Lewes the king. But if it must needs be that they must for the publike necessitie be leuied or taken away; it cannot bee done [ E] but by him that hath the soueraigne power; as it hath bene iudged by a decree of par∣liament, against the duke of Burgundie; and many times since, aswell in the high court of parliament, as also in the priuie Councell. And for that diuers particular lords, ci∣ties, and corporations, vnder show of the common good, haue imposed diuers taxes and payments vpon their people: king Charles the ninth, by a generall edict by him made in the parliament at Orleans, expresly forbiddeth them so to doe without leaue: albeit that for the common necessitie they be borne withall in so doing without commission, so that they exceed not the summe of twentie fiue pounds. And after∣ward

the same edict was more straitly againe renewed at Moulins, well agreeing both [ F] with law and equitie. And although that the Roman Senat in time of warres, yea and the Censors themselues imposed certaine taxes and payments, which could hardly haue bene extorted from the bodie of the whole commonaltie: yet so it was, that that still passed by the sufferance of the Tribunes of the people, who ost times also opposed themselues against the same. Yea and that in such sort, that they presented a request vn∣to the people, that from that time forward no man vpon paine of his head should bee so hardie, as to cause any law to be passed in the campe: for that the Senat by subtill meanes had there in the campe at Sutrium, caused to be published that notable impo∣sition, which they called Vicesima Manumissorū, that is to say, the twentith part of the goods of them that were manumised; vnder colour that it was to pay the armie with∣all: [ G] which thereunto right willingly agreed: and so suffered the law to passe. And in* 1.504 the second Carthaginensian warre, at such time as there was great want of coyne in the common treasurie; there was by a law made a taxe generally imposed vppon euery man, which was by another contrarie law againe repealed, after the returne of Paulus Aemylius, who with the spoyles of Perseus king of Macedon, so filled the citie, and euerie priuat man also with wealth, as that the people was from that time discharged of all taxes and payments, vntill the Triumuirat ciuill warre, about an hundred yeares after, vntill that such new taxes and tributes as by the power or couetousnes of former tyrants had bene imposed vpon the people, were by the good * 1.505 emperour Pertinax againe eased and taken away. [ H]

But here might some say, diuers particular lords here and there, to exact not onely customes, but tributes also, not onely in Fraunce, where (as Caesar hath most truly writ∣ten) nothing is more contemptible than the vulgar people: but in England and Ger∣manie, and much more straitly in Denmarke, Polonia, and Norway: which impositi∣ons and tributes, are confirmed and growne strong, both by long prescription of time, and vse of iudgements: yea and that to be lawfull, euen vnto such as haue neither soue∣raigntie, nor any iurisdiction at all, the court of Paris hath adiudged. Whereunto I aunswere, that the thing hauing begun by abuse, and by long continuance of time in∣ueterat, hath well some colour of prescription: but yet an abuse can neuer be so ouer∣growne, but that the law shall euer be of greater force than it; whereby the abuse is to [ I] be reformed: and for that cause it was forbidden by an edict of Moulins, that any tri∣bute should be exacted of the subiects, vnder the colour of prescription: for that many lawyers and judges haue exposed all the strength and force of iudgements onely in pre∣scription alone: not regarding whether that which is in question can of right bee pre∣scribed or not.

Now if Pompeius hath denied, that the common high way can by any continuance of time be prescribed vpon: why then should these men thinke the rights of customes and tributes, or of soueraigne maiestie to be prescribed against; and yet the common high way belongeth not vnto the right of Soueraigntie. Wherefore it were better to [ K] confesse (which yet without deadly wrong cannot bee done) those aforesaid things which we haue spoke of, not at all to belong vnto the right of soueraigne maiestie: or else to say that the kingdome it selfe, and in briefe the royall crowne and scepter might be prescribed vpon. The same we are to thinke also of the exemptions from the pay∣ment of taxes and tributes, which no man can graunt vnto another man, but hee which hath the soueraigne power in a Commonweale: which is also prouided for in an arti∣cle of the edict at Moulins: neither is that enough, but that the charters of such immu∣nities graunted, must be also enrolled in the records of the court of accounts, and be al∣lowed of by the judges of the court of Aydes. But what kind of taxes and tributes

there be, and how farre they are to be exacted, shall in due place be declared: let it now [ A] for the present suffice, it to appeare, that right and power to belong only vnto Soue∣raigne maiestie.* 1.506

Now many there be that thinke also, that to haue power to lay an imposition vpon salt, is a more proper marke of Soueraigntie than the rest: and yet therof giue no good reason. For almost in euery Commonweale we see salt pits and mines both to be, & al∣wayes to haue bene in priuat mens possession, not onely vpon the sea coasts towardes the South (for toward the north it hardeneth not with the Sunne) but also in the medi∣terranean regions, wherein mines of salt, and wels of salt water are found. As in Spaine, in Italie, Fraunce, and the countrey of Cracouia, is found salt in great aboundance. Yea euen at Rome we read, some priuat men to haue had salt mines. Yet true it is, that ma∣nie [ B] soueraigne princes haue of auntient time imposed tribute vpon salt; as did Lysima∣chus* 1.507 king of Thrace, Ancus Martius king of Rome, Philip Valois king of France, who were the first that exacted tribute vpon salt, euery one in his owne kingdome. And al∣beit that by the law Valeria the people of Rome were freed from such customes & tri∣butes, as had by their kings bene brought in and imposed vpon them: yet Liuius the Censor thought no imposition in the Commonweale lighter or fitter, than that which was laid vpon salt; who thereof surnamed Liuius Salinator, (or Liuius the Salter.) For why that imposition little or nothing impaireth the right of priuat men: but that they still remaine lords and owners of their salt pits, aswell as of their other mines, sa∣uing vnto the Soueraigne prince his rights and customs. [ C]

But forasmuch as the sea it selfe cannot be proper vnto any priuat man, the rights* 1.508 thereof belonging vnto such soueraigne princes as dwell thereby, who may lay impo∣sitions thereupon thirtie leagues off from their owne coast, if there bee no other soue∣raigne prince neerer to let them, as it was adiudged for the duke of Sauoy. Neither can any but a soueraigne prince giue them letters of safe conduct; which the Italians call Guidage; nor yet of right take any wracke: as is expresly prouided for by the decree of the emperour Fredericke the second. A thing truely most barbarous, and not in aun∣tient* 1.509 time of soueraigne princes vsed, shamefully to suffer the reliques of the goods and fortunes of such as haue by shipwracke miserably perished, and whome we ought with some part of our owne to releeue, being cast vpon our coast, and which ought with [ D] good faith to be againe restored, to be most shamefully I say spoyled. Yet such is the manner of all that haue ports vpon the sea, in this case to show such extremitie aswell vnto their owne people, as to straungers. But by what right doe you aske? The com∣mon errour maketh the right: or if the wrong be done not by errour, but by know∣ledge, then it is meere wickednesse, masked with the vaile of errour. For I haue heard that at such time as the emperours ambassadours complayned vnto Henry the second, the French king, in the yeare 1556, that two gallies which had suffered wracke vpon the coast of Corcyca, were taken by Iordan Vrsin, requesting to haue the same gallie againe restored: he was aunswered by Anne Mommerance then constable of Fraunce, that wracks by the law of all nations belonged vnto such princes as ruled vpon the coasts [ E] whereon they were cast. Which law was so strong, as that Andrew Doria neuer so much as complained of the losse of two of his gallies, confiscated by the prior of Ca∣pona the French Admyrall, for casting anchor onely vppon the land without leaue, which of antient time men by the law of nations might right lawfully do. And wher∣as by the Roman law it was lawfull for any man to seise vppon things lost, or vppon goods or lands vacant and forbidden: now it is onely lawfull vnto them which haue the soueraigne power, or some other iurisdiction by law or custome confirmed vnto them, to take vnto themselues things lost or forsaken, and that after a certaine determi∣nat

time: which in a thing moueable is defined to be fortie dayes after the publication [ F] of the thing lost or forsaken: except it be in the meane time by the right owner chalen∣ged. And as for vacant possessions, the Roman emperours haue decreed, That they may at any time within foure yeares be againe recouered by the prince: but that after foure yeares once expired, a man may prescribe euen against the common receipt. But forasmuch as these things are also graunted vnto priuat men, they no more belong vn∣to the right of Soueraigntie, than it doth to haue a receipt of his owne: which is not a thing common vnto priuat men onely, but euen the prince himselfe hath his owne receipt diuided from the publike receipt; and his owne possessions seperat apart from the possessions of the Commonweale: and so diuers officers were by the Roman em∣perours appoynted vnto both. So Lewes the xij the French king, hauing obtained the [ G] crowne, erected the chamber at Blois, for his particular demaines of Blois, Montfort, and Cousi, which he commaunded to be diuided from the dukedome of Orleans, and the other publike possessions; and the accounts thereof to be kept apart by themselues. But amongst the rights of receipt, there be some that belong not, but vnto the soue∣raigne prince onely: as the confiscation of goods or lands in cases of high treason, vn∣der which are comprehended also such as be conuicted of impietie against God, which we call Heresie; or of offence against the Commonweale, as in coyning false money. Howbeit if our late lawyers haue with two much learned and curious subtiltie in an hundred and fiftie chapters found out the lawes and rights of the receipt: but yet so as that of one they make ten, that so they may seeme the moe: so confounding and min∣gling [ H] the rights of soueraigntie with the rights of receipt (which are also common vnto priuat men) and publike things with things priuat. The other rights of receipt are al∣most all common vnto the soueraigne prince, with other lords iusticiaries, as to haue right vnto treasure found: and the power to graunt Faires, which was in auntient time a marke of Soueraigntie; as now it is at this present comprised vnder the case of priui∣leges.

As for the right of Marque, or of Reprisall, which soueraigne princes haue proper* 1.510 vnto themselues from all others, it was not of auntient time proper vnto a soueraigne prince; but permitted vnto euery man without leaue, either of magistrat or of prince to take reprisall, which the Latines called Clarigatio: howbeit that the princes by little [ I] and little gaue this power vnto magistrats and gouernours; and in the end reserued this right vnto their owne soueraigntie, for the better assurances of their peaces and truces, which were oftentimes broken by the rashnesse of some particular men, abusing this right of Marque or Reprisal. In this realme the parliament graunted letters of Marque, as we find by the decree of the xij of Februarie 1392, vntill that Charles the eight by an especiall edict, reserued that power vnto himselfe, in the yeare 1485. It is also of our men properly called a royaltie or right of soueraigntie, whereby the prince, a bishop being dead, taketh vnto himselfe the profits of the bishopricke, in the meane time whi∣lest another bishop is chosen by the chapter, or by the prince himselfe appointed: and so being sworne, is put into possession thereof: but forasmuch as that in all places is not [ K] obserued: and few there be that haue that right, it is not to bee accounted among the markes of soueraigntie.

There be many other right small things, which are accounted proper vnto princes,* 1.511 as things concerning their greater reputation and dignitie, as in their edicts, mandats, and commissions to vse these words, Dei Gratia, by the grace of God; which wordes Lewes the xj, the French king, forbad the duke of Britaigne to vse in his life; although we read them to haue bene vsed almost in all auntient leagues; and attributed not vn∣to great princes and commaunders onely, but euen to the least magistrates and depu∣ties

also. The kings of Fraunce haue also reserued vnto themselues the right to seale [ A] with yellow waxe, a thing forbidden their nobilitie and other their iusticiaries; which Lewes the xj by speciall priuilege and letters patents graunted as a great fauour vnto Re∣nate* 1.512 of Aniou, king of Naples and Sicilie, that in fealing he might vse yellow waxe: with like priuilege vnto his heires also, confirmed in parliament the 28 of Iune 1465. He which copied the Comentaries of Tillet, calleth it white waxe, which I find our kings neuer to haue vsed.

But much more it belongeth vnto the royaltie of soueraigne maiestie, to be able to* 1.513 compell the subiects to vse the language and speech of him that ruleth ouer them: which the Romans so commaunded their subiects, that euen yet at this day they seeme farre and wide to raigne ouer a great part of Europe. But the king of the Hetruscians, [ B] who last was by the Romans ouercome in all other things yeelded vnto them, but in that he could in no wise be perswaded to yeeld, to chaunge his countrey language, and to receiue the Latine tongue, as Cato Censorius writeth. But France for that it swarmed* 1.514 as it were with citisens of Rome, did so confound the Latine tongue, with the naturall countrey speech, as that the auntient writers called our countrey men Romans; yea the iudgements and decrees of the higher court of parliament, viz. of Paris were set downe in Latine (which the presidents and gouernours were commaunded to doe) vn∣till that Francis the first had giuen order that they should vse their owne countrey lan∣guage: as by like edict Edward the third commaunded the judges and magistrats of England, to giue iudgements in their owne countrey language, when as before they [ C] vsed the French. And at such time as the Sarasins had subdued the greatest part of Asia, and Afrike: they withall most farre spred their language and religion euen into the farther part of Spaine: which when Philip king of Spaine would gladly haue sup∣pressed, yet could he by no meanes effect it.

Some amongst the markes of Soueraigntie, haue put also the power to iudge and* 1.515 decide matters, according to their conscience; a thing common to all iudges, if they be not by expresse law or custome prohibited so to doe. And that is it for which wee of∣tentimes see in the edicts vpon the articles committed to the arbitratarie iudgement of the judges, this clause added, Wherewith we haue charged our conscience. For if there be either custome or law to the contrarie, it then is not in the power of the judge, to [ D] passe beyond the law, or to dispute against the receiued law. For that was a thing for∣bidden by the most politique lawes of Lycurgus: and also by the most auntient lawes of Florence, whereas a soueraigne prince may do both, if he be not by the law of God forbidden; whereunto we haue before showed him to be still subiect.

As for the title of Maiestie it selfe, it sufficiently appeareth, that it onely belongeth to* 1.516 him that is a soueraigne prince: so that for him that hath no soueraigntie to vsurpe the same, were a verie absurd thing: but to arrogat vnto himselfe the addition of most ex∣cellent and sacred maiestie, is much more absurd▪ the one being a point of lightnes, and* 1.517 the other of impietie: for what more can we giue vnto the most mightie and immor∣tall God, if we take from him that which is proper vnto himselfe? And albeit that in [ E] auntient time neither emperours nor kings vsed these so great addition or titles: yet the German princes neuerthelesse haue oft times giuen the title of Sacred Maiestie vnto the kings of Fraunce; aswell as vnto their emperour. As I remember my selfe to haue seene the letters of the princes of the empire, written vnto the king, for the deliuerance of countie Mansfeld, then prisoner in Fraunce: wherein there was sixe times V. S. M. that is to say, Vestra, Sacra, Maiestas, or Your Sacred Maiestie▪ an addition proper vn∣to God, apart from all worldly princes. As for other princes which are not soueraignes some vse the addition of His Highnesse, as the dukes of Loraine, Sauoy, Mantua, Ferra∣ra,

and Florence: some of Excellencie, as the princes of the confines; or else of Sereni∣tie, [ F] as the duke of Venice.

I omit here many other meaner rights which Soueraigne princes euery one of them pretend in their own countries, in number infinit, which yet are no marks of soueraign* 1.518 ty, such as ought to be proper to all soueraigne princes in generall, apart from all other lords, iusticiaries, magistrats, and subiects, and which are of their owne nature incessible and not to be alienated from the soueraigntie: nor by any course of time to be prescri∣bed. And if the soueraigne prince shall giue or grant any lands or lordship of the pub∣lique possessions, vnto any, with iurisdiction and power to vse the same, in such sort as he himselfe might: albeit that the royall rights properly belonging vnto soueraigntie, be not in the charter or writings expresly excepted: yet are they alwayes by the verie [ G] * 1.519 law it selfe thought to be excepted, which by an old decree of the counsell of France was decreed not only for graunts made vnto priuat men, but also for such gifts or grants as were made vnto the princes themselues descended of the royall blood and familie: which royall rights can by no tract of time whatsoeuer, be prescribed against or vsur∣ped vpon. For if publique place, or the publique possessions of the Commonweale cannot be got by any prescription: how much lesse then can the royalties proper vn∣to soueraigne maiestie be prescribed vpon. But it is certaine by the edicts and lawes concerning the publike demaine, that it is not to bee alienated, neither by any tract of time to be gained. Which is no new thing: For it is two thousand yeares agoe since that Themistocles, making seisure of certaine lands belonging vnto the publike demaine, [ H] vsurped by some priuat men; said in the oration which hee made vnto the people of Athens, That mortall men could nothing prescribe against the immortall God: neither could priuat men in any thing prescribe against the Commonweale. The selfe same speech Cato the Censor vsed also in the Oration which he made vnto the people of Rome, for the reuniting of some part of the publike demain, vsurped vpon by certaine priuat men. How then can a man prescribe vpon the rights and markes of Soueraigntie? And that is it, for which in law he is guiltie of death, that in any sort vseth the markes properly reserued vnto the maiestie of a Soueraigne prince. And thus much concerning the principall points of Soueraigne maiestie, in as briefe manner as I possibly could, hauing handled this matter more at large in my booke De Imperio. And [ I] forasmuch as the forme and estate of a Commonweale depen∣deth of them that haue the Soueraigntie therein: Let vs now see how many sorts of Common∣weales there be.

Finis Lib. Primi.

[ K]

THE SECOND BOOKE OF [ A] [ B] OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEALE.

CHAP. I. ¶ Of all sortes of Commonweales in generall, and whether there bee any moe then three.

FOrasmuch as we haue before sufficiently spoken of Soue∣raigntie, [ C] and of the rights and markes thereof; now it be∣houeth vs to consider who they bee which in euery Com∣monweale hold that Soueraigntie; thereby to iudge what the estate is: as if the Soueraigntie consist in one onely prince, wee call it a Monarchie: but if all the people bee therein interressed, we call it a Democracie, or Popular estate: So if but some part of the people haue the Soue∣raigne commaund, we account that state to be an Aristo∣cracie. Which words we will vse, to auoide the obscuritie and confusion which might otherwise arise, by the varietie of gouernours good or bad: which hath giuen occasion [ D] vnto many, to make moe sorts of Commonweales than three. But if that opinion should take place, and that we should by the foot of vertues & vices, measure the estate of Commonweales; we should find a world of them, and them in number infinit. Now it is most certaine, that to attaine vnto the true definitions and resolutions of all things, wee must not rest vppon the externall accidents which are innumerable, but rather vpon the essentiall and formall differences: for otherwise a man might fall into an infinit and inextricable labyrinth, whereof no knowledge is to bee had, or certaine precept to be giuen. For so a man should forge and fashion infinit numbers of Com∣monweales, not onely according to the diuersitie of vertues and vices; but euen accor∣ding to the varietie of things indifferent also. As if a Monarch were to bee chosen for [ E] his strength, or for his beautie, for his stature, or for his nobilitie, or riches, which are all things indifferent; or for his martial disposition, or for that he is more giuen to peace, for his grauitie, or for his iustice, for his beautie, or for his wisdom, for his sobrietie, or his humilitie, for his simplicitie, or his chastitie; and so for all other qualities, a man should so make an infinitie of Monarchies: and in like sort in the Aristocratique state, if some few of many should haue the soueraigntie aboue the rest, such as excelled others in ri∣ches, nobilitie, wisedome, iustice, martiall prowesse, or other like vertues, or vices, or things indifferent, there should thereof arise infinit formes of Commonweales: a thing

most absurd, and so by consequent the opinion whereof such an absurditie ariseth, is [ F] to be reiected. Seeing therefore that the accidentall qualitie chaungeth not the nature of things: let vs say that there are but three estates or sorts of Commonweales; name∣ly a Monarchie, an Aristocratie, and a Democratie. We call it a Monarchie, when* 1.520 one man alone hath the soueraigntie in a Commonweale, in such sort as wee haue aforesaid. And a Democratie, or Popular estate, when all the people, or the greater part thereof hath in it the soueraigne power and commaund, as in one bodie. The Aristocratie is, when the lesser part of the people hath the Soueraigntie, as in one bo∣die, and giueth lawes vnto the rest of the people, whether it be in generall, or in particu∣lar: all which things are of themselues more cleerer than the day. And true it is, that the writers of auntient time do therein well agree, that there can be no lesse then three [ G] kindes or sortes of Commonweales: Whereunto some others haue ioyned a fourth, composed of all three: and some other a fift, diuers from all the rest.

Plato hath vnto these three well adioyned a fourth kind, that is to wit, where some few of the better sort excelling the rest in vertue, haue the soueraignetie: which for all* 1.521 that in proper tearmes, is nothing else but a pure Aristocratie: how be it, he hath not receiued the mixture of the aforesaid three states, for an other diuers forme of a Com∣monweale. Aristotle beside these three kinds of Commonweales which we haue spoken of: and the fourth also named by Plato, setteth downe a fift kind of Common weale, by confounding together the three former states, and so maketh fiue sorts of states or Commonweales. But Polybius reckneth vp seauen sorts; three commend∣able: [ H] three faultie: and the seauenth compounded of the mixture of the three first. Dionysius Halycarnasseus, Marcus Tullius, Thomas More, Gaspar Contarenus, Frauncis Machiauell, and many other following Polybius, haue as it were with one consent ap∣prooued his opinion, which in deed is most auntient, and tooke not beginning from Polybius, although he would seeme to be the authour thereof, neither from Aristotle, but aboue foure hundred yeares before Aristotle. Herodotus (the father of antiquitie) writeth, that fourth kind of a Commonweale, confused of the three other, to haue be•…•… commended of many, and yet for all that contenting himselfe with the three former kinds, reiecteth the rest as imperfect: And were it not that I were not onely by proba∣ble arguments, but euen by forcible reasons drawne from that opinion of Polybius, [ I] Tullie, and the rest, I could easilie haue suffered my selfe to haue been ouercome by the authoritie of so great and graue men. It behoueth vs therefore by liuely reasons to shew them to haue erred and been deceiued, which haue brought in that fourth kind of Commonweale composed of the mixture of the other three: which I trust the more plainly to bring to passe, if I shall vse the same examples in refelling of them, that they themselues haue before vsed. For they them selues haue set downe the Lacede∣monian, Roman, and Venetian Commonweales to haue been compounded and sweetely mingled with the three kind of states, that is to say, with the Monarchie, Ari∣stocratie, and Democratie. But when Plato said, the best kind of a Commonweale •…•…o be composed of the mixture of a Monarchie and Democratie, he was therefore forth∣with [ K] reprehended by his scholler Aristotle, saying, that of these two could no com∣mendable state be made, and that therefore it was better of all three estates to make a fourth: wherein Aristotle reasoneth also against himselfe; for if he confesse no good thing possiblie to be made of two extreames; what shall then bee made of three con∣founded amongst them selues? And for that this opinion for the making of a fourth* 1.522 estate of the confusion of the rest, may moue great troubles in Commonweales, and therein worke maruelous effects, it is requisite for vs well to examine the same: For when states of Commonweales are in them selues contrarie, as a Monarchie and a

Democratie, they are by contrarie lawes and ordinances to be gouerned. The Flo∣rentins [ A] throughly perswaded of that opinion of the auntients for the mingling of the three estates together, as the best forme of a Commonweale; when they moued with the seditious sermons of P. Soderin, and Hierome Sauanarola, had translated the soue∣raignetie or chiefe power of the Commonweale vnto the people: thought it best to keepe the rout of the vulgar and common people from bearing of offices and rule, and altogether from the affaires of state: that so the chiefe managing of matters might be reserued vnto the more auntient sort of the citizins, and such as were of greater wealth and abilitie then the rest: who yet had not power to dispose of all matters, but onely of such things as were the chiefest, viz. the making of lawes, the creating of magistrats, and disposing of the common treasure: reseruing the rest vnto the Senat and magi∣strats, [ B] that so they might inioy that moderat state of a Commonweale, whereof they had so strongly dreamed. And certes if of the three estates moderately mixed might a fourth state arise, it should haue a certein power by nature diuers from the rest: as we see in Harmonicall consent, composed of Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportion artificially confused; yet quite differing from them both: so as if the mixture of things of diuers and contrarie natures, ariseth a third all together differing from the things so together mixed. But that state which is made of the mixture of the three kinds of Commonweales, differeth in deede nothing from a meane popular state; For if three cities, whereof one of them is gouerned by a king, and so a Monarchie; the second by the nobilitie, and so an Aristocratie; the third by the people, and so a Democratie; [ C] should be confounded, and so thrust together into one and the same forme of a Com∣monweale, and so the chiefe power and soueraignetie communicated vnto all: who is there that can doubt but that that state shall be all together a state popular? except the soueraignetie should by turnes be giuen; first to the king, then to the nobilitie, and af∣terwards to the people; As in the vacancie of the Roman kingdome, the king being dead, the Senators ruled by turnes: yet must they needes againe fall vnto one of these three kinds of a Commonweale which we haue spoken of: nether could this alterna∣tiue manner of gouernement be of any long continuance, either yet more profitable to the Commonweale, then as if in an euill gouerned familie, the wife should first commaund the husband; then the children them both; and the seruants after them to [ D] dominier ouer all.

But to confound the state of a monarkie, with the Popular or Aristocratical estate, is a thing impossible, and in effect imcompatible, and such as cannot be imagined. For i•…•… soueraignetie be of it selfe a thing indivisible, (as wee haue before showed) how can it then at one and the same time be diuided betwixt one prince, the nobilitie, and the people in common? The first marke of soueraigne maiestie is, to be of power to giue lawes, and to commaund ouer them vnto the subiects, and who should those subiects bee that should yeelde their obedience vnto that law, if they should also haue the power to make the lawes? who should he be that could giue the law? being himselfe [ E] constrained to receiue it of them vnto whom he him selfe gaue it? So that of necessitie we must conclude, that as no one in particular hath the power to make the law in such a state, that then the state must needs be a state popular. Now if we shall giue power vnto the people to make lawes, and to creat magistrats, and not to meddle in the rest; we must yet needs confesse that such power giuen vnto the magistrats belonged vnto the people, and that it is not giuen but as in trust vnto the magistrats: whom the peo∣ple may againe displace, euen aswell as they placed them, in such sort as that the state should alwaies be popular.

And to proue that which wee haue said to be true, let vs take the same examples that

Polybius, Contarenus, and the rest haue left vs; They say that the state of the Lacede∣monians [ F] was composed of all the three kinds of states which we spoke of: For that in that Commonweale they had two kings representing a Monarchie; eight and twen∣tie Senators representing an Aristocratie; and fiue Ephori figuring and patronizing the popular estate. But what will these men then say to Herodotus, who bringeth the* 1.523 Lacedemonian estate for an example of a most pure Aristocratie? what will they also aunswere vnto Theucidides, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Plutarche? who speaking of the warres of Peloponnesus (which continued twentie yeres betwixt the Popular and the Aristocratique Commonweals) say, that the whole drift of the Athenians and their allies was to chaunge the Aristocraties into Democraties, as they did in Samos, Corfu, and all the other cities by them subdued. Whereas contrariewise the Lacedemoni∣ans [ G] purpose and intention was to chaunge the Popular states into Aristocraties, as in deede they did in all the cities of Greece after the victorie of Lysander; yea euen in the citie of Athens it selfe, where after he had layed the wals euen with the ground, he tooke the soueraignetie from the people, and gaue the same vnto thirtie citizens, (who are therefore of the Athenians called the thirtie Tyrants) to rule and gouerne in such sort and manner as they did amongst the Lacedemonians, where so many, and no moe had the gouernement of the state. But among the citizens of Samos, the Siaeyons, the Aeginits, the Mylesians, and other cities of Ionia and the lesser Asia, they gaue the soueraignetie vnto Tenne principal men, with one chiefe Captaine ouer them, for the managing of the warres; calling hoame againe such as had bene bani∣shed [ H] for holding with the Aristocratie, and driuing into exile them that were chiefe of the popular factions.

What will they also say to Maximus Tyrius, who reckning vp the States which held the pure Aristrocratie first of all nameth the Lacedemonians, and after them the Thessalians, the Pellenians, the Cretentians, and the Mantineans. We must first con∣uince these so many and so famous authours of vntruth, before we can thrust the La∣cedemonians from their Aristocratie: which writers liuing almost in the same time wherein the Athenian and Lacedemonian Commonweales flourished, and beeing* 1.524 themselues Grecians, were like more certainly and truely to know these things, than a Venetian Senator, a Florentine, or an English man. [ I]

What was it then that deceiued Polybius, who was himself a Megalopolitan, borne neere vnto the Lacedemonians? Truely it was euen the name of the Lacedemonian kings. For Lycurgus hauing altered the state of the Commonweale, and by the good will and consent of the kings themselues (who deriued their pedegree from Hercules) hauing translated the soueraigntie vnto the people, left vnto the kings, but the bare name and title onely, and to be the generals in warres. For why the regall power was now before alreadie sore shaken and weakned: after that Aristodemus king of Lace∣demonia, had at once left his two sonnes to raigne together ouer the Lacedemonians (to the imitation of the Messenians, ouer whome Amphareus and Leucippus together raigned) who whilest they would both be kings and commaund ouer all, could neither [ K] of them so be, but by their ielous conceits and contentions, drawing the state into facti∣ons, gaue occasion to Lycurgus, being descended also of the same stocke with them, to ouerthrow their royall power, leauing vnto them and their house nothing els but the name and show of kings, giuing the rest vnto the Senat and the people. But as in Athens and Rome, after the kings were thence driuen out, they yet left the name of a king vnto a certaine priest, whome they called King of the Sacrifices, to doe a certaine sacrifice, which the king himselfe onely had in former time done: Which priest for all that was himselfe subiect vnto the great bishop, and could not (as Plutarch saith) haue

any estate, or beare any office as the other priests might: euen so did Lycurgus vnto [ A] the two kings of Lacedemonia, who vpon the matter were nothing but Senators, ha∣uing but their voyces with the rest, without any power at all to commaund; but to the contrarie were themselues constrayned to obey the commaundements of the Ephori, who oftentimes put them to their fines, yea and condemned them to death also, as they did the kings Agis and Pausanias, the soueraigntie still resting with the people, in whose power it was to confirme or infirme the acts and decrees of the Senat. Thucidi∣des also himselfe reiecteth the opinion of them which thought the kings each of them to haue had two voyces. But about an hundred yeares after the popular state, orday∣ned, was againe chaunged by the kings Polydorus and Theopompus; seeing it to bee an hard matter to call the people together, and a great deale harder to rule them by rea∣son, [ B] being assembled; oftentimes at their pleasure reuersing the most wholesome and religious decrees of the Senat. Wherefore they chaunged that popular gouernment into an Aristocratie, subtilly wresting an Oracle of Apollo to that purpose: whereby the God (as they said) commaunded that from thenceforth the gouernment of the Com∣monweale should be in the power of the Senat: and yet to please the people so grie∣ued to haue left their power, they gaue them leaue to draw out of themselues fiue jud∣ges, called Ephori, as Tribunes or patrons of the people, who should examine the say∣ings, doings, and deuises of the kings, and by all meanes let them from the exercising of tyranny. And these Ephorie, euerie ninth yeare once, vpon some cleere night gazing vpon the firmament (as Plutarch saith) if they then saw any starre, as it were, sparkle or [ C] shoot, they thereupon committed their kings to prison, who might not thence be deli∣uered, vntill the Oracle of Apollo had so declared. In like manner the Phylactes or Gailor, euerie yeare had the king of Cumes in prison, vntill the Senat had determined what should be done with him. Now this state of the Lacedemonian Commonweale endured about fiue hundred yeares, vntill the time of Cleomenes, who hauing slaine the Ephori and the Senatours, and so oppressed the Commonweale, tooke vppon himselfe the soueraigntie, and so held it vntill such time as he was ouercome by Antigonus king of Macedon; who hauing vanquished him, restored that Commonweale into the state it was before: howbeit that twentie yeares after, being fallen againe into the power of Nabis the tyrant, who was afterward slaine by Philopomenes, that Commonweale was [ D] vnited vnto the state of the Achaeans, whereof it was a prouince, vntill that about thirty yeares after, it was by Gallus the Roman Proconsull taken from the Achaeans, and by Roman emperours set at libertie. Thus in few words you may see the true historie of the the Lacedemonian Commonweale, for most part taken from Xenophon, Thuci∣dides, Liuy, & Polybius, whereof yet no man hath more curiously written than Plutarch, who out of the Lacedemonian acts and publike records, hath corrected such things as of others haue bene but slightly or falsly set downe and reported: which hath giuen occasion to many to be deceiued, and to thinke that state to haue bene mingled of the three diuers kindes of Commonweales. Which is plainly to be gathered out of Li∣uie, where he bringeth in Nabis the first tyrant of Lacedemonia, thus speaking to Titus [ E] Flaminius, Noster legulator Lycurgus, non in paucorum manu Rempub•…•…esse voluit, quem vos Senatum appellatis, nec eminere vnum aut alterum ordinem in ciuitate, sed per aequati∣onem fortunae & dignitatis fore credidit, vt multi essent qui propatria arma ferrent, Our lawgiuer Lycurgus (saith he) would not the state of our Commonweale to bee in few mens hands, which you call the Senat, neither would haue any one or other order to excell the rest in our citie; but by the making equall of mens fortune and dignitie, thought it would come to passe, that there should be many which would beare armes for their countrey. Thus he couereth his tyrranny with the show of a popular state,

when as then there was no popular estate at all; yet in that he said most truely, that [ F] Lycurgus at the beginning gaue the soueraigntie vnto the people.

But let vs see the rest. They also haue put for example the Roman Commonweale, which they said to haue bene mingled of the three kinds of Commonweales: For so saith Polybius (who was maister to Africanus the Great) Wee see (saith hee) the regall power in the Consuls, the Aristocratie in the Senat, and the Democratie in the people.* 1.525 Vnto whome do plainely assent Dionysius Halycarnasseus, Cicero, Contarenus, Sir Tho∣mas More, and many others: which opinion for all that is neither grounded vppon truth not reason. For where is this Monarchie, that is to say, the soueraigne gouern∣ment of one man? which in the two Consuls cannot bee imagined. But soueraigne maiestie, if it were in the consuls could not possibly be diuided betwixt two, for the in∣diuisible [ G] nature thereof, which it seemeth more probable and reasonable to attribute the same vnto the dukes of Genua or Venice. But what regall power could there bee in the two Roman Consuls? who could neither make law, nor peace, nor warre, nei∣ther* 1.526 any great officer, neither graunt pardon, neither take a peny out of the common treasure, neither so much as to whip a citisen, if it were not in time of warre, without leaue of the people: which hath bene a power alwaies giuen to all gouernours of ar∣mies, whome we also may so call kings, and with greater appearance than the Consuls, who had not power but the one of them after the other, and that but for the space of one yeare onely. The constable of Fraunce, the chiefe Bassa of the Turkes, the Bethu∣dere in Aethiopia, the Edegnare in the kingdome of Afrike, haue ten times more power [ H] than had the two Consuls together, & yet for all that they are but subiects & slaues to other princes, as were the Consuls subiects and seruants vnto the people. And to what purpose say they, that the Consuls had such royall authoritie, seeing that the least of the Tribunes of the people might imprison them. As did Drusus the Tribune, who by a sergeant tooke Philip the Consull by the coller, and cast him in prison, for that hee had interrupted him, as he was speaking vnto the people: and that he might lawfully so doe, shall hereafter be declared. The power of the Consuls was to lead the armies, war being before denounced, to assemble the Senat, to present the letters of the captaines and allies vnto the Senat, to giue audience vnto ambassadours before the people or the Senat, to call together the great estate, and to demaund the aduise of the people, about [ I] the election of officers, or promulgation of lawes; who yet standing, spake vnto the people sitting, and their mases downe, in token of their subiection vnto the people. The same authoritie with the Consuls had the chiefe gouernour of the citie in their ab∣sence. Ioyne hereunto also, that the Consuls had power but for one yeare: where∣fore I leaue this opinion as scarce worthy the refuting.

Now as concerning the Senat, which they say to haue had the forme and power of* 1.527 an Aristocratie, it was so farre there from, as that there was neuer priuie councell, which had not more authoritie: for it had no power to commaund either particular men, or magistrats: yea the Senators might not assemble themselues, except it so pleased the Consuls, or the Praetor in the absence of the Consuls: insomuch that Caesar a popular [ K] man, perceiuing himselfe not gratious with the Senat, oftentimes called the people to∣gether in the yeare of his Consulship: but the Senat in all that yeare he assembled but once or twice, still presenting his request vnto the people when he would obtaine any thing: which was no great noueltie, for the Consull for his pleasure to doe, contrarie to the good liking and mind of the Senat. For we read (that the Senat at such time as it was in greatest authoritie that euer it was) in the daungerous time of the Common∣wealth, hauing requested the Consuls to name a dictatour, the Consuls would therein doe nothing: insomuch that the Senat hauing no power to commaund them, neither

any sergeant or like officer, which are the true markes of them which haue the power [ A] to commaund, sent Seruilius Priscus with their request vnto the Tribunes in this sort, * Vos (inquit) Tribuni plebis Senatus appellat, vt in tanto discrimine Reipublicae dictatorem* 1.528 dicere, Consules pro vestra potestate cogatis: Tribuni pro collegio pronunciant, placere Con∣sules Senatui dicto audientes esse, aut in vinculase duci iussuros, The Senat (saith he) ap∣pealeth vnto you the Tribunes of the people, that in so great daunger of the Com∣monweale, you for the great authoritie you haue, would compell the Consuls to no∣minat a Dictator: whereupon the Tribunes pronounced for their whole societie, that their pleasure was, that the Consuls should be obedient vnto the Senat, or els that they would commaund them to prison. And in another * place the same author saith, That* 1.529 the Senat was of aduise, that the Consull should present the request vnto the people, [ B] for the commaunding of him whom they would haue Dictator: which if the Con∣sull should refuse to doe, that then the Praetor of the citie should do it: who if he should refuse also, that then the Tribunes of the people should propound the matter. Consul negauit se populum rogaturum, Praetoremque rogare vetuit: Tribuni plebis rogarunt, The Consull denied to request the people, and forbad the Praetor also to request them, the Tribunes made the request. Wherby it euidently appeareth, that the Senat could not so much as commaund the lesser magistrats, the greater magistrats forbidding them. And as for that which Polybius saith, That the Senat had power to iudge of ci∣ties and prouinces, and to take punishment of conspirators against the state: * Liuie* 1.530 showeth it to haue bene otherwise, as when question was made for the chastising of the [ C] traitors of Campania, who after the battell at Cannas had ioyned themselues vnto Hannibal, an auntient Senator said in full Senat, Per Senatum agi de Campanis iniussu populi non video posse, I see not that any thing can by the Senat bee done concerning the Campanians without the commaundement of the people. And a little after, Ro∣gatio ferator ad populum, qua Senatui potestas fiat statuendi de Campanis, Let request bee made vnto the people, wherby power may be giuen vnto the Senat, to determine con∣cerning the Campanians. And vpon the request to that purpose presented vnto the people, the people gaue them commission, and commaunded the Senat to proceed* 1.531 against them in this sort, Quod Senatus maxima pars censeat, qui assident id volumus iu∣bemusque, What the greatest part of the Senat shall agree vppon, wee that here sit [ D] will and commaund the same. Neither is Polybius •…•…sse deceiued, in saying, That the Senat at pleasure disposed of the prouinces and gouernments: whereas Liuie the best author of the Roman antiquities, is of contrarie opinion, writing thus, Qui•…•…tus Fului∣us postulauit a Consule vt palam in Senatu diceret, permitteret ne Senatui vt de prouincijs decerneret, staturusque eo esset quod censuisset, an ad populum laturus: Scipio respondit se quode Republica esset facturum. Tum Fuluius a vobis peto Tribuni plebis vt mihi auxi∣lio sitis. Quintus Fuluius requested of the Consul, that hee should openly say in the Senate whether hee gaue leaue or not vnto the Senat, to determine of the prouinces, and whether he would stand to that it should decree, or els would referre the matter vnto the people: Whereunto Scipio answered, That hee would do that which should [ E] be for the good of the Commonweale. Then said Fuluius, I request you the Tribunes of the people to aid and helpe me. So that it plainely appeareth, the Senat to haue had no power at all, neither the decrees thereof to haue bene of any force, without the consent of the Tribunes of the people: and that the rest they had by the sufferance of the same people. Now he that hath nothing but by sufferance, hath indeed nothing of his owne, as we haue before said. Yea such decrees of the Senat, as were confirmed by the consent of the Tribunes of the people, vnto whome they were to be communica∣ted, could not yet be put in execution, except that either the Consuls did so command;

or that the Consuls refusing so to do, the Tribunes themselues propounded the same [ F] vnto the people. So that in briefe all matters of estate, and namely all the councels and decrees of the Senat were of no force or vertue, if the people did not so command: or if the Tribunes of the people consented not thereunto, as wee haue before touched, and shall more at large declare in speaking of a Senat. Wherefore in the Roman state, the gouernment was in the magistrats, the authoritie and councell in the Senat, but the soueraigne power and maiestie of the Commonweale was in the people. Ex∣cepting that time wherein the Decemuiri contrarie to the law, kept in their hands lon∣ger than a yeare, the soueraigne power to make lawes committed vnto them; from which they were shortly after by force of armes remoued: for then it might of right haue bene called an Aristocracie, or more properly to say an Oligarchie. Now as we [ G] haue before said, that the power of magistrats (how great soeuer it be) is not of them∣selues, neither theirs, but as committed vnto them in trust: so at the first, after the dri∣uing out of the kings, the Senators were chosen by the people; who to discharge them∣selues of that labour, committed that charge to the Censors, who were also chosen by the people, so that vpon the matter all the authoritie of the Senat depended of the peo∣ple, who at their pleasure vsed to confirme or infirme, to ratifie or disanull the decrees of the Senat.

The same opinion hath Contarenus of the Venetian Commonweale, saying it to be* 1.532 also mixt of the three formes of Commonweales, as were those of Rome and Lace∣demonia: For, saith he, the royall power is in a sort in the duke of Venice, the Aristo∣cracie [ H] in the Senat, and the popular estate in the Grand Councell. But Ianot after him hath most curiously brought to light the true estate of the Venetian Commonweale; wherein he sheweth by most euident testimonies, drawne out of the most auntient and true Venetian records, That Contarenus in so saying was much deceiued. He sheweth plainely, that not past three hundred yeares ago, before the time of Sebastian Cyanee duke of Venice, the Venetian estate was a pure monarchie. Howbeit that Contare∣nus writeth it to haue bene established in the state it now is eight hundred yeares: and Pau. Manutius, saith it to haue so stood twelue hundred yeares: all which Ianot pro∣ueth out of the publike records, and certaine historie to be vntrue. But howsoeuer that be, plaine it is, at this day to be a pure Aristocracie: For by the view of the citie and the [ I] * 1.533 citisens, which was taken about thirtie yeares ago, were reckoned nine and fiftie thou∣sand three hundred fortie nine citizens, beside children vnder seuen yeares old, but of Gentlemen, in whome resteth the soueraigne power of that state, betwixt foure and fiue thousand yong and old: yet had the church men and gentlemen vnder fiue and twentie yeares old, nothing to do with the state, more than to looke on, neither had they accesse into the Grand Councell, but by way of request: the young gentlemen beeing so vpon request receiued at the age of thirtie yeares, according as discretion was to be seene more in some one, than in some others: and yet hath it not bene found this hundred yeare, that the Grand Councell assembled, to decide the great affaires of that state, hath exceeded the number of fifteene hundred, as is to be seene in the histo∣ries [ K] of Sabellicus, and of cardinall Bembus, the rest being absent. It is therefore the least* 1.534 part of the Venetians that haue the soueraigntie, and they also of certaine noble fami∣lies, for all the gentlemen borne in Venice, are not receiued into the Grand Councell; but there are of one and the same stocke, of the same race, of the same name, whereof some are citisens, and come not into the councell, and the others come. I do not here set downe the reason why, which euery man may see in Sabellicus. This great councel as Contarenus saith, hath soueraigne power to make and repeale lawes, to place or dis∣place all officers, to receiue the last appeales, to determine of peace and warre, and to

giue pardon vnto the condemned. Wherein Contarenus condemneth himselfe: for [ A] seeing it is (as he saith) it cannot be denied, but that the state of this Commonweale is Aristocratique. For were it that the Great Councell had no other power than to make lawes and magistrats, it were enough to proue it to be an Aristocraticall state, as we haue before said: for if those officers haue any power, they hold it of the Seigneu∣rie: which sufficeth to show, that neither the Decemuiri, neither the Senat, neither the Sages, nor yet the duke with his sixe councellors, haue any power but by sufferance, and so farre as it shall please the Great Councell. As for the duke himselfe he alone of all* 1.535 other magistrats hath no command at all, as not hauing power to condemne any man before him, neither to stay or examine any man; which is the first marke of command, giuen euen vnto the least magistrats, neither may he decide any cause whether it be in [ B] matters of state, or administration of iustice; either in the assembly of the sixe coun∣cellors, or of the Decemuiri, or of the Sages, or of the Senat, or of the fortie judges in ciuill or criminall causes, or of the Grand Councell. For albeit that he may enter into all their corporations and colleges, yet so it is, that he hath but his voice, as any one of them; but that he vseth to giue it to the last: neither dare he to open any letter directed vnto the Seigneurie, or admit or discharge any ambassadours, but in the presence of his sixe councellors, or of the Decemuiri, or to go out of the citie without leaue. Yea Fa∣lerius the duke, for that he had without the consent of the councell married a straunger, was by the Decemuiri hanged. And beside him Sabellicus reckoneth vp twelue dukes moe, either by the tumultuous people slaine, or otherwise put to death for abusing their [ C] authoritie. But he weareth a most pretious cap, a robe of gold, he is followed, honou∣red, and respected as a prince: and the coyne carrieth his name, albeit that the stampe of the Seigneurie be vpon it, which are all tokens of a prince: all which royall magni∣ficence we graunt him to haue, but yet all without power or commaund. Now if it were so that we should not according vnto truth, but after showes and appearances iudge of the estate of Commonweales, there should be found none simple and pure, but all mixt and confused in such sort as they say. Yea the empire of Germanie should be much more mixt, than the Venetian state. For the emperour hath other markes and* 1.536 more royall than hath the duke of Venice: then the seuen princes electors, with the other princes, haue the show of an Aristocracie, or of an Oligarchie: and the ambassa∣dours [ D] of the imperiall townes resemble a Democracie. And yet for all that most cer∣taine it is, that the imperiall state of Germanie is a pure Aristocracie, composed of three or foure hundred persons at most, ouer whome one prince beareth rule, to put in exe∣cution the decrees of the councell, or els is to be forced to giue vp his office, as wee shall in due place declare. In like manner they say also the states of the Swissers to be mixed of the three diuers formes of a Commonweale: Amongst whome the Burgamaister representeth the king, the Senat an Aristocracie, and the assemblies generall and parti∣cular, the state popular: and yet for all that men know might well, that all their states and Commonweales are either popular, as are they which inhabit the mountaines, or els Aristocratike, as are almost all the rest. [ E]

And this opinion of the mixed state hath so possessed the mindes of men, that ma∣ny* 1.537 haue both thought and w•…•…it this monarchie of Fraunce (than which none can bee imagined more royall) to be mixt and composed of the three kinds of Commonweals, and that the parliament of Paris hath the forme of an Aristocracie, the three estates of a Democratie, and the king to represent the state of a monarchie: which is an opinion not onely absurd, but also capitall. For it is high treason to make the subiect equall to the king in authoritie and power, or to ioyne them as companions in the soue∣raigntie with him. And what popular power appeareth, when the three states are

assembled? or the parliament called? or wherein is the soueraigne maiestie of a prince [ F] so much manifested, as when euery man in particular, and all men in generall, aswel the noble as the meniall, with bended knee, and bare head, adore their king? offer vnto him their requests, which he at his pleasure admitteth or reiecteth. What counterpoise of a popular power against the maiestie of a monarch can there be in the assembly of the three estates? yea of the whole people, if it could be gathered into one place, which* 1.538 humbleth it selfe, requesteth and reuerenceth their king. So farre is it from that such an assembly in any thing diminisheth the power of a soueraigne prince, as that thereby his maiestie is the more encreased and augmented. For it cannot bee exalted into a more high degree of honour, of power, and of glorie, than to see an infinit number of great lords and princes, and people innumerable, of men of all sorts and qualitie, to [ G] cast themselues downe at his feet, and to doe homage vnto his maiestie; seeing that the honour, glorie, and power of princes, consisteth not but in the obeysance, homage, and seruice of their subiects. If then no forme or fashion of a popular power can bee imagined in the assembly of the three estates, which they make in this realme, no more or haply lesse than in England and Spaine: much lesse shall there be an Aristocracie in the Court of Peeres, (who are so called, for that they bee equall one with another among themselues, but not with the prince, as some haue too rustically deemed) or in the assembly of all the officers of the realme, considering that the presence of the king doth make all power and authoritie of all corporations and colleges, and of all officers aswell in generall as in particular to cease: in such sort, as that no magistrat hath power [ H] to commaund any thing in his presence, as we will in d•…•…e place declare. And albeit that the king sitting in his seat of iustice, the chauncelour first addresseth himselfe vnto him, to know his pleasure, by commaundement from whome he goeth, gathering the aduise and opinions of the princes of the blood, and other great lords, the peeres and magistrats, which he reporteth againe vnto him: yet is not that so done, to the intent to number the voyces, as in the consistorie among the judges, but that the king vnder∣standing their opinions, may as seemeth vnto him good, receiue or reiect the same. And albeit that most times he follow the opinion of the greater part, yet to make it knowne, that it is not the judges or magistrats decree, but the decree of the prince one∣ly, and that the rest of the magistrats haue therein no power, the chauncelor pronoun∣ceth [ I] not this or that to be thought good vnto the judges of the court, but with a lowd voice vseth these words, The king sayeth vnto you. Wee see also that the court of par∣liament, writing vnto the king, keepeth euen yet the auntient stile, which is this in the superscription of their letters, To our Soueraigne Lord the King. The beginning of* 1.539 which letters is on this sort, Our Soueraigne Lord in most humble wise, and so much as in vs is we recommend vs to your good grace, And the subscription placed as low as may be: Your most humble and obedient subiects and seruants, the men holding your court of Parliament. Which is not t•…•… th•…•…anner of the lords of an Aristocracies speech: neither of such as are companions in Soueraigntie with the king, but of true and humble sub∣iects. And for that I haue touched this point before, I will now lightly passe it ouer. [ K] The state of Fraunce therefore is a pure Monarchie, no•…•… mingled with the popular power, and so lesse with the Aristocratique Seigneurie: which mixture of states is al∣together impossible, and incompatible. And Aristotle most subtilly examining this opinion, for the mixture of states, truly calleth the state composed of an Aristocratic and a Democratie 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say a Commonweale: but showeth not how that may be done, neither giueth thereof example, as he vsually doth in others: but to the contrarie confesseth, that he knew none such in his time; or yet had found any such before, albeit that he is reported to haue gathered an hundred Commonweales into

one booke, which booke is now lost. And forasmuch as Aristotle seldome or neuer re∣porteth [ A] the true opinions of Plato, but to the contrarie alwaies disguiseth and obscureth them as the antient Academiques haue right well noted; and namely where hee reie∣cteth his Commonweale; vpon whose sayings many resting themselues haue often∣times deceiued both themselues and others. We not addicted to either, will in few words set downe the true opinion of Plato concerning his Commonweale, deseruing well to be knowne for the better vnderstanding of the question we haue in hand, which some which neuer read the same, call a diuine opinion: some others in the meane time treading the same vnder foot, and rayling thereat as fast.

Plato faigned vnto himselfe onely two Commonweales, whereof the first hee attri∣buted to Socrates, who neuer thought (as saith Xenophon) of that which Plato maketh [ B] him to say: and in his Commonwealth he taketh away these words, Mine, and Thine, as the source and fountaine of all euil, and would haue al goods, yea wiues and children to be common. But seeing euerie man to find fault therewith, he quietly left it, as if he had so writ more for argument sake, than for that he so thought, or to haue the same put in effect. The second is his owne, wherein hee taketh away the communitie of* 1.540 goods, of women and children: as for the rest those Commonweales are both in all things alike. For both in the one and the other, he would not haue aboue fiue thou∣sand and fortie citisens, a number by him chosen to haue 59 entire parts: in which Commonweales he also maketh three estates or degrees of men: viz. the Guardes, Souldiors, and Labourers: and after that diuideth the citisens into three degrees, accor∣ding [ C] to the vnequall rate of their substance. As for the soueraigntie hee giueth it vnto the whole multitude of the people; as to make and abrogat lawes, cause sufficient enough to iudge that he ment to make it a popular estate, if there were nothing else. But he passeth on farther, and giueth vnto the whole assembly of the people power to place and displace all the officers: and not content with that, willeth also that the peo∣ple should haue all the power to iudge in criminall causes; for that they are (as he saith) all therein interessed. In briefe he giueth vnto the people power of life and death, to condemne, and to graunt pardon; which are all euident arguments of a popular state. For he appointeth no soueraigne magistrat, which might represent the state royall, and but a little of the forme Aristocratique: for he willeth, that the Senat, or the counsel for [ D] the affaires of the state, which he calleth Guards or keepers should consist of foure hun∣dred citisens, to be chosen of the people. Whereby it is most euidently to bee vnder∣stood, that Plato his Commonwealth is the most popular that euer was, yea then that of his owne countrey of Athens, which Xenophon thought to haue bene the most po∣pular state in the world. I omit the 726 lawes set downe by Plato, in the twelue books for the gouernment of his Commonweale: sufficeth it mee to haue showed Plato his imagined Commonweale not to haue bene made of a mixture of an Aristocracie, and Democracie, as Aristotle said, whose errour Cicero, Contarenus, and others, one after another following, led the rest that followed them into errour also.

Let vs therefore conclude, neuer any Commonwealth to haue beene made of an [ E] Aristocracie and popular estate; and so much lesse of the three states of Common∣weales, and that there are not indeed but three estates of Commonweales, as Herodo∣tus first most truely said amongst the Greekes, whome Tacitus amongst the Latins imi∣tating, saith, Cunctas nationes & vrbes, populus, aut primores, aut singuli regunt, The peo∣ple, the nobilitie, or one alone, do rule all nations and cities.

But some man will say, May there not be a Commonweale, wherein the people hath the power to create the magistrats, to dispose of the common reuenew, and power of life and death; which are three markes of soueraigntie, & the nobilitie to haue power

to make lawes, to dispose of peace and warre, and of the impositions and taxes; which [ F] are also markes of soueraigntie: and besides all these to haue one royall magistrat aboue all, vnto whome all the people in generall, and euerie one in particular should yeeld their faith and liege loyaltie, and from whose iudgement none might appeale or present any ciuill request. For so the rights and markes of soueraigntie should seeme to be diuided in three parts: the people chalenging one part thereof, the nobilitie ano∣ther, and the king the third: whereby in that state a mixture might seeme to bee made of the royall Aristocratique and popular state together. Whereunto I aunswere, that such a state was neuer found, neither that such a state can bee made, or yet well imagi∣ned,* 1.541 considering that the markes of soueraigntie are indiuisible. For the nobilitie which should haue the power to make the lawes for all: (which is as much as to say to com∣maund [ G] and forbid what them pleased, without power to appeale from them, or for a man to oppose himselfe against their commaunds) would by their lawes at their plea∣sure forbid others to make peace or warre, or to leuie taxes, or to yeeld fealtie and ho∣mage without their leaue: and he againe to whome fealtie and homage is due, would bind the nobilitie and people not to yeeld their obedience vnto any other, but vnto himselfe. And admit that euerie one would seeke to defend his owne right, and not suffer any thing to be taken from him that he thought belonged to himselfe: yet that doth most differ from the nature of a Monarchie, that he which hath the soueraigntie, should himselfe bee enforced to obey any other but especially his subiect. Where∣by it commeth to passe, that where the rights of soueraigntie are diuided betwixt the [ H] prince and his subiects: in that confusion of the state, there is still endlesse sturres and quarrels, for the superioritie, vntill that some one, some few, or all together haue got the soueraigntie. Whereof as there be many examples of old, so is there none fitter in our time, than the example of the kings of Denmarke, whome the nobilitie euer since Christiern the great grandfather of Frederike which now raigneth, hath almost made subiect vnto the lawes. Christiern they thrust out of his kingdome, and set vp his co∣sen in his place, with condition that he should neither make peace nor warre, without the leaue of the senat: nor that he should haue any power to condemne any gentleman to death; with many other like articles, which I will in their place set downe: which the kings since that time haue sworne to keepe: which that they should not go against, [ I] but that they might be the more firmly kept, the nobilitie will in no case that the king should of himselfe make any peace; and yet haue themselues made a league with the king of Polonia, and them of Lubec, against the king, for the defence of their libertie. So indeed are the rights of Soueraigntie diuided betwixt the king and the nobilitie, but so as that they both liuing in perpetuall feare and distrust; do seeke for the alliance and fellowship of their neighbour princes and people, so to receiue the lesse harme one of them from another. With like surges and tempests is the kingdome of Sweden also tossed, the king whereof liued in such distrust with his nobilitie, as that king Henry was* 1.542 glad to take a German for his Chauncelour, and one Var•…•…nnes a Norman for his high Constable: and yet at length was by his nobilitie thrust out of his royall seat, and by [ K] them cast in prison, wherein hee liued seuenteene yeare. Wherefore such states as wherein the rights of soueraigntie are diuided, are not rightly to bee called Common∣weales, but rather the corruption of Commonweales, as Herodotus hath most briefly, but most truely written. For as bodies by nature well framed, if they begin to change, with wonderfull stinke and contagion annoy all that come neere them, vntill they bee quite altered, and become new things; as when egges are set vpon, which before they were set, and after they be hatched also haue a good smell and taste, though in the verie alteration of them not so: so also Commonweales which chaunge their state, the so∣ueraigne

right and power of them being diuided, find no rest from ciuill warres and [ A] broiles, vntill they againe recouer some one of the three formes, and that the soue∣raigntie be wholie in one of the states or other.

Yet might one say, that in the estate of the Romans the lesse part of the people cho∣sen out of the richer sort made the lawes, and greatest officers; namely the Consuls▪ the Praetors, the Censors, had both soueraigne power of life and death: and disposed of warre, and that the greater sort of the people made the lesser officers and magistrats, to wit, the Tribuns of the people; the foure and twentie militarie Tribunes; the two Aediles or Sherifes; the Treasourers; the Scout, and mynt masters, and gaue also all benefices vacant, and more then that the greater part of the people iudged of the great criminall processes before Sylla, if it tended not to the naturall or ciuill death of [ B] any. And by this meane it seemeth that that Commonweal was composed of an Ari∣stocracie, and of a popular estate: Whereunto I answere, that it had well some ap∣pearance, but yet neuerthelesse was in effect a true popular estate: for albeit that the great estate of the people was diuided into sixe degrees, or companies, according to euery ones abilitie, and that the knights, and the greatest part of the Senators, and of the nobilitie, and richer sort of the people were of the first companie: who agreeing among themselues, the lawes by them made were published, and the great magistrats by them chosen receiued to take their oath: yet neuerthelesse true it is that the fiue companies that remayned, had tenne times as many citizens in them: and in case that all the Centuries of the first companie agreed not vpon the matter, they then came to [ C] the second companie, and so by order even to the sixt and last, which in deede seldom times or neuer happen. Matters being still so agreed vpon, as that they came not al∣wayes vnto the second companie, but seldom to the third, and most seldom to the fourth, scarcely at all vnto the fift, and neuer vnto the sixt: wherein was all the rabble of the poore and base people, in number farre exceeding all the rest: yet sufficeth it for our purpose, that all the people had thein part, to shew it to haue beene a popular state: albeit that the most noble and richer sort were first called. And yet for all that the meniall people, (that is to say, the greater sort of the people) without the nobilitie, seeing them selues sometime deceiued of their voices (after that the kings were driuen out) and little or no regard to be had of them, began tumultuously to arise: whereof [ D] grew the three departures of the people into the mount Auentine, whither the people in armes had retired them selues for the defence of their libertie and power against the nobilitie: which could not bee appeased vntill it was lawfull for them to chuse vnto them selues their owne sacred magistrats, and that in their owne assemblies, from which the nobilitie was excluded: and then the Commonweal seemed in a maner to haue beene mixt of the nobilitie and the people. But if a man will consider the short∣nes of the time, and the turmoyles where with the Commonweal was in the meane time afflicted, he shall confesse that it could scarce haue stood in that state, although most miserable twentie or thirtie yeares: neither yet so long, had it not on euery side beene beset with enemies. For shortly after the people tooke vnto them selues the [ E] power to make lawes, wherein the maiestie of the Commonweal is contained; and so by little and little wrested from the nobilitie (much against their will & long strugling therefore) the other soueraigne rights also: in somuch that the nobilitie scarce made twelue lawes in the space of foure or fiue hundred; And yet at the same time that the people chose the greater magistrats by their greatest assemblies, the vulgar people was there present, and enrolled in the sixt companie, which although it most seldom gaue suffrage or voice, yet might it so do, if the other companies should haue disagreed among them selues: a reason sufficient to showe the state even at that time also to haue

beene a popular state. [ F]

Yet for all that a man may say that it followeth not hereof that there are not but three sorts of Commonweals, although they cannot be amongst them selues mixed: for it may be that of threescore thousand citizens in a citie, fortie thousand may haue the soueraigntie, and twentie thousand be excluded: where, for that the greater part beareth the sway, it shal be a popular state: and contrarie wise if but an hundred of that multitude shall haue the soueraigntie, it shall be an Aristocracie; for that the lesse part of the citizens gathered together hath the soueraigne power: what then, if of the same number of citizens fiue and twentie thousand shall hold the chiefe power? Truely, it may be doubted whether such a state be an Aristocracie, although the lesse part of the citizens enioy the soueraigntie, the rest being reiected: for why, it differeth much whe∣ther [ G] an hundred citizens, or fiue and twentie thousand beare rule, and much more if of an hundred thousand citizens fiue and fortie thousand haue the soueraigntie: or of so great a multitude thirtie onely should beare the sway, the rest excluded, as among the Lacedemonians: yet I alwaies deeme it to be an Aristocracie, if the lesser part of the* 1.543 citizens beare rule ouer the rest: for otherwise if the diuersitie of the number should make the diuersitie of Commonweals, there should be of them a million, yea an infi∣nite of diuers kinds of Commonweals: for the number of them which should haue part in the state encreasing or diminishing, should make an infinite diuersitie, whereof no knowledge is to be had; suffiseth it the soueraigne power to be with the greater or* 1.544 lesser part of the people, for the making of an Aristocracie or Democracie. The rest [ H] of the difficulties which might be moued concerning the nature of euery Common weal shall hereafter be in due place declared.

Yet one thing remayneth in the question we haue in hand to be discussed, which is that the Roman Commonweal vnder the emperour Augustus, and the other empe∣rours after him, vnto the time of Flauius Vespatianus, was called a principalitie, of which sort of Commonweal, neither Herodotus, neither any of the Greek or Latine writers, except Tranquillus, seemeth to make any mention: for he writeth that the emperour Caligula, seeing diuers kings at his table to enter into the tearmes of ho∣nour, and the antiquitie of their houses among themselues; with a loude voice brought forth that verse of Homer which Agamemnon vseth against Achilles, who would [ I] needs make himselfe equall and companion with him.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

An euill thing it is to be ruled by many: one prince, and one king, where there is any.

And much it missed not but that hee had euen than taken vpon him the imperiall crowne, and chaunged the forme of the Roman principalitie into a kingdome; and thus much he. whereby it is to be vnderstood the Roman state vnder Augustus af∣ter the battell at Actium, to haue beene neither a Popular state, an Aristocracie, nor a [ K] Monarchie. Now a principalitie is nothing else then an Aristocracie, or a Democra∣tie,* 1.545 in which one chiefe commaunded euery man in particular, and it is but the first in generall: for this word (Prince) to speake properly signifieth no other thing but him that is first. So the Iewes complained Aristobulus the first of the house of the Amoneans, to haue chaunged the principalitie which was Aristocratique, into two kingdomes, at such time as he tooke one crowne to himselfe, and sent an other to his brother. The like wee find, that the auncient cities of Tuscanie made alliance with Tarquinius Priscus king of the Romans; vpon condition that hee should not haue

power ouer them of life and death: neither to put garrisons into their townes, nor to [ A] impose vpon them any taxes or tallages; or to chaunge any of their customes or laws, Sed vt ciuitatum principatus penes regem Romanum esset, but that the principalitie of their cities onely should be with the Roman king: for so saith Florus. Now all those cities were of a popular state. Wherefore Tarquinius was but the first and chiefe in the assemblies of those cities, who might gouerne the multitude no otherwise than doth the emperour in the German empire, or the duke in Venice, or Genua, who may most rightly be called princes, as in the same sence in antient time the chief magistrat among the Athenians, was called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or prince: yet was that Commonweale of all other most popular.

But if there be two chiefe magistrats of like power, as in Rome; or three, as in ma∣ny [ B] cities of the Swissers; or foure, as amongst them of Geneua; it cannot there be cal∣led a principalitie, for that none is there chiefe or principall. But in the Roman Com∣monweale, Augustus by a crafty deuise hauing made himselfe but great Generall of the armie (by the name of Imperator) and Tribune of the people for defence of their pro∣fit, (from whome for all that he had taken their libertie) and as it seemed almost enfor∣ced by the Senat, had taken vpon him the charge of the Commonweale for ten yeares, made that state in show and false semblant but a principalitie, when as before hee had placed in all the prouinces fortie legions, and taken three for the safetie of his person, and put sure garrisons into all the castles and strong fortresses of the empire: so inua∣ding the royal power without a Scepter, without a Diadem, or a Crowne; whose suc∣cessors [ C] * 1.546 (excepting some few) some more, some lesse, exercised most cruell tyranny. For Tiberius in the beginning of his raigne, rise vpon the Consuls, and meeting them gaue them way, (as sayth Tranquillus) but afterwards oppressed the Commonweale with most filthy seruitude and slauerie. But here is to be considered what was in deed done, and was not made show of: for he that beareth greatest sway in the Common∣weale, him men thinke to haue the soueraigntie: but if question be made of the right, then are we to looke not what is indeed done, but what ought to be done. Wherfore it appeareth a principalitie to be nothing els, but an Aristocratie, or a Democratie, ha∣uing some one for chiefe or principall aboue the rest, the soueraigntie yet still remaining with the nobilitie or the people. [ D]

CHAP. II. ¶ Of a Lordly Monarchie, or of the sole gouernment of one.

WE haue before said, that a Monarchie is a kind of Commonweale, wherein the absolute soueraigntie lyeth in the power of one onely prince: which definition we are now to explaine. When we say of one, so the word Monarchie of it selfe importeth: For if we shall in the* 1.547 gouernment ioyne two or moe, no one of them shall haue the soue∣raigntie: for that a soueraigne is hee which commaundeth all others, [ E] and can himselfe by none be commanded. If then there be two princes equall in pow∣er, one of them hath not the power to commaund the other, neither can hee suffer the commaund of the other his companion, if it stand not with his owne pleasure, otherwise they should not be equals. Wee may then conclude, that of two princes equall in power in the same Commonweale, and both of them in al things lords of the same people, and of the same countrey indiuisibly, neither the one nor the other hath therein the soueraigntie: but it may well be said them both together to haue the so∣ueraignty of the state comprised vnder the name of an Oligarchie, but is more properly

called a Duarchie, a kind of Aristocracie, which may be of continuance and durable, so [ F] long as the two princes shall well agree together. As Romulus and Tatius, one of them king of the Romans, and the other of the Sabines, after certaine conflicts, making peace entred into societie together, vpon condition, that both their people vnited together, should dwell within the same walles, and by the name of Quirites by common soue∣raigntie be gouerned by both kings. But Romulus, who before by the slaughter of his* 1.548 brother Remus had rid himselfe of his fellow in the kingdome, could not long endure the straunger to raigne with him, but caused him to be slaine, or at leastwise held the murtherer excused, being for the fact apprehended. Long time after the Roman em∣pire was conuerted from a Monarchy into a Binarchie: at such time as Antoninus Pi∣us left M. Aurelius, and Aelius Verus, emperours, and both fellowes in the same em∣pire: [ G] of which two Aelius in short time after died, and not without the suspition of poi∣son. For it is, and alwayes hath bene a thing most hard to maintaine the equall soue∣raigntie of both together. And that which Lucan writeth,

Nulla fides regni socijs, omnis que potestas, Impatiens consortis erit.

No sincere loue is to be found in partners of the soueraigne state, And fellowship in power great, is alwaies mixt with mortall hate.

Is especially to be vnderstood of a Diumuirat, or soueraigne gouernment of two toge∣ther. [ H] For that the gouernment of three or moe together in the soueraigntie, may bee firme, but of two not so; seeing that by nature one thing is but contrarie to one, and not to many: the third as a meane still ioyning the extreames together. And there∣fore the Roman emperours, when as they at the same time tooke vpon them the same soueraigntie of gouernment, least by the mutuall concurse of their power, they should violat their faith and friendship, diuided the empire, the one being emperor of the East, and the other of the West; the one residing at Constantinople, and the other at Rome, in manner as if they had bene two Monarches, although sometimes the same edicts and lawes were in both empires by the common consent of both princes published. Yet so soone as they began to quarrell, the two empires were indeed diuided in power [ I] lawes and estate. So might a man say of the Lacedemonian Commonweale well go∣uerned by one king. But when Aristodemus left the kingdome to be gouerned whol∣ly, and diuided by his two sonnes Froclus and Euristhenes both at once, they quickly fell at oddes, and had their state taken from them, by Lycurgus (beeing himselfe a prince descended of the blood of Hercules) and the soueraigntie by him giuen vnto the peo∣ple. The like happened vnto Amphareus and Leucippus, kings of the Messians. But the Argiues least they should sal into the same troubles, to auoid the plurality of kings, at such time as Atreus and Thyestes at once seised vpon their fathers kingdome, the peo∣ple (I say) made choyce of the wiser, or as Lucian saith of the more learned. And the princes of the blood of Meronee and Charlemaigne, diuided the kingdome amongst [ K] them. So the children of Clodoueus, of their fathers one kingdom made foure of equall power. And the three children of Lewes the Debonaire diuided so many kingdomes amongst them. Neither do we read many at once long to haue holden a kingdome to∣gether vndiuided: for the indiuisible nature of soueraigntie, and the fellowship of go∣uernment, is alwayes full of dangers, where no one hath the soueraigntie, except when a straunge prince marrieth a queene, among such as are acquainted with womens go∣uernment: where commonly the pictures of the man and his wife, their names and armes are ioined together; as if the soueraigntie belonged vnto them both: as it chan∣ced

when king Ferdinand married Isabel queene of Castile, Anthonie of Burbon, Ioane [ A] queene of Nauarre, and Philip king of Spaine Marie the daughter of Henrie king of England. Howbeit the English men would not suffer him to haue any part with her in the soueraigntie, or of the fruites or profis thereto belonging, but that the same should remaine wholly vnto her selfe; albeit that they were contented that they should both (for fashion sake) beare the name, and both the one and the other signe charters, and commissions, but yet so, as that the signe of the queene might of it selfe bee suffici∣ent, but that without hers the signe of king Philip should be to no purpose. Which was also agreed vpon with Ferdinand king of Arragon, hauing married Isabel of Ca∣stile,* 1.549 where all the commaunds were signed, Yo el Roy, and Yo la Reyna; and by the secre∣tarie [ B] of the state, with sixe doctors: but as for the soueraigntie it was wholly in the queene. Than which no more effectuall reason can be giuen against the Manichies, who crroneously appointed two gods of equall power; one good, & the other euil: for if it were so they being contrarie the one to the other, should either ruinat the one the other, or els being at continuall variance, should without ceasing trouble the sweet har∣monie and concord that we see in this great world. And how could the world endure those two lords of equall power, and contrarie in will the one to the other, seeing that the least citie or Commonweale cannot suffer two, albeit that they were brethren, if they should fall neuer so little at variance: much more easily could it endure three such princes than two; for that the third might vnite the two, or els ioyning himselfe with the one, constraine them both to liue in peace. As it happened so long as Pompee, Cae∣sar, [ C] * 1.550 and Crassus liued, whome the people called the monster with three heads: for so long they peaceably gouerned the Roman empire, which then depended of their power. But so soone as Crassus was slaine in Caldea, straight way the other two fell in sunder, and so egerly made warre the one of them vpon the other, as that to reconcile them was impossible, vntill that one of them had quite ouerthrowne the other, and made himselfe maister of all. The like happened after the death of Caesar, in the Tri∣umuirat of Augustus, M. Antoninus, and Lepidus, who hauing of one popular Com∣monweale, made three Monarchies; and Lepidus vnfit for gouernment, had submit∣ted his authoritie vnto Augustus, although Antoninus had married Augustus his sister, and that they two had equally diuided the empire betwixt them, and liued in countries [ D] farre distant one from another; yet rested they not long, but that the one of them was shaken out of all, by the authoritie and power of the other. Whereafter ensued the sure state of the empire, established vnder one mans gouernment. Wherefore let vs hold it as resolued vpon, that it cannot be called a Monarchie, where the soueraigntie is in two mens power; neither that any gouernment can consist in that state, if they shall fall at variance betwixt themselues.

Now Monarchie is diuided into three formes: for he that hath the soueraigntie, is* 1.551 either lord of all: or else a king, or a tyrant, which maketh no diuersitie of Common weals, but proceedeth of the diuersitie of the gouernour in the Monarchie: For there is great difference betwixt the state, and the gouernment of the state: a rule in pollicie [ E] (to my knowledge) not before touched by any man: for the state may be in a Mo∣narchie, and yet the gouernment neuerthelesse popular; if the king do distribute all places of commaund, magistracie, offices, and preferments indifferently vnto all men, without regard of their nobilitie, wealth, or vertue. But if the prince shall giue all com∣maund, honours, and offices, vnto the nobilitie onely, or to the rich, or to the valiant, or to the vertuous onely, it shall be a royall Monarchie, and that simple and pure, but yet tempered in maner of an Aristocracie. So also an Aristocratique seigneurie, may gouerne their estate popularly; diuiding the honours and preferments therein vnto all

the subiects indifferently: or else Aristocratically, bestowing them vpon the nobilitie or richer sort onely; which varietie of gouernment hath deceiued them which haue made a mixture of Commonweals, and so made more sorts thereof then three, with∣out hauing regard that the state of a Commonweal is different from the administra∣tion and gouernment of the same: But this point we will farther touch in place con∣uenient.

Wherefore a lawfull or royall Monarchie is that where the subiects obey the lawes* 1.552 of a Monarque, and the Monarque the lawes of nature, the subiects inioying their na∣turall libertie, and proprietie of their goods. The lordly Monarchie is that where the prince is become lord of the goods and persons of his subiects, by law of armes and lawfull warre; gouerning them as the master of a familie doth his slaues. The tyran∣nicall [ G] Monarchie, is where the prince contemning the lawes of nature and nations, imperiously abuseth the persons of his free borne subiects, and their goods as his owne. The same difference is also found in the Aristocratique and popular estate: for both the one and the other may be lawful, lordly, and tirannicall, in such sort as I haue said: for the greatest tyrannie of all other is of Tully called the rage of the furious and tur∣bulent people.

Now as concerning the lordly Monarchie, it is conuenient for vs first to intreat* 1.553 thereof, as of that which was first amongst men: for they are deciued which follow∣ing the opinion of Aristotle, suppose that golden kind of men (more famous for the poets fables, then for that there were any such in deed) to haue made first choice of [ H] their heroicall kings: seeing we find, and all men are perswaded that the first Monar∣chie was established in Assiria, vnder the power of Nemrod, whom the holie scripture calleth the great hunter; which is a common phrase of speach amongst the Hebrewes, by which word they signifie a theefe, or robber. For the auntient writers, viz. Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon, haue put robberie among the kinds of hunting, as wee haue elswhere noted. For before the time of Nemrod no man is found to haue had power* 1.554 and rule one ouer an other, all men liuing in like libertie; he being the first that tooke vpon him the soueraigntie, and that caused free borne men to serue: whose name seemeth to haue beene giuen him according vnto his qualitie, for asmuch as Nemrod signifieth a terrible lord. Soone after the world was seene full of slaues, Sem one of [ I] the sonnes of Noe yet liuing. And in the whole course of the Bible, the scripture spea∣king of the subiects of the kings of Assiria and Aegipt, calleth them alwaies slaues: and not the holie scripture onely, but the Greekes also, who alwayes in their writings tearme them selues free, and the Barbarians slaues; meaning by the Barbarians the people of Asia and Aegipt. And therefore the kings of Persia denouncing warre, de∣maunded the earth and the waters, (as Plutache writeth) to showe that they were ab∣solute Lords of all that was in the land and sea conteined. And that is it for which Xe∣nophon in his Cyropaedia writeth, that it is a thing good and commondable among the Medes, that the prince should be lord and owner of all things: And thereof came the adoration which not onely the subiects, but straungers also, yea and the embassadors [ K] of forren nations vsed towards the kings of Persia, to showe that all was in his power. For when Themistocles, whose name euen then and long before was most famous, would after the manner of the Greeks haue spoken vnto the Persian king, Atabanus captaine of the kings gard, kept him from comming vnto him, neither would suffer him to preferre any request vnto him, vntill such time as he had after the Persian man∣ner adored him: but afterwards when he was gon out of the kings presence, hee cour∣teously spake vnto him, and in these words excused that he had done; It is seemely O Themistocles, to follow the fashion of the countrey wherein a man is: you Greci∣ans

make great reckning of your libertie and equalitie of commaund; but we esteeme [ A] it for the best thing in the world to reverence, serue, and honour our king, as the image of the living God. Wherevnto agreeth that which Liuie writeth, Barbaris pro legi∣bus semper dominorum imperia fuerunt. The commaund of their lords haue beene al∣waies* 1.555 vnto the Barbarians for lawes. Neither ought this lordly monarchie to be ac∣counted a tyrannie: for it is not inconvenient, that a soueraigne prince hauing in good and lawfull warre vanquished his enemies, should make himselfe lord of their goods and persons by the law of armes, governing them now his subiects, as doth the good housholder his seruants or slaues: as wee see it a thing receiued by the manner and custome of almost all nations. But the prince which shall by vniust warre, or other vnlawfull meanes make of freemen his slaues, and possesse himselfe of their goods, is [ B] not a lordlike Monarche, but a verie tyrant: from which Adrian the emperour was so farre, as that he would not that a slaue a player, should enioy his libertie, which his master at the request of the people of Rome had giuen him in the Theater, but left it to the discretion of his master, to be as he thought good disposed of: As had Tibe∣rius before, and after that Marcus Aurelius Adrian his sonne in like case forbid the same: whatsoeuer consent the master had giuen at the clamour of the people; reputing it rather forced than done of good will: to the end that the full disposition should be in euery mans power, of that which vnto him belonged. And now although at this pre∣sent there be few princes which haue in their absolute power the bodies and goods of their subiects, although we see many tyrants; yet are there many in Asia and Africa: [ C] but in Europe I know none which take so much vpon them, beside the Princes of the Turkes, and of the Moscouits. True it is that the Moscouits call themselues Chlopes,* 1.556 that is to say, seruants, which wee corruptly call slaues. But the Fmperour of the Turkes styleth himselfe Sultan, that is to say Lord: not so much for the largenes of his possession, (seeing that the king of Spaine hath vnder his dominion and rule, peo∣ple for their crueltie barbarous, for their multitude innumerable, in places infinite: which his kingdome is bounded with the same countries, wherewith the course of the sunne is bounded, being ten times greater then the Turkes empire) but is therefore cal∣led Lord of the Turkes, for that he is lord of their persons and goods; whom for all that he gouerneth much more courteously and freely, then doth a good housholder [ D] his seruants: for those whom wee call the princes slaues, or seruants, the Turkes call them Zamoglans, that is to say tribute children; whom the prince vseth no otherwise to instruct, then if they were his children: and to bestow on them noble preferments, which are of others desirously sought after. As for his Timariot horsmen, they hold all their possessions in fealtie of the Prince, as it were during pleasure, renewing their letters patents from ten yeares to ten yeares: neither when they dye can they leaue their children heires of their possessions, but of their moueables onely; except by the gift of the prince they keepe the possession of their fathers lands, as they doe of his goods. Other princes there are none in Europe which call themselues lords of the bodies and goods of their subiects, and fewer in auncient time then at this present: for [ E] Augustus the emperour himselfe, although he were in effect the greatest monarch in the world, yet so it was that he so abhorred to be called Lord: neither had any that held of him in fealtie and homage.

Now if one say that there is no Monarque in Europe which pretendeth not all the* 1.557 goods and lands of his subiects to belong vnto him in right of direct soueraigntie, nei∣ther any man which confesseth not to hold his goods of his soueraigne prince: yet I say that that sufficeth not that any man should therefore of right be called lord of all, or a lordly Monarche: seeing that euery subiect hath the true proprietie of his owne

things, and may thereof dispose at his pleasure: although the prince for pompe and [ F] show challenge vnto himselfe the soueraigntie thereof. And yet there are diuers lands which are called Allodial, wherein the prince hath neither proprietie, nor soueraigne* 1.558 right, as not holden of him. The Hunns a Tartar-like nation come from the farthest parts of Scythia, at such times as they with fire and sword destroied almost all Europe, first showed the example vnto the Lombards and Almans, Germaine nations, and to the Frankes, the auncient inhabitants of Fraunce, calling themselues Lords of all, and so accustomed these nations to lord it ouer all: as that no man could hold a turfe of ground but by their leaue. True it is that the Romans hauing vanquished their ene∣mies, most commonly solde them for slaues, or else condemned them to lose the* 1.559 seauenth part of their lands: which lands they straight waies gaue vnto their Colonies [ G] in pure proprietie. But princes and people instructed in ciuilitie, for feare of rebellion, or distrust of their owne power, reiected such lordlike soueraigntie as had the kings of Persia and Asia ouer their subiects: contenting themselues with the shadow of such lordly Monarchie. And albeit that the Persian kings before the time of Artaxerxes, had vsed to cause their great lords and magistrats to be stript starke naked before them and whipped as slaues: yet king Artaxerxes was the first that ordained that they should in deed be stript, but should not haue but their cloathes and garments onely beaten: and wheras their haire was wont in dispite to be pulled off, he commaunded the wooll of their cappes onely to be so pulled. True it is that Francis Aluarez writeth, that he* 1.560 hath seene in Aethiopia the great Chauncelour, and other great lords and gouernours [ H] of prouinces stript starke naked, and cast vpon the ground whipped as slaues before their prince: who held the same as a great honour vnto them; by the discourse of whose hystorie, a man may easilie gather the great Negus of Aethiopia to be a Lordly Monarque. But the people of Europe more couragious, and better souldiers then the people of Africke or Asia, could neuer endure the lordly Monarques, neither had euer vsed them before the incursions of the Hunnes into Europe, as I haue before said. And first of all Odonacre king of the Herules, who almost at the same time invaded Italie, that Attila did Germanie; hauing brought Italie vnder his subiection, tooke the third part of the territorie from the subiects (the punishment of all people by him vanqui∣shed,) but left their persons free, and themselues lords of their goods, without any [ I] * 1.561 tenure, or yeelding vnto him of any fealtie or homage. But after that the Almans, Lombards, Frenchmen, Saxons, Burgundians, Gothes, Ostrogothes, Englishmen, and other Northren people had tasted the maners and customes of the Hunnes, they began to make themselues Lords, not of the persons, but of all the lands of them whom they had vanquished: and yet afterward reseruing vnto themselues the most fruitfull part thereof, left the rest vnto the auncient inhabitants, to be by them inioyed, yet as holden of them in fealtie, with paying of some small tribute if they should change the possession thereof: which for this cause are called Seigneuries, or Lordships; to show that the shadow of the auncient lordly Monarchie as yet remayneth, although greatly diminished. For these fees and lordships were in auncient time nothing else but bene∣fits [ K] and rewards giuen to souldiors for terme of their liues, and afterward by fauour continued from the father to the sonne: except dukedomes, marquisats, earledomes, and other like honours and dignities, giuen vnto dukes, marqueses, earles, and such like honorable personages, and not vnto the lands: a custome not yet chaunged in England and Scotland for regard of the dignities, where the dukes and counties being dead, their children and successours haue their lands; but not still the dignities, prero∣gatiues, and titles of their predecessours: for when fees or lands were giuen to souldi∣ours for terme of their liues, they afterward obtained, that they might either by their

wills, or else dying intestate, leaue them vnto their children; and that if there were no [ A] heires males left, they should by law descend vnto the women: excepting in Germany, where the women are excluded from the inheritance of lands in fee▪ which was the strongest argument which Fredericke countie of Vaudemont vsed against Renat of Aniou king of Sicilie at the counsell of Constance, demaunding of the Emperour that he might be invested in the dukedome of Loraine, considering that it was an imperial fee, and by consequent that Isabel wife to Renate was not thereof capable: although she were the duke of Lorains daughter. Howbeit that Renate the king of Sicilie, might by an other reason haue defended himselfe, that is to say, that in question of fees, and seruices, we are to follow the lawes and customes of the land that oweth the seruice, and not of that wherevnto the seruice is due: now by the custome of Loraine the [ B] daughters succeede in fees. But how soeuer it be, most certein it is that the marks of* 1.562 Lordly Monarchies, haue continued in Germanie, and towards the North more than in the other parts of Europe. For albeit that William the Conquerour, hauing conque∣red the realme of England, by force of armes, called himselfe not onely lord of that realme, but also caused it to be proclaimed, that the soueraigntie and proprietie of al his subiects goods, mouable, and immouable vnto him belonged: yet neuerthelesse so it was, that he contented himselfe with the direct soueraigntie, fealtie and homage: the* 1.563 subiects still enioying their libertie, and full propertie of their goods. But the empe∣rour Charles the fift, after he had subdued the great countrey of Peru, made himselfe Lordly Monarch thereof, causing all things to be holden of him, excepting the slaues, [ C] whome for that they were innumerable he caused to be set at libertie. As for the lands he left them to be enioyed by them that possessed them at his pleasure: and not to des∣cend vnto their children by inheritance. A craftie and subtill deuice, whereby Lagasca the lawyer, the emperours lieutenant in Peru (Gonsulo Pizarra, and the rest of the au∣thors of rebellion vanquished and ouerthrowne) by a perpetuall bond to keepe the in∣habitants of that country, within the compasse of their duety, compelled them for euer to aske of the king of Spaine, the possession of their goods, their kinsmen beeing dead: except the parents themselues yet liuing, had before procured the same to be graunted for their children in time to come: which was not to be obtained without a great sum of money to be paid into the kings coffers: they of greater power in the meane time [ D] being thereby kept from raising of any new sturres. For like cause whereof in one* 1.564 chapter of Mahomets, it is forbiden all persons of what degree or qualitie soeuer to call themselues in any sort lords, except the Caliph, or great bishop the successour of Ma∣homet, who at the first was the onely Lordly Monarch or lord of all, giuing vnto kings and princes their principalities and kingdomes, during his pleasure, vntil that the Otho∣man princes, the Curdes, and the kings of the higher part of Asia and Afrike, by little and little exempted themselues out of their power (by reason of the diuision betwixt them and the Anticaliphes) and so tooke vnto themselues the kingdomes of those countries.

But yet here might some man doubt whether the lordly Monarchie be not a Ty∣ranny, [ E] * 1.565 considering that it seemeth to be directly against the law of nature, which re∣serueth vnto euerie man his libertie, and the soueraigntie ouer his owne goods. Wher∣unto I aunswere, that of auntient time it was indeed against the law of nature to make free men slaues, and to possesse himselfe of other mens goods: but if the consent of all nations will, that that which is gotten by iust warre should bee the conquerours owne, and that the vanquished should be slaues vnto the victorious, as a man cannot well say that a Monarchie so established is tyrannicall: seeing also wee read that Iacob the Patriarch, by his testament leauing vnto his children certaine lands that hee had

gotten, said that it was his owne, for that he had got it by force of armes. And that [ F] more is, the rule that willeth that the law of armes should take no place where there be superiours to do iustice (which is put in practise against the greatest princes, and impe∣riall cities of Germany, who be proscribed by the empire, for not making restitution of that which belonged to others) sheweth right well, that where there is no superiour to commaund, their force is reputed iust. For otherwise, if we will mingle and confound the Lordly Monarchie, with the tyrannicall estate, we must confesse that there is no dif∣ference in warres, betwixt the iust enemie and the robber; betwixt a lawfull prince and a theefe; betwixt warres iustly denounced, and vniust and violent force; which the an∣tient Romans called plaine robberie and theft. We also see tyrannicall states and go∣uernments, soone to fall, and many tyrants in short time slaine: whereas the seigneure∣like [ G] states, and namely the Lordly Monarchies haue bene both great and of long con∣tinuance, as the auntient Monarchies of the Assyrians, the Medes, Persians, & Aegyp∣tians;* 1.566 and at this present that of Aethiopia (the most auntient Monarch of all Asia and Afrike) whereunto are subiect fiftie kings as slaues, if we may beleeue Pau. Iouius, who all are, and tearme themselues the slaues of the Grand Negus of Aethiopia. And the reason why the Lordly Monarchie is more durable than the royall, is for that it is more maiesticall, and that the subiects hold not their liues, goods, and libertie, but of the soue∣raigne prince, who hath by iust warre conquered them; which plucketh downe the courage of subiects, so that the slaue acknowledging his condition, becommeth hum∣ble, abiect, and hauing as they say a base and seruile hart. Where to the contrarie, men [ H] free borne, and lords of their owne goods in a royall Monarchie, if one would make them slaues, or take from them that theirs is, they would not take it, but easily rebell, bearing noble harts, nourished in libertie, and not abastardised with seruitude. And thus much concerning a Lordly Monarchie: Now let vs speake of the Monarchie Royall.

CHAP. III. Of a Royall Monarchie.

A Royal Monarch or king, is he which placed in soueraignty yeel∣deth [ I] * 1.567 himselfe as obedient vnto the lawes of nature as he desireth his subiects to be towards himselfe, leauing vnto euery man his naturall libertie, and the proprietie of his owne goods. I haue put to these last words for the difference of a Lordly Monarch, who may be a iust and vertuous prince, and equally gouerne his subiects, being himselfe yet neuerthelesse lord both of their per∣sons* 1.568 and goods. And if it so chaunce the Lordly Monarch hauing iustly conquered his enemies countrey, to set them againe at libertie, with the proprietie of their goods: of a lord he becommeth a king, and chaungeth the Lordly Monarchie, into a Monar∣chie Royall. And that is it for which Plinie the younger saith vnto Traian the empe∣rour, [ K] Principis sedem obtines, ne sit Domino locus, Thou holdest the seate of a prince, Lord it not. This difference (betwixt a Royall Monarch and a Lordly) was well no∣ted by the auntient Persians, calling Cyrus the elder (which ouerthrew the Monarchie of the Medes) by the name of a king: but tearming Cambyses a lord, and Darius a mar∣chant; for that Cyrus was a gentle and courteous prince towards his subiects, but Cam byses his sonne was haughtie and proud, and Darius too great an exactor and coue∣tous. So it is also reported Alexander the Great to haue bene aduised by Aristotle, to beare himselfe towards the Greekes as a father; but towards the Barbarians as a

lord: which his councell Alexander neuerthelesse reiected, willing that the Greekes [ A] should be reckoned of according to their vertue, and the Barbarians according to their vices; saying, that the whole earth was but one citie, and his campe the Castle thereof.

We haue moreouer said in our definition, that the subiects ought to be obedient vnto the Royall Monarch, to show that in him alone lyeth the soueraigne maiestie; & that the king ought to obey the lawes of nature: that is to say, to gouerne his subiects, and to guide his actions atcording vnto naturall iustice, whose luster was brighter than the light of the sunne it selfe. It is then the true marke of a Royall Monarchie, when the* 1.569 prince sheweth himselfe as obedient vnto the lawes of nature, as he wisheth his subiects to be vnto himselfe. Which it is not hard for him looking into the dutie of a good [ B] prince to obtaine; as fearing God aboue all; if he be also pitifull vnto the afflicted, wise in his enterprises, hardie in his exploits, modest in prosperitie, constant in aduersitie, ad∣uised in his speech, wise in his councell, careful of his subiects, comfortable to his friends, terrible to his enemies, courteous to the good, dreadfull towards the euill, and iust to∣wards all. Which royall soueraigntie so set downe, as that the subiects stand obedi∣ent vnto the lawes of their prince, and the prince likewise vnto the lawes of nature: the law being on both sides a mistresse, or as saith Pindarus, a queene raigning ouer both, it shall in the same bonds vnite the subiects among themselues, and together with their prince: whereof shall grow a most sweet harmony, which may with wonderfull plea∣sure and felicitie blesse them both. This is that regall and lawfull Monarchie of one, [ C] which we seeke after, whether the kingdome descend by succession, as it most com∣monly doth; or by the law, as this of ours, or by election, as in many kingdomes to∣wards the North; or by gift, as the kingdome of Numidia (which by Caesar brought into the forme of a prouince, was by Augustus the emperour giuen to young Iuba, who so of a slaue became a king) or as the kingdome of Naples, and Sicilie, giuen to Charles of Fraunce, and after to Lewes, first duke of Aniou, or left by testament, as in former times the kingdomes of Tunes, Fez, and Marocco, and was also of late put in practise by Henrie the eight king of England, who by his will left that kingdome vnto his son Edward the sixt, to whom hee substituted his sister Marie, and vnto her Elizabeth, who was afterward queene: or that the kingdome bee got by fraud and deceir, so that he [ D] raigne iustly, as Cecrops, Hieron, Gelon, and Pisistratus, who right wisely vsed their pow∣er, as saith Plutarch: and in our time Cosmus de Medices: or by chaunce, as the king∣dome of Persia, by the neying of an horse fel to Darius Histaspis one of the seuen Persi∣an lords, it being so before agreed, after they had slaine the Mages, who had vsurped the kingdome, that he whose horse first neyed, should haue the kingdome: or be it that the prince by force of armes, by right or wrong conquer his kingdome, prouided that he vprightly gouerne the same so by him conquered; as Titus Liuius saith of king Ser∣uius, Neque enim praeter vim quicquam adius regnt habebat. Neither had he any thing but force vnto the right of the kingdome; and yet he was a good king, as it oftentimes hath bene seene of a robber and a theefe, to haue proued a vertuous prince; and of a [ E] violent tyranny, to haue growne a iust royaltie. Or be it that the king bee chosen for his nobilitie, as was Campson chosen Sultan of Aegypt by the Mamalukes: or for his iustice and deuotion, as Numa in Rome: or for his age, as the antient Arabians made choice of the eldest amongst them for their king, as saith Diodorus, and they of Tapro∣bana, as saith Pliny: or for his strength and force, as Maximinus the Roman emperor, being of such stature and strength, as that he seemed to haue come of the race of Gi∣ants: or for his feature and beautie, as was Heliogabalus, therefore chosen emperour of the same Roman empire: or for his height and stature, as in Aethiopia the kingdomes

were still giuen to the tallest: or for that he could drinke most, as in Scythia, as Ari∣stotle [ F] saith; who defineth a king to be him, who chosen by the people, raigneth accor∣ding to the desire of them his subiects: from whose will (as hee in another place saith)* 1.570 if he neuer so little depart, he becommeth a tyrant. Which his description is not only* 1.571 without reason, but also daungerous: for that soucraigne power which he said to bee most proper vnto a king, must so needs fall, if the king could nothing command against the liking and good will of his subiects; but must to the contrarie be constrained to re∣ceiue lawes of them In briefe it should be lawfull for the people to do all things; and the most iust and best kings should so be accounted for tyrants: neither were a king to be reputed of any thing else, than as of a meane magistrat, vnto whome power were to bee giuen, and againe taken away at the peoples pleasure. Which are all things [ G] impossible, and no lesse absurd also, than is that which the same Aristotle saith, That they are barbarous people, where their kings come by succession. When as yet his owne king and scholler Alexander the Great, was one of them which descended in right line from the blood of Hercules, and by right of succession came to the kingdom of Macedon. The Lacedemonians should be also barbarous, who from the same stocke of the Heraclides, had had their kings about a thousand yeares. The people of Asia also, the Persians, and Aegyptians, should so all bee barbarous: in whome not onely rested, but from whome all humanitie, courtesie, learning, knowledge, and the whole source and fountaine of good lawes and Commonweales haue sprung: and so at last none but Aristotle with some handfull of Greekes should bee free from bar∣barisme. [ H] Whereas indeed nothing can be deuised more daungerous vnto the state of* 1.572 a Commonweale, than to commit the election of kings vnto the suffrages of the peo∣ple; as shall in due place be hereafter declared. Although Aristotle be in that also de∣ceiued, where he saith, That there be three sorts of kings; & yet hauing in his discourse reckoned vp foure, in casting vp of the account he findeth out a fift. The first hee cal∣leth Voluntarie kings, as raigning by the will and good liking of the people, such as were the kings of Heroique times, whome he supposeth to haue bene Captains, Iud∣ges, and Priests. The second he saith, are proper vnto the barbarous nations, where kings come by succession. The third are made by election. The fourth was proper to the Lacedemonians, whome he saith to haue bene perpetuall generals in their [ I] warres; the sonne still succeeding his father. The fift and last kind, is of them which hauing themselues got the Lordly soueraigntie, vse their subiects, as doth the maister of the house his slaues. As for the first sort of kings, we find, that they indeed executed the offices of judges, captaines, and priests, yet none of them are found to haue ruled at the will and pleasure of the people, either to haue receiued their authoritie from the peo∣ple, before Pitacus king of Corinth, and Timondas king of Nigropont: but to the con∣trarie* Plutarch writeth, That the first princes had no other honour before their eyes,* 1.573 than to force men, and to keepe them in subiection as slaues: whereof the holy scrip∣ture also certifieth vs of the first Lordly Monarch Nemrod; leauing the soueraigntie to their children, in right of succession; as saith Thucidides. Which hath also beene [ K] well confirmed by the succession of a great number of kings of the Asirians, Medes, Persians, Indians, Aegyptians, Hebrewes, Lacedemonians, Macedonians, Sicyonians, Epirots, Athenians: and their lines failing, the people in part proceeded to make choice of their kings by way of election, some others inuaded the state by force, other some maintained themselues in Aristocratike and popular seigneurie; as witnesseth Herodo∣tus, Thucidides, Iosephus, Berosus, Plutarch, Xenophon, and other most auntient historio∣graphers of the Hebrewes, Greeks, and Latines, sufficient to conuince the opinion of Aristotle of vntruth in those things that he hath writ concerning kings. Whereas also

he comprehendeth the Lacedemonian generals, vnder the name of kings: he is therein [ A] deceiued, seeing it is before declared, that he cannot be a king, which hath not the rights of soueraigntie. And that the Lacedemonian kings, after the conuersion of that Com∣monweale, were nothing but Senators, and subiect to the magistrats commaund, wee haue also before shewed. Yea the generals power was not alwaies giuen vnto them, as Aristotle supposeth, who calleth them the perpetuall generals of the warres: for as∣much as that power and authoritie was communicated to their citisens also, as to Ly∣sander, Leonidas, Callicratides, Gilippus, whome the Lacedemonians oppressed with warres preferred before their kings. And albeit that Agesilaus was one of their kings, yet so it was, that he durst not take vpon him the charge of a generall, vntill the Seig∣neurie had so commanded; as Plutarch in his liues reporteth. And when they were [ B] chiefe captaines and generals, they gaue them yet no royall power, no more than had the generals of the Acheans, which were made by election, considering that they were subiect vnto the slate of the Acheans, who if they so deserued punished them, as they did Democritus their generall, whome they fined at thirtie thousand crownes, as wee read in Pausanias. So the Ephori punished their kings with banishment, imprisonment, and fines, yea and sometime wi•…•…h death, as we haue before said. We must not there∣fore put these in the ranke of kings, no more than him which is a Lordly Monarch, lord of the persons and goods of his subiects, who hath his proper difference seperated from a Monarch Royall.

As for the third sort of kings, which he said was made by election, that can make [ C] no difference of kings, no more than can the second, which he said was by succession, for otherwise he should by the same meanes make also a sixt kind of kings, made by chaunce; as was Darius the first: and so a seuenth by donation, an eight by testament,* 1.574 and a ninth by finnes and deceit, and a tenth by force: which were nought else, but to make an infinit sort of kings, who all neuerthelesse are comprehended vnder one kind. For the difference of Monarches is not to be gathered by the meanes of the comming to the state, but by the meanes of gouerning of the estate. Which as we said is com∣prised in three kinds or sorts, viz. the Lordly Monarchie, the Royall Monarchie, and the Tirannicall Monarchie. But whereas Aristotle vnder the name of kings compre∣hendeth them also which were woont for a short time to be chosen, to establish or re∣forme [ D] the Commonweale, and that done, to giue vp their charge, are quite different from the regall power. Neither hath it any apparance to call them kings, which are nothing els but simple commissioners, such as were the dictators in the Roman Com∣monweale, whome Dionysius Halicarnasseus writeth, to haue bene in power and office like vnto them whom the Thessalians called Archos, the Lacedemonians Cosmos, the Mitylenians Aesymnetes, hauing like charge that the baily of Florence had at such time as that Commonweale was gouerned by a popular gouernment; that is to wit, the Grand Councell of the people made choyce of eight or ten persons, best seene in their affaires, to reestablish the state, and to put againe in order that which by processe of time was fallen into disorder, either in their lawes, or in their customes, in their reue∣newes, [ E] or in creating of their officers: which done they discharged themselues of their offices: like as the Decemuiri, or ten commissioners, which were chosen in Rome, to reforme that was amisse in the state, whome wee should by this meanes, according to the opinion of Aristotle call also kings; which should be a thing verie absurd; for as∣much as the qualitie of a magistrat, and much lesse of a commissioner hath nothing agreeing or common with the soueraigne maiestie of a king. And albeit that Caesar in his Commentaries saith, the inhabitants of Autun to haue euerie yeare chosen them a magistrat with royall power; that is of them but improperly spoken: for why, it is ma∣nifest,

that he which was a magistrat could be no king. And that more is, the gouer∣nours [ F] of the countries and prouinces conquered by Alexander the Great, although that after his death euerie one of them tooke vpon him the soueraigntie in the country or prouince that he gouerned; yet it was a long time before they durst stile themselues by the name of kings. The first that began was Antigonus, after the victorie by him* 1.575 obtained against Ptolomeus Lagus: after which he set a crowne vpon his head, and vsed in his titles the name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or king. And immediatly after, the Aegyptians cal∣led Ptolomee king; as to their imitation did the Assyrians Seleucus, and the Thracians Lysimachus also. And not to go further, the auntient kings of Loraine and Burgundie, after that they had yeelded fealtie and homage vnto the German emperour, lost the name and soueraigntie of kings, and called themselues but dukes: for that now they [ G] were no more kings, according to that fit saying of Martial, Quirex est, regem Maxime non habeat. For why, the name of a king is alwaies maiesticall, and the most honou∣rable that a soueraigne prince can haue: and for that cause the habit, the markes, the signes of kings, haue bene alwaies particular, and proper vnto themselues; as the royal armes, the golden robes, the crowne and scepter, not to be communicated vnto other men. And there was nothing that made the maiestie of the Roman kings so venera∣ble, as the royall ornaments which Tarquinius Priscus brought from the antient kings of Hetruria, as we read in the histories. And the Romans themselues, after they had driuen out the proud Tarquin their king, although they abhorred the verie name of a king, and much more the gouernment, hauing chaunged the royall state into a popu∣lar: [ H] yet so it was, that the Roman Senat vsed to send vnto kings, their allies and con∣federats, the royall marks of kings; namely a diadem or crowne of gold, a cup of gold, the iuorie scepter; and sometime the popular robe embroidered with gold, & a chaire of iuorie, as the histories declare. And in the Commentaries of pope Gregory the se∣uenth,* 1.576 we read that Demetrius was by the scepter, crowne, and ensigne established king of Croatia and Sclauonia: of which things the bishops of Rome haue oftentimes bene liberall (should I say) or prodigall? aswell as the emperours: yet had they no more so to do, then had the Greeke emperour Anastasius, who sent the Consulatie orna∣ment and titles of Augustus vnto Clodoueus king of Fraunce, who (as Aymon saith) recei∣ued them in the citie of Tours: or than Iustinian, who gaue vnto king Childebert the [ I] title of a Senator: by which things it is certaine, to be derogated from the soueraignty of anothers maiestie, which is it selfe the chiefest, except they bee receiued from them that are in their confederation their superiours. But as for the Frenchmen they had not made any league with the Greeke emperours, but by their valour had thrust the Romans out of the possession of their kingdome. True it is, that betwixt confederats of equall power, ornaments of honour, as girdles, rings, and such like, may both bee gi∣uen and receiued, without any emparement to their maiestie: but to receiue the honor of a Consull, or of a Senator, is as much as to acknowledge the maiestie of a superiour. Frederike the emperour (first of that name) sent vnto Peter prince of Denmarke, a sword and a crowne, with the title of a king, which was a title contrarie to the effect, [ K] considering that he yeelded himselfe vassall vnto the empire, and did fealtie and ho∣mage vnto the emperour, for the realme of Denmarke, promising and binding aswell himselfe as his successours, to hold that kingdome of the empire, in this forme, * 1.577 Rex Danorum Magnus se in potestatem Imperatoris tradidit, obsidesdedit, iuramentum fecit, se successoresque suos, non nisi imperatoris & successorum eius permissu regnum adepturos, The great king of the Danes hath deliuered himselfe into the power of the emperour, hath giuen hostages, taken his oath, that he and his successours shall not but by the suf∣ferance of the emperour and his successours, take vpon them that kingdome. Where∣in

he two wayes offended, first, for that allured with the ornaments sent him by the [ A] emperour, hee diminished his owne maiestie: and then for that he bound vnto per∣petuall seruitude, not himselfe onely, but his posteritie also: who perceiuing the er∣rour, reuolted from the empire. for seeing that the kingdome of Denmarke depen∣ded of the voices and suffragies of the Senat and the people, hee could not bind, not onely his posteritie, but not so much as himselfe vnto that law. The duke of Austria also was by the same emperour, and almost at the same time, honored with the same ornaments and title, yet with condition that hee should still re∣maine in the perpetuall obeisance of the German Empire, wherein he then was, and euer had beene: but when he breaking his faith, had reuoulted from the empire, he was within twelue yeares after spoyled both of his royall dignitie and title. By like errour [ B] Henry the first king of England, sonne to William the Conquerour, whilest he yet liued caused Henry his eldest sonne to bee crowned king: for he straight way after, would needs be equall with his father, and take vpon him to mannage the greatest affaires of state; in such sort that great quarrels and contentions arise betwixt the father and the sonne, euen vnto parts taking, which had without doubt ruinated the state, had not the sonne beene before by death prevented. So also in this realme, when the familie of the Capets had vsurped the kingdom, the better to confirme their wealth and power, not as yet well grounded; lest the kingdom after the death of their kings should fall into an Anarchie, they still caused▪ their sonnes (whilest they themselues yet liued) to be crowned and proclaimed kings. So Hugh to assure this succession, caused his sonne [ C] Robert to be crowned king: Robert, Henry: and he afterwards Philip; which manner of crowning of the sonnes, the fathers yet liuing, after their estate and power better confirmed and established, was againe left. And so to doe, vnto mee seemeth a thing* 1.578 verie daungerous, especially if the new crowned king be sicke with the ambitious desire of rule: for that the subiects more willingly behold the sunne rising then setting: ex∣cept the king haue many kingdomes, with great fluds, most high mountaines, or the deepest seas, one from an other divided, not easily with the wings of aspiring ambition to be passed. So Seleucus king of both Asiaes, graced his sonne Antiochus not onely with the royall dignitie, but also placed him in the gouernment of the kingdome of the higher Asia; which is a thing may well be suffered where kings haue vsed to be created [ D] by the voices of the Senat, and the people▪ as are the kings of Denmarke, Sueuia, Po∣lonia, Tartaria, Bohemia, Hungarie, and Tunes: who commonly cause him whom they desire to raigne, to be before hand elected by the suffragies of the people, and to bind the princes by oath vnto him, So Changuis first of all the Tartar kings, chosen king by his subiects, caused Hoccata his eldest sonne to be crowned king, himselfe yet liuing. And Gostanus king of Sweden hauing vsurped vpon that state against the king of Denmarke, caused his sonne Henry to be also chosen king. And Frederik now king of Denmarke, was chosen king in the yeare 1556, two yeares before the death of his father: who not yet so secured, but doubting least his vncles Iohn and Adolphe after his death should practize a new election, and so raise new stirres, requested the French [ E] king by M. Danzai the French ambassadour, and afterward by an embassadour of his owne, (sent directly for that purpose) to stand his friend, and to receiue him into his protection. So haue done, and yet also doe the kings of Marocco, Fez, and Tunes. And in our memorie Ferdinand of Austria yet liuing, caused Maximilian his sonne to be chosen and crowned king of Hungarie and Bohemia: as shortly after Maximilian did the like for his sonne Ernestus; and so peoples voices by little and little taken away are at length quite buried in obliuion. The like was also attempted for the nomina∣ting of his successour by Sigismundus Augustus king of Polonia, but was letted so to

doe by the states of that kingdom, although it seemed for the good of that Common [ F] weal, for the auoyding of sedition, which might rise about the election: yet would not the states of that kingdom thereto agree; for feare least the right of their election, should so passe into the force of succession. As we see the Germain Empire to haue ta∣ken so deepe roote in the most honorable familie of the house of Austria, as that there is but little hope for the pulling of it out thence againe. And thus much concerning a royall Monarchie: now let vs likewise speake of the third kind, which is a Tyranni∣call Monarchie.

CHAP. IIII. ¶ Of a Tirannicall Monarchie.

[ G]

A Tirannicall Monarchie is that where one man treading vndet* 1.579 foot the lawes of God and nature, abuseth his free borne subiects as his slaues: and other mens goods as his owne. This word Ty∣rant deriued from the Grekes was of the proprietie thereof hono∣rable, and in auncient time signified no other thing then a Prince, which without the consent of the people, had by force or fraud possessed himselfe of the state; and of a companion made him∣selfe their master: whom they called a Tyrant, although he were* 1.580 a right wise and iust prince. So Plato writing to Dionysius the Tyrant of Syracusa by [ H] way of honour giueth him this title; Plato to Dionysius the Tyrant greeting, and the answere was; Dionysius the Tyrant to Plato health. And so the rest aswell philosophers as friends, honestly called them Tyrants which had by force or finenesse got the soue∣raigntie of their cities and states: in which name the Tyrants themselues also gloried. And to show that the name of a Tyrant was aswell giuen vnto a good and iust prince, as to an euill and wicked, it appeareth euidently in that, that Pittacus and Periander reckened among the seauen Sages of Graece, were called Tyrants, hauing taken vnto themselues the state and gouernment of their countries. But for the mercie of their ene∣mies, were constrained for the safetie of their liues and goods to haue gardes of straun∣gers about their persons, and great garisons in their fortresses and strong holds: and [ I] for the maintenance of their souldiours and retinue were enforced to lay vpon their subiects great impositions and tributes: and seeing their liues not yet so assured, hauing but poore friends, and puisant enemies, put to death, or banished the one, to enrich the other; and hauing taken their goods, rauished also their wiues and children: they with these outragious enormities raised a wonderful hatred of themselues through out the whole world. For we read that Dionysius the elder which had oppressed Syracusa had alwaies about him for the garding of his person and the citie ten thousand foot∣men, and as many horsemen; beside a fleete of foure hundred gallies still readie furni∣shed with all things necessarie: and yet thought it not a strength sufficient to keepe vn∣der those fewe citizens that were left, whom he had vtterly disarmed, and in most ser∣uile [ K] manner oppressed: although hee had before taken away not onely their societies and companies; but forbidden also neighbours and friends to eate together, and oft times commaunded them returning home from supper or making merie, to be robbed and spoiled by his garde; to the intent there might bee the lesse friendship amongst them, and so they more hardly conspire against him. And yet for all that Plutarque hath giuen him the praise of a good prince, as one who in iustice and vertue exceeded many, who abusing the most honorable names of Kings, are themselues polluted and defiled with all maner of vices. For we are not much to rest vpon the vaine show of

words and glorious titles; when as often times the worst men arrogate vnto them [ A] selues the most commendable names, showes, and recognancies of vertue; against which sort of Princes, the subiects for all that vse to cast forth most reproachfull taunts: as the three Ptolemeis kings of Aegypt; of whom the one had put to death his brother; the other his mother; and the third his father: the subiects in derision called them * 1.581 Philadelphe, * 1.582 Philometor, and * 1.583 Philopator. Also the most reuerend and holy names haue become abhominable, for the wickednesse of them that haue most filthy∣ly abused the same. The name truely of a king is holy, yet was it for the pride of Tar∣quinius, and the rauishment of Lucretia by his sonne, made hatefull vnto the Romans. And the crueltie of Scylla in his Dictatorship made the Dictators odious. So the im∣moderat ambition of Francis Valori made the Confalonniers of Florence hatefull vn∣to [ B] the Florentines. And so also it is euident, the name of Tyrant to haue bene hateful to all nations for oppressing of the people.

But it may be, that one and the same prince, whose dominion is large and wide, may beare himselfe as a king vnto his naturall subiects: and as a lordly monarch to∣wards them, whome he hath by iust warre subdued, and as a tyrant toward the rest: or that in the same citie he may tyrannise ouer the rich and better sort of the citisens; and yet show himselfe courteous and gentle vnto the poore and baser sort. And amongst tyrants there are diuers sorts and degrees of more or lesse: and as there is not so good a prince, which hath not some notable vice; so wee see that there is none so cruell a tyrant, which is not endued with some good vertue, or hath not in him some thing to [ C] be commended. Wherefore it is a thing of most euill example, and thereto daunge∣rous* 1.584 withall, rashly and foolishly to censure a prince, whose actions and comportments we throughly know not; whereas we ought first wisely to weigh his vertues and vi∣ces, his heroicall or base and euill disposition: after the manner of the Persians, who condemned no man to death (although conuicted of the crime whereof he was accu∣sed) except it first appeared by his former life, whether his vices exceeded his vertues or not. For so Liuie did well, who hauing diligently reckoned vp Hannibal his vertues, and comming afterward vnto his vices, saith, Has tot ac tantas virtutes ingentia vitia aequabant, These his so many and great vertues, were counteruailed with great vices. Wherefore least the good should be confused and so confounded with the bad; o•…•… [ D] that we should vnder the name of a tyrant comprehend them also which were right worthy and famous men: let vs compare the worst tyrant with the best king; that by such comparison of the two extreames, those may bee the better perceiued which are in the middest betwixt both. Now when I say the best king, my meaning is after the* 1.585 common manner: neither doe I seeke after such an one as is accomplished with all he∣roicall vertues; or the rare paragon of iustice, wisedome, and religion, a man without all imputation: which in the fables of auntient worthies, were propounded with more magnificence than truth, for princes to looke vpon and to imitat; such as neuer was, nor euer shall be: but rather such an example of a good and iust king, as is indeed in the ranke of princes to be found; and such an one as is alwayes readie to bestow his goods, [ E] his blood, and life, for the good of his people: What manner of prince is of Homer in two words called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whose whole endeuour is to bee indeed such an one as Codrus and Decius are reported to haue bene, who aduertised by the Oracle, that the victorie ouer their enemies depended of their death, without farther delay sodenly sacrificed their liues: and Moyses aboue all, whome Philo calleth the most wise law gi∣uer; a most iust prince, who besought God, That he might rather die the euerlasting death of the wicked, and haue his name blotted out of the booke of life, than that the people committed to his charge, should endure so great and grieuous punishment as it

had deserued: by which prayers hee appeased the wrath of God, like a most good [ F] king, & true father of his people: than which name Augustus the great emperor is re∣ported neuer to haue heard any title or addition, vnto him more pleasing, at such time as M. Valerius Messala, was by a decree of the Senat, and of the people of Rome, called Father of his countrey. For why, the best prince nothing differeth from the best father, as Xenophon was woont most excellently to say.

Now the greatest difference betwixt a king and a tyrant is, for that a king confor∣meth* 1.586 himselfe vnto the lawes of nature, which the tyrant at his pleasure treadeth vn∣der foot: the one of them respecteth religion, iustice, and faith; whereas the other re∣gardeth neither God, faith, nor law: the one of them referreth all his actions to the good of the Commonweale, and safetie of his subiects; whereas the other respecteth [ G] nothing more than his owne particular profit, reuenge, or pleasure: the one doth all his endeuour for the enriching of his subiects; whereas the other seeketh after nothing more, than by the impouerishment of them, to encrease his owne wealth: the one of them accounteth his owne goods to be the goods of his people; the other reckoneth not onely the goods, but euen the bodies of his subiects also to be his owne: the one of them seuerely reuengeth the publique iniuries done against the state, and easily par∣doneth the wrongs done vnto himselfe; the other most cruelly reuengeth his owne, and pardoneth that which is done against others: the one easily forgiueth the offen∣ces of other men, but is of his owne misdeeds a seuere judge; whereas the other most sharply reuengeth euen the least offences of others, but is vnto himselfe most fauoura∣ble: [ H] the one of them fauoureth the honour of modest matrons, and other mens wiues; the other triumpheth in their shame and dishonour: the one refuseth not to bee freely and discreetly reproued for that he hath done amisse; the other hateth nothing more than the graue free spoken man: the one enforceth himselfe to maintaine and keepe his subiects in peace and vnitie; whereas the other seeketh still to set them at ods, so to rui∣nat them one by another; and with the confiscation of their lands and goods to en∣rich himselfe: the one taketh pleasure to see his subiects, and to be of them oftentimes seene and heard; whereas the other feareth their presence, and hideth himselfe from them, as from his enemies: the one reposeth his estate and fealtie in their loue towards him; the other in their feare: the one taketh no care but for his subiects; the other fea∣reth [ I] nothing more than them: the one chargeth his subiects as little as he can, neither exacteth any thing of them, but when the publike necessitie so requireth; whereas the other drinketh his subiects blood, gnaweth their bones, and out of them also sucketh euen the marrow, so by all meanes seeking to weaken them: the one aduanceth vnto the highest degrees of honour the best and most vertuous men; whereas the other stil promoteth the greatest theeues and villaines, whome he may vse as spunges, to sucke vp the wealth of his subiects: the one frankly bestoweth the greatest and most gainful offices of the state vpon men of best deserts, who free from briberie & corruption, may defend the people from all iniurie and oppression; whereas the other setteth the same to sale to such as will giue most for them, so by their robberies and vnreasonable exa∣ctions, [ K] to keepe the people vnder, and then afterward when they are well fatted, to cut such caterpillers throates also, so to be accounted great iusticiars: the one measureth his manners, according vnto his lawes; the other measureth his lawes, according to his owne disposition and pleasure: the one is readie to expose his life for the good of his countrey and people; the other wisheth it and them all to perish for himselfe: the one is beloued and honoured of his subiects; the other hateth them all, and is likewise of them hated: the one in time of warre hath no recourse but vnto his owne subiects; whereas the other hath no greater warre than against them: the one hath neither

guard, nor garrison, but of his owne people; whereas the other for the defence of his [ A] person, and keeping of his subiects in awe, hath alwayes a garrison of armed straun∣gers to go before him: the one liueth secure in all quiet and tranquilitie of mind; the other troubled with carefull and contrarie thoughts, stil languishing in perpetuall feare: the one expecteth a most blessed and eternall life in heauen; the other still fearing euer∣lasting paines of hell: the one hath the immortall good author of all his actions; the other followeth the aduise of wicked men and damned spirits: in briefe the one is prai∣sed and honoured of all men whilest he liueth, and much missed after his death; where∣as the other is defamed yet liuing, and most shamefully reuiled both by word and wri∣ting when he is dead. And albeit that a tyrant abound in wealth, haue honour, soue∣raigntie, health, and surpassing Champion like strength of bodie, with the deepe and [ B] profound knowledge of many and great matters, and flowing eloquence most of ty∣rants to be in others feared; yet shal he therefore be neuer the better, but wel the worse; abusing his wealth to fulfill his lust; his soueraigntie, to the oppressing of other mens libertie; his strength for the performing of his villanie; and his knowledge for the cir∣cumuenting of the plaine and simple, and shamefull confusion of all things. Which so many and notable gifts, if they chaunce by the grace and goodnesse of God to bee giuen to any good prince: we then esteeme of him, as of a God, sent euen down from heauen into the earth here amongst vs.

But what need we to vse many examples to proue this to be true, being of it selfe so* 1.587 manifest in euerie mans eye. And seeing that we find in histories tyrannie to haue bene [ C] of all men so much feared, hated and detested, that euen schollers and weake women haue not doubted to aduenture with daunger of their liues, to gaine vnto themselues the honour of the killing of tyrants. As did Aristotle (not hee of Stagira, but hee that was surnamed the Logitian) who slew a tyrant of Sicione. And Thebe, who slew her* 1.588 husband Alexander, tyrant of the Pheraeans. And to thinke that tyrants might by force warrant themselues, is but meere and vaine errour. For who were of greater force than were the Roman emperors, who ordinarily had fortie legions at their command in their prouinces, and three moe in Italie, beside their Praetorian bands, for the de∣fence of their persons: and yet in no place in the world were there so many princes slaine; yea sometimes the captaines of their guards slew them euen in their pallaces, [ D] whome they guarded. As Cherea the tyrant, and the Mamalukes eight Sultans of Aegypt.

But he that would see the miserable ends of tyrants, let him but read the liues of * 1.589 Timoleon, and of Aratus, where hee shall see the tyrants drawne out of the nest of their tyranny, stripped starke naked, theeues beaten to death with clubbes in the presence of Children, and the rest of the common people: and after that their wines and children, their kinsfolkes and familiar friendes most cruelly murthered and slaine: and that more is the verie image & statues of them that were dead in their tyranny, ac∣cused, and publikely condemned, deliuered vnto the common hangman to bee as it were executed; their bones also taken out of their graues, and cast into most lothsom [ E] iakesses, and the raking officers of these tyrants dismembred, and most miserably tor∣mented with al the cruelty that a people enraged could deuise: their edicts & laws torn, their castles and proud houses rased and laid euen with the ground, and the verie me∣morie of their name, by publike iudgements and written bookes, condemned to per∣petuall infamie, as an example to all future princes, to the end they might haue in de∣testation such plagues, so pernitious and dangerous vnto mankind.

And albeit that tyrants whilest they liued, haue not wanted their flattering claw∣backs,* 1.590 whome they with rewards enduced to write their vnworthie prayses; yet wee

read, that after their death, such their histories, and panegiricall orations, before written [ F] in their prayses, were burnt, torne and suppressed, and the truth (yea sometime with more too) brought to light, & in stead of them other most reprochfull and contumeli∣ous writings published, in such sort, as that not so much as one small fragment of any booke written in the prayse of any tyrant, were he neuer so great, is now extant or to be found. Which thing maketh tyrants, whilest they yet liue to fret and fume as if they were mad: for that they see they must in time become a laughing stocke vnto the people and their verie enemies. And albeit that they euill perswaded of the immorta∣litie of the soule, thinke the same to perish together with the bodie, or haply before the body, which embaulmed with sweet odours may be long preserued, yet so long as they* 1.591 liue they still feele the torment of the infamie to come, which they yet liuing see shall [ G] befall them after their death. Whereof Tiberius the emperour grieuously complai∣ned, but Nero much more, who wished that when he died, yea that whilest hee yet breathed, all the world might with fire be consumed. And for this cause Demetrius, surnamed Poliorcetes, to gratifie the Athenians vndertooke the warre for the defence of their rights and libertie, to the intent to be honoured by their learned writings; know∣ing well that the citie of Athens was as it were the watch of the whole world, which might in like sort make the glorie of his noble acts to shine throughout the world, as doth a beacon set on fire vpon the top of an high tower: neither was he therein decei∣ued: but so soone as he gaue himselfe ouer vnto vices and villanies, there was neuer ty∣rant better (than he was by them) washed; hauing his name most shamefully by them [ H] defamed, by whome he had bene before commended. And albeit that some may think tyrants, for that they haue no taste of true praise, to care the lesse what posteritie either thinke or say of them, yet in truth liue they most miserably, if their life be so to be cal∣led, which liue in continuall feare, still feele the most sharpe sting of greefe; seeing them∣selues, their lawes, their wiues and children, their kinsfolks and friends, euer in daunger. For it is impossible for him that hateth and feareth his subiects; and is againe of them all himselfe also hated and feared, to be able long to continue or stand. Whereby it commeth to passe, that in stead of being assailed by his enemies, hee is oft times vppon the sodaine assailed by his owne subiects. Neither may hee repose any trust or confi∣dence in his friends, vnto whom he is himselfe oftentimes a traytour and disloyall, cau∣sing [ I] them for the least suspition to be slaine: as we read it reported of Nero, Commodus, Caracalla, and such other tyrants. And sometime the whole people with one rage and surie runneth headlong vpon the tyrant, as it did vpon Phalaris, Heliogabalus, Alcetes tyrant of the Epirots, and vpon Andronicus emperour of Constantinople, whom stript and set vpon a bare asses backe, the people of Constantinople caused to endure all the indignities and reproaches that were possible, before they would giue him leaue to die. Yea and sometimes it chanceth, that euen they themselues are the occasion of the ha∣stening* 1.592 of their owne death, as it is reported of Caracalla the emperour, who would needs know of Iultus, his mothers Mathematician, whom he thought should succeed him in the empire (for that is a common course amongst tyrants in their affairs and do∣ings, [ K] to aske the councell and aduise of wisards and diuels) vnto whome the Astrono∣mer by his letters aunswered, That Macrinus was the man that should succeed him; which letters by chaunce falling into the hands of Macrinus: he thereupon forthwith caused Caracalla to be slaine, for feare of the danger prepared for him by Caracalla. So Commodus also, hauing hardly escaped the stabbe which a murtherous villaine was about with a dagger to haue giuen him, (who in giuing of the blow said, That the Se∣nat had sent him that) straight waies after made a roll of al them whom he purposed to put to death: which roll by good hap comming into the hands of Martia his concu∣bine▪

and she therein finding her owne name enrolled amongst the rest, to auoid the [ A] daunger prepared for her and the rest, caused the tyrant to be forthwith slaine. Of like examples all the auntient histories are full, which show plainly the liues of tyrants to bee alwayes beset with a thousand ineuitable mischiefs, death still hanging ouer their heads.

Now the state of a royall Monarchie is quite contrarie vnto a tyrannie: for the king* 1.593 is so vnited with his subiects, that they are still willing to spend their goods, their blood, and liues, for the defence of his estate, honour, and life; and cease not after his death to write, sing, and publish his prayses, amplifying them also in what they can. As we see in Xenophon the liuely purtract of a great and vertuous prince, drawne vnder the per∣son of Cyrus, whose praises he hath with wonderfull eloquence set forth, to giue eaxm∣ple [ B] to other princes for to imitat and conforme themselues vnto; as did Scipio Africa∣nus,* 1.594 who hauing alwaies before his eyes and in his hands Xenophon his Cyropoediae, and framing himselfe to the imitation thereof, profited so much, as that he in vertue, honor, and prowesse, surmounted all the kings and princes, not of his owne age onely, but of former times also; in such sort, that certaine pirats enflamed with the report of his fame, and knowing that he was in his house in the countrey farre from any towne, came and beset the same: against whom as he was about to put himselfe with his peo∣ple in readinesse, and so to haue stood vpon his guard: they perceiuing the same, forth∣with threw downe their armes, assuring him that they were not come thither, but one∣ly to see him, and to do him honour, which they most humbly requested, that they [ C] might be admitted to do him. Now if the lustre and brightnesse of vertue in such a prince, hath drawne euen theeues and pirats into the admiration thereof; than of how much greater force ought it to be in good and loyall subiects? And what prince is there so foolish or void of sence, which would not wonderfully reioyce to heare it re∣ported, how that Menander king of the Bactrians, was for his vertue & iustice so well beloued of his subiects, as that after his death the cities were at great strife & debate a∣mongst themselues, which of them shuld haue the honor of his sepulchre: neither could the matter be appeased, vntill that at length it was agreed, that euerie one of them should in the honour and memoriall of him build a seuerall tombe or sepulchre. What tyrants malice also or dissimulation is so great, whome Plinie his Panegyricall [ D] oration would not driue into a phrensie? who when he had therein with all worthie prayses so adorned Traian the emperour, as that it seemed nothing more could there∣unto be added: he so concludeth the period, That nothing greater or better could bee wished for vnto the Commonweale, but that the immortall gods would imitat the life of Traian. Which excessiue amplification, although it sauour of impietie, yet who doubteth but that it proceeded from the zeale of a most famous man, towards his most excellent prince? for whose daunger at his going out, and welfare at his comming home, all the temples were filled; and who himselfe in his solemne prayers, was thus woont to couenant with the gods, That they should keep and preserue him, if they saw it to be for the good of the Commonweale. What tyrant is so cruell, what show soe∣uer [ E] he make, which most hartily wisheth not for the honour which king Agesilaus re∣ceiued, at such time as he was fined by the Ephori, for hauing alone robbed the hearts and gained the loue of all the citisens vnto him? What king is there, which wisheth not to haue the surname of Aristides the Iust? a title more diuine and royall than euer prince yet knew how to get: albeit that in stead thereof many haue caused themselues to be called Conquerors, Besiegers, Lightnings. Now on the contrarie part, when as we read of the most horrible cruelties of Phalaris, Busiris, Nero, and Caligula, who is he which is not moued to a iust indignation against them? or hearing of their miserable

and wretched ends, can containe himselfe from reioycing thereat?

Thus haue we seene the most remarquable differences betwixt a king and a Tyrant, which are not hard to be perceiued betwixt the two extremes of a most good king, and a most detestable Tyrant: but is not so easilie to be deemed, when the prince taketh part of a good king, and some other part of a tyrant: so as it were tempering the good with the bad. For so things oft times fall out, that for the varietie of times, places, per∣sons,* 1.595 and other occasions presenting themselues, princes are constrained to doe such things, as may seeme vnto them tyrannicall, and vnto others commendable. Where∣fore let no man measure Tyrannie by Seueritie, which is oft times in a prince most ne∣cessarie: neither for his castles, gardes, and garisons: neither by the soueraigntie of his commaunds, which are in deed more to be wished for, then the sweet requests of ty∣rants: which draw after them an ineuitable violence. And that is it for which in law, he which hath bound himselfe at the request of a Tirant, is alwaies againe to be resto∣red into his former estate, wherein he was: whereas if he that shall so doe at the com∣maundement of a good prince shall not by the law be relieued: neither are those mur∣thers, proscriptions, banishments, incests, rauishments, and other such villanies which happen in ciuill warres, in the chaunging or destruction of the states of Common weales, or the establishment of the same, to be called tyranies: for that in such violent conuersion and chaunge of state, it cannot otherwise be. As it fell out in the Roman Triumuirat, in the election of diuers Emperours, and in our time Cosmus de Medices, first taking vpon him the dukedome of Florence. For he after the death of his kins∣man [ H] Alexander Medices, slaine by the conspiracie of his enemies, tooke vnto him∣selfe a strong garde of straungers for the defence and safetie of his owne person: built castles and strong holds: fortified the citie with strong garrisons: imposed new tributes and customes vpon the subiects; which vnto the common people, and men abusing the popular libertie, seemed violent oppressions and tiranies: but vnto the wise men necessarie and wholsome remedies: especially in such a sicke citie and Commonweal, as with most desperate diseases and incurable vlcers was like otherwise to haue peri∣shed: as also against such vnruly citizens, and inured to all licentious libertie; who had a thousand times conspired against this new Duke, reputed for one of the most wise and vertuous princes of his time: but of them accounted a tyrant. [ I]

Now to the contrarie it hapneth often that the state of a citie or Commonweal rui∣nated* 1.596 by the too much lenitie and facilitie of one prince, is againe relieued and vphol∣den by the austeare seueritie of an other. It is sufficiently knowne how terrible the ty∣ranie of Domitian was vnto the Senat, the nobilitie, and other the great lords and go∣uernours of the Roman Empire; in somuch that all his lawes and edicts were by their procurement after his death repealed: and yet for all that was he euen after his death also most highly by the generall consent of all the prouinces commended: for that the Proconsuls with the other magistrats and officers of the Commonweal, were neuer before more vpright or freer from corruption then they were in his time, for feare they had of his seueritie, & him. But when Nerua who succeeeded him in the Empire, ab∣horring [ K] seuerity, enclined altogether to lenitie, & things began to fall into a most mise∣rable estate; the lawes being prostituted, iustice peruerted, and the poore by the mightie oppressed: then Fronto the Consul with many moe with most earnest desire, wished for that crueltie and tyranie which they before had condemned in Domitian. Also when a prince with most sharpe seueritie as with a bridle, keepeth in the mindes and licenti∣ous desires of a furious and headstrong people, as if it were an vntamed beast: such wholsom seueritie ought in no wise to be accounted or called tiranie; but to the con∣trarie Cicero calleth such licentious libertie of the vnrulie people meere tiranie.

It may be also that a prince may exercise tiranie against the great ones in the state, as

it alwaies hapneth in the violent chaunge of an Aristocratie into a Monarchie, when [ A] * 1.597 as the new prince being in necessitie and poore, and not knowing where to haue mo∣ney, oft times falleth vpon the rich, without regard of right or wrong: or else infran∣chiseth the common people from the seruitude of the nobilitie, and the rich by that one and selfe same act to gaine the goods and wealth of the rich, and the fauour of the poore. But of all tirants there is none lesse to be detested than he which preieth vpon the rich to ease the necessitie of the poore. Now they that praise the goodnes, bountie, and courtesie of a prince, without wisedom; are themselues vnwise and ignorant in matters of state, abusing therein both their praises and leasure: for asmuch as such sim∣plicitie without wisedome is most dangerous and pernitious vnto a king, and much more to be feared than is the great seueritie of a cruell, couetous, and inaccessible [ B] prince. So that it seemeth our auntient fathers not without cause to haue vsed this Pro∣uerbe, That of a craftie and subtill man is made a good king: which saying vnto the de∣licate* 1.598 eares of such as measure all things by false opinions rather than by sound reasons, may seeme right strange: for by the too much sufferance and simplicitie of too good a king, it commeth to passe that flatterers, extorcioners, and men of most wicked dis∣position, without respect, inioy the principall honors, offices, charges, benefits, and preferments of the Commonwealth, spoyling the reuenues of the state: wherby the poore people are gnawne vnto the verie bones, and cruelly made slaues vnto the great: in somuch as that in stead of one tirant, there is ten thousand. Out of which corruption also of the magistrats, and too much curtesie of the king, proceed many [ C] mischiefes and euils; as impunitie of offenders, of murderers, and oppressours: for that the king so good and so gratious cannot refuse to graunt them pardon. In briefe, vn∣der such a prince the publique good is turned into particuler, and all the charge falleth vpon the poore people: as wee see in cathares and fluxes in sicke and rheumatique bo∣dies, the maladie still falleth vnto the weakest parts; which to be so, we might proue by many examples aswell of the Grekes as of the Latins: but we will go no farther than to this our owne * realme, which was in the most miserable case that euer it was, vnder the raigne of Charles surnamed the simple, and of some called Charles do nothing. It* 1.599 was seene also, great, rich, and florishing, in armes, lawes, and learning of all sorts in the time of Francis the first: but especially some few yeares before his death, when as he [ D] waxing old, became so wayward and inaccessible, as that no man durst come vnto him to craue any thing of him; hauing driuen the courtly doggs, and shameles persons far from him, bestowing rewards, offices, honours, and benefits vpon none but such as were vertuous, and had well deserued of the Commonweal: and withall so gouerning his bountie, as that at the time of his death were found in the common treasurie almost a thousand Sestertioes, that is to say, seauentie hundred thousand french crownes, be∣sides three moneths tribute which was now due: neither was the Commonweale vnto any then indebted, more than vnto the Swissers, and the Banque of Lyons, whom he would not pay, so to keepe them in awe: at which time he had firme amitie and peace also with all princes and people: and the bounds of his kingdom extended euen vnto [ E] the gates of Millan: his realme full of great captaines, and of the wisest men of the world.

But within twelue yeares after that Henry the second his sonne raigned (whose boun∣tie* 1.600 was so great, as that the like was neuer in any prince of his time,) we saw the state almost quite chaunged: for as he was sweet, gratious, and courteous, so could he not denie any thing to any person; so that his fathers treasures were in few moneths scatte∣red, the great offices and places of commaund were set to sale more than euer, the greatest spirituall preferments without respect bestowed vpon vnworthy men, magi∣stracies

sold to them that would giue most, and so consequently to the most vnwor∣thie [ F] greater customes and payments exacted than euer were before: and yet when he•…•… died, the estate of the receipt of Fraunce was found charged with two and fortie milli∣ons, after it had lost Piemont, Sauoy, the isle of Corsica, and the frontiers of the Low countrey: Howbeit that all these losses were but little, in comparison of the losse of his reputation and honour. Whereas had the facilitie of this great king bene tempe∣red with seueritie, his lenitie with some rigour: his bountie, with a certaine sparing, and that for a weake and soft spirit, he had borne a stout and couragious mind: we had no doubt liued both well and happily, neither had the Commonweale fallen into such miserable calamities as now we haue endured.

But to hold this golden meane (some man will say) as it is hard for euerie man to do: [ G] so for princes whom diuers strong perturbations call out of the middle course vnto the one or other of the the extreames, it is of all others most hard. True it is, that ver∣tue consisting in the meane, is enuironed with many vices, much like vnto a straight line, which is hard to be found among a million of crooked: which graunted, yet so it is neuerthelesse, that it is better and more expedient for the people and the preserua∣tion of an estate to haue a rigorous and seuere prince, than too gentle and courteous. The bountie of the emperour Pertinax, and the enraged youthfulnesse of Heliogaba∣lus had brought the Roman empire euen vnto the verie point of vtter ruine: when as the emperours Seuerus of Afrike, and Alexander Seuerus of Syria, by a rude kind of se∣ueritie and imperiall austeritie reestablished the same, in the former brightnes and ma∣iestie, [ H] to the great and wonderfull contentment of all good men. Thus therefore is the prouerbe that we receiued from our auncestors (That of an euill and subtill man is made* 1.601 a good king) to be vnderstood: for otherwise the word euill, of the proprietie of it selfe signifieth not so much seueritie, as the vttermost point, or the extremitie of impietie, which our auncestors called euill: so Charles king of Nauarre was called an euil king, than whom none was more wicked of his time. Wee must not therefore iudge a prince to be a tyrant for his seueritie and rigour, so that he do nothing contrarie to the lawes of God and nature. But forasmuch as this discourse hath brought vs on so far, let vs see also whether it be lawfull for a good man to lay violent hand vpon the person of a tyrant. [ I]

CHAP. V. ¶ Whether it be lawfull to lay violent hand vpon a tyrant; and after his death to dis•…•…∣null all his acts, decrees, and lawes.

THe proprietie of the word Tyrant, being not well knowne, hath de∣ceiued* 1.602 many, and armed the subiects vnto the destruction of their princes. We haue before said him properly to be called a Tyrant, who of his owne authoritie taketh vpon him the soueraigntie, against [ K] the will of the people, without election, or right of succession, neither by lot, by will, nor iust warre, nor speciall calling of God: and this is he, whome poth the lawes and the writings of auntient fathers commaund to bee slaine; propounding also most ample rewards vnto such as should kill him: viz. the honourable titles of nobilitie and prowesse, armes, statues, crownes, and in briefe the goods of the Tyrant also; as vnto the true deliuerer of his countrey, or as the Creten∣sians vse to say of his mother. Neither in this case make they any difference betwixt a good and a vertuous prince; or a wicked man and a villaine. For it is not lawfull for any man liuing, of himselfe to inuade the soueraigntie, and to make himselfe maister

of his fellowes, what colour of vertue or iustice soeuer they pretend: and that more is, [ A] in law he is guiltie of death, that wrongfully taketh vppon him any the markes pro∣per vnto soueraigne maiestie. If then the subiect will inuade or take vppon him the state of his king by any meanes whatsoeuer; or in a popular or Aristocraticall state, doth of a companion make himselfe a soueraigne, hee deserueth death: So that our question in this respect hath in it no difficultie, but that such aspirers may of all the peo∣ple, or any of them, be lawfully slaine. Yet true it is, that the Greekes haue in this point differed from the Latins; as whether a man in this case ought by way of fact to preuent* 1.603 the course of iustice? For why, the law Valeria published at the request of Pub. Valeri∣us Publicola giueth leaue to euery man to kill a Tyrant, and afterward to trie the cause of him so slaine. Which law seemeth also not to want good ground of reason: for [ B] that to proceed by way of iustice, the Commonweale should bee consumed with the firebrands of tyranny, before the fire once kindled could bee quenched: Besides that, who should cal into question of iustice the Tyrant, armed with his guard and garrisons? who should take him being possessed of the castles and strong holds? were it not bet∣ter by times to oppresse him by force, than by too religious standing vpon the procee∣ding of the law, to loose the law together with the state? Howbeit the law of Solon is quite contrarie vnto this, expresly forbidding to proceed by way of fact, or to kil him that seeketh to possesse himselfe of the soueraigntie, but first to bring him vnto his tri∣all; which seemeth more reasonable than the law Valeria: For that otherwise good & innocent men might oftentimes be taken out of the way and slaine by their enemies, [ C] vnder the color of aspiring, before the truth could be tried: who so once dead, are in that regard alwayes accounted as men iustly slaine. But these two lawes so repugnant and contrarie, may in mine opinion thus be well reconciled; if the meaning of Solons law be referred vnto him, who suspected of aspiring, hath not as yet possessed the castles or strong places, seduced the people, nor armed himselfe with strong garrison: and the law Valeria vnto him who hath openly declared himselfe a Tyrant, seised vppon the castles and citadels, and strengthned himselfe with garrisons. In the first case wee find that Furius Camillus the dictator, by way of iustice proceeded against Marcus Man∣lius Torquatus: and in the second case Brutus and Cassius euen in the Senat and most open assembly of the people, slew Caesar, thinking of nothing lesse. But Solon, when as [ D] he too religiously (should I say) or superstitiously, had ordained that Tyrants should be lawfully tryed before they were put to death, whilest he yet liued saw Pisistratus of a subiect to aspire vnto the soueraigntie of the Athenian state, against whome for all that they which slew the Tyrants at Athens proceeded not by way of iustice; whose children neuerthelesse Harmodius and Aristogiton slew, contrarie vnto the law, by the priuat authoritie of Solon onely.

But here might many questions be made, as, Whether a Tyrant who by force or* 1.604 fraud hauing oppressed the libertie of the people, and so aspired vnto the soueraigntie, may be iustly slaine; hauing after his aspiring caused himselfe to be so chosen or con∣firmed by the voyces of the people in generall? For why, it seemeth that such a solemn [ E] act of election, is a true ratification of him in his tyrannie, the people consenting there∣unto. Yet am I neuerthelesse of opinion, that he may lawfully be slaine, and that with∣out any lawfull processe or triall, except he shall first renounce his authoritie, quit his forces, and so put himselfe into the power of the people: for why, that cannot bee thought to be done by the free consent of the people, which they do by constraint, be∣ing by the Tyrants dispoyled of their authoritie and power. As when Sylla caused himselfe to be confirmed dictator for fourescore yeares, by the law Valeria, which hee caused to be published, hauing at the same time a strong and puissant armie of his own

within the citie: * 1.605 Cicero said, That it was no law at all. And in like case Caesar, who [ F] about thirtie sixe yeares after, caused himselfe by the law Seruia, to bee made dictatour perpetuall. And also Cosmus Medices, who after the death of his kinsman Alexander hauing an armie in the citie of Florens, caused the Senators to chuse him duke of that citie for euer: about which election whilest they made some doubt, hee so thundered with his artillerie before the pallace, as that the Senat doubting otherwise of the safetie of themselues, and of the rest of the citisens, hasted the rather to make choyce of him. Howbeit if the children or posteritie of a tyrant, shall for long time, as by the space of an hundrd yeares, in continual possession hold the soueraigntie, possessed by their great grandfathers or auncestours, and so by their iust commaunds, gouern the Common∣weale; such a gouernment ought not now to be called a tyrannie, for that in this case, [ G] * 1.606 as in all other things, a prescription of so many yeares serueth in stead of a iust title. And whereas it is said, that the rights of soueraigntie cannot be prescribed: that is to say, in lesse then an hundred yeares, and concerneth priuat men, who the Commonweale yet standing vpright, seeke to vsurpe the soueraigntie, but concerneth not the generall conuersion or chaunge of the whole state of a Commonweale. Wee said that the possession of the posteritie of a tyrant ought to be of long continued without interupti∣on or interpellation: that is to say, that the subiects haue not with any conspiracie re∣bellion, or intercession, troubled the gouernment of the tyrant, or of his posteritie: for thereby it is in a sort euident, and to bee gathered, the subiects of their owne accord to haue yeelded vnto his commaunds, and to haue taken him for their iust prince. But [ H] interpellation or gain▪ saying, and resistance, may aswell be showed & declared by deeds as by words: of which sort was that which Aquila the Tribune of the people did, who in sight of all the people tooke off the crowne that was set vpon the head of Cae∣sars statue, Caesar himselfe in vaine fretting thereat; who afterwards vnto such grants of honours and preferments as he gaue vnto his friends, would still adde that, If by Aquil•…•… his leaue we may do it. And thus much concerning a Tyrant, whether hee bee a good man or an euill, who without all right hath aspired vnto the soueraigntie of the Com∣monweale wherein he liueth.

But the chiefe question of this our discourse, is to know, whether a soueraigne prince* 1.607 come vnto that high estate by election, or by lot, by rightfull succession, or by iust warre, or by the especiall vocation of all-mightie God; forgetting his dutie, and be∣come without measure cruell, couetous, and wicked, so peruerting the lawes of God and man, and such an one as we commonly call a Tirant, may be lawfully slaine or not. And true it is that many interpretours, both of Gods and mans lawes, haue said it to be lawfull: many of them without distinction ioyning these two incompatible words together, a King a Tyrant: which so daungerous a doctrine hath bene the cause of the vtter ruine and ouerthrow of many most mightie empires, and kingdomes. But to discide this question wel, it behoueth vs to distinguish an absolute soueraigne prince, from him which is not so: and also subiects from straungers, according as wee haue before declared. For it is great difference to say that a Tirant may lawfully be slaine by a prince a straunger; or by his owne subiect. For as of all noble acts, none is more* 1.608 honorable or glorious then by way of fact, to defend the honour, goods, and liues of such as are vniustly oppressed by the power of the more mightie, especially the gate of iustice being shut against them: as did Moyses seeing his brother the Israelite beaten and wronged by the Aegyptian, and no meanes to haue redresse of his wronges; so is it a most faire and magnificall thing for a prince to take vp armes to relieue a whole na∣tion and people, vniustly oppressed by the crueltie of a tirant: As did the great Hercu∣les, who traueling ouer a great part of the world with wonderfull prowes and valour

destroyed many most horrible monsters, that is to say Tirants: and so deliuered people [ A] without number among the gods: his posteritie for many worlds of yeares after, hol∣ding most great kingdomes, and other the imitatours of his vertues: as Dio, Timoleon, Aratus, Harmodius, Aristogiton, with other such like honorable princes bearing the titles of chastisers and correctors of Tyrants. And for that onely cause Temir-Cutlu, whom our writers commonly call Tamerlan emperour of the Tartars, denounced warre vnto Baiazet king of the Turkes, who then besieged Constantinople; saying that he was come to chastice his tiranie, and to deliuer the aflicted people; whom in∣deed he in a set battell vanquished in the plaines neare vnto Mount Stella: and hauing slaine and put to •…•…light three hundred thousand Turkes, kept the tirant (taken priso∣ner) in chaines in an yron Cage vntill he dyed. Neither in this case is it materiall whe∣ther [ B] such a vertuous prince being a straunger proceed against a Tirant by open force, or finenes, or else by way of iustice. True it is that a valiant and worthy prince hauing the tirant in his power, shall gaine more honour by bringing him vnto his triall, to chastice him as a murtherer, a manqueller, and a robber: rather then to vse the law of armes against him. Wherefore let vs resolue vpon that, that it is lawfull for any straunger to kill a Tirant; that is to say a man of all men infamed, and notorious for the oppression, murder, and slaughter of his subiects and people. But as for subiects to do the same, it is to be knowne whether the prince that beareth rule be an absolute so∣ueraigne; or not: for if he be no absolute soueraigne, then must the Soueraigntie of ne∣cessitie be either in the people, or in the nobilitie: in which case there is no doubt, but [ C] that it is lawfull to proceed against a Tirant by way of iustice, if so men may preuaile against him: or else by way of fact, and open force, if they may not otherwise haue reason. As the Senat did in the first case against Nero: and in the other against Maxi∣minus: for that the Roman Emperours were at the first nothing else but princes of the Common weal, that is to say the chiefe and principall men, the soueraigntie neuer∣thelesse still resting in the People and the Senat: as I haue before showed, that this Commonweal was then to haue bene called a principalitie: although that Seneca spea∣king in the person of Nero his scholler sayeth: I am the onely man amongst liuing men, elect and chosen to be the Lieutenant of God on earth: I am the Arbitratour of lyfe and death: I am able at my pleasure to dispose of the state and qualitie of euery man. True it [ D] is that he tooke vpon him this soueraigne authoritie by force wrested from the Senat and people of Rome: but in right he had it not, the state being but a verie principalitie, wherein the people had the soueraigntie. As is also that of the Venetians, who con∣demned to death their Duke Falier, and also executed many others, without forme or fashion of any lawfull processe: forasmuch as Venice is an Aristocraticall principa∣litie, wherein the Duke is but the first or chiefe man, soueraigntie still remayning in the state of the Venetian Gentlemen. As is likewise the Germain Empire, which is also nothing else but an Aristocraticall principalitie, wherein the the Emperour is head and chiefe, the power and majestie of the Empire belonging vnto the States thereof: who thrust out of the gouernment Adolphus the emperour in the yeare 1296: and [ E] also after him Wenceslaus in the yeare 1400, and that by way of justice, as hauing iuris∣diction and power ouer them. So also might we say of the state of the Lacedemoni∣ans, which was a pure Aristocratie, wherein were two kings, without any soueraigntie at all, being indeed nothing but Captaines and Generals for the managing of their warres: and for that cause were by the other magistrats of the state, sometime for their faults condemned to pay their fine; as was king Agesilaus: and sometime to death also as were Agis and Pausanias. Which hath also in our time hapned vnto the kings of Denmarke and Sweden, whereof some haue beene banished, and the others died in

prison: for that the nobilitie pretendeth them to be nothing but princes, and not So∣ueraignes, [ F] as we haue before showed: so also are they subiects vnto those states which haue the right of their election. And such were in auntient times the kings of the cities of the Gauls, whom Caesar for this cause oftentimes calleth Regulos, that is to say little kings: being themselues subiects, and iusticiable vnto the Nobilitie, who had all the soueraigntie: causing them euen to be put to death, if they had so deserued. And that is it for which Amphiorix the captaine generall, whom they called the king of the Liegeois said; Our commaundes (saith he) are such, as that the people hath no lesse power ouer vs, then we ouer the people: wherein he showed euidently that he was no soue∣raigne prince: howbeit that it was not possible for him to haue equall power with the people, as we haue before showed. Wherefore these sorts of princes, hauing no so∣ueraigntie, [ G] if they polluted with wickednes and villanie, cannot be chastised by the authoritie and seueritie of the magistrat, but shall abuse their wealth and power vnto the hurt and destruction of good men; it alwayes hath and shall be lawfull not for strangers onely, but euen for the subiects themselues also, to take them out of the way.

But if the prince be an absolute Soueraigne, as are the true Monarques of Fraunce,* 1.609 of Spain, of England; Scotland, Turkie, Moschouie, Tartarie, Persia, Aethiopia, India, and of almost all the kingdomes of Affricke, and Asia, where the kings themselues haue the soueraigntie without all doubt or question; not diuided with their subiects: in this case it is not lawfull for any one of the subiects in particular, or all of them in generall, to attempt any thing either by way of fact, or of iustice against the honour, life, or dig∣nitie [ H] of the soueraigne: albeit that he had committed all the wickednes, impietie, and crueltie that could be spoken; For as to proceed against him by way of justice, the sub∣iect hath no such iurisdiction ouer his Soueraigne prince: of whom dependeth all po∣wer and authoritie to commaund: and who may not onely reuoke all the power of his Magistrats; but euen in whose presence the power of all Magistrats, Corporations, Colleges, Estates, and Communities cease, as we haue said, and shall yet more fully in due place say. Now if it be not lawfull for the subiect by way of justice to proceed against his prince; the vassall against his lord; nor the slaue against his master; and in briefe, if it be not lawfull, by way and course of iustice to proceed against a king, how should it then be lawfull to proceed against him by way of fact, or force. For questi∣on [ I] is not here, what men are able to doe by strength and force, but what they ought of right to do: as not whether the subiects haue power and strength, but whether they haue lawfull power to condemne their soueraigne prince. Now the subiect is not on∣ly guiltie of treason in the highest degree, who hath slaine his soueraigne prince, but euen he also which hath attempted the same; who hath giuen councell or consent thereunto; yea if he haue conccaled the same, or but so much as thought it: which fact the lawes haue in such detestation, as that when a man guiltie of any offence or crime, dieth before he be thereof condemned, he is deemed to haue died in whole and perfect state, except he haue conspired against the life and dignitie of his soueraigne prince: this onely thing they haue thought to bee such, as that for which hee may worthily [ K] seeme to haue bene now alreadie iudged and condemned; yea euen before he was ther∣of accused. And albeit that the lawes inflict no punishment vpon the euill thoughts of men; but on those onely which by word or deed breake out into some enormitie: yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his soueraigne prince, although he haue attempted nothing, they haue yet iudged this same thought worthie of death, notwithstanding what repentance soeuer he haue had* 1.610 thereof. As in proofe it fell out with a gentleman of Normandie, who confessed him∣selfe vnto a Franciscan Frier, to haue had a purpose in himself to haue slaine Francis the

first, the French king: of which euill purpose and intent he repenting himselfe, receiued [ A] of the frier absolution, who yet afterward told the king thereof; who sending for the gentleman, and he confessing the fact, turned him ouer to the parliament of Paris for his triall, where he was by the decree of that high court condemned to death, and so af∣terwards executed. Which wee cannot say, that the judges did for feare, seeing that they had oftentimes refused to ratifie the edicts and letters patents by that gratious king granted, notwithstanding whatsoeuer commaundement hee did giue for them to con∣firme the same. And so in Paris, although a foolish man and altogether out of his wit, called Caboche, drew his sword vpon Henrie the second, Francis his son, as with a pur∣pose to haue slaine him; but without effect or hurt done, yet was he neuerthelesse con∣demned, and so put to death, without any regard had vnto his lunesie or frensie; al∣though [ B] the lawes euerie where excuse the madde and lunitike man, from all punish∣ment, what murther or villanie soeuer he doe; seeing that hee is more than enough* 1.611 tormented with the frantike furious passion it selfe. And least any man should thinke themselues to haue bene the authors of these lawes and decrees, so the more straitly to prouide for their owne safetie and honour, let vs see the lawes and examples of holy Scripture. Nabugodonozor king of Assyria, with fire and sword destroyed all the coun∣trey of Palestine, besieged the citie of Hierusalem, tooke it, robbed and rased it downe to the ground, burnt the temple, and defiled the sauctuarie of God, slew the king, with the greatest part of the people, carrying away the rest that remained into captiuitie into Babilon; and yet not so contented, caused * the image of himselfe made in gold, to be [ C] * 1.612 set vp in publike place, commaunding all men without exception to adore and worship the same, vpon paine of being burnt aliue: and caused them that refused so to doe, to be cast into a burning furnace: and yet for all that the holy * Prophets directing their* 1.613 letters vnto their brethren the Iewes, then in captiuitie at Babilon, will them to pray vnto God, for the good and happie life of Nabuchodonosor and his children, and that they might so long rule and raigne ouer them as the heauens should endure. Yea euen God himselfe doubted not to call Nabuchodonosor his seruant; saying, That he would* 1.614 make him the most mightie prince of the world. And yet was there euer a more dete∣stable tyrant than he? who not contented to be himselfe worshipped, but caused his image to be also adored, and that vpon paine of being burnt quick. And yet for all [ D] that we see the prophet Ezechiel, enspired with the spirit of God, angrie with Sedechia king of Hierusalem, greatly to detest his perfidious dealing, disloyaltie, and rebellion against king Nabuchodonosor, whose vas•…•…all hee was, and as it were reioyceth him to haue bene most iustly slaine. We haue also another more rare example of Saul, who possessed with an euill spirit, caused the priests of the lord to be without iust cause slain, for that one of them had receiued Dauid flying from him, and did ofttimes what in his power was, to kill, or cause to haue bene killed the same Dauid, a most innocent prince, by whome he had got so manie victories ouer his enemies: at which time he fell twice himselfe into Dauid his hands; who blamed of his most valiant souldiers (ouer whom he then commaunded) for that he would not suffer his so mortal an enemie then in his [ E] power, to be slaine, being in most assured hope to haue enioyed the kingdome after his death, he detested their counsel, saying, God forbid that I should suffer the person of a king, the Lords annointed to be violated. Yea moreouer hee himselfe defended the same king persecuting of him, when as hee commaunded the souldiers of his guard ouercome by wine and sleepe to be wakened. And at such time as Saul was slaine, and that a souldiour thinking to do Dauid a pleasure, presented him with Saul his head: Da∣uid forthwith caused the same souldier to be slain, which had brought him the head, sai∣ing, Go thou wicked, how durst thou lay thine impure hands vpon the Lords annoin∣ted?

thou shalt surely die therefore: and afterwards without all dissimulation mourned [ F] himselfe for the dead king. All which is worth our good consideration. For Dauid was by Saul persecuted to death, and yet wanted not power to haue reuenged himselfe, being become stronger than the king by the aid of his enemies, vnto whome hee fled euen against his will: besides that he was the chosen of God, and annointed by the hands of Samuel, to be king of the people, and had also married the kings daughter: and yet for all that he abhorred to take vpon him the title of a king, and much more to attempt any thing against the life or honour of Saul, or to rebell against him, but chose rather to banish himselfe out of the realme, than in any sort to seeke the kings destructi∣on. So we also read, that the most holy and best learned men that euer were amongst the Iewes▪ whome they called the Essei (that is to say, the true executors of the law of [ G] God) held, that soueraigne princes whatsoeuer they were, ought to bee vnto their sub∣iects inuiolable, as persons sacred, and sent vnto them from God. And wee doubt not, but that Dauid a king and prophet, led by the spirit of God, had alwaies before his eies the law of God, which saith, Thou shalt not speake euill of thy prince, nor detract the Ma∣gistrat.* 1.615 Neither is there any thing more common in all the holy Scripture, than the forbidding not onely to kill or attempt the life or honour of a prince, but euen for the verie magistrats also, although (saith the Scripture) they be wicked and naught. If ther∣fore he be guiltie of treason against God and man, which doth but detract the magi∣stracie; what punishment then can be sufficient for him that shall attempt his life? For the law of God is in this case yet more precise than are the lawes of men: For the law [ H] Iulia holdeth but him guiltie of treason, which shall giue councell to kill the magistrat, whereas the law of God expresly forbiddeth in any sort to speake of the magistrat euil, or in any wise to detract him. Wherefore to aunswere vnto the vaine and friuolous obiections & arguments of them which maintain the contrarie, were but idly to abuse both our time and learning. But as he which doubteth whether there bee a God or nor, is not with arguments to be refuted, but with seuere punishments to bee chastifed: so are they also which call into question a thing so cleere, and that by bookes publikely imprinted; that the subiects may take vp armes against their prince beeing a Tyrant, and take him out of the way howsoeuer: howbeit that the most learned diuines, and of best vnderstanding, are cleere of opinion, that it is not lawfull for a man not only to [ I] kill his soueraigne prince, but euen to rebell against him, without an especiall and vn∣doubtfull commaundement from God; as we read of Iehu, who was chosen of God, and by the prophet annointed king of Israel, with expresse commandement vtterly to root out all the house of king Achab. He before as a subiect had right patiently borne all his wickednesse and outrages. Yea the most cruell murthers and torturing of the most holy prophets, and religious men, the vnworthy murthers, banishments, and pro∣scriptions of the subiects; as also the most detestable witchcraft of queene Iesabel: yet for all that durst he attempt nothing against his soueraigne prince, vntill he had expresse commaundement from God, by the mouth of his prophet, whome God indeed so as∣sisted, [ K] as that with a small power he slew two kings, caused seuentie of king Achab his children to be put to death, with many other princes of the kings of Israel and of Iu∣da, and all the idolatrous priests of Bahal, that is to say of the Sunne, after thas hee had caused Iesabel the queene, to be cast headlong downe from an high tower, and left her bodie to be torne in peeces and eaten vp of dogges. But we are not to apply this espe∣ciall commaundement of God, vnto the conspiracies and rebellions of mutinous sub∣iects against their soueraigne princes. And as for that which Caluin saith, if there were at this time magistrats appointed for the defence of the people, and to restraine the insolencie of kings, as were the Ephori in Lacedemonia, the Tribunes in Rome, and

the Demarches in Athens, that they ought to resist and impeach their licentiousnesse [ A] and crueltie: he sheweth sufficiently, that it was neuer lawfull in a right Monarchie, to assault the prince, neither to attempt the life or honour of their soueraigne king: for he speaketh not but of the popular and Aristocratique states of Commonweales. And we haue before shewed, that the kings of Lacedemonia were no more but plaine Se∣nators and captaines: and when he speaketh of states, he saith, Possibly, not daring to* 1.616 assure any thing. Howbeit that there is a notable difference betwixt the attempting of the honour of his prince, and the withstanding of his tyranny; betwizt killing his king, and the opposing of ones selfe against his crueltie. We read also, that the Prote∣stant princes of Germanie, before they entred into armes against Charles the emperor, demaunded of Martin Luther if it were lawfull for them so to doe or not; who frank∣ly [ B] told them, That it was not lawfull, whatsoeuer tyrannie or impietie were pretended; yet was he not therein of them beleeued: so thereof ensued a deadly and most lamenta∣ble warre, the end whereof was most miserable, drawing with it the ruine and destru∣ction of many great and noble houses of Germanie, with exceeding slaughter of the subiects: whereas No cause (as saith Cicero) can be thought iust or sufficient for vs to take vp armes against our countrey. And yet it is most certaine, that the soueraigntie of the empire resteth not in the person of the emperour, (as we will in due place declare) but being chiefe of the state, they could not lawfully take vp armes against him, but by a generall consent of the state, or of the greater part of them, which was not done: then much lesse is it lawfull to take vp atmes against a soueraigne prince. I cannot vse a bet∣ter [ C] example, than of the dutie of a sonne towards his father: the law of God saith, That he which speaketh euill of his father or mother, shall be put to death. Now if the fa∣ther shall be a theefe, a murtherer, a traytor to his countrey, as an incestuous person, a manqueller, a blasphemer, an atheist, or what so you will else; I confesse that all the pu∣nishments that can bee deuised are not sufficient to punish him: yet I say, it is not for the sonne to put his hand thereunto, Quia nulla tanta impiet as, nullum tantum scelus est, quod sit parricidio vindicandum. For that (as saith an auntient Orator) no impietie can be so great, no offence so hainous, as to be reuenged with the killing of ones father. And yet Cicero reasoning vpon the same question, saith, our country to bee deerer vnto vs than our parents. Wherefore the prince whom you may iustly call the father of the [ D] country ought to be vnto euery man dearer & more reuerend than any father, as one ordained & sent vnto vs by God. I say therfore that the subiect is neuer to be suffered to attempt any thing against his soueraign prince, how naughty & cruel soeuer he be law∣ful it is, not to obey him in things contrarie vnto the laws of God & nature: to flie and hide our selues from him; but yet to suffer stripes, yea and death also rather than to at∣tempt any thing against his life or honour. O how many Tirants should there be; if* 1.617 it should be lawfull for subiects to kill Tirants? how many good and innocent princes should as Tirants perish, by the conspiracie of their subiects against them? He that should of his subiects exact subsidies, should be then (as the vulgar people accompt him) a Tirant: he that should rule and commaund contrarie to the good liking of the [ E] people, should be a Tirant: (as Aristotle in his Politiques sayeth him to be) he that should keepe strong gardes and garrisons for the safetie of his person, should be a Ti∣rant: he that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his state should be also counted a Tirant. And in deed how should good princes be assured of their liues, if vnder the colour of tirannie they might bee slaine of their subiects, by whom they ought to be defended? Not for that I would say it not to be lawfull for other Princes by force of armes to prosecute tiranie (as I haue before said) but for that it is not lawful for subiects so to doe. Howbeit that I am rather of Diogenes the Cinique his opinion,

who one day meeting with Dionysius the yonger, then liuing in exile at Corinth, and [ F] seeing him merily sporting himselfe in the streats with iesters and minstrels; verie so∣berlie said vnto him, Truely thou art now in an estate vnworthie of thee. I hartilie thank thee (said Dionysius) for hauing compassion on me. And thinkest thou said Dio∣genes that I thus say for any compassion I haue of thee? mistake me not, for I speake it rather in dispite of the life thou now leadest, to see such a vile slaue as thee, worthy to grow old, and die in the accursed state of tirannie, as did thy father, thus to sport thy selfe in securitie, and quietly to passe thy time among vs. For can any hangman more cruelly torment a man condemned to torture, than feare? Feare I say of death, of infa∣mie,* 1.618 and of torture: these bee the reuenging furies which continually vex Tirants, and with eternall terrours torment them both night and day: Then enuie, suspition, [ G] feare, desire of reuenge, with a thousand contrarie passions at variance among them∣selues, do so disquiet their minds, and more cruelly tiranize ouer them, than they them∣selues can ouer their slaues, with all the torments they can deuise. And what greater wretchednesse can happen vnto a man, than that which presseth and forceth the tirant? to haue a desire to make his subiects beasts and fooles, by cutting from them all the waies to vertue and learning? To bee a slaue and subiect vnto a thousand spyes and pryers into other mens liues? to heare, see, and vnderstand, what is done, saied, o•…•… thought of all and euery man? and in stead of ioyning and vniting of his subiects in loue and amitie together; to sow amongst them a thousand quarrels and dissentions: to the end they should alwaies be at defiance among themselues, and in distrust one of [ H] an other? And who can doubt but that a Tirant still languishing in such torment, is of all men most miserable, and more afflicted and tormented, than if he should die a thou∣sand deaths? Death (as sayeth Theophrastus) is the end of all miseries; and the repose of the vnfortunate, as sayeth Caesar: neither the one nor the other being in that point su∣perstitious, as not persuaded of the immortalitie of the soule, or that it longer liued than the bodie, or that there remayned any farther paines for the wicked after this life: so that to wish a Tirant slaine as a punishment for his deserts, is but to wish his good and rest.

But most Tirants haue ordinarilie neare vnto their owne persons certeine Mynni∣ons,* 1.619 of whom they make great account and reckning: whom they vse as spunges to [ I] suck vp their subiects blood, vpon whom when occasion serueth, they discharge them∣selues; to the end that the people entering into furie, should seise vpon them, and spare themselues: So had Tiberius, Seian; Nero, Tigillin; Dionyse the younger, Phyliste; and of late Henry king of Sweden, George Preschon, whom we read to haue beene gi∣uen as a prey vnto the furious people, and by them to haue beene rent and torne in peeces. So the Emperour Anthonius Caracalla to please the people, put to death all the flatterers who had before induced him to kill his brother. Neither did Caligula in better sort intreat his claw-backs. And by these sleights haue Tyrants oftentimes wel escaped the rage and furie of the people. But if the conspiratours began their furie at [ K] the person of the Tyrant himselfe, then were not onely his friends and fauourites, but euen his wiues, children, and neerest kinsmen, most cruelly slaine. Which they did not onely all Greece ouer, but in Sicilie also: as after the death of Hiero the Tyrant, ensued the slaughter of all his friends and kinsfolks, the rage of the people with vnspea∣kable crueltie bursting out, euen to the dismembring of his sisters and cosens: his sta∣tues were cast downe, all his edicts reuoked, not only those which were vniust and vn∣reasonable, but euen those also which were right commendable and necessarie; to the intent that no memoriall of Tyrants might remaine: yet true it is, that oftentimes their good decrees were still kept. And that is it for which Cicero said, That there was no∣thing

more common, than to approue the acts of a Tyrant, and yet to place in hea∣uen [ A] them that had slaine them. And yet he in another saith it be a doubt, not yet re∣solued vpon, viz. Whether a good man ought to come vnto the counsell of a Tyrant con∣sulting euen of good and profitable matters? And yet this question dependeth of the other: for if a man make conscience to be assistant vnto a Tyrant, consulting of good things, for feare least in so doing he should seeme to approue his tyrannie: wherefore should he then approue the good lawes and decrees by him made? for that is also no lesse to ratifie his tyranny, and to giue example to others, aswell as to giue councell vn∣to a Tyrant, in good and commendable things. Except one should say, that tyrannie which yet is in the force and strength of it selfe, is shored and countenanced by the* 1.620 councell of good and honest men, vnder the couert of some one or other good and [ B] commendable act, which would otherwise of it selfe fall, by the onely euill opinion conceiued of tyrannie; whereas he which is alreadie dead, cannot be againe reuiued to ratifie his other euill acts. Yea it oftentimes falleth out, that not onely the good & pro∣fitable acts of Tyrants, but euen their euill and vniust acts and orders are of necessitie to be retained also, if we will haue the Commonwealth in safetie to stand. Where∣fore Thrasibulus after he had put to flight the thirtie Tyrants of Athens: and Aratus hauing slaine Nicholas the Tyrant of Sicyone: and to the imitation of them Cicero af∣ter the death of Caesar the dictator, perswaded the publication of the lawes of forgetful∣nesse, to extinguish the desire of reuenge: yet for the most part ratifying the acts of those Tyrants, which they could not vtterly disanull, without the ruine of the whole Com∣monweale. [ C] As for that we read the acts of Nero and Demetrian, to haue beene reuo∣ked, and disanulled by the Senat, that concerneth certaine perpetuall edicts of theirs, which for that they had a perpetuall inconuenience annexed vnto them, would if they had not bene abrogated, haue in time vtterly ruinated all that was now againe set in or∣der: as for their good & cōmendable lawes, they were not at all altred. For what time was more glorious than Nero his first fiue yeares raigne? what more fit or better for the well ordering of a Commonweale? Insomuch that Traian himselfe a most excel∣lent prince, deemed no man to haue bene like vnto Nero, for the well gouerning of a Commonweale. Vnto this the opinions of the lawyers agree, who hold the succes∣sours* 1.621 of Tyrants to be bound vnto all such things as the Tyrants their predecessours [ D] haue iustly promised or done, but not vnto the rest. So the emperour Constantine the Great, by a law abrogated such things, as Licinius the Tyrant had before vniustly de∣creed, but confirmed the rest. The like we read to haue bene done by Theodosius the younger, and Arcadius the emperours, after the death of the Tyrant Maximus, by this law, Quae Tyrannus contra ius rescripsit non valere praecipimus: legitimis eius rescrip∣tis non impugnandis, What the Tyrant hath against right decreed, we commaund to be of none effect; not impugning his lawfull decrees. And albeit that these two yong emperours, to be reuenged of the Tyrant Maximus, had by a generall edict reuoked all the prodigall gifts and preferments, which he lauishly had bestowed vppon wicked men, and of no desert in the Commonweale: and also disanulled his iudgements and [ E] decrees: yet would they not repeale any thing that had bene by him decreed or graun∣ted, without fraud and deceit, and the hurt of the Commonweale. Those last wordes without fraud and deceit, which we read in Theodosius, his law, are added against Ty∣rants Agents, & Brokers, who are especially to be laid hold vpon, to the end that others take not example by them, to build their houses, or enrich themselues by the ruine or hurt of others, during the time that tyranie beareth sway; or that the Commonwealth is with ciuill warres diuided. As it happened in the state of Milan, rent in sunder by the Venetians, the French, the Swissers, and the Spaniards, euerie one of them taking

vnto themselues so much thereof, as they could by force and strength, as if it had bene [ F] by good right, and the Sforces the rest: where amongst others it fortuned Iason the fa∣mous lawyer, a fauourit of the Spaniards, by fraudulent meanes to obtaine the goods of Triuultius, a worthie captaine of the French part: but the Spaniards afterwards dri∣uen out, and the French returned, Iason was right well beaten with his owne lawes and decisions, being by the captaine Triuultius againe thrust out of his vniust possession, and that by his owne doctrine. In which case yet the force of lawes and decrees ought* 1.622 not to be of so great force and power, as naturall and vpright equitie it selfe, which can∣not be fully comprised in any lawes, but is to be left vnto the religious arbitrement of them who know how to mannage the affaires of state, and wisely to ballance the parti∣cular profit, with the counterpoise of the publique, according to the infinit varietie of [ G] times, places, and persons; alwaies remembring the profit of euerie man in particular, and of all together in generall, not to be one and the same: and that the publike is al∣waies to be preferred before the priuat, except the priuat be grounded vpon the greatest equitie and reason. As if the Receiuers in the heat of the ciuill warres, or in the raigne of a Tyrant, or in such time as lawfull enemies make inuasion, shall be enforced to pay the publike money: it is good reason it should be allowed them, as paid vnto the Com∣monwealth. For so it was iudged by decree of the parliament of Naples, for them that had paid vnto the receiuers of Charles the eight, when as after the returne of the Spaniards, they would haue enforced the receiuers to haue paid the money twice, na∣turall reason (in this case) preferring the priuat profit before the publike. For the recei∣uers [ H] could not otherwise doe, the Frenchmen then fully possessed of the kingdom of Naples. But if the Receiuers or debtors of the Commonweale, shall without any sum∣mons or constraint, or for some colourable suit, pay vnto the enemie, or a Tyrant, part of that which is due, to accept in stead of the whole, they shall yet still remaine not onely debtors for the whole, but be in daunger also of treason. Wherefore to con∣clude this question, It is not meet that the good decrees or laws of a slaine tyrant should be repealed or disanulled.

And in this, the princes much deceiue themselues, which ouerthrow and make void* 1.623 all the acts of Tyrants, their predecessours; and namely they which giue reward to them that haue slaine Tyrants, to make them a way vnto the soueraigntie. For they [ I] shall neuer assure themselues of their owne liues, if they seuerely punish not the conspi∣ratours against their owne prince and murtherers of him, although hee were neuer so great a Tyrant. As most wisely did Seuerus the emperour, who put to death all them which had any part in the murther of the emperour Pertinax: which was the cause (as saith Herodian) that there was no man which durst attempt his life. So also Vitelliu•…•… the emperour put to death all the murtherers and conspirators against Galba, who had presented requests signed with their owne hands vnto the emperour Otho, to haue had of him reward for their distoialtie. And Theophilus emperour of Constantinople cau∣sed them all to be called together, who had made his father emperour, after they had [ K] slaine Leo the Armenian, as if he would haue well recompensed them for so great a good turne: who being come together with many other, who though not partakers of the murther, were yet desirous to be partakers of the reward; hee caused them alto∣gether to be slaine. And that more is, the emperour Domitian put to death Epaphrodi∣tus, Nero his manumised seruant, and secretarie to the state, for hauing holpen Nero to kill himselfe, who most instantly requested him so to doe, being thereby deliuered from the executioners hands, and crueil exemplarie death. And these things wee read not onely Tyrants, but euen good kings also to haue done, not so much in regard of their owne safetie, as of the dignitie of them that were slaine. As Dauid did vnto him

who in hope of reward brought him his father in lawes head cut off, but slaine by his [ A] enemies. And Alexander the Great caused cruelly to bee put to death him that had murthered king Darius, abhorring the subiect which durst to lay hand vpon his king: although Alexander himselfe by lawfull warre sought after his life and state, as beeing his lawfull enemie. And yet in mine opinion the thing that hath most preserued the kings of Fraunce and their persons inuiolated, is for that they haue not vsed crueltie to∣wards* 1.624 them which were neere vnto them in blood, albeit that they were attainted; conuicted, yea and condemned as enemies to their prince, and guiltie of treason. As Iohn the second, duke of Alencon, although he was twice for the same cause condem∣ned, as for that he had with the enemies conspired against king Charles the seuenth and the Commonweale, and the sentence of death pronounced against him by the Chan∣celour, [ B] yet for all that would not the king, that he should bee executed. Many haue blamed this the kings too much clemeneie, as daungerous: but they see not, that kings in so doing, do not so much deliuer their kinsmen from punishment, as themselues; nei∣ther so much to prouide for other mens safetie, as for their own; nor that in forbidding the blood of their kinsmen to be shed, they spare their owne; nor that hee which put∣teth a prince of his owne blood into the executioners hands, or causeth him to be mur∣thered, forgeth a knife to cut his owne throat. For wee haue seene the emperours of Constantinople both of auntient and latter time, and many kings of Spaine and Eng∣land, who fouling their hands in the blood of their princes, suffered themselues after∣ward in their persons that which they had done to others. For not to speake of those [ C] things which are reported to haue of late bene done in the house of Castile: one king in that nation cruelly murthered six of his brethren: and in lesse than thirtie six yeares fourescore princes of royall blood, were (as Philip Comines in his Commentaries re∣porteth) in England either slaine or executed by the bloudie executioners hands. Now the greatest safetie of a soueraigne prince, is to haue their subiects persuaded, that they ought to be holy and inuiolat; although it much concerne the Commonweale also, the kings stocke to be most sacred, least the princes of the blood being taken out of the way, the Commonweale fall also; or else troubled with endlesse sedition, bee rent in peeces, as we shall in due place declare. I know well that some haue blamed Seleucus, for not hauing put to death Demetrius, surnamed the Besieger, one of the most valiant [ D] princes that euer was; but hauing onely kept him in prison: And Hugh Capet, for ha∣uing kept in prison in the castle at Orleans, Charles the last of the blood of king Char∣lemaigne: And Henrie the first, king of England, for hauing kept in prison vntill his death, his elder brother Robert, hauing before caused his eyes to bee put out: As also Christiern father to Frederike king of Denmarke, for hauing kept his cosen the king of Denmarke thrust out of his kingdome, fiue and twentie yeares prisoner, who as a priuat man there died in prison, in the castle of Calembourg, being 77 yeares old: And Iohn king of Sweden, who keepeth his elder brother Henrie (reiected by the people) prisoner euer since the yeare 1567, least he should trouble both him and the Common∣weale. But they haue bene, and yet are by this meanes more reuerenced and ho∣noured [ E] of their subiects, than if they had put these their so honourable prisoners to death.

But here some men wil obiect, The keeping of such princes prisones, to be a thing* 1.625 full of perill and daunger: which I confesse, and was the onely reason that moued the pope to counsell Charles of Fraunce, to put to death Conradin his prisoner, the sonne of Manfroy king of Naples. As with like crueltie had Ptolomie, last king of Aegypt caused Pompey the Great, after his flight vnto him from the battaile of Pharsalia, to be slaine; his councellors saying vnto him, That dead men bit not. And yet neuerthelesse

neither could this Ptolomee escape destruction: neither wanted there heires enow of [ F] the house of Aragon, who ceased not to driue out them of the house of Aniou, and to recouer againe the kingdome: and albeit that he which put him to death, beeing him∣selfe afterward also condemned to die, escaped: yet so it was, that the infamie of so de∣testable a murther, without cause committed vppon the person of a young innocent prince, hath yet tested vpon them which did the execution to their owne destruction. And truely our auncestours seeing Iohn duke of Burgundie, rashly in the verie time of iudgement, confessing the murther of Lewes his kinsman, duke of Orleans; and yet to haue easily escaped the daunger, said, That surely from thence foreward a man might haue the blood of princes good cheape, and in so saying said well. For the same Iohn comming afterward vnder safe conduct, was himself likewise serued, and in cold blood [ G] slaine, they that were the authors of his death escaping vnpunished.

CHAP. VI. ¶ Of an Aristocratie.

AN Aristocratie is a forme of Commonweale, wherein the lesse* 1.626 part of the citisens with soueraigne power commaundeth ouer all the rest; and euerie citisen in particular. And in that it is con∣trarie vnto the estate Popular, for that in the Aristocraticall state the lesser part of the citisens command, and in the Popular state [ H] the greater: and yet in that they both agree, that they which haue the soueraignty, haue power to commaund ouer euery one in particular, but not ouer all in generall. Wherefore a Monarchie is in that better and more honourable than the other two; for that in it the power of one extendeth it selfe ouer all in generall, and in particular also: a thing in mine opinion well worthy the no∣ting. And like as a Monarchie is either Royall, Lordlike, or Tyrannicall: so also an* 1.627 Aristocratie may be Lordly, lawfull, or factious; which in auntient time the called an Oligarchie; that is to say, a Seignorie of a verie small number of Lords. As were the thirtie lords of Athens, ouerthrowne by Thrasibulus, whom they called the thirtie Ty∣rants. Or the ten commissioners, commonly called the Decemuiri, appointed to re∣forme [ I] the lawes and customes of Rome: and long after the Triumuiri, who by force oppressing the libertie of the people, inuaded the soueraigntie. And that is it for which the auntients haue alwaies taken this word Oligarchie, in the euill part, and Aristocra∣tie* 1.628 in the good; defining it to be A gouernment of good men. But we haue before decla∣red, that in matters of state (to vnderstand of what forme euerie Commonweale is) we must not haue regard whether the gouernours thereof bee vertuous, or otherwise; but to the gouernment thereof. It is also a difficult matter, and almost impossible, to esta∣blish an Aristocratie composed onely of good men; for that cannot bee done by lot, neither by election, the two vsuall meanes: whereunto we may ioyne the third, by lot [ K] and election together, as impossible as the other; vertue with fortune hauing no agreement. Neither is lot and fortune to be admitted vnto the consultations of ho∣nest causes: and if the same should be committed vnto the choyce of the promiscuous and vulgar people, they would not make choyce of men altogether vnlike themselus; that is of fools, of wicked and most impudent men, good and wise men (if there be any) euerie where being the least part of the people: and what more shamefull thing could there be, than the honour and reputation of wise men, to depend of the iudgement (should I say, or of the rashnesse) of the head strong people. Yet let vs grant some few good and wise men to bee in the citie, truely they will shun euen the verie sight of the

wicked and of the bedlem multitude: neither if they come vnto their common assem∣blies, [ A] be so shamelesse and impudent, as to name and make their choice of themselues as of wise men. For so Lactantius Firmianus meerely iesteth at the seuen Sages of Greece: If they were but wise (saith he) in their owne iudgements, then were they not wise: but in the iudgement of others, much lesse, who were not wise in iudging no mo wise but seuen, and all the rest fooles.

But some may say it should do well herein to imitate the auncient Romans, and other Latins, in the choice that they by solemne oath made of the most valiant and warlike man of all other for their Generall: who so chosen, should make choice of a second for his Lieutenant most like himselfe: and he likewise of the third: and the third of the fourth; and so in order one valiant man of an other, vntill the number of their [ B] Legions were filled. This truely might seeme a good way for the forming of a Com∣monweal of good and worthie men, at the first beginning thereof: But who should prefine the measure and number of those good men? and who should be suertie vnto the Commonweal, that euery one of those good men, should still make choice of an other good man like himselfe; rather then of his sonne, his brother, his kinsman, or his friend? and admit it were so done, sith euery where there are so few good men, who should defend them from the multitude, and violence of them that were left, as fools and wicked men? But admit that a Commonweal may at the first be made of such a select number of good men; how long shall we think it can so stand? And that is it for which there neither is, nor euer was any pure Aristocratie; wherein the most vertuous [ C] onely had the soueraigntie. For albeit that the Pythagorians hauing drawne vnto their line the most noble and honorable princes of Italie: in the time of king Seruius Tullius had chaunged certeine Tyrants, into iust Regalities, and were in hope also by little and little to haue brought the Oligarchies, and Democraties, into Aristocraties, as in some places they had alreadie done: yet neuerthelesse it so fell out, that the popu∣lar men, and ringleaders of the people, seeing all power and authoritie, vnder the cou∣lour of vertue, to be taken out of their hands, entered into great conspiracies, and so ar∣ming the people against the Pythagoreans, and the desperate rout, against the better sort: (as easie it was for the stronger to oppresse the weaker) burnt them in their diet, and massacred almost all the rest that escaped from the daunger of the fire: which [ D] shamefull murther of the Pythagorians raised great sturres in Italie.* 1.629

Wherefore whether they be of the better sort, or of the worse; of the richer sort, or of the poorer; of the nobler, or of the baser; of the more warlike, or otherwise which hold the soueraigntie, so that it be the lesser part of the citizens or people, we call it by the name of an Aristocratie. This lesser part of citizens or people we need not to de∣fine by any certein number: for that the varietie of numbers is infinite, and can by no man be comprehended. As admit there be ten thousand citizens, of whom an hundred haue the soueraigntie; if in their common assemblie three score of them shall be of one* 1.630 opinion for the making of a law: that law shall in generall bind the other fortie which haue part also in the soueraigntie, but are the fewer in number, together with the other [ E] nine thousand nine hundred excluded from the gouernment, and the same three score being of one mind together, shall rule the whole ten thousand in particular: Neither yet for all that is the soueraigne right drawne vnto those three score; But as in euery lawfull Colledge and Corporation, the greater part is euery where the better: so it followeth that three score being of one accord, shall ouer rule the other fortie both altogether and a part: except by law concerning soueraigntie it be prouided, that two thirds of the citizens agreeing among themselues, should preuaile against the rest; as we see it set downe in almost all the lawes and statutes of Colledges: by which

meanes threescore foure citizens, shall in the aforesaid number of an hundred, be supe∣riou [ F] vnto the other thirtie six. Wherefore in an Aristocratie we are not to haue re∣gard how little, or how great the number of the citizens is; prouided that they which haue the soueraigntie ouer the rest, be fewer in number than the one half of the whole. For admit there be an hundred thousand citizens in a Commonweale, of whom ten thousand haue the soueraigntie ouer the rest, it shall as well be called an Aristocratie; as if of ten thousand citizens, one thousand onely should hold the estate: considering that both in the one and other Commonweal, the tenth part hath the soueraigntie: so we may say where the hundred, or the thousand part of the citizens beare the sway; and the fewer that they be, the more assured and durable is the state; so that they be not at variance amongst themselues. As the estate of the Pharsalians was the most durable of [ G] * 1.631 Graece, and yet it had but twentie Gouernours. And the Lacedemonian Common∣weal, which caried away the prize of honour from all the others of the East: albeit that it was most populous, yet for all that it had in it but thirtie Gouernours, chosen out of* 1.632 the better sort, to continue in the gouernment so long as they liued. The Epidaurians saith Plutarche had but an hundred and foure score of the noblest and welthiest of the citizens which had part in the soueraigntie: out of which number they chose the coun∣sellours of the state. The auntient Commonweale of Marseilles in Prouence (which* 1.633 in the iudgement of Cicero was the best ordered Commonweal that euer was in the world) had in it six hundred citizens which held the soueraigntie: out of which num∣ber of six hundred were taken the Senators, and fifteene magistrats, and of these fif∣teene [ H] magistrats were three Presidents set ouer them in maner of the Roman Praetors. The like we may deeme of the Rhodians and Theban Common-weales, after that their popular estates were chaunged into Aristocraties, the richer sort possessing them∣selues of the soueraigntie: than which nothing can bee more commodious for the Commonweal, especially if good citizens cannot be had. For which cause Titus Fla∣minius the Consul established the townes and cities of the Thessalians in forme of an Aristocratie, making Senatours and Iudges of the richer sort, and giuing to them the soueraigne power, whom it concerned most, that their Commonweal should conti∣nue in rest and peace. Which order Andrew Doria seemeth to haue followed in* 1.634 reforming the Commonweal of Genua, by him drawne from the obeysance of the [ I] French, in the yeare 1528, at which time he by the consent of the citizens there establi∣shed an Aristocratie of eight and twentie families, chosen as well out of the base com∣monaltie, as out of the nobilitie, so that they had six houses within Genua, all whom by a law he made noble, & partakers of the soueraigntie of the state: leauing vnto their discretion, euery yere to chuse vnto them ten other citizens, such as they should think fittest for their vertue, for their nobilitie or riches. Out of these eight and twentie fa∣milies, he established a Counsell of fower hundred men, euery yeare to be chosen for the gouernment of the state: who also made choice of the Duke, and eight gouer∣nours for two yeares to continue, whom together they call the Seignorie; for that [ K] vnto them it belongeth to manage the waightie affaires of the Common wealth: ex∣cept some such great matter happen, as may require the aduise of the Senate, which consisting of an hundred persons, is vsually euery yeare chosen by the nobilitie, by se∣cret voices, by lot giuen, as they do in Venice. And euery one of these eight Gouer∣nours after his office expired, continueth for two yeares Procurour of the Common wealth: and from that time forward, remayneth one of the priuie councell, together with them which are and haue beene Dukes, who are Procurours of the Common weal so long as they liue. Besides that there are fortie Captaines euery yeare chosen, and an hundred men deputed to euery one of those captaines, which is a legion of

foure thousand men, appointed for the strength and defence of the citie: Ouer which [ A] legion there is one Colonell, or chiefe Captaine, whom they call the Generall; who are all chosen by the voices of the nobilitie: As for their iurisdiction or administration of justice, they vse strangers, viz. a Praetor, who is alwaies a stranger; with two Lieutenants his assistants, the one for the receit, the other for criminall causes: and fiue other Ciuilians, judges for all priuat causes for two yeares, all strangers also; whom, they call the Rota. Yet besides them, there are seauen extraordinarie Iudges chosen out of the Citizens, for the extraordinarie deciding of causes. Besides whom were also fiue Syndicques to receiue informations against the Duke, and the eight Gouernours, after that their charge was expired, causing proclamation to be openly made, That if any man had any complaint against them, for any wrong or iniurie receiued from them, he [ B] should come in and be heard: at which time if none complained, they had letters testi∣moniall giuen them, in witnesse of their vpright dealing in their office. The same yeare* 1.635 that Doria established an Aristocratie at Genua, they of Geneua also changed their Pontificall monarchie into a Popular state, gouerned in maner of an Aristocratie. And albeit that the Towne long time before pretended, it selfe not to bee subiect vnto the laws either of the Duke of Sauoy or of the Pope, but to be free from them both; yet the citizens thought it not best for them to attempt any thing, vntill that discord about the Soueraigntie was risen not only betwixt the Duke & the bishop, but euen betwixt the bishop and the people also: at which time they tooke hold vpon the occasion then presented vnto their desires for the changing both of their Religion & state. Where∣fore [ C] their Commonweale now set at libertie, they established a Counsell of two hun∣dred citizens, with soueraigne and perpetuall power; but that the people still reserued vnto themselues the confirmation of lawes, the election of their Syndicques and other the great magistrats, and the treaties of peace and warre; all which belong vn∣to the right of Soueraigntie, as we haue before declared. Now out of this great Coun∣sell of two hundred, they made choice of a perpetuall Senat of threescore persons: and out of that Senat, they take fiue and twentie to be of the priuie Counsell for euer, chosen all by the great Counsell, and the foure Syndicques chosen euery yeare for so∣ueraigne Magistrats, beside the other Iudges and magistrats ordinarie. But the diffe∣rence betwixt this Commonweal and that of Genua is notable, but especially in this, [ D] that the Genowaies vse euery yeare to change their great Counsell of fower hundred, and Senat of three score, with other their Magistrats, except some few which continue for two yeares. Whereas the great Counsell of Geneua, the Senat, and priuie counsell are once chosen for euer: yet so, as that the censuring of euery one of them euery yere is still reserued vnto the Citizens: which is most straitly looked vnto; whereby it com∣meth to passe, that the Commonweal of Geneua is more firme, and lesse subiect vnto alteration or seditious innouation than is that of Genua. Moreouer the choice of the great Counsell, the Senat, and of the priuie Counsell at Geneua is not made all at once, as at Genes and Venice; but a roome being become void by the death or attainder of a councelour of the priuie Counsell of fiue and twentie, they proceed to the choice of an [ E] other out of the great counsell, to put in his place into the priuie Councell: and after that of a citizen, or at least wise of a Burgeois, to put into the great counsell, a man not any way sported or defamed: not hauing any regard in the choice of them, vnto their wealth, or nobilitie, but in what they may vnto their vertue and integritie only: a thing (as we read) vsed amongst the Lacedemonians, who after the death of their Senators, made choice of others in respect of their honour and vertue onely.

The Swissers except the Grisons, and the other fiue little cantons, haue almost the* 1.636 same forme of a Commonweale; as we see at Zurich the great Councell of two hun∣dred,

the Senat, and the priuie Councell established after the maner of Geneua: or to [ F] say better, that of Geneua after the forme of Zurich; which is almost like vnto that of Berne. Which neuerthelesse differ in this, that with these the great Councel & the Se∣nat chaunge euerie yeare: which they do not at Geneua: for with these the fraterni∣ties, which they call Zunfft, euerie one of them composed of one, two or three occu∣pations: which are eleuen at Schaffouse, twelue at Zurich, fifteene at Basil; and in other places more or lesse, chuse twelue persons of euerie fraternitie, for the great Councell: and for the Senat they chuse two, as at Zurich; or three, as at Basil; of whome one is the chiefe of the fraternitie. So that the great Councell at Zurich, consisteth of two hundreth, of 244 at Basil, of 86 at Schaffuse. And of Senators at Zurich the number is fiftie, at Schaffuse twentie sixe, and at Basil sixtie three. But they which are so cho∣sen [ G] by the voyces of the fraternitie, are confirmed also by the great Councell, and by the Senators or magistrat, or by the old Senat, as at Basil. For the one halfe of the Se∣nat is that which was before, which had the charge alreadie sixe monethes. And the other-moytie of the Senat, is of those which are but newly chosen, to the intent that the Senat should not be wholy chaunged all at once. True it is, that the auntient Senat of Basil, chose alwaies the Senat for the yeare following: and the Burgamasters who had for their companions three Tribunes at Zurich, and two at Basil, who with the Bour∣gamasters being foure, haue nine other persons, as assistants ioyned vnto them, and so together make the colledge of the thirteene men (as they call it) vnto whome all the mannaging of the secret affaires of the Commonwealth are committed: and without [ H] whose authoritie nothing vsually is propounded vnto the Senat or great Councell to resolue of. There are also at Zurich eight men, which haue charge of the common receit, ouer whome one Bourgomaster is gouernour. And at Zurich and Shaffuse the new Senators determine all causes criminall: whereas in all the other townes the Pro∣uost of the empire, with three Senators in the name of the whole Senat decide the same: which prouost is also chosen of the Senat, and generally none may bee chosen into the Senat which is defamed or base borne. By all which it is manifest, that their estate is gouerned Aristocratically; and yet more at Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Sole•…•…∣re, where the fraternities and companies haue no voyces in the state, neither power o•…•… authoritie to meet together, more then for matters concerning their occupations and [ I] trades: but euerie yeare foure captaines or chiefe men of euerie citie, chose out sixteen other citisens, men of greatest integritie, and without all imputation: who three daies before Easter make choice of the great Councell, consisting of an hundred of the bet∣ter sort of the citisens at Lucerne, and of more than two hundred at Berne: which great Councell afterwards chuseth the Auoyer, which they call Schuldthessen, and the other magistrats. And particularly the Auoyer, with the aforesaid sixteene, and the foure captaines chose the Senat, which is of xxvj at Berne, and xviij at Lucerne: who haue the power of the state at Berne for a yeare. The foure captaines are also annuall cho∣sen by the great Councell; by which captaines and the treasurors, all the judges are •…•…le∣cted [ K] and confirmed by the Senat: which Senat hath also the deciding of the first ap∣peales. The second appeales are decided by the same Senat of xxvj, and xxvj others whome the Senat shall make choice of. But the last appeale of all is vnto the great Councell, the chiefe whereof is the Auoyer: where if question be of the life, fame, or fortune of any the citisens: it is by the decree there made decided, without further ap∣peale. The same order almost is vsed in the state of Friburg, in making choyce of the great Councell, consisting of two hundred of the better sort of the citisens: by whome afterward is chosen the Senat of twentie foure persons, and the Auoyer with the foure captaines.

Whereby it is well to be vnderstood those estates of the Swissers to bee Aristocra∣tique, [ A] * 1.637 yet popularly tempered: for that the way is open for all the citisens of what de gree soeuer vnto all the officers and places of commaund, benefits and charge in the Commonweale, if they be not men infamed, distracted of their wits, or otherwise vt∣terly ignorant of gouernment. That is also belonging vnto popularitie, that almost all their magistrats are annuall: which temperature of the better or richer sort with the meaner or poorer, in being capable of the honours of the Commonweale, maketh the same much more firme and stable, than if the honours and preferments were com∣municated but vnto the Senators or richer sort onely; with whome the vulgar people is most commonly at oddes: and that so much the more amongst the Swissers, where the nobilitie (except some few) long sithence destroyed and almost rooted ou•…•…, the peo∣ple [ B] tooke vpon them the soueraigntie: which by little and little falling againe vnto the nobil•…•…itie (excepting in the fiue mountaine cities) haue with a popular moderation tempered their states with better lawes and orders than the rest. For commonly the Aristocraticall state admitteth none but the Senators, the nobilitie, or richer sort, vnto the honours and offices of the state, the rest being quite excluded. Howbeit there haue bene moe Aristocraties, consisting of the more auntient and noble families, than of the richer or more vertuous. As the Commonweales of the Samians, the Corcyreans, the Rhodians, and Cnidians, and almost all the Commonweales of Greece, after the victorie of Lysander, were by him chaunged into Aristocraties of the most auntient families, in chusing out ten or twentie, or at the most thirtie, vnto whome hee com∣mitted [ C] the soueraigntie for the gouernment of their estates. Wee see also the state of Venice, to be as we haue before shewed meere Aristocratike: And them also of Rha∣guse, of Luca, of Ausbourg, of Nuremberg, to be composed in forme of Aristocraties, of the most auntient families, although they be but few in number. For as for the Rha∣gusians* 1.638 (in auntient time called Epidaurians) hauing new built the citie of Rhaguse, neere vnto the auntient citie of Epidaurus, vtterly rased by the furie of the Gothes, and exempting themselus from the gouernment of the Alhanois, established among them∣selues an Aristocratike forme of a Commonwealth, gouerned by the most noble and auntient families; following therein almost the example of the Venetians: yet still much more respectiue and carefull of their nobilitie, than are the Venetians. For a Ve∣netian [ D] gentleman may marrie a base woman, or a common citisens daughter: whereas the Rhagusian gentleman may not marrie a common citisen, neither a straunger, how noble soeuer, if she be not a gentlewoman of Zarafi, or Catharo, and bee farther worth at the least a thousand ducats. There are also but twentie foure houses, which haue part in the state: out of whom are drawne diuers families, out of which the great Councell of about three hundred gentlemen is drawne; prouided alwaies that they bee twentie yeares old, when they are so chosen. These make choyce of threescore gentlemen Senators, for the mannaging of the affaires of the state, and in cases of appeale, so that they be aboue the value of three hundred ducats: who haue also the hearing of crimi∣nall causes of importance, as if question be of the life, honour, or state of any gentle∣man. [ E] Beside this Senat there is a priuie councell of twelue persons, with a yearely prince or gouernour of the citie; and fiue masters of requests (whome they call Proui∣sors) men appointed to receiue the requests of the people presented vnto them in what court soeuer. There are also six Consuls to decide ciuill causes, and fiue other judges for criminall matters, and thirtie others for the deciding of such suits and controuersies as exceed not the summe of three hundred ducats. Many other meaner officers they haue also, of whome we will in due place speake. Truely this Commonweale of Rha∣guse hath of all others that we haue heard, the purest Aristocratie, and farthest from all

popular mixture. The citie of Luca also gouerned after the same fashion, admit∣teth [ F] * 1.639 onely the auntient families to bee partakers of the soueraigntie of their gouern∣ment, who are but few, albeit that about the yeare 1555 there were numbred two and fiftie thousand citisens, besides women. Out of the nobilitie are created an hundred & twentie yearely Senators: out of whome are chosen the ten Councellors of the priuie Councell, with the prince whome they call the Gonfalonnier. And in these consi∣steth the soueraigne state of this Commonweale. Other officers there be also, as Cen∣sors, Pretors, and Receiuers, of whome we will in due place speake. Suffiseth it now for the present to haue shewed diuers Aristocraticall estates, in respect of soueraigntie, to the end by diuers examples both of the auntient and new Commonweales, we may the better vnderstand the true nature of an Aristocratie. [ G]

And forasmuch as diuers men beleeue, and some of them of greatest knowledge of* 1.640 the Germans haue by writing also published, the German empire to be a true Monar∣chie: we will also speake of that estate, whereof although we haue in briefe somewhat spoken before, yet here we will more at large thereof discourse, and show the same to be an Aristocraticall estate. True it is, that from the time of Charlemaigne vnto the raigne of Henrie surnamed the Falconer, it was a pure Monarchie by right of successi∣on, continued in the royall blood of the said Charlemaigne. But the descent of Charle∣maigne, taking end in this Henrie the Falconer, the Monarchie by the voyces of the princes being translated from this Henrie, hath of long time continued by the right of election: insomuch that the seuen princes Electours, hauing by little and lirtle with∣drawne [ H] the soueraigntie, haue left nothing vnto the emperour, but the ba•…•…e marks ther∣of in show; the soueraigntie it selfe in effect remaining vnto the state of the seuen ele∣ctors, of three hundred German princes or thereabouts, and the ambassadours deputed for the imperial cities. Which when it first happened, I see no man to haue yet written▪ For that such things as by little and little and little creepe into a Commonweale, are scarcely at all perceiued, neither well felt, vntill the change bee quite made. Now wee haue before shewed that it is an Aristocratike state, wheresoeuer the lesser part of the ci∣tisens or people commaund ouer the rest together, and ouer euerie one in particular. And so it is, that the estates of the empire, composed of three or foure hundred men (a•…•…* 1.641 I haue said) haue the soueraigne power priuatly ouer the emperour himselfe, and ouer [ I] all the other princes, and townes of the empire in particular: as also to giue lawes to all the subiects of the empire, to determine of peace and warre, to lay taxes and impo∣sitions vpon the people, to appoint judges both ordinarie and extraordinarie, to iudge of the goods, honour, and liues of the emperour, the princes and imperiall townes: which all are the true markes of soueraigntie. Which if it be so, as most certaine it is, who can denie but that the state of the German empire is a true Aristocratie? And that to bee true which I haue said, is most euident; sith it is so, that the power of soueraigne commaund dependeth of the acts and decrees of the estates. But the de∣crees are made by the seuen princes electors, accounted for one third part of the voy∣ces: [ K] and by the other princes of the empire, in number not aboue three hundred, who haue also another third part of the voyces: and by the deputies of the free cities or im∣periall townes, in number seuentie, or thereabouts, which haue the other third part of the deliberatiue voyces: by whome all the lawes and decrees of the empire, or whatso∣euer els is propounded, haue vsed to be made, established, disanulled, or confirmed. And hath nothing particular in respect of the state, different from other Aristocraties, but that the seuen princes electors haue (as we said) one third part of the voyces; the prin∣ces another, and the imperiall townes the rest: in such sort, as that if the seuen electors and the deputies, or the deputies and the princes, or the electors and the other princes,

be of accord and agree in one, the decree whatsoeuer passeth. And for that the eccle∣siastical [ A] princes are the greater number, they oftentimes carrie away the matter against the lay princes: which was the cause that the same lay princes, who had before renoun∣ced the Romish religion, tooke in euill part the diet which Charles the fift held at Ra∣tisbon; neither being thither sent for, would come. And like as the gentlemen of Ve∣nice, Luca, and Rhaguse, vntil they be twentie yeares old enter not into the great coun∣cell, neither haue any part in the soueraigntie: euen so likewise the children or neere kinsmen of the German princes, be they young, or be they old, haue no voyces in the diet, if they be not qualified princes of the empire: which are a certaine number of Dukes, Marquesses, Counties, Lantgraues, Burgraues, Margraues, Barons, Archbi∣shops, Bishops, and Abbats. And albeit that the duke of Loraine be a prince of the em∣pire, [ B] and hath a voyce with the rest of the princes, yet so it is, that his vncle the countie Vaudemont, of the same stocke and house with him, as other like princes of the same ranke and order, haue neither voyces nor places in the assembly of the states and prin∣ces of the empire, but are reckoned amongst the children of those princes. Howbeit yet many are of opinion, the princes and imperial cities to haue their soueraigne states apart, neither to be bound vnto any other mens commaunds or lawes, otherwise than as friends and confederats; in such sort and manner, as the Swissers haue their cities and iurisdictions among themselues, one diuided from another. But the difference is to him that looketh neerer thereinto, right great, euerie Canton being soueraigne in it self, and not subiect vnto the lawes and commaundements of others; neither otherwise [ C] bound among themseues, than in aliance offensiue or defensiue, as we haue in due place declared: whereas the German empire is vnited by the estates generall in soueraigntie, who not onely haue power to bridle the princes and cities, with fines, exile, proscripti∣on, and other seuere punishments, but also to depose and thrust out of the empire euen the emperours themselues, as they did the emperours Adolphus and Venes•…•…aus, with many others. Beside that, the estates make ordinatie decrees and lawes, which bind all the subiects of the empire, as well in generall, as in particular. And that more is, the ten circles or circuits of the empire, hold their particular estates, and yet bring their re∣quests, complaints, and grieuances, vnto the estates generall, to receiue their comman∣dements and resolutions, as lawes. Moreouer the princes electours, the day after the [ D] * 1.642 coronation of the emperour, protest themselues to hold their states of the empire, and not of the emperour, albeit that they doe their homage betwixt the emperours hands. In briefe, all iurisdiction and soueraigntie of all appeales in ciuill causes, aboue twentie crownes by the auntient lawes, and fortie by the new, appertaine vnto the imperiall chamber, as to all the appeales of the subiects of the empire: which chamber is com∣posed of twentie foure judges, and one prince of the empire, chosen euerie yeare, accor∣ding to the order of the ten prouinces or circuits. And if so be that any controuersie arise betwixt any of the princes, or the imperiall cities themselues; whether it bee for their bounds, their liues, their honour or states, the deciding thereof belongeth vnto the judges of the imperial court: except it please the whole states of the empire to take vnto [ E] themselues the hearing and determining of the matter, in such their generall assemblies as we haue before spoken of. As in the yeare 1555, it is set downe in a decree of the em∣pire, That if from that time forward any prouince, prince, towne, or subiect of the empire should beare armes against the German nation, hee should bee iudged by the states of the empire; who to that end were appointed to hold a diet at Wormes. And in the same diet holden at Ausburg, it was forbidden all the princes of the empire, to raise any armie, or to take vp armes in the aid of any straunge prince, and that vppon a great penaltie. And that more is, it is expresly and most straitly forbidden by the laws

* 1.643 of the empire, any prince, towne, or corporation, to be so hardie, as to prohibit or let [ F] the appeales of the subiects vnto the imperiall chamber, and that vpon great paine also. And in fine, the emperour himselfe, as head of the assemblie of the states, more straitly bindeth them as it were into one bodie and Commonweale, than if they were but of* 1.644 themselues onely: and yet in him resteth not the maiestie of the empire, but in the whole assemblie of the states. For other which hold the soueraigne power in Com∣monweales, doe themselues creat princes, dukes, and earles, whereas the emperour is himselfe by the other dukes and princes of the empire created. How therefore can hee being the selfe same man be both the soueraigne and subiect of the empire, lord, and vassall, maister, and yet constrained to be obedient vnto the estates? And not vnto the estates onely, but euen vnto the deputies and lieutenants of the empire? Which vnto [ G] some may seeme right straunge, and yet is indeed most true. I truely my selfe haue read the letters of a great lord, pentionarie vnto the king, directed vnto Mommorancie the Connestable, bearing date the twelft of May, in the yeare 1552: whereby hee aduerti∣seth, that Henrie the second (then the French king) had iust cause to complaine vnto the duke of Saxonie, and the countie Palatine, lieutenant for the empire, to haue iustice against the emperour Charles the fift and his brother Ferdinand king of the Romans, according to the golden bull, and decrees of the states: for that they contrarie vnto the lawes of the empire and customes of their auncestors, hauing intercepted the kings letters directed vnto the estates of the empire, had not suffered the same to bee vnto them deliuered, but also forbidden the archbishop of Mets, chauncelour of the empire [ H] to receiue or present the same vnto the states, as his office was. And by the assemblie of the imperiall diet holden at Heidelberg, in the yere 1553, it was decreed, that none of the emperours court should mannage any the affaires of the empire; as I haue seene by letters from the French ambassadour. And as for monies extraordinarily raysed by the decree of the estates, for the affaires of the empire, they are not brought into the emperours coffers, but are laid safely vp in store in certaine cities therefore appointed: viz. Strausbourg, Lubec, and Ausbourg: Neither is it lawfull for the emperour to take so much as one peny out of the common treasure, without the consent of the state. Al which most plainly show them to be in an errour, and much deceiued, which call the German emperour a Monarch; or which deeme that Aristocraticall estate to bee a [ I] right Monarchie. Whereas all to the contrarie the emperour Maximilian the first, great grandfather to him which now raigneth (albeit that hee was ambitious enough) yet in a discourse which hee had with the states of the empire concerning such mat∣ter, told them, That hee thought it not needfull to take the imperiall crowne at the hands of the Bishop of Rome, neither to stand vpon such ceremonies, seeing that the soueraigne power, as they knew, rested in the states themselues. Neither is it lawfull for the emperour of himselfe, or at his pleasure to call together a diet of the empire, without some especiall and extraordinarie vrgent cause, neither to dissolue the same: but at the breaking vp of euerie diet, order is there taken for the diet to bee holden the [ K] yeare next following. So that it is not lawfull for the emperour to rall an assemblie of the states, which it was lawfull for the Roman magistrats to do, as also for other magi∣strats in euerie popular and Aristocraticall Commonweale, so that it were done by commaunding of euerie one, as in particular, but not of altogether, as in common: Af∣ter the auntient manner of the Romans, whereby the Consull might by his edict call together all the Senators, one by one into the Senat, vpon paine of proceeding against them, by seising vpō their bodies or goods, by way of imprisonment, taking of pledges or rasing of their houses. And yet for all that the German princes are not bound to come vnto the diet of the empire, if they be by none commaunded, but by the empe∣rour,

as they gaue Charles the fift the emperour well to vnderstand, in the yeare 1554: [ A] and also Maximilian the second, refusing in the yeare 1566, to haue any diet then ac∣cording to his request holden. And if it fortune the emperour, or king of the Romans, to come vnto the frontiers of their territories, the princes euerie one of them in their degree goe to meet them, but yet in such sort, as if it were but to meet a straunge prince.

Now if one should say that the Emperour beareth himselfe as a Iudge, and deter∣miner* 1.645 of all quarrels and controuersies betwixt the Princes, or the imperiall Townes; True it is at the first motion, and when the parties are content to accept thereof, and that also but as Lieutenant for the Empire: as in like case the Duke of Saxonie, and the Countie Palantine might also iudge as the Imperiall Lieutenants: and yet for all this, [ B] appeal made vnto the Estates of the Empire suspendeth the power of the Emperour, aswell as of the imperiall Lieutenants. Yet might some say, that the Princes of the Empire by their letters, and in the assemblies of the States, vse these magnificall titles towards the Emperour, Your sacred Maiestie, and such like, which cannot be applied but vnto him which is himselfe a Soueraigne: such as slaues would scarce vse towards* 1.646 the greatest kings on earth: titles for fashion sake, foolishly or wickedly (should I say) giuen by flatterers vnto men, which are onely fitting the most mightie and immortall God. And yet do in deed no more increase the power of the Germaine Emperour, then of the King of the Romains: whom by such like prodigall pompe and words, a man might also think to haue the power of soueraigne Maiestie; so that in that Em∣pire [ C] there should be two Soueraignes: and yet for all that one of them subiect vnto the other. For so George Helfustein Baron of Gondelphfingen, pronouncing the speach of Ferdinand king of the Romans in the generall assemblie of the States of the Empire in the yeare 1556, calleth him their Soueraigne Lord.

But the greatest argument of Soueraigntie is, that the Emperour giueth the fees of* 1.647 the Empire being void, vnto whom he pleaseth, and inuesteth in them whom he seeth good: and that without the consent of the States. Whereunto I againe answere, that the expresse consent of the Estates is not necessarie, and yet is it not altogether done without their good liking, who neuerthelesse permit the same; when as they might as∣well cut of this point, as they haue done the other marks of Soueraigntie. And how∣beit [ D] that the embasadour Marillac was of opinion, that the Emperour had not this power: and therefore aduertised king Henry, how that the Emperour Charles the fift had at Bruxels in the yeare 1551, inuested Philip of Spaine in the Duchie of Millan without the consent of the States of the empire: yet can he not find so much as any one inuestiture of any Imperiall fee, in the conferring whereof the expresse consent of the Estates was had. But certein it is, that the Emperour bestoweth not these fees or inuestitures, but as in qualitie of the Lieutenant of the empire: in such sort as he recei∣ueth the fealtie and homage of the princes, for, and in the name of the empire. As in like case Ferdinand the emperour without the consent of the estates of the empire, re∣ceiued Granuellan sent vnto him with speciall charge and deputation from Philip king [ E] of Spayne in the yeare 1565, to do for him the fealtie and homage due vnto the Em∣pire, for the Duchie of Millan, and the perpetuall Lieutenancie of the principalitie of Sienna: granting vnto him as a vassall of the Empire charters of his fealtie done: and for the confirmation of his possession therein. The same is to be thought concerning the confirmations of benefices, and other royall rights, which giuen by the princes or cities of the empire, or by the Chapters and Colleges of priests themselues, are yet neuerthelesse to be confirmed by the Imperial authoritie: according to the agreement made betwixt the Bishop of Rome, and the estates of the Empire. As for letters of

safe conduct which he giueth vnto embassadors, heralts at armes, and other strangers, [ F] * 1.648 whereunto the ordinarie clause is adioyned in these words, Forasmuch as wee for our Imperiall power may do all things: they show right well that the Emperour was in aun∣cient time a soueraigne Monarchie; which he now is not: For why then should the Electors and other princes of the Empire refuse to grant vnto the emperour, the diet which he requested of them in the yeare 1566? or why then should both hee and his officers be by them forbidden so much as to touch the monies by them raised for the maintenance of the warres. And to cut it short, we need not but to look into the ar∣ticles of the oath made by the Emperours (by vs before declared) to know yet more euidently, that the soueraigntie of the Empire is not any wise in the emperour, albeit that he carrie the crowne, the scepter, and weare the other most precious and imperial [ G] habits, and in all solemnities and ceremonies hath the precedence before other the Christian kings, yea and that men attribute vnto him the title of Most sacred Maiestie, all in deed hauing the show of soueraigne and royall maiestie, but yet not the thing it selfe. And yet to say the trueth, a man knoweth not how to do him so great honour as the maiestie of the sacred empire, whereof he is the head, deserueth. But the maner* 1.649 of well gouerned Aristocratike states, is to graunt vnto him the least power to whom they giue the greatest honour: and sometimes also least honour vnto them that be of most power: as of all others the Venetians in the ordering and gouernment of their Commonweal best know how to vse that matter. Seeing therefore wee haue thus showed the Empire to bee but an Aristocraticall estate, we may well conclude, That [ H] there is neither prince nor imperiall citie which hath therein the soueraigntie, being nothing else but members of the empire, euery one of them gouerning their estate vn∣der the power, and without any thing derogating from the lawes and ordinances of the empire. Wherein many are deceiued, which make so many Commonweals as there are princes and imperiall townes; the contrarie wherof we haue before showed. But as in this realme euery citie and feigniorie haue their Iudges, Consuls, Sheriffes, and other their particular officers which gouerne their estate; so is it in the Imperiall townes and cities: but that here are moe roiall judges; whereas in the empire there is none but the Imperiall chamber onely which receiueth the Appeales from the other judges and lieutenants of the empire. And yet neuerthelesse when it chanceth the [ I] empire to be diuided into factions, and part takings; or that the princes bandie them selues one of them against an other (which hath beene too often seene) then euery towne and prince for the most part beare them selues as diuers Aristocraticall estates, and particular Monarchies; making of euery member a particular bodie of a soue∣raigne Commonweale.

Now as the state of the Empire it selfe is entirely Aristocratique, so also the great imperiall townes and cities hold their estates in Aristocraticall forme: as Ausburg, Nuremberg, Wormes, and others, which are almost all Aristocraties; albeit that in trueth some of them are more popular than others, as is the citie of Strasbourg. But [ K] for breuitie sake I will for example onely set downe the state of the citie of Nurem∣berg,* 1.650 the greatest, most famous, and best ordered of all the imperial cities, established in forme of an Aristocratie; wherein of an infinite number of citisens there are but xxviij. auntient families which haue power ouer all the rest of the subiects, which are within the iurisdiction of Nuremberg. Out of these xxviij. families, they euery yeare first make choice of two Censors, men without any imputation; which done, all the rest of the magistrats are euery one of them displaced: then these Censors according to their owne discretion make choice of xxvj. Senators: who out of themselues chuse xiij. persons, for the managing of the secret affaires of that Commonweal: and out of

the same Senat also make choice of other xiij. Sheriffes also: beside the vij. Bourgma∣sters, [ A] which are an other particular counsell, whose authoritie aud power is much like vnto that of the Decemuiri in Venice. And these Magistrats which we haue spoke of, are they which mannage all the greatest affaires of that Commonwealth. I speak not of the fiue criminall judges: nor of the twelue appointed for the deciding of ciuill cau∣ses; neither of the Prouiditor for victuals, the two treasurers: nor of the three maisters of the wards: almost of like authoritie with the procurators of Saint Marke at Venice, to the imitation of whome they of Nuremberg seeme in some sort to haue bene desi∣rous to fashion their Commonweale. And albeit that of the imperiall townes some of them be freer than other; as are those which be neither in subiection nor protection of other princes, namely Nuremberg, Strasbourg, Lubec, Hambourg, Breme, [ B] Wormes, and Spires. Yet so it is, that they all as subiects haue a reuerent regard vnto the maiestie of the German empire. True it is, that there are many which haue exemp∣ted themselues from the power of their princes, to maintaine themselues in libertie: and now of late to hold of the empire, as the towne of Brunswich, which hath withdrawne it selfe from the obeysance of the princes of Brunswich, Wormes and others, which* 1.651 haue exempted themselues from the power of their auntient lords. As in like case the Swissers and Grisons, now diuided Commonweals, but sometimes subiects of the em∣pire. And namely, the lords of the Canton of Fribourg, in the treatie of Combour∣geoisie, betwixt them and the lords of Berne, call the towne of Fribourg a member of the empire, albeit that they haue their state therefrom diuided vnto themselues in full [ C] soueraigntie. Some others acknowledge and confesse themselues to hold their liber∣ties and priuileges, for the gouernment of their estate from the emperour; as they of Vri, vnderuald, and Schwits, hauing their letters patents therefore from Lewes of Ba∣uaria the emperour, bearing date the yeare 1316. They also of Tietmarsh for the con∣fidence they had reposed in the strength and situation of their countrey, (placed in the frontiers of the kingdome of Denmarke) withdrew themselues from the German em∣pire, and established their Commonweale in forme of an Aristocrati•…•…, of eight and fortie of the better sort of them, who so long as they liue haue the soueraigntie, and when one of them is dead, still chusing another in his place. True it is, that in the yeare 1559, Adolph duke of Holst did what he could to haue subdued them, pretending that [ D] Christiern his great grandfather had of the emperour Frederike the third obtained the soueraigntie ouer them of Tietmarsh, for hauing dismembred themselues from the em∣pire; as I haue seene by the letters of Maister Danzai, ambassadour for the king into Denmarke.

Wherefore it is manifest not onely the whole estate of the Germaine empire, but euen the imperiall citties, themselues also to be gouerned in manner and forme of pure Aristocraties. But heere we must haue regarde in considering of the Aristocratique e∣state that wee confound not the princes and chiefe magistrates of a Commonweale with kings: nor a counsell of the nobilitie with a Senate: wherein Historiographers often times erre and goe astray, and that specially when as in a Commonweale there [ E] are so few of the nobilitie or better sort to mannage the state, as that they are both Se∣natours and magistr ats: which gouernment of few, the Greekes call an Oligarchie. So the Pharsalian estate was gouerned by twentie of the nobilitie: the Lacdemonians by thirtie, neither were there moe in all the cities of the Greeks after the victorie of Lysan∣der. They of Thetmarsh were gouerned by eight and fortie; and had no other Sena∣tours then the Seignorie it selfe: the Cnidians by threestore (whome of their inte∣gritie of life they called Amymones) but these were but annuall magistrates: where∣as the other were perpetuall. And all be it that the Cnidians neuer gaue any account

of that they had done in time of their gouernment, yet were they not therefore soue∣raigne [ F] lords, but soueraigne magistrats; who their magistracie once expired, were again to restore vnto the nobilitie, the soueraigne gouernments by them committed to their charge. In like case they of Zurich chose euerie yeare thirtie six magistrats, of whom twelue by course gouerned foure moneths: which forme of gouernment continued vnto the yeare 1330, that the common people enraged and rising vp in mutinie cast them out, creating in their stead a Senat of two hundred of the nobility, with a Con∣sull chiefe amongst them: and all those estates had the counsell of their nobilitie and Senat all one. Yet doe they better and much more surely, which in an Aristocratie (how little soeuer) be it deuide the counsell of the nobilitie from the Senat: as amongst the Rhagusians, where although the number be but small of them that gouerne that [ G] Commonweale, being it selfe shut vp into a small roome: yet of them is made a Se∣nat of threescore men, out of whom are selected twelue to mannage the secret affaires of their state. Heretofore also the Commonweale of Chio established in forme of an Aristocratie by certaine Genua gentlemen of the house Austinian, hauing won it from the emperours of Constantinople; euery yeare made choice of twelue counsellors of estate for the Senat: out of whome they chose foure, who with one soueraigne prince or magistrat gouerned all the affaires of state: the authoritie of which foure for all that, was but for six months, the soueraign magistrat yet stil holding his place for two yeres: in which manner of gouernment they honorably maintained their estate, vntill that of late yeares it was by the Grand Signior taken from the Genowayes, and so vnited vnto [ H] the Turkish empire.

And thus much concerning the definition of an Aristocratie. Now as concerning the profits and dangers incident vnto an Aristocratique estate: & the manner of the go∣uernment thereof, we will in due place declare. It resteth now to answere vnto that* 1.652 which Aristotle saith concerning an Aristocratie, being altogether contrarie vnto that which is by vs before set downe. There are (* 1.653 saith hee) foure sorts of Aristocra∣ties: The first, where none but the richer sort, and that to a certaine reuenue, haue pan in the gouernment of the Seignorie: The second, where the estates and offices are gi∣uen by lot vnto them which hold most wealth: The third, where the children succeed their fathers, in the gouernment of the Seignory: And the fourth, when they which take vpon them the state, vse a lordlike power and commaund without lawe. And yet neuertheles in the same booke, and a little after, hee maketh fiue sorts of Common∣weales, viz. the Regall, the Popular, the gouerment of a few, the gouernment of the nobilitie▪ and after these a fift kind, composed of the other foure: which (as hee saith* 1.654 afterwards) is no where to be found. But such a medley of Commonweales wee haue before not onely by probable but euen by necessarie reasons also, prooued to bee im∣possible, and by nature altogether imcompatible: wherefore letting that passe, let vs now also show the diuers formes of Aristocraties by Aristotle set downe, to bee no way considerable. First hee no where defineth what an Aristocratie is: the ve∣rie cause of his errour. For what can bee more vaine, than to say it to be an Ari∣stocratie where the ritcher or the better sort haue onely part in the gouernment?* 1.655 For it may bee that of ten thousand citisens, six thousand of them hauing two hundred crownes of yerely reuenue, haue all part in the Seignorie; and yet neuerthe∣lesse the state shall be a popular state, considering that the greater part of the citisens haue the soueraignitie: for otherwise there shall be no popular Commonweale at all. The like might be said for the gouernment of the better sort also, who might chaunce to be the greater number of the citisens, which should haue part in the Seignorie: and yet according to the opinion of Aristotle, it should also be an Aristocraticall estate, al∣be•…•…

it that the greater part of the people beare therein the sway. As for the gouernment [ A] of good men, if we shall measure them according to the highest degree and perfection of vertue, we shall not finde one such: but if after the common manner, and opinion of the people, so euerie man will call himselfe a good man. But to iudge of an other* 1.656 mans integritie and vertue, as it is an hard matter for any man to do, so hath it it also vnto wisemen alwaies seemed a thing most dangerous: Insomuch that the wise and graue Cato being chosen out for the purpose, durst not giue sentence whether Q. Luc∣tacius was a good man or not. But admit that in euerie Commonweale the good are in number fewer than the bad; & yet haue the gouernment of the common state: why for the same reason hath not Aristotle made one sort of Aristocraty, wherin the nobili∣tie hold the soueraignitie? seeing that they are euer fewer in nūber then the base & vul∣gar [ B] sort: why also maketh he not an other sort of Aristocratie, wherein the most anti∣tient families although but of base degree bore rule? As it chanced in Florence after that the nobilitie were driuen out. For it is right certain that there are many base fa∣milies, who although they be not famous or much spoken of for any great thing by them or their auncestours done, are yet more auncient and honest then a number of vpstart gentlemen, who happily scarce knowe their owne fathers. He might also make an other sort of Aristocratie, wherein the tallest and greatest should haue the soueraig∣nitie as he himselfe* 1.657 saith they do in Ethiopia: and so consequently also an Aristocra∣tie of the fairest, of the strongest, of the valiantest, of the wisest, of the learnedst, and of others with such like qualities of the bodie, or of the minde: as wee see to bee incident [ C] but into the fewer sort: whereof should ensue an infinite multitude and varietie of A∣ristocratique Commonweales. But that seemeth also vnto mee most strange that hee should say the second sort of an Aristocraty, to be where the richer sort by lot haue the gouernment and mannaging of the state, whereas alwaies, elsewhere, hee had said lots properly to appertaine vnto the popular state. Thus the Athenian Commonweale was of all other most popular, he with Xenophon agreeth: and yet for all that the great∣est honours, offices, and preferments were not their giuen, but vnto the richest before the time of Pericles. And in Rome which was also a popular state, before the law Ca∣nuleia the greatest honours, priesthood, and preferments, were not bestowed vpon any of the common vulgar sort of people, but vpon the most auntient gentlemen [ D] whome they called Patricii: a most certain argument that the Commweale may be•…•… in state popular, and yet gouerned Aristocratically: and that there is a notable diffe∣rence betwixt the state of a Commweale; and the gouernment of the same, as we haue before said. As for the fourth sort of Aristocraties, wherin (as Aristotle saith) some few which take vpon them the mannaging of the state, vse a Lordlike power and com∣maund ouer all without law, in manner of a tiranie: we haue before showed the diffe∣rence betwixt a Monarchie royall, Lordlike, and tirannical: the like difference where∣of is also in the Aristocraticall gouernment: wherein the Lords may gouerne their subiects as slaues, and dispose of their goods, as may the Lordly Monarke, without law and yet without tiranising also: not vnlike the good maister of the familie, who is al∣waies [ E] more carful of his slaues, than of his hired Seruants: and so also loueth them bet∣ter. For why it is not the law which maketh the iust and rightfull gouernment, but the true administration of iustice, and equall distribution thereof. And the fairest thing in the world that can be desired in matter of state, (in the iudgement of Aristotle him∣selfe)* 1.658 is to haue a wise and vertuous king, knowing how to gouerne his people with∣out lawe: considering that the lawe oftentimes serueth many but as a snare to deceiue and snarle men in: and is also of it selfe dumb and inexorable: as the nobilitie of Rome complained at such time as the people would needes haue lawes, and be gouerned by

them, after that the kings were driuen out, who gouerned without law & gaue iudge∣ment [ F] according to the diuersitie of the facts or causes presented before them: which manner of iustice the consulls and nobilitie, who in some measure held the Common∣weale in an Aristocratique state continued, vntil that the people desirous to bring it vn∣to a popularitie, requested to bee gouerned by the equalitie of lawes, and not to haue their liues, fame, and fortune, to depend of the iudgement of the nobilitie & choice ma∣gistrats only: which their request after that it had bin, with much a do 6 yeres debaited, against the Lordlike Aristocraticall gouernment of the nobilitie: they at length at the instance of their Tribune Terentius Arsa caused it to passe in force of a law, that from that time forward the nobilitie, consulls, and magistrates, should themselues as well as the people, be bound to all such lawes, as the Decemviri to that purpose appointed by [ G] the people should set downe and make. It is not therfore the law which maketh good Princes, or magistrats in a Commonweale, be it a Monarchie or Aristocratie; but vp∣right reason and iustice, engrauen in the mindes and soules of iust princes and Magi∣strats; and that much better then in tables of stone. Neither euer were there more cru∣ell tirants then were they, which bound their subiects with greatest multitude of edicts* 1.659 and lawes, which •…•…he tyrant Caligula of purpose, and to no purpose, caused to bee set downe in so small letter, as that they could hardly be of any man red, but with Linceus eyes, to the intent thereby to entangle the moe through ignorance transgressing the same: whose successour and vncle Claudius in one day made twentie edicts: and yet for all that there was neuer greater tiranie then then: neither worse or more vilanous [ H] men. But as an Aristocratie well ordered is of it selfe a maruelous faire and goodly state: so can there be none worse if it be once corrupted: when as for one tirant there* 1.660 shal be many: and that especially when the nobilitie shal bandie it selfe against the peo∣ple: as it often times chaunceth; and as we reade it to haue in auncient time fallen out, when as in many Aristocratique estates none was by the nobilitie admitted into their number for the gouernment of the state; but that they must first sweare, to be for euer enemies vnto the people, and all popular men: a course not so much tending to the destruction of the cominaltie and people, as of the nobilitie and mightie men them∣selues: and so to the vtter subuersion of all Aristocraties, as we shall in due place declare And thus concerning the Aristocraticall estate: now let vs likewise see what a popu∣lar [ I] estate is.

CHAP. VII. ¶ Of a Popular Estate.

A Popular estate is a forme of Commonweale, wherin all or most* 1.661 part of the people togeather commaundeth in soueraignetie o∣uer the rest altogether, and ouer euerie one in particular. The [ K] principall point of a popular estate is seene in this, that the grea∣ter part of the people hath the Soueraigne commaund and pow∣er not onely ouer euerie one in particular, but also ouer the les∣ser parte of all the people together. As for example in Rome, where there were but fiue and thirtie tribes or companies of the people: eighteene of these companies together, had soueraigne power ouer the other seauenteene: and authoritie to establish lawes, whereunto both they and euerie one of the Citise•…•…s in particular were subiect and bound, wherfore Tiberius Gracchus the factious Tribune of the people requested Marcus Octauius his companion and fellow of himself to giue

vp his office, before that the eighteene tribes had giuen their voices for the deposing [ A] of him: for withstanding of Tiberius propounding and vrging the lawes for the diui∣sion of lands: and for opposing himselfe against the profit of the people. Also at such time as Lucius Rullus, the busie Tribune by request which hee presented vnto the peo∣ple, concerning the diuision of lands, desired that the commissioners which had that charge, might bee chosen by the greater part of the seauenteene tribes of the people onely: Cicero, then Consull tooke thereupon occasion amongst the other things to crosse the entertainement of his request, and publication of the law, saying: that the Tribune in so doing went about to deceiue the other eightteene Tribes, that is to say the greater part of the people of their voices, which the Consuls obiection was the lesse to haue bene regarded, and the more easily to haue by the Tribune bene answered, [ B] for that his request was, but if it pleased the people (that is to say: the greater part of the 35 Tribes) that the lesse part of the people (that is to say the seauenteene tribes) might appoint the commissioners▪ so that the maiestie of the people notwithstanding his request remained still whole and vntouched: considering that the lesser part of the people was thereunto to be deputed, but at the will and pleasure of the greater part: to the end that the greater part of the people should not still for euerie trifling matter be called together. So by the law Domitia it was prouided that if by the death of any of the Augures, Preests or Bishops any benefice fell voide, they should assemble but 17 tribes of the people for the nominating of him, whom they would haue chosen Bi∣shop: so that he which was by nine of the tribes of the people nominated and allowed, [ C] was by the chapiter or Colledge of Augures or Bishopps to be admitted and receiued.

When I say the greater part of the people to haue the soueraignitie in the po∣pular* 1.662 estate; that is so to be vnderstood, when the voices are to bee taken by Pole as in Venice, in Rhaguse, in Genua, in Luca, and almost al Aristocratique Commonweales: but if the voices be taken by tribes, parrishes, or companies sufficeth it, of them to haue the greater part, also albeit that there be in them far the lesser part of citisens, as it hath commonly chanced in auncient popular Commonweales. In Athens the people was diuided into ten principall tribes, whereunto in fauour of Demetrius, and Antigonus they ioyned two others, of them called Antigonia and Demetria: and againe the peo∣ple was diuided into thirtie sixe classes or companies. But such diuisions according to [ D] the diuers encreasings of the people, and more easie and commodious giuing of voices are often time changed. So Romulus at first deuided all the people in Rome* 1.663 which then was about 3000 into three tribes or parts: and after that euerie part into ten companies, appointing ouer euerie one of them an head: how be it the voices (as Liuy saith) were then al giuen by poll. But by the ordinance of king Seruius the people was againe diuided into sixe companies, according vnto euery mans wealth and reue∣nue: in such sort: as that the first companie wherein the richest were enrolled, had as∣much power as all the rest: if the centuries of this first companie were al of one accord and mind in giuing of their voices, that is to say fourescore centuries, which were but eight thousand persons; for in that case the voices of the other fiue companies were ne∣uer [ E] asked. But if two or three centuries of the first companie were not of the same opinion with the rest: so many centuries of the second company were drawne out as might supply that defect, and that so often in euerie companie, vntill the number of fourescore companies were filled vp. So that in taking voices they seldom came vn∣to the third & fourth company: but most seldom vnto the first, and vnto the sixt ne∣uer: in which sixt companie was the refuse of the people, and poorest citisens, which according to the view then taken, were in number aboue threescore thousand: beside the bourgesses and citisens of the fiue first companies in number sixteene thousand▪

And had this ordinance of king Seruius still remained in force after kings were driuen [ F] * 1.664 out, it had not bene a popular state but an Aristocraticall, for that the lesser part of the people had then therein the soueraignetie. But shortly after the expulsion of the kings the common people seeing themselues oppressed by the wealth & power of the grea∣ter, reuolted thrice from the nobilitie, and held their state apart: to the intent they might euery one of them, as wel the poore as the rich, the base as the noble, haue their voices alike; neither could they be before quieted, vntill they had obtained power out of the bodie of themselues to chuse their Tribunes, the maintainers of their liberties: wherof their Tribunitial assemblies began first to be holden. But for asmuch as the no∣bility & richer sort dispersed among the tribes, caused the poorer & meaner sort (for the most part their followers▪) to giue their voices at their appointment & pleasure; [ G] there was a decree made, That from thenceforth the nobilitie should no more be pre∣sent at the assemblies of the common people: which was then diuided into eighteene tribes, which by little and little in continuance of time tooke such increase, that they grew to the number of fiue and thirtie tribes: who at length by meanes of their facti∣ous Tribunes got vnto themselues the soueraigntie of the Commonweal, with power to make all the lawes, and chuse all the magistrates, except the Consuls, the Praetor, and Censors, which for that they were the greatest magistrates, they were still chosen by the greatest assemblies, that is to say of the nobilitie and people to∣gether, the whole bodie of the people beeing (as wee said before) diuided into tribes or companies. But forasmuch as the enfranchised men, and such as by de∣sert [ H] had obtained the libertie of the cittie, mingled through all the tribes of the people of Rome, in number far exceeded the naturall and antient citisens, and so by multitude of voices, carried all things away from them: which (as we haue before said) was by Ap∣pius the Censor done, thereby to gratifie the vulgar people, and by that meanes to ob∣taine* 1.665 of them what so he would: Fabius Maximus the Censor by great wisdom ouer∣threw all the grace that Appius had by cunning got, by thrusting all the enfranchised men, and such as were of them discended, into foure tribes by themselues: so to pre∣serue the antient and freeborn citisens in the right of their voices. For which onely fact by him brought to passe without tumult or sedition, hee obtained the name of Maxi∣mus, or as we say, the Greatest. Which his order still continued, vntill that about 300 [ I] yeares after, Seruius Sulpitius Tribune of the people, would needes haue the enfran∣chised men againe enrolled into the Tribes of their maisters by whome they were be∣fore manumised or set at libertie: but before this his motion was brought to effect, he was himselfe slaine: which for all that in the time of the ciuill warres betwixt Marius* 1.666 and Silla, was by Marius (hauing ceised vpon the citie) effected: so to make the estate of the Commonweale more popular, and to weaken the authoritie of the nobilitie and richer sort. Demosthenes after the victorie of Philip king of Macedon at Chaero∣nea attempted the like at Athens; by presenting a request vnto the people, That the enfranchised, and other the inhabitants of Athens, might be enrolled in the number of [ K] citisens: which his request was then euen openly reiected, albeit that there then were not aboue 20000 citisens: which was seuen thousand moe than was in the time of Pericles, when as were found but thirteene thousand citisens enroled, out of whom* 1.667 also 5000 strangers, who had s•…•…yly crept in for citisens, were sold for slaues: and yet the multitude of the slaues was than ten times more than the number of the citisens.

This which I haue said, may well serue to aunswere that which might bee alleaged, That there is not, neither haply euer was any so popular a Commonweale, as wherein the subiects had all voyces alike; or if they had, that they could all meet together to make lawes, create magistrats, and vse the other markes of soueraigntie: a good part of

them to the contrarie being ordinarily still absent, and so the lesse part making the law▪ [ A] But it sufficeth, that the greater part of the tribes carried away the matter, albeit that haply in some one tribe a thousand citisens were in voyces equall vnto another, where∣in there were ten thousand; considering that the prerogatiue of euerie mans voyce was in this tribe re•…•…etued vnto him. Yet hereby it came to passe, that the more ambitious fort of men oftentimes by bribes or fauour corrupted the chiefe men, and as it were the ringleaders of the tribes, especially at such time as the lesser part of the people was present at the assemblies: Which to meet withall, it was therefore often∣times prouided, that when any law of importance was made, it should in no wise bee againe repealed, except there were six thousand citisens at the least present at the assem∣blie, who gaue their consent to the reuoking thereof; as is oftentimes to bee seene in [ B] Demosthenes. And the Ostracisme (as Plutarch writeth) tooke no place vpon any man, except six thousand citisens at the least agreed in one therein: which yet was the lesser part of the people. T•…•…e like whereof is also obserued in the lawes of the Venetians, being of any great weight or importance; and namely in laws concerning the executi∣on of iustice, whereunto this clause is adioyned, That the great Councel shal not in any thing derogat from the law established, except there be at the least a thousand Veneti∣an gentlemen there present; and that of them, eight hundred all agree in one and the same opinion, for the repealing of the law. Whereunto the Roman lawes, concer∣ning corporations and colleges, seeme also to haue had regard; where two third parts of the Collegiats, and of them also the most voyces must agree, to giue any law [ C] or order vnto the rest. And in all the assemblies of the Venetians, which haue bene called together for the gouernment of the seignorie in our daies, there haue scarcely at once met together fifteene hundred gentlemen: so that when the law willeth a thou∣sand of them at the least to be present, the meaning of the law is, that there should two third parts of those which haue voyces in the state be still present, and of them eight hundred to be all of one opinion for the passing of any matter: which I thinke to bee therefore done, for that eight hundred of them make the greater part of fiftene hun∣dred: a thing requisit, where voices are taken by the Poll, as in Venice, and not by tribes or companies, as they did in Rome and other popular estates, by reason of the infinit multitude of them which had part in the seignorie. And in Rome, vntill the law Fusia, [ D] (made 693 yeares after the building of the citie) they confounded the voices of the tribes, to the intent it might lesse be vnderstood which way euery tribe had gone, so to auoid the displeasure of the citisens among themselues, about the giuing of their voices. So at Strasbourg the most popular of the German cities, and at Mets, although it came into the power of the French, yet they giue their voices by tribes; as the three popu∣lar Commonweals also of the Grisons, call the tribes and companies vnto their assem∣blies, for the creating of their magistrats, and making of lawes: yet so, as that the greater tribes haue the greeter part of the suffrages or voyces. True it is, that the cantons of Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, Zug, Glaris, and Apenzel, which are true Democraties, and hold the more popular libertie, for that they are mountainers, make their assemblies for [ E] most part in open places, and there euerie one of them (being fourteene yeares old) giue their voices for the chusing of the Senat, the Aman, and their other magistrats, which they doe by lifting vp their hand, after the auntient forme of the Athenian 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and manner of other such popular Commonweales, sometimes constraining their neighbours with drie blowes to hold vp their hand, as they did of old. In like manner the tribes of the Grisons, which are of others most popular, and most popularly gouer∣ned of any Commonweale that is, make their common assemblies for the choice of their Aman: (which is the soueraigne magistrat in euerie one of their little cantons:)

where he which hath bene Aman the three yeares before, standing vpright, and excu∣sing [ F] himselfe vnto the people, craueth of them pardon for whatsoeuer hee hath done amisse in his office before: then after that hee appointeth out three citisens, out of whome the people chose one for their Aman or chiefe magistrat for the yeare following: after whome they chose also his lieutenant, who is as it were the chauncel∣lour, and thirteene other councellors, of whom foure are of the councell for the more secret affaires of the state, and after them the Camarlign, or Chamberlaine treasurer for the common treasurie. But in this there is a notable difference, betwixt the gouern∣ment* 1.668 of the Grisons, and of the other Cantons of the Swissers: for that hee which can giue vnto his side, two or three of the principal officers, of any one canton of the Swis∣sers, who are ruled by certaine great men bearing sway amongst them, may assure him∣selfe [ G] to haue gained the whole canton: whereas the people of the Grisons hold them∣selues in nothing subiect or pliant vnto their officers, if the good liking of the whole commons be not gained; as I haue seene by the letters of the bishop of Bayonne, am∣bassadour for the French king: and afterward by Maister Bellieure ambassadour also, and a man of good vnderstanding in matters of state, hauing the same charge, gaue the king to vnderstand, in the moneth of May 1555, how that the ambassadour of Spaine had almost caused all the companies of the Grisons to reuolt, insomuch that in assem∣blie of the Cade, there were moe voyces for Spaine, than for Fraunce. And after that how that they of the Comminaltie of Linguedine, hauing not receiued the money promised them by the Spaniards, laid hand vppon the Spanish pentioners amongst [ H] them, and putting them to torture, afterward condemned them in a fine of ten thou∣sand crownes to be by them paid into the common treasure. Wherein the French ambassadour so well bare himselfe, that notwithstanding the Spanish practise, they within two moneths after, together with the rest of the cantons of the Swissers sent 27 ambassadours into Fraunce, to renue and confirme their former alliances.

These examples of popular cities we haue set downe, that thereby the force and na∣ture of popular states and Commonweales might the better be vnderstood: Where∣fore let vs then conclude; That to be a popular State or Commonweale wherein the greater part of the people haue the soueraigntie; whether their voices be giuen by* 1.669 poll, by tribes, companies, parishes, or communities. And yet Aristotle writeth vnto [ I] the contrarie: We must not saith he, according to the common opinion iudge the estate popular, where the greater part of the people haue the soueraigntie: And after∣ward for example bringeth forth xiij. hundred citisens in a citie, of whom a thousand of the better & richer sort haue the soueraigntie, excluding the rest: we ought not saith he to deeme this a popular state; no more than that to be an Aristocratie, wherin the lesser part of the citisens haue the soueraigntie, being men of the poorer sort. And after that he concludeth thus: The popular estate is wherein the poorer sort of the citisens haue the soueraigntie; and an Aristocratie where the richer sort beare the rule, whe∣ther they be moe or fewer in the one or in the other much concerneth not. And by [ K] this meanes Aristotle to establish his owne, reiecteth the common opinion of all peo∣ple: yea euen of the Philosophers and law-giuers themselues: which common recei∣ued opinion hath alwaies beene, is, and shall be mistris in matters of state. And yet he had neither true nor probable reason to depart from the common opinion: where∣as thereof ensueth a thousand intollerable and ineuitable absurdities. For so we might say that the faction of the Decemuiri or ten commissioners, appointed for the corre∣cting and amending of the euill lawes and customes of Rome, taking vpon them the soueraigntie, was a popular estate; albeit that all histories call it an Oligarchie, although they in that barenes of the Commonwealth were not chosen for their wealth, but for

their wisedome onely. And to the contrarie, when the people for the maintenance [ A] of their popular estate had driuen them out, a man might say that the state was then chaunged into an Aristocratie. So should we also say, if twelue thousand of the richer sort had the soueraigntie, and but fiue hundred of the poorer sort were excluded, that that state were an Aristocratie. And againe to the contrarie, if there were but fiue hun∣dred poore gentlemen, which had the gouernment ouer the rest of the richer sort, one should call such a Commonweal a popular state. For so saith Aristotle, calling the Commonweales of Appollonia, Thera, and Colophon popular states, wherein a few auntient verie poore families had the soueraigntie ouer the rich. Yea he passeth on further and saith, that if the greater part of the people hauing the soueraigntie, giue* 1.670 the great offices and honours of their state vnto the fairest or tallest of their citisens, it [ B] shall no more be a popular, but an Aristocratique estate: which is an other foule er∣rour in matter of state, considering that to iudge of an estate, the question is not to know who haue the magistracies or offices: but onely who they bee which haue the soueraigntie and power to place and displace the magistrats and officers, and to giue lawes vnto euery man.

And these absurdities, and others also much greater then they, ensue hereof, in that* 1.671 Aristotle hath mistaken the manner and forme of the gouernment of a Common∣weale, for the soueraigne state thereof. For as we haue before said, the state may be a pure royall Monarchie, and yet the gouernment there of popular: as namely if the prince giue honours, offices, and preferments therein to the poore, aswell as to the [ C] rich: to the base aswell as to the noble, and so indifferently to all without respect or ac∣cepting of person. As also it may be that the state be royall, and yet the gouernment aristocraticall: as if the prince giue the honours and offices to a few of the nobilitie, or to a few of the richer sort onelie, or some few of his fauorits. And to the contrarie, if the people hauing the soueraigntie, giue the most honorable offices, rewards, and pre∣ferments vnto the nobilitie onely, as they did in Rome, vntill the law Canuleia, the estate should be in deed popular, and yet the gouerment Aristocratique. So if the no∣bilitie, or a few of the better sort should haue the soueraigntie, and yet bestow the most honorable charges and preferments vpon the poorer and baser sort, aswell as vpon the rich, without fauour or respect of persons: the state should be Aristocratique, and yet [ D] popularly gouerned. But if all or the greatest part of the people hauing the soueraign∣tie, shall giue the honorable offices and preferments indifferently to all, without respect of person, or by lot bestow the same vpon all the citisens: a man might wel iudge that estate not onely popular, but also to be most popularly gouerned. As was done at Athens at the request and motion of Aristides the just, whereby all the citisens were receiued into all the offices of the Commonweale, without respect of their wealth, contrarie to the law of Solon, whereby it was prouided, that in bestowing of honours and places of authoritie and commaund, regard also bee had vnto mens abilitie and wealth. So likewise if the nobilitie onely, or some few of the richer sort should haue the soueraigntie in the state, and so exclude all the rest of the people from the honora∣ble [ E] places and preferments in the Commonweal, so to keepe them to themselues a∣lone: one might say that estate not to be aristocratike only, but also aristocratically go∣uerned; as wee may see in the state of Venice. But here happily some man will say, that none but my selfe is of this opinion, and that not one of the auntient, and much lesse of the moderne writers which intreat of matters of state or Commonweales, haue once touched this point. True it is that I cannot denie the same; yet this distinction neuerthelesse seemeth vnto me more then necessarie, for the good vnderstanding of the state of euery commonweal; if a man will not cast himselfe head long into an infi∣nite

labyrinth of errours, where into we see Aristotle himselfe to haue fallen: mista∣king [ F] the popular Commonweal for the Aristocratique: and so contrarie wise, con∣trarie to the common receiued opinion, yea and contrarie to common sence also: For these principles euill grounded, nothing that is firme and sure can possiblie be thereon built. From this errour likewise is sprung the opinion of them which haue forged a forme of a Commonweale mingled of all three, which we haue for good reasons be∣fore reiected.

Wherefore let vs firmely set downe and resolue that there are but three formes of* 1.672 Commonweales, and no moe, and those simple also, and without any confused mix∣ture one of them with an other; albeit that the gouernment be sometimes contrarie to [ G] the state: As a Monarchie is contrarie to a Democratie or popular estate; and yet ne∣uerthelesse the soueraigntie may be in one onely prince, who may popularly gouerne his estate, as I haue before said: and yet it shall not be for that a confusion of the popu∣lar estate with a Monarchie, which are states of themselues incompatible, but is well (as it were) a combyning of a Monarchie with a popular gouernment, the most assured Monarchie that is. The like we may deeme of the Aristocratique estate, and of the popular gouernment: which is by farre more firme and sure, then if the estate and go∣uernment were both Aristocratique: the state standing almost inuiolable, when as the subiects by such a moderat kind of gouerment are amongst themselues combyned, as also vnto the Commonweale. And albeit that the gouernment of a Commonweale [ H] may be more or lesse popular, aristocratique, or royall, (as of tyrannies, some may be more cruell than others,) yet so it is that the state in it selfe receiueth no comparison of more or lesse. For the soueraigntie is alwaies indiuisible and incommunicable in one* 1.673 alone, or in the lesse part of all the people, or in the greater part thereof; which are the three sorts of Commonweales by vs set downe. And as for that which we haue said, that the gouernment may be more or lesse popular, may be deemed so to be, by the Commonweales of the Swissers, where the mountaine Cantons of Vri, Schwits, Vn∣deruald, Zug, Glaris, and Apensel are so popular, as that the soueraigntie of the Com∣monweal* 1.674 resteth onely in them all, so that they be fourteene yeares old, in somuch that their chiefe magistracies & places of greatest commaund are sometime giuen euen to verie Sadlers, and such other mechanicall men: neither of the aforesaid Cantons is [ I] any one of them walled except Zug. The other new Cantons and Geneua, are lesse popular, gouerning thrmselues by certein lords, which they call the Councell, as I haue learned by Master Basse-fountaine Bishop of Limoges, who long and discreetly without blame, as any one embassadour, hath to his great honour mannaged this charge. And albeit that the Bernoies and they of Zurich compose their Senat of di∣uers handy crafts men, yet they vse commonly to creat their Auoyers (or chiefe ma∣gistrats) of their most noble and auntient families: whereby they are lesse subiect vnto seditions and tumults: whereas the lords of the three Cantons of the Grisons being more popular, are also more subiect vnto seditions and sturres, the people in their [ K] assemblies being hard to be gouerned; and once moued, hard to be pleased; as the am∣bassadours of princes haue alwaies by experience found. For the true nature of the* 1.675 people is, to desire libertie without restraint of bit or bridle whatsoeuer: and to haue all men equall in wealth, in honour, in paines, and rewards; without regard of nobilitie, wisedome, or vertue: and as Plutarch saith wisely to haue all cast into lot, and euen bal∣lance, without respect or fauour of any man, then if any valiant or honourable minded of the nobilitie or richer sort shall by any meanes attempt to restraine the people so in∣temperatly abusing their libertie; them straight waies they do what they can to kill or to banish, and confiscating their goods, diuided the same among the poorer sort, and

that the rather, if they be rich, or seeme to aspire: Yea oft times it happeneth, that the [ A] common people puft vp with the punishment or slaughter of some one mightie man, violently breaketh out vpon the rest, and that especially if it be once come to armes,* 1.676 and that the nobilitie be by the force of the people ouerthrowne. As it happened at the establishing of the popular estate of the Swissars, after the battell of Sempach, where al∣most all the nobilitie was slaine, and the rest which were left constrained to renounce their nobilitie; and yet neuerthelesse were excluded from all honours and offices of charge in the Commonweale, except at Zurich and Berne (which is in them the lesse to be maruelled at, for that the nobilitie there, with great safetie and without force of armes, made their peace with the victorious common people, now before quite spent* 1.677 with ciuill warres.) Yet for all this insolencie, did the Swissers more moderatly vse [ B] their popular libertie, than did in antient time the Grecians or Italians, who oftentimes would needs haue all bonds and obligations burnt or canceled: yea sometime the common people set on by such as were farre endebted, ranne vppon the creditours and rich men, robbed their houses, and enforced them to make an equall diuision of their possessions and lands, forbidding them the hauing or possessing of cattell or lands, aboue a certaine number or rate by them set downe: from which kind of dealing the Swissers haue alwaies abhorred. And albeit that the publike pensions of princes, and gifts of straungers, in some of the Swissers cities, are not laid vp in the common trea∣sure, but diuided among the people in particular; in the diuision whereof hee that hath most male children hath also a greater part than the rest: yet for all that, when as they [ C] of the canton of Glaris requested of Morlet, the French kings ambassadour, in the yere 1550, That the priuat and extraordinarie pensions, which the greater men yearely re∣ceiued of the king, might together with the publike pension bee equally diuided amongst them all: King Henrie denied so to doe, and said, He would rather restraine his bountie, than suffer his priuat liberalitie to be so at their pleasure confounded with the common. Yea that worse is, the insolent libertie of the auntient Greeke popular Commonweales, proceeded to that libertie (should I say) or rather lewd madnesse, as to banish them that were more wise and discreet than the rest for the mannaging of their affaires, as they did Damon, maister to Pericles: and not onely wise and discreet, but euen the most iust and vertuous also; as was Aristides in Athens, & Hermodorus at [ D] Ephesus: which what thing is it else, than to go about to pluck vp vertue it selfe by the root? But they were afraid least so great brightnesse of vertue in one great citisen or* 1.678 subiect▪ should so dazle the eyes and minds of the rest of the common people, that for∣getting their libertie, they should chuse rather to liue in subiection vnto so wise and ver∣tuous a man, than to rule thēselues. Which thing they the more feared, if vnto his ver∣tues and good parts were ioyned nobilitie, or power, or experience in great matters; who with force ioyned thereunto, might from the citisens either with their will, or against their will, extort their libertie. Whereas the nobilitie and better sort, to the contrarie make no account or reckoning of the popular state: but thinke it good rea∣son, that he which hath the most nobilitie, wealth, vertue, or knowledge, should be also [ E] the more esteemed, respected and honoured; and that the honourable charges in the Commonweale, should of right be due vnto such men: and therefore alwaies desire and seeke to haue themselues alwaies diuided and seperated from the dregges and rascal* 1.679 sort of the common people. Sith therefore the princes and nobilitie so much differ from the common and base people, it is a thing impossible by any meanes to make them together equall: or being made in honors and commaund, euen to reconcile thē among themselues, together with the Commonweale: and so (as they say) with one and the same brewing to moderat two so contrarie humors. Albeit that Solon vaunted,

that if he had power to make lawes, he would make them such as should be most in∣different, [ F] both for the rich and the poore, the nobilitie and the base: which the nobili∣tie thought Solon to meane of the equalitie in Geometricall proportion; and the peo∣ple of the proportion Arithmeticall: whereby it came to passe, that both the states yeelding vnto him, gaue him power for the making of them lawes, and establishing of their Commonweale. But these things, as also what commodities or inconueniences attempted vpon euerie Commonweale, shall in their due places bee more at large de∣clared: sufficeth it now with what breuitie well might be, to haue set downe the de∣scriptions and kinds of all Commonweales, as also what is to euerie one of them pro∣per, straunge, or common with others: and also who in euerie Commonweale hath the power of Soueraigne maiestie. Now let vs prosecute euerie part and limme, [ G] as it were, of a Commonweale, which are tied vnto the soueraigntie of the state, as members vnto the head; viz. the Senat, the magistrats, the officers, colleges, and corporation▪ and that in such order as wee haue here rehearsed them.

Finis Lib. Secundi.

[ H] [ I] [ K]

THE THIRD BOOKE OF [ A] [ B] OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEALE.

CHAP. I. ¶ Of a Senat, or Councell of Estate, and the power thereof.

A Senat is a lawfull assemblie of Councellors of Estate, to* 1.680 giue aduise to them which haue the soueraigntie in euerie [ C] Commonweale. For so order requireth, that hauing before spoken of them which haue the power of soueraigne maie∣stie, and of the markes thereof, and also touched the diuersi∣tie of Commonweales: We should now also speake of the Senat, as of the chiefe and principal part of a Commonweal, next vnto the prince. Not for that a Commonweale can∣not altogether be without a Senat or Councell: for a prince may be so wise and discreet, as that he cannot find better councell than his owne: or els hauing not whome to trust, taketh aduice neither of his owne people nor of strangers;* 1.681 but of himselfe alone, as we read of Antigonus king of Asia, and of Lewes the ele∣uenth [ D] the French king; whome the emperour Charles the fift doubted not in that to imitat: as also of Caius Iulius Caesar among the Romans; who neuer spoke any thing vnto others, of the enterprises he had in hand: nor of his iourneies, no not so much as of the day of battell; and yet performed great matters, albeit that he were beset with many great and right puissant enemies: and was therefore the more redoubted, for that his designes were so close and couert, as that they were still executed before they enemy could perceiue them: who still was by that meane ouertaken, and ere hee were aware surprised. Besides that, the captaines and souldiors reposing themselues in the wise∣dome of such a prince or generall, were alwaies in expectation, prest, and readie euen in a moment, to performe whatsoeuer he should command, but with the holding vp of [ E] his hand. No otherwise than the members of a bodie well composed are alwaies rea∣die to receiue & put into execution whatsoeuer reason shal commaund them, although they be no whit partakers of the concell thereof.

Now many haue (and that in mine opinion) without cause doubted, Whether it were better for the Commonweale to haue a most wise and vertuous prince to gouern the same without councell; or a dull and vnfit man of himselfe for gouernment, but well prouided of a graue and wise councell? And truely vnto the wise neither the one nor the other seemeth any thing worth. But if the prince be so wise as they suppose, as

that he greatly needeth not of councell: yet the greatest point for his aduantage •…•…n [ F] matters of any consequence is, to keep his designes and resolutions secret, which once* 1.682 laid open and so made knowne, serue no more but as mines discouered; causing oft∣times the ruine and decay of most famous cities and states. And therefore the wisest princes haue still vsed to speake and talke most of such things as they meant least. And as for an heauie headed and foolish prince, how should he be well prouided of a graue and wise councell, sith that the choice thereof dependeth of his owne will? and that in a prince there is no greater signe of wisdome, than to know well how to make choice of wise men, whose councell he may vse and follow.

But forasmuch as the brightnesse and beautie of wisedome is so rare amongst men,* 1.683 and that we must with all obedience reuerence such princes as it shall please God to [ G] send vs; the fairest wish that they can make is, That they may haue a graue and wise councell. For it is not by much so dangerous to haue an euill prince and a good coun∣cell, as it is to haue a good prince misseled by euill councellours; as said the emperor Alexander. Wherefore we say, that a prince ought to follow the good aduise and councell of his graue and wise councellors, not onely in his more great and weigh∣tie affaires, but euen in his meane and least matters also (albeit that in truth nothing can be meane or little, which concerneth the Commonweale) For there is nothing that* 1.684 giueth greater credit and authoritie vnto the lawes and commandements of a prince, a people, or state, or in any manner of Commonweale, than to cause them to passe by the aduise of a graue and wise Senat or Councell: and the rather, if it be doubtfull whe∣ther [ H] it be profitable or no, which the prince or state would haue done. And that of all others, Charles the fift the French king, was woont best to doe: For hauing a purpose to driue out of his kingdome the Englishmen, who in fealtie held all the castles and townes in Aquitaine; and now prouided of all things, which he thought needfull for the doing thereof, he receiued the complaints of the Frenchmen of Aquitaine (the king of England his subiects) against the English gouernours, directly contrarie vnto the treatie of Bretignie: who for such appeales and complaints vnto the king, had vsed them euill. Vpon which occasion, whether of purpose sought for, or by chaunce offe∣red, the king tooke hold: but yet would not vndertake the warre, without the councel [ I] and good liking of the nobilitie and people, whose helpe he was to vse therin. Wher∣fore he commanded them all to be assembled vnto the parliament of Paris, pretending that he had sent for them to haue their aduise, and by their wisedome to amend what had by himselfe not altogether so wisely bene done or considered of. Which warre by that councell decreed, prospered in his hand, and tooke good successe. But when the subiects see things done either without councell, or contrarie to the will and decrees of the Senat or councell, then they contemne them and set them at naught; or els fear∣fully and negligently do the commaunds of their princes and magistrats: of which contempt of lawes and magistrats, ensue the seditious and slaunderous speeches of the people; and so at length most daungerous rebellion, or els open conspiracie against [ K] the prince, drawing after it the vtter subuersion of all estates. And so Hiero king of Sicilie was together with all his kindred and friends most cruelly slaine, for that hee so proudly and insolently contemned the Senat, nor in any thing asked the aduise therof; by the aduise whereof (his grandfather hauing inuaded the soueraigntie) had before gouerned the state fiftie yeares and more. The same errour committed Caesar, not on∣ly in the time that he was Consull, but in his dictatorship also, neuer vsing the aduise or councell of the Senat: The principall occasion that was taken for the killing of him, being for that he vouchsafed not to rise vnto the whole bodie of the Senat (consi∣sting of about a thousand Senators) comming at once vnto him; too arrogantly and

indeede too foolishly done; not that Caesar was by nature or disposition so prowd, but [ A] for that when he would haue risen vp vnto the Senate, he was by Cornelius Balbus (his flattering claw-backe, and a man of all other most inward with him) persuaded not so to doe. For which selfesame cause, also the Romans had long before slaine their first king and founder of their cittie, and driuen out their last king the prowd Tarquin: for that both of them contemning the Senate, did all things on their owne heads and the latter of them seeking also quite to suppresse the Senate, by putting of the Senatours to death: which thing was not dangerous onely vnto those princes which wee haue now spoken of, but also vnto Lewes the eleuenth the French king, who in nothing as∣ked the aduice of his Counsell, but had thereby (as hee afterward confessed) brought himselfe within an inch of his vtter ruine: for which cause, hee would not that his [ B] sonne Charles the eight, should vnderstand any more but three words of Latine (and those, such as are razed out of the historie of Philip Comines,) to the end that mistru∣sting of his owne wisedome, he should rest himselfe vpon the graue counsell of others, and so by their aduice to mannage his affaires rather than by his owne. For it is right* 1.685 certaine, that great learning in princes is often times a thing no lesse dangerous than a knife in a mad-mans hand, except he be by nature well giuen, and more vertuously in∣structed and brought vp. Neither is there any thing more to be feared, than great lear∣ning accompanied with iniustice, and armed with power. There was neuer yet prince lesse learned (except in deedes of armes) than Traian, neither any of greater knowledge than Nero; and yet for all that, this man had neuer his peere for crueltie, nor the other [ C] for bountie: the one of them deadly hating the Senat, and the other in all things fol∣lowing the aduice thereof. Seeing therefore that a Senat is a thing so profitable in a Monarchy, and so necessarie in all Popular and Aristocraticall estates, as is in man wit and reason, without which his body cannot long gouerne it selfe, or haue at all any be∣ing: let vs first speake of the qualities requisite in Senatours or Counsellors; then what number they ought to be, and whether there ought in a Commonweale to bee moe Counsells than one, and of what things they are to counsell of: and last of all, what power is to be giuen vnto the Senat or Counsell in a Commonweale.

First we said the Senat to be a lawfull assemblie: which is to be vnderstood of the* 1.686 power which is giuen them by the prince, or soueraigntie in other states, to assemble [ D] themselues in time and place to them appointed. As for the time and place when and where they are to meet, it is not much materiall, sith that the diuers occasions and op∣portunities of occurrents doe oft times of themselues require, and as it were point out the same. Yet is the decree of Lycurgus in the mean time to be commended, forbid∣ding any pourtraitures or pictures to be in the place where the Senat shuld consult, for that the obiect of such things as wee behold, often times distract the phantasie, and transport reason else where, which ought wholy to be intentiue vnto that which then is to be consulted of. We said moreouer in the definition of a Senat, That they should be Counsellors for the estate: to put a difference betwixt them and other counsellours and magistrats of the Commonweale, who are oftentimes called to giue their aduise [ E] vnto the counsellours of estate, yea and vnto the prince himselfe, euery one according to his qualitie and vocation; and yet are not for all that counsellours for the estate, but onely vpon occasion men extraordinarilie called. And as for the name and title of Se∣natour, it signifieth a man well strucken in yeares: as also the Greeks call the Senat* 1.687 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which showeth well that the Greeks and Latins composed their Senats of seniors or aged men, whom our countrie men call Seigneurs, for the authoritie, reue∣rence, and dignitie, which hath alwaies beene giuen vnto the auntients, as vnto the wiser sort, and men of greatest experience: vpon that hope and opinion that they

which were elder than the rest, should also in wisedome exceed the rest. For so it is [ F] prouided for, in the lawes of Charles the great; Nulli per sacramentum fidelitas per∣mittatur, nisi nobis & vnicui{que} proprio seniori: Let credit be giuen to no man vpon his oath, but vnto vs and euery proper elder: whereby he meant the manumised mens patrons, rather than the Senators; as if honour and reuerence were due rather vnto the elder, than the yonger. Also by the custome of the Athenians, when the people were assembled to giue their aduice, the huisher with a loud voice called all them that were fiftie yeares old together, to consult of that which should be good and profitable for the Commonweale. And not only the Greeks and Latins haue giuen this prero∣gatiue vnto the aged, to giue counsell vnto the Commonweale, but also the Aegipti∣ans, [ G] Persians, and Haebrewes, who taught other people well and wisely to gouerne their estates. And what more diuine order would we haue than that of God? who when he would establish a counsell vnto the Israelits his people▪ * 1.688 Assemble vnto me (saith he) seauentie of the most auntient of the people, wise men, and fearing God. For albeit that a man might find a number of discreet, wise, and vertuous yong men, experimen∣ted also in the affaires of the Commonweale (a thing for all that right difficult,) yet so it is that it should yet be a thing right perilous to compose of them a Senat (which were rather to be called an assemblie of yong men) for that their counsell should not be receiued, either of the yong or of the old: for that they of like age would esteeme themselues as wise as they, and the other themselues much wiser than such yong coun∣sellours. And in matters of state (if in any thing in the world) opinion hath no lesse, [ H] yea and oftentimes more force than the trueth it selfe. The common people thinketh, and that right well, yong men neuer, or else right seldome to excell in wisedome: but they which are such, can neither gouerne the people, nor chastice the offendours, or in the open assemblies of the people persuade them vnto that which is good and profi∣table. Neither is there any thing in a Commonweale more dangerous, than the sub∣iects to haue an euill opinion of the Counsell or magistrats which commaund ouer them: for then how shall they obey them? and if they obey them not, what issue is* 1.689 thereof to be expected. And therefore Solon forbad any yong man to be admitted into the Senat seemed he neuer so wise; which the Graecians in their owne language haue better set downe than the Latins▪ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And Licurgus before [ I] him, had composed his Senat of the elder sort. And not without cause haue the lawes giuen the prerogatiue of honour, priuileges, and dignities vnto the Elders; for the pre∣sumption we ought to haue that they are wiser, of better vnderstanding, of more ex∣perience, and fitter to giue counsell than the yonger sort. Yet for all that, is not that graunted to all old men: no not to them which hauing before excelled in vertue and wisedome, are now growne so old and decrepit, as that their naturall forces faile them, and their braines weakned, can no longer do their dutie, but are now as men destitute of wit and iudgement, vnable longer to vse the instruments by nature giuen them to reason with, so that in them their verie mind seemeth to be with age both weak and [ K] sicke; whom Plato himselfe, who appointed the Elders to be keepers of his Common∣weal, hath excused from any longer bearing of charges in the Commonweal, or for any more giuing of counsell. It is also said in the holie Scripture, That God hauing chosen seauentie Elders, powred vpon them aboundance of wisedome: for which cause the Hebrewes call their Senators, the Sages, or wise men. And Cicero elegantly (as he doth all things) calleth the Senat the soule, the reason, and vnderstanding, of a* 1.690 Commonweale; meaning thereby to conclude, that a Commonweale can no more maintaine it selfe without a Senat, than the bodie can it selfe without a soule, or a man himselfe without reason: and that Senators should by long experience and practise be

able and readie, to heare, consider, and resolue of the greatest affaires of the Common [ A] weale. For whatsoeuer things are notably done in warre, or peace, in making of lawes, in appointing the orders and degrees of the subiects, in reforming the manners and conditions of the people; and in briefe in the whole disposing of the Common weal, are all nothing else but the execution of such things as are by a wise counsell de∣uised and resolued vpon: which the Greeks for that cause called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.691 as if nothing could be more sacred than good counsell, and the Hebrewes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as who should say, the most sure foundation of all things, whereupon all faire and commenda ble actions are built, and without which all things fall, and are turned vpside downe. When I say a wise counsell, my meaning is that politique wisdome should bee euer ioyned with faith and justice: for it is no lesse, and I know not whether more dange∣rous, [ B] to haue a Senat or Counsell consisting of euill and wicked men, how wise and ex∣pert soeuer they be; than of the ignorant and foolish: for that these as they cannot much profit, so can they not much hurt the Commonweal; whereas the other by their mischieuous counsell to reuenge themselues, make no question or doubt to en∣danger or ouerthrow the whole state of the Commonweal, so that they onely may stand safe in the middest of the ruines thereof, yea and many times contrarie to their own conscience, stick not most earnestly to crosse their aduersaries opinions▪ although most profitable to the Commonweal, turning their priuat hatred vnto the common destruction? albeit that they reap no other profit thereby, then the triumph which they account themselues to haue gotten of the shame of them, whom they haue in [ C] counsell vanquished, drawing them of their owne faction as it were in a string af∣ter them.

An other sort of Senators there are also which are led neither with enuie, hatred,* 1.692 nor loue of any man, but with an obstinate conceit and loue of their owne opinions, from which they will not by any reason or perswasion suffer themselues to be remo∣ued, and therefore come into the Senat armed with such a force and multitude of ar∣guments, as if they were euen there to combat with their enemies; least that they should seeme to haue erred in their discourses, or lightly to haue changed their opi∣nions. And that worse is, such strong conceited men, account it a great shame to them, [ D] to agree with any other man in opinion; but thinke themselues to haue most brauely acquited themselues, if as when men driue but one naile with another, they also shall obtrude one opinion to another: than which I cannot tell whether any thing can bee worse, being a thing no lesse to be shunned, than a rocke in the deepe sea But as a wise maister in a wrought sea, if he cannot by reason of the tempest in safetie put his ship into the desired port, yeeldeth then vnto the wind, and taketh in all his sailes, lest other∣wise carried away by force of tempest he suffer shipwracke: and so trieth it out, vntill the sea be againe calmed, and more fauourable winds arise: Euen so the irremouable resolution of a Councellor, in consultations of matters of state, was neuer of wise men commended; but alwaies deemed as a thing ioyned not onely with a certaine obsti∣nacie, but also arrogancie of mind: Whereas to the contrarie, sometimes to change [ E] a mans opinion, is not onely commendable, but also wholsome and profitable vnto the Commonweale: and according to the new occurrents of time, to apply also the deuises of new councels: sometime with the agreeing voices, approuing the opinion euen of the more ignorant and simple sort. And therefore Sir Thomas Moore in the Vtopian Commonweale by him deuised, wisely set downe, That nothing should bee disputed or reasoned vpon, the same day it was propounded, but to be still reserued vn∣to the next assembly of the Senat▪ to the end, that he which had rashly and vnaduisedly deliuered his opinion, should not afterward enforce himselfe to maintaine the same, ra∣ther

than to yeeld to reason. [ F]

Wherefore it beseemeth a wise Senator, euen in the entrance of the Senat, to lay* 1.693 downe all fauour towards his friends, all hatred towards his enemies, and all high con∣ceite of himselfe; ayming at no other end, but to the aduancement of the glorie of God, and the welfare of the Commonweale. Wherein the manner of the Lacede∣monians was to be commended, who were so readie to defend whatsoeuer was once decreed for the good of the Commonweale, as that they which had before impugned the same, would now so conforme themselues for the establishing thereof, as that they would themselues refell what they had before to the contrarie commended: and all because it was not lawfull for them to dispute of the lawes once established by the Se∣nat: which manner of custome the Achaeans and Florentine Commonweales, after∣wards [ G] borrowed from the Lacedemonians. And albeit that learning be alwaies neces∣sarie* 1.694 for a Senat or Councellor, especially the knowledge of antiquitie, and of the estates of Commonweals: as also to be seene in the lawes of his owne country, which he ought not to be altogether ignorant of, yet is a sound iudgement ioyned with faith iustice, and integritie more necessarie: by meanes whereof he may easily persuade any thing without much eloquence. But aboue all things a Senator must beware that hee* 1.695 suffer not himselfe to be corrupted with the bountie of forren princes: neither bee be∣holden to any forren lord or prince, for any thing that he holdeth of him, whether it be by fealtie and homage, by mutuall obligation, or by pention, which hee receiueth: which although it be a thing most daungerous in a Commonweale, and ought there∣fore [ H] to be capitall: yet for all that there is nothing than that more common in the Councell of princes. Except in the citie of Venice, which hath a Senat so free from this kind of base corruption, as that euen for that cause their priests (bee they neuer so free or nobly borne) out from comming into the Councell of state; for that they are thought to be sworne to doe nothing against the commoditie or profit of the bishop of Rome. Whereupon it is, that commonly the citisens before the giuing of their voyces, crie out alowd * 1.696 For a i Preti. And namely they banished Hermolaus Barba∣rus their ambassadour vnto the pope; as they did not long ago cardinall Mule, their ambassadour vnto him also, for that they had of him receiued the cardinals hat, with∣out leaue from the Seigneurie. But I find, that in this realme there haue bene thirtie [ I] fiue chauncellors, which haue bene cardinals or bishop at least: and so in England the like. And in Polonia, where the archbishop of Gnesne is by inheritance alwaies chan∣cellour of the realme: the kings of that country haue bene glad to make a lay man their vicechauncellor, by no oath bound vnto the bishop of Rome. As for pentions giuen by straungers vnto the minions or ambassadors of other princes, it is a thing so ordina∣rie, as that it is growne into a verie custome. Yea Mounsier Cotignac the French am∣bassadour into Turkie, was so bold as to presume to marrie a Greeke gentlewoman, without making of the king at all acquainted therewith. And not long after, another also at the instigation of Mhemet Bassa, and the duke of Naxo, would likewise haue [ K] married the prince of Valachia his sister: which poore prince for refusing to giue his consent thereunto, which he for feare had before graunted, was by the Bassa thrust out of his estate, and Stephen Bathor (who now gouerneth the kingdome of Polonia) pla∣ced in his stead. All which, with other such like enterprises, are dangerous in an estate, and therefore in a well ordered Commonweale, in no wise to be suffered. And these vnto me seeme to be the chiefe qualities and ornaments of a good Councellour of Estate.

But beside these, in many Commonweales nobilitie of birth is alwaies in a Senator required; as at Venice, Rhaguse, and Nuremberg: and amongst the Polonians it was

by Sigismundus Augustus, in the yeare 1550 by law prouided, That no man should [ A] * 1.697 be chosen a Senator, except he were nobly descended, by the fathers side at least, & had also borne armes. In other places choyce was made of them by their wealth, as at Ge∣nes, and in auntient time in Atheus by the lawes of Solon: and so almost in all other auntient Commonweales. And namely Augustus the emperour, would not that a Roman Senator of his time should be lesse worth than thirtie thousand crownes, sup∣plying of his owne bountie what the wise Senators being poorer wanted: not that it was so necessarie vnto their Councell, but that so they might haue wherewith to main∣taine their estate, aunswerable vnto their calling: as also least the rest proud of their wealth, should contemne the other which were poorer, as commonly it falleth out in the Aristocratique estate, where the Senator is chosen by his wealth. And by the aun∣tient [ B] order of the Romans also, no man could be made a Senator, except he had before borne some honourable place or charge in the Commonweale. And therefore the Censors from fiue yeares to fiue yeares, registred in the roll of the Senat, all them which had borne any great or honourable office or place in the Commonweale; viz. such as had bene Consuls, Praetors, Aediles, or at least Quaestors. And for that in the ouerthrow of Marius 90 Senators were slaine; Sylla created Dictator, to supply the order of the Senators, which he fauoured, created twentie Quaestors, and Caesar fortie, who at the same time should be made Senators, with power also to giue voyces, which before was not lawfull, vntill they had by the Censors bene nominated and regi∣stred. Which indeed is a laudable custome, and in many well ordered Commonweals [ C] at this present obserued. As in Polonia none is receiued to be a Senator, which is not a Palatine, a Bishop, a Castellan, or Captaine; or else before hath beene imployed in some honourable ambassage, or bene generall of an armie. Neither hath any man place in the Great Turkes Diuano or Councell, but the foure Visier Bassaes, the two Cadilisquiers or Chauncellors, and the twelue Beglerbegs, gouernours of great pro∣uinces.

But whereas we haue before said, that Senators are to be chosen out of such as haue before borne some honourable place or office in the Commonweale: that concerneth not them which shamefully buy their offices, neither the Commonweale wherein ho∣nours and offices are bought for money: for those vertues which we said to bee requi∣red [ D] in a Senator; namely iustice, faith, integritie, wisedome, experience, and knowledge in the lawes both of God and man, are things so sacred and diuine, as that they cannot for any reward or money be bought. Now that a Senator should by the Senat be exa∣mined or tried, is a new and vnwonted thing: as men whome either the Censors, or the other offices and honours by them before obtained, had sufficiently alreadie tried. Yet in the time of the Gothes, the Commonweale being by them chaunged, we read it to haue bene done: For so •…•…aith Theodoricus, with Cassiodore, Admittendos in Senatum examinare cogit solicitus honor Senatus, The carefull care we haue of the honour of the Senat, causeth vs to examine such as are to be admitted into the Senat.

As for the number of Senators it cannot be great, considering the perfection requisit [ E] * 1.698 in a Counselour of estate. True it is, that in popular and aristocratique Common∣weales, to auoid seditions, and to feede the enraged famine of the ambitious, which haue part in the soueraignetie: they are oft times enforced to augment the number of the Senatours; as in Athens by Solons law, they by lot euery yeare made choice of foure hundred Senatours; whereunto it pleased them afterwardes to adde another hundred, that so fifty might by lot yearely bee drawne out of euery one of the ten tribes: vnto whom they ioyned also another hundred, to make vp the full number of 600. After that they had vnto the ten tribes ioyned two others, namely the tribes of

Antigonus and Demetrius, albeit that in the time of Pericles, there were not in the ci∣tie [ F] aboue 13 thousand citisens, and 20 thousand in the time of Demonsthenes. For which cause (as I haue said) Plato in his popular Commonweale: by him set downe, appoin∣teth the Senate to consist of an hundred threescore and eight of the better and wiser sort, which was the thirtith part of 5040 citisens the full number of them, of whom he would haue his Commonweale to stand. And in like case, Romulus tooke the thir∣tith part of his subiects to make the first Roman Senate of, choosing out of 3000, (the whole number that then was of the citisens) an hundred, and them also by him chosen not by lot, but by discretion, euen of the nobler sort of his people: viz. such as whose auncestours had neuer serued as slaues. But afterward, the Sabins being according to the league receiued into the citie, hee added vnto the former number another hun∣dred; [ G] vnto whom, after the kings driuen out, Brutus also put to an hundred moe, which number of three hundred Senatours, so continued by the space of almost foure hun∣dred yeares, without increasing or diminishing. But in the time of Cicero, it is manifest that there were about fiue hundred, by that he writeth foure hundred and fifteene Se∣natours, to haue giuen voices when Pub. Claudius, who was afterwards tribune, was brought in question for hauing polluted the sacrifices of Bona Dea, by committing of adultery with Pompeia: at which time, when the Senatours were not constrained to be present in the Senate, no man can doubt, but that many of them then dispersed into all the prouinces of the Roman empire, or otherwise busied with their owne affaires, or letted with age and sicknesse, were then also absent. And after that, Caesar to haue [ H] moe beholden vnto him, and for the better establishing of his owne gouernement, augmented the number of the Senatours vnto a thousand, chusing into that honoura∣ble order, not onely citisens of all sorts, but euen Frenchmen and other strangers also, namely Lu. Licinius the Barber, as saieth Acron. But Augustus (after the Common∣weale againe pacified) seeing the danger of so great a number of Senatours, brought them to the number of sixe hundred, with purpose to haue brought them also to the antient number of three hundred, which was not much more then the ten thousand part of the whole number of the citisens, being then almost infinite.

Wherefore the number of Senatours is not to bee appointed, according to the [ I] * 1.699 multitude of the people, neither to serue the ambitious desire of the ignorant; and much lesse for the drawing of money from them, but onely for the respect of the vertue and wisedome of them which haue deserued the place; or if it be not possible otherwise to satisfie the ambition of them, which haue part and interest in the estate of popular and aristocratique Commonweales, but that of necessitie the gate of the Senate must bee opened vnto the multitude, that it be yet so ordered, that none should therein haue de∣liberatiue voices, but such as had borne the greatest offices▪ and charges in the state: as in the Cretensian popular Commonweale, all the citisens had free accesse and en∣terance into the Senate, and there might franke and freely deliuer their opinions, but not with authoritie to determine any thing, that power being still reserued vnto them [ K] onely which then were, or had before beene the great magistrates. And in the Senate of the Achaeans, none but the generall and the ten Dimiurgi, had power to determine of such things as were in counsell propounded. Howbeit a wise lawegiuer will neuer* 1.700 goe so farre, if hee may otherwise auoid the popular sedition: for beside the manifest daunger, which is for reuealing of counsell communicated to so many persons: it gi∣ueth also occasion vnto the factious for troubling of the state, if they which haue the power to determine and resolue vpon matters, shall in opinion differ from them which haue but voices consultatiue; which indeede are accounted as nothing: for preuenting of which dangers, both the one and the other, the antient Greekes in their Common∣weales

still created a counsell apart, of the grauest and wisest of their Senators (whom [ A] they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) to consult of the more secret and vrgent mat∣ters of state; as also by themselues to dispose of the greatest affaires of the Common∣weale, and to consider what thing were to be consulted of in the open Senat, or pub∣likely to be propounded vnto the people. Besides that, what an hard matter it was of such a multitude of Senatours, to assemble so many as were requisite, and to make them to agree when they were assembled; the estate in the meane time standing in dan∣ger & the oportunitie for the well mannaging of matters passing. The Senators office amongst the Romans was most glorious and full of honour; and yet could Augu∣stus the emperour neuer bring to passe, that the Senators should be present at the ordi∣narie Senat, which was holden the calends or ides of euerie moneth at the farthest; al∣beit [ B] that he set great fines vpon them that were absent, and gaue not their assistance: which grew so heauie vpon the offendors, as that he was glad to take of them so offen∣ding euerie fift man by lot. And Ruscius Caepio the rather to inuite them to that their dutie, by his last will and testament left a certaine summe of money to them that came into the Senat. For it was requisit that there should be fiftie Senators at the least for the making of any decree, and oftentimes an hundred, or two hundred, yea and some∣times foure hundred, which was two third parts of six Senators; as in corporations and colledges the manner is. Howbeit Augustus the emperour at length taking away the necessitie of so great a number, appointed two hundred to be sufficient, beeing two thirds of three hundred; which was the lawfull number of the Senators appointed by [ C] Brutus. Moreouer the Senat was not ordinarily assembled but three times a moneth; and if it pleased not the Consull (without whose commandement the Senat might not assemble it selfe) or the greatest magistrat in the absence of the Consull, sometime an whole yeare passed without calling together of the Senat: as Caesar did in his first Con∣sulship, hauing the Senat bent against him; and yet in the meane time by prodigall bountie caused euen what he would to be decreed by the people. Whereas Solon had much better prouided for the matter among the Athenians, hauing beside the ordina∣rie Senat of 400, euerie yeare to be changed, appointed also a priuie and perpetuall* 1.701 Councell of the Areopagi, consisting of threescore of the wisest and grauest sort of the citisens, men without reproach, who by all the degrees of honour were risen to haue [ D] the mannaging of all the most secret affaires of the state, and to foresee that in time of daunger the Commonwealth should take no harme. Of which councell how great the need was, was then well vnderstood, when as Pericles to gaine the fauour of the common sort, had taken away the authoritie from the Areopagits, and translated the same vnto the people: for shortly after, the state of that Commonweale sore shaken both with forren and domesticall warres, began forthwith to decline and decay. Wee find also, that the Aetolians, beside their great Councell, which they called Panaetolium, had also their priuie Councell chosen of the grauest and wisest men amongst them; of whome Liuie speaking, saith, Sanctius est apud Aetolos consilium eorum quos apocloets ap∣pellant, There is among the Aetolians a more sacred (or priuie) Councel, of them whom [ E] they call apocletos: and immediatly after, Arcanum hoc gentis Consilium, This is the se∣cret* 1.702 Councell of the nation: Whereas before he had said, Legibus Aetolorum caueba∣tur, ne de pace belloue, nisi in Panaetolio & Pilaico Consilio ageretur, It was prouided by the lawes of the Aetolians, that nothing should be entreated of concerning peace or warre, but in their Panaetolio, or Pilaican Councell. Wee read also, that the popu∣lar Commonweale of the Carthaginensians, beside their Senat of foure hundred Se∣nators, had also a particular or priuie Councell of thirtie Senators, men of greatest ex∣perience* 1.703 in their publike affaires and matters of state: Of whome Liuie thus saith,

Carthaginenses xxx legatos seniorum principes adpacem petendam mittunt: id erat san∣ctius [ F] apudeos Consilium, maximaque ad Senatum regendum vis, The Carthaginensians (saith he) send thirtie ambassadors, the princes of their elders to sue for peace: and that was the more sacred Councell with them, and the greater power for the ruling of the Senat: which manner of Councell the Romans wanted. And therefore Liuie won∣dereth (as at a right strange thing) that the ambassadors of Greece and Asia, which came to Rome, could of so great a number of Senators vnderstand nothing of that which king Eumenes then plotted in the full Senat, against Perseus king of Macedon, Eo silen∣tio curia clausa erat, The court (saith he) was with such silence shut vp: Whereby he sufficiently sheweth, that in his time, as also long before that, nothing was done or [ G] agreed vpon in the Senat, which still was not by one or other of so great a number re∣uealed. For which cause the Senators themselues sometimes were constrained to be∣come clarkes and secretaries in the secret affaires of the state, and to take of euerie man an oath, not to reueale any such thing as was in the Senat decreed, vntill such time as it was put in execution: For as yet no capitall punishment was appointed for such as shuld reueale or bewray the secret councel of princes. And indeed how could any thing there be kept secret, where fiue or 600 Senators were priuie to all that was done in the Senat, beside the clarks and secretaries for the state? When as also the yong Senators children, before the time of Papyrius Praetextatus might come into the Senat, & carrie the news of such things as were there done, vnto their mothers. Augustus was the first, [ H] who out of the Senat made choice of some few of the wiser sort to be of his priuy coū∣cel, without giuing the rest of the senat to vnderstand, that he would with them resolue* 1.704 of the most important and secret affaires of state, but onely to haue their aduise concer∣ning such things as were to be afterward propounded in the open assemblie of the Se∣nat. Immediatly after whose death, Tiberius the emperour requested of the Senat, to haue twentie Senators appointed him, with whome he might (as he would haue them to beleeue) consult of such things as the Senat was further to bee moued of. Whose example the wiser sort of the emperours afterwards followed; namely Galba, Traian, Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, and Alexander Seuerus: of whome Lampridius speaking, He neuer (saith he) made decree without the aduise of twentie lawyers, and diuers other of the Senators, (men of great euidently and vnderstanding in matters of state) euen to [ I] the number of fiftie, to the end there might be no fewer than were necessarie for the making of a decree of the Senat. Whereby it euidently appeareth, that in that pri∣uat Councell of fiftie Senators, with the prince, were the greatest matters dispatched; and that it was not onely to consult of that which was to be in the Senat propounded, but euen to resolue and determine of the most secret and important affaires of the state, and so by little and little to draw them from the Senat, vnto the more priuat councel of the prince. By which meanes was also prouided for another difficultie (otherwise in a Monarchie ineuitable) which is the multitude of Senators, which could not still follow the prince; vnto whome for all that his councell ought to bee alwaies assistant, [ K] especially in a Monarchie, where the prince is to visit diuers his prouinces: or is him∣selfe in person busied in his warres. For which cause and no other, the auntient diuines and poets, haue faigned Pallas alwaies to sit on the right hand of Iupiter, but not Iupi∣ter on the right hand of Pallas: to giue vs thereby to vnderstand, That the Councell ought alwaies to be present with the prince, but not the prince to bee tied to the place where the Councell is resident: which were a thing not onely not agreeable with the maiestie of a soueraigne prince, but also impossible. And albeit that there bee many things in euerie Commonweale dispatched by the priuie Councell, wherewith it is not needfull either the people or the rest of the nobilitie to be made acquainted: yet so

it is, that in a Monarchie it is expedient and requisit that the prince should himselfe vn∣derstand [ A] them: or at leastwise that euerie man should thinke that he so doth, so to giue the greater authoritie and credit vnto such things as are by the Councell decreed, and that the subiects should not complaine and say, The king vnderstandeth not hereof. And for this cause the Grand Signior of the Turkes hath alwaies a lattise or grate, opening into the Diuano, or chamber wherein his Councell sitteth, to the intent to keepe his Bassaes and them of his councell in awe; whilest they thinke him their prince alwaies to see them, and to obserue their proceedings and doings.

But it may be (may some man say) that a Commonweale may be so little, and men* 1.705 of experience in it so few in number, as that not a Senat, but euen such a priuie Councell as we spake of, cannot therein be made. In which case of so strait a Commonweale, it [ B] is not needfull to diuide the Senat apart from the priuie Councell. As in the Common∣weale of the Pharsalians (which was within most narrow bounds shut vp) there were but twentie persons which had the soueraigntie, who in that state serued for the nobi∣litie, the Senat, and priuie Councell. And yet neuerthelesse in the Lacedemonian Commonweale alwaies both before and after the conquest of Greece, there were but thirtie lords, both for the state and the Senat: and yet out of this number of thirtie, they made choice but of twelue for the mannaging of the secret affaires of their state, as we read in Xenophon: establishing the same forme of gouernment in Athens also, where they deputed thirtie lords for the gouernment of that state, as they did in all the rest of the cities of Greece, except some little ones, ouer whome Lysander placed ten [ C] chiefe men, without any other Senat or priuie Councell. And the reason was, for that they had resolued to chaunge all the popular states of Greece, into Aristocraties; which they could not haue done in the lesser townes, if they should in them haue erected a seignorie, a Senat, and a priuie Councell. But for the present there is almost no Com∣monweale, be it Popular or Aristocratique, which hath not a Senat and particular or priuat Councell: yea and oftentimes beside both them, a Triumuirat of some few, for the mannaging of the more secret affaires of state, and that especially in a Monarchy. For so Augustus the emperour (albeit that he surpassed all the rest that came after him, both in wisdome, and happinesse) beside the Senat, which he had filled with 600 Sena∣tors, [ D] * 1.706 and the priuat councell of twentie select men, had also another neerer and more inward councell of Maecenas and Agrippa, with whome he resolued of his highest af∣faires, calling vnto him none but them two after the victorie of Actium▪ to resoluè with, Whether he should still hold, or discharge himself of the empire. So Iulius Caesar, had none but Q. Pedius, and Cornelius Balbus of his most inward councell, vnto whom also he gaue his manner of writing in secret caracter, for them the better to vnderstand his secrets thereby. So Cassiodorus speaking of the secrets of princes, saith, Arduum nimis est principis meruisse secretum, Too high a thing it is (saith he) to haue deserued to be of the princes priuitie. We see in like case, that the court of the parliament of Pa∣ris,* 1.707 was the auntient Senat of the realme of Fraunce: but when it tooke pleasure in deciding of ciuill controuersies, nor could not well bee remoued from the citie; the [ E] kings appointed another councell, which for that it handled matters of greatest impor∣tance, in the time of Charles the seuenth, was called the Great Councell: which when it was also entangled with deciding of extraordinarie suits and controuersies, by the lawes of Charles the eight, and much more by the lawes of king Lewes the xij, who appointed a court of twentie judges; king Francis the elder remoued that Great Councell from medling with the secret affaires of state, hauing got vnto himselfe ano∣ther councell of certaine select princes his friends: which of the Latines is called; The Familiar Councell, and of our countrey men, The princes priuat Councell. But Fran∣cis

being dead, Henrie his sonne got another councell also: which for that it consisted [ F] of few, was called the narrow or strait Councell. But at last, when that Familiar or priuat Councell, was thought to exceed also with the multitude of Councellors, Hen∣rie the third, the sonne of Henrie ordained another Councell, which for that it was on∣ly to consult of matters concerning the state of the Commonweale, and not of suits and controuersies, was called the Councell for the State. Beside these, it was thought meet that there should also be a more secret or chamber Councell, wherein the king rising from his bed, should confirme or reiect such things as were by the Councell de∣creed: there are princes letters opened, ambassadors reported, and messages deliuered. There is also apart another Councell of the Finances instituted by Henrie the second, [ G] and by little and little taken from the auditors, wherein are assistant the intendants and secretaries of estate of the Finances, and the treasuror for the common treasure. Beside all which princes haue alwaies had a more strait Councel, of two or three of their most inward and faithfull friends; who so highly stand in the princes fauour, not so much for their youth or person, as for their wisedome and vertue. As for the chamber Coun∣cell whereof we spoke, it consisteth but of a few, and albeit that by the decree of Charles the ninth, made in Nouember, in the yere 1563, it is in the first article expressed, that so soone as the king was vp, all the princes and the councell might come into the cham∣ber, yet was not that his decree therein obserued or kept.

Which pluralitie and diuersitie of Councels in the kingdome of Fraunce, ought [ H] * 1.708 not to seeme straunge, seeing that in Spaine there be seuen, beside the strict and inward Councell, which are alwaies in diuers chambers neere vnto the king, and yet within the compasse of the same house or lodging; to the intent, that the king going from one of them to the other, may the better be enformed of his affaires: as namely the councell of Spaine, the councell of the Indies, the councell of Italie, and the councell of the Low countries, the councell for the warres, the councell for the order of Saint Iohn, and the Inquisition. Now if any man there be, that thinke the greatnesse of that kingdome (than which neuer yet was any greater) to require so many councels: I denie it not, but yet so he may see also in Venice, which hath no verie great territory, foure councels, be∣side the Senat and Great Councell: viz. the councell of the Sages for matters at sea, the councell of the Sages for matters at land, the councel of the Decemuiri, or ten men, [ I] * 1.709 and the councell of the Septemuiri, or seuen men; where the duke maketh the seuenth man, which they cal the Seignorie, when it is ioyned with the councell of the ten men, and the three presidents of the fortie, beside the Senat of sixtie; which with the magi∣strats may come to the number of six score. And what then should let, but that where there be but few men worthy to be of councell for the state, but that the Senat may be made right little, and the priuie councell lesse, and yet diuided from the Senat also. The state of the Rhagusians is but strait, & comprised almost within the same bounds, wherewith the wals of the citie are enclosed, and yet the Senat consisteth of threescore. In the citie of Nuremberg is a Senat of twentie six Senators, and a priuie councell of [ K] thirteene, beside another councell of the seuen Bourgomasters. The Canton of* 1.710 Schwits is the least of all the Cantons, and yet for all that beside the Senat of fortie fiue persons, it hath a priuie councell of seuen, of whome the Aman is chiefe. Which selfe same forme of councell is also kept in the canton of Vti. As for the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Schafluse. Basill, Soleurre, Friburg, and Lucerne, they haue alwaies be∣side the Great Councell, a little councell also. The Great Councell of Berne consi∣steth of two hundred Senators; and the little of twentie six: At Lucerne of an hun∣dred, and the little of twentie eight: At Saint Gal also the Great Councell is of sixtie six, and the little of twentie foure: At Coire the Senat is of thirtie, and the priuie

councell of fifteene. And without going so farre, it is well knowne, that the state of [ A] * 1.711 Geneua is enclosed within the compasse and circuit of a mile, yet for all that beside the councell of two hundred, it hath a Senat of sixtie; and after that a priuie councell of twentie fiue. Neither is there any canton so little, (except the three cantons of the Grisons, gouerned by the common popularitie) which hath not a priuie councell be∣side the Senat, wherein some haue three, and some haue foure. As in the canton of Ba∣fill, where the secret affaires of state are mannaged by two Bourgomasters, and two other chiefe men of their colleges, whom they call Zunfft maisters. And in like case at Berne the two Auoyers, and foure ensigne bearers, haue the ordering of all the secret businesse of their state; as hath the priuie councell in a Monarchie. And namely in the diets and assemblies of the thirteene cantons, there is none but the priuie councell of [ B] the ambassadours, which make their decrees, and direct their commissions, concerning their common affaires: I say then that it is a thing most profitable in euerie Common* 1.712 weale, to haue at the least one priuie councell beside the Senat, sith that the auntient rulers of both the Greekes and Latines haue so taught vs, reason so shewed vs, and ex∣perience therein confirmed vs.

But there is a notable difference betwixt the Senat of a popular or Aristocratique* 1.713 Commonweal, and the Senat of a Monarchie: for in them the diuises and consulta∣tions are had in the secret or priuie counsell; but the resolutions and decrees are all made in the great Counsell, or in the assemblie of the States, or of the people, if the matter be such as is to be vnto them published: whereas in a Monarchie the manner [ C] of proceeding is quite contrarie, wherein nothing is communicated or imparted to the people, or the nobilitie, but such things as seeme vnto the Senat doubtfull, or being of greater importance, are still referred vnto the priuie Counsell; and if the matter con∣cerne the soueraigntie, it is reserued vnto the iudgement of the soueraigne prince onely. And albeit that the Senat or Counsell in a Monarchie seeme to do all the rest of it selfe, yet still we see all to depend of the princes commaund. And this which we haue said concerning the manner of consultation, is almost no where better put in practise then* 1.714 in Venice: where if any difficultie arise in the counsell of the sages, it is commonly discided by ioining of the Decemuiri vnto them, (and therefore vnto such decrees as are by them made are ioined Con la Giunta) and if they cannot so agree, but still rest [ D] among themselues in opinion diuided, they call vnto them the Septemuiri or counsell of seauen: but if so nothing can be decreed for the diuersitie of opinions, the matter is then propounded in open Senat: And sometimes also (although but seldome) if the matter be of such consequence, or so much concerne the maiestie of the State, as that the authoritie of the Senat seemeth not to be thereunto sufficient, or that the Senat be thereupon diuided, it is propounded in the great counsell of all the gentlement of Ve∣nice, where it taketh the last and finall resolution; which as Aristotle writeth, was also the auncient custome of the Carthaginensians, where if the Senat could not agree, the difference was disputed, debated, and discided by the people.

Now all this differing of resoluing and determining, proceedeth from the diuersitie [ E] of the soueraigntie, and of them which haue the mannaging of the gouernment: for what the Senat decreeth in an Aristocratique, or popular Commonweal, that the no∣bilitie, or people ratifieth and commaundeth if the matter so require: contrarie to that we see to be done in a Monarchie, where the wiser the prince thinketh himselfe, the lesse he vseth the counsell of the Senat: (albeit that he oft times aske the aduise thereof, to make his doings the more acceptable, or for the easing of himselfe, committeth vnto them commissions for extraordinarie justice, or the iudgement of inextricable matters and causes of appeales) especially if the Senat be so great as that the prince by publi∣shing

of his secrets to so many persons, shall not come to the point of his designes. By [ F] * 1.715 this meane Tiberius the Emperour sought to kepe the Senat busied in disciding of great and extraordinarie causes, to make it by little and little to forget the vnderstan∣ding of matters of state. And after him Nero likewise ordeyned that the Senat should haue the hearing of Appeales which before were made vnto himselfe, and that the fine for the offence set downe by the Senat should be as great, as if he had heard the cause himselfe; By this meane making of a Senat an ordinarie court and iurisdiction of Iud∣ges: who in the time of freedome of that popular Commonweal neuer vsed to judge, except ordinarilie in conspiracies, and other such like great offences against the state: or that the people which had the hearing of many causes, had committed the vnder∣standing thereof vnto the Senat. For which cause Cicero accusing Verres saith in this [ G] sort, Quo confugient socij? quem implorabunt? ad Senatum deuenient, qui de Verre suppli∣cium sumat? non est vsitatum, non est Senatorium: Whither shall our friends and al∣lies flie? whom shall they aske help of? shall they come vnto the Senat, to take punish∣ment of Verres? it is no thing in vse, it appertaineth not vnto the Senat. Wherein ma∣ny deceiue themselues, which think that the Senat judged, when they saw that the Senatours were drawne by lot to judge of publike and criminall causes, sometimes by themselues, sometime with the knights, by the law Liuia, and afterwards with the knights and the Treasurours, by the law Aurelia: for there is great difference betwixt the bodie of the Senat, and the Senatours taken in the qualitie of judges, and betwixt the priuie Counsell, and the counsellours thereof comming into the soueraigne courts [ H] to judge. For before Nero the Senat neuer had so much as ordinarie iurisdiction or* 1.716 power to judge of any matter; And namely Augustus would not that the Senat should trouble it selfe, with the judging of the honour, or of the life of Senatours, albeit that he were thereunto importuned by his friend Moecenas. And albeit that Tyberius the emperour often times sent vnto them such causes, yet was it but extraordinarie and by way of commission; which Adrian the emperour afterward caused to passe into the forme of an ordinarie iurisdiction. We see in like case that Philip the faire, or as some others say Philip the long, to discharge himselfe of the Court of parlament, and easilie to take from it the dealing with the affaires of state, made it an ordinarie Court, giuing it iurisdiction, and a fitting place in Paris: which Court was in auntient time the Se∣nate [ I] of Fraunce, and yet at this day calleth it selfe the Court of Peeres, erected by Lewes the yong, (according to the truer opinion) to giue counsell vnto the king; as we may see by the creation of Countie D' Mascon for a Peer, by king Charles the fi•…•…t, in the yeare 1359, where it is said that the king of Fraunce ordained the twelue Peers, to giue them their counsell and aide, and tearmed it selfe, as yet it doth at this present, (by way of prerogatiue of honour) the Court of parlament (without any other addi∣tion)* 1.717 as it is to be seene in the letters which it wrote vnto the king: whereas the other Courts of later time established, vse their particular additions; As, The Parlament of Tholouse, of Roan, of Burdeaux, of Dion, of Gratianople, and Aquasexia. But in the [ K] raigne of Charles the ix, at such time time as the Court of Paris liked not of the decree of the Senat, whereby the king in the Court of Roan was by the voices of the princes declared sufficient for the gouernment of the kingdome without a Regent, according to the law of king Charles the first: the king yet vnder age, aduised the court, to meddle only with the desciding of controuersies, and the equall administration of justice: for that the king his predecessours had for that onely purpose appointed that Court, and there placed them, and not to become his tutors, or protectors of the realme, or kee∣pers of his towne of Paris: and therefore commaunded such lawes and edicts as hee had appointed to be proclaimed in the court of Paris, to be published: wherein if any

thing should be contained that seemed not to stand with right and reason, he could [ A] (as he said) be content to be thereof tould; but yet so as that after he had vnderstood the matter, if it were his pleasure to haue the law proclaimed, they should forthwith without farther reply do that they were commaunded: with which the kings edict the court was wonderfully troubled; and for that the judges were equally diuided into two opinions: the one being willing to haue the kings edict published, and the other denying the same. The Court thought good againe to aduise the king, that the court might not be enforced to allow or publish such things as should thereunto seeme vn∣reasonable or vniust. Wherewith the king displeased, caused his priuie Counsell to be called, and by the authoritie thereof a decree to bee made the xxiiij. of September, whereby the parlament of Paris was forbidden once to call in question the lawes or [ B] decrees proceeding from the king concerning matters of state: which was also before by king Francis decreed in the yeare 1528. In like case the great Counsell which was not almost employed but in affaires of state, in the raigne of Charles the seauenth, and Charles the eight, was by little and little so filled with sutes, that Charles the viij. made it an ordinarie court of seauenteene counsellours; whom Lewes the xij. made vp xx. beside the Chauncelour, who was President thereof, (in such sort, that vnder king Francis there was but a President in steed of a Chauncelour) who were not imploied but in hearing of extraordinarie causes by way of commission, or remitting of the pri∣uie* 1.718 counsell, and ordinarily the appeales of the Prouost of the houshold. We se also the priuie Counsell it selfe to be as it were brought into the forme of an ordinary court, [ C] by heating the differences betwixt the Townes and the Parlaments, and oft times be∣twixt particular men, euen for small matters: to the end that such a great companie of the nobilitie, and men of marke, should be busied with some thing, hauing as it were lost the vnderstanding of the affaires of state, which can neuer sort to good end, if they be communicated to so many persons: where the wiser sort are commonly ouer ruled by the greater part, ioining hereunto also, that it is impossible, to keepe the counsell* 1.719 of the state secret: or to know in such a multitude who it is that discouereth the same, nor to cast them out who are holden for suspect: Except by vsing the custome of the auntient Athenians, by vertue whereof the Senatours by a secret iudgement which [ D] they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 might with all libertie, and without displeasure con∣demne the blabbing Senator, or him that had defiled the honour of his estate. As in like case the Roman Censors without forme or fashion of processe, had accustomed to remoue the vnworthie Senators, and by that meanes to exclude them out of the Se∣nat; except they would put themselues vpon their triall before the judges which were aboue the Censors, or that the people had giuen some new office, or honorable charge to him that was so remoued by the Censors, or condemned by the judges. But the Romans were much to blame, both for too easie receiuing and remouing of the Se∣natours, and that in too great number: For Fabius Buteo made Dictator to supply the defect of the Senat, at one time receiued in an 177 Senatours. Whereas Lentulus and Gellius Censors at one dash remoued 64. Howbeit, it were more seemly and agreeing [ E] with the dignitie and honour of a Senat to receiue into it few, and them also chosen and culled out as pearles; than to exalt vnto so high degree of honour men worthie* 1.720 and vnworthie, and afterwards to cast them downe againe with eternall infamie and dishonour, vnto whom they had before giuen their helping hands: Besides that it can∣not alwaies be done without danger and sedition, or the dishonour of him that ruleth. It is foure hundred yeare since that the Priuie Counsell of England, at the instance and •…•…ute of the Archbishop of Canterburie (then Chauncelour) established, there were there into but fifteene persons then chosen; neither hath it euer since passed the num∣ber

of twentie; and yet by meanes of that little Counsell they haue retained their state [ F] most faire and florishing in times both of peace and warre, as is by their histories to be seene; and by the treatie of peace made betwixt Lewes the ix, and Henry the first, king of England; which for the more assurance thereof was sworne by the Prince and the xvij priuie Counsellors: viz. one Archbishop, one Chauncelor, one Bishop, six Earls, and six other Lords, with the great Treasurour, and a magistrat whom they call chiefe Iustice of England. Now I doubt not but that in euery Commonweale, many by vaine ambition, fauour, impudency, or corrupt briberie, in sort euen against the Prince and peoples will find meanes to enter into the sacred Senat; against which in∣conuenience remedie might be well prouided, if we would but vse Solons law. For he would haue none to bee admitted into the Senat of the Areopagits, but such as had [ G] without touch, by all the degrees of honour ascended vnto the highest places and pre∣ferments of the Commonweale: for so he deemed him to be well able to hold a place in the Senat without staggering or falling, that could hold himselfe vpright in such dangerous and slipperie wayes. And that is it for which all the auntients both Greeks and Latins, haue so highly commended the Senat of the Areopagits, composed of sixtie persons, as we read in Athens. The same manner is yet vsed among the fiue lesser cantons of the mountaine Swissers, that they which haue passed through all the honourabre estates should continue Senators for euer: but this is not the way to haue good resolution, and yet lesse to keepe the affaires of state in secret, in that the Sena∣tors of the little cantons, which are fortie fiue in Zug, and an hundred sixtie foure in [ H] Appenzel, and more or lesse in the others, when question is of matters of importance, may euerie one of them bring with him into the councell two or three of the citisens, such as he liketh best of. Whereby it commeth to passe, that sometime there are foure or fiue hundred, part Senators, part others, assembled together into the Senat, and yet all haue deliberatiue voices therein. Whereas multitude is euer an enemie, vnto wise resolutions.

And thus much concerning the number of Councellors of estate: let vs now also breefly speake of them that are to propound matters in the Senat; and then of such* 1.721 things as are there also to bee propounded. As touching the first, men of auntient time haue alwaies had great regard vnto the qualitie of them which were to propound [ I] any thing in the Senat. For we see that to haue bene the proper charge of the grea∣test magistrats in Rome, whome for that cause they called Consuls: or in their absence the greatest magistrat that was in Rome (to wit, the Praetor of the citie) supplied the place of the Consull: receiuing the particular requests both of the citisens and straun∣gers, of ambassadours from forren princes, and allies letters from the gouernours of their prouinces: which letters he read in the Senat, asked euerie mans opinion, com∣maunded the decrees of the Senat to be written, & also dismissed the Senat. Amongst the Grecians the greatest Praetor executed the same office▪ who among the Athenians was called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; & the rest as they were created in some places 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 [ K] 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who bare almost the same office that do the prouiditors in the cōmonwealth of Rhaguse, & the sages in the state of Venice: howbeit that there the three Auogadors ordinarily propounded vnto the senat, that wherof it is to consult. In the councel of the Greeks the president caused to be cried aloud by a sergeant, That if there were any per∣son that had any thing to say concerning the good of the state, he should speake: which Titus Liuius speaking of the Achaeans affirmeth generally of all the Greeks. But as for* 1.722 the Aetolians, their custome was most notable, worthy to be of all men regarded, being highly commended and approued by Philipemen generall of the Achaean league; which was, that the presiden•…•…, or hee which in full councell propounded any thing

which seemed vnto himselfe good, should therein haue no voice himselfe. A great [ A] meanes to take away the practises and couert traines, which are commonly made in Popular and Aristocratique estates, where the busiest heads easily draw others to their opinions. Howbeit I cannot commend the fashion and custome of them of Genes,* 1.723 where none but the duke alone hath power to propound in the Senat that which plea∣seth himselfe. For beside the difficultie of speaking with the duke on euerie side beset, and troubled with infinit affaires, and to lay before his eyes a thousand diuers reasons for the debating of the matter in the councell: it is also daungerous to giue so great au∣thoritie to one person, that he may open or keepe secret to or from the Senat, whatso∣euer himselfe pleaseth; it being not lawfull for any man to propound any matter but himselfe. It is also much perilous one citisen, who first deliuereth his opinion to be of [ B] such authoritie and power, as that the rest which are to speake after him, dare not freely say what indeed they thinke. And that is it for which it is wisely prouided in the realm* 1.724 of Fraunce, that it is permitted to all them which haue accesse into the councell (al∣though they therin haue neither deliberatiue voice nor place) euerie man to propound his owne requests, & to aduertise the councell of that which is profitable for the Com∣monweale; to the end it may be the better prouided for. And oftentimes their opini∣on is also thereof demanded, and then afterward the aduise of the councellors of the estate, which in councell haue place and deliberatiue voice, in such sort and order, as that the great lords deliuer their opinions last; to the end, that the libertie of the lesser should not be impaired by the authoritie of the greater princes or magistrats, and espe∣cially [ C] by the power of ambitious and factious men, who cannot in any case abide to be contradicted. In which course they which haue onely voyces consultatiue, make way for them which haue voyces deliberatiue: and oftentimes broach vnto the councell good and liuely reasons: and where they in any thing erre, they are without ie lousie againe by the others brought into the right. Which is a custome much more com∣mendable than that of the Romans, where the Consull first demaunded the opinion of the chiefe man in the Senat, or els of him that was appointed Consull for the yeare following. And yet neuerthelesse the contrarie was vsed before the people: for first the particular men deliuered their opinions, and after them the lesser magistrats, and [ D] last of all the greatest, to the intent that the libertie of the lesser should not be preuented by the authoritie of the greater. Ioyne hereunto also, that the ambition to speake first doth oftentimes draw after it the enuie of some, and the ielousie of others. So wee see the cruell emperours to discharge vpon the Senat, the discontentment that the people had of their cruelties, caused such things as they would haue done to bee propounded or red in the Senat: which to gainesay or seeme to dislike of was death. Which was not to demaund the aduise of the Senat, but indeed most imperiously to command the same. Where of an auntient Senator complaining saith, Vidimus curtam elinguem, in* 1.725 qua dicere quod velles periculosum: quod nolles miserum esset, We haue seene (saith hee) the court dombe, wherin to speake that thou wouldest was daungerous; and to say that thou wouldest not, was a thing right miserable: For that the emperor Dometian, (vnus [ E] solus censebat quod omnes sequerentur) alone decreed what all men should follow: and commendeth Traian (quod eo rogante, sententias libere dicere liceret, vinceretque senten∣tia non prima, sed melior) for that he propounding of matters, euerie man might freely speake his mind: and that opinion preuailed not which was first, but best. By the cu∣stome of the auntient Hebrewes, the king refrained from comming into the Senat, least any should bee contrarie vnto him, or hee to any; for so they writ in their Com∣mentaries.

It were also to be wished, that the Councell should sit in the morning yet fasting,

for that is not to be holden for a councell well disgested, which is done after dinner, as [ F] * 1.726 saith Philip de Commines, and especially in countries where the people are subiect vnto wine. Salomon detesteth those princes, who when they ought in the morning to feed their mind with religious contemplation of high and diuine matters, doe with full fee∣ding pamper the inordinat desire of their languishing & broken lust, & with new nou∣rishment kindle the fire of new desires: Which he in three words declareth, Wo (saith he) vnto princes which cate early. Which is a thing so much the more to be detested, by how much many thinke it to be the greatest brauerie, to bee well whitled with wine. For what can be more beastly than was the old maner of the Germans, who neuer vsed to consult of their greatest affaires but in middest of their cups persuaded so that euery one of them warme with wine, should discouer the verie secret of his hart, and to be the [ G] more eloquent to persuade what they thought to bee most expedient. Which cu∣stome they haue now well changed, insomuch that euen their priuat and domesticall contracts made when they are in drink, are to none effect or purpose, it being alone a* 1.727 sufficient cause for the iudge to reuoke them being so made. Now as concerning such things as are to be consulted of in the Senat, they depend of such occasions & affairs, as in course of time present themselues. The antient Romans first consulted of matters concerning their religion, as the marke and end wherat all humane actions ought both to begin and end. There was neuer also, saith Polybius (he himselfe being an Atheist) a people more deuout than this: adioining therunto moreouer, That by meanes of reli∣gion they had established vnto themselues the greatest monarchy in the world. Then [ H] after matters of religion, and worship of the immortall gods, are to be entreated of the greatest and most vrgent affaires of state, and most concerning the Commonweale, as the making of peace or war: in both which, long delay is no lesse dangerous, than is too* 1.728 hastie resolution. In which case, as in all things doubtful, the antients had a rule which suffered no great exception, which was, That we ought not to do, neither to councell any thing to be done, wherof we doubt whether it be iust or iniust, profitable or hurt∣full; or if the harme that may ensue bee greater than the profit that may come of the enterprise that is to be taken in hand: but if the harme be euident, & the profit doubtful, or contrariwise, there is then no deliberation to be had or doubt made which to chuse. [ I] But the doubt is greater, when as that which we are to consult of, hath in show moe & greater profits, if we can bring it to good effect, than it hath hurt if wee faile therein. Howbeit the more wholsome opinion of the antients is to bee preferred, viz. That when question is of matters of estate, things doubtfull, or subiect to the change of for∣tune,* 1.729 are not at al to be embraced. And therfore the subtiller sort, cause thē that be more simple, to propound and persuade in councell such things as seeme vnto themselues doubtfull; to the intent that so the blame may rest vpon them, if things fall out euill: & yet the honor redound vnto themselues if it fall out wel. Howbeit nothing ought to be* 1.730 thought commendable and well done, which dependeth of the euent. For it behoueth vs by most certaine arguments and reasons to show wherfore this or that is to be done, [ K] and not by the euent: yea it behoueth a wise man rather to feare vnfortunat euents, than to presume of happie successe. And therfore a wise councellor neuer resteth him∣selfe vpon the chances of fawning fortune, or vpon aduentures, but still forceth himselfe by good and wise discourse to gather the true effects of precedent causes: albeit that hee oft times see, the most aduenturous and rash, to be the most happie & fortu∣nat in their attempts. And therefore the antient diuines (who couered wisedome in fa∣bles) doubted not to exclude that goddesse whom they called Fortune, out of the coū∣cell of the gods; least that which should be sought for by wisedome, should seeme to haue bene obtained by the rashnesse of fickle fortune. And yet for all that wee see no∣thing

to be more cōmended or blamed, than the good or euil end of mens actions: and [ A] so wisdome measured by the foot of fortune. But if the law condemne the souldior that •…•…ighteth with the enemie without the commaundement of his captaine, although hee carrie away the victorie; how much more dangerous ought it to be, to put the hope of councels, & state of the Commonweal in the vncertaine hope of fortune? Besides that, such continuall aduentures do oftentimes draw after them the ruine of aduenturous princes. And therefore to auoid that nothing should be rashly or vnaduisedly decreed in the councel, I like well the aduise of sir Thomas Moore, To propound the day before what was in the Senat to be resolued on the day following; to the end that such delibe∣rations might the better be disgested: prouided for al that, That question be not of the particular interest of any of them which haue voice in the councell: for in that case it is [ B] much better to resolue vpon the matter the same day, & without delay, than to attend vntil the sound iudgement of some be preuented by the subtilties of others, & that men come prepared with long traines of reasons, to reuerse that which ought of right to be concluded. For as the truth, the more naked and simple it is produced, the fairer it is; so is it most certaine, that they which disguise it by figures or colours of Rethorique, take from it the lustre and naturall beautie thereof: a thing which a man ought aboue all things in matters of councell to shun. True it is, that to vse oloquence, in the assemblies of the people, and with the sweetnes of speech to delight the ears of the ignorant multi∣tude, or with faire words to blind their eies, or with pleasing reasons to turne their minds from rage and furie to peace and quietnes, is a thing not onely commendable, [ C] but necessary also. But al these things are far to be remoued from a Senat or councell, if aduise be to be sought for or required of such Senators as we haue spoken of, that is to say of wise men. And the Lacedemonian breuitie full of good reasons, is to be vsed, that they all may haue time to speake: & that no orator hauing got the possession of spea∣king, shold with long discourse or speech exclude the best & wisest of the senators. And therefore by an old decree of the Areopagits, it was not lawfull in that graue councell, to vse either any induction or after-speech. As for the deliuering of their opinions by secret suffrages, as amongst the Venetians; or by changing of places, as amongst the Romans, I cannot greatly commend of either, but especially if the matter in consulta∣tion [ D] consist of many points, of which some are to be liked of, and othersome to be reie∣cted: so that it is necessarie to propound euerie article or point apart, which the Latins terme diuidere sententiam, and so to cause the Senators to passe & repasse from one side to another. Into which difficulties the Venetians falling, are oftentimes constrained to leaue their secret voices giuen by lots, and to giue the same by word of mouth; which they vse to do, when question is of the life, fame, or fortune of any man, according to the maner of the antient Greeks & Romans; a thing which cannot by secret voices, by lot, without iniustice be done, for the infinit varietie of cases which may present themselues to be iudged vpon. Now as the Senat of a Commonweale is not bound to the cer∣taine* 1.731 hearing and deciding of causes, so ought it not to trouble it selfe with intermedling with the iurisdiction of the magistrats, except it be in the controuersies of the greatest [ E] magistrats, or soueraigne courts among themselues. And for this cause Tiberius the em∣perour, in the beginning of his raigne protested in the Senat, That he would not alter any thing in the course of iustice, neither haue to do with the iurisdiction of the ordina∣rie magistrats. And they which make a confusion of a Senat & priuie councel, do great∣ly diminish the dignitie & honor therof, for that it ought to be regarded as to confirme the princes actions, & wholly to attend the publike affairs: worke enough to busie a se∣nat, except it be when question is of the life or honour of the greatest lords and princes, or of the punishment of cities, or other such causes of like consequence and impor∣tance,

as may well deserue the assemblie of the Senat; as in auntient time the Roman [ F] Senat, by commission from the people, had the hearing of the treasons and conspira∣cies of their allies, against the state, as we see in * 1.732 Liuie.

Yet resteth the last point of our definition, that is to say, that the Senat is established* 1.733 to giue aduise and councell to them which haue the soueraigntie in euerie Common∣weale. To giue aduise (I say) and councell; for that the Senat in a well ordered Com∣monweale, ought not to haue power to commaund, nor to direct out their mandats, neither to put into execution their aduises and consultations, but onely to make report thereof vnto them which haue the soueraigntie. Now if a man should aske, Whether there be any Commonweale wherein the Senat hath such power? It is a question but of fact: but if demaund were made, whether of right it ought so to haue or not? our [ G] opinion is, that in a well ordered Commonweale it is in no wise to be suffered: for that it cannot be without impeaching of the soueraigntie, and that much lesse in a Monar∣chie, than in an Aristocratie, or a Popular estate. And in that the maiestie of a soue∣raigne prince is knowne, in that he can, and his wisedome, in that he knoweth to weigh and iudge the aduise of his councell, and so conclude according to the resolution of the wiser part, and not of the greater.

Now if any man thinke it straunge or inconuenient for all other magistrats and so∣ueraigne* 1.734 courts, to haue power to commaund, in their owne names to direct out their commissions, and the Senat that iudgeth of their authoritie and controuersies, to be de∣priued of this power: let him consider that vnto such magistrats and courts, power is [ H] giuen them euen by their institution, election, and creation, and by the charters and grants vnto them made for the limiting of their charge and power, without which neither martiall nor ciuill or domesticall affaires can well be gouerned: whereas there was neuer Senat in any auntient well ordered Commonweale, which had any pow∣er to commaund by vertue of the institution thereof. So we see, that in the kingdoms of Fraunce, Spaine, and England, the priuie councell is not erected or instituted in forme of a bodie politique or colledge; neither to haue power by the election or or∣daining thereof, to order or commaund any thing, so as is necessarie for all magistrats, as we shall hereafter declare. And as for that that some will say, That the priuie coun∣cell [ I] may disanull and reuerse the iudgements and decrees of the magistrats and soue∣raigne courts: and so conclude, that it is not without great authoritie and power: mine answere is, that the decrees of the councell depend not in any thing of the coun∣cell it selfe; but of the royall power, and by commission onely, in qualitie of extraordi∣narie iudges for the execution of iustice, besides that the commission and authoritie of the priuie councell is alwayes ioyned with the person of the king. And therefore we see in a Monarchie all the decrees of the priuie councell to carrie these words with them, By the king in his priuie councell: which can do nothing if the king bee not present or at leastwise confirme the acts of his councell. But wee haue before shewed the power of all magistrats and corporations to cease, and bee suspended in the presence of the [ K] prince. Now if the power of the Senat be nothing in the absence of the prince, and much lesse in his presence, where then is the Senats power? And if the Senat cannot of it selfe decide and determine a controuersie; how can it then dispose of such things as belong vnto the state of the Commonweale? and that is it wherfore we see such things as are decreed vpon by the Senat, to be still referred vnto the prince: or if they bee of lesse importance, yet to be still confirmed with the princes authoritie, hand, and seale. Which is no new matter, but of auntient time done. For we see an old charter ma∣king mention of one Endobalde, countie of the Pallace of king Clotoire, who sitting in councell with the Senat, was to report the decrees thereof vnto the king, to the end to

haue them by him either approued or reiected. [ A]

But the doubt is greater, whether the Senat in a Popular or Aristocratique estate* 1.735 ought to haue more power than in a Monarthie, or not? considering the great diffe∣rence there is betwixt one lord and many, or betwixt one prince the soueraigne com∣maunder of his people; and an infinit number of men; as in a Popular estate. Besides that, we read also, that in the Roman Commonweale (which is holden to haue beene one of the most flourishing and best ordered that euer was) the Senat had power to di∣spose of the common treasure, and publike reuenue (one of the greatest points of soue∣raigntie) to appoint lieutenants and gouernours of princes, to grant triumphs, and to dispose of religion. And for this cause Tertullian saith, That neuer any God was recei∣ued in Rome, without the decree of the Senat. And as for ambassadours of kings and [ B] people, none but the Senat receiued and dismissed them. And that which more is, it was forbidden vpon paine of treason, to present any request vnto the people, without the aduise of the Senat before had, as we haue before declared. Which was not onely in Rome obserued, but also in all the Graecian Commonweales. For offending wher∣in Thrasibulus was in Athens accused of treason, as was afterwards also Androtian by* 1.736 Demosthenes. Which order is euen at this time better obserued and kept at Venice, than euer it was in Rome or Greece. And yet notwithstanding all this I say, that the Senat of the Popular or Aristocratique estates ought not to haue but the aduise and consultation of matters of state onely, the power still depending of them, which had the soueraigntie. And as for that which is said of the power of the Roman Senat, that [ C] which it had, was nothing else but dignitie, authoritie, councel, and not power: for that* 1.737 the people of Rome might when it saw good confirme o•…•… repeale the decrees of the Senat, which had no power to commaund, and much lesse to execute the decrees ther∣of; Dionysius Halycarnassaeus hath well noted, and Liuie himselfe oft times vsing this forme of speech, Senatus decreuit, populus iussit, The Senat decreed, and the people commanded. Wherein Festus Pompeius is deceiued, interpreting the word iussit, com∣maunded, for decreuit, or decreed. So that it belonged to the Senat to decree, and to the people to commaund. As when Liuie speaking of the authoritie of Scipio Africa∣nus, saith, Nutus eius pro decretis patrum, pro populi iussis esse, His beck was in stead of the Senators decrees, and the peoples commaunds. And that the least Tribune of the peo∣ple, [ D] opposing himselfe against the Senat, might stay all the decrees thereof. I haue here before noted certaine places out of Titus Liuius: whereby it euidently appeareth, that the Senat could in nothing commaund: and especiall by the decree where it is said, That the Consull if he should thinke it so good, should present the request vnto the people, for the making of a dictator: and if it pleased not the Consull, then the Prae∣tor of the citie should take that charge vpon him: who if he would therin do nothing, that then one of the Tribunes should do it. The Consuls (saith Liuie) would therein doe nothing, and forbad the Praetor also to obey the Senat: Now had the Senat had so much power to commaund, as had the Consull, or one of the Tribunes of the peo∣ple, it would neuer haue vsed such kind of speech; neither would the Consul haue for∣bidden [ E] the Praetor to obey the Senat. For indeed the Senat could not commaund the Praetors, but vsed these or like words, If it should so seeme vnto them good; or if so it were their pleasure. So the same man in another place saith, Decreuerunt patres vt Mar∣cus Iunius Praetor vrbanus si ei videretur, Decemuiros agro Samniti, Appuloque, quoad eius publicum erat metiendo, deuidendoque crearet, The Senators decreed, that Marcus Iunius, Praetor of the citie, if he should thinke it so good, should appoint ten men for the measuring and diuiding of so much of the Samnite and Appulian land, as belonged to the Commonweale.

Now if any man should say that these words, Si ei videretur (if it should so seeme [ F] vnto him good) imported a commaund: the contrarie is proued in that, that Liuie speaking of the punishment of the Campanians, saith, That the Consull Fuluius ha∣uing red the decree of the Senat which caried these words: Integram rem ad Senatum reijceret si ei videretur: interpretatum esse, quid magis è Republica duceret, aestimatio∣nem sibi permissam: That he should, if he thought it so good, referre the whole matter vnto the Senat: to haue so interpreted the decree, as if the matter had beene commit∣ted to his discretion, to deeme what he should think best and most expedient therein to doe for the Commonweale: at which time question was of the liues and goods of all the Campanians, part of whom the Consull of himselfe without farther authoritie from the Senat caused to be put to death, and the rest to be sold by the drume. But that [ G] the dignitie of the Magistrats was in the Roman Commonweale greater than the Se∣nats, it appeareth by that, that such as writ letters vnto the Senat and people of Rome,* 1.738 if they therein comprehended the Magistrats also, they still placed them in order be∣fore the Senat; as is manifest by the inscription of their letters, in this sort; Cn. Plancus Imp. Cos. desig. S. P. D. Coss. Pret. Tribb. pleb. Senatui, Populo, plebiquè Romano: Cn. Plancus Generall, Consull elect, vnto the Consuls, Pretors, Tribunes of the people, the Senat, People, and Comminaltie of Rome sendeth greeting. Wherefore Cicero doth but orator like taunt Vatinius, when he saith, Art not thou a most certein murthe∣rer of thy countrey? thou leftest not vnto the Senat, that which neuer man tooke from it; that Legates should be appointed by the authoritie of that order. And he in * Liuie [ H] * 1.739 when as he speaketh of Triumphes, saying, It was neuer before by the people deter∣mined of triumphes, the estimation and bestowing of that honour hauing alwayes beene with the Senat: no not the kings themselues to haue impaired the maiestie of that order: he speaketh (I say) but like an orator: for that there was nothing which might not be taken from the Senat, the magistrat propounding a request to the con∣tratie vnto the people: as we haue by examples before declared. But how soeuer the Senat for the maintenance of the authoritie thereof made decrees, yet could it not commaund or put in execution any of those things that were by it decreed: neither had it so much as any Lictors or Sergeants, the true markes of them which haue power to [ I] commaund. But the Magistrats hauing the decrees of the Senat in their hand, directed their owne mandats and commissions for the execution thereof, if they thought it so good: assuring themselues to be out of blame in doing that the Senat had before de∣creed, it being alwaies readie to maintaine them in so doing: So the Senat being no way able to restraine Caesar, tooke their refuge to that auntient decree of the Senat, which was commonly made but in the dangerous times of the Commonweale, viz. Videant Consules ac caeteri Magistratus ne quid detrimenti capiat Respublica: Let the Consuls and other magistrats foresee that the Commonweale take no harme: with which decree of the Senat (saith Caesar) the Consuls armed, sodenly raised their power and took vp armes against Caesar: by which words it appeareth, authoritie to haue [ K] beene in the Senat, but the chiefe commaund in the Magistrats. But if any Tribune* 1.740 of the people once opposed himselfe against the decree of the Senat, not onely the au∣thoritie of the Senat, but of the Consuls and other magistrats also ceased. And for that cause there were ordinarily some of the Tribunes at the gate of the Senat, (before that the law Atinia gaue them entrance into the Senat house) vnto whom the decrees of the Senat were brought and showed, for them to confirme by writing ouer them this letter T, or reiect by putting thereunto this word Veto, that is to say, I forbid it. So that the Senat did nothing but by sufferance of the people, or of the Tribunes, who were as it were espials of the Senat, and keepers of the libertie of the people, hauing

alwaies free power to take exception to whatsoeuer was decreed, if the people by ex∣presse [ A] law tooke it not from them, permitting the whole disciding of the matter pro∣pounded, vnto the Senat, without the interruption of the Tribunes. As it did at the request of Tiberius Graccus Tribune of the people, giuing leaue vnto the Senat for that yeare to dispose of the Consularie prouinces, with expresse prohibition vnto the Tri∣bunes for the opposing of themselues, for that time onely. For after that time the peo∣ple oft times gaue the prouinces and gouernments, without the aduise or authoritie of the Senat. Now to say that the Senat had the disposing of the common treasure, true it is, but that was but vpon sufferance, and so long as it pleased the people; as we may see by the law Sempronia, whereby the people decreed that the souldiours should be apparelled of the charge of the common treasure. And he that hath no power but by [ B] sufferance, and by way of intreatie hath no power at all, as we haue before said. So in like case we see the Auogadours or Triumuiri in the Venetian state often times to op∣pose themselues, not onely against the proceedings of the Sages and Decemuiri, but euen of the Senat also, and so cause the matter to be brought vnto the hearing of the graund Counsell.

But here againe a man may say, that if the Senat in bodie or lawfull assemblie had* 1.741 no power to command, there was then no difference betwixt the decrees of the Senat, and that which they call The authoritie: for so it was that if there were lesse then foure hundred Senatours, by the decree of Augustus, (who were afterward brought to the number of fiftie) that they agreed vpon, was called an Authoritie, but not a Decree [ C] of the Senat. As also we may see by the law Cornelia, published at the request of a Tribune of the people: whereby it was forbidden the Senat any more to graunt priui∣leges or dispensations, except there were two hundred Senatours at the least present. Whereby it is to be gathered, that the Senat in such number had power to com∣maund: whereunto I say that a decree in the nature of it selfe carrieth with it no com∣maund, no more then the sentence of the judge, if the commission be not on foor. Now the Senat neuer iudged or determined, neither could giue out any commission or mandate; and therefore neuer had the power to commaund their decrees to be put in execution, without the power and authoritie of the magistrats still being of none effect. And yet whatsoeuer decree the Senat had made, and were it neuer so well by [ D] the power of the magistrat confirmed; was but annuall as Dionysius Halicarnasseus hath well written; and not perpetuall as Conan supposeth.

But how then (might some man say) did the Senat cause three hundred souldiours citisens of Rome, which remayned of the Legion that had sacked Rhegium in Sicilie where they were left in garrison, to be led away, and being stript and beaten, to be all afterward beheaded before the people, without any regard had vnto the opposition of the Tribunes, or appeales of the condemned, most miserably crying out, the sacred lawes to be therein broken and troden vnder foot. But herein question was of militarie discipline, which in that respect hath nothing common with domesticall lawes and* 1.742 customes. Beside that it was done but by the aduise of the Senat, the execution thereof [ E] being performed by the magistrats, who were not bound to obey the Senat, if they had not beene thereunto willing. Yea moreouer such was the crueltie and horriblenes of the villanie by the garrison souldiours committed at Rhegium, who themselues most cruelly rifled the citie, which they ought with their blood to haue defended a∣gainst the assaults of the enemie: as that it caused all the ordinarie power of the lawes to cease: no punishment being thought sufficient to reuenge the same. Which cases when they chaunced, the tittles and querks of lawes were little at all regarded, espe∣cially in the midest of such a noise of weapons. But as oft as the Senat or Consuls

attempted to infringe the soueraigntie of the people, or to breake the laws, as oft times [ F] they did the Tribunes, were straight waies readie to oppose themselues against them. For in that Caius Cornelius Tribune of the people, made a request vnto the people, that the Senat from that time forward, should not decree any thing against the libertie of the people, and the maiestie thereof: it sufficiently declareth the Senat oft times before contrarie vnto the law, to haue vsurped the rights of soueraigntie: howbeit therein is not to be respected what was done, but what of right ought to haue bene done. How∣beit it is manifest, that the Senat in the latter times thereof had power to make lawes: but then it had left off to be a Senat, and was then become rather an ordinarie court of judges. And yet the magistrats themselues, as the Praetors, the Aediles, yea and the fa∣mous lawyers also made a great part of the Roman law, albeit that they had no power [ G] to commaund at all: but all this dependeth fo the good liking of the prince or people, without whose authoritie and commaund, the force of the law, edict, or decree made, was nothing. Seeing then that the Senat in a Popular estate hath no ordinarie power to commaund, nor to do any thing but by sufferance; much lesse power shall it haue in an Aristocratique estate, or in a Monarchie: and so much the lesse in a Monarchie by how much kings are more ielouse of their estates, than are the people, and better know than they, how to defend their owne soueraigntie.

But whereas we said, It was not lawfull without the priuitie of the Senat, to pro∣pound any request vnto people, that indeed was so prouided by the law Popilia and Hortensia: yet was it lawfull alwaies without the priuitie of the Senat, to propound [ H] requests vnto the Comminaltie: and although that by the Consularie law Cornelia, it was also forbidden without the priuitie of the Senat, to propunnd any request vnto the Comminaltie, yet was that law shortly after againe by the law Pompeia repealed and abrogated. Wherein many with great libertie abuse the words Populi ac Plebis Romanae, (the People and Comminaltie of Rome) and especially the Greekes, and such as ignorant of the Roman antiquitie, interpret the Greeke writers.

That is also worth the noting, that albeit that the request which the magistrats were about to propound vnto the people, were disliked of the Senat, yet might they neuer∣thelesse lawfully moue the same vnto the people, after they had once made the Senat acquainted therewith. The same may serue also for an aunswere to that which Iose∣phus [ I] the historiographer saith, That Moyses forbad the king to denie any thing con∣cerning the publike, without the aduise of the Senat, and the high priest (howbeit that this article is not to be found in all the law) yet thereof it followeth not, that the king was thereby of necessitie bound to follow their aduise. For albeit that the Roman emperours terme themselues the principall Senators, or chiefe of their councell; yet* 1.743 such additions in nothing diminished their maiestie. Yea albeit that they called the Senators their companions, or good lords and maisters; as did Tiberius, who in the beginning of his raigne called the Senators, Indulgentissimos dominos, His most louing Lords, as we read in Tacitus. But how much princes gaue vnto the Senat, and the Se∣nat [ K] vnto princes, Plinie the younger doth in two words (as it were) declare; where hee thus speaketh of a certaine decree of the Senat, Voluntati tamen principis sui, cui in nulla re fas putaret repugnare, in hac quoque re obsequi, but to obey the will of their prince, whereunto they thought it not lawfull in any thing to resist, euen so in this this thing also to show themselues obedient.

And further also, the Senators or Councellors of the estate, to speake properly are no where accounted either as officers or commissioners: neither in * 1.744 this realme are they by any law, or edict, or charter of the kings made councellors, but only by a short briefe without any seale, signed with the kings hand, expressing in few words, that the

king during his pleasure giueth them place and deliberatiue voice in his councell. But [ A] the king being dead, they must haue another such briefe for the holding of their places, except such as for their calling, or the charge they haue in the Commonweale, haue ac∣cesse and entrance into the councell.

Now if any man aske, Why a Senat in a well ordered Commonweale, should not* 1.745 haue also power to commaund? The principall reason is, for that if it should haue pow∣er to commaund also what it had in councell decreed, the soueraigntie should rest only in the councell: and so the councellors of the estate, in stead of councellors should ther of become maisters, hauing the mannaging of the affaires, and power to dispose of all at their pleasure; a thing impossible to be done, without the impairing, or to say better the vtter subuersion of all soueraigntie and maiestie: which is so high and so sacred, as [ B] that it belongeth not vnto subiects, of what estate or condition soeuer, once to touch it either nie, or a farre off. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, them that giue commaund vnto a Senat, to go about the destruction of the Commonweale, and vtter ruine of the state. And for this cause the Great Councell of Venice (wherein the maiestie of their state consisteth) seeing the Decemuiri to take vpon them aboue that which was com∣mitted to their charge, forbad them vpon pain of high treason to commaund or deter∣mine of any thing concerning the state, nor so much as to write their definitiue letters; but to haue therein recourse vnto the Seignorie, vntill the Grand Councel were assem∣bled. For which selfe same reason, and that moe of the citisens also might be partakers of that honour, hey haue decred, That the six councellors of estate, assistants vnto the [ C] duke, shall not be but two moneths in that so honourable a charge: to the end that the custome to commaund should not breed in them a desire still to continue the same,* 1.746 as also to aspire higher. Howbeit I am not of opinion so to haue the councellours of estate changed and rechanged; but rather to haue them perpetuall, as they were of an∣tient time at Rome, Lacedemonia and Pharsalia, and yet are in Polonia and Geneua. For the yearely chaunging which they made in Athens, and yet make in Venice, Rha∣gusium, Luques, Genes, Nuremberg, and diuers other townes of Germanie, doth not onely greatly obscure the glorie of the Senat, which ought to shine as the sunne, but also draweth after it the ineuitable daunger of disclosing and publishing of the secrets of [ D] the estate: ioining hereunto also, That the Senat, all new, cannot bee enformed of af∣faires passed, neither yet well continue the entertainment of the affaires present. Which for that it seemed vnto the Florentines a thing verie daungerous, they at the request of Peter Soderin their Gonfalonier (and a chiefe man in the reforming of their estate) de∣creed, That all the Senat of fourescore, should from six moneths to six moneths bee re∣moued; excepting such as had before bene Gonfaloniers or chiefe officers in the Commonweale, whome they appointed perpetuall Senators, of purpose to instruct the other new Senators in the affaires of state. The same order they of Genes are faine also to take in their mutable common Senat, wherein such as haue bene dukes and Syndics are perpetuall Senators. Wherein the Rhagusians are better prouided of their Senat than are the Venetians, whose example they seeme to haue followed in the [ E] forming of their Commonweale: For in Venice the Senat changeth euery yeare all at once: but in Rhaguse the Senators which are also but one yeare in charge, change still one after another, and not all in one yeare. But if the desire of honour bee so great, as that the citisens cannot otherwise be satisfied, except they all by turnes may haue place in the Senat, we must then imitat that which Solon did; who in the Popular estate of the Athenians by him framed, appointed a mutable▪ Senat of foure hundred citisens euery yeare to be changed: but withall hee made a perpetuall priuie Councell of the Areopagits, to the intent, that that mutable Senat, and yearely change of all the other

magistrats might thereupon rest, as vpon a most firme and sure stay. And thus hauing [ F] spoken of a Senat, order requireth that we should also speake of the Officers and Com∣missioners in a Commonweale.

CHAP. II. ¶ Of the Officers and Commissioners in a Commonweale.

AS in the whole bodie of the law concerning Commonweales, are contained many things right fruitfull and commodious: so also amongst the rest, the reasoning and discourse concerning publike persons, hath alwayes bene thought most profitable: and albeit [ G] that many things concerning magistrats are thought common and vsuall, yet lie the same for most part almost wrapped vp in obscuritie: For that they which haue thereof reasoned, do there∣in define nothing plainely. Wherefore I haue thought it best to begin this our dis∣course of their definitions. An Officer therefore is a publike person, who hath an or∣dinarie* 1.747 charge by law limitted vnto him. A Commissioner is a publike person, but with an extraordinarie charge limited vnto him, without law, by vertue of commissi∣onely. Which definitions so by vs set downe that they may become more plaine, it shall not be amisse to make a diuision of publike persons, euen from the first beginning of them. And first I call them publike persons, who are to attend vpon the publike af∣faires: [ H] * 1.748 of whome there are two sorts, one which hath power to commaund, whome they call Magistrats: and another sort which hath no such commaunding power, but is onely to vnderstand or to put in execution the commaundements of the others; and are yet all publike persons also. Howbeit for all that, all publike persons are not Offi∣cers, or Commissioners; as Archbishops, Bishops, and Ministers, are publike persons, and beneficed men rather than Officers: which we must not mingle together, consi∣dering that the one sort is established for matters diuine, and the other for worldly af∣faires, which ought not to be confounded. Ioyning hereunto also, that the establishing of them which are employed in diuine matters, dependeth not of the politique edicts or lawes, as the Officers do. Let vs then see the definitions by vs set downe, whether [ I] they be good or no, before we enter into the deuision of Officers, for that no man, ei∣ther lawyer, or of them which haue before entreated of the state of Commonweales, hath truely told what an Officer, a Commissioner, or a Magistrat is: which for all that is a thing most necessarie to be vnderstood, seeing that the Officer is one of the most principall parts of a Commonweale, which cannot stand without Officers and Com∣missioners. But forasmuch as Commonweales were first serued by Commissioners, before they were serued by Magistrats or Officers (as wee will hereafter show) it is fit that we should first speake of Commissioners, and of the difference betwixt them and the Magistrats or Officers. [ K]

Aristotle saith, That a Magistrat is he that hath a deliberatiue voice in the Senat,* 1.749 and in iudgement, with power also to commaund. He also calleth the magistrat 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which is not proper but to them which are of power to commaund, and agreeth not vnto officers that serue, as Vshers, Sergeants, Trumpetors, Scribes and Notaries, whom he putteth into the ranke of Magistrats, and yet haue no power to commaund: so that this definition is in that respect too short. Besides that, it is a thing more absurd, that he should not be a Magistrat, which hath no entrance into the priuie councell, neither yet deliberatiue voyce, nor power to iudge: for if it were so, there should be but few magi∣strats in all Commonweales, considering that there are so few conncellors of the pri∣uie

councell in well ordered Commonweales, and among them not one which hath [ A] deliberatiue voice, but by commission: and albeit that they had such voice, yet had they no commaund, as we haue before declared.

And as for the lawyers, there be but few of them which haue touched this string:* 1.750 and namely doctor Iouean confesseth, That it alwaies seemed vnto him an hard thing, rightly to define a Magistrat. And indeed in the definition of a Magistrat by him made he is deceiued: For he saith, That a Magistrat is he to whome the prince hath giuen any charge▪ in which sence and sort all Commissioners should be magistrats. But D. Cuiacius▪ beside the definition of Aristotle, promiseth to bring three others: A Magi∣strat (saith he) is a publike person, who hath preheminence in doing of iustice; or hee which sitteth in seate of iustice; or else he which hath iurisdiction and publike iudge∣ment: [ B] so that by his account he appointeth foure definitions, with that of Aristotle. Which is directly against the Maximes of all Philosophie, and contrarie to the prin∣ciples of Logike, that one should giue more than one definition to one thing: and is also impossible by nature. But if any say, That many descriptious may be giuen of one and the same thing, for that the accidents are manie which are in one thing: true it is, but an hundred descriptions cannot declare and make manifest the substance or nature of a thing: Which in the Art of reasoning is a great fault: but in the know∣ledge of the law much greater, and especially in the matter of Magistrats and officers, which is the entrance of the law, where the lawyers begin. For the principall marke* 1.751 whereby a Magistrat is knowne, which is, To haue power to commaund; is in these [ C] three definitions wanting: and the magistrats lieutenants haue the hearing of causes, are presidents in iudgement, and sit in the seat of iustice, and yet for all that are no magi∣strats at all. The bishops also sit in publike iudgement, and seat of iustice, and haue the hearing of causes: For when Lentulus the Great Bishop, made relation vnto the Senat, of the decrees of the colledge of Bishops, and the law Clodia, concerning the conse∣cration* 1.752 of Ciceroes house, thus he began his speech, Pontifices religionis sunt iudices, legis Senatus, The Bishops (said he) are judges of religion, and the Senat of law. So doe the Cadies, or Mahometane Bishops in the East; and yet for all that they are no magi∣strats, considering that they had or haue no power to commaund, nor to call men be∣fore them, to imprison them, or to put their owne iudgements in execution: neither [ D] haue they any sergeant or officer whome they can commaund, no more than haue the Cadies, or Paracadies in Turkie, or the auntient bishops of Rome; which is a thing worth the marking. And sometimes cleane contrarie, some haue authoritie and pow∣er to commaund, which haue no iurisdiction or hearing of the cause at all, as wee will hereafter shortly show. And that more is, the Commissioners of publike extraordinarie causes, in antient time deputed by the people of Rome, whom the law calleth quaestores parricidij, had (as at this present Commissioners appointed by the prince haue) power to heare the cause, to sit in iustice, to iudge, to commaund, to compell, and yet for all that were no magistrats. Which being so, none of the aforesaid definitions can bee good. Besides that there is another fault in them, for not hauing distinguished the magistrats [ E] from the other officers, nor made any difference betwixt an officer, & a commissioner; whereof a great confusion and medley of commissioners and officers must needs ensue. Carolus Sigonius, who seemeth more curiously to haue searched into the definition of a Magistrat, is yet therein many waies also deceiued: For he calleth all them magistrats which haue any publike charge of worldly affaires, without making of any difference betweene officers and commissioners, or betwixt the magistrats and other officers, which haue also publike charge; besides that he giueth power to al magistrats, to iudge, to commaund, and to put in execution, euen vnto the Aruspises. Howbeit as a defini∣tion

ought not to extend farther, or lesse way, than doth the thing that is defined: so [ F] ought also the description of a magistrat in this our treatise of a Commonweale, to agree to all magistrats of all Commonweales indifferently.

Now in the definition by our selues proposed, we first said, all officers (whither they* 1.753 were magistrats, or magistrats seruants) to be publique persons: who in that differ from priuat men: for that priuat men haue nothing to doe with the affaires of the Common weale. We said also the Magistrats to haue an ordinarie charge, whereby to differ from Commissioners, who haue also publique charge, but yet extraordinarie, accor∣ding to the occasions in the occurents of time presented: such as were in auntient time the Dictators, criminall Quaestors, and other judges extraordinarily by the people of Rome appointed, at the motion and request of the Magistrats. And last of all we [ G] * 1.754 said, their ordinarie charge to be to them by law limitted and bounded: for the erection of their publique ordinarie charges, erected by the name of offices, which otherwise should be no offices, if there were not for them an expresse edict or law. A thing al∣waies obserued in the auntient Commonweales both of the Greeks and Latins; and now also better than euer: and to this end Princes cause their edicts to be published, in their soueraigne and inferiour courts: and in this realme of Fraunce, the charters of of∣fices newly erected are sealed with greene wax, with labels of greene and red silke, and this style, viz. To all men present and to come, with a continuance perpetuall: whereas the letters pattents of commissions, are sealed with yellow wax, with a labell of plaine parchment, without any perpetuitie. And albeit that all Corporations and Colleges [ H] be graunted by the prince with a charge by law limitted for euer, as I haue said; yet so it is, that if the king will augment or increase the number of the corporation or colle∣ges of judges, or other magistrats, yea or of the most base or vile officers: as of Serge∣ants, criers, trumpetours, land measurers, broakers, and such like, it must be done by publique edict, verified and inrolled: of examples whereof all the records of the courts of justice are full. But whereas we said the lawes concerning officers to be perpetuall,* 1.755 that is to be vnderstood of the perpetuitie of the offices, which continue for euer after they be once by edict erected, (what time soeuer it be that is prescribed vnto the offi∣cers themselues,) vntill that by contrarie edicts or lawes the same offices be againe put [ I] downe. Although the officer hold his place but for the space of eighteene moneths, as did of long the Censors their censorship, (which for al•…•… that was at length prorogued for fiue yeares, for that so great an office could not in lesse time well be discharged,) or for a yeare: as did all the other offices in Rome, by the law Villia: or for six moneths, as did the Senators of Florence, after it was a popular estate: or for two moneths, as did the six Counsellours of the seignorie which are assistant vnto the duke of Venice: or for one day onely, as the Captaines of the two fortresses of the castle of Rhaguse,* 1.756 whose office is perpetuall, albeit that their commaund last but for one day. But how∣soeuer it be that offices be erected with ordinarie and publique charge, it must still be [ K] done by law: not for that it is needfull to haue parchment to write it in, or greene waxe to seale it with, or yet magistrats to publish the edicts concerning the erection of such offices: for the writing, the seale, the verification, albeit that they giue credit vnto the lawes which are made, yet make they no lawes; no more than they doe other acts and contracts. But to the contrarie there were neuer lawes more strong or better kept, than those of the Lacedemonians, which Lycurgus forbad to be written, and were for that cause called Rhetes: for so he was persuaded that they should the rather remaine in∣uiolat and of long continuance, if they were once writ in the hearts of his citisens, and not in tables, in their mindes, and not in bookes. The Athenians in like case had a certeine forme of presenting their requests vnto the people, which if the people re∣ceiued,

it then passed into the force of a law: which they vsed to ingraue in brasse, and [ A] to fasten it vnto a pillar, lest any man should vnder the colour of ignorance excuse him selfe in transgressing the same. So when question was for the erecting of an hundred new Senators in Athens out of the two new Tribes of Antigonus and Demetrius, the law for the erection of them was published vnto the people: which was also done in the erection of all other offices as is to be seene in Thucydides, Plutarch, and Demosthe∣nes.* 1.757 The like is to be said of the Roman magistrats: for the Consuls were created by the law Iunia: and the Tribunes of the people by the law Duillia: and when question was for the creating of one of the Consuls out of the people, it was done by the law Licinia. And afterward the Praetor for the administration of justice in the citie was made by the law Sextia. And the foure Praetors for publique criminall causes, (beside [ B] the other before erected) by the lawes Cornelia and Baebia. So may we also see of all the other Magistrats erected by the Emperours: that it was alwaies done by expresse Edict, wherein the time, the place, and their ordinarie charge are limitted. As in all the first & twelft bookes of the Code, and in the Edicts of Iustinian it appeareth where euery magistrat hath his particular Edict.

We haue put also into our definition of an Officer, that he must haue an ordinarie* 1.758 charge, for that the commaunds of the people of Rome granted by commissions and extraordinarie charges were aswell called by the name of Lawes, as were those that were made for ordinarie offices: the charge, the time, and place being still limitted by commission: as a man may see by the commissions granted vnto the Dictators, [ C] which were sometime made by the decree of the people, as I haue before shewed. And also by the commission granted to Pompee for fiue yeares, therein to end the Pirats warre: with commaund ouer all the coasts and hauen townes of the Mediterranean Sea, all granted vnto him by the law Gabinia. As also by commission giuen him for the warre against king Mithridates, granted by the law Manilia. But forasmuch as these were not but extraordinarie charges, a man could not call them offices, which are still ordinarie and perpetuall. And for because those warres were in short time to be ended, it was not meete therfore to create a new magistrat, whose office and charge should be perpetuall, but onely extraordinarily to commit the care of that warre vnto [ D] a most sufficient Captaine and Generall: vnto whom fiue yeares time was limitted at the request of Catulus: to the intent that Pompee in that time might end the warre, and not longer to protract it to be so alwaies in imployment: Or if the warre were sooner ended, that then his commission should end also. And all such extraordinary charges we call by the name of Commission. The Dictatorship was also a charge giuen by commission, and not an ordinarie power: for why, the Dictator was not but extraor∣dinarily and without law nominated by the Interrex or Consul, some great matter so requiring: and for that all offices ceased the Dictator being created, his commission was limitted but vnto six moneths at the most, and if he had soner dispatched the bu∣sinesse for which he was appointed Dictator, his commission then also expired, and his authoritie ceased; as we haue by many examples before declared. And as a man [ E] may see by * 1.759 Aemilius Mamercus, who chosen Dictator, and the same day hauing dis∣patched the businesse for which he was chosen, the verie next day following gaue vp his charge: showing therein how little he liked of long rule or authoritie. Howbeit such is the nature and power of all Commissions, as that according to the pleasure of* 1.760 him that hath the soueraigntie, they may be either reuoked or proroged. And albeit that commissions in Popular and Aristocratique Commonweales are almost still li mitted vnto a certaine time: yet in a Monarchie that extraordinarie and permissiue charge is tyed to no time at all: for why, in Popular and Aristocratique estates and

gouernments, the greater the charge is giuen by commission, the more need it is to [ F] haue it in short time expired; least longer power might giue occasion to ambitious* 1.761 minds to take vnto themselues the gouernment, and so to oppresse the libertie of the state. And therefore the dictatorship was but for six moneths, neither was that pow∣er euer longer proroged to any man in that free Commonweale, except to Furius Ca∣millus. For at such time as the people of Rome had extraordinarily created the De∣cemuiri with a yearely and soueraigne power, for the reforming of their old lawes and customes, and the making of new and more commodious for the state: their commis∣sion* 1.762 which should not haue passed, a yeare being expired, was againe by the people for another yere proroged, with absolute and soueraigne power: and all other magistrats suspended during the time of their commission; vntil that out of the best lawes of other [ G] cities they had gathered the lawes of the twelue tables. Vpon which continuance of bearing rule, these Decemuiri tooke occasion to oppresse the libertie of the state, and to take vpon themselues the soueraigntie, had it not by force againe bene wrong out of their hands, and that no without the great trouble and turmoile of the citie. For which cause the people from thenceforth erected the offices of the Tribunes of the peo∣ple, as defendors and keepers of their libertie; who alone of all the magistrats held their places after the creation of the dictator, all other magistrats and officers being for that time suspended. The Florentines did otherwise, who almost euerie sixt yeare extraor∣dinarily created eight or ten Commissioners, with soueraigne power, and without li∣mitation of time, for the ordering of their Commonweale, and the reforming of the [ H] abuses therein: who being once created, all other their magistrats ceased. By which meane these ambitious in effect tooke vpon themselues the gouernment, albeit that in outward appearance they made faire show of the giuing vp of their charge. For the suspending of all magistrats in generall, is a thing right dangerous, not onely in Popu∣lar and Aristocratike estates, but euen in a Monarchie also: which yet I neuer knew to haue happened in this kingdome of Fraunce, but at such time as king Iohn was taken prisoner by the Englishmen: For then Charles the fift hauing gotten of his father the gouernment of the kingdome, appointed fiftie commissioners for the reforming of the Commonweale, with power to examine the doings and abuses of all the other magi∣strats, from whome as then all power was taken. At which time the Commonweale [ I] destitute of gouernours, was by the seditious wonderfully disturbed: but more of these things in their place.

But the better and the more easily to vnderstand the difference betwixt an office and* 1.763 a commission, a man may in some sort say, that an office is a thing borrowed, which the owner cannot demaund againe before the time it was lent for bee expired: but a com∣mission is a thing which one hath but by sufference, end as it were by leaue, which the owner may againe demaund when he seeth good. And that is it for which Tacitus merily speaking of the raigne of Galba, which continued but three moneths, saith, Prae∣carium seni imperium, & breui transiturum, The old mans empire was but by sufference [ K] and in short time to passe away: not for that he had indeed his empire by sufferance, but for that he was now growne extreame old, and being vnfit for the gouernment of the empire, foresaw that in short time it must againe by naturall death bee taken from him, although he had not (as indeed he was) bene before slaine. Howbeit a Commissi∣on is of such nature, as that it expireth so soone as the charge thereof is executed, al∣though it be not reuoked, or that the time was graunted longer for the execution ther∣of, and yet neuerthelesse may be alwaies reuoked, whensoeuer it shall please him that graunted it, whether the matter for which it was graunted be yet entire or not, as wee haue before showed by the example of the Dictators. And to this purpose there is an

old deeree of parliament yet extant in the records of the court of Paris, against the pur∣seuants [ A] sent to Troy with the judges for the publike extraordinary causes, being indeed none of the bodie of the court, who (the commission expired) neuerthelesse yet bearing themselues as purseuants, were by the court commaunded to resigne vp their office, and a decree made them to be no officers at all.

I stand longer vpon this point, which although it may seeme easie vnto men of ex∣perience, yet vnto others it may seeme strange: yea two of the greatest orators of their time, namely Demosthenes and Aeschines grounded the state of their orations and pleas vpon this point. For when Ctesiphon had presented a request vnto the people, That it would please them, that Demosthenes for his good deserts towards the Commonweale (and namely for hauing most strongly fortified the walles and castles of the citie of [ B] Athens) might in the open theater be rewarded with a crowne of gold. Aeschines De∣mosthenes his greatest enemie, opposed himselfe against the entertainment of the re∣quest, alleaging for the cause thereof, That by the law no man was to be rewarded, ex∣cept he had first giuen an account vnto the people of his office well discharged, as all magistrats were bound to do. Demosthenes for that it concerned his owne honour and reputation, taking the matter in hand, made of all others a most excellent oration for Ctesiphon, or more truely to say, for the crowne he would haue had, alleaging, That the law spake not but of Magistrats; and that charge of repairing and fortifying of the wals and other fortresses, was no magistracie or office, but onely a simple commission; and therefore in his vulgar tongue saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. [ C] * 1.764 Which the Latines properly called Curatio, which is to say a Commissi∣on. Wherby it appeareth, that publike charge, for repairing of the walles, not to haue bene an ordinarie matter, but extraordinarie, for that there is not still need for to repaire them. Neither ought it to seeme strange, if Demosthenes well knew to distinguish and put a difference betwixt a commission and an office (as hauing bene of long time exer∣cised in the publike affaires, and as it were in the middest of the Commonweale) both which Aristotle altogether confounded. The one of them also hauing alwaies man∣naged the affaires of state; and the other as saith Laertius, neuer intermedling therein. And that is it for which Nicholaus Grouchius, and Carolus Sigonius, for not hauing vn∣derstood the difference betwixt an office and a commission, haue so much troubled [ D] themselues with replies and reioynders, without any resolution at all, as men ignorant in the knowledge of matters of law and of state. All which shall I hope be well mani∣fested, by that which shall be set downe in this booke.

In the laws of Charlemaigne Commissioners were called missi, a mittendo; which signifieth sent; which the Germans call by an old word Skaken: whereof they called the court of judges, which were extraordinarily sent into the prouinces (& were indeed nothing else but Commissioners) Scacarium. But here perhaps may some man say, That the Commissioners of the castle of Paris, and judges of the court of Requests of the Pallace, are also officers: which being so, how could it then be, that an office and a commission should not be also all one? Whereunto I answere, That of antient time [ E] * 1.765 those judges were but simple commissioners, with authoritie and power during plea∣who yet afterwards for the common good and profit were made perpetuall offi∣cers, with an ordinarie and perpetuall charge and power committed vnto them them: their old and former name of commissioners, yet by abuse or for the honor of that court still remaining: whereby those judges of the court of Requests, are yet called the Commissioners of the Parliament; as judges appointed, and againe to be reuoked at the pleasure of the prince. Which judges of the court of Requests (for all that) can∣not now be reuoked by the king himselfe, except they first bee by capitall iudgement

condemned, or willingly of themselues resigne their places: for so it was by the law [ F] of Lewes the eleuenth prouided. Not for that commission is incompatible with an of∣fice, most part of compassions being not directed but vnto magistrats or officers: but for that an officer in the qualitie of an officer, cannot be also a commissioner, for the self same charge limited vnto him by his office. For such commissions as they call Excita∣tiues, extraordinarily directed vnto officers for matters concerning the reuiuing the iu∣risdiction, or authoritie of their offices, are not properly commissions, if the time or the place be not by the commission altred; as to iudge according to the latter proceedings, and to leaue the former: for after that the time and order appointed by the law, is alte∣red by the authoritie of the prince or magistrat, it is to be now determined by commis∣sion. Now the difference herein which the lawyers hold, is nota•…•…le, as▪ That if any of∣ficer [ G] haue iudged of a fact contained in his commission, in the qualitie of an officer, that his iudgement is naught: but yet that is to be vnderstood in a thing which con∣cerneth not his office: For if there bee a concurrence of the commission Excitatiue, with the charge contained in the erection of his office, the ordinarie hearing of the cause is to be preferred before the commission, euen as the qualitie of the officer is to be preferred before the qualitie of the Commissioner; and the acts of the officers more assured than the acts of the Commissioners. And so in such concurrence of authoritie, if the officer commissionat also in a matter belonging to his owne charge, haue not de∣clared in what qualitie he had the hearing of the cause: the act by him done shall be ta∣ken, as the act of an officer, to the intent it may be the more firme and sure. It is also [ H] * 1.766 manifest, extraordinarie commissions extenuating the power and authoritie of magi∣strats or officers to be odious, or at leastwise lesse gratious, if they bee not for the refor∣ming and amending of the abuses and corruption of the officers. As they do in Venice, from fiue yeares to fiue yeares: And euerie yeare in Genes, where the Sindies are af∣terwards Commissioners, to heare the abuses committed by the magistrats & officers (which in auntient time in Athens was giuen to certaine ordinarie magistrats) as also at Rome by the law Bebia▪ when as before Quaestors or judges were by commission appointed by the people. That extraordinarie hearing of causes of the judges by com∣mission, was also gratious; which Vespasian the emperour appointed for the hearing [ I] and determining of suits and controuersies, which in the time of the ciuill warres were growne infinitly, and for the deciding whereof the whole liues of all the magistrats would haue scarce sufficed. Commissions may also bee graunted for things concer∣ning the greater part of officers, or a whole corporation or colledge, in which and like cases commissions are necessarie. And I remember that king Charles the ninth, ha∣uing directed his letters patents, in the yeare 1570, for the generall reformation of the waters and forrests of Normandie, which drew after it question of the fairest of his de∣maine; from the hearing whereof the precedent and councellors of the parliament of Roan were forbidden: Which interiection although they left nothing vnattempted to haue letted, yet so it was, that in fine they agreed thereunto, after that I had againe [ K] and againe presented vnto them the kings commaunds, to that effect and purpose, and commenced suit not onely against the principall men of that prouinciall court, about matters concerning my commission, but also against the whole bodie and corporati∣on of the citie of Roan, for the rights which they pretended against the king; and that, that was the cause for which I had obtained the interdiction.

But briefly, and yet more plainely and plentifully to make plaine all sorts of Com∣missioners, whether they be for the gouernment of prouinces, or for the warres; or* 1.767 for the administration of iustice, or for the kings receits and treasure, or other things concerning the state. We say, that the commissions come still from the soueraigne

prince, or from the magistrats, or from commissioners deputed by the soueraigne [ A] prince; for a fourth there is not. Againe Commissioners deputed, are either taken out of the number of magistrats and officers, or out of other priuat men. And if the com∣mission be directed vnto the magistrats or officers, it is either for matter belonging vn∣to them by their office, or otherwise not belonging vnto them. And in what sort soe∣uer it be that commission be directed, whether it be to an officer, or a particular per∣son, it is directed with power and authoritie to heare and proceed in the cause; either without appeale, or else with appeale reserued vnto the soueraigne prince, (if the com∣mission came from him) or vnto the magistrats named in the commission; or els a commissioner is appointed by him whome the soueraigne hath deputed: as sometime commission is giuen out for the instruction of the affaires, or proceedings vnto the de∣finitiue [ B] sentence exclusiuely ro inclusiuely, sauing the execution thereof, if appeale bee made. Sometime also Commissioners are appointed by the magistrars to examine a fact, or the right of a matter, or both the one and the other together; sometimes without any power or commaund, and sometime with both.

This diuision extendeth to all Commissioners, in what forme of Commonweale soeuer it be. As is to be seene in the state of the Romans, where the mannaging of the warres, and gouernment of the countries and prouinces newly conquered, at the first belonged vnto the ordinarie magistrats and officers, viz. the Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors, yea euen a good way from the citie, whilest that the Roman empire was yet* 1.768 contained within the bounds of Italie: But after that the bounds thereof were exten∣ded [ C] further, they then began to appoint Commissioners to gouerne their prouinces, in stead of their ordinarie magistrats, who although they were all by one name called Po∣testates, yet for all that they gouerned the prouinces in stead of Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors: they were also called Proconsuls, Propraetors, Proquaestors, that is to say, Commissioners, or Lieutenant sent in stead of Consuls, Praetors, or Quaestors: As is in Liuie to be seene, who speaking of Philo the first Proconsull saith, Actum cum Tri∣bunis Plebis est, ad populum ferrent vt cum Philo Consulatu abijsset, pro consule rem gere∣ret, The tribunes of the people were dealt with, that they would moue it vnto the peo∣ple, that when Philo was out of his consulship he might rule as proconsul. But after that [ D] the empire was growne great, and also extended farre, such commissions were by the sufferance of the people graunted by the Senat, to such as were lately gone out of their offices in the citie, who agreed among themselues for the gouernment of the prouin∣ces; or if they could not so fall to agreement, cast lots for them, which they called C•…•…mparare inter se, & sortiri: Except the charge and commission were of such conse∣quence and importance (by reason of some great warre alreadie risen, or like to arise in the prouince) as deserued to haue some valiant and great captaine without lot there∣vnto by the Senat appointed: Where if any partaking or factions chanced to arise about the matter, the people at the request of the Tribunes appointed one thereunto by commission. As it did Scipio Africanus, to whome the people gaue commission for the mannaging of the warres in Spaine and Affrike, and by that meanes drew Han∣nibal [ E] out of Italy, and discharged that country of a long and most dangerous war. The like commission was without lot extraordinarilie by the people also granted to Paulus Aemylius, to make warre against Perseus king of Macedon. And so also to the great captaine Pompey against the pirats, by the law Gabinia, and against king Mithridates, by the law Manilia: all they which the yeare before had borne office, beeing reiected, the people naming whome they pleased and best liked. Howbeit that this was no vsu∣all matter, but right seldome times done: For ordinarily the Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors discharged, and so going our of their offices in the cities, cast lots for the

prouinces, if they could not otherwise agree for the gouernment of them among them∣selues: [ F] * 1.769 and for that the charge of the warre against Mithridates by lot fell vnto Cor. Sylla, Marius by the working of Pub. Sulpitius, one of the Tribunes by him suborned, caused it to be by the people taken from him; and by extraordinarie commission giuen vnto himselfe: which was the cause of the most cruell and bloodie ciuill warre that euer was in Rome. So also was the prouince extraordinarily appointed vnto Cato Vticensis, against Ptolomee king of Cyprus; which by him vndertaken, Clodius boasted, That he had pluckt out Catoes tongue, which had alwaies before beene at libertie to speake against extraordinarie powers and commissions. Sometime also if the horrible∣nesse of some enormious fact required a more seuere triall, the matter was propounded vnto the people, who put it ouer by commission vnto the Senat; which out of the [ G] bodie of it selfe appointed some one or moe, not onely for instructions, but euen to heare and end the matter. As when Lucius Tubullus the Pretor, had with grieuous ex∣tortion most filthily polluted the Tribunall seat, and peruerted iustice; so that the peo∣ple leauing the ordinarie course, and the magistrats to whom the hearing of the mat∣ter belonged, referred it wholly vnto the Senat by extraordinarie commission: the Se∣nat forthwith deputed Cn. Scipio to iudge and end the cause. So also when Tiberius the emperor by cōmission appointed the Senat to enquire of the murthers committed be∣twixt the Nucerians & Neapolitans: the Senat deputed the Consuls to enquire therof. Yea sometime the senat without commission from the people, but as it were by meere soueraignty appointed commissioners, if the case in question were committed in Italy, [ H] out of the territorie of the citie of Rome, as a thing belonging to the Senat, apart from all others; as saith Polybius: as it happened in a straunge robberie and murther, wherof Cicero speaketh in his booke De Claris Oratoribus; to the hearing whereof (hee saith) the Senat deputed the Consuls. By which examples here before produced, it appeareth* 1.770 that Commissioners appointed by the prince, or people hauing the soueraigntie, whe∣ther they be magistrats or priuat men, may appoint their deputies, and so commit the matter to others, if it be not expresly forbidden them by their commission so to doe; or that question be of the estate it selfe in the commission: as the ambassadours or Commissioners which are to entreat of peace, or alliance, or other such like things can∣not commit the same to others. As is also to be said if question be of the life, •…•…ame, or [ I] state of any man: wherein the manner and examination for better instructions may be deputed to others, but not the iudgement it selfe, except the judge before appointed by commission excuse his absence by sicknesse or some other lawfull cause. But Iustinian the emperour afterwards ordained better by forme of a perpetuall edict, That Com∣missioners appointed by the prince, should depute nothing of their commission to others more than the instructions of the suit: neither thought he that sufficient, but decreed also, that the Commissioners appointed by the prince should themselues heare the appeale, and instructions of the suit. But to meet with all that is to be met with, the most sure rule is to haue al that is commited, particularly in the commission, expressed, [ K] and so the commissioners to be ruled by the commission, as is the manner in all well established Commonweals.

And albeit that a man might make many questions concerning commissions graunted, as well by the soueraigne prince, as by the magistrates, in time both of peace and warre: yet will I thereof touch but two or three, and those most necessarie to bee vnderstood of them which haue the managing of the affaires of state, whether it be in peace or warre. Wherefore leauing the rest, and to bee briefe: wee say that the* 1.771 commission ceaseth by the death of him that graunted the same, or by his reuoking of the commission: or in case that the commissioner during the time of the commis∣sion,

obtaine some office or preferment equall to him that graunted the commission: [ A] for then one of them cannot commaund the other. But as for the expresse reuocation* 1.772 declared by the princes letters or edicts, concerneth as well them which are ignorant of such reuocation of their authoritie and commission, as them which know it. And albeit that the acts of a commissioner so reuoked, done after the reuocation of the commission, and yet before the knowledge of such a reuocation to him giuen, hold for good but in regard of particular men, towards whom the commissioner hath exe∣cuted his commission; and especially, if they haue voluntarily yeelded vnto the com∣missioner, knowing the commission to be alreadie reuoked: and that towards others the acts of the commission after the reuocation of the commission, are of none effect by the rigour of the law, yet equitie and reason bindeth them thereunto, vntill that the [ B] commissioners or appointed iudges doe know that their commission is reuoked. For as a commissioner hath no power vntill he haue receiued his commission: so likewise the commission dureth, vntill the reuocation thereof be signified; or at leastwise vntill the commissioner know that it is reuoked. And therefore Celsus sayth, that the acts of the gouernour of a prouince are good and auaileable, if the commissioner know not that his commission is called in. And although Pope Innocent were of opinion, that it was otherwise to be iudged, if question were of life or honour, and was therein of many followed, yet he continued not in that opinion. And albeit that he was a pope* 1.773 & soueraigne prince, and a man most skilfull in both the lawes, yet willed he no greater authoritie to be giuen vnto his writings than to other mens, neither to rest thereon [ C] further than there were good and strong reason therefore. But to take away these an∣tient difficulties, the secretaries to the state haue vsed to ioyne vnto commissions, and almost to all mandats and letters pattents this clause, A die qua rescriptum Significabi∣tur, From the day that the rescript shall be notified: which clause if it be omitted, yet is it alwayes necessarily to be vnderstood. And thus much concerning the expresse reuo∣cation of a commission.

So also a Commission taketh end by the death of him that graunted it, bee hee* 1.774 prince or magistrat; prouided alwaies, that the thing committed bee yet whole and entire: for otherwise the commissioner may continue that which hee hath begun, so that it be done without fraud. But it is fraud in law, when a Commissioner not ad∣uertised [ D] by a purseuant or expresse rescript (but by some other certaine meanes) of the death of the prince, the matter being yet whole, neuerthelesse proceedeth therein. Now the matter is not whole and entire, which cannot by the Commissioner bee left off without proiudice to the publike state, or to the right of priuat men: as in matter of iustice, if the parties haue contested, the thing is no more entire, but the Commissioners may and ought to go through with that they haue begun, whether it bee the prince or the magistrat that hath giuen them commission. And so in warre the matter is said not to be entire, if the battell stand ranged before the enemie, and that the retreat can∣not without euident perill be made: in which case the generall is not to forbeare the gi∣uing of battaile, although he be certainly enformed of the death of the prince; or that it [ E] be forbid him to ioyne battaile. So if rebellion arise, which cannot otherwise be appea∣sed but by the execution of the authors thereof; that is first to bee done, and afterward knowledge thereof to be giuen, (as saith the lawyer) although the death or counter∣maund of the prince happen or come in the meane time. Yet the commissions com∣ming from the prince, or letters mandatorie, are in that different from the other letters royall, which they call letters of iustice: for that these coutinue in their force and ver∣tue, whereas the letters of commaund expire after the death of the prince. Yet ne∣uerthelesse the new prince oftentimes ratifieth that which was done by the commaun∣dement

of his predecessour, although he died, the matter yet whole and entire, and the [ F] rather if it be well and for his profit done; which the magistrats cannot do to the com∣missioners by them appointed, for that their ratifications in tearmes of iustice are neuer to be receiued. And thus much concerning all the sorts of Commissioners.

Now, that we haue alreadie said of Commissioners, hath no place in officers, for* 1.775 that their power endeth not together with the death of the prince, although it bee in some sort holden in sufferance, and as it were suspended vntill they haue letters from the new prince, or confirmation from him for the continuance of their offices. And for this cause the parliament of Paris after the death of king Lewes the eleuenth, decreed that the officers should continue in their charge, as they had before done, vntil that they receiued commaund to the contrarie from the new king; following therein an aunti∣ent [ G] decree giuen in like case in the moneth of October, in the yeare 1380. Howbeit the court of Toulouse after the death of Charles the seuenth, otherwise decreed than had the parliament of Paris, viz. That all their iurisdiction should cease, vntill they had receiued new commaundement from the new king; and yet that if any occurrents should chance wherein the authoritie of the court should bee requisit, that then the court should proceed by letters and commissions, intituled The people holding the Parli∣ament royall of Toulouse, firmed with the seale of the court, without any mention ma∣king of the king. But forasmuch as the king comming vnto his kingdome by right of succession, vseth his maiestie before he be consecrated; as it was iudged by a decree of the parliament of Paris, the nineteenth of Aprill, in the yeare 1398 (contrarie to the [ H] opinion of many) it belongeth not vnto any officers, parliament, or Senat, to doubt of the power or maiestie of the prince: which if it were not, neither were they to haue any authoritie or power: neither are in any other sort to proceed, but as officers vnto the king, and vnder his obeysance. But if it were lawfull for the people to make choice of their king, as it is in Polonia, Denmarke, and Hungarie; (where the kings beeing dead, the maiestie of the kingdome is to returne vnto the people) another thing were to bee said: For then the magistrats vse not the princes name in the vacancie of the kingdom (for that then there is no king) but euery one of them do their lawfull acts and duties, as if they had such power from the Senat and the people) by force of the law, and pow∣er [ I] proper vnto the magistrats: whereas Commissioners and judges extraordinarily appointed, can by no meanes (the prince being dead) hold their authoritie and power; for that they do nothing by the vertue of the law or of ordinarie power: and not for that commissions be odious, and offices gratious (as some haue thought) for oftentimes a commission is more gratious, yea and more profitable also vnto the Commonweal, than any officers ordinarie power. And as for the decree of the parliament of Paris (bearing date the sixteenth of October 1381) whereby it was ordained, that the kings edicts and commands should haue like power the king being dead, that they had whi∣lest he yet liued; that is so to be vnderstood, if the charge committed bee then begun to be put in execution. And therefore if the power of the magistrats be annuall, and the [ K] king die before the magistrats yeare be expired, yet may the magistrat neuerthelesse hold his office for his yeare: or if it be perpetuall, continue the same in such sort and so long as the law giueth him leaue, for that his office dependeth not of a simple com∣maund* 1.776 which may still be reuoked, or of a charge which cannot be recommaunded, but is grounded vpon a law, receiued, published, verified, and registred: in such sort as that his office cannot be suppressed but by a contrarie edict or law. As when question was for the suppressing of the militarie Tribunes, (for the discord betwixt the Senat and the people, before created with the power of the Consuls) and in their steady to re∣store again the Consuls, it could not be done vntill that by the law Licinia, that power

of the Tribunes was againe taken away. And in our time when as the fift and sixt pre∣sident [ A] of the parliament of Paris were to be suppressed, they were not yet therefore displaced (for that against their wils they could not, except that for some capital crime they had bene before condemned) but an expresse edict was made, that after their death none should be more placed in their roomes, but so their offices to bee suppres∣sed. So by a generall edict made by Charles the ninth, at the request of the estates of Orleans, in the yeare 1560, all offices erected after the death of king Francis his grand∣father, were againe suppressed. And oft times it happeneth, that one officer is by one law made; but more often, that many are made at once: as when threescore sergeants were at once created by one edict of king Francis the first; and the criminall judges at once erected throughout the realme by an edict in the yeare 1527▪ when as before the [ B] same man was judge both of criminall and ciuill causes. Which course was so straitly obserued and kept in the kingdome of Fraunce, as that the verie clarkes of the clarke of the parliament, were by expresse edict made an office, though afterwards by another edict againe suppressed, at the instance of the chiefe clarke, in the yeare 1544: as were other small charges, which the Roman Commonweale were by the magistrats them∣selues commonly giuen vnto their seruants, without any law at all. Neither is it suf∣ficient for the magistrats and other officers to be by the law created, but that their suc∣cessours also haue a particular declaration, to testifie that they haue obtained their offi∣ces, and yet no need of any new edict or law. And for this cause the princes commissi∣ons directed vnto the officers in the quality of officers, continue in force to their succes∣sors: [ C] for that the prince therein maketh choice of the magistrat or officer, and not of the person: but if choice be made of any mans person, whose name is expressed in the commission, he being dead, his successour in the same office cannot execute the com∣mission, for that the prince made choyce not of the magistrat but of the person.

Yet there are other differences also betwixt an officer and a commissioner: for that* 1.777 the power of an officer besides that it is ordinarie, it is also better authorised, and larger than is a commissioners, & that is it for which the Edicts and lawes leaue many things to the consciences and discretions of the Magistrats: who indifferently applie and inter∣pret the lawes according to the occurrents & exigence of the causes presented: Where∣as [ D] Commissioners are otherwise bound, and as it were tyed vnto the verie words of their commission, and especially where question is of the affaires of state: as in the charges and commissions of Embassadours or Commissioners deputed to negotiate betwixt princes, where the Commissioners may not without danger of their liues passe one point beyond the lesson they haue in writing, if this clause (which is oft times put vnto the charges and instructions of Embassadours and Commissioners to treat with princes) be not thereunto annexed, viz. That if any thing else be to be done, the Em∣bassadour shall at his wisedome and discretion, according to the chaunge of places, times, and persons, haue care thereof: much like vnto that clause whereof Aeschines the Orator speaketh in the oration which hee made for the defence of his legation; where he saith, that this clause put into the the commission of Embassadours, viz. [ E] That they should do whatsoeuer they saw to be for the common good; extended not vnto that they had in their expresse and particular charge: so that the aforesaid clause extendeth not vnto the principall obligations and resolutions of treaties, as to the ma∣king or breaking of peace, but onely vnto the accessories and matters of lesse impor∣tance. As if question be of any thing to be graunted vnto the enemies or friends, for the inlarging of their power to the hurt of the Commonweale, it is not lawfull for the Embassadours without speciall commaund to intreat thereof: For seeing that in the lesse affaires of priuat men, an Attourney or Proctor hauing a generall authoritie with

full and entier power, may not yet for all that giue, acquite, or alienate any thing, or [ F] giue or take an oath of any person without a speciall charge; much lesse ought he so to doe in things touching the publique, and namely in things concerning the state: well may things done without commission, be confirmed, yet could they not of right without commission be so done. For albeit that in priuat matters he may say him* 1.778 selfe to haue well and duely executed his charge, which hath done it better than was to him inioyned, yet in publique affaires of the estate it is not alwaies so: for the Soul∣diour which hath assailed the enemie, or the Captaine which hath giuen battell con∣trarie to the Generals commaund, are both worthie of death, although they obtaine the victorie. For what could euer haue more honorablie beene done, or more wor∣thie eternall praise, than was that which was done by Fabius, collonell of the horsemen [ G] vnder Papyrius Cursor the Dictator? who with the losse but of an hundred men onely, slew twentie thousand of the enemies; and yet for that he contrarie to the Dictators commaund had ioyned battell with the enemie, he was brought in question of his head, neither had so escaped, had not the Dictator (ouercome by the earnest intreating of the people) so rested contented. And therefore Caesar in like case speaking of one of his captaines called Syllanus, said him to haue done well and wisely in not giuing of battell, although he were sure to haue caried away the victorie: for that said he it is not the dutie of a captaine, to do any thing that is by his Generall forbidden him. Yea so much it concerneth not to doe any thing that is forbidden in matters of warre, as that the Lieutenant generall to an other man, ought not to giue the enemie battell, except [ H] it be so expresly giuen him in charge: which was the cause that the Countie of Aigue∣mond was shrewdly shent of the Spaniards, for giuing battell vnto the Mareshall de Termes (although he therein tooke him prisoner and discomfited the French armie) for that he had hasarded the whole state of the low Countries, if he had lost the bar∣tell. But this latter point is to be vnderstood of such as be Lieutenants, or subiect to the commaund of others, who by vertue, of their office haue not power to command. For an officer, as the Consull, or in his absence his Lieutenant; or with vs the Consta∣ble, the Marshall, or other Generall of the armie, placed as in title of office, to haue full and absolute commaund ouer the armie, and to mannage the warre, may by vertue of his office, and without attending any other speciall commaund, make warre vpon the [ I] denounced enemies, pursue them and giue them battell, besiege them, and take their fortresses and strong holdes, and dispose of the armie according to his discretion, if he haue not expresse commaundement to the contrarie from his soueraigne, and so his power suspended: yet hauing taken any strong places, or the enemies Generall, he may not without speciall commaund deliuer them, or yet make peace with the ene∣mie. True it is, that in popular estates these points are not, neither can bee so straitly* 1.779 kept, the generals thereof themselues doing almost all; which in a Monarchie depend of the will and pleasure of one onely prince: For why it is more easie to know the pleasure of the prince, than of the people; of one man, than of many thousands. As [ K] we may still see in Liuie large commissions by the people giuen vnto the generals of their warres▪ as in the warres against the Hetrusceans, all power was giuen vnto Fabius, Omnium rerum arbitrium & a Senatu, & a populo, & a collega, Fabio Consuli Commis∣sum, The disposing of all things (saith he) was both of the Senat, and the people, and his fellow in office committed to Fabius. And in another place, Initio liberum pacis at belli arbitrium permissum▪ At the beginning the free disposing of peace and warre was committed vnto him. And yet neuerthelesse they kept this difference betwixt them which had the mannaging of their warres by vertue of their office, and them which did the same by commission; as that the Consuls, Praetors, and others, hauing power

to make warre by vertue of their office, might auow and iustifie their owne actions, [ A] without any other ratification, except they had taken vpon them some thing that con∣cerned the soueraigntie of the people; whereas the Commissioners, if they therein pas∣sed their cōmission, must of necessitie haue their actions by the Senat or by the people ratified. As Pompey hauing had commission for the mannaging of the warre against king Mithridate, passing farther made warre also against diuers other nations and peo∣ple, at his pleasure bestowing the kingdomes, estates, and towns by him conquered and wonne: and albeit that the people would infringe or reuoke nothing of that hee had done, yet neuerthelesse after his triumph, he oftentimes requested the Senat, that those his doings might by it be ratified: and finding the Senat to make thereof difficultie, and to vse therein long delayes; he to strengthen and backe himselfe against his enemies, [ B] and such as were about to looke into his doings, ioined himselfe in friendship and alli∣ance with Caesar, so to make themselues both of them the stronger. For albeit that hee had a generall commission, and that in that case all was at his discretion: and therefore (as some thinke) needed no ratification: yet is it not so, the generall clauses of commis∣sions being alwaies to be interpreted and ruled to the best good and profit of the Com∣monweale▪ not in any thing giuing power to doe that is hurtfull vnto the publike state; which is not a thing lawful or permitted euen vnto a priuat man to do, hauing a charge in generall tearmes committed vnto him. Wherefore these words expressed in com∣missions, be they Gouernors, Captaines, Iudges, or ambassadors (for things to be done)* 1.780 At their discretion according to their wisedome; or at their will and pleasure: and others [ C] such like, are still to be so interpreted and vuderstood, as euerie good and wise man would interpret and vnderstand them, still respecting the good and profit of the Com∣monweale: wherein if any fault be committed, account thereof is to be giuen; the least fault that can be, being still in matters of state, and publike interest to be enquired af∣ter: no excuse of errour, or ignorance, being therein to be admitted or accepted. And much the lesse, if he which hath taken vppon him such publike charge had it not laid vpon him, but was by him sought for: neither offered vnto him, but by force by him extorted. For if priuat mens faults, when they haue taken vpon them the charge to do any thing one of them for another (although it bee of their owne accord) be not excu∣sable; how should they then be excused in matters concerning the state and Common∣weale. [ D]

But to the intent that the force of Commissions and offices may the better bee vn∣derstood, it shall not be amisse to produce the examples of the auntient Romans, and to compare their manner of speech in the making of them, with that of ours. As in* 1.781 that which Festus Pompeius saith, Cum imperio esse dicebatur apud antiquos, cui nomina▪ tim a populo dabatur imperium, He was said of the auntients to haue power, to whome by name power was by the people giuen: which is asmuch as to say, by expresse com∣mission, without appeale vnto any other magistrat, vnto whome so authorised the law gaue power to command: For that a magistracie or office cannot be wishout power to commaund. So we see in Liuie, at such time as Hannibal besieged Rome, Placuit▪ [ E] omnes qui Dictatores, Consules, Censoresue fuissent cum imperio esse, donec recessisset hostis a muris, that is to say, A decree was made (or commission giuen) that all such as had bene Dictators, Consuls, or Censors, should haue power and authoritie to command, vntill the enemie were departed from the walles. So Cicero speaking of Augustus Caesar saith, Demus imperium Caesari, sine quo res militar is geri nō potest, Let vs giue (saith he) power and authoritie vnto Caesar, without which militarie affaires cannot be man∣naged. For why, Octauianus yet but yong, could by the law neither beare office, nor lead the armie, much lesse without power and authoritie take vpon him a generals

charge: and therefore Cicero persuaded, That the charge for the mannaging of the [ F] warre should with power by commission be giuen vnto him: which place of Cicero hath much troubled both Sigonius and Gruchius. For had Octauianus bene either Con∣sul or Praetor, Cicero would not haue vsed these words, for that he should then by law haue had the power and commaund of a magistrat.

Beside this, there was also a notable difference betwixt the manner of propounding* 1.782 the request for the creating of a magistrat, and of a Commissioner: For the magistrat was vsually created by vertue of the lawes before made; the magistrat thus asking the people, Quos vellent Consules fieri, Whome they would to be made Consuls? and so of the other magistracies and offices being vacant. But for commissions of command, they vsed these words, Vellent iuberent vt huic vel illi imperium esset in hac vel illa pro∣uincia, [ G] If they willed and commaunded that this or that man should haue the gouern∣ment in this or that prouince. As is reported of Scipio Africanus, who had commissi∣on with power to commaund, although he were not yet of age to beare office, or to be a magistrat. And Cicero speaking of all sorts of commissions saith, Omnes Potestates, Imperia, curationes, ab vniuerso populo proficisci conuenit, It beseemeth al potestats, com∣maunds, and commissions, to come from the bodie of the whole people. Where by the word Potestates, he vnderstandeth the gouernours of princes, who were properly so called. And by the word Imperia, Captains, who had particular commission to man∣nage the warres (howbeit that the word Imperia, is vnderstood also of the ciuill magi∣strats) with power to commaund. By the word Curationes, is meant all other charges, [ H] without power to commaund. The word Imperator, signifieth properly a generall or chiefe captaine, as Plinie speaking of Pompey, Toties Imperator antequam miles, So often a generall before he was a souldior. But generally the word Curatio, importeth all sorts of commissions; as is easily to be gathered by this place of Cicero, Idem transfero in magistratus, Curationes, Sacerdotia: The same I transferre into magistracies, Commis∣sions, and Priesthoods; which are the three sorts of publike charges. Vlpian the lawyer allo well distinguisheth a magistrat from him whome he calleth Curator republicae, of whome he hath made an expresse booke: whome the law calleth by a Greeke word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; who had no power to condemne, nor to appoint any fine, which was lawfull [ I] for all magistrats to do, as we haue before showed.

But it is to be noted, that al commissions passe into the nature of offices, as oft as that* 1.783 is by law made an ordinarie charge, which was before done by commission, as we haue by the examples of our owne Commonweale before declared. And that which was before giuen at the pleasure of the magistrats, becommeth also an office, if he that hath the soueraigntie doth by law establish the same. As in auntient time the Consuls, as it were by commission made choice of the six Colonels, whome they called Tribunos militum, vntill that about 642 yeares after the foundation of the citie of Rome, it was by an expresse law (made at the request of the Tribunes of the people) set downe and decreed, That from that time forward it should bee an ordinarie office, and the peo∣ple [ K] to haue the choice of them: which was euer after obserued, except some such great warre were in hand, as that it was thought needfull, that extraordinarie choice should be made of those Colonels by commission: As in the Macedonian warre against king Perseus, Licinius and Cassius the Consuls, made a motion vnto the people, That the Tribunes, or Collonels of the souldiors, might for that yeare bee chosen by the Con∣suls, as indeed they were. So likewise in auntient time also, the Consuls, Praetors, and other great magistrats made choice of their slaues and seruants for their vshers, secreta∣ries, sargeants, Trumpetors, and such like; as they did also in this realme, vntill the time of Philip the Faire, who was the first that tooke this power from the bailiefs and sene∣schals,

and yet leauing vnto the lords justices, power to establish sergeants and notaries [ A] in the prouinces of their iurisdiction and territorie. And in like case the kings atturney generall, in the time of our fathers, made choice of such aduocats as hee thought best for the pleading of the kings causes; who are now as ordinarie officers created by the prince himselfe, the particular commission before giuen vnto the atturney generall, be∣ing conuerted into the forme of a most honourable office. And thus much in gene∣rall concerning Commissioners and officers: it followeth now that wee should also speake of Magistrats, and of such other things as are vnto euerie one of them properly belonging.

CHAP. III. [ B] ¶ Of Magistrats.

A Magistrat is a publike officer, which hath power to commaund* 1.784 in a Commonweale. And an Officer we said to bee a kind of publike person, who hath an ordinarie charge by law appointed vnto him. But a Commissioner wee said to bee a publike per∣son also, with a publike, but an extraordinary charge, at the plea∣sure of the prince. Now orderly proceeding required that wee should before speake of Commissioners, then of officers; for that they were before any lawyers or Officers established. For right certaine it is, the [ C] * 1.785 first Commonweales were by soueraigne power gouerned without law, the princes word, becke, and will, seruing in stead of all lawes, who both in time of peace and war, by commissions gaue out charge to whome they pleased; and againe at their pleasure reuoked the same, all depending of their full and absolute power, being themselues not bound to any lawes or customes at all. And that is it for which Pomponius writeth, the Roman Commonweale to haue bene at the first gouerned by regall power, without vse of any law. And Iosephus the historiographer, in his second booke against Appi∣an, desirous to show the most honourable antiquitie of the Hebrewes, and of their lawes, saith, That Moyses of all others was the first that euer writ lawes. And that in [ D] * 1.786 fiue hundred yeares after, the word Law was neuer heard of. Alleaging in proofe ther∣of, That Homer in so many books as were by him written, neuer vseth this word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Law: a good argument that the first Commonweals vsed not but Commissioners, considering that an officer cannot be established without an expresse law (as we haue said) to giue him his ordinarie charge, and limited to a certaine time: a thing seeming to diminish from the power of soueraigntie. For which cause kings and princes (ie∣lous of their state and greatnesse) haue vsually annexed vnto all their letters pattents of office, an auntient clause retaining the marke of lordly Monarchy, viz. That the officer should enioy his office so long as it stood with the princes pleasure. Whereby it ap∣peareth the officers power to depend of the princes power▪ rather than of order. And albeit that this clause be to no purpose in the kingdome of Fraunce, for that by a law [ E] by Lewes the eleuenth established, ordinary offices and charges, by the prince once law∣fully bestowed, cannot from them on whom they are so bestowed be againe taken, ex∣cept they haue committed some criminall cause worthy of death; and that in Spayne, England, Denmarke, Sweden, Germanie, Polonia, and all Italie the like order be obserued: yet for all that, the Secretaries of estate neuer forget the same: a great argu∣ment that all charges and offices were of auntient time in the nature of commissions; which whither it bee profitable vnto Commonweales or not, shall in due plaec be hereafter declared. But let vs before speake of the Magistrat which whaue before de∣fined

to be a common or publique officer with power to commaund. [ F]

Now there is no lesse difference amongst writers betwixt the officer and magistrate,* 1.787 then there is betwixt the officer and commissioner. For albeit that euery Magistrat be an officer, yet euery officer is not a magistrat; but onely they bee Magistrats which haue power to commaund, which their greeke names 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 well de∣clare;* 1.788 as who should say Commaunders, and the latine word Magistratus, which is asmuch as to say masters and commaunders. And for that the Dictator was he which had the greatest power to commaund, the auntient writers called him Magister po∣puli, the word Dictator signifying a Commaunder; as who should say, saying the word, and it was done: for that edicere is as much as to commaund, which is prope•…•… vnto Magistrats: for that edicts are the Magistrats commaunds. Howbeit that many [ G] herein deceiue themselues, who supposing the bookes written in latin in the name of Mar. Varro to be his, say that the Dictator is so called, quasi dictus ab interrege, as so called of the Interrex: But by the same reason the Collonell of the horsemen might be also called a Dictator; for that he was then also so appointed by the Dictator, as is to be seene through all the historie of Liuie, and should rather be called Dictatus, as a man appointed; in the signification passiue, than Dictator in the actiue. Wherefore Dionysius Halycarnasseus Varro his domesticall friend better saith, the Dictator to haue beene so called as an Edictator, that is to say, a soueraigne commaunder, and was therefore called Populi magister, or the Master of the people.

Now we haue before declared the definition of a Magistrat by the yonger lawiers, [ H] and by Aristotle himselfe set downe, to be in no wise to be allowed or maintained:* 1.789 who call none but him a Magistrat which hath a deliberatiue voice in iudgement, and in the priuie counsell, with power to commaund; and principally saith hee to com∣maund: for in his sixt booke de Republica, seeing the number of officers to be infinite, whom he calleth all 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a name proper vnto Magistrats hauing commaund in the Common weale: he findeth himselfe therein much entangled, for that he seeth others also besides them necessarie for the ornament and glorie of the Commonweale: and then after them all the Magistrats ministers, as Sargeants, Vshers, Secretaries, Nota∣ries, all whom he calleth by the common name of Magistrats: euen as he doth them which haue power to commaund: and so passing on further, saith, such ministers to [ I] haue also power to commaund, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And yet for all that in an other place* 1.790 he maketh question, whether that the Iudges and Orators are to be called Ma∣gistrats: whereunto he aunswereth, that a man may say them to be no magistrats, ha∣uing no part of the commaund of the Commonweale; And therefore Cato Vticensis chastising the Registers, Comptrollers, and Receiuers, you ought (saith he) to remem∣ber your vocation, and that you are but ministers, and not Magistrats, as Plutarke re∣porteth. As for Preachers and Orators whom he calleth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, if so it be that they haue no commaund or ordinarie power, it is right certein that they are no magi∣strats at all: but yet often times they are also Magistrats, I meane such as in Popular [ K] and Aristocratique estates and Commonweales haue power to perswade or disswade the people, to or from such things as they thought to be for them vnprofitable or dis∣profitable, whom they called Rhetoras. Howbeit that in Athens euery particular man, (so that he were fiftie yeres old) had of himselfe power to speake; and the rest by the magistrats leaue: whereas in Rome it was not lawfull for any man to deliuer any speech vnto the people, but by the leaue of the chiefe Magistrat in the assemblie. And as for the doubt that he maketh of Iudges, as whether they be Magistrats or not, the resolution is easie, if we will graunt the diuision of judges set downe by Iustinian the emperour to be good: which is, that some of them be Magistrats, and some of them

be not. We must therefore now confesse, that amongst them which haue publique [ A] and ordinarie charge; that is to say, of Officers, some of them are Magistrats, (viz. such as haue power to commaund) and some of them not, (as hauing no such com∣maunding* 1.791 power) but seruing onely as the magistrats ministers: which diuision see∣meth vnto vs necessarie for the auoyding of such businesse as might arise of a diuision of it selfe imperfect. Wherefore we haue said that such publique persons as haue an ordinarie charge limitted vnto them by lawes, or by edicts, without any commaund at all, to be simple officers, whom the Emperours of latter times often times in their lawes call officiales, being indeed but ministers vnto the magistrats. The auntient Do∣ctors of the law haue for most part followed the opinion of Accursius, who set downe neither any definition nor distinction of Officers; nor of Commissioners, nor of Ma∣gistrats; [ B] but simply saith, That there are foure sorts of Magistrats, viz. them whom they called Illustres, the Spectabiles, the Clarissimos, and the Perfestissimos, to whom he giueth all commaund. All which are rather honorable qualities and titles attributed vnto the magistrats and Officers, according to the conditions of their persons. How∣beit that in this diuision of them also according to their titles and qualities, he hath left out the Patricij, who were of greater reputation and dignitie than the rest: as also the Augustales, who were superiours vnto the Clarissimos: for why Iustinian the empe∣rour appointeth these degrees of honour, the Patricij, Illustres, Spectabiles, Clarissimi,* 1.792 siue Speciosi, and the Perfectissimi, all which honors and titles were giuen aswell vnto priuate men as vnto magistrats. But as for that which Bartholus saith, That there are [ C] some which haue honour without charge; as Counties and Marquises, vnto whom for all that he attributeth power to commaund, and the administration of justice, it deserueth not aunswer; for that he therein is most manifestly contrarie vnto himselfe. So also is there small probabilitie in that he saith, Scholmasters as magistrats to haue iurisdiction ouer their schollers, and power to establish lawes and ordinances: for so domesticall power and the discipline of families should be also altogether confounded with the publique iurisdiction, which we haue before shewed to be a thing impossi∣ble. Alexander Imolensis the greatest lawier of his time, hath touched much neerer the true definition of a Magistrate: in that he saith, None to be Magistrats but they which are ordinarie judges; And yet is not this enough: for why they are such magi∣strats [ D] as haue power to commaund, and yet haue not any ordinarie iurisdiction: as the Censors, and the Tribunes of the people. And so to the contrarie some there be (which being no magistrats) haue an ordinarie iurisdiction, but without any commaunding power, without Pursiuant or Sargeant, as had in auncient time, and now also in euery place the Bishops, who haue the hearing and determining of all sacred and religious things, and yet were neuerthelesse no magistrats. The Bishops saith Lentulus are jud∣ges of Religion, and the Senat are judges of the law. So one may see neither the aun∣tient nor late writers to haue handled this point, or yet so much as touched the diffi∣culties or differences of Officers, Magistrats, and Commissioners, as the matter well deserued. And albeit that the true definitions of Magistrats, officers, and commissio∣ners [ E] be not to be found in the papers and writings of Lawyers, yet are the same to be gathered from them, and from the discourse of good histories. For Vlpian writeth it to be lawfull for all magistrats, excepting the Duumuiri, by inflicting of iudiciall pains to defend their iurisdiction: which extendeth not onely vnto the imposing of fines vp∣on the offendors, but euen to the attaching of their goods and bodies, and casting of them into prison. And yet it appeareth (may some say) that Vlpian hauing excepted these Duumuiri (who were in like power that the Sherifes were in townes without any iurisdiction at all) yet neuerthelesse accounteth them in the number of Magistrats▪

and seemeth also to say, these Duumuiri to haue also had iurisdiction: For otherwise [ F] in vaine were they excepted, if they had not such authoritie and power. And yet the same lawyer in another place saith, these Duumuiri to haue had no iurisdiction nor the hearing of any causes whatsoeuer, but were onely to receiue needfull cautions, and to deliuer possession: which sauoured more (as saith he) of power than of iurisdiction. And yet in this case (saith he) they were but simply the Praetors deputies, who in their absence gaue them this commission, for preuenting gf the daunger which might in the meane time happen, if men of necessitie must be driuen to runne still vnto the Praetors: who in like case also afterwards gaue them power to appoint tutors vnto the poorer sort of orphanes for the preseruation of their goods. Whereby it is euident them to haue had no iurisdiction or power by vertue of their owne magistracie, but onely part [ G] of the Praetors iurisdiction, and that also by leaue and sufferance. But they which haue nothing but such deputed or precarie iurisdiction, can of right call nothing thereof their owne: Wherefore whether the power of the Duumuiri consisted onely in ha∣uing power to commaund, or in iurisdiction, it was vndoubtedly but by leaue and suf∣ferance: whereby it is to be vnderstood, these Duumuiri not properly to haue bene at all magistrats. But they which haue power to commaund, together with iurisdiction, may call men before them, attache them, and with penall iudgement defend their iuris∣diction, & also put their iudgements in execution: wheras they which haue power on∣ly to command without any iurisdiction, may well cause a man to be apprehended, but not proceed further. And in that some are deceiued, who for that by the old law Alteria [ H] Tarpeia power was giuen to all magistrats, to impose fines vnto the summe of three∣score six shillings, therefore suppose all magistrats to haue had iudiciall power also. For if the fine were by the magistrat imposed for publike iudgement sake (as by a Tri∣bune of the people,) it was lawfull for the partie that was so fined either to pay the fine, without further examination of the matter, or to appeale vnto the people, and so to trie the cause of his fine, as is in Liuie oft times to bee seene: which was done by the law Icilia. For why the fine of it selfe inflicted not any infamie vpon the partie so fined, but for the publike crimes sake: as the punishment of beating with staues im∣paired not any mans reputation, but the cause wherefore he was so beaten. But if a fine [ I] were set vpon him that had not obeyed the magistrat sending for him, or for not aun∣swering being asked, or for any other cause, not impairing his credit; it was lawfull for the magistrat by taking of distresse to exact the fine, without appeale: For that by the law Tarpeia, there was a certaine stint and measure for fines appointed and set downe vnto the magistrat, that so the disobedient citisens might without any trouble of the state be kept in order, and their insolencie restrained.

Now the least fine vpon any man to be imposed, was one sheepe; and the greatest* 1.793 two oxen, or thirtie sheepe: which for that according to the diuersitie of the cattell it made the penaltie either lighter or heauier, and for that they could hardly be brought [ K] and looked vnto in the citie, a sheepe was valued at ten asses, and an oxe at an hundred, that is to say, at so many pound of brasse. But afterward the riches and territorie of the Romans encreasing, extraordinarie and greater fines were imposed, if greater cause so required. As Liuie writeth of Fuluius, who for that hee being Praetor and generall against the enemie, the Roman armie was put to flight, and he the Praetor reported to be the first that fled; the Tribunes of the people fined him at thirtie thousand peeces of brasse, when as before the greatest fine was but two oxen, or thirtie sheepe: howbeit that the fine was oftentimes forgiuen, for that the sentence of the people condemning a man vnto a fine, carried alwaies with it the note of infamie.

And for that we are by way of discourse drawne thus farre, wee will here amend an

errour in Aulus Gellius (about this matter) not as yet corrected. For hee in his Noctes [ A] * 1.794 Atticae, speaking hereof, writeth, The greatest fine to haue bene of thirtie oxen, or two sheepe; in stead of thirtie sheepe, or two oxen: and thereof gathereth, that as then there were moe oxen than sheepe in Italie, and that it was thereof called Italie: the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 with the Greekes, and with Varro signifying an oxe. But Dionysius Halicarnas∣seus, Varro his domesticall friend, writeth, That by the law Tarpeia, it was permitted to all magistrats, to impose fines: and yet a measure thereof to haue bene by the law ap∣pointed, viz. That the fine should not exceed two oxen, or thirtie sheepe at the most. In like errour offendeth Festus Pompeius, and in the same words with A. Gellius; so that the one of them seemeth to haue bene deceiued by the leading and authoritie of the other. Both of them also writ, a sheepe in auntient time to haue bene called Ouis, in [ B] the masculine gender, which yet you shall no where find; although wee see Boues for oxen, to be oft times vsed in the feminine gender: But it may bee that they mistooke Duos O•…•…es, that is, Two Sheepe, for Duos Boues, which is, Two Oxen. And least any man should thinke me to attribute more to Dionysius Halycarnasseus a Grecian, than to Au. Gellius, or to Festus, both citisens of Rome, they themselues are of themselues re∣futed: For both of them confesse, the least fine to be imposed, to haue bene a fine of one sheepe; and the greatest, of thirtie oxen, or two sheepe: whereas (if they would haue agreed with themselues) they should haue said, the least fine to haue beene of one oxe. Neither do we as yet see whome we may preferre in the searching out of the Ro∣man antiquities, before this Dionysius Halicarnasseus, excepting Varro, whose domestical [ C] and familiar friend this man was, out of whome he had many good things: For as for the books which are in his name carried about in the Latine tongue, as wel the foolish∣nesse thereof declare them to be none of Varroes, as for that in them it is read, many things to be in them spoken by contraries. But Au. Gellius writeth, Varro in his one & twentieth booke Rerum Humanarum, to call Mulctam a Sabine word: but the latter Grammarians to take it to be so called by the contrarie: whereby it is cleere those bookes not to haue bene Varroes. Yet these things which we haue written concerning the estimation of the cartell exacted for a fine, are confirmed by the authoritie of De∣metrius Phalerius: For he writeth, a dramme of siluer to haue bene appointed by So∣lons [ D] laws, for a reward to him that had killed a shee wolfe; but fiue drammes vnto him that had killed an hee wolfe: for that a shee wolfe easily killeth a sheepe; but that the he wolfe being stronger, killeth an oxe. Whereby it is manifest, oxen to haue beene thrice as cheape in the countrey about Athens, as in Italie. For ten Asses, or the Ro∣man Denarius ouer-weigheth the Greeke dramme. And in the same place in Au▪ Gellius there is another more notable fault, where he saith, Mulctam, quae suprema dici∣tur, in singulos dies institutam fuisse, The fine which is called the greatest, to haue bene imposed euerie day: where the word dies, or daies, is to bee put out; for the meaning of the law was, that the greater fine might be exactect of euerie citisen in par∣ticular, if so be that many of them had in the same fault offended: for otherwise it had not bene lawfull for the magistrat the same day to impose diuers fines, if many had of∣fended: [ E] whereof the impunitie of offences, and contempt of the magistrat should en∣sue. For proofe hereof let that example of Au. Gellius serue, Marco Terentio quando neque citatus respondit, ne{que} excusatus est, ego ei ouem mulctam dico, Forasmuch as Mar. Terentius, being summoned, aunswered not, neither made his excuse, I set the fine of a sheepe vpon him. Another errour also there is in Festus, where he writeth T. Meneni∣us Lanatus, & Sestius Capitolinus the Consuls, to haue made the law concerning fines: for it is a thing not heard of, lawes to haue bene made by the Consuls: and as for that law it was made in the yeare 297, after the building of the citie: in which yeare Sp. Tar∣peius▪

and Au. Aterius were chosen Consuls: but true it is, that about six yeares after [ F] * 1.795 T: Menenius, and Pub. Sestius Capitolinus, being Consuls, made a request vnto the peo∣ple, That the fine before imposed in cartell, might be conuerted into money, valuing euerie sheepe at ten Asses, and euerie oxe at an hundred. But whereas Dioxysius writeth it to haue bene lawfull onely for the Consuls to impose a fine, ought not to seeme strange; for that at such time as the law was made, there was neither Praetor nor Aedile in Rome, the first Praetor being there made 386 yeares after the foundation of the ci∣tie. And Cicero hauing as he thought best, made lawes for his Commonweale, which he to the imitation of Plato had conceited, amongst the rest made one, whereby he gi∣ueth vnto all magistrats iurisdiction and diuination. But they which thinke the same to haue bene the verie Roman lawes which we see in Cicero, are much deceiued; as we [ G] will hereafter show, all magistrats not to haue had also iurisdiction, which yet seemed vnto Cicero both good and profitable. And yet the magistrat that hath iurisdiction (to speake properly) whether it be that he haue it in his owne right, or from others, hath* 1.796 also (saith a certaine lawyer) all such things as without which he cannot exercise that his iurisdiction; that is to say, power to commaund: which is still said to be annexed vnto iurisdiction, and without which iurisdiction is but vaine and to no purpose. Whereof it followeth, that the iurisdiction of the auntient bishops, and of our bishops also, with∣out power to commaund, was not properly a iurisdiction, but onely a simple hearing and vnderstanding of matters. For that which Lucullus the bishop said in the Senat, The bishops to haue bene the judges of religion, and the Senat of the law, tendeth to [ H] that end, and is so to be vnderstood, as that when question is of religion, credit is to bee giuen vnto them, as is vnto other men skilfull in their professions and trades; or as vn∣to iudges appointed either for the bare examination of the fact, who are properly cal∣led Recuperatores (or as we terme them Delegates:) or for the vnderstanding of that is iust and right, who more truely are arbitrators by law appointed, and not by the agree∣ment of the parties, and yet are often called judges. And therefore wee see the Vestall Virgins (in Liuie) which had polluted their vi•…•…ginitie, to haue beene alwaies chastised and punished by the Praetors of the citie, but neuer by the bishops. And so when Pub∣lius Clodius was about to haue committed adulterie with Pompeia Caesars wife, in the temple of the goddesse Bona Dea, the full Senat had the determining of the matter, con∣cerning [ I] the religion and sacrifices by him polluted. So in the beginning of the Chri∣stian religion, the Christian bishops (as Augustine, Nicephorus, and Iustinian do witnes) had not so much as the least iurisdiction of any matter, or the examination of the priestes themselues: howbeit that Iustinian graunted to them the examination of them that were of their owne order and calling. Neither would our auncestors haue any part of commaunding power to be giuen vnto bishops, and that the court of the parlia∣ment of Paris, hath oftentimes by the decrees and ordinances thereof witnessed. But why then (might some man say) do we see consistories, prisons, examinations, and fines to be permitted vnto bishops? What other thing else do all these things declare, but [ K] a meere commaunding power? Yea Philip the Faire, and king Lewes his sonne, gran∣ted vnto the bishop of Paris power to apprehend and arrest men offending in his Di∣ocesse. Howbeit I suppose those former things to belong rather to their vocation, than to their power to commaund: for that the execution thereof belongeth vnto ma∣gistrats: and yet such power of staying and apprehending graunted to the bishop of Paris was by a decree of the Senat forthwith againe from him taken. And although that not long since Henrie the second had graunted vnto all bishops the power to stay and apprehend men for heresie and impietie: yet neuerthelesse was that law shortly af∣ter againe abrogated. Yea the bishops themselues do in their owne decrees professe

themselues to haue no power for the execution of any thing: yet is it with vs permit∣ted [ A] vnto them, to stay and apprehend offendours, within the boundes of their con∣sistories and courts; so that they go no farther.

And when as fines contrarie vnto the lawes were by the Bishops vpon men impo∣sed, the Parliament of Paris receiued euery mans free appeal from them: yea and after∣wards power was taken from them also, for calling of men before them; which they call, A liuely summoning or Citation. For there is an old decree yet extant, whereby the Bishop of Paris was grieuously fined, for that he had vsed such calling of men be∣fore* 1.797 him. But when as the Bishops vnder the colour of ministring of oathes, and of the contempt of Religion, had with vs drawne vnto themselues the hearing almost of all matters, (for Alexander Immolensis was of opinion, the power of administring an oath [ B] to be sufficient to giue vnto the Bishops iurisdiction also) the greater Courts forbad them vnder the colour of ministring an oath, to take vnto them the hearing of any mat∣ter. And at length it was forbid them also to haue the hearing of the causes concer∣ning the possession of benefices: and so after much, long, and hard sute, prouided for by the decree of Martin the fist Bishop of Rome; which decree is yet extant in the publique records. Yea the Spaniards truely, the most earnest defendours of the See of Rome, would not that their Bishops should haue to doe with any publique or priuat iudgements: except it were for Religion and Church matters, of which opinion I see Felinus (a man skilfull in both the lawes, and a most subtill interpretor of the Popes decrees) to haue beene. And albeit that certain ambitious decrees do giue vnto the Bi∣shop [ C] of Rome more authoritie and power than to all other princes and people: yet pope Innocentius the fourth, and euery other good expounder of the law, haue long since reiected these decrees: with all such others as haue preferred the bishop of Rome before the Councell of other Bishops and Princes. And Bartholus himselfe when he had fearfully written, The subiects not to be guilty of treason, which for the honor and wellfare of the Bishop of Rome had taken vp armes against their prince; craued pardon for that his errour. Trulie in mine opinion it were better and more profitable also for the Commonweal, commaunding power to be giuen vnto Bishops together with so great iurisdiction as they haue: or else that their iurisdiction, to be restrained vnto the hearing of matters of religion onely; as we see the auntient Romans, the Swissers, [ D] them of Geneua, and the Germans to haue done. And yet the censuring of manners is of necessitie to be giuen vnto the Bishops: which beeing once taken away, I see not what course would be taken for the punishment of secret wickednes & villanie, where∣of we will in place conuenient hereafter speake. Howbeit for all that, the imposing of fines is not to be permitted vnto bishops, or yet commaunding power to bee giuen them: For why should the magistrat be enforced to put into execution the vniust sen∣tence of the bishop? for it is vtterly forbidden magistrats to enter into examination of the bishops proceedings: except appeale be made as from the bishop abusing his po∣wer, vnto the more higher courts; which with vs is seldome done, for the heauines of the penaltie, if it shall be found the appeal to haue bene made without iust cause: for so [ E] the interpretors of both the lawes determine the acts of magistrats which haue taken vpon them the determining of things belonging vnto the bishops, to be of none effect: as also if such things chaunce to be discided in the bishops consistorie as belong vnto the magistrat, they confesse them to be to no purpose. So that if a Priest be conuicted of incest, or of forgerie, before the magistrat, and confesse the same, in the bishops con∣sistorie no regard is had of such his confession made: for so it is in the Popes decree ex∣pressed. But when this case had happened, wherein the Popes Legat called before himselfe the acts and things done before the magistrat, & disannulled the same: appeal

was made vnto the parliament of Paris, where I remember it was long time doubted, [ F] whether the euident proofes wherupon the priest was before the magistrat conuicted, ought to be void or not; for of the rest of the acts it was lesse doubted: wherein the court at last iudged, That it was in the Councell to be discided. And againe when the like case was in question before the criminall iudges, I my selfe being present, the same court delayed againe the cause, and referred it vnto the Councell: least it should haue seemed either to abrogate the ambitious decrees of the Pope, or to giue vnto the wicked licence to offend. For what could be more absurd, than to suffer a priest by the law Cornelia conuicted of forgerie, and by witnesses published, by retracting the cause, to reiect the witnesses; and so when as no moe could iustifie the matter, freely and without punishment to commit villanie euen in the middest of the Common∣weale? [ G] Our auncestours neuer handled the publique iudgements of priests, with diui∣ded examinations: But the Court of Paris, although it often times by iust decrees either quite abrogated, or with equitie tempered the Popes decrees and ordinances, yet neuer more iustly than in this case: which when it had often times beene delayed, at length by a law made at Molines, that decree of the Popes law was with vs taken away. So by little and little are the Popse lawes to be cut short and abolished. For at first in the beginning of the Christian Church, the authoritie of Bishops was shut vp within verie strait bounds, which Iustinian would haue to extend farther by this law by him made. Si quis aduersus Clericos, Monachos, Diaconos, Asceterias, actionem ha∣beat Episcopus iudex esto: sententiam vero episcoporum magistratus exequitor: If any [ H] man haue any sure against Clarkes, Monkes, Deacons, or other the religious persons, let the Bishop be the judge, but let the Magistrats haue the execution of the bishops sentence: but the words of the law following▪ do giue leaue vnto the magistrat to exa∣mine the bishops sentence, except there bee an other judge by the prince appointed. Which words haue troubled many, doubting whether they ought to put in execu∣tion* 1.798 the bishops commaund or not, before they haue vnderstood of the equitie of the sentence. Now if no appeal be made from the sentence, most are of opinion, That it is without farther examination of the magistrat, to bee put in execution: but if appeal be made, that then enquirie is to be made of the equitie of the appeal, which yet some [ I] denie to be lawfull. Yet in mine opinion, if question be of the thing it selfe, or of the matter of the iudgement, and that the iudgement be not giuen contrarie to the Popes decrees, that then the magistrat ought not farther to enquire of the cause. But if the bishop shall by his sentence go about manifestly to infringe the popes lawes, whether the errour be in the matter it selfe, or in the forme of the iudgement; that then the ma∣gistrat may farther enquire of the sentence; that is, in case he abuse the popes authori∣tie and decrees. The magistrat may also farther examine the sentence, if the bishop shall in iudgement giue sentence contrarie to the lawes of the kingdome, although he seeme to haue grounded the same vpon the popes decrees: as indeed many of their de∣crees are quite contrarie vnto the positiue lawes of Commonweales: in which case, the [ K] magistrat shall not suffer the lawes of the kingdome to be infringed by the Popes au∣thoritie. In all other cases it is ment that the magistrat should faithfully put the bishops sentence in execution: and so with vs we vse. The same law, and like maner of pro∣ceeding the Easterne people vse also: with whom their Bishops haue the bare hearing* 1.799 of matters, and the magistrats the execution: for which cause the bishops haue neither sargeants nor pursiuants, the chiefe tokens and marks of authoritie and magistracie.

But yet question might be made whether all magistrates haue iurisdiction and po∣wer to commaund or not? for that M. Messala the lawier, and M. Varro haue left in writing, That some magistrats had power to call men before them, and also to lay

hands vpon them: othersome had power also onely to lay hands vpon men: and [ A] other which had power to doe neither the one nor the other: and that they which had power onely to lay hands vpon men, had also onely a Sargeant and nothing else: and that they which had power to doe both, had both Sargeants and mase-bearers: whereas they which had neither power to call men before them, neither to lay hands vpon them, had neither sargeants nor mase bearers. When I say power to lay hands vpon men, my meaning is to haue power to seise vpon the bodie or goods of men; for by our customes many hauing praediall iurisdiction, (or as we tearme them mannours) may lay hand vpon mens lands, but not vpon their bodies: which was not by the aun∣tient Roman lawes permitted; of whom it is needfull here to speake, and in briefe to declare their power, the more manifestly to show the power of all sorts of Magistrats, [ B] in euery kind of Commonweale. For the great magistrats, that is to say, the Consuls,* 1.800 Praetors, and Censors; and amongst the commissioners, the Dictator, and he whom they called the Interrex; then also the Proconsuls, the Propraetors, and in generall all the Lieutenants & Gouernours of countries, had power to call before them not onely the priuat citisens particularly, but euen the lesser magistrats also: excepting the Tri∣bunes of the people, whose bodies (for that they were most sacred) it was not lawfull to violate. Neither might these aforesaid magistrats onely summon and apprehend men, but it was lawfull for them also to punish and imprison them, and in briefe to pluck downe and raze their houses and pallaces, who refused to obey these magistrats commaunding them. But the Tribunes of the people had no power to call men be∣fore [ C] * 1.801 them, yet had they authoritie to commaund any citisen to prison, yea euen the Consuls themselues. So L. Drusus Tribune of the people cast in prison Philip the Con∣sull, for that he had interrupted him as he was speaking vnto the people: which then by the law was death. Beside that it was also lawfull for them to oppose thēselues not only against all the magistrats, and the whole bodie of the Senat, but the opposition euen of one of the Tribunes was of power to stay all the proceeding of the •…•…est of the Tribunes his fellowes in office: On which great power they presuming and bearing themselues, doubted not contrarie vnto the law to call men before them, and to take vpon them authoritie and iurisdiction. Which thing Labeo the lawier gaue them well to vnder∣stand, [ D] who being by one of them summoned, refused to make his apparance before him, openly protesting for defence of himself, That the Tribunes were not ordained or appointed for the administration of justice, or to haue iurisdiction, but onely to op∣pose themselues against the violence and abuse of other magistrats, and to giue ayde and succour vnto such as appealed being vniustly oppressed, and to imprison them which would not yeeld and giue place to their opposition. So the Tribune Sempro∣nius, seeing that the Censor Appius would not giue vp his office, after that he had bene eighteene moneths Censor, (according to the law Aemylia, which had brought the tearme of fiue yeares before prefixed to the Censor, vnto the tearme of eighteene mo∣neths) told him that he would thrust him into prison, if he obeyed not that law (which he did by consent of six others of the Tribunes his fellowes in office▪) but Appius ha∣uing [ E] practised with three other of the tribunes to oppose themselues against the com∣maundement of the other seauen, by that meanes held still his office: for why, the opposition of one onely of the Tribunes suffised to stay the proceedings of all the rest, if order were not otherwise taken by the people, by taking from him his power and office; as by the request of Tiberius Gracchus, it was taken from Marcus octauius the Tribune, opposing himselfe against the law Agraria, that it might not take place. And this is it for which a Tribune of the people, speaking to the nobilitie said, Faxo ne i•…•…uet vox ista VETO, qua Collegas nostros concinnentes tam laeti auditis, I will make

(said he) that this word VETO shall not helpe, wherewith you so merrie heare our fel∣lowes [ F] in office singing in accord together. And but a little after, Contemni iam Tribu∣nos Plebis, quippe quae potestas iam suam ipsa vim frangit intercedendo, non posse aequo aure agi, vbi imperium penes illos, penes se auxilium tantum sit, nisi imperio communicato, nun∣quam Plebem in parte pari Reipublicae esse, The Tribunes of the people (he said) now to be contemned, as whose power did now of it selfe breake the strength of it selfe, by op∣posing of it self against it self, that things could not be there indifferently ordered, where the commaunding power was with the nobilitie: and onely the power of giuing help with the Tribunes. And that the people could neuer haue like part in the Common∣weale, except the power to command were made common vnto both. The Tribunes complained the people to haue no magistrats which had power to commaund: the [ G] Tribunes (they said) to haue power to oppose themselūes, and to yeeld the people re∣leefe, but yet to haue no power to commaund; neither that the comminaltie could be made equall with the nobilitie, except the offices and power to commaund were made common vnto both: and therfore they made request, That the Consuls might be cho∣sen as well out of the comminaltie, as out of the nobilitie: which when it could not be obtained of the nobilitie, it was agreed, certaine Tribunes of the souldiours with the power of Consuls, to be indifferently chosen out of both sorts: which manner of go∣uernment continued fortie fiue yeares, without any Consull, vntill such time as that it was agreed, That one of the Consuls should be still chosen out of the people. Howbe∣it a man might say, That the Tribunes in so saying made their power lesse than indeed [ H] it was, they hauing power to oppose themselues, and to commaund men to prison; which is a part of power. For so Vlpian speaking properly and as a lawyer, •…•…aith, That it is not lawfull without leaue and commission from the magistrat, to call into iudge∣ment the Consuls, Pretors, or Proconsuls, or generally any of them saith hee, Qui impe∣rium habent, & iubere possunt in carcerem duci, which haue power and can commaund men to be laid in prison. And so wee conclude, that they which haue power to com∣mit men to prison, although they haue no iurisdiction, are in right magistrats, as the Tribunes in Rome, the kings atturneyes in Fraunce, and the three Auogadours at Ve∣nice. Neither do I in that agree with Plutarch, who saith in his Problems, That the [ I] Tribunes were no magistrats, for that they had neither mase-bearer nor seat of Iuorie, the true markes (as he saith) of magistracie: for why, they had sergeants, the token of their commaund; as M. Messala affirmeth. And lesse is it to the purpose, that hee al∣leageth of Appius the Consull: of whom, contending with one of the Tribunes in the assemblie of the people, Liuie thus writeth, Tribunus viatorem mittit ad Consulem, Con∣sul Lictorem ad Tribunum, priuatum esse clamitans, sine imperio, sine magistratu, The Tribune sent a sergeant vnto the Consull, and the Consull sent a Lictor vnto him again, crying out, That he was but a priuat man, without power, without magistracie: For so the Consull said but to impaire the power of the Tribunes. Which for all that was so great, as that Licinius Stolo one of the Tribunes, was so bold, as by force to constrain [ K] Manlius the Dictator to depose himselfe of his Dictatorship. Another of them also committed both the Consuls to prison, for that they would not at the request of the Tribunes discharge ten souldiours from going to the warres. Yet true it is, that the power of the ten Tribunes of the people was shut vp and contained within the walles of Rome. And therefore Mar. Fabius, and Luc. Valerius the Consuls, seeing that they* 1.802 could not leuie their souldiours; for that the Tribunes opposed themselues against them, commaunded their chaires to be carried out of the citie, and so did there what they saw good. Yet oftentimes the Tribunes tooke vpon them more than belonged to their place, or than was by law permitted them, oftentimes propounding their

edicts and prohibitions. Whereof Liuie speaking saith, Communiter edicunt Tribuni [ A] ne quis Consulem faceret: si quis fecisset so id suffragium non obseruaturos, The Tribunes generally forbad any man to giue his voyce to the making of a Consul, but if any man so did, that they would haue no regard of any such voice giuen. Which was but an abuse, and presumption vpon the power of the people, to forbid them the free and entire choice of their magistrats: ouer whome in generall, albeit that no man could commaund, yet did the Tribunes so do ouer euerie one of them in particular, al∣though they could by no right so doe. Moreouer they tooke vpon them the admini∣stration of iustice, to all such as came vnto them, as is if they had had power to call men before them: as it is to be seene in Plutarch, where hee saith, That the Tribunes administred iustice in the place which was called Basilica Porta. And Aesconius Paedia∣nus [ B] saith, Tribunos, Quaestores, Triumuiros▪ Capitales non in sellis Curulibus sed in subsel∣lijs iura dixisse, The Tribunes, the Questors, and Triumuiri, judges of criminall causes, to haue administred iustice not in Iuorie chaires, (as the manner of the great Roman magistrats was) but vpon their benches. And Appian also saith, Liuius Drusus the Tri∣bune, to haue bene most diligent in the administration of iustice, and doing of right to euerie man. Pomponius also reckoneth the Tribunes of the people amongst the Con∣suls, Pretors, and other magistrats which administred iustice vnto the citisens and stran∣gers in Rome. Wherefore Cicero saith them to haue bene called Tribunes of the peo∣ple, for that they might examine the wrong done by the Pretors: which what man∣ner of examination should it haue bene, if they had wanted iurisdiction? Yea they had [ C] not onely taken vpon themselues iurisdiction, but appointed also commissioners: and in many causes made them whome they called Aediles aedituos, their deputies or Lieute∣nants; which they could not haue done, had they not had authoritie and iurisdiction: For why, that authoritie thou thy selfe hast not, thou canst not giue vnto another. Howbeit yet all this their presumption was but vsurpation and abuse; as Labeo the lawyer well shewed them, who being sent for by them, would neuer (as we said) come before them.

The same opinion we are to haue of those officers or magistrats whome they cal∣led* 1.803 Aedules Curules, who had neither power to call men before them, neither to attache any mans bodie; and therefore neither had mase-bearer nor sergeant, (as Marcus Var∣ro [ D] and Messalla haue noted) and yet by the sufference of the Pretors vsurped a great part of their authoritie and iurisdiction. Which the Pretors of the citie oppressed with the multitude of causes easily suffered, at the first committing vnto them causes concerning the sale or alienating of things mouable: who afterward tooke vpon them to haue to do with lands and things immouable also: and after that drew vnto them also the hea∣ting of courtisans and common harlots causes, who might by no meanes set vp that base and filthie trade of life, but that they must first openly professe the same before the Aediles, and that they would prostitute themselues. Which the auntients did, to the intent that such women as reason could not keepe within the bounds of modestie, should yet for shame of such publike profession (of so lewd a life before the magistrat) [ E] be restrained. But after that in latter times many euen of the most noble dames in Rome (hauing together with their chastitie also lost their modestie) a shamed not right impudently to make such open profession before the Aediles, That they would prosti∣tute themselues. The emperour Tiberius tooke order, that from thenceforth the magi∣strats should proceed against them by way of iustice: & at the same time also to represse the presumption and encroaching of the Aediles and others, by decree appointed vnto what summe, and what causes, their authoritie was to extend: which yet they had not by their auntient institution, and much lesse to call particular men before them, or to

commit them, although they had power to call a generall assembly of the common [ F] people.

As for the Questors, I see not that they euer had, or yet tooke vpon them to haue* 1.804 had any iurisdiction or power to commit men: for so Varro saith, that they had not: albeit that the yeare after their office expired, they had sometime the gouernment of some prouince bestowed vpon them: as Gracchus the younger after his Questorship had the gouernment of Sardinia giuen vnto him. From which time they had as much and more power in the gouernment of the prouinces committed vnto them, than had all the magistrats in Rome: but that was not by way of commission, as had all the rest of the gouernours of prouinces.

As concerning Censors, Fr. Ottoman, and Carolus Sigonius (both of them most skil∣full [ G] * 1.805 antiquaries) say, That they had well as they writ, Potestatem, sed non Imperium, (that is to say) power, but not commaund a thing altogether impossible: for that the word Potestas (or power) in termes of law, or in the person of a magistrat, importeth alwayes with it power to commaund. And namely Vlpian, where he saith, That the gouernour of a prouince had almost ample iurisdiction and power of life and death; calleth it pro∣perly by the name of Potestas. And wee oftentimes in antiquities read, the Censors Edicts, that is to say, their commaundements and lawes. Varro also and Messala call the Consuls, Censors, and Pretors, Maiores Magistratus (that is to say) greater Officers; and the rest, Minores, or lesser. And saith moreouer, That it was not in the power of the Pretors (who yet had both iurisdiction and commaund) to assemble the armie of [ H] the citie, which the Censors might, Praetori exercitum vrbanum conuocare non licere: Consuli, Censori, Interreg•…•…, Dictatori licere, He said it not to be lawfull for the Pretor to call together the armie of the citie; but yet to be lawful for the Consull, the Censor, the Interrex and the Dictator so to do. And at such time as Hannibal besieged Rome, there was an edict made, That all such as had bene Dictators, Consuls, or Censors, should haue a commaunding power, vntill such time as that the enemie had raised his siege. Placuit (saith Liuie) omnes qui antea Dictatores, Consules, Censoresue fuissent, cum imperio esse donec hostis a muris discessisset. Which they would not haue done if the Censors had not had a commaunding power, whilest they yet were in their office; espe∣cially seeing that they which had bene Pretors, had no such power giuen them. Be∣sides [ I] that, if the Tribunes (whom Varro putteth in the number of the lesser magistrats) had power to command, why should not then the Censors so haue, whome he calleth the Greater Magistrats? Yea that more is, Plutarch giueth more authoritie and power* 1.806 vnto the Censors, than to any other of the Roman magistrats: yet attribute I no•…•… so much vnto his writings, but that I see him being a Grecian, to be oftentimes deceiued in the antiquities of the Romans. Wherefore that is it which hath deceiued many, that the Censors, although they had power, yet had they no iurisdiction: albeit that Onophrius writ, That the Censors in some cases, and for some crimes had power to condemne men: but what those cases or crimes were, hee sheweth not. For either [ K] they must haue bene publike crimes, or priuat crimes: of priuat crimes the Pretor of the citie iudged, but of publike crimes the Pretor of the publike iudgements, and Triumuiri of criminall and capital causes determined. True it is, that the Censors were controllers of the peoples manners: but there is great difference betwixt the iudging of criminall causes, and the reprehending of mens manners and behauiours. And therefore Cicero said, The Censors iudgement, no farther to touch the partie by them condemned, than to make him blush. And that therefore, as all that the Censors iudgement concerned onely a mans name and credit, so it was called an ignominie or discredit, but not an in∣famie. For why, he saith not, That the Censors touched any mans honour, to the in∣tent

to note it with infamie, but rather with a certaine ignominie, or kind of disgrace, [ A] * 1.807 which many haue rashly abused for infamie; howbeit that there is great difference be∣twixt infamie & ignominie. Carolus Sigonius hath therein erred defining ignominie to be an infamie: and in the same place saith, That there are certaine capital causes, which draw infamie with them, and yet without crime, contrarie to the principles of the law: Whereby we are taught, that he which is by publike iudgement for any crime con∣demned, is thereby become infamous: And that the souldiour for his fault worthily by his captaine cassired, was thereby become ignominious, but not infamous, vntill that by the Pretors expresse edict he were so declared. The auntient doctors of the law haue called Ignominie, the infamie of a fact done: Whereof Cassius the lawyer saith, That he thinketh that a Senator put out of the Senat, can neither bee judge, nor [ B] beare witnesse, vntill he be againe restored: howbeit he doth say, That hee doth but thinke so. Which phrase of speech Vlpian also vseth, when as he saith, Se putare ei quae in adulterio depraehensa est & absoluta: notam obesse, That he did thinke, that vnto her that was taken in adulterie and acquited, yet the note thereof was a blemish. For cer∣taine it is, that he which is by iudgement acquited, is safe from the infamie of the law, but yet not from the ignominie of the fact. And Calistratus saith, That hee did also thinke the honour and reputation of a man to be impaired, Quando quis ordine moue∣t•…•…r, when a man is put out of his place. Festus Pompeius also setteth downe three sorts of militarie punishments, viz. Deprehensa, castigatio, ignominia, Deprehensa, saith he, is greater than castigatio, and lester than ignominia; and aboue all these the law addeth in∣famie. [ C] For otherwise if infamie, and the Censors note of ignominie were all one, the threescore and foure Senators by Lentulus and Gellius the Censors at once displaced and thrust out of the Senat, as also the foure hundred knights, who by Valerius and* 1.808 Sempronius the Censors were cassired, and their horses and publike wages taken from them, had bene also infamous. Yea that more is, all the people of Rome had beene noted with infamie, by the censure of Liuius Salinator, who rased and noted all the tribes, and as Valerius Maximus saith, Inter aerarios retulit, put them all from their free∣dome, and made them to pay all duties as straungers; For that they had by publike sentence first condemned him, and afterward made him Consull and Censor: only the [ D] tribe Metia he excepted, which had neither condemned nor acquited him, neither thought him worthie of those so honourable offices in the Commonweale. Hee also afterward noted Claudius Nero his companion in the Censorship, who also requited him againe with the like. VVherefore Cicero speaking of the Censorship, thus saith, * 1.809 Illud commune proponam, nunquam animaduersionibus Censorijs hanc ciuitatem ita con∣tentam, vt rebus iudicatis fuisse, I will (saith he) set before you that common matter, this citie neuer to haue bene so contented with the Censors animaduersions, as with iudge∣ments. And bringeth for example C. Geta a Senator, who by the Censors thrust out of the Senat, was afterwards himselfe made Censor. And after that he addeth, Quod si illud quoque iudicium putaretur, vt caeteri turpi iudicio damnati in perpetuum omni honore ac dignitate priu•…•…rentur, sic hominibus ignominia notatis, neque ad honorem, neque in curi∣am [ E] reditus esset: timoris enim causam non vitae poenam in illa potestate esse voluerunt. Quare qui vobis in mentem venit haec appellare iudicia, quae a populo Romano rescindi, ab iuratis iudicibus repudiari, a magistratibus negligi, ab ijs qui eandem potestatem adepti sunt solent commutari? If that (saith he) should also be thought a iudgement, as others with infamous iudgement condemned, they should for euer be depriued of all honour and dignitie: so vnto men (by the Censors) noted with ignominie▪ should bee no meanes for them againe to returne vnto their honour, o•…•… into the court: For why, our aunce∣stors would cause of feare, but not danger of life to be in the Censors power. Where∣fore

how came it into your mind, to call these iudgements, which may by the people [ F] of Rome be reuoked, by the sworne judges be reiected, by the magistrats bee negle∣cted; and of them which haue obtained the same power be vsually changed. Wher∣by it euidently appeareth the Censors to haue bene without all manner of iurisdiction. For the Pretors had the hearing and examination of the suits of the farmars of the publike reuenewes of all such things as concerned tributes, rents, writings, repairations, and farming out of publike things, made or done by the Censors: for that the power of the Censors was quite different from the iurisdiction of the Pretors. And so with vs (here in Fraunce) power is giuen vnto the gouernours of prouinces, but yet with∣out iurisdiction: except it be, that they by consent of both the parties, take vpon them to decide or determine any matter. And so we may in like sor•…•…say, That the Censors [ G] had power to commaund, but without any iurisdiction.

There were also other magistrats in Rome, which had power to command, and iu∣risdiction* 1.810 also in criminall causes, as those whome they called Triumuiri Capitales, whose power and authoritie extended yet onely vnto straungers or slaues: except per∣haps such were the vnworthiuesse of the magistrats, and their corruption, or offence so great, as that the other magistrats did willingly winke at the proceeding of these Capi∣tal Triumuiri, & at the publike punishment by them taken vpon such notorious offen∣dors. These Triumuiri beside this had also the putting in execution of all the capitall iudgements of the people, or of the other magistrats.

Now by this discourse of the Roman magistrats and their power, it appeareth, that [ H] in Rome there were some magistrats, who at the beginning of their first institution had no power or commaund, or els power yet without iurisdiction; and yet to haue at* 1.811 length vsurped both. Howbeit I deeme not them to be called Magistrats, which haue no power; well they may enioy some publike honour or charge, but no magistracie. For the true proprietie of the word Magistrat, importeth and draweth with it a power to commaund. And he that will haue regard vnto the phrase and manner of speech of the auntient Latines, and especially of the lawyers, shall find them to haue called the offices with honest charges in the Commonweale, by the word Honores, Honor (saith Calistratus) est administratio Reipublicae cum dignitate, Honour is a gouernment of the Commonweale with dignitie or reputation: and those which beside their honor had [ I] power also to commaund, them they noted by the word Imperia. As in Liuie we see the nobilitie to complaine in this sort, Salios, ac Flamines sine Imperijs as potestatibus relinqui, The Salij and Flamines to be left without command, without power: vnder∣standing by the word Imperia, the great estates of the citie, whether it were by commis∣sion, or by office, such as had Mase bearers and power to commaund allowed them. And by the word Potestates, meaning the gouernours of prouinces, whome Vlpian the lawyer in proper tearmes calleth also Potestates. VVhich also Alexander Seuerus the emperour meant, when he with a loud voyce saith, Non patiar mercatores potestatum, I will not suffer the buiers of the gouernments of prouinces. [ K]

Now as a man may haue a publike charge without honour, as Criers, Sargeants, Trumpetors, (which in auntient time were slaues, & of the magistrats familie without title of office) and especially the towne clarkes and notaries vnto the magistrats, or Commonweale, vntill the time of Valcntinian, who forbad slaues any longer to haue that charge. So a man may say also, That there are publike charges with honour, with∣out power to commaund; as ambassadours and priuie councellors, secretaries of estate, and treasorours; the auntient Ediles and Questors, and our Receiuers. So also some other there be which haue honorable charge, hauing also the hearing of many causes, and yet without commaund: as the auntient Roman Bishops, and our

great Prelats. Others haue honorable charge, with power also to commaund, and [ A] * 1.812 yet without iurisdiction: as the Tribunes of the people, the Censors, and our Gouer∣nours of countries, together with the kings Attourney. Some others there bee also which haue ordinarie, and honorable publique charge, and power to commaund with iurisdiction: and those are they, whom properly we call Magistrats: such as were the two Consuls and Praetors; who were encreased euen to the number of sixteene. As for the Dictators, Gouernours of prouinces, and those whom the Romans called In∣terreges: and Praefectos vrbi Latinarum feriarum causâ: they had more power and authoritie, then all the other magistrats we haue spoken of: yet were they not magi∣strats, but commissioners onely, as we haue before showed: albeit that some called them by the common name of Magistrats; but yet not they which knew how pro∣perly [ B] to speake. And so oftentimes it happeneth that they which haue the greatest honors, are yet destitute of all power and commaund: as amongst the Venetians the Chauncelour is created out of the people, which is with them the greatest honour; and yet without any power. So the Procurators of S. Marke, are also (with them) highly honored, and in all Commonweales the counsellors of estate, Embasladours, Bi∣shops, and prelates, who haue no commaund, and yet are more respected, than the other little Prouosts, and diuers other judges, which haue power to commaund, and iurisdiction to discide controuersies, with administration of justice both high and low.

There are also publique charges, who haue neither honour nor commaund, but ra∣ther [ C] * 1.813 to the contrarie draw after them a certain kind of dishonour: as the Hangmans office; who after the charge committed vnto him for the execution to death, was by the Praetors edicts commaunded still to lodge out of the citie: a custome yet ob∣serued in Tholouse, and in diuers other cities also. Other publique charges also there be, not much more honest, and yet neuerthelesse necessarie vnto the Com∣monweale, and profitable vnto them that haue execution of the same: to the end that the profit arising thereby, might in some sort couer the dishonour thereof. And vnder this diuision are generally comprehended all publique persons placed in title of office, or in commissions, or in simple dignitie without power to commaund. And in like maner we might diuide all publique officers & magistrats, according to the [ D] diuersitie of the publike charges, which euerie one of them hath: some in matters of religion, other some in the affaires of state; these haue the administration of iustice: others haue the charge of the publike reuenewes, some of the fortification and repaira∣tion of publike places, and others the prouision of victuals, and other things needfull: these haue the mannaging of the warres, for the defence of the subiects against their enemies: these the care of the publique health and welfare of the people, and these the ouersight and charge of the high waies, riuers, forrests, ports and passages: all which publicke charges may bee giuen either in title of office, or in commission, or simple dignitie without commaund: or els with a commanding power also, or only by way of the execution of the commaunds of others, such as are the magistrates ministers, [ E] towne clarkes, notaries, vshers, surueyers, sergeants, cricrs. Which so great a mulri∣tude of honours, offices, and publicke charges, to comprehend under the simple name of magistrates, or as the Greekes call it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, were but to confound the whole dis∣course of publicke honours and offices, of all magistrates and commissioners toge∣ther.* 1.814

Wherefore in euerie Commonweale for the creating of magistrats and officers, and such as are to be implo•…•…ed in common charge, three things are chiefly to bee respe∣cted: First them that haue the choyce and creation of them: then of what manner of

persons choice is to be made: and thirdly in what maner and forme they are to be crea∣ted [ F] or chosen. As for the first, it is a thing belonging onely vnto the soueraigntie, as we haue in due place declared. And the second, although it most properly belong also vnto soueraigntie, yet for the most part it ordinarily followeth the lawes to that end and purpose established, and especially in the Popular and Aristocratike estates: wher∣in (as generally in all sorts of Commonweales) offices, and publike charges are giuen vnto men, either for their vertue and wisedome, or else for their wealth, or for their nobilitie; or indifferently for all these things together; for why there is no Com∣monweale so barbarous, which hath not some regard of these things in bestowing of the offices and publike charges of the state: but which of these considerations were most to be respected, belongeth not to this place to discusse. And as concerning the [ G] third point, which is the manner and forme for the choice and creation of magistrats and officers, it is of three sorts: For either it is done by election, or lot; or by a mix∣ture of both together. Election is made either by liuely voyce, or by holding vp of hands, (which the auntient Greekes called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) a thing yet vsed amongst the Swissers: or else by tables or billets, by beanes or stones, and that in two sorts, viz. by open, or by secret suffrages. By lot choice is made of one, or mo of the citisens to be magistrats, or out of all sorts and degrees of the people, at a certaine age, by the laws appointed. Now as for choice to be made by election and lot mingled together, al∣though it be a thing not much vsed in auntient time, yet is it now at this present a a thing most common in Aristocraticall estates, and especially in Genes and Venice. As [ H] the Romans alwaies also did in making choice of the judges of capitall causes, concer∣ning life and death; who were by lot drawne onely out of the order of the Senators, before the law Sempronia, or out of the orders of the Senators and the knights by the law Sempronia also; or out of both those orders, and the Tribunes of the common treasure, by the law Aurelia, the people being still excluded. But in a Popular estate, either must all the citisens together iudge of euerie one in particular, or of the lesser part together, and that without lot or election. (For where the whole multitude of citisens haue authoritie and power, there is no place left for election or lot:) or else must some citisens by lot, or choice, or both drawne out, iudge of euery man in particular: or some, [ I] of some chosen by lot or election onely, or by both together; or else some partly by lot, partly by election taken our of all the estates of the Commonweale, to iudge of some of the other citisens; or else some by lot drawne out of all, with some other taken out of one or many estates of the Commonweale: or part by lot and election drawn out of all, and other part out of a certaine order of the citisens. And thus much concer∣ning all the meanes that can be imagined concerning the varietie of them which haue any publike charge: and for the estate, qualitie, and condition of euerie one of them, with the forme of their calling and imploiment.

Aeschines the orator, diuiding the offices and publike charges of the Athenians, hath cut them much shorter, and more obscurely reckoned them vp, than was fit for so great [ K] a citie, considering that therein were moe magistrats and officers, than in any other Commonweale that then was, for the greatnesse thereof. Hee said, That there were therein three sors of officers: one sort of them which were taken by lot or choice; ano∣ther of them which had publike charge aboue the space of 30 dayes, such as were they which had the ouersight of publike repairations and buildings; and the third sort, of such as were by the auntient lawes appointed; as commissioners chosen for the warres, or for the administration of iustice, such as were the magistrats. But by this diuision cannot the diuersitie of magistrats and officers be iudged, no more than by that of De∣mosthenes, (altogether different from that of Aeschines his aduersarie.) For hee saith

them onely to be magistrats, which were by lot drawne in the temple of Theseus: or [ A] they to whome the people had giuen extraordinarie power to commaund, or made choice of for captaines. The diuision also of Varro, and Messala, is also too short, who make but two sorts of magistrats in Rome, viz: the great and the little. The great magistrats they called the Consuls, the Pretors, and Censors, as chosen by the great estates: and the other they called the little, as chosen by the common people; the cere∣monie of their soothsayers diuination being more solemne in the choice of the greater, than in the choice of the lesser. But better it were to search and find out the essentiall diuisions of magistrats, and such as might serue in euerie Commonweale; as are those by vs alreadie set downe, concerning the charge of magistrats. VVee may also other∣wise diuide magistrats into three sorts, in respect of their power. The first may bee cal∣led [ B] Soueraigne Magistrats, as owing obediēce vnto none, but vnto the soueraigne ma∣iestie onely. The second are lesser Magistrats, who owe obedience vnto the soueraign Magistrats, and yet haue commaund ouer other magistrats also. The last sort are they which owe obedience vnto other superiour Magistrats, and yet haue no com∣maund but ouer particular persons onely. Let vs then in order speake of these three sorts of Magistrats, and first of the obedience of Magistrats towards their Soueraigne Prince.

CHAP. IIII. ¶ Of the obedience that the Magistrat oweth vnto the Lawes [ C] and Soueraigne Prince.

SEeing that the Magistrat next vnto the Soueraigne Prince, is the principall person in the Commonweale, & vpon whom they which haue the soueraigntie discharge themselues, communicating vnto him the authoritie, force, and power to commaund: it is good rea∣son before we passe further, briefly to touch what obedience he oweth vnto his Soueraigne Prince; which is the chiefe part of his dutie. Now in this the Prince and Magistrat, and both of them do most differ from a priuat* 1.815 man: for that the Prince seeth no man in the state or Commonweal, whome he may [ D] compare or preferre before himselfe; but as one placed in a most high degree, and next vnto the immortall God, beholdeth all his subiects set a great way beneath him: wher∣as the priuat man cannot by any publike right commaund ouer any other subiect, al∣though that he by priuat and domesticall commaunds rule and gouerne his owne fa∣milie. As for the Magistrat, for that he is to regard many persons, hee must oftentimes change his port, his gesture, his speech and countenance, for the good performance of his dutie towards all: which no man can well discharge, except he first know his duty towards his Soueraigne prince, as also how to submit himselfe vnto the other Magi∣strats his superiours, how to respect his equals, and how to commaund his inferiours, how to defend the weake, to withstand the great, and to doe iustice to all. And that is [ E] it, for which the auntients commonly said, Magistracie or authoritie to declare what was in a man, hauing as it were vpon the stage in the Theatre, and in the sight of all men, to performe the parts of many persons. And so also may we say, A man to show what his office is: For if he be such an one as he ought to be, hee graceth his place: whereas if he bee otherwise, hee debaseth not only the authoritie of his place and office; but euen of the maiestie of the state and Commonweale. So Liuie speaking of Quintus Flami∣nius, a man vnworthy his high place, saith of him, Non qui sibi honorem adiecisset, sed indignitate sua vim ac ius Magistratui quem gerebat dempsisset, That hee had not (by

his office) encreased his honour; but by the vnworthinesse of himselfe, impaired the [ F] force and power of the office which he bare.

Now the better to know what obedience the Magistrat oweth vnto his Soueraign, it is needfull first to vnderstand, what it is that a Soueraigne Prince may of right com∣maund* 1.816 euery Magistrat to doe. For why, the lawfull commands of Soueraigne Prin∣ces are right diuers, and vnlike themselues. Some of them seruing for perpetuall edicts or lawes concerning all persons, of what condition or qualitie soeuer they bee; or but for certaine persons, and for a certaine time, by way of prouision: othersome containe some priuilege or exemption contrarie to the edicts or lawes, for some one onely, or for some few of the subiects: or some graunt not contrarie vnto the law, or some reward for the good, or punishment for the euill, or some office or commission; or else serue [ G] for the expounding of some edict or priuilege, or for the denouncing of warre, or the making of peace, or for raising of souldiours, or for the erecting of Faires or Markets, or for the leuying of taxes, subsidies, fifteenes, new impositions, or loanes: or for the sending of ambassadours to congratulat the good haps of other princes; or to mone their misfortunes, or to entreat of marriages, and alliances, or other such like things; or for the building or fortifying of places to be fortified, for the repairing of bridges, hie wayes, ports or passages, or for to iudge of certaine suits and proceedings in the law, or for the execution of some commaunds, or for the maintenance of letters of iustice, or for the restoring of such as be vnder age, or of full age, or of such as be condemned, or for some particularitie, or for some remission, or pardon, which may bee of diuers [ H] sorts. Of which commaunds so before declared, some containe diuers kinds, as do pri∣uileges and graunts, whether it be for some gift giuen, or for exemption and immuni∣tie from all charges, or from some one: or letters of discharge, or of estate, or to haue the freedome of a citisen, or for to be made legitimat, or for nobilitie, or knighthood, or for the erecting of corporations or colleges, or other such like things. All which let∣ters may be diuided into two sorts, that is to say, into letters of iurisdiction or com∣maund, or letters of iustice or state. Albeit that the word Iubemus, or we commaund, be as well in the letters of iustice, as in the letters of grace and fauour, as is to bee seene in the lawes and letters pattents of the Greeke emperours. Yet the letters of grace, or which proceed from the onely power and authoritie of the prince, are properly in [ I] Fraunce called Mandements, or Commands; and the secretaries which dispatch them are also called the Secretaries of the Commaunds: whereas the letters of iustice are most commonly dispatched by the other secretaries; beside the difference of the great and little seale, and for the most part the diuersitie of the waxe: or the single or double labell, or the seale hanging in silke of diuers colours, making the difference of the letters to be knowne. The auntient Latines called such instructions as were by princes giuen to their ambassadours, or gouernours of countries, or generals of their armies, Manda∣ta Principum, or Princes Commands, which we do call by the name of of instructions: For so the word Mandat•…•… is taken in the law, where Iustinian the emperour saith, That [ K] hee had made a booke of Mandats or Commaundements for the gouernours of pro∣uinces.

But leauing the subtilitie of words, let vs go vnto the matter, and examine the force* 1.817 of the clauses commonly set downe in the letters patents and mandates of princes. And first these wordes, Vniuersis praesentibus & futuris (To all men present and to come) are ioyned onely vnto such letters patents as are to endure for euer: (howbeit that no worldly thing can so for euer continue) but not vnto temporarie edicts made by way of prouision, nor to commissions, nor to any other letters of prouision. But this clause, Quantum satis est &c. (so much as shall suffice) is of much greater impor∣tance,

& ordinarily ioyned vnto letters which they call letters of iurisdiction or iustice, [ A] whereby the prince leaueth vnto the discretion of him to whom such his letters are ad∣dressed, to allow of them, or to refuse them, as his conscience, and the equitie of the cause shall require: which is not in letters of commaundement which leaue nothing vnto him to whom they are directed, except happily sometimes the examination of the fact onely: as in these words, Si paret &c. (If it shall appeare vnto you &c.) In such* 1.818 sort that one may say of all sorts of charters or letters of iustice, albeit that they be gran∣ted by the prince, that they import not any commaund or constraint whatsoeuer vnto the magistrat to whom they are directed: But to the contrarie, that by our lawes and customes it is most religiously prouided, that the magistrats or judges should vnto such charters or letters haue no further respect, than in that they were agreeable with [ B] equitie and trueth. And although that the same forme of letters of justice, be graunted in England, as also in Spayne, and other kingdomes; yet so it is neuerthelesse, that it is done rather for the particular profit of some one, than for the greatnes or increasing of the maiestie of the king, (who graunted them by way of benefit vnto the partie) or for any necessitie there is thereof: seeing that the whole is remitted vnto the power of the magistrat, after the graunting of such letters, which was not before the graunt thereof. Which was the cause that the people in the assemblie of the Estates in parlia∣ment at Orleans, presented a request vnto the king for the cutting off of this formalitie of letters: as seruing not but to the oppressing of the people, without any profit ther∣out of to be drawne vnto the king or Commonweale. The auntient Greeks and La∣tins [ C] also neuer knew this forme of letters of iustice: but the magistrats vpon the request of the parties did as much as do our judges vpon the graunt of such letters of iustice. And the clause, Quantum satis erit quod liqueat (so much as may suffice for the mani∣festing of the matter) is the same which was conteined in the Praetors edicts, in this forme, Si qua mihi iusta causa videbitur, (if any iust cause shall seeme vnto me.) True it is that the power to correct, supply, and expound the lawes, concerning the ciuill iu∣risdiction, together with the restitution & relieuing of them which had beene circum∣uented, or deceiued by the formalities of the lawes, (a power before giuen vnto the Praetors by the vertue of their office) resteth now (I know not how) amongst the [ D] marks of soueraigne maiestie; and for this cause the Praetors authoritie and lawes were called honorable; which the interpretors of the law call Nobile officium. Wherefore as offices are confounded, when as the prince conuerteth vnto himselfe such things as belong vnto the magistrat▪ euen so also are the rights of soueraigntie impaired, when as they are by the magistrats vsurped. Now as for the declaration, and correcting of the edicts and lawes, we haue before said that it appettaineth and belongeth vnto them which haue the soueraigntie: But as for restitutions against the extremitie of the law, and all that concerneth letters of justice, it greatly appeareth not that the soueraigne princes haue much troubled themselues therewith, but haue left them to the magistrats to be in their name decided. I except only certain letters of iustice, which passe vnder the great Scale, and whereunto the aforesaid clause, If it shall be iust, If it shall be agreeable [ E] vnto equitie and truth, is inserted: which clause so much displeased a certaine great personage, holding one of the highest places of honour in this Realme, (who vnder∣stood not the force thereof) as that he would haue raced out the same; saying the ma∣iestie of the king to be thereby impaired▪ howbeit that he was therein to be excused, as being a straunger, and not well seene in the lawes and customes of a straunge coun∣trey. But how could the maiestie of kings be in this respect empaired or diminished? seeing that the auntient kings of Aegipt caused their magistrats solemnely to sweare,* 1.819 neuer to obey their commaundements, in case they commaunded them any thing

that was vniust: as we read in the sayings of the Aegiptian kings reported by Plutarch. [ F] Seeing therefore that the allowance or reiecting of letters of iustice directed in the kings name vnto the magistrats, dependeth of the equitie and discretion of the magi∣strats themselues, it needeth not vs to speake any more thereof. Wherefore let vs now proceed to those rescripts or letters of commaund, which for that they concerne the state of the Commonweale, and publique and not priuat causes, are called rescripts of State; or letters of commaund or state. Concerning which, a double question may be made: One whether such Rescripts or letters of the prince, containing onely the sim∣ple examination of the fact, without giuing any further hearing of the matter vnto the magistrat, according to the desert thereof; whether (I say) the magistrat fully informed of the truth of the fact according to the tenour of his letters, ought to proceed to the [ G] further execution thereof being vniust, or to hearken vnto the vniust commaunds of his prince? The other, whether the magistrat hauing neither power to examine the* 1.820 equitie nor truth of a matter, may refuse the vniust commaunds of his prince: the doubt therein being the greater, if they shall be thereunto by the prince more straitly vrged, or expresly commaunded: For sometime princes by their particular and secret letters, vse to request the magistrats; so with couert requests accompanying their vn∣iust commaunds: yea oftentimes in their letters patents their requests are ioyned with their commaunds, because they would not seeme to wrest all things from them against their wils; but to request many things of them: as when they say, We pray and com∣maund you, wherein the prince seemeth as in nothing more to derogate from his soue∣raigne [ H] maiestie: for if the thing be iust and honest which hee commaundeth, what needeth requests? if vniust or dishonest, why doth he commaund it? Now the magi∣strat is neuer to be requested to doe his dutie, or intreated not to doe wrong, or that which is vniust or dishonest, as Cato the Censor saith. Besides that, to commaund is a thing incompatible with request. It is wisely said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.821 Tyrants requestes to bee commaunds: wherefore let vs suppose no∣thing to be more straitly commaunded, than that which the prince seemeth by fyled speech or intreatie to persuade. Wherefore to resolue this point, if the princes letters giue vnto the magistrat neither the examination nor the hearing or disciding of the [ I] fact, or of the right and truth of the cause, but that onely the execution of the princes commaund be vnto him committed: the magistrat in this case may not in any sort take vpon him the examination or hearing of the matter; except the letters of com∣maund be notoriously false, faultie, or absurd, and contrarie to the lawes of God and nature (as we read of the commaunds of Pharao and Agrippa:) or else to robbe and spoile the poore people; as in our time Albert Marques of Brandeburg, who amongst other his notable cruelties, set vp sundrie gibbets in all such townes and cities as he had taken in, threatning his souldiours to hang them thereupon, if that contrarie to his commaund they should spare to robbe and spoile the poore inhabitants: albeit that he had neither true, nor yet any colourable cause, for his taking vp of armes against his [ K] countrey. Now if a man subiect vnto a particular Lord or Iustice, be not in law or right bound to obey him passing the bounds of his territorie, or the power to him gi∣uen, (albeit that the thing which hee commaundeth be both iust and honest) but may well refuse his commaund: how should the magistrat then be bound to obey or to put into execution the princes commaunds in things vniust and dishonest, the prince in this case transgressing and breaking the sacred bounds of the lawes both of God and nature? But some will say, no prince to be found so euill aduised, nor that it is to be sup∣posed that he would commaund any thing contrarie vnto the lawes of God and na∣ture: and true it is; for why he worthily loseth the title and honour of a Prince, which

departing from reason, and forgetting the dutie of a prince, breaketh the lawes of [ A] God and nature.

We haue before (as we suppose) sufficiently enough declared, what and how much* 1.822 a prince may doe by the right of his soueraigntie, from whence many things may be deriued pertinent vnto this question here in hand: for why it is not well to be vnder∣stood what obedience is by the magistrat due vnto the soueraigne maiestie, except the rights of Soueraigntie be before well vnderstood and fully knowne. But here the que∣stion is, what commaunds of the prince, and how farre the magistrat ought to execute the same? for sometime dishonest and vniust thinges are by princes commaunded, which the euill magistrats themselues do more willingly, and shamefully put in execu∣tion, than they were by the princes commaunded. As not long agoe in the time of the [ B] ciuill warres, (wherewith all Fraunce was on a light fyer) the president of the court of Normandie (whose name deserueth to be buried in perpetuall obliuion) beeing com∣maunded extraordinarily to leuie thirtie thousand crownes of them which professed the reformed religion, extorted from them three hundred thousand; and for so doing (the calamitie of the time considered) receiued a great reward. Howbeit that Tiberius the emperour (a man of incredible crueltie) sharply reproued the gouernour of Aegypt for exacting more of the subiects than he was commaunded: saying, Tonderioues meas non cutem detrahi volo, I would haue my sheepe shorne, but not flaine. If therefore the commaundement of the prince be not contrarie vnto the lawes of God and nature, the magistrat is to put it in execution, although it seeme to differ from the lawes of other [ C] nations: which lawes it is not against nature for the princes to chaunge, for the profit or disprofit of their Commonweales. For albeit that the princes (as wee haue said) ought to keepe the oath by him made vnto his people, if hee haue so bound him∣selfe by oath; and although hee were not by oath so bound, yet neuerthelesse of due∣tie ought to keepe the lawes and customes of the estate and Commonweal where∣of hee is soueraigne: yet for all that wee must not thereof conclude or gather, That if the prince doe in that case commaund any thing contrarie vnto his oath or the due∣tie of a Prince, that the Magistrat is therefore to refuse to obey his commaund. Forasmuch as it belongeth not vnto the Magistrat to examine or censure the do∣ings* 1.823 of his prince, or to crosse his proceedings concerning mans lawes, from which the [ D] prince may as he seeth cause derogat. Yet if the Magistrat bee commaunded by the Prince to abrogat an auntient law, being more vpright and profitable to giue way vn∣to another lesse iust, and lesse profitable for the Commonweale; he may stay the exe∣cution of such a law or commaundement in suspense, vntill he haue shewed his reasons therefore vnto the prince, which he is in dutie bound to do, not once, but euen twice or thrice: and then if the prince notwithstanding his remonstrances, will not by him be aduised, but refuse his wholsome and profitable admonition, and will needes haue the law to passe further; then the Magistrat (as hauing alreadie done his dutie) shall put it in execution: which he may also at the first commaund of his prince doe, if the de∣laying thereof be daungerous. And to that end and purpose tendeth that which is by [ E] Innocentius the fourth written, before he was Pope, That Magistrats ought to put in execution the princes commaunds, albeit that they be vniust: which is to bee vnder∣stood of ciuill iustice and vtilitie: but not if such commaunds bee contrarie to the lawes of nature. Which interpretation may serue also for the right vnderstanding of that which the lawyers say, That the prince may derogat euen from the law of nature. VVher∣in* 1.824 their meaning is, from the law of nations, and common constitutions of other peo∣ple: least any deceiued by the obscuritie of the words, or equiuocation of the law of na∣ture, should thereby rashly presume to breake the sacred lawes of God and nature.

Now if any man shall obiect and say, That the emperour Anastasius expresly com∣maunded, [ F] That the judges and Magistrats should not so much as suffer men to pro∣duce the princes rescripts or letters graunted vnto particular persons, contrarie to the generall edicts or lawes: Mine aunswere is, that that is to be vnderstood, if in such the princes rescripts or letters no speciall clause be comprehended, derogating from the ge∣nerall lawes: notwithstanding which derogation, yet the Magistrat ought neuerthe∣lesse to aduertise the prince thereof, and to put him in mind of his dutie: who if he be not by the Magistrats reasons to be remoued from his former opinion, but command the same the second time, the Magistrat is then to obey his commaund, although the thing so commaunded be not agreeing with the common profit, and contrarie vnto the lawes. For why, the Magistrat hauing so done his dutie, is not to expect but the [ G] second commaund; as is by the law prouided. To the example whereof the edict of Charles the ninth was made, concerning the magistrats admonitions vnto their prince. So long before this Theodosius the Great, at the request of Saint Ambrose the good bi∣shop of Milan, made a law, whereby he willed, That the execution of his letters pat∣tents and commaunds, should be holden in suspense thirtie dayes after the signification thereof, when he had commaunded any to be more rigorously punished than the vsual manner and custome was. The occasion of the making of which law was, the execu∣tion of seuen thousand Thessalians, put to death by the commaundement of this Theo∣dosius, for that they had murthered and slaine certaine of his Receiuers and Magistrats. For which cause Saint Ambrose excommunicated the emperour, neither would suf∣fer [ H] him to be reconciled, vntill he had made the aforesaid law. And hereof (as I sup∣pose) proceed those rescripts, which are yet vsed by the bishops of Rome: the first called Monitorie, the second Iussorie, and the third Executorie; or as we say in English, Edicts of admonition, of Commaund, and of Execution.

The same opinion we are to haue, if the prince by his letters patents command the* 1.825 Magistrat to proceed to the execution of the penaltie vppon them that haue offended against such his edicts and lawes, as by the antiquitie of themselues, or by the negli∣gence of the Magistrats seeme to haue bene quite forgotten and abrogated. For why, the long sufferance of the prince, and conniuence of the magistrats, in the sight and [ I] knowledge of whome the lawes are so broken, remitteth the penaltie due by the law: which could not otherwise haue bene infringed, by the abuse of them which transgres∣sed the same, had it by the prince or magistrat bene still looked vnto. And therefore the magistrat ought not rashly to proceed to the execution of the penaltie of such forgot∣ten or neglected lawes, before he haue caused the same to be againe republished, being by his default before neglected. Yea the prince ought rather to proceed against his magistrats, who through their remisse negligence haue suffered his edicts and lawes to be contemned. For otherwise it should be a thing verie vniust and sauouring of tyran∣nie, to make edicts and lawes, and after long neglecting of them, vpon a sodaine to pro∣ceed against them, who by the example of others, had transgressed against them, see∣ing [ K] others before them to haue escaped vnpunished. Which was one of the tyranni∣call slights of the most cruell emperour Nero, as of other auntient tyrants also. Wher∣as the good emperour Traian to the contrarie commaunded Plinie gouernour of the lesser Asia, of new to publish such edicts and lawes as were any wise before buried in obliuion, by the disobedience or errour of his subiects, or the sufferance of the magi∣strats: for that a common errour is reputed for a law, if the errour bee not against the law of nature, against which no errour can probably be pretended.

But some man may aske, Whether the magistrat owe obedience vnto such his princes commaunds, as shall vnto him seeme contrarie vnto the law of nature, albeit

that indeed they be not contrarie thereunto? For the equitie and reason which we call [ A] * 1.826 naturall, is not alwaies so cleere and manifest, but that it findeth impugners. Yea often∣times the greatest lawyers and philosophers are therein intangled, and of quite contra∣rie opinions, and the lawes of people are therein sometime so repugnant, as that some of them appoint reward, and some others punishment for the selfe same fact, whereof bookes, lawes, and histories are ful, all which to prosecute were a matter infinit. Wher∣unto I aunswere, that if that which the auntients say may take place, a man neuer ought to doe that whereof he doubteth, whether it be iust or not; and much lesse ought hee so to doe, if he be thereof certainly persuaded that the thing which the prince com∣maundeth, is of it selfe by nature vniust. But if question be of ciuill iustice onely, the* 1.827 magistrat ought in such case to verifie and put in execution his princes commaunds, al∣though [ B] he thinke them to be in ciuill equitie or law vniust. And therfore the magstrats in euerie Commonweale were compelled to sweare to obserue the lawes and ordinan∣ces; to the end they should not call into dispute or question, that which they ought to hold, as before resolued vpon. And this was the manner and custome of the Romans when the old magistrats receiued the oath of the new, before they entred into their charge: which was commonly done vpon the calends of Ianuarie, in the capitoll, after solemne sacrifices there made: for otherwise the magistrat lost his place of estate, if hee tooke not his oath within fiue daies after. Yea sometimes the Tribunes which held the estate of the people constrained them in particular which had withstood the pub∣lishing of a law, to sweare to obserue the same, after that it was once published, and that [ C] vpon the paine of banishment. So L. Metellus Numidicus was by a decree of the peo∣ple banished, for refusing to sweare vnto the lawes published at the instance of the fa∣ctious Tribune Saturninus. So also after that the lawes of Lewes the twelfth were published in the high court of the parliament of Paris: for that many disliked of the same, the kings atturney generall there made a request, That they might be duely ob∣serued, and prohibition giuen for any man to call them in doubt, and that vpon paine of high treason; as is to be seene in the records of the court. For why, it is lawfull for* 1.828 euerie man before the publishing of the law, to despute and reason of the equitie there∣of: which to doe after the publication thereof, is not lawfull. And so, before that, when [ D] as king Lewes the eleuenth had commaunded certaine vniust decrees of his to be publi∣shed in the court of the parliament at Paris: the court refused to yeeld thereunto, for that they seemed vnto euerie man vniust: but the king neuerthelesse still vrging his for∣mer requests, ioyned thereunto grieuous threats also; as that they should loose their heads that would not yeeld thereunto. Which thing Lauacr•…•…e, president of the parlia∣ment* 1.829 vnderstanding, accompanied with the rest of the judges of that honourable court in their red robes, came vnto the king, not to excuse the fault by him and the rest com∣mitted, in refusing the kings vniust decrees, but to show the reasons of their such refusall, and to request, That he with the rest might rather bee put to death, than enforced to giue their consent to the publishing of the propounded lawes. The king beholding the grauitie, the port, and dignitie of these persons, and almost abashed with the so con∣stant [ E] resolution of such his great magistrats, and withall doubting the power and au∣thoritie of the parliament, caused those his decrees so much misliked, to bee abrogated, and in their presence torne in peeces, requesting them to continue so still to maintaine iustice; solemnly protesting neuer more to send vnto them any edict which should not be both iust and reasonable. It is a wonderfull thing to say of what power and moment this thing was to keepe the king within the bounds of reason, who otherwise had alwayes vsed his absolute power and commaund. As before hee came vnto the kingdome, being as yet Dauphin, he caused the presidents of the court of Paris to bee

called before him▪ to rase out the clause, De expresso mandato (by expresse commaunde∣ment) [ F] which the court had caused to be put vnto the confirmation of the priuileges graunted vnto the countie of Maine, protesting, That he would neuer goe out of the citie, vntill it were done, or yet take vppon him the charge by the king committed vn∣to him. Whereupon the court indeed commaunded those words to bee cancelled: but yet that the cancelling might appeare, commaunded the acts to be kept, which are* 1.830 yet preserued vndefaced. Now these words, De expresso mandato, and De expressissimo mandato, whereunto these words are also sometimes annexed, Multis vicibus iterato (or oftentimes repeated) which are many times to be found in the records of soueraign courts ioyned vnto the publication of the princes edicts and decrees, haue this illation or meaning, that such edicts and priuileges (graunted by the princes expresse comman∣dement) [ G] should not be so precisely kept, but that shortly after they might by the suffe∣rance of the magistrats be againe forgotten and neglected, as not much regarded. And by this secret of the courts, hath the state of this kingdome bene preserued in the great∣nesse thereof: which otherwise would haue bene ruinated by the flatterers of princes, who by such extorted priuileges scrape vnto themselues whatsoeuer they desire: and the good kings not stil able to satisfie the hungry courtiers, sometimes wel eased, which haue vsed these restrictions, being so of their subiects well beloued, the confirmation of such edicts and priuileges not carrying with them any effect vnto the subiect, or diso∣bedience vnto the king to giue good words, or charge of conscience vnto the magistrat in not performing it. [ H]

But yet farther question might be made, VVhether a magistrat may bee suffered to* 1.831 giue vp his place, rather than he will allow an edict, a commission, or commandement from his prince, which he for certaine thinketh to be vniust and contrarie vnto naturall reason, when as the equitie of it is called in question, & especially if the other magi∣strats and multitude of the people shall hold it to be iust, contrarie to the others. For the force of iustice, and power of vpright reason, is not perceiued but of the fewer and wiser sort: and a wise man being as it were the rule of reason, is of all others the grea∣test enemie vnto the multitude. VVhich if it be so, why should a wise man bee enfor∣ced to giue his consent vnto the multitude of mad magistrats. In which case I say, that the magistrat is not to be suffered to giue vp his place, if it please not his soueraign [ I] prince he should so do, but ought rather to bee constrained to obey his princes com∣maunds, if the equitie thereof being called in doubt, be approued by the greater part of the magistrats, which haue charge to confirme such edicts: For otherwise if they should be permitted to giue vp their places, rather than to passe an edict approued by others, it would open a perilous gap to all the subiects, by their example to refuse and reiect the edicts and commaunds of their prince: and so euerie one in his charge might leaue the Commonweale vnto danger, and expose it vnto the tempest, as a ship with∣out a Rudder, and that vnder the shadow of an opinion of iustice▪ which may haply be but a deuise of a subtill braine, to no other purpose than to contradict the more com∣mon [ K] opinion. And therefore among the most lawdable laws made by Lewes the xij, there is one which importeth, That if the judges be of three or moe opinions, those which were the fewer in number should be constrained to conforme and ioyne them∣selues vnto one of the greater parties, for the concluding of the decrees. VVhereupon the court of Paris of long time doubted, whether this law should be published or not: for that it seemed a very hard and a most strange thing vnto many, to force the consci∣ence of the judges contrarie to their owne opinions, and so enforce them to iudge contrarie to that they ought, and that especially in such things as were committed vn∣to the wisedome and deuotion of the judges, as are almost all both publike and priuat

iudgements. Yet neuerthelesse after the court had considered of inconueniences which [ A] it saw ordinarily to arise vpon the varietie of opinions, and that the course of iustice, and the concluding of many good decrees, was thereby also often letted, the court confir∣med the aforesaid law, which by processe of time hath bin found to be most iust & pro∣fitable. Hereunto also agreeth the maner and custome of the antient Romans: for their judges oftentimes to change their opinions, and to ioine themselues vnto the greater part, albeit that they were not thereunto constrained. As is to bee seene in Plinie, of a iudgement wherin one part of the iudges had condēned the guiltie person vnto death, another part had cleerely and fully acquited him, and the third part had for a time bani∣shed him: in this diuersitie of opinions, as well they which had before acquited him, as they which had condemned him to death, consented both to them which would haue [ B] him banished. But our law is in that point better, which compelleth the fewer to ioyne themselues vnto the more. For in all corporations & colledges reason would, that that which pleaseth the greater part should take place and preuaile, as strengthened with the most voices. Howbeit that in all such consultations and actions the rule of the aunti∣ent wise neuer faileth; which willeth, That of many honest and profitable things pro∣pounded vnto vs, we should chuse those which be most honest, and most profitable: and so of many inconueniences and daungers, to make choice of the least: for other∣wise mens actions should neuer sort to good end. And a man may also say, That the equitie of a law is not properly naturall, if it bee obscure or doubtfull; for that true na∣turall iustice is more cleere and resplendent than the brightnesse of the sunne, as not [ C] wrapped vp in obscuritie, nor depending of the erroneous opinions of men, but of the most cleere and immutable wisedome of the euerlasting.

And yet neuerthelesse since the law of Lewes the xij. I find not that any magistrat hath giuen vp his place, as fearing to be inforced to maintaine or yeeld to any opinion contrarie vnto his conscience: and especially since the places of justice were giuen vnto men for vertue, and not for reward and fauour. Neither hath the law of Lewes the xij. at any time constrayned the judges to iudge contrarie vnto their conscience, but hath rather silently giuen them leaue to giue vp their places; howbeit that it were more equitie so to constraine them, than to leaue it vnto their will and pleasure. For which cause the kings Attourneyes general haue oftentimes constrained the Iudges to iudge [ D] according vnto Lawes and customes of the land, albeit that all the Iudges were of con∣trarie opinion. As I remember that whilest I was at Tholouse, one Bartholomew Pre∣sident of one of the Chambers of Inquirie, seeing all the counsellours of his court of one and the same opinion in a suit, and directly against the law: after he had assembled all the rest of the courts vpon the matter, he constrayned them to change their opini∣ons, and to iudge according to the law; And that iustly also: for who enforced thee to seeke for thine office? or to accept of it being offered thee? and hauing taken it vpon thee, (being happily got either by suspending of voices, or by sure, or briberie,) and be∣ing sworne, wilt thou now forsweare the lawes, which thou mightest before haue red, or at least wise oughtest to haue red? wilt thou by thy false opinion of the law and [ E] iustice, wrong the place thou bearest? delude the lawes? or forsake thy prince and Commonweale.

Yet sometime it happeneth that such lawes as of themselues seeme vnto euery man* 1.832 most iust, may vpon some suddein occurent appeare and proue to be most vniust. In which case, whereas the wrong is in the fact presented plaine and euident, wise magi∣strats vse to certifie the king thereof, (as I remember it to haue most oftentimes bene done in the parliament at Paris,) who imparting the matter vnto his Counsell, doth as he seeth cause derogate from the positiue law; or adde some thing vnto the same:

(which our men call the exposition or declaration of the law) a thing properly belong∣ing [ F] vnto the soueraigntie of a Prince, as we haue before declared. So that in this case, it is not lawfull for the magistrat to iudge against the law, although he may suspend his sentence vntill that the Princes pleasure be further knowne. But otherwise the law being cleare and without difficultie, the magistrat is to iudge according thereunto without disputing of the equitie thereof: for otherwise if the judge shall wittingly and wilfully iudge contrarie vnto the law, he is by the lawes themselues noted of infamie: but if he shall so iudge of ignorance, or supposing himselfe to iudge according vnto the law; he is not therefore to be accounted infamous: howbeit that such his iudgement is of it selfe void, as if it had not beene giuen at all, in such sort as that a man by the auntient Roman law need not at all to appeale therefrom. [ G]

Now there is great difference whether question be of the lawes alreadie established, or of those which yet are by the magistrat to be published. For why, such as be alreadie established, euery man is bound to keepe, and especially the magistrats, who if they wittingly swarue therefrom, (beside the penaltie appointed by the law) are subiect also vnto the note of infamie, as periurours and forsworne men. But as for such Edicts and* 1.833 lawes as are not yet published, but are but as yet presented vnto the magistrats to be confirmed and published, of them it behoueth the greater magistrats (to whom the publication of lawes especially appertaineth) well to consider, and to show the reasons if they shall dislike of them vnto the prince, albeit that it concerne but the particular interest of some one priuat person; but much more, in case it concerne the great harme [ H] or good of the Commonweale: which good if it be verie great, may in some sort co∣uer the iniustice of the law; (as the auntient states-men say.) Yet must we not proceed so farre in respecting of the publike profit be it neuer so great, as therefore to forget rea∣son, and to be caried headlong with wrong and iniustice: as were in auntient time the Lacedemonians, who measured all iustice by the common profit, whereunto they directed all their lawes, all their iudgements, and counsels; so that if that were once in question, neither oath, nor reason, nor iustice, nor yet the law of nature was by them* 1.834 once respected. But much better it were for the Commonweale, and more beseeming the dignitie of the magistrat, of himselfe to giue vp his office (as did the Chauncelour [ I] of Philip the second, duke of Burgundie) than to giue way vnto a law that is contrarie vnto the lawes of God and nature, or that in euery mans iudgement seemeth to be dis∣honest or vniust; howbeit the Duke seeing the irremoueable constancie of his Chaun∣celour, readie to giue vp his office, thought it better to reuoke such his commaunds, than to want so stout & wise a man. Which so constant resolutions of the magistrats, hath oftentimes preserued Princes from infamie, lawes from decay, and Common∣weales* 1.835 from destruction. But when such constancie cannot heale the diseases of the Commonweale, or faults of soueraigne princes; and that the prince commaundeth the magistrats, to haue his actions excused vnto his subiects; it is much better for the ma∣gistrat to obey his commaund, and in so doing to couer and burie the memorie of a [ K] wicked fact alreadie done, than in refusing so to do, to irritate the prince to the doing of worse; and so (as they say) to cast the helue after the hatchet. As did Papinian the great Gouernour of the empire, (and by Seuerus the Emperour in his will appointed Tutor vnto the yong emperours Anthonius Caracalla, and Geta his sonnes) who by Caracalla commaunded to excuse vnto the Senat the murder by him committed vpon the person of his brother Geta, would therein do nothing, but cut him off with this sharpe and short answere, saying, That murthers were more hardlie excused, than com∣mitted: which was of him more stoutly then wisely said. For Caracalla with this aun∣swere enraged, and yet not satisfied with his brothers blood, in his rage commaunded

Papinian also to be slaine: and after the death of him so great a man, (as who alone [ A] might haue gouerned the furious yong prince, and repressed his rage) neuer ceased without any contradiction or controulment to kill, murther, and tyrannize, vntill such time as he had brought himselfe together with the Empire vnto destruction. Which I would not haue to bee so vnderstood, as spoken of vs in any respect to impaire the worthie praises of so notable a man, (for that can in no wise be done) but that magi∣strats may hereby vnderstand, how farre they are to beare with the saults of princes, which once done, cannot by them be amended. For had Papinian couered that he could not now amend, he had saued his owne life, and counterpeased the tyrannies and cruelties of the Emperour, who alwaies before had him in greatest honour and regard. Which fault in Papinian I haue thought good to note, for that many haue [ B] right highly commended him for the same▪ without respecting, that such his resistance auailed nothing, but brought an irrepairable losse vnto the affaires of the empire, be∣ing so depriued of so great a personage, as might therein doe more than any other; for that he was a prince of the blood, and the greatest magistrat in the state. But had the matter then stood whole and entier, and that the Emperour had commaunded him to put his brother Geta to death, he had then done both stoutly and wisely in refusing so to doe, and had had iust cause rather to die than to consent to that vnnaturall fact, for one brother to murther another. But Seneca and his companion Burra (the gouernors of Nero) shall be for euer blamed, as hauing no excuse to pretend for their most wicked counsell, persuading Nero to kill his mother, who by chaunce had escaped drowning: [ C] which most cruell counsell, commaund, or fact, shall together with the authors thereof be for euer crowned with eternall infamie and shame.

But what if the prince shall command any thing to be done, and that the same thing* 1.836 being begun to be put in execution, he changing his mind shall reuoke his former com∣maund; shall the magistrat in this case stay from proceeding any further, or go on with that he hath begun? Whereunto a man at the first sight would say, That he ought to stay and to proceed no farther: following therein the maximes of the law. Howbeit to aunswere rightly thereunto, the matter is by distinction to be opened; that is to wit, that if the thing so begun may be left off without the publike harme, it is then so to bee [ D] left off according to the last commaund: but if it be so begun, as that it cannot bee left off, whithout the manifest hurt of the state and Commonweale; the magistrat in this case is to proceed on with that he hath so begun, notwithstanding the latter counter∣maund, and that especially in matters of warre; as wee haue before said. And to this* 1.837 purpose Marcellus the Consull saith, Multa magnis ducibus sicut non aggredienda, ita se∣mel aggressis non dimittenda. As many things are not of great captaines to be at all ta∣ken in hand: so being once by them vndertaken, are not by them to bee againe giuen ouer. And this in time of warre. But if at home the magistrat following the comman∣dement to him giuen, hath begun to execute the condemned, or them that the prince hath commaunded to be put to death, he ought forthwith to surcease from any further execution, if the commaundement be reuoked: and not to do, as did the Consull Fului∣us, [ E] who hauing taken the citie of Capua, as he was punishing the authors of the rebelli∣on, and had now caused the greater part of the Senators of that citie to bee beheaded, receiuing letters from the Senat of Rome, willing him to stay and cease the execution, put those letters in his bosome, without reading of them, & doubting of the contents thereof, proceeded to the execution of the rest, vntill he had put to death fourescore of them. True it is, that the Senat had no power in any thing to commaund the Con∣suls (as we haue before said) yet for all that, the gouernours of prouinces, and the gene∣rals of the Roman armies, yea a•…•…d the Consuls also, vsed most commonly to be obedi∣ent

vnto the Senate, and to yeelde vnto the decrees thereof, as vnto lawes. And truely [ F] the principall cause why they of Gaunt put to death sixe and thirty of their lawyers, after the death of Charles Duke of Burgundy, was for nothing else, but for that they had condemned a citisen to death, after the death of the Duke; before they were a∣gaine confirmed in their authoritie and office, although it was not a thing altogether necessarie; as with like examples wee haue declared. Yea it is almost a perpetuall thing, for them which are in authoritie and haue power to commaund, to bee able of their owne right to execute that was commanded them, yea after that the time of their authoritie is expired, if he that gaue them the authoritie and charge knowing and wit∣tingly shall dissemble the fact, or not forbid it when he might.

Now all that we haue hitherto said, is to be vnderstood onely of such letters or re∣scripts [ G] of commaund, as yet carrie with them no power for the magistrat to examine the fact or matter they concerne. But then what shall wee say, if such rescripts or com∣maunds report such things as certainely knowne and true, which yet are neither pub∣likely, nor vnto the magistrat so knowne to be. Heere we must againe consider, whe∣ther* 1.838 the examination of the matter, be by speciall commaund expresly taken from the magistrat, or else left vnto him: if it be left vnto him, there is then no doubt, but that the magistrat may and ought to enquire of the truth of such things, as are reported in the princes rescripts or letters: but if al examination of the matter be taken from the ma∣gistrat, then some doubt, whether he may inquire of the truth thereof or not; and espe∣cially if it be expressed in the rescript or mandate, that the prince being well enformed [ H] of the truth, commaundeth the magistrat to proceede to the execution of his letters or commaunds: howbeit the best opinion is, that the magistrat both in the one case and the other, ought to examine the truth of the matter. For when to inquire of the truth of the cause, is neither forbidden nor commaunded, although it bee expressed in the princes rescripts or letters, to proceede to execution, yet ought the magistrat neuer∣thelesse to examine the truth of the mater. And to the intent, that the magistrats should not pretend to excuse themselues by ignorance, the emperour Constantine, prouided by an expresse law, that the magistrats should inquire, whether these things were true or not, which were set downe in his rescripts or letters of commaund, whether it were so in them expressed, or left out. And as for the other point, if in the rescripts or letters, [ I] it be expresly set downe to proceede to execution, for that the prince is well enformed of the truth of the matter; yet neuerthelesse ought the magistrat to examine the truth thereof: notwithstanding the clause which I haue said, which ought not to hinder the examination of the matter, nor to be preiudiciall to any other mans right; and so much lesse vnto the publike, and least of all vnto the truth: and so generally, all such narra∣tiue clauses as are but reported in rescripts, mandates, commissions, lawes, priviledges, testaments, and sentences, cannot be any thing preiudiciall vnto the truth. And albeit, that during the tyranny of the Sforces, they made a law, that all faith and credence should be giuen vnto the princes commaunds and letters; yet was the same law againe [ K] disanulled, after that they were by the French, driuen out of the estate of Milan. And if the faith and credite must needes bee giuen vnto the narratiue clauses of princes re∣scripts and letters of commaund, that is to bee vnderstood, onely of such clauses, as whereby the obscure places of their edicts, and lawes, commissions, mandates, or iudge∣ments are expounded, which none can better declare, then they themselues that made them; howbeit, that such their declarations ought rather to be called decrees, then ex∣positions or declarations. But if the prince shall in the bestowing of offices, places of charge, or other his grants in his rescripts or letters, testifie for the fidelity, integrity, wisedome, or religion of any man, it is so farre from, that the magistrat should rest con∣tented

with that testification, as that hee ought therefore with greater diligence to in∣quire [ A] * 1.839 of him, for that the prince supposed him to be indeede such, and would not haue such benefits or preferments bestowed vpon an ignorant or vnwise man. But contrary wise, if the prince shall simply giue vnto any man an office or place of commaund, he is no farther by the magistrat to bee inquired of, for that the prince in his wisedome hath thought him worthy such honour and place; if the prince first giue him not leaue so to doe, or that the custome of the country so require: as in the latter times they did in Rome; but afterwards, almost •…•…ery where: but especially in the appointing of iud∣ges. So also in antient time, in the raigne of the Gothes, triall was made of the Sena∣tors, before they were to bee admitted into the Senate. For Theodoric, king of the Gothes, writing vnto the Roman Senate, for the receiuing of a new Senator, saieth, [ B] Admittendos in Senatum examinare cogit sollicitus honor Senatus▪ the care (we haue) of the honour of the Senate, causeth vs to examine such as are to be admitted into the Senate.

But if any man vnder a false pretensed colour shall encroach vppon the prince the profits and commodities vnto him graunted, being in the princes rescript expressed, yet is he thereof by the magistrat to be embarred; and the rather, if the common treasure be with immoderat gifts exhausted: vnto which disease euerie where spreading, remedie might be giuen, if the law of Valois concerning gifts might take place. For Philip Va∣lois the French king, commaunded those gifts and graunts to bee reuoked from them, who in the letters of such gifts or graunts, had not expressed what they or any other [ C] for them, had for the same cause in the letters of their graunts, before obtained; which yet also is in vse in Millan. For seeing that it much concerneth the Commonweale what money and profit, what rewards, and priuileges, euery man obtaine•…•…h, the magi∣strats* 1.840 must thereunto haue a most vigilant eye, and especially in popular estates, wher∣in as all publike things lie open vnto the spoyle of all men; so for the same cause occasi∣on is ministred vnto the seditious, to the trouble and oftentimes to the ruine of the Commonweale. And for this cause it was most straitly prouided by a law in the twelue tables, that no priuilege or dispensation might in any wise be graunted, and that vpon paine of death, but onely in the great assembly of the whole estate of the people: the words of the law being these, Priuilegia nisi Commitijs Centuriatis ne irroganto, qui [ D] secus faxit Capital esto, •…•…et no priuilege be graunted, but in the great and general assem∣bly of the people: and he that shall otherwise doe, let him die the death. And after that Constantine the emperour writing vnto the people, saith, Nec d•…•…mnosa fi•…•…co, nec legibus contraria impetrari oportet, •…•…t is not fit, things hurtfull vnto the common treasure, or* 1.841 contrarie vnto the laws, to be obtained▪ howbeit that all priuileges are directly con∣trarie vnto the law; for otherwise they should not be priuileges. And i•…•… it bee so, that they must needs passe after the second commaund (as we haue before said) yet besee∣meth it the magistrat to cut them short, and to interpret them in strictest maner that he can, and to the least hurt of the Commonweale, as things odious, and contrarie vnto the law; and not by fauourable interpretations to encrease their strength, or to draw [ E] them into consequence, as heretofore haue the judges and the clergie, which by their faire gloses, haue drawne the profit and priuileges graunted onely vnto souldiors, vnto themselues also; vsing these faire gloasing words, of worldly Souldiours and heauenly Souldiours: so laying all the burthen vpon the poore countrey man, vnto whom the same priuileges ought of better right to be communicated than to them.

But for that our purpose is not here to enter into the disputing of priuileges, which* 1.842 were a thing infinit, sufficeth it in passing by, in generall to aduertise the magistrat to haue speciall regard vnto the priuileges by princes graunted, and most straitly to exa∣mine

them, what good report soeuer the prince therin make of him that hath obtained [ F] such priuilege: For that euery man well knoweth, that the prince oftentimes knoweth not them to whome such priuileges are graunted; vnworthy men still not so much ob∣taining them, as indeed wresting them from princes, euen as it were against their wils: no craft or subtiltie in this case left vnsought out, to defraud the lawes, and abuse the prince and magistrats, and that with so many shifts and quirkes of words, and so much deceit, as that they seeme hardly to be by the magistrat to be met withal, but by plaine force. Such is that clause, De motu proprio (of our owne meere motion) which inuen∣ted at Rome, hath from thence crept abroad into all Europe. For why, there is almost neither king nor kesar, which when question is for the breaking of a law, or repealing an edict, or for giuing way vnto dispensations and priuileges, ioyneth not thereunto [ G] this clause, De motu nostro proprio (Of our owne proper motion) howbeit that the same princes haue bene importuned, and as it were enforced to graunt that euen vnto vnknowne and most vnworthy men, for whome they haue bene so importunatly re∣quested. There is at Rome a field called Flory, or Flourishing, not so much for the plentie of flowers, as of witnesses that are therein; out of which euerie man may take testimonies, for the bestowing of benefices vpon them which dwell euen in the remo∣test places of Asia and Affrica, and that with these words, De motu proprio. By which onely clause, all the fraud and deceit of them that sued for preferment, be they neuer so bad or vniust, are easily excused: and by vertue of which words the examination of all slye incommings or craftie intrusions, cease, if wee will receiue the opinion of some [ H] most pernitious and daungerous vnto the state: but such sleights and deceits wee haue long since bid farewell out of our Commonweale. And for that princes and magistrats circumuented with the wiles of deceitfull men, could hardly, or not at all escape the same, it was wisely decreed, That the princes rescripts, nor letters pattents, should be of none effect, except they were presented vnto the magistrat the same yere that they were obtained; neither should be of any force, before they were by the magistrat approued. And yet it seemeth vnto me, that the law of Milan is better, that is to wit, that the prin∣ces mandats and letters pattents directed vnto the Senat, were not to be receiued after the yeare expired: neither those that were directed vnto the magistrat after a moneth [ I] were past: and that not onely the yeare and day, but euen the verie howre also, should be therein set downe, as the manner is almost throughout all Germanie; following therein the opinion of many great lawyers, to stop the suits and controuersies which oft times arise for gifts, offices, and benefices graunted vnto diuers in one day, as it was decreed by the parliament at Blois, at the request there made by Bodin deputie of Ver∣mandois.

But what if the prince by his rescript or letters pattents, shall expresly forbid the ma∣gistrat* 1.843 to examine the truth of such things as are contained in them, albeit that they be false or doubtfull; ought the magistrat in this case to examine the matter? And it seemeth that he ought so to doe: For we haue before said, that hee may, and ought to [ K] examine the cause, and enquire of the truth of things expressed in the princes rescripts and letters, albeit that the prince therein declare himselfe to know the truth thereof. Yet for all that, I say, that it belongeth not vnto the magistrat in this case to passe be∣yond the prohibition of his soueraigne prince: For there is great difference when the prince declareth, That he knoweth the truth; and when he forbiddeth to enquire ther∣of: For in him it is to be presumed, that he hath bene circumuented, and so mistaking things false for true, and things vnknowne for knowne, to haue commaunded them so to be put into his rescript, which he would not haue done, had hee beene truely thereof enformed: As if hee should giue a judges place vnto a souldior, or a captaines place

vnto a lawyer, neither the one nor the other ought by the magistrat to be admitted or [ A] receiued, although the souldiour were commonly called a lawier, and the lawier a souldiour, such pretended qualitie hauing happely giuen occasion vnto the prince to be so in his graunt deceiued. But when the prince shall expresly forbid the magistrat to examine the fact or matter, it is to be presumed, that he well knoweth that which he doth, and that he would not that the magistrat should farther enquire thereof. Yet may the magistrat well vse the remedie by vs before spoken of, and show the prince the truth, and the importance of his commaund, with the inconueniences and harmes en∣suing thereof, and so in what he may to draw him from his former purpose: and hauing so discharged his duetie, yet neuerthelesse then to yeeld his obedience, if he shall be a∣gaine so commaunded: for otherwise the maiestie of a prince or Commonweal should [ B] be but a mockerie, as still subiect vnto the controlement of the magistrates. Besides that, it is much more also to be feared, least that the other magistrates, by the example of one or two, and after them other priuat men also, should presume to contemne the princes commaund, to the great endangering and ruine of the Commonweale.

Now if a man should say that a Prince ought not to commaund any thing that is dishonest or vniust, he therein sayth well: neither ought the prince (if it were possible) to commaund any thing not beseeming his honour, or that were so much as subiect vnto reprehension or slaunder, or knowing the magistrates to be of contrarie opinion vnto his, to constraine them thereunto: for that the ignorant and common people is no way more moued vnto disloyaltie, and contempt of their princes edicts and lawes, [ C] then to see the magistrates hardly delt withall, and the lawes by them contrarie to their* 1.844 good liking published and forced. But now here the question is, what the magistrat ought to doe, in case the prince forgetting his duetie, commaund any thing contrarie to the common profit and ciuill iustice; yet prouided still that it be not against the law of God and nature: whether the magistrat ought to obey such his princes commaund, or to giue vp his place? And if so it be, that the worldly magistrat ought to be obeyed, albeit that he commaund such things as are vniust: Ne Praetoris matestas contempta vi∣deatur, Lest the maiestie of the Praetor should seeme to be contemned (as saith the law) how much more then ought men to obey their soueraigne Prince, of the maie∣stie [ D] of whom all magistrates depend? Now it is in many lawes repeated that we must obey the magistrat, whether the thing that he commaundeth be iust or not, following the counsell of all the wise which haue hereof written. And to this purpose saith Ci∣cero (albeit that he was a mortall enemie vnto the Tribunes of the people) that men were to obey euen the vniust oppositions of the Tribunes, in these words: Parere iu∣be•…•… lex intercessori, quo nihil praestantius: impediri enim bonam rem melius est, quàm con∣cedi malè, The law (saith he) commaundeth vs to obey the magistrat that opposeth himselfe, then which nothing is better: for better it is a good thing to be crossed then euill graunted. And before he had said: Nihil exitiosius ciuitatibus, nihil tam contra∣rium iuri ac legibus, nihil minùs ciuile & humanum, quàm composita & constituta re∣publica quicquam agi per vim, Nothing is more dangerous vnto cities, nothing more [ E] contrarie vnto right and law, nothing more vnciuill or inhumaine, then in a well or∣dered* 1.845 and setled Commonweale to haue any thing done by force. We oft times see the subiects to take vp armes against their prince, the lawes violated, and iustice go to wracke, and all for the false opinion that the people haue of the equitie and integritie of the judges, refusing to verifie and put in execution the Edicts and commaunds of their prince. O but say they it is an vniust Edict or law, neither can we, nor ought we, to obey the same: an honest speech, if indeed thou canst not; but where learnedst thou that thou oughtest not? from whence haddest thou that doctrine? wilt thou (being a

magistrat) with stripes, imprisoment, fines, yea, and with death it selfe enforce priuat [ F] men to obey, yea euen thine vniust commaunds, and yet thy selfe not obey the com∣maundement of thy Prince? But thou wilt denie thine owne commaunds to be vniust: so doth the prince also denie that which he commaundeth to be so: shalt thou now be iudge herein, or he? or if thou wilt needs be iudge, why shouldst thou not thinke to suffer the same in thine owne decrees concerning priuat men. Besides that, as no man enforced thee to take vpon thee thine office, so no man forbiddeth thee to giue vp the same, if the law thou likest not seeme to thee so vniust: it is therefore the desire of bearing rule, that maketh thee that thou wouldest beare rule ouer priuat men, and yet not obey thy prince thy selfe. Wherefore let vs vpon this conclude, it to be much better in all obedience to stoupe vnto the soueraigne maiestie, than in refusing of his [ G] soueraigne commaunds to giue example and occasion of rebellion vnto the subiects; yet still keeping the respects that we haue before set downe, and especially when it concerneth the honour of God, which is and ought to bee vnto all subiects greater, and more precious than the wealth, the life, the honour of all the princes of the world. And to know how a man should beare himselfe herein, amongst many examples we will vse but one or two. Saul commaunded all the priests of God without iust cause in his presence to be slaine, yet was there no man which refused not his vngodly com∣maund, except Doeg, who himselfe alone performed that so cruell an execution. An other notable example there is of one Petronius gouernour of Syria, who receiued* 1.846 commaundement to place the image of Caligula the emperour, in the fairest place of [ H] the Temple of Hierusalem, as it had beene in all other Temples of the empire: how∣beit that the Iewes had neuer suffered those images to stand in their Temples, but had still cast them downe, and broken and beaten them all to peeces, euen to the verie shieldes of the emperours, which they had there placed. Whereof Petronius aduerti∣sed the Emperour, and that it could not be done without great trouble and slaughter of the people: wherewith Caligula more incensed, sent more expresse and strait com∣maund vnto Petronius, to assemble all the old bands of his garison souldiours in those quarters, and so with a puissant armie to put his commission in execution. Of whose comming the Iewes hearing, left their Townes, and the tillage of their grounds, and so in great companies all vnarmed, went to meet him, if happily they so might by their [ I] humble prayers intreat him; telling him withall, that they ought not so much to feare any mortall man, as to commit so abhominable a sinne against the maiestie of the im∣mortall God: and therfore most humbly requested him to take in good part such their constant resolution, which was rather to die, than to see so great an abhomination, as the most sacred Temple of God to be so polluted with the images of men. Neuerthe∣lesse Petronius told them that it concerned his life, to performe his commission: and so to terrifie them the more, marched with his armie vnto Tiberias, (as supposing him∣selfe to doe nothing contrarie to his owne religion, or to the lawes of God or man) but there the people came running vnto him from all parts, disarmed, and resolued all [ K] to die, rather than to see the image set vp in the Temple, humbling themselues, and bowing their heads before the armie wherewith Petronius had beset them round: who seeing the great constancie of the people, and their exceeding zeale towards the honour of their God, as to chuse rather to die, than so much as to see the image of 2 man in the Temple of God; wonderfully moued therewith, and with their pitifull complaint and teares, (and being himselfe also a man of a courteous and milde nature, and farre from that crueltie, which the Iewes feared not whatsoeuer it had beene) he commaunded them all to returne home; promising againe to write in their behalfe vn∣to the Emperour, and rather himselfe to die than to execute his commission, accoun∣ting

his life a worthie ransome for the sauing of the guiltles blood of so many innocent [ A] people. Neuerthelesse Caligula therewith the more enraged, sent vnto him a new com∣maund, with grieuous threats to put him vnto the most grieuous torture that he could possibly deuise, if he forthwith put not his commission in execution, according to his commaund. But the ship, together with them that brought the commission, was by force of tempest caried an other way, and newes brought into Iurie of the death of the tyrant, before that the cruell commission could come thither. And so Petronius hauing discharged his conscience towards God, his duetie towards his prince, and well showed his great loue toward the subiects, and discharged all the parts of a most wise Gouer∣nour: was himselfe by the diuine prouidence wonderfully preserued from the cruelties vnto him by the tyrant threatned. But yet this is especially to be considered, that we [ B] * 1.847 pretend not the vaine show of religion, or rather of superstition, against our princes commaunds, and so vpon a conscience euill grounded open a way vnto rebellion: for when the magistrat maketh conscience, and a matter of religion, about the executing of his princes commaunds, he seemeth himselfe (and giueth occasion vnto others also) to suspect euill both of the religion and conscience of his prince. Wherefore he ought to be well assured of the true knowledge of the eternall God, and of the true worship and seruice vnto him due: which consisteth not in vaine and counterfeit showes of reli∣gion or conscience. Diuers other examples I could to the same purpose produce, were I not afraid lest those whom we call Pagans should therein ashame vs, with whom the feruent zeale vnto the honour of God is so abated, and by processe of time cooled, as [ C] that it is to be feared lest at length it be altogether frosen. And thus much for the obe∣dience of the Magistrat vnto his Soueraigne Prince. Let vs now also speake of his power and authoritie ouer particular and priuat men, and what a manner of man we wish him for to to be towards them.

CHAP. V. ¶ Of the power an•…•… authoritie of a Magistrat ouer particular and priuat men, and of his office and duetie.

WE haue before said, That a Magistrat is an officer which hath publike [ D] power to commaund, or to forbid: Now he hath power so to command or forbid, which hath publike power to enforce or constraine them which will not obey that which he enioyneth them, or which do contrarie to his prohibition, and may also ease the prohibitions by himselfe made. For albeit that the law saith, That the force of the lawes consisteth in commaunding, and forbidding; in suffering, and punishing: yet is this power more proper vnto the Magi∣strat, then vnto the law, which is of it selfe dombe: wheras the Magistrat is a liuing and* 1.848 breathing law, which putteth all this in execution, seeing that the law in it selfe carrieth or containeth nothing but commaunds or prohibitions, which are but mockeries and to no purpose, if the Magistrat and the punishment were not attendant at the foot of [ E] the law, readie for him which transgresseth the same. Howbeit that to speake properly, the law containeth nothing but the verie prohibition, and the threats for not obeying the same; considering that he which commaundeth (inclusiuely) forbiddeth to trans∣gresse his commaund: and as for sufferance, that is no law: for sufferance taketh away prohibition, and carrieth with it neither penaltie nor threat, without which the law cannot be, considering that the law is no other thing, then the commandement of the soueraigne, as we haue before declared: and whatsoeuer threat or penaltie is propoun∣ded by the law, yet the punishment neuerthelesse neuer ensueth the breach thereof, vn∣till

it be pronounced by the mouth of the Magistrat. Whereby it euidently appeareth [ F] * 1.849 all the force of the law to consist in them which haue the commaund, whether it bee prince, people, or magistrat, vnto whome so commaunding, except the subiects yeeld their obedience, they haue power to enforce or punish them, which Demosthenes cal∣leth the verie sinewes of the Commonweale.

We haue said, that the Magistrat ought to haue publike power, to put a difference* 1.850 betwixt this power and the domesticall power. We said also, that the Magistrat should haue power to constraine such as would not obey: for the difference from them which haue the hearing of matters, who may also iudge and pronounce sentence, & call men before them, but yet haue no power to compell or constraine men, or to put their sen∣tences or commaundements in execution; such as were in auntient time the bishops, [ G] and now our bishops also: such were also the auntient commissioners, delegats vnto the Magistrats, hauing power to heare the causes vnto them committed; as also to condemne the parties, but yet had no power to constraine them, but sent their senten∣ces vnto the Magistrats, to be ratified or reuersed, and by them to be put in execution as they saw good: So might these delegates call men before them, but yet so, as that no man, except he listed, needed to obey them, except the Magistrats themselues had by vertue of their authoritie so commaunded. And therefore he was not in danger of the law, who had by force rescued a priuat man, as he was to be brought before these priuat judges or delegates appointed by the Magistrats, which he should haue incurred, had the delegates had of themselues any power to commaund. Howbeit that now by our [ H] lawes and customes the delegates haue with vs power to command, and to cause their sentences to be put in execution by sargeants and other publike persons, by vertue of their decrees which they giue out, signed and sealed with their owne hands and seales: whereas the bishops with vs haue no such power to constraine men, but send their sen∣tences to be executed by the Magistrats. As the Cadies, and Paracadies do in all the East, who haue the hearing of all matters, but yet haue no power to constraine men, but send their iudgements vnto the Sabbassaes, which haue the commaund and power in their hand.

We haue before said, that the first constraint of all them which had power to com∣maund, [ I] * 1.851 is the ceising or attaching both of mens goods and persons; which the aunti∣ents called prehensio, or as we say an apprehending or laying on of hands: for it were to no purpose, for the Magistrat to call a man before him, to iudge him, or to fine him; and wh•••• all is done not to haue power to seise vpon their goods nor person of him that shall disobey him. Now we haue before said, that some there be, which haue such power to apprehend and attache men; which yet haue no authoritie or power to call a man before them, neither to examine a matter, neither to rescue a man, neither to en∣large them whome they haue committed; as we haue showed of the Tribunes of the people, of the eleuen Magistrats in Athens, of the Capitall Triumuiri in Rome, of the Auogadours in Venice, of the kings Attourneies, and the deputies of them which haue [ K] power of the common treasure in other realmes and Commonweales: and of the Commissioners of the Chastelet of Paris, who may all imprison men, and seise vppon them, and yet for all that cannot releeue or enlarge them, which belongeth onely vnto the publike Magistrats, which haue power to condemne and acquite, and to iudge, some of them of mens goods onely, other some of mens goods and honour also, aud other some of mens goods and honour, with power to inflict corporall punishment also, but* 1.852 not death: and some hauing power to put to death also, and that some of them such power, as from whome men may appeale; and some others, such as from whom men may not appeale. But the last and highest degree, is of such as haue the absolute pow∣er

of life and death; that is to say, power to condemne to death, and againe to giue life [ A] * 1.853 vnto him which hath deserued to die; which is the highest marke of soueraigntie, aboue all lawes, and aboue the power and authoritie of all Magistrats, as proper onely vnto soueraigntie, as we haue before declared. Whereby it appeareth, that there are two kinds of commaunding by publike power: the one in soueraigntie, which is abso∣lute, infinit, and aboue the lawes, the Magistrats, and all other priuat persons: the other is a lawfull commaund, as subiect vnto the lawes and soueraigntie, and is proper vnto* 1.854 the Magistrats, and them which haue extraordinarie power to commaund, vntill it be againe reuoked, or the time of their commission expired. The soueraigne prince next vnder God knoweth none greater than himselfe; the Magistrat vnder God holdeth his power of his soueraigne prince, and remaineth alwaies subiect vnto him and his [ B] lawes: the particular man next after God (whome wee must alwayes put in the first place) acknowledgeth the soueraigne prince, his lawes, and his Magistrats, euerie one of them in his place. Vnder the name of Magistrats I vnderstand also them which haue iurisdiction annexed vnto their fees, considering that they hold them also as well of the soueraigne prince, as do the Magistrats, in such sort, as that it seemeth that there are none in the Commonweale but the soueraigne princes, which may properly vse these words, Impero & iubeo, I charge and commaund: which in auntient time signi∣fied, I will and commaund, seeing that the will of euerie Magistrat, and of all others al∣so, which haue power to command, is bound and dependeth wholly of the soueraigne, which may alter, chaunge, and reuoke it at his pleasure. For which cause there is nei∣ther [ C] any one Magistrat, nor yet all together, which can put in their commissions, Such is our pleasure: or this clause, Vpon paine of death, for that none but a soueraigne prince or state, can vse the same in their edicts or lawes.

And hereof riseth a notable question, which is not yet well decided, viz. Whether* 1.855 the power of the sword (which the law calleth Merum imperium, or meere power) be proper vnto the soueraigne prince, and inseparable from the soueraigntie; and that the Magistrats haue not this merum imperium (or meere power) but onely the execution thereof: or that such power is also common vnto the Magistrat, to whome the prince hath communicated the same. Which question was disputed betwixt Lothaire and [ D] Azon, two of the greatest lawyers of their time: and the emperour Henrie the seuenth chosen thereof judge, at such time as he was at Bononia, vpon the wager of an horse, which he should pay, which was by the iudgement of the emperour vppon the afore∣said question condemned. Wherein Lothaire indeed carried away the honour, how∣beit that the greater part, & almost all the rest of the famous lawyers then held the opi∣nion of Azon; saying, That Lothaire equum tulerat, sed Azo aequum (Lothaire had carri∣ed away the horse, but Azon the right) neuerthelesse many s•…•…nce haue holden the opini∣on of Lothaire: so that the question remaineth yet (as we said) vndecided, which for all that deserueth to be well vnderstood, for the consequence it draweth after it, for the bet∣ter vnderstanding of the force and nature of commaunding, and the rights of soueraign maiestie. But the difficultie thereof is growne, for that Lothaire and Azon neither of [ E] them well knew the estate of the Romans, whose lawes and ordinances they expoun∣ded; neither tooke regard vnto the chaunge in that estate made by the comming in of the emperours. Certaine it is, that at the first, after that the kings were driuen out of the citie, none of the Roman Magistrats had power of the sword ouer the citisens: yea that which much lesse is, they had not so much power, as to condemne any citisen to be* 1.856 whipped or beaten, after the law Portia▪ published at the request of Cato Tribune of the people, 454 yeares after the foundation of the citie. By which law the people tooke this power, not from the Magistrats onely, but dispoyled euen it selfe thereof also so

much as it could, giuing the condemned leaue for what fault or offence soeuer it were, [ F] to void the countrey, and to go into exile: and that which more is, there was not any one magistrat, which had power to judge a citisen, if once question were but of his ho∣nour, or good name, or of any publike crime by him committed; for then the hearing thereof was reserued vnto the comminaltie, or common people: but if it concerned the losse of life, or of the freedome of a citisen, none might then iudge thereof, but the whole estate of the people in their greatest assemblies, as was ordained by those lawes, which they called Sacred. Which although that they were not alwaies so precisely kept, but that they were sometime broken; yet Cicero for transgressing the same esca∣ped not, but being Consull, and hauing caused certaine of the conspirators with Cate∣line to be executed, was therefore himselfe afterwards banished, and his goods all con∣fiscated. [ G] Long after the lawes Valeria, Sempronia, and Portia, which had now remo∣ued the Consuls hatchets and rods from the heads and backs of the citisens of Rome: Cornelius Sylla the dictator published his lawes concerning publike iudgements, wher∣by were appointed a certaine number of Praetors, as ordinarie officers, which were to iudge of all such causes as whereof the comminaltie before iudged, or at leastwise ap∣pointed commissioners for to iudge of such crimes, as of murders, of robbing of the common treasure, of treason, or of extortion; but yet so, as that these Pretors had their lesson by writing, beyond which they might not passe a iot. For they by lot drew a certaine number of particular judges out of them, which by the lawes might in such causes be iudiciarie judges, who before all the people hauing heard the accusations and [ H] defenses both of the one part and the other, had brought vnto euerie one of them the judges, three little tables of diuers colours, vpon one of which was written an A. vppon another a C. and vpon the third N. L. the A. signifying acquited, C. condemned, and N. L. as much as to say, Non Liquet, or it is not manifest, or the matter is farther to bee inquired of (which they called Ampliare, and Amplius quaerere.) With these tables was also brought vnto the judges a vessell whereinto euerie one of them did cast one of the three aforesaid tables, without any word speaking: Which done they counted the tables so cast in, and if there were moe marked with C. cast in, then the Pretor in his purple robe mounting into an high seat, in open place, and in the sight of all the people pronounced these words, Reus parum cauisse videtur, which is to say, It seemeth that the [ I] partie accused, hath not kept himselfe from doing amisse; or else Non iure fecisse vide∣tur, He seemeth not to haue done right; or Videtur prouinciam spoliasse, He seemeth to haue spoyled the prouince. This was the Roman grauitie in iudgement mixt with* 1.857 modestie, least they should seeme therein to lie, or rashly to affirme any thing which was not altogether most manifestly tried. Of which sort are these words also, Si quid mei iudicij est, If my iudgement be any thing. So presently after the Pretor had pro∣nounced the aforesaid words, the penaltie of the law was put in execution, the partie condemned voided the countrie and went into exile, and the receiuers seised vpon his goods. If such penaltie were for the offence of the law appointed, vnto which law ex∣cept [ K] the partie so condemned yeelded himselfe obedient, he was forthwith by the Tri∣umuirie of causes capitall, apprehended and cast in prison. VVherefore, might some man say, that these capitall Triumuiri had power ouer the citisens: But wee said before them to haue had power onely ouer straungers, and that truely: and so men condem∣ned to exile, are but to be accounted straungers, for that they haue lost the libertie of the citie. To like purpose is that which Martian the lawyer writeth, concerning the decree of the Senat, at the motion of Turpilian, Si iudex pronunciauit haec verba, calum∣niatus es, condemnauit eum, If the judge (saith he) hath pronounced these words, Thou hast slaundered, he hath therein condemned him: and albeit that he say no more con∣cerning

the punishment of the offendor, yet shall the penaltie of the law neuerthelesse [ A] be executed vpon him. Not to speake in the meane time of the inscriptions of their li∣bels, with the examination of witnesses and writings. This was the manner of the pub∣like iudgements vsed by the auntient Romans: VVherby it is easily to be vnderstood, that the Pretors or judges were but onely the simple executioners of the law, without power to adde or diminish one iot thereof, hauing not onely no power of the sword, but not so much as to whip, or yet lightly to punish a citisen.

Now if question were for the fine of any publike crime, which was not prouided for by the law, the lesser assembly of the common people or comminaltie, was called together therefore: But if question were of the life, good name, or the whole estate of any citisen, the people then in their greatest and most solemne assemblies gaue iudge∣ment [ B] thereof: and that in both cases extraordinarily, as commonly they vse to doe which haue the soueraigntie in all Commonweals: neither were voyces in these cases giuen by tables or markes: for that the law it selfe, and not the people, was made iudge of the punishment to be inflicted. The sentence of which law was almost this, or such like, Si M. Posthumius ante Calendas Maias non prodisset, neque excusatus esset, videri eum in exitio esse: ipsi aqua & igniplacere interdici, If M. Posthumius made not his ap∣pearance before the first of May, neither made his excuse, it should seeme good that hee should be banished, and decreed, That he should be forbid the vse of fire and water: all which things are more plentifully and at large set downe by Liuie Asconius, and Cicero. But if the state of the Commonweale being chaunged, and the power of iudge∣ment [ C] and of giuing of voices, being taken from the people, yet for a certaine time conti∣nued this manner and forme of iudiciall proceedings, euen after that the forme of the Commonweale was chaunged from a Popular estate into a Monarchie, as a man may see in the time of Papinian the great lawyer, who gaue occasion vnto Lothaire & Azon to make question of the matter, in these words by him set downe as a maxime, Whatsoe∣uer it is that is giuen vnto Magistrats by decree of the Senat, by speciall law, or by the consti∣tution of princes, that is not in their power to commit vnto other persons: and therefore (saith he) the Magistrats do not well in committing that their charge vnto others, if it bee not in their absence: which is not so (saith he) in them that haue power, without the limita∣tion of speciall laws, but onely in vertue of their office, which they may commit vnto others, [ D] albeit that they themselues be present. And thus much for that which Papinian doth say, vsing the words, Exercitionem publici iudicij: as if he should say, That they which haue the soueraigne maiestie haue receiued vnto themselues the power of the sword, and by speciall law giuen, but the execution thereof vnto the Magistrats. And this is the opini∣on of Lothaire. By which words yet Azon vnderstandeth the right and power of the sword it selfe to haue bene translated and giuen vnto the Magistrats. Now there is no doubt, but that the opinion of Lothaire was true, if hee had spoken but of the auntient Pretors of Rome, and so kept himselfe within the tearmes and compasse of Papinian his rule: but in that he was deceiued, that he supposed that maxime or rule of Papinians, to extend to all Magistrats which haue bene since or yet are in all Commonweals, who [ E] yet for the most part haue the hearing of murders, robberies, riots, and other such like offences, and so the power of the sword giuen vnto them euen by vertue of their offi∣ces. For the emperours and law giuers hauing in the processe of time seene the incon∣uenience and iniustice that arise by condemning all murtherers, vnto one and the selfe* 1.858 same punishment, or els quite to absolue them: and so the like in other publike crimes also, thought it much better to ordaine and appoint certaine Magistrats, who accor∣ding to their conscience and deuotion, might encrease or diminish the punishment, as they saw equitie and reason to require. And first of all Augustus vnto the three little

tables noted with A. C. and N. L. added a fourth, whereby it was lawfull for the jud∣ges [ F] to pardon them, who by other mens fraud or deceit had offended the law, as wee read in Suetonius. And by little and little the auntient order and manner in the iudicial or penall laws set downe, was chaunged; the penaltie by euery one of them appointed yet neuerthelesse still remaining, not by any to be encreased or diminished, but by them which we haue before said, what diuersitie of causes soeuer happened. And often∣times the emperours committed it vnto the Senat, or some other the great and most worthy magistrats extraordinarily to iudge of great personages, or of some notable crimes, and to punish them as they saw cause, or thought best, without binding them vnto the ordinarie penall lawes. But in the time of Papinian, Seuerus the emperour gaue power vnto the great Prouost of Rome, extraordinarily to iudge of all offences [ G] and crimes, whatsoeuer they were, committed within the citie or within fortie leagues •…•…ound about it. Yea the other Pretors of the citie, who but by the ordinarie course of law were to iudge of ciuill causes and priuat crimes, dealt also with certaine publike iudgements referred vnto them, not by vertue of their office, but by the law it selfe: whereof Papinian sheweth example. And sometime the Pretor preuenting the great Prouost, so by way of preuention extraordinarily iudged of extraordinarie crimes, to∣gether with the great Prouost. As for the presidents and gouernours of prouinces, in that they had power and authoritie of all the Magistrats of the citie, and extraordina∣rily iudged of all offences, and according to their owne discretion appointed both pe∣nall and capitall punishment vnto all men, except the citisens of Rome; no man can [ H] reasonably doubt, but that they had the power of the sword, and were therefore called Potestates: for that before the creating of the great Prouost, there was none but the go∣uernours of the prouinces which had the power of the sword; whom they yet call euen to this present in Italie, by the name of Potestats. Now it is plaine by the maximes of the law, that the Magistrats which had power extraordinarily to iudge, might con∣demne the guiltie parties to such punishments as they would, yet so, as that they ex∣ceeded not measure: For so Vlpian the lawyer writeth, him to exceed measure, who for a small or light offence inflicteth capitall punishment; or for a cruell murther impo∣seth* 1.859 a fine. VVhereof wee may then conclude, that the great Prouost, and the gouer∣nours [ I] of prouinces, and generally all such Magistrats as haue extraordinarie authority to iudge of capitall crimes (whether it bee by commission, or by vertue of their office) haue the power of the sword, that is to say, to iudge, to condemne, or acquit; and not the bare execution of the law onely, whereunto they are not in this respect bound as are the other Magistrats, vnto whome the law hath prescribed what and how they are to iudge, leauing vnto them the naked execution of the law, without the power of the sword.

And thus much briefly, concerning the question betwixt Lothaire and Azon: for the fuller and more plentifull declaration whereof, it is needfull for vs yet to search far∣ther: where it is first to be enquired, Whether the Magistrats office be proper vnto the [ K] Commonweale, or vnto the prince, or vnto the magistrat himself that beareth office, or else be common vnto the Magistrat himselfe together with the Commonweale? Then whether the power graunted vnto the Magistrats be proper vnto the Magistrats, in that they are magistrats, or els be proper vnto the prince, the execution therof only be∣longing vnto the magistrats; or else be common vnto them both together? Now con∣cerning the first question, there is no doubt, but that all estates, magistrats, & offices, do in proprietie belong vnto the Commonweale (excepting in a lordly Monarchie) the* 1.860 bestowing of them, resting with them whith hane the soueraigntie (as we haue before said) and cannot by inheritance be appropriat vnto any particular persons, but by the

graunt of the soueraigne; and long and secret consent of the estates, confirmed by a [ A] long lawfull and iust possession. As in this kingdome, the Dukes, Marquesses, Coun∣ties, and such others as haue from the prince the gouernment of the castles in sundrie* 1.861 prouinces, and so the commaund of them, had the same in auntient time but by com∣mission onely, to be againe reuoked at the pleasure of the soueraigne prince, but were afterward by little and little graunted vnto particular men for tearme of their liues, and after that vnto their heires males, and in processe of time vnto the females also: inso∣much as that in fine, through the negligence of princes, soueraigne commaunds, iurisdi∣ctions, and powers, may lawfully be set to sale, as well as may the lands themselues, by way of lawfull buing and selling, almost in all the empires and kingdoms of the VVest, and so are accounted of▪ as other hereditarie goods, which may lawfully bee bought [ B] and sold. VVherefore this iurisdiction or authoritie which for that it seemeth to bee annexed vnto the territorie or land (and yet in truth is not) and is thereof called Prae∣diatorie, is proper vnto them which are possessed of such lands, whether it bee by inhe∣ritance, or by other lawfull right, and that as vnto right and lawfull owners thereof, in giuing fealtie and homage vnto the soueraigne prince, or state, from whome all great commaunds and iurisdictions flow, and in sauing also the soueraigne rights of the king∣dome, and the right of the last appeale.

Other publique officers there bee also which haue neither iurisdiction nor com∣maund,* 1.862 but onely a certeine publique and seruile charge: as the foure offices of the Waxe-chafers in this realme, by right of inheritance belonging vnto certein men, by [ C] the graunt of king Lewes. Diuers also haue attempted by processe of time to prescribe the offices of the Constables both of Normandie and Champagne; as also the offices of the great Chamberlaines, by right of inheritance to belong vnto them: howbeit that in that their sute they haue beene often times by diuers decrees reiected, and a∣mongst others by one solemne one, in the records of the court made in the yeare 1272. True it is that the word (Constable) was in auntient time no other thing than the captaine of a companie, which they called a Constableship, as we oftentimes read in Frosard. And in the records of the Chamber of accounts I remember I haue red, three hundred Constables to haue beene at once in the armie. We read also that by the de∣cree [ D] of the yeare 1274. Simon Countie of Montfort was excluded from the successiue right which he pretended to the honor of the Mareshalship D'la foy, which the lords of Mirepoix challenge vnto themselues in their styles. And forasmuch as certaine Ma∣reshals of Fraunce would haue continued their estates in their posteritie and successors,* 1.863 they were embarred so to doe by a decree made in Parliament the xxij of Ianuarie, in the yeare 1361, as is to be found in the records of the court: wherein it is expresly set downe, That the estates of the Marshalships of Fraunce should bee as part of the de∣maine of the Crowne, and the execution thereof to remaine vnto the Marshals so long as they liued. And albeit that the power of the Mareshals was not of force but in time of warre, (as was iudged by a decree of the xv of August in the yeare 1459,) yet neuer∣thelesse the militarie discipline carried with it the power of the sword, albeit that it [ E] were not giuen vnto it by expresse Edict or law; as in nothing communicating with the decrees and lawes of ciuill pollicie, or of other the ciuill magistrats; which seemeth from the auntient manners and customes of the Romans to haue beene vnto vs tran∣slated. For albeit that the power of the sword, yea and of punishing with rods also was by the law Portia taken from all the Roman magistrats (so that it was not lawfull for any of them, or for all of them in the citie to beate or scourge a Roman citisen, as we haue before noted,) yet neuerthelesse the Consull had still full power of life and death ouer the souldiours and men of warre, (without which their militarie discipline

could neuer haue bene kept and preserued) from whom there was no mean to appeal [ F] * 1.864 as saith Polybius, and for that cause saith he, the Consuls had royall power: howbeit he marked not, that the Praetors, Dictators, Quaestors, and other Generals of their ar∣mies, had euen the selfe same power. In like manner the Constable of Fraunce by his letters of commission hath not the power of the sword, or of life and death graunted vnto him: but hauing the managing of the warres, and conducting of the armyes, as in his absence the Mareshals of Fraunce haue: the power of the sword is also left vnto them, as without which militarie discipline cannot possibly be maintained: which martiall power the simple captaines abused also, putting their souldiours to death, with out any forme or fashion of iust triall. Vnto that Henry the second the French king, at the request of Francis Colineus the Dandelot, then Colonell of the footmen, by ex∣presse [ G] edict forbid them any more so to do.

If then the martiall Magistrats and Generals haue in euery Commonweal the po∣wer of the sword without any limitation or restriction vnto the forme of proceeding or of the punishment to be by them inflicted, according to the varietie of crimes and offences, all being as it were left vnto their owne discretion and iudgement, a man then cannot truely say them to be but the simple executioners of the law, considering that they haue no law whereunto they are in this regard subiect: and so consequently we may conclude, that the power of the sword is transferred into their persons, that power now not remayning in the prince alone. Whereby it also followeth, that they being present, may commit vnto others, so much of that power and authoritie which [ H] they haue by vertue of their place and office, as they please, and retaine thereof vnto themselues what shall seeme vnto them good, which they could in no wise doe, if by speciall law they were constrained and bound, to heare & determine of matters them∣selues, and from word to word to follow the solemnitie and paines set downe in the lawes. And this is it for which the law saith, That the Praetor of the citie, being him∣selfe present, might commit his authoritie and power to whom soeuer hee saw good, which the Praetors for publike causes could not do: for the Praetor of the citie had the hearing and disciding of all ciuill and criminall causes, (except such as they called pub∣lique, as belonging to the common state) which fell out betwixt the citisens of Rome: as had also the Praetor, established for the hearing of causes betwixt straungers and citi∣sens, [ I] who according to their discretion condemned, or acquited such as were conuen∣ted before them, moderating, correcting, or supplying the rigour or lenitie of the law as they saw cause, which their power was limited by the will and discretion of the Pre∣tor so iudging, and not by the necessitie of the law. And yet when as by the law or decree of the Senat, any particular cause otherwise out of their iurisdiction was com∣mitted vnto them, albeit that it were referred vnto their conscience to iudge thereof, yet neuerthelesse could they not in this case commit the same vnto others, as is to be seene by many examples noted by the lawyers. Which point so manifested leadeth vs vnto the disciding of an other question by vs before propounded: viz. That the [ K] power and authoritie graunted vnto Magistrats by vertue of their office, is proper vnto* 1.865 the office, albeit that the honour and dignitie of the office be not proper vnto the per∣son: for Papinian saying, That Commissioners and Lieutenants haue nothing proper vnto themselues, but that they vse the power and authoritie of them, which haue commissionate and deputed them, sufficiently showeth, that the power is proper vnto them which so commissionate and deputed them, whether they be Soueraigne Prin∣ces, or Magistrats hauing power so to doe. And so in like case the law sayth, That the Gouernour of a countrey or prouince, hath within his gouernment all power and authoritie next vnto his Prince: wherefore it is not then onely in the prince. But the

difficultie of this question dependeth principally on this distinction, (whereunto the [ A] interpretours of the law haue had no regard,) as namely, that it is great difference to say that the power or authoritie is proper vnto the Magistrat in the qualitie of a magi∣strat, or in the qualitie of a particular person: for it followeth not, that if the authori∣tie or iurisdiction be proper vnto the Praetorship, that therefore the Praetorship should be proper vnto the person: but to the contrarie the law saith, That he hath it in trust, and that he is but the keeper thereof. So we call the Prouost of Paris the keeper of the Prouostship of that citie; which is to speake properly, and to show, that the estates and offices rest and remaine in the possession and propertie of the Commonweale, as* 1.866 a thing put in trust vnto the magistrat. And for that cause the Bailiffes of cities and townes are so called of the word (Bail,) that is to say Gardiens or keepers. So also the [ B] Florentines called the Ten men deputed to the keeping of their state and soueraigntie by the name of Bailifes. And that is it for which the Court of parliament in the decree concerning the Mareschals of Fraunce (before noted) saith, That their estate was of the proper demaine of the Crowne, as thereunto properly appertaining, and the exer∣cise thereof belonging vnto them so long as they liued. And so we may discide the* 1.867 generall question, and discusse the controuersie betwixt Lothaire, and Azon, who spake but of the power of the sword onely: and conclude, that as oft and whensoeuer the Magistrats and Commissioners are bound by the lawes and decrees, to vse the power and authoritie which is giuen them, in such prescript forme and manner as is therein set downe, whether it be in the forme of proceeding, or concerning the punishment; [ C] without power for the magistrats to adde or diminish any thing thereunto, or from: in this case they are but meere executors and ministers of the lawes and of the princes, from whom they haue their authoritie: yet not hauing any power in this point or res∣pect in themselues, whether it be concerning ciuill pollicie, or the administration of justice, or the mannaging of warre, or treaties to be had betwixt princes, or the charges of Embassadours: but in that which is left or committed to the magistrates integritie and discretion, in that case the power and authoritie lyeth in themselues.

Now as in euery Commonweale there are two principall points which the magi∣strats* 1.868 ought alwaies to haue before their eyes: that is to say, the Law, and Equitie: so say we, that there is also the execution of the law, and the dutie of the magistrat, which [ D] the auntients called Legis actionem, and Iudicis officium: or as we say, the action or exe∣cution of the law, and duetie of the judge; which is to commaund, to decree, or to put in execution. And as the word Iudicium, or judgement, is properly vnderstood of that which is ordained by the magistrat following the strict tearmes and tenour of the* 1.869 law: so the word Decretum, is likewise properly vnderstood of that which the magi∣strat ordaineth or decreeth, following equitie without the prescript law; the law it selfe being still referred to the strict execution thereof, and equitie vnto the duetie of the magistrat. And for this cause all the decrees of the Prince are properly called Decreta, and not Iudicia, Decrees I say not judgements: for why the soueraigne prince is not subiect vnto the law; wherein they deceiue themselues, which take a decree to be any [ E] thing else then the resolute sentence of the Senat in their consultations: or the decree of a soueraigne prince, or the voluntarie ordinance of a magistrat, without being bound to law or custome in the making thereof. Now such proportion as there is of the law vnto the execution thereof, the like there is of equitie vnto the office of the judge. And so likewise of magistrats, who in case wherein they are not subiect to the law, resemble arbitrators: but being strictly and wholly bound vnto the law, are but as judges ap∣pointed to vnderstand of the fact onely, without any power of themselues to deter∣mine of the merit or iustice of the cause, otherwise than the verie strictnesse of the law

appointeth. Now of these the one is is seruile, the other is noble; the one is bound [ F] vnto the law, the other is not so; the one vnderstandeth but of the fact, the other of the right; the one is proper vnto the magistrat, the other is reserued vnto the law; the one is precisely written in the law, the other is without the lawes: the one is in the magi∣strats power, and the other quite without the same. And the better to note and per∣ceiue this difference, the law saith, That it is not lawfull for a man to appeale from the punishment set downe by the law, being pronounced by the magistrat, but onely from* 1.870 that the judge hath declared and denounced the partie accused to be guiltie: whereas it is right lawfull for a man to appeale from the punishment which the judge by his owne discretion appointeth: For he which appealeth from the law, appealeth from the prince, from whome no appeale is to be made. And thus much concerning the di∣stinction [ G] of the power of magistrats, whereby not onely the question of Lothaire and Azon is decided, but many others also concerning the charge and duetie of magistrats, wherewith diuers haue sore entangled themselues, some mistaking the practise, and some the theorique, but most part, for not hauing vnderstood the Roman estate, albeit that they were well exercised and seene in all the parts of their lawes, and yet neuerthe∣lesse in the state of magistrats, concerning their power and authoritie they found them∣selues greatly troubled. For Moulin himselfe (the honour of lawyers) not vsing the distinctions by vs before set downe, hath without reason followed the opinion of Al∣ciat and Lothaire: Whereunto he addeth the Pretors of cities, whome wee call Bai∣lifes, and Seneshals, by the lawes of this realme, to haue had the power taken from them [ H] for the appointing of their deputies: for that they are but as simple vsagers or occupiers, and that he which hath a thing but onely to vse and occupie, cannot make any other vsager or occupier but himselfe; which is a reason without apparance, as we haue be∣fore shewed. VVhereunto ioyne also, that it is not past an hundred or six score yeares at the most, since that Charles the seuenth, and the eight, were the first which made an office of the Lieutenants, or deputies of Bailifes and Seneschals. For if Moulin his opi∣nion were grounded vpon reason, why should Papinian expresly say, That magistrats may depute and commit in their presence so much and so long, and with such limitati∣on as they themselues please, of such things as they haue by vertue of their office, and [ I] which are proper to their estate? Now their magistrats estates and offices in auntient time were much lesse proper, and lesse appropriat vnto the persons, than they be at this present. For with vs they are perpetuall, and in Rome they continued but for one yeare; and therefore might with much better reason than they appoint their lieute∣nants or deputies. Besides that, the lawyers themselues haue made and written diuers expresse bookes concerning lieutenants and deputies, which were all to no purpose, if the comparison of him, which hath but the vse onely vnto the magistrat, were to be ad∣mitted and receiued. And as for others, the auntient doctors and interpretors of the law; they haue in such sort entangled themselues, as that it euidently appeareth them to [ K] haue had no insight into the estate or gouernment of the Roman Commonweale: without which it is impossible to determine any thing concerning these questions. For whereas the Romans had properly separated the office of the Proconsuls Lieutenant, whome they called Legatum, from the office of the Proconsull himselfe: and so of the deputie tearmed a particular Commissioner, whome they called Iudicem datum, from the Commissioner himselfe, and of him vnto whome power was giuen by the magi∣strat to commaund, whome they called Eum cui mandata inrisdictio est, the doctors haue confounded all together vnder the name of Delegats, which were a thing too long, and too superfluous to refute, hauing proposed vnto ourselues no other end, but to entreat of that which concerneth the estate and duetie of magistrats in generall.

It is also worth the noting, that in Popular and Aristocratique estates, such as were [ A] * 1.871 those of the Greekes, and of the Italians, their chiefe drift was so much as they could, so to bind their magistrats, gouernours, ambassadours, captaines, lieutenants, and other their great officers & ministers vnto their lawes, as that they should not one iot swarue or stray therefrom: which the auntients did much more than they of our time: where∣as in a regall monarchie it is quite otherwise, where in publike iudgements all paines and penalties, and in priuat iudgements that which concerneth euerie priuat mans right, is left to be iudged and determined according to the discretion of the magistrat. And albeit that Iustinian the emperour made a law, That euerie mans right should be tried by the law, so to haue kept the magistrats within the power of the lawes: yet was that his law to no purpose, but much troubled all the judges and lawyers, willing to [ B] obserue the same his law, being impossible to be kept, and incompatible with the other auntient former lawes. For why, that which concerneth euerie mans right, consisteth* 1.872 in fact, and not in the law: by which words Paulus (the great lawyer) seemeth euen by the root to haue cut vp all the opinions of all the interpretors of the law, being not on∣ly in number almost infinit, but also altogether inexplicable, thereby giuing men to vnderstand, that that which concerneth euerie mans right, ought not only in priuat, but euen in publike iudgements also to be left vnto the fidelitie, integritie, conscience, and wisedome of the magistrat. VVhich with vs is by a royall constitution prouided for, and by the vse of iudiciall proceedings, in respect of the infinit varietie of causes, places, times, and persons: which for that they are infinit, can in no lawes, writings, or tables, [ C] be comprised, and much lesse vnder any certaine rule be comprehended.

Now I haue before said, that there was a new officer erected in Rome, who was the* 1.873 Prouost or Pretor of the citie, with power giuen him, to correct, supply, and amend, the lawes and customes, in that which concerned his iurisdiction, so farre as hee saw good in priuat iudgements: and euerie yeare the new chosen Pretor in the Tribunall seat appointed for the making of orations, after he had thanked the people for the honour he had of them receiued, gaue them there to vnderstand of his edicts, and in what sort his purpose was to administer the law. VVhich his edicts he caused afterwards to bee painted, and set vp in some publike place: which for al that were not lawes, neither had [ D] the force of lawes, but were only edicts (that is to say, the magistrats commands) wher∣unto neither the people, nor the Senat, nor the Consuls, nor the other Pretors, nor the Tribunes, not yet the successors in the selfe same office, were not in any wise bound, but onely particular men, and they also but in that which was within the Pretors power and authoritie, as concerning their priuat suits, and businesse betwixt man and man. And therefore Cicero taunting Verres, intemperatly abusing the power and authoritie of his Pretorship, saith, Quiplurimum edicto tribuunt legem annu amappellant, tu plus edicto complecteris quàm lege, They which attribute most vnto an edict, call it but an annuall law, but thou comprehendest more in an edict, than in a law. For the magistrat how great soeuer he be, cannot of himselfe derogat from the law, and much lesse abro∣gat the same: for these things we haue shewed properly to belong vnto soueraigntie. [ E] Neither must we vnderstand, that the * lawyer when he saith, That the Pretor might* 1.874 correct, amend, or supply the laws, that he had therefore power to derogat from them, or to disanull them, which is the highest point of soueraigntie: but that hee might by the authoritie of his office expound the obscure lawes, and in what they might with equitie be extended, yet without breaking or impugning the same. And that is it, for which the law generally saith, That the Pretor neuer could giue possession of the goods vnto them, who by the lawes and ordinances could not be the heires. Neither was it also in the power of the Pretors, nor yet of all the magistrats together, to make

an heire of him which by the lawes could be none; for why, that was to be done one∣ly [ F] by vertue of the law, whereby the magistrat by his definitiue sentence declared, the succession to belong to such, or such a man, whome the law or the testator had appoin∣•…•…ed heire. And albeit that diuers of the Pretors edicts were more reasonable and indif∣ferent then the lawes themselues; yet so it was, that the first Pretor that would, might (without regard vnto all the edicts of his predecessors) make all new, or againe reuiue such lawes, which by reason of their antiquitie, were before buried in obliuion. And this was the cause that the Tribune Aebutius presented a request vnto the people, which passed in force of a law; which was that the lawes of the twelue tables, which by long tract of time were then growne out of vse, might by an expresse law bee repealed and abolished: which law needed not, if the Pretors by vertue of their edicts had had pow∣er [ G] to derogat from the positiue lawes. Yea the Pretors themselues did not alwaies in the administration of iustice follow their owne edicts, but spared not sometime to giue iudgement quite contrarie vnto them, especially if the equitie of the causes vpon some straunge occurrents so required; sometimes also chaunging them for the grudge or fa∣uour that they bare vnto certaine priuat men: which thing Cicero by way of reproach obiected to Verres, saying, Ille nulla religione motus, contrà quàm edixerat, decernebat, That he moued with no religion, iudged quite contrarie vnto that which hee himselfe had before decreed. Howbeit that this reproach was but a flourish of the Orators, and not of any great importance: For as no man was subiect vnto the law which hee him∣selfe made, so also might he vpon good and iust cause derogat from the same. Yet cer∣taine [ H] yeares before it was enacted by the people at the motion of Cornelius the Tri∣bune, That the Pretors, and so euerie other magistrat also should bee constrained in gi∣uing of iudgement, to obserue their owne edicts by themselues published and set vp at their first entrance into their office, and not to depart therefrom; which cut off many courtesies and fauours which the magistrats before shewed vnto such as they thought good. Neuerthelesse this law being published without the good liking and consent of many: and also contrarie vnto the nature of lawes (which can neuer bind them that made them) was shortly after abolished. Howbeit that the magistrats for their owne particular, and in their owne causes, were constrained to endure the same edicts, iudge∣ments, and decrees, which they themselues had made, and caused to be executed vppon [ I] others: yet that notwithstanding the magistrats were alwaies at libertie, to derogat from their owne edicts, or to alter the same, whether they were published for the whole yeare that they were Pretors, or for a moneth, or for some few dayes or howres. For generally the law saith, That the magistrat may reuoke that which he hath decreed, and* 1.875 forbid that which he hath commaunded, although that he cannot reuoke that which he hath once iudged and pronounced sentence of. For that iudgements and decrees giuen or made vpon the hearing of a cause, cannot without iniurie be reuersed or chan∣ged, as also for that nothing ought to be more firme and sure then iudgements once gi∣uen, as whereby all ciuill societie is especially maintained: wherein many interpretors [ K] of the law haue deceiued themselues, calling the magistrats simple commaunds, pre∣cepts, and not edicts: whereas an edict (as saith Varro) is nothing els but Magistratus iussum (that is to say) the magistrats commaund, and whereof another errour hath ri∣sen also, viz. That such the magistrats simple commaunds should bind no man: For so the auntient doctors affirme. VVhich their opinion, if it were true, wherefore then* 1.876 should the law commaund vs to obey the magistrats bare commaund, without regard whether it be iust or vniust? Or why should the lawyer Maetian say, Reipublicae inte∣resse, vt iniustis & ambitiosis decretis pareatur, It behoueth the Commonweale, that euen vniust and proud decrees (of the magistrats) should be obeyed. Yea and all the

auntient Philosophers and law makers, haue more religiously recommended nothing [ A] vnto vs, not onely than the lawes, but euen than the writings and decrees of the wise. Now it is more reasonable to obey a simple verball commaund, which is but for a day or an howre (if we doubt or mislike of the equitie thereof) than to the commaunde∣ments which were for a yeare, as were all the edicts of the magistrats: besides that it was more easie to performe the one than the other. And that more is, the lawes, the ordinances, the decrees, and sentences, of themselues bind no man, if the commissi∣on (that is to say, the magistrats commaund) be not on foot. And therefore the Roman Pretors, and other their great magistrats, seldome times troubled themselues with gi∣uing of iudgements, but were still occupied in appointing of judges, in commaunding and the putting in execution of the sentences and iudgements of such iudges as had [ B] by them bene appointed. Whose verball commands (as these men tearme them) had they bene of no force to bind men, the decrees and iudgements of such as were by them appointed, should haue bene to no end or purpose, neither should they haue bene obei∣ed. And therefore the law permitteth all magistrats by punishment or penaltie to cause their commaunds to be obeyed, without distinction whether they bee commaunde∣ments verball, or by way of commission, or by decrees by them made, or by iudge∣ments by them giuen.

Of this errour (for not obeying the magistrats command) is risen also a farre greater,* 1.877 some defending that it is lawfull for men in fact, and by force to resist the magistrates, offering them violence, (for that is the word which they vse) whether it be in the ad∣ministration [ C] of iustice, or otherwise out of the same. Howbeit that the difference is great betwixt the one and the other: for that the magistrat out of iudgement, and out of the qualitie of a magistrat, is no more but as a particular man, and so if he by word or deed wrong any man, he may be resisted, in such sort as the law permitteth: but in the execution of his charge within his power, not exceeding the bounds of his iuris∣diction, there is no doubt but that he ought to be obeyed, whether it bee right or wrong, as saith the law. But if he shall exceed his authoritie or power, a man is not bound to obey him, especially if the excesse be in it selfe notorious, but may defend himselfe by oppositions and appeales: but if he may not appeale, or that the magistrat will not admit his appeale, but proceed against him; in this case it is to be considered, [ D] whether the griefe be to be recouered, or otherwise irrecouerable: which if it be to be recouered, no resistance is then to be made against the magistrat; but if the case be ir∣recouerable, as in question of life, or of corporall punishment, and that the magistrat will needs proceed without regard of any appeale, in this case it is lawful for euery man to make resistance, not of purpose to crosse or offend the magistrat, but onely to de∣fend the life of the innocent man in danger, yet so farre as that it be done without fraud or seditious tumult: not for the violating of the magistrat, as we said, but for the deli∣uerance of him which is with iniurie by the magistrat oppressed. As when Appius Claudius enflamed with the desire and lust of the faire maiden Virginia, (wresting the lawes) was about to giue sentence against her libertie, Virginius her father to preserue [ E] the honour of his house, and wishing rather the death of his so faire a daughter, than that she should so loose her virginitie, slew her openly with his owne hand, and so set all the citie on an vproare. Which desperat boldnes of the man was not indeed to haue beene suffered, neither ought the quiet estate of the Commonweale to be with such* 1.878 outragious facts troubled, what violence soeuer be done by the magistrat. Howbeit that it belongeth not vnto priuat men to iudge whether the magistrat offer to doe wrong, or not: which to determine, if it appertaine but vnto the greater magistrats, or the Prince onely, in vaine then it is to aske whether priuat men may by force resist the

magistrates, offering them violence? but onely this, whether Magistrats which go a∣bout [ F] to put in execution their sentences of life and death, or for the inflicting of some corporall punishment, contrarie vnto appeales from them made, may of right bee withstood? which that they lawfully may be, I doubt not, so that it be done without fraud or tumult, in cases of life and death: but if iudgement be of goodes, or fines, or imprisonment, I thinke it not to be lawfull, for that all these things may be amended, either by intercessions, or by appeales, or by actions of trespasse, or iniurie, or by way of petition. But in other causes lawfull it is not by the law either of God or man to* 1.879 withstand the magistrat offering vs violence: as many euill taught, and worse instin∣cted in ciuill pollicie and gouernement most daungerously affirme: by whose positi∣ons (if they will be like themselues) the estates of all cities and Empires must needs be [ G] troubled and confounded. For if it were lawfull for the subiects by force to defend themselues against the magistrats, they might vpon the same reasons and grounds re∣sist their soueraigne Princes also, and tread the lawes vnderfoot. Wherefore we see the lawmakers and lawyers to haue respected nothing more, than to keepe all force, and violence, not from the magistrats onely, but euen from priuat men themselues, hauing violence in so great detestation, as that they haue restored euen theeues and* 1.880 robbers into places, vniustly by them possessed, if they were from thence by force cast out, and excluded the true owners thereof from their rights for proceeding by way of force. And albeit that some particular men hauing territoriall iurisdiction, may (in the opinion of many) in a sort in their owne right of themselues lay violent hand, vpon [ H] the land holding of them: when as the vassall neglecteth his duetie vnto his Lord, yet the truer opinion is that he cannot in his owne cause so doe, for that it is a thing iniu∣rious and vnreasonable, that any man should be a judge in his owne cause, or giue sen∣tence for himselfe. Now the law which forbiddeth priuat men to doe that, which ought to be done by the magistrat, hath this reason ioyned with it, lest occasion should be giuen of greater sturre and tumult. The law also of the xij Tables, which saith: Vis in populo abesto, Let violence be from among the people, is not to be vnderstood onely of violence to be done by force of armes, whether it be publiquely or priuately done: but also when men would haue things otherwise done then by the ordinarie [ I] way of justice: as when things are done by priuat mens authoritie, which should haue beene done by the Magistrat or judge. And if it bee not lawfull for the true lord or owner to put his seale vnto his owne things being in the possession of an other man; how then should it be lawfull vnto the territoriall lord of himselfe to enter or seize vp∣on lands, the propertie whereof belongeth vnto an other man? Wherefore the opi∣nion of Plato is to be of vs reiected, who in his bookes of lawes hath left the shamefull violence and abuse offered vnto maydens or boyes, to be reuenged by their kinsfolke, and not by the Magistrat.

Now of this question dependeth an other; as whether the Magistrat may reuenge* 1.881 the wrong and iniurie offered him, as he sitteth in place of justice: whereof what to say [ K] the lawiers haue not yet determined. Neuerthelesse without entering into farther dis∣pute, it is and alwaies hath beene lawfull for all Magistrats exercising their estate or commission, to condemne or chastice them, which giue vnto them rash or contume∣lious speech, and to proceed against them by way of fine, or by seizing vpon their bo∣dies or goods, according to the power and authoritie vnto them giuen; if the wrong or iniurie offered be not such as may deserue corporall punishment: for then the ma∣gistrat ought to lay aside his publique person, and to receiue iustice at an other mans hand. But yet if the iniurie be done vnto the whole companie or bench of Iudges, or Magistrats, in this case they may enquire and iudge of the crime or offence, and so

altogether lawfully do that which they could not do apart: and the reason seemeth [ A] to be, for that in so doing they punish not the wrong done vnto themselues, but vnto the Commonweale, which is therein farre more wronged than are they which beare* 1.882 the persons of magistrates. And albeit that the law saith, That the action of iniurie is easely to be forgiuen, and that it is soonest by sufferance buried; that is to be vnderstood of particular men, & not of publique persons, and especially of Magistrats vnto whom* 1.883 whosoeuer shall offer violence, is by the law in danger of treason. And for this cause an outrage committed against the person of a Magistrate, the indignitie of the fact is together with the heauinesse of the punishment therby encreased▪ and that not onely when he exerciseth his estate, but also in what place soeuer it be wherein he carrieth with him the marks and tokens of his office, or is knowen to be such a man, he ought [ B] to be inuiolable, and as the auntient Latins say, Sacrosanctus, or most holy: for that word the law, Horatia (published for the safetie of Magistrats) vseth, conceiued in these words: Qui Tribunis plebis, Aedilibus, Iudicibus nocuerit eius caput Ioui sacrum esto; familia ad aedem Cereris, liberi, liber aequè vaenum ito, He that shall hurt the Tribunes of the people, the Aedils, or Iudges, let his head be sacrificed to Iupiter, and his familie and children, male and female, sold at the Temple of Ceres. Wherein some are of opinion that the word Iudicibus (or judges) is meant or to be vnderstood of the consuls, who were afterwards the onely judges amongst all the magistrats: whereof they haue some probabilitie, for they were first called Pretors, and after that Iudges; and after that their iurisdiction for the citie was giuen to one speciall Pretor, they were called [ C] Consuls. Howbeit neuerthelesse it seemeth that the law Horatia hauing put the jud∣ges after the Tribunes, and the Aediles whome they called Aedituos (for why, the great and honourable Aediles, whome they called Curules, were not yet erected) was meant to comprehend all judges; considering withall, that the law it selfe was not published at the request or motion of any of the Tribunes, or in disgrace of the Consuls, but at the motion of Horatius the Consull himselfe. And this law Horatia was made fortie foure yeares after the sacred law Iunia, made for the safetie of the Tribunes of the peo∣ple: whereby they were as by a speciall law, more religiously prouided for than were the rest of the magistrats. VVhereby it appeareth this law to appertaine to all magi∣strats, but especially vnto judges, whose liues and persons are the more subiect to all [ D] daungers, in that they are to iudge of the liues, honour, and goods of all the subiects. And therefore the law saith not, That he that killeth the judges (shall die therefore) but if hee shall offer them neuer so little violence; that is to say, Si nocuerit, which is, if hee but hurt them. And well it is to be noted, that it is not said, as they are exercising their authoritie and iurisdiction onely, but euen in what other place soeuer they bee: which otherwise were but to open a gap to haue them slaine in euerie other place where they •…•…at not in iudgement. So when as with vs a certaine noble gentleman beeing called in∣to* 1.884 question, had with his sword wounded one of the judges of the court of Paris, not as then sitting in iudgement: the court condemned 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to haue his right hand cut off, his bodie afterward to be quartered, his goods confiscated, and a most great fine to bee [ E] paid vnto the judge. But if the magistrat disguised, or walking the streets by night to doe any man harme, shall himselfe chance to be by any man hurt, hee cannot redresse such his wrong as done vnto a magistrat, but as vnto a priuat man. So Aulus Hostilius the Aedile, when as by night hee had attempted to haue broken open a Courtisans doores, was there grieuously hurt: whereof he complaining vnto the people▪ in hope to haue found some good remedie, was sent away with shame enough▪ for that the outrage vnto him done, was not to be punished as done vnto a magistrat. VVhich ought not to seeme strange, seeing that one of the Tribunes, who had vnlawfully abu∣sed

a boy, and taken by the Capitall Triumuiri, was by him punished as a slaue or stran∣ger [ F] (the rest of the Tribunes his fellowes forsaking him, as abhorring his most filthy lust) albeit that the sacred lawes forbid vpon paine of death to offend the Tribune, or to commaund him to be punished for what thing soeuer. In like case if the magistrats went roaming vp and downe masked, and priuat men went masked also, carrying with them the markes of magistrats, as in Rome they did during the feast of Cybele: if any iniurie happened to be so done vnto the magistrat, it was not punished as done vnto a magistrat, but vnto a priuat person: howbeit that out of these cases the magistrat is to be holden for such as he is, in what place soeuer he be.

Neither is it not onely vnlawfull to offend or abuse the magistrats by word or deed,* 1.885 but necessarie it is, that we should duetifully respect and honour them, as them vnto [ G] whome God hath giuen this power: which thing we see the auntient Romans (from whom the fountaines of law and iustice flowed into all the world) to haue much more religiously obserued, than did the other nations. For the Censors disgraced and degra∣ded from his order a bourgeous of the citie, by taking away from him his horse, for that he had but coughed and spauled a little too lowd in their presence. And Vectius a citi∣sen of Rome, for not rising vnto the Tribune of the people, but passing by him, was by the people slaine. Yea the law it selfe calleth it sacrilege, not to reuerence the magi∣strat. VVe vnderstand also not the same, but yet great reuerence to haue beene giuen vnto the magistrats euen amongst the Greekes also, in that it was not lawfull for a man to laugh in the councell of the Areopagits. VVe read also, that Fabius Maximus his [ H] sonne seeing his father a farre off comming towards him, and that the Lictors or offi∣cers for his fatherly reuerence durst not cause him to alight from his horse, commaun∣ded him himselfe to alight: which his commaund the father obeying, alighted and em∣braced his sonne, making much more of him, than if he had done otherwise. For do∣mesticall power (as saith the law) ought to stoope vnto publike authoritie. True it is, that in those times and in those places offices were giuen to vertue, and not to them that offered most: for then verily was the time wherein rewards were set vp for vertue: Howbeit that the lawes against ambition, and the auntient histories sufficiently declare honours and offices to haue bene oftentimes in Rome, de lapide emptos, as saith Cicero. But howsoeuer power and authoritie be got, whether it be by fauour, by wealth, or [ I] force of armes, we must not therefore contemne the magistrat, which cannot bee done without the contempt of God, from whome he hath his authoritie, in whatsoeuer fo•…•… it be. As witnesseth that speech of God vnto Samuel judge of Israel, now growne weake with age: whose commaunds when as the people did refuse, It is not thee (saith he) but me, whome they haue despised.

Now if these deriders of authoritie and power, be not to be moued either with the feare of God, or the touch of religion, yet can they not denie, but that it is more than necessarie for priuat men to obey, respect and honour the magistrats, for the defence of Commonweales, and of the ciuill societie of men. Which the aunrient Poets haue vn∣to [ K] vs well set forth in their deuised fables, making the goddesse Pitharchie (which sig∣nifieth the obedience of subiects vnto their princes and magistrats) wife vnto Iupiter▪ Sauiour: and of that marriage Eutuchia (that is to say Felicitie) to haue bene engendred* 1.886 and borne. Wherefore the magistrat on his part also ought to giue a good opinion of himselfe, for his iustice, wisedome, and sufficiencie, that so the subiects may haue oc∣casion to honour and reuerence him: and not by his vnworthinesse to suffer the ho∣nour of the Commonweale to be troden vnderfoot or despised: for the fault which in a priuat man is but light, is in the person of the magistrat doubled. And therefore Solo•…•… in his lawes gaue leaue to kill the drunken magistrat, without any daunger of punish∣ment

therefore. Truely an vnreasonable law, for that it was thereby to be feared, least [ A] vnder the pretence of drunkennesse the magistrats life should be oftentimes endaunge∣red. VVhereby yet we may gather, how much vice was then detested, as also with what integritie, seueritie, and wisdome, magistrats ought to excell other men. And yet ought we not to imitat them, who by the rigour of punishment seeke to bee accounted seuere; or by their too much lenitie, desire to be accounted gentle, both the one and the other being therefore worthily reproued by the law. VVherein many haue mista∣ken* 1.887 themselues, who hauing extraordinarie power to punish without law, haue thought equitie to consist in lenitie and mercie, repugnant to the rigour of the lawes: howbeit that equitie is of such a nature, as that it in nothing communicateth either with rigour, or with mercie; but declining from both the extreames, crueltie (I say) and [ B] mercie, keepeth clemencie, the preseruer of them both: not vnlike the Lesbian rule, which being of lead, yeelded as well vnto the one side as to the other. Now if the of∣fence be greater than the punishment appointed in the ordinarie lawes, the magistrat hauing extraordinarie iurisdiction and power may as an vpright iudge augment the punishment. So if the fault be lesse, he may with like equitie mitigat the punishment by the rigour of the law appointed. And truely the magistrat in seeking to be accounted* 1.888 pitifull offendeth more, than if he should seeme to be cruell: For crueltie, although it be indeed to be blamed, yet keepeth it the subiects in obedience vnto the laws, for feare of punishment; whereas too much lenitie giueth libertie vnto offence, and causeth the magistrat himselfe, the lawes, yea and the prince which established the lawes, to bee al∣together [ C] contemned. And this is it for which the law of God expresly forbiddeth to haue any pitie of the poore in iudgement. Some others there bee, which iudge well* 1.889 and vprightly, enclining neither vnto crueltie nor mercie, but yet cannot keepe that grauitie and seueritie which best beseemeth a magistratias in our time one of the chiefe magistrats of this realme, who in the highest seat of iustice, and euen then when he pro∣nounced the sentence of death vpon the condemned, would with one merrie conceit or other, minister vnto the hearers occasion of laughter. VVhereas Augustus Gaesar did farre otherwise, who albeit that he was accounted a sincere and vpright iusticiar, yet for all that he neuer pronounced sentence of death vpon any, but with deepe sighes fet euen from the bottome of his heart. Some other to the contrarie, all enraged, [ D] threaten and reuile them whom they giue iudgement of: as did ordinarily the empe∣rour Claudius, who one day with a countenance more like a beast than an emperour, strucke him in the face with a pen knife, whom he was to pronounce sentence of death of. Yet blame I not the graue exhortations, and bitter reproofes of the magistrat vn∣to the offendors, and then especially, when as hee meaneth to vse more lenitie than the rigour and extremitie of the law requireth. For why, it is one of the things most re∣quisit in a magistrat to cause the offendors to haue the better vnderstanding and feeling of the greatnesse of their offences: that so they may the better also perceiue and see what they haue therefore deserued, and so to be the rather induced to repentance. But it were a kind of iniurie, and not beseeming the authoritie and wisedome of a magistrat [ E] to charge him whome he hath condemned to death, with opprobrious words also. Papirius Cursor was of all that liued in his time (than which none is said to haue bene* 1.890 more plentifull of vertues) a man most famous both at home and abroad in the wars, but so terrible with the maiestie of his commaund, as that hee caused euen the stoutest of his followers to tremble and quake at the force of his commaunding speech: which his roughnesse of speech he for all that wisely tempered with great lenitie in the execu∣ting of punishment. As when the generall of the Prenestines was come vnto him with his promised aid after the battaile fought & the victorie obtained▪ Paperius with sterne

countenance, and such speech as caused all there present to tremble thereat, hauing first [ F] reproued him, forth with commaunded one of the Lictors to vnbind his bundle of rods, and to make readie his axe: the fearefull captaine in the meane time expecting no∣thing but present death, when sodenly Paptrius commaunded the same Lictor standing readie with the axe in his hand, to haue done execution (as all men thought) but to cut vp a stub of a tree which stood in his walke, and condemned the negligent captaine in a great fine, which he right willingly paid, with great thankes that hee had so spared him his life. Whome if he had put to death, it was in daunger least that those his fol∣lowers the Romans allies would haue thereupon reuolted: which so great a fault no doubt Papirius would not haue pardoned a Roman. But as there is great difference* 1.891 betwixt faults which are committed in warre, and elsewhere (for that as an antient cap∣taine [ G] said, In martial matters men scarcely offend twice) so must the militarie magistrats vse another manner of fashion of commaunding, of punishing, and execution of penal∣ties, than must the magistrats in time of peace. For that the discipline of warre ought to be much more seuere than the domesticall or ciuill gouernment. And yet for all that ought not this martiall rigour to passe into crueltie, nor the generall to exceed the bounds of seueritie, as many commaunders do, who in nothing show themselues vali∣ant, but in killing their souldiors without hearing. As Seneca propoundeth one act of Piso the Proconsull, for an example of his notorious crueltie towards his souldiours.* 1.892 For seeing a souldiour returning alone out of the field into the campe, from forraging, in a rage condemned him to death, for that he was returned out of the field without [ H] his companion, charging him, That hee had slayne him: the souldiour still alleaging, That his fellow was comming after him: which his excuse for all that Piso would not admit, but sent him presently to be executed. But lo, whilest that the execution was about to be done, he sodenly returned who was supposed to haue bene slaine. VVher∣upon the captaine which had the charge to see the execution done, returned to the Proconsull with both the souldiours, who embrasing one the other, were with great applause and reioycing of their fellow souldiours brought before him: Wherewith the Proconsull enraged, caused them all three to bee put to death: The first, for that hee was before condemned: The second, for that he was the cause of his fellowes con∣demnation: [ I] And the captaine, for that hee had not done what hee was by him his ge∣nerall commanded. So that for the appearing of one innocent mant, he put three to death: which was not iustly to vse, but most cruelly to abuse his authoritie. VVhich his crueltie was so much the more to be detested, for that there was there no meanes to appeale, nor prince to flye vnto, nor ciuill exception to bee taken, by reason of the rigour of the militarie discipline. And thus much concerning the power and authori∣tie of Magistrats ouer particular and priuat men: It remaineth now to speake also of the power and duetie of one of them towards another. [ K]

CHAP. VI. [ A] ¶ Of the mutuall duties of Magistrates among themselues, and of the power that one of them hath ouer an other.

IN euery well ordered Commonweale there be three degrees of* 1.893 Magistrates: The highest, which is of them which may be called soueraigne magistrats, and know none greater then themselues, but the soueraigne Maiestie onely: The middle sort which obey their superiours, and yet commaund others: And the lowest de∣gree of all, which is of them which haue no commaund at all [ B] ouer any other magistrats, but onely ouer particular men subiect to their iurisdiction. Now of soueraigne magistrats, some haue power to commaund all magistrats without exception, and other some acknowledge no superiour but the soueraigne Maiestie, and yet haue no power ouer all the rest of the magistrats which are placed in the middle & lowest degrees, but ouer such onely as are subiect vnto their iurisdiction. Of the first sort of soueraigne magistrates which haue power ouer all others, and that know none their superiours, but the soueraigne power, there are but verie few, and fewer at this present then in auntient time: for that it is by daily experi∣ence found, nothing to be more dangerous in a Commonweale, then for some one* 1.894 magistrat to be aboue the rest, who may lawfully commaund all the rest, aswell pri∣uate [ C] persons as magistrats, wanting himselfe but one step or degree to mount vnto the soueraigntie, and that especially if his soueraigne magistrate which hath such power bee alone, and without a companion, hauing all in his owne hand: as had sometime the Grand Prouost of the Empire, whom they called Praefectum Praetorio, who had commaund ouer all the Magistrates throughout the whole Empire, and might receiue the appeales from all the other magistrates and gouernours; but might not be appealed from himselfe, no not although the appeal were made euen vnto the Emperour himselfe, albeit that the first which were promoted to this dignitie and ho∣nour, were but captaines of the praetorian legions: as Seius Strabo the first that was pre∣ferred [ D] vnto this office vnder Augustus: and after that Seianus vnder Tiberius. Which honour the other succeeding Emperours thought good to bestow vpon such as of whose integritie, fidelitie, and deuotion towards them they had had good experience and proofe: such as they would in some sort to be their imperiall Lieutenants, vpon whom they for the most part discharged the mannaging of their greatest affaires, such as were by the Emperours themselues to haue beene discharged: as the hearing of im∣periall causes: the receiuing and dismissing of Embassadours: the hearing of appeales from the Magistrats of all prouinces; which great charge for that no man could well execute, except he were skilfull in the Lawes, the Emperours in steed of captaines of their legions, preferred lawyers to that honour. So did Otho the emperour promote Martian: Seuerus, Papinian: and Alexander, Vlpian. And at length vnder the Greek [ E] emperours, two great Prouosts of the empire were by the Emperours created, and at last three also, that the greatnes of their power so diuided might be lessened; and yet the honour thereof imparted to moe. Such soueraigne Magistrats were with our aun∣cestours: the Master of the Pallace: and he whom they called the Prince of Fraunce: and of late Henry duke of Aniou, king Charles his great Lieutenant: and the chiefe Bassa in the Turkes empire: and the great Edegnare or Diadare in Aegypt vnder the princi∣palitie of the Mamaluke Sultans. Yet in this they differ, that in the Turkish empire the Great Sultans children in the absence of their father commaund aboue all the Bas∣saes,

and had the preheminence and precedence before them: and in Aegypt the great [ F] Edegnare commaunded ouer all the rest of the Magistrates, excepting such onely as had the keeping of the castles & fortresses of the kingdom committed to their charge, ouer whom he had no commaund. Which manner and custome whether the Prin∣ces of the East tooke it from ours, or our Princes from them, we still keepe together with the Italians, Germaines, Spaniards, and most of other Nations also. Wherefore* 1.895 the soueraigne power to commaund ouer all Magistrats and officers without excepti∣on, ought not to be giuen to one alone, but in case of necessity; as when the Common∣weale cannot otherwise be preserued: and yet then not with the authoritie and coun∣tenance of a standing office, but by way of commission onely, such as were in auntient time graunted vnto the Roman Dictators, the Archo of the Thessalians, and Azym∣nets [ G] of the Lacedemonians: and now with vs are giuen vnto Protectors and Regents, in the absence, furie, or minoritie of soueraigne Princes. In the absence I say of the so∣ueraigne prince, for that in his presence all the power & commaund of magistrates and* 1.896 commissioners cease: For as the force and strength of all riuers and flouds is together with their names lost and swallowed vp when they once fall into the Sea; and as the other heauenly lights, as well the planets as other starres, lose their light in the presence of the Sunne, or as soone as he approacheth the horizon, in so much as that they seeme againe to render vnto him the whole light that they had before borowed of him▪ euen so likewise all the authoritie of the Senat, and all the commaund and power of Magi∣strats cease in the presence of the prince. So we see that he which deliuereth the soue∣raigne [ H] princes mind, whether it be in counsell, or in soueraigne court, before the states, or vnto the people, still vseth these wordes, So and so the king commaundeth, or saieth. But to the contrarie, if the prince be absent, the Chauncelour or President keeping the kings place aboue the other princes, pronounceth sentence or iudgement according to the opinion and mind of the Senat or Court wherein he sitteth, hauing ordinarie iu∣risdiction and power, and not in the name of the king. And for asmuch as William Poyet Chauncelour of Fraunce, and President of the great Counsell, in the absence of the king, oftentimes in iudgement vsed this forme of speech, The king saith so and so vnto you; he was therefore charged with treason, besides the other points of his accusa∣tion. Wherefore many are deceiued which thinke those lawes or Edicts which are [ I] published or ratified in the councell or court, in the presence of the prince, to be so pub∣lished or confirmed by the Court or Councell: seeing that the Court hath then the hands bound, and that it is none but the king that so commaundeth, the motion or consent of his Attourney, the prince himselfe being then present, seruing to no purpose at all. And in Popular estates, the greatest magistrats as well as the least, in token of their humilitie, laid downe their mases and other tokens of honour before the people, and so standing, spake vnto the people sitting: showing, that in their presence they had no power at all to commaund. So all the motions made by the magistrates of Rome, were by way of humble request, as in this forme, Velitis, Iubeatis, May it please [ K] you, or commaund: VVhereunto the people there present, giuing their consent with alowd voice, before the law Cassia Tabellaria, vsed these words, Omnes qui hic assident volumus, iubemusque, All we that here sit will and commaund. And after the lawes called Tabellarias, the letters A. and V. R. written in the tables, signified Antiquo, (or, I repeale the law) and Vti Rogas (or, as you request). And in like manner the people of Athens gaue their voyces sitting, the magistrat in the meane time speaking vnto them standing, so long as they had any thing to say vnto them.

But then might some man say, If it be so, that the magistrats had no power to com∣maund particular men, nor yet one another, in the presence of the people which had

the soueraigntie. VVhy did the Tribune of the people send his vsher vnto Appius [ A] Claudius the Consull, to commaund him to silence? And why did the Consull •…•…o re∣quite him with like, send his sergeant vnto him likewise, crying with a lowd voice, That the Tribune was no magistrat? VVhereunto I aunswere, that such contention and debate▪ oftentimes fell out amongst the magistrats, and especially betwixt the Consuls and the Tribunes: yet may we not thereof conclude, that either of them had any pow∣er to commaund the one the other, in the presence of the people, both their authorities then ceasing. So a controuersie arising betwixt the high court of Paris, and the court of Aids, for wearing of their purple robes, and accompanying the king, not farre from Henrie the second the French king, the president of the greater court of Paris sent a ser∣geant vnto the judges of the court of Aides, to forbid them to go any further: (and al∣beit [ B] that the king was not so nie as that he could heare such the presidents commaund) yet receiued he such aunswere from the judges, That hee had no such power to com∣maund ouer the court of Aids, and if he had, that yet he could not rightly there vse the same in the presence of the king.

But yet some man might obiect and say, That if the magistrats had no power to commaund in the presence of the prince, they were no more magistrats, neither should so great regard be had of their honours and dignities the prince being present, so as we see there is. VVhereunto mine aunswere is, That the magistrats by the presence of the prince loose nothing, but still continue in their offices, and so consequently in their dig∣nities and honours, their power to commaund being but suspended. As in like case [ C] the Dictator being created, all the magistrats continued in their estates and offices, howbeit that all their commaunding power was then holden in suspence: but so soone as the Dictators commission was expired, and he once out of his office, the magistrats againe commaunded by the same right they had before: which they could not haue done, if their magistracies and offices had so, & indeed bene from them taken. Which may serue for aunswere to that which might be alleaged of these words, which are of∣tentimes to be read in the writings of the auntient Romans, viz. Creaeto Dictatore ma∣gistratus abdi•…•…aht, Whereby it might seeme that the Dictator being created, the ma∣gistrats were out of office: which is not to be vnderstood of their offices, but of their power, as we haue before said, which was so for a while suspended. For otherwise the [ D] Dictator yeelding vp his office, the magistrats must haue sought for new power and authoritie from the people, their former power being before together with their office* 1.897 expired. And the reason is generall, that the power of the inferiour should be holden in suspence, in the presence of the superiour: for otherwise the subiect might command contrarie to the will of his lord, the seruant contrarie to the good liking of his master and the magistrat contrarie to the will and pleasure of his soueraigne prince•…•… o•…•… might at leastwise oppose himselfe against him, and by the vertue of his office forbid the in∣feriour persons to performe the commaunds of their superiours: which can in no wise be done, without ineuitable preiudice vnto the soueraigntie▪ except it be that the prince laying aside the soueraigntie of his person, goeth to see how his magistrats commaund; [ E] as the emperour Claudius ofttimes went openly to see the doings of his magistrats, and without disguising himselfe sat beneath them, foolishly giuing to them the more ho∣nourable place: or else in case tha•…•… the prince, his maiestie in a sort set aside, giue leaue to the magistrat to iudge of his cause. For the maxime of the law, which saith, That the magistrat of equall or greater power may bee iudged by his companion or fellow in office, or by his inferiour also, when he snbmitteth himselfe vnto his power, hath place not onely in priuat persons and magistrats, but euen in soueraigne princes also; whether it please them to submit themselues or their causes to the iudgement of

other princes, or of their owne subiects. And albeit that they may bee judges in their [ F] * 1.898 owne causes, vnto whome power is by God giuen to iudge, without beeing bound to the law, as Xenophon saith; yet neuerthesse it is much better beseeming their maiestie, and more indifferent also for them in their owne causes to abide the iudgement of their magistrats, than to become judges thereof themselues. But to the intent that the soue∣raigne maiestie of princes should not in any thing be impaired of the greatnesse there∣of, and yet that the brightnesse and glorie of the royall name should not dazle the eies of the judges, it was wisely in this realme ordained by our auncestors, That the king should not plead but by his atturney; and that in all publike causes wherein the king or Commonweale were priuatly interessed, the kings name should be still cancelled, and the matter pleaded but in the name of his attourney. Which thing the rest of the [ G] princes and others hauing territorial iurisdiction, haue afterwards imitated and follow∣ed. So Augustus the emperour writ vnto the lieutenants of his prouinces, That they should not suffer his name to be debased with being too common in their commissi∣ons, as Tranquillus reporteth. Yet is it by a certaine speciall custome by our auncestors receiued, that if the king will in priuat iudgements against priuat men, be restored, the kings attourney shall not in demaunding thereof hold his seat and place, but chaunge the same, least he should seeme to plead a publike and not a priuat cause. But whereas we haue said, the power of the magistrats to be suspended in the presence of the prince, belongeth vnto the whole princes familie, so long as they waite vppon the prince: for ouer them the ciuil magistrats haue no power, except such magistrats as the prince hath [ H] appointed for the executing of the iurisdiction of the court.

Yet a man might demaund, Whether the magistrat might forbid a subiect or pri∣uat* 1.899 man to come vnto the court, being within the iurisdiction of his territorie? Which is not without some difficultie: howbeit without entring into farther dispute, I say, that the magistrat banishing the guiltie subiect out of the territorie of his iurisdiction, where the prince may then be, secretly also forbiddeth him to approach the court, albeit that he cannot expresly forbid him to come vnto the princes court. Wherein the rule of Vlpian the lawyer taketh place, which saith, Expressa nocent, non expressa non nocent, Things expressed hurt, but things not expressed hurt not. And I remember how that [ I] it seemed a thing right strange vnto the court, and especially vnto the chauncellours of the houshold, that the Commissioners deputed by the prince, for the triall of the presi∣dent Allemand (who familiarly vsed my councell) hauing by their sentence condemned him, forbad him also to come within ten leagues of the court. Which thing the coun∣cell vnderstanding, decreed, That it was lawfull for no man but the prince only to make any such prohibition. And haply was the chiefe cause that the president (of whose councell I was) obtained of the king, to haue the iudgement reuersed. For it were not onely an hard and inhumane thing, to keepe the subiects from hauing accesse vnto the prince, to deliuer vnto him their petitions (as well agreeing with the lawes both of God and nature) but it should also be a thing much preiudiciall vnto the maiestie of a soue∣raigne [ K] prince, as I haue before said. And albeit that the superiour courts of this king∣dome haue vsed to banish men out of the realme, and so out of the bounds of their iuris∣diction, yet should such their iudgement take none effect, if the king in whose name the courts of Parliament giue iudgement, gaue them not commission so to do, and that his royall commaunds were not vnto such their sentences subscribed: So their decrees also in forme begin in the kings name.

Now as the presence of the Prince holdeth the power of all Magistrats in suspence,* 1.900 so is it also to be deemed of the power of the superiour magistrates or commissioners ouer the inferior. As a man may see in Fraunce, where the Presidents & Councelours,

euery one in his iurisdiction, and the Masters of Requestes in all seates of iustice, (ex∣cept [ A] the soueraigne courts) haue power to commaund the Seneschals, Bailiffes, Pro∣uosts, and other inferior magistrates, when they come into their prouinces, and sit in their places of justice, and there may iudge, ordaine, and commaund as superiours vnto their inferiours, and prohibit them to proceed any further, which is generall to all supe∣riour magistrats towards their inferiours, as saith the law: Iudicium soluitur, ventante eo qui iudicare iusserat, vel qui maius imperium in ea iurisdictione habet, The iudgement is stayed, he forbidding it which commaunded it, or he which hath greater power in the same iurisdiction. Where the word, Imperium, or power, signifieth not onely the power to commaund, or forbid, but euen the magistrat himselfe: As when Cicero saith: Maius imperium à minori rogari ius non est, Lawfull it is not, for the greater power to [ B] be examined by the lesse; he would say, that the magistrat or commissioner equall or superiour in power, is not bound to answere before his companion, or one lesse then himselfe, which is a Maxime of the auntients, which Messala the Lawyer decla∣reth by example, as thus: A minore imperto, maius, aut a maiore collega rogari iure non potest: quare neque Consules aut Praetores, Censoribus, neque Censores, Consulibus aut Praetoribus turbant, aut retinent auspicia, at Censores inter se; rursus Praetores Consu∣les{que} inter se, & vitiant et obtinent, The greater power cannot by right be examined by the lesse, or a fellow in office, by an other his fellow officer though greater then him selfe: wherefore neither the Consuls or Pretors trouble, or keepe the south-sayings from the Censors, neither the Censors from the Consuls or Pretors, but the Censors [ C] amongst themselues; and so againe the Pretors and Consuls among themselues, do one hinder an other, and so preuaile. And these be the words of Messala, which hee saith himselfe to haue writ out of the xiiij booke of C. Tuditanus, but hath failed in that which he saith after: Praetor etsi Collega Consulis est, neque Praetorem, neque Consu∣lem iure rogare potest, The Pretor although he be the Consuls companion, can by right examine neither the Pretor nor the Consul, which was happely done by the errour of him that write it: For he should haue said: Praetor etsi Collega Praetoris est, The Pre∣tor although he be the Pretors companion, and not, Consulis, or the Consuls: except we should salue the matter, in saying that the Consuls, Pretors, and Censors were all fellowes and companions: Quia soli ijsdem auspicijs, ijsdem comitijs, id est maioribus [ D] creabantur, caeteri magistratus minoribus auspicijs & comitijs, for that they alone were created and chosen, by the same diuinations and assemblies, that is to say the greater: whereas the other magistrats were chosen by the lesser, for otherwise the Latins neuer abused the word (Collega) in that sence; Besides that the Pretor was neuer the Con∣suls companion or fellow: but well to the contrarie, appeal might lawfully be made from the Pretor to the Consul. As we read that Aemylius Lepidus the Consul receiued a man appealing from the Pretor Orestes; and by a contrarie decree reuersed the Pre∣tors decree. So we read also that Luctatius the Consull tooke the triumph from Vale∣rius the Pretor, for that he being Consull was the generall of the armie, although he were that day from the armie wherein the victorie was got. That showeth also the [ E] power of the Consull to haue beene greater then the Pretors, for that the Consull had twelue Lictors, and the Pretors but two in the citie, and sixe at the most if they were sent into the prouinces, whom the Greekes therefore called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for so it is by the law Lectoria prouided, which was made concerning the power of the Pretor of the citie; who was of all other Pretors the greatest: Praetor Vrbanus duos Lictores apud se habeto, isque ad supremum solis occasum ius inter ciues dicito, The Pretor (or Prouost) of the citie, let him haue with him two Lictors, and let him administer justice amongst the citizens vnto the going downe of the sunne. Wherefore let this stand for good,

not onely fellowes and companions in the same power, but also magistrats of like and [ F] equall power, not to haue power to examine one another, and therefore much lesse them which haue greater power than themselues.

But yet question may be, whether a companion or fellow in office, or one of lesser* 1.901 power, or he which is no fellow in office at all, yet hauing power in his owne iuris∣diction, may therein stay the acts or proceedings of his equall or superiour in authori∣tie? For oftentimes great cōtrouersies haue fallen amongst magistrats about such pre∣rogatiues. And the difference is right great betwixt commaundement, and empeach∣ment or opposition: for companions or fellowes in office haue no commaunding po∣wer one of them ouer an other, and yet neuerthelesse they may in publique actions one of them oppose themselues against an other, and so hinder one an others procee∣dings. [ G] * 1.902 As Piso the Pretor or judge betwixt straungers and the citisens of Rome, oft times troubled Verres the Pretor of the citie, sitting in iudgement of causes betwixt ci∣tisen and citisen: causing his tribunall seat to be brought neere vnto the tribunall seat of the Pretor of the citie, so to hinder the vniust and iniurious decrees of Verres; and so administred iustice vnto the citisens flying from the tribunall seat of the citie, vnto him, as by the law they might. And therefore Cicero in one of his lawes sayth: Magistra∣tus nec obedientem, & nociuum ci•…•…em, mulcta, verberibus, vinculis coerceto, nisi par ma∣iorue potestas prohibessit, Let the magistrat restraine the disobedient and hurtfull citisen, with fine, stripes, and bondes, except an equall or greater power forbid it to be done:* 1.903 neither sufficeth it to say prohibessit, or forbid it, for that the magistrat can do nothing [ H] in the presence of his companion equall in power with himselfe, without his expresse consent, or else that he submit himselfe vnto his power. As it appeareth in that which Paulus the lawyer saith: Apud eum cui par imperium est manumitti non posse, & Praeto∣rem apud Praetorem manumittere non posse, Before him which hath equall power (with himselfe) a man cannot manumize, and a Pretor before another Pretor cannot ma∣numize. Neither doth that saying of Vlpian contradict or impugne the same: Con∣sulem apud Consulem manumittere posse, which is, That one of the Consuls may manumize before the other Consul: seeing that that is to be vnderstood that he might not doe it vpon the same day that hee which did manumize or enfranchise had the bundels of rods and power to commaund; for that they both neuer had power vpon [ I] the same day, as saith Festus Pompeius, as is in many places to be seene, whether they were at vnitie betwixt themselues or not. And therefore Liuie surnamed the Salter, car∣ried away the triumph from Claudius Nero his fellow and companion in the Con∣sulship, for that he commaunded that day wherein the victorie was obtained (as saith Liuie) albeit that the battell were giuen against Hasdruball by consent of them both; For Lucius Caesar (as Festus Pompeius writeth) deemeth him to be called the greater Consul, which had the bundels of rods or maces; or him which was first made Consul; which Paulus himselfe confirmeth. And all this wisely, for if both of them should at once haue had the power, nothing could haue beene peaceable, nothing firme or [ K] sure in the great affaires of the Commonweale. Wherefore the Decemuiri beeing created at Rome for the reforming of the Commonweale, and making of the lawes of the xij Tables; it was added vnto the law, That they should by turnes haue the ma∣ces with the power to commaund. Now if any man aske the reason why a fellow in office may impeach or stay his fellow officer in his proceeding, if they both haue au∣thoritie and power at the same time: it is grounded vpon the reason generall, of all them which haue any thing in common, wherein he which forbiddeth hath most force, and his condition in that case is better than his which would proceed on further. Which reason preuaileth also, when question is of the force & power of laws, wherein

the force of the law which forbiddeth, is greater then of that which commaundeth. [ A]

But whereas we haue said Magistrats of like power or fellowes in office not to be* 1.904 bound to the power or commaund of their companions or fellowes, that is so true if that they both be in number equall: for in all Corporations and Colleges, they which are in number most, are also superiour in power: and therefore the lesse part of magi∣strats fellowes in office, cannot forbid the greater. But if all the Magistrats were of one mind and opinion, these words were wont to be written vpon their decrees and edicts, Pro Collegio, for the Colledge, (which shall in their place be expounded.) But if it be true that we haue said, why did then Messala say? Consulem ab omnibus magistratibus concionē auocare posse▪ ab eo neminem: deinde Praetorem ab alijs preterquàm a Consulibus: minores magistratus nusquam nec concionem nec comitatum auocasse, That the Consull [ B] might call the assemble of the people from al the Magistrats, but none might call them from him, and so next after him that the Pretors might call them from all others, excep∣ting from the Consuls: but that the lesser magistrats could no where call away, neither the assemblie nor sessions of the people. Wherof it followeth, that the impeachment & opposition of the lesser magistrats could not in any sort let or hinder the actions or commaunds of the greater. Whereunto I aunswere, that to call away belongeth to power and commaund, which opposition doth not. Now there is great difference, whether you commaund, or otherwise hinder any thing to be done, as we will here∣after more plainely declare. But first it is to be noted, that that which Messala saith is true in other magistrats, but not in the Tribunes of the people: whome wee haue [ C] showed to haue had the title of magistrats, with power to assemble and call together the common people, and to constraine the Consuls to giue place vnto their oppositi∣on, not so much by the power they had to commaund▪ as by imprisoning of their per∣sons, and seising of their goods: for if they commaunded any thing, and the magistrat refused or reiected their commands, they forthwith for such their contempt, comman∣ded them to be cast in prison: For so Seruilius the Senator directing his speech vnto the Tribunes, saith, Vos Tribunt plebis Senatus appellat, vt in tanto discrimine Reipublicae Dictatorem dicere Consules provestra potestate cogatis, Tribuni pro collegio pronuntiant, placere Consules Senatus dicto audientes esse, aut in vincula se duc•…•… iussuros, The Senat cal∣leth vpon you the Tribunes of the people, that in so great a daunger of the Common∣weale, [ D] you for the power you haue, would compell the Consuls to nominat a Dicta∣tor. The Tribunes in the name of the colledge of Tribunes pronounced that their pleasure was, that the Consuls should be obedient vnto the commaund of the Senat: threatning otherwise to commaund them to bee cast into bonds. And it was so farre from being lawfull for the Consuls to haue power to hinder the assemblies of the common people called together by the Tribunes, as that it was not in their power so much as to interpret them in speaking vnto the people, and that vppon paine of death by the law Icilia, if he that had so interpreted the Tribune in his oration or speech, pai∣ed not the fine or amercement imposed vpon him by the Tribune. As the Tribune Drusus well caused Philip the Consull to vnderstand, whome he made to be cast in pri∣son [ E] for interrupting him in his speech vnto the people.

That also which we haue said, the greater part of a companie, or colledge of magi∣strats* 1.905 to preuaile against the lesser, taketh not place amongst the Tribunes of the peo∣ple, one of the Tribunes voices being able of it selfe to stay all the proceedings, not of the Senat onely, but of all other the magistrats, yea & of the rest of his fellow Tribunes also: whereas to the contrarie, the acts of one Tribune alone, were of force, except some of his fellowes and companions openly opposed himselfe against the same. As is in Liuie to be seene, where he saith, The farmers of the publike demaine to haue beene

discharged by a decree published vnder the name but of one of the Tribunes only. And [ F] that the power of the greater part of the Tribunes might bee withstood by the fewer opposing themselues against them, it is manifest by that, that at such time as Appius the Censor by force held his power and Censorship longer than he should haue done, and the time thereof being now expired, contratie to the law Aemilia, Sempronius the Tri∣bune of the people in the open assemblie of the people, said vnto him, Ego te Appi in vincula duci iubebo nisi Aemiliae legi parueris, approbantibus sex Tribunis actionem colle∣gae, tres auxilio fuerunt summaque inuidia omnium or dinum solus Censuram gessit, I will commaund thee, O Appius (saith he) to be cast into bonds, except thou obey the law Aemilia; and six so of the Tribunes allowing & approuing the doing of their compani∣on and follow Tribunes, three others of them tooke part with Appius, and so hee alone [ G] held his Censorship, with the great enuie and hart-burning of all sorts of men. So like∣wise at such time as Cicero then Consull (the armie of Cateline beeing discomfited and ouerthrowne, by the conduct of C. Antonius the other Consull) bare all the sway in the citie, and had turned all the fauour of the people vnto himselfe alone, nine of the Tri∣bunes of the people to restraine such his immoderat power, were all of opinion to send for Pompey with his armie; and had so done, had not Cato one of the Tribunes of the people alone opposed himselfe in Ciceroes behalfe, and so hindered the proceeding of his fellow Tribunes. So when Scipio Africanus accused of extortion, was to haue bene cast in prison, he was saued onely by Sempronius one of the Tribunes, and father of the Gracchies, opposing himselfe against his fellowes. [ H]

But how (might some man say) could one Tribune alone let the actions and procee∣dings of the Senat, of the Consuls, yea and of all his companions and fellowes in office also? Yet most certaine it is that he might so do, if the other Tribunes preferred not a request against him vnto the people, to haue him put out of his office and authoritie. And therefore at the request of Tiberius Gracchus the Tribune, Marcus Octauius ano∣ther of the Tribunes, withstanding the profit of the people, and the enacting of the lawes for the diuision of lands, was of necessitie to be thrust out of his office of the Tribuneship, before the law Sempronia for the diuision of lands could bee established. And to that end tendeth that speech of the Tribune vnto the Senators, in Liuie, Faxo ne iuuet vox ista veto, qua collegas nostros tam laeti concinentes auditis, contemni iam Tri∣bunos [ I] plebis, quippe potestas Tribunitia suam ipsa vim frangat intercedendo, I shall make (saith he) that this word Veto, (or, I forbid) which you now so merrie heare our fel∣lowes together singing, shall helpe you nothing, the Tribunes of the people must now needs be contemned, for that the Tribunitial power doth weaken the power of itselfe, by opposing it selfe against it selfe. But this power and opposition of the Tribune, was ordained and prouided for the libertie of the people, and against force offered them, and not for the priuat profit of the Tribunes themselues: who if question were of any particular of theirs, whether it were in ciuill or criminall causes, were not in any thing respected, but suffered iudgement, as other men did, if some one or other of their fel∣lowes [ K] in office enterposed not themselues, and so letted the proceeding. As when Luci∣us Cotta one of the Tribunes of the people, being sued, would neither answere nor pay his creditors, Fiducia sacrosanctae potestatis, as bearing himselfe vpon the reputation and credit of the most sacred power of the Tribuneship; his companions in office openly denounced vnto him, That they would aid the creditors against him, except hee made them payment. Yet at length by little and little it was agreed, That the colledge or companie of Tribunes, should be also bound vnto the same lawes and customes that other colledges and companies were, viz. That decrees made by the consent of the greater part should bind the rest. As is easily to be gathered of that which Liuie saith,

Ex auctoritate Senatus latum est ad populum, ne quis templum arcemue iniussu Senatus, aut [ A] Tribunorum plebis maioris partis dedicaret, It was by the authoritie of the Senat pro∣pounded to the people, That no man without the commaund of the Senat, or of the greater part of the Tribunes of the people, should dedicat a temple or a castle. And af∣terwards by the law Attilia it was ordained, That the Pretor of the citie, and the grea∣ter part of the Tribunes of the people, might appoint tutors vnto women and father∣lesse children. Which custome grew into such force, as that the Senat commaunded Quintus Pompeius Rufus a Tribune of the people to be cast into prison, for that he be∣ing but one, went about to forbid an assemblie of the states to bee called. Whereas otherwise the wilfull rage of one furious Tribune might haue troubled the whole state of the Commonweale. And this was the cause why the Consull being about to assem∣ble [ B] the great estates of the people, by sound of trumpet caused an edict to bee proclai∣med, forbidding all magistrats lesser than himselfe, to haue regard vnto the Auspicia, that is to say, vnto the disposition of the ayre, or the flight of birds, for the coniecturing thereby, whether the thing which was then taken in hand, were agreeable with the wil and pleasure of their gods or not. For if it thundered or lightned neuer so little, or if the birds were seene to flie on the right hand, or if any of them there present fell of the falling sicknes, (which was therefore called Morbus comitialis) or if any other monster were borne, the assembly was accounted thereby polluted, and so the people presently broke vp and departed without any thing doing: the sooth-sayers thereby denouncing vnto them, That the gods were then angrie, and not well pleased with their doings. [ C] Which was the charge of the Augures or soothsayers so to denounce vnto them, but yet might not lawfully oppose themselus against that was to be done, as might the ma∣gistrats of equall power, or greater: but if the magistrats were inferiour vnto him that held the assembly of the estates, their opposing of themselues could not let the further proceeding of the superior magistrat, howbeit that such acts or proceedings were there∣by defectiue, and so subiect to reuocation. In such sort, as that Caius Figulus the Con∣sull with his companion, after he had bene chosen, taken his oath, and transported his armie euen into Spaine; yet was he neuerthelesse with his fellow Consull, by a de∣cree of the Senat, called backe againe home and enforced to giue vp their power and authoritie: For that the soothsayers had before declared vnto Tiberius Gracchus the [ D] Consull (then holding the great assemblies for the choyce of the Consuls) That the signes and tokens whereby they tooke their predictions were vnfortunat and contrary. Wherefore the lesser magistrats could not trouble the assemblies of the greater, or cal the people alreadie assembled from them, but such magistrats onely as were equall and of like power with them. But the Tribunes of the people although they might not in∣terrupt the assemblies of the greater magistrats, or cal the assembled people from them, yet might they by opposing of themselues hinder their other actions and proceedings: and in case that the magistrats would yet needs proceed contrarie to their oppositions, the Tribunes would then vse plaine force against them; so that ostentimes murthers were thereabouts committed. For so Asellius the Pretor, or Prouost of the citie, for fa∣uouring [ E] the debtors against their creditors, was as he was doing sacrifice slain by atu∣multuous company of the creditors, hauing for their leader one of the Tribunes of the people. In like sort Appius Saturninus Tribune of the people, slew Munius the Consul,* 1.906 in the verie assemblie of the people.

And as publike actions are troubled or letted by magistrats equal or greater in pow∣er than they by whome they are done, opposing themselues against them: so beeing once done, appeale is to be made from the lesser magistrats vnto the greater, sauing vn∣to euerie man his iurisdiction and power. Now if it bee not in the lesser magistrats

power to commaund the greater, or to stay his proceedings, much lesse can he vndoe [ F] what he hath alreadie done, reuerse his iudgements, or receiue appeales made from him, which are not lawfully to be admitted from the greater magistrats vnto their fel∣lowes or men equall in authoritie with themselues. But euen to the contrarie, if a ma∣gistrats deputie or lieutenant be preferred to like estate or degree with the magistrat whose deputie or lieutenant he is, his commission of deputation or lieutenancie cea∣seth, and the acts by him begun are interrupted and broken off. Wherefore if the equall or lesser magistrat, shall receiue one appealing from the equall or greater magi∣strat, an action of iniurie may be commenced against such a magistrat, as also against him who hath so appealed vnto the lesser magistrat, or fellow in office with him from whom he hath appealed. For so Caesar as then but Pretor, beeing accused before one [ G] of the Questors, as hauing an hand in the conspiracie of Cateline, caused both the accu∣ser and the Questor being both grieuously fined to bee cast in prison, and especially the Questor, for that he had suffered a greater magistrat than himselfe to be accused before him, as saith Suetonius. So the court of Paris by a seuere decree forbad the jud∣ges or magistrats of them which haue territoriall iurisdiction, to bind the kings magi∣strats or judges with their edicts or prohibitions: and that if they did otherwise, the kings magistrats or judges might by way of iustice proceed against them for so doing.

But here a man might doubt, Whether the inferiour or lesser magistrat, who may* 1.907 be commaunded by the superiour, may also be commaunded by the superiour magi∣strats lieutenant, or deputie? Which most haue thought to be a thing without doubt, [ H] considering that the lieutenants, or deputies, command nothing in their owne names, neither can do any thing but in the name of the magistrat whose place they hold, and vnto whome the inferiour magistrat oweth obedience. For otherwise if it were lawfull for the inferiour magistrats to disobey the lieutenants or deputies of their superiours, other particular men by the same reason might likewise withstand them, which were the way to ruinat & ouerthrow the whole estate of the Commonweal. Howbeit that it might also be said, that magistrats lieutenants erected in title of office haue power and authoritie by the law, and so also power to commaund in their owne names, and in that qualitie to constraine the inferiour magistrats to obey them. Yet neuerthelesse I say, that in that they are lieutenants or deputies vnto other the superiour magistrats, [ I] they cannot commaund or giue our commission in their owne names; which if they do, the inferiour magistrats are not bound to obey them: As was adiudged by a de∣cree of the parliament of Paris, at the suit of the Seneschal of Touraine against his lieu∣tenant, who published edicts and decrees in his owne name, which should haue bene set forth in the name of the Seneschall himselfe. Which was a thing without all doubt before the edict of king Charles the seuenth that the lieutenants should bee placed and displaced by the Seneschals: but the doubt arose after that they were by him erected in title of office, as hauing then their power from the king, and not from the Seneschals. But we must not thereupon presume, that the purpose and intent of the king therein, [ K] was to take away the power from the Seneschals or Bailifes (which could not be done but by an expresse edict for the suppressing of those offices) but contrariwise the erecti∣on of their lieutenants in the title of lieutenants, was much more to establish the ho∣nour of the Seneschals and Bailifes, and yet so to diminish their power. As first the Senators at Rome, and after that the emperours themselues, were woont to appoint lieutenants vnto the Proconsuls (or gouernours of their prouinces) who yet for all that had not their power to commaund from the Senat or the emperour, but from the Proconsuls or gouernours themselues. Wherefore the law saith, Apud legatum Proconsulis non est legis actio, that is to say, that he might do no exploit or act of iustice,

but in the name of another man: not for that▪ it was not lawfull for the Proconsuls [ A] lieutenants, as it was for the lieutenants of al other magistrats to manumise or enfran∣chise within the precinct and territorie of the prouince of those magistrats whose lieu∣tenants they were. Which the doctor Cuias hath denied, and in the auntient reading corrected these words, Ex quo prouinciam ingressus est: Which his correction if it were to be admitted, thereof should follow diuers ineuitable absurdities, these words (as hee would haue them) being left out: for so the lieutenants could not in the territorie of their magistrats, ordaine, decree, commaund, or do any thing; which is all that the law properly calleth Legis actiones, or the actions of the law; all which we read lieutenants to haue still done in their owne prouinces: and yet neuerthelesse the Maires, and Du∣umuirs, or Consuls of villages & townes, had power to manumise or enfranchise, and [ B] to appoint tutors by commission within their owne iurisdiction. Wherfore the execu∣tion or action of the law, is not in the magistrats lieutenāts or deputies, but in thē which so appointed the lieutenants or deputies. Yea the magistrat himselfe, who doth but exercise another mans iurisdiction, can in his owne name commaund nothing. Wher∣of it commeth, that a man cannot appeale from a lieutenant or deputie, vnto him whose lieutenant or deputie he is: for so appeale should be made from the same man to himselfe. Howbeit that the magistrat may examine the iniurie and wrong done to priuat men by his lieutenant or deputie; and that because the lieutenant or deputy hath not all the iurisdiction and power of the magistrat, whose lieutenant or deputie hee is: and yet lesse in auntient time, than at this present, when as the lieutenants of the Pro∣consuls [ C] or gouernours of countries, had no power to inflict corporall punishment vp∣on any. The princes lieutenants generall also in the wars, albeit that they haue a most high commaund and power ouer all souldiors, of what degree or condition soeuer, yet if any of the princes of the blood offend against the lawes militarie, the hearing and triall thereof belongeth not vnto the lieutenants generall, but vnto the soueraigne prince himselfe; or at least wise vnto the chapiter of the knights of the order, especial∣ly in case it concerne either honour, or life. And in much more strong tearmes, if que∣stion be of ecclesiasticall discipline, onely the bishops are not bound to aunswere before the archbishops officials, or vicars generall; as it was by a decree of the parliament of* 1.908 Paris, adiudged for the bishops of Troy, and Neuers: Whereby it was said, that they [ D] were not bound to obey, but onely vnto the archbishops in person themselues. But that which I haue said of the power of the superiour magistrats ouer the inferiour, is to bee vnderstood in their owne territorie, seat, and iurisdiction▪ out of which they are but as other priuat and particular men, without power or commaund.

But now the question might be asked, Whether that magistrats equall and fellows* 1.909 in authoritie and power, be also equall in honour and dignitie? Whereunto I aun∣swere, that honor and dignitie doth in nothing communicat with authoritie and pow∣er: yea oftentimes it chaunceth and commeth to passe, that hee which hath most ho∣nour, hath so much the lesse power: than which secret none is almost greater, or more profitable for the maintenance & preseruation of the Aristocraticall or Popular Com∣monweales, [ E] or that is in any place of the world better kept than in Venice. Of the Consuls he that was first chosen Consull, was also first named in all their publike acts and fastes, and so had the honour of precedence: but if they were both at once chosen, he that was the elder was in honour also aboue his fellow, vntill the law Pappia Poppe∣ia, which gaue the prerogatiue of honour vnto the married Consull: or if they were both married, then vnto him that had most children, which supplied the number of yeares. So amongst the Pretors, who were all of one colledge or companie, and their power all one; he which was called Vrbanus (or the Pretor of the citie) was in dignitie

and honour aboue the rest, and so called the Greatest Pretor, for that he was first of all [ F] chosen, and in the absence of the Consuls held their places, assembled the Senat, and called together the greatest estates, with such other like things belonging to the office of the Consuls. And amongst the ten Archontes of equall power in Athens, there was one, who yet in honour exceeding the rest, had the publike acts authorised in his name, and gaue himselfe names also vnto the Annales and publike acts and decrees, and was thereof called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. So amongst all the parliaments of Fraunce (beeing almost all of like power) the parliament of Paris hath the prerogatiue of honour aboue the rest, as more auntient; and by a certaine singular right is yet called the Court of the peeres of Fraunce, as hauing the triall and iudgement of the peeres, which none of the rest of the courts of parliament haue. And albeit that in the time of Charles the viij, the [ G] great Councell mannaged the affaires of state, yet so it is, that the king by expresse edict ordained and appointed, That in all edicts and mandats, wherein mention should bee made of the court of parliament, and of the great Councell, the Court of parlia∣ment of Paris should alwayes be set formost. So whereas the kings Attourneies are almost in number infinit, he of the parliament of Paris hath alwaies the prerogatiue of honour aboue all the rest of the kings Attourneies, who all are sworne vnto the jud∣ges of the soueraigne courts (wherein they are Attourneies) except the Attourney ge∣nerall of the Parliament of Paris, who is not to bee sworne but vnto the king onely. So wee see that the Constable of Fraunce, and the Chauncelor, albeit that they haue not power or commaund one of them aboue the other, but are equall in sit∣ting, [ H] and in going side by side, yet neuerthelesse the more honourable place is reserued vnto the Constable▪ which is on the right hand of the king, and the Chauncellor on the left: except some haply may say him to haue that place for to beare the kings sword vpon the kings right hand: yet besides that, at the consecration and coronation of the king, and other ceremonies wherein place of precedence is, the Constable goeth before the Chauncellour, and next vnto the Chauncellour followeth the Grand Maister of Fraunce. Which I would haue vnderstood to be of me so spoken, not as if my pur∣pose were to determine any thing of honours, but as an example by the way whereby to perceiue how much honour differeth from authoritie or power. [ I]

But forasmuch as we haue said, that magistrats equall in power, or which hold no∣thing* 1.910 one of them another, cannot be commaunded one of them by another; a man may doubt whether if amongst many princes or coequall lords, one offend, hee may be restrayned or corrected by the other princes or lords his equels? For why, iu∣risdiction is of it selfe by nature indiuisible: and lords of one and the same iurisdiction haue one of them as much power as the other; and euerie one of them hath entire power for all: which is not so amongst princes or magistrats which haue their charges or territories diuided, and which haue not any thing to commaund one of them the other; and much lesse when many magistrats in one bodie or colledge haue one and the same charge together; where no one of them hath of himselfe any [ K] power or commaund, except it be by commission from the whole colledge giuen him. Yet many there be which hold, that one of these lords may be restrained and corrected by the other lords his compeers and coequals, as hauing by his fault lost his iurisdiction and right, as it hath bene iudged in the court at Rome. Which iudgement may well be borne with, howbeit that the reason thereof is not good; for to say that hee offen∣ding hath thereby forthwith lost his power and iurisdiction, were to do execution be∣fore iudgement, and to spoile the lord or magistrat of his estate or place before he were heard. And albeit that the threats, penalties, edicts, and decrees, expressed and set down in the lawes, had the force of a thing alreadie iudged, as some haue thought them to

haue: yet so it is, that the fact in question is alwaies in iudgement to be tried, whether [ A] it were done or no; and in case it be confessed, yet before the execution, must the sen∣tence be pronounced by the mouth of the judge, who can haue no power ouer his compeere, who hath equall power and authoritie in the same territorie with himselfe, as we haue before declared, following therein the sounder opinion of the greater part of lawyers, not much regarding that others say, That euerie man is there to be iudged where he hath offended: which is so true, if there be no lawful cause which may hinder iudgement to be in the same place giuen. In a colledge or companie of magistrats, or* 1.911 judges, if the greater part of them agree in one, there is no doubt but that they may iudge or chastice any one, or the lesser part of their fellowes: as they did in the Senat of Rome, after the law which Adrian the emperour made for the iudging of Senators; [ B] and as they doe in all the courts of this realme. But betweene many equall lords or compeers of the same territorie, the reason is farre otherwise; for that euerie one of them hath himselfe the whole iurisdiction and power, nor cannot iudge but by turnes, one of them after another, neither haue more than one seat of iustice, in one and the same iurisdiction, but by the new grant of their patron or predominant lord. And in this, seruice differeth from iurisdiction; for that seruice suffereth it selfe to be at once & together enioyed of euerie one that hath right thereunto: but iurisdiction not so, as ma∣ny haue thought, hauing excepted dutchies, marquisats, and counties; which by the auntient lawes of fees are of an indiuisible nature. But it is neither for vs needfull, nei∣ther doth this place require vs by reasons to refute the opinion of them which affirme [ C] iurisdictions so to cleaue vnto the territories, as if they were indeed seruices; least in so doing we should passe without the bounds of our purpose. Sufficeth it in passing by, to say, Iurisdiction to hold so little of fee, as that the soueraigne prince selling or giuing a fee, of what nature soeuer it be, is not therefore to be reputed to haue giuen or sold the iurisdiction thereto belonging; as it hath ofttimes bene iudged, & at length because it should no more be doubted of, was by an edict of Philip the faire more straitly proui∣ded for: yea although the donation were by the soueraigne prince made to religious or deuout vses; which many (but without cause) haue excepted, the law being made generall. Seeing therefore that magistrats in power equall, or which hold not any thing one of them of another, cannot be commaunded or corrected one of them by [ D] another; much lesse can the equall lords or compeers of the same territorie and iuris∣diction commaund or reforme one another, but the superiour magistrat or predomi∣nant lord is to haue the hearing and determining of the matter. By our customes the superiour courts haue reserued vnto themselues, the controuersies of the kings magi∣strats and officers amongst themselues, concerning their power and iurisdiction. But if question be for the executing of the decrees or iudgements of one of them in the ter∣ritorie of another, it is to be done by honest request and leaue before obtained: how∣beit that by a new law, that custome is taken away out of this our Commonweale, and power giuen vnto pursiuants to put in execution all the magistrats commaunds, almost throughout all the kingdome. As for soueraigne princes, not subiect to the [ E] power or commaund of others, they must in such case, of necessitie vse requests one to another, for that they cannot be compelled by the command of any greater power, as magistrats may, who without any leaue asked, suffer the iudgements of other magi∣strats to be put into execution in their prouinces: or in case they refuse so to doe, are to be constrained by the superior powers. Which asking of leaue of the greater or equall power to execute or suffer iudgement giuen out of their territories, to bee executed therein, offering to do or suffer the like to be done in theirs, as occasion shall require, hath of all antiquitie beene obserued and kept. Howbeit it seemeth the Roman empire

yet florishing, that to put in execution a mandat or iudgement out of ones owne terri∣torie, [ F] it was needfull first to obtaine the Emperours letters of commaund, seeing that the law saith, Sententiam Romae dictam, possunt Praesides in prouincijs, si hoc iussi fuerint exequi, The Presidents in their prouinces may put in execution a sentence (or iudge∣ment) giuen at Rome, if they be thereunto commaunded: yet much more seemely it were by the good leaue of the magistrat to obtaine the same, than by force to extort it against his will. As in like cause the Emperour said vnto him which complayned of his companion, without hauing before spoken vnto him, Alloquere illum, ne rem iniu∣stam faciat, Speake vnto him, that he do thee not wrong: forasmuch as the princes commaund, or constraint of the superiours in such case, giueth occasions of quarrels and iealousies amongst Magistrats, seeing the decrees of their equals, or of their infe∣riours, [ G] against their wils to be put in execution in their owne territories: which oft times turne to the great hurt of the subiects, and dishonour of the Commonweale, one of the magistrats, or of such as are in authoritie, in dispite of the other discharging their cholerique passions vpon the poore innocents: As did the Consul Marcellus, who in* 1.912 despite of Caesar caused certeine of the citisens of Nouocome to be whipped, to make them to know (as he said) that Caesar had no power to giue vnto them the right and freedome of the citisens of Rome. But much greater is the poore subiects harmes if such contention and difference for power and authoritie, fall out amongst the greatest magistrats, or highest Courts. As I remember such a difference fell out betwixt the [ H] parliament of Paris, and of Burdeaux, about the execution of an arrest giuen in the parliament of Paris; which the parliament of Burdeaux vpon the princes commaund suffered to be executed within the iurisdiction thereof, but with condition, that if any opposition or appeale were in the doing thereof made, the parliament of Burdeaux should haue the hearing and disciding thereof. He which had the execution of the matter, willing to proceed farther, notwithstanding the opposition of the defendant, appeal was by the partie made vnto the parliament of Bourdeaux, whom the plaintife preuented in the parliament of Paris. This contention betwixt the two parliaments was by the king referred vnto the great Counsel; where it was decreed, That to receiue and heare the appeale belonged vnto the parliament of Paris; for that euery man ought [ I] of right to be the interpreter and expounder of his owne meaning: and as none but the prince may declare his lawes and commaundements, so it belongeth to the magistrat to declare the meaning of his owne sentence. Now here question was of the right meaning of a thing alreadie iudged, at such time as the partie guiltie offered his opposi∣tion vnto the officer, putting into execution the decrees of the higher Court, from which a man may not by the lawes appeale▪ vnto which opposition of the partie guil∣tie, if the officer giue not way, then it is vsuall to appeale, not so much from the sen∣tence of the higher Court, as from the iniurie of the officer which would not heare the opposition, which he must needes, except the Court haue commaunded the iudge∣ment thereof to be put in execution, notwithstanding any opposition. [ K]

But what if the Magistrat shall haue no respect or regard vnto the requestes or de∣crees* 1.913 of his equall, or of the inferiour magistrat, nor suffer their commaundements to be put in execution within his iurisdiction. Truely in this case he is to be thereunto by the superiour magistrats compelled: or if they be of the higher sort of magistrats which are at controuersie among themselues about their iurisdiction and power, they are by the princes authoritie to be enforced: for so these wordes of Vlpian the Lawier are to be vnderstood, Si hoc iussi fuerint, If they shall be so commaunded: viz. by the prince, (but not by the magistrats) at such time as the Presidents or gouernours of countries, euery one of them in his own prouince had the chiefest power and authoritie next vnto

the Prince, by whom onely they were to be commaunded. And whereas in the Edicts [ A] or lawes any thing is commaunded to be done, it is thus to be vnderstood, that euery Magistrat in his owne prouince is to be obeyed, for that the magistrat hath no power to commaund out of his owne territorie or iurisdiction. In auntient time the kings Pursuiuants or officers, if they were to put in execution the commaunds of the royall magistrats in the territorie of such lords as had therein territoriall iurisdiction, were first to aske them leaue; vntill that afterwards it was by the most strait decrees of the highest courts forbidden them so to doe, for that therein the soueraigne maiestie of the king seemed to be something empaired.

But yet it might be demaunded, whether the inferiour Magistrats might cause their* 1.914 commaunds to be put in execution, without the leaue of the superiour magistrat, vnto [ B] whom appeale was made? and that after the same appeale let fall, and the time past, appointed for the prosecuting thereof; which the Lawiers to no purpose call Fatalia, enduced thereunto by an old errour and inueterat fault of them which haue transla∣ted the Code, and authentiques out of Greeke into Latin, wherein for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they haue red 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is to say, fatall daies, for daies prefixed and of as∣signation: which the law of the twelue Tables called Statos d•…•…es, daies appointed; as in this law, Si status dies cum hoste, that is to say, If the day appointed with a straunger. Neither euer did lawier or man that could speak Latin, vse this forme of speaking, nei∣ther hath any of the Latins or Greeks called them for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Fa∣tales. The Lawiers haue oftentimes diuided Dies sessionum, a diebus continuis, Daies [ C] * 1.915 of Session, from daies of Continuation. And if any thing were by the magistrat com∣maunded to be done within a certaine time, the Lawiers called it Statutum tempus, and edictum peremptorium, a time appointed, or edict peremptorie: but when the time wherein the sute ought to be determined is expired and past, or that the sute is let fall, we say, Litem mori, the sute to die; or instantiam perimi, the instance to be lost: as be∣fore, we say, Litem viuere, or, the suit to liue: but none of the Lawiers hath vsurped Fatalem diem, or Fatalia tempora, a fatall day, or fatall times. But all this errour is de∣riued of the chaunging of this one Greeke letter 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for seeing that by the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Greeks aswell as the Hebrewes signifie Fatum, or destinie, they must needes translate 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, fatalem diem, that is to say, a fatall day. Demosthenes [ D] oft times calleth it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which the Latins call statum diem; and we in our practise, praefixam, that is to say, an appointed, or prefixed day: for so Demosthenes saith against Media, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & against Stephanus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: and sometimes also he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as to Nicostratus: and the later Greeks haue called it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but neuer called it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And so pope Synesius metaphorically calleth the last day of a mans life 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because he would not call it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Fatall; a word vnto Christian men and true religion straunge. Wherefore for Fatall daies of appeales, we shall more truely and better vse the tearmes of Appointed times, for so the lawyer calleth them. But that Iustinians lawes were written in Greeke before they were written in Latin, I suppose no man to [ E] doubt. And that the Theodosian and Hermogenian Codes, out of whome Iustinians Code was almost all compiled, were as well written in Greek as in Latin, it is plaine: and so the law Properandum to haue beene translated rather by a Greeke than by a Latinist, being altogether writ in the Greeke phrase, as namely calling the defendant fu∣gientem, or the partie flying away; which is the proper Greeke word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ Neither ought it to seeme straunge, that the Greekes translated the Roman lawes, and euen Iu∣stinians Iustitutions into Greeke; seeing them to haue translated most of the writings of Thomas Aquinas, as also the latter bookes of Aristotles Metaphysikes out of Ara∣bike

into Greeke, the Greeke copie being before lost. But to returne againe from [ F] whence we haue digressed, and to resolue the propounded question; I say, that it is not needfull for the inferiour magistrat, the appeale being let fall, to haue leaue of the supe∣riour magistrat (vnto whome the appeale was made) for the putting in execution of their owne iudgements: as in the time of our auncestors, the manner was, by letters of iustice (as they tearmed them) which by a decree of Charles the seuenth, were vtterly abolished and taken away: sufficeth it the appeale being once giuen ouer before the iudge that gaue the sentence, to request, that the same may now be put in execution, ex∣cept the superiour magistrat vnto whome the partie condemned hath appealed, hath expresly before forbid the executionto be done. In which case it is needfull, that such prohibitiō be taken away, before the inferior magistrat proceed further. For otherwise [ G] it is not requisit, that the appeale should by the superiour magistrat be declared to be let fall or giuen ouer, that the sentence may be put in execution; for that the benefit of the appeale let fall, is obtained by the law, & not by vertue of the magistrats sentence. Nei∣ther is the honour or reputation of the superiour magistrats impaired by the inferiours, not hauing from them expresse prohibition: in reuerence & respect of whom, the infe∣riour magistrats ought to stay the execution, if the stay thereof bee not perilous vnto the Commonweale. In which case they may proceed, although it were in question of life, and afterwards write back their aunswere; whereas otherwise, in causes concer∣ning life and death, if the magistrat giue not way vnto the appeale, he himselfe is in dan∣ger of capitall punishment. Yea and in this case, the magistrat for not yeelding vnto the [ H] appeale, is guiltie of treason, albeit that question were but concerning the whipping of a citisen.

Now all that which we haue hitherto said concerning magistrats, and of the obedi∣ence that one of them oweth vnto another, is to be vnderstood of magistrats that be of the selfe same Commonweale. But what shal we then say of magistrats of diuers Com∣monweales? As if a man by the magistrats condemned in this kingdome shall flie into Greece, whether shall the Grand Signior of the Turkes, at the request of the French king, or of some other priuat man whome the matter doth concerne, cause the iudge∣ment to be put in execution, without further enquirie of the equitie of the cause? The [ I] like question whereunto I remember to haue hapned in the parliament of Paris, con∣cerning a French marchant condemned by default and contumacie at Venice, at the suit of a Venetian marchant; who came into Fraunce to demaund execution of the iudgement giuen in Venice, hauing before obtained letters of request frō the seigneurie to that purpose, as the vsuall manner & custome of soueraigne princes & lords in such cases is: For a mutual respect and care which all princes haue vnto iustice, wherof they hold their Scepters and Crownes. The French marchant excepteth against the Vene∣tian, and no regard being had to his exception, appealeth vnto the court of parlia∣ment. Where most were of opinion, that the sentence so giuen was to bee put in exe∣cution, without any farther examination, whether it were rightfully iudged or not: [ K] which otherwise might▪ seeme a wrong offered vnto the Seigneurie of Venice, which might vse the like circumstāce, & examine the iudgements of the magistrats of France, and also reuerse them, rather in reuenge of their wronged maiestie, than for the iniqui∣tie of the same. Yet for that the marchant was condemned by default, it was thought meet to haue it enquired, whether he had by couenant in this point submitted himselfe vnto the Venetian Seigneurie and iurisdiction or not? And then, whether the iudge∣ment were duely giuen, after certaine peremptorie edicts and appointed times, accor∣ding to the laws and customs of the Venetians? Which being found to be so, the court adiudged the sentence to be put in executiō. And this is the course in priuat iudgements.

Howbeit if question were of the honour, or life, not of one of our owne subiects only, [ A] but euen of a straunger flying vnto vs, the iudgement of a straunge magistrat is not to be put in execution, before the truth of the matter be againe of fresh and throughly examined and tried. Yea Adrian the emperour commaunded the gouernours of his prouinces, to vse 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (for that word the law vseth) that is to say, to iudge againe of them which had beene condemned, by the justices of peace euen of the same Ro∣man empire. And that which I haue said, is right straitly obserued and kept in the Commonweales of the Swissers, of Geueue, of Venice, Lucque, and Genes, who cause the condemned straungers flying vnto them, to be againe of new tried, before they restore them vnto forrein princes, demaunding from them such their condemned* 1.916 subiects againe. For so all lawiers almost with one consent say; Soueraigne Princes [ B] not to be bound to restore Straungers flying vnto them, vnto their owne Princes de∣maunding them againe. Which is true that they are not bound in any ciuill obliga∣tion, from which all soueraigne princes are exempted: but they without any distincti∣on of the Law of nations or nature, altogether denie that a forrein subiect is to be re∣stored vnto his prince requiring him againe. Onely Baldus addeth this condition ther∣unto, Not to restore him to be right, so that the prince vnto whom the condemned or guiltie person is so fled, do vpon him iustice. But if they will confesse euery Prince by the lawes both of God and nature to be bound to doe iustice; they must also confesse that he is bound to restore another mans subiect vnto his owne natural prince, deman∣ding him: not onely for the more manifest trying out of the truth, and discouering of [ C] the conspirators their partakers, for which their personall presence and confrontation is most necessarie; but also for exemplarie punishment to be done, in the same places where the offences were committed: which of all other things seemeth most to be∣long vnto the profit to arise vnto the Commonweale by punishments, as examples of common reuenge, the death of the offender, being one of the least thing that in mat∣ter of iustice is to be sought after. And if Magistrats in the same Commonweale are by mutuall obligation bound to helpe one an other, and so the Commonwealth, (whereunto next vnto God we owe all our endeuours) for the prosecuting and puni∣shing of malefactors and offenders; why then should Princes be exempted from the* 1.917 like bond, so well agreeing with the lawes both of God and nature? Wherein the no∣table [ D] act of Mahomet (the second of that name) emperour of Constantinople, euen he which was surnamed the Great, is tight worthily commended; in that he caused the murtherer, who had most cruelly slaine Iulian de Medices in the Church before the Aultar, to be apprehended at Constantinople whether he was fled, and so bound hand and foote, to be restored to Laurence de Medices and the state of Florence, requesting of him: which he did not as respecting the power of the Florentines, being then but small, but as fearing the hand and power of the immortall and almightie God. And in this Realme the custome hath alwaies beene to restore the guiltie fugitiues vnto their owne Lords and Princes demaunding of them, except therein question be made of the maiestie, boundes, or state of the kingdome, which hath beene by their decrees [ E] determined. One of the parliament of Paris: Another of the court of Rome against the king of England, who demaunding his fugitiue subiect, was denyed him: And the third of the parliament of Tholouse: that of Rome being then grounded vpon the soueraigntie of the See of Rome ouer the realme of England. But out of tearmes of estate, and where question is but of publique punishment, there is no Prince which is not bound to restore another mans subiect vnto his Prince demaunding him, as hath beene solemnly iudged by the parliament of Bourdeaux: howbeit that the same hath beene also expresly articulated in diuers treaties of peace. As in the treatie which

the Swissers made with the emperour Charles the fift, as Duke of Millan, the vij arti∣cle [ F] caried an expresse clause, for the restoring of guiltie fugitiues. And for this cause king Henry the second, after he had by his Embassadour requested the Lords and peo∣ple of Geneua, to restore vnto him Baptista Didato an Italian, his Receiuer generall of Roan, who was thither fled with all the money of the receipt: which they being there∣to oftentimes requested, refused to doe: At length the king protested vnto the Lords of Berne, in whose protection the Seignorie of Geneua then was, that he would vse the law of Reprisall against them of Geneua; who before had resolued in their grand Councell of two hundred, in no wise to restore him: but afterwards being by an He∣rault sent from them of Berne, willed to deliuer him vnto the king, they chaunged that their former opinion for the detaining of him: So at length the robber of the cōmon. [ G] treasure was forsaken by them of Geneua, lest they in doing otherwise should haue stirred vp the displeasure of a most mighty king, or of the Swissers against them, as also seeme to haue opened a sanctuarie or place of refuge for the eues, and other such like wicked men. And this we haue gathered out of the letters of the French embassador to Anne Mommorancie Constable of Fraunce, so that they are to be blamed which otherwise either thinke or write. Wherefore I hold it to be an iniurie vnto the estate* 1.918 of another man, to detaine a guiltie fugitiue after he is demaunded to be againe vnto his owne prince restored; and much more if he should be so detained by the subiects among themselues. For which cause all the Tribes of Israel combined themselues a∣gainst the Tribe of Beniamin, which was so vtterly destroyed, except sixe hundred [ H] persons, for refusing to restore the guiltie persons demaunded of them. And for the* 1.919 same cause we find that the Hippotae were all destroyed, and their citie v•…•…terlie razed by the Thebaus; for that they chose rather to defend the murtherers of Phox the Baeo∣tian, and for them to take vp armes, then to restore them vnto the Thebans, demaun∣ding them. But if the Prince vnto whom the fugitiue is retired certeinly know him* 1.920 whom he hath so receiued, to be an innocent and guiltles man, and to be vniustly pur∣sued and sought after, as hauing but escaped the crueltie of a tyrant, it is not onely a shamefull and iniurious thing to betray the poore innocent and straunge man vnto the cruell tyrant: but he should rather for the miserable mans defence, and safegard of his life take vp armes, seeing that by the law of God, we ought not to restore a fugitiue [ I] * 1.921 seruant vnto his angry master, from whose furie he is fled into anothers mans house.

And thus much concerning Magistrats; and the obedience that they owe vnto Prin∣ces, and of the power that they haue ouer particular men, and of the respect that they ought to haue one of them towards an other. But to compare the Magistrats of aunti∣ent time, with ours now, belongeth not to this our purpose, considering that they are still in chaunge, howbeit that wee see them to be like in effect, although that they differ in names. As we read in the booke of the kings, where it is said, That Azarias the sonne of the high priest Tsadoc was neere vnto the person of Salomon to instruct him in matters concerning Religion; that Iosophat was chiefe of his councell, or his Chaun∣cellour; [ K] that Eliphore, and Aiah were his Secretaries for the estate; that Banaia was his Constable; and Azarias the sonne of Natan his Lieutenant generall ouer the go∣uernments of the twelue Tribes, which are and haue beene as it were like in all Mo∣narchies. So in like maner we see in the Turkish Empire, that the first and principall Bassa is Generall of the armie, as Constable or chiefe Mareschall; and Beglerbegs are gouernours generall of Prouinces; the Zanzacks are as more particular and inferiour gouernours; the two Cadilesquires are the Chauncelours, attendinding vnto the ad∣ministration of justice, the one in Asia, the other in Europe; the Sabbassaes and Cadies are the ordinarie magistrats and judges; the Mophti is the great Bishop. So in the

kingdomes of Thunes, of Fes, and of Maroch, the Munafide is as Chauncelour, the [ A] Admirall is Generall of the armie at Sea, a word or name which we haue borowed from the Arabians. So we see the charges and offices to be as it were like, although their names be diuers, as the Great Master of Ethiopia is called Bethudere, which is an Hebrew word, signifying Master of the houshold. But forasmuch as Magistrats in euery Commonweale are diuided into Corporations and Colledges, and that there are more Corporations and Colledges of priuat men than of Magistrats, let vs also say somewhat of such Corporations and Colledges.

CAAP. VII. ¶ Of Corporations, and Colledges, Estates, and Communities, and what profits [ B] or inconueniences ensue thereof vnto the Commonweale.

NOw after that we haue spoken of a Familie, and of the parts thereof, of Soueraigntie, and of Magistrats; we must speake of Corporations and Colledges also: wherefore let vs then first speake of the cause of Corporations and Colledges, and after of their power and priuileges in generall, and of the maner of punishing of them, if they offend: and last of all whether the Commonweale can be without them. The difference of a Fa∣milie, from Corporations and Colledges, and so of them from [ C] a Commonweale, is such as is the difference of the parts from the whole: for the com∣munitie of many heads of a familie, or of a village, or of a towne, or of a countrie, may be without a Commonweale, aswell as a familie without a colledge. And, as many fa∣milies* 1.922 by amitie alyed, are members of one corporation and communitie; so many corporations and communities allyed by a soueraigne power, make one Common∣weale. Now a familie is a communitie naturall; a colledge is a communitie ciuill; and a Commonweale hath that moreouer, That it is a communitie gouerned by a so∣ueraigne power, and may be so strait, as that it may haue neither corporation nor colledges, but onely many families in it. And so the word Communitie is common vnto a familie, a colledge, and a commonweale. And properly a Corporation is vn∣derstood [ D] to consist of diuers families, or colledges, or of many families and colledges together. But the beginnings of all ciuill societies are deriued from a familie, which is* 1.923 (as we say) it selfe a naturall societie, and by the father of nature it selfe first founded in the beginning together with mankind. But when reason, by God himselfe ingrafted in vs, had made man desirous of the companie and societie of man, and to participate together both in speech and conuersation; the same so wrought, as that proceeding farther from the loue of them that were domesticall & their owne, it extended farther, to take pleasure in the propagation and encrease of families. So also families by little and little departing from their first beginning, learned by ciuill societie to imitate the naturall societie of a familie. For why, a Commonweale is a ciuill societie, which can [ E] of it selfe stand without corporations or colleges; but not without a familie: besides that, Commonweales may be dissolued, for that they are deriued from the Lawes and institutions of men: whereas families cannot altogether perish, but that all mankind must before perish also. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, From the roote of one fami∣lie, by the euerliuing God himselfe planted, at the first to haue sprung vp as it were cer∣teine plants, who by necessitie constrained, built for themselues houses and dwelling places, so to be the safer from the iniurie of the weather, and the rage of wilde beasts: and after that Hamlets and villages, which in processe of time became Boroughes and

Townes. But being growne to such a multitude, as that they could not longer be con∣tained [ F] within the compasse and precinct of the same countrie, they were driuen to de∣part thence also, and to seeke out new dwelling places. So that now thus diuided in places, in regions, and kinred, being bound vnto no law or commaund, as euery one of them exceeded the other in strength and power, so he forced himself to thrust them that were neere vnto him, and weaker than himselfe, out of their houses and dwelling* 1.924 places; or to take from them their springs, their fountaines, or pleasant places; or to driue them from their pastures or feedings: which violence so offered by the stronger, enforced the weaker either to seeke out places by nature defencible and strong, or else by art or wisedome to fortifie themselues, their children, wiues, and families, with ditches, trenches, and walles, whereof strong townes and cities arise. For so Dionysius [ G] long since writeth king Seruius to haue placed certeine places of refuge in the moun∣taines & strongest hilles, whether the poore countrie men might retire themselues out of the fields, so to saue themselues from the incursions of their enemies. And yet could not the enemies force be so kept off with walles and other fortifications, but that they which had so shut vp themselues therein, were yet neuerthelesse besieged by the stron∣ger. For why, the first sort of men was most giuen to rapine, murther, and theft, de∣lighting* 1.925 in nothing more, nor accounting any honour greater than to robbe and kill, and to oppresse the weaker sort as slaues: as Plutarch well agreeing with the sacred historie most truely writeth. And long before Plutarch, Thucidides the most famous historiographer of them that florished among the Greekes reporteth, all Greece but a [ H] little before his time to haue beene troubled with the robberies and outrages commit∣ted* 1.926 by the mightier sort; and then robberie & theft to haue bene no disgrace or shame. Yea such as traueiled by Sea or land (as the same authour reporteth) when they met, before they came neere together, vsed commonly (and that without any reproach or imputation) to aske whether they were Robbers or Pyrates or not. And not onely Plato, and his disciple Aristotle, haue put robberie among the kinds of hunting, but the Hebrewes also▪ who call Theeues and Robbers, mightie hunters, as they did Nim∣roth. And by the lawes of Solon it is plaine, that men might lawfully ioine in fellow∣ship* 1.927 to robbe and steale, (prouided alwaies that it were not from the subiects of their [ I] owne estate) as appeareth by these words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which the Latin inter∣pretour thinking to be absurd and false, hath wrested them another way: For what other thing is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, than to robbe? And what other thing is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉? Neither were robberies lesse allowed of the auntient Latines than they were of the Greeks and Hebrewes, as it is to be perceiued by the first league made betwixt the Romans and the Carthaginensians: wherein it was thus expresly set downe: * Vltra Promontorium pulchri praedae aut mercaturae gratia Romani ne naui∣ganto,* 1.928 Beyond the faire Promontorie, the Romans shall not saile either for bootie, or in trade of marchandize. From which kind of robberies long it was before other people also abstained: for so Caesar speaking of the Germaines in his time saith, [ K] Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines cuiuscunque ciuitatis fiunt, atque ea iuuentutis exercendae, ac desidiae minuendae causa fieri praedicant, Robberies done without the boundes of euery citie, haue with them no infamie; and those they say to be done for the exercise of the youth, and auoiding of slouth. This licence and im∣punitie of robbing and reauing, constrained men which as yet had no Princes nor Magistrats, to ioyne themselues in societie and amitie for the defence of one an other, and to make Communities and Fraternities, which the Greekes called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as brethren which drew water of the same well, which they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which are rurall and countrie people vsing the faire fountaine, which

the Dorians called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and whereof such countrie villages were called Pagi, as [ A] the Latines also said them Commessari, who in the same countrey villages, which the Greekes called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ did ordinarily eate and drinke together: as * 1.929 Festus writeth. Whereby it is plainely to be seene, the societies of men among themselues, to haue bene at the first sought out for the leading of their liues in more safetie and quiet: and them first of all to haue sprung from the loue which was betwixt man and wife: From them to haue flowed the mutuall loue betwixt parents and their children: then the loue of brethren and sisters one towards another: and after them the friendship betwixt cosens and other nie kinsmen: and last of all, the loue and good will which is betwixt men ioyned in alliance: which had all at length growne cold, and bene vtterly exstin∣guished, had it not bene nourished, maintained, and kept, by societies, communities, [ B] corporations, and colledges: the vnion of whome hath for long time in safetie main∣tained many people, without any forme of a Commonweale, or soueraigne power* 1.930 ouer them. So the people of Israel for a long time florished in great tranquilitie with∣out kings, and without any Popular or Aristocraticall estate, euerie man liuing at his pleasure in all libertie, euerie Tribe being in it selfe vnited by the bond of bloud and kindred, and all of them together by the communitie of their law and sacrifices. Who when they were by any enemie to be assailed or inuaded, the estates of their Tribes and communities assembling together, made choyce of a chieftaine, vnto whom they gaue soueraigne power; and namely of such an one as God had with his spirit enspired and stirred vp amongst them. So of many Tribes and families together vnited, was made [ C] •…•… Commonweale, by meane of a soueraigne power set ouer them. And for this cause the princes and lawgiuers which first founded Commonweals, who had not yet disco∣uered the difficulties they were to proue, to keep & maintaine their subiects by way of iustice, ordained and maintained fraternities, communities, and colledges; to the end, that the parts and members of the self same body of a Commonweale, being at accord among themselues, it might be for them the more easie to rule the whole Common∣weale* 1.931 together. So we see that Numa Pompilius, king and lawgiuer vnto the Romans (after he had abolished the name of the Sabines, which some thing diuided the Roman state) established certaine fraternities, and colledges, or companies of men, of all maner of occupations; appointing vnto euerie fraternitie certaine patrons, priests, and solemne [ D] sacrifices, which were kept on certaine appointed dayes of the yeare. And afterwards also ordained a fraternitie of marchants, to whome he gaue Mercurie for their patron: which he seemed to haue done to the imitation of Solon, who by a positiue law per∣mitted all manner of fraternities and communities whatsoeuer, with power for them to make such lawes and statutes among themselues as they should see good, so that they were not contrarie vnto the publike positiue lawes of the state. Lycurgus also did not onely permit, but straitly commaund also to maintaine and cherish such societies and communities, as well generall as particular; and that all his subiects should take their refection and diet in companies of fifteene and fifteene together: which for that they were kept for friendship sake, were called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the friendship that they had [ E] one of them with another. As also in almost all the other townes of Greece, there were the like fraternities and companies, whome they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as in Italie the same colledges and companies were called Sodalitia; for the vnitie, companie, and* 1.932 friendship they had among themselues, eating and drinking together for the most part: and hauing no judges but themselues, if any difference or strife chaunced to fall out amongst them, being such companions and fellowes; as knowing that amitie and friendship was the onely foundation of all humane and ciuill societie, and much more requisit for the keeping and maintaining thereof, than iustice it selfe: For that iustice

neuer flexible, but alwayes keeping the vprightnesse of it selfe, by iust iudgement well [ F] endeth suits; but not hatred, making oft times of friends foes: whereas amitie and friend∣ship, which is by company nourished, yeelding of the right of it selfe, best establisheth the true naturall iustice, and plucketh vp all controuersies by the root, with great quiet∣nesse and loue reconciling subiects among themselues, together with the Common∣weale. Now the principall end & scope of all laws, both diuine and humane, is to keep and maintaine the loue of men one towards another amongst themselues, and them altogether in their dutie towards God; which cannot better be done, than by ordina∣rie and orderly conuersing and combining of men themselues together.

Wherefore the Cretentians in auntient time did all eat and drinke together, young and old, men and women; for to maintaine the loue and amitie which we haue before [ G] spoke of amongst them: Howbeit that afterwards to auoid confusion, the ages and sexes were into certaine orders diuided. So we see in the law of God, the feasts of Passe∣ouer, to haue bene commaunded to be holden by companies of ten and ten persons to∣gether: beside the feasts of Tabernacles, and the ordinarie banquets of sacrifice, which God commaunded to be solemnised with all ioy and gladnesse: and that for no other cause, but that so men might be together vnited in religion towards God, and mutuall loue and friendship one to another among themselues. The same was also well obser∣ued* 1.933 & kept in the Christian primitiue church, who oftentimes made such feasts, which they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for the deuout kissings, and charitable embracements one of them (in the feruensie of their zeale) gaue to another, in the ending of them, besides their or∣dinarie [ H] behauiour and communication. And albeit that many things are long since by tract of time growne out of vse, yet neuerthelesse a resemblance of those old feastes is yet shadowed in our holy feasts and banquets: which not faigned but true feasts the Venetians do with most great care and solemnitie keepe: but the Swissers better than in any place of the world, where the fraternities and companies in euerie towne haue their common houses or halles▪ wherein they oftentimes make their feasts and bankets, neither is there any village so little, which hath not a common house in it for that pur∣pose. Where if any strife or contention shall arise amongst them that be of the fellow∣ship or companie, it is by the common consent there ended, and the definitiue sentence there written, not in paper, but vpon the verie table whereon they haue banqueted, and [ I] that not with inke, but with chalke. And as in auntient time artisans, marchants, priests, bishops, and all sorts of men had their fraternities, and companies: so had also the philosophers, and especially the Pythagorians, who ordinarily met together, and li∣ued for most part of their time in common. And thus much concerning the cause, the beginning, and progresse of corporations, and colledges, communities, and companies: which afterwards by succession of time haue in all Commonweales beene better ruled by lawes, statutes, and customes.

But that all things which are to be said of corporations and colledges, may in order be declared: Let vs first orderly set downe and show, what power euery corporation [ K] or colledge is of, and what priuilege is to euerie one of them giuen; then how they are to be gouerned, and kept within the bounds of their dutie; and last of all, whether a* 1.934 Commonweale can be without colledges or companies, and what colledges are most necessarie and best fitting a Commonweale. Which the better to vnderstand, we may say, that all colledges and companies are ordained either for religion, or for policie, and so concerne but worldly things. If they be instituted but for policie, either they haue iurisdiction, or are without all iurisdiction. Colledges without iurisdiction, are such as are ordained for the bringing vp of youth, or for fellowship of physitians, or of other schollers, or of marchants, or of handie craft and trades men, or of companies of hus∣bandmen:

but such as haue iurisdiction, are colledges of magistrats, and judges, such [ A] as of whome we haue before spoken. Colledges ordained and made for religion, or for publike deuotion, are growne into number almost infinit; differing as wee see, in lawes, manners, life, attire, orders, fashions, and apparell. And it may be, that a colledge may be particular to one occupation, or to one science, or to one companie of mar∣chants, or to one iurisdiction: and it may also be, that two or moe colledges, may bee vnited into one bodie, as all manner of occupations together, all sorts of marchants, or all maisters of sciences, or all the magistrats; which ought not of right to bee called a colledge, but a bodie politique, or corporation: albeit that by the ambiguitie of words they be oftentimes together confounded. For there was one colledge of the Tribunes, another of the Pretors, and another of the Questors: but when these three colledges [ B] meet together into one and the selfe same bodie, it is foolishly called a colledge: and yet can it not rightly be tearmed an Vniuersitie, which consisteth of the companie and assemblie of all the citisens, colledges, and corporations, yea and sometimes also of the villages of the same countrey. Wherefore we shall rather call it a bodie politique than a colledge: which so together groweth of many colledges, or persons of vnlike condi∣tion. And it may be also, that all the particular colledges may haue the right of a gene∣rall communitie, or of an vniuersitie. And that not onely all the colledges and com∣munities, but that also all the inhabitants ioyned together with the corporation & col∣ledges of a towne, or of a countrey, or of a prouince, may haue the right of a communi∣tie for to hold their estates. Moreouer the right of a colledge or companie may be gi∣uen [ C] to euerie mysterie or occupation in particular, and yet forbidden them in generall.* 1.935 And euerie one of them may haue diuers rules, statutes, and particular priuileges. So that we may say, that euerie corporation or colledge, is a lawfull communitie or conso∣ciation vnder a soueraigne power. Where the word Lawfull importeth the autho∣ritie* 1.936 of the soueraigne, without whose permission there can be no colledge: and is re∣ferred not onely vnto the power of meeting together: but vnto the place also where it ought to meet, vnto the time and manner of meeting, and to what things ought to bee entreated of, in their assembly. And the word communitie, or consociation, signifieth that there ought some thing to be common to all that be fellowes of the colledge or* 1.937 societie: For where there is nothing common, there is no colledge: sufficient it is for [ D] them to haue their meeting common, their attourney or agent common, and the pri∣uileges giuen vnto the colledge common unto all the fellowes thereof: albeit that they haue neither common treasure, neither ordinarily liue or conuerse together. So that they haue not well defined a colledge, which haue said it to bee a fellowship of three persons dwelling together, hauing their goods and substances in common. Wherein they are two wayes deceiued, for it may be, that three persons or moe may haue their goods in common, and liue together, and yet be all no colledge, but a societie of them∣selues, contracted for the getting of goods, and liuing together: as also to the contrarie, fellowes of the same colledge may dwell separat in houses, not hauing their goods in common, nor any common treasure; neither yet commonly liuing together: and yet [ E] enioy indeed the right of a colledge or companie, as hauing by law and the princes graunt, power to assemble themselues and meet together at certaine places, and times: and to intreat of certaine their affaires, such as are the fraternities or companies of arti∣ficers and trades men, whome the law calleth Collegia, or colledges. Yet some colled∣ges there be, which haue almost all those things among themselues common, as wee* 1.938 see those to haue, which are together ioyned for studie, religion or deuotion sake.

As for the number of fellowes in a colledge or societie, it is no matter what it bee, so that they be not fewer than three: for that otherwise it cannot be a colledge. Where∣fore

the Romans called it not a colledge of their Censors, or Consuls, as they did of [ F] * 1.939 their Pretors, Tribunes, and Questors. And as for the fellowes themselues, my mea∣ning is, that they should be equall of power, in respect of their communitie or fellow∣ship, hauing euerie one of them a deliberatiue voice in their affayres: howbeit that it may be, that the colledge, or prince, may make choyce of one of the fellowes to com∣maund, reforme, and chastice euerie one of the fellows in particular, but not all of them in generall: such as are our bishops and abbats, hauing power to chastice their religious and chanons But if this head or chiefe haue power ouer the whole body of the societie or colledge in grosse, it is not then rightly a colledge, but rather a forme of familie, such as are colledges or schooles ordained for the bringing vp of youth: wherein there bee no bursors or fellowes, which haue therein any deliberatiue voice: For if it haue in it [ G] any such bursors or fellowes, hauing the right of the societie or colledge, and delibera∣tiue voice in their assemblies, it is then a colledge, albeit that the rest of the yonger sort be vnder the power and correction of the principall.

And hereof ariseth a question, Whether a bishop in the companie of his priests, or an abbat amongst his religious, be to be accounted fellowes, hauing the verie title and* 1.940 right of a fellow, and himselfe making a part of the colledge, without the qualitie or ti∣tle of a bishop or abbat? Which question being by the learned on both parts disputed, yet remaineth vndecided. But to leaue the disputation apart, it seemeth, that he which is chosen by the colledge or prince to commaund all the fellowes in particular, hath a [ H] double qualitie; one in respect of euerie one of the fellowes, and another in respect of the whole colledge or societie: where in regard of the fellowes he is called Principall, Bishop, Abbat, Prior, President, or such like, hauing power and authoritie to command euerie one of them in particular: howbeit that in the bodie of the colledge or corpora∣tion, he is no more than a fellow, although he haue the place of precedence: and that is it for which they put their titles diuided, as, the Bishop, Chanons, and Chpite•…•…; the Abbat, Religious, & Couent; the Principall, Bursors, & Colledge. Wherein one of the chiefest lawyers hath bene deceiued, saying, That the Philosophers haue called the persons of a colledge, the colledge: showing indeed no Philosophie in so saying, consi∣dering* 1.941 that a colledge is a name of right, and that all the reuenew and right of a col∣ledge [ I] may remaine in one person, the rest of the fellowes being all dead. And in case that all the fellowes of a colledge were dead, yet doth the right of a colledge remaine: neither can the lands or goods thereof be confiscated, except the right of a colledge be before by the supreme authoritie suppressed. For one of the principall priuileges of corporations and colleges is, that legacies may be vnto them giuen by testament: wher∣as societie by the law forbidden, are not colleges, but vnlawfull assemblies, vnto whom it is not by the law permitted, to leaue any thing by testament, albeit that legacies may be giuen vnto euerie one of the colledges. But to the intent such vnlawfull companies and assemblies might be repressed, I thinke it needfull, that it should by law bee forbid∣den, [ K] any lands or legacies to be vnto al or any of them left by testament, as vnto fellows of such corporations or colledges.

And whereas we haue said, that a colledge or societie may be without any common* 1.942 stocke or treasure: that it also to be vnderstood, that a colledge or societie may bee or∣dained with such prouiso, that nothing shall be left vnto it by gift or legacie. Antoninus the emperour was the first which gaue leaue for legacies & donations to be giuen to al colledges, except to the colledges of the Iewes, vnto whome it was yet lawfull to meet together for religion sake, and to haue their Synagogues: as is to be seene in the orati∣on of the ambassadour Philo, vnto the emperour Caligula. And Augustus himselfe by letters pattens directed vnto the gouernours of the prouinces of the empire, comman∣ded,

That they should permit and suffer the Iewes to enioy their colledges. Whereup∣on [ A] * 1.943 Narbanus Proconsull of Asia, forbad the magistrats of Ephesus in any sort to let of disturbe them. Yea that more is, Augustus himselfe commaunded a dailie and perpe∣tuall sacrifice of a calfe, a goat, and a ram, to be made at Hierusalem for the welfare of himselfe, and of the Commonweale: and willed an ordinarie almes or doale to bee gi∣uen vnto the Iewes, of his owne proper costs and charges, for the reliefe of their neces∣sitie. There be also corporations and colledges of judges and magistrats, which yet are not capable of testamentarie legacies, if they haue not expresse leaue by their erection and institution so to doe. As was iudged against the Senat of Rome: whereunto Rus∣sius Caepio one of the Senators, had giuen by legacie a certaine summe of money, which he willed to be still distributed to them onely which came vnto the councell: which le∣gacie [ B] the Senat demaunding, Caepio his heires denied it to bee vnto the Senat due: in which controuersie Domitian the emperour gaue sentence for the heire, and exclu∣ded the Senat, although it were the most auntient, and most necessarie corporation of all the Roman Commonweale.

And thus hauing set downe and declared the beginning and definition of colledges, and communities: let vs now also speake of their power in generall; which is not de∣termined by their particular foundations, statutes, and priuileges, which are diuers and* 1.944 almost infinit, according to the diuersitie of the particular colledges and communities themselues. Now the chiefe corporations or colledges, and which haue most power in a Commonweale, are the colledges of judges and magistrats: who not onely haue [ C] power ouer euerie one of their fellowes, and the lesser part of their owne colledge, but ouer other particular colledges also; and so ouer others subiect to their iurisdiction, and yet without their colledge. And in this the colledges of judges and magistrats notably differ from other colledges: for that other colledges are established euerie one of them for the good gouernment of that onely which is vnto themselues common; whereas the colledges of judges and magistrats, are principally erected for the good of other subiects, and to rule the other colledges, as also to chastice them if they shall trans∣gresse their lawes and statutes. But as a wise man ought first to be wise for himselfe, and then for others; as also to looke first into himselfe, before he can rightly iudge of others; or as the Hebrewes in their prouerbes say, That charitie ought first to begin of [ D] it selfe, if it be well ruled: So ought the colledges of judges and magistrats, first to esta∣blish iustice amongst themselues, euerie one of them in particular, and to themselues all in generall, the better to distribute the same to the other subiects.

But question might be made, Whether it were more expedient that the colledges* 1.945 of magistrats and judges, should be iudged by their fellowes, or by others? for some particular reasons, which in due place we shall hereafter set downe. But here to make the matter short, If the colledge for the most part be composed of euill and naughtie men, it is not to be left vnto themselues, to iudge of their owne misdemainers; but they are to be iudged by the superiour magistrats, if they haue power ouer them; or by the prince, in case they be not by any other superiour magistrat to be reformed. But if the [ E] greater part of them be good and honest men, there is then no doubt but that it is bet∣ter and more expedient both for the colledge and the Commonweale, that the fellows should be iudged by their fellowes, rather than by other iudges: For that euerie col∣ledge I know not how hath in it some particularitie which cannot so well bee vnder∣stood or iudged, as by the fellowes of the same corporation themselues. Ioyning here∣unto also, that by this meane the loue and vnitie of the fellowes among themselues, is in their colledge and societie the better maintained. And for this cause chiefly the em∣perour Adrian decreed, That the Roman Senators should be iudged by the Senat one∣ly.

And for the selfe same reason the ciuill iurisdiction of marchants, and for the trade [ F] of marchandise hath bene wisely in all Italie, and since that in Fraunce committed and giuen to certaine magistrats and Consuls of the corporation and companie of mar∣chants, summarily to decide the differences arising about the contracts of marchan∣dise, which haue in them I know not how certaine secrets, not to others well knowne.

As for other corporations and colledges, as of physitians, and tradesmen, albeit that* 1.946 by their foundation they haue not any iurisdiction or commaunding power; yet ne∣uerthelesse so it is, that they alwayes haue a certaine restrayning authoritie and power by their statutes and priuileges, limited and allowed them; and sometime without any limitation at all left vnto the wisdome and discretion of the corporation or colledge, or [ G] of the head thereof: which ought to be vsed with such moderation, as the father is to vse towards his children: which ought not to be with crueltie or rigour. For if the law condemne him to pay the price of the slaue, slaine by him that hath taken vppon him to teach him, albeit that it were in correcting of him: of much greater reason were he to be condemned, which hauing but the moderat correction of men of free conditi∣on, should vse such rigour as that death should thereof ensue? As it sometimes hap∣pened in Lacedemonia, where yong children were by the Great Maister of the youth so rigorously whipt, a•…•… that sometimes they gaue vp the ghost vpon the altar of Diana whilest they were yet in whipping; most part of them not daring so much as to sigh or grone, for feare they had to be accounted faint harted cowards. And albeit that the [ H] emperour Frederike the second gaue power and authoritie vnto the rectours of Vni∣uersities, and that the principals of schooles and colledges haue alwayes had the cor∣rection of their disciples and schollers: yet that is to bee vnderstood but of light mat∣ters, and not of such chastisement and correction as the magistrat hath by the princes graunt ouer priuat offendors; as many haue beene of opinion. For why, neither the German emperour, no•…•… the pope can giue any such power vnto the principalles of colledges, or to the colledges themselues: but in such countries as are vnto them∣selues subiect. For albeit that pope Gregorie the eleuenth in a Bull graunted for the confirmation of the priuileges of the Vniuer•…•…itie of Paris, before graunted by the popes Vrban the fift, and Innocent the sixt, in one article prouided, That if a schol∣ler [ I] committed any thing deseruing punishment, the hearing thereof should belong vnto the bishop of Paris onely: and in another article also, That no scholler should from thenceforth bee imprisoned for whatsoeuer debt. Yet the French kings and magistrats haue o•…•…eentimes well declared themselues not to bee bound to any such the popes Bulles. Yet true it is, that colledges instituted for religion, haue ordina∣rily the correcting of them that are therein professed; and that so much the more, as their rule and order is the straiter: For which cause such as haue therein taken vppon them such profession, are exempted from the power and correction of their owne fathers: albeit that many hold the contrarie: whose opinion for all that is not in that [ K] point followed. And yet neuerthelesse certaine it is, that the naturall dutie and reue∣rence* 1.947 of children towards their parents, remaineth alwaies in force and power, not∣withstanding whatsoeuer bond and vow they haue made to any corporation or col∣ledge. For why, neither mans lawes, nor the statutes or priuileges of princes can derogat from the lawes of God and nature, which hath expresly bound children vnto the obedience of their fathers and mothers; from which they can by no otherwise free, or yet deliuer tthemselues, than by lawfull emancipation: or their fathers silence, who in saying nothing, seeme to haue consented vnto their childrens vowes, which by spea∣king they might haue letted: which cōsent for all that excuseth not children from doing

the honour and reuerence due vnto their parents, although that they being so profes∣sed, [ A] be from thenceforth accounted children of the colledge; vnto whome also their colledges in right of inheritance succeed, they themselues beeing accounted of seruile estate & condition. For which cause the canonists giue vnto the abbies power and au∣thoritie ouer their owne religious, exempt from the bishops, which hath oftentimes by the decrees of the parliament of Paris bene confirmed. In such sort, as that they which are once entred into such religious orders, may not from that time be called to account or into questiō for any thing by them committed before they entred into the monaste∣ry: which yet is to be vnderstood but of light & youthful faults; which otherwise were but to open a way to theeues and murtherers, to retire themselues into such colledges, as into forrests, for the auoiding of due punishment; as indeed it ofttimes happeneth: [ B] wherewith the wise magistrats ought to meet, & according to the law of God to draw the murtherers from the altar to doe vpon them iustice. As the court of parliament of Thoulouse (not long agoe) condemned two religious monks of the order D'aurade, to be in their habits shamefully drawne vpon a hurdle to the place of execution, and there to be quartered, without disgrading of them, for hauing most cruelly murthered* 1.948 the head of their monasterie, whose seueritie they could by no meanes endure. Yea the abbat himselfe may by his monkes be conuented before the ordinarie judge, and that as well in criminall as ciuill matters: who may also freely appeale from the sen∣tence of their abbat vnto his superiour, as it hath oftentimes beene iudged by the de∣crees of the parliament of Paris; & that without leaue, as witnesseth * 1.949 the abbat of Pa∣lermo; [ C] and hath also bene iudged by the parliament of Bourdeaux. And for the same reason if the colledge would without cause thrust out or depriue one of the fellowes of his right, priuilege, and libertie in the colledge, the hearing of the cause belongeth to the ordinarie judge of the colledge. Howbeit that in auntient time the corporations and colledges of Artisans, Marchants, and other such like, had this power (for the remo∣uing of their fellowes) as we read in Cicero of the Roman marchants, Mercuriales & Capitolini, M. Furium hominem nequam, equitem Romanum de collegio deiecerunt, The Mereuriales and Capitolini (saith he) thrust M. Furius a naughtie man, and yet a gen∣tleman of Rome, out of their colledge or companie. And in Lacedemonia (as Plu∣tarch writeth) it was lawfull for to thrust out of their colledges or companies, him that [ D] had discouered or reuealed the sec•…•…ets of their companie. As in like case Panormitan the abbat writeth, That in abbies or colledges erected for deuotion, the chapiters haue power to thrust out any of the fellowes, or to depriue him of his ordinarie diuidents, but not to beat him, or to vse sen•…•…re correction vpon him, or yet to imprison him; as hath bene iudeged by a decree of the parliament of Paris.

But yet here a man might aske, Whether a colledge may make a decree, That none of the fellowes shal conuent or sue another of his fellowes, before any other judges but the colledge? And in case it be so decreed, whether hee that shall breake the decree so made and sue his fellow before another judge, shall be bound vnto the ciuill penaltie in the decree set downe? Wherein Sceuola the lawyer is of opinion, the decree to bee [ E] good; and that the fellow of a colledge or societie cannot haue recourse vnto other magistrats, contrarie vnto the decree of the colledge, but in paying the penaltie in the decree of the colledge expressed. Howbeit (in mine opinion) this decree is not general, neither can take place in causes criminall, no more than the conditionall penalties set downe in arbitrements, which haue no place if they concerne matters of crime. Se∣condarily mine opinion is, That the decree of a colledge or companie, euen in ciuill causes hath no place, if all the fellowes of the colledge or societie giue not thereunto their consents, as they do in arbitrements, whereunto no man is bound that

would not. For in all communities, corporations and colledges, and so generally in [ F] * 1.950 euerie societie and companie, if question be of any thing which is common to them al in particular & apart from the community, the expresse consent of euery one of them is therin requisit, if any thing be therin to be done. But if question be of that which is com∣mō to them all iointly & indiuisibly, it sufficeth that the greater part be of one opinion, for the binding of the rest: Prouided alwaies, that nothing be ordained or decreed, con∣trarie to the statutes of the colledge, established by the soueraigne prince, or by the founder of such corporation or colledge, authorised by the prince. Wherfore the laws of the Commonweale, and the statutes of the colledge standing whole and entire, the colledge may make decrees which may bind the lesser part all together, and all the fel∣lowes in particular: yet still prouided, that two third parts of the fellowes consent vnto [ G] the making of the decree: albeit that they be not all of one aduise or opinion, in matters concerning their common society, although that such decrees so made cannot bind the greater part of the fellows collectiuely, and much lesse the whole corporation and col∣lege: no more than the prince is bound to his owne law, or the testator to his owne will, or particular men vnto their owne agreements, from which they may by their common consent reuolt, nothing beeing more agreeing with reason and nature, than euerie thing to be dissolued, by the same meanes that it was made.

But yet it might be doubted, Whether decrees made by the consent and good li∣king* 1.951 of an whole colledge or societie, might bee againe repealed and abrogated by the greater part, or two third parts of the same societie or colledge? Which I doubt not [ H] but that they may in al common estates, corporations, and colledges, if question be but of things common to them al in generall (as they are one vnited body:) but if question be of euerie mans right by himselfe particular and apart from others, then euerie man is to giue his consent thereunto. Wherefore if the assemblies of the estates in a Com∣monweale consist and be of diuers bodies, as in the diets of the empire, and in all other Commonweales are composed of three orders and degrees of men, viz. of the Cler∣gie, the Nobilitie, and Comminaltie, nothing can be done or decreed by any two of the orders, to the hurt or preiudice of the third, especially if the matter concerne euery one of the orders by themselues apart. By which reason I caused two of the orders of [ I] Fraunce, to chaunge their opinions in matter concerning the third. For at such time as I was sent deputie for the prouince of Vermandois to Blois (whither king Henry the iij had called an assemblie or parliament of al the kingdome of France) a great and weigh∣tie question was moued amongst the three estates, Whether it were more indiffe∣rent, and better also, the requests of the people to bee before the prince iudged and determined by 36, men which euerie one of the three orders should by voice chuse, than by the prince himselfe with his councel? And now the Clergie and Nobilitie had not onely so decreed, but had drawne a great part of our sort vnto their side also, ha∣uing with hope of great rewards gained their voices. At which time I perceiuing the drift and purpose of certaine ambitious persons that were dealers in the matter, aun∣swered, [ K] That the matter was further to bee considered of. For why, it was labou∣red, that such things as could not bee obtained of the people in generall, might so be from a few in the name of the whole extorted. Wherefore the question being more throughly debated, I denied that the matter could so by vs bee passed, without a more speciall commission from the people. Neither that if wee had any such speci∣all commission from the people, could it yet by vs bee done, without the great daunger of the whole Commonweale; and that for many reasons, by me then discouered: whereby I drew the rest of my fellowes backe againe to mine opini∣on, who laied this charge vppon mee to remoue also the other two orders of estate

from their former receiued and setled opinion. But when the Archbishop of Lyons [ A] (President of the Ecclesiasticall estate) earnestly withstood me, seriously alleaging that the Clergie and Nobilitie had before so resolued; I showed him, that such a Preroga∣tiue had from all antiquitie beene kept to euery of the three Estates, as that no two of them could decree any thing to the preiudice of the third: as it had before without any difficultie passed in the parliament at Orleance; and as it is also vsed in the diets of the Empire, and the Parliaments of England, and of Spayne. For which cause, and other reasons then alleaged, I requested the other two orders of Estate, to take it in good part, in that they were by me hindered, as hauing the charge of the third estate. Which was the cause, that the thing beeing againe called into consultation, both the estates chaunged their opinions. Which the king hearing, and dissembling his griefe, said in [ B] the presence of Ruze Bishop of Angiers, and other Lords, That Bodin at his pleasure had ouer ruled the Estates.

But if question be of a thing common to all a corporation or colledge, and which* 1.952 concerneth not any the particular members apart from the whole bodie, but the whole and entire bodie onely; the greater part of the societie, may at their discretion thereof determine: albeit that the whole communitie haue determined that their Statutes and orders should not be infringed, but by the consent of all the fellowes. For why, The greater part of a Communitie is alwaies reputed for the whole. Yea the law willeth, that he which is chosen of a communitie or colledge to entreat and discide of their common affaires, may bind euery one of the colledge. Wherefore they are deceiued [ C] which write the greater par•…•…, or two third parts of a Colledge, to be able to do nothing, if the colledge haue made a statute, That they must all thereto consent: for if that might take place, then any one of the fellowes himselfe alone might empeach and stay the aduise, decrees, and resolutions of the whole societie; which is contrarie to the formall disposition of the law, which willeth, That in all acts concerning a communie or cor∣poration, the greater part should be the stronger; and that the more part of two third parts, may giue lawe to all the fellowes in particular, whether the rest of the fellowes be there present or absent. For why, it is not needfull that they should all be present, that the decrees should stand good, and that especially in light matters; prouided yet that they be all thereunto summoned or called. Howbeit that in matters of waight & [ D] consequence, it is needfull that two third parts be there present, albeit that they all giue not their consents, except it be by a speciall law prouided that the two third parts must of necessitie agree in one. As by the iudiciall lawes of Lewes the xij the French king, it is ordained, That two parts of the Iudges, and no fewer, may in the higher Courts end any ciuill cause: whereas in criminall causes, equall voices acquite the partie accused; who yet otherwise is to be condemned, if the greater part do but by one voice exceed the lesser. So also by a decree of Gregorte the x, concerning the election of the Pope, he must haue two third parts of the colledge of Cardinals that is to be chosen Pope. As also in many elections of the heads of Colledges, it is necessarie that two third parts of the colledge should agree in one. Yea sometime it is necessarie that all the fel∣lowes [ E] should be of one and the selfe same accord. As in Rome it was by the Tribuni∣tiall law requisite that all the ten Tribunes should be of one opinion and mind, or at least wise not openly to discent, for that otherwise one Tribune alone might empeach and stay the proceedings of the whole Colledge. Now if they all agreed in one, then vnto the decree were ioyned these words, Pro Collegio, for the Colledge: otherwise if there be no speciall statutes or law to the contrarie, the greater part of two third parts sufficieth in all acts concerning the communitie of corporations and colledges.

It is also necessarie, that the consent whereof we speake, bee giuen in the common

assembly of the corporation or colledge: for albeit that all the fellowes had seperately [ F] * 1.953 and apart consented vnto any thing concerning that which is common to all the Col∣ledge, yet so it is that such act is not to any effect or purpose, neither for nor against them which haue so giuen their consents, although it were done euen before publique notaries: for that it is not done by the Colledge, which is done by all the fellowes apart. Neither sufficeth it that all they of the Corporation or Colledge were called together, if it were not in time and place, by the Statutes appointed. Wherefore two parts of the fellowes gathered together, can do more, than all the fellowes consen∣ting apart.

But here some man may aske, who shall call the fellowes together? Wherein ma∣ny are of opinion, that the most auntient fellow of the Colledge or Societie, hath po∣wer [ G] * 1.954 to call the rest together; as also to condemne them of contumacie for not com∣ming▪ and yet for all that not to haue power to fine them, which is but a ridiculous thing, if such contumacie cannot be punished, neither by him, nor yet by the colledge; as certein it is that it cannot: wherfore such calling of the fellows together, by the most auntient fellow, is but vaine, except that the fellowes of their owne accord be content to obey the same. And therefore the Senat during the Consulship of Caesar could not be assembled or called together, Caesar the greatest magistrat forbidding the same, as is afore said. Othersome are of an other opinion, and hold, That two third parts of a Colledge may of right call together the rest: but yet who shall then call together those two third parts they say not. Howbeit is two third parts suffice to do and deter∣mine [ H] the affaires of a corporation or communitie, we need not to trouble our selues with the rest, all the fellowes being called. Howbeit the custome kept almost in all corporations and colledges is, for the elders by their seruants or other ministers to call together the rest; or else for them of them selues to come together at the tolling of a bell, or the sound of a Trumpet; as in auntient time they did in Graece and Rome, when as the magistrats which had power to assemble the people, or the Senat, caused their commaunds by the sound of a Trumpet to be published to the people in particu∣lar, but not to all in generall, for that they could not be so in that sort commaunded. And who so obeyed not but refused to come, him the magistrat had power to fine, or seize vpon his goods. As we see how that Marcus Antonius being Consull, threat∣ned [ I] Cicero to pull downe his house, if he came not to the Senat being called. So that there is no question where he that calleth together the fellowes, hath power to com∣maund. But if the Colledge or societie be destitute of an head or magistrat which hath power to commaund, or hauing power, yet is not willing to constraine them which will not obey him; then he whom it concerneth to haue the societie assembled, is to obtaine commission from the magistrat to constraine them to come together, and so we vse to doe. Yet may the greater part of the fellowes together, depriue euery par∣ticular fellow of part of the profit and commoditie he is to haue of his Colledge, if be∣ing orderly called he shall refuse to come, it being so decreed; yet so that it be mode∣rately [ K] * 1.955 done. Wherefore to conclude this question of the power of Communities, Corporations, and Colledges, we may say Solons law to haue generally place in euery Commonweale, and to be approued by the Interpretors of both the lawes: that is to say, that it is free for all lawfull communities, corporations, and colledges, to make such orders as they shall think for themselues best, so that therby they do not derogate from the statutes of the Colledge, made or established by the Soueraigne Prince, or that they be not repugnant or contrarie to the lawes and ordinances of the Common∣weale. And in auntient time it was not forbidden corporations and colledges to make decrees and ordinances within themselues, without derogating from the publique

lawes; as also to put therunto such and so great a penaltie and punishment, as pleased [ A] the Colledge. But since that time by the statutes and ordinances of euery Colledge & Commonweale, that power hath beene ordinarily cut short, and brought vnto some small fi•…•…e. Neither am I of their opinion, which hold that a Colledge may make or∣dinances and decrees without any penaltie annexed vnto them; for that such an ordi∣nance, degree, or statute, should be but vnprofitable and ridiculous, if no punishment were thereunto apposed against them that should disobey the same, especially if he that maketh the orders or decrees haue not power by arbitrarie punishment to cause them to be obserued and kept. We see also in many places the Corporations of arti∣ficers and such like, which haue the right of a communitie, to haue also a certeine forme of restraining, and visiting of the workes and wares of their occupations or [ B] trades, with power to seise vpon them, or to breake or confiscate them, if any thing be done contrarie to their decrees and orders: sauing yet alwaies the Magistrats authori∣tie* 1.956 for the hearing of the matter, if it be so reserued vnto him. But whereas we said that a lawfull Corporation or colledge may make ordinances and decrees, not dero∣gating from the lawes of the Commonweale: that is so yet to be vnderstood, as that they in their assemblies and meetings entreat onely of that which is vnto themselues common, and not of such things as whereof they are by the law prohibited not onely to determine, but euen to consult also: lest in so doing they incurre the penaltie ap∣pointed against vnlawfull Colledges and Companies.

And thus much concerning the power, rights, and priuileges of Corporations and [ C] * 1.957 Colledges in generall. Let vs now see also how and in what sort they are to be corre∣cted and punished when they shall offend. Howbeit that one might say that where no offence is committed, there no punishment is to be inflicted. Now so it is that a col∣ledge or corporation cannot offend, nor so much as consent, or doe any thing by fraud or deceit (as the law saith;) and therefore there lyeth no action of fraud or deceit a∣gainst a colledge or corporation, although all the fellowes of the same colledge, or all the inhabitants of a citie, or all the estates of a countrie, had particularly and euery one of them apart consented thereunto: a thing yet altogether impossible in corporations and communities of Townes, Countries, Prouinces, & Commonweales, considering that the children and furious persons which therein are, cannot yeeld their consent [ D] thereto. But forasmuch as things done by the greater part of the fellowes of a colledge* 1.958 collegiatly assembled, or by the greater part of the inhabitants of a towne or citie in a lawfull assemblie, are supposed to be done by them all, therefore the whole colledge or corporation is punished: as in rebellions of Townes, and seditions of communities, which are punished in their Corporations by losse of their priuileges, or of the right of their communitie, by fines, charges, seruices, and other punishments, according to the qualitie of the offence: which punishment yet ought not to take place, if the rebellion or other crime be not committed by the consent of the communitie or corporation, and decree for the doing thereof made in their common assemblie: as it was iudged by a decree of the parliament of Paris, for the communitie of the citie of Corbeil. And [ E] yet neuerthelesse, if the corporall punishment be for the offence committed, to be in∣flicted, as whipping, torture, or death, none of the societie or corporation are so to be punished, but they which were therein partakers, or at least thereunto priuie, although the whole bodie of the communitie or colledge be therefore condemned. As in pri∣uat offences done by many being of no colledge or communitie, there lyeth not an action but against euery one of the offendours in particular, and for the whole, in such sort, as that one of them hauing made satisfaction, the others are thereby acquired. But if such fact or offence be done by any one, following therein the aduise, counsell, and

deliberation of all, they may be all therefore conuented, and euery one of them apart [ F] for the whole, neither one of them making satisfaction, are the others thereby dis∣charged. But happely it may seeme a thing verie vnreasonable and absurd, that many, yea the greater part of the same colledge or corporation, should be found innocent, and yet to be altogether punished in the whole bodie, as in the cases by vs before re∣hearsed. Whereunto I answere, That it is yet more straunge, that the innocents should by lot be drawne together with the offendours, and that these should be puni∣shed, vpon whom the lot should fall; as the maner was in the Decimation (or as it were tything) of the armie, for hauing borne it selfe cowardly against the enemie, where the most hardie & valiant, were oftentimes by lot drawne out, and for cowards executed. Which example the Senator Cassius vsed, at such time as he in full Senat, [ G] persuaded the Senators to put foure hundred Slaues to death, although that there was one (and he vnknowne) amongst them guiltie of the murther committed in the person of their master, ioyning thereunto these wordes: Omne magnum exemplum habet ali∣quid* 1.959 ex iniquo, quod publica vtilitate compensatur, Euery great example sauoreth some∣thing of iniustice, which (yet for all that) is with the common profit againe recom∣pensed or requited. But this is not (may some say) to pay the debt, to alleage one incon∣uenience in defence of an other, and of one absurditie to conclude an other. Where∣unto I say, that the best iustice that a man can doe is, of diuers inconueniences at once* 1.960 propounded, to shunne the greatest, especially when question is of such offences as may in no wise be left vnpunished. For we see that the wisest, & most aduised Lawiers [ H] haue descided, That if there be any one slaine, or beaten, or robbed by many, they are all bound for the whole, albeit that happely it was but one of them which gaue to him the mortall wound: but if it shall appeare, which of them killed him, and that it was done without the conspiracie of the rest, onely he is bound that so slew him: But if it appeare not at all by whom he was slaine, neither that they had conspired against him, they are all acquited from corporall punishment; but yet are to be therefore fined: For nothing is more effectuall for the finding out of that which is true and iust, then that in doubtfull things it is admitted, still to shunne those things which are more absurd and vniust. As if a felonie bee done which cannot by one man be performed; as if many haue caried away an other mans timber log, and amongst those many it appea∣reth [ I] not who it was that did it, none of them is guiltie of the theft, if we will sticke vnto the subtillitie of the words of the law; and yet are they all indeed guiltie: where∣of the Lawiers haue no other reason, but that the inconuenience falleth greater on the one side, when they would shunne it on the other, which is (as we said) the greatest reason that a man can haue, to find out the truth of all things, when all other reasons faile. We speake not here of that which enemies do to townes besieged, and by force taken, pilling, killing, sacking aswell the good as the bad; and where the better that a man is, the worse commonly he fareth: but what a prince ought to do against his re∣bellious subiects. Howbeit that the Romans, although accounted the most iust peo∣ple [ K] of the world, haue not alwaies followed that rule of equitie and iustice which we before spoke of, but sometimes punished not onely in generall, but euen in particu∣lar,* 1.961 all the inhabitants of their rebellious Townes after that they had taken them: and yet alwayes obserued this point, to punish the heads more seuerely than the rest, and to preserue them that had resisted the seditious; hauing still aspeciall regard whether the rebellion were consulted of and decreed in the Corporation and communitie or not. So Liuie saith: Valerius Leuinus Agrigento capto qui capita rerum erant, virgit caesos securi percussit, caeteros proedamque vendidit, Valerius Leuinus hauing taken Agrigentum beheaded them that were the chiefe authours (of the rebellion) being

before whipped, the rest and the prey he sold. And in an other place: Quoniam de∣fectionis [ A] authores merit as poenas a dijs immortalibus, & a vobis habent P. C. quid pla∣cet innoxia multitudine fieri? tandem ignotum est illis, & ciuitas data, For that the authours of the rebellion (saith he) haue from the immortall Gods, and you the ap∣pointed fathers, receiued their deserued punishment, what is it your pleasure to be done with the rest of the guiltlesse multitude? at length they were pardoned, and the freedome of the citie giuen them. The Consull Fuluius, hauing after a long siege taken the citie of Capua, beeing renolted from the Romans, beheaded fourescore of the Senatours, beside xxvij others which had before poysoned themselues, and caused three hundred moe of their chiefe gentlemen to be in prison starued, the rest of the inhabitants he sold for slaues. As for the other Townes which were vnder the obe∣dience [ B] of them of Capua, there were none but the chiefe men punished. Atella, Ca∣latia{que} in deditionem acceptae, ibi quoque in eos qui capita rerum erant animaduersum, Atella and Calatia (saith Liuie) were taken in by composition, and there also execu∣tion was done vpon such as were chiefe doers in the rebellion. The other Consull Ap∣pius more seuere than his fellow Fuluius, would haue enquirie made also of their allyes, who had had secret part in the same conspiracie: Whereunto Fuluius would not a∣gree, saying, That so to do, were but to prouoke their faithfull and loyall allyes to re∣bell, in giuing credit vnto the traiterous Campanians▪ Whereby it is manifest with* 1.962 what seueritie the Romans thought it good to punish their rebellious conspirators, du∣ring the time of their popular gouernment. And as for the Roman Emperours, [ C] some of them vsed towards such offendours gratious fauour, and othersome extreame ctueltie. The emperour Aurelianus for his clemencie deserueth to be for euer com∣mended, who laying siege vnto the citie Thyane, swore that there should not a dog escape aliue, if he should take the citie: but hauing by force wonne it, chaunging his mind, as with compassion moued, he straitly forbid any man to be therein slaine; and when some to prouoke him vnto wrath, put him in remembrance of the oath he had made: he said it concerned but dogs, which hee commaunded to be all forthwith kil∣led. The like clemencie Henry the fift the Germaine Emperour, hauing condemned the citie of Brixia to bee vtterly rased, and laid euen with the earth; yet when he had wonne the same, pardoned the citisens neuerthelesse, least the innocent people should [ D] so haue perished together with the offendors; following therein the mercie of God, who would not onely the good not to perish together with the euill and wicked, but promised to be mercifull vnto certeine cities, and a multitude of wicked persons, for some few good men to bee found amongst them. Some others of the Emperours haue contrariwise vsed most barbarous cruelties, without discretion killing the good and bad together, and that for the fault of some few. As the emperour Antonius Caracalla, who in reuenge of certeine rymes and songes made and sung against him* 1.963 at Alexandria, caused certeine of his garrison souldiours and Praetorian bandes to bee entermingled with the people as they were there beholding playes: who vpon a signall giuen, slewe an infinite number of the poore Citisens one with an other [ E] without respect, as they came to hand. The like whereof hee had also before com∣maunded to bee put in execution at Hierusalem. And afterward at Thessalo∣nica, where the Emperour Theodosius the great caused seauen thousand of the in∣habitants to bee slaine one with another pell mell in reuenge of certaine of his Re∣ceiours and other his magistrates and officers there slaine, without any delibe∣ration or decree for the doing thereof, before made in their Communitie or Cor∣poration. Xerxes king of Persia vsed an other manner of reuenge, not in deede so cruell as the other, but yet farre more ignominious and despirefull, causing

the noses of all the people of a citie in Syria to bee cut off (which citie after that was [ F] of that euent called Rhinocura) for the like fault done by some few of them. But of all cruelties that of Syllaes passed, who beside three score thousand citisens of Rome by him slaine, caused also all the inhabitants of Preneste to bee put to death, pardoning none but his hoast, who would also needs die with the rest, saying, That he would not be beholden for his life, vnto the murtherer of his countrey. Which cruelty may yet be borne with, when the vanquished shal chuse rather to die than to be∣come subiects; as in all ages there haue bene such: but not if they shall bee content to serue and obey them, by whome they are ouercome and vanquished. So the Pisans (in the memorie of our fathers) not able to endure the iust gouernment of the Florentines their lords, by the fauour of Charles the eight the French king, yeelded themselues to [ G] Countie Valentine Borgia, who beeing not able to protect them, they in vaine offered themselues first to the Genowayes, and then to the Venetians: By both which states they being reiected, after that they had for a long time beene most straitly besieged, they yeelded themselues subiects vnto the Florentines their old lords, of whome they easily obtained pardon, and so afterwards continued their good and faithfull subiects. But Lewes eare of Flaunders, and the last of his house (for after his death that earledom* 1.964 fell into the house of Burgundie) hauing brought the Gantois rebelling against him to such extremitie, as that they were glad to craue of him grace and pardon, would not so receiue them, but propounded vnto them most hard conditions, and not beseeming a free people to accept of: as that they should all come vnto him out of the citie to craue [ H] pardon with halters about their neckes; and that then he would consider what he were to do with them. Which put the poore distressed people into such a desperat feare, as that they went out being in number but fiue thousand (but all armed with dispaire) against the earle, who then was fortie thousand strong, whome they in a great battell ouerthrew; and so brought vnder their obeysance all the townes of Flaunders, except Audenard. The earle flying out of the ouerthow hid himselfe vnder a poore womans bed; who afterwards found meanes for his escape, by couering him in an heape of ap∣ples: but being so escaped▪ for euer lost his power, together with his honour. With which so great an ouerthrow giuen, the Gantois became much more arrogant than be∣fore, [ I] * 1.965 & neuer afterwards willingly endured their princes commands. Whereby it was then perceiued, No more cruell enemies to be found against the prince, than his despe∣rat subiects, Nor any war to be more iust, than that which is by necessitie imposed; as said an auntient Roman Senator. But that the aforesaid warre was such, it is euident & plaine, seeing that together with their most shamefull yeelding, most cruell death did hang ouer all their heads, and a reproach heauier than death it selfe; reproach and dis∣grace being alwayes more dreadfull vnto men of honourable minds, than most cruell death. But in that time it should seeme, that princes tooke pleasure to encrease their crueltie with reproach and despight against their disobedient and disloyall subiects. For so * 1.966 Frederike the second, the German emperour, to reuenge the miurie done vnto his [ K] wife, with great disgrace at Milan, hauing besieged and taken the citie, after he had put to death the chiefest of the citisens, and rifled and rased the citie, vsed a contumelie and despight towards the rest that had escaped the souldiours furie, as was vnto them more despightful than cruel; & yet worse than death. So Dagobert king of France, not cōten∣ted to haue slaine the inhabitants of Poitiers, for ayding his enemie against him, caused also the towne to be rased, and the ground to be plowed with an eternall curse, and salt to be sowne vpon it to make it barren: whereof they are yet called Salted men of Poi∣tiers. But as princes which with sufferance passe ouer the seditions & rebellions of the corporation or communitie of any towne or prouince, giue example to others to doe

the like: so those princes also which without measure exercise crueltie vpon their van∣quished [ A] * 1.967 subiects, get vnto themselues not onely the title of most barbarous and cruell tyrants, but in so doing sometimes also hazard their whole estates. But hee shall de∣serue the prayse and commendation of a iust prince, and preserue also his estate, which shall keepe the meane in punishing the authors and ringleaders of rebellions, tempe∣ring seueritie with lenitie. As did Charles of Fraunce king Lewes the ninth his brother: (afterwards king of Naples) who hauing commission from the king, to chastice the inhabitants of Mont Pelier, who had slaine certaine of the kings receiuers & officers: tooke from them all their liberties and priuileges, appointed the walles of their citie to be rased, their steeples pulled downe, and a fine of six score thousand crownes to be set vpon them: or as some write, caused halfe the goods of the citisens to bee confisca∣ted, [ B] and of six hundred of them one part to be drowned, another part to bee hanged, and the third part burnt. And so indeed the iudgement was to the terrour of them gi∣uen, and the decree set downe: how bei•…•… that it was afterwards by the good prince moderated, in such sort, as that none but the offendors themselues were executed: for that the kings officers and magistrats had bene so murthered by no publike councel, or assembly of the citisens orderly called, but by the insolencie of the rash tumultuous peo∣ple onely. With like lenitie Charles the sixt the French king disarmed the Parisians risen vp in rebellion against him, and executing the authors thereof, restrayned the rest of the whole bodie of the citisens, by imposing vpon them a great fine. And admit all the citisens of a citie, by their common consent, and the matter being before well deba∣ted, [ C] to haue all together with one mind rebelled, and chosen vnto themselues a new prince: Yea and to haue augmented their wickednesse with contumelie and despight against their soueraigne: yet were it not the part (I will nor say) of a good prince, but euen of a wise prince, to take reuenge of all of them of whome he might, for blemishing thereby for euer of his fame and reputation; than which nothing ought to bee vnto a prince more deere: albeit that he might so doe (which yet were a most hard thing) the state of the Commonweale reserued whole. Wherefore T. Quintius the Consul* 1.968 did wisely, who when he could not with the safetie of the Commonweale chastice the armie which he then had vnder his conduct and leading, for their rebellious mutinie, af∣ter he had appeased all matters, and yet thought it not safe for the souldiours so in dan∣ger [ D] of the law to returne into the citie, he himselfe came first to Rome, and there by consent of the Senat presented a request vnto the people, Ne cui militum fraudi esset secessio, That the mutinous reuolt might not be daungerous to any of the souldiours: which he with the great good liking both of the Senat and of the people obtained. With like wisdome Scipio Affricanus the father, repressed the mutinie of his army at Seuerone, with the execution of thirtie fiue of the souldiours onely: Certabatur vtrum in authores tantum seditionis xxxv animaduerteretur, an plurium supplicio vindicanda de∣fectio magis esset quam seditio: vicit sententia lenior, vt vnde culpa orta esset, ibi poena con∣sisteret, ad multitudinis castigationem satis esse, Question was (saith Liuie) whether exe∣cution were to be done onely vpon thirtie siue, the authors of the sedition: or that so [ E] great a reuolt rather than a sedition, were to be reuenged with the execution of moe: wherein the milder opinion preuailed, That from whence the offence was begun, there should the punishment rest: and that to suffice for the chastising of the whole multi∣tude. And shortly after in the oration which Scipio made vnto the armie, he vseth these words, Se non secus quàm viscera secantem sua cum gemitu & lachrimis xxx hominum capitibus, expiasse octo millium noxam, Him no otherwise but as a man cutting his owne entrels, with sighes and teares to haue made satisfaction for the offence of eight thou∣sand men, with the heads of thirtie. So when Appius the Consull (with great rashnesse

should I say, or pride) would by strong hand haue restrained and corrected his armie, [ F] then all in a mutinie, he was by the Colonels and captaines staied from so doing: who all with one voice told him, Nothing to be more daungerous, than to seeke by force to chastice them, in whose loialtie and fide litie the whole force of the empire consisted. And albeit that nothing were to bee feared in the punishing of an whole armie, or* 1.969 of a citie, yet such generall and popular punishments are not to be vsed: but in chasti∣sing of such offences, an especiall regard is to be had, Vt poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perueniat, That the punishment it selfe should touch but few, but that the feare thereof should come vnto all; * 1.970 as an auntient orator no lesse eloquently than wisely said.

Yea moreouer it beseemeth not a soueraigne prince to be the executor or beholder of the execution of such generall punishments; (if otherwise it may bee in his absence [ G] done) to the intent his subiects minds should not so be alienated from him: but to the contrarie it is needfull for him with a conuenient lenitie to moderat euen the iust and necessarie seueritie of his deputies and magistrats, to the imitation of Antiochus the* 1.971 great king of Asia, who hauing giuen commission to Hermeas his constable, to punish the rebellion of them of Seleucia: and he condemning the corporation of the citie in a fine of six hundred thousand crownes, and banishing also a great number of the citi∣sens, and taking away the liberties and priuileges of the citie: Anoiochus called home againe the banished; and contenting himselfe almost with the tenth part of the fine, re∣stored againe vnto the citie the auntient liberties and priuilegs thereof. But not to goe further, Henrie the second the French king, hauing giuen commission to the duke [ H] Mont-morencie constable of Fraunce, to chastise the rebellion of the countrey of Guy∣enne, and especially of the inhabitants of Bourdeaux, graunted them afterward a gene∣rall patdon, and forgaue them the rasing of their towne hall, wherein they had made their assemblies, with the fine of two hundred thousand pound, and the charges of the armie brought against him: in all which the inhabitants of Bourdeaux were by the duke condemned; restoring vnto them also the right and freedome of the corporati∣on of the towne, excepting them only who had laid hands vpon his officers, and some few priuileges and demaines of the towne, which were then abridged and cut off. But the emperour Charles the fift, not so cruelly as wisely, by one and the selfe same iudge∣ment,* 1.972 reuenged the often rebellions and iniuries which they of Gaunt had of old vsed [ I] to doe against his auncestors, and which till then remained vnpunished: partly by the sufferance, and partly through the weakenesse of the earles of Flaunders. For when the citisens of Gaunt had now compelled the Bourgamaster openly to teare in peeces the emperours edicts, and had sent ambassadours vnto Frauncis the French king to re∣ceiue them with their citie into his protection: and he refusing them, had solicited his other subiects, their neighbours to rebellion: the councell of Spaine decreed, That the citie should be rased and laid euen with the ground, and all the goods of the citisens confiscated. Howbeit the emperour hauing it in his power, spared the countrey and citie wherein he was borne and brought vp: but executed thirtie of the chiefe authors [ K] of the rebellion, tooke away all their corporations and colledges, depriued the citie of part of the publike lands thereunto belonging, as also of all the priuileges; and caused a most strong castle to be there built, and a garrison therein to be kept and maintained, and all at the citisens charge. This the emperours sentence I receiued of them of Gaunt, at such time as I was of councell to Frauncis duke of Aniou, and of the Low countries. And not long after king Frauncis, who had refused to protect the Gantoies going in person himselfe to represse the rebellion at Rochell, raised for the custome of salt, with the maiestie of his speech terrified them of Rochell, and fined them, but yet put no man to death: yea he left vnto the citie the liberties and societies thereof whole,

yet protesting himselfe to haue had no lesse occasion to reuenge himselfe than had [ A] Charles the fift, but that he had rather to encrease his commendation, by sauing, than by spilling of his subiects, and by gentlenesse rather than by crueltie. By these exam∣ples before set downe it is well to be vnderstood, what is to bee determined for the pu∣nishment of Communities, Corporations, and Colledges: wherein they which affect lenitie, do giue occasion vnto the same citisens oftentimes to rebell: which in a Com∣monweale is of a prince especially to be taken heed of. In which thing no man see∣meth to haue behaued himselfe more wisely than Charles the fift. Yet he that seemed to haue bene so seuere against the Gauntois, vsed the greatest lenitie that might bee to∣wards the Spaniards of all sorts, at such time as they had not only rebelled against him, (when he went to take possession of the empire) but also chosen the duke of Calabria [ B] for their king, who refused that so daungerous a preferment. Of which so great a mul∣titude Charles thought it not good to punish one, and that right wisely: for that in so doing he should haue launced all the members of the Commonweale. For albeit that it is an wholesome thing to cauterise or cut off a mortified member for the preseruati∣on of the whole bodie; must we therefore if all the members of the bodie bee in a con∣sumption, or taken with a Gangrena vse sections or cauterisations? Hypocrates the great physitian saith no, forbidding vs to apply remedies to desperat diseases, and so much the lesse, if a consumption shall take hold of the chiefe and principall members of the bo∣die.* 1.973 Wherefore to conclude this question, if the offence be committed by the coun∣cell or deceit of a communitie or corporation, that which belongeth vnto such a com∣munitie [ C] or corporation so offending, is therefore to be confiscated or forfeited: but if there be no such thing thereto belonging that may so be forfeited, then a fine in money is to be set thereupon, but yet to be exacted onely of them which gaue counsell or aid to the committing of the offence: for as much as it could not bee committed by the whole communitie or corporation it selfe: but if the guiltie parties be not to be known from the guiltles, then are they altogether to be fined: but as for any corporall punish∣ment, it is not to be inflicted, except that euerie one of them, and all of them together, haue most grieuously offended. Neither yet are they to be thought all to offend, al∣though they follow the ensignes displaied, except that they altogether and euerie one of them apart gaue their councell or consent thereunto before: but the communitie or [ D] corporation being punished, doth not therefore exempt them that are guiltie of the of∣fence committed, from their due deserued punishment.* 1.974

But these things being thus declared, concerning the punishments of Communities aud corporations: it remaineth for vs to see, whether that a Commonweale can bee without such Communities, Corporations, and Colledges. Wee said at first, men euery where to be, and alwaies to haue bene desirous of the societie and companie of men: and so out of a familiar and naturall societie by little and little to haue growne in∣to a colledge, into a corporation, into a communitie, and so at length into a citie: and so to haue made these empires and kingdomes, which we here in the world see, hauing no surer foundation wherupon to rest (next vnto God) than the loue and amitie of one [ E] of them towards another: which can in no wise be maintained, but by alliances, socie∣ties, estates, communities, fraternities, corporations, and colledges. So that to demand, whether communities and colledges be necessarie in a Commonweale? is as much, as to demaund, Whether that a Commonweale can be maintained and vpholden with∣out loue and amitie? without which the world it selfe cannot long stand. Which I haue said, for that there haue bene, and yet are some of opinion, That all corporations and colleges are out of a Commonweale to bee excluded and banished; not conside∣ring that a familie, and the verie Commonweale it selfe, are nothing else but commu∣nities.

Which is an errour whereat the greatest spirits haue oft times stumbled; for [ F] one absurditie or incommoditie which ensueth of one good custome or ordinance, wil∣ling to haue the same custome or ordinance abolished and quite taken away, without* 1.975 regard of the great good which otherwise ensueth thereof vnto the Commonweale. I confesse that colledges and communities euill gouerned, draw after them many facti∣ons, seditions, part-takings, monopolies, yea and sometime the ruine of the whole Commonweale also: and that in stead of sacred loue and amitie, there ariseth of them coniurations, and conspiracies of one of them against another. And that more is, it hath bene seene, that vnder the shadow of religion diuers colledges haue couered some most detestable and execrable impietie. Whereof no better example can bee giuen, than of the fraternitie of the Bacchanals in Rome, which deuised vnder the colour of [ G] religion, so long couered the most execrable and detestabble filthinesse of both sexes, vntill that the secrets thereof opened, polluted the citie then mirrour of the world, and all Italie with the loathsome sauour thereof, aboue seuen thousand persons beeing partly accused, attainted, conuinced, and many of them execured and banished,* 1.976 for the abhominable villanies by them committed vnder the colour of that religion, which hath alwaies the fairest and most glorious show that can bee deuised, to bee set vppon a fowle matter; as said Flaminius the Consull speaking vnto the people of Rome, concerning the impieties by him found out, Nihil in speciem fallacius praua religione; vbi Deorum numen praetenditur sceleribus, subit animum timor, Nothing is in show more deceitfull than corrupt religion: For where the maiestie of the gods [ H] is pretended for the cloaking of villanies, there feare pierceth the mind. Which was the cause that the fraternities of the Bacchanals was by a decree of the Senat put downe through all Italie: VVhich decree of the Senat confirmed by the people, passed into the force of a law, That from that time forward no moe sacrifices should bee made by night, but alwayes done in publike. VVhich thing Damonax a wise Grecian had long time before attempted to persuade the Athenians of, saying, Those* 1.977 night-sacrifices to haue alwaies seemed vnto him verie suspitious. And better it is in euerie Commonweale openly to suffer whatsoeuer assemblies or sacrifices to bee done by day, in the sight of all the people, then nightly assemblies to bee made vnder [ I] the colour of religion▪ VVhereof Cato the Censor most grieuously said, Ab nullo genere non summum periculum est, sicaetus, & consilia, & secretas consultationes esse si∣nas, There is no sort of men from whom the greatest daunger is not to bee feared, if you shall suffer conuenticles, and secret councels and consultations to be kept amongst them: VVhich can so much the lesse be auoided, when as the false opinion of religion is pretended for to colour villanies. For that there is no conspiracie, which may not be contriued and made in such secret assemblies: which growing by little and little, and not perceiued vntill they bee growne great, at length bursting like to a rotten im∣postume, infecteth the whole bodie of the Commonweale. As for proofe thereof in our remembrance, whereas there haue alwaies beene many conuenticles and mee∣tings [ K] of seditious persons, vnder the pretensed show of religion, so a more daunge∣rous companie of filthie fellowes neuer more sodenly in any place brake out, than did that of the Anabaptists in Munster, the chiefe citie of VVestphalia, who there secretly multiplying, vppon the sodaine tooke vp armes, and by the lea∣ding of a Taylour draue out the bishop and magistrats, and so possessed the citie wholly to themselues, which could not bee againe recouered from them, not those phantasticall seditions repressed, but by a strong armie of the whole German empire. The Colledges and Fraternities of the Pythagorians dealt more moderatly in Italie, who professing the studie of wisedome, and hauing drawne vnto them

so many disciples, as that many the greatest lords & princes, both of Italie and Greece, [ A] moued with the admiration of their doctrine, were now become both their auditors and followers: they bearing themselues thereupon, went about to haue euerie where ouerthrowne the popular estates, and tyrannicall gouernments, and for them to haue established Aristocraties, and the gouernments of wise men. But that their so good a purpose was ouerthrowne by certaine ambitious and popular men, who setting the people in an vprore with fire and sword, destroyed all the Pythagorians. Which (as saith Polibius) troubled almost all the estates both of Italie and of Greece. And for this cause the emperours, and almost all other princes, popes, and councels, giuing the Iews leaue to haue their meetings & synagogues (which Tyberius, Claudius, & Domitian) the emperours, had of antient time taken from them) commaunded yet, That they should [ B] alwaies do their sacrifices, and haue their prayers openly, and in publike. Which li∣bertie Pharao king of Aegypt (terrified with the iudgements of God) would haue also graunted them, but was by Moyses refused, alleaging, That it was to be feared least the Aegyptians should ouerwhelme with stones the Iewes, vsing a strange religion, and by the lawes of the countrey forbidden. And to say the truth, it is a thing most hard and* 1.978 difficult to maintaine colledges or corporations in a Commonweale of what religion soeuer, either publikely or priuatly, being contrarie to the religion of the people, or of the greater part of them: For that the people euery where most iealous of their religi∣on, cannot but most hardly endure any rites and ceremonies, differing from the religion by themselues generally receiued: neither are by the lawes, or by the magistrats com∣maund, [ C] or bands of men so to be restrained and kept in, but that their rage will oft∣times most furiously breake out, not against the weaker sort onely, but euen against the most mightie ones also. For so Thomas emperour of Constantinople, pulling downe the altars and images of the saints, was by the angrie people most cruelly slaine in the verie temple of saint Sophia. We haue also seene in the citie of Franckford foure cor∣porations* 1.979 and colledges of diuers religions, to haue bene publikely allowed and exerci sed, namely those of the Iewes, of the Catholikes, of the Protestants, and of the Confes▪ sion of Geneua: But it so fell out in the yeare 1562, in the moneth of May, that the Protestants assuring themselues of the strength of their partakers, fell vpon them of the Confession of Geneua, (who in their profession came neerest vnto them) and bearing [ D] with the other which more differed from them, cáused that of the Confession to bee there vtterly forbidden. Which is lesse to be feared in such religions and sects as haue bene of auntient time receiued, and which as it were in their owne right defend their profession: such as is the religion of the Iewes, from which all other religions, except 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, seeme to haue taken their beginning: which Chrysostome therefore calleth The mother of the Gentiles: the princes of Europe and of Barbarie hauing al∣waies granted vnto the Iews, their antient priuileges, corporations, & colledges, for the exercising of their religion, in paying vnto them certaine tribute, as they did vnto the Roman emperors, which was called Aurum Coronarium; which the German empe∣rours ordinarily giue vnto the emprises, for the confirmation of the Iewes priuileges, [ E] which are yet greatet in Polonia and Lituania than in any other place of the world, since they were by Cazimir the great king of Polonia graunted vnto them, at the re∣quest of a Iewish ladie, called Hester; such as had of antient time by a Persian king bene vnto this nation giuen, at the instance of another Iewish ladie of the same name. Where they so mightily encreased, as that there was no prince in the greater Asia, which had not in it one or other Collonie of the Iewes; as we read in Iosephus, and Phi∣lo. Wherefore the most auntient antiquitie of that the Iewish religion, together with the great pouertie of the Iewes themselues, who in no place of the world may possesse

any lands, maketh that they need the lesse, and are indeed the lesse able to sight for their [ F] religion and libertie.

But it may be, that the consent and agreement of the nobilitie and people in a new religion or sect, may be so puissant & strong, as that to represse or alter the same, should* 1.980 be a thing impossible, or at leastwise maruelous difficult, without the extreame perill and daunger of the whole estate. In which case the best aduised princes and gouer∣nours of Commonweales do imitat the wise pilots, who when they cannot attaine vn∣to the port by them desired, direct their course to such port as they may: Yea and oft times quite chaunging their course, giue way vnto the stormes and tempests, least in seeking too much to put into the desired hauen, they suffer shipwracke. Wherefore that religion or sect is to be suffered, which without the hazard and destruction of the [ G] state cannot be taken away: The health and welfare of the Commonweale being the chiefe thing the law respecteth. Wherefore Constans the emperour suffered the com∣panies and colledges of the Arrians, not so much for the loue and affection he bare to∣wards them, as diuers haue written but so in quiet to preserue his subiects, and estate. And Theodosius the Great being himselfe a Catholike, and alwaies contrarie to the Ar∣ria•…•…s opinion, yet bare with their religion, which hee could by no meanes suppresse, maintaining both the one sort and the other in peace and obedience. And after him Zeno the emperour, to reconcile the companies of all sorts of religions among them∣selues, and together with the Commonweale, commaunded an edict, which they cal∣led 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is to say, of vnion and tranquilitie or quietnesse to be published. Af∣ter [ H] whose example Anastasius caused the law of forgetfulnesse to bee set forth, cheri∣shing the graue and modest preachers, and remouing such as were of vehement and turbulent spirits.

And yet no doubt, but that a prince fauouring one sect or religion, and disliking ano∣ther,* 1.981 may if he will without force or constraint, or any violence at all, suppresse that which he liketh not (except it be by the hand and power of the almightie supported) & that by keeping the maintainers thereof from all preferments and places of command; and by shewing himselfe in deeds rather than in words, to abhorre that religion which he desireth to haue extinguished, For the maner of men is, to loue such things as their princes embrace: and minds resolued, the more they are crossed, the stiffer they are, [ I] which otherwise of themselues grow weake and feeble, if they be not at all resisted. Be∣sides that, there can be nothing more daungerous vnto a prince, than to make proofe of his forces against his subiects, except he be wel assured to preuaile against them: which otherwise were but to arme a lion, and to show him his clawes wherewith to teare his master. But if the wiser sort of princes do in the varietie of religions right, hardly keepe the concord and vnitie of their subiects: what then is to be hoped for of such princes, as haue no experience of gouerning of the state, on euerie side beset with their flatterers? pressed by their false enformers, thrust forward by their furious followers: aiming only at this, how to fill themselues with other mens wealth and blood. So in the beginning [ K] * 1.982 of the Primitiue Church, vnder the first emperours, so many grosse and impudent ca∣lumnies, and slaunderous reports, were deuised and put in writing against the Christi∣ans, for the taking away of their assemblies and meetings, as the like whereof were ne∣uer before deuised, and would indeed seeme incredible, were they not yet in writing extant. As witnesseth Anaxagoras the orator, in his apologie to Antoninus: Tertullian in his apologie for the Christians: and Origen against Celsus, certaine of whose wri∣tings are yet extant. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, that it was commonly obiected vnto the Christians, that they were Atheists, irreligious contemners of all gods, incestuous murtherers: and such as in their secret assemblies and meetings vsed

to kill yong infants conceiued of their mutuall incests, and after that they had so killed [ A] them, to eate them. Which thing indeed Epiphanius reporteth of the heretiques called Gnostic•…•…: as that they should in their meetings beat in a morter their new borne chil∣dren, begotten in incest,, with the yeolkes of egges, flower, honie, and certeine spices mingled together, and so to make cakes of them, and to bake them, and eate them: and that to haue beene with them accounted a sacrament of the bodie and blood. Which slaunders so falsely obiected against the Christians, might seeme altogether incredible, if in the time of our auncestours the like accusation had not beene com∣menced against the Templers, viz. vnder the raigne of Philip the faire; for which the* 1.983 Colledges in Fraunce before graunted vnto the Templers, at last by a decree of pope Boniface the viij were taken from them, the master with a great number of his fellowes [ B] most cruelly burnt, and the order quite suppressed. All which for all that, the Ger∣mans by their writings haue since showed to haue beene but a malitious false accusa∣tion, inuented for the taking away of their great lands and wealth from them. The like practise was also vsed against the Corporations and societies of the Iewes, aswell in* 1.984 Fraunce vnder Dagobert, Philip Augustus, and Philip the long: as afterward in Spaine vnder Ferdinand king of Aragon and Castile, who of a mercilesse deuotion driue them quite out of their countries, and enriched themselues with their goods, it being giuen out, that they had crucified boyes, and poysoned wels with the blood of their leprous persons.

Wherefore, to discide the question before propounded, as whether Communi∣ties, [ C] * 1.985 Corporations, Societies, and Colledges be good in a Commonweale, or no? or that the Commonweale may well be without them? Truely in mine opinion no∣thing could euer haue beene deuised more effectuall or better for the keeping & main∣teining of popular estates, or for the ouerthrow of tyrannicall gouernements, than corporations and societies: For why, the Commonweales and estates being one vnto an other contrarie, doe by quite contrarie meanes both mainteine and ruinate them∣selues. And therefore the people and popular estates, accept and embrace all manner of communities, corporations, and colledges; as we said that Solon did, in establishing the popular estate of Athens. All which tyrants in their tyrannicall gouernments seeke vtterle to ouerthrow, as well knowing, the vnitie and amitie of subiects among them∣selues, [ D] to be the tyrants ineuitable ruine and destruction: the iust royall, and Aristo∣craticall estates, euen for the same reasons still holding the meane betwixt both, nei∣ther accepting nor reiecting of all communities and colledges, but admitting onely such as they see needfull for the state and Commonweale; which with good lawes and orders they still keepe within the compasse of duetie and obedience. The good king Numa was the first that ordained Societies and Fraternities of artificers and men of occupation; and so Tarquin the proud was the first that tooke them away, and that forbid the assemblies of the people, and that had in himselfe a purpose also to haue sup∣pressed the bodie of the Senat, by the death of the Senatours, not suffering any new to be chosen in the roomes of them that died But he was no sooner by his subiects dri∣uen [ E] out, but that the popular estate was established, the number of the three hundred Senatours supplied, and the colledges and companies before abolished againe restored. But when the people by the helpe of their Tribunes began more insolently to rule, and that in the bodie of the Senat were almost six hundred of the nobilitie and chiefe men of the citie, who had almost drawne vnto themselues the soueraigntie, the colle∣ges, and companies of the citisens, were by a decree of the Senate, for the most part suppressed and put downe: Howbeit shortly after Clodius the Tribune to be the more gracious with the people, and to maintaine them in iarre and discord with the nobilitie

(which he had renounced, causing himselfe to be adopted by a base fellow, so to be∣come [ F] Tribune) not onely restored all the Colleges and companies by the Senat be∣fore suppressed, but ordained and erected a great number moe: which Caesar being got to be Dictator, to maintaine his owne power and weaken the peoples, put downe; but were afterwards by Augustus hauing assured his estate, by an expresse edict againe restored. All which Nero the the tyrant againe suppressed. Whereby it appeareth, Tyrants alwaies to haue hated the corporations and communities of the people, and* 1.986 by all meanes endeuored to haue them vtterly extinguished: Insomuch that Dionysius the tyrant of Sicilie would not that euen neere kinsfolks should so much as visit one an other, but as they came late from supper from their friends, caused them to be robbed and spoiled. As in like manner did Nero, who oft times by night walking the streats, [ G] spoiled and slew such as he met, which returned late from supper with their friends; so much he feared the assemblies of his subiects, for the conspiracies they might so make against the tyrannie of him so wicked a prince. And yet for all that the iust Mo∣narchie,* 1.987 hath not any more assured foundation or stay, than the Estates of the people, Communities, Corporations, and Colleges: For if need be for the king to leuie mo∣ney, to raise forces, to maintaine the Estate against the enemie, it cannot be better done, than by the estates of the people, and of euery Prouince, Towne, and Commu∣tie. Yea we see that they themselues which would haue these estates of the commu∣nities and societies of the people suppressed and abolished, haue in time of their neces∣sitie no other refuge or stay to flie vnto, but euen to these estates and communities of [ H] the people: which being together vnited, strengthen themselues for the defence and protection, not of their Prince onely, but euen of themselues also, and of the whole estate and subiects in generall, especially the Prince himselfe there being in person pre∣sent. For where can things for the curing of the diseases of the sicke Commonweale, or for the amendment of the people, or for the establishing of lawes, or for the refor∣ming of the Estate, be better debated or handled, than before the prince in his Senat before the people? There they conferre of the affaires concerning the whole bodie of the Commonweale, and of the members thereof; there are heard and vnderstood the iust complaints & greeuances of the poore subiects, which neuer otherwise come vnto [ I] the princes eares; there are discouered and laid open the robberies and extortions com∣mitted in the princes name; whereof he knoweth nothing, there the requests of all degrees of men are heard. Besides that, it is almost a thing incredible to say, how much the subiects are eased, and how well they are also pleased, to see their king to sit as chiefe in the assemblie of the estates, and to heare him discoursing; how euery man desireth to be seene of him, and if it please him to heare their complaints, and to receiue their requests, albeit that they be often times denied the same; yet O how it pleaseth them to haue had accesse vnto their Prince, yea sometime they goe away better pleased with such a deniall, than if they had had that they requested, being by their prince altoge∣ther contemned. All which is better obserued and kept in Spayne, than in any place of [ K] the world, where the assemblies of the estates heretofore haue beene holden euery two or three yeares one. And in England also, for that the people graunt no payments, if the Estates be not assembled: as I remember was done, when as I passed ouer into England embassadour from Frauncis duke of Aniou. Our kings do not so often call together the assemblies of their estates, as doe the kings of England. But whereas there are accounted sixteene Prouinces in this kingdome, whereof six haue their particular assemblies among themselues, (namely Bretagne, Normandie, Bourgundie, Lan∣guedoc, Dauphine, and Prouence) some there were, who for feare their villanies and extortions should in those assemblies haue beene found out, laboured to the vttermost

of their power to haue had the same assemblies and meetings of the Estates of the a∣foresaid [ A] prouinces, in any wise taken away and changed into elections. As also in the beginning of the raigne of Charles the eight, at such time as it was with one generall voice called vpon, that a generall assemblie of all the Prouinces might be had; there wanted not some who threatned it to be Treason to such as in the counsell should con∣sent with the people for the calling of such an assembly: whose opinion Philip de Com∣mines (a most worthy counsellour and a man of great experience) most earnestly with∣stood. But how necessarie the assemblies & meeting of the whole people for to con∣sult* 1.988 of matters, are, is hereby perceiued; in that the people which may so call together such their counsels, with them all things go well: wheras others which may not so do, are oppressed with tributes & seruitude. For as the shot of many pieces of artillerie de∣liuered [ B] one after another, is not of so great force and power for the battering of a fort, as when the whole tyre of the great ordinance is together discharged, so the particular re∣quests of men often times vanish but into smoake. But when whole Colleges or Com∣munities, or the estates of a prouince, or of a people, or of a realme, shall make their re∣quests vnto their king; the voice is so loude, and the requests so effectuall, as that it is hard for him to refuse it. Howbeit that there is a thousand other commodities & vses of the generall assemblies of the Estates in euery prouince and countrie, for the com∣mon good therof. As if question be for the leuying of forces, or of money to withstand the enemie, or for the building of fortresses, for the mending of high waies, repairing of bridges, or for the scouring of the countrie of theeues, or withstanding of the great; [ C] all these things which can in no wise be done by particular men, are best of all perfor∣med by them all in their generall assemblies. As to passe ouer the rest, all these things haue beene better done in the prouince of Languedoc by their assembled Estates, than in any other prouince of this Realme. They within a few yeares erected a Schole, and appointed twelue hundred pounds yearely pension for the instruction of all the youth of the countrie. In the Towne of Nismes, beside the other particular Colleges, they built the fairest fortresses of this realme; and caused Buzac to be executed, the most no∣table* 1.989 robber that euer was in our remembrance, of whom neither judge, nor magi∣strate, no nor yet the parliament of Thoulouse it selfe, could take punishment, he be∣ing growne so strong as to doe his robberies in forme of iustice, and yet no man so [ D] hardie as to dare to lay hands vpon him: of whose execution I was a beholder, & saw the people wonderfully reioycing to see themselues deliuered of a theefe and robber, of all others the greatest: albeit that I remember ten thousand crownes to haue bene be∣fore laide out about the same matter. And to keepe that prouince the safer from theeues & robbers, they appointed farre greater rewards for the Prouost Marshal than did any other prouince, as twelue hundred pound for his maintenance, and xxv pound for euery processe he should bring of the execution by him done. I haue bene willing in passing by, thus the rather to note these particularities, to show the great good which ariseth vnto Cōmonweals by the assemblies of their Estats: which are yet better ordered in the Commonweals of the Swissers, & the Germaine empire, than in other the Common∣weals [ E] of Europe. For the Swissers beside the assemblies of Estate, in euery Towne and Canton, haue their generall assemblies of their Estates also; and the ten Circles or Cir∣cuits of the Empire haue their assemblies of their Estates separate, vnto whom the parti∣cular estates of the Imperiall Townes & Countries referre themselues: and so likewise the estates of the circuits refer themselues and their decrees vnto the assemblie of the es∣tates* 1.990 of the Empire, which without this pollicie had long ago bene ruinated & fallen.

We said that the meane and measure which is in all things commendable, ought also to be kept in all iust Monarchies and Aristrocraties, in regard of the number of

Corporations and Colleges to be had in their kingdomes and Commonweales: For [ F] as quite to take away all Corporations and Communities were to weaken or ruinate the estate, and to establish a barbarous tyrannie, or tirannicall gouernment; so likewise to permit and suffer all assemblies, and all fraternities, is not also without danger, as not easely to be ruled by the princes power, or nobilities commaund. In them also oft times are couered conspiracies, and secret Monopolies, whereof we haue many examples, which hath bene the cause often times by expresse Edict in this Realme to take away these fraternities; which for all that could neuer yet be put into execution. Howbeit much better it were to take away the abuse, than the thing it selfe that is abused, and to* 1.991 pluck vp the weeds alone, rather then both the good and bad together. And to auoid Monopolies amongst artificers and trades men, it is good to diuide them into diuers [ G] streets and quarters of the citie, and not to seat them in one street or quarter together, (as they do in Affricke, and also in many townes and cities of Europe) except th•…•… place for the hauing of water, or some other such common respect so require: For besides the incōmoditie that it is in great cities not to haue artificers which are ordinarily required in euery quarter thereof, there must needs either be secret monopolies amongst them so to sell their marchandize and wa•…•…es the dearer, or else iealousies and quarels, if one of them shall sell better cheap than another, before his face that hath refused to take the money. I said artificers ordinarily required, for that it is not fit in their dwellings to mingle men giuen vnto their studie and quiet, together with Fishmongers, or Armo∣rers, or Curriors with Schollers: for as for such as are lesse requisite as hammermen, [ H] they may well enough be raunged in the same street or quarter of a citie together, and that better than to trouble the quiet of others. But as there is nothing better for the maintenance of the strength and vnitie of the subiects, than Corporations & Commu∣nities: so is there nothing which can so much weaken & keepe vnderfoot a Common∣weale, as by the vtter taking away of Communities, Corporations, and Colleges, or Societies: Which the Romans well knowing, wisely put in practise, who after they had vanquished the kings of Macedonia, and conquered the countrie, vtterly forbid all assemblies and meetings together of the people there to consult of matters. And so af∣terwards also the Achaeans being ouer come, the consul Mummius as saith Liuie: Con∣cilia omnia singularū Achaiae nationum, & Phocensium, & Baeotorum, aut in alia parte Grae∣ciae [ I] deleuit, Suppressed all the councels of all the particular nations of Achaia, and of the Phocensians, and of the Baeotians, or in what soeuer other part of Graecia else: But after that they were once become good and obedient subiects vnto the Romans: Antiqu•…•… concilia genti cuique restituta, The auntient councels were vnto euery nation againe restored, as saith Strabo.

CHAP. VIII. ¶ Of the orders and degrees of Citisens.

NOw forasmuch as we haue alreadie spoken of Corporations [ K] * 1.992 and Colledges, it remaineth for vs also to speake of the orders and degrees of Citisens. For if so be that in all things wee de∣sire and seeke after a conuenient and decent order, and deeme nothing to be more ougly or foule to looke vpon, than confusi∣on and broyle: then how much more is it to be sought for in a Commonweale, so to place the Citisens or subiects in such apt and comely order, as that the first may be ioyned with the last, and they of the middle sort with both; and so all with all, in a most true knot and bond among themselues, together with the Commonweale? For why, it is a most an∣tient

and receiued opinion of the wise, Almightie God himselfe the great and supreme [ A] workemaster and creator of this great and wonderfull Fabrick of all things, in the crea∣ting thereof, to haue performed nothing either greater or better, than that hee diuided the mingled and confused parts of the rude Chaos, and so setled euerie thing in his due place and order. Neither can there be any thing faiter to behold, more delightfull to he mind, or more commodious for vse, than is order it selfe. But they which goe about so to make all subiects or Citisens equall one vnto another in dignitie, order, and and place, as that there shall be nothing in a Citie or Commonweal first, or in the mid∣dest, but will haue all degrees so mingled together and confounded, without respect of sexe, age, or condition they seeme to mee to do as they doe which thrust barly, wheat, rise, mill, and all other kind of pulse into one heape together; whereby they loose the [ B] vse both of euerie kind of graine in particular, as also of the whole heape together. Wherefore there was neuer any law-giuer so vnskilfull, but that he thought that there ought still to bee some diuision, ordering, and sorting of the Citisens or subiects in a ci∣tie, or Commonweale. Here by ordering and sorting of the Citisens or subiects, my meaning is, that there should be a part of the citisens diuided from the rest in condition, state, or sexe: in condition, as the nobilitie from them that were but from the Senators descended, the knights and gentlemen from the common people in sexe: as women from men: in state, as free borne men from them which are but of manumised slaues made free; and they which are by state free, are diuided from them both.

As for slaues we haue before said, them by the generall con•…•…ent of almost all peo∣ple, [ C] * 1.993 to haue bene still exempted out of the number of Citisens. Yea Aristotle hath tear∣med slaues, but instruments for other mens vses; whereas some others haue accounted of them, but as of beasts, or rather worse: and yet the question resteth vndecided, Whether that slaues are to be accoūted in a mans goods or substance, or not. But if the determining hereof might be vnto me referred, surely I should wish the right and li∣bertie of the citie to be set open, as well vnto the slaues as vnto the free borne men. For what is this so arrogant temeritie (should I say) or impietie of men, that forgetting mens conditton and state, they should enforce this so diuine a creature, hauing his liber∣tie shamefully taken from him, not onely to serue their lust, but also to make no more [ D] account of him, yea and peraduenture lesse too, than of a verie beast? But bee it that slaues be indeed of the basest sort of men, do they therefore not deserue to be tearmed by the name of citisens? There be in mans bodie some members, I may not call them filthie (for that nothing can so be which is naturall) but yet so shamefull, as that no man except he be past all shame, can without blushing reueale or discouer the same: and doe they for that cease to be members of the whole bodie? The feet themselues, with per∣petuall labour hold vp and carrie about the whole bulke of the bodie, and are oft times foule with durt, filth, and dust, but yet who is so mad, as to thinke them there∣fore worthy to be cut off from the bodie? Now if these baser members indeed bee and are still called parts of the whole bodie, why shall wee not by the same reason suffer slaues, who are still pressed and kept vnder with the most heauie burthens and com∣maunds [ E] of the other citisens, to bee called and accounted members of the same citie with them? But if we thinke this to be an absurd thing, then are they to bee driuen out of the citie, and as rotten limmes to be cut off: but if we will still retaine them in a ci∣tie, in a familie, and so in our obedience and seruice, we must also make them partakers of the citie with vs. For seeing they be subiects and not straungers, they must needes make vp a part of the citisens, and bee accounted in the number of them. Which I would haue vnderstood to be of me so spoken, not for that I should desire slauerie long since taken away out of our Commonweale, to be thereinto againe restored: but

that forasmuch as the force and boldnesse of men is so farre broken out, as that wee see [ F] seruitude and slauerie by little and little to creepe in, and to returne againe: it might be forseene and prouided for, that such slaues might not hereafter bee more hardly vsed, than the state and condition of man requireth, and might also haue their certaine place and order in the citie. Wherefore let the order of slaues bee of all others the lowest in degree in a citie; and of them wee will begin first to speake. For as for that which Cicero obiecteth vnto Antonius, That he had so contracted affinitie, as that hee might thereby the better commend himselfe vnto them that were of the meanest degree: hee ment it by them which had bene mannumised men, and not by the slaues indeed: for that in the citie Rome, slaues indeed had neither place nor degree. Neither did Metel∣lus his speech concerning marriages to bee made in degrees together belong vnto [ G] slaues, to whome the rites and rights of marriage were altogether forbidden, hauing onely their mutuall conuersing and companie one of them of another; as Paulus the lawyer writeth in the second booke of Sentences, albeit not altogether aduisedly, for that they held the right of blood, as did other citisens, and were forbidden incestuous marriages as well as others; although that they had not the other rights of marriages. And for that slaues were oftentimes borne of vncertane fathers, their children were al∣so accounted vncertaine: and therefore slaues and manumised men were not said to be of any familie, stocke, or house; onely they which were of the nobilitie descended, boasted themselues to haue stocke, or house from whence they came. Hereof came that speech of Decius against them that were descended from the nobilitie, Semper ista [ H] audita sunt, vos solos gentem habere: an hoc, si Claudiae familiae non sim, nec ex Patricio san∣guine ortus, sed vnus Quiritium quilibet, qui modò me duobus ingenuis ortum sciam, reti∣cere possim? These things haue alwaies bene heard, you alone to haue a stock & house, But if I were not of the house and familie of the Claudians, neither borne of noble blood, but some one of the common people, which but knew my selfe to bee borne of two free borne pe•…•…sons, could I in this hold my peace? Whereby he sufficiently insi∣nuateth neither slaues nor mannumised men to haue had any stocke or house from which they might account themselues descended: and them onely to haue beene ac∣counted* 1.994 so to haue, which had their beginning from them that were free borne: and [ I] hereof it commeth that we call such as be nobly borne by the name of Gentlemen, as hauing an house or familie from which they are descended. Howbeit that they which were so nobly borne, went yet further, vaunting them onely to haue an house and fa∣milie, from which they might produce their discent, none of whose auncestors had at any time serued as slaues: For why, the multitude of the vulgar and common sort of the people, was thought almost all to haue taken their beginning from such as hauing bene slaues, were by mannumission become free.

Next vnto slaues are they whome they call State-free men, and after them the Li∣bertines,* 1.995 or as we may tearme them the manumised men, who were euery where of diuers sorts and condition, as there were also diuers sorts of slaues. And to let other [ K] cities passe, wee see in Rome to haue bene foure sorts or kinds of these Libertines, or enfranchised men; viz. those whome they called Romani, Latini, Iuniani, and Dediti∣cij: whome for that they be vsuall and common, I let them passe: sufficeth it as it were with the finger to point out the fountaines of them, least in a citie these diuers orders of enfranchised or mannumised men might bee together confounded. Now the order or degreeof state free men, was in a meane betwixt slaues and the Libertines or ma∣numised men, for in that their libertie was yet holden in suspence, they were in better* 1.996 case and condition than were the slaues, and yet withall in worse than were the liber∣tines, or men alreadie enfranchised. And these orders euerie one of them accor∣ding

to the qualitie of their condition and state, were also likewise in their degrees [ A] placed.* 1.997

The rest of the citisens are diuided according to the varietie of their conditions and estates, and diuersitie of their manners and customes. Yet that is common almost to all people, that noble men should in order and dignitie be diuided from the vulgar and common people, since first Nimrod the great robber, most notably attended vppon with a great power of wicked companions, and such as himselfe was, with cruell serui∣tude oppressed them that were too weake for him, and so first tooke vpon him the go∣uernment* 1.998 of the Assyrians, as we haue before said. So left his nobilitie got by villanie, for his posteritie to imitat: which opinion further spreading, tooke such deep root, as that euerie man as he was the mightier in violence and murthering of others, hee was [ B] * 1.999 thought to be so much more the nobler: vntill such time as that the people by good lawes and ciuilitie better instructed, deemed, that the true nobilitie, was by vertue and not so by villanie to be sought for.

But forasmuch as one man excelleth another in some one or other vertue: and for* 1.1000 that such vertues as are in one citie or place most highly commended, are in some other no lesse contemned. Hereof it commeth, that no one definition of nobilitie could euer yet be made agreeable vnto the nobilitie of all the people: honour and infamie be∣ing still deemed and reputed of, according to the manner and custome of euerie coun∣trey. For by the customes of the Perusines and Florentines, he which but now began [ C] to beare arms and serue in warre, was of one before vnnoble, now thereby become no∣ble: whereas with vs he is not so by and by: but if his posteritie shall follow the wars, they are reputed to haue gotten nobilitie as it were by the continuance of time. But not so at Venice, who still measure the nobilitie of their gentlemen, by the honourable antiquitie of such houses and families as haue alwaies attended their publike councels and affaires. And albeit that the Decurions or pettie captaines by the Roman law, bee reputed of by the name of gentlemen: which law is also receiued with them of Poitiers* 1.1001 by the consent of all the three estates, yet is it no where els with vs so found. But that the bearing of armes should of it selfe make a gentleman, I see it to haue so pleased not onely the Florentines and Perusines, but diuers interpretors of the law also, and especi∣ally Alciat, who hath not doubted to cite Triuultius the great captaine as author ther∣of. [ D] Truely amongst the Aegyptians it was not lawfull but for the Calasyres: and ma∣ny worlds of yeres after, for the Mammalukes in the raigne of the Sultans, to serue and beare armes: who therefore enioyed most great priuileges. Yet other people haue di∣uided genter•…•…e from warre, neither haue therefore reputed any one to be a gentleman, for that he was a souldiour: vnto which opinion all the greatest lawyers together with Plato haue almost with one voice consented. And albeit that the Romans farre ex∣ceeded all other people in martiall honour, and bestowed the greatest priuileges vppon souldiours: yet for all that they bound not gentrie vnto martiall seruice: seeing that it was lawfull for the Libertines or manumised men to serue in the warres, and that men for the filthinesse of their liues, and iudgements, therefore vpon them passed, infamous, [ E] who were therefore embarred from all honours, had yet no exemption from the warres.

But forasmuch as all citisens after they had taken vpon them the manlike atttire, were bound to beare arms, so by that reason al the citisens should haue bin therby ennobled, which were a thing absurd: for were all the citisens noble, none of them were indeed in that vulgaritie of nobilitie to be accounted at all noble. Wherefore Lucius Sicci∣us Dentatus is of Dionysius Halicarnasseus, called a common and ordinarie man, whose speech against them of the nobilitie and gentrie is yet at this present extant:

Wherein he boasteth himselfe to haue bene in pay fortie yeares in the seruice of his [ F] * 1.1002 countrey, to haue fought in an hundred and twentie set battels, to haue receiued 45 wounds, and twelue of them in one day, all of them in the fore part of his bodie: and in token of his good seruice, to haue receiued fourteene Ciuic or oken crowns (the honourable rewards due vnto him that had saued so many citisens) three others the rewards of his good seruice done in the besieging of townes, fourescore and three gold chaynes, an hundred and threescore bracelets of gold, ten faire launces, and thirtie fiue faire furnitures for horses. And yet this so worthy & valiant a man, adorned with so many trophies in reward of his valour, was by the Roman lawes no more but as a common person. For they accounted him first a gentleman, that was the sonne of a new raised man: and him they called a new man, who was the first in his familie that [ G] * 1.1003 had borne some honourable charge or office, and so had power to erect vnto him∣selfe his statue or image; such as were Caius Marius, and M Tullius Cicero of Arpine, both of them beeing but new men. Of whome the one beeing first made Quaestor, and then Aedilis, and afterwards Pretor, at last came to bee Consull; who in the time of his Consulship, in an oration which hee made vnto the people, boa∣sting therein of his newnesse, thus said, Ego nou•…•…s homo primus omnium claustra nobi∣litatis refregi, &c. I beeing but a new man, was of all others the first which brake open the barres of nobilitie. The other hauing beene seuen times Consull, in an oration which he made against the nobilitie, said, Contemnunt nouitatem meam, ego illo∣rum ignauiam: mihi fortuna, illis probr a obiectantur. Quod si me iure despiciunt, faciant [ H] idem maioribus suis, quibus vti mihi nobilitas ex virtute caepit. Nunc videte quàm ini∣qui sunt: quod ex aliena virtute sibi arrogant, id mihi ex mea non concedunt: scilicet quia imagines non habeo, & noua nobilit as est, quam perperisse melius est, quàm acceptam corru∣piss•…•…, They contemne (saith he) my newnesse, I their cowardise: my fortune is to mee obiected, but vnto them their vices. But if they therefore of right contemne and de∣spise me, let them so also doe their owne auncestours, whose nobilitie begun of their owne vertues, as doth mine. Now but see how partiall they are in their owne cause; that honour which they arrogat vnto themselues by other mens vertues, that they will not graunt vnto me for mine owne: and all forsooth, because I haue no images of mine auncestours to show, and for that my nobilitie is but new, which yet is better for [ I] me to haue of my selfe raised, than hauing receiued it from mine auncestors, to haue my self stained the same. For Cicero had six competitors in his Consulship, wherof two were noble men, two other of them were the first of their familie which had borne office, onely Cicero himselfe was a gentleman borne: whose father, as also the father of Ma∣rius, of Cato the Censor, of Q. Pompeius, of Curius, of Philo, and of Genutius, were all base persons of the comminaltie, but yet their sonnes were accounted of as new men* 1.1004 and gentlemen. But such as were descended from the Senators, by Romulus in the be∣ginning of his raigne appointed, or from them which were afterwards by the Consull Publius Valerius ioyned vnto them, were called Patricij (as hauing their beginning from [ K] the Senators, whome they called Patres) all the rest were common men, or else men of some better note, whome they called Equites, or Gentlemen; who were in the mid∣dest* 1.1005 betwixt the Senators & the cōmon people, being partly dissended from the Sena∣tors, and part of them risen out of the communaltie: who if any of them were chosen in∣to the Senat, they were no more to be accounted amongst those Equites or gentlemen: as is to be seene by Lucius & Nero the Censors, who yet seruing vpon publike horses, were one of them by the other commaunded to sell them: for after the ouerthrow by the Romans receiued from the Veians, the gentlemen began to serue vpon horses pro∣uided for them of the publike charge. Now I find that there were of the Patrician Fa∣milies

in Rome, about fortie: but of such as by their valour left nobilitie to their poste∣ritie [ A] * 1.1006 in Ciceroes time scarcely thirtie: of which families, or houses, seuen were of the same name with the Patricij, viz. Pompilia, Martia, Tullia, Iunia, Mutia, Claudia, and Sempronia. And for that the entrance and way vnto the honourable preferments in the state, before the law Canuleia, was kept shut vp and stopped by the Pratricij (or them that were of the Senators descended) against the common and vulgar sort of the peo∣ple; and yet for all that none of these Patricij was accounted noble, except some of their auncestors had borne the honourable offices of the state: many of the Patricij, who were descended from the Senators, and yet could not cite such their auncestors as had borne such honourable charge in the estate, (which was well to be vnderstood by their statues or images) were accounted of as of men of base & low degree. So it came [ B] to passe, after the law Canuleia was made, that some euen of the common sort of the people became noble, and some of the Patricij vnnoble, that is to say, obscure and vn∣knowne. As Marcus Aemylius Scaurus, a man descended of the Senators rase, had his auncestours base and obscure men: whereas he himselfe being but a new man, came to be Pretor, Consull, and Censor, and at last being made chiefe of the Senat, raised no∣bilitie* 1.1007 to all his posteritie. Wherfore the Roman nobilitie lay in the voyces and iudge∣ment of the people, which as they thought best, bestowed the honourable preferments in the estate and Commonweale. Yet was it an absurd and most vnreasonable thing, that any most wicked murtherer and manquellar, were he neuer so basely borne, might by the benefit of bearing of some great place or office in the estate, leaue nobilitie vnto [ C] his posteritie: whereas he which excelled in wisedome, iustice, fortitude, and tempe∣rance, and so in all other vertues, godlinesse, and learning, yea and was descended also of the Senators race, if he could not show his auncestors statues, was euen therefore ac∣counted but as base and obscure. For such is the force of this word Ignobilis with the Latines, which in the selfe same sense is of the Greekes called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; that is to say, such as either by some foule or notable fact or deed done, came into the knowledge of men: which is yet oftentimes taken in the better part, for they which are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, refer it vnto the honor of their house & stock: which amongst the Ro∣mans did especially appeare amongst the Patricij or posteritie of the antient Senators: which for that they were almost dead and worne out, Caius Caesar by the law Cassia, [ D] and after that Augustus by the law Seruia, chose many of the more noble families in∣to the order of the Patricij. For before the law Canuleia it was lawfull onely for the Patricij to be bishops and priests, and for them alone to make sacrifices, and to keep the Auspicia or diuine obseruations. But after that Genutius (first Consull that was made of the people) was in battell with the great slaughter of his armie vnder his conduct ouerthrowne, Patres non tam publica calamitate maesti, quàm feroces infoelicis Consulis plebei ductu, fremunt, omnibus locis, irent, crearent Consulem explebe, transferrent auspicia quo nefas esset, The fathers (as saith Liuie) not so heauie for the publike calamitie, as become insolent with the euil conduct of the vnfortunat Consull chosen from amongst the people, murmured and fretted in all places, that they should go and againe create [ E] a Consull of the people; and thither to translate the Auspicia or diuinations, whither it was not lawfull for them so to doe. And Appius Claudius the Consull, before that an∣swered one of the Tribunes, asking him in an assembly of the people, Why one of the Consuls might not be chosen out of the people? Because (said he) none of the vulgar and common sort of the people can hold the Auspicia or diuinations; and that there∣fore the Decemuiri had appointed a certaine order of mariage, least the sacred diui∣nations should haue bene polluted with persons vncertainly descended. At which an∣swere, the people was with indignation exceedingly enraged, to heare it denied them

to hold the diuinations, as if they were vnto the immortall gods, more hatefull than [ F] others. And albeit that the people at length had all things common with the Sena∣tors, viz. honours, commaunds, iudgements, diuinations, cures, priesthoods, councels, powers, statues, triumphs, and all other the greatest preferments in the Commonweale; yet could it neuer be obtained, that any one of the common sort of the people, should nominat the Interrex, or pronounce who should be the Archpriest, the Priest of Mars, or of Romulus: or yet be chosen into the colledge of the Salij. But as a statue or image* 1.1008 was among the Romans the signe of nobilitie obtained: so in antiēt time with vs arms, with Cognisances set ouer them, were the tokens of nobilitie. Lawfull it hath alwaies bene, and so still will be, for euerie man to deuise vnto himselfe his Cognisance to bee* 1.1009 known by, but yet not to vsurpe the Cognisances, or beare the armes of other noble fa∣milies. [ G] But the antient Grecians deemed not of nobility by the obtaining & bearing of great offices; which euerie man among the Athenians (after the law of Aristides, and the seditious declamations of Ephialtis) might by lot, and few by voyces obtaine: but* 1.1010 nobilitie with them was still to be deriued from the stock of their kings, or race of their great worthies, as from the Heraclide, the Aeacidae, or Cecropidae, or from such other like: or else from such, as who for the worthie acts, either by themselues, or by their aunce∣stours done, had by the generall good liking, and publike decree of the people, and of the nobilitie, with commendation obtained a crowne of gold, extraordinarie priuile∣ges, statues, to sit in the highest places, or to haue their diet allowed them in the Pryta∣naeo, or other like publike places: Such as is that decree of the Athenians (whereof Plu∣tarch [ H] * 1.1011 writeth) concerning Lycurgus the sonne of Lycophron, It pleased the people of Athens (saith he) that requitall should bee made vnto such as had well deserued of the state, as to praise Lycurgus the sonne of Lycophron for his vertue and iustice sake: and in the honor of him to erect a brasen Statue for him in the market place, except in such place as where the law forbiddeth any statue to be erected, and diet in the Prytanaeo to be for euer allowed vnto the eldest of the posteritie of Lycurgus. So in like maner Isaeus the orator writeth publique diet, the first places, and priuileges, to haue bene graunted vnto the posteritie of Harmodius the tyrant queller. Which thing Aristotle reporteth to hane bene a thing common vnto all the cities of Graece, to allow diet of the publique* 1.1012 charge vnto the children of such as had valiantly dyed for their countrie. Howbeit that [ I] the Grecians with too much lenitie (should I say) or rather leuitie erected statues for such as had of them well deserued, which they vppon the least displeasure againe cast downe, and that with greater despite than they had with honor before set them vp. So when the Athenians had appointed 365 statues to be set vp in euerie place of the citie in honor of Demetrius Phalereus, they againe in a moment caused them all to bee cast downe: & not yet so contented brake them also with such furie, as that no fragment of them was left, except that onely which was kept fast shut vp in the tower of Pallas.

Amongst the Hebrewes were two sorts of noble men; the one descended from the* 1.1013 stock of Aaron, who only were priests: the other from the stock of the kings. For why, [ K] that nation wisely reposing their chief felicitie in the sinceritie of their religion, and the true worshipping of God, so likewise deemed their priests, which came neerest vnto the power of the immortall God, to be of all others most noble. Yea God himselfe had an especiall regard in making choice of Aaron, & in establishing of him after the most grie∣uous reuolts & miserie of his people. And therefore as often as he cōmandeth extreame destruction to be denounced & threatned vnto his people, he oftentimes doubleth that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is to say, That the state of the priest and of the common person, should bee all one. And therefore when the Iewes had cast off from the seruile yoke of Antiochus the Noble: the Familie of the Aesmonaeans being of the stocke of Aa∣ron, held the high priesthood, together with the kingdome about two hundred yeres,

that is to say, euen vnto the raigne of Herod the Great. Wherein the Hebrewes did [ A] well: for if great offices in Rome, got oft times by corruption and briberie, left nobili∣tie vnto their posteritie which had so got them: what let is there why the priesthood of the eternall God, should not much more also ennoble men, especially if we measure* 1.1014 nobilitie by the places men hold, and not by their persons. Truely all the best learned lawyers are of opinion, That the priestly dignitie is to be preferred before all other ho∣nours and vocations: and that the ministers of diuine things, & moderators of the most sacred rites, are not to be accounted among the nūber of the vulgar & common peo∣ple:* 1.1015 which is no new or strange opinion, but drawn & deriued euen from the most an∣tient antiquitie. For the most antiēt kings, to make their roial power the more reuerend and stately, exercised also the priestly dignitie. Neither did the Greeks only, but the Ro∣man [ B] kings also, yea and the greatest emperors themselues, stile themselues high Priests or Bishops, whome the chiefe Arabian princes being also bishops, seeme therein to haue followed. And so the Christian kings beeing by their religion forbidden to min∣gle prophane things with sacred or armes with religions; yet tooke that which was next; that is to say, in preferring a sacred, order of the Clergie, not only before the com∣mon and vulgar sort of the people, but before the Senators, yea and not before them alone, but euen before dukes, earles, and other magistrats whatsoeuer: giuing vnto them the highest roomes, and first places next vnto the kings themselues, in all assemblies, councels, enacting of lawes, and graunting of liberties and priuileges. And why not? when as the most antient people of the Celtes, accounted their Druides, who were the [ C] princes of their religion and iudgements, superiours not vnto the common sort of the people onely, but euen vnto their captaines and rulers also. For which cause Caesar in recounting of their degrees, first reckoneth vp the Druides, then their knights or hors∣men, and after them the common people. For the order of knights in the time of their auncestors, with a most strong power of horsemen excelled all people; as witnes∣seth Caesar himselfe, as also Marcus Antonius: so that therefore I suppose them to haue* 1.1016 bene called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; for the Greeks call him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whome the Latines cal∣led Sellarium, and we an horseman. We said before the Turkish and Arabian princes yet in all their kingdomes and empires, to honour and obserue their Mufties, or high Bishops, with the greatest honour and respect possibly to bee giuen vnto them, still re∣ferring [ D] vnto them the greatest and most doubtful questions of their law, to be by them decided. Yet the Venetians vse to exclude their priests from their councels, from all* 1.1017 places of commaund, and from all offices, least haply they should bewray the secrets of the citie vnto the pope, to whome they are by dutie & oath bound. Wherfore among* 1.1018 the Venetians, the order of the Senators is first and chiefe of all others, for that in it is the soueraigne power of that state: next vnto the Senators follow the gentlemen, who are not accounted of the number of the Senators▪ and last of all the c•…•…mmoners, who yet are both by one name called Citadinia, or Citisens. But the Florentines before that all was swayed by one mans commaund, diuided not onely the nobilitie from the cler∣gie, but euen from the common people also; and the common people they diuided [ E] againe into three sorts, of whome such as exceeded in wealth were called the Great ones, others of meaner wealth were called Popular Commoners, and they of the third sort, the refuce of the whole people. The auntient Aegyptians much better diuided* 1.1019 their whole multitude of citisens, into Priests, Souldiours, and Labourers: setting the Priests and Souldiours, whome they called Calasyri, free from all taxes and payments. Hyppodamus, who gaue lawes vnto the Melesians, did a little otherwise diuide the peo∣ple into Souldiours, Artificers, and Husbandmen: whose writings Aristotle seemeth either not to haue well vnderstood, or else not so wisely reproued, as is euidently to be

gathered of those fragments which are yet to be seene extant in Stobaeus. I know not [ F] also how it came into Plato his mind, that hauing made a diuision of his citisens into Keepers, Souldiors, and Husbandmen, he separateth the Souldiors (vnder whose buck∣lers and defence the citisens ought to rest) I know not how, from keepers. But in briefe, he would haue the keepers of his Commonweale to excell all others in wisedome and experience: and so to rule ouer them, without any respect to bee had either to the ho∣nour of their dissent, or to the greatnesse of their wealth or substance. Truely it was wisely so set downe by that most wise man: who although he were himselfe descended of the most auntient stocke of the Senators, and deriued his pedegree by the mothers side euen from Solon himselfe, the Athenian law-giuer, vet thought the true glorie of nobilitie and soueraigntie to consist in vertue onely: Which thing Euripides had be∣fore [ G] also wittily said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Wherefore let vs measure true nobilitie by vertue, for that there∣in not onely Philosophers and Diuines, but also Poets, Historiographers, and almost* 1.1020 all lawyers, do with one consent in mine opinion agree, denying any place to bee left for nobilitie without honestie. And two things propounded, to wit, Noble discent, & Vertue, they haue decreed, That the more higher & more honorable place is to bee gi∣uen* 1.1021 vnto vertue, whether question be of bearing of rule, or of honour, or concerning the grauitie and weight of their testimonies and witnesse. The next cause of nobilitie vnto vertue, many haue appointed to be the knowledge of hidden and most excellent things, whome they which haue attained therunto, the law it self expresly calleth most [ H] noble▪ whom (saith the law) Knowledge maketh most noble: or els as Cassiodorus saith, ex obscuro nobilem efficit doctrina, Learning maketh of an obscure man a gentleman. But then how much more noble is he than both of them, whome morall vertue concur∣ring* 1.1022 with the vertues of the mind and knowledge, hath together •…•…obled? But yet if integritie be diuided from such knowledge of most secret and most excellent things, the prioritie in this case is of right to be giuen vnto integritie and vertue: except in such vo∣cations and callings, as wherein such excellent knowledge is of necessitie required: For why, it is better and more agreeing with reason, to haue a Generall skilfull in martiall affaires, although he be otherwise a naughtie man to gouerne an armie, than a good [ I] man which is no souldiour at all: but of these things more shall in due place be said.

But yet that which Plato setteth downe, That they which are but obscurely borne,* 1.1023 excelling in vertues, are to be preferred before them which are nobly descended, excel∣ling also in the same vertues with them; seemeth to me a thing verie absurd and vnrea∣sonable. And truely these two things thus propounded, it is right that some regard should be had of the vertue and nobilitie of a mans auncestours, and on that opinion the Lawiers haue alwaies been, whether question be for the obtaining of honours, or for the taking of places in solemne assemblies & meetings, That they are stil to be pre∣ferred, which both for their owne vertues and the nobilitie of their auncestours toge∣ther, are to be cōmended. But he whom the prince hath made noble, although he be not [ K] of any account or worth, either for his own vertue, or for the vertues of his auncestors,* 1.1024 or for his learning & knowledge: yet by the consent of all the Lawyers he is to be ac∣counted in the ranke and order of the Nobilitie. And therefore Plinie writing to Traian said: Caesaris esse vt nobiles efficeret ac tueretur, That it was the Emperors part to make noble men, & also to defend thē. But this nobilitie Bartholus, not vnfitly hath called Ci∣uil nobilitie; declaring therby them to haue so gotten a certein counterfeit kind of no∣bilitie in the opinion of men, but yet indeed to haue no part of the honor of true nobi∣litie, without vertue. Wherefore let vs graunt them to inioy the fruits of such their ciuill nobilitie, vnto whō they are so by the princes gift & grant conferred▪ whether that such

their nobilitie be for money or reward, or for the pryme of their youth, or for some [ A] other their most foule and filthy seruices, by the princes bestowed vpon them. But to bestow such nobility belongeth onely to them which haue the power in soueraigntie: and to them also whome Bartholus writeth to haue but the principalitie, especially if they be subiect vnto the commaund of superiour princes, or haue fellowes or compa∣nions in their gouernment: who cannot so much as make a man base borne to bee le∣gitimate. Much lesse true it is, that some haue written, the minions and domesticall at∣tendants of princes to be therefore become noble: for albeit that they thereby enioy certaine priuileges and exemptions from other seruices, yet are they not therefore to be accounted noble, except they haue borne the greater and more honorable offices and places of commaund. [ B]

Yet question is, and I see it to haue often times beene before demaunded, whether* 1.1025 he which by some chaunce or casualtie hath obtained some great place of seruice, or other fee, be thereby made noble? which I see to haue so pleased many, so that an honorable power and commaund be knit and ioined to such fee; such as are those of Dukes, Counties, and Marquesses, or that the title of nobilitie be by the soueraigne Prince expresly set downe in the charters and graunts of homage and fealtie, and so giuen vnto the things themselues, and the professors thereof. And hereof rise that be∣ginning of noble and vnnoble fees. But by the custome of our countrie, wherein fees are deemed by of the same right and nature that other lands and possessions be: as con∣cerning* 1.1026 the right of the persons that had them, the Artificer which by inheritance, or [ C] by purchase possesseth a Dukedome, is nothing therefore the more noble, then if he possessed other tributarie lands: For why it seemed vnto our auncestours an absurd thing, out of the right of the land to fish out that honour which they otherwise had not▪ and the persons themselues to giue place vnto the things as a picture vnto the table where on it is painted, and much more indignitie that the right of nobilitie should be* 1.1027 so bought and sold. For of two of the greatest things, namely, of Vertue, and of No∣bilitie, as Euripides plainly witnesseth no trafique is to be made, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Wherefore seeing that by our customes, aswell as by the customes of the Ger∣mans, the Spanyards, the Brittons, and Italians, all these fees, whether it please you to [ D] tearme them priuileges or seruices by chaunce obtained are to be bought and sold, who can of right thinke himselfe any whit the more noble for the hauing of such mer∣cenarie things? And yet it is lawfull for euery most base Cobler hauing got such fee, to create his vassals to hold of him; as it is also for euery most honorable person to re∣ceiue his owne base vassall. Whereby it appeareth, that wealth and riches be they neuer so great, can neither get nor bring forth any true nobilitie at all. Howbeit that* 1.1028 Euripides bringeth in a person according to the opinion of the common people thus speaking: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Nobilitie is in riches. And in Aulide: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

And yet we read not onely the vulgar add common sort of men, but euen * Ari∣stotle* 1.1029 [ E] also himselfe to haue placed the first degree of nobilitie in wealth; the second in honorable discent; and the third in vertue, placing that last which should haue beene in order first. Solon also in like maner made choice of the Citisens of Athens by their wealth and riches, vnto honors and places of commaund: the cause whereof we will in due place declare. Which opinion hath taken so deepe roote, that many thinke wealth, riches, and great substance, not onely to beget nobilitie, but that all the glorie of nobilitie is by pouertie & want of wealth quite extinguished and blotted out, how∣beit that they which so say are themselues but men of small authoritie and credite.

Truely Augustus the emperour supplied the wants of the poorer sort of the Senators, [ F] lest that most honorable order should haue beene with pouertie oppressed. But Bar∣tholus hath expresly written, True nobilitie to be neither got by wealth, nor lost by pouertie. Neither did M. Aemylius Scaurus deeme the honour of his house to be taken* 1.1030 from him by his pouertie: yea the nobilitie and glorie of his familie deliuered him from the power of his most gratious and mightie accusors. Now then if there be a most shamefull villaine, and thereto rich withall; shall he therefore be in degree supe∣riour vnto the honest poorer sort? men I thinke will not so say: then how much lesse ought we to iudge murtherers and men polluted with all kind of villanies, because they abound with wealth to be therefore the more noble? For why the Romans alwaies diuided wealth from nobilitie, for so Tacitus reporteth of Cassius and Syllanus, the one [ G] of whom saith he excelled in auntient wealth, & the other in the honour of his aunce∣stours. And so Cicero called Rossius for nobility and wealth the chiefe man of the towne wherein he dwelt. Wherefore our kings at such time as they, troubled with warres and pressed with want of coyne, had set nobilitie to sale, and that many men for their bad liues infamous, were yet for their money become noble▪ the Prince by a law made, declared none of them to be therefore so to be deemed noble, but that he might still be accounted amongst the number of the meaner sort, and beare offices amongst them. For what can be more absurd or pernitious, than to measure reputation by gaine, de∣gree by money, and nobilitie by wealth? whereas these things often times by theft and robberie, or immoderat lauash prodigalitie of tyrants are bestowed vpon euery bad [ H] fellow, or by some other chaunce, (although in truth nothing be by chaunce done) or fortunes frailtie (whereof they be called the goodes of fortune) giuen vnto men, and so also againe from them taken. Whereas honestie doth in nothing participate with for∣tune, nor the true possession of vertue and nobilitie can by theft be taken away, nor by fire be consumed, nor by the inundation of waters drowned, nor by any other force ex∣tinguished. But for asmuch as we are for the most part led by the vaine opinion and popular errours of men, whereof both all publike and priuat lawes consist; it hath also preuailed, that hee which hath either by the Princes graunt, or by his owne▪ vertue, or wealth, or learning, or seruice in warres obtained nobilitie, may of right transferre [ I] the same not onely vnto his posteritie, but euen vnto them also whom he hath adop∣ted. And that contrarie to the decrees as well of the Diuines, as of the Philosophers: Whereby it is sufficiently vnderstood all sorts of men to haue had their beginning from the rotten earth, as it is said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But it is one thing to reason of degrees and dignities in the assemblie of wise men; and another thing to doe it in the presence of the vulgar sort, and scumme of the people. And yet neuerthelesse it not onely is, but alwaies also hath beene a thing both honest and neces∣sarie, for euery man to yeeld and consent vnto the Lawes and customes of his owne citie and countrie. And yet for all that some would not that the vertues, deserts, and ho∣nour* 1.1031 of the Grandfathers should be extended farther then vnto their Nephues sonnes, [ K] and that also vnto such as were of themselues lawfully descended, and not vnto their bastards or base borne. True it is, that by the customes of the Turkes, euery mans de∣gree & reputation is esteemed by his owne worth and vertue, neither doth the grand∣fathers valour or nobilitie reach farther then their nephues: wherein they doe also* 1.1032 wisely, to the intent that euery one of them should endeuour themselues by their owne vertues to renew the declyning honour of their stocke and kinred; being otherwise, to be accounted in the number of the base and common sort of people. Howbeit that by our depraued and corrupt manners, the farther that a man is in discent or degree from the vertue of his auncestors, from whom he tooke the beginning of his honour, the

more noble he is therefore reputed: neither if he shall by all manner of villanies, or [ A] loosenes of life dishonest himselfe, doth he therefore loose his degree or honour, ex∣cept hee be in publique iudgement noted with infamie: in which case although hee leaue his lewde life and the companie of wicked men, and ioine himselfe with the good, yet shall he not againe recouer his nobilitie▪ so by iudgement once lost, but by the Princes restoring of him, and by speciall rescript. And as hee himselfe from his auncestours receiued nobilitie, so doth he also vnto his posteritie deriue the note of in∣famie, whether he were by right or wrong condemned: for that a thing by iudge∣ment passed, is still accounted to be indeed a thing true. And what maruell? seing that* 1.1033 he which exerciseth base trades, and not beseeming a noble man, is euen without any such publique iudgement to be thrust into the order of common persons. But which [ B] be such base trades is an high question, by reason of the diuers Lawes of diuers nati∣ons, in that point one of them most vnlike another. Herodotus writeth, That in his time they were by the customes of all people accounted base, which vsed handy∣craftes:* 1.1034 of which opinion we read Xenophon also to haue beene, who yet yeeldeth a reason thereof not beseeming a philosopher; as forsooth that men of such occupati∣ons were still busied, and led a close and sedentarie life: for what can bee more pain∣full or troublesome than the Generalls life? or more close and sedentarie than the judges calling? And yet what can bee more glorious or more noble than they both are in euery Citie and Commonweale? But Aristotle said better, who writ all Me∣chanicall* 1.1035 or handiecraftes men in the cities of Graece to haue beene still kept from [ C] councell, from all commaund, and honours: for that they beeing mercenarie men, and to be hired for wages, had quite lost the strength and power of a noble and he∣roicall minde. And truely the * Master of wisedome it selfe repelleth husbandmen,* 1.1036 Smithes, Potters▪ Image makers, and such other handycrafts men from bearing of authoritie and rule, from honors, and from taking places with the judges. Lycurgus* 1.1037 also and Romulus seperated their citisens farre from all handycrafts; yet Romulus per∣mitted his citisens to vse husbandrie, and to beare armes: whereas Lycurgus gaue his leaue onely to exercise armes. And to the end it may be the lesse doubted of, Diony∣sius Halycarnasseus repeating the same thing saith: Hoc lustro, qui puberes essent supra centum millia censa: mulierum autem, seruorum, mercatorum, artesque sordidas exercen∣tium [ D] (siquidem Romanorum nemini cauponariam artem, aut vlla opificia tractare licet) triplo plus quàm turbae ciuilis, In this view were mustered of them that were fourteene yeare old, aboue an hundred thousand: but of women, seruants, marchants, & such as vsed base occupations and trades, (for why it is not lawfull for any Roman to keepe a Tauerne, or to exercise any other handicraft) were reckned three times moe than there were of the ciuiler sort or citisens. Yet some there be which think Numa Pompilius to haue derogated from the law of Romulus, seeing that he appointed Colleges or Com∣panies of artificers, as if they might not haue beene made of straungers, or of slaues. Which seemeth to be also confirmed by that which Cicero said, Many to haue beene in Catilins conspiracie, which flockt together about the Tauernes, in hope that the [ E] minds of the needie might for money be moued to take his part. And by that also, that the Tribunes of the people had by the companie and rout of the Artificers, wonted to guard themselues against the insolencie of the Consuls. But against these repugneth that which Dionysius Halycarnasseus writeth, viz. that in the seauenth view were mu∣stered an hundred thousand citisens, beside artificers: By which words it is manifest, that Numa derogated not from Romulus his law, for asmuch as king Seruius, the third from Numa, was the first that so viewed or mustered the people. Neither doth that which is alleaged conuince them to haue bene citisens whom the Tribunes or seditious

citisens stirred vp to rebellion, seeing that very slaues in like case were often times called [ F] vnto libertie: as we read they sometimes were by C. Cinna. Cicero also thus speaketh of the Artificers, whom the conspirators with Catiline stirred vp to rebellion: Etenim omne eorum instrumentum, omnis opera, ac quaestus, frequentia ciuium sustinetur, alitur otio, For (saith he) all their instruments and tooles, all their worke and gaine, is main∣tained* 1.1038 by the multitude of Citisens, and with quietnesse nourished. Now it were verie improperlie said, artificers to be maintained by the multitude of citisens, if they them∣selues had bene also citisens. But by the Martiall law of the Romans, the citisens after* 1.1039 they had begun once to weare the *mans gowne, were compelled to serue in the wars vntill they were fiue and fiftie yeares old. Neither was there any way for a citisen of Rome to attaine vnto any honor, except he had serued in the warres ten yeares: For [ G] which cause it is by Liuie reported, two thousand of the citisens to haue beene openly sold, for that they had not for foure yeares space serued in the warres; which could by no meanes haue bene done vnto artificers: whom Liuie also in one place writeth, to haue beene men altogether vnfit for the warres. That testimonie of Cicero is in this point also of more waight: Illiberales sunt & sordidi quaestus mercinariorum omnium, quorum opera non quorum artes emuntur, est enim in illis ipsa merces autor amentum ser∣uitutis, The gaines (saith he) of all mercinarie men are seruile and base, whose works and not whose skill are of men bought, for in them their verie wares is the earnest penie of their slauerie. But where he speaketh of the Roman citisens indeed, he nei∣ther thinketh nor writeth any thing of them which is contemptible or base, or that [ H] soundeth not vnto their reputation and honour. Whereby it is to bee vnderstood* 1.1040 Artificers and men of occupation in Rome, to haue beene either slaues, or straun∣gers, and men of most base and lowe estate and condition: or if that by manumissi∣on they were become citisens of Rome, yet they were therefore but in the number of Libertines, hauing as it were in some sort lost the right of the citisens of Rome, no otherwise then Noble men with vs, which haue giuen themselues to base and gainfull occupations or trades, who as they haue thereby left their nobilitie: so haue they also lost their degrees and places: except they haue therefore obtayned par∣don of our Prince, as that enforced with necessitie, they haue so intermedled in such base trades. [ I] * 1.1041

Howbeit concerning the trade of marchandize, it is not well agreed vpon betwixt the Lawiers and the auntient writers amongst themselues, whether it be repugnant vnto a mans credit and reputation or not. We read that by the Tribunall law Clau∣dia, it was forbidden the Senatours to haue any greater ship at Sea, then of the bur∣then* 1.1042 of three hundred Amphoras, and that also for the carrying of the fruits of their landes: Quaestus omnis (saith Liuie) patribus indecorus visus, All gayning by trade (saith he) seemed vnto the Senatours vnseemely. Which law Hortensius said to be in his time dead: as in Cicero we read: Whereby it is yet to bee gathered, that not onely to haue beene lawfull for the rest of the citisens to doe, euery mans credit and reputation saued whole: But also euen the Senators themselues, not to haue altoge∣ther [ K] abstained from the trade of marchandize, or at least wise to haue had their fa∣ctors; as wee see the manner is for the Venetian, Spanish, and English gentlemen to haue. And that it was lawfull for the Romaine knights or gentlemen to vse the trade of marchandize, or at least wise that it was not altogether forbidden them, is to be pro∣ued* 1.1043 by that which Cicero saith against Verres: Lucius Praetius splendidissimus Eques Romanus qui Panormi negotiatur, Lucius Praetius a most worthie Romaine knight, which doth trade at Panormo. And in another place: Q. Mutius Eques Romanus qui Syracusis, Q. Mutius a Romaine knight who tradeth at Syracusa. Much lesse

therefore was the trade of marchandise forbidden the common sort of men. And yet [ A] although by the old custome of the Romans, it was no shame for the citisens to trade marchandise: (yet I say) it seemeth not for all that to haue bene altogether lawful for them so to doe: as is to be proued out of Dionysius Halycarnasseus, who writeth aboue an hundred thousand citisens to haue bene cessed: but of women, and marchants, and others of base trades, three times as many as of the citisens: whereby hee seemeth to haue exempted marchants out of the number of the Roman citisens.

Neither do we see that to haue bene the manner and fashion of the Romans only,* 1.1044 but of the Lacedemonians and Thebans also. Howbeit that the vse of gold and siluer, being taken from the Lacedemonians, there was no place left for marchandise: yet was it Lycurgus his pleasure, by an especiall law more solemnly to prouide therefore. [ B] As for the Theban citisens, it was not otherwise lawfull for them either to sue for the magistracies, or honourable offices of the Commonweale, or to accept thereof bee∣ing offered them, except they had full ten yeares before abstained from the trade of marchandise. And at length by the imperiall lawes all entrance vnto honors, and pla∣ces of commaund were shut vp vnto the order of marchants: and not that onely, but euen to deale in the trade of marchandise was aswell forbidden the nobilitie, as to in∣termeddle with martiall affaires was forbidden marchants. By which lawes the trade of marchandise seemeth vnto many either base▪ or not verie honest or commendable. Truely Plato, Aristotle, Apollonius, Thyaneus, say, The trade of marchandise to bee an enemie vnto vertue. Yea the law of God seemeth also to haue restrained the holy peo∣ple [ C] from the trade of marchandise, in these words, Non erit mercator in populo tuo,* 1.1045 There shall be no marchant in thy people: that is to say, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which word improper∣ly signifieth a deceiuer, but more properly a marchant: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is properly to buy & sell; and in that sence it is almost alwaies vsed. For that diuine law which forbad the people, but not straungers, to commit vsurie, seemeth also to haue forbidden to buy any thing, to sell the same thing the deerer vnto a naturall Israelite. Wherunto agreeth that which he the * Prince of wisdome writeth, Mercatorem manus a scelere puras vix* 1.1046 habiturum, A marchant hardly to haue his hands cleane from wickednesse. Where∣fore the * Prophets most often, and the interpretours of holy scripture, more often doe* 1.1047 so detest the trade of marchants, as that * Chrysostome not obscurely or doubtfully, but [ D] euen plainely denieth, That marchants can please God, by reason of their lies, periu∣ries, and deceits, and for that they are still prone vnto vnhonest gaine, as Vlpian the law∣yer writeth.

Yet of that we are to he warned, that whereas the immortall God forbid his peo∣ple (whome he by a singular right and choice had consecrated vnto himselfe) to trade in marchandise: belongeth not to other people in like manner also; for that he would haue this his people to excell all others in puritie and integritie of life. For why, mar∣chandise is not onely vnto cities profitable, but honest also; and not onely honest, but also necessarie. For what if a citie be built in such a barren soile, or situat in such a place,* 1.1048 as that men cannot therin not commodiously, but euen not at all otherwise liue? Such [ E] as we haue heard the citie of Athens to haue bene, and as our Limoge, and the German Nuremberg is: and Venice also the beautie of the Mediterranean sea. Which foure cities without traffique and the trade of marchandise had neuer bene such and so great as they were and are. Wherefore M. Tullius out of the number of marchants, or at leastwise of base men, exempteth them which exercise a plentifull and gainfull, and not a base and bare trade of marchandise, Mercatura si tenuis est, sordida putanda est, simagna & copiosa, multa vndique apportans, multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda, The trade of marchandise (saith he) if it be small and bare, is to be accoun∣ted

also base, but if it be great and plentifull, bringing in on euerie side many commodi∣ties, [ F] and without vanitie commnnicating the same vnto many, it is not much to be dis∣commended. Whereunto I would add that of Platoes, if it bring in but such things as are necessarie, or at leastwise profitable for the citisens, and carrie out but such things as are vnprofitable, and to be spared. And therefore many lawyers say, The trade of mar∣candise abounding in plentie of all things, in nothing to derogat from the honour of a mans birth, his degree, or nobilitie. Which haply may be so in Italie, in England, and in Portugall, but not with vs in France, nor yet in Germany. Yet that is euery where* 1.1049 true which Cicero writeth, Sordidos iudicari qui mercantur a mercatoribus quod eodem lo∣co ac momento vendant, Them to be deemed but base, which buy of marchants that which they hold euen in the same place, and selfe same moment againe sell: for why, [ G] they should gaine nothing, except they should lye loudly: whereas nothing is more foule than vanitie and lying. Whersore they do wisely which forbid not only the no∣bility, but euen the magistrats & souldiors also to deale in the trade of marchandise, least vnder the colour of such traffique, a way be opened and giuen to basenesse and rapine: neither is it to be suffered, that he which cannot by himselfe, should by the help and mi∣nisterie of his seruants in that point defraud the law.

But baser than these are the buyers and sellers of things dishonest, bee they neuer so precious, and to be placed beneath handie crafts-men and laborers, or rather so much as is possible to be quite driuen our of all cities: which cannot yet altogether bee done,* 1.1050 for that the law for things honest and dishonest, for things profitable and disprofitable, [ H] is not euerie where one and the same. We haue heard painting and engrauing to haue bene much commended and respected▪ by the estimation that the Greekes and La∣tines had of them. For who was more famous than Protogenes? or more glorious than Apelles? one of whose tables, which for that it was most curiously wrought, preserued the Rhodes from distruction, Demetrius besieging of it: Which table is re∣ported to haue bene esteemed at more than three hundred talents. And as Tully saith, It was giuen as a praise & commendation to Fabius, a most noble gentleman, That he was seene in painting: which yet the Hebrews account of all other occupations the basest. And by the lawes and customes of the Turkes, as of all them of the East, and of Affrike also, it is not onely a base thing, but capitall also, with the needle, pencill, or [ I] moulding, with any pictures or lineaments to shadow or draw the purtrature of any plant, or liuing creature, or of whatsoeuer thing else that nature hath created. Wee read also the profession of Physike to haue bene amongst the Romans a seruile and abiect thing, and Physike it selfe to haue bene excluded from the other liberall scien∣ces; which yet for all that the Hebrewes and Greekes euer had in great estimation: and begun then to be of our countreymen regarded, when as the Arabians had first di∣uided Surgions and Apothecaries from Physitians, vsing them but as their instruments and ministers. And albeit that Physitians be in cities to be reuerenced, yet is it not to* 1.1051 be suffered them to be equall with orators and lawyers. For why, the most famous [ K] Philosophers haue defined the ciuill and lawfull knoledge of the law, to bee the mode∣ratour and chiefe gouernour, not of arts onely, but euen of all liberall sciences also. And Rome (as Marcus Cato witnesseth) flourished aboue six hundred yeares without Phy∣sitians: whereas no citie can without lawes, and the lawfull knowledge of the law, any small while endure or stand.

The order and vocation of Husbandmen and Grasiers, is also right commendable:* 1.1052 as they which by those two most auntient trades, haue taught cities, townes, villages, and families, to releeue and maintaine themselues with things of all others most neces∣sarie. And truly Cyrus the Greater, of nothing vaunteth so much, as of the fields set and

planted by his owne industrie and labour. Serranus, also Curius, Concinnatus, Torqua∣tus, [ A] and Cato, men no lesse famous for their ciuill than their domestical prayses; were yet for that most commended, Quod attritis opere rustico manibus salutem publicam stabili∣rent: quaeque modo arantium boum iuga rexerant, triumphalis currus habenas retinerent, That with their hands worne with countrey labour, they established the welfare of the Commonweale: and that those hands which of late ruled the yokes of oxen at plow, now held the raines of the triumphall chariots in the citie of Rome. But these things were chiefly done in that age when as such men as had before bene Consuls were now from the plow called vnto the Dictatorship. Truly of all things whereby any thing is gotten, nothing is better than husbandrie & grasing, nothing more plentiful, nothing more pleasant, and I might say also with Theophrastus, nothing better beseeming a free [ B] borne man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: were not these most notable arts, in seruile manner contumeliously let out vnto base men, for wages hired. Now wee haue said those arts to be accounted base, whose wages is the earnest penie of their sla∣uerie: so that it ought not to seeme straunge, if that husbandmen in the fall of the Ro∣man Commonweale were put backe from the warres. Whereof it followeth, both the orders and degrees of husbandmen (I say) and shepheards to be placed in the rank and number of labouring men. For necessitie it selfe (yea oft times against reason) en∣forceth the dignitie of degrees and vocations of men to be disposed of according to the lawes and customes of euerie citie and countrey.

The Hangmans office almost euerie where is deemed of all other the basest: nei∣ther [ C] * 1.1053 by the Censors lawes was it for him lawfull to haue a dwelling place within the ci∣tie: as in this our age it is not lawfull for him at Tholouse. Whereas by the lawes of the Hebrewes it was not onely honest, but necessarie also, euen the noblest of them if they had bene witnesses of capitall crimes, to be also the executioners therein. Yea and* 1.1054 in England the neerest kin to them that be hanged, be it their fathers, their brethren, or neerest kinsmen, the last kindnesse they can doe them, is to play the part of the hang∣man, and to strangle them hanging vpon a low paire of gallowes. But by our customs we see gainfull rewards propounded vnto this so base an office, least wee should bee at any time destitute of an office so necessarie for the cities: as we haue heard say it to haue long since happened in Gaunt, where the iudge for lacke of an hangman commaunded [ D] the father and the sonne, both convicted and condemned for the same offence, to cast lots which of them should be the others hangman; wherein the lot fell vnto the father, who now growne verie aged, with much entreatie obtained that his sonne, as by age the stronger, and so fitter to liue, might become the executioner; who without feare hanged his father: the eternall monument of which impietie and villanie (which I against my will haue beholden) the Gantois suffer yet to stand in statues of brasse, and that in a publike and open place euen in the middest of the citie.

There is also in cities a great multitude of idle lazie fellowes, who neither in time of* 1.1055 peace, nor warre, haue any occupations to set themselues to worke, o•…•… other trade to busie themselues withall: whome it is needfull either to banish out of the citie, or to [ E] keepe them in publike workes: for why, they can in no degree be placed, and so much the more, if they haue nothing of their owne wherewith to maintaine that their idle life. And these kind of men Amasis king of Aegypt put to death, in like manner as if they had bene theeues and robbers. Wherein they of Paris doe much better, who thrust the strong and lustie of these idle mates into their publike workes; courteously •…•…eeding and curing the sicke and aged, and diligently instructing the fatherlesse and poore boyes and maids, some in learning, some in occupations, in foure diuers colleges, besides a great hospitall endowed with most faire reuenewes.

But if citisens liue idle vpon such goods as they haue themselues before got, or were [ F] of old left them, albeit that they lead a foule and sluggish kind of life, yet are they to be therein suffered, if it were but that they might with their wealth helpe the poore Com∣monweales wherein they liue. But if these men feed also their mind with the contem∣plation of high and heauenly things, I deeme them then of all sorts of citisens the hap∣piest, and to be placed in the highest rankes and degrees of them. But if they had rather lead an actiue than a quiet kind of life, it is much better to call them than poorer men vnto honours and magistracies, if no dishonestie of life let: for that they are like to bee cleerer from briberie and corruption, than they which are pressed with pouertie and want. Wherefore in obtaining of magistracies and honours, the law commaundeth the richer sort to be oftentimes placed together with the nobler; yea and some times [ G] also to bee preferred before them, if no staine of their fore passed life let: and that is well agreeing vnto the lawes and customes of the Indians, whom Plinie writeth to preferre still the best and richest man vnto honours and places of commaund.

Wherefore in what order citisens are to be placed, is to be referred vnto the iudge∣ment and discretion of the masters of the ceremonies of euerie citie, for the vnliknesse of* 1.1056 their lawes and customes almost infinit. Yet I suppose, that citisens in a monarchie might in this order not vnaptly be placed. That next vnto the king himselfe, who out of the number of the citisens, going farre before the rest should follow the holy order of the clergie: next vnto the sacred order of the clergie, the Senat: after the Senat should follow the martiall men, and amongst them, first the generall of the armie, or great [ H] constable, & then the dukes, counties, marquesses, gouernors of prouinces, landgraues, burgraues, captaines of castles, vassals, and other souldiours, with such others, as vppon whome the charge of the warres, by the custome of our auncestours lieth. After them should follow the order of gowne men, which should containe the colledges of magi∣strats, and companies of judges, partly diuided into their places, with oratours, lawyers, pleaders, aduocats, attourneies, proctors, scribes, registers, notaries, sergeants, apparitors, garders, tryers, trumpeters, gailors, and all the companie belonging to the law. Next vnto whome should follow the order of physitians, surgeons, and apothecaries. And after them schoole men, such as professed to instruct the youth, or are themselues in∣structed; the professors (I say) of diuinitie, law, and physike, natural philosophers, mathe∣matitians, [ I] logitians, rhetoritians, historiographers, poets, and grammarians. After the order of gowne men, I suppose are to be placed marchants, agents, farmers of the com∣mon custome, bankers, money chaungers, brokers, and especially they which haue the charge for the bringing in of corne into the citie, and of such other things as are most necessarie for the feeding of the citisens, such as are the cornmungers, butchers, fishmun∣gers, fishers, bakers, puddingmakers, cookes, vnto whome we will ioyne husbandmen and grasiers; and vnto these all kind and sort of handycrafts men: which for that they seeme almost innumerable, of them, they which are the most profitable, ought to haue the first place, carpenters (I say) armourers, masons, metall men, coyners, gold beaters, [ K] goldsmiths, metall melters, glasse makers, smiths, bakers, potters, horners, chaundlers, weauers also, and such as deale in spinning of silke, wool, beasts, haire, flaxe, hempe, cot∣ten wool, and such other like, whereof we see cloath, ropes, garments, hangings, sayles, and paper to be made. Next vnto whome follow curriers, skinners, fullers, diers, tay∣lors, shoomakers: vnto which occupations, although printing be not for antiquitie to* 1.1057 be compared, yet seemeth it for the excellencie thereof, before al the rest worthily to be preferred. For as for painters, image makers, caruers, makers and sellers of womens paintings, minstrels, players, dauncers, fencers, tumblers, iesters, and bauds, are in mine opinion either to be quite driuen out of cities, or else to be placed in the lowest place of

all: so that euen bath keepers, barbers, sailers, hucksters, ostlers, coach men, carters, graue [ A] makers, sargeants, and hangmen, are to be placed before them: For that these are in∣deed necessarie for the carrying out of filth, and the clensing of the citisens and cities: whereas the other with their most base trades, the ministers of foule and vaine plea∣sures, not onely corrupt the citisens maners, but vtterly ouerthrow euen the cities them∣selues. But we haue so described the orders of citisens, not so much that the dignitie, as the condition of euerie one of them might so the better be vnderstood.

Neither are citisens but most seldome, and that also in time of great necessitie, to bee* 1.1058 in orders from other citisens diuided: for that so doing may giue occasion and minister matter vnto ciuill sedition: when as some of them diuided from other some, shall per∣ceiue themselues to be noted also with a difference of their order and degree. Yea we [ B] said, that the citisens of one and the same trade or occupation were not in one street or quarter of the citie to be together placed: except they were by the straitnesse of the places or opportunitie of the waters they were to vse, thereto enforced; as butchers, curriers, felmungers, bath keepers: who for that they are to haue the continuall vse of water for their oft washings, must haue their dwellings also neere vnto the riuers sides: so are also armourers, and smithes, to be placed apart by themselues from schollers and students, as for other handicrafts men, marchants, and trades men, it is good to haue them separated one from another, and to be diuided into euerie part of the citie, that the citisens may more commodiously vse their helpe in generall, and not in time of daun∣ger [ C] be enforced oftentimes to runne from the furthest place of the citie to the furthest. Whereunto is to be ioyned, that citisens of the same occupation or trade, diuided into diuers parts of the citie, cannot so easily conspire against the common good, or delude* 1.1059 the lawes, as if they dwell together. But if assembly of all the orders and degrees of ci∣tisens, must of necessitie be made (for that degrees must needes in some sort bee distin∣guished from degrees, that a certaine dignitie of degrees may be kept) especiall care is to be had, that the citisens be not diuided into two parts onely, and yet that in such as∣semblies there be not more than three degrees or places: for that contention arising betwixt two, they easily breake out into force; or else vpon equall voyces breake off, and leaue the matter vndecided: when as one thing is contrarie but onely vnto one, and that by nature many things cannot vnto one be contrarie, but that the third must [ D] of necessitie ioyne it selfe vnto the one of the two, so to reconcile them together: whereas if there be more than three parts, and in number equall, the same inconueni∣ences doe follow (that doe of two) the euen number being easily to bee diuided into two parts: but if in number vnequall the number of opinions diuers will hardly end the controuersies once moued.

It shall also be more commodious and profitable to haue one oratour or speaker,* 1.1060 for all the degrees of citisens together, then for diuers orders and degrees, diuers: so that it be agreed vpon amongst all the degrees and orders what is to be requested, determi∣ned of, or done: as heretofore at Thurin and Orleance, when they called their assem∣blies. But if the orders and decrees of citisens shall therein differ among themselues, it [ E] is then needfull for euery order and degree of the citisens, to haue their owne speaker. As of late in the parliament of Bloyse, when as the Bishops grieuously complained of the Nobilirie; and againe the Nobilitie of the Bishops; and the Comminaltie of them both, it was then needfull to haue three Speakers appointed: and yet so could not the good of the people bee sufficiently prouided for, but that the Speakers were blamed of falshood and collusion, and that diuers great and grieuous complaints of the people were thereof giuen out. But these things are especially to be taken heed of in a Monar∣chie, wherein one man is judge of all controuersies: Wheras in other kinds of states,

albeit that there be many speakers, yet the matter is still in the end put to voyces. [ F]

But that diuision of the citisens (which we haue spoken of) into three degrees or parts,* 1.1061 as it is vnto all kinds of cities profitable, so is it in an Aristocratie most necessarie, that two of them disagreeing, the third may end the strife, or taking part with one, may draw the other whether it wil or no from the former receiued opinion. For if two facti∣ons shall arise, they which are wise, & wish the good & welfare of the Commonweale, should set vp an head of a third faction, and ioyne themselues vnto him: For three lea∣ders of diuers factions, or part▪takers, are right easily reconciled; whereas two are most hardly brought to agreement: whereof oftentimes arise seditions and ciuill warres, and that especially in the Aristocratike estate: For that in that estate, betwixt the nobilitie and common people, can be no third degree, all the right of soueraigntie being in the [ G] nobilitie, and nothing thereof in the people; all the same right in a Popular citie, or estate, being common to the nobilitie and Senat together with the people. Where∣fore it is an easie matter to create a third degree or order: as at Rome the order of knights or gentlemen, was in a sort an arbitratour or vmpier betwixt the Patricij and* 1.1062 the people, as made of both degrees. But for that both the Patricij and the knights made scarcely the fifth part of the whole people, the people did therefore the more im∣periously raigne & rule: which was then especially vnderstood, when as by a law con∣cerning the Theatres, place for the beholding of playes, was first giuen to the Senat, & next after them vnto the knights or gentlemen, all apart by themselus from the people: whereof Liuie thus writeth, C. Attilij Serrani, L. Scribonij Libonis Aedilium Curulium [ H] Ludis Romanis primum Senatus a populo secretus spectauit, praebuitque sermones sicut om∣nis nouitas solet alijs tandem, quòd mentò antè debuerit tributum censentibus amplissimo ordini, alijs demptum ex dignitate populi quicquid maiestati patrum adiectum esset inter∣pretantibus: & omnia discrimina talia quibus ordines discernerentur, & concordie, & li∣bertatis aequè minuende esse: ad quingentissimum quinquagissimum Sextum annum in promiscuo spectatum esse, quid repente factum? Cur non immisceri sibi in cauca Patres ple∣bem vellent? Cur diues pauperem consessorem fastidierit? Nonam & superbam libidinem ab nullius ante gentis Senatu neque desideratam, neque institutam Postremo Africanum quoque ipsum, quod Consul auctor eius rei fuisset, poenituisse ferunt, At the Roman plaies of C. Atilius Serranus, and L. Scribonius Libo, the honourable Aediles, the Senat apart [ I] and diuided from the people, first beheld the same: which thing (as euerie nouelty vseth to doe) gaue occasion of speech, some deeming it now at length to be giuen vnto that most honourable order, which should long time before haue of right beene giuen it; other some interpreting it to be taken from the dignitie of the people, whatsoeuer was added vnto the honour of the Senat: and all such differences as whereby degrees were discerned asunder to tend alike to the diminishing both of concord and of libertie: that the people indifferently together had beholden the plaies, now fiue hundred fiftie six yeares. What was that now so sodenly done? Why should not the Senators be con∣tented to haue the people mingled with them in the Theatre? Why should the rich [ K] scorne the poore man to sit by him? A new and proud insolencie, neuer before of the Senat of any nation either desired or ordained. Last of all it is reported, Africanus also himselfe to haue repented him, That being Consull, hee had beene author of that matter. Thus much he. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, that for the preseruing of the popular libertie, and concord, degrees ought so to be placed with degrees, as that al of them may more easily bee ioyned vnto all in societie and communion together. Wherefore this fact of Africanus was blamed, not onely of the common people, but euen of the Senators themselues, whose fauour he was thought to haue gotten: For so Tullie writeth him to haue bene blamed, not onely of the wiser sort, but euen of him∣selfe

also; for that, that was by force from the people extorted, which had before [ A] vntill then bene willingly graunted vnto the Senators: for that albeit that the seats were indifferent vnto all, yet neuer any of the people would presume to sit to behold the playes before the Senators. About an hundred yeares after was a law made by L. Roscius Otho, Tribune of the people, That the knights or gentlemen should sit and take their places vpon the foureteene steps or degrees next vnto the stage: For when the magistrats and the rest of the Senators, by the Censors law, did more commodiously see and heare from the first and neerest places vnto the stage, the higher degrees and far∣ther off, were accounted of lesse credit: & albeit that the places of the Theater were of right great receit (as which contained oftentimes threescore thousand of the citisens) yet could they not containe them all: & therfore by the law Roscia concerning the Thea∣ter, [ B] it was needfull that place should be kept for the knights, in the fourteene steps and degrees neere vnto the stage: and for that thereby the peoples voyces seemed secretly in some sort to be taken from them by Roscius the Tribune, whom it beseemed to haue bene a keeper & preseruer of the popular libertie and dignitie; at such time as he came to behold the playes, he was by the knights (whose fauour he had won) with great ac∣clamation and applause receiued, but of the people with greater tumult and sturre, in so much that Cicero the Consull was glad to call all the assembly of the people out of the Theater. And so as a man of great wisedome and eloquence, with a graue oration repressed the peoples insolencie, and with a reproofe and chiding, well beseeming the dignitie of a Consull, so appeased the tumult, as that the people returned againe into [ C] the Theatre well pleased. Hereof came that speech of Plinie in commendation of Cicero, Te suadente tribus Roscio Theatralis legis auctori ignouerunt, notatasque se discri∣mine sedis aequo animo tulerunt, The tribes (saith he) at thy persuasion pardoned Roscius, author of the law of the Theatre, and tooke it patiently themselues to bee noted with the difference of their seats and sittings. Now a punishment was set downe by the law of the Theatre, Ne quis nisi censum equestrem haberet in xiiij spectaret, That no man except he had a knights wealth, should stand in the xiiij steps or degrees to behold the playes. But when many, their patrimonie being by the ciuill warres wasted, durst not for feare of this Theatrall law behold the playes from the fourteene steps or seats, Au∣gustus the emperour decreed, That they should not be therewith bound, who them∣selues [ D] or their parents had euer had a knights wealth or abilitie. Now as for the order and degree of women, I meddle not with it; onely I thinke it meet them to be kept far off from all magistracies, places of commaund, iudgements, publike assemblies, and councels: so to be intentiue onely vnto their womanly and domesticall businesse. And thus much concerning the order and degrees of Citisens. But by what meanes prouision is to bee made against the reuolt and tumultuous stormes of the common people, wee will in due place more at large declare. [ E]

Finis Lib. Tertij.

THE FOVRTH BOOKE [ F] [ G] OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEALE.

CHAP. I. ¶ Of the rising, encreasing, flourishing estate, declining, and ruine of Commonweales.

ALl Commonweales take their beginning either from a Fa∣milie, [ H] * 1.1063 by little and little encreasing; or els arise at once, as when a multitude of people as a Colony drawne out of ano∣ther Citie or Commonweale, doe as a young swarme of bees fly abroad vnto another place: or as a slip or science pluckt off from a tree, and planted in a straunge soyle, which taking root, bringeth forth much more plentifull and plea∣sant fruit, than doe those trees which grow vp of small ker∣nels, or of their owne accord, Yet both the one and the other of these Commonweales, are established either by the strength of some stronger [ I] than themselues, or by the power of some others, who voluntarily had subiected them∣selues together with their libertie, vnto the power and pleasure of others, to be by them disposed of, as by a soueraigne power without any law at all, or else vpon certaine laws and conditions betwixt them agreed vpon. So the Commonweale hauing taken be∣ginning if it be well rooted and grounded, first assureth it selfe against al externall force, and then against the inward diseases of it self, and so by little & little gathering strength, groweth vp vntill it be come to the full perfection of it selfe: which wee may call the Flourishing estate thereof; which cannot be of any long continuance, by reason of the* 1.1064 chaunges of worldly things, which are so mutable and vncertaine, as that the greatest Commonweales oftentimes fall euen all at once with the weight of themselues, some [ K] others by ciuill warres, some by popular diseases, but most by the enemies violence, be∣ing as then ruinated, when as they thought themselues most assured: other some by the wrath of God, being vpon the sudden, and in a moment ouerthrowne: some few by age growing old, and by their inward sicknesse taking end. But yet no Common∣weales, finding or feeling greater chaunges or falles than the fairest of them: which for all that, are not in that to be blamed, especially if the change or alteration come by any externall force, as most commonly it chaunceth, the fairest things being still the most enuied at. And as Demetrius (he which was called the Besieger) deemed no man more happy, than him who had longest quietly liued in the greatest aboundance of al things,

neuer hauing tasted of aduersitie, as a man by fortune deemed most abiect and vnwor∣thie, [ A] with whom shee should contend or striue: so we see some Commonweales so shamefully buried in pleasures and idlenes, or else so to be corrupted, as that they might well moue any man rather to pitie then to enuie at their state. Wherefore the risings and ruines of the Commonweales are well of vs to be considered, and what the causes be of euery such their conuersion and change before that we giue iudgement of them, or propound them as examples to be imitated and followed. Now I call that a Con∣uersion* 1.1065 of a Commonweale, when as the state thereof is altogether chaunged: as when a Popular estate is changed into a Monarchie; or an Aristocratie into a Demo∣cratie; or contrarywise: For as for the change of customes, lawes, religion, or place, it is but a certaine kind of alteration, the state and soueraigntie continuing still: which [ B] may also to the contrarie it selfe be changed, without any change of religion, or lawes, or any other things else, besides them which belong vnto soueraigntie. As when in our time the Florentine popular estate was changed into a Monarchie. Neither is the age or continuance of a Commonweale to be measured by the long standing of a ci∣tie, or of the walles thereof, as Paulus Manutius seemeth to haue done: who writeth* 1.1066 the Venetian Commonweale that now is, to haue stood twelue hundred yeares; which hath yet suffered three changes, as we shall forthwith declare. Sometime it hap∣neth also no change either of the citie, or of the citisens, of the customes, or religion to be made, or any other force offered, or wrong done to any man; and yet that the state may perish: as when any soueraigne prince willingly subiecteth himselfe, his king∣dome, [ C] and people vnto the power and obeysance of some other Prince, or else by his testament appointeth some popular Commonweale inheritour of his State and king∣dome: As is reported of Attalus king of Asia; of Coctius king of Alpes; of Ptolaemee* 1.1067 king of Cyrenae; of Eumenes king of Pergamus; of Nicomedes king of Bithynia; of Polemon king of Pontus, who left the people of Rome heires of those so many their kingdomes: for then those kingdomes were quite taken away, and those Common∣weales brought into the forme of Prouinces, and no change made of their Monar∣chies into a popular Estate. And so contrariwise, if of one or many cities or prouinces* 1.1068 be made one or manie Monarchies or popular estates diuided in soueraigntie, that is not to be accounted any conuersion or change, but euen a verie beginning of diuers [ D] new Commonweales: As when the countrie of the Swissers and the Grisons reuol∣ted from the Germaine Empire, they became eighteene Commonweals, euery one of them holding their estates (diuided from the other) in soueraigntie. Sometime also of two is made one and the same Commonweale: as were the Romans and the Sabines, their two kings and people being in the same power and league ioyned and comby∣ned together, neither of them subiect vnto the Lawes or commaund of the other; but with equall power both of them growing together into the same citie. And lest the Sabines so ioyned vnto the Romans should haue seemed to haue accrewed vnto ano∣ther mans kingdome, it pleased them that the names of both the people being taken away or suppressed, they should be called Quirites, which name the Magistrates in [ E] their orations vnto the people euer after vsed: Albeit that Romulus (who because he would not seeme to endure a fellow in the kingdome with him, had not spared his owne brother) caused Tatius king of the Sabines not long after to bee also slaine: wherefore the Sabines Commonweale so perished not, either accrewed vnto the Ro∣maines (as some haue beene of opinion) albeit that other people called them neither Sabines, nor Quirites, but Romans: For that that name once giuen vnto the Citie and the people, could neuer more be changed; or for that the name of the Romans was more stately; or else for that those two people so grew together within the wals

of Rome, yet so as that the one became not subiect vnto the other: as it chanceth [ F] when the one being vanquished, yeeldeth it selfe vnto the other, and so suffereth the lawes of the vanquisher. Which may serue for the disciding of the question of Cune•…•…u the lawier, who doubteth, Whither the subiects of the one Commonweale, if they be ioyned into one and the selfe same bodie with the subiects of another Common∣wealth, be thereby the subiects of them with whom they are so ioyned: which thing Bartholus denieth; and for example thereof alleageth Raimond Countie of Toulouse, not erring indeed in his resolution of the question, but in the example by him produ∣ced, not hauing good regard vnto the treatie made betwixt the Countie and the estates of Languedoc of the one part, and Lewes the ix the French king on the other part, wherin it was comprised, That the only daughter of the countie Raymond should [ G] be espoused to Alphonsus countie of Poitiers, the kings brother, with condition, that if they died without heires of their bodies lawfully begotten, the countrey of Languedoc should in full right returne vnto the crowne; yet for all that so, as that the customes of the countrey should not be chaunged, neither any taxe▪imposed without the consent of the estates of the countrey▪ which hath alwaies beene obserued, the soueraigntie ouer the country and the inhabitants of Languedoc remaining vnto the kings, as it had before that the countie was therefrom exempted. But most certaine it is, that an estate subiect vnto another, maketh not another Commonweale, but onely a part of the subiects.

But that these things may the better be perceiued, it is to be vnderstood, that al con∣uersions [ H] and chaunges of Commonweales, are either voluntarie or necessarie, or else mingled of both: and as for necessitie, it is also either naturall or violent: For albeit that the birth of things be more faire and pleasing than their death, yet for all that so it is, that the source and course of flowing nature rauishing all things, giueth vs also to vnderstand, that the one cannot be without the other: so that all things which had be∣ginning, although they haue stood many hundred yeares, yet must at length in time take end and perish also. But, as we deeme that death more tollerable which by little and little creepeth on through the weakenesse of age, or the course of some long linge∣ring disease, and that almost without any sensible feeling thereof: so also may wee say the chaunge or fall of a Commonweale, which proceeding as it were of age, and after [ I] hauing endured a long tract of worlds, to be necessarie, and yet not violent: for that nothing can well be called violent, which is agreeing vnto nature: seeing also that the course of euerie things age is certaine, and a certaine ripenesse vnto euerie age appoin∣ted:* 1.1069 so that in due time to take end seemeth to bee a thing of euerie thing to bee wi∣shed for.

Now Commonweales be also chaunged some times to the better, and sometimes to the worse, whether such chaunge bee naturall or violent: yet the violent change still hauing violent motions, and so quickely done; and the naturall chaunging still be little and little, and so the lesse felt. But of all chaunges of Commonweales, no voluntarie* 1.1070 chaunges is more pleasing or easie than that which is made by the consent and good will of him which hath the soueraigntie, and of his subiects: when as hee which hath [ K] the soueraigntie, chooseth rather to yeelde the same vnto the nobility, or the people, than to hold it himselfe: as we haue heard Sylla, with incredible violence to haue ta∣ken vpon him the Dictatorship, and that not without the most cruell slaughter of the people, and so to haue turned the soueraignty of the Commonweale from a popular estate, into a Monarchie; and yet him the same man within foure yeares after, volun∣tarily and of his owne accord, dispoiling himselfe of the Monarchy, which he had co∣uered vnder the colour of his Dictatorship, to haue againe restored the soueraignty vn∣to

the people, to the great contentment of them all in generall, and the good liking of [ A] euery one of them in particular. So also the nobilite of the state of Sienna, by their common consent, yeelded the soueraignty of that state vnto the people, and abando∣ned the city themselues, which Pandulphus the tyrant, violently afterwards inuaded. And as in mens bodies diuers changes happen from the qualities of the elements, the disposition of the body or the minde, the temperature of the humours, as also from the manner of the education thereof, and diuersity of diet: so also the Commonweale may suffer an vniuersall change or ruine, from friends or enemies externall or inter∣nall, or from both, whether it be from good to euill, or euill to good, and that oft times contrary to the good liking of the subiects, who must sometimes as children and mad folkes, be cured euen against their wills, as Lycurgus, who changed the lawes and roy∣all [ B] state of his country, into a popular gouernment, contrary to the good liking of the subiects, or of the greater part of them; howbeit that in so doing, hee was well beaten of them, and lost one of his eyes (the reward of his vertue) although hee had before renounced the claime and right that he and his successours had vnto the kingdome, as princes of the blood, and nearest vnto the crowne.

But forasmuch as there are but three sorts of Commonweales, as wee haue before [ C] * 1.1071 declared: there are also but six perfect conuersions or chaunges thereof, viz. of a Mo∣narchie into a Popular estate, or of a Popular estate into a Monarchie: and so like∣wise of a Monarchie into an Aristocratie, and of an Aristocraty into a Monarchie: and of an Aristocratie into a Popular estate, and of a Popular estate into an Aristocratie. So also of euerie estate there be six other imperfect chaunges, or rather alterations; that is to wit, from the Royall estate vnto the Lordlike: from the Lordlike estate vnto the Tyrannicall: from the Tyrannycall vnto the Royall, or from the Royall into the Ty∣rannicall: from the Tyrannicall into the Lordlike, and from the Lordlike into the* 1.1072 Royall. So might one also say of an Aristocratie, lawfull, lordlike or factious: And of a Popular estate, lawfull, lordlike, and turbulent. I call it an vnperfect chaunge, as the [ D] change of a lawfull Aristocratie into a faction; or of a Royall estate into a tyranny: for that therein is nothing but the chaunging of the qualities of good gouernors into euil, the Monarchie yet still remaining in the one, and the Aristocratie in the other. I speake not here of the chaunging of a Monarchie into a Duarchie (or soueraigne gouernment of two) for that we haue before declared such a Duarchie to bee comprehended vnder an Oligarchie (or gouernment of few) otherwise a man might make also a Truarchie of three princes, ruling together in one Commonweale (as it chaunced in the Trium∣uirat of Marcus Antonius, Augustus, and Lepidus) as also a Tetrarchie (or gouernment [ E] of foure) and so other chaunges of Commonweals in number infinit: whereof there is not onely no rule or precept to be giuen, but are also of themselues most absurd: For when wee once passe the soueraigne gouernment of one, wee forthwith enter into the popularitie of moe: which as the lawyers say, is still contained in the number of two.

But besides these conuersions and chaunges of estates, which wee haue alreadie* 1.1073 spoke of, it happeneth some time that the estate of a Commonweale is holden in su∣spence and sufferance: as after the death of Romulus, the people of Rome was a yeare without a Monarchie, a Popular estate, or Aristocratie: For the hundred Senatours which commaunded one of them after another, had no soueraigne power, neither commaunded but onely by commission: true it is, that one might say, That the soue∣raigntie was againe returned vnto the people, and the charge of commaund vnto the Senators, vntill that by common consent they had chosen them a king.

And some times againe it chaunceth, that the Royall, Aristocratike, or Popular* 1.1074

Commonweale being quite extinguished, there ensueth a meere Anarchie: when as [ F] there is neither soueraigntie, nor magistrats, nor commissioners, which haue power to commaund; as it chaunced the people of Israel after the death of Iephte, when as their* 1.1075 estate was brought to a meere Anarchie, and vpholden onely by the prouidence and power of God alone, the best and greatest king: for so it is in holy writ reported. So likewise at Syracusa, after the death of Dion, and in Florence after that the nobilitie was thence driuen out by the people: which so continued a certaine time without go∣uernment, as a ship without a pilot or gouernour. And so after the death of Abusahit king of Fez, that kingdome was in most miserable case eight yeares without a king. As also after diuers murthers of many the Aegyptian Sultans, the Mammalukes made choyce of Campson Gaurus, hauing liued a certaine time in a pure Anarchie. And in [ G] like manner the Russians, being wearie and spent with ciuill warres, for lacke of a soue∣raigne, of themselues made choice of three of the German princes to rule ouer them.

Wherefore when an estate is come vnto a meere Anarchie, that is to say, when no* 1.1076 man either commaundeth or obeyeth, it is to bee accounted the verie ruine and destru∣ction, and not the chaunging of a Commonweale: although that the families and col∣ledges therein continue friends together. But if the nobilitie or people haue power to create the prince, and he being dead the magistrats shall themselues retaine the soue∣raigne power and commaund: yet is it not therefore to bee deemed an Anarchyie, for that the soueraigntie is still like againe to fall either vnto the nobilitie, or to the people. [ H]

The last point is, when as an Estate or Commonweale is together with all the peo∣pled* 1.1077 quite extinguished: as it hapned vnto the people and seigneurie of Thebes, which Alexander the Great vtterly rooted out, together with their city, sauing only the house of Pindarus the Poet: vpon the entrance whereof was written▪ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Burne you not Pindarus his house. So also the Madianites, the Amorites, the Ie∣busites, and Phaerezites, were by the people of Israel vtterly destroyed: which was not the chaunging of one estate into another, but a meere ruine of the estate with the peo∣ple together. But yet it may well be, that some one member of a Commonweale, or that some one prouince thereof may be destroyed, or a towne rased, and all the people therein slaine, and yet the Commonweale stand: as it chaunced to the towne of Arzil∣le, [ I] in the kingdome of Fez, which the Englishmen rased, and put all the people therein to the sword: and to Sebastia, in the kingdome of Amasia, which Tamarlan the Tattar king vsed in like sort: and to the towne of Bizance, a member of the Roman empire, which after it had bene three yeares besieged by the emperour Seuerus, was in the end taken, sacked, rased, and all the people slaine, and the scite thereof giuen to the Perin∣thians, who reedified it, being afterwards called Constantinople, and now corruptly Stamboll, the choyce seat of the Turkish emperours.

But this is in Monarchies speciall and proper, that the Monarches one of them often∣times* 1.1078 by force driuen out by another, do not yet therefore chaunge their estate: as in a few moneths in our remembrance it happened in the kingdome of Telesin, where the [ K] king Abuchemo was by the people driuen out of his kingdome, and Abyamein chosen king in his stead: who forthwith after was also cast out by Hariadenus Barbarussa, who long time raigned not there, but that Abuchemo returning with the forces of the empe∣rour Charles the fift chased away Barbarussa, and tooke sharpe reuenge vpon his dissoi∣all subiects, making himselfe the emperours tributarie and vassall: but was againe not long after driuen out againe by Barbarussa: the state of a Monarchie yet neuer chaun∣ging, no more than did the Roman empire, for hauing had foure emperours in one yeare; one of them slaine by another: the estate of the Monarchie neuerthelesse still re∣maining

as the prise and reward of the victor. [ A]

Sometime also rule and soueraigntie is euen thrust vpon men by force and against their will: as first Claudius, and then Gordianus the elder were euen drawne and enfor∣ced to take vpon them the Roman empire. And in our remembrance the inhabitants of Tripolis in Barbarie, after they were reuolted from Iachia king of Tunes, chose Mu∣camen* 1.1079 for their king: who being shortly after poysoned, they vpon the sudden enforced a religious Hermit to take vpon him the crowne and the kingdome; wherein he raig∣ned against his will, vntil that Peter of Nauarre, by force tooke the citie of Tripolis, to∣gether with the king, whome he sent prisoner into Sicilie: but was afterwards by the emperour Charles the fift (to his great contentment) sent backe againe to liue in his solitarie cell in Affricke. [ B] * 1.1080

But as of men some perish and die in the most flourishing time of their age, some others in their youth, some in their childhood, and some before they could bee well borne; so wee also see some kingdomes and cities to bee cut vp and destroyed before they could strengthen themselues with lawes and armes, othersome as abortiues to be dead and extinguished before they were borne: as in our time the kingdome of the Anabaptists at Munster (the metropoliticall citie of Westphalia) was taken away and subuerted before it was well thought to haue bene borne. Iohn of Leiden, a Sadler, and their ringleader, who had there by the space of three yeares borne himselfe for a king, and taken vpon him the soueraigntie (though still by the imperiall hoast besieged) be∣ing at last together with the citie taken and publikely executed. [ C]

Now when I speake of the flourishing estate of a Commonweale, my meaning is* 1.1081 not, that it should be come to the height of most absolute perfection: for that in these transitorie things there is nothing so perfect, and in mans actions lesse than in any thing in the world: but I call that the flourishing estate of a Commonweale, when it hath attained vnto the highest degree of the perfection and beautie thereof; or to say better, then when it is least imperfect, and farthest from all kind of vice: which cannot be wel knowne, but after the declination, chaunge, or ruine of euerie Commonweale: As the Romans hauing made proofe of the Royall, Tyrannicall, Aristocratike, and Popular estates and Commonweales, yet neuer flourished more than in the Popular estate: neither did that their Popular estate euer flourish more in armes and lawes, than in the [ D] time of Papirius Cursor: Illa aetate, qua nulla virtutum feracior fuit, nemo erat, quo magis innixares Romana, quàm in Papirio Cursore staret, In that time (saith Liuie) than which* 1.1082 none was more plentifull of vertues, there was no man on whome the Roman Com∣monweale resting staied, than vpon Papirius Cursor. This was the iudgement of the Romans, of the most flourishing time of their Commonweale▪ for neuer after was the militarie and domesticall discipline, the lawes and ordinances better executed, faith bet∣ter kept, religion more sincerely embraced, nor vices more seuerely punished▪ So that it ought not to seeme straunge, if there was neuer than then greater store of most va∣liant and worthy men.

Now if any man shal obiect and say, That the Romans were then but poore, as not [ E] yet got out of Italie, neither hauing as yet extended their armes into Grecia, Asia, and Afrike, no not hauing as then so much as subdued Italie, neither that the Capitoll did as then glister with guilded vaults, but was couered with shards: I say againe▪ That ver¦tue* 1.1083 is not to be measured by the foot of wealth and riches; neither the excellencie and perfection of a Commonweale, by the largenesse of the bounds thereof, but by the bounds of vertue it selfe. So that I deeme those their vntrimmed and rough shades and groues, to haue had in them more maiestie and honor, than had afterwards their plea∣sant

greene woods, with the trees most artificially planted in order of the cu•…•…ious [ F] Quincunx, and reckon Rome homely and vntrimmed, more stately and replenished with maiestie, than when it was neuer so well deckt, and with precious ointments per∣fumed. For neuer was the power of the Romans greater than in the time of Traian the emperour, who ioyned vnto the Roman empire, not onely Arabia Felix, but many other great prouinces also beyond the riuer Euphrates, and with incredible workman∣ship* 1.1084 hauing built a bridge ouer the Danubie, (the remainders whereof are yet to bee seene) subdued Decebald, with the kingdom of Dacia, & with the Roman legions dan∣ted the most cruell and barbarous nations that then liued; when as the citie of Rome it selfe, being head of the whole empire, did so abound and flow with ambition, coue∣tousnesse, pleasures and delights, as that it seemed to retaine no more but the shadow of [ G] the auntient vertue thereof. Neither was the Lacedemonian Commonweale then most flourishing, when as it had by force of armes subdued all Grecia, with some parts of Asia also: for now they contrarie vnto the lawes, had giuen way for gold and siluer to enter into the citie, now the discipline of Lycurgus seemed to haue beene almost ex∣tinct, and so indeed not long after that same Commonweale came headlong tumbling downe. And thus much concerning the differences of the changes of Commonweales, which it is needfull for vs to note, the better to conceiue such conuersions and changes of estates, which none haue touched heretofore.

Now as for the causes of the chaunges of Commonweales, although they bee* 1.1085 right many, and hard to be all reckoned, yet so it is that they may bee brought into [ H] some certaine number, which may suffice for▪ our instruction. The most common cause of the chaunge of Commonweales is, that when the posteritie of princes fai∣ling, the great men fall out among themselues, and so take vp armes for the gouern∣ment of the state: or for the too great pouertie of the greater part of the subiects, and the excessiue riches of some few: or for the vnequall diuision of estates and honours, or for ambition and the great desire some haue to commaund, or for the reuenge of iniuries, or for the crueltie and oppression of Tyrants, or for the feare that some haue to bee punished for their deserts, or for the chaunging of lawes or of religion, or for the desire of some at full to enioy their pleasures, or for the casting out of them which with their excessiue and beastly pleasures pollute and defile the place of maiestie and [ I] honour. All which causes wee will particularly entreate of, and as need shall bee, ma∣nifest the same with examples.

Wee haue now here before declared, That Commonweales had their begin∣ning* 1.1086 by violent tyrannies: whereof some haue afterwards continued in the state of Lordlike Monarchies, and othersome in Royall Monarchies by right of succession: vnto whome diuers chaunges haue also happened for the causes by vs before touched. And that it is so, all the Histories, both sacred and prophane agree, That the first soueraigntie and forme of a Commonweale had beginning by the Monarchie of the Assyrians, and that the first prince called Nimroth (which is to say a Bitter Ruler) [ K] whome the Histories for the most part call Ninus, by force and tyranny made him∣selfe a soueraigne prince; and that after him his successours continued that Lordlike Monarchie, taking vnto themselues the whole and entire disposition of their sub∣iects and their goods, vntill that Arbaces gouernour of the Medes, draue out Sarda∣napalus, which was the last king of the Assyrians, and made himselfe king, without any forme of fashion of election at all. The cause why, being for that Sardanapalus drowned in vaine pleasures and delights, was more amongst women than hee was amongst men: a thing which men of courage and valour take most impatiently, to see

themselues subiect to such an one, as hath nothing of a man more than the figure [ A] onely. We see also, that the princes of the Medes descended from Artabazus, the kings of Persia, of Aegypt, of the Hebrews, the Macedonians, the Corinthians, the Si∣cionians, the Athenians, the Celtes, and Lacedemonians, are all come by right of suc∣cession vnto their kingdomes and principalities, for most part founded by force and vi∣olence; but afterward by iustice and good lawes polished, vntill that their posteritie* 1.1087 failed (which oftentimes drew after it the chaunging of the estate) or that the princes abusing their power, and euill entreating their subiects, were themselues driuen out or slaine: and the subiects fearing againe to fall into a Tyrannicall gouernment, if they should giue the soueraigntie to one alone, or not willing to endure the commaund of one of their owne companions, founded amongst them the Aristocraticall estates, lit∣tle [ B] regarding the common people: at which time if there were any of the poorer or popular sort, which would also haue had part in the seigneurie or gouernment, they sung vnto them the fables of the Hares, which would commaund together with the* 1.1088 Lions: Or if it were that the Monarchie chaunged into a Popular estate, yet so it was neuerthelesse, that the nobilitie or richer sort still carried away all the great offices and places of state: as for example, Solon hauing founded the Popular estate in Athens, yet would not that the poore and common sort of the people should haue part in the estates. Neither the Romans hauing chased out their kings (albeit that they had esta∣blished a Popular estate) yet so it was, that the honorable offices and preferments were still reserued vnto the nobilitie onely. Wee also read, that the first tyrants beeing dri∣uen [ C] out, the men at armes and gentlemen were indeed alwaies chosen vnto the honou∣rable places of estate, and the vulgar people still excluded: vntill that Aristides and Pe∣ricles in Athens, and Canuleius and the other Tribunes in Rome, first opened the gate of honourable offices and preferments vnto all the people in generall. But afterwards* 1.1089 when as it was by long experience found out, That Monarchies were more sure, more profitable, and more durable also, than were the Popular estates, or Aristocraties; and amongst the Monarchies, them also which were founded in the succession of the next heires male: these successiue Monarchies were generally receiued almost throughout all the world, and the Popular and Aristocratike estates driuen out. Yea the people sometime fearing the death of their princes, without heires male, persuaded them whi∣lest [ D] they yet liue, to make choice of their successours: as diuers of the emperours of Rome did, and as they yet at this present time doe in many places of Affrike: or else the right of the election of the prince remaineth in the people, the prince beeing dead without heires: yea and in some places the people hauing power for the election of their prince, albeit that their princes haue heires male also: as in the kingdomes of Po∣lonia, Bohemia, Hungarie, Denmarke, Sweden, and Norway, where they haue oft times thrust their kings out of their kingdomes▪ for staining the maiestie of their go∣uernment with tyrannie, licentious liuing, or cowardise. So sometimes also the peo∣ple hauing had a cruell tyrant, chose for him a iust and courteous prince: or hauing had an idle, an effeminat, or contemplatiue prince, make choyce of some valiant captaine: [ E] as did the Romans, who after the death of Numa Pompilius (to rule their religion to∣gether with their policie) made choice of Tullus Hostilius, a good captaine. Yea most* 1.1090 commonly it chaunceth, that vnto the greatest and most cruell tyrants succeeded the most iust and vpright princes, as men ashamed to follow or imitat the doings of them whose ends they abhorre; or els vpon certaine conditions, hauing taken the soueraign∣tie vppon them, and so hauing their lesson by writing, haue also their power therein somewhat diminished. So after the vnfortunat end of Marcus Antonius, a man altoge∣ther giuen to riot and voluptuous pleasure, succeeded the great Augustus, a most wise &

sober prince. So after the miserable death of Nero a most cruell tyrant, succeeded Galba, [ F] an emperor most gratious: So after the strange euent of the most drunken and licen∣cious Vitellus, succeeded Vespatian the most continent: And vnto the monster of na∣ture* 1.1091 Heliogabalus slaine and drawne in the same faction that was Vitellus, succeeded Alexander Seuerus the most vertuous: a thing most strange, considering that he was his cosin germaine, and together with him nourished and brought vp: and that the power to commaund in soueraigntie hath this mischiefe in it, that often times it ma∣keth of a good man, an euill; of an humble man a proud; of a mercifull man a tyrant; of a wise man a foole; and of a valiant man a coward. For what could be more notable then the first fiue yeares of Nero his raigne? what more excellent then his youth? or who for modestie was to be compared in the beginning to Tiberius? who so behaued [ G] himselfe (as saith Suetonius) as if he had almost beene a priuat man: and being of one called Lord, commaunded him, that he should no more by way of reproach so call him: and against slaunderous and infamous libels made of him, oft times said no more, but that in a free citie, men ought also to haue their tongues free: but speaking vnto the Senat: I haue had this good fortune (said he) to haue you for my gratious Masters, and so long as I liue I will acknowledge you for my good Lords: for a good prince (said he) must be the slaue not onely of the Senat, but also of all the citisens in generall, and often times of euery one of them in particular. Neither did he any thing in the be∣ginning of his raigne, no not euen in the least things, without the aduise of the Senat; and yet afterwards hauing well tasted of the power of soueraigntie, hee became the [ H] most detestable tyrant that euer was for crueltie and voluptuous pleasures. So we read also that Herod the elder raigned six yeares as a good and iust king (as saith Philo) and one and thirtie yeares as a most cruell tyrant, who caused seauentie Senators of the the house of Dauid to be all slaine, which was indeed the whole bodie of the Senate except Semneas, and afterward put to death his wife a most noble gentlewoman, with three of his owne children: and now lying at the point of death, gaue commaunde∣ment to kill all the best and chiefe of the Nobilitie of the whole land, to the intent that* 1.1092 great mourning might thereby be after his death. Which examples I haue amongst many other marked, whose beginnings were too faire to continue long: the reason whereof may well be, for that he which at the first seemeth to be so notable wise and [ I] worthie, must needs dissemble much: wherein Tiberius the emperour is said to haue excelled all others. Whereas of them which haue so curiously learned the art of false semblant and dissimulation, and haue their countenances at commaund, nothing that good is, true, or honest, is to be expected; but all things vaine, salse, and fained, ful of hi∣pocrisie and craft: Whereas he which at the first discouereth his imperfections (albeit that he be not therein wise) yet can he not possibly be a man exceedingly mischieuous or naught: yea of such an one it is to be hoped, that he may at length proue an vpright and iust man: such an one as Iohn the French king is reputed to haue bene, who was of such a stomacke, as that he could by no meanes endure to looke ar•…•… •…•…t vppon him [ K] * 1.1093 whome he hated or liked not of: And yet for all that we read not of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thing by him either dishonourable or wickedly done. Neither ought it vnto any man to seeme straunge, if there haue bene but few princes for their vertues famous: for if euery where there be such a scarcitie of good and valiant men, and that kings are not chosen out of the number of such: and that they to whome their kingdomes come by succession, commonly haue their education polluted with so many vices, as that hard it is to say which of them is the greatest: it is almost a myracle if one of them shall bee able to get out of such a gulfe of all maner of vices. Yet if any such there shall be, as shall for his vertues become famous, he as a toarch vpon an high place or watch tower, filleth al

things with the light and brightnesse of himselfe: neither is onely whilest he yet liueth [ A] * 1.1094 highly commended: but being dead, leaueth vnto his children and posteritie also, the most fragrant and sweet smelles of his vertue and worth, who though they shall right wickedly liue, yet are they the rather borne with, for their fathers vertues sake. Camby∣ses did many most cruell and shamefull things, yet was hee alwaies both loued and ho∣noured of his subiects, and redoubted of his enemies, and all for the great loue they bore vnto his father Cyrus, which was so well grauen in the harts of the people (as saith Plutarch) that they loued euen all such as had a great and rising nose, such an one as Cy∣rus had. And the emperour Commodus, albeit that he were a most cruell tyrant, and had in one day commaunded the great Prouost of Rome to kill all the beholders of the playes in the Theatre (which were not fewer than threescore thousand persons) for [ B] that they could not forbeare laughing, to see him in stead of an emperour, so cunningly to play the Fencer, as if he had bene one inded; yet was hee neuerthelesse of the people alwaies beloued, for the loue they bare vnto the remembrance of Marcus Aurelius his father.* 1.1095

Wherefore we see kingdomes which come by succession, seldome times to suffer chaunge or innouation, albeit that a wicked sonne succeed a good father: for that his kingdome is like vnto a great tree which hath taken as deepe root as it spreadeth bran∣ches: whereas he which commeth but newly vnto a kingdome commended nor strengthened with no vertue or power of his auncestours, is indeed like vnto an high tree: which for that it is not well rooted, is with the wind and tempest easily ouer∣throwne. [ C] For which cause a tyrant the sonne of a tyrant, must needs raigne in great daunger, except he be with great wealth and the power of his neighbor princes streng∣thened, or by long discent of his auncestours haue obtained his kingdome. Neither can the verues of a new prince deliuer his vngracious sonne from the conspiracies of his subiects: as it happened vnto Hierome a tyrant of Sicilie, who succeeded to Hiero his grandfather, a new prince in his kingdome, which he had by no right or claime gained, but was yet for his manifold and great vertues, of a priuat man, thought right worthy of that so great a kingdome, which hee so held almost sixtie yeares, without force or garrison, to the great contentment of all men; beloued not of his owne subiects onely, but of all his neighbour princes also, and especially of the people of Rome, to whome [ D] he was most deere: whose nephew, that he might seeme to excell his grandfather in magnificence and state, thought it better for the assurance of his estate, to strengthen himselfe with strong garrisons of men, and so afterwards wholly giuing himselfe ouer vnto riot and excesse, bare himselfe proudly towards all men, and so drew all mens ha∣tred vpon him: and as for the counsel, the most assured foundation of his grandfathers kingdome, he altogether set it at naught: & to heape vp his mishaps, without any cause why, renounced the amitie and alliance of the Romans. And so hauing lost both all the ornaments of his honour, and the stayes of his assurance, was by the conspiracie of his subiects himselfe with all his friends and kinsfolkes most miserably slaine, and his Monarchie forthwith chaunged into a Popular estate. The like end almost had Dio∣nysius [ E] the younger, another king of the same countrey also, and sonne to Dionysius the elder, who by fraud inuaded the estate, which he of long time held with strong garri∣sons and fortresses, without the stay or alliance of any other forren prince: but he once dead, and this his sonne a man vnskilfull of the gouernment, and altogether giuen to riot, succeeding in his place, and banishing his vncle Dion, and confiscating his goods, he was by the same Dion, returning out of exile againe into his owne countrey, with an armie thrust out of his kingdome, and all the fortresses of his tyrannie ouerthrowne: which Dion not long after being also slaine, the Monarchie was againe chaunged into a

Popular estate. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, new princes without great vertues [ F] hardly to maintaine their estate: which although it be a thing right, manifest, yet ap∣peareth it more plainely by the example of Herod the elder, vpon whome Caesar for the valour of Antipater his father, by a decree of the Senat bestowed the kingdome of the Iewes: who although he were in great fauour with Marcus Antonius, and Octauianus Augustus, yet for the better assurance of his kingdome, built most strong castles, and to gaine the good will of his subiects, bestowed great masses of money for reliefe of the poorer sort, and eased the people of a third part of their woonted tributes: but know∣ing how little he had for all that gained, he tooke also an oath of alleagiance of his sub∣iects, seeking to gaine them of the better sort with extraordinarie fauours and good turnes: and yet for all that he could do, he was so hated of his subiects, that beeing be∣come [ G] sickly, the people much reioyced thereat: which he perceiuing, it had almost dri∣uen him into a phrensie. But he being dead, the Iewes sent fiftie ambassadors to Rome, that so eased of that regall gouernment, they might become subiects vnto the Romans, and so happily had obtained to haue bene, had not Herod his sonne bene then in great fauour with Augustus the emperour, vnto whome the elder Herod had before by his* 1.1096 will left fifteene hundred talents of gold. Howbeit yet, that all the successours and po∣steritie of Herod, which were in number many, in lesse than threescore yeares, all in poore estate perished, as well for that he being but a new man, was not descended of royall race: as for that his prowesse and valour fayled in his successours.

But these conuersions and chaungings of kingdomes and Commonweales chance [ H] * 1.1097 so much the rather, if the tyrant be too great an exactor, too cruell, or too much giuen to his voluptuous and vnlawfull pleasures, or be delighted in all these together: as was Nero, Tiberius, and Caligula: and yet of these, wantonnesse and whoredome hath rui∣nated moe princes than all the other causes: and so is it also much more daungerous vnto a prince for his estate than crueltie: for crueltie keepeth men in feare and awe, & bringeth a terrour vpon the subiects; whereas wantonnesse bringeth after it an hate and contempt also of the tyrant; forasmuch as euerie man deemeth the effeminat man to be also faint hearted, and farre vnworthie to commaund a whole people, which hath* 1.1098 not power ouer himselfe. So we see that Sardanapalus king of Assyria, Canades king of Persia, Dionysius the younger, and Hierosme, kings of Sicilie, Heliogabalus, Amyntas, [ I] Chideric, Periander, Pisistratus, Tarquin, Aristocrates king of the Messenians, Timocrates king of Cyrene, Andronicus emperour of Constantinoble, Rhoderike king of Spaine, Appius Claudius, Galeace Sfortia, Alexander Medices, the Cardinall Petruce Tyrant of Sienne, Lugrac and Megal, kings of Scots, all for wantonnesse to haue lost their estates, and most of them slaine vpon the fact doing. Neither is it long since Delmendin and Delmedin, two of the greatest cities of Affrike, were by rebellion dismembred from the kingdome of Fez, and brought vnder the obeysance of the Portugals, for a maiden by force taken from her husband to whome she was betrothed, by the gouernour, who was therefore afterwards slaine: as was also Ahusahid king of Fez himselfe with his six children all massacred by a secretarie of his, for hauing abused his wife. Neither for any [ K] other cause did the people of Constantine (a sea towne in Affrike) chose rather to suf∣fer the commaund of Delcaid a Christian renegat, than to obey the king of Tunes his sonne. And why in our time was Muleasses thrust out of his kingdome, and so lost his estate, but for intemperance? and yet neuerthelesse was so drowned in delights, as that returning out of Germanie, without hope that the emperour Charles the fift (in whom his greatest trust was) would afford him any aid, and banished as he was out of his king∣dom, yet spent he an hundred crowns vpon the dressing of one peacock, as Paulus Ioui∣us reporteth: and to the end he might better conceiue the pleasure of musick, stil coue∣red

his eyes, as hauing learned a double pleasure, not to bee so well perceiued by two [ A] sences at once: yet such was the iudgement of God vppon him, as that by the com∣maundement of his sonnes he had his eyes put out with an hot barre of Iron, by little and little drying vp the humors of them, and depriued of his kingdome also.* 1.1099

But for the crueltie of a prince, the estate easily chaungeth not, if he be not more cru∣ell than the wild beasts themselues, such as were Phaleris, Alexander Phereus, Nero, Vi∣tellius, Dometian, Commodus, Caracalla, Maximinus, Ecelinus of Padua, and Iohn Maria of Millan, who were all slaine, or driuen out of their dominions, and their Tyrannical estates for the most part chaunged into estates Popular. Which befell them not so much for the crueltie by them vsed against the common sort of people (wherof no rec∣koning nor account is made in a Tyrannicall estate) as for crueltie committed in the [ B] person of the great and best friended, who are alwayes of tyrants to bee feared: vnto whome euen contumely and disgrace is oftentimes more grieuous than crueltie it self: wherof we haue a domesticall example of that Bodile, who for that he was by the com∣maundement of Childeric king of Fraunce whipped, slew not onely the king, but the queene also, being then great with child. So was also the emperour Iustinus the third slaine by Atelia generall of his armie, whose sonne he had slaine, and in despight prosti∣tuted his wife vnto his seruants. And Archetaus king of Macedon, was likewise slaine by him whome he had put into the hands of Euripides the poet, to be whipt: as was his nephew also king of Macedon, slaine by him whome hee had without punishment suffered to be abused against nature by Antipater, and scorned him crauing of him re∣uenge. [ C]

The Aristocratike estate also of them of Mitylen, was chaunged into a Popular, for that it chaunced certaine gentlemen as they went along the streets with their bastana∣does, in sport to strike all such of the common people as they met: Whereupon one Megacles tooke occasion to stirre vp the comminaltie to fall vpon the nobilitie, and so to kill them. And not to seeke for examples farther, Henry, of late king of Sweden (but now a prisoner) was also thrust out of his kingdome, for that he not onely disdainfully reiected the request of a certaine gentleman his subiect, but also with his owne hand most cruelly stabbed him with his dagger: wherwith the nobilitie and people moued, tooke him prisoner, and enforcing him to resigne his kingdome, gaue it to his younger [ D] brother, who now raigneth. And almost alwaies the tyrants-quellers haue receiued* 1.1100 either the estate or goods of the tyrants by them slaine, or the greatest honours and preferments in the state, as rewards due to their deserts. So both the one and the other Brutus, obtained the greatest estates in Rome; the one of them for hauing driuen out the proud king Tarquin, and the other for hauing slayne Caesar. And Arbaces gouer∣nour of the Medes hauing brought Sardanapalus king of Assyria to such extremitie, as that he was glad to burne himselfe aliue together with his concubines and treasures, for reward enioyed his kingdome. So Lewes of Gonzaga hauing slaine Bonacolse, tyrant of Mantua, was by the subiects chosen their prince, his posteritie euer since by the space of about two hundred and fiftie yeares hauing enioyed that estate. And the Venetians [ E] hauing slaine the tyrant Eceline, obtained the seigneurie of Padua.

Some others there be, which seeke the tyrants death, and so the chaunge of the* 1.1101 estate; hauing nothing before their eyes but the desire of reuenge, and that without ei∣ther the feare of God, the regard of their countrey, or loue of their neerest and deerest friends: as he which to be reuenged of king Roderike, who had rauished his wife, drew the Mahometan Moores into Spaine, who draue out the king, and there vsing an hun∣dred thousand cruelties, possessed the kingdome of Spayne, which they held by the space of seuen hundred yeares after. And some others there bee also, who neither for

hope of bearing of rule, of preferment; or of wealth: neither for reuenge of wrongs, nor [ F] for any other priuat iniuries receiued, are yet induced to the killing of a tyrant, without hope to be able by any means to escape therefore a most sharpe and cruell death, respe∣cting onely the deliuerance of their countrey, and the honour of the fact: such as were Harmodius; and Aristogiton in Athens, and those which slew Domitian and Caligula the cruell emperours. A thing which most commonly happeneth in the Popular estates, wherein the new tyrants by force or fraud hauing oppressed the libertie of the people, are neuer assured of themselues, or of their estate, without great and strong garrisons about them. So we see Alexander Medices, nephew to pope Clement the seuenth, & sonne in law to the emperour Charles the fift, by whose forces and power hee obtained the soueraigntie of Florence, and draue out them also that were of greatest power and [ G] courage in the state, to haue compassed himselfe with great and strong garrisons, and alwaies to haue gone armed, in such sort as that it seemed almost impossible to find the meanes to come neere him, and yet for all that to haue bene slaine by the conspiracie of Laurence Medices, not onely his neere kinsman, but his most familiar and domesti∣call friend also▪ when as the said Laurence had promised to prostitute vnto him his owne sister; that so he might the better deliuer the man disarmed (euen as he was kis∣sing and embrasing his sister, who me he thought to haue rauished) to the murtherer to be slaine▪ which was so couertly done, as that the souldiours of his guard, whome he kept for the saftie of his person, making merrie in a dining chamber fast by, perceiued nothing of the murther of their prince. And yet in so doing, the said Laurence neither [ H] deliuered his countrey from tyrannny (whereinto it by and by after againe fell) neither himselfe from daunger, being at length by a murtherous fellow himselfe also slaine at Venice. And Cosmu•…•… Medices, who after the death of Alexander, by the helpe of the garrison souldiours, the supportation of his friends, and fauor of the pope, obtained the same gouernment▪ albeit that he was reported to haue bene one of the wisest princes of his age, or of long time before him, and a right great justicier, euen by the report of his enemies themselues, and had diuers strong castles euen in the citie it selfe: yet ne∣uerthelesse was he an hundred times in daunger of his person, by the conspiracies of his subiects against him, being not able to endure a maister ouer them, albeit that hee were both iust and vertuous. And he which now raigneth, not long since missed not [ I] much to haue bene •…•…laine by the conspiracie of Puccinus, neither can bee safe without a strong garrison, so long as the citisens his subiects shall either remember or hope for the rewards of their valour and libertie. And for this cause Dionysius the elder of Syracu∣sa, being chosen generall, and hauing made himselfe maister of all, and chaunged the Popular estate into a Monarchie, had alwaies forty thousand souldiors in readinesse at his call to set forward, beside a great garrison still attendant about his person, and di∣uers strong holds, onely to keepe the people of Syracusa with a part of Sicilia in subie∣ction. And yet neuerthelesse was he no tyrant, as we call a tyrant, that is to say, a cruell, vitious, and naughtie man: neither was he euer amorous of other mens wiues, but to the contrarie sharply reproued his sonne (as saith Plutarch) for hauing taken away one [ K] of his subiects daughters, saying, That he should neuer haue one to succeed him in his estate, if he vsed such fashions: as indeed it fell out with him, being shortly after his death chased out of his kingdome.

Now if any man shall obiect and say vnto mee, That force and feare are two euill* 1.1102 masters for the maintaining of an estate: true it is, and yet needfull for a new prince to vse, who by force changeth a Popular estate into a Monarchie, a thing altogether con∣trarie vnto a Monarchy Royall; which the lesse guard it hath, the surer it is: & there∣fore the wise king Numa put from him the three hundred archers which Romulus his

predecessour had taken vnto him for his guard, saying, That hee would not distrust a [ A] people which had willingly and of themselues put their trust in him: neither yet com∣maund ouer them which should distrust him. But Seruius hauing of a slaue made himselfe a king, beset himselfe with strong guards, and that wisely, as beeing forsaken of the Senators, who tooke his seruile gouernment in great euill part: For as iust, plea∣sing, & gracious, as he was, yet had it bene a thing impossible for him without guards, garrisons, and fortresses, long to haue maintained himselfe and his so new an estate, but that he should haue fallen into the hands of his enemies. There was neuer a more gratious, magnificent, noble, couragious, or courteous prince then Caesar; and yet notwithstanding, all these his great vertues were not able to preserue him, but that he was by his sonne Brutus and other the conspirators with incredible consent and fideli∣tie [ B] combyned against him, in the middest of the Senat most cruelly slaine: who being before warned to take vnto him a guard for the safetie of his person, frankly answered▪ that he had rather to die once for all, than still to languish in feare: wherein he did not wisely so to refuse a guard, hauing pardoned his greatest enemies (whom he suffered still to liue) and desiring to chaunge into a Monarchie the free estate of the most war∣like people that euer was in the world. Which his course Augustus his successour followed not, but first caused to be put to death all the conspiratours against Caesar, (not so much in reuenge of the death of his vncle Caesar, as he pretended, as so to pro∣uide* 1.1103 for his owne safetie) after that hee still guarded with a strong guard about him, easely kept himselfe from the violence of his enemies: And albeit that hauing quite [ C] discomfited and ouerthrowne Sextus Pompeius, and Lepidus, and ouercome Marcus Anthonius in battell at Actium, (who afterwards also slew himselfe) and the other citi∣sens of greatest force and courage, either in battell slaine or otherwise taken out of the way; he might haue seemed to haue beene able to haue raigned in great securitie: yet neuerthelesse hee dispersed fortie legions into the prouinces, placed three legions in Italie, and that not farre from the citie, kept a strong guard about him for the safetie of his person: forbid the Senators without leaue to depart out of Italie, and commit∣ted the gouernment of his legions not vnto any the great Lords, but to gentlemen onely, or some of the meanest of the nobilitie. As for the creating of the officers of the citie, he diuided it betwixt himselfe and the people; yet so as that of such as stood [ D] for them, he would bring some of them by the hand vnto the people, and so recom∣mending vnto their choice them whom he wished to haue preferred vnto the offices and honors: he tooke from the people their free choice, and had the magistrats still be∣holden and bound vnto him. Iustice he daily administred, without intermission, re∣ceiuing and answering euery mans request, hauing alwaies before him the records of the publike reuenues of his forces, and of the prouinces, so that he alone seemed to dis∣charge all the dueties of all the officers. Whereby it euidently appeareth him to haue beene a sole Monarque, and soueraigne Prince, whatsoeuer faire title of a Tribune of the people, or of a Prince, was by one or other giuen vnto him. That is also reported to haue beene of him verie popularly done, in that he commaunded debts due to the [ E] Commonweale, which were growne by the ciuill warres, and the records of the debters to be torne and burnt. And yet this so mightie a Prince, endued with so great vertue & wisedome hardly escaped the hands of the wicked conspirators against him, albeit that the most desperat and daungerous sort of them were now long before dead. But after that the subiects hauing by little and little made proofe of his justice and wise∣dome, tasted of the sweetnes of long peace and assured tranquillitie, in steed of cruell and bloodie ciuill warres,, and that they had to doe, rather with a father than with a lord (as saith Seneca) and so began to loue and reuerence him: he againe on his part

discharged his guard, going as a priuat man sometimes with one man, and sometimes [ F] with an other without any other companie; and so laide the foundation of that great Monarchie, with the most happie successe that euer Prince did.

Now all Monarchies newly established by the change of an Aristocratie, or Popu∣lar* 1.1104 estate, haue as it were taken their beginning, after that some one of the magistrats, captaines, or gouernours, hauing the power of the state in his hand, hath of a compa∣nion made himselfe Lord and soueraigne, or else that some straunger hath subdued them, or that those states haue willingly submitted themselues vnto the lawes & com∣mandements of some other man. As for the first point, and the most ordinarie change of these estates we haue examples enowe. For so Pisistratus, when he had got the chiefe office in the common weale, inuaded the libertie of the people: as did also Cyp∣selus [ G] at Corinth, Thrasybulus, Gelo, Dionysius, Hiero, Agathocles at Syracusa, Panaetius, and Icetes at Leonce, Phalaris at Agrigentum, Phidon at Argos, Periander at Am∣brace, Archelaus in Ca•…•…die, Euagoras in Cyprus, Polycrates in Samos, Anaxilaus at Rhegium, Nicocles at Sicyon, Alexander at Pheree, Mamercus at Catana, the De∣cemuiri at Rome, and there after them Sylla and Caesar: the Scaligers at Verona, the Bentinoli at Bolonia, the Manfreds at Fauentia, the Malatestes at Atiminum, the Ba∣leones at Perusium, the Vitelles at Tifernas, the Sforces at Millan, and diuers others of like sort, who of gouernors of cities and armies haue taken vpon them the soueraign∣tie. For in matters of estate it may be holden for an vndoubted maxime, that he is* 1.1105 master of the estate, which is master of the forces. Wherefore in well ordered Aristo∣cratique [ H] and popular Commonweales, the greatest honours are graunted without power of commaund, and the greatest powers to commaund are not graunted with∣out a companion therein: or if it be dangerous to diuide the power of commaund to* 1.1106 many, as in matters of warre it is; then the power so graunted vnto the magistrat or Generall ought to be but short. And therefore the Romans made chiefe commaun∣ders their two Consuls: and the Carthaginensians their two Suffets, who euery other day commaunded by turnes: For albeit that the dissention which is commonly be∣twixt them which are in power equall, is sometimes an hinderance for the execution of good and profitable things: yet so it is that such a commonweale so gouerned is not so subiect to be turned into a Monarchie, as it were if it had but one chiefe and so∣ueraigne [ I] magistrat: as the great Archon at Athens, the Prytani with the Rhodians, the yearely Generall with the Achaeans and the Aetolians, and the Duke at Genes. And for the same cause the Dictatorship in Rome continued no longer then the charge required, which neuer passed six monethes at the longest; yea and sometime lasted but one day; which time expired, the power to commaund ceased: and if so be that the Dictator did for any longer time retaine his forces, he might therefore be accused of treason. And in Thebes, so long as it was a Popular estate, the law was that the Gene∣rall of the armie should be put to death, if he retained the forces aboue a day after the appointed time: which was the cause that the great capitaines Epaminondas and Pelo∣pidas were condemned to death, for hauing retained their forces foure monethes after [ K] the time, howbeit that they were by necessitie constrayned so to doe, neither could without the great danger of the State haue otherwise done. And so for the same rea∣son almost all the Magistracies are annuall, in Aristocratique and Popular Common∣weales. Howbeit that in Venice the six Councelours for the estate which are assistant vnto the Duke, continue but two monethes in their charge: and he that had the kee∣ping of the principall fortresse of Athens, had the keyes thereof but for one day onely: no more then hath the captaine of the castle of Rhaguse, who chosen by lot, hath the charge but for a day, and is led into the castle hoodwinkt. It behoueth also in popu∣lar

& Aristocraticall Commonweales so much as possible is, to beware that the lawes [ A] * 1.1107 and ordinances concerning the Magistrats time be not changed, neither their charge prorogued, if the necessity be not verie great: as the Romans did to Camillus, to whom the Dictatorship was prorogued for six monthes, which had neuer to any other per∣son beene graunted. And namely by the law Sempronia it was straitly forbidden that the gouernments of Prouinces should be graunted vnto any for longer time than fiue yeares: which law had it beene kept, Caesar had neuer inuaded the estate as he did, ha∣uing the gouernment of the Gaules by the consent of Pompeius and Crassus graunted for fiue yeares more than the law allowed of; whereunto in that point was derogated in fauour of him. Which was a notable ouersight, considering that they had to doe with the most ambitious man that euer was; who so well grounded his power to [ B] continue, that he gaue at one time vnto Paulus the Consull nine hundred thousand* 1.1108 crownes, to the intent that he should not oppose himselfe against his enterpises; and vnto the Tribune Curio, fifteene hundred thousand crownes to take his part. The people of Rome moreouer allowing him pay for ten legions of souldiers so long as the warres in Fraunce should last. Which so great a power was ioyned with the har∣diest hart that then liued, and the most valiant that euer was, and discended of so noble an house, as that in an oration vnto the people he doubted not to say, That by the fa∣thers side he was discended from the gods, and by the mothers side from kings; and yet withall so modest, as that his great enemie Cato said, That there was neuer so mo∣dest a tyrant as he, and withall so vigilant: as that Cicero an other great enemie of his, [ C] (who conspired his death) calleth him in one of his Epistles, The monster of wisdome & incredible diligence: and moreouer so magnificall and popular as euer any was▪ spa∣ring for no cost for the setting forth of playes, iusts, tournies, feastes, largesses, & other publike delights: In which doing he vpon the publike charge woon the harts of the common people, and gained the honour of a most gratious and charitable man to∣wards the poore. And yet for all that hauing by this meanes gained the soueraigntie, he sought for nothing more than by all meanes to clip and cut off the wealth & power of the people, and to take from them their priuileges: for of three hundred and twen∣tie thousand citisens which still liued of the publique corne which they receiued, he retained but an hundred and fiftie thousand, and sent fourescore thousand ouer the sea [ D] into diuers Colonies a farre off: and beside that tooke away most part of their frater∣nities, corporations, and colleges. In briefe it hath alwaies beene seene in all changes* 1.1109 of Aristocratique and popular Commonweales, them to haue beene still ruinated, which haue at any time giuen too much power vnto the subiects whereby to exalt themselues: Which thing Iulian the Apostatament by that his embleanie or deuise of an Eagle shot thorow with arrowes fethered with his owne feathers, being before pluckt from her. For so do the soueraigne gouernors and magistrats of those estates, especially when too great power is giuen to him which is of too ambitious and hautie a mind. And thus much concerning the chaunge of a Popular or Aristocraticall estate [ E] into a Monarchie, wherein one of the subiects maketh himselfe Lord thereof.

But the chaunge of a Popular estate into an Aristocratie chanceth commonly vpon* 1.1110 the losse of some great battell, or other notable detriment of the state, receiued from the enemie: as to the contrarie the Popular power then most encreaseth when it re∣turneth from the warres with some great victorie ouer their enemies. Of which man∣ner of chaunges as there are many examples, so is there none more fit than those of the Athenians and Syracusians, two Commonweales of the selfe same time; when as the Athenians by the default of Niceas their generall, vanquished by the Syracusians and so discomfited, forthwith chaunged their Popular estate into an Aristocratie of foure

hundred men, who yet bare themselues for fiue thousand by the deceit of Pisander: so [ F] that the people complayning themselues to be so spoiled of the soueraigntie, and com∣ming to giue voice in the councell, was thence repulsed & driuen backe by the forces which the foure hundred had in their power, wherwith they slew diuers of the people and discouraged the rest: at which verie time the Syracusians proud of their victorie (to the contrarie) chaunged their Aristocratie into a Popular estate. And within a while after the Athenians hauing heard news of the great victorie of Alcibiades against the Lacedemonians, tooke vp armes against the foure hundred of the nobilitie, whom they by the leading of Thrasybulus thrust out or slew, and so againe chaunged the Ari∣stocratie into a Popular estate. And in like manner the Thebans ouercome by the Enophites, chaunged their Popular estate into an Aristocratie. And albeit that the [ G] Romans hauing lost two great battels vnto Pirrhus changed not their popular estate, yet so it was that indeed it was then a faire Aristocratie of three hundred Senators which gouerned the estate, and but in appearance and show a Democratie, or a Po∣pular estate, the people being neuer than then more calme and tractable. But so soone as the Romans had gained the estate of Tarentum, the people forthwith began to set vp their hornes, demaunding to haue part in the lands which the nobilitie had of long time possessed. And yet neuerthelesse afterwards, when as Hannibal had brought the Roman estate into great extremitie, the people became as humble as was possible: but after that the Carthaginensians were ouercome, king Perseus ouerthrowne, Antio∣chus put to flight, the kingdome of Macedonia and Asia subuerted▪ then immediatly [ H] againe followed the sturres for the diuision of lands, and the turbulent seditions of the Gracchies, wherewith the Tribunes armed the people in most insolent manner, insul∣ting vpon the nobilitie. In like manner the Florentines ouerthrew their Oligarchie, established by Pope Clement the seuenth, restoring the people againe vnto their won∣ted libertie: for so soone as newes was brought vnto Florence, That Rome was by the imperials sackt, and the Pope with the rest of the Cardinals and Bishops besieged▪ it is not to be beleeued, with what pride the headstrong people began to rage against them of the house of Medices; with what •…•…urie they cast downe their statues, defaced their armes, and reuersed all their decrees and lawes. The Popular estates of the Swis∣sers indeed first tooke their beginning from the pride and insolencie of the gouernours [ I] of those places, but yet had their greatest encreasings after the victorie of Sempach, about the yeare 1377, at which time the nobilitie being with a great slaughter ouer∣throwne by the rural people, there was no more talking of Aristocraties, nor of acknow∣ledging of the soueraigntie of the empire ouer them, in what sort soeuer. But the chiefe cause of these conuersions and chaunges of these estates, is the rash vnstaidnesse and vn∣constancie of the people, without discourse or iudgement moued with euerie wind; which as it is with a little losse discouraged, so is it also after any victorie intollerable; neither hath it any more deadly or dangerous enemie, than too much felicitie and pro∣sperous successe of the affaires thereof; nor a wiser maister than aduersitie and distresse, wherewith it daunted and discouraged, learneth to rest vpon the councell of the wiser [ K] sort, leauing the helme of the estate for them to gouerne, which they themselues in such tempestuous times know not how to hold. Whereby it is to bee perceiued, nothing* 1.1111 to be more profitable for the preseruation of a Popular estate, than to haue warres, and to make enemies for it if otherwise it haue none. Which was the principall reason that moued Scipio the yonger so much as in him lay, to hinder the rasing of the famous citie of Carthage, wisely foreseeing, that the people of Rome being altogether mar∣tiall and warlike, if it had no enemies abroad would at length be enforced to make war vpon it selfe. For which cause also Onomadesme generall of the Commonweale of

Chio, hauing appeased the ciuill warres, and driuen out the most mutinous, would by [ A] no meanes banish the the rest, albeit that he was earnestly persuaded so to doe, saying That so it would be daungerous, least (that hauing cast ōut all the enemies) they should fall together by the eares with their friends. Howbeit that this reason which hath place for the straunge and forren enemies, is not yet to bee receiued for the maintaining of enemies at home amongst the citisens themselues: and yet in this case hee did but that which best beseemed him, and was also most expedient. For he that will haue the vp∣per hand in ciuill warre, if he shall banish all them that take part with the faction con∣trarie to his owne, he shall then haue no hostages at all left, if the banished shall prepare new warres against him: but hauing slaine the most outragious and daungerous, and banished the most mutinous, he ought still to retaine the remnant; for otherwise hee is [ B] to feare least all the exiled together, making warre vppon him, without feare of their friends at home, should so by force ouerthrow their enemies, and chaunge the Popular estate into an Aristocratie. As it happened vnto the Heracleans, the Cumans, and the Megarenses, who were chaunged from Popular estates into Aristocraties, for that the people had wholly driuen out the nobilitie, who with their friends combining their forces, and possessed of these three commonweales, ouerthrew therein the Popular estates, and againe established Aristocraties.* 1.1112

Yet amongst other conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales, the chaunge of a Popular estate into a Monarchy oftenest happeneth; and that either by ciuill warres, [ C] or through the ignorance of the people, hauing giuen too much power to some one of the subiects, as we haue before said. For Cicero speaking of the ciuill warres betwixt Caesar and Pompey, saith, Ex victoria cum multa, tum certe Tyrannis existit, Of victorie ensue many things, but especially a Tyrannicall gouernment. For that almost alwaies in ciuill warres the people is diuided: wherein if it so fall out, that the leaders of the fa∣ctions bring the matter vnto the tryall of a battaile, no man can doubt but that hee who therein shall carrie away the victorie, possessed of the forces and powers, shall either for ambition and the desire of honour, or for the saftie of his person, keepe vnto himself the* 1.1113 soueraigntie. Whereas contrariwise Tyrannicall gouernments (for the most part) chaunge into Popular estates. For that the people which neuer knoweth how to keep [ D] a meane, the Tyrannicall gouernment once taken away, desiring to communicat the soueraigntie vnto them all, for the hatred that it beareth against Tyrants, and the feare that it hath to fall againe into tyranny, becommeth so furious and passionat, as without reason or discretion to fall vpon all the kinsmen and friends of the tyrant, and not to leaue one of them aliue: whereof for the most part ensueth the slaughter, exile, & pro∣scription of the nobilitie; in which case euerie man of valour, courage, and worth, chu∣seth rather to shunne the furie of the most headstrong people, as the raging of a wild beast, rather than to beare rule ouer it. As it happened at Athens, after that Pisistratus was slaine; at Rome, after Tarquin the proud was driuen out: at Syracusa, after Hiero slaine, and againe after that Dionysius was banished: at Florence, after that the duke of [ E] Athens (who afterwards died Generall in the expedition of Poitiers) was driuen out: at Milan, after that Galuagno the tyrant had there lost his estate, where the people of Milan for fiftie yeares after, held a Popular estate, vntill that at last it was againe chan∣ged into a Tyrannicall gouernment by the Toresa•…•…s. Neither did the Swissars other∣wise establish that thei Popular estate (which by the space of 260 yeares hath conti∣nued euen vnto this day) but by killing of the tyrannicall deputies of the empire, tyran∣nizing ouer them. The like we see to haue happened in Thessalie, after that Alexan∣der the tyrant of the Phereans was slaine: and in Sienna, after that Alexander Dichi the new tyrant, was by the conspiracie of Hierome Seuerin slaine, and his partakers of the

nobilitie De Monte Nouo cast out, slaine, and banished, the people forthwith tooke vp∣on [ F] it the soueraigntie. Neither is it to be doubted, but that the Florentines, after the death of Alexander Medices the new tyrant, would haue taken the gouernment from them of the house of Medices, and reestablished their Popular estate, if they had cer∣tainly knowne the tyrant to haue beene slaine: but when as almost onely Laurence Medices with Caracciolus the muttherer were priuie to the murther (supposed to bee not onely the tyrants familiar and domesticall acquaintance, but his most inward friend also) no man could by him be persuaded, that he had slaine the tyrant: but so by pre∣sent flight making shift for himselfe, gaue opportunitie to young Cosmus Medices his cosen (who then had the forces of the estate in his power) to take vppon them the so∣ueraigntie. But this conuersion or chaunge of Tyrannicall gouernments into Demo∣craties, [ G] or of Democraties into Tyrannicall gouernments, most commonly happe∣neth, as we haue said, by occasion of ciuill warres: for if a strange enemie become lord of any Popular estate, he commonly ioyneth it vnto his owne: which is not then to be called a change, but a destruction of that Commonweal, so vnited vnto the victors; except the victor (which seldome times happeneth) restore vnto the vanquished their libertie and gouernment: as the Lacedemonians chose rather that the confederat ci∣ties of the Athenians, by them ouerthrowne in the Peloponesian warre, yea and that euen the citie of Athens it selfe also, should enioy their wonted libertie, than to be ioy∣ned vnto the Lacedemonian estate: howbeit yet that the Lacedemonians in euerie place established Aristocraties for Popular estates, quite contrarie vnto the manner and [ H] fashion of the Athenians, who in all places went about to ouerthrow Aristocraties, and to establish Democraties or Popular estates. So that it differeth much, whether the conuersions or chaunges of Commonweales proceed from a forren and straunge ene∣mie, or else from the citisens themselues.

Sometime also the people are so fickle and fantasticall, as that it is almost a thing im∣possible* 1.1114 for them to hold any one estate, which it is not by and by againe wearie of: as we may say of the auntient Athenians, Samians, Syracusans, Florentines, and Geno∣wayes; who after they had changed from one estate or forme of gouernment, would by and by haue another. Which phantasticall disease most commonly chanceth vn∣to such Popular estates, as wherein the subiects be too wise and of too subtill spirits, as [ I] were those whome we haue before spoken of: For amongst them euerie man thin∣keth himselfe worthy to be a commaunder, whereas where the subiects be more gros∣ser witted, they the more easily endure to be by others ruled, and more easily yeeld vn∣to other mens aduises, than doe they whome you must with the multitude of argu∣ments and subtiltie of wit conuince, before you shall persuade them vnto any thing: so subtillising their reasons, as that oftentimes they vanish euen into smoke; whereof ariseth an obstinacie of conceit, alwaies enemie vnto wise councels, with diuers chan∣ges of Commonweales. As a man may easily see in Thucidides, Xenophon, and Plu∣tarch, the Athenians lesse than in an hundred yeares, six times to haue chaunged their estate; and since them the Florentines seuen times: which so happened not neither vn∣to [ K] the Venetians, nor Swissers, men not of so sharpe a wit. For who knoweth not the Florentines to be most sharpe witted men? but the Swissers to haue alwaies bene men of a more dull spirit? And yet when as they both almost at the same time, chaunged their Monarchie into a Popular estate, the Swissers haue therein so maintained them∣selues now almost three hundred yeres: wheras the Florentines not long after changed their estate into an Aristocratie; they which in nobilitie and wealth exceed the rest, al∣together disdaining to be made equall with the common sort of the people. But the* 1.1115 nobilitie hauing so got the soueraigntie, began also to striue amongst themselues for

the principalitie: and with mutuall hatred and proscriptions so weakned themselues [ A] and their estate, as that they were by the people taking vp armes against them easily ouercome and put to flight. But the nobilitie (and so the Aristocraticall estate) thus ouerthrowne, the popular sort, and they of them especially which were called the Grandes (or great ones) began to striue and contend among themselues, for the go∣uernment of the state: and yet these much more cruelly than had before the nobilitie; for that they contended not by forme of iustice, or of law, but by verie force of armes, and dint of sword; who hauing with mutuall slaughters spent themselues, the middle sort of the people (for they were diuided into three sorts) began to take vpon them the mannaging of the estate: but these also falling together by the eares for places of ho∣nour and commaund, the verie basest and refuse of the rascal people, became too strong [ B] for them, filling all places with the blood and slaughter of them, vntill they had driuen out and slaine the most part of them. Now these also of the baser sort become masters of the estate, and hauing no moe enemies left with whome to striue, began at length to struggle with it selfe, and made such cruell warre vpon it selfe, that the blood ran down the streets, yea & that most part of the houses were with fire quite consumed, vntill that they of Luca moued with their great miseries and distresse, comming in great compa∣nies to Florence, exhorted them their neighbours to lay downe armes, and to seeke for peace: by whose good speeches they persuaded at last, ceased from their slaughters & butchering of one another. Whereupon to end the matter, they sent ambassadours vnto the pope, to send them some one descended of royall blood, to rule and raigne [ C] ouer them: where by good fortune there was then at Rome Charles of Fraunce brother to king Lewes the ninth, who at the request of the pope, and of the Florentines themselues, came to Florence, and with the good liking of the people in generall, tooke vpon him the gouernment, ended their quarrels, and reconciled the citisens among themselues, together with the Commonweale: and so hauing appeased the citisens, and reformed the Commonweale, being inuited to the kingdome of Naples, he left in the citie of Florence his deputies. But he was scarce well gone out of the citie, but that the Florentines wearie of the gouernment of the deputies, came againe vnto their po∣pular gouernment, and so with all renewed their ciuill warres. For redresse whereof [ D] they sent for the duke of Athens, who hauing taken vpon him the soueraigntie, com∣maunded the citisens to lay downe armes, and for the safetie of his person, tooke vnto him a strong guard, so to keepe vnder the seditious and rebellious persons. But the ci∣tisens now supposing themselues so to be spoyled of their libertie, and brought into bondage by the terrour of his guard, turned their old mutuall hatred all vppon the prince, first secretly, and afterwards three conspiracies breaking forth into open force, one after another in the citie: yea at last the citisens altogether burst out into such ha∣tred against the prince, that they besieged the pallace wherein he lay, together with the souldiours which guarded him: neither could that so strait a siege be broken vp, vntill the prince was content himselfe with all his familie to void the city: which for safegard [ E] of his life he was glad to do, not hauing yet a whole yeare gouerned the state. So the citie deliuered of the feare of a master, appointed a forme of an Aristocratie, not much vnlike vnto a Popular estate; deuising new names for their officers and magistrats, still chaunging and rechaunging them with the manner of their state and gouernment, of∣tentimes no better ordered, than if it had bene committed to mad men, or children without discretion: scarcely twentie yeares together keeping the same forme of state. But as sicke men in the heat of burning feuers, desire to be remoued now hither, and by and by againe thither, or from one bed to another, as if the disease were in the places where they lay, and not in the verie entrals of their bodies: euen so the Florentines

were still turning and tumbling of their estate, vntill they light vpon Cosmus Medices, [ F] of all Physitians the most skilfull, who cured the citie of these popular diseases, by esta∣blishing therein a Monarchie, and building therin three strong citadels, furnished with good & sure garrisons; so leauing vnto his posteritie a well grounded soueraigne state, by himselfe holden by the space of almost fortie yeares: than which nothing could haue bin wished for of almightie God, better or more wholsome for such a most sediti∣ous citie. And thus much briefly concerning the Florentine state, which haply might seeme incredible, had they not bene committed to the remembrance of all posteritie, euen by the * writings of the Florentines themselues. The like tragedies we see to haue* 1.1116 bene plaid also by the people of Affrike (who in sharpnesse of wit are said to passe the Italians) when they made proofe of Popular estates: whereof I will set downe but one [ G] or two examples amongst many: as namely the inhabitants of Segelmessa, a citie vpon the sea coast in the kingdome of Bugia, reuolting from their king, established among themselues a Popular estate, but shortly after entred into such factions and ciuill sediti∣ons, as that not able to endure either the gouernment of their king, or yet the gouern∣ment of themselues, they by common consent laid all their houses and the walles of their citie euen with the ground, that so they might euerie one of them as kings and princes rule and raigne in their owne houses abroad in the countrey. The people also of Togoda, a citie in the frontiers of the kingdome of Fez, wearie of their Aristocratie, forsooke their countrey. For which causes the people of Affrike, not able to endure the Aristocratique or Popular estates, haue almost euerie where established Royall [ H] Monarchies.

Now albeit that Aristocratike estates seeme to many both better and more assured* 1.1117 and durable also than the Popular, yet so it is, that the gouernors therof if they bee not of accord among themselues, are still therein in double daunger: the one from the fa∣ction among themselues, the other from the insurrection or rebellion of the people, who neuer faile to fall vpon them if they once find them at variance among them∣selues, as we haue before shewed of the Florentines. The like whereof happened at Vienna, at Genes, and diuers other Commonweales in Germanie also. As it also chan∣ced in the Peloponesian warre, vnto all the cities of Greece which were then gouer∣ned by the nobilitie or richer sort. Which is also yet more daungerous, when the go∣uernours [ I] giue leaue to all straungers to come and dwell in their cities or countries: who by little and little encreasing, and in wealth and credit growing equall with the na∣turall subiects or citisens, and hauing no part in the gouernment, if they shall chance to be surcharged, or otherwise euill entreated of the gouernours of the state, will vppon* 1.1118 the least occasion rise vp against them, and so haply chase euen the naturall lords out of their own countrey: As it chaunced at Sienna, at Genes, at Zurike, and at Cullen; where the straungers encreasing, and seeing themselues surcharged and euill entreated, without hauing any part or interest in the estate, draue out the gouernours and slew most part of them. And namely they of Lindaw, after they had slaine the gouernors, chaunged their Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate: as also did the inha∣bitants [ K] of Strasburg, who in detestation of the Aristocraticall gouernment, which they had chaunged into a Popular, after they had driuen out, banished, or slaine their lords and gouernours, solemnly by law prouided, That no man should haue the great estate, or any other publike charge in the citie, except hee could first well proue his grandfather to haue bene some verie base fellow, and so himselfe to be descended from the meanest sort of the rascall people. Which yet is no new matter: For we read, that the straungers in the Commonweale of Corfu encreased so fast, that in the end they seised vpon all the nobilitie, whom they cast into prison, and there murthered them;

chaunging afterwards that Aristocraticall estate into a Popular gouernment. The like [ A] hapned vnto the Aristocratique Commonweales of the Samians, the Sibarites, the Trezenians, the Amphipolits, the Chalcidians, the Thurians, the Cnidians, and them of Chio, who were all by strangers changed into popular estates, hauing with their multitude thrust out the naturall Lords and gouernours. Which is the thing most to be feared in the Venetian estate, which we haue before showed to be a meere Aristo∣cratie, and receptacle of all straungers, who haue there so well encreased, that for one Venetian gentleman there are an hundred citisens, as well noble as base descended of straungers; which may well be proued by the number of them which was there taken 20 yeares agoe, or thereabouts: wherein were found nine and fiftie thousand three hundred fortie nine citisens, aboue twentie yeares old; and threescore seauen [ B] thousand fiue hundred fiftie seauen women: two thousand one hundred eightie fiue* 1.1119 Religious men, 1157 Iewes: which are in all, an hundred thirtie and two thousand three hundred and thirtie persons; whereunto putting a third part more for the num∣ber of them which are vnder twentie yeares old, (taking the ordinary age and the liues of men to be 60 yeares, as the law pre•…•…ineth) it amounteth to the number of about an hundred seauentie six thousand foure hundred and fortie citisens, beside straungers. In which number the nobility or gentlemen were not comprehended, who could not be aboue three or foure thousand, accounting as well them that were absent, as them that were present. And truely I cannot but maruell why the Venetians haue publi∣shed, yea and that more is haue suffered to be put in print the number that then was [ C] taken. The Athenians long agoe committed the like errour, and when the citie was most populous, found that vpon the number taken, there were in the citie twentie thousand citisens, ten thousand straungers, and foure hundred thousand slaues: which open number and account the Romans would not take of their straungers, and so much lesse of their slaues: whom they would not either by their countenance or at∣tire haue knowne from the rest of the citisens: Howbeit that some were of opinion that the slaues ought to be knowne by their apparell; yet their opinion preuayled which thought the same to be daungerous, and a thing to bee feared, lest the slaues entering into the number of themselues, should make their masters their slaues, for so Seneca writeth. We read in the hystorie of Cardinall Bembus, that the greatest as∣semblie [ D] of the gentlemen of Venice in his time (when as that Commonweale was most populous) was but fifteene hundred; which their fewnesse they by most certein tokens, and their attire, make still to appeare. But that which hath most maintained their seignorie against the commotion of the citisens, Is the mutuall amitie and con∣cord of the gouernours and gentlemen among themselues; and the sweetnes of liber∣tie, which is greater in that citie than in any other place of the world: so that beeing drowned in pleasure and delights, and hauing also part in certeine honors and meane offices, whereof the gentlemen are not capable, they haue no occasion to stirre for the chaunging of the estate; as had those of whom I haue before spoken, who were not onely debarred of all offices, but by the gouernors of the State surcharged and [ E] euill entreated also.

Now all these changes of Aristocraties into popular Commonweales haue beene* 1.1120 violent and bloodie, as it happeneth almost alwaies: whereas to the contrarie it com∣meth to passe that Popular estates chaunge into Aristocraties by a more gentle and insensible chaunge. As when entrance is giuen vnto straungers, who in tract of time by little and little plant themselues, and multiplie, without hauing any part in the estate and gouernment, it falleth out in the end that the naturall citisen employed in publique charges, or in the warres, or by popular diseases wasted, do so decay; the

straungers still encreasing: whereby it commeth to passe, that the lesser part of the in∣habitants [ F] hold the soueraigntie, which wee haue shewed to bee a right Aristocratie. Such were the changes of those Commonweals which we haue before noted, from the people vnto the nobilitie, and such as haue indeed happened vnto the Venetians, the Luques, them of Rhaguse, & of Genes, which being in auntient time Popular estates, haue by little and little as it were without feeling, changed into Aristocraties: ioyning hereunto also, that the poorer sort of the citisens hauing much a do to liue, & so wholly intentiue vnto their domesticall and priuat affaires, shun all publike charges without profit: and so by succession and prescription of time exclude themselues with their fa∣milies from entermeddling with the state. And this maner of change in the estate, is of all others most gentle and easie, and least subiect vnto tumults and sturres: neither can [ G] otherwise be letted, but that it wil in time chaunge, but by keeping of strangers from en∣tring into the citie: or by sending of them out into colonies, or else together with the rest admitting them vnto the honors and preferments in the estate: and so much the more if the people be giuen to warre. For otherwise it is to be feared, that the nobilitie not daring to put armes into the subiects hands, but being constrained to go to warres themselues, should be all at once ouerthrowne, and so the people inuade to soueraign∣tie: as it happened to the seigneurie of Tarentum, which in one battell against the Iapi∣ges lost almost all the nobilitie: after which the people seeing themselues the stronger,* 1.1121 changed the Aristocraty into a Popular estate, in the time of Themistocles. And for this cause the nobilitie of the Argiues, being almost all slaine by Cleomenes king of Lacede∣monia, [ H] they that remained yet aliue, fearing the rebellion of the people, of themselues receiued the comminaltie into the fellowship of the gouernment, and so of their owne accord seemed willingly to grant that which the people otherwise haue taken from them by force, & whether they would or no: by which means their Aristocratie most quietly and sweetly chaunged into a Popular estate. So one of the things that gaue ad∣uantage vnto the people of Rome ouer the nobilitie, was the victorie of the Vientes, who in one battell slew 300 of the Fabians, all gentlemen of one house, when as not long after twelue families of the Potitij, who ascribed the beginning of their houses vn∣to the gods, were in one and the same yere quite extinguished & brought to naught, as Liuie writeth. And therefore the Venetians, better citisens than warriors, if they bee to [ I] make warre (which they neuer doe but vpon great necessitie) vse commonly to chuse their generall one of their nobilitie, their souldiors for the most part beeing stran∣gers and mercenarie men. But this inconuenience for the changing of the estate, for the losse of the nobilitie, cannot happen in a Monarchie, if all the princes of the blood bee* 1.1122 not slaine together with the rest of the nobilitie: as the maner of the Turks is to doe in all places where they haue any purpose absolutely to command, where they spare not so much as a gentleman: whereof haue ensued the destruction of many Common∣weals in the East, and great encreasing of the Turkish empire. But this change, or rather vnion or encreasement of one estate by another, proceedeth from externall force. So in France also, when as almost all the nobilitie of France was slaine in the expedition of [ K] Fontenay, neere vnto Auxerre, by the ciuill warre betwixt Lothaire the eldest sonne of Lewes the Gentle, on the one part, and Lewes and Charles the Bald on the other: yet for all that all their three Monarchies stood still firme: and namely when the countrey of Champagne had lost so much of the nobilitie in those wars, as that for the restoring therof, the gentlewomen had especial priuilege to ennoble their husbands with whom they should marrie, and yet for all that the Monarchy in the state therof felt no change at all. And thus are the great and notable changes commonly made in Aristocratike and Popular Commonweales.

But nothing is so much in an Aristocratie to be feared, as least some gracious man [ A] * 1.1123 of the nobilitie, or of the people, desirous of rule & authoritie, should stirre vp the peo∣ple against the nobilitie, and become leader of them himselfe. For therof ensueth the most certaine destruction of an Aristocratie, together with the nobilitie. In this sort Thr•…•…syllus first, and afterward Thrasybulus at Athens, Marius and Caesar at Rome, Fra. Valori, and P. Sodorin at Florence, armed the people against the nobilitie: which is also so much the more to be feared, if the great honours of the estate bee bestowed vppon most filthy and wicked men, and other vertuous men and such as haue well deserued of the Commonweale, kept backe and excluded. Which thing seemeth not grieuous onely to euerie good man, and not to be borne withall, but ministreth occasion also vnto the seditious and popular, to enflame the people against the nobilitie. Neither [ B] for any other cause did the people of the Orites by force wrest the power and gouern∣ment from the nobilitie, than for that they had preferred vnto the chiefe honours one Heracleotes, a man for his euill life infamous. Which thing also was the destruction of Nero and Heliogabalus, for that they had bestowed the greatest honours and prefer∣ments of the empire, vpon most wicked and corrupt men. Which of all other things is most to be feared and shunned in an Aristocratie Aristocratically gouerned: that is to say, where the people is kept from all honours and places of commaund: which al∣though it be of it selfe an hard thing patiently to endure, yet were it the better to bee borne, if the gouernment were committed to good men: but when it is giuen to wic∣ked and vnworthy men, euerie audacious fellow vppon occasion offered, will easily [ C] draw the people from the nobilitie, and so much the rather, by how much the nobilitie shall be at lesse vnitie among themselues. Which plague, as it is in all estates and go∣uernments,* 1.1124 so is it especially in an Aristocratie to be eschewed and fled. Now discord oft times ariseth euen of most small matters, which as sparkes raise the great fiers of ciuill warres, which at length take hold euen of the whole bodie of the estate of a citie or Commonweale. As it happened at Florence, for the refusall made by a gentleman of the noble house of Bondelmont, to marrie a gentlewoman to whome hee had before giuen his promise, gaue occasion to the raising of a faction amongst the nobilitie, who so wasted and deuoured one another, as that the people to end the quarrel, easily draue* 1.1125 out all the rest, and commaunded the state of the citie. And for like occasion arose [ D] great ciuill warres amongst the Ardeates, for an inheretrix, whome her mother would haue married vnto a gentleman, and her guardions to a base obscure man: which di∣uided the people from the nobilitie, in such sort, that the nobilitie vanquished and put to flight by the people, tooke their refuge vnto the Romans, and the people vnto the Volsians, who were afterwards vanquished by the Romans. So also the citie & Com∣monweale of Delphos, for the same occasion, was chaunged from an Aristocratie vn∣to a Popular estate. The state of Mitelin was also chaunged from an Aristocratie into a Popular estate, vpon a suit betwixt the nobilititie and the people, Which of them should haue the tuition of two orphans. And the state of the Commonweale of the Hestiens, for a suit in matter of inheritance betwixt two priuat men. And the sacred [ E] warre which chaunged not, but euen vtterly ruinated the estate of the Phocenses, was grounded vpon the marriage of an inheritrix, whome two of their great lords stroue to haue. And that more is, the Aetolians and Arcadians, for a long time sore weakened one another with mutuall warres, and all but fo•…•… a boares head: as they of Carthage and of Bizaque did also for a small frigot. So betwixt the Scots and the Picts, was rai∣sed a most cruell warre, and all but for certaine dogges, which the Scots had taken from the Picts, and neuer could be againe reconciled, howbeit that they had for six hundred yeares before liued in good peace and amitie together. And the war betwixt the duke

of Burgundy and the Swissers, which could no otherwise be ended, but by the death of [ F] the duke himself, was all but for a wagon load of sheepe skins which he had taken from the Swissers.* 1.1126

Sometime also the changes and ruines of Commonweales come, when the great ones are to be brought in question, to cause them to giue an account of their actions, whether it be for right or wrong: wherein euen they which are guiltlesse (and especi∣ally in Popular estates) not without cause alwaies feare the calumnies and doubtfull is∣sues of iudgements, which most commonly endaunger the liues, the goods, and ho∣nour of such as are accused. And to leaue forren examples, wee haue store enow of our owne, and that of such as of late haue set on fire all the kingdome with ciuill wars when it was but spoken of, for calling them to account for two and fortie millions. And [ G] no maruell if they so feared to be brought in question for embeseling of the common treasure and reuenewes, when as Pericles, a man of greatest integritie, and which had most magnificently spent euen his owne wealth for the Athenian Commonweale, ra∣ther than he would hazard the account that they demaunded of him for the treasure of Athens, which he had mannaged, and so generally of his actions, raised the Pelopone∣sian warre, which neuer after tooke end vntill it had ruinated diuers Commonweals, and wholly chaunged the estate of all the cities of Greece. Who alwaies hauing bene a good husband, and had the charge of the common treasure of that Commonweale, by the space of almost fiftie yeares, was therefore yet found neuer the richer, as Thucy∣dides, a most true historiographer, and Pericles his most mortall enemie reporteth of [ H] him: who caused him to be banished with the banishment of the Ostracisme. And euen for the selfe same cause the Rhodians and they of Choos had their estates chan∣ged from Aristocraties into Popular estates. And albeit that Caesar was of himselfe most ambitious and desirous of soueraigntie: yet was he not so much desirous to beare rule, as affraid to be called to account by priuat men, for such things as he had done, as his enemies had openly boasted that he should, so soone as hee was discharged of his charge: not the least cause that moued him to ceise vpon the estate. For what assu∣rance could he haue of himselfe, seeing before the two Scipioes (Africanus the honor of his time, and Scipio Asiaticus) Rotulus and Cicero, by the iudgement of the people condemned? Now if good men were to feare, what should the wicked do? who be∣sides [ I] that they are in hope the better to escape, the Commonweale beeing all on a broile, are also resolued, that the common treasures can neuer more easily be robbed, or good men spoiled and slaine, than in the time of ciuill warres: euer taking it for an aduantage to fish in the troubled water. And although it may fortune such wicked men also to perish (as oftentimes it happeneth them which haue bene the authors of ci∣uill warres, themselues to die a most miserable death) yet haue they still in their mouths that desperat saying of Cateline▪ That the fire (forsooth) which had taken hold of his house, which he could not with water quench, hee would yet quench with the vtter ru∣ine of the same. And truly much he missed not, but that hee had vtterly ouerthrowne the Roman Commonweale, or stept into the soueraigntie, had not Cicero the watchful [ K] Consul, and Ca. Antonius his companion (although it were with much a do) slaine him so desperat a citisen, with all his fellows. Neither ought Cicero (by his good leaue bee it said) to haue driuen Catiline out of the citie, but to haue oppressed him euen there, the conspiracie once detected. For it is not to be hoped, but that he which seeth himself ba∣nished from his house, & from his country, if he haue power, wil forthwith put himself in arms, as he did. And had he gained the battell against Ca▪ Antonius, hee had put the* 1.1127 whole estate in great danger, being one of the most noble gentlemen, and best allied of all them that were in Rome. Certeine it is that by his departure out of the citie, a great

and dangerous sinke of the Commonweale was so well clensed; yet had it beene bet∣ter [ A] for him to haue beene there oppressed, than armed against his owne countrie. But of such great and dangerous enemies, the wiser sort aduiseth vs, to make them our* 1.1128 verie good friends, or else vtterly to destroy them, rather than to driue them out of the citie; except we should for honour banish them: as they did in the cities of Athens, Argos, and Ephesus, where the great Lordes mightie in wealth, fauour, or vertue, were for a certeine time (which for all that neuer exceeded ten yeares) constrained to absent themselues, without any losse of goods or reputation; which was an honourable kind of banishment. Of whom so banished, not any one of them is reported to haue there∣fore made warre vpon his countrie. But to banish a great Lord with losse of his good•…•… and contumely, is not to quench but to kindle the fire of warre against the estate: For [ B] that oft times such a banished man by the helpe of his friends aspireth vnto the soue∣raigntie; as did Dion banished out of Syracusa by Dionysius the yonger, against whom for all that he yet tooke not vp armes vntill he was by him proscribed. And Martius Coriolanus, who cast into exile, brought the Romans to such extremitie, as that had he not suffered himselfe to haue beene ouercome with the prayers and teares of his mother, and the other women whom the Romans had sent vnto him, the Roman state had there taken end. In like manner the banished men of the house of Medices, and the nobilitie of Zurich in the yeare 133•…•…, thrust out of their cities, by the helpe and power of their friends and allies besieged their owne natiue countries, and for a long [ C] time wearied the citisens their countrymen with a most doubtfull and daungerous warre. But yet here some man may say, That it is more safetie to keepe a wicked and a daungerous citisen without the wals, than to bee troubled with such a plague in the verie entrailes of the Commonweale. Whereto I yeeld: but yet how much greater a follie is it to let him whom thou oughtest to kill, to escape out of the citie, who once got out, is both willing and able to stirre vp, and maintaine warre? Artaxerxes king of Persia had cast in prison Cyrus the yonger, guiltie of high treason, and had comman∣ded him in princely manner to be bound with chaines of gold; and afterwards ouer∣come with his mothers requests enlarged him: but he had no sooner got his libertie, but that he made most grieuous warre vpon the king, and was like enough by his bro∣thers [ D] death to haue obtained the kingdome, or else haue vndone his countrie; had he not by the kings armie beene circumuented and slaine. I said we must kill such people,* 1.1129 or make them our good friends: as did Augustus, hauing discouered the conspiracie of Cinna against him, and hauing him in his power attainted and conuinced by his owne letters, yet neuerthelesse pardoned him; and not so content, tooke him by the hand, and swore a bond of mutuall friendship with him, and afterwards bestowed the greatest honours and preferments of the estate vpon him, at the time that Cinna ex∣pected nothing but the sentence of condemnation, and so present execution; vsing these words of grace and fauour vnto him: Vitam tibi Cinna iterum do, priùs hosti, nunc insidiatori ac parricidae; Ex hodierno die amicitia inter nos incipiat, contendamus vtrum [ E] ego meliore fide vitam tibi dederim, an tu debeas, Cinna (said he) thy life I giue thee againe, being before mine enemie, and now a traitour and a murtherer; But from this day, let vs begin to be friends, and from henceforth let vs striue, whether I with greater trust haue giuen thee thy life, or thou with greater faithfulnesse doest ow it. After which time he neuer had a more faithfull friend; being also afterwards by him appoin∣ted heire of all his goods. Augustus had before put to death an infinite number of such as had sworne and conspired his death: but now had a purpose in Cinna to proue if by gentlenesse and mercie he could gaine the hearts of men, wherein he was not de∣ceiued: for from that time there was neuer any found which durst attempt any thing

against him. So the Venetians also hauing taken prisoner Gonzaga the duke of Man∣tua, [ F] of all others their most mortall enemie, (who had ioyned all his forces and power with king Lewes of Fraunce for the ouerthrow of the Venetian state) did not onely set him at libertie, but made him Generall also of their forces; by which so honorable a kindnesse he bound, for euer after continued their most fast and loiall friend. And this is it for which Pontius the old capitaine of the Samnites said, That the great armie of the Romans surprised in the straites of the Appenine mountaines was either franke and freely to bee set at libertie, or else all to be put to the sword: for that so it should come to passe, that either the power of the Romans should by so great a slaughter be greatly weakned, or else hauing receiued from the Samnites so great a benefit, as the life and libertie of so many men, they should for euer after keepe good league and [ G] friendship with them.

But these conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales do more often happen in* 1.1130 little and small cities or estates, than in great kingdomes full of great prouinces, and people. For that a small Commonweale is soone diuided into two parts or factions: Whereas a great Commonweale is much more hardly diuided; for that betwixt the great Lords and the meanest subiects, betwixt the rich and the poore, betwixt the good and the bad, there are a great number of the middle sort which bind the one with the other, by meanes that they participate both with the one and the other, as hauing some accord and agreement with both the extreames. And that it is for which we see the little Commonweales of Italie, & the auntient Commonweals of Greece, [ H] which had but one, two, or three townes or cities belonging to them, in one age to haue suffered moe alterations and chaunges than are in many ages reported to haue beene in this kingdome of Fraunce, or in the kingdome of Spayne. For it is not to be doubted but that the extreames are alwaies contrarie one of them to the other, and so at discord and variance betwixt themselues, if there be not some meanes which may binde and ioine the one of them with the other; which we see by the eye, not onely betwixt the nobilitie and base common people, betwixt the rich and the poore, be∣twixt the good and the bad, but euen in the same citie also, where as but the diuersitie of places seperate but by some riuer, or wast vacant peece of ground without building vpon it, doth oft times set the citisens at odds, and giue occasion to the chaunging 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [ I] * 1.1131 the estate. So the citie of Fez was neuer at quiet, neither could the slaughters & mur∣thers euer be appeased or staied, vntill that Ioseph king of Marocco and of Fez, of two townes standing somewhat distant one of them from the other by continuate buil∣ding made them both one, and that now the greatest citie of Fez, whereby he gained the praise and commendation of a most wise & discreet prince; for that he so not onely ioyned houses to houses, and wals to wals, but bound also the mindes of the citisens and inhabitants of both places (before burning with an incredible hatred one of them against an other, and alwaies diuided in warres) now in perpetuall loue and friendship together. Which hapned also vnto the Clazomenians, where one part of the citie standing in the maine, and the other part in an Island, there was alwaies discord and [ K] warre betwixt them of the Isle and the other citisens. And so at Athens they which dwelt by the hauens side commonly called Piraeus, were at continuall discord and va∣riance with them of the vpper Towne which they called Astu or the Citie, vntill that Pericles with long walles ioyned the Hauen vnto the Citie. For which cause also such tumults and quarrels fell betwixt the citisens of Venice, and the mariners and other the seafaring men, as had brought the citie into extreame perill and daunger had not Peter Lauredan with his great authoritie and wisedome appeased the same.

But most often it hapneth the chaunges of Commonweales to follow after ciuill

discord, especially if some neighbour prince shall vpon the suddein oppresse a citie or [ A] * 1.1132 State weakned with the slaughter of the citisens or subiects, or else the citisens or sub∣iects themselues being by the eares together: As the Englishmen haue often times van∣quished and ouerrunne the French being at variance among themselues: And the king of Fez easely tooke the citie of Tefza, the citisens being almost all consumed and spent with ciuill warre, And in the memorie of our fathers Philip the second duke of Bourgondie ioyned vnto the boundes of his dukedome Dinan and Bo•…•…ines, two cities in the countrie of Liege (parted in sunder but with a riuer) after that they had with long warres weakned themselues, which two cities for all that he could not be∣fore by any force subdue; howbeit that in taking of them he did but marrie the one of [ B] them vnto the other, as saith Philip Commines. So also whilest the kings of Marocco were in armes together for the soueraigntie, the Gouernour of Thunes and of Tele∣sin dismembred those two prouinces to make himselfe a kingdome of. And by the same meanes Lachares seeing the Athenians in combustion, in the time of Demetrius the besieger, stept into the Seignorie. And that more is, we read that foure thousand fiue hundred slaues and banished men inuaded the Capitoll, and missed but a little to haue made themselues lords of Rome, whilest the Nobilitie and Common people in the meane time were together by the eares in an vproar in the middest of the citie, who thereupon fell to agreement among themselues; not vnlike vnto two dogges, who readie to pull one an others throat out, seing a wolfe, fall both vpon him. Wher∣fore such ciuill discord is most daungerous vnto cities or estates, especially if there be [ C] no societie or allyance betwixt the State so troubled, and the neighbour Princes: for that the enemie so at hand, may oppresse the state (the citisens or subiects so at vari∣ance among themselues) before that any helpe can come. Whereat we are not to matuell, for they to whom neither the huge height of steepe mountaines, neither the vnmeasurable depth of the botomlesse sea, nor the most solitarie desarts, nor the grea∣test and strongest fortifications, nor the innumerable multitude of enemies can serue for the staying of their ambitious and auaritious couses and desires; how should they content themselues with their owne, without encroaching vppon their neighbours, whose frontiers touch theirs, and that fit occasion presenteth it selfe for them so to do? which is there the more to be feared where the Commonweale is but little: as is that [ D] of Rhaguse, of Geneua, and of Luque, which haue but one Towne, and the territorie vene strait; so that he which shall gaine the towne, shall withall become master of the Estate also: which so chaunceth not in great and spacious Commonweale, wherein many castles, cities, countries, and prouinces are in mutuall helpe together combyned, so that one citie thereof being taken, or a countrie or prouince thereof spoyled, yet followeth not the ruine of the Estate, one of them still succoring an other, as many members in one bodie, which at need helpe one an other.

Yet for all that a Monarchie hath this aduantage proper vnto it selfe, aboue the* 1.1133 Aristocratique and Popular estates, That in these commonly there is but one towne [ E] or citie wherein the Seigneurie lyeth, which is as an house or place of retrait for them which haue the mannaging of those estates to retire vnto; which once taken by the enemie, the estate is withall vndone: whereas a Monarke chaungeth himselfe from place to place as occasion requireth: neither doth the taking of him by the enemie bring with it the losse of the Estate. As when the citie of Capua was taken, their estate was also ouerthrowne by the Romans, neither was there so much as one towne or fortresse which made resistance against them; for that the Senat and the people which had the soueraigntie were all together taken prisoners. The citie of Sienna also being taken by the duke of Florence, all the other townes and fortresses of that Seigneurie

at the same time yeelded themselues vnto him also. But the king taken prisoner, is [ F] most commonly for his ransome set at libertie; wherewith if the enemie hold not him selfe content, the Estates may proceed to a new election, or take the next of blood if they haue other princes: yea sometime the captiue king himselfe had rather to yeeld vp his estate, or else to die a prisoner, than to grieue his subiects with his too heauie a ransome. As indeed that which most troubled the Emperour Charles the fift was the resolution of king Francis then his prisoner, who gaue him to vnderstand that he was* 1.1134 vpon the point to resigne his kingdome vnto his eldest sonne, if he would not accept of the conditions by him offered: For why, the realme and all the Estate stood yet whole without any chaunge taking, or any alteration suffering. And albeit that Spayne, Italie, England, all the Low Countries, the Pope, the Venetians, and all the Poten∣tates [ G] of Italie had combyned themselues against the house of Fraunce, ouerthrowne our legions at Pauie, and caried away the king with the flower of the nobilitie into Spayne; yet was there not any which durst enter into Fraunce to conquer it, knowing the lawes and nature of that Monarchie. For as a building grounded vpon deepe foundations, & built with durable matter, well vnited and ioyned in euery part, feareth neither winde nor tempest, but easily resisteth all force and violence; euen so a Com∣monweale grounded vpon good lawes, well vnited and ioyned in all the members thereofe, asily suffereth not alteration: as also to the contrarie we see some states and Commonweales so euill built and set together, as that they ow their fall and ruine vn∣to the first wind that bloweth, or tempest that ariseth. [ H]

And yet is there no kingdome which shall not in continuance of time be chaunged,* 1.1135 and at length also be ouerthrowne. But they are in better case which least feele such their chaunges by little and little made, whether it be from euill to good, or from good to better; as we haue showed by the example of the Venetian Commonweale: which at the beginning was a pure Monarchie, which afterward was sweetly chaunged into a Popular estate, and now by little and little is chaunged into an Aristocratie, and that in such quiet sort, as that it was not well by any man perceiued that the estate was at all chaunged. An other example we haue also of the Germaine Empire, which foun∣ded* 1.1136 by Charlemaigne and discending to his posteritie, so long continued a true Mo∣narchie vnder one soueraigne princes gouernment, vntill that the line of Charlemaigne [ I] fayling, the Emperours begun to be created by election; at which time it was right easie for the princes which had the choice by little and little to clip the Eagles wings, and to prescribe lawes and conditions vnto the Emperour to rule by; and yet right happie was he which could thereunto aspire vpon any condition whatsoeuer: where∣by the state of the Monarchie began by little and little to decay, and the state of an Aristocratie to encrease in the Princes and Estates of the Empire, in such sort as that at this present the Emperours haue nothing more but as it were the bare name and title of an Emperour, the soueraigntie resting in the Estates of the Empire it selfe. So that had not eleuen most noble Princes of the house of Austria for their worthy deeds right famous, as it were in a successiue right (one of them whilest he himselfe yet li∣ueth, [ K] still procuring an other of the same house to be designed Emperour) in some sort maintained the maiestie of the Germaine Empire, the Emperours for their estate had now long ago beene like vnto the Dukes of Venice, and happely inferiour too. The •…•…ke chaunge hapned vnto the Polonians, the lyne of Iagellon failing: as also the Danes, after that Christierne their king was by them his subiects imprisoned, and his brother to be chosen king in his place, sworne to such conditions as the nobilitie would: and after that Frederike which now raigneth hath beene constrained to confirme the same, (as I haue before noted) whereby it manifestly appeareth, that the Nobilitie there

hold as it were the soueraigntie, and that by little and little that kingdome will change [ A] into an Aristocratie if Frederike should die without children.

And albeit that the estates of Hungarie, Bohemia, Polonia, and Denmarke, haue al∣wayes* 1.1137 pretended the right of election of their kings, although they haue children, (which prerogatiue they stil maintaine) yet commonly the kings their parents appoin∣ted their children vnto the succession of their kingdomes, who so chosen in their fa∣thers places, better maintaine the rights of soueraigntie than do straungers (who haue the same oft times cut short, and so their soueraigne power in them restrained) so that the kingdomes so descending, as it were in succession from the great grandfathers vnto their nephewes, the soueraigne rights by little and little without violence returne again from the nobilitie vnto the kings themselues: which is both an easie chaunge, & most [ B] wholsome for the Commonweale. For so Cazimir the Great, king of Polonia, worthi∣ly defended the soueraigne rights by him receiued from his great grandfather: but hee dead without issue, the Polonians indeed called Lewes king of Hungarie (and Cazimir his nephew) vnto the kingdome of Polonia, but with the soueraigntie therein much diminished; he for the gaining of the kingdome yeelding to whatsoeuer the estates de∣sired. But Lewes dead also without heires male, Iagello duke of Lithuania marrying one of the daughters and heires of Lewes, and so with her obtaining the kingdome of Polonia, yet more impaired the soueraigne rights than they had before bene: the prin∣ces of whose posteritie neuerthelesse as it were in successiue right, for the space of aboue [ C] two hundred yeares, tooke vpon them the gouernment of the kingdome, and notably maintained the rights of their soueraigntie, vntill the death of Sigismundus Augustus, last heire male of that house: vnto whome by right of election succeeded Henrie of Fraunce, Charles the ninth the French kings brother: but with oathes and conditions bound vnto the estates, so much derogating from the rights of a soueraigne Monarch, as that indeed he might haue seemed rather a prince than a king. And to say yet more, I being sent to Mets, to assist them which were thither sent with the duke, to receiue the ambassadours of Polonia, and to parle with them, it was told me by Salomon Sbo∣roschi one of the ambassadours, That the estates of Polonia had yet cut much shorter the power of the new elected king, had it not bene in the regard they had of the honor [ D] of the house of Fraunce. Thus we see Monarchies peaceably by little and little to change into Aristocraties, if so it be that the Monarchie be not by auntient lawes and immutable customes, maintained in the maiestie thereof. As we see in the creation of the pope, where the Consistorie (or Colledge of Cardinals) derogat nothing from the soueraigne maiestie that he hath in all the demaine of the church, and the fees depen∣ding thereon: no more than do the order of the knights of Malta in any thing dimi∣nish the power of the Grand maister, who hath the power of life and death, and to di∣spose of the reuenewes, estates, and offices of the countrey, yeelding fealtie and homage vnto the king of Spaine for the isle of Malta, which Charles the fift the emperour vpon this condition gaue them. And albeit that the colledge of cardinals after the death of [ E] pope Iulius the second, determined in the conclaue, to moderat the popes power: yet shortly after they flew from that they had before decreed, in such sort that Leo the tenth, then by them chosen, tooke vpon him more power than had any pope of long time before him.

But that chaunge is of others most daungerous to a Monarchie, when as the king* 1.1138 dying without issue, there is some one who in wealth and power exceedeth the rest; & so much the more, if he be also ambitious and desirous of rule: For no doubt, but that hauing the power in his hand, hee will, if hee can, take the soueraigntie from the other weake princes. For so Hugh Capet the right line of Charlemaigne ended, being Prouost

of the citie of Paris, and a man of great wealth, and no lesse fauoured of the people, ex∣cluded [ F] from the kingdome Charles duke of Loraine, who with his sonne Otho were the onely men left of all the posteritie of Charlemaigne. Which is also to bee feared of the great Othoman princes, who although they haue their families of the Machal∣oglies, of the Ebranes, and the Turacans, of the princes house and blood, to succeed in the Turkish empire: yet for all that if the Othoman familie should altogether perish, it is to be thought, that some one of the Bassaes or other great men, in greatest fauour with the Ianzaries, and the other souldiours of the court will carrie away the estate and so∣ueraigntie from the other princes of the aforesaid families, being but weake, and far off* 1.1139 from the Grand Signior, which might so raise the greatest ciuill warres in the East, for the great opinion which the people hath of long conceiued of the valour and maiesty [ G] of the Othoman familie. A notable example of such change of state wee haue in the chaunge of the Lacedemonian kingdome: where Cleomenes the king vanquished and put to flight by Antigonus, the kingdome was chaunged into a Popular estate, which so continued for three yeares: during which time the people made choyce of fiue Prouosts, or chiefe magistrats, whome they called Ephori, chosen out of the people themselues: but newes being brought of the death of Cleomenes, slaine in Aegypt, two of the fiue Ephori conspired against the other three their companions and fellowes in office: and so as they were doing sacrifice, caused them to be slaine: which done, they proceed to the election of Agesipolis for their king, a prince of the royall blood. But whereas before Cleomenes they were woont to haue two kings: one Lycurgus a man [ H] gracious with the people, but otherwise none of the blood royall, by corruption and briberie caused himselfe also by the people to be chosen king, Chilon, a noble gentle∣man, discended from Hercules, being for his pouerty and want of ability excluded, who not able to endure so great an indignity offered vnto his house and family, procured all the magistrats to be slaine: Lycurgus himselfe onely escaping, who after great effu∣sion of blood, held the soueraignty himselfe alone, hauing before almost quite destroy∣ed the royall race of the Heraclides posterity of Hercules. And thus much concerning the chaunge and ruine of Commonweales, which whether they may by any meanes be forseene and preuented, let vs now also see. [ I]

CHAP. II. ¶ Whether there be any meane to know the chaunges and ruines, which are to chaunce vnto Commonweales.

SEeing that there is nothing in this world which commeth to passe by chaunce or fortune, as all diuines and the wiser sort of the Philoso∣phers haue with one common consent resolued: Wee will here in the first place set downe this maxime for a ground or foundation, That the chaunges and ruines of Commonweals, are humane, or naturall, or diuine; that is to say, That they come to passe eitheir by the onely [ K] councell and iudgement of God, without any other meine causes: or by ordinarie and naturall meanes of causes and effects, by almightie God bound in such fit order and consequence, as that those things which are first haue coherence with the last; and those which are in the middest with them both: and all with all combined and bound toge∣ther with an indissoluble knot and tying: which Plato according to the opinion of Homer hath called the Golden Chaine, that is to say, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or by the will of man, which the diuines confesse to be free, at the least concerning ciuill actions: how∣beit that indeed it is no will at all, which in any sort whatsoeuer is enforced and bound.

Which will of man is so mutable and vncertaine, as that it should be impossible to giue [ A] * 1.1140 thereby any iudgement, to know the changes and ruines which are to fall vpon Com∣monweales. As for the councell of God, it is inscrutable, but that he sometime by secret inspiration declareth his will, as he hath done vnto his Prophets, causing them many worlds of yeres before to see the falles of many the greatest empires and Monarchies, which posteritie hath by experience found to be true. But this diuine power of the al∣mightie most seldome times showeth it selfe immediatly without the comming be∣twixt of meane causes; neither doth he it without greatest force and most sudden vio∣lence: as when he in one and the selfe same moment with wonderfull fire, and reuen∣ging flames, destroyed the fiue cities with Sodome and Gomorrha: and so chaunged* 1.1141 also the place then full of most sweet waters and aboundance of fish, with a most stin∣king [ B] & lothsome tast, as that it yet is vnto all kind of fish pestilent & deadly: and as for the ground it selfe, before of wonderful fertility, he so couered it with ashes and stinking sulpher, as that he seemeth in that countrey to haue left no place for wholsome plants, or any kind of graine to grow in. So also he ouerwhelmed Bura and Helice, two cities of Greece, with such a deluge of water, and that so suddenly, that euen they also which were about to haue fled out of the cities into the ships, being by the wonderfull rising of the waters, vnable to come to the hauen, were so all drowed. By the like wrath of God a great earthquake in a moment swallowed vp three and twentie cities in Italie, where afterward the Fennes called Pontinae burst out. As in like manner twelue cities of Asia are reported to haue bene all at once vpon the sudden with an earthquake de∣uoured. [ C]

Wherefore seeing that mans wil is still diuers and mutable, & God his iudgements most secret and inscrutable: there remaineth onely to know, whether that by naturall causes (which not altogether obscure, but by a certaine constant order of causes and ef∣fects gouerned, kept their course) a man may iudge of the issue and successe of Com∣monweales.* 1.1142 Yet by these naturall causes hauing in them this power (which are many and diuers) we meane not ciuill causes, whereunto the chaunge and ruine of cities and Commonweales must needs immediatly follow: as when good deserts goe vnrewar∣ded, and great offences vnregarded, who knoweth not but that such a state or Com∣monweale must needs in short time perish and come to naught? For of all causes none [ D] is more certaine, none more weightie, and in bri•…•…fe none neerer vnto the change or ru∣ine of a citie or Commonweale, than these. But the causes which we here seeke after, are the celestial and more remote causes▪ yet proceeding from a certaine naturall course and force: howbeit that it be good also to behold and foresee all maner of causes what soeuer. For as a painter doth one way consider of a mans bodie, and the Physitian ano∣ther: and the naturall Philosopher one way considereth of the mind of man, & the di∣uine another: so also the Politiitan doth one way, the Astrologer another, and the di∣uine a third way, iudge of the change & ruine of Commonweals. The Polititian in the ruine of a citie or Commonweale, blameth the iniuries and wrongs done by the prince [ E] vnto his subsects, the corruptnesse of the magistrats, with the iniquitie of the laws: The Astrologer considereth and beholdeth the force and power of the heauenly starres and planets, and thereof thinketh diuers motions to arise in mens minds, for the change and innouation of estates and Commonweales: But the Diuine constantly affirmeth all plagues, wars, dearth, destructions of cities and nations, to proceed from the contempt* 1.1143 * of God and of his religion, and God therefore to be angrie, and to stupifie the wise∣dome euen of the most wisest magistrats, and to arme euen his starres against princes. And euerie one of these haue their causes, by the helpe and concourse whereof wise men may guesse the change or ruine of a citie or Commonweale. In which point we

see many to erre and be deceiued, which thinke, that to looke into the starres, and to [ F] * 1.1144 search after their secret influencies and vertues, is in some sort to diminish the maiestie and power of almightie God: whereas to the contrarie it is thereby made much more glorious and beautifull, to do so great things by his creatures, as if he did then imme∣diatly by his owne mightie hand, without any other meane at all.

Now what man is there of sound iudgement, which feeleth not the wonderfull* 1.1145 force and effect of the celestiall bodies in nature in generall? Which yet for all that no necessitie of nature worketh, for that it may by almighty God be stil kept back and re∣strained, being himselfe free from the lawes of nature, which hee himselfe hath com∣maunded; not as by a decree of a Senat, or of a people, but euen of himselfe: who be∣ing of all others the greatest, can do nothing but that which is right and iust, for that he [ G] is himselfe the best, and hath a * 1.1146 perpetuall care of all people and nations, but yet ther∣of himselfe secure, for that he is himselfe the greatest. But as all things which had be∣ginning haue also a loose and fraile dissoluable nature (as by most certaine and vn∣doubtfull demonstration is to be proued) it must thereof needs follow also, not onely* 1.1147 cities and Commonweals, but euen also other things, which from their first beginning haue innumerable worlds of yeares flourished, must at length in tract of time fall also and take end. And albeit that Plato the prince of Phylosophers, hauing not as yet the knowledge of the celestiall motions, and so much lesse of their effects (which as then was couered in most thicke darknesse and clouds) when as he with a notable inuen∣tion had conceited such a forme of a Commonweale, as seemed vnto many to bee [ H] euerlasting, if it erred not from the lawes and orders by him set downe; yet for all that he said, That it should in time perish: as he which most manifestly saw the vanitie of all things, which as they had a beginning, so were they also to take ending; nothing be∣ing still firme and stable, besides him which was the father of all things. Which being so, there be no so notable orders, no so religious lawes, no such wisedome or valour of man, which can still presetue estates or Commonweales from ruine and most certaine destruction. By which reasons, Secundus (a Philosopher of the Stoike sect) greatly com∣forted Pompey, discouraged and almost desperat after the Pharsalian ouerthrow. Nei∣ther yet therefore do they which thinke the course of naturall causes to concerne the changes and ruines of cities and Commonweals, thereby bind the free will of man, and [ I] much lesse almightie God himselfe vnto a fatall necessitie: no not if we should deeme all things to be done by a continuat and interlaced course of forerunning naturall cau∣ses; seeing that euen nature it selfe is by the power of God kept in & restrained. Wher∣fore we oftentimes see both plants, and other liuing creatures, which by nature haue a certaine period of their liues, by some externall force to hasten or preuent the tearmes by nature prefined, and so sooner to die than by nature they should. And as for man∣kind, we haue it oftentimes in holy writ recorded, That they which lead an vpright & vertuous life, shall liue long: whereas the wicked should shorten their dayes, and bring themselues vnto a most speedie confusion and end. Whereby it appeareth certaine prefixed bounds of euerie mans life, to be by God appoined, which by sinne may bee [ K] cut shorter, and by vertue extended farther. So kingdomes also haue their beginnings, their encreasings, their flourishing estates, their changings, and ruines: yet when these chaunges shall be, or ruines, or destructions betide them, we see it by no learning to bee perceiued or vnderstood. For as for that which Plato hath written, Kingdomes then to fall and take end, when as the sweet consent and harmonie of them should perish and decay; is a thing not worth the refutation: whereof yet for all that more in due place shall be said.

Now many there be, which haue thought the conuersions and chaunges of estates

and Commonwealas, to depend of the force, power and motion of the superiour cele∣stiall [ A] bodies: which to discouer, were a matter of infinit difficultie, which yet for all that should not be so great, if Commonweales should as men and other things take their beginning. And albeit that the state and ruine of Commonweales should wholly next vnto God depend of those eternall lights, and of their mutuall coniunctions and oppositions, yet could thereof no certaine doctrine be deliuered or gathered, for the* 1.1148 great varietie and inconstancy of them which haue obserued the force and course of the celestiall stars & orbes; insomuch, that some one hath written the same star in the selfe same moment to haue beene in his direct motion, and another hath likewise written the same to be retrograde, which yet for all that, was to bee seene in the hea∣uens stationarie and immoueable. So that they are by their owne rashnesse to be re∣felled, [ B] which vaunt themselues to be able without error, to foretell the force and pow∣er of the starres, vpon cities and Commonweales; as also what effects they shall for many yeares to come produce, when as in the very motion of the moone, which of all the other planets hath in it least difficulty there is not one of them which well agreeth with one another. So Cyprian Leouicius, following the table of Alphonsus, (the eui∣dent error of whom Copernicus hath declared) hath made so apparant faults, as that the great coniunctions of the superior planets were seene one or two moneths after his cal∣culation. And albeit that Gerardus Mercator haue endeuoured by certaine eclipses of the sun & of the moone, by antient writers set downe, more curiously than any other, [ C] to iudge of the course and order of the whole time from the beginning of the world; yet so it is, that all his obseruations threaten a fall, as grounded vpon a false supposition: which can in no wise be true, For he supposeth that in the creation of the world, the sunne was in the signe Leo, without any probable reason, following the opinion of Iulius Maternus, contrary to the opinion of the Arabians, and of all other the Astro∣logers, who write, that the sunne was then in the signe Aries▪ being yet both therein de∣ceiued▪ these, six signes; and Mercator too. For why it is manifestly to bee proued, not onely by the most antient orders and customes of all people, but by the most diuine testimonies of holy scripture also, The sunne in the creation of the world, to haue bene* 1.1149 in the signe Libra: wherby the Feast of the gathering of the fruits is commanded to be [ D] kept the last day of the yere, that is to say, the two and twentith day of the seuenth mo∣neth; which Moses hath expresly written to haue bene the first, before the departure of the people out of Aegypt. Which to the intent it might be the lesse doubted of, wee reade to be oftentimes by him repeated: for when he had cōmanded the feast day Abib, that is to say, The feast of weeks, which the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: he ioyneth herun∣to these words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, And the feast of the gathering of fruits in the end of the yere. But the last moment of the yeare past, is the beginning of the yere following; as Orus Apollo writeth, the Aegyptians to haue declared the reuolution of the yeare, by a dragon turned about into a circle. But Iosephus, the best interpreter of antiquity, declareth the moneth Abib, which of th Chaldaies is called Niscan, and of [ E] vs before, March, but now Aprill, to haue beene in order the first for the deliuerance of the people out of the bondage of Aegypt: but yet the moneth which of the Chal∣deis is called Ethanim, of the Hebrewes Tisri, which was our October, but afterward fell into our September, to haue bene by nature the first. All which, not onely Iose∣phus, but almost all the Hebrew Rabines also, namely Eleazar, Abraham, Ezra, Iona∣thas the Chaldean interpreter, with almost all the rest, constantly affirme. Which for that it hath great force for the discerning of the ruines of Commonweales, is of vs* 1.1150 more manifestly to be explaned. The antient schoole of the Hebrewes, begin the rea∣ding of Moises his bookes, the Genesis, in Autumne: and Samuel, the most antient Ra∣bine

of the Hebrewes, appointeth the first Tecupa, or yearely conuersion of the yeare, [ F] in the Autumne equinoctiall: whereby it is manifest, the doctrine and customes of that most antient nation, to concurre and agree with the law of God. The same was the doctrine of the old Aegyptians and Chaldies also, concerning the beginning of the yeare, from whom all the mathematicall scienses tooke not onely their beginning, but were from them to all other nations of the world deriued also. So Iulius Firmicus wri∣teth, the Aegyptians hauing receiued it from their ancestors, to haue deliuered it vnto posterity, The sunne in the beginning of the world to haue bene placed in the last part of Libra. The same was also the opinion of the Indians, who are yet worshippers of the Sunne, & of the Moone, as the Spaniards haue reported. And although the yere of the Grecians, tooke beginning from the summer Solstitium, yet neuerthelesse the people [ G] of Asia beganne their Olimpiades and the beginning of the yere from Autumne. The Romans also from the remembrance of most auntient aniquitie, began the yeare from* 1.1151 the Ides of September, Lex vetusta est (saith Liuie) & priscis scripta literis, vt qui Prae∣tor maximus sit, Idibus Septembris cl•…•…uum pangat, It is an old law (saith he) and written in old auntient letters, that he which was the great Prouost, should euer the Ides of September driue or fasten a naile. This naile Festus calleth annalem, or an annuall naile, Qui quotannis figebatur in dextra parte capitolij vt per eos clauos numerus colligeretur an∣norum▪ Which was euerie yeare fastned in the right side of the Capitoll, that so by those nayles the number of the yeares might be gathered. Augustus appointed also the Olympic games in the moneth of September. And albeit that the Astrologers (as [ H] other people also for the most part) follow a new manner of account of the yeare, set downe by Moyses, and begin their account of the spring diuision, yet neuerthelesse they begin their tables of the celestiall motions receiued from the Aegyptians and Chaldeies from the Autumne diuision. VVhich antiquities, with the authoritie of so many and so worthy men, although they make the matter manifest enough and out of all doubt▪ yet euen nature it selfe leadeth vs thither also, as that wee must needs con∣fesse the beginning of the world to haue bene in Autumne. For if we grant, as we must needs, man as all other liuing creatures also, to haue bene by almightie God created in such state and perfection as that they should need no nurses; so also is it to be thought him to haue prouided for all liuing creatures, and especially for mankind, ripe fruits for [ I] him to feed vpon, and most beautifull to behold, planted in most faire gardens, as is in the sacred booke of Genesis to be seene: which can in no wise be done, but that the world must be created in the beginning of Autumne. For why, Adam was created about Iordan, whereas corne in the spring time yet shooteth not on eare; and the mo∣neth Abib is so called, for that the corne in the spring time in those places runneth but vp in spindle, and the trees but scarcely bud: neither is the law of nature, or the season of the spring, or of Autumne, from the beginning of the world chaunged. Where∣fore Plutarch in his Symposiaques, when he pleasantly questioneth, Whether egges or birds were first? resolueth birds to haue bene first created: and so whatsoeuer things els are contained in the whole world, to haue bene in all parts created perfect For other∣wise [ K] if God should haue created man a crying child, or calues for oxen, or egges for birds, he must also haue created nurses to haue suckled them, and birds to haue hatched them: which if it be absurd and foolish to say, so must also of necessitie those things bee absurd, whereof these things follow, viz. the world to haue bene created in the begin∣ning of the spring, and young shoots to haue bene made for fruitfull trees, and so like∣wise other things to haue bene created young, and not in their perfection. Whereby it is euident them greatly to erre & be deceiued, which accounting & taking the begin∣ning of the world from the spring, and the beginning of the day from noone, doe with

their vaine coniectures go about to blot out and extinguish the authoritie of the sacred [ A] scriptures, as also the most auntient records of the Indians, the Chaldes, the Aegypti∣ans, and Latines, and all forsooth because cold weather still followeth after Autumne: they fearing (as I suppose) least Adam being a naked child, should haue taken cold. See∣ing therefore the Astrologers, euen as these men also to haue laid false principles and grounds, of the celestiall motions, and much to differ amongst themselues, concerning* 1.1152 the course of the starres and planets, they can therefore (I say) set downe nothing cer∣taine, concerning mans affaires, or the ruines of cities and Commonweals.

But yet it hath lesse probalitie by the foundation of townes and cities, to iudge of* 1.1153 the rising or falling of Commonweales: as many do also of houses before they lay the foundations of them, to foresee and let that they should not be burnt or rased, or sicke [ B] of the falling sicknesse: which to doe is a meere folly, differing little from extreame madnesse, as though natures most constant order should depend of mans lightnesse, and the force of the celestiall Spheres, of the will and pleasure of a base carpenter or mason. Indeed by the law it is prouided, That the value of houses burnt should bee deemed by their age and continuance, for so it is read in the old Hetruscian copie: al∣though that D. Cuias a most diligent interpretor of auntient readings, be of their opini∣on, which for aetatibus, thinke it ought to be read quantitatibus (as who should say by their quantities, rather than by their age) whereunto the lawyer neuer had respect. For his meaning was, That houses according to the stuffe and matter they were built of, were to be esteemed of longer or shorter continuance: as if an house were built of clay [ C] or morter, it was esteemed to be able to last some fourescore yeares: in such sort as that if it had cost an hundred crownes at first to build, being burnt fortie yeares after, there should halfe the price thereof be abated in the estimation thereof: For as for houses built with bricke (they as Plinie saith) if they be built vpright are euerlasting. And so Victruuius, and all other builders were woont to esteeme of the losse sustained, by the age and continuance of the houses burnt. For to esteeme of them by the elle, or by the greatnesse, so a barne built of clay or straw should be esteemed more worth than smal∣ler buildings built of marble or of porphiree, as the temple of Porphiree at Sienna, one of the least, but most costly buildings of Europe. But the deciding of such questions we must referre to Victruuius, and other builders. And as for that some thinke we are [ D] by the foundations of cities and other buildings, to iudge what shall be the state or successe of a kingdome or monarchie should lesse need the refutation: but that M, Var∣ro (whome Tullie writeth to haue in learning excelled all other Greeks and Latins) commaunded Tarentius Firmianus to declare vnto him the Horoscope of the citie of Rome: for so Plutarch and Antimachus Lyrius report. Whereupon he by the pro∣gresse of that Commonweale gathering the causes thereof; and by things ensuing af∣ter, gessing at things forepast, & so by ret•…•…ogradation iudging the causes by the effects, by most light and vaine coniectures affirmeth the foundation of the citie to haue bene laid in the third yeare of the sixt Olympiade, the one and twentieth day of Aprill, a lit∣tle [ E] before three of the clocke in the afternoone, Saturne, Mars, and Venus, being as then in Scorpio, Iupiter in Pisces, the sunne in Taurus, the moone in Libra, Gemini holding the heart, or middle of the heauens, and Virgo rising. But seeing that the chiefe points of this figute belonging vnto Mercurie, and that this whole celestial Scheame betoke∣neth men of traffique, or otherwise studious of Philosophie, and all kind of learning, how can it come to passe, that these things should agree, or bee applied vnto the Ro∣mans, a people of all others most couragious and warlike? Howbeit that Taruntius in this his figure, or Horoscope of the foundation of Rome, is most shamefully deceiued, as hauing therein placed the celestiall orbes in a situation quite contrarie vnto nature,

viz. Venus opposit vnto the Sunne: which yet can neuer be aboue eight and fortie de∣grees [ F] * 1.1154 at the most distant from the Sunne: which yet were a thing excusable and wor∣thy to be pardoned, if it had bene by him done by forgetfulnesse: as it happened to Au∣gerius Ferrerius an excellent Mathematician, who in his booke of Astronomicall iudgements, hath set Venus and Mercurie, one of them opposit vnto another, and both of them opposit vnto the Sunne: a thing by nature impossible, and hee himselfe ac∣knowledging that Mercurie can neuer be six and thirtie degrees from the Sunne. Yet true it is, that Iohn Picus earle of Mirandula, grounding vpon this demonstration of the celestial motions, without cause blameth Iulius Maturnus, for that he placed the Sunne in the first house, and Mercurie in the tenth, which cannot be (saith he) except the sun should be from Mercurie the fourth part of the circle (or three signes distant:) not ha∣uing [ G] regard, that the globe may so be placed, to encline vnto the North, as that the sun rising, Mercurie may come vnto the meridian, yea vnto the tenth house two houres be∣fore noone, and yet not be thirtie dgrees from the sunne. But Plutarch writeth Anti∣machus Lyrius to haue left recorded, the Sunne to haue bene then ecclipsed, which yet he saith to haue bene the diametre of the circle distant from the Moone. And yet there is another greater absurditie in that theame of Taruntius, in that hee placeth the sunne in Taurus the xxj day of Aprill, which then entred not thereinto vntill the thir∣tith of April. Howbeit also that Lucas Gauricus, who collected the celestiall theames of many most famous cities, differeth altogether from this theame of Rome, by Tarun∣tius before set downe: for he placeth Libra in the East, as doth also Manlius. But of all [ H] absurd things none is more absurd, than by the ouerthrow of cities to measure the de∣struction of the estate or Commonweale, whereas before we haue declared, that a city oftentimes may be ouerthrowne and laid euen flat with the ground, and yet the state and Commonweal therof remaine, as we haue before shewed of the citie of Carthage: as oftentimes to the contrarie the estate and Commonweale may perish, the walls and other buildings yet standing all whole.

Wherefore then I rest not vpon such opinions, and much lesse vpon that which Cardan saith, who to seeme more subtilly than others to handle these hidden and ob∣scure matters, & to raise an admiration of himselfe with men vnskilfull of these things, maintaineth the beginnings and encreasings of the greatest cities and Empires to haue [ I] come from that Starre which is the last in the taile of Vrsa Maior, which he saith to haue bene verticall vnto the great citie of Rome at the foundation thereof, and from thence euen by the helpe and working of the same Starre translateth the Roman Em∣pire to Constantinople, and so afterwards into Fraunce, and so from thence into Ger∣manie: which although they be so set downe but by a most brainsicke man, yet do* 1.1155 men ignorant of the celestiall motions wonderfully admire the same, and are therfore by vs to be refuted. For perceiuing that last starre of Vrsa Maior to be daily vnto ma∣nie people verticall, though perpendicular vnto them onely which are subiect vnto the circle which that starre describeth, Cardican saith it should be verticall at such time as the Sun toucheth the Meridian circle: in which state he supposeth it to haue beene, [ K] at such time as Romulus the founder of the citie laied the foundation thereof: which could not by nature so be, viz. that the last starre of Vrsa maior in the same howre, that is to say at noonetide, should together with the Sun touch the verticall circle: For that starre being now in the xxj degree of Virgo, by proportion of the motion of the fixed statres, by reason of the motion of the eight Sphere, it must needs haue beene in the xix degree of Leo at such time as the foundation of the citie of Rome was laied, and the Sun in the xix. degree of Aries, as the foregoings of the Sun declare. So that that starre was the third part of the circle, or foure signes and twentie degrees distant

from the verticall, when as it ought to haue beene in the same signe, and in the same [ A] degree of the signe wherein the Sunne was, if Cardan his doctrine were true: who yet when he knew the same starre to haue beene verticall vnto many great cities at the time of their foundation, since the beginning of the world, the Sun also then being in the Meridian; he to meet with that obiection, said the Monarchie to be due but to one of them. But why that to the Romans from whose verticall it is distant twelue de∣grees, rather then to the Scottish fishermen which dwell neere vnto the Orcades? or vnto them of Norway, and other the Northren people? vnto whom the same starre is not onely verticall, the sun touching the Meridian in September, but is also directly perpendicular? Yet is it also more straunge, to say the same starre to haue giuen the Empire to Constantinople, considering that that citie was built nine hundred yeares [ B] before that the Empire was thither translated. Ioining hereunto also that the horo∣scope of the citie of Constantinople found in the Popes librarie in the Vatican written in Greeke letters, calculated by Porphyrie (as some affirme) and copied out by Lu∣cas Gauricus the Bishop, declareth the Sunne then to haue beene in the xvij degree of Taurus, the Moone in the v of Leo, Saturne in the xx of Cancer, Iupiter and Venus coniunct in the same signe, Mars in the twelft, Mercurie in the first of Gemini, Aqua∣rius holding the verticall of heauen, and the xxiij of Gemini in the Leuant; which he setteth downe to haue beene in May vpon a Munday, two howres after the sunne ri∣sing. An other celestiall Theame of the same Citie is also taken out of the Vatican, [ C] calculated by Valens of Antioch, later than the former by fortie minutes. But yet that is verie absurd which Gauricus the good Bishop to come to his acconut supposeth the citie of Constantinople to haue beene built in the yeare of our Lord 638, three hun∣dred yeares after the death of Porphyrie: which yet it is manifest to haue flourished aboue 500. yeares before Christ: which he thinketh also to haue beene afterwards taken by the Turks armie in the yeare of Christ 1430. when as in truth it was by them woon and sackt in the yeare of our Lord 1453, the xxix day of May, being 1800 yeare before taken by the French men: wherein they raigned vntill the time of Clyarus king of Thracia, as Polybius (tutor vnto Scipio Affricanus) writeth; at which time it was called Bizance. And againe afterwards also was taken by Pausanias king of Lacede∣monia [ D] in the Median warre. And yet more, afterwards also was besieged by Alci∣biades generall of the Athenians. And long time after, three yeares together againe besieged by Seuerus the Emperour, who after he had sacked it, razed it also downe to the ground, and carrying away the rest of the citisens into captiuitie, gaue the ground whereon it stood vnto the Perinthians about the yeare of our Lord two hundred: which yet not long after was againe reedified, and by Constantine the great wonderful∣ly enriched after that he had thither translated the seat of his Empire. And yet againe after that, was with fire and sword most cruelly wasted by the armie of Galienus the Emperour, all the citisens therein being either slaine, or else caried away into captiui∣tie. Yet ceased it not for all that to be still the seat of the Greeke empire, vntill that the [ E] Frenchmen and Flemings vnder the conduct of Baldwin Earle of Flaunders seized thereon; which they held together with the Empire, vntill that about fiftie yeares af∣ter they were by the Palaeologi againe driuen out: who hauing so recouered the citie there raigned, vntill that it was by Mahomet the great Turke woon. All which chan∣ges of the Empire, and ruines of the citie, Gauricus neuer touched; neither did Cardan himselfe so much as suspect them: otherwise I suppose he would neuer haue written things so absurd, and so disagreeing with themselues. But great maruell it is that this Cardans starre hath had such power as to graunt the Empires of the world to Italie, Greece, Fraunce, and Germanie, when as it was to them but verticall, and yet hath

had no power at all vpon the realmes of Norway and Sweden, where it is not onely [ F] verticall, the Sunne being at the Meridian in the moneth of August, but is also perpen∣dicular: and yet neuerthelesse distant from Rome and Constantinople in latitude twelue degrees at the least. Besides that, why should he giue vnto this Starre (which some foolish Astrologers take to be Saturnia) more power than to others, both for their greatnesse & nature more notable? why doth he exclude from the gouernment of the world Regulus the greatest of all the sixe starres? whie Medusa, Spica, the great Dog, the Vultur, all most faire and beautifull starres? whie in briefe a thousand and threescore others, (for so many there are accounted beside the wandering starres) vnto whom the Hebrew Mathematicians had added thirtie six mo also? Sufficeth it for this time to haue reiected these errours so grosse, as the day it selfe is cleere. [ G]

But for asmuch as it were a thing infinite to refell all mens errours in this kind of* 1.1156 matter, I will onely touch theirs, who haue thought themselues wiser than the rest, and haue beene had in reputation as best seene in the iudgement of the heauens for the chaunges of Commonweales: such as was Peter of Arliac Chauncelour of Paris, and afterwards Cardinall in the yeare 1416: For he writeth the beginnings, channges, and ruines of religions and Commonweales, to depend of the motion and coniuncti∣on of the superiour Planets. And to mee it seemeth right straunge, whie Iohn Picus Earle of Mirandula hath without farther search; accounted of the shamefull errours of this man, concerning the knowledge of the Celestiall Spheres, as of most certeine & approued demonstrations; who hauing noted six and thirtie great coniunctions of [ H] the superiour planets, Iupiter & Saturne, since an hundred and fifteene yeares after the creation of the world, vnto the yeare of our Lord Christ 1385, there are not of them six true, and scarce any of them set in such place and time as they ought to be. Leu∣pold, Alcabice, and Ptolomee were also of the same opinion, viz. the remouings of people, warres, plagues, deluges, plentie, dearth, the chaunges of Estates and Com∣monweales, to depend of the motion and coniuction of the Planets, and especially of the superiour planets Saturne I say and Iupiter, and so much the more if Mars be also in coniunction with them both. And so indeed as oft as they are in coniunction toge∣ther, such things thereof ensue as often times draw euen the wiser sort into admita∣tion: howbeit that no necessitie be imposed vpon man kind by the influence of the [ I] heauens. But howsoeuer that be, it is manifest the Cardinall of Arliac to haue beene most grieuously deceiued, who reckning vp those great coniunctions from the begin∣ning, supposeth it by his account to haue beene seauen thousand yeares since the cre∣ation of the world, following therein the errours of Alphonsus, Eusebius, and Beda; which the great consent not of the Hebrewes onely, but of all Christians also hath long ago reiected: so soone as by the old interpretation of the Bible it was perceiued them to haue erred in their account aboue a thousand fiue hundred yeares: whereas all Churches at this present follow the more certeine account of Philo the Iew, who followed almost the mean betwixt Iosephus and the later Hebrewes: for Iosephus diffe∣reth 342 yeares, and Philo but an 160 from the other Hebrewes. Whereof it is to be [ K] gathered this present yeare, which is from the birth of our Sauiour Christ 1583, (wherin Bodin writ these things in Latin) to haue beene 5531, or at most 5555 since the crea∣tion of the world. Wherefore Arliac is deceiued, who put the coniunction of the superiour Planets seauen thousand yeres ago, in the 320 yeare after the creation of the world: which after that computation must haue happened twelue hundred yeares before that the world was made. The same man doth suppose also that at the creation of the world, the Horoscope whereof he discribeth, the first degree of Cancer to haue beene then rising, the Sunne then to haue beene in Aries, (which to be false we haue

by necessarie arguments before proued) the Moone and Venus in Taurus, Saturne in [ A] Aquatius, Iupiter in Pisces, Mars in Scorpio, Mercurie in Gemini: which is all false and quite contrarie vnto the nature and motion of the celestiall Spheres, which is ma∣nifest vnto euery man which shall more narrowly looke thereinto, or take account of the motions of the Planets from thence vnto these times: not to speake of that, that he placed the Sunne in the xix degree of Aries, and Mercurie in the xv of Gemini, ha∣uing so against nature diuided the one of them from the other six and fiftie degrees, as we haue before declared: viz. that Mercurie when he is farthest from the Sunne, ne∣uer to be farther off than six and thirtie degrees. Which may suffice in passing by, ot show that the Hypothesis of the Cardinal of Arliac and his foundation being false, the rest that is thereon built cannot stand. But this he had propounded vnto himselfe, It to [ B] be a thing contrarie vnto the maiestie of the Planets, if in the creation of the world he should place them other where than euery one of them in their owne throne and cha∣riot: which deuises of the vnskilfull, are more light and farther from the antiquirie of the Chaldeis, than that they deserue to be refelled.

But how much more certainlie and better do they, which hauing consideratlie looked thorow the antiquities of the Hebrewes, and the animaduertions of Coperni∣cus (who most diligently corrected the errors of Alphonsus, and of the Arabians) going orderly retrograde from these oppositions and coniunctions of the Planets which we now behold, vnto the verie first beginning, iudge of the reuolution of the time past, as also of the chaunge and state of Commonweales; if yet by this meanes [ C] any such iudgement, free from impietie and rashnesse may be made. Neither is it to be hoped (except happelie in an innumerable sort of worlds) that the three superiour Planets shall meet together in the first point of Aries, whereof our wisards rashly di∣uine a generall destruction of Commonweales, as also of the whole world then to ensue by fyre from heauen. Howbeit that in the yeare of our Lord Christ 1909, there shall be a meeting together of the three superiour Planets in the ninth degree of Aries: which yet for all that is no true coniunction, as not made by the centers, but by the Orbes and Spheres of the Planets. And in the yeare 1584, Saturne and Mars shall be in coniunction in the first point and 46 minutes of Aries, and Iupiter in the same signe, but distant from them twelue degrees, with the Sunne and Mercurie: which coniun∣ction [ D] shall scarce chaunce againe in the reuolution of eight hundred yeares. And in* 1.1157 this sort it is lawfull for a man looking into the yearely course of time, by writing to commend vnto posteritie the chaunges of cities and Commonweales, and so by things precedent and alreadie forepassed to iudge also of things to come: yet sauing alwaies the maiestie of almightie God, who is himselfe bound vnto no lawes of nature, nei∣ther hath thereunto bound any of his seruants. Wherein many greatly offend, who thinke the power and influence of the celestiall Spheres to be nothing, when as yet for all that their strength and power hath alwaies beene most great and effectuall, not onely vpon these elements which we here see, and so vpon all other sorts of liuing [ E] creatures, but euen vpon them also which liue like beasts, as * in sacred writ is to be* 1.1158 seene, and yet of the good nothing at all to be feared. So many stood in great doubt in the yeare 1524, wherein the three superiour Planets, Saturne, Iupiter, and Mars were in coniunction in the tenth degree of Pisces, the rest of the Planets together with the Dragons head being in Aquarius & Pisces, both of them waterie Signes. Which selfe same yeare in the moneth of Februarie were twentie other coniunctions of the* 1.1159 Planets also among themselues, besides the sixe starres; which of all other things, was a thing most worthie the admiration. So that hereupon the Astrologers all the world ouer agreeing together for the destruction of the world, with a great feare terrifyed

the minds of many weake men; in that they so constantly all with one consent affir∣med, [ A] the world to be now againe ouerwhelmed with an vniuersall deluge and inun∣dation of waters; in somuch that many miscreants caused shippes to be made for them to saue themselues in from such the rage of the waters, and especially Auriolus Presi∣dent of Tholose a most cunning lawier, but a man either ignorant, or a contemne•…•… of the lawes of God, howbeit that he heard the promises of God still preached vnto him, and the oath by him made vnto * 1.1160 Noah that he would no more destroy the world by water. And true it is that in that yeare were flouds and inundations of wa∣ters in diuers countries, but yet no such generall deluge as was foretold and feared, neither any cities or countries at all knowne to be drowned. Wherefore to affirme any thing of the chaunges and ruines of Commonweales, it sufficeth not to be∣hold [ G] onely those great coniunctions of the three superiour Planets, but also diligently to obserue and note the meane coniunctions, which are euery two hundred and fortie, and euery twentie yeare: as also the eclipse of the Sunne, and of the Moone, with the oppositions and coniunctions of the inferiour Planets amongst themselues, and with superiour planets, and in briefe their mutuall traiections, as also the force and power of the fixe starres, and their respect towards others. True it is that many of the aun∣tient writers haue noted either dearth, or popular diseases, great mortalitie of liuing creatures, or the remouing of people, inundations of waters, or the destruction of cities, or chaunges of kingdomes to haue followed such coniunction of the superiour planets; yet not in euery place generally, but in certaine countries and places onely, [ H] whereby they haue by a certain coniecture iudged this or that signe to be by God de∣puted vnto this or that countrie. And hereof according to the power of the foure elements they haue diuided the twelue celestiall signes into foure parts, and haue there∣of left certaine instructions to posteritie: whereof for all that because they were not by long experience approued they could make no certaine art: as the Chaldies haue* 1.1161 fained, who vaunted themselues to haue spent 470 thousand yeares in the practise of natiuities, the better to perswade men of the certaintie of their knowledge, and to make it thereby the more saleable. Which the Chaldean bables spred abroad farre and wide vnto all people, but vnto none more foolishly then to the Indian Chinois, who say 783 thousand and seauen hundred sixtie two yeares, to be the last yeare past [ I] since the creation of the world. Others there be which in that matter lie not so loudly and yet impudently enough. For Linus the most auntient writer of the Greekes, Or∣pheus and Heraclitus, shut vp the period of the greatest yeare within the reuolution of 360 thousand yeares, whereof they supposed an hundred fourescore foure thousand to be past. But a certaine Aegiptian priest vaunted before Solon, the Aegiptians his coun∣trie men to haue an historie of twentie thousand yeares written in Hieroglyphicall letters. And a little while after Herodotus (called the father of historie) vnderstood from the same Aegiptians, recordes of thirteene thousand yeares to be extant in their sacred letters. Diodorus yonger then the rest going into Aegipt to find out the trueth, heard certaine Priests to say antiquities of three and thirtie thousand yeares old to be [ K] found amongst the Aegiptians: but when he came to wey the trueth of the matter in equall ballance, he found all their antiquitie to consist but of three thousand seauen hundred yeares: the computation of which time from the beginning of the world, agreeth altogether with Philo, or within little lesse then two hundred yeres. And truely Callisthenes perswaded by the speech of Aristotle his master, when as others at the sacking of Babylon greedely sought after the Persian wealth, he diligently searched out and gathered together the bookes and antiquities of the Chaldies, and there noted all the historie of the Chaldies to haue bene comprehended in 1903 yeares: which time

well agreeth with the sacred historie, if we account the time from Nimrod, who first [ A] obtained the soueraigntie of the Chaldies: which historie is to be thought so much the truer, for that it is so reported by Simplicius a mortall enemie of the Christians, as wee haue elswhere declared. And therefore Ptolomey, who farthest repeating from vtter∣most remembrance the antiquities of the Chaldies (of them I say, which had noted the stedie courses of the celestiall Spheres) bringeth the beginnings of the celestiall mo∣tions no farther than from Nabonassar, and from those eclipses of the moone which happened in the time of his raigne, that is, the yeare of the world 3750: But Ptolo∣mey flourished in the time of Adrian the emperour, about foure hundred yeares af∣ter Nabonassar. Wherefore it ought not to seeme straunge to any man, if he neuerso∣much as once suspected the motion of trepidation, neither vnderstood the reuolution [ B] of the eight Sphere: yea he well obserued not the Equinoctials: For hee saith, The Equinoctium to haue bene the the twentie sixt of September, after the sunne rising: which Hisparchus had taught to haue happened 285 yeares the same day of the mo∣neth, about midnight, whose errours could scarcely be perceiued in the time of our an∣cestors: as not long ago Io. Regiomontanus shewed the motion of trepidation, before vnto Astronomers vnknowne. Wherefore by what meanes could they by any art conclude mens fortunes, or the chaunges and ruines of cities and Commonweales, who vnderstood not so much as the celestiall motions, and much lesse the histories of all nations, when as yet they scarcely knew the tenth part of the world? [ C]

Wherefore they do foolishly which attribute the Quadripartite booke to Ptolomey,* 1.1162 wherein the fiery Triplicitie is giuen to Europe, and those countries which lye betwixt the West and the North; the ayrie triplicitie vnto Asia, and those places which are seated betwixt the North and the East; the watrie triplicitie vnto Affrike, and the earth∣ly triplicitie vnto the other places. Neither haue those things followed the coniuncti∣ons of the superiour planets, which should haue followed had their rules beene true. Now if any man thinke (as many there be which think right foolishly) the places of the signes being chaunged, the force and nature of the celestiall Spheres to be chaunged al∣so; he must surely vtterly subuert all the knowledge of the force and power of the stars by them before set downe and deliuered: seeing that the fix starres are found since the [ D] beginning of the world to haue passed through the fourth part of the eight Sphere: but since the time wherein the course of the celestiall Spheres began first to bee of the Chaldeis noted vnder king Nabonassar vnto this our time, to haue ouergone almost a whole signe, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or which is all one, the Equinoctials in the same space, to haue preuented the staies of the wandering starres, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and yet neuer∣thelesse the force and power of the celestiall houses approued in mens natiuities, is still the selfe same that it is reported to haue before bene: which thing to be so, Cardan him∣selfe confesseth: whom yet for all that it ashamed him not to write the Britons, Spani∣ards, & Normans, in auntient time gentle and modest nations, to be now (the regions of the starres being changed) become slie, craftie, and deceitfull theeues; for that they [ E] were in antient time gouerned by Sagit•…•…ary, but now by Scorpio▪ vnto whom the same may be aunswered which Cassius did vnto a certain Chaldean Astrologer, who forbad him to fight with the Parthians before the moone was out of Scorpio: vnto whom* 1.1163 Cassius pleasantly aunswered, Non Scorpiones metuo, sed Sagittarios, I feare not (said he) Scorpions, but Sagittaries; meaning the Parthian archers, by whom the Roman legi∣ons wherwith Crassus in Chaldea discomfited and ouerthrowne. And truely if Cardans opinion were true, the nature of all things must needs so be subuerted, which yet is still the same which euer it was: For the people toward the North are now taller and stronger, and more warlike than the rest of the people of the world; and such Vitru∣uius,

Plinie, Caesar, Strabo, and Plutarch, haue writ them to haue beene sixteene hundred [ F] yeare agoe: and therefore them to be pleasant, drunkards, grosse witted, hoarce, gray eyed, yellow haired: but Southerne people to bee sad, small of stature, leane, weake, smooth, blacke eyed, curled haire, and cleere of voice. And yet it is manifest, the con∣iunctions* 1.1164 of the superiour planets in the same celestiall house, viz. in Scorpio to haue showed their force (if it were any) in Asia, and Europe, and not in Affrike, which they say to be gouerned by the signe of Scorpio. For before the chaunge of the Ro∣man empire was made, and that Popular estates transferred vnto the soueraigntie of Caesar alone, the superiour planets with a great coniunction met together in Scorpio: which coniunction chaunged againe about seauen hundred yeares after: at which time innumerable legions of the Arabians hauing receiued the new doctrine of Muhamed, [ G] rebelled against the Greeke emperours, subdued a great part of the East Asia, abolished the orders, customes, rites, ceremonies, and lawes of the Christians, when as yet Asia is in situation contrarie vnto Europe. The same coniunction happened in the yeare of our Lord 1•…•…64, after which ensued diuers motions of the people, almost in all parts of the world. For Ladamachus king of the Tartars was by his subiects thrust out of his kingdome: Henrie the sixt, king of England was by his subiects also taken and in prison slain, Edward the iiij of a subiect made king: Frederike the third driuen out of Hungary by Matthias Coruinus, who of a prisoner was chosen a king: Lewes the eleuenth the French king, by his nobilitie and vassals besieged in his principall citie, and brought in daunger to haue lost his estate. At which time also Alexander (commonly called [ H] Scanderbeg) the king of Albania his soone, brought vp in the Turkes court, reuolted from the Turke, and tooke vp armes against him. Yet is it worth the noting, that the great coniunctions of superiour planets, show their effects more in Scorpio, a martial signe, than in any other the rest of the signes, and so much the more if Mars be there als•…•…, or else some one of the other planets be also in coniunction or opposition with them. With like coniunction the same planets met together also in Sagittarie, in the yeare of our Lord Christ 74: at which time all the land of Palestine was sacked, the ci∣tie of Hierusalem burnt and rased, and eleuen hundred thousand dead in the warres: at which selfe same time were seene in Europe great ciuill warres, and foure emperours slaine the same yeare. Two hundred and fortie yeres after, another coniunction of the [ I] same planets chaunced in Capricorne, after which ensued wonderfull chaunges not onely of Commonweales, but euen of empires and kingdomes also: Constantine the Great being therein chiefe doer: who hauing put to flight and slaine foure emperors, and translated the seat of the empire from the West into the East, by a perpetuall law tooke away the vaine and superstitious worshipping of the Paynim gods. We see al∣so, that after the coniunction of the same planers in Aquarius, in the yeare 430, the Gothes, the Ostrogothes, the Francons, the Gepiges, the Heruli, the Hunnes, & other Northerne people going out like swarmes of bees, ouerranne and ransacked the pro∣uinces of the Roman empire, and most cruelly sacked the verie citie it selfe, sometime the seat of the empire. And againe in the yeare 1524, when as the coniunction of the [ K] same superiour planets, (yea twentie other coniunctions) had happened in Pisces, most great motions of the people ensued thereafter in many places in Europe: the people in armes against the nobilitie set all Germany on a broyle: in which warre an hundred thousand men are reported to haue bene slaine: the Rhodes by the Turkes was taken from the Christians: Frederike, his brother Christierne being driuen out of his king∣dome, possessed the kingdome of Denmarke: Gostauus of a priuat man became king of Sweden: Francis the French king ouerthrowne at Pauia was taken prisoner by the Spaniards. Besides that, it is to be seene, that after the great coniunction of the same

superiour planets in Leo, in the yeare 796 king Charlemaigne ouerthrew the estates of [ A] the Lombards, tooke their king, and conquered Italie. At which very selfe same time the Polonians made choyce of their first king: with diuers other notable and remar∣kable chaunges. So also fortie yeares after, the same coniunction happened in the signe of Sagittarie, when as the Moores sacked diuers countries, inuaded a part of Greece, and ouerran Italie: and the Danes were then vp in great ciuill warres: when as at the same time Charlemaigne made himselfe Lord of Germanie, tooke away the Paynim superstition in Saxonie, and chaunged all the Commonweales and principali∣ties in Germanie, and Hungarie, which he brought vnder his obeysance. With this great coniunction happened also foure eclipses: which hath not happened since: but six hundred thirtie six yeares after, viz. in the yeare 1544, in which time haply there [ B] had bene moe notable changes seene, if the great coniunction which hapned the yeare following in Scorpio, had happened the same yeare. And yet neuerthelesse as it was, all Germanie was vp in armes; which warres continued seuen yeares after. In briefe, if any foreknowledge be to be had from celestiall things, for the chaunges of Common∣weales, we must consider the coniunctions of superior planets, since 570 yeres, with the coniunctions, eclipses, and aspects of inferiour planets, and of the fix starres at the time of the great coniunctions, and to compare them with the truth of histories, and of times with coniunctions before past; and not wholly to rest vpon opinion of them, which haue determinatly assigned the Triplicities vnto regions, which I haue by euident ex∣amples before shewed not to be of any good assurance, but rather to stay vpon the na∣ture [ C] of the signes and of the planets. And yet for all that to referre the causes and effects of them vnto the great God of nature, and not to tie them vnto his creatures. As did* 1.1165 Ciprianus Leouitius, who of a coniunction of almost all the planets, than to come toge∣ther with an eclips of the sunne in the yeare 1584 by his writings (as from an oracle) denounced the end of the world euen then to come, saying, Procul dubio alterum aduen∣tum filij Dei & hominis in maiestate gloriae suae praenuntiat, Without all doubt (saith he) it foreshoweth another comming of the sonne of God and man in the maiestie of his glorie. But seeing he had so strongly assured men then of the consummation of the world, why did he yet write his Ephemerides for thirtie yeares after, when as the cele∣stiall signes and all Commonweales should according to his predictions haue before [ D] perished? But therein he found himselfe as wel deceiued, as was before him Albumar, who with like rashnesse had written, That the Christian religion should take end in the yeare 1460. And Abraham the Iew (surnamed The Prince of Astrologers) who pro∣phesied, That in the yeare 1464 should be borne a great captaine (whom they call Mes∣sias) who should deliuer the Iewes his countrey men from the seruitude of the Christi∣ans. And Arnold the Spaniard, who with like follie prophesied of the comming of Antichrist, in the yeare of our Lord 136. But Leouicius might haue knowne, that since the creation of the world vnto this time, there haue beene two hundred and threescore coniunctions of the superious planets, wherein were twentie foure great ones; that is [ E] to say, such as still come againe after the reuolution of two hundred and fortie yeares, Iupiter and Saturne meeting together in the same triplicitie (as they call it) and the les∣ser euerie twentie yeares: and the meanest planets, as of Saturne and Mars, euerie thertie yeares in the signe Cancer: and the greatest of all, viz. of Iupiter and Saturne in Aries, which commeth againe about euerie eight hundred yeares. Howbeit that Mes∣sahala calleth it the greatest coniunction of all, when as the three superior planets meet together in Aries: which yet I see not shall chaunce in the yeare 1584, as Leouicius sup∣poseth, when as Iupiter shall be distant twelue degrees from the full coniunction of Sa∣turne and Mars: which cannot rightly be called a coniunction so much as by their

Spheres. But whereas the same coniunction, yea and a greater too, together with the [ F] most darke eclipses of the sunne, and of the moone, happened in the raigne of Charles the Great, yet wee see not the world therefore to haue taken end. True it is, that the Hebrew learned men write, the destruction of all this elementarie world, and so of all* 1.1166 mankind, & of all Commonweales, to ensue after euerie seuen thousand yeares, by the inundation of waters, or els by fire, and so to rest a thousand yeares: after which God shal againe restore that which is perished: and that this shal be done seuen times, which maketh nine and fortie thousand yeres compleat, and that then this elementarie world and the celestiall also, with all the bodies thereof shall take end, the maiestie of the great eternall God, with all the blessed spirits yet still remaining. Which they say to bee by the word of God, howbeit verie obscurely declared: when as the tilling of the ground [ G] is commaunded euery seuenth yeare to be left off: and after seuen times seuen, not on∣ly the tilling of the ground is commaunded to be left off, but euen slaues and debtors to be set free, and euerie man to returne againe vnto his owne lands and dwelling. Tru∣ly it is by long obseruation at length knowne and found out, the motion of trepidati∣on of the eight Sphere to accomplish the course thereof, in the reuolution of seuen thousand yeares, and the ninth Sphere in the space of fortie nine thousand yeares. Whereof Io. Regiomontanus hath since within this foure and twentie yeares made plaine demonstration: of the truth of which motion neither the auntient Chaldies nor Aegyptians had any knowledge, but were thereof altogether ignorant. And albeit that the auntient learned Hebrewes, haue by the gift and goodnesse of God, had not onely [ H] the knowledge of diuine and celestiall things, but euen the hidden and secret causes of nature also reuealed and made knowne vnto them, and that from them the knowledge of most goodly things is vnto other men come: as Porphyrie the greatest of all the Phi∣losophers of his time confesseth: and that this doctrine of the Hebrewes curteth off the impietie of them which hold the eternitie of the world, or els that God was for an in∣numerable world of yeares altogether idle: yet doe these so learned Hebrewes attri∣bute nothing vnto fatall necessitie, either feare any the decrees of the celestiall starres, but affirme all things to be gouerned and changed by the will and pleasure of almigh∣tie God: as by him which as oft as he will is of power to shake the nature of all things, yea euen the verie foundations of the world it selfe, as was well seene in the generall [ I] deluge, which ouerwhelmed the whole world 1656 yeares after the creation thereof.

Yet doubt I not but that some more certaine precepts might be giuen of the chaun∣ges,* 1.1167 and ruines of Commonweales, if a man would enter into a certaine account of the time past euen from the beginning of the world: and so comparing one thing with another, and knitting one thing vnto another, shall proceed farther, and set in order the varietie of Historiographers at varience among themselues: and also going back∣wards, shall of all the eclipses of the Sunne and of the Moone, euen to the beginning of the world, by most certaine demonstrations comprehend the reason of the whole time past: and compare the histories of the most true writers amongst themselues, and with the oppositions and coniunctions of the celestial starres and bodies, knit and con∣ioyne [ K] the same with numbers, whose force in all the course of nature is greatest: which things foulded vp in infinit obscurities, and hidden and shut vp in the most secret places of nature, are to be showed not by vaine coniectures, but by most euident and manifest arguments. Which is not to be hoped for from them which are more desirous of words than of matter or knowledge: who vpon an obstinat opinion confound the be∣ginning of the world, and beginning the yere at the spring, which they ought to begin at Autumne, and the day at noone, which they ought to begin at euen, not remem∣bring darknesse to haue bene before light, confusion before order, and a rude confused

Chaos before the world it selfe: beside that it is in the sacred bookes of Genesis so of∣ten [ A] repeated, Vespere & mane dies vnus, The euening and morning were made one day. Truely I commend many things in Gerardus Mercator a most pure writer for the ob∣seruation of time: but in that I cannot commend him, that he beginneth the yeare els∣where than of Libra; whereas we haue by most certaine reasons not onely out of the most auntient customes of almost all nations; but also out of the most pure fountains* 1.1168 of sacred scriptures, declared the yeare to haue taken beginning in Autumne. Which we will againe show by the great and notable changes of estates and Commonweals: whereby things to come may be the better and more certainly perceiued, and the grea∣test chaunces, alterations, and changes, seene to haue happened about Autumne, that is to say, a little before, or a little after the Autumnall equinoctiall in September, the Sun [ B] then entring into Libra: where the law of God appointeth the beginning of the yeare. And first it is manifest, the generall deluge to haue begun and also ended in Autumne. We read also, the great earthquakes, wherewith oft times great cities, and whole coun∣tries haue bene destroyed, to haue happened in Autumne, such as was that trembling of the earth at Constantinople, wherein thirteene thousand men were lost in the yeare 1509, in the moneth of September: in which moneth, and in the same citie, the earth againe grieuously shooke in the yeare 1479. So also in the yeare of Christ 545 such an earthquake happened in September, that almost all Europe shooke therewith. The same moneth of September, wherein the battell was fought at Actium, ten thousand [ C] men perished in the land of Palestine with an earthquake. And not long agoe, viz. in the yeare 1526, and 27, in the moneth of September a great earthquake happened at Puteoli. The third day of the same moneth, in the yeare of our Lord 1556, such a tem∣pest of raine and thunder happened at Lucerne, as that a greater (as is reported) was neuer seene: which selfe same month & day the towne hall at Maidenburg in Germa∣nie, with the citisens dauncing therein, were all together with lightning consumed. The victorie of Augustus also against Antonius in the battaile at Actium, was by him ob∣tained the second of September, where question was of the greatest empire that euer was, and the matter tried with the greatest forces that euer were assembled in any wars whatsoeuer: by which victorie the empire both of the East and of the West, fell into [ D] the power of Augustus himselfe alone. The third day of the same moneth the Mace∣donian empire, which had so long, aud with so great glorie flourished, was by Paulus Aemilius chaunged from a great kingdome into diuers Popular estates, the king Per∣seus being by him ouercome and taken prisoner. Sultan Soliman on the like day tooke Buda the chiefe citie of Hungarie, with the greatest part of that kingdome. The same day and moneth Rhoderike king of Spaine was by the Moores ouercome and chased out of his kingdome, which wrought a wonderfull chaunge in the state of all that Mo∣narchie. On the same day and moneth reuoluing, Lewes the twelth the French king tooke the citie of Milan, with Lewes Sfortia duke thereof, whome he depriued of his estate. The like day the emperour Charles the sift passed ouer into Affrike, and inua∣ded [ E] the kingdome of Algiers. The day following, that is to say, the fourth of September Sultan Soliman died before Sigeth, which being one of the strongest holds of Chri∣stendome, was by the Turkes taken the seuenth day after. The ninth of September, in the yeare of our Lord 1544, Iames king of Scots was by the English men slaine, and his armie ouerthrowne. The same day in the reuolution of the yeare, the councell of Possi was gathered in Fraunce, Charles the ninth then raigning in the yeare 1561, and a decree made for the receiuing of the new religion, which raised most great troubles in France. The same day and moneth Alexander the Great at Arbela ouerthrew Darius king of Persia, with his armie of foure hundred thousand men; and so ioyned the king∣dome

of Persia vnto his owne. The tenth of September Iohn duke of Burgundie, was [ F] by the commandement of Charles the seuenth slaine, wherof great wars arose through∣out all Fraunce. The like day and moneth was Peter Louys the tyrant of Placence slaine by the conspiratours. We read also, that the eleuenth of September the Palae∣ologues, the Greeke emperours tooke the imperiall citie of Constantinople, and draue out thence the earles of Flaunders, who had there possessed the empire 560 yeres. The fourteenth day of September the Swiffers were with a great slaughter ouerthrowne by the French, in the expedition of Mirignan: which selfe same day also the Turkes great armie laid siege to Vienna, the Metropoliticall citie of Austria. The seuenteenth day the French armie was by the English ouerthrowne at Poitiers, and king Iohn of France by them taken prisoner. Which day also, (or rather the like in the reuolution of the [ G] yeare) a peace was concluded at Soissons, betwixt Francis the first, the French king, & the emperour Charles the fift, being both readie with their great armies to haue fought for the kingdome, to the great hazard of both their estates, in the yeare 1544: a thing the more to be noted, for that the same yeare, moneth, and day, was also a great coniun∣ction of the superior planets. The same day of the same moneth, in the yeare 1575 the Christian fleet with a great slaughter ouerthrew the Turkes great fleet in the battell of Lepanto. The eighteenth day of the same moneth Boulleine was deliuered vnto the Englishmen. And the foure and twentieth of September Constantine the Great, in a bloudie battell ouercame Maxentius the emperour, in the yeare of our Lord 333, and so of a simple straunge captaine made himselfe a great Monarch (which wrought a [ H] most notable and maruellous chaunge almost throughout the whole world) and so from thenceforth commaunded the account of the yeare to bee begun in September▪ and in the Greeke feasts vnto that day is added, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Wee find also, that in the yeare 1136, in the moneth of September there was a great coniunction both of the superiour and inferiour planets, in so much that the Astrologers of the East, by their letters written from all parts (as saith the Cronicle of Saint Denis) threatned the world with great calamities, and the people with the chaunge of their estates, which afterwards indeed chaunced: howbeit that in that the author of the historie erred, that he saith, How that the same yeare there was an eclips of the Sun the eleuenth of Aprill, and another of the Moone [ I] the fift of the same moneth, a thing by nature impossible. It is also right memorable, that the seuenteenth day of September, in the yeare 1567 Charles the ninth the French king, was by his subiects assailed neere vnto Meaux, where by speedie flight, and the helpe of the Swissers he hardly with life escaped the hands of the conspiratours: the which selfe same day, moneth, and yeare, Henry king of Sweden was by his rebellious subiects dispoiled of his estate, and east in prison, where he yet remaineth, without any great hope to be euer with life from thence againe deliuered. The battell Montcon∣tour was fought also in September. And the eighteenth day of September Baiazet at Nicopolis with a notable ouerthrow defeated a great armie of the Christians, of three hundred thousand men. And the same day Saladin tooke the citie of Hierusalem, on [ K] which Pompey had before taken it. Pope Boniface the eight also was in September 1303 by the French taken prisoner, and depriued of his papall dignitie. We read also many the greatest princes and monarches of the world, to haue as this moneth died: as namely the great emperour Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian, Titus, Domitian, Aurelia∣nus, Theodosius the Great, Valentinianus, Gratianus, Basilius, Constantine the fift, Leo the fourth, Rodolphe, Frederike the fourth, Charles the fift, all Roman or Greeke emperors. And of the French kings, Pipin, Lewes the younger, Philip the third, Charles the fift sur∣named the Wise, and Lewes his kinsman king of Hungaria and Polonia, with other

most noble and famous Monarkes in number infinite. But that is worth the marking [ A] that Lothaire and Charles the bauld, the one the king of Fraunce, and the other the German Emperour (and both of them the sonnes of Lewes the deuout emperour) both dyed the xxix of September, the first of them in the yeare 855, and the other 877. So Charles the fift, and Sultan Solyman, two of the greatest Emperours that were these many ages, were both borne in one yeare, and so both also in one moneth dyed, viz. in September. Antonius Pius also and Francis the first the French king, both of them great & famous Monarques, were both borne in September, and died both in March the moneth opposite to September. Octauius Augustus was also borne in September,* 1.1169 and so likewise in the same moneth of September dyed. Whereby it is to be vnder∣stood, Autumne and especially that moneth wherein the world was created, viz. [ B] September, in a sort to carie as a marke therof the notable chaunces of many the most noble and renowmed Princes, as also the straunge chaunges which haue happened aswell vnto the whole world, as vnto particular Estates and Commonweales. The next conuersions and chaunges of cities and Commonweales we see to happen into the signe of Aries, which is an other period of the Sunne, and the third and fourth sort of chaunges to fall out about the Winter or Sommer Solstitium, or farthest stayes of the Sunne: not for that the creation of the world is to be deriued from Aries, but for the notable periods of the Sunne in those times. Wherefore Leouicius following the dreames of vnskilful men, ought not to refer the creation and destruction of the world vnto the moneth of March; and much lesse to threaten vnto the world euen a present [ C] consummation and end. But he the same man had before by his writings promised vnto Maximilian the Emperour the soueraigntie of all Europe, with power to correct and chastice the crueltie and tirannie of other Princes (for so he writeth) of whom for* 1.1170 all that it beseemeth him to haue more modestly writ: But Maximilian was so farre from the soueraigntie which he had in his vaine hope conceiued, as that he yet liuing, and with the German hoast also looking on: Sultan Solyman without any empeach∣ment hauing farre and wide wasted the borders of the Empire, besieged and forced Sigeth the strongest place of the Empire, yea of all Europe: showing well that he should not haue too far assured himselfe vpon the prophecie of Luther, who hath left in writing that the power of the Turkes should from thenceforth diminish, which yet [ D] more encreaseth than euer it did. But it is straunge that Leouicius saw nothing of the straunge chaunge of the three kingdomes his next neighbours: which sith he saw not, how could he haue such certein knowledge of the end of the world, neuer as yet vnto the Angels themselues reuealed? For all which he bringeth no other reason, but that the Christian religion must together with the world take end in the waterie triplicitie, for that Christ Iesus himselfe was borne vnder the waterie triplicitie; willing as should seeme to bring in an other deluge: Wherein he showeth no lesse impietie then igno∣rance, whether we respect the maximes of the Astrologers, who affirme and say that neuer planet ruinateth his owne house, which should yet happen vnto Iupiter being [ E] in Pisces. (For certein it is in the signe Pisces in the great coniunction in the yeare 1583 and 84, and that the coniunction of these two planets in that Signe is alwaies friendly:) or that we follow the opinion of Plato, and of the Hebrewes, and of all other Philosophers, who generally say, That the world is to be successiuely destroied first by water, and then againe by fire: or else that we rest our selues (as indeed we ought) vpon the promises of God, who cannot lye, which he in mercie made to Noah neuer to drowne the world againe. But as we ought not rashly certeinly to af∣firme any thing of the chaunges and ruines of Monarchies and Commonweales: So can we not denie but that the effects are right great and wonderfull in the coniunction

of the higher planets, when they chaunge the triplicitie, and especially when the three [ A] * 1.1171 superiour planets are in coniunction together: or that such their coniunction haue concurrence with the the eclipses of the Sunne or of the Moone: as it happened the day before the taking of Perseus king of Macedon, and the battell of Arbella in Chal∣dea, which drew after them the ruine of two great Monarches, and the chaunge of di∣uers Commonweals, there appeared two most great and darke eclipses of the Moone. As there did also in the beginning of the Peloponesian warre, wherewith all Grecia was on a fire, the Sunne vpon a faire day was wonderfully darkened, euen at such time as Pericles the Athenian Generall began to set saile.

But as for them which contemne the force of the heauenly starres, or els are altoge∣ther ignorant thereof; they stand as men amased, to see in the same instant such conuer∣sions [ G] and chaunges of Commonweales, and such great and turbulent motions of the people together and at once raised. As namely Polybius (himselfe an Atheist) in his hi∣storie exceedingly maruelleth, That in the hundred and thirtieth Olympiade in one selfe same time there was seene vpon the sudden a new chaunge of princes almost throughout the whole world. As namely Philip the younger to become king of Ma∣cedon, Achaeus to be king of Asia, which he vsurped vpon Antiochus, Ptolomeus Philo∣pater to become king of Aegypt, Lycurgus the younger, king of Lacedemonia, Anti∣ochus king of Syria, Hanniball generall of the Carthaginensians: and all these people as it were at the same instant vp in armes one of them against another; the Carthagi∣nensians against the Romans, Ptolomey against Antiochus, the Achaeans and Macedo∣nians, [ H] against the Aetolians and Lacedemonians. And afterward also three of the most famous generals of the world, namely Scipio Affricanus, Hannibal, and Philopoemenes, to haue all died (as Liuie writeth) in one yeare. These great chaunges are more euident to be seene after the coniunction of the two superiour planets, with the Sunne, or Mars: as it happened in the yeare 1564, that the superiour planets were in coniunction in the signe Leo, together with the Sunne & Mercurie: So haue we afterwards seene strange motions and sturres almost all Europe ouer. We haue seene in the same time, in the same yeare, in the same moneth, in the same day, viz. the twentie seuenth of Septem∣ber, in the yeare 1567, the French king guarded with the Swissers, assailed and in daun∣ger to haue bene taken by his subiects: and Henrie king of Sweden dispoyled of his [ I] estate, and by his owne subiects cast in prison: and euen as it were at the same time Mary the most noble queene of the Scots spoiled of her kingdome by her subiects, and by them imprisoned, by whome it beseemed her to haue bene deliuered: and the king of Thunes driuen out of his kingdome by the king of Algiers: the Arabians vp in armes against the Turkes, the Moores of Granado and the Flemings against the king Catholike, the Englishmen against their queene, and all Fraunce in combustion. The same coniunction of the three superiour planets happened also an hundred yeares be∣fore, viz. in the yeare 1464, but not so precisely, neither in the signe of Leo, but onely in the signe of Pisces, and yet by and by after all the people were seene vp in armes, and not onely the princes among themselues, but the subiects also against their princes, as [ K] we haue before said.

Now as for that which Copernicus (the great Astrologer of his time) saith, The chan∣ges* 1.1172 and ruines of kingdomes and Commonweales, to depend of the Eccentrique mo∣tion of the earth, it is such, as that it deserueth no aunswere or account to bee thereof made. For that he for the ground thereof supposeth two things most absurd: the one That the influences which all Philosophers attribute vnto the starres, proceed from the earth, and not from the heauens: the other, That the earth it selfe moueth with the same motions, which all the Astrologers of former times (except Eudoxus) haue alwais

giuen vnto the heauens. And yet more straunge it is to make the Sunne immouable [ A] and the center of the world; and the earth fiftie thousand leagues distant from the cen∣ter, and to make part of the heauens, & of the planets, to be mouable, and part of them immouable. Which old opinion of Eudoxus, Ptolomey hath by probable arguments and reasons refuted. Whereunto Copernicus hath well aunswered: vnto whome Me∣lancthon hath onely with this verse right well replied, God in the heauens hath a taber∣nacle for the Sunne, which commeth out as a bridegroome out of his chamber, and reioyceth as a Giant to runne his course. It goeth out from the vttermost part of the heauen, and run∣neth about to the end of it againe: and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof. So also might he say, That Iosua commaunded the Sunne and Moone to stay their course. But vnto all this might be aunswered, That the Scripture oftentimes accommodateth [ B] and sitteth it selfe vnto our weake sences: as when it calleth the Moone the greatest light next vnto the Sunne, which yet neuerthelesse is the least of all the starres except Mercurie. But this doctrine of Copernicus might by a manifest demonstration, which no man hath yet vsed, easily be refelled, viz. that one simple bodie hath but one sim∣ple motion proper vnto the same: as is manifestly to be proued by the principles of naturall Philosophie: then seeing that the earth is one of the simple bodies, as the other elements be, we must necessarily conclude, that it cannot haue but one onely motion proper vnto it selfe: and yet for all that Copernicus hath assigned vnto it three diuers motions: whereof it can haue but one proper vnto it selfe, so that the other must needs [ C] be violent, a thing altogether impossible: and so by the same consequence impossible also, that the alterations and chaunges of Commonweales, should proceed from the Eccentrique motion of the earth.

But let vs now come vnto the opinion of Plato, who thought the chaunges and* 1.1173 ruines of Commonweales to ensue, when as the consent of the sweetnesse which pro∣ceedeth from the harmonie thereof is interrupted and broken. Which chaunceth when in the nuptiall number (as he tearmeth it) you depart farthest from those con∣cords which the Musitions call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. As for the nuptiall num∣ber he defineth it to be, that number which beginning of an vnitie, as of a mayden inuiolate is diuided in a double or triple sort of consent, in such sort as that the male, [ D] that is to say the odd numbers shall in continuate order be placed on the right hand, and the female, that is to say, the euen numbers on the left hand in this sort and order. As for the middle places they are to be filled with numbers

[illustration]

perfect, imperfect, quadrate, spherique, and cubique, so that no sort of numbers be wanting. But this order of numbers may be infinite, for that the force and power of tune and con∣sent, is in diuision as infinite, as any other dimension whatso∣euer. So that the forme of a well ordered Commonweale shall so long be firme and sure, as it shall keepe right consent and tune, well agreeing vnto the sweet delite of the eare. The Dupla or Diapason, [ E] which is of one to two; the Sesquialtera, which is the proportion of two to three, which maketh 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or a fift; the Sesquitertia or proportion of three to foure, which maketh 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or a fourth. The Tripla porportion which maketh 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which for that it comprehendeth al concords and consents is cal∣led 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or a gathering of all together. Now if you go farther as vnto that propor∣tion which is of foure to nine, the proportion of these numbers being not harmoni∣call, their followeth thereof an vnpleasant discord, which marreth the whole harmo∣nie of a Commonwealte. And this in mine opinion is that which Plato would say, for no man as yet hath explaned this point; so that antiquitie it selfe hath not without

cause long since complained, nothing to be more obscure than the Platonicall num∣bers. [ F] * 1.1174 For Forrester the Germaine is farre from the mind of Plato, when as he seeketh after triple and quadruple proportions, for that in so doing he ouerthroweth the foun∣dations of the nuptiall number & the sides of the Triangle, which consist of the dou∣ble and triple proportion. But in him is also absurd, that he thinketh the same propor∣tion to be betwixt 27. and 64▪ which is of three to foure, a thing by nature impossible, and contrarie to the grounds of the Mathematiques. But Plato willeth vs also to fill the vacant place of the propounded triangle of the nuptiall

[illustration]

number with such other numbers as proportionally arise of the mutuall coniunction of the male and female numbers, yet still continuing the harmonie, for that the same concords [ G] are amongst them to be found, which we haue alreadie set downe amongst the other foure first numbers: as of the ma∣riage of two to three: viz. of two times three is begot the number of six, which placed in the middest filleth vp the emptie place betwixt 4. and 9, which two numbers by no meanes make any consent or harmonie, but the propor∣tion of either of them vnto sixe, is the same which is is of three to foure, that is to say, Sesquialtera or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or a fift. And so also if the number of two be as it were ma∣ried or in proportion ioyned vnto six, or the number of three, so combyned vnto six; as viz. two times six, or three times six, thereof shall arise two numbers, viz. 12. and 18, which shall fill the emptie space of the triangle betwixt 8. and 27. So if the number [ H] of two be proportionally ioyned vnto twelue, and the number of three to eighteene (as viz. two times twelue, or three times eighteene) thereof shall arise the numbers of 24. and of 54. And againe, if three be ioyned vnto twelue, or that which is all one, two to eighteene, thereof ariseth the number of 36. which three proportionate num∣bers of 24. 36. and 54. shall fill vp the vacant place of the triangle betwixt 16. and 81, the mutuall proportion of which numbers so put into the void places of the triangle, and so filled with the numbers next, still keepe a perpetuall sweet course, although the sides of the triangle were infinitely extended, of which triange let this be the forme. If therefore choice be had of such proportions as make a sweet consent in the perpe∣tuall course of numbers, the Commonwealth shall so be euerlasting: if so be that the [ I] * 1.1175 state of Commonweales depend of harmonie. But that harmonie (as saith Plato) is sometime broken, so that the sweet consent thereof must needs perish, and so Com∣monweales at length come to ruine and decay. But to say the truth, is it not much more to be feared, lest the subiects or citisens erring or declyning from the sweet and naturall harmonie of well tuned lawes, and customes, shall in steed of them embrace most wicked and pernitious lawes and fashions? And yet for all that will I not denie but that harmonie and musike haue great force & power for the chaunging of a Com∣monweale, in which point both Plato and Aristotle well agree. Howbeit that Cicero is of opinion it to be a thing impossible, that for the musique of a Commonweal* 1.1176 chaunged, the Commonweale should it selfe therefore take chaunge. Whereof for [ K] all that we haue a most memorable example, of the Commonweale of the Cyne∣thenses in Arcadia, who hauing giuen ouer the pleasure of musique, shortly after fell into such sedition and ciuill warres, as wherein no kind of crueltie was forgotten, or not put in execution: whereat euery man marueling why this people was become so wilde and barbarors, seeing that all the rest of the people of Arcadia were wonderfull ciuill, courteous, and tractable: Polybius was the first which noted it so to haue happe∣ned, for that they had left to take pleasure and delight in musique; which from all anti∣quitie had beene alwaies more honored and esteemed in Arcadia than in any place

of the world else, in such sort as that by the lawes and customes of that countrie euery [ A] one was vppon great paines bound to exercise him selfe therein, vntill he was thirtie yeares old, which was the meane (as sayth Polybius) the first lawgiuers of that people wisely deuised, to quiet and tame them, being by nature rough and barbarous, as com∣monly* 1.1177 all the inhabitants of the mountaines and cold countries be. The like we may almost also say of the French nation, whom Iulian the Apostata in his time calleth a barbarous and fierce people and of all others most desirous of libertie, who yet now at this day are in ciuilitie inferiour to no people of all Europe, none being more tra∣ctable vnto their magistrates or obedient vnto their Princes than they, as men by na∣ture well, but by instruction better taught, and in the iudgement of all their neigh∣bours most skilfull in Musike. Wherein that is also worth the noting, that almost all [ B] the French songes & tunes (wherewith the countrie people are euen yet much deligh∣ted) are still Ionique or Lidian, that is to say, of the fift or seuenth tune. Which tunes Plato and Aristotle forbid the youth and women to vse: for that they be of great force and power to mollifie and effeminate the minds of men; and therefore would haue them to vse the Dorian tune, which our men call the first tune, to the intent that so they might be the better instructed with a certaine pleasant modestie, mixt with grauitie, a thing proper vnto this Dorian Musike. Which prohibition might haue serued better in the lesser Asia, where they haue no other songes but of the fift or sea∣uenth tune; and namely in the countries of Lydia and Ionia: But the people of the cold and mountaine Northern countries, which are ordinarily more sauage or at least [ C] wise lesse courteous than the people of the South and the inhabitants of the plaine countries, can no way better tame and mollifie themselues than by vsing the Lydian and Ionique harmonie. Which kind of Musike was also forbidden in the primitiue Church; wherein it was not permitted to sing Psalmes or prayses vnto God but in the Dorian or first tune, which at this present is yet in the Church most in vse. But as men which would tame wilde and sauage beasts, disarme them first of their teeth and clawes; so the Lydian and Ionique harmonie disarmeth the more outragious and* 1.1178 barbarous people of their sauage and cruell nature, and maketh them quiet and tracta∣ble: As it is happened vnto the Frenchmen, who happely had not beene so pliant and [ D] obedient vnto the lawes and statutes of this kingdome, if the nature which Iulian the Emperour saieth to haue beene in them so hautie and impatient of seruitude, had not by Musique beene attempered and mollified.

But of all those things which we haue yet brought to iudge of the future chaun∣ges* 1.1179 and ruines of Commonweales, we see no rule (whether it be of Astrologie or mu∣sike) certain and sure: howbeit that we haue by them some probable coniectures, whereof yet none seemeth vnto mee more certain or easie, than that which may be drawen from numbers. For why I thinke almightie God who with wonderfull wis∣dome hath so couched together the nature of all things, and with certain their num∣bers, meanes, measures, and consent, bound together all things to come: to haue also [ E] within their certaine numbers so shut vp and enclosed Commonweales, as that after a certaine period of yeares once past, yet must they needes then perish and take end, al∣though they vse neuer so good lawes and customes: as Plato with Aristotle therein agree. But when that period shall be, neither of them declareth: except some there be which suppose Plato to signifie it by certaine obscure numbers in his eight booke De Republica: at which rocke not onely all the Academikes, but euen almost all the sects of other Philosophers also, haue suffered shipwracke. And first of all Aristotle skip∣peth ouer this place as ouer a dich, neither doth here carpe his maister (as his manner is) when as for the obscuritie thereof he had not wherefore he might reproue him.

Proclus also hauing curiously enough enterpreted seauen of Plato his bookes de Re∣publica: [ A] * 1.1180 would not so much as touch the eight, stayed (as I suppose) with the diffi∣cultie of the matter. Theon also of Smyrna (for there is an other Theon also of Alexan∣dria; who writt a commentarie vpon Ptolomee in Greeke) a man most skilfull not in Plato his philosophie onely: but in the Mathematiques also: at such time as he ex∣pounded Plato his Commonweale there stucke fast, neither tooke vpon him to ex∣pound this place. Cicero in one word excuseth the difficultie of Plato his numbers. Marsilius Ficinus (in mine opinion) the sharpest of all the Academikes plainely con∣fesseth himselfe not to know what Plato in that place ment: fearing lest it should so fall out with him as it did with Iamblichus, who seemeth to haue bene willing in three words not to haue manifested a thing of it selfe most obscure, but rather to haue made [ G] it darker. Philo the Iewe euerie where imitating of Plato, thought that obscure and hidden number to be fiftie, and that he saieth to be signified by the right cornered Scalenus, such an one as Pithagoras comprehended in the three numbers 3, 4, 5. and therunto he supposeth those wordes of Plato to be referred, sesqui tertia radix quina∣rio coniuncta: sesqui tertia the radix or root ioyned vnto the number of fiue for the proportion of 3, 2, 4. is the proportion sesqui tertia. But in that he is deceiued for that he hath brought in a plaine number, whenas it appeareth Plato his meaning to haue bene to haue a solid number sought out, which should in it selfe containe all kind of numbers, excepting the numbers perfect. Yet Philo of these radicall numbers, 3, 4, 5,* 1.1181 brought euerie one of them apart into themselues maketh three quadrats: whereof [ H] are made 50 numbers, all plaine: but the wordes of Plato make mention of the hun∣dred cube. Beside that there be Dimetients incommensurable vnto the sides, as in the number of Plato: whose wordes it pleaseth mee heare to set downe, and to interpret the same: as well for that the interpretors doe in the interpretation thereof verie much differ amongst themselues: as also for that hee sayth the ignorance of that num∣ber to bee vnto the Gouernours of Cities and Common-weales almost capitall. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. [ I] which is as I interprer it, Truly the compasse of such things which take their beginning from God, is by the perfect number comprehended: but the compas of worldly things is con∣tained by that number wherein are found numbers exceeding, and numbers exceeded by encrease and decrease, three spaces in foure tearmes comprehended; whereof are made numbers among themselues both like, and vnlike, numbers encreased, and diminished, which may be called by their owne names, and compared among themselues: whose ses∣quitertiall radix ioyned vnto the number of fiue, maketh two consents thrice encreased, one equall equally: an hundred times an hundred: an other equall, on one part of it selfe longer, of an hundred dimetients, which might among themselues be compared, the num∣bers of fiue detracted lesse by the vnitie: but two of ineffable proportion: but an hundred [ K] Cubes of the ternarie it selfe. And this number made by Geometricall proportion, is in worldly things most mightie, to them which haue either the better or the worse begin∣ning. Here Plato is s•…•…ylie led away, not vnlike the fish Polypus, hauing on euery side* 1.1182 cast out his blacking like ynke, lest otherwise he should haue beene entangled and caught. Wherein truely he seemed to haue imitated Heraclitus, to vnderstand whose writings he said a man had need of a most skilfull interpretour. Which obscure kind of writing and speaking by Heraclitus deuised (when as he most often would beat into his Schollers eares that his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say speake obscurelie) is oft times vsed

not of Plato onely, but euen of Aristotle him selfe also, to the intent that so ha∣uing [ A] cast a mist before his eyes aswell of the learned as of the vnlearned, concerning the knowledge of most difficult things, and shut vp in the hidden secrets of nature, they might themselues become therefore the more admirable. Which thing we es∣pecially note in the bookes of nature; which bookes Aristotle boasteth himselfe of purpose to haue so writ, as that he would not haue them to be vnderstood, imitating therein Plato his most obscure Timaeus: Which thing Lucilius writ also of him selfe, that he had rather not to be at all vnderstood, then to be reprehended or found fault with all. But let vs discouer Plato his deceit by those things which he himselfe writeth* 1.1183 more plainly, that we may more certeinly iudge of those things which he fouldeth vp in such obscuritie of words: for he would that those things which take their beginning [ B] from God, should be contained within the perfect number. But what thing is there at length which oweth not the first beginning of the being thereof vnto almightie God, either immediatly without any other meane cause, or else some other the meane or middle causes comming betweene. And that God himselfe without any other meane cause created the Angels, and other the celestiall bodies not onely Plato, but euen the Manichies also themselues confesse; who yet most wickedly thought all earthly things to haue had their beginning from the prince of euils. True it is that the earth brought forth plants & other liuing creatures, the waters also fishes, and foules; yet both of them by the commaundement of almightie God: But vnto the creation of [ C] Man he would also haue the * 1.1184 Angels present. Howbeit that Aristotle was of opini∣on the formes of all things to be in a sort diuinely infused into them, when as he writ in all things to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or some diuine thing. As for the mind of man he calleth it not obscurely or doubtfully but euen plainely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: which is (as I inter∣pret it) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from aboue, from God, or from heauen, not out of the power of the seed, as he saith of other liuing creatures: of whom for all that Virgil in generall saith: Igneus est ollis vigor & caelestis origo, A fierie force they haue, and a celestiall beginning. Wherefore we must confesse all things to be included in perfect numbers if we will beleeue Plato. But let vs graunt vnto the Academikes (which yet is an impietie to do) these earthly things which we speake of, to haue had their begin∣ning [ D] else where then from almightie God, shall therefore the perfect numbers as better, be attributed vnto heauenly things? yea the perfect numbers should rather agree vnto earthly things, for that the perfect numbers how many soeuer they be are euen, and of the female kind, for otherwise they were not perfect: neither are more than * foure* 1.1185 within an hundred thousand: there beeing also other perfect numbers * aboue that number of an hundred thousand, but such as cannot be applied either vnto diuine, or humaine or worldlie things. Wherefore seeing that the number of six is the first of* 1.1186 the perfect numbers, it ought by the opinion of Plato to agree vnto things immedi∣ately by God himselfe created; and yet we see the same number neuerthelesse to agree vnto most vile and abiect liuing creatures. For Aristotle writeth the Hare (by the [ E] law of God an vncleane creature, & forbidden his holie people to eate of) to liue at the most but six yeares. The like number of yeares the same man attributeth also vnto Mice. And vnto certaine kinds of flyes, as vnto waspes and Bees six yeares are by Vir∣gill allotted, and their hiues are still made six cornered; all which base creatures ex∣cept the Hare are engendered of putrifcation. But as saith the Poet: Numero Deus impare gaudet, God delighteth in an odd number. And odd numbers are attributed vnto men: For that which Seneca writeth: Septimus quisque annus aetati notam impri∣mit, Euery seauenth yeare imprinteth some marke into age, is to be vnderstood onely of the male sexe: for experience showeth vs euen vnto the view of the eye, that the

number of six maketh a chaunge, and leaueth a marke vnto the female kind: So that [ F] as men begin to feele the heat of youth at fourteene yeares; women wax ripe at twelue, and so holding on from six to six, still so find in themselues some notable chaunge in the disposition either of their bodies, or of their mindes. All diuine Holy∣daies* 1.1187 also are concluded in septenaries, or such other odd numbers. In many places also Diamonds grow by nature it selfe pollished six square, as Plinie in his 33. booke reporteth, which in the mountaines of the Pyrenes is a common matter. Wherefore it is an absurd thing that Plato attributeth the beginning and ending of diuine things vnto perfect numbers onely. But Porphyree the most famous philosopher of his time, when he enterpreted that of Plato out of his Timaeus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, writeth the estate of all Commonweales, and the life of spirits to be determined, at the [ G] farthest in the reuolution of a thousand yeares. Plutarch in his booke entituled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 supposeth the life of Spirits to extend longer, but yet nei∣ther of them sought after the perfect numbers. But if so be that Plato in so great few∣nesse of perfect numbers, could not tell which of them should agree to things sprung from a diuine beginning; by what numbers then should he discide so great varietie of worldly things? or if he knew that number, why did he pray and make vowes vnto the Muses that they would show him it.

Wherefore it behoueth a man of deeper consideration to seeke out such numbers* 1.1188 as may signifie the conuersions & chaunges of worldly things, and which are by long experience, and not by light and vaine coniectures approued: such as I deeme the [ H] numbers of seauen and nine and their quadrate and cubike numbers: viz. 49, 81, 343, 729, to be. For as the number of six (which is of all perfect numbers the first) chaun∣geth the manners, habit, or nature of the Female kind, so most * 1.1189 auncient antiquitie hath by experience proued the number of seauen in some sort to chaunge the Male kind also: and that as the numbers of seauen or nine vse commonly to giue vnto men* 1.1190 the beginning and time of their birth, that so the number growing of the multiplying of either of them, hath beene wont to bring vnto them their end and destruction. Which same thing I transfer and applie vnto Commonweales also, so that the num∣bers of seauen and nine, and such as arise of their quadrate and cubike numbers, do often times bring ruine and destruction vnto Commonweales. For that which we [ I] haue alleaged out of Seneca and Censorius euery seauenth yeare to imprint some marke into the age of man, and so the daungers of mens liues & substance to happen still vpon their seauenth yeares: vnderstand that to belong especially vnto men. Of which mine opinion I haue vse aud experience the authour: For it is euery sixt yeare which leaueth a most certaine note of it selfe vnto women. And first to begin withall the strength of bodie and of mind is increased in them the sixt yeare, or else therein they die: the twelft yeare they begin to wax warme, and the eighteenth yeare are rea∣die for husbands: and if diseases fall vpon them in their sixt yeares, they are so often times in daunger: The like whereof happeneth vnto men the seauenth, the fourteenth, and one and twentieth yeare: So that Plato not without cause attributeth the euen [ K] numbers vnto the female sexe, and the odd numbers vnto the male. And for this cause Plutarch saith, The auntient Romans to haue vsed to giue name vnto their male chil∣dren the ninth day, for that the seauenth was more daungerous, and vnto their female children or daughters the eight day: for that (as saith he) the euen number is proper vnto the female sexe: And therefore I suppose them of old time to haue vsed euery eight day to do sacrifice vnto Neptune, for that the element of water agreeth vnto wo∣men, as doth the firie element vnto men: As also that they thought the number of seauen to be feared. Howbeit that the law of God commaundeth the male children

to be circumcised the eight day: which the sacred interpretors of the Hebrewes thinke [ A] * 1.1191 to haue beene done, that so there might be one Sabaoth betwixt the birth of the child and the circumcision thereof, and so more strength might thereby be giuen vnto the child. For why, Moyses doth in sacred writ teach vs, God most plentifully to blesse the Seauenth day (which was the birth day of the world) with his grace and all other good things: which aboundance and stoare of his good blessings is no where seene to be giuen vnto the rest of the other dayes, by a certaine wonderfull cause of nature from all Philosophers hidden.

Yet nothing seemeth in mans nature more wonderfull than that the yeare three∣score* 1.1192 three hath bene still noted to be vnto almost all old men fatall, Obseruandum est (saieth Au. Gellius) in multa hominum memoria, expertumque in senioribus plerisque [ B] omnibus sexagesimum tertium vitae annum cum periculo & clade aliqua venire, aut corpo∣ris morbis grauioris, aut vitae interitus, aut animi aegritudinis, It is a thing obser∣ued (sayeth hee) in the great remembrance of men, and also by experience pro∣ued in many old men, The threescore and third yeare of their age to come vnto them all with some danger and hurt, either of the body, or of some great disease, or of losse of life, or of some tormenting griefe of mind. Yea there is an epistle of Augustus the emperour vnto his nephew Caius, bearing date the ninth of the Calends of Octo∣ber, written to the same purpose, in this sort, Aue mi Cai, meus ocellus iucūdissimus, quem semper medius fidius desidero quùm a me abes: sed praecipuè diebus talibus qualis est hodi∣ernus: oculi mei requir unt meum Caium: quem vbicum{que} & hoc die fuisti, spero laetum & [ C] bene valentem celebrasse quartum & sexagesimum natalem meum: nam vt vides 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 communem seniorum omnium tertium & sexagesimum euasimus, &c. All haile my Caius (sayth he) my most sweet delight, whom of my faith I alwaies long for when thou art from me, but especially on such daies as this is mine eyes doe now seeke after my Caius, whome wheresoeuer thou hast this day bene, I hope that thou merrie and in good health, hast celebrated my threescore & fourth birth day: for as you see we haue escaped the threescore and third yeare, the common Climacteriall yeare of all old men, &c. Howbeit that Augustus liued vntill he was seuentie seuen yeares old; as did also Pomponius Atticus, who died at that age. We might reckon vp an infinit number not only of the poore and baser sort, but euen of the nobler sort also, who ended their [ D] * 1.1193 daies in the threescore and third yeare of their age: but we will onely reckon vp some such as were for their learning famous, who as at that age died, viz. Aristotle, Cicero, Crysippus, S. Bernard, Boccace, Erasmus, Luthar, Melancthon, Siluius, Alexander Imolen∣sis, the most famous lawier of his time, Cardinall Cusan, Linacre, and Sturmius: And therfore the old Greeke diuines seeme to haue consecrated the number of seauen vnto Apollo, and of nine vnto the Muses, as Plutarque writeth.

Now if any man will more curiously search out these things, whether it be in the* 1.1194 sacred or profane histories, he shal find the liues of men for the most part to haue expi∣red and taken end still in the seauenth or ninth yeares of their age: and women in the [ E] sixt. Plato is said to haue died at the age of fourscore and one, which is nine times nine yeares: Theophrastus at 84, which are twelue times seauen yeares, which period few men passe; or els they passe to xiii times seauen, as did S. Hierom and Isocrates, who liued 91 yeares. Plinie, Bartholus, and Caesar liued fiftie sixe yeares, which is eight times seauen yeares: Lamech liued 777 yeares, and Methusala (who of all others liued the longest) 970 yeares: Abraham liued an hundred seauentie and fiue yeares, which are fiue and twentie times seauen yeares: Iacob 147 yeares, which are xxi septinaries, or spaces of seauen yeres: Isaac liued 190 yeares, which make xx times nine yeares: Dauid liued seauentie yeares, which make ten times seauen yeares. An infinit thing it were

to recken vp all which are in histories found to haue ended their daies at these afore∣said [ A] periods of seauens and nines. He also who of our auncestors and of histories is cal∣led Ioannes de temporibus liued 361 yeares, that is to say three and fiftie times seauen yeares. It is manifest also men to be alwaies borne in the ninth or seauenth monethe whom the Graeks therfore call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and that they which are borne either soo∣ner or later liue not. For which cause Hippocrates writeth a child to be fully made and perfected in all the parts and limbs thereof the seauenth day: and afterward to take encrease: and being borne the seauenth moneth to liue: but none to haue liued being borne in the eight moneth: a child also in the seuenth yeare to haue all the teeth, and that men (as Plinie writeth it to haue bene euen from the farthest memorie of men ob∣serued) hauing bene kept from meat seuen dayes, albeit they may liue longer, shall yet [ G] * 1.1195 neuerthelesse at length die thereof. The law of God hath most religiously also both consecrated and commaunded, the seuenth day to be kept holy, as the birth day of the world, and of all that therein is: which one day of all others God almightie blessed, and which day all antiquitie hath by long experience reported to be so vnlike the other daies of the weeke, as that it is taken vp as an old prouerbe, No seuenth day 〈◊〉〈◊〉 passe wherein the sunne is not at one time or other therein to be seene. Vpon which day the auntient Hebrewes constantly affirme, The rage of diuels to be restrained, wisedome to be into the minds of men infused, their bodies to be strengthened, and their fields with encrease of fruit to be blessed. The seuenth yeare also is by the law of God holy, as is also the seuenth time seuen yeare, which is the yeare of Iubilie: neither is if to be [ H] doubted, but that a certaine secret force is in them, both for the chaunge and ruine of Commonweales. So that it ought not to seeme straunge, if that this number of seuen be of the Hebrews called sacred or holy: which Caluin (following Galen, as I suppose) calleth Perfect (where he entreateth of the rest of the Sabboth day) which hee euen to astonishment woundereth to be so often and so religiously propounded, to bee of all men obserued and kept, in so much that euen the paine of death is propounded vnto the breakers thereof: so that the whole summe of all God his lawes may seeme to bee therein contained: yet is not therefore the number of seauen a number perfect, for that it is odd and masculine: whereas all perfect numbers are euen and feminine. For why,* 1.1196 the Mathematitians define that to be perfect, which may bee diuided into the same [ I] whole parts, whereof it is made, so that in such diuision nothing be wanting or super∣fluous. As 1, 2, 3, make sixe: which three numbers do also equally diuide sixe into equall parts, as it was of them made, as it is in other perfect numbers also. Lactantius* 1.1197 in the same errour offended, who calleth the number of three and ten, perfect and full numbers: and also Cicero, who deceiued many, in calling the numbers of seuen and* 1.1198 eightfull numbers; which Macrobius vnderstandeth to bee solide, and others to bee perfect numbers: neither of which can truely bee said of the number of seuen: as for the number of eight it is indeed a solid, but not therefore a perfect number. With like errour is Plutarch himselfe deceiued, who writeth, Three to be a number perfect: howbeit that Aristotle deemeth the force of that number to be of great force in the [ K] whole course of nature. Philo was herein also deceiued, in taking ten to bee the most perfect number.* 1.1199

Now indeed there are but foure perfect numbers from one vnto an hundred thou∣sand, viz. 6, 28, 496, and 8128, amongst which the last cannot serue for the changing of Commonweales, for that it exceedeth the age of the world: neither the two first, for that they are too little: so that but one of them can be well applied vnto the chaun∣ges of cities and Commonweals, viz. the number of * 1.1200 496, which is made of seuentie septenaries of yeares, and a perfect number: it being also a thing by most auntient anti∣quitie

obserued, All cities in the reuolution of fiue hundred yeares, to suffer either some [ A] great chaunge, or else some vtter ruine. But these numbers touching the chaunge or ruine of cities and Commonweales, may be two wayes applyed, viz. vnto the princes themselues, or els vnto the continuance of their kingdomes and empires. As if a man should say, This kingdome of Fraunce to fall and take end, after that threescore and three kings had therein raigned, this number consisting of the numbers of seuen and* 1.1201 nine, conuerted in themselues. As Esaias, who liuing in the time of Romulus, prophe∣sied, That nine kings should more yet raigne in Iudea, and that the tenth should toge∣ther with the people be led away into captiuitie, and so that kingdome to take end: As also that there should be nine kings of the Persians, or as that the seuenth king of the Romans should be thrust out of his kingdom: which number of princes well agreeth [ B] with the number of the yeares which they raigned in Iurie, viz. 182, a number consi∣sting of six & twenty septenaries: & at Rome 244, for in the 75 septenarie, that is to say, in the 245 yere Tarquin the proud, last king of Rome, was thrust out of his kingdome. Hieremie the Prophet then liued, when as the prophesie of Esay was fulfilled, and him∣selfe prophesied, That the people should be againe deliuered in the seuentie yeare of their captiuitie, as indeed they were, and the temple againe restored. The same Prophet * 1.1202 Esayas prophesied also, The most famous citie of Tyre to be in 70 yeres after vnpeo∣pled and left desolat, and afterwards within seuentie yeares moe after the ruine therof, to be againe restored. The same number agreeth vnto the Athenian Commonweale, [ C] wherein seauen princes, whome they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, raigned also 70 yeres▪ the taking of which citie, and the victorie of the Athenians at Salamine, is reported to haue happe∣ned vpon the verie like day. As for the number which of the Academikes is called fa∣talis n•…•…merus, or a Fatall number, viz. 1728 (being indeed a quadrat number) seemeth to haue bene expired from the raigne of Ninus vnto the victorie of Alexander the Great, at Arbela, and the ouerthrow of the Persian empire. For Herodotus, Diodorus, Trogus Pompeius, Iustin, and Ctesias, begin that empire from Ninus. And at such time as Hierusalem ouerwhelmed with most bitter calamities, was won and rased, the tem∣ple ouerthrowne, king Sedechias slaine, and the people carried away into captiuitie: at the selfe same time the Aegyptians rebelled against the kings of Assyria, the Athenians [ D] shooke off the tyrannicall yoke of the Pisistratides, and the Romans expulsed the proud Tarquins. Now the temple had before stood 427 yeares, a time cousisting of whole septenaries. But for that in the computation of times, there is great difference amongst the Historiographers, we will vse the Roman Fasts or Calenders, which can∣not lie. Wherein we see, that from the foundation of the citie, and of the Roman Commonweale vnto the battaile of Actium, wherein Marcus Antonius was by Augustus vanquished, and the whole empire brought vnder the power of one onely Monarch, and a generall peace established throughout the world, there are accounted 729 yeares, the solide number of nine. The same number of yeres passed from the con∣quest of the kingdome of the Lombards by Charlemaigne, vnto the conquest of the [ E] same countrey by Lewes the twelfth the French king, vpon the Venetians and the Sfor∣ces. The like number of yeares is accounted also from the ouerthrow of the kingdom of the Picts, and the great victorie of the Scots vnto the captiuitie of Marie Steward their queene. As also from Egbert king of the West Saxons (who hauing vanqui∣shed the East Saxons, made himselfe the sole Monarch of England, and called the peo∣ple Englishmen) vnto queene Marie, who was the first woman that tooke vpon her the soueraigntie of that people in fourteene hundred and fortie yeares space. So from the raigne of Augustus, after the victorie by him obtained at Actium, and the temple of I•…•…nus the fourth time shut vp, vnto Augustus the last of all the Roman emperors, slaine

by Odouacer king of the Herules, and the empire possessed by the Gothes, there are ac∣counted [ F] 496 yeares, which we said to be a perfect number, as consisting of seuentie sep∣tinaries; with the perfect number of six: For by the Fasts the yeare following Odoua∣cer began to raigne. Wherein it is also worth the noting, that as the first emperour Augustus with wonderfull felicitie and wisedome, both established and encreased that so great a Monarchy, which he held more than fortie yeres: so Augustulus the last of the Roman emperours diminished both in name and soueraigntie, held that his empire scarce a whole yeare, which happened the tenth of the calends of September. As it happened to Constantine the Great, who established the seat of the empire at Constan∣tinople: and to Constantine the last Christian emperour, there dispoyled of his estate, and slaine by Mahomet king of the Turkes, surnamed the Great. Now from the [ G] building of the citie vnto this Augustulus, are accounted 1225 yeares: which number consisteth of whole septinaries: which thing Vectius the great sooth-saier foretold, as* 1.1203 Censorinus out of Marcus Varro writeth. The same number of yeares wee find from Ninus king of Assyria, vnto the death of Sardanapalus, whome Arbaces gouernour of Media dispoyled of his gouernment, and translated the kingdome vnto the Medes. Now from Saul the first king of the elect people of God vnto that Sedechias was slain, and his kingdome ouerthrowne, returneth that perfect number of 496 yeres. But whereas Iosephus reporteth the burning of both the Temples, and the taking of the citie, to haue chaunced the selfesame day, viz. the ninth day of the first moneth; he in that agreeth not with the booke of the Kings, neither with the Prophet Hieremy, [ H] who both otherwise report the same. So many yeares, viz. 496. are accounted from Caranus first king of the Macedons, vnto Alexander the Great last king of that coun∣trey, discended of the line and issue of Hercules, and of Aeacus. Some there bee which adde certaine yeares moe, and some others which detract some also. Wherefore my meaning is not to alleage any other than the records set downe by the most certaine Historiographers, and such as euery man may draw euen out of the verie fasts and ca∣lenders of the Romans themselues. Of which sort is that, that from the foundation of the citie of Rome, vnto the sacking therof by the French men, are accounted 364 yeres, which number consisteth of whole septinaries: As also from the building of the citie, vnto the slaughter at Cannas, Terentius Varro being then Consull (at which time the [ I] Commonweale was fallen into extreame danger) are numbred 536 yeres, that is to say 77 septinaries of yeres: And from thence vnto the slaughter by the Romans, receiued from the Germans, vnder the conduct of Quinctilius Varro, are passed 224 yeares, a number consisting of whole septenaries: both which ouerthrowes happened the se∣cond day of August, as is by the auntient Romans reported. Neither is that lesse me∣morable which Tarapha a most certaine Historiographer amongst the Spaniards re∣porteth, The Moores and Arabians to haue inuaded Spaine in the yere of Christ 707, and that also the seuenth yeare of the raigne of king Roderike, and to haue holden the same kingdome 770 yeares, neither could vtterly be from thence againe expulsed, be∣fore the time of Ferdinand king of Arragon and Castile. It is also worth the noting, [ K] that from the execution of Aman, and the deliuerie of the Iewes at the intercession of Hester, vnto the victorie of Iudas Machabeus against Antiochus the noble king of Sy∣ria and his lieutenant, there passed 343 yeares, which is the solid number of seuen, that is to say seuen times seuen septenaries: both which victories happened the thirteenth day of the moneth Adar, as the Hebrewes haue well noted. The same number of yeares passed from the time that Octauianus (hauing vanquished Marcus Antonius, and vnited the whole Roman empire vnder his owne obeysance) was by the Senat called Augustus, vnto Constantine the Great; a time notable for the straunge chaunces which

then happened in the whole empire, as well in the lawes politique, as in matters of reli∣gion. [ A] Tacitus hath also noted in another singularitie, That the citie of Rome was by Nero burnt, on the like day that it had long before beene burnt by the Gaules, which was the fourteenth of the calends of August: wherēin some haue gone so farre, as to number how many yeares, moneths and dayes, passed betwixt both those fiers.

But that the numbers of six are almost vnto women fatall, I thought it not needfull* 1.1204 by examples to proue, least I might be thought to stand vpon triflles, only that I note, that in the yeare 1582, at such time as the prince of Orenge had receiued a mortall wound, the one and twentieth of March, being the fortie ninth yeare of his age, and that all men dispaired of his life, he yet recouered his health at his entrance into his fiftieth yeare: But Carola Charlet of Burbon his wife within two monethes after [ B] died, when as shee entred into the six and thirtieth yeare of her age, which is the quadrat of the number of six: euen as the prince her husband was wounded in the nine and fortieth yeare of his age, the quadrat of the septenarie or number of seuen: which I thought not to haue written, but that I was told the same by the prince of Orenge himselfe, as a thing by him noted, when as I was of councell with Francis duke of Alanson at Anwerpe.

But now for that we are by way of discourse come so farre, the last that remayneth is for me to aunswere some thing to them which take pleasure rather to carpe than to commend my writings: for that * 1.1205 I said I vnderstood not the prophecies of Daniel concerning the rising and ruine of Empires and kingdomes. For I doubt not but that [ C] if he (amongst others a most wise man) would in their due times haue plainly set downe such things as he by diuine inspiration had conceiued and declared, all things then whereof we now doubt, should without all doubt be vnto vs most plaine and cleere. Truely he defineth the state of his owne citie, king Cyrus then beginning his raigne, what time the captiuitie was ended, according to * 1.1206 the prophecie of Ieremie, (which he beginneth from the destruction of the Citie and of the Temple, and not from the raigne of Ioachim as some suppose) and the holie people returned. He defi∣neth* 1.1207 it (I say) by seauentie weekes of yeares, that is by 490. yeares, and that right plainly; when as the prophecie was made in the last yeare of the captiuitie, which was the seauentieth from the destruction of the Citie and of the Temple: that so the pro∣phecies [ D] might in good order with the prophecies, and times with times be continued: whereas they which longer protract the times leaue an hundred and twentie yeares at one gaping. But the Prophet expresly taught, that the beginning of the time ought to be accounted from the time of the prophecie giuen, wherein the people againe re∣turned as if it had beene before dead, and appointed vnto it selfe a Prince and other magistrates, from whence the restoring of the Citie is to be accounted, and not from the repairing of the walles and buildings. In which case Pompee said well: Vrbe de∣serta, in parietibus Rempublicam non consistere, That the citie being forsaken, the Com∣monweale consisted not in the walles thereof. But many * 1.1208 Historiographers from [ E] the time of Cyrus vnto the raigne of Herode the great (who hauing taken Hierusalem and slaine all the Senators together with the king himselfe, and spoiled the Iewes of their kingdome) do account 490. yeares. Others there be which recken otherwise, and so great varietie and difference there is amongst them, as that all the opinions of all of them, may well be refelled, not onely by euery one of them a part, but euen by all of them together. As for those things which Daniel writ concerning the Empires, he openly and plainly hath called the Medes, the Persians, and Grecians vnto the Em∣pire of Babylon; but besides them none. The fourth Empire (by him spoken of) we haue showed not to belong vnto the Romans, seeing that question is there concerning

Babylon, which the Romans neuer subdued; which when they passing ouer the riuer [ F] Euphrates had vnfortunately attempted, they receiued many and great ouerthrowes of the most inuincible Parthians. But yet more foolishy do they who attribute that fourth Empire vnto the Germans, who neuer so much as dreamed of any the least part of the Babylonians Empire. Which things for that they be by vs else where dis∣puted we will here let passe. Which things for all that Frankbergerus the Saxon and Bishop of Lipsic, by the authoritie of Luther, and one Dresserus a meere schoolman with rayling without any reason at all refelleth, whom I shall yet count an eloquent man, if he shall but learne aswell to speake, as he hath learned to speake euill: But for that the angrie man (a common fault of the wise) is angrie with me, for that I dare not rashly iudge of the diuine oracles, least in so doing I might offend in such his mat∣ters, [ G] and so farre from all mens senses: he should haue taught me why he thinketh the Prophet Daniel to haue there omitted fiftie empires, which I haue * 1.1209 noted to haue bin ten times greater than the German empire, and such as haue in them also contained a great part of the Babylonian empire? Why also Daniel in his first chapter hath writ of himselfe, That he liued in the first yeare of the raigne of Cyrus king of Persia? And yet more, why he should write himself to haue receiued that diuine oracle or prophesie in the * 1.1210 third yeare of the raigne of king Cyrus? And why in the chapter following doth he make mention of Darius king of Persia▪ who was inuested in that kingdome seuen and thirtie yeares after that Cyrus began to raigne? For neither Berosus a most true interpretor of the Chaldean antiquities, whome Ctesias and most of the auntient [ H] writers, haue followed: neither Megusthenes the Cronicler of the Persian affaires, nei∣ther Herodotus, called the Father of Historie, neither any of the Greeke or Hebrew hi∣storiographers, report any to haue bene before Darius Hystaspes: I except onely Iose∣phus, who in that place dissenteth from Berosus. But least we should seeme to deale to sharply, and to presse them too farre, What is the reason why Daniel in the eleuenth chapter of his prophesie writeth, That Darius should haue three Persians his successors and that the fourth should come out of Grecia, who by mightie force and strong hand should obtaine the empire? But that this was Alexander the Great no man doubteth, who thrust Darius Codomaenus out of the Persian empire, whose father was Darius Achos, his grandfather Darius Mnemon, and his great grandfather Darius Nothus, vn∣to [ I] whome Daniel turneth his speech. Which if it be so, Daniel must needes haue liued two hundred and twentie yeares, if he were a youth growne when as hee was carried captiue into Chaldea, which he must needes be, for that hee then spoke both most elo∣quently and wisely. And thus much euerie man may most plainely gather both out of the sacred scriptures, and also out of the auntient histories of Herodotus and Iosephus. For Cyrus died in the 30 yeare of his raigne, Cambyses in the 6, Darius Hystaspes in the 37, Xerxes in the 21, Artaxerxes in the 44, Darius Nothus in the 19, Darius Mne∣mon in the 36, Darius Achos in the •…•…6, Darius Cadomanus in the 10, all making the summe of 228 yeares. For Daniel was taken prisoner together with king Ioachim. But let the interpretors of these diuine oracles suppose all things to bee manifest vnto [ K] them, and let euerie one of them with great confidence at their pleasure deter∣mine of these Daniels weekes. Yet how can these which euen most subtilly hane discussed all these matters, defend that of the Prophets Zacharias * 1.1211 and Aggaeus, who writ their prophecies in the end of the seauentieth yeare of the captiuitie, Darius Nothus* 1.1212 as they will haue it then raigning. This is now (say those Prophets) the seauentieth yeare▪ And if it be so that they will haue the seauentie yeares to be accounted not from the destruction of the Temple, but from the Edict of Xerxes, then truly Zerubabel and Nehemiah the chiefetaines of the people must needs haue liued full two hundred and

fiftie yeares, being so old when Cyrus began his raigne, as that they were able to con∣duct [ A] the people out of Chaldea into the land of Palestine: whom yet the doubt not to proue euen by the testimonie of Nehemiah himselfe, him to haue liued euen to the last Darius. Wherefore all Historiographers are here much troubled and at great variance among themselues: one saying that there were but fiue of these Persian kings: an other six: and others seauen: many eight: some nine: yea and some there be which haue deuised a tenth also. Truely Genebrardus in his Chronologie affirmeth there to haue bene of them onely fiue: but Functius saith ten. Wherefore in so great rietie of opinions one of the two may be: as viz. that none of them all be true, the other can in no wise be, that moe of them then one should at all be true; and which of them it is I can not affirme: neither if I could would I. And in mine opinion [ B] I haue hereof more modestly than they written, that it was not a thing to me well knowne, vnto whom for all that I will yeeld, if they can by any meanes maintaine the certaintie of their owne positions. Howbeit that S. Hierome hath reiected many things which are found in the writings of Daniel: And that the Hebrewes allow not of the rest which are not writ in the Chaldee, but in the Greeke tongue by Theodotion.

Wherefore these examples thus propounded, it is lawfull by a certaine coniectu∣rall* 1.1213 gessing to ayme at the rising and falling of Commonweales: as also for a man looking into the precedent causes of things, with the diuers coniunctions and oppo∣sitions of the Planets, to go so farre as the knowledge of such things will beare: not [ C] rashly affirming, or lightly beleeuing any thing concerning such things as are by the Almightie and euer liuing God farre set from the sense and reach of man.

CHAP. III. That it is a most daungerous thing at one and the selfe same time▪ to chaunge the forme, lawes, and customes of a Commonweale.

HOw Cities and Commonweales arise; by what meanes they are also encreased; what diuers alterations and chaunges befall euery one of them; and by what coniectures the fall and ruine of them is to be [ D] by vs gathered, I suppose we haue sufficiently before declared. But for asmuch as the presumptions by vs alreadie noted, are not suffi∣cient to make any certaine demonstration of, but rest vpon such grounds as are farthest off from the senses and capacitie of the common sort of men: Neither that if they were deliuered by way of demonstration, or other more certaine rules, should they therefore inferre any necessitie at all? It remaineth that wee accor∣ding to that wisedome and discretion wherewith almightie God hath of his goodnes endued men, endeuour our selues to rule Estates and Commonweales, and by all meanes to foresee and decline the chaunges and ruines of them. For why, it is one ge∣nerall opinion and doctrine of all Philosophers, yea euen of them which idly dispute [ E] what is done in heauen: a wise man not to be bound or subiect vnto the power or in∣fluence* 1.1214 of the starres: but onely they which giue the raines vnto their disordered appe∣tites, and beastly desires, not suffering themselues to be gouerned by the rule of reason, or of other the best lawes: vnto whome Salomon the maister of wisedome hath sharp∣ly threatned the torment of the wheele, saying, That God should cause the wheele to passe ouer them: that is to say, the force and effect of the celestiall Spheres, which ouer the good should haue no power at all. Seeing therefore that the power & influence of the starres may by the power of God, that is, by wisdome (by the gift and goodnesse of almightie God giuen vnto men) be auoided: and that wise physitians haue found the

meanes to chaunge the diseases, and to alter feuers contrarie vnto their naturall courses, [ F] to the intent the more easily to cure them, or at leastwise to asswage them; why should* 1.1215 not the wise polititian, or gouernour of a Commonweale, foreseeing the conuersions and chaunges which naturally happen vnto Commonweales, by good lawes and other conuenient remedies preuent the ruine therof: or if the force of the mischiefe be so great, and the destruction so certaine, as that it can by no wisdome of man bee pre∣uented or staied, yet shall he performe that which cunning physitians doe, who by the Symptomes appearing vpon the criticall dayes, and by the causes of the disease, doe more certainlie and better guesse of the sicke mans death in what manner it shall bee: and so yet in good rime giueth thereof warning vnto his ignorant subiects, lest that they should vpon the suddein be vtterly oppressed with the ruine of the falling Estate [ G] and Commonweale. And as the most skilfull Phisitions euen in the state of the disease,* 1.1216 and the greatest griefe therof, do yet put their patients in greater comfort, if the Symp∣tomes, be good then if the griefe or fit without them were but easie and gentle; and as to the contrarie when they see a man in the highest degree of health that may be, they are then in the greatest feare, lest he should suddenly fall vnto some extreame sick∣nesse, as the great phisition Hippocrates saith: So also a wise gouernour of a Com∣monweale, seeing the state on all sides beset, and almost ouerwhelmed with ene∣myes, yet if in so great daunger he otherwise see wise men sitting at the helme of the Commonweale, the subiects obedient vnto the Magistrats, and the Magistrats vnto the Lawes; he taketh courage thereat, and promiseth both vnto himselfe and others [ H] good successe; the ignorant people & cowards hauing in the meane time lost their pa∣tience, and lying as men plunged euen into the bothom of dispaire. In which state the Romaine commonweal stood after the third slaughter of their armie at Cannas, when as now many of the friendly and confederate cites, which before had continued in their fidelitie and allegeance, reuolted from the Romaines, following the fortune and* 1.1217 victories of Hanniball: For why almost all men now despaired of the estate of the Romaine Empire: at which time of distresse, of all others no man more hurt the Commonweale than did Terentius Varro the Consul, who with some few hauing escaped from so great a slaughter (as wherein threescore thousand of the citisens of Rome were slaine) writ letters vnto the Senat and people of Capua, That the Roman [ I] Commonweale was vndoone, as hauing in that battell lost all the force and flower thereof. Which thing so terrified them of Capua, (although in wealth and power they fa•…•…re exceeded all the rest of the Roman confederates) that they not onely them∣selues forsooke the Romans, but drew with them many of their allies and confederates also vnto Hanniball: when as in deed the Consul should haue extenuated the ouer∣throw and losse receiued. Whereas Scipio, who was afterwards called Africanus, to the contrarie with comfortable speeches then cheered vp diuers of the citisens dispai∣ring of the state of the Commonweale, and by oath constrained such as were about to haue abandoned the citie, to stay there still, and not to stirre, but resolutely to ad∣uenture their liues for the defence of their countrie and Commonweale. Neither was [ K] the Senate terrified with the feare of so many daungers, as wherewith they were on euery side beset and inclosed, but rather seemed with greater wisdome to mannage the Estate than euer it did before. And albeit that the common people (according to their wonted lightnesse and foolish ignorance) almost in euery towne and city sung the prai∣ses of Hanniball, after his so many and so great victories ouer the Romans: Yet for all that, the Senat of euery citie fauoured the Romans: For so saith Liuie, Vnus veluti morbus omnes Italiae populos inuaserat, vt plebs ab optimatibus dissentiret: Senatus Ro∣manis faueret, plebs ad Poenos rem traheret, One disease as it were (saith he) had infected

all the people of Italie, viz. That the people still dissented from the nobilitie; the Senat [ A] still fauoured the Romanes; and the people still enclined vnto the Carthaginensians. Yea Hiero king of Siracusa, accounted the wisest prince of his age, did then much more carefully than before honour and reuerence the amitie and alliance of the Romaines, not doubting in what he could to helpe and releeue them; yea and in that their despe∣rat estate amongst other things sent them a statue of Victorie (of gold) for a present▪ as he which had oftentimes proued the incredible wisdome of that Senat in the manna∣ging of their affaires. Wherein a man may see, that the wiser sort seeing the Romans so aduised and so constant in their extreme necessitie, and that their lawes were neuer more straightly kept, or martiall discipline more seuerely obserued, (as Polybius an eye∣witnesse of those things, himselfe writeth) were alwaies of opinion that the issue of [ B] their affaires would be good: not vnlike the wise physition, who seeing fauourable Symptomes in the strongest fit of his patients disease, is yet still in good hope. Whereas Carthage to the contrarie proud of so many and so great victories, mistres of so many countries and nations, and placed in the height of all worldly felicitie, was neuer than then neerer vnto ruine and destruction: wherof were most certain tokens, for that in that Commonweale was no place left either for law or vertue, all things be∣ing done by the popular rage, or vnruly lust of the common people: so that it must needs shortly after be cast downe headlong from the highest degree of honour, and become subiect vnto the Romans, as not long after it did, Scipio beeing then their ge∣nerall. [ C]

Wherefore the first rule for the keeping and preseruing of Commonweales in* 1.1218 their estates, is well to know the nature of euery Commonweale, together with the diseases incident vnto them: whereof we haue more at large discoursed in the former Booke. For it is not enough to know which kind of Commonweale is better than o∣ther, but it behoueth vs also to know the meanes how to maintaine euerie one of them in their estate, if it be not in our power to chaunge the same, or that in chaun∣ging thereof we shall put all to the hasard of vtter ruine and decay. For whie, it is bet∣ter to haue an euill Commonweale than none at all: as with conuenient diet in some* 1.1219 sort to preserue the sicke man, than by applying of medicines to an incurable disease so to take away his life quite. For as physitians say, we must neuer apply violent reme∣dies [ D] but vnto desperat diseases; and that whenas there is now no other hope left. And this maxime taketh place in euerie sort of Commonweale, not onely for the chan∣ging of the estate, but euen for the changing of lawes, maners, and customes also: whereunto many hauing no regard haue ruinated and ouerthrowne right faire and great Commonweales, allured with the baite of some one or other good law, which they haue borrowed from some one Commonweale quite contrarie vnto their owne. For as we haue before shewed, many good lawes there be good for the maintenance of a Monarchie, and yet fit for to ruinat a Popular estate: as other also there bee good for the preseruation of the Popular liberty, & yet most fitly seruing for the ouerthrow of a Monarchy: for that those Estates by nature contrary, are by quite contrary laws [ E] both maintained and ruinated.

And albeit ihat some lawes there be good and indifferent to all sorts of Common∣weales, yet so it is, that the antient question of right wise Polititians is not yet well re∣solued, viz. Whether a new law being better, be to be preferred before an old antient law* 1.1220 that is worse? For the law be it neuer so good, is nothing worth if it cary with it a con∣tempt of it selfe, or of the rest of the lawes: Now so it is, that newnesse in matter of* 1.1221 lawes is alwayes contemptible, whereas to the contrary, the reuerence of antiquity is so great, as that it giueth strength enough vnto a law to cause it to be of it selfe obeyed,

without the authority of any Magistrat at all ioyned vnto it: whereas new edicts and [ F] lawes with all the threats and penalties annexed vnto them, and all that the Magistrats can do, cannot but with great difficulty find intertainment: in such sort, as that the fruit we are to receiue of a new edict or law, is not oft times so great, as the harme which the contempt of the rest of the lawes draweth after it for the nouelty of some one. And to make the matter short, there is nothing more difficult to handle, nor more doubtful in euent, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to bring in new decrees or lawes. And this reason seemeth vnto me very considerable, but yet I will set downe another of no lesse weight, which is, That all the change of laws concerning the estate is dangerous: For to chaunge the customes and lawes concerning inheritance, contracts, or serui∣tude from euill to good, is in some sort tollerable; but to chaunge the laws which con∣cerne [ G] * 1.1222 the estare, is as daungerous, as to remoue the foundation or corner stones which vphold the whole weight or burthen of the buildings; in which doing▪ the whole fa∣brike is to be sore shaken, and beside the daunger of falling, receiueth more hurt by the shaking thereof, than it doth good by the new repairation, especially if it bee now be∣come old and ruinous. For euen so it is in a Commonweale now alreadie growne old, wherein if a man neuer so little remoue the foundations that vpholdeth the same, he is in great danger of the ruine therof. For the antient maxime of the most wise politi∣tians ought wel to be waied, That we must not change any thing in the laws of a Common∣weale which hath long maintained it selfe in good estate, whatsoeuer apparent profit may bee thereby pretended. And for these causes the old law of the Athcnians, which was after∣ward [ H] also receiued in Rome, and passed in force of a law, published at the request of Publius Philo, was the most necessarie law that could be in a Commonweale, viz. That it should not be lawfull for any person vpon paine of death to present any request vnto the people, without the priuitie of the Senat. Which law is yet better kept in Venice than in any place of the world els, whereas it is not permitted so much as to present any request euen vnto the Senat, without the aduise of the councell of the Sages. And yet* 1.1223 in the Commonweale of the Locrensians, this law was much straiter, Where he which would present any request, to haue it passe in force of a law, was constrained to moue it before the people with a rope about his neck, wherewith hee was there vpon the place to be strangled, if he preuailed not to proue the law by him moued to be good and pro∣fitable [ I] for the Commonweale. Which was the cause that this estate for a most long time stood and flourished, without any thing added or diminished to or from the most antient laws and customes thereof, no man daring to propound any new law to passe, vntill that one of the citisens which had but one •…•…ie, made a request vnto the people, That he which wittingly should put out his eye which had but one, should therefore himselfe haue both his owne put out: For the making of which motion his aduersa∣rie had giuen him cause, hauing oftentimes threatned him to thrust out his eye, and so to depriue him quite of his sight, although he were therefore to endure the penaltie of the law, which was to loose one of his owne. With the equitie, or rather necessi∣tie of whose so reasonable a request the people moued (though with much a do) ena∣cted [ K] the law. Whereby yet nothing was derogated from the law called Lex talioni•…•… (or the law of like punishment) which was then common to almost all nations: For why, it was reason that hee which had maliciously depriued another man of his sight, should himselfe be depriued of his owne sight also.

Now if any man should say, That many lawes must oft times of necessitie bee chan∣ged,* 1.1224 as the lawes concerning victuals, or the bringing in, or carrying out of marchan∣dise, or concerning the augmenting or diminishing of the punishment to bee inflicted vpon offendors, which are euen in a short time to be chaunged; I therein agree with

him, for that necessitie hath no law: first, if new lawes giue good hope of fruit and pro∣fit [ A] of them to arise, as of good corne yet in the blade, then are they not to be reiected: but here question is not of lawes concerning ordinarie policie, but of such as concerne the very estate it selfe. Which I both would and wish, if possibly it might be, that they should still be most firme and immutable: not for that the Commonweale ought to serue the laws, seeing that they are al made for the maintenance of the Commonweale, and of the societie of men: neither that any man wisheth the safetie and preseruation of the lawes, but for the Commonweales sake. For why, the first and chiefe law of all* 1.1225 Commonweales, is this, SALVS POPVLI SVPREMA LEX ESTO, The welfare of the people, let that be the last law. For what reason moued Themistocles to fortifie the citie of Athens with walles and bulwarkes, euen the verie same reason induced [ B] Theramenes to persuade the Athenians to rase their walles, viz. the welfare of the peo∣ple: whereas otherwise the Lacedemonians had vndone the citisens together with the citie. Wherefore no law is so sacred, but that vpon vrgent necessitie it is to be changed. And therefore Solon after he had published his lawes, caused the Athenians to sweare to* 1.1226 obserue and keepe them for the space of one hundred yeare: giuing them thereby to vnderstand, that lawes could neuer be made immutable, neither were to be all at once together chaunged. Lycurgus also in like maner tooke an oath of the Lacedemonians his subiects, to keepe his lawes vntill his returne from the Oracle of Apollo, from whence he afterwards neuer returned, but went himselfe into voluntarie exile, out of his natiue countrey; so to bind his citisens so much as possible was to the perpetuall [ C] * 1.1227 keeping of his lawes. And albeit that the iniquitie of some auntient law bee by right euident, yet is it better to endure it, vntill that it in time by little and little of it selfe loose the force, than vpon the sudden by violence to repeale it. For so did the Romans by many the lawes of the twelue tables, which they would not abrogat, but onely by not obseruing them, in that they were vnprofitable or vniust, suffered them so to grow out of vse: which they so did, least in abrogating of them, they might seeme to impaire the credit and authoritie of the rest of the same lawes. Yet after that they had by tract of time bene of long buried as it were in obliuion (which was seuen hundred yeares after that they were first published) it was at the motion of Aebutius the Tribune, decreed, That such of those lawes as were as it were of themselues growne out of vse, should be [ D] reputed as repealed and abrogated, to the end that no man should with them yet stan∣ding in force be entangled.

But for that the nature of man as of all other worldly things also, is most slipperi•…•…* 1.1228 and vnconstant, running still headlong from good to euill, and from euill to worse; vi∣ces by little and little still encreasing, not vnlike vnto euill humors, which without sen∣cible feeling encrease mans bodie, vntill it be full of them, breedeth in it many most daungerous diseases, and so at length bringeth it vnto vtter destruction. For remedie where of new lawes must of necessitie be deuised: which must yet for all that by little and little be done, and not violently all at once. As Agis king of Lacedemonia vn∣wisely attempted to haue done: who desiring to reestablish in the Commonweale the [ E] auntient discipline of Lycurgus, now by the negligence of the magistrats almost grown quite out of vse, caused all the obligations and scedules of priuat men to be vppon a sudden brought out & burnt: which done, he was about to haue proceeded to the ma∣king of a new diuision of lands, to the end to haue so made an equalitie of wealth and goods amongst the citisens, as Lycurgus had before done: which although it were a thing desired of many in the Lacedemonian Commonweale (which had indeed so bene founded) yet so it was, that in making too much hast in the doing thereof, he not onely fell from his hope, but thereby kindled such a fire of sedition also, as burnt vp his whole

house, and so afterward dispoiled of his estate, and by his rebellious subiects together [ F] with his mother and other his friends and partakers strangled; made away for a sort of mad and euill minded fellowes to inuade the state, hauing so depriued his countrey of himselfe a good and vertuous prince. Whereas he should before haue made himselfe maister of the forces, or if that had not bene possible, yet to haue sounded the minds of them of the geater sort, and by meanes to haue gained them vnto him one after ano∣ther, as had Lycurgus done before him; and then to haue forbidden them the vse of gold and siluer, that so it might haue growne into as little estimation as iron: and in some time after that, to haue forbidden all sumptuousnesse in apparell, and rich furni∣ture, and not at once to haue encroached vpon the libertie of the people, to haue pro∣ued their patience, and chaunged their discipline: For that to vse such a violent letting [ G] of blood, before the corrupt humors purged, or so strong a medicine, before any pre∣paratiue giuen, is not the way to cure the diseases, but to kill the diseased. Where∣fore in the gouernments of Commonweales, and healing the diseases thereof, we must imitat not the Physitians onely, but euen nature it selfe, or rather the great God of na∣ture whom we see to do all things by little and little, and almost insensibly. The Vene∣tians right wisely during the life of Augustin Barbarin their duke, attempted not in any thing to abridge his power, though by them much misliked and feared; least in so do∣ing they should eithe•…•… haue offered some disgrace vnto him their prince, now growne old, or els haue raised some new sturres, and so haue troubled the quiet of their Com∣monweale. But he once dead, before they proceeded vnto the new election of Lore∣dan, [ H] the seignorie caused such new lawes and decrees to be published, as whereby the power of the dukes was right greatly impeired and diminished. The same wee haue shewed also to haue bene done in the elections of the German emperours, the kings of Polonia, and of Denmarke, who of soueraigne Monarches are now brought vnto the small estates of Generals in chiefe, some of them more, and some lesse: which the more closely to hide, they haue left vnto them the imperiall and roiall markes and cognisan∣ces in their habits, in their titles and ceremonies, but in few things els in effect and deed.

But as it is a daungerous thing for the subiects all at once to abridge or cut short* 1.1229 the power of a soueraigne prince or magistrat, who yet hath the power in his hand: so is it also no lesse daungerous for a prince vpon the sudden to displace or cast off the an∣tient [ I] seruitors of his predecessours, or els at once to thrust out some part of the great magistrats and officers of the estate, and to retaine the rest, they which are new chosen or retained, resting ouer charged with enuie, and the other with euill doing or ignorance, and withall depriued of the honour and good, which they haue bought full deere. And it may be that one of the fairest foundations of this monarchy is, that the king dying, the officers of the crowne continue still in their charge, who by that means still maintaine the Commonweale in the estate thereof. And albeit that the officers of the kings house be at the pleasure of the successour to be chaunged, so ought hee yet therein to vse such discretion, as that they which are remoued haue not occasion to in∣nouat or moue any thing as men disgraced, or at leastwise haue no power left them so [ K] to doe, albeit that they were thereunto willing. In which point the emperour Galba being deceiued, and hauing thrust Otho out of the hope hee had conceiued of the em∣pire, to adopt Piso to succeed him in the gouernment, and yet for all that without disar∣ming of Otho, he was shortly after by the same Otho (a man in great fauor with the Pre∣torian souldiours) slaine together with Piso, whome he had before adopted to succeed him in the empire and gouernment of the state. All which perils and daungers are lesse to be feared in an Aristocratike or Popular estate, for that in them they which haue the soueraigntie neuer die; howbeit that there is in them no lesse danger in chaunging of

their soueraigne magistrats, or generals (as we haue before declared) or in making of [ A] lawes which may tend to the impairtng of the power of the people▪ or which may any way seeme profitable vnto the nobilitie, and preiudiciall or hurtfull vnto the people: or in case that victuals and prouisions faile, or that some great extreame dearth arise; in which cases there is alwaies daunger of popular commotions and rebellions. So that* 1.1230 in briefe, when question is for the displacing of great magistrats, or for the suppressing of corporations or colledges, or for the cutting short of priuileges, or the augmenting of punishments, or for the reforming of disorders amongst the people, or for the calling of great men to account, or for the reducing of religion to▪ the former course and begin∣ning thereof; which by succession of time, following the naturall corruption of man, hath bin altered & changed from the first puritie therof: there is no better means than [ B] to come thereunto by little and little, without forcing of any thing, if it were possible, as by way of suppression. Whereof we haue a notable example of king Charles the fift (euen he that was surnamed the Wise) who at such time as he was Regent in France (his father being as then prisoner in England) by the euill councell of some, ignorant in matters of estate, at one chop suspended all the officers in Fraunce, of whome also hee suppressed the greatest part, appointing fiftie commissioners for the hearing of such ac∣cusations as should be laid against them for the extortion and briberie by them com∣mitted and vsed: whereupon all Fraunce was in such tumult and vp•…•…ore (for the infinit number that then were of male contents) as that shortly after for remedie thereof, hee [ C] by a decree in the high court of parliament at Paris, whereunto all the nobilitie were as∣sembled, abrogated the former law. Which decree is yet extant in the act of that his court, to this effect and purpose, Cùm regiae potestati & procurationi, quam gerimus, non modò quae ab alijs, sed etiam quae a nobis ipsis & in Rempublicam, & in singulos peccantur emendare consentaneum sit, rebus planè perspectis & cognitis, quae de imperio magistratibus adempto noua lege iussimus, placet abrogari; vt quidem abrogamus, & apertè declaramus, legis illius, quae importunis quorumdam rogationibus erepta est, nullam vim fore, & quae acta gesta sunt, cum magno nostro dolore acta gesta fuisse; nec illam magistratuum ac honorum abrogationem, quam non iure factam esse censitemur cuiquam fraudi esse: aut cuiusquam ius ac dignitatem violare nos vlla ex parte voluisse: ac proinde legem illam iure a nobis [ D] rescindi & abrogaritestamur, vt omnibus magistratibus salua omnia & integra restituan∣tur, Whereas by the regall power and authoritie which we beare, it is fitting for vs to correct and amend, not onely such things as by others, but euen by our selues also are trespassed against the Commonweale, or other men in particular: all things through∣ly looked into, and tried, our pleasure is, That what we haue by a new law commaun∣ded concerning power and authoritie taken from the magistrats, to be againe abroga∣ted, as indeed we abrogat, and plainely declare the force of that law (which was by the importunat suit of some wrested from vs) to be nothing: and that such things as were then done, to haue bene done to our great griefe: neither that that depriuation of offi∣ces or honours, which we confesse to haue bene not lawfully done, to bee impu•…•…ed to [ E] any man: neither that our will was in any part to violat any mans right or honour: And therefore we freely protest, that new law to be of vs rightly repealed and abroga∣ted: and that so all things safe and whole, may so againe bee vnto the magistrats resto∣red. And thus much he. But Charles the ninth comming vnto the crowne, and see∣ing the number of officers through the libertie of the times growne almost infinit, to* 1.1231 the great hurt of the Commonweale, in such sort, as that it seemed a thing almost ne∣cessarie to haue depriued them of their honours and fees, yet did he not so, for that it could not without great iniurie be done, when as the money they had before paid for them, could not by reason of the want of coine in the common treasurie, bee againe

repaid vnto them: neither if it could haue bene, could he yet be without imputation & [ F] disgrace, that was so without cause displaced. Besides that, vnto many their credit & re∣putation was in more esteeme & deerer than was their profit, and much the more was it to be feared, that if they should both of their money and preferment be together spoi∣led, least their present credit and profit being impaired, and the hope also of the recoue∣rie of the money they had paid lost▪ should minister vnto many of them occasions for them to raise rebellions and new sturres in the estate of the Commonweale. Where∣fore the want of money in the common treasurie profited vs then mindfull of other things, and fortune so fauoured our vnskilfulnesse and ignorance, as in auntient time it did a painter, who painting of an horse, when as he not knowing how cunningly to ex∣presse the foame of the horses mouth, and wearie of his worke not well sorting to his [ G] mind, in an anger cast his wet spunge at it, and so by fortune expressed that which he by cunning could not do: euen so it pleased that king to lessen the multitude of his officers stil as they died, by chusing no new in their steads, when as he could not againe restore vnto them the money they had paid for their offices; neither yet if the princes wealth &* 1.1232 power had bene so great, as with his becke or a wink of his eye, to cause all his subiects to tremble, and so to be able to doe what thing soeuer he list, should he yet seeme to do wisely by force to take away the offices and places before sold vnto his magistrats and officers: For that not onely they which haue receiued the iniurie, but euen other his subiects also, are oft times much moued and incensed with iniuries and wrongs done vnto other men: Besides that, the mightier that a man is, the more iustly and tempe∣rately [ H] he ought to behaue himselfe towards all men, but especiall towards his subiects.* 1.1233 Wherefore the Senat and people of Basil did wisely, who hauing renounced the Bi∣shop of Romes Religion (which they now detested) would not vpon the sodaine thrust the Monkes and Nunnes with other the Religious persons out of their Abbies and Monasteries: but onely tooke order, that as they dyed, they should die both for themselues and their successors, expresly forbidding any new to be chosen in their pla∣ces; that so by that meanes their colledges might by little and little by the death of the fellowes be extinguished. Whereby it came to passe, that all the rest of the Carthusi∣ans of their owne accord forsaking their cloister, yet one of them all alone for along time remained therein, and so quietly and without any disturbance held the right of his [ I] couent, being neuer enforced to chaunge either his place, his habit, or old ceremonies, or religion before by him receiued. The like order was taken at Coire in the diet of the Grisons: wherin it was decreed, That the ministers of the reformed religion should be maintained of the profits and reuenewes of the church, the religious men yet neuer∣thelesse still remaining in their cloisters and couents, to bee by their death suppressed, they being now prohibited to chuse any new in stead of them which were dead: as I haue learned by the letters of the ambassadour of Fraunce, who was then at Coire. By which meanes both they which professed the new religion, and they which profes∣sed the old, were both prouided for: whereas otherwise it had beene an vnreasonable thing to haue thrust them, who had learned not onely to liue idly, but euen to doe no∣thing [ K] at all (as Lucilius merrily saith) hauing neither trade nor occupation to liue vp∣pon, out of the old possession of their lands, were it neuer so vniust. Whereof beside the iniurie vnto them done, daunger might haue also ensued, least they not hauing whereof to liue, and so brought into dispaire, might haue attempted some thing against the state; and so haply drawne after them all their friends and allies alo, to the great trouble of the whole Commonweale. For the same cause the king hauing giuen leaue for the free exercise of the new religion in this realme of Fraunce, and seeing that they which vnder the colour thereof were gone out of ther cloisters, demanded a portion in

the lands and inheritance of their parents or neere kinsmen: it was decreed, and that vp∣on [ A] great paine, That they should againe returne vnto their cloisters: which seemed to be a thing directly contrarie vnto the law, whereby free libertie was giuen for euerie man that wold, to professe the new reformed religion. Howbeit that this was indirect∣ly to stop the mouthes of them which departing out of their monasteries, sought to trouble the estate, and vnder the vaile and colour of religion, to trouble the most great and noble houses of this realme: besides that it had beene also necessarie in all the cu∣stomes of this realme, to rase the article concerning the religions, who both by the cannon and ciuill laws, as also by all our lawes and customes, are excluded and shut out from all hope of inheritance.

But now that which we haue said, That the multitude of officers, or of colleges, and [ B] companies, of priuileges, or of wicked men, which through the sufferance of princes, or the negligence of the magistrat, are by little and little growne to the hurt of the Com∣monweale, are by the same meane to be againe suppressed; hath place in all things which concerne the publike state, and hath a reference vnto the nature of the lawes,* 1.1234 which haue no force nor effect but for the time to come. And albeit that tyrannie bee a thing most cruell and detestable, yet so it is, that the surest way and meane to suppresse the same, if the tyrant haue neither children nor brethren to succeed him, is together with the death of the tyrant to abolish also the tyrannicall gouernment; & not by force whilest he yet liueth to striue to take from him the gouernment, with the hazard of the [ C] ruine of the whole estate, as oftentimes it chaunceth. But if the tyrant haue children, and doth what he may to destroy the good, and to put the great men one after another to death (as Tarquin the proud, and other tyrants following his steps vsed commonly to doe) or to suppresse the magistrats or other great officers which might stay the course of his tyrannie, to the end that hee may without let or controle∣ment doe whatsoeuer him pleaseth: then in this ease violent remedies are to bee vsed, but with such limitation and restriction as we haue before set downe, and not other∣wise, least so wee might seeme rashly to arme the subiects against their princes.

We ought then in the gouernment of a well ordered estate and Commonweale,* 1.1235 to imitat and follow the great God of nature, who in all things proceedeth easily and [ D] by little and little, who of a little seed causeth to grow a tree for height and greatnesse right admirable, and yet for all that insensibly; and still by meanes conioyning the ex∣tremities of nature, as by putting the Spring betwixt Winter and Sommer, and Au∣tumne betwixt Sommer and Winter, moderating the extremities of the times and seasons, which the selfe same wisedome which he vseth in all other things also, and that in such sort, as that no violent force or course therein appeareth. But if it be oftentimes daungerous to chaunge the lawes of an estate or Commonweale, as wee haue before declared: Let vs now see also, if it be not in like sort daungerous oftentimes to chaungethe magistrates, or that it is much better to haue them perpetuall and [ E] without chaunge.

CHAP. IIII. [ F] ¶ Whether it be better in a Commonweale to haue the Magistrats still chaunge∣able, or else perpetuall.

FOrasmuch as both cities, citisens, and Commonweales, vse commonly to be for nothing more turmoiled and troubled than by men for the obtaining of offices and honours, mee thinke this question to bee one of the most profitable and most necessarie of any that can be made in matter of estate, Whether it be better to haue annuall or perpetuall Magistrats [ G] in a Commonweale? Than which question I know not whe∣ther there be any amongst them which concerne a Com∣monweal more harder to decide, or more pleasant to vnder∣stand, and therefore not in any wise by vs in this place to be omitted. Which I say not as meaning to take vpon me the deciding of this question, but onely to touch the rea∣sons which might well be giuen both on the one side and the other, leauing the resolu∣tion therof vnto them which heretofore haue better sounded the proceeding and con∣sequence thereof. Neither is it mine intent or purpose, either to propound and moue this question, to giue foot vnto them which would chaunge the laws alreadie receiued, which the subiects ought to hold for good and wholesome in euerie Commonweale▪ [ H] nor for any desire I haue to chaunge the estate of Commonweals alreadie established, which haue continued by long succession and course of yeares.

Now the first and strongest reason that is to be had to make the magistrats and offi∣cers* 1.1236 annuall, is, for that the first and principall end of euerie Commonweale ought to consist in vertue: and that the scope of euerie good and true law▪ giuer, is to make his subiects vertuous. Which to attaine vnto, it behoueth him to propound vnto the view* 1.1237 and sight of the whole world, the rewards of vertue, as the marke whereat euerie man ought to aime in best sort he can.

Now most certaine it is, that honour is no other thing than the reward and prize of vertue, which neither ought nor can by the counterpoise of profit be esteemed: wher∣as [ I] rather to the contrarie vertue hath no more capital an enemie, than profit deuised to arise by honour. If then the honourable preferments, offices and commissions bee ta∣ken out of publique place, to be alwayes enclosed & shut vp within the particular hou∣ses of most vnworthy men, who for fauour or money carrie away the same; it is not then to be thought vertue in that estate to be the prize, the corrupt nature of man being such as is right hardly to be drawne vnto vertue, what reward or prise soeuer bee deui∣sed for the alluring of men thereto. And thus much for the first point, which ought to moue princes and wise law giuers, to set preferments, offices, and all such other the re∣wards of vertue, in the eye of all the world, and so to diuide them amongst their sub∣iects, to euery man according to his deserts, which they cannot do, if they grant them [ K] vnto men in perpetuities.

Another point which the wise law giuer ought still to haue before his eyes, is, To* 1.1238 cut vp the roots, and to take away the seedes of ciuill sedition, so to maintaine his sub∣iects in good peace and amitie amongst themselues, and one of them with another. Which is a matter of such weight, as that many haue thought it to bee the onely end which the good law maker ought to hope after. For albeit that vertue may oftentimes be banished out of Commonweales, for men to liue in a disordered licentiousnesse of all kind of voluptuous pleasures: yet in that all men agree, that there is no more daun∣gerous

a plague vnto Commonweales, than ciuill sedition and discord. Forasmuch as [ A] it draweth after it the common ruine aswell of the good as of the bad. Now so it is, that the first and principall cause of sedition, is inequalitie; as to the contrarie the mo∣ther nurse of peace and amitie, is equalitie; which is no other thing than naturall equi∣tie, distributing rewards, preferments, honours, and all other things common vnto the subiects indifferently, and in the best sort that may be. From which equalitie the very theeues and robbers themselues may in no wise depart, if they meane to liue together. Hee therefore that shall diuide the honours and offices of estate vnto a small number of men, as needs it must be, when they are giuen for tearme of life, hee I say hath lighted the greatest flames of ielousie of one of them against another, and the greatest fire of sedition that can possibly be raised in a Commonweale. [ B]

Now if there were no more but the two reasons before alleaged, viz. The enioy∣ing* 1.1239 of vertue, with the rewards thereunto due, and the auoyding of sedition, the grea∣test plague of a Commonweale; yet were they euen sufficient to let, that offices should not be perpetuall, but rather annuall, to the end that euerie man so hauing therein part and interest, might so also haue occasion to liue in peace. But yet there are farther rea∣sons also, which is, that by such perpetuitie of offices and promotions, not onely the vnitie and concord of subiects, and the true rewards of vertue are so taken away, but that the due punishment by the lawes appointed for offendors are thereby also impea∣ched, or rather quite abolished: Whereof the wise law giuer ought to haue a greater regard than of the rewards to vertue due▪ For that the wise and accomplished man [ C] looketh for no other reward of his vertuous actions, more than vertue it selfe: which a man cannot say of vice, neither of the vitious. And for this cause the lawes both of God and man, euen from the first vnto the last, haue commaunded nothing more, than the punishment of the wicked. And what punishment should a man do vppon them, who are alwaies so high mounted, as that it is impossible to come nigh them? Who shall accuse them? who shall imprison them? who shall condemne them? Shall their companions or fellowes in power? will they cut their owne armes, or rip their owne entrals? beleeue it they will neuer be so euill aduised. What if the great ones bee also partakers of their foule robberies, villanies, and extortion? how shall they then punish [ D] the others? they will rather blush for shame, and be touched with compassion of them which are like vnto themselues, than with the hainousnesse of the offences be en∣duced to take of them punishment. But if any there be so hardie as to accuse, yea or but so much as to complaine of one of these demie gods, he is in daunger of his life, as a false enformer, if hee by proofe cleerer than the sunne it selfe, proue not villanies done in most obscure darkenesse: and admit that all be by them well proued, and that the guiltie magistrat be conuinced and attainted, yet so it is, that this ordinarie clause Frater noster est, He is our brother, shall suffice to couer and burie all the villanies, de∣ceits, and extortion, of the most vniust magistrat that a man could imagine. So that hardly one of a thousand which had deserued punishment, should in fiue hundred yeres be brought to execution. [ E]

But if the magistrats were annuall, it is most certaine, that the feare to be called to ac∣count,* 1.1240 would alwaies keepe them in awe, and that they would tremble and quake as often as they heard that thundering threatning which the Tribunes of the people made to Manlius, Priuatum rationem rerum ab se gestarum redditurum, quoniam Consulnol∣uisset, That he being a priuat man, should giue account of such things as hee had done, for that he would not so do being Consull. And indeed what could a man see more faire, than them which had but a little before administred iustice, and taken charge of the common treasure, with other such publike offices, after that they had put off their

robes of dignitie, to come in their common attire as priuat men, to giue an account of [ F] their actions done in the time of their magistracie. And this is it for which Plutarch hath so highly commended the custome of the auntient Romans, who animated the young men to commence their publike accusations against such as had euill acquited themselues in their publike charges, setting them on as grayhounds vpon wolues, or other wild beasts. In which doing not onely the offendors were punished, but euerie man else also vpon an emulation and strife, as it were endeuoured him to doe well; but especially they, who had themselues accused others, as well assured that there ne∣uer wanted some, who still right narrowly looked into all their doings, so that it much concerned them to beare themselues most vprightly in the whole course of their liues. Which benefits those estates and Commonweales must neeedes want, which haue [ G] their magistrats perpetuall, or for tearme of life. For which cause the emperour Clau∣dius wisely renewed an old edict or law, then growne out of vse: which was, That hee to whome the gouernment of any prouince was by lot fallen (as the maner was) should forthwith, all excuses set apart, go vnto his charge; and that the time of his authoritie and charge once expired, he should not forthwith take vppon him any other new pub∣like charge or gouernment, to the intent that the euill behauiour or extortion of the magistrats should not by such continuation of their power and authoritie remaine vn∣punished. For whatsoeuer decrees or lawes bee made, the euill magistrats would still* 1.1241 keepe the power in their hands, and doe what they can one for another; in such sort strengthening themselues, as that is a thing almost impossible to haue of them any rea∣son. [ H] Which was the cause that moued Hannibal that great captaine to present a re∣quest vnto the people of Carthage, To make their judges annuall, which before held their places for tearme of life, and that none of them should keepe his place two yeares together, as Liuie reporteth, whose words we thought good thus here to set downe, Iudicum or do ea tempestate dominabatur Carthagine, eo maximè quòd ijdem perpetui iudi∣ces: res, fama, vitaque omnium in illorum potestate erat; qui vnum eius ordinis, & omnes aduersos habebat. horum in tam impotenti regno Praetor factus Annibal, vocare ad se Quae∣storem; idem pro nihilo habuit; nam aduersae factionis erat: & quia ex qu•…•…stura in iudi∣ces potentissimum ordinem referuntur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebant: id in∣dignum ratus Annibal, viatorem ad prehendendum Quaestorem misit, subductumque in [ I] concionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum (prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam essent, nec magistratus) accusauit, & vt secundis auribus accipi orationem animaduertit, legem extemplo promulgauit pertulitque, The order or companie of the judges (saith he) did at that time beare all the sway at Carthage; and well the more, for that the selfe same men were still perpetuall judges: euerie mans wealth, fame, and life, was in their power; he that had one of them of that order against him, had them al his enemies. In this their so insolent a raigne Hannibal being made Pretor, conuented one of the Questors, or publike receiuers before him, which made thereof no recko∣ning, for why, he was of the contrarie faction vnto him: and forasmuch as out of the Questors choyce was still made into the most mightie order of the judges, they still [ K] bare their hautie minds aunswerable vnto the wealth and power they were afterwards to enioy. Which Hannibal taking for a great indignitie, sent a sergeant to lay hands vpon the Questor, and hauing brought him into the generall assemblie of the people, accused not him more than he did the whole order of the judges (through whose pride and wealth, neither the lawes nor the magistrats were (as he said) any thing at all regar∣ded) and perceiuing his speech to be with the good liking of the people receiued, forth∣with enacted, and proclaimed a law, That the judges should be euery yeare chosen, and that none of them should be judges two yeares together. And thus farre he. For why,

it was otherwise a thing impossible to chastise them, a man still hauing them all his [ A] enemies, that should touch but one of them. For that they beeing perpetuall magi∣strats, and commonly allied one of them vnto another, it was impossible to hope to haue any of them punished, and much lesse to haue against them iustice, if a man had any thing to do with them: and in case a man refused one of them, hee must in so do∣ing refuse the whole bench of them also. As not many yeares ago in the court of Pa∣ris (which at this time consisteth of an hundred and fiftie judges) in a suit betwixt Chr. Thuan, chiefe justice in that court, and Iohn Tili, register of the court (who tooke vpon him the defence of his daughter being absent) were, for alliance onely, threescore jud∣ges on the one side, and two and fortie on the other, chalenged and reiected▪ and all vp∣on the same bench. And for this cause it was ordained in the assembly of the estates [ B] of the countrey of Languedoc, holden at Montpelier in the yeare 1556, where then I was, and charge there giuen to Iohn Durande, atturney for that country, That amongst other his instructions, he should especially moue the king, that it might please him to ordaine, that the nie kinsmen or other of alliance vnto the judges, should not from thenceforth be admitted vnto the same bench, neither into the same court. Which same request foure yeares after, was by the estates of Fraunce presented vnto the king in the parliament at Orleance, howbeit that nothing could therein bee obtained, nei∣ther can be, so long as honours and preferments are in perpetuitie giuen in the Com∣monweale. For it is now two hundred and fiftie yeares since that king Charles the fift, [ C] and before him Philip the Faire had ordained, That no man should bee judge in the* 1.1242 same countrey wherein he was borne: as in like case Marcus Aurelius made an edict, That no man should be gouernour in his owne countrey. Of which law the profit was thought so great, as that he would haue the same afterwards extended euen vnto them which were but councellours or assistants vnto the gouernours of countries: which was a thing then wel put in execution, as it is at this present in Spaine, & in most* 1.1243 of the cities in Italie, where the ordinarie judge is most commonly a stranger. Which was also by the ambassadours of Moscouie requested of the estates of Polonia. How∣beit that the decrees of our kings concerning those matters, were quickly buried, after that the publike offices and charges began to be with vs giuen for tearme of life. And [ D] not to search further into the edicts of the Roman emperours, we find also in Caesar his* 1.1244 Commentaries, that the auntient Gaules, and namely they of Autun, had amongst them an inuiolable law, which expresly forbad the magistrats to be continued in their places aboue one yeare, and that two of one familie could not be magistrats together, nor yet one of them, so long as the other who had alreadie bene magistrat should liue. And that more is, it was alwaies expresly forbidden, That two of one familie might be councellors together, neither yet one of them, so long as the other who had alreadie so bene a councellour was aliue.

Moreouer the thing which ought of all others to be most recommended vnto all* 1.1245 subiects in generall, & euerie one of them in particular, is the preseruation of the Com∣monweale. [ E] And what regard or care of the publike good should they haue, which therein haue no part? Such as are themselues excluded, and which see the common preferments and offices giuen in prey to some few in perpetuitie? How should they haue any care of that which concerneth them not, neither neere, nor a farre off? And admit that any good and honest man would say, would doe, or vndertake, any thing that were for the common good or profit, being himselfe but a priuat man, who should hearken vnto him? who should support him? who should fauour him? So that euery man leauing to thinke of the publike, entendeth vnto his owne businesse, and hee in that case should be but laughed at, and derided as a foole, which should take more care

of the common welfare than of his owne. As for them who alreadie enioy the pub∣like [ F] preferments and offices, they for the most part haue no great care of the common good, being now for euer assured of that which they most desired. O but how much more happie should both the subiects and Commonweale be, if euerie man in his de∣gree and according to his qualitie, hauing enioyed conuenable preferments, and so ha∣uing learned true wisedome by the mannaging of worldly affaires, should retire them∣selues from these vaine and worldly businesses, to occupie themselues in the contempla∣tion of things naturall and diuine? For most certaine it is, that contemplation is the true mother and mistresse of al true wisedome and happinesse, which men altogether wrap∣ped vp in worldly affaires, neuer so much as once dreamed or tasted of; and yet for all that this is the end, this is the scope, this the chiefe point of all mans felicitie. [ G]

And yet besides these three, there is another great inconuenience also, in that offi∣ces* 1.1246 and preferments are in Commonweales graunted vnto men for tearme of life: that is to wit, that some few would haue all, and some one would possesse himselfe of many publike charges and offices at once; as it was in auntient time permitted them in Car∣thage: which for all that seemed both vnto Plato and Aristotle a thing right daunge∣rous, For that it is an hard matter for one man well to discharge one office, but well to discharge many no one man can; and is therefore in euerie well ordered Common∣weale a thing forbidden. Howbeit that the ambitious desires of men alwayes passeth beyond the prohibitions of the lawes, the most vnworthy most commonly burning with the hoatest flames of ambition; not vnlike the weake stomacke, which is alwaies [ H] more desirous of meat which it cannot disgest, than is the stomacke which can better disgest it: thinking it not to stand with their honor and reputation to stay in the meane, or to abate any of their titles and dignities, but contrariwise to mount still higher and higher. In so much that the seigneurie of Venice in some sort to satisfie the ambition of the citisens, gaue leaue vnto him which had borne a greater office, to refuse the lesse being laid vpon him: which is a daungerous course, to measure the publike charges and offices, by the foot of the subiects ambition, and not by the common profit.

Then how much more daungerous is it, to make the magistrats and publike char∣ges perpetuall, onely to serue the ambitious desires of some, and so to make the Com∣monweale subiect vnto the desire and pleasure of some few? For why, it is to be feared [ I] least that they who can neuer satisfie their immoderat desires with the multitude of of∣fices and publike charges, but had rather to burst at the table of ambition, than in time to withdraw themselues: It is (I say) to be feared least some hungrie fellowes shall at length say vnto them, Depart you hence; or if they will not so doe, plucke them away by force, not without their owne daungers, and troubling of the quiet estate of the Commonweale. At the assemblies of the estates of Rome into the place called Cam∣pus* 1.1247 Martius, for the chusing of their cheife magistrats, and other their great officers, certaine narrow bridges were in diuers places laid for the citisens to passe ouer by, that so the little tables wherein their voices were contained, might the better be of them re∣ceiued: at which time such as were threescore yeares old, were still warned to giue [ K] place, and not to come to giue their voices, least haply they might by the multitude of the younger sort be oppressed: and not for that such old men were cast headlong from off the bridges into the riuer, as some haue thought. But how much more seemely were it for them which haue quietly of long enioyed the great offices and preferments in the Commonweale, and which are now growne old therein, sweetly to retire them∣selues out of those high places, than violently to be thrust out by others? especially con∣sidering that there is no place more slipperie or daungerous, than are the places of ho∣nour and commaund. Besides that (which worse is) such ambitious men in their fal∣ling

draw after them the fall of many others also, together with the ruine of the whole [ A] * 1.1248 Commonweale▪ as did Marius, who hauing passed through all the degrees of ho∣nour, and bene six times Consull (which neuer Roman had bene before him) yet not so content, would needs take vpon him the charge of the wars against king Mithri∣dates (which by lot was fallen vnto Sylla) howbeit that hee was now growne extreame old, to the intent to obtaine the seuenth Consulship, and to continue a perpetuall com∣maunding power vnto himselfe. But Sylla vnderstanding of the commission giuen to Marius, and of the authority by a tumultuous assembly of the people taken from him now absent (and hauing also an army with him) contrarie vnto the law and the custom of their auncestors, straight way returned to Rome with his partakers, seyzed vpon the citie, where he made a most horrible massacre; which afterwards in such sort continu∣ed, [ B] as that all Italie and Spaine was embrued with blood, not onely the captaines and chiefe commaunders of Marius his faction being by Sylla slaine, but euen his compa∣nions, friends, and kinsmen also, being most shamefully proscribed, or els banished, and so the Popular estate brought vnto an extreame tyrannie. So euen for the same occa∣sion three hundred yeares before, the Popular estate was there chaunged into a faction of an Oligarchie; not for hauing of offices in perpetuitie for tearme of life, but onely for hauing continued the charge vnto the Decemuiri, or ten Commissioners, for two yeares together; men appointed for the reforming and amending of the lawes, who would haue so continued the third yeare also, and by force of armes still maintained their commission, encroaching vpon the libertie of the people, had they not by force [ C] of armes (though not without great daunger of the state) bene againe remoued.

So by the same meanes many Popular and Aristocratique estates were chaunged in∣to* 1.1249 Monarchies, or at leastwise into tyrannicall gouernments; for hauing giuen the pub∣like charges and commissions vnto their magistrats or commissioners, for longer time than was needfull, or for proroguing of them longer than by the law they should; as to Pisistratus in Athens, to Philon in the citie of Argos, to Cypselus in Corinth, to Dionysi∣us at Syracusa, to Panaetius at Leontium, and to Caesar at Rome. Which Aemylius Mamercus the Dictator foreseeing, presented a request vnto the people, which passed into the force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That the Censors power from that [ D] time forward should continue but for eighteene monethes, which before was establi∣shed for fiue yeares: and the next day after that he was created Dictator, deposed him∣selfe of his Dictatorship, being not willing to hold it more than one day; giuing this reason vnto the people of his so doing, Vt scitas quàm mihi diuturna imperia non place∣ant, That you may know (said he) how little long lasting authoritie and power please me. And for the same occasion the law Cornelia, published at the instance of one of the Tribunes of the people, prouided, That it should not be lawful for any man to seeke to haue one and the same office more than once in ten yeares. Neither missed it much but that Gabinius the Tribune had by the Senators themselues beene slaine in the full Senat, for hauing by his request made vnto the people, procured commission for fiue [ E] yeares together to be graunted vnto Pompey, for the ending of the Piraticall warre: Whereof Dion giueth a notable reason, For that (saith he) the nature of man is such, as that a man hauing for long time borne some honourable charge, commonly hath al other men in contempt and disdaine, neither can well endure to liue in subiection after he hath for a long time commaunded. Which thing Cassiodorus almost in the same sence writeth, Antiquitas, prouinciarum dignitatem voluit annua successione reparari, vt nec diutina potestate vnus in solesceret, & multorum prouectus gaudia reperiret, Anti∣quitie (saith he) would the honour of the prouinces to be repaired with annuall succes∣sion, in such sort as that one man should neither grow insolent with long power, and

preferment be a comfort to many. And haply it was not one of the least causes that [ F] the Assyrian and Persian empires stood so long, for that they euerie yeare chaunged their lieutenants and generals.

But how then commeth it to passe, that euen children by way of complaint sue to* 1.1250 be maintained and kept in the possession of the honours and estates that their fathers and grandfathers had? As in fact hath bene seene in the constables of Campagne, of Normandie, and of Britaigne: in the marshals De la Foy, as they tearme them, in the great chamberlaines, and other infinit, euen vnto the sergeants sees of Normandie, as I haue before noted. And namely in Aniou, Touraine, and Maine, the house of Ro∣ches had made the offices of bailifes and stewards hereditarie, had not Lewes the ninth reuoked them, and made them mutable and iusticiable, by his decree in the yeare 1256. [ G] The like is done in Principalities, Dukedomes, Marquisats, and Earledomes, which now are had in perpetuitie, which before were holden but by way of commission, and that during the princes pleasure, which at the first were but annuall, but afterwards per∣petuall: and at last by the fauour of our kings are become hereditarie. Howbeit that other people also as well as we, haue in the same errour offended. So that there is al∣most no place in all Europe (except in England) where offices and dignities are not now hereditarie, in such sort as that commaunding power and authoritie, with the ad∣ministration of iustice, is by right of succession fallen euen vnto women and children, and so of a thing publike made particular, and to be sold to him that wil giue most, as it must needs be, being once brought into the forme of a patrimonie, which hath giuen [ H] occasion more boldly to trucke all estates and offices, when as men see by the lawes and customes euen sacred iustice it selfe prophaned, and set to sale to him that will giue most: Of which inconueniences is proceeded the euill custome of making of all estates and offices perpetuall. For one should doe iniurie to take an office from a marchant, and not restore vnto him againe the money that he paid for it. Thus we see the dan∣gers and absurdities one of them as it were linked in another, by the making of the estates and offices of the Commonweale perpetuall. Besides which reasons by me al∣leaged, we haue also the authoritie of the greatest Law makers, Philosophers, and Lawyers, as also the examples of almost all the auntienr Commonweales; as namely, of the Athenians, the Romans, the Celtes, and others infinit, who haue flourished, and [ I] do yet flourish in diuers places of Italie, Swisserland, and Germanie, as also the authori∣tie of Sir Thomas Moore, chauncellour of England, who in the Commonweale by him deuised, maketh all the magistrats and officers therein annuall, some from six mo∣nethis to six monethes, and othersome from two monethes to two monethes, and all to auoid the inconueniences which I haue before spoke of. And these reasons they for most part vse, which say, That magistrats and officers should not be in a Com∣monweale perpetuall.

But now on the other side, they which maintaine it to bee more for the publike* 1.1251 good, to make the estates and offices in a Commonweale perpetuall, alleage, That no∣thing can be well done in a yeares space, when as the magistrat must depart out of his [ K] charge before he well know his dutie; and hauing begun to vnderstand what belong∣eth vnto his place, must yet forthwith leaue the same vnto a new man; and so hee like∣wise vnto another, all still new men; so that the Commonweale is still to fall into the hands of vnsufficient men, and such as want experience. But suppose that the prince or the people, or they which haue the choice of the magistrats, commit not the publike charge but vnto men knowne to be of good experience, yet seeing so many holy daies, dayes not iudiciall, vacations, daies of election, and of triumph, as take vp a great part of the yeares, as well the publike as mens priuat actions must therewith needs be trobled,

warres begun be delaid, iudgements interrupted, actions of the wicked abolished, pu∣nishments [ A] deferred, & in briefe the Commonweal in the greatest dangers therof to be abandoned. Whereof wee haue a million of examples in all histories, both of the Greekes, and of the Latines, which had their offices annuall. And it hath oftentimes happened, that the magistrats and captaines hauing charge to make & performe some warre, were vpon a sudden called home againe, and so all was at a stay: as it happened when question was for the sending of one to succeed Scipio Africanus, the people, the Senat, and the magistrats, found themselues therewith greatly entangled; Mutis (saith Liuie) contentionibus & in Senatu, & ad populum acta res est: postremò eò deducta vt Se∣natui permitterent: patres igitur iurati (sic enim conuenerat) censuerunt vt Consules pro∣uincias inter se compararent, The matter (saith he) was with great contention debated, [ B] both in the Senat, and before the people; at length it was brought to that point, as that the people committed it vnto the Senat: wherefore the Senators beeing sworne (for so it was agreed) determined, That the Consuls should diuide the prouinces betwixt them. Which was a great noueltie to sweare the Senat thereunto. But Scipio vnder∣standing of the decree of the Senat, whereby one of the Consuls was forthwith to suc∣ceed him, without farther delay concluded a peace, more to the aduantage of the ene∣mie than hee would otherwise haue done, if hee had not feared least his successour should haue carried away from him the glorie and honour of his victorie, as it is repor∣ted himselfe to haue oftentimes said. So the warre against king Mithridates was pro∣tracted [ C] aboue twentie yeares, by reason of the continuall chaunging of the Ro∣man Generals, the enemie in the meane while (many faire opportunities by him offered, and by the Romans neglected) farre and wide extending his dominion and empire. Yea sometimes the Generall was to giue vp his charge, when hee was euen vppon the point to ioyne battell with the enemie, although he had none appointed to succeed him: as it happened vnto the great captaines Epaminondas and Pelopidas, whose charge expired euen at such time as they were to giue the enemie battell: who yet neuerthelesse seeing themselues to haue an aduantage of the enemie, and that they could not without the most manifest danger of the state leaue their charge, gaue battel, and so obtained a most glorious victorie, whereby the Thebans with their allies were [ D] preserued, and the Lacedemonians with a great slaughter ouerthrowne. But returning home, in stead of thanks and triumph, they were both accused of high treason, for that they had holden their charge longer than the time by the law appointed, & so brought vnto their triall and conuicted, were by the commissioners condemned to die: howbe∣it that they were afterwards by the people pardoned. Now who knoweth not how many strong places haue bene taken by the enemie, for chaunging of their captaines? how many cities and townes haue bene forced, for hauing put into them new gouer∣nours? and especially at such time as the enemie was nie, & readie to besiege the same: as oftentimes it commeth to passe, that the fauourites carrying away the honor, the old expert captaines are excluded, who right often in reuenge thereof either go ouer vnto [ E] the enemie, or els otherwise disfurnish the place of victuals, and other things necessarie.

And yet there is another reason which might well stay the preferments and offices of the commonweale from being mutable, which reason Tiberius the emperour had* 1.1252 still in his mouth, at such time as men complained him to be the first that had for many yeares together continued the estates and offices still in the same mens hands: I do it (said he) to the end that they which are already full of the blood of the people, may as Horseleeches, full and ready to burst, giue the subiects some release, fearing lest such as should come new & all an hungred, should without remorse or respect at all, draw out the rest of their blood, gnaw their bones, and sucke out the very marrow that was yet

left in the subiects. And this vnto me seemeth to be a reason of right great importance: [ F] for it is an olde and true saing, Non parcit populis regnum breue, a short raigne spareth not the people. And yet in the raigne of Tiberius, offices and other places of com∣maund, were vsually giuen and not sold; obtained, but not craued, vpon men of desert bestowed, and not shamefully set to sale to them that would giue most: which opinion of Tiberius ought to bee of much more force in such places as where port sale is made of all preferments and offices of the common weale: for it is to bee presumed (as sayth Alexander Seuerus the emperor, & after him Lewes the 12) that the marchants of offices must sel by retaile, & as deere as they can, that which they had before bought in grosse.

And beside that which we haue already said, how is it possible that he should com∣maund with such authority as beseemeth a magistrat, which seeth that by and by after [ G] he shall but stand for a cipher (as they say) without any authority or power at all? who shall obey him? who shal feare him? who shall do his commaunds? wheras to the con∣trary, if the magistrats power be perpetuall, he shall commaund with dignity, hee shall boldly oppose himselfe against the wicked, and giue ayde and succour vnto the good: he shall reuenge the wrong done vnto the oppressed, and resist the violence of tyrants, and that without feare or misdoubt of being thrust out, or dispoyled of his dignity and office, as hath bene seene by some euen of the greatest princes, astonished with the con∣stancy & immutable assurance of the magistrats, not hauing what to reproue him for: neither yet daring to displace them, fearing also the discontentment of their subiects, vnto whom the brightnes of Iustice and vertue is alwayes redoubtable, and the inte∣grity [ H] of valiant and couragious men right commendable.

In briefe, if we would haue (as all men ought to wish to haue) magistrats wise, stout, and well experimented in the charge committed vnto them, we must wish them to bee perpetual: for why it is impossible that new magistrats should be expert in their charge the first yeare, considering that the life of man is right short, and the nature of authority and power most difficult, whether it be for the training vp of the subiects in warres, or for the maintaining of them in peace; for the administration of Iustice, or for the man∣naging of the publike reuenues: all which cannot in short time of new magistrats be either throughly learned, or duly practised. For as the ruine of families commonly commeth of new seruitors, euen so the fals of Commonweales also proceedeth from [ I] * 1.1253 new magistrats, who still bring in new deuises, councels, laws, factions, customs, edicts, stiles, iudgements, ceremonies, actions, and in briefe a new chaunge of all things in the Commonweale; whereof ensueth a contempt of the old laws & customs, as also of the magistrats themselues. All which may well be seene in the antient Commonweals of of the Greeks & Romans, wherein the new magistrats were no sooner placed, but they forthwith forged new edicts & laws, so to cause themselues to be the more spoken of; without regard whether they were profitable for the Commonweal or not: propoun∣ding only this vnto themselues, how to leaue a remembrance of their names vnto po∣steritie: wheras men so sicke of ambition, are still more desirous of a great than of a good name. Howbeit that it is not needfull to vse many arguments to proue & show [ K] as it were vnto the sight of the eye, that the magistrats and officers ought to be perpetu∣all, seeing that we haue the law of God, which cannot bee so bound vnto places or per∣sons, but that a man therefrom may well draw an example to imitate and follow. Now it is not found, that the magistrats and officers established in the law of God were annuall: neither is it found, that they which were once prouided of honorable places and preferments in the Commonweale, were euer after againe remoued to giue place vnto new magistrats, and so to yeeld vnto ambition that which is to vertue due. So wee find also, that Plato would that the offices in his Commonweale should

still for the most part be perpetuall. So that in briefe we see the reasons by vs alleaged, [ A] to be by the sacred scriptures, as also by long experience and tract of time confir∣med, not by the example of small Commonweales, but euen of the greatest and most flourishing monarchies and kingdomes that now are, or euer were in the whole world, as were those of the Assyrians, the Persians, the Aegyptians, the Parthians, the Aethio∣pians, the Turkes, the Tartars, the Moscouites, the Polonians, the Germans, the French men, the Danes, the Swedens, the Englishmen, the Scots, the Spaniards, the Italians; excepting some few Commonweals, which are still turmoiled with the continual chan∣ging of their Magistrats, and perpetuall flouds of sedition and discord for the shortnesse of their offices.

Now it is not like so many people and nations to haue failed of the light of na∣ture, [ B] of iudgement, of reason, & experience, seeing their estate so wisely managed, and to haue so long flourished both in time of peace and war: which could in no wise so long haue stood, had their mutable magistrats bene euery moment to haue bene a∣new chosen. And thus we see the reasons both of the one side and of the other, which might moue some to make their magistrats perpetuall, as some others also to make them annuall. Vnto which reasons sometime are ioyned such flourishes of eloquence, as might at the first well dasse the eyes not onely of the ignorant, but euen of the shar∣pest witted also, to heare the reasons of the one side, without giuing of eare vnto the reasons of the other, which are hereby vs indifferently set downe, that euery man might suspend his iudgement, vntill that euerie thing were in equall ballance well weighed▪ [ C]

But as men oftentimes erre in the maintaining of the societies of men▪ and gouern∣ment* 1.1254 of cities and Commonweales; so doe they in two notable things also especially: whereof the one is, That they too narrowly looke into the inconueniences of a law, without weighing of the good that ensueth thereof: the other, That they runne from one extreame into another; and so as it were shunning the water, run all headlong in∣to the fire, when as they should haue staied in the middest. Plato would, that the magi∣strats in his Commonweale should bee all perpetuall: which extremitie seemed vnto Aristotle blame-worthy, who therefore running himselfe into the other extremitie, and reiecting the opinion of his master Plato, opened a way vnto all the citisens, to all [ D] the honours and preferments of his Commonweal, saying, That otherwise to do, were to kindle the fire of sedition in the whole estate: whereas yet neither the one nor the other of them hath made any distinction at all of Commonweales, whereof the reso∣lution of this question especially dependeth. And we haue seene euen in this our time one* of the greatest persons of this realme, and the chiefe man of his cote, who hauing* 1.1255 embraced the opinion of Aristotle, hath endeuoured himselfe by all means to change all the offices into commissions, to be holden but by sufferance: who neuer had other thing in his mouth, and yet without any distinction in what forme of Commonweale this chaunge were, without harme to be receiued.

Now most certaine it is, that Commonweales in nature contrarie, are by con∣trarie [ E] * 1.1256 lawes and meanes to bee also gouerned and maintained (as wee haue often∣times before said, and yet must oft times say) so that the rules and orders proper to maintaine and preserue Popular estates, serue to the readie ruine and ouerthrow of Monarchies and sole gouernments. The Popular estates are maintained by* 1.1257 continuall chaunge of officers, to the end that euerie man according to his qualitie might haue part in the offices, according as they haue part in the soueraigntie, which can in no wise bee where offices be giuen in perpetuitie. Besides that equalitie the nurse of Popular estates is by the annuall succession of magistrates the better main∣tained, and the long custome of continuall commaund giue not an appetite

or desire to some one or other ambitions citisen to aspire vnto the soueraigntie alone. [ F] Whereas to the contrarie in Monarchies it is not necessarie, no nor yet wholesome, that subiects hauing no interest in the soueraigntie, should be nourished in ambition, it being sufficient for them to learne to bee dutifull and obedient vnto their soueraigne prince, and especially if the Monarchy be Lordlike or Tyrannicall: For that the sub∣iects in the one be the princes naturall slaues, and in the other the tyrants slaues by force, it should be a thing impossible for such a Lordlike Monarch, or tyrant to hold their estates, and to giue such yearely or successiue commanding power vnto their sub∣iects.* 1.1258 And therefore tyrants, who are no lesse hated and feared of their subiects, than they themselues feare and hate them, hauing little or no trust or confidence in them, for most part guard themselues with straungers onely, and some few of their owne sub∣iects, [ G] such as they know to be vnto themselues most loyall and faithfull, vnto whome they commit the custodie and guard of their owne persons, of their estates, of their for∣ces, and of their wealth, without any desire at all to chaunge them, not onely for that they distrust others, but also for that they would not acquaint them with the sweet∣nesse of power and command, least so some one or other of them therewith enflamed, should be desirous to dispatch the tyrant of his life, so to obtaine his place: or els other∣wise in so doing to gratifie the subiects. Whereas the Lordlike Monarch whome his subiects more willingly obey as his naturall slaues, is not so much hindred or letted from the choice of his magistrats and officers, as is the tyrant, who is not but by force and constraint obeyed of his subiects; and therefore giueth not the preferments or of∣fices [ H] of his estates in perpetuitie, neither yet maketh them annuall; but onely bestow∣eth them as he seeth good, and that for so long as pleaseth him, diuiding them amongst many at his good pleasure, without any law or decree therefore, all depending of his will and pleasure.

But the Royall Monarch, who is in such sort to intreat his subiects, as is the good fa∣ther* 1.1259 his louing children, albeit that he be no more bound vnto mans lawes, than are the other Monarches, yet will he neuerthelesse of himselfe establish decrees and lawes, for the placing and displacing of magistrats and officers, to the end they might so bee holden; diuiding the honours and rewards of vertue not to all indifferently, without discretion, but vnto such as deserue the same; hauing still more respect vnto the expe∣rience [ I] and vertue, than vnto the grace and fauour of them who are vnto him most of all commended. And yet for all that, shall in all things obserue and keepe the com∣mendable mediocritie, in such sort, as that he shall make many offices perpetuall, and some changeable also from three yeares to three yeares; and othersome to bee euerie yeare also chaunged; as namely the presidents of the parliaments, of the finances or common receit, or gouernours of prouinces, who could neuer otherwise bee punished for their oppression and misdemeanor, if they had their such great authoritie and pow∣er in the estate and Commonweale still in perpetuitie. He shall also diuide the honors and p•…•…eferments of the state, vnto the richer and nobler sort, albeit that they be not men of so great experience as are some of the poorer and baser sort, so to preuent sturres and [ K] seditions: yet for all that prouided alwayes, that vnto them which of themselues are not of sufficient capacitie be still associat men of good experience in their charge, so to couer and supplie the defect of the others: And yet is not so bound, vnto his own laws, but in case of necessitie hee may againe displace them whome hee hath before ordai∣ned to be perpetuall magistrats, finding them of whome he hath so euill made choice, for the weakenesse of their minds or bodies, to be altogether insufficient for the pub∣like charge to be by them sustained, or for to couer the shame of them which are so in∣sufficient, shall giue them some honest meanes to discharge themselues of such their

charge: as did the most wise emperor Augustus vnto a great number of the Senators, [ A] who vnworthy of their so honourable places, by that meane cleanely displaced themselues, without any force or sturre; or at leastwise shall appoint them depu∣ties for the executing of their charge: yet in the meane time suffering the magistrates and officers themselues, to enioy still their titles of their offices, and woonted pri∣uileges. And to the intent that iustice, the principall and chiefe ground of an estate* 1.1260 or Commonweale may bee the more religiously distributed, hee shall for the administration thereof appoint perpetuall colledges and companies of Iudges, and especially of such as are without appeale to iudge of the lives, fame, and goods of the subiects: not onely that these judges should so be the better experimented (as well for hearing the opinion of diuers, as for their long exercise in iudgement:) but also that so [ B] their seuerall power might be in some sort weakened (for feare they should abuse the same) and that so being many of like authoritie and power, they should not so easily be corrupted: not unlike to a great deale of water which is more hardly corrupted than is a little. For as Plinie sayth: Nemo omnes, neminem omnes vnquam fefellerunt: meliùs omnibus quàm singulis creditur. No man euer deceiued all men, neither did all m•…•…n euer deceiue any man: better it is to beleeue all than one. Howbeit, yet that by the wisedome and vertue of some one good judge, a whole companie, or bench of judges of the same court is oftentimes releeued: and their factions and secret practises broken; or being otherwise good men, yet misse-enformed by false accusers and pet∣tie [ C] foggers, cannot know or vnderstand the truth: but are by the wisedome of some one of their companie the better enformed. As I haue knowne one judge alone to haue caused the whole companie of judges to change their opinion, being before re∣solued and set downe to haue put a poore innocent woman to death: whom yet for all that he by most pregnant and liuely reasons clearely and fully acquited of that shee was in danger to haue beene condemned for. Who therefore well deserueth to be na∣med: and was Potier a learned judge of great integritie and vertue: who hath left unto his countrey his two sonnes inheritours of their fathers vertues: one of them Master of the Requests: and the other, Secretarie of the Finances; in vertue not inferior unto their father. Besides that, the experience of many worlds of yeares hath giuen vs suffi∣ciently [ D] to understand many judges, by conferring their opinions together, to giue ther∣by a better and sounder iudgement, than where they iudge euery one of them apart. Howbeit that Aristotle thinketh it better to haue euery judges opinion considered of apart by it selfe: and that he saith to haue beene the vsuall manner of iudgement in many the cities of the Greeks. Now the Romans to haue holden both these fashions and manners of iudgements Asconius Paedianus is the Authour, where he saith: Aliam esse rationem cum vniuersi Iudices constituunt, aliam cum singuli sententiam ferunt, It to be one manner of proceeding when all the judges together determine of a matter, and another when euery one of them deliuer their opinions apart. Wherefore causes are more indifferently and vprightly discided in Europe by a competent number of [ E] judges together: then by seuerall judges in Asia and Africke, whereas one particular* 1.1261 judge of a Prouince according to his will and pleasure determineth of all appeales made vnto him from the other particular and inferiout judges in that prouince. And albeit that in Grand Caire (one of the greatest cities of the world) there be foure jud∣ges which haue their diuers and seperate iurisdictions, and euery one of them haue also their diuers Deputies, who iudge also of causes apart and by themselues, yet are the appeales still brought vnto the first judge chiefe of the foure; who alone without any companion or assistant by him selfe at his pleasure discideth all appeales: whom it is no great matter for him to winne, that standeth in his good grace, or that hath the

greatest presents to giue him. Howbeit that the two Cadeleschers are the chiefe of all [ F] the judges, and may at their pleasure place or displace any of the rest of the judges, yea and all of them together also so long as it shall please the Grand Seignor▪ For why amongst the Turkes all power and commaund is but by sufferance and during plea∣sure both giuen and receiued.

Now we haue before said that in the royall Monarchie all the Magistrates and Of∣ficers* 1.1262 should neither be perpetuall, neither all still mutable: For that it is not needfull to chaunge the meane officers, as Clarks, Sergeants, Vshers, Notaries, and such other like, who for that they haue no power or authoritie to commaund, cannot hurt the Estate: and yet neuerthelesse the experience of their charge which cannot but in long time and by great practise be got, requireth that they should bee perpetuall. And so [ G] might a man say of other inferiour officers also, being still subiect vnto the power and authoritie of the greater, but cannot yet oft times be chaunged without the great hurt of the Commonweale, and many priuate mens hinderance. The Senators and Coun∣celours of estate also, whose dexteritie for the mannaging of the great affaires of the Commonweale is not but by long experience to be gotten; we see them to haue * 1.1263 beene in Rome, in Lacedemonia, and amongst the Areopagi in Athens, perpetuall: and so I thinke they ought to be euery where else, so that in the perpetuall chaunge of mutable magistrates, the Senate should still be constant, firme, and immutable, and that vpon it the other mutable offices and magistrates should as vpon a most sure slay rest: which was not so well prouided for by * Plato, who would haue his Senate to be [ H] * 1.1264 euery yeare by lot chosen. But now as for such great magistrates and officers as ac∣knowledge no commaund more than the soueraigne Princes alone, whither it be in martiall affaires, the administration of iustice, or the charge of the publique receit if the royall Monarch shall keepe them but one, two, or three yeares in their charge at the most, he shall so leaue open a way vnto his iustice, for the examining of their actions, and by the same meanes shall cause the wicked and corrupt magistrates to quake, standing alwayes in dread to be called to giue an account of their doings. And for that Magistrats and Officers are not to be chaunged all at once (for that all sudden chaunges in a Commonweale are daungerous) and that the publique actions be not interrupted, the chaunge of such great Magistrates as are in corporations and colleges [ I] together is to be made by the succeeding of them one of them vnto an other: as they doe in the Commonweale of Rhaguse, where the Senate is perpetuall, and the Sena∣tors who are also soueraigne judges, are not but euery one of them one yere in charge: who yet chaunge not all at once, but successiuely, and as it were insensiblie; and in their turne after that they haue for a certaine time liued as priuate men, returne more fresh vnto the same charge againe.

But yet generally in euery Commonweale this rule hath alwayes place without ex∣ception,* 1.1265 viz. That the perpetuall Magistrats & Officers should haue either no power at all, or else verie little power to commaund, or else some companion ioyned with them: and that they to whom great power is giuen, haue the same but for a short time, [ K] and by the law limitted to some few monethes or yeares. By which tempering and moderation of power and commaund, the difficulties and daungers shall cease, which might otherwise ensue by the sudden chaunge of all the Magistrates at once, for the interruption of publique actions. Neither need we so to feare lest the Commonweale should be without Magistrates, as a ship without a master to gouerne the same: as it often times chaunced in Rome, for the sute of the magistrates, who one of them hin∣dered an other, or els the same day entered all into their charge, as they all at one and at the selfe same instant departed out of the same together. Neither need we to feare

also lest the wicked by briberie mounted vnto the more hie degrees of honour, should [ A] escape vncorrected: or that the ignorant or vnskilfull should carie away the prefer∣ments of the estate and Commonweale: they which before had charge, hauing for certaine yeares rested themselues, still returning againe with much greater experience then before. Now they which wish for annuall Magistrats, annuall Senators, annuall powers and commaunds, forsee not that (beside the difficulties and daungers by vs before alleaged to ensure thereof) by this meanes either rude artificers or such like ignorant and vnskilfull men, must be called vnto such publike charges as they are neuer able to discharge, or else that the Commonweale must needs be full of most wise men, and such as are of greatest experience and knowledge. Howbeit that can∣not by nature be, that all men can do all things: wheras we see particular men scarcely [ B] well to discharge their particular charges; and in other some to rest great wisedome, who yet haue no skill in gouernment at all. But in doing that which wee haue said there shall not easilie any default fall out, neither shall the subiects haue any iust cause whereof to complaine; the rewards of honour being so exposed to euery mans sight, as the marke whereat euery one should ayme, though few there bee which hit the same, and the fewer officers and rewards there should be, and the dearer that they were prized, the more they should be of all desired: when as euery man should for his vertue be called vpon, and that there should be no cause of sedition, no man being excluded from the merite and reward of his vertue and sufficiencie, so that the causes of sedition [ C] so taken away, the subiects may still liue in all peace and tranquillitie. And if need be we may vse Commissioners or Syndiques, as they did in the time of Lewes the ix, and Philip the faire, for the chastising of the officers, and the calling of them to account.

Now some difficulties concerning the chaunging of Magistrats and Lawes are by vs before set downe, and more I suppose will be imagined: yet were it vnreasonable to looke into the discommodities of a law (and so for the same to reiect it) without con∣sideration* 1.1266 also of the profits thereof, seeing that there is no law so good (as saith C•…•…o the Censor) which draweth not after it some incommodities. And in mine opinion that law may alwayes be accounted good and profitable, if the good which may ensue* 1.1267 thereof be manifest, and greater then the harme that is to be feared thereof: wherein [ D] many often times offend, which thinke it impossible to haue all discommodities quite taken out of the lawes, the Commonweale yet neuerthelesse still standing in safetie,* 1.1268 but so falling into such daungers as they before thought not of, straight waies blame the lawes, and often times chaunge the same, when as in truth they should haue accu∣sed & chaunged them selues. So some good Princes euill aduised often times to their harme cancell a good Law for some one incommoditie they haue seene therein▪ Whereof we will vse no other example then that of Lewes the xj, who comming to the Crowne at once displaced all his fathers auntient seruitours, and remoued also the princes his nie kinsmen from the gouernment of the state: who therefore with a won∣derfull consent conspired with the enemy against him, and brought him to such a strait, [ E] as that they had almost strucke the crowne from his head, and by force wrested the roiall scepter out of his hands. But these sturres againe quieted, and all things well pa∣cified and set in order, fearing lest his sonne should fall into the like daunger, charged him neuer to chaunge them whom he had aduanced; and yet not so contented, made a law, whereby he decreed all offices to be perpetuall; and that such as were once pre∣ferred thereunto, should not be againe displaced, otherwise then by resignation, death, or forfaiture: And by an other Edict declaring the former, published the xx. of Sep∣tember in the yeare 1482 decreed, That no officers hauing forfeited their offices, for what cause soeuer, should be enforced to yeeld vp their offices, except it were so before

adiudged, and the parties condemned. Which edict hee commaunded to stand in [ F] force, not onely whilest he himselfe yet liued, but also during the raigne of his sonne Charles. And albeit that he could not so bind the hands of his successour, yet so it is neuerthelesse, that this his decree & law hath euer since bene inuiolably kept, although the auntient clause, So long as it shall please vs, remaine still in all letters of office. Which words declare no perpetuall power to be giuen vnto the magistrats or officers, but by sufferance onely, except by law or custome it be otherwise prouided. Yet still remaineth that idle clause, that thereby it may be vnderstood, all power and authoritie to haue in auntient times bene giuen by our kings during their pleasure, and so to haue of the magistrats bene holden but by sufferance onely. And albeit that in the raigne of Philip the Faire this string was againe touched, for the giuing of offices in perpetuitie, [ G] yet for all that the matter still rested vndecided. But Philip Valois reuoked the commis∣sions, and ordained, That from that time forward the royall offices should bee perpetu∣all; which well declareth them before to haue beene mutable at the pleasure of the kings, albeit that the officers had not forfeited them. And amongst those praises which they giue vnto king Robert, one of the greatest is, That he neuer displaced officer, if he had not for some foule and infamous fact before forfeited his office. Whereby it is to be gathered, king Robert his auncestours to haue vsed other lawes and customes.

But yet haply it may seeme vnto some, that if offices should still be giuen with that clause, During the Princes pleasure, the magistrats would better discharge their charges for the hope they should haue by this meane to continue still in their places, procee∣ding [ H] still from better to better, and bearing themselues vprightly, for feare otherwise to be displaced. Whereunto I agree, in a well ordered Lordly Monarchy: but the daunger should be greater to open such a gap vnder a prince on euery side beset with flatterers, and compassed in with clawbackes: For why, euerie man seeth, that princes so beset, must either make a most filthy gaine and traffique of their offices, or else take such places and power to commaund, from good men, who almost alwaies haue the courtiers life (polluted with all manner of vices) in hatred and detestation. Besides that* 1.1269 this bestowing of offices during pleasure, sauoureth somewhat of tyranny, or of a Lordlike gouernment, rather than of a Royall Monarchy; which (so much as possible is) should by lawes, and not by the princes will and pleasure onely bee gouer∣ned: [ I] So as many a Lordly Monarchie, where the subiects being naturall slaues adore and feare their soueraigne prince, as a god come downe from heauen, accounting his commaunds as the lawes of nature it selfe. Whereas in a Royall Monarchy, where the subiects are as children, it is needfull to rule and gouerne all things by law, as much as possible may be: for otherwise if the king shall without cause exclude some one more than some other from some office or preferment, he that should bee so excluded should hold himselfe iniured, and so rest discontented with his prince; who ought ra∣ther to be beloued than feared of his subiects: which to bee, he ought to take away all occasion of discontentment that men might haue against him; and better meanes is there none, than to leaue all that may be to the disposition of the lawes and customes, [ K] no man so hauing iust cause to complaine of the prince.

The learned Budeus who was of opinion that it were best to haue the magistrats and offices still changeable, without hauing regard vnto the law made by Lewes the xi. hath holden, That in auntient time the Presidents and counsellors of the parliament of Paris were but annuall: and that the solemne oath which they still take the 12. day of nouember, and the letters patents which they still are to haue from the king for the opening of the Parliament, show sufficiently that their estates were not perpetuall, but still at the pleasure of the prince to bee reuoked, and so to bee by them holden but by

sufferance: and so by these reasons drew many to be of the same opiniō with him, who [ A] * 1.1270 had they but turned ouer the records of the court, and of the chamber of accounts, they should haue found that that Parliament which before was ambulatorie & moue∣able, and which had no power but by commission, was by Philip the long ordayned to be an ordinarie Court, with ordinarie power, circuite, and iurisdiction; in the ere∣ction whereof was expressed that it should still haue therein one or two Presidents, of whom the first was the Earle of Burgundie the kings nie kinsman, as in like sort the President in the Imperiall chamber, is alway one of the princes of the Empire. And so for a long time also the President of the court of Paris was still a martiall man and not a gowne man as he now is: and euen yet at this present the Great Praetor of the court of Paris, whom we call the chiefe President, is still honored with the qualitie and [ B] title of a martiall man, as of a knight, or as the Latins call it Miles, or a souldiour, al∣though he neuer drew sword: which title the other judges of that court haue not, who then were but three score, but now are an hundred and fiftie. Whereby it is plaine the court of Paris so founded to haue an ordinarie and perpetuall power, nei∣ther to haue need of the Princes annuall rescripts, or letters patents for the disciding and determining of controuersies. Howbeit that king Henry the second comming into the Parliament for the publishing of certaine Edicts and lawes, which in that court could hardly find passage (hauing it put into his mouth by certaine flatterers) said openly, That the Parliament had at all no power, if it pleased not him by sending of his letters Patents euery yeare to giue opening vnto the same; which his speech [ C] astonished many. But certaine it is that the letters patents which are sent to this end, and the annuall oath which the Presidents and Councelours take, is but a matter of formalitie and custome, necessarie at such time as the parliaments were not holden but by commission: But afterwards that they were erected into the forme of ordinarie courts, such auntient solemnities are no more necessarie: for why the annuall Magi∣strats are to take an annuall oath; whereas they which are perpetuall Magistrats are to take it but once for all, without any needlesse reiteration of the same. So the continuall Roman Magistrats euery yeare tooke their oath, for that their power was but annuall: wheras the Senators tooke it but once for all, for that their dignitie was perpetuall and [ D] during the whole time of their liues. The same might be said of the forme of the com∣missions and decrees of that court, conceiued vnder the name and seale of the king, and namely of the letters missiue of the court: which although they bee conceiued in the name of the court, are yet neuerthelesse sealed with the little royall seale with the flowredeluce: howbeit that all the other magistrats, seneschals, bailiefes, prouosts, and gouernours of countries, hauing power of ordinarie commaund or by commission, direct the same vnder their owne names, and their owne seales; which is yet retained of the auntient forme, euer since that the parliament was but the kings priuie councell, which councell for that it had no ordinarie power, did nothing of it selfe, and the com∣missions are alwaies graunted in the name of the king, as hauing the onely power to [ E] commaund in his councell, as we haue before shewed. Which forme hath bene euer since followed in the erection of other parliaments, euen vnto the court of Aides, who giue out all their commissions, vnder the kings name•…•… which hath moued some to say, That the parliaments haue nothing but an extraordinarie power by way of commissi∣on onely. Howbeit that it sufficiently appeareth by that which is by vs before said, them to haue an ordinarie and perpetuall power, which they still hold the king beeing dead: Which if it were but a power holden vpon sufferance, (as some would haue it) it should then together with the death of the king take end, as all other powers and commissions else doe. But these courts and the ordinarie magistrats thereof, the king

being dead neither chaunge their attire, nor vse any mourning garments, or other [ F] signes of sorrow: yea that more is, the first confirmations of the new king are alwaies graunted vnto the Courts of Parliament; as hath beene alwaies vsed since the time of Lewes the eleuenth, in such sort as that their power is not onely ordinarie, but perpe∣tuall also, not onely in the whole bodies of themselues, but euen in euery one of the members, officers, and ministers of the said Courts of Parliament.* 1.1271

And yet for all that is not the manner of those Princes to be discommended, who vnto their Officers and Magistrates giue their power but by sufferance, which they (if cause be) at their pleasure againe take from them, as the kings of England haue vsed to doe. For albeit that the auntient and moderne Commonweales, especially the Po∣pular and Aristocratique (more straitly bound vnto the lawes than are Monarchies) [ G] haue their Magistrates and officers for the most part annuall, and that none of them was againe displaced, without iust cause why; yet so it was for all that, that the peo∣ple sometimes reuoked their former choice made, and placed some others whom they knew to be more fit for the charge they were to vndergoe: as it did in establishing the Dictators and others their Captaines and Gouernors, reuoking sometimes (as I say) euen their ordinarie magistrates; as it did Octacilius the Consul, who at the request of Fabius Maximus was remoued from his charge, as a man not sufficient for the man∣naging of so great and daungerous a warre as the State had then in hand. Neither had they for the remouing of their magistrat, regard onely if he had in any thing trespassed, and so deserued to be remoued; but euen vnto the insufficiencie of him also, whither [ H] it were knowne or vnknowne when they receiued him into the Estate, or that it were befallen him afterwards; deeming also weaknesse, or age, madnesse, or other like dis∣eases, such as let and hinder mens reasonable actions, to be sufficient also to displace them from their offices. And namely Lucius Torquatus chosen the third time Consul excused himselfe before the people for the infirmitie of his eyes; saying, That it was not reason to put the gouernment of the Commonweale into his hands, who could not see but by other mens eyes. But O how many are there of the blind, deafe, and dumbe, not hauing in themselues any light of nature, neither wisedome, nor experi∣ence so much as to gouerne themselues, who are not yet content to guide the sayles and tackles, but desire also to lay hands euen vpon the verie helme also of the Com∣monweale? [ I]

Now that which we haue said concerning the meane that ought to be kept in the chaunge and continuation of Magistrats and Officers, hath not onely place in royall Monarchies, but euen in Popular and Aristocratique estates also, where the offices* 1.1272 almost all, or for the most part, ought to be euery yeare, or from two yeares to two yeares still mutable: as they do among the Swissers, and diuers other Commonweals. Yet neuerthelesse for the preseruation of the same, there must still be some estates in the Commonweale perpetuall: as namely those whose experience and wisdome is alwayes necessarie for the stay of the rest, such as be the Councellors of estate: And this is it, for which the Senat in Rome, in Athens, and in Lacedemonia, was still per∣petuall. [ K] And why, the Senators still during their liues held their charge and places: for as the hookes and hinges whereupon great burdens rest, must of themselues be strong and vnmoueable; euen so the Senat of the Areopagi, and of other Common∣weales also, were as most strong and sure hinges, whereupon as well all the mutable officers as the whole waight of the Estate and Commonweale rested & reposed them∣selues. The contrarie whereof is to be done in Monarchies, wherein the greater part, and almost all the estates ought to be perpetuall, except some few of the chiefe and principall: as they doe in the kindome of Spayne, where they well know how to

keepe this mediocritie or meane proper vnto the royall estate. And so for the same [ A] cause the Venetians which haue an Aristocratique estate, make their officers euery yeare chaungeable, and some of them from two moneths to two moneths; and yet neuerthelesse haue their Duke, the Procurators of S. Marke, the Chauncelour, and foure Secretaries for the Estate, perpetuall; which the Florentines ordayned in their Estate also (after that they were by Lewes the xij, deliuered from the most cruell ty∣rannie of Countie Valentinus Borgia) taking order that their Duke should from that time forward be perpetuall, to the entent that the Commonweal before in perpetuall motion and chaunge of all their estates and offices, might yet haue some thing firme and stable whereupon to rest and stay it selfe: which good order being in short time after by the most turbulent Florentines abolished, they fell againe into greater tumuls [ B] and ciuill warres then euer they were in before: whereas if they had had but a perpe∣tuall Senate at the least, and the Senators continued in their charge, (who from six moneths to six moneths were stil chaunged and rechaunged) and had but kept a cer∣taine meane betwixt these two extremities, of generall chaunge, and still continuing of all their offices, their estate had beene much the more assured, neither had their Commonweale beene still so tossed and turmoyled with so many and so great surges of sedition, and tempests of ciuill warres. But these things thus by vs declared, let vs now see also whether in a wise and well ordered Commonweale it be good that the Magistrates should be all at vnitie, and of one accord among themselues or not? [ C]

CHAP. V. ¶ Whether the vnitie and concord of Magistrats amongst themselues bee good and wholesome for the Commonweale, or not?

THis question, viz. Whether it be good that the magistrats and offi∣cers of a Commonweale should be of accord, or els at discord and va∣riance among themselues? may perhaps seeme altogether needlesse and vaine. For who euer doubted but that it was alwaies expedient, yea and necessarie too, that the Magistrats in euerie Commonweale [ D] * 1.1273 should be of one and the same mind? to the end that they all together might with one consent and heart embrace and seeke after the publike good: And if so it be (as wise men haue alwaies thought) that a well ordered Commonweale ought to resemble a mans bodie, wherein all the members are vnited and conioyned with a maruellous bond, euerie one of them doing their office and dutie; and yet neuerthe∣lesse when need is, one of them still aideth another, one of them releeueth another; and so all together strengthen themselues, to maintaine the health, beautie, and welfare of the whole bodie: but if it should happen them to enter into hatred one of them against another; and that the one hand should cut the other, or the right foot supplant [ E] the left, and that the fingers should scrape out the eyes, and so euerie member should draw vnto it selfe the nourishment of the other next vnto it; it must needs fall out, that the bodie in the end must become maimed, lame, and impotent, in all the actions ther∣of: euen so in like manner may a man deeme of the estate of a Commonweale, the ho∣nour and welfare whereof dependeth of the mutuall loue and good will of the subiects among themselues, as also toward their soueraigne prince. Which sweet vnitie and agreement how is it to be hoped for, if the magistrats which are the principall subiects▪ and such as ought by their example to bind together the rest, be at variance and discord among themselues? But euen to the contrarie the subiects shall become partakers of the factions of the magistrats, they first nourishing secret grudges, and afterward open

enmitie, vntill that at length all breake out into open ciuill warre, all for the mainte∣nance [ F] and vpholding euerie one of them of the chiefe of their factions, to the destructi∣on of the Commonweale: or in case stay be made thereof, and that things fall not out altogether so euill, yet must still publike actions by such ambitious discord of the magi∣strats be hindred, and the Commonweale sore troubled: whereunto it shall happen as it doth vnto a maid, for whome (as Plutarch saith) her suters enter into such a ielousie and passion, as that desiring euerie one of them to haue her to himselfe, they so in stead of louing and embracing of her, most cruelly rent her in peeces amongst them. And what good successe may a man expect of an armie, or what victorie is to bee hoped for ouer the enemie, where the captaines and commaunders are at discord among them∣selues? or what iustice is to be looked for, where the judges are diuided into factions? [ G] Yea it hath bene oftentimes seene some of them to haue beene of contrarie opinions and aduise vnto others, and that vpon a verie iealousie and hatred they had among themselues, and so play as it were at hazard with the life, the goods, and honour of the subiects: as Agesilaus king of the Lacedemonians (albeit that hee was one of the most famous of them that euer was) to impaire the credit and authoritie of Lysander whome he hated, reuersed all his iudgements, and gaue sentence quite contrarie, not so much for the iniquitie of the cause (as he himselfe said) as in despight of him his enemie onely. And to make the matter short, most certaine it is, that dissentions and ciuill warres (the capitall plagues of Commonweales) take foot, root, encrease, and nourishment, of nothing more than of the hatred and enmitie of the magistrats among them∣selues. [ H] Whereof it followeth the vnitie and concord of them among thmselues to be vnto the subiects not onely profitable, but euen necessarie also. Which may all seeme right profitable arguments and reasons for the one side.

But now they which more subtilly reason of these matters, deeme to the contrarie,* 1.1274 the health, and welfare of the Commonweale to be best preserued and kept by the dis∣cord of the magistrats. For why (say they) the force and nature of vertue is such, as that it cannot be contrarie vnto vertue; neither that good men, although they bee at neuer so great oddes, can yet be enemies among themselues: but being prouoked by the in∣iuries of the wicked their aduersaries, do still wel the more and more encrease and flou∣rish: neither is the valour of worthy men any where more euident and manifest, than [ I] when they without bitternesse contend among themselues; and so prickt forward with an honest ambition, and enflamed with the heat of men like vnto themselues, as with a fire, are by the emulation of their competitors incited to take in hand great matters, and so still to ouercome their enemies in well doing. So when Taxilas king of the Indians had by his ambassadours freely and without resistance offered his kingdome vnto Ale∣xander the Great, (then bearing downe all the kingdomes of the East before him) if so be he wanted wealth; and withall refused not to receiue wealth also at his hands, if hee had of it too much: Alexander glad of such a match, said vnto him, If we must thus contend and combat together, it shall neuer be said, that you shall take this point of ho∣nour from me, as to be accounted more magnificall, more courteous, or more royall, [ K] than my selfe: and so gaue vnto him another great kingdome, with an infinit masse of treasure. In like manner Tullus Hostilius king of the Romans, said vnto Metius Suffe∣tius Dictator of the Albanians, The ciuill discords which thou obiectest vnto vs, wee deem them as profitable to our citie; for we striue together, whether of vs shall better or more ear∣nestly fight for the good of the Commonweale.

Now if contention and emulation be thus good and profitable amongst valiant & good citisens, and wholesome for Commonweales, how much more then ought it to be thought necessarie for most base and abiect men, for the stirring of them vp to ver∣tue,* 1.1275

and deterring of them from vice. For of all the great profits which men vse to reap [ A] from their enemies, none is greater than so to liue as that we seeme not to exceed them in vices, or be ouercome of them in vertues. But if such discord and contention be both honourable and profitable in a citie or Commonweale, wherein the princes and magi∣strats are all good men, and striue but for vertue onely; how much more then shall the contention be profitable, where the good striue against the euill? But in case that all the magistrats be euill, then is discord and contention amongst them not onely profita∣ble, but euen necessarie also, least otherwise they beeing at vnitie and concord among themselues, and in possession of the gouernment, might freely and without feare make hauocke and spoile both of the publike and priuat affaires. In which case it cannot fall out better either for the subiects, or for the whole Commonweale, than if they by their [ B] mutuall hatred and accusations shall openly detect and lay open vnto the world, their owne filthinesse, their foule extortions and robberies, as the sheepe are neuer more as∣sured, than when the wolues deuoure one another; as it happened saith Philip Commi∣nes in England, that whilest the great lords slew or condemned one another, the poore people in the meane while remained safe from their inuasion. Which was the wise councell of Cincinnatus, seeing the Consull Appius openly to withstand the people to hinder them for the doubling the number of their Tribunes: Let be (said Cincinnatus) for the moe they shall be, the worse they will agree. And right needfull oftentimes it was the power of the Tribunes to bee broken and weakned by their owne diuision, [ C] when as by the opposition of any one of them, all the proceedings of the rest were so hindered and stayed. And truely Cincinnatus therein said wisely, for so the Common∣weale stood and flourished, the Tribunes oftentimes being at discord and varience among themselues, which (they being at vnitie and concord) would haue in a moment fallen: and so long it well stood vntil that Pub. Clodius a most wicked man, about foure hundred yeares after presented a request vnto the people, which passed into the force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That from thenceforth the opposition of one of the Tribunes should not hinder the proceeding of the rest of his fellow Tribunes. And therfore Cato the Censor, the beautie of the Romane wisedome (and one to whome was giuen the chiefe prayse for wisedome and vertue amongst the Romans) could nei∣ther [ D] endure the agreement of his seruants in his familie, nor of the Magistrats in the Commonweale, but slily and secretly still sowed hatred and sedition amongst them; that so the wicked and offendors might with their accusations as with mutuall wounds fall, and the good so gaine praise. For why, he thought it a thing almost impossible in so great an accord of slaues and of magistrats, but that the one of them should make spoile of the Commonweale, and the other of his priuat substance, especially being in hope to escape vnpunished, and our of feare for being accused. And therefore doubted not fiftie times to accuse offendors, hee himselfe being also fortie times by others accu∣sed: howbeit that he still bearing himselfe vpon the integritie of his forepassed life, and the commendable things by him done, easily auoided all the slanders by his aduersaries [ E] against him fasly surmised. Neither was that Commonweale euer after fuller of good and valiant citisens, than it was in his time. Yea the Senat of Rome allotted a great summe of money to Mar. Bibulus to buy his Consulship, and the voyces of the people, to the intent to oppose him against Caesar his knowne enemie, who had cunningly set vp Luceius his friend (whome the Senat would haue had excluded) that so hee might doe all things as he thought good, his friend and fellow in office agreeing thereunto. And not to go farther, we haue herefore the witnesse of Iulius Caesar, who in his Com∣mentaries* 1.1276 saith, The Gaules to haue had a most auntient custome amongst them, to stirre vp their great lords one of them against another, to the intent that the common

people (which were as he reporteth but slaues) might so bee safe and free from their [ F] outrages and robberies. For so one of them opposing himselfe against another, and euill controlled by the good, and the wicked by themselues; there should be no doubt but that the Commonweale should so be in much more safetie and assurance, than if they were of one accord among themselues. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, the dis∣cord of princes and magistrats to haue alwaies bene vnto Commonweals wholesom: as the meane whereby the wicked (as we said) may by the vertue of the good, or their owne mutuall accusations be weakned. Which seemed a thing profitable not onely vnto the Romans, and our auncestours, but euen vnro Lycurgus the wise law giuer al∣so, who therefore himselfe set dissention betwixt the two kings of Lacedemonia, and appointed also, That there should alwaies two enemies be sent ambassadours for the [ G] state; to the intent they should not by their mutuall consent and good agreement be∣tray the Commonweale: but that being at variance, they might still one of them bee controlled by the other. As for that which is said, the parts of mans bodie which re∣present a well ordered Commonweale, to bee neuer at discord among themselues, is quite contrarie; for were not the humors of mans bodie much contrarie, a man should quickly perish: the preseruation thereof dependeth of the contrarietie of hoat & cold, of moisture and drought, of bitter choller to sweet flegme, of beastly desires to diuine reason; as also the preseruation of the whole world next vnto God dependeth of the contrarietie, which is in the whole and euery part thereof. Euen so the magistrates in [ H] a Commonweale ought in some sort to be at difference among themselues, albeit that they otherwise be right good men, for that trueth, the publike good, and that which is honest, best discouereth it selfe by that which is thereunto contrarie: and is still to bee found in the middest betwixt two extreames. And it seemeth that the Romans had this principall end before their eyes, ordinarily making choyce of their magistrats that were to bee placed in the same charge, still enemies one of them vnto another; or at leastwise of quite contrarie humors and dispositions, as is in all their histories to be seene. As when the Senat foresaw that Claudius Nero should carrie away the Con∣sulship, an hoat and sturting man, and withall a most valiant and couragious captaine to oppose against Hannibal: the Senat (I say) procured to haue ioyned vnto him for his companion or fellow in office Liuius Salinator an old captaine, and a man of [ I] great experience, but yet as cold and staid, as was the other hoat and terrible, and yet fit to heat the old age of Liuius, now a little too cold for the warres: who so ioy∣ned and vnited together, gained a most notable victorie against Hannibal, which was the ruine of the Carthaginians, and the preseruation of the Roman estate. These two men also afterwards were by the people made Censors together; who still at dis∣cord, noted one of them another of infamie, a thing neuer before seene: and yet they thus still at variance, were in all mens iudgements two of the most famous and vertuous men that then were in Rome. With like wisedome the Romans ioyned to∣gether Pabius Maximus, and Marcus Marcellus, in their warres against Hannibal, both of them right great and most expert captaines, but the one of them being a cold, and [ K] the other an exceeding hoat man; the one alway still desirous of battell, and the other still seeking for delay; the one called the Roman Sword, and the other the Bucklet; the one a fierce warrier, and the other a long lingerer: by which contrarie humors of these two so great personages the estate was not onely preserued from ruine and destruction, which must needs otherwise vndoubtedly haue ensued, but farre and wide enlarged also. If then the emulation and discord of the most vertuous magistrats be so profita∣ble vnto a Commonweale, what then is to bee hoped for, when the good magistrats shall oppose themselues against the wicked?

And these reasons may on both sides seeme probable, but what in trueth is to bee [ A] * 1.1277 resolued vpon, is not so easie to iudge which to do, not onely the qualitie of the magi∣strats themselues, but the diuers formes of Commonweales, is to bee also considered. And yet I suppose, that in euerie kind of Commonweale it is good that the inferiour magistrats and officers, being vnder the power and authoritie of the greater, should stil be at variance and discord among themselues, and that more in a Popular estate than in any other: For that the people hauing none but the magistrats to gouerne them, is most easie to be pilled and polled, if the magistrats bee not one of them by another controlled. And in a Monarchie it is expedient also, that euen the greatest magistrats should sometime be at oddes, considering that there is a soueraine prince to chastise and correct them; so that hee bee not mad, furious, or a child, or one otherwise sub∣iect [ B] vnto another mans power. But in an Aristocratike or Popular Commonweale it is most daungerous, that the great magistrats should bee at discord among them∣selues, and that especially if they bee not good men, who neuer haue any such con∣tention or debate amongst them, as may hurt the estate or Commonweale: but such as was the honourable difference betwixt Scipio Affricanus, the elder, and Fa∣bius Maximus: betwixt Scipio the younger, and Cato; betwixt Liuius and his com∣panion Nero; or the contention of Lepidus with Fuluius, of Marcus Scaurus with Catulus; or of Themistocles with Aristides: whose notable contention for vertues sake was alwayes vnto the Commonweale wholesome. But if the greatest magi∣strats in a Popular estate bee euill and wicked men, or that their ambition be founded [ C] vppon an euill ground, it is then daungerous least that their differences bee cause of ciuill warres; as it happened betwixt Marius and Scylla, betwixt Caesar and Pompey, Augustus and Marke Anthonie, Thucidides and Pericles. And yet much more dan∣gerous such contentions are in an Aristocratie, than in a Popular Commonweale: For that the gouernours, which are alwaies the fewer in number in an Aristocratique estate, and yet commaund the rest, haue still to doe with the people: who vpon the first occasion take vp armes against their lords, if they once enter into quarrels. For a few lords in an Aristocratie are easily drawne into two parts, by the great magi∣strats, who if they fall into sedition among themselues, as also with the people, it [ D] cannot otherwise bee, but that the chaunge of the estate must thereof needes ensue; the leaders of the factions oppressing their enemies: or else the gouernment of the estate falling wholly into one mans hands, which is not so much to bee feared in a Monarchie, whereas the soueraigne prince vnder his power keepeth all the magistrats in awe.

But in euerie Commonweale it is expedient and necessarie, that the numbet of the* 1.1278 soueraigne magistrats, or of them which come neere vnto the soueraigntie, should still be odd, to the end that the dissention amongst them might still be composed by the greater part or number of them; and that the publike actions be not by the equa∣litie of them hindred or letted. And that is it for which the Cantons of Vrie, Vnder∣uald, [ E] Zug, and Glaris (which of all others are most Popular) haue beene glad to make in euerie one of them three soueraigne magistrats, whom they call Amans, & not two, for that the third may easily reconcile two being at variance betwixt thēselues: in stead whereof they of Schwits haue foure, as they of Geneua haue also their foure Sindic∣ques, and they of Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Solure their two Auoyers: and Zuric, Basil, Schaffouse, their two Bourgomasters: as some there were which thought it bet∣ter to haue of such great magistrats moe than foure, and yet in odd number also; as in auntient time the Athenians had their nine Pretors, whome they called Archon∣tas; that so the fewer might still yeeld vnto the rest, or be in number ouercome, which

cannot be where onely two beare the sway, except they had alternatiue power to [ F] commaund each of them his day by turnes, so as had the Carthaginensians Suffetes, and the Roman Consuls, so as we haue before said. And therefore by our laws also are three appointed for the common receit, that so the third might still reconcile the other two his companions at difference betwixt themselues, or els by ioyning himselfe to one of them, make that part the greater. Which odd number of great magistrats is more necessarie in a Popular or Aristocratike estate, than in a Monarchy; and the dis∣cord and dissention of them lesse in this state to be feared than in the other. For that as almightie God the Father of the whole Fabrike of the world, and of nature, doth with an admirable concord and agreement gouerne this world, composed of the contrarie conuersions and motions of the celestiall orbes among themselues, as also of the diffe∣rent [ G] natures of the starres and elements, and of the contrarie force and power of planets and of other liuing creatures: euen so also a king (the liuing image of God himselfe the prince of all things) should of the dissimilitude of magistrats, in some sort, at variance among themselues, keepe and maintaine the welfare of his subiects and people. And as in instruments, and song it selfe, which altogether out of tune, or all in the selfe same tune, the skilfull and learned eare cannot in any sort endure, is yet made a certaine well tuned discord, and agreeing harmonie, of most vnlike voices and tunes, viz. of Bases, Trebles, and Meanes, cunningly confused and mixt betwixt both: euen so also of the mightie, and of the weake, of the hie, and of the low, and others of the middle degree and sort betwixt both; yea euen of the verie discord of the magistrats among them∣selues [ H] ariseth an agreeing welfare of all, the straitest bond of safetie in euerie well orde∣red Commonweale. So Caesar making sharpe warre vpon them of Beauuis, hauing in his armie two captaines deadly enemies one of them vnto the other, commaunded them to turne all that their hatred vpon their enemies, who so in his verie sight with great emulation gained a notable victory ouer their enemies, which their dissention had giuen vnto their enemies, had they not had a generall aboue them, who kept them both in awe. Which as it oftentimes happeneth, so did it also chaunce to Lewes the twelfth the French king, who gained the estates of Bolonia, and ouerthrew the Popes armie, by reason of the discord betwixt the cardinall of Pauie, and the duke of Vrbin, who through iealousie of one of them against the other, so hindred & entangled them∣selues, [ I] as that they gaue victorie vnto the French: into which daunger the Roman estate was like to haue fallen, by the contention risen betwixt Fabius Maximus, and Minutius the Roman generals, which had vndoubtedly giuen Hannibal the victorie, and the Romans the ouerthrow, had not Fabius for the good of the Commonweale forgot his displeasure, and by his valour deliuered his rash companion together with the Roman armie, from a most certaine and present destruction.

Wherefore the contentions of the greater Magistrates are most daungerous in a* 1.1279 Popular estate or Commonweale, (where there is no other head to commaund them but the multitude) and especially if he seeke how to serue their owne proud and ambi∣tious desires, rather then the common good. And therefore the Roman Senat seeing [ K] Marcus Lepidus, and Q. Fuluius mortall enemies chosen Censors together, went vn∣to them in great number to perswade them now at length for the Commonwealth sake to become friends, or at least wise to suspend their enmitie, so the better to attend vnto their office, being the fairest and of greatest importance in the whole Common∣weale. The like whereof we read to haue beene often done by the Senat, in setting the busie Tribunes, and proud Consuls agreed, at such time as their dissentions seemed to tend vnto the daunger of the State. But as it is not good that the greatest magi∣strates in a Popular estate should be too great enemies; so also is it not conuenient that

they should be too great friends, especially if they be not good men, and that for the [ A] reasons by vs before alleaged. Which was the cause that the yonger Cato seeing Pom∣pee, Caesar, and Crassus so straitly allied together, and that they so conioyned, were too strong for all the rest of the people; cried out aloud the Commonweale by such com∣byning of the great ones to be bought and sold; foreseeing as it were out of a watch tower the stormes and tempests thereof then at hand. Yet true it is that of two extre∣mities it is better that the great Lords and magistrats in a Popular or Aristocratique estate should be of one accord then at discord: for that being of accord, they will al∣waies like better to commaund others, and so in some sort or other to preserue the Estate such as it is, than together with the Commonweale, quite to ouerthrow their owne power, whereunto their discord would bring them, when they had once giuen [ B] sayles vnto the tempest. In such sort as Liuie said of Caluinus the Campanian: Im∣probum hominem, sed non ad extremum perditum, qui mallet incolumi quàm euersa pa∣tria dominari, A wicked man (saith he) but not altogether desperate, who had rather to rule ouer his countrie yet standing vpright, then ouer the same ouerthrowne. So albeit that Mar. Tullius said, The three-headed alliance of Caesar, Crassus, and Pompee to be a thing greatly to be feared: Yet when he saw Crassus the moderator with the Roman legions slaine in Chaldea, and Iulia Caesars daughter Pompee his wife by vn∣timely* 1.1280 death taken away, he cried out: Vtinam Cn. Pompei, amicitiam cum Caesare nunquàm coisses, aut nunquàm diremisses, I would to god, O Pompee, (said he) thou [ C] haddest either neuer made friendship with Caesar, or hauing once made it, haddest neuer broken it. For why their friendship much diminished the Popular power, but their enmitie altogether ruinated the same; one of them being in no wise able to en∣dure his equall, nor the other his superiour, vntill that so by ciuill warre the state was quite at length ouerthrowne, and Caesar become master of all. And as for that which Caesar writeth, our auncestours the auntient Gaules to haue thought the dissention of their princes and great gouernours to haue beene profitable vnto their estates, I can hardly be perswaded therein: when as by the report euen of Caesar himselfe, the dissen∣tion of the princes and of the estates of Fraunce, (then for the most part gouerned by Aristocraties) wrought their owne destruction; some of them praying aide of the Ger∣mans, [ D] and some of them of the Romans, being long a prey both to the one and to the other, and in the end vnto the Romans alone as the onely conquerors. Neither is it true the mutuall slaughters of the Nobilitie of England to haue beene commodi∣ous and profitable vnto the comminaltie and inferiour sort, as Philip Comines writeth; yea at such time as I was Embassadour in England, I vnderstood by some of the inha∣bitants there, them to feare nothing more then the factions of the Nobilitie and their ciuill discord: for the better appeasing and repressing whereof they haue often times vsed to assemble the high court of Parliament, whereunto all the States are assem∣bled. And thus we haue declared in what sort the Magistrates ought to behaue them selues towards their Prince, as also how they ought to beare them selues one of them [ E] towards an other, as also towards other priuate men; and whether they ought to be at vnitie among them selues or not. Now it remaineth for vs briefly to show also, how the Prince ought to behaue him selfe towards his subiects; and whither it be ex∣pedient that he should him selfe iudge them, or be him selfe conuersant among them.

CHAP. VI. [ F] ¶ Whether it be conuenient or expedient for the Maiestie of a soueraigne Prince to iudge his subiects him selfe, or to be much conuersant with them.

IT may seeme vnto some that this question not before reasoned of, hath not in it any doubt, and that it is not needfull for vs far∣ther to enter there into, considering that all the auntient and wise polytitians are of accord, that kings were neuer for other thing established than for the administration of justice, as saith Herodotus speaking of the Medes; and Cicero likewise of the Ro∣mans;* 1.1281 as also we read that the first kings of Greece, Aeacus, Mi∣nos, and Radamanthus had no title more honorable then the title of Iudges; who for [ G] they with great equity administred iustice, are by the Poets reported to haue obtayned of Iupiter an euerlasting power & office for iudging of the ghosts in hel. And albeit that Homer calleth princes the pastors, or feeders of the people. Yet so it is that the title of Iudges hath long time after him continued in the person of the princes of Athens, who had the soueraigne gouernment for ten yeares. And not onely the princes of the Medes, the Greeks, and Latins, but euen the Generals also, who were as soueraignes amongst the Hebrewes, had no other title then the title of Iudges: And at such time as they demaunded of Samuel (now wearied with age) a king, they ioyned thereunto, that he might iudge them, as other kings did their people: Which showeth suffici∣ently that the principall charge which they had, was to doe iustice themselues in per∣son. [ H] And the principall reason that might moue the princes themselues to iudge the* 1.1282 subiects, is the mutuall obligation which is betwixt the Prince and his subiects: For as the subiect oweth vnto his lord all duety, aide, & obedience; so the Prince also oweth vnto his subiects iustice, guard, & protection: so that the subiects are no more bound to obey the prince, than is the prince to administer vnto them iustice. Neither is it suf∣ficient to haue it done by an other man, as by the Magistrate at the Princes command, seeing that the subiects being commaunded to yeeld their faith and obedience vnto the prince, cannot do it by their Deputies, but onely by themselues in person; and that this obligation betwixt the Prince and the subiect is reciprocall. Howbeit that it is lesse inconuenient that the vassall should giue his faith and homage vnto his Lord [ I] by his deputie, than the Lord to do him iustice by his officer, for that the obeisance of the subiect in this case cannot be called in doubt: whereas the subiect hath no war∣rant that the magistrat or officer shall not suffer himselfe to be by bribes corrupted, which the Prince will not do, who is therefore still aunswerable before God, vnto whom he cannot say that he hath therewith charged the conscience of his Iudges, his owne thereby being not discharged. Besides that it much and notably concerneth Commonweales, that they which hold the soueraignty should themselues doe iustice: that is to wit, the vnion and amitie of the Princes with the subiects, which cannot bet∣ter be nourished and maintained than by the communion of one of them with the o∣ther, which is lost, and brought to nought, when the Princes do nothing but by their [ K] magistrats and officers: For so it seemeth vnto the subiects that their princes disdaine and contemne them, a thing vnto them more grieuous than if the prince should him selfe doe them wrong; and so much the more heauy, as a contumelie or disgrace is* 1.1283 more hardly to be borne, than is a simple wrong or iniurie. Whereas to the con∣trarie when the subiects see their Prince to present him selfe in person vnto them to do them iustice, they go away halfe contented, albeit that they haue not that which they desired, or at least wise they will say, The king hath seene our request, he hath heard our difference, he hath taken the paines to iudge our cause. And if so be that the sub∣iects

be by their king seene, heard, or vnderstood, it is almost incredible, how much [ A] they are rauished with contentment and pleasure, if the Prince be neuer so little vertu∣ous, or haue any other commendable qualitie in him. Besides that there is no greater meane to giue authoritie vnto his Magistrats and officers, and to cause iustice it selfe to be both feared and reuerenced, than to see the king him selfe sitting in his regall throne to do his subiects iustice. Moreouer the Magistrats often times doe wrong and iniu∣rie vnto the subiects by standing vpon the nice clauses, words, and sillables of the law, which they dare not passe, as being bound and subiect thereunto. And in case that they make any conscience to iudge according to the strictnesse of the law, they must yet first send their reasons vnto the Prince, and attend his aunswere, and exposition of his Edicts and lawes made according vnto the opinion and aduise of his other officers, [ B] who will often times see the suters purses bothom; in such sort as that many sutes liue longer than the parties and suters them selues, yea and some times are for euer suspen∣ded. Whereas if the Prince him selfe in person shall vouchsafe to iudge the matter, he which is the liuing law, and aboue all ciuill lawes, being accompanied with his Counsell shall doe both good and speedie iustice, as hauing respect vnto the verie ground and equitie of the matter, without farther standing vpon titles and formali∣ties. By this meanes also so many oppositions, appeales, ciuill requests, remouing of causes, infinite decrees, one of them vpon an other, which make sutes immortall, should cease, and iustice without stay or let take course, no appeal being to be made from the Prince. Ioyning hereunto also that the Commonweale should so be relie∣ued [ C] of the great charges and wages which it alloweth vnto Iudges, and of their parti∣cular fees which are aboue measure heauie; besides the bribes and presents which must be giuen, which often times passe the ordinarie fees, in such sort as that the subiects in steed of hauing good and speedie iustice (which the Prince oweth them) are constrai∣ned to paie for it as for the most precious thing in the world: howbeit that oftentimes it happeneth, that the marchant is well paid, and yet the marchandise by him deliuered is right little or nothing worth. And yet there is another verie considerable point al∣so: which is, That the parties contending are sometimes great and honourable, as that they would neuer answere before many judges, in discredit for their vnworthinesse, ini∣quitie, [ D] or other like qualitie, whereby it oftentimes commeth to passe, that they end their suits and differences by combats and dynt of sword: whereas the Prince in pre∣sence might euen with the twinkling of his eye set them agreed. And were it that no other greater profit were thereby to come vnto the Commonweale, then that the prince by vse and exercise of iudgement should haue the force of right and iustice throughly engrafted in his mind; what greater or better thing could there bee wished of almightie God either for the prince or for the subiects, than that hee might most cu∣riously and seriously learne daily to administer iustice? The knowledge of other artes and sciences, which is it selfe a thing most royall, and so most proper vnto kings. For as for the knowledge of armes, and of martiall affaires, it is well fitting a Prince against his enemies, whereas iustice is most necessarie for him at all times, and in all places, [ E] whether it be in peace or warre.

But not to rest altogether vpon reason and arguments, we will also vse the examples* 1.1284 herein of the most wise and noble princes. VVhat man was there amongst men to be in wisedome compared with Salomon? And yet we read, That the onely prayer that he made vnto God, was to obtaine wisedome wherewith rightly to iudge his people, which his prayer was so acceptable vnto God, as that he seemed therefore most plenti∣fully, and to the great worlds wonder, to haue powred out vpon him all the treasures both of wisedome and of knowledge; that so all men might vnderstand God not one∣ly

to haue inspired him with wisdome, but also that the office of right iudgement was [ F] euen by God himselfe giuen vnto kings; who was also for experience in great affaires and politike wisedome like vnto the Great Augustus? And yet neuerthelesse wee read that he without ceasing was still busied in the administration of iustice, insomuch that euen when he was sicke, he caused himselfe to bee carried in his horselitter to doe iu∣stice. Howbeit that that was the ordinarie vacant time of the Roman emperours, who for the administration of iustice were commended aboue all the princes of the world,* 1.1285 euen so farre, as that a poore old woman to whom the Great emperour Adrian refused to aunswere her preferring vnto him a request, excusing himself, That he was not then at leasure, Raigne no longer then (said she) but discharge thee of thy charge thou bearest. Whereunto the emperor hauing not what to answere, presently staid & did her iustice. [ G] Now then if so great a prince (whose empire was bounded with the same bounds that the course of the sunne was, and troubled with so great affaires) acknowledged the bond, To doe his subiect iustice: what ought they then to doe which hold but the scantlings of that great empire? Ought not euerie one of them to enforce himselfe in his owne person, and to studie with all his power, how to imploy himselfe for the do∣ing of iustice? considering that (as Plinie the yonger saith) there is no more noble Phi∣losophie, than to entreat of the publike affaires, and to doe iustice, putting in practise that which the Philosophers haue taught.

Now if the knowledge of that which is right, and the administration of iustice, bring so many & so great profits vnto princes; how much greater shal the same then be, if they [ H] * 1.1286 shall by themselues handle but those things onely which are proper vnto their soue∣raigntie? For as for the rest of the ciuill affaires, a prince may well commit them vnto the magistrats: but the rights of soueraigntie, and the deciding of them, hee can in no wise put off, but together with the soueraigntie it self. Surely they are verie blind, deafe, and dumbe, which neuer but by other mens eies see, and by other mens eares heare, and by another mans tongue, and that oftentimes a straunge tongue also, speake and talke of such things as are theirs, and most proper vnto themselues. Now wee haue before shewed also, not by the examples of straunge nations onely, but euen by the examples of our auncestours also, the idle slothfulnesse of kings, who committed the mannaging of all their affairs vnto their domesticall seruants, to haue thereby brought both them∣selues [ I] and their posteritie vnto destruction.

These arguments and reasons thus by vs before alleaged, make a faire show vnto them who sufficiently vnderstand not, nor by experience know not, the secrets of soue∣raigntie,* 1.1287 and hidden knowledge for the maintaining of maiestie: But vnto me looking neerer into the matter, they are not sufficient to resolue this question, nor to maintaine, That a prince ought in person himselfe to administer iustice: Yea vnto mee it seemeth not onely not necessarie, but not profitable vnto the subiects, the prince himselfe to bee vnto them the minister of iustice. True it is, that for them so to do, it should bee not onely profitable, but euen necessarie also, if the princes were themselues such as Scy∣lax faigned vnto himselfe the kings of the Indians to be; that is to say, so much better [ K] than their subiects, as the gods are aboue men. For what can bee more glorious or more royall, than to see a prince by himselfe in the open sight of the people with great integritie and vprightnesse iudge and decide causes, to giue rewards vnto such as haue well deserued of the Commonweale, and to inflict punishment vpon the wicked and offendors. For he must needs be a good and wise man himselfe, which is not deligh∣ted but in the companie of good and wise men: and he must needs excell in integritie and iustice, who himselfe with great equitie administreth iustice. But shall we therfore say, that vitious princes ought to thrust themselues into the sight, and so to communi∣cat

their vices vnto their subiects? the least vice in a prince being like vnto a canker in [ A] a faire face: and so to doe, what were it els, than in the sight of the people to set vp an example of vice, to lead men, to draw them, yea & euen to enforce them to be naught? For there is nothing more naturall, than for the subiects to conforme themselues vnto* 1.1288 the manners, vnto the doings and sayings of their prince; there being neither gesture, action, nor countenance in him, be it good or bad, which is not marked, or counterfai∣ted by them which see him, hauing their eyes, their sences, and all their spirits, wholy bent to the imitation of him. So that Plinie well called the princes life a Perpetual Cen∣sorship, whereunto we still direct and conforme our selues. And this is a doctrine from most auntient antiquitie deliuered vnto all posteritie, first by the maister of wisedome himselfe, and after by Plato, Cicero, Liuie, and Cassiodore, repeated as an infallible rule, [ B] That such as the prince of a Commonweale is, such will the people also be. Yea Theodoric king of the Gothes, writing vnto the Senat of Rome, passeth further, vsing these words, Facilius est errare raturam, quam dissimilem sui princeps possit Rempublicam formare, An easier thing it is (said he) for nature to chaunge her course, than for a prince to frame a Commonweale vnlike vnto himselfe. And though examples need not in so plaine a matter, yet we haue seene king Francis the first, in this realme, and Mansor, surnamed the Great, emperour of Affrike and Spaine, who both two in diuers times, and in diuers places, began to haue learning and learned men in estimation; when suddenly the prin∣ces, the nobilitie, the cleargie, yea euen the souldiors and artificers, with all the people in general, gaue themselues so to learning, as that there was neuer found so great a num∣ber [ C] of learned men in all languages, and in all sciences, as in their time. Seeing therefore* 1.1289 that the princes example is of so great force and power for the conforming and chaun∣ging of his subiects manners, either to good or bad; great heed is to bee taken, that the prince, except he be by nature wel, and by education better framed and instructed, come not much abroad for the people to behold and imitat: but if he be euill & wicked, then by all meanes to be as a popular and common plague kept out of the sight of his sub∣iects. Yet haply some man may say, That an euill prince should not therefore abstaine or withdraw himselfe from publike affaires, or from the iudgement place or Senat; for that no man was so bad, but that he hath in him some vertues or commendable quali∣tie; or which cannnot at leastwise dissemble some of his vices: of which his vertues & [ D] vices, his subiects may make choyce, in such sort as that they may easily decline the one, and embrace the other. But in mine opinion and iudgement, they will rather imi∣tate* 1.1290 his vices, than his vertues: and so much the rather, by how much the corrupt na∣ture of man is more prone and enclined vnto vice than vnto vertue; as also for that there is but one most strait way which leadeth vnto vertue, wheras on both sides there are innumerable crooked by-wayes and turnings vnto vice, whereinto they may more easily fall, than into the straight and right way of vertue. In Alexander the Great were many most rare and heroicall vertues, yet so it was, that he greatly blemished the beautie of them, as also of his other noble acts, by an euill custome that hee had to bee drunke; wherein he tooke such delight, as that hee propounded a talent as a prize vn∣to [ E] * 1.1291 him which could drinke most: in which beastly contention and strife fortie toge∣ther with him which had gained the prize burst and perished; hee himselfe almost loo∣king on. Mithridates also king of Amasia, imitating of Alexander the Great herein, surpassed him, that hauing set vp a prize for him that could eat and drinke most, hee (as Plutarch saith) gained the foule victorie in both (if to bee ouercome of intemperance and excesse be to be accounted at all a victorie.) But to counterfeit vertues, or to dis∣semble vices, as it hath alwayes seemed a most hard thing vnto all men, so hath it especi∣ally vnto princes, for that they of all others haue least learned to commaund their de∣sires,

to restraine their lusts, to bridle their affection, which he that knoweth not how [ F] * 1.1292 to do, shall neuer be a good or cunning dissembler. Dionysius the younger moued with the fame and vertue of Plato, caused him to be sent for vnto Syracusa, who had no soo∣ner begun to tast of the wisedome, vertue, and learning of the man, but that in a mo∣ment all minstrels, players, drunkards, bauds, harlots, and such like, were quite vanished out of the princes sight, and the court so suddenly chaunged, as if it had bene from hea∣uen inspired. But for that Dionysius had but chaunged his countenance, & not his mind, and cast out the allurements of pleasures, but not pleasures themselues; hee could not long dissemble his vices, eithes yet e•…•…dure Plato, who was no sooner gone out of the court, and disembarqued out of Sicilie, but that the prince forthwith returned vnto his woonted vices, by him before for a while forborne, but not quite forsaken: at which [ G] verie instant minstrels, dauncers, harlots, bauds, and such other vermine of the court, which had before bene driuen out were againe recalled. So much power the prince hath at his pleasure to chaunge and turne the harts of his subiects, but alwayes rather vnto vices and vanities, than vnto vertues. But I doe more willingly remember our own domesticall examples than others; king Francis the elder, for the healing of a wound he had receiued in his head, caused his head to be polled, when suddenly after all his houshold seruants, all the princes, all the nobilitie, the magistrats, the artificers, and people of all sorts in generall, caused their heads to be from that time forward pol∣led also, insomuch that if any did from thenceforth vse the old fashion, and account it an vndecent thing to be polled, he was therefore of all men derided: whereas before [ H] from the beginning of this kingdome, it had alwayes bene the marke of the kings, nei∣ther was it lawfull for any but for the nobilitie and Senators, to weare long haire: all the rest of the meaner sort being befor compelled to poll themselues as slaues, vntil that Peter Lombard bishop of Paris (for the power and authoritie which bishops then had aboue kings) obtained, That it might be lawful for the common people to weare long haire also. True it is, that the flatterers of princes helpe much to conforme the maners and fashions of the people vnto those of the princes, they still rather counterfeiting than imitating euen the vices and defects of the prince, whome if they see laugh, they laugh also, although they know no cause why; if he be lame, they halt downe right al∣so. Alexander the Great, and Alphonsus king of Aragon, beeing both wrie necked, [ I] the one by nature, and the other by custome, the courtly curres to counterfeit that their deformitie, held their neckes also awry; as the Courtier, and Plutarch in the life of Pyr∣rhus writeth. Seeing therefore the nature of man is enclined to follow the vice of the prince, were it not euen to vndoe a people, and to ruinat an estate, to thrust still into the sight of the people a prince euill brought vp; and a pottraitor of vices for them to imi∣tat? And yet it is more daungerous for that for one vice which the prince hath, often∣times those of his traine haue an hundred, who euerie where as they passe, may alter & marre the good disposition of the people; or like swarmes of flies & caterpillers, who hauing deuoured the leaues, and fruit, do also leaue their spaune behind them, able to insect the fields and trees be they neuer so cleane and fruitfull. [ K]

But suppose we the prince not to be vitious (a rare gift, and by the goodnes of God giuen vnto men, when as in euerie age a tollerable prince is scarcely to bee found) but to be of great vertue and perfection, yea euen a man without fault (howbeit that there is a great space betwixt them which are endued with vertues, and them which are with∣out vices) yet is it almost a thing impossible, but that some thing shall at one time or other fall from him, which wel noted may seeme vnto the people foolish or rediculous: wherein much is derogated from the reputation and dignitie which the subiects ought to haue of him. But let vs suppose that also, him to be neither a man euill giuen, nor

foolish; neither yet so to seeme, but to be a man endued with great vertues, and of good [ A] * 1.1293 education; yet so it is that too ordinarie conuersation, and too great familiaritie of the subiects with the prince▪ much diminisheth his maiestie, and withall engendreth a cer∣taine contempt of him: of which contempt proceedeth the disobedience of the sub∣iects vnto him and his commaunds, to the ruine of the whole estate. And now againe to the contrarie, if the prince to maintaine his maiestie shall ordinarily show himselfe vnto his subiects, in his greatnesse, with a terrible port, it may be that so hee may bee the more of them redoubted: but it is daungerous least he should be therefore the lesse lo∣ued. Whereas the loue of subiects towards their soueraigne is much more necessarie for the preseruation of an estate, than is feare; and so much the more, for that loue can∣not be without feare to offend him whome wee loue; whereas feare may well be, and [ B] most often is without any loue at all, men commonly hating him whome they feare, and as occasion serueth still seeking to take him out of the way.

And truely vnto me more deepely considering of the matter, almightie God (the* 1.1294 soueraigne prince of the whole world) seemeth to haue shewed a short way vnto worldly princes (the true images of himselfe) how they are to communicat them∣selues vnto their subiects, to be of them both beloued and feared: For the communica∣teth himselfe vnto men but by visions and dreames, and that but to a few of the elect & most perfect of them also, men of great integritie of life. But when hee with his owne voyce published the Ten Commaundements, he caused his fire to bee seene heauens high, and the mountaines to tremble with thunder and lightning, with such a dreadfull [ C] sound of trumpets, that the people strucken with feare, and falling flat vpon their faces, besought him, That hee would no more from thenceforth speake vnto them himselfe (for that otherwise they should all die) but onely to commaund such things as he plea∣sed by his seruant Moyses. So that that people of all others most chosen, had but once almightie God (who sheweth himselfe but in spirit to be seene) himselfe sounding forth his lawes; when as yet for all that to allure men the more feruently to loue him, hee at all times, and in all places and countries, doth with great loue, and eternall bountie, fo∣ster and cherish all mankind, yea indeed all sort of liuing creatures, powring continual∣ly vpon them his great and infinit fauours, larges, and bountie. If therefore the wise [ D] prince ought in mannaging of his subiects, to imitate the wisedom of God in the go∣uernment of the world, he must but seldome times come into the sight of his subiects, and that with such a state and maiestie, as best agreeth with his wisedome, power, and greatnesse, and yet make choice of some few most wise and worthy men, with whome to communicat his secret councels, and by them to declare his will and pleasure vnto the rest, and yet incessantly to heape vpon his subiects his graces and fauours; & with great wisedome and power to protect and defend them against their enemies. In the booke De Mundo (or of the world) dedicated to Alexander the Great (and without cause ascribed to Aristotle, as sauouring nothing of his stile) a comparison is made of a soueraigne prince vnto God; as that the great king of Persia was stil resiant in a proud and stately pallace or castle, compassed in with three high walles, full of all pleasures [ E] and delights, neuer sturring abroad, or shewing & acquainting himselfe but with some few of his friends; who yet neuerthelesse by fiers and watches set vpon high places, stil in one day vnderstood and knew all the enemies of his empire, euen from the farthest parts of the East Indies, vnto the straits of Hellespontus. And yet neuer was there any princes vnder heauen more honoured and reuerenced, or better beloued of their sub∣iects than they: or whose commaunds were more iust vnto their subiects, or more of their subiects regarded, or that longer preserued their empire, power, and state. So those princes also which giue themselues ouer, and became slaues vnto their vaine pleasures

and delights, most commonly vsed to withdraw themselues from the sight of the mul∣titude [ F] into some secret places, that so they might at more libertie glut themselues with all kind of pleasures. For so Tiberius Caesar of all others the most cunning dissembler, made choyce of a most desert island, wherein he for many yeres liued in all kind of vo∣luptuous and beastly pleasures. Which was of him right filthily done, but yet more wisely than they who with the most odious smell of their loathsome pleasures pollute and defile as well publike as priuat places: who besides that they offend more by gi∣uing of euill example than by the wickednesse it selfe by them committed, doe also in the minds and conceits of men engender a neglect and contempt of themselues.

Wherefore a prince that wise is, so oft as he should show himselfe vnto the people* 1.1295 (which he should most seldome do) should so prepare himselfe, as that he may vnto all [ G] men seeme euen in his face and countenance to carry with him a certaine state and ma∣iestie, yet still mixt with modestie, but especially in his speech, which should alwaies be maiesticall and sententious, and in the manner of phrase, something different from the vulgar. Which if it shall seeme something hard for the prince to performe, or that he haue not the grace of speaking, it is best for him to speake little, or els altogether to be silent: For that we know men in so great matters, as to contemne, or feare; to hate, or loue; to be stil no lesse with opinion, than with any certaine reason, led & moued there∣unto. For if the prouerbe of the wise Hebrew be true, That the foole himselfe in holding his peace is accounted wise, how circumspect and aduised ought a prince to be, when hee openeth his mouth to speake in publike place? considering that his words, his coun∣tenance, [ H] and lookes, are oftentimes accounted and esteemed of as lawes, oracles, and decrees. Wherein Tiberius the emperour, least he should in any thing offend, brought in a new fashion, as to be spoke vnto, and also to giue aunswere by writing, for what matter soeuer it was, Moris erat (saith Tranquillus) eo tempore principem etiam presen∣tem scripto adire, The manner (saith he) at that time was, with writing to goe vnto the prince euen then present; to the end that nothing might escape which had not before bene well thought vpon. For it is not possible but that they which speake much in open assemblies, as in the Senat, or before the people, must many times erre: which done by a prince, shall breed contempt, or at leastwise cause him to bee the lesse estee∣med: so that a Grecian (I wot not who) not vnfitly said, That a prince if hee bee wise [ I] should vnto the people, or in open audience no otherwise speake, than hee would doe in a Tragedie.

But I know that some of contrary opinion vnto mine, wil say, Is it not the true estate and office of a prince, to doe iustice vnto his people? to heare the complaints of his subiects? to see the requests of his own? and by the mouth of euery one to vnderstand of their iust grieuances, which are commonly suppressed, or at leastwise disguised by another man? And why then should the prince hide himselfe from his people? talke but with few, and those of his most inward friends also? or aunswere nothing vnto ma∣ny, of right asking him of many things? yea not to be willing so much as to heare his subiects speake? Things altogether absurd, and not beseeming the maiestie of a soue∣raigne [ K] prince. Whereunto I say, that mine opinion is not, that he should so hide him∣selfe, as not at all to show himselfe; as the kings yet doe euen at this present in the East Indies, and namely the king of Borney, who speaketh not vnto any but vnto his wife* 1.1296 and children; neither is seene of any, but still speaketh vnto others by one of his gen∣tlemen through an hole by a reed or cane which he holdeth in his mouth, as he did vn∣to the king Catholike (as we read in the histories of the Indies:) but my meaning is,* 1.1297 that he should not be much in the assemblies of the people, neither easie to bee spoke withall of all men, not to vse much discourse with his subiects, except with such as are

neere vnto him, or of his familiar acquaintance; not to take pleasure in iests and taunts, [ A] in play, or other publike exercise: For that by such things the princes maiestie and re∣putation, which ought by all meanes to be whole and vntouched, is greatly impaired and lightned: and so much the more, by how▪ much the prince is of greater estate and maiestie: whereunto good and especiall regard is alwayes to be had. For it were not seemely for a pettie prince in his estate to counterfeit the great kings of Aethiopia, of Tartarie, of Persia, or of Turkie, who suffer not their subiects so much as to looke di∣rectly vpon them, neither are so much of them redoubted and feared for their power, as for the maiesty that they hold when they show themselues vnto their subiects. How∣beit that the kings of Affrike hold yet this maiestie more, as in the historie of Francis D' Aluarez is to be seene, where hee speaketh of the maiestie of the Great Negus, [ B] whome we call Prester Iohn: and in the historie of Leo of Affrike, where hee speaketh of the king of Tombut, before whome his subiects appeare not, but vpon their knees, with dust vpon their heads.

Now if any man shall say, That the kings of the East, and of the South are thus to be honoured, for that their subiects are of an abiect and a seruile nature; but that they of the North, or of the West, whose subiects be of greater courage, are not able to endure such a seruitude and slauerie: this shall be in due place decided, as also what the nature of euerie region is: and yet for all that I see the kings of England, Sweden, Den∣marke, and Polonia, who are situat toward the North, much better to maintaine the maiestie of their estates with their subiects, than doe the kings of Fraunce, or the [ C] princes of Italie; and the kings of Moscouia yet better than all the rest, and yet are not therefore the lesse, but well the more of their subiects obeyed.

Now the greatest daunger that can come vnto a prince, to doe all by others, is, least* 1.1298 that they vpon whome he should so discharge himselfe, should take from him his estate and soueraigntie, and so possesse themselues thereof: which for al that hath neuer chan∣ced in this realme, but onely vnder king Childeric, surnamed the Loutish▪ since the time that the kings of Fraunce showed themselues vnto their subiects in their maiestie but once a yeare, viz. the first of May; as we read in our owne histories, and also in Cedri∣nus a Greeke author, who saith, That the auntient kings of Fraunce tooke no other pleasure but to eat and drinke, leauing the mannaging of all their affaires vnto the great [ D] Master of the Pallace. But we must not draw into consequence the example of one king bereft of sence, to ground a maxime of state vpon. Yet is there well one meane to meet with that inconuenience, which is, That the prince for one lieutenant, or for one great Maister of the Pallace, should haue two or three in power and fauour equall: For in so doing he shall neuer be circumuented, their power being so diminished, one of them still bewraying or controlling the other, the kings maiestie being so still the more stately and sure. For Tiberius hauing made Seianus too great; and so Commo∣dus, Perennius; Theodosius the second, Eutropius; Iustinian, Bellisarius; Xerxes, Artae∣banus; and Childeric, Pepin: committing vnto them alone the mannaging of all their affaires, with the guard of their persons, they fell into the daungers which wee spake of, [ E] being in hazard of their estates.

As for the administration of iustice, and the hearing of the complaints and griefes of* 1.1299 the subiects, it shall be alwayes better prouided by good and sufficient magistrats, than by the prince in person himselfe. For who knoweth not so many good parts to bee requisit in a good judge, as are not all well to be found in the most sufficient prince in the world? Yea who knoweth not so many things to bee within the compasse of the duetie of a good judge, as may ouerslip and escape euen the most skilfull and carefull men? whereof many must needs escape the prince before he can perceiue them, and

so many times the verie substance of the matter consisteth in that which is ouerslipped. [ F] And if one shall say, that the prince may haue about him both wise and learned coun∣cellors, according to whose aduise and councell he may determine of matters, and so giue iudgement; such as Augustus, Traian, Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, Alexander Seue∣rus, and the other Roman emperours are reported to haue had: who were alwaies ac∣companied with most worthy and excellent personages: truly that seemed not so hard a matter vnto the Roman princes, so brought vp and so enured thereunto, but now we liue after another manner and fashion. And who is there that seeth not, not onely the prince not to be able to endure so many dilatory pleas, so many slights of the lawyers, so many shifts of the plaintifes; such petitions and outcries of such as run from court to to court? but not euen the magistrats themselues without incredible tediousnesse to be [ G] able to endure the same? all which yet they must deuoure. Yea the prince is not able himselfe to conceiue all such things as are the greatest and of most importance in the Commonweale, and how then shall he alone suffice to decide and determine so many suits and causes? But if hee shall take that charge in hand, and not well and orderly dis∣charge the same, in stead of doing of the subiects right, hee shall doe them great iniurie and wrong. Wherein Demetrius (he which was called the Besieger) hath for iust cause beene blamed: who hauing receiued a great number of his subiects requests, put them into the lap of his mantle, and at the first bridge he came vnto, whereby hee was to passe ouer a riuer, shooke them all into the water: Wherof the subiects seeing them∣selues by him contemned, conceiued a mutuall hatred against him, so that shortly after [ H] he was forsaken of his armie, which yeelded it selfe to Pyrrhus together with the king∣dome, which he so gained without battell. Besides that in this course taken, we should be alwaies driuen to haue recourse vnto the commissioners for instructions: and after∣wards vnto the prince for iudgement of the cause: howbeit that it is sometimes hard, and oftentimes pernitious also, to seperat the instructions of the matter from the iudge∣ment.

But suppose that the prince were at leisure, and that hee both could and would see,* 1.1300 heare, and iudge all the causes of his people, yet were it a thing not beseeming the ma∣iestie of a king to make such an ordinarie confusion of his court, where beside the sub∣tilties, the countenances and fauours, (not there subiect to enquirie) and the contraritie [ I] of letters, commissions, decrees, and prouisions, which are there dispatched vnder the name (but without the knowledge) of the prince, whereof colour is oftentimes made for the doing of wrong: it is yet moreouer insupportable for the subiects, vnto whome iustice is due in the places where they are, to search for the same at the court, and to fol∣low the prince still remouing from place to place; where it were better for them some∣times to loose their right, than with so great charge to follow the suit. Besides that the most honorable and worthy causes for a prince that wil himselfe intermedd•…•…e in iudge∣ments, are the causes concerning life and honor: who shall be the accusers? who would fall into so great charges to sue the matter in the court? and into the daunger to bee slaine by the accused, if the prince should pardon the fault. For when princes vse scarce∣ly [ K] at any time to condemne the guiltie parties, but doe oftentimes pardon and restore such as be alreadie condemned: by this meanes should ensue not onely no punishment of offences, but euen the greatest impunitie of the offendors: than which there is no more certaine token of a Commonweale in short time about to perish. Wherewith to meet, secret accusations haue bene brought in and admitted by an auntient edict of Conan king of Scots, which is at this day in vse in Scotland, and called the Indict: and yet is better prouided for by the ordinance of Milan (which well deserueth to bee reli∣giously kept in euerie Commonweale) where in euerie towne there is a chest with an

hole in it, in euery principall church, whereof the gouernours haue the key, wherein∣to [ A] it is lawfull for euery one secretly to put his bill of accusation against any man; wher∣in the crime committed, the time, the place, the partie guiltie, and the witnesses, are all of them comprised, with the reward of the moitie of the confiscation allowed vnto the accuser. Which is an easie way for the punishing of offences before ordinarie judges; a thing impossible to prosecute before the prince. For these reasons and the difficulties by vs noted, Tiberius the emperour hauing obtained the empire, protested in the full Senat, and afterwards by his letters made it knowne vnto the officers, That hee would take vppon him nothing which belonged vnto the iurisdiction of the ma∣gistrats;* 1.1301 for that it was more that was required of a prince, than of a magistrat. Nei∣ther ought it to seeme vnto any man straunge, why the office to iudge and decide mat∣ters, [ B] proper vnto the auntient kings, should now belong vnto the magistrats? for that when people as yet had no lawes, but that the kings power and will was accounted for law, it was then needfull for subiects causes to bee iudged by the princes: but after that lawes were once established, according vnto which the magistrat was bound to iudge, and due punishment by them appointed for offences, and rewards vnto such as had well deserued; that necessitie was taken away, and translated from the princes vnto the judges.

But here some man may say, That a prince may be so wise, so iust, and so full of vn∣derstanding,* 1.1302 as that he will giue no iudgement but such as is agreeable vnto equitie and [ C] reason; and the compasse of his territorie so strait, as that hee may himselfe suffice to iudge and determine all the suits of his subiects, as there bee diuers such princes in the Low countries, in Germanie, & especially in Italie: In this case should it not be a good∣ly and a profitable thing for the Commonweale, the prince himselfe there to admini∣ster iustice? If thou aske me what mine opinion is therein, I thinke it not profitable ei∣ther for that so blessed a prince, either for those his so happie citisens or subiects, or him in person himself to sit in iudgement; not for that the subiects do so much loue and ho∣nour the maiestie of their prince, as not to dare freely enough to speake their minds, and to cause him to vnderstand their right; neither for that they could hardly haue ac∣cesse vnto him, for the multitude of causes which he should still haue before him, ha∣uing [ D] opened this gap: but euen for that nothing is so proper vnto a prince, as clemen∣cie; nothing vnto a king, as mercie; nothing vnto maiestie, as lenitie. And therefore the emperor Titus (a man of so great courtesie, as that he was called Humani generis de∣litias, or the myrror of mankind) gladly took vpon him the office of the great bishop, because he would pronounce sentence of death vpon no man, either pollute his hands with mans blood, when as yet some other emperours who were also bishops (though not so religious as he) least of all others abstained from such capitall iudgements of life and death. Now nothing is more contrarie vnto true iustice, than pitie; neither any* 1.1303 thing more repugnant vnto the office and dutie of an vpright judge, than mercie: hee not onely by the ciuill law, but euen by the law of God also being forbidden to haue [ E] pitie (euen of the poore) in iudgement: which we said to be so proper vnto maiestie, as that it cannot be therefrom diuided or seperated. So that a prince sitting in iudgement must take vpon him two contrarie persons, that is to say, of a mercifull father, and of an vpright magistrat; of a most gentle prince, and of an inflexible judge. And if the prince be by nature mild and pitifull, there shall bee none so euill or wicked, who by force of teares and prayers shall not escape the punishment by the law appointed, euen the most cruell men being oftentimes by them ouercome. So we read, that Augustus the great emperour, for wisedome inferiour vnto none, examining a murderer, began in this sort to question with him, I am sure thou hast not killed thy father: in which words he not

onely instructed the guiltie man what he was to aunswere to him both his prince and [ F] judge, but also most courteously gaue him his pardon. Nero also at such time as the condemnation of a man was presented to him to signe, is reported to haue said, Vtinam liter as nescirem, I would to God I knew not letters. And therefore Cicero pleading be∣fore Caesar, before resolued in any wise to haue put Ligarius to death, said, That he plea∣ded not before him as a judge, but as before the father of the people: and hauing some∣what appeased his anger, began thus to presse him farther, Causas, Caesar, egi multas, & quidem tecum, cum te tenuit ratio honorum tuorum, certe nunquam hoc modo; ignoscite iu∣dices: errauit, lapsus est, non putauit, si vnquam posthac: ad parentem sic agi solet, ad iudices, non fecit, non cogitauit, falsi testes, fictum crimen, Dic te Caesar de facto Ligarij iudicem esse &c. Caesar (saith he) I haue pleaded many causes, and that with thee, when thou stoodst [ G] vpon thine honour, but yet neuer pleaded I in this manner: pardon him my lords, he hath erred, he was deceiued, he thought it not, if euer hee shall doe so againe: so men vse to plead before a (soueraigne prince, or a) father: but vnto the judges, we say flatly, He did it not, hee neuer thought it, the crime is forged, the witnesses are false. But say Caesar, thy selfe to be judge of the deed done by Ligarius, &c. And in this sort secretly infinuating vnto Caesar, that he ought not to bee a judge, holding the place of a soue∣raigne: and afterwards highly commending Caesar his noble acts, his valour and his clemencie, moued him so much, as that he chaunged both his colour and countenance, and was in such a sort rauished, as that he could not heare the one halfe of the oration (the shortest of all them that Cicero left in writing) but that he graunted more vnto the [ H] guiltie man than euer he hoped for. If then Caesar himselfe, one of the greatest orators that euer was (euen in the iudgement of his capitall enemie Cicero) and one of the most valiant and wisest men of his time, was so ouercome by the force of eloquence, pardoning him whome he deadly hated, and had before resolued to put to death: what shall the lesse circumspect prince do, be he neuer so little enclined vnto pitie? how shall he be able to endure the filed speech of an eloquent aduocat? the pititious complaints of poore old men? the cries and sighes of distressed women? the weeping and wayling of little children? King Agesilaus a most famous prince of his time, ouercome by the importunat requests of a friend, writ vnto the judges, requesting them, That if the par∣tie accused, in whose behalfe he writ, were not guiltie, hee should bee acquited by the [ I] equitie of his cause: but if he were lawfully conuict, hee should yet neuerthelesse bee for Agesilaus his sake discharged, and so in any case acquited. But O how many should escape the penaltie of the lawes, if judges in such cases should hearken not one∣ly vnto the princes secret letters, but euen vnto their letters pattents also: and then what may wee deeme that a prince himselfe would doo? Wherefore himselfe in per∣son to sit in iudgement, beseemeth not the maiestie of a soueraigne prince.

But now if it bee so hard for a prince in this case not to erre and bee deceiued, then* 1.1304 how much more hard is it in a Popular estate, where the people suffer themselues to bee deceiued and led away with faire words, as a man may see almost in all the accu∣sations made both in Athens and Rome, when the people giue sentence; where the [ K] innocent were condemned, and the guiltie acquited: of examples whereof all the hi∣stories are full. As Seruius Galba a great oratour, accused, attainted, and condem∣ned of treason befor the people of Rome; not hauing any more to say for himselfe, but turning his speech and action, wholly framed to the mouing of pitie; and so em∣bracing his children, and with teares commending them vnto the people, so moued the beholders, as that he easily obtained pardon, and so escaped. Whereupon Cato the elder, who had accused him, said That had not Galba abused his children and his teares, hee had beene well whipt. Whereas other noble and valiant men, who could

neither abuse their prayers nor teares, but bearing themselues vpon their integritie, if [ A] but some lying oratour, or false enformer, had accused them, they were most vniustly condemned. And so oftentimes in like manner not oratours, but flatterers: and that not openly, but secretly, doe with diuers deceits circumuent the prince. And there∣fore the nobilitie of Polonia, by force wrested a priuilege from Lewes king of Polo∣nia and Hungarie: That if question were of any of their liues and honours, they should not bee iudged but by the king himselfe: foreseeing, that so they might easily escape the iudgement of the king, but not the judges, who are bound vnto the stricktnesse of the lawes. And hereupon it is come to passe, that none of the nobili∣tie are euer there condemned to death, what offence soeuer they doe, but alwayes [ B] escape either by fine, or at worst, by beeing kept in prison for the space of a yeare and sixe weekes, which is now there passed into the force and strength of a law, and yet is there obserued and kept; as I haue learned of Zamosche the Polonian ambas∣sadour.

But suppose the prince to bee such an one as is not easily to bee moued vnto pitie or* 1.1305 compassion, yet then is it to bee feared, least hee in iudgement fall into crueltie. For whereas to keepe the meane is to euerie man a right hard thing, so vnto princes it is of all others most difficult, who easily suffer themselues to be carried into the one ex∣tremitie or other. If hee bee a good prince and an embracer of vertue, hee will haue wicked men in extreme horror & detestation, wherwith euen the wisest men are mo∣ued [ C] with a iust anger, and so oftentimes carried away with a cholerike passion. There need no better example than that of Augustus the emperour, who was accounted to bee one of the most wise and vertuous princes that euer was, and at his first sitting in iudgement endured as it were the paine of the condemned: and suffered not lesse (as saith Seneca) than did they themselues which were executed. And yet neuerthelesse this vertuous prince by continuall custome of iudging and condemning such as were conuict before him (as most necessarie it was) became too much rigorous and cruell, suffering himselfe to bee transported with passion and indignation against the wicked: in such sort, that one day sitting in iudgement, and condemning many the accused to di∣uers punishments: his friend Mecenas beeing not able for the preasse to come neere [ D] him, cast a little billet of paper into his bosome, wherein hee called him an Execu∣tioner or Hangman: whereat Augustus suddenly staied, and finding himselfe transpor∣ted with choler, and so to bee too hastie in iudgement, to stay his anger forthwith brake vp the court. And for this cause our fathers haue right wisely ordayned, That the Criminall Chamber of Parliaments should from three monethes to three mo∣nethes still bee chaunged (which for this cause is called Tournelle: for that all the jud∣ges of the other Chambers iudged euerie one of them by turnes, to the intent that the common custome to condemne and put men to death, should not chaunge the natu∣rall mildnesse of the judges, and make them cruell and hard harted. Besides that it is [ E] a verie hard, and almost impossible thing (as saith Theophrastus) that a good and ho∣nest man, should not enter into choller, seeing the most detestable enormities of the wicked, and so sometimes to become as a man euen furious, and as it were out of his wits. So Claudius the emperour hearing one day the plaintife rehearse the great and manifold villanies of one accused, fell into such an outrage, that taking vp a knife which lay before him, hee threw it into the accused mans face, euen in full iudgement. But if the prince which intermedleth himselfe with iudgement bee by nature cruell, he shall then make a butcherie of his court; as did the emperour Caligula, who by one* 1.1306 onely sentence, for diuers crimes condemned fiftie persons, euen vnto the same kind of death, and often tooke pleasure to cut off the heads of many goood men, some∣time

to proue his owne strength, and sometime to proue but the edge of his Cimitar, [ F] If therefore it bee so hard euen for the most wise, to keepe the meane betwixt mildnesse and rigour, which is necessarie for judges, it is not so easily to bee found in princes, who are most commonly extreame in their actions: for the waywardnesse of a priuat man, is indignation in a prince; and the anger of a subiect, is called furie in a king.

But let vs proceed farther, and suppose, that the prince haue the grauitie, the know∣ledge,* 1.1307 the wisedome, the discretion, the experience, the patience, and all other the ver∣tues requisit in a good judge: yet so it is, that he cannot be without daunger, if he shall in person iudge his subiects. For the best and fairest rule for the maintenance of the state of a Monarchy, is, that the prince, if it may be, cause himself to be beloued of al, without [ G] the disdaine or hatred of any. Wherunto to attaine, he hath two means, the one by ap∣pointing due punishment to be inflicted vpon the euill, & the other by giuing deserued rewards vnto the good. And for that the one of them is fauorable, & the other odious, it behoueth the prince that would be loued, to reserue vnto himselfe the bestowing of rewards; which are, estates, honors, offices, benifices, pentions, priuileges, prerogatiues, immunities, exemptions, restitutions, and other graces and fauours, which euery well aduised prince ought himselfe to graunt: but as for condemnations, fines, confiscati∣ons, and other punishments, he is not himselfe to meddle with them, but to commit them vnto his most vpright and wise magistrats, for them to doe good and speedie in∣stice therein. In which doing, they which receiue the benefits, shall haue good cause [ H] to loue, respect, and reuerence the prince their benefactor: and those which are con∣demned, shall yet haue no occasion at all to hate him, but shall still discharge their chol∣ler vpon the magistrats and judges. For why, the prince doing good to euery one, and euill to none, shall be beloued of all, and hated of none: which euen nature hath figu∣red out vnto vs in the king of Bees, who neuer hath sting, least he should hurt any. And albeit that the sacred Scriptures teach vs, all plagues, diseases, calamities, and other worldly chaunces to depend of the wrath of God; yet in this all diuines (which more exactly entreat of diuine matters) wholly agree, none of all these things to bee done by almightie God, as by an efficient cause; but by permission onely, and to bee from him diuided, but as from a not letting cause: which cause the manner of the Hebrew phrase [ I] euerie where signifieth by the word Hiphil, ordinarily vsed, when it speaketh of the vengeance of God. We read also in the Poets (though somewhat otherwise) that Iupiter had three kinds of lightning, which they called Manubias Albas, Rubras, Atras, The first is white, which serueth for aduertisement, but hurteth no man, as proceeding onely from Iupiter, and his friendly aspect vnto the Sunne: For which cause Seneca saith, Id solum fulmen placabile est quod mittit Iupiter, That onely lightning (saith hee) is peaceable which Iupiter sendeth. The other is red, and proceedeth from the aspect of Iupiter vnto the inferiour planets, whome they call the inferiour gods, which hur∣teth and blasteth fruits and beasts, but killeth no man. The third is blacke, and made by the aspect of Iupiter vnto the high planets and the sixe starres (which they call the high [ K] gods) which killeth, ouerthroweth and destroieth whatsoeuer it lighteth vpon. For the Theologie of the auntients belonged vnto the Bishops, the Philosophers, and the Po∣ets, as Marcus Varro witnesseth in the one and twentieth booke of worldly things: wherein they all agreed, That the great God, which they thought to be Iupiter (to speake properly and according to the truth) could not be himselfe augrie, neither hurt nor condemne any man, but all things to be done by meane causes, and the ministerie and power of angels. And therefore the auntient Aegyptians deriued a law euen from

Promethius their law giuer, whereby their kings were not onely forbidden to kill any [ A] man, but euen so much as to behold any execution done; least by such looking on, some print of crueltie should remaine in them the beholders. And this vnto mee see∣meth a great secret of this our kingdome, and a thing of great force for the gaining of the subiects loue and good will towards the prince; all rewards, gifts, honours, offices, charges, and commaunds, comming still from the king: but penalties, and punishments alwaies adiudged and inflicted by the magistrats. For at such time as William Poyet (my countrey man) Chauncellor of Fraunce was accused of treason, and by the enuy of his most gratious enemies circumuented, the king who had receiued the wrong would not himselfe be iudge in the cause, neither so much as be present at the triall; yea when the partie accused had refused all the judges of Paris, it was the kings pleasure, that two [ B] judges, men of great integritie, and free from all corruption, should be called and chosen out of euery court of parliament in Fraunce to try him: Whereby may be vnderstood with what an obseruation of law and iustice this kingdome standeth, when as almost at the same time Thomas Moore Chauncellor of England, and Hierome Moron Chan∣cellor of Milan, both of them accused of treason, had for their judges, one of them euen the verie conspirators themselues, guiltie of the same treason against the prince, and the other his great enemies.

But here haply some man may say, the honour of noble personages to require, that when question is of their liues, their honour, or whole estate, the king himselfe should take vpon him the hearing of the matter. For when the duke of Alencon (Charles the [ C] seuenth his nie kinsman) was accused of treason, the court of parliament answered the king, That hee could not be tryed but in the presence of the king, and of the peeres of Fraunce, without being lawfull for them to appoint their substitutes. In like case vp∣pon councell asked by Lewes the eleuenth, when question was for the triall of Renate of Aniou king of Sicilie, the court gaue the same aunswere, viz. That it could not so* 1.1308 much as giue an interlocutorie decree against a peere of Fraunce, when question was of his honour, except the king himselfe were there present. I say for all that, that this was not for the king to iudge. For why, it is to be proued, that the king in auntient time was not in person himselfe assistant in the iudgement of treason, although it were in the triall of the princes, or of the peeres; as is to be found in the records of the court, a pro∣testation [ D] the third of March 1386, made by the duke of Burgundie, as chiefe peere of Fraunce, against king Charles the sixt, wherein is contained, That the king ought not to be assistant at the iudgement of the king of Nauarre, arraigned of treason; and that so to be, appertained not but onely to the peeres of Fraunce, saying, The like protesta∣tion to haue beene made against king Charles the fift, to the intent hee should not bee present at the triall of the duke of Brittaine: and in case hee would needs passe on far∣ther, and breake the custome of their auncestors, the peeres of Fraunce demaunded in full parliament, That an act of that their protestation might be vnto them decreed, and so afterwards it was enioyned vnto the clarke by a decree of the court, to deliuer vnto the peeres, and to the kings Attourney generall an act of such their protestation. So [ E] also when question was for the triall of the marquesse of Salusse, vnder the raigne of Francis the first, it was by liuely reasons, and by the authoritie of the lawes both of God and man maintained, That the French king could not in that iudgement be assistant, seeing it concerned the confiscation of the marquisat: and albeit that the kings Attour∣ney generall vrging the matter, the king was at the iudgement present, yet gaue hee not sentence, whereby the marquesse was himselfe condemned, and his goods most iustly confiscat, yet that iudgement for al that seemeth vnto many but extorted, and the other princes rested therewith much discontented. So also Alexander the Great would neuer

take vpon him the person of a judge, neither thought it meet to bee assistant in the [ F] iudgement giuen against Philotas, Calisthenes, and others which conspired against his person, least he should so seeme to haue terrified the judges, or to haue taken from* 1.1309 them the free power of iudging: as we read in Quintus Curtius. For if it bee contrarie vnto the law of nature, that the partie should be judge also; & That the king is a partie in all causes which concerne either the publike or his owne proper patrimonie in parti∣cular, in which case he cannot be a judge; by a much stronger reason ought the same to take place in the offence of treason, and especially in the chiefe point, where questi∣on is, the partie accused to haue attempted the honour or life of his prince. And for this cause Lewes the ninth would not pronounce sentence at the iudgement of Peter Mauclere duke of Britaine, albeit that hee was there present when the iudgement was [ G] giuen; neither likewise at the iudgement of Thomas earle of Flaunders. Neither yet Philip the Long the French king, in the cause of Robert earle of Flaunders attainted of treason. Yea that more is, the decrees or sentences are giuen in the name of the peers, and not in the name of the king, albeit that he were himselfe there present: as is to bee seene in the sentence giuen against Robert earle of Flaunders, which beginneth thus, Nos pares Franciae ad requestam & mandatum regis venimus in suam curiam Parisijs & tenuimus curiàm cum xij alijs personis, &c. Wee the peeres of Fraunce at the request and commaundement of the king came into his court at Paris, and with twelue other persons held court. The sentence also against Peter Mauclere, whereby the fee of the countie of Britaine was taken from him, is giuen by one archbishop, two bishops, eight [ H] earles, Mathew Montmorancie the vicount of Beaumont, and Iohn of Soissons, concei∣ued in these words, Notum facimus quod nos coram clarissimo domino nostro Ludouico re∣ge Franciae iudicauimus, &c. We make it knowne, that we before our most noble lord Lewes king of Fraunce haue iudged, &c. By which words it appeareth that the king, al∣beit that he was present, yet gaue not sentence, no not euen in trials concerning soue∣raigntie. So also we may see in the case of the succession of Alphonsus countie of Poi∣tiers, although there were but question of the demaine, the king yet neuerthelesse gaue not therein his opinion or iudgement. Neither in like sort did king Francis, howbeit that he was present at the iudgement of Charles of Burbon the constable attainted of treason▪ And that more is, when question was of the fealtie and homage which the [ I] counties of Champagne ought to doe vnto the king, it was iudged by the peeres of Fraunce, and many earles, the king the present, not to iudge, but to assist them: the forme of which sentence is yet found in these words conceiued, Iudicatum est a paribus regni, videlicet a Rhemensi Archiepiscopo, & Lingonensi, Guillielmo Catalaunensi, Ph. Be∣luacensi, Stephano Nouiomensi episcopis, & Odone duce Burgundiae, & alijs episcopis, & ba∣ronibus, &c. Nobis audientibus & iudicium approbantibus &c. Now if the prince ought to doubt to iudge the causes of his subiects, where it concerneth but their particular, and wherein he himselfe can haue no interest, to the end not to giue occasion of discon∣tentment to them whome he should condemne, whether it were right or wrong, but ought still to maintaine himselfe in the loue and vnitie of his owne people, as in a most [ K] stately and strong tower: then how much more ought he so to doe, when hee is him∣selfe a partie, or the causes capitall, as for rebellion or treason? I remember, that in the triall of Charles duke of Burbon, one Valier examined in the tower of Loches, by the president de Selua, and the bishop of Puy, and other the conspiratours examined at Tarrare by Iohn Brinon president of Roan, deposed, That the occasion which caused the duke to rebell, was the aunswere that king Francis made vnto the articles which the duke had sent vnto the court of parliament, concerning the suit he had against the king and the regent, concerning certaine lands and demaines which the duke claimed as be∣longing

vnto himselfe. Wherein had not the king in any sort medled, but left it all [ A] together vnto his judges and attourneies, he had not giuen occasion to so great a sub∣iect to haue brought both the king himselfe, and the whole realme, into such a daunge∣rous an estate as it was in short time after. For what good iustice soeuer the prince do, alwaies he that shall bee condemned will thinke that hee hath wrong done him.

Now to say as some men do obiect and say, That if the prince in person himselfe* 1.1310 should take vpon him the administration of iustice, men should haue a good and quicke dispatch of their suits; and that such numbers of appeales, such exceptions and petitions, with other long delaies of iustice, should be so quite cut off; deserueth not so much as aunswere. For who is he which knoweth not at what great charge he must bee, how many circumstances and delayes, how many windings and turnings, how many repul∣ses [ B] and griefes he must endure that hath any suit in court? Neither is it to be thought, Iudgements to be so much the better, by how much they are the shorter. For albeit that Thucidides (the most famous of them that were of his time, of the councel of the Areo∣pagi in Athens) seemeth to haue beene in the same opinion that some others were, viz. That offences once committed, were forthwith to be punished; yet I verily sup∣pose the opinion of Plutarch, yea of the Hebrewes themselues to bee the truer: for these thinke it necessarie for him that will iudge aright, to vse delaies in publike iudge∣ments. But he in that little booke which he wrot of the slow vengeance of God, plainly* 1.1311 teacheth men to be warned by almightie God, if they will be the true imitators of his [ C] iustice, to proceed but slowly and by little and little in the triall of capitall causes, whe∣ther it be that the truth of the matter may the better appeare, or for the drawing of some profit from the offendors before their death, or to draw them to repentance, or for their more griuous punishment (for that the punishment is the greater the longer that it hangeth ouer ones head) or the better or more iustly to iudge of another mans life, being withall in question. For right hard it is for a judge pressed with choller and desire of reuenge, hasted by some, and thrust forward by others, to doe good iustice, what knowledge or feare soeuer hee haue to iudge amisse: and what shall then the prince doe, who hath neither the one nor the other? The iudgements of the inferiour magistrats are corrected by the superiour, by way of appeale: but if the prince himselfe [ D] shall take vpon him to iudge, who shall reforme his decrees? For he that in the former iudgement hath not sufficiently declared his matter vnto the judge, or by ouersight let some thing passe; if yet he may appeale, all may wel be amended: but if the prince him∣selfe shall once giue iudgement, the gate is then after sentence shut vp, and no place left for appeale, or how to amend the errour. Which we say to restraine a prince from in∣termedling with iudgements, except he be a man of great wisedome, or vse therein the* 1.1312 assistance of his wise and learned councellors; and the causes such as may seeme wor∣thy the princes hearing and iudgement: following therein the councell of Iethro, who seeing Moyses troubled from morning to night in doing iustice to all men, and in all causes, You kill your selfe (said he) with taking so much paine; chuse mee out of the [ E] wisest and most discreet men of the people to ease your selfe vpon; and if there be any thing high or difficult to iudge, it sufficeth that you take vpon you the hearing thereof, leauing the rest vnto the other magistrats and judges to heare and determine. Which counsell of his father in law Moyses followed. So likewise wee read, that Romulus ha∣uing committed vnto the Senat and the magistrats, the ordinarie administration of iu∣stice, reserued vnto himselfe onely the hearing of matters of greatest importance. And albeit that the Roman emperours afterwards would haue their iudgements to extend something farther, yet was the emperours iurisdiction for the hearing of matters still shut vp and included within certaine bounds: which for all that the princes flatterers, or

else the princes themselues oft times went beyond, sitting in iudgement sometimes [ F] euen of light and ordinarie matters: so as did Claudius the emperour, (the most sottish lout that euer was) who yet would alwayes be iudging and deciding of causes and con∣trouersies: of whome Tranquillus thus writeth, Alium negantem rem cognitionis sed or∣dinarij iuris esse, subito causam apud se agere coegit, He compelled (saith he) another man denying the matter to belong vnto the emperours hearing, but to be onely an ordina∣rie matter, and so to belong to the ordinarie iurisdiction, hee compelled him (I say) euen forthwith and without more adoo, to plead the cause before him, but that so foo∣lishly, as that the lawyers openly mocked him, therefore insomuch that one of them was so bold with him as to say vnto him in Greeke, which yet most of the standers by* 1.1313 vnderstood, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, An old man, and a foole too. And another [ G] tript him going out of the iudgement seat, and so gaue him a fall: yea his folly at last proceeded so farre, as that the verie pages and lackies would play with his nose as hee slept, and spot his face with inke. And into this case the prince must needs fall, who void of wisedome, thinketh it a goodly matter in the presence of the people to determine great matters, and so to make himselfe to bee of all men contemned and laughed at: than which nothing can be more daungerous in a Monarchy. Wherefore the prince which will often sit in iudgement, be present in the Senat, or much show himselfe vn∣to the people, him I would haue equall in vnderstanding vnto Salomon, in wisedome* 1.1314 to Angustus, and in modestie to Anreltus; or els but seldome to come abroad, and more seldome himselfe to administer iustice, and that so much the lesse in the presence [ H] of straungers, who still iudge such things as seeme not commendable in a prince, not onely in his mind, but euen in the euill feature of his bodie, or vncomelinesse of his at∣tire: and such other small imperfections (which the subiects for the loue and reuerence which they beare vnto their naturall prince easily beare with all) to be euen right great vices or deformities. Which the straungers neuer excuse, but reporting the same to the worst, still augment them in straunge places, euen to the least of his lookes, counte∣nance, behauiours and gestures. The same of king Agesilaus had with the bruit ther∣of filled all the lesser Asia, Greece, and Affrike, whome yet when the king of Aegypt had seene lying vpon the ground in a medow, with a course Greeke cloke on his back, and himselfe but leane, little, and lame withall, he made of him no great account, but [ I] rather had him in contempt and derision. The like is reported in the memorie of our fathers, to haue happened vnto king Lewes the eleuenth, who being chosen arbitrator in a controuersie betwixt the kings of Nauarre and Castile, and going vnto the fron∣tiers of his kingdome, the Spaniards at their arriuall mocked the French men and their king, Who seemed vnto them as a pilgrim come from Saint Iames of Compostella, with his great cap vpon his head, set all about with brouches, and his iacket of course cloath, without any maiestie at all, either in his countenance, or in his behauiour; and they of his traine all in like sort apparrelled: (For why, he could not abide to see any man in braue attire) whereas the king of Castile and his troupe beeing come, showed themselues in most sumptuous attire, with their horses in their rich caparisons: which [ K] shewed a certaine greatnesse in the Spaniard, insomuch as that it seemed the French∣men to haue bene but the Spaniards seruants, but that there was a great and strong ar∣mie of them not farre off in the field, in readinesse at all assaies: which the Spaniards discouering, yeeld vnto the French king such conditions as himselfe pleased. And yet the same king Lewes the eleuenth considering princes by the opinion of men to bee either prayse or disprayse worthy (who commonly are led away but with the exterior show) hearing that the ambassadours of Venice were come brauely apparrelled, and well accompanied, he caused himselfe to be also most magnificently in royall robes at∣tired,

and so sitting in an high chaire of Estate, admitted the embassadours vnto his [ A] presence.

Wherefore with greater reason ought a prince, when as he commeth to an enter* 1.1315 view with another strange prince (which he ought but most seldome to doe) to shew himselfe in such sort, as that there be nothing in his attire, and much lesse in his counte∣nance or behauiour and speech to be discommended. And that is it for which Philip Comines speaking of the enterview of princes, sayth, That they ought to shun it so much as they may: for that their presence alwaies diminisheth their fame, and the opi∣nion conceiued of their persons, causeth them to bee the lesse esteemed: a thing yet more to be feared towards the strangers than towards the subiects.

Now that which I haue said, It not to be fit for soueraigntie, or for soueraigne prin∣ces [ B] to entermeddle with iudgements; ought yet more to be obserued in a popular e∣state,* 1.1316 for the great difficulties in assembling of the people, and to cause them to vnder∣stand reason; and then after that they haue vnderstood it, to induce them well to iudge thereof, their iudgements being oft times peruerted by seditious declamations or facti∣ons: which was the greatest occasion of the ciuill warres amongst the Romans, vntill that Sylla the Dictator had remitted the hearing of all causes vnto the magistrats, ex∣cepting the offence of treason, and that in the highest degree.

But yet besides the inconueniences by vs before noted, nothing hath euer bene more* 1.1317 daungerous, or more ruinated Commonweales, than to translate the authoritie of the [ C] Senat or commaund of the magistrats, vnto the prince or the people. For that the lesse the power of the soueraigntie is (the true markes of maiestie thereunto still reser∣ued) the more it is assured; as well said Theopompus king of Lacedemonia, who hauing encreased the power of the Senat, and appointed fiue Ephori in title of office, as Tri∣bunes of the people: and being therefore by his wife reproued, for that in so doing hee had much diminished his owne power: So haue I also (said he) much more assured the same for the time to come. For hard it is for high and stately buildings long to stand, except they be vpholden and staid by most strong shores, and rest vpon most sure foun∣dations; all which consisteth in the Senat or councell, & in the good duties of the ma∣gistrats. In which thing the Venetians, as they haue done many things wisely, so haue [ D] they done in nothing more than in that, that they which haue the soueraigntie, inter∣medle not with iudgements onely, but not so much as with any other thing els, which may wel by the magistrats or the Senat be dispatched: Which haply hath bene one of the chiefe meanes wherby that state hath bene so long preserued, considering that there neither is, nor euer was any Cōmonweal, where they which haue the soueraigntie tro∣ble themselues lesse with that which belongeth vnto the councel or the magistrats. The Great Councel of the nobilitie, or gentlemen, wherin the whole maiestie of that Com∣monweal resteth, is neuer assembled but for the creating of new magistrats, or enacting of lawes, all the rest of the affaires of the estate being to be dispatched by the Senat, and the councell of the Ten, and of the Seuen men; and matters of iurisdiction by the other [ E] magistrats. Which if it be a thing commendable, and well appointed in Aristocra∣tike estates, with better reason ought it to take place in Popular estates, Where the moe heads there be, the lesse wit there is, and so the worse resolution also. Neither like I of Xe∣nophon that most famous mans opinion, who speaking of the Athenian Common∣weale, saith, That the more popular that the lawes are, the better they maintaine a De∣mocratie, or Popular estate, When as (saith hee) the people hath the hearing of all matters, and that all passeth by lot and voyce: which thing indeed doth vtterly ouer∣throw all Popular Commonweales. As in Athens, when as by the persuasion of Pe∣ricles, the hearing and deciding of matters, and the mannaging of the state, was taken

from the Senat or councell of the Areopagi, to be brought backe vnto the people; the [ F] * 1.1318 citie destitute of wit, and without councell, fell first forthwith into great broyles, and not long after into vtter ruine & decay. But amongst the Swissers, where their Popular estates haue now flourished 260 yeares, and so yet continue and grow from good to better, still flourishing both in peace and warre: those their estates are preserued and vpholden by lawes of all other least popular, nothing being almost left vnto the peo∣ple more than the chusing of their officers, the other rights of soueraigntie being but sparingly and within a certaine conuenient measure communicated vnto them. Nei∣ther was the Roman Commonweale euer fairer or farther from ciuill warres, than when (the maiestie of the people saued whole) all things were done by the Senat and the magistrats: which was from the first Carthaginensian warre, vnto the conquest of [ G] the kingdome of Macedon. But after that both the Gracchies by their most popular lawes had taken from the authoritie of the Senat and the power of the magistrats, as much as they possibly could, all to encrease the wealth and libertie of the people; there ensued thereof a most miserable change of that Commonweale: neither did the citie of Rome euer after cease from ciuill warres and sedition, vntill that immoderat li∣bertie of the insolent people, was by the power of one oppressed and brought vnder, and they so brought into extreame miserie and seruitude. The same inconuenience or mischiefe befell the Megarensians, who from a Popular estate fell into a most miserable Tyrannicall gouernment (as saith Plato) for the vnbridled libertie and insolencie of the people, taking vpon them the hearing of all things, aboue the authoritie, iurisdiction, [ H] and power of the Senat, or of the other magistrats.

But the best kind of Commonweale is that, wherein the soueraigne holdeth what* 1.1319 concerneth his maiestie, the Senat maintaineth the authoritie thereof, the magistrats execute their power, and iustice hath her ordinarie course. Whereas otherwise if the prince or the people shall take vpon themselues the authoritie of the Senat, or the com∣maunds, offices, or iurisdictions of the magistrats; it is much to be feared, least that they destitute of all helpe, shall at the length be spoyled of their owne soueraigne maiestie al∣so. And in mine opinion they shamefully erre, which thinke themselues to encrease the princes wealth and power, when they show vnto him his Clawes, giuing him to vn∣derstand, that his will his countenance, and his looke, ought to be as an edict, a decree, [ I] and a law; to the end that there should be none of his subiects which should presume to take vpon them the hearing or deciding of any matter, which might not bee againe by him reuersed and chaunged: so as did the tyrant Caligula, who would not that the* 1.1320 lawyers should so much as giue their councell and opinions, when as he said, Paciam vt nihil respondeant nisi Eccum, that is to say, That is he to whome it alone belongeth to giue his opinion; meaning by himselfe: but by the word Eccum, which is, Behold the man; alluding to the word Aequum, which is, That which is right and iust. But this opinion by little and little crept into princes minds, breeding in them an incredible de∣sire of oppression and tyrannie.

[ K]

CHAP. VII. [ A] ¶ Whether a Prince in ciuill factions ought to ioyne himselfe to one of the parties, and whether a good subiect ought to be constrained to take part with the one or the other faction: with the meanes to remedie seditions.

NOw wee haue alreadie declared▪ What a Soueraigne Prince ought to be in the administration of iustice towards his subiects; and if he should take vpon him the person of a judge, when, and how, and in what sort of Commonweale he ought to doe it: let vs now also see out of the tearmes of iustice, when the subiects; [ B] are diuided into factions and part-takings, and that the judges and magistrats are themselues parties also, Whether the Soue∣raigne Prince ought to ioyne himselfe to one of the parties; & whether the good subiect ought to be constrained to follow the one or the other par∣tie, or not. And first let vs set downe this as a maxime, All factions and part-takings to be daungerous and pernitious in euerie sort of Commonweales, and that they ought, if* 1.1321 it be possible, by all meanes to be preuented; or if that cannot be before they bee plot∣ted, yet to search the meanes to heale them▪ or at leastwise to imploy all conuenient remedies to mittigat the disease. And albeit that of ciuil seditions and part-takings there sometime commeth great good, as some one or other good law, or some other good [ C] reformation, which had not beue if the sedition had not happened; yet it is not there∣fore to be said, that sedition is not daungerous, although that it by chaunce and casual∣ly draw after it some good: as in mans bodie a disease chauncing, is the cause that men vse letting of blood, and purgations, and so draw away the euill and corrupt humors: so seditions oftentimes are cause that the euill or wicked men are slaine, or driuen away and banished, to the end that the rest may liue in quiet; or that euill lawes and decrees be cancelled and repealed, to giue place vnto good, which had otherwise neuer beene receiued. For which if one shall say, That seditions, and ciuill warres, are good, hee might also say, that murders, parricides, adulteries, theft; and the subuersion of estates & [ D] Commonweales are also good. For why, there is no impietie so great, no villanie so detestable, whereof no profit may redound, either to all, or to some men in particular; yea the verie villanies of wicked men almightie God vseth to draw either to the punish∣ment of the reprobat, or to the glorie of his name. Which yet to prayse, were as if we should commend diseases; as Fauorinus the Philosopher highly commended the feuer quartaine: which were but to confound the difference betwixt good and euill, the diffe∣rence betwixt profit and disprofit, betwixt honour and dishonour, betwixt vice and ver∣tue; and in briefe to confound fire and water, heauen and earth together. Wherefore as vices and diseases are daungerous both vnto the bodie and the soule; so seditions and ciuill warres are hurtfull and pernitious vnto all estates and Commonweales.

But it may be some man will say, That seditions and ciuill warres are good and pro∣fitable [ E] * 1.1322 for Tyrannicall Monarchies, and for the maintaining of Tyrants in their Tyran∣nicall estates, they being alwayes enemies vnto their subiects, and such as cannot long continue, if the subiect be once at accord amongst themselues. But we haue before de∣clared, the Tyrannicall Monarchy to be of all others the weakest, as that which is not but by cruelties and villanies nourished and maintained; and yet commonly wee see it to fall and take end by seditions and ciuill warres: so that if we looke into all tyrannies which haue bene destoyed and ouerthrowne, we shal find it most commonly to haue happened of factions and ciuill tumults. Yea euen the most craftie and subtill tyrants,

who by little and little put to death, now some, and then others, to fat themselues with [ F] the blood of their subiects, and to saue their owne vnluckie life, which they lead in con∣tinuall paine and languor, neuer escape the murdering hands of conspirators; who so much the more encrease, by how much moe the tyrant putteth of his subiects to death; others which are vnto them allied, being alwaies prest and readie to reuenge the death of their so nie kinsmen: and albeit that the tirant put to death all their kinsmen, friends, and allies, yet neuerthelesse they shall so stirre vp all the good subiects against them∣selues. And of the goods of the subiects for tyrants to enrich themselues, is to procure their owne ruine and decay: for it is impossible that spleene should fill it selfe, or that the ouergrowing of corrupt proud flesh should fatten it selfe, but that the other mem∣bers must drie, and so the whole bodie shortly after perish and consume also. And ther∣fore [ G] the Florentines in my iudgement had no reasonable cause, why secretly to main∣taine the factions of the Pistoians, whome they had before subdued: for that they fore∣saw not, them whome they thought might so by their mutuall broiles and contentions be weakned, & so the more easily endure the Florentines their lords, by liberty and the vse of armes to grow more fierce and couragious, than if they had liued in peace and quiet, and with aboundance of delights lost their force and strength: besides that, they therewith lost so much of their owne force, by the losse of so many good subiects, one of them by another ruinated and ouerthrowne.

Now if seditio•…•…s and factions be dangerous vnto monarchies, then are they much* 1.1323 more daungerous vnto Aristocraties and Popular estates: for that Monarches may [ H] maintayne their maiesty, and as neuters decide the quarrels of their subiects; or by ioy∣ning themselues to one of the parties, to bring the other vnto reason, or els altogether to oppresse them: whereas the people diuided in a popular estate, hath no soueraigne ouer them; no more than the lords diuided in Aristocratie haue no man to cōmaund them: if it be not that the greater part of the people, or of the lords, be not of the facti∣on, which so may commaund the rest. Now when I say faction, my meaning is not* 1.1324 of an handfull of people, or some small number of subiects, but euen of a good part of them banded against an other, able to trouble the whole estate: but if they be but few in number, hee that hath the soueraignty in hand, ought at the first to represse them; which he may doe either by commaunding them to lay downe armes, or by referring [ I] the cause of their dissention and variance vnto indifferent judges: or if the matter bee such as may require his own declaration and pleasure, then to doe the same with good aduice, and the mature deliberation of his most wise magistrats and councellours, not in any wise suspected to fauour the one part more than the other: and this to the intent that the prince, or they which haue the soueraignty, should not themselues beare the enuy or discontentment of them which should so bee condemned. But if the faction be grown so farre, as that it cannot by way of justice, or by orderly inducements be ap∣peased, it then be hooueth the soueraigne prince, or them that hold the soueraignety in an Aristocratie or popular estate, to vse their forces for the vtter extinguishing thereof, by the punishing of some few of the ring-leaders and chiefe men in the faction; that so [ K] the punishment may touch but some few▪ and yet the feare come vnto all of them. Nei∣ther ought the soueraigne prince to deferre the matter so long, vntill they bee growne so strong as that they be not any more to be resisted, or that the leaders of them being for feare of punishment become desperat, shall seeke to ouerthrow the whole estate of the commonweale. For there still are, and alwaies haue bene good and valiant men, which for the welfare of their countrey doubt not to aduenture their liues; although there be many, who to the contrary had rather their countrey should perish for them. Which kind of men (the very plagues of commonweales) are vpon the sudden to bee

oppressed▪ lest happely the whole estate of the commonweale were oft times by some [ A] one or other of them to bee indaungered; yea, although such ciuill discord rise but for some priuate displeasure of theirs.

But all this which we haue yet said, is to be vnderstood but of factions which con∣cerne* 1.1325 not the estate; for if the faction be directly against the state, or the life of the soue∣raigne prince, there is then no question whether the prince should take a part, or show himselfe an open enemy vnto such seditious, which so professe themselues of all others the greatest enemy of their prince & commonweale: for otherwise, if when the state and welfare of the commonweale, or the prince his owne life is attempted, he shall sit still but as an idle beholder, he shall so inuite and annimate not the more desperate sort of men onely, but euen very cowards to seeke after his life also. But yet a great diffe∣rence [ B] there is to bee made in the manner of punishment of the offendors: for if the number of the conspirators against the state or his person be but few, he shall suffer the Magistrats to proceed against them by order of law, and as he seeth cause himselfe to moderate the heauinesse of the punishment; which the fewer the conspirators are, is so much the sooner to be inflicted▪ and before that moe bee discouered, to the end that by the punishment of some few, the good subiects may stil be kept within the compasse of their allegiance and dutie, and those which were euill enclined, so terrified from their euill intended purpose. Neither yet is too strait or strict enquirie to bee made to find* 1.1326 out all the conspirators, least by force of torture and torment, such things bee haply [ C] wrung out, as were indeed better vnknowne than knowne. And yet it is not to bee dissembled or winked at, if the partie guiltie bee once discouered to haue conspired against the life of his soueraigne, or yet to haue but bene willing so to haue done. As it happened vnto a gentleman of Normandie, who confessing vnto a frier (his ghostly father) of a purpose that he had had to haue slaine Francis the first the French king, but yet not daring so to do, to haue repented him now of his so wicked and detestable a purpose, was therefore of the frier so much as in him lay pardoned; who yet neuer∣thelesse forthwith reuealed the same vnto the king, who causing the gentleman to bee apprehended, sent him vnto the parliament of Paris to be tryed, where he was as a trai∣tor condemned to death. Howbeit, that (in mine opinion) the king in his greater wise∣dome [ D] might haue done better to haue pardoned him, for that it had repented him of that his wicked purpose (which the law for the hainousnesse of the fact doe so seuerely punish) & so was become the betraier & accuser of himself before he was by any other accused. And it may be that it had bin better to haue executed him without making of the king acquainted therewith, so to haue disburdened him of the enuy of such a iudg∣ment. So as did the emperour Augustus with Q. Gallus, who hauing not onely pur∣posed, but euen desperatly also attempted to haue slaine him; and being therefore by the Senate condemned of treason, was yet by the same emperour Augustus (dissem∣bling the matter as if he had thereof knowne nothing) pardoned, and so sent away vn∣to his brother then gouernour in one of the prouinces: but was yet neuerthelesse vpon [ E] the way slaine, not without the secret commaundement of Augustus himselfe, as ma∣ny men supposed, vsing therein the like subtilty: a craft that had his vncle Caesar before vsed, in giuing pardon to M. Marcellus at the request of the Senate; who yet was im∣mediatly after slaine, as one of Caesar his most mortall enemies. Yet more likely it is, neyther Caesar (who in a certayne naturall clemency exceeded almost all other princes) neyther Augustus (placed in so high a seat of honour and maiestie) to haue beene willing to haue defiled or stained their so great honour & dignity with the secret mur∣der of them whom they might most iustly haue executed. Howbeit that some of the finer sort to the contrary excuse the matter, as by them done for the safty of their owne

liues; and yet so by his meanes still to maintaine the great opinion which they had be∣fore [ F] * 1.1327 caused men to conceiue of their clemency and mercy. But if the conspirators be in number many, and that they be not all discouered, the wise prince ought to beware how he putteth to torture those that be condemned, albeit that he might euen with a becke without danger kill them all: for that for one that he should put to death, there would arise vp an hundred of their allies & friends, who it may be, haue power enough, or at least wise neuer fayle of will enough to reuenge the death of them which were of their bloud; and in case all this were not so, yet ought the prince alwayes to shunne the note and blame of cruelty, as well of his subiects as of strangers: wherein Nero was greatly deceiued, who hauing discouered the conspiracy against his person and estate, would needs by torture & torment know all them that were partakers therein: wher∣in [ G] he found so great a number of them that were, what by right, and what by wrong accused, as that the cōspirators indeed seeing themselues condemned, discharged their choller vpon the tyrants most faithfull and loyall friends: all whom hee caused most cruelly to be slayne; which was afterwards the cause of the open and generall rebelli∣on of the captaynes and gouernours of the prouinces against him. And for this cause Alexander the great hauing put to death Parmenio, Philotas, and the rest which had conspired his death, by a new decree or law abrogated the auncient law of the Ma∣cedonians, whereby fiue of them that were the nearest of kinne vnto the conspirators were still to be put to death. But the best and surest way to auoyd the farther daunger of a conspiracy already preuented, is for a prince to dissemble the matter, as if he knew [ H] not the conspirators, as Tacitus well sayed, Optimum remedium insidiarum, est si non* 1.1328 intelligatur, The best remedie of a conspiracie is, not to seeme to vnderstand thereof. So when Hanno generall of the Carthaginensians, had purposed to haue slaine all the Senators, and chiefe men of the citie, vnder the colour of the marriage of his daughter; the Senat vnderstanding of the matter, but dissembling the same, forthwith caused an edict or law to be published, concerning the charges to be made at feasts: wherein the number of the guests, & the charges of the feast (which was not great) was most strait∣ly appointed. By which decree of the Senat, the conspiracie intended, was without any tumult or bloodshed at all quietly suppressed. So in like manner Eteocles captaine of the Lacedemonians, with a strong garrison of souldiors holding the island of Chio [ I] against the Atheniensians, and vnderstanding that the garrison souldiours secretly con∣spiring together, had determined to kill the inhabitants their friends and allies, in whose aid they were come, and so to take vnto themselues the possession of the iland; and that the signall of the conspiratours was, for euery one of them to carrie in their hands a cane, or reed: hee (I say) vnderstanding of the matter, and accompanied with cer∣taine of his most assured friends, & so walking about the citie, slew the first that he met withall carrying of a reed, and so suddenly gaue it out, That hee would kill all the rest that so carried reeds in their hands, and yet withall tooke order with the inhabitants of the island, that the souldiers were paid their pay: and so by the death of one onely soul∣diour the conspiracie was quenched before the fire could bee well kindled: and the [ K] occasion of the conspiracie so taken away, and all againe well quieted. Wherefore eue∣rie gouernour and magistrat ought to take care, not so much to take away seditions al∣readie growne, as to preuent them: For that a sedition once set on fire, is like a sparke suddenly blowne, which with the rage of the people, which setteth all the citie on a light fire before it can be againe quenched. Wherein the princes commaunds are not to be expected, who commonly know least of such things as touch them neerest. Yea oftentimes it happeneth princes wel to vnderstand the secrets, writings, doings, and say∣ings of other forren princes, and yet perceiue not the fire kindled at home in their own

realmes, in their own pallaces, yea euen in their owne bed chambers. The conspiracy of [ A] * 1.1329 Pelopidas, for the surprising of the castle Cadmea, and the expulsing of the Lacedemo∣nians out of Thebes, was knowne in Athens, before that any thing thereof was disco∣nered in Thebes, as the euent shewed. For why, but euen a little before that Archias the captaine of the castle was together with the garrison souldiors therein slaine, he was by letters from the bishop of Athens warned to looke to himselfe: which letters be∣cause he would not at supper read, he vsed the common prouerb; In crastinum negotia, To morrow will serue for our businesse. Who knoweth not the emperour Charles the fift to haue bene either partaker, or priuie almost to all things that were any where done by other princes, yet did he not so much as once suspect the conspiracie which * 1.1330 duke Maurice and Albertus marquesse of Brandeburg his familiar and domesticall [ B] friends, had euen fast by him contriued against him: yea and had also effected the same before he could feele or perceiue the smoke thereof. But what need forren examples? the conspiracie of Amboise, which set all Fraunce on fire, was diuulged in Germanie, England, and Italy, before it was once suspected by them against whome it was contri∣ued in Fraunce: vnto whom the cardinall Granuellan is reported by his letters to haue first discouered the same, and yet there were aboue ten thousand persons which had therein a part. Whereby it is plaine, such conspiracies as wherein the force and power* 1.1331 of many is to be required, to haue alwayes had most difficult and daungerous euents: for that they can neither by a few be effected, neither yet by many be concealed. Yea oft times it chaunceth the conspirators most secret designes to bee euen by women first [ C] reuealed. As it happened to Philotas, who discouering the conspiracie against Alexan∣der the Great vnto a courtisan whom he loued, was together with his complices to his destruction by her bewrayed. So Fuluia vnderstanding of Cateline his conspiracie by one of his souldiors, reuealed the same vnto the Consull Cicero. And in our time the secret designes of the Prior of Campania (generall of the French gallies) for the sud∣den surprising and rifling of the citie of Venice by a souldiour reuealed vnto a courti∣san,* 1.1332 was forthwith by her discouered and made knowne vnto the Senat. Yet for all that an hard matter it is for a prince, be he neuer so wise or subtill, to preserue himselfe from the daunger of a resolute man that hath sworne his death: for that as the secret, & [ D] the exeuction thereof is but against one man onely, so is it but in one man alone enclo∣sed, willing and resolued to sacrifice his life (how deere vnto him soeuer) to haue ano∣ther mans, howbeit that he were beset round with an armie. Such an one as Sc•…•…uola is reported to haue bene; who of the euent gaue first name vnto his house and familie, for that he of his owne accord had thrust his right hand into a burning fire, so to bee burnt of, for that he mistaking the man, had slaine the kings lieutenant in stead of the king himselfe. With no lesse boldnesse (or valour should I say) did a seruant of La∣zarus the Despot of Seruia kill Amurath the king of the Turkes, in the middest of his legions of men, so to reuenge the death of his lord, and the dishonour done vnto the queene his wife. So Pausaenias also in the sight of the whole armie slew Philip king of Macedon, Alexander the Great his father. And Peter Aloisius also duke of Placence, [ E] was in his owne castle by two murderers stabbed and slaine euen in the sight of his guard. And he that slew the emperour Domitian went to seeke him out euen into his cabinet with his arme in a scarfe: in such sort as did Aod kill Eglon king of the Moa∣bites. And if Cosmus Medices duke of Florence (hauing ceized vpon the estate) had not alwaies gone armed, neither could his great guards, nether yet his strong castles haue kept him from the hands of most desperat men, who oftentimes found meanes to enter euen into his most close and secret places, to haue slain him an hundred times, what death soeuer they should therefore haue died. Yea amongst the rest of many

most desperat murtherers, there was one, who euen in the councell chamber strucke [ F] him with his dagger, thinking so to haue stabbed him (his guard standing round about him) not knowing him as then to haue had a priuie coat vpon him. And yet well hee knew that his life lay thereon, and so indeed was presently cast headlong out at a win∣dow downe to the ground.

But forasmuch as we haue before touched certaine meanes which may preserue a prince from falling into these daungers, and whereby to hinder the conspiracies which might be made against his person: Let vs now see how he ought to beare and behaue himselfe in conspiracies and factions, which are not directly against himselfe nor his estate, but amongst his great lords among themselues, or among the estates, townes, or prouinces subiect vnto him; all which he ought by all meanes to preuent, and not to [ G] neglect any thing how little soeuer it be for the meeting therewith. For as the great stormes and tempests are caused of most light and insensible exhalations and vapours:* 1.1333 euen so seditions and ciuill warres the destructions of cities and Commonweales, are most times begun for most smal matters, and such as a man would not thinke that euen they should worke such effect. In the raigne of Iustiman the emperour all the cities of the Greeke empire were diuided into factions, for the maintaining of the colours of Greene & Blew, which they according to their fancies tooke vnto them in their sports and iusts, one of them brauing and contending with another: which in the end tooke such force and went so farre, as that the judges and magistrats of Constantinople, going about to punish the seditious, were letted so to doe by others of the same faction who [ H] tooke part with them, and so tooke out of the hands of the officers and executioners such as were by them led to the place of execution, and not so contented brake open the prisons also, and let loose all the prisoners, and in the same rage burnt the temple of Saint Sophia: and to auoid the punishment which they (hauing laid downe armes) were not to hope for, made choyce of one Hippatius the captaine and ring-leader of their faction, for emperour; Iustinian with his familie in the meane time lurking in a corner. Which tumult proceeded so farre, as that thirtie thousand men were in one day in that quarrel slaine: and had not he the leader of the faction (and he euen the new chosen emperour) there beene killed, the emperour Iustinian had vndoubtedly had much to do to haue saued his life; who yet at the beginning together with his other [ I] courtiers tooke great sport and pleasure therein. The like whereof happened at Syra∣cusa also, where two of the magistrats become riuals, and so falling out for their loue, at the first gaue occasion for other men to laugh at them, but at length so diuided the whole Commonweale into two such factions, which so banded the one the other, as that the most couragious of the nobilitie being slaine, the people taking vp armes and driuing out them that were left of the nobilitie or better sort, tooke vpon it the soue∣raigntie, and so changed the Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate. Wher∣fore it behoueth a prince, before the fire of sedition and ciuill warres by such sparkes be* 1.1334 enflamed, to cast on cold water, or else quite to quench the same: that is to say, to pro∣ceed to the preuenting thereof, either by sweet speeches and persuasions, or elsby open [ K] force. So as did Alexander the Great, who seeing Ephestion and Craterus his greatest friends, vpon a mutuall emulation to be at discord and varience amongst themselues, and so to draw the rest of his valiant captaines into parts-taking with them: hee at the first with faire words, and gentle persuasions sought to make them friends together, but afterwards taking them apart, sharply rebuked them both, threatning withall to band himselfe against him which soeuer of them should first by word or deed offend the other: by which sharp reprehension putting them both in feare, made them friends together. And so our king Lewes, he who for his deuotion towards God, for his loue

towards his neighbours, for his charitie towards particular men, and vpright dealing [ A] towards al, is numbred amongst the Saints; vnto his great praise vsed the matter, as that all the time of his raigne there was neuer difference or contentions betwixt any the princes, which he for his integritie and wisedome himselfe in most friendly and peace∣able manner quieted not. Yet of all things this is in a prince most to bee taken heed of, That in ending the differences and quarrels of the nobilitie or princes, he seeme not to be led or moued with the loue or hatred of any of them, one more than another. Wherin Archidamus king of the Lacedemonians, wisely prouided for himselfe, who* 1.1335 seeing two great men his most deere friends at oddes betwixt themselues, brought them both into the temple, and there demaunded of them whome they would make choyce of to be arbitrator of the difference betwixt them? who both answering, That [ B] they would make choyce of none other but of Archidamus himselfe: Sweare then vn∣to me (said he) that you shall both abide mine award, and doe as I shall enioyne you: which they both doing, he straitly enioyned them both, Neuer to depart out of that same church, vntill they had reconciled themselues one of them vnto another, and so became sworne friends. Whereby he wisely without any offence or displeasure vnto himselfe (by giuing of iudgement betwixt them) made them friends, and so with thanks enioyed the fruit of their friendship and good agreement, than which nothing ought to be more deerer or more pretious vnto a prince: for that no fortresses are vnto prin∣ces more assured, no castles stronger, than is the loue and fidelitie of their subiects to∣wards them. But here I speake of a good prince, and not of a tyrant which taketh [ C] pleasure to see the great men still ruinated one of them by another; neither aimeth at any other marke, but how to flesh the great ones one of them vpon another. Howbe∣it* 1.1336 that it oftentimes falleth out, that the dogges falling vnto agreement among them∣selues, fall all vpon the wolfe: so as did the factions of the Colonnois and the Vrsins, who hauing discouered that pope Alexander the sixt set them still at discord and vari∣ance among themselues, so by their calamities and falles to encrease the strength and power of his bastard sonne Borgia; they fell to agreement among themselues, and so made head against him their common enemie.

Sometime also a tyrant seeing the nobilitie in the State to flourish with the strength [ D] and alliance of friends, and the fauour of the people, and not to seeke one of them ano∣thers ruine, neither to haue any equall aduersaries to oppose themselues against them; doth yet secretly affoord fauour vnto some of the meaner or weaker sort, and so armeth them against the richer and stronger, and by some notable and irremissable villanie by them committed against the other, bindeth them vnto him, in such sort, as that they can neuer be reconciled againe vnto the parties by them so offended. So as Iohn Benti∣uole the tyrant of Bononia is reported to haue done: who fearing the good agreement of them of the greater sort, easily suffered the chiefest of the house and familie of the Ma∣rischots (then the richest and a man of greatest credit in all that countrey) to bee of his enemies slaine, to the end that hee might so bee dispatched of him, and supported of them of the contrarie faction: all reconciliation being by that so great an outrage bro∣ken [ E] off, and all hope of mutuall friendship vtterly cut a sunder: all which his tyrannicall slights and deceits, together with the fauour of the French king, yet helped him not, but that at length he was thrust out of his estate, and so by violence pluckt headlong* 1.1337 euen out of the chiefest strength of his tyranny. But as the bond and obligation of a notable villanie is of all others the strongest, so is it also in euery Commonweale most of all to be feared, for that thereby all the hope of amitie and concord is cut off to∣wards them which haue receiued the iniurie. As it happened to the armie of Car∣thage, which for want of pay reuolting against the seigneurie or state, vnder the con∣duct

of two or three of their mutinous captaines, ceized vpon diuers strong townes & [ F] places which they rifled and ransackt: which captaines and ringleaders fearing to bee by the souldiours at one time or other betrayed and deliuered, persuaded the rest of the chiefe principall men amongst them, to kill the ambassadours of the seigneurie, and to hang vp Hasdrubal the Generall with the rest of the Carthaginensians which were fal∣len into their hands, to the end that hauing bound them by such cruelties, they should now haue no hope at al to saue their liues by composition. In which case there was no other meane for the Seigneurie to vse, but euen plaine force, so vtterly to root them out which could not otherwise be healed: as was afterwards that armie of the Carthaginen∣sians, being by a long and cruell war at length defeated. For why, they had directly ban∣ded themselues against the seigneurie: in which case we haue said the prince must of ne∣cessitie [ G] become a partie, and show himselfe a most sharpe enemie vnto the rebellious.

But if discord and contention be amongst the princes and great men themselues, &* 1.1338 that vnder the same soueraigne prince, which yet he cannot either by his princely au∣thoritie, neither by faire persuasion, nor hope of rewards, appease; he ought then to giue them arbitrators, men of great integritie and wisdome, and such as they themselues can like of. In which doing the soueraigne prince shall discharge himselfe of the heauinesse of the iudgement to be giuen, and of the hatred and displeasure of him or them that should be condemned. For if this manner of proceeding is and alwayes hath beene commendable for the ending of controuersies euen betwixt kings themselues, by com∣mitting their differences vnto the arbitrement of princes; and that all nations vse this [ H] manner and fashion: with how much more reason ought a wise prince (as of right hee may) cause his owne subiects to condescend thereunto, and especially them which are neere vnto him in alliance or blood, to the end that their quarrels and contentions should neuer (if it were possible) so farre passe the bounds of reason, as to come to bee tried by the sword or force of armes.

But in ending such controuersies, the prince aboue all things must beware that hee* 1.1339 show not himselfe more affected vnto the one part than to the other: which hath bene the cause of the ruine and ouerthrow of many princes and estates. So Philip the first king of Macedon was not slaine, but for that he openly fauoured Antipater against Pausanias a meane gentleman, in denying of him iustice; which was the cause that [ I] Pausianas discharged his choler euen vpon the person of the king himselfe. Neither for any other cause did Henrie the sixt, king of England, stirre vp that long and deadly ciuill warre, wherewith all England was in combustion eight and twentie yeares, and wherein were lost about fourescore princes of the royall blood (as Philip Comines re∣porteth) but for that the king tooke vpon him to be captaine of them of the faction of the house of Lancaster, against them of the faction and house of Yorke: who at length hauing vanquished and ouercome their enemies, put to death the king himselfe in pri∣son, with all the rest of his neerest kinsmen. The conspiracie also of the marquesse of Pescara, against Charles the emperour, was grounded vpon the fauour that the empe∣rour bare vnto the viceroy of Naples, against the marquesse. It were but lost time to [ K] set downe in writing the cruell & bloodie warres which haue bene raised in this realme by Robert of Arthois, Lewes of Eureux king of Nauarre, Iohn Montford, Iohn of Bur∣gundie, and diuers others of our time, which it is not needfull to rehearse, and all for the fauours of the kings, who forgetting the high degree of maiestie whereunto they were mounted, would basely take vpon them the offices of aduocats, of judges, and arbitra∣tors; so descending from the highest vnto the lowest places, so to follow the passions of their subiects, making themselues companions vnto some of them, and vnto other some of them enemies.

But some will haply say, That by this meanes the king shall know newes, and keepe [ A] the parties also in awe: whereunto I also well agree, that a young king might so doe amongst his ladies and gentlewomen, to take pleasure & knowledge of news enough, but not amongst his princes and other his great lords. Now if any man shall further obiect and say, Princes to be oftentimes, yea and that against their will enforced so to doe, and to take a part, when as he which thinketh himselfe wronged, vpon an obstinat* 1.1340 mind will not by any reason, persuasion, iudgement, or arbitrement, suffer himselfe to be ouerruled or persuaded. In which case I say, that necessitie hath no law: and yet that the prince before hee may come to that point of extremitie, as to vse his force, ought to proue all the meanes that he possibly may, for the composing of the matter in controuersie, and making of those his great subiects friends: which if it may not be, [ B] then by force and strong hand to ouerrule that which he could not otherwise doe: For that it cannot be, that he which shall be so froward or presumptuous as not to hearken vnto reason, nor his friends persuasion, can haue many to take his part, or to stand fast by him in that his so great and obstinat wilfulnesse.

Yet might some man say, That the occasion of the quarrell may be so secret, as that no proofe can thereof be made, neither any iudgement giuen, and yet that hee which hath so receiued the iniurie, demaundeth thereof an amends: in which case the princes find themselues oftentimes much troubled, as when an iniurie or offence is vnto any man secretly offered or done, which he which did it denieth, and that the trueth cannot [ C] therein be tried but onely by bare surmises & coniectures; in this case what is amongst the common and vulgar sort to bee done? it is an easie thing to say, as that no man ought without most manifest witnesses to be condemned: but souldiours, and such as* 1.1341 stand vpon their nobilitie, deeme their honour to be stained, and their reputation great∣ly impaired, except he haue satisfaction, who vpon his oath affirmeth himselfe to haue so bene by any man secretly wronged. For why, such men say, the subiects liues and goods to be all in the princes hand and power to be disposed of▪ but not their honour and reputation. In which case the people of the North haue for the tryall of the mat∣ter appointed combats; as is to be seene in the auntient lawes of the Lombards, of the Saliens, the Ripuaries, the English, the Burgundions, the Danes, the Almaines, and the [ D] Normans; who in their customes call the Combat, The law of appearance: which ma∣ny for all that haue as a most beastly thing reiected, as neuer receiued or practised by the Assyrians, the Aegyptians, the Persians, the Greekes, or Latines, except in lawfull warre, one man against his enemie, and that by the good leaue of the Generall of the armie; or else sometime one Generall encountering hand to hand with another, for the sparing of their subiects blood: so Cossus and Marcellus in battell hand to hand ouercame their enemies kings? Or els one king against another king, as did Romulus with the king of the Latines, and Hundig king of the Saxons, with Roe king of Den∣marke. So also Charles king of Naples chalenged Peter king of Arragon vnto the combat, for the triall of their right vnto that kingdome, which they yet performed not. [ E] Neither is this any meane matter, when as Corbis and Orsua contending for the princi∣palitie before Scipio Affricanus the Romane Generall, said, That they would haue none other judge, either of God or man, to decide their quarrell, but Mars onely. And yet* 1.1342 for all that it is better to appoint combats amongst subiects, according to the auntient and lawfull manner of our auncestors, when the persons are of like qualitie which so stand vpon their honour, and that there is some apparant coniecture of the wrong re∣ceiued (for why, the auntient lawes neuer admitted combat in a plaine and euident matter, or wherein good proofe was to be had) for that to deny combat vnro noble personages standing vpon their honour, and at so great oddes as that they can by no

other means be appeased, were but to nourish the fire of ciuill war euen in the entrails of [ F] the Commonweale, which after it is once kindled, enflameth the whole body thereof. For that two inconueniences propounded, wise men haue well taught vs, the greater ought stil to be of vs declined. Ioine hereunto also, that to change a custom which hath for many worlds of yeares bene found necessarie, is not onely an hard matter, but with∣all* 1.1343 daungerous also. Rotaris king of the Lombards, had taken the law of Combats from amongst his subiects, but yet at their instant requests was enforced to restore the same againe into the former force; protesting withall, That it was but inhumane and naught, (as is in the lawes of the Lombards to be seene) but yet for all that necessarie to auoid greater inconueniences: For that the law of Combat being so taken away, moe good and innocent men were most cruelly and secretly slain and made away, than hap∣ly [ G] had bene, the daunger and eternall infamie of such hidden treacherie beeing still pro∣pounded to the offendors, to be tried by combat. So king Lewes the ninth, hauing the honour of God, and the welfare of his subiects before his eyes, was the first that forbad combats in this realme; which edect was thus, NOVS DEFENDONS BATAILLES PAR TOVT EN NOSTRE DOMAINE EN TOVTES QVERELLES, We for∣bid Combats in all quarrels throughout our dominions. And for that this edict was euill kept, Philip the Faire, king Lewes his nephew, caused the like also to bee published, whereby he vtterly forbad combats: who yet within two yeres after was at the instant request of his subiects constrayned to restore them againe, by reason of the secret mur∣ders and stabbings, yea euen of the most valiant men, who then were in euery place so [ H] slaine. Philip of France, surnamed the Hardie, duke of Burgundie, did not altogether forbid combats in Holland, but yet commanded them not to bee at all suffered, with∣out the lawfull appointment of the magistrats: whereas before they were there open and common without iust cause euen to all sorts of men. But it was a thing most bar∣barous, that Fronto king of Denmarke in auntient time appointed all causes and quar∣rels to bee decided by combat, as the Saxon historiographer saith. Howbeit that the Russians and Hungarians otherwise vse it not, but when there is no euident proofe of the matter brought in question. But in our remembrance the prince of Melphe, the king his lieutenant in Piemont, found no remedie or meanes better, for the restrayning of the secret murders and mutinies which were ordinarie amongst his souldiors, than [ I] combat to be for them appointed, by the leaue and authoritie of the Generall; with condition, That the vanquished should not be spared, but still bee slaine by the victor, and his bodie throwne into the riuer: For which such combats hee appointed a pub∣like place betwixt two bridges, compassed round about with the riuer: so that the hope of flight or of aid taken away, and that they must either ouercome their enemie, or there shamefully die; the souldiors afterwards began to behaue themselues more mo∣destly, and so liue the more quietly together.* 1.1344

But now, when as to haue the lie giuen one, was neither by the Romans thought to be a thing iniurious, neither that our auncestors had allowed the combat for the lie gi∣uen to another man; it began in our age to be a thing not only contumelious, but euen [ K] capitall also; and that especially in the time of Francis the first the French king, who in a great assembly of his greatest peers one day said, that he was not an honest man which could endure the lie giuen him. Which he said, hauing by his heraults at armes giuen the lie to Charles the fift, for some dishonorable speeches he had giuen of him. Which yet since with vs is growne as it were into a law, so that none of the nobilitie or martiall men, which will put vp the lie, is accounted of, as of a man of any worth or valour, but as of a base or vile fellow. Whereof haue risen great quarrels, brawles, and murders, amongst all sorts of subiects. Which to meet withall, Henry the second, who not with∣out

much griefe with a great number of his nobilitie, had seene a matter ended by com∣bat, [ A] by a perpetuall law forbad controuersies or quarrels to be afterwards so tried. And to the intent that no man, who had rashly receiued the lie, should incurre the note of infamie: Charles the ninth reuiuing the edict made by his father, for the forbidding of combats, ioyned thereunto moreouer, That he would take vnto himselfe the honour and reputation of such as found themselues grieued, for that they might not haue the combat for the lie offered them: and yet there was neuer in Fraunce so many murders seene, as when combats were so forbidden. For who should not bee well laughed at, which for the lie giuen him should appeale vnto the judges? And yet in the opinion of the nobilitie and martiall men, he shall seeme to incurre the most heauie note of infa∣mie, which shall not by force of armes repell such a reproach or disgrace offered him. [ B] Neither can the frowardnesse (should I say) or vanitie of so foolish an opinion easily be out of mens minds remoued.

But whereas we before said, that the combat is for the auoiding of greater inconue∣niences* 1.1345 to be borne withall, my meaning is not, that it should be by law allowed, but onely in case of necessitie graunted, and that by the princes expresse letters, after the hearing of the parties, and for the auoyding of murders and seditions, which might otherwise ensue. Whereby that inconuenience shall be auoyded, which otherwise without combat could not be prouided for, that kinsmen, neighbours, and friends, should for one mans wrong in a sort be enforced to take vp armes, and so to entertaine [ C] another mans quarrell: as oftentimes it chaunceth the force and furie of wicked men, to fall vpon the heads of good and worthy subiects. But that is in the hearing of the matter especially to be respected, that combat be not graunted for the triall of any but of capitall causes, and those also whereof no manifest proofe is to be had or found out: following therein also the auntient lawes, which will, That the vanquished should bee declared infamous, and so disgraded of all his estates and honours, condemned to some shamefull death, if he will not better die of the hand of the victor. Which seueritie of punishment, and feare of infamie, might stay many as well from entring into combats, as also from leading of a quarrellous and wicked life. For Philip the Faire hauing for∣bidden combats, thought it not good otherwise to restore them againe vnto the nobi∣litie, [ D] but vpon the cause before knowne vnto the magistrats, as it was by the old decree of the Senat prouided. As by another decree of the same Senat giuen in the contro∣uersie betwixt the counties of Foix and Armagnac, it was said, That combats might not take place, when question was of ciuill right and law, which is yet the custome of them of Berne. And by the lawes of Naples also, it was ordained, That combats should not take place but in cases of treason, and of casuall murder: whereas before it was law∣full in any offence whatsoeuer to chalenge the combat of the aduersarie, theft onely ex∣cept: which yet I see by the custome of them of latter time, not to haue beene without good cause lawfull. Howbeit that by the lawes of Spaine no iust cause of combat is allowed. And thus much concerning priuat and particular quarrels▪ with the meanes [ E] to appease the same.

But if quarrels and contentions arise betwixt whole families, or betwixt whole cor∣porations* 1.1346 and colledges of the same citie or Commonweale, and vpon such like cau∣ses as doe betwixt priuat men: combats in that case are not to haue place▪ but the par∣ties so at oddes are by way of iustice to be kept in good peace; or otherwise by force & sharpe punishment to be inflicted vpon the offendors to be kept in awe; yet for all that in such sort, as that iustice should still haue place euen in armes in the execution doing: as it was in Rome, at such time as by a decree of the Senat it was appointed and set downe, That foure hundred innocent slaues should be all put to death; with which vn∣usuall

manner of execution the common people all inraged was about to haue taken [ F] * 1.1347 vp armes, if the emperor Nero had not for the keeping of them in, dispersed the souldi∣ours of his guard into euery quarter of the citie, so to keepe all quiet, vntill that the exe∣cution was done. Whereof Iustinian the emperour hauing euen in like case failed, fell into the great and daungerous sedition (whereof we before spake) which vpon the sudden set all Constantinople almost vpon a light fire. As not long ago the two most famous cities of Paris and Antwerpe, were in great tumults and vproares, at such time as the people saued from execution certaine persons for their religion condemned to die: whereof the reuolt of the Low countries against the king begun. Neither is this any new matter, but knowne to haue happened in the glory of the Roman Common∣weale: when as at such time as the Consull had commanded one Volero a factious fel∣low [ G] to haue the bastenado giuen him, (as the manner of punishing of such offendors was) the people by force tooke him out of the hands of iustice, euen as hee was to haue bene stripped, and made him Tribune to defend the popular libertie against the Senat and the Nobilitie, with whome the people were still at warre, if they had no enemies abroad. For which cause the Senat and Magistrats chiefe care, was to find out forren enemies to oppose against the people: or if they wanted such, by all meanes to forge new enemies and warres, as knowing them otherwise neuer to cease from seditions & ciuill broyles. For so soone as that the Carthaginensians had made peace with the Ro∣mans, after the first Punique warres, they forthwith entred into a great daungerous ci∣uill warre at home among themselues: which still happened vnto them at Rome, if [ H] they were neuer so little a while without warres. We see also, that they neuer shut vp the temple of Ianus, which was the signe of an vniuersall peace, but twice in seuen hun∣dred yeares space. And if we marke the histories well, wee shall find nothing to haue* 1.1348 bene more daungerons and hurtfull vnto a valiant and warlike people, than peace: For that men accustomed to warres, and still trayned vp in armes, seeke for nothing els but dissentions and broyles, neither hate any thing more than to be at rest and quiet. And that is it for which the histories report Ca. Marius to haue bene the best generall of his time in the warres abroad, but the worst and most troublesome man aliue at home and in time of peace: for that he well knew not what peace & quietnesse meant. Yet whe∣ther it be better in a Commonweale to traine the people vp in peace or warre wee will [ I] hereafter declare.

Now we haue in some sort touched certaine meanes for the preuenting of seditions and part-takings: but as it is much more easie to stay the enemie from entring, than to driue him out after he is once entred; so is it more easie also to preuent seditions and tu∣mults, than to appease the same: and yet that more hardly also in a Popular estate or* 1.1349 Commonweale, than in any other. For why, the prince in a Monarchy, and the lords in an Aristocratie still are, and ought to be, as soueraigne judges and arbitrators of the subiects: and so oft times of their absolute power and authoritie appease and quiet all their differences: wheras in the Popular gouernment the soueraigntie lieth in the peo∣ple themselues, which are so diuided into factions, who in no other acknowledge the [ K] magistrats, but as men subiect vnto their commaund and power. Wherefore in such Commonweales such seditions and factions are with the greatest care and diligence that possible is, to be at the first preuented: but if they bee once risen before they were well foreseene, then it behoueth the most wise and vertuous men in the estate to take the matter in hand: who by their great wisedome and kind speeches may againe ap∣pease the turbulent motions of headstrong and giddie common people. For as they which are sicke of a phrensie, which causeth them to skip and daunce without ceasing, cannot be cured, except the cunning musitian tune his instrument vnto their mad man∣ner

and fashion, to draw them vnto his owne, and so to fall by little and little▪ vntill that [ A] they be so againe made more quiet and tractable: euen so ought also the wise magi∣strate seeing the people in a rage, at the first to accommodate and frame himselfe vnto their disordered appetite, that so he may afterwards by little and little induce them to hearken vnto reason: and so by yeelding at first vnto the tempest, at length put into the desired hauen. For to seeke by force to stay the rage of an angry and incensed mul∣titude, is no other thing than as if a man should by maine strength seeke to stay the force and course of an headie streame, most violently falling from the high and steepe rockes.

And as for them which goe about by force of armes and strong hand to stay the* 1.1350 angrie peoples rage and furie, if they bee not verie strong and well assured of the vi∣ctorie, [ B] they put the estate into great perill and danger: for if the subiect become victor, no doubt but that hee will at his pleasure prescribe lawes vnto the vanquished. And admit that the prince himselfe be not vanquished, yet so it is, that if he attaine not vn∣to the full of his designes, he shall in so doing make himselfe contemptible, giue occa∣sion vnto his other subiects to rebell, for strangers to inuade him, and for all men to contemne him. Which is yet more to bee feared in popular estates, and was most manifestly knowne in the seditions which happened in Rome, wherein they which would needs proceed by force, and openly resist the desires of the people (vp in furie) matred all: whereas to the contrarie, they which sought by faire meanes to win them, [ C] still brought them to reason, and so vpheld the state of the citie, otherwise readie to haue fallen. Appius Claudius seeing the people of Rome to demaund to haue had the obligations and bands for money lent, canceled, (wherein the richer sort and vsurers had a notable interest) was of opinion, not to haue any thing of the due debt remitted. And at another time the people being reuolted from the nobilitie, hee the same man would haue had them most rigorously entreated, without any regard to haue been had of them at all; for that the people otherwise would swell with pride, and become in∣supportable: howbeit, Seruilius at the first time, and Menenius Agrippa at the second, withstood him, and so carried away the matter from him. Which Agrippa shewed in deed, and by a most excellent fable of mans bodie and the parts thereof (which hee so [ D] liuely set before euery mans eyes) that he caused the armes to fall out of the hands of both parties, and so sweetly againe reconciled the people unto the nobilitie: wherby he together with the welfare of the Commonweale, and all mens loue, gained also vnto himselfe immortall fame and glorie. And if so be that wild beasts will neuer by strokes be tamed, but by the kind handling of him that •…•…ameth them: euen so the peo∣ple once moued or enraged, as a beast with many heads, and of all others the wildest and fiercest, is neuer by force, but by good and kind vsage and entreatie to be gained. Wherefore in such time of common vprore and tumult, something is to be graunted vnto the people: and if the sedition be raised for famine or for dearth of victuals, some present distribution is to be made, and reliefe giuen vnto the poorer sort, who are not [ E] with words to bee appeased. For that as Cato the Censor, speaking of the people of Rome, sayd, The hungrie bellie hath no eares. Neither in that case must the magistrats* 1.1351 spare faire words or promises, yea more than is euer to be performed. For that the matter so standing, both Plato and Xenophon giue leaue vnto the magistrates to lie, as physitions to children and their sicke patients. So the wise Pericles, to draw the peo∣ple* 1.1352 of Athens vnto reason, fed them with feasts, with plaies, with comedies, with songs and daunces; and in time of dearth caused some distribution of corne or money to be made amongst them: and hauing by these meanes tamed this beast with many heads, one while by the eyes, another while by the eares, and sometimes by the bellie, hee

then caused wholesome edicts and lawes to bee published, declaring vnto them the [ F] graue and wise reasons thereof: which the people in mutinie, or an hungred, would ne∣uer haue hearkened vnto.

Yet whereas we haue said, that the people is to be flattered, and to haue something* 1.1353 graunted vnto it: yea sometimes euen things vnreasonable; especially in popular and Aristocraticke estates, that is to be vnderstood in time of extremitie, when as it is al∣readie vp in sedition: and not for that one ought still to follow the appetite and passion of the insatiable people, and without reason: But euen to the contrarie, it is so to bee gouerned, as that it be not too hard curbed, neither yet left with the reines at too much libertie. For as it is a right slipperie high standing place to serue the appetite and plea∣sure of the vnsteady people, so is it yet much more daungerous also, openly to oppose [ G] a mans selfe against it: so as did Appius, Coriolanus, Metellus, C•…•…to the younger, Phoci∣on, and Hermiodorus, who whilest they would haue all things of the people by strong hand, and rather breake than bow, they did either vtterly vndoo themselues together with the Commonweale, or at leastwise brought it into most great perill and danger. True it is, that for the prince or magistrats thus to temper maiestie with clemency to∣wards an vnruly and headstrong people, without iudgement and reason, is a most hard and difficult matter: yet is there nothing more necessarie, especially in Popular go∣uernments, than not too much to flatter, neither yet to deale too roughly with the people. But as the Sunne goeth, rising and setting with the other starres and planets, dayly carried about with the most swift motion of the superiour celestiall spheres, and [ H] yet for all that faileth not to performe his owne naturall course by retiring backe by little and little; and that by how much the higher he is mounted vp from the Horison, the lesser hee seemeth for to be: Euen so ought the wise gouernour to doe, following in part the affections and desires of the troubled people, so much the more easily after∣wards* 1.1354 to attaine vnto the full of his designes. And albeit that a prince had the power by force to represse and reforme a mutinous and rebellious people, yet ought he not so to doe, if otherwise he may appease them. For what Physitian is there so inconsiderat, as to vse sections, and cauterisings, or burnings, if the disease might otherwise be cured? And so what prince is there so euill aduised, as by way of force and fact to proceed against his people, if with a kind word speaking hee may appease all? But especially in [ I] a Popular estate, wherein it beseemeth the wise magistrat, by all faire means to appease and quiet the passions of a troubled people, in laying plaine before their eyes the euill successe which may ensue of their so euill and disordered proceedings. We read ther∣of many examples, but yet none more famous than that of Pacuuius Caluinus of Ca∣pua, who being accounted a great fauourer of the comminaltie, and an vtter enemie vnto the nobilitie of that citie, yet vnderstanding of a purpose that the people had vp∣pon the sudden to kill all the Senators of the citie, which so cruell a murder hee greatly detested, but yet seeing the common people so resolutely set downe vpon the matter, as that they were not to be remoued, he himselfe made show also, as if he had as well as any of the rest liked of that the peoples will and purpose, yet withall gaue the Sena∣tors [ K] to vnderstand of the great daunger they were in, and of the purpose he had for the safegard of their liues, willing them to bee of good cheere, and to feare nothing. And* 1.1355 so afterwards the Tribune or chiefe leader of the mutinous people, hauing shut vp all the Senators into a strong place, as men appointed for the slaughter: but indeed so to preserue them from the present furie, hee then with a merrie and chearefull countenance comming forth vnto the angrie people, spake vnto them thus, That which you men of Capua haue oftentimes wished for, That it might once be in your power to be re∣uenged

of the most wicked and abhominable Senat; you now haue the same put into your [ A] hands, not by vprore and tumult, by assaulting and breaking open their houses one by one, which they keepe and defend with strong companies and guards of their seruants and friends, but euen at your pleasure, and without daunger. Receiue them all shut vp in the court, where I will giue you power to pronounce sentence of euery one of their liues. But before all things it behoueth you so to satisfie your anger, as yet to deeme your owne health and welfare better than the satisfying of your rage and wrath. For a Senat you will not altogether bee without: for that you must needs either haue a king, which is a thing to be abhorred; or els a Senat, the onely Councell of a free citie. Wherefore two things rest for you to doe, the one that you take out of the way the old Senat: and the other, that you chuse a new. And this said, hee sat downe; and so the Senatours names beeing all [ B] put into a pot, hee commaunded the first name that was drawne out to bee read, and him so named, to bee brought out of the court. Is it your pleasure then (said hee) that this man shall first die? Whereunto all the people cried alowd, That it was well said of him, and well done. Well, I see then (said Pacuuius) what his doome is: let him bee cast out; and now for him an euill and wicked man, make you choyce of a good and vpright Senator to bee put into his place. Whereupon they all at the first were silent▪ for lacke of a better to make choyce of: but as soone as one more impudent than the rest had named one, presently a greater crie was heard than before; some cry∣ing out, That they knew him not; othersome exclaiming as fast against him as a naughtie base fellow, of some beggerly trade or other, and so vnworthy of the [ C] place: The like sturre there was▪ when choyce was to bee made of the second, and third Senator, the base artificers and trades-men still nominating some one, and some another: in such sort, as that they now began to fall out among themselues, about the choyce, none of them beeing willing to yeeld or giue place to other, which whilest they did in euerie Senator which was named, there was no lesse trouble and sturre among themselues, than was before betwixt them and the Senatours. Where∣uppon they were better contented that the old Senatours should now still hold their places, than to suffer one of them to bee preferred before another. Wherein the councell of the Tribune was right wise, and cunningly by him put in execution: who after hee had by his wise dissimulation somewhat appeased the mad peoples [ D] rage, hee as it were with his finger poynted out, and layed open euen vnto euerie mans eye, the great hurt and inconuenience that was to ensue, by putting the Sena∣tors to death: as that not onely such a shamefull murder should for euer bee ac∣counted most cruell and inhumane; but that also by the dooing thereof the Com∣monweale should bee without councell, as a bodie without a soule; and the fire of sedition raised also amongst the people, about the preferment, and them that were to bee preferred.

But if the people once enraged be alreadie vp in armes, it is a most hard and daun∣gerous* 1.1356 matter to appease them: in so much as that not long agoe there was one that set fire on his owne house (least the Commonweale should with the flames of se∣dition [ E] euen then haue perished) so to turne the citisens then together by the eares to leaue the fray, and to come to helpe to quench the fire, for feare least all should haue beene burnt. Then if any man there bee in vertue and valour exceeding the rest, who will with good speech take vppon him to persuade the people vnto peace and concord, hee onely, or else none, is the man that may appease the peoples frantike fu∣rie and rage. Which thing Virgil most excellently expressed in these few verses fol∣lowing▪

Ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta [ F] Seditio est, saeuit{que} an•…•…mis ignobile vulgus; Iam{que} faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat: Tum pietate grauem ac meritis si fortè virum quem Conspexere, silent, arrectis{que} auribus astant: Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.

And as a sudden tumult rais'd amidst a people great, When as the base and rascall sort are in the greatest heat, And firebrands now and stones do flie, such weapons as there lye, Then if some good graue worthy sire they fortune to espie, [ G] They silent with attentiue eare stand listning to his lore: He with good words their minds doth rule, and calmes the whole vprore.

Such we said Pericles to haue bene in Athens, Menenius Agrippa in Rome, and not long agoe Peter Loredan in Venice, who at such time as the marriners and sea-fa∣ring men banded themselues against the rest of the citisens, and in such sort massacred one another, as that neither duke, neither the Senat, nor other magistrat could come nie, but that they were by force and violence of the furious people reiected; this plaine gentleman Peter Loredan (I say) a priuat citisen, and bearing no office at all, showing* 1.1357 but himselfe in the middest of these combats, and holding but vp his hand on hie, cau∣sed [ H] the weapons to fall out of euery mans hand, for the reuerence they all bare vnto the vertue of so graue a personage; and so as it were in a moment appeased all that ciuill discord. Whereby it was to be seene, vertue to be of greater power and maiestie than armes, than lawes, yea than all the magistrats together.

There is also in the reuerend feare of religion a great power for the staying of the* 1.1358 tumultuous people. For at such time as the Florentines were fallen out into such a fu∣rie among themselues, as that the citie swome with the blood and slaughter of the citi∣sens: and that they could by no meanes be parted, Francis Soderin the bishop attired in his bishoplike attire, and attended vpon with a company of priests, and a crosse carried before him, came into the middest of the furious citisens, so bandying it one against [ I] another; at the sight and presence of whome, they all for the reuerend feare of religi∣on vpon the sudden laid downe their weapons, and so without more adoo, got them∣selues home euery man vnto his owne house. So also Iadus the Iewes high Priest, in his Pontifici•…•…libus met Alexander the Great comming towards Hierusalem with his victorious armie, with whose port and maiestie Alexander terrified, worshipped the High Priest, and was so farre from ransacking either of the countrey or holy citie, as that he gaue it great priuileges, with whatsoeuer the High priest els requested. With like wisedome pope Vrban is reported to haue turned Attila king of the Hungarians from the siege of Aquilia.

But sometime such is the deadly hatred of citisens amongst themselues, as that they [ K] * 1.1359 need of the helpe of their friends and allies, yea and sometimes euen of meere strangers to set them agreed. In which case an other good old man of Florence seeing the citi∣sens without pity to kill and massacre one another, and on all sides to burne one ano∣thers houses, went to request the Luquois their neighbours and friends, to interpose themselues for the appeasing of these so deadly broyles, as had well neere ruinated the whole estate: Wherewith the Luquois mooued, came in great numbers, by whose good trauell and mediation all those slaughters and broyles were well stayed and qui∣ted: a thing both commendable and profitable, not to them onely which are so set a∣greed,

but euen to them also which were the workers therein, as reaping therby great [ A] honour, together with the loue of them whom they so made friends. Yea oftentimes it happeneth, that the citisens deuided into factions, weary at length of their murders and tumults, seeke but to find an occasion for them to fall to agreement; yet being of opinion it to touch them in honour, that should first seeke for peace, therefore continue their bloody quarrels vntill that they haue vtterly ruinated one another, if some third man interpose not himself betwixt them for the making of them friends: which thing oftner happeneth in popular or Aristocratike commonweales, than in a monarchie: wherein the subiects are by the power and authority of one onely prince still to bee set at one, & reconciled amongst themselues, together with the commonweale. How∣be* 1.1360 it, that sometime it happeneth the soueraigne prince to make himselfe a party, in [ B] stead of holding the place of a soueraigne Iudge: in which doing for all that he shall be no more but the head of one party, and so vndoubtedly put himselfe in daunger of his life, and that especially when such daungerous seditions and factions be not groun∣ded vpon matters directly touching his estate, but otherwise, as it hath happened al∣most in all Europe within this fifty yeares, in the warres made for matters of religion: for we haue seene the kingdome of Sweden, of Scotland, of Denmarke, of England, the Cantons of the Swissers, yea and the Germaine empire also, to haue changed their religion, the estate of euery of these monarchies and commonweales yet standing en∣tire and whole: howbeit that the truth is, that it was not done, but with great violence, and much bloudshed in many places. [ C]

But religion by common consent once receiued and setled, is not againe to be cal∣led* 1.1361 into question and dispute, that so all the wayes and entrances vnto sedition and fac∣tion may be stopped, and the assurances of vnity and peace strengthened; for that all things called into disputation, are so also but as things probable called in doubt: and what can come neerer to impiety then by probable arguments to call in doubt the lawes of God, which are by their nature immutable and eternall; and such as of the truth whereof euery man ought to be most certainly resolued and assured Besides that, nothing is so firme and stable, nothing so manifest and cleare (except it rest vpon most* 1.1362 playne and vndoubtfull demonstrations) which may not by disputation and force of arguments be obscured or made doubtfull; and especially where that which is called [ D] into question, or dispute, resteth not so much vpon demonstration or reason, as vppon the assurance of fayth and beleefe onely: which they which seeke by demonstrations and publishing of bookes to performe, they are not onely mad with reason, but wea∣ken also the foundations and grounds of all sorts of religions.

There is a most antient law of Licurgus extant, which the Florentines (of all others the sharpest disputors) established in their popular estate, viz. Ne de legibus semel reep∣ctis ac probatis disserere liceret, That it might not be lawfull to dispute or make question lawes once receiued and allowed. For why he of others the wisest▪ well vnderstood, lawes disputed and reasoned vpon to bee still doubted of; which doubting brought with it an opinion of the iniquity thereof; whereof must needs follow the contempt [ E] both of the lawes and magistrats, and so consequently the ruine and destruction of the whole commonweale. But if Philosophers and Mathematicians cannot abide to haue the principles of their sciences reasoned of, what great folly, or rather madnesse is it to dispute not onely priuatly, but euen openly also of religion alreadie approued. Howbeit that Anaxagoras maintained the snow to be blacke, and Fauorinus the Quar∣taine feuer to bee a very good and wholesome thing; and Carneades hauing one day highly commended iustice, the very next day preferred iniustice before it, and that it was (without all comparison) better to be a verie knaue than a vertuous honest man:

which they all so perfuasiuely did, as that they drew a great number of men to bee in∣deed [ F] of their opinions. Although Aristotle said them which made question, whether snow were white or not, to want sence: but them which doubted whether there were a God or not▪ not to be with arguments refuted, but by the lawes punished: howbeit that he himselfe by necessarie demonstration proued there to be one euerlasting God, and that there could be no moe gods but he. Wherfore, all the kings and princes both of Affricke and of the East, doe most straitly forbid all men to dispute of their religion. Which like strict prohibition is also set downe by the lawes and decrees of Spaine. So also the king of Moscouie seeing his people, who had receiued the rites and ceremo∣nies of the Greekes, diuided into diuers sects and factions, by reason of the diuers prea∣chings and disputations of the ministers: hee thereupon forbad them vppon paine of [ G] death any more to preach or dispute of religion; and withall gaue a booke vnto the bishop and parish priests, wherein was contained what hee would haue euery man persuaded of, and to beleeue, concerning matters of faith and religion, which he com∣maunded them vpon all feastiuall dayes to reade and publish vnto the people: with a capitall paine thereunto annexed, if by any mans exposition any thing were at all thereunto either added or diminished. And Moyses, when hee had most curiously written all those things which he had learned and receiued from Almightie God, and declared the same vnto the people: yet in one chapter of the law (the people yet wan∣dering vp and downe in the desart) he commaunded the priests and Leuits aloud and distinctly to reade the law, yea, and that dayly also, that so it might bee vnderstood [ H] and knowne vnto the people of euery age and sexe: and so in another chapter for∣bad any thing to be vnto the lawes of God either added or detracted. Yet sayth hee not, that they should dispute thereof: but euen to the contrarie, the Hebrewes instru∣cted by the prophets from the father to the sonne: they teaching the law of God in seuen Colledges, which then were in mount Syon, neuer yet suffered men to enter in∣to disputation thereof, as we read in Optatus Mileuit•…•…nus. For why, disputation was* 1.1363 inuented▪ but for things probable and doubtfull; and not for things religious and ne∣cessarie, and such as euery man is bound to beleeue: which by disputation are al∣waies made doubtfull. Wherefore seeing that disputations of religion bring not only the doubt and ouerthrow of religions, but euen the ruine and destruction of Com∣monweales [ I] * 1.1364 also; it behooueth them to be by most strait lawes forbidden: which after long ciuill war was by the estates and princes of the Germane empire prouided for, and a decree made, that the princes should with mutuall consent defend both the Romane and Saxon religion: whereunto that was also ioyned, That no man should vpon paine of death dispute of the religions. Which seuere punishments, after that the Germane magistrates had inflicted vpon diuers, all Germany was afterwards at good quiet & rest: no man daring more to dispute of matters of religion. Moreouer, seeing that not onely all wise law-giuers and Philosophers, but euen the very Atheists themselues also (as namely * 1.1365 Polybius himselfe an Atheist) are of accord, That there is nothing which doth more vphold and maintaine the estates and Commonweals than religion: and that it [ K] is the principall foundation of the power and strength of monarchies and Seignories: as also for the execution of justice, for the obedience of the subiects, the reuerence of the* 1.1366 magistrats, for the feare of doing euill, and for the mutuall loue and amitie of euery one towards other, it is by most strait and seuere lawes to be prouided; that so sacred a thing as is religion be not by childish and sophisticall disputations, (and especially by such as are publickely had) made contemptible, or by probable arguments made doubtful, and so at length quite taken out of the minds, both of the hearers & of the disputors toge∣ther. Neither are they to be heard which thinke themselues to be able with more subtill

reasons to persuade all things: for that as Papinian most wisely said, Summa ratio est [ A] quae pro religione facit, It is of all the greatest reason, which tendeth to the maintai∣nance of Religion.

I will not here in so great varietie of people so much differing among themselues in* 1.1367 religion, take vpon me to determine which of them is the best (howbeit that there can be but one such, one truth, and one diuine law, by the mouth of God published) but if* 1.1368 the prince well assured of the truth of his religion, would draw his subiects thereunto, diuided into sects and factions, hee must not therein (in mine opinion) vse force: (For that the minds of men the more they are forced, the more froward and stubborne they are; and the greater punishment that shall be inflicted vppon them, the lesse good is to be done; the nature of man being commonly such as may of it selfe bee led to like [ B] of anything, but neuer enforced so to doe) but rather it he houeth the prince so per∣suaded of the truth of his religion, without fainting or dissembling to professe and fol∣low the same, still deuoutly seruing the almightie God: by which meanes he shall both turne the will and minds of his subiects vnto the admiration and imitation of himselfe, and at length also plucke vp euen the verie rootes of all sects and opinions: In which doing he shall not onely auoid commotions, troubles, and ciuill warres, but lead al∣so his straying subiects vnto the port of health. Whereof as there are many exam∣ples, so is there none more fit for this our purpose, than that of Theodosius the elder, who at the beginning of his raigne found all the prouinces of the empire full of Arri∣ans, [ C] whose strength and power was so growne and encreased vnder three or foure Ar∣rian emperous their fauourors, as that their doctrine was not onely by eight councels confirmed, which were at diuers times assembled at Tyre, at Sardis, at Sirme, at Mi∣lan, Seleucia, Nice, Tarsis, and especially at Ariminum (where six hundred bishops were of their opinion: and but three of name which held the contrarie) but that they also punished other their aduersaries of opinion contrarie vnto themselues, with confis∣cations, proscriptions, and other most grieuous punishments. Yet would not this good emperour now come vnto the empire, either force or punish the Arrians, al∣though that hee deadly hated them, but graunted vnto them both the Arrians (I say) and the Catholikes, their churches, and suffered them in euerie towne to haue two bi∣shops, [ D] of either religion one: and albeit that hee at the importunat suit and instance of the Catholike bishops, commaunded certaine edicts to bee published against the Arri∣ans, yet was hee well contented to haue the same holden in suspence, and not put in∣to execution; as his letters vnto Ambrose in these words declare, Trade Arrianis Ba∣silicam, mei namque sunt omnia iuris, Giue (saith hee) vnto the Arrians a church: for that all are in my power. Which thing Rotaris also king of the Lombards by his law permitted. And yet neuerthelesse this emperor liuing according to his religion, and in∣structing his children & kinsmen in the same, wonderfully diminished the Arian sect in Europe: howbeit that they haue euer since continued, and so yet do, both in Asia and Affrike, vnder the law of Mahomet, grounded vpon the same foundation. The great [ E] emperour of the Turkes doth with as great deuotion as any prince in the world honour and obserue the religion by him receiued from his auncestours, and yet dete∣steth hee not the straunge religions of others; but to the contrarie permitteth euery man to liue according to his conscience: yea and that more is, neere vnto his pallace at Pera, suffereth foure diuers religions, viz. That of the Iewes, that of the Christi∣ans, that of the Grecians, and that of the Mahometanes: and besides that, sendeth almes vnto the Calogers or religious Monkes, dwelling vppon the mountaine Athos (being Christians) to pray for him: as did Augustus to the Iews, to whom he ordinarily

sent his almes and perpetuall sacrifices to Hierusalem, which hee commaunded to bee [ F] there dayly made for the health of himselfe, and of the Commonweale. For why the people of auntient time were persuaded, as were the Turks, All sorts of religions which proceed from a pure mind, to be acceptable vnto the gods. And albeit that the Romans easily admitted not straunge religions into their Commonwealeas (as in the warres against them of Veios the Aediles had in charge, Ne qui nisi Romani dij, neu quo alio mo∣re quam patrio Colerentur, That no gods should be worshipped but the Roman gods, neither after any other manner than after the manner of the countrey) yet for all that did they easily suffer euery man priuatly within the citie to vse his owne manner and fa∣shion, and his owne religion: yea the Romans themselues receiued into the citie the sacrifices of Isis and of Esculapius, and suffered the Pantheon to be dedicated to all the [ G] gods. Only the Iewes of all people detested straunge ceremonies: whereby they pro∣uoked the hatred of all people against them. For at such time as Antiochus the Noble besieged Hierusalem, the Iewes tooke truce with him for eight dayes, wherein they might keepe holy the Feast of their deliuerance out of Aegypt, dedicated vnto the ho∣nour of the immortall God: Whereunto Antiochus (as Plutarch writeth) willingly condescended; and yet not so contented, with great reioicing brought also bulles and rammes for the furnishing of the sacrifice euen vnto the gates of the citie. Howbeit that afterwards the time of the truce expired, he tooke the citie and sacked it. But as he was about therein to haue sacrificed after the manner of the Greekes, the Priests & Leuites cursing and banning, forsooke the Temple. For which cause Antiochus enfor∣ced [ H] them, as contemners of the gods, to receiue the Greeke ceremonies and sacrifices, yea and caused hogges also to be killed in the temple, and the Iewes to bee enforced to eat of them, tormenting such as refused so to do with all kind of torments and tor∣tures, which in that citie wrought the change both of the religion and state. But Pto∣lomeus Lagus (as Agatharchides writeth) and after him Pompeius, after long siege hauing taken Hierusalem (the same day that the Iewes had before taken truce with Antiochus) yet both of them kept their hands from sacrilege: which Crassus did not, neither Flac∣cus: whome yet Cicero denieth to haue taken any gold belonging vnto the temple; in which oration, as serued for his purpose, hee said, The gods of the Iewes to haue de∣liuered their seruants from the bondage of the Romans. So that the Iewes detesting [ I] the gods of other nations, caused all other people and nations most grieuously to hate and contemne them: For at such time as Quadratus being President of Iudea, a com∣mon souldiour had in contempt showed his tayle vnto the Iewes, as they were sacrifi∣sing in the temple, such an vpro•…•…e and tumult ensued thereof, as that twentie thousand of the Iewes were there slaine. At which time the Iewes by a decree of the Senat, were driuen also out of Rome: where Tiberius caused such as would not remoue thence, ei∣ther to chaunge their religion, or to become slaues; but this was done in Rome onely. For the same Tiberius forbad Pilat, who had determined to haue placed certain shields and escutchions in the temple of the Iewes, to place the same, or to alter any thing of their religion. But Alexander Seuerus the emperor in his priuat sacrifices worship∣ped [ K] Abraham, Orpheus, Hercules, and Christ. But when the Christians as well as the Iewes, had begun to detest those thirtie thousand gods which Pindarus now in his time worshipped, and so began to breed a contempt of the gods in the minds of men, the princes and magistrats began likewise with most grieuous punishments to persecute them, except they would forsweare Christ and the Christian religion, the Iewes (bea∣ring themselues vpon the antiquitie of their religion) being become their accusers and enformers against them, least they should seeme partakers of the same impietie with them. And thus as the multitude of religion and sects was innumerable, some dete∣sting

the rites and ceremonies of others: so thereof proceeded also the diuers and [ A] manifold chaunges of Commonweales. And albeit that tyrants had before exercised incredible cruelties vpon their subiects, yet neuer thought they it lawfull for them to rule ouer mens minds before the time of this Antiochus, whome wee but euen now spoke of. Which was the cause that Theodoricus king of the Gothes (though fauou∣ring the Arrians) would not yet enforce the conscience of his subiects, nor haue them tormented for their religion; least vnder the pretence of impietie hee should haue seemed to haue taken the spoyle of their goods, or bind their minds, which could by no threats or commaunds be constrained or bound. For so he wri•…•…ing vnto the Senat* 1.1369 at Rome, vseth these words, Religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur vt cre∣dat inuitus, Religion (saith he) we cannot commaund, for that no man is compelled [ B] against his will to beleeue: as we read in Cassiodore: Which reason of all others see∣meth vnto me most effectuall, for the taking away of such punishments, as are vnder the colour of religion to be inflicted vpon the subiects. Wicked and straunge rites & ceremonies, and such other as the greater part of the subiects of greatest power detest, I thinke it good and profitable to haue them kept out of the Commonweale. For the preseruation of the subiects loue amongst themselues, which is especially nouished & maintained by their consent and agreement in matters of religion: yet if the same reli∣gion be liked of by the opinion of neighbour nations, and of many of the subiects, then ought it not onely with punishments not to be restrained, but also so much as may be prouided, that if it may not without sedition bee publikely profes•…•…ed, yet that no [ C] man be forbidden the priuat exercise of such his religion. For otherwise it shall come* 1.1370 to passe, that they which are destitute of the exercise of their religion, and withall dista∣sted of the religion of the others, shall become altogether Atheists (as wee daily see) and so after that they haue once lost the feare of God, tread also vnder foot both the lawes and magistrats, and so inure themselues to all kinds of impieties and villanies, such as is impossible by mans lawes to be redressed. Howbeit what lettteth vs to fol∣low the councell of the most holy prophets, of whom * 1.1371 the one persuaded his countri∣men l•…•…d away into captiuitie into Chaldea, That at such time as they should bee enfor∣ced to fall downe before the idols, yet that they should with a pure mind alwayes wor∣ship the euer liuing God: & the * 1.1372 other admitted the request or excuse of Naaman the [ D] king of Syria his seruant, but newly instructed in the true religion and seruice of God, if he were present with the king his maister sacrificing vnto a straunge god, so that hee kept his mind pure and cleane from idolatrie. For they are much deceiued, which think Commonweales to be better kept in order by mens commands and lawes, than by the feare of God his iudgements. For as the greatest tyranny is nothing so miserable as an* 1.1373 Anatchie, when as there is neither prince nor magistrat, none that obeieth, neither yet any that commaundeth, but that all men liue as they list at libertie in all loosenesse of life, without feare of punishment. So the greatest superstition that is, is not by much any thing so detestable as Atheisme. And truely they (in mine opinion) offend much, which thinke that the same punishment is to bee appointed for them that make many [ E] gods, and them that would haue none at all: or that the infinitie of gods admitted, the almightie and euerliuing God is thereby taken away. For that superstition how great soeuer it be, doth yet hold men in feare and awe, both of the laws and of the magistrats, as also in mutuall duties and offices one of them towards another: whereas meere Atheisme doth vtterly root out of mens minds all the feare of doing euill. Wherfore two inconueniences propounded▪ Superstition (I say) and Atheisme, we must still de∣cline the greater: yet when we may not publikely vse the true religion, which still con∣sisteth in the worshipping of one almightie and euerlasting God: least by contemning

of the religion which is publikely receiued, we should seeme to allure or stirre the sub∣iects [ F] vnto impietie or sedition, it is better to come vnto the publike seruice, so that the mind still rest in the honour and reuerence of one almightie and euer liuing God.

But now, whereas some men maruell how it came to passe, that in the time of Theo∣dosius,* 1.1374 considering the diuersitie of sects and of religions that then were, they could so stand without ciuill warres, being then at the least an hundred diuers sorts of them ac∣cording to the account of Tertullian and Epiphanius: whereof the cause was, the multi∣tude and varietie of such different opinions, which so still held one of them in counter∣poise with another. Now in matters of sedition and tumult, nothing is more dange∣rous, than to haue the subiects diuided into two opinions or factions onely, whether it be before matters of estate, or of religion, or for the lawes and customes, or other mat∣ters [ G] whatsoeuer that the subiects are so diuided. For that but one thing can by nature be contrary vnto another thing: and moe things than one to be contrarie vnto one, is a thing not to be imagined. So that where there be moe than two sects or sorts, there must needs be some in the meane betwixt the two contrarie extreames, which may set them agreed, which otherwise of themselues would neuer fall to agreement. And ther∣fore Solon by law prouided, That in ciuill seditions and troubles, euery man should of* 1.1375 necessitie take either the one or other part, and that it should not bee lawfull for any man to stand as neu•…•…er: which vnto many seemed a thing vnreasonable, considering that the greatest prayse and commendation of a good subiect is; to bee a quiet ciuill man, desirous and doing the best that he can to liue in peace. Besides that, by this means [ H] the conscience of an honest man is forced, to take either the one or other part, when as haply he thinketh both naught, and that they are both in the wrong. And that more is, it may so happen, that if in such seditions he will follow that part which hee iudgeth the better, he must beare armes euen against his father, against his brethren, and friends, which are in armes in the other side: which were the way so to compell men to com∣mit vnnaturall murders, and to kil euen them whom we ought to defend, & to depriue them of life, by whom we our selues liue. In briefe the law of God forbiddeth him that knoweth the truth, to follow the common opinion of them which are out of the way: whereunto Solons law seemeth to repugne, in forcing a man to take either the one part or the other, although that they be both naught. Howbeit that a man might say vn∣to [ I] the contrarie, this Solons law to be most profitable and necessarie also vnto Popular and Aristocratike estates, wherein is no soueraigne, which standing as neu•…•…er, may de∣termine and decide the differences of them which shall so bee at discord and variance. For men well know, that the most craftie men in time of ciuill warres, withdraw them∣selues so much as possibly they can out of the preasse, if they be not well assured of the victorie of the part that they themselues take (if it bee not so, that they see the daunger such, as that the publike fire is like to take hold and burne euen their own priuat houses) yea oftentimes the more subtill and deceitfull sort set the rest at dissention and debate, that so they may themselues the better fish in troubled water, and make a bridge for themselues to passe ouer, to ceize vpon other mens goods and honors: imitating ther∣in [ K] the priests of Mars, whome the auntients called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Fire-bearers, who ha∣uing orderly performed their solemne execrations, cast fire brands betwixt both armies standing readie ranged, and so stirred them vp to battell: but yet retired themselues in safetie out of the medley and daunger. Now if the law of Solon might take place, these fire makers durst not sow debate and discord among the citisens, seeing that they must themselues then run into the same danger with others. And as for other honest men which loue peace, and like neither of the one nor other faction, if they must needs be constrained to take a part, they will then enforce themselues by all means to preuent

seditions, and in what they may to withstand them: or if they cannot be foreseene, yet [ A] to do what they may to appease them. For why, the great vertue and authoritie of good subiects is of great force to keepe the rash and mad vulgar people in some order: and to persuade them being disquieted againe vnto reason, who would euer be at ods and variance, if they were not by the good councell of the wiser sort better persuaded. By which reasons Solons law seemeth to be vnto cities and Commonweales profita∣ble. Besides that, if in the leagues and societies of princes among themselues, it be good and profitable for them all, some one of them to be of greater power than the rest, or at leastwise to ioyne himselfe with them that bee of greatest power: how much more true and profitable is it in ciuill warres still to take the one or the other part: where hee which standeth as neuter, as he is of no man protected, so lieth he open to the common [ B] * 1.1376 spoyle of all men. For so Theramenes, who all the time of the Peloponesian war, and the troubles of the Athenians, had kept himselfe quiet, and stood still looking on, but as an idle beholder, without taking part either with the one or with the other, was him∣selfe at the last forsaken of all, and so left vnto the mercie of the tyrants, who made him a miserable spectacle vnto all men, and in the end most cruelly put him to death. Hee therefore which will stand as neuter, whether it be in ciuill warre, or in warres amongst straungers, ought at the least to doe his endeuour to set the rest agreed: or if hee shall see the quarrels, warres, and ruines of others, to tend to the profit of the better sort, or the assurance of his estate, his wealth or person (as it sometimes happeneth that tyrants [ C] and wicked subiects or citisens agree not but for to •…•…uinat the good) yet ought he which so standeth as neuter, to show himselfe in appearance desirous and forward to set them agreed: which many men haue done euen then when they most nourished and main∣tained such quarrels in the most secret manner they could: A thing which God (as Sa∣lomon* 1.1377 saith) abhorreth: if it be not in case (as I haue said) that the concord and agree∣ment of the euill, tend to the ineuitable ruine and decay of the good. For as for one good vertue, there are many vices one of them quite contrarie vnto another; and that for one good man, there be ten which are nothing worth: so God hath also appoin∣ted, That the euill and wicked men should euen one of them by another be brought to ruine and destruction: I will reuenge me (saith God, speaking by the mouth of the pro∣phet [ D] Ieremie) of mine enemies, by mine enemies. I haue said, that good princes and good subiects ought to dissemble the good and pleasure they take in the discord and conten∣tion of other the wicked princes or citisens; for that there is nothing which grieueth a man more, than to see others in all securitie, to take pleasure and reioyce in his ruine and decay.

Thus haue we seene certaine meanes for the appeasing of tumults and seditions* 1.1378 amongst many. For which there might yet some more particulars bee also rehearsed; as to take away the vse of belles from rebellious or seditious citisens: so as wee read to haue bene done in the rebellions at Montpelier, and at Bourdeaux, which were yet af∣terward vnto them againe not without a great fine restored: howbeit that the greater [ E] part of the inhabitants of Bourdeaux most instantly requested, That they might not be so restored, hauing felt the commoditie that came thereby. But whether well or euill, I leaue it to the resolution of euery man of sound iudgement. The great emperour of the Turkes, with the other princes of the East, haue taken strait order, That this inuen∣tion of belles, first deuised in Italie, should not into any of their dominions or territo∣ries be receiued: whereby they haue well auoided one of the greatest occasions of ci∣uill tumults and broyles. The noyse and backward ringing of the belles (as when hou∣ses be on fire) being not onely proper vnto straunge accidents, and to put the muti∣nous people into armes, but also to trouble euen the quiet spirits of peaceable men,

and to thrust fooles headlong into fury: as did he, who the more to sturre vp the people [ F] rung the Tocsaine, together with the great bell at Bourdeaux, and was therefore him∣selfe hanged in the belrope, as he had well deserued.

Another and the most vsuall way to preuent sedition, is to take away the subiects* 1.1379 armes: howbeit that the princes of Italy, & of the East cannot endure that they should at all haue armes; as doe the people of the North and of the West: no more then they did in auncient time in Greece and in Asia. For so Aristotle speaking of the Barbari∣ans, accounteth it for a strange thing, that a man should in a quiet and peaceable citie* 1.1380 weare a sword or a dagger in time of peace: which by our lawes, as also by the man∣ners and customes of the Germaines and Englishmen is not onely lawfull; but by the lawes and decrees of the Swissers euen necessarily commaunded: the cause of an infi∣nit [ G] number of murders, hee which weareth a sword, a dagger, or a pistoll, being more fierce and insolent to offer vnto others iniury, as also to commit murder if any iniurie be offered him: whereas if he were disarmed, he should doe neither the one nor the o∣ther; neither should yet incurre the infamy and disgrace which followeth them, who when they are wronged, dare not to draw their weapons. The Turkes herein go yet farther, not onely in punishing with all seuerity the seditious and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 people, but also by forbidding them to beare armes, yea euen in time of warre, except it bee when they are to giue battell: wheras otherwise if the enemie be not nie, they lay their armes vp in their tents, or in their carriages: and yet they are accounted the best soldi∣ours of the world: which if they doe in the field, and in time of warre, what is it to be [ H] thought them to doe in their townes, and in time of peace?

Amongst many the lawdable manners and customes of the policy of Paris, there is one a very good one, and well put in execution, which is, That no car-man or por∣ter shall weare sword, dagger, knife, or any other offensiue weapon, and that for the murders by them committed in their ordina•…•…ie quarrels which they still had one of them against another▪ which if it might take place vpon all persons: also a thousand murders and stabbings are committed, which should neuer haue happened, neither the seditions and broyles raysed, which haue vpon this occasion bene in many places kin∣dled. For it is not the part of a wise polititian, neither of a good gouernour, to expect vntill the murder be committed, or that the sedition be raysed, before he forbid the bea∣ring [ I] of armes, but as a good phisition preuenteth diseases: and if chaunce be that the partie be sodainly attainted with any violent griefe, he first asswageth the present paine, and that done applyeth conuenient remedies vnto the causes of the disease: euen so the wise prince ought (so much as in him lyeth) to preuent sedition, as also when they are happened to appease them at what charge soeuer: and then afterward to looke into the cause of the diseases farthest off from the effects, and so thereunto to apply re∣medies conuenient.

Now we haue before spoken of the causes which worke the chaunge of estates and* 1.1381 commonweales, of which selfe same causes proceed also seditions and ciuill warres, as of the denyall of iustice, of the oppression of the common people, of the inequall di∣stribution [ K] of punishments, and of rewards; of the excessiue riches of some few in num∣ber, and extreame pouertie of the greater sort; of the too great idlenesse of the subiects, or of the impunitie of offendors: and it may be that this last point is therein of greatest consequence or importance, and yet the least of all regarded. Which as I haue before touched, so must I also oftentimes repeat the same, for that the princes and magistrats which desire to be accounted mercifull, do oftentimes turne vpon their owne heads the same punishment that the offendors deserued. And that is it for which the wise Hebrew hath so oftentimes aduised vs, Not to become suretie for another man: not for that he

forbiddeth a charitable dealing one of vs towards another (as many haue thought) but [ A] rather to giue all men to vnderstand, That they which become sureties for wicked men, and so find meanes to deliuer them from deserued punishment, shall beare the pain of the offendors guilt therefore. As was said to king Achab, who had saued the life of Benadab the king of Syria, whom hee should haue put to death, God caused it to bee told vnto him by his prophet, That he was become suretie for another man, and that it should surely cost him his life therefore. Which being but spoken in particular vnto this one king, extendeth yet in general vnto all princes and Commonweals, who haue no more certaine cause of their ruine and decay, than the want of the due execution of iustice. To punish the rebellious, is also one of the meanes to preuent and meet with re∣bellions yet to come, which how it is to be done we haue before said, when as wee rea∣soned [ B] of punishments to be vpon corporations and colledges inflicted; which is to take place when some one corporation, or the least part of the subiects haue erred or of∣fended; but not if all the people in generall, or the greatest part of them be in fault: For albeit that the physitian or surgeon sometimes for the preseruation of the whole bodie, cuts off a mans leg or arme, yet must he not therfore cut off the head, or any other of the principall members, if they shall chance to be infected: but therin follow the wise coun∣cell of the great Physitian Hippocratts, who vnto desperat diseases forbiddeth vs to ap∣ply any remedy at all. But beside the causes of seditions & rebellions, which wee haue* 1.1382 before spoke of, there is yet another, which dependeth of the immoderat libertie of [ C] speech giuen to orators, who direct & guide the peoples hearts & minds according to their owne pleasure. For there is nothing that hath more force ouer the minds of men, than hath eloquence: So that our ancestors haue not without cause pu•…•…traied Hercules Celtique not as a yong & strong man with a great club in his hand, but as a reuerend bauld old man, drawing after him a great number of people enchained, & hanging by the eares with chaines, which all issued out of his mouth; to shew, that the armies and power of kings and monarchs are not so strong as the vehemencie and force of an elo∣quent man, who encourageth & enflameth the most cowardly & faint hearted to van∣quish euen the most valiant, who striketh armes out of the hands of the most couragi∣ous, who turneth rage into mildnesse, & barbarisme into ciuility, who changeth whole [ D] Commonweals, and sporteth with the people at his pleasure. Which I say not for the prayse of eloquence, but to shew the force & power therof, which is oftner emploied to* 1.1383 euill, than to good. For seeing that this is nothing els but a disguising of the truth, and an art to make that seeme good, which is indeed naught, & that right which is wrong, and to make a great matter of nothing, as of an Emot an Elephant (that is to say, an art to lie cunnungly) wee need not doubt, but that for one which vseth this art well, fiftie vse the same euill, & that amongst 50 Orators it is hard to find an honest man. For that to seeke after the plaine & bare truth, were a thing altogether contrarie vnto their pro∣fession, seeing that the best rule that Cicero giueth vnder the person of Marcus Antonius the Orator, is to say nothing against himself: or rather as Aristotle saith, So well to dis∣guise [ E] matters, as that the deceit thereof cannot not be discouered: or to speake more plainly, to couer all things with lies and dissimulation. So that if we will but wel looke into al them which had the name to haue beene the most noble and famous Orators, we shall find them to haue beene still the stirrers vp of the people to sedition, to haue of∣tentimes changed the laws, the customs, the religions, and Commonweals, yea & some others of them to haue vtterly ruinated the same; in which doing they haue also al∣most all of them ended their dayes by violent death. Which it is not needfull here to proue by the Orators of Athens, or of Rome, but euen by those of our age, who haue so well besturred themselues, as that vnder the colour of religion they haue trou∣bled

all the empires both of Affrike & of the West: yea and many of them so wrested [ F] the scepters euen out of the kings hands. As it happened vnto the king of Marocco, des∣cended (as is supposed) from the house of Ioseph, from whom a preacher vnder the vaile of religion tooke both the crowne and scepter: & albeit that he was commonly called the Asse Knight, yet preached he so well, as that he assembled an armie of sixscore thousand men to take his part. In like sort he which was first called the Sophi, inuaded the kingdome of Persia, and in short time draue out the children of Vsun Cassan the lawfull king, vnder the same coulour of religion. As also not long agoe Iohn of Lei∣den (who of a botcher became a preacher) ceised vpon Munster the Metropoliticall citie of Westphalia, and there taking vpon him the state of a king, was hardly after three yeares siege by the imperiall armie thence remoued. And by the selfe same [ G] meanes Hierome Sauanarola a preacher, incited by Anthonie Soderin, vppon the con∣tention which happened among the inhabitants at Florence, about the estate, so much preuailed with his persuasions vnto the people, as that hee translated the soueraigntie from the nobilitie vnto the people, and chaunged the Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate. No otherwise than had before Ephialtes, by the setting on of Pericles by his seditious orations, drawne vnto the people the soueraigntie of that state, taken from the Senat of the Areopagi; and so made the Athenian estate of all others the most Popular. And to be briefe, we haue seene all Germany in armes, and an hundred thou∣sand men slaine in lesse than in a yeare space, after that the mutinous preachers had stir∣red vp the people against the nobilitie. How often hath the speeches of preachers bene [ H] heard, tending by all meanes to haue incited the princes and people to kill, massacre, & burne their subiects: as did in auntient time Nestorius, preaching before the emperor at Constantinople in this sort, Giue me emperour, the earth void of heretikes, and I will giue thee heauen: destroy with me the heretikes, and I with thee wil ruinat the power of the Per∣sians: for which he was called the Fire maker: For had the emperour giuen credence vnto him, he had so put to death the greatest part, and almost all his subiects, and Ne∣storius himselfe first of all. Wherefore a knife is not more daungerous in the hand of a* 1.1384 mad man, than eloquence in the mouth of a mutinous Orator. And yet neuerthelesse it is a meane for them which will well vse it, to reduce the people from barbarisme to hu∣manitie, to reforme disordered maners, to correct the lawes, to chastice tyrants, to cast [ I] out vices, to maintaine vertue. And as men charme the Aspis, Vipers, and Serpents, by certaine words; euen so the Orators (as Plato saith) by the sweetnesse of their eloquent persuations, charme euen the most sauage and cruell people. Neither is there any other* 1.1385 greater or better means for the appeasing of seditions & tumults, and to keepe the sub∣iects in the obedience of their princes, than to haue a wise and vertuous preacher, by whom they may bend and bow the hearts of the most stubborne rebels, especially in a Popular estate, wherein the ignorant people beareth the sway, and cannot possibly bee kept in order but by the eloquent Orators: which for this cause haue alwayes holden the chiefe degree of honour & power in such Popular estates, causing the honourable charges & commissions, gifts and rewards, to be still giuen to whom they saw good: so [ K] that in briefe both peace & war, arms and laws, wholy depended on the pleasure of the Orators. And so to the contrarie, there is nothing more to be dreaded in a tyrant, than the Orator which hath the bent of the peoples bow, and is in credit & estimation with them, especially if he hate the tyrant, or his Tyrannicall gouernment. But forasmuch as the rules by vs alreadie set downe, ought to bee applied vnto the nature of Common∣weals, and that the Commonweals, laws & customs, are likewise to bee fitted vnto the nature & disposition of euery nation. Let vs now also speake of the nature of al people, as of a thing most necessary for the good gouernment of Estates and Commonweales.

THE FIFT BOOKE OF [ A] [ B] OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEALE.

CHAP. I. ¶ What order and course is to be taken, to apply the forme of a Commonweale to the diuersitie of mens humors, and the meanes how to discouer the nature and disposition of the people.

[ C]

HItherto we haue treated of that which concernes the gene∣rall Estate of Commonweales; Let vs now shew what may be particular to some, through the diuersitie of peoples hu∣mors, to the end that wee may accommodat the publike weale to the nature of the place; and the ordinances of man to the laws of nature, wherof many haue had small regard: but striuing to make nature obedient to their edicts, haue* 1.1386 oftentimes troubled, yea ruined great estates. And yet those which haue written of a Commonweale, haue not treated [ D] of this question. For euen as we see a great varietie in all sorts of beasts, and in euery kind some notable alteration for the diuersitie of regions: in like sort we may say, that there is in a manner as great difference in the nature and disposition of men, as there is of countries: yea in the same climats the people of the East are found to differ much from them of the West: And in the same latitude and difference from the Equator, the people of the North differ from them of the South: And which is more, in the same climat, latitude, and longitude, and vnder the same degree, we find a difference betwixt a hilly countrey and the plaines: so at in the same citie, the diuersitie of hills and vallies forceth a diuersitie of humors and dispositions: And townes seated vppon vneuen* 1.1387 places, are more subiect to seditions and chaunges, than those that are built vppon an [ E] equall and plaine ground. The citie of Rome, which hath seuen hils, was neuer long without sedition. And Plutarch (hauing not duely examined the cause) doth wonder why there were three factions in Athens of diuers humors: those of the high citie, which they called Astu, demaunded a Popular State; those of the base towne requi∣red Oligarchia, or the gouernment of few; and the inhabitants of the Port Pjree, desi∣red an Aristocraticall State, that is, a mixt gouernment of the nobilitie and the people: whereof wee will soone shew you a naturall cause. And if Theophrastus find it strange that the people of Greece be so different in manners and dispositions, who would not admire to see such contrarie humors in one and the same citie? we cannot impute it to

the mixture of people which haue come thither from all parts, seeing that Plutarch [ F] speaketh of Solons time, when as the Athenians were so little mingled with any other nations, as they held for certaine, that they were issued out of the land of Attica, wher∣in the Orator Aristides doth glorie. In lik sort we say the Swissers (hauing their ori∣ginall out of Sweden) to be verie different in manners, nature, and gouernment: for although they be more strictly allied than euer any nations were, yet the fiue small can∣tons of the mountaines, and the Grisons, are held more fierce and more warlike, and do gouerne wholy popularly: the rest are more tractable, and are gouerded by an Aristo∣cratie, being more enclined thereunto, than to a Popular estate. It is needfull to haue a speciall care to the nature and inclination of the people, if wee will chaunge an estate* 1.1388 as it happened in Florence, about an hundred years since, when as the Commonweale [ G] by succession of time was almost chaunged into Aristocratia, the citisens beeing so en∣creased, as they were forced thrise to enlarge the compasse of their walles. For the preuention whereof the Senat was assembled, and the matter propunded: whereas the Senatour Vespucius did show by liuely reasons, That an Aristocraticall estate was without all comparison the most sure, and farre better than a Popular gouernment; giuing for an example the state of Venice, flourishing vnder the commaund of few gen∣tle men: but Antonie Soderine maintained a Popular estate, and preuailed; saying, That* 1.1389 the nature of the Venetians was proportionable to an Aristocratie, & the Florentines to a Popular estate. We will soone shew if his grounds were true. We read also, that the Ephesians, Milesians, and the Siracusians were almost of the Florentines humor: [ H] for they could not endure any but a Popular estate, nor allow any one to exceed his companions, banishing euen those that surmounted in vertue: and yet the Athenians, Ephesians, and Milesians, were much more mild and tractable; so were they much neerer the East: and contrariwise the Siracusians, Florentines, and Carthagineans, were* 1.1390 much more fierce and rebellious, beeing more Westward. The people of the East haue much more ostentation and many words, in the iudgement of all auntient wri∣ter, and euen of the ambassadour of the Rhodiots, excusing the fault of his maisters, vp∣on their naturall inclination, making mention also of the naturall vices of other people, Gentes aliae (inquit) iracundae, aliae audaces, quaedam timidae, in vinum ac venerem pronio∣res aliae sunt, Atheniensium populum fama est celerem & supra vires audacem ad conan∣dum, [ I] Lacedemoniorum cunctatorem: non negauerim & totam Asiae regionem inaniora* 1.1391 parere ingenia, & nostrorum tumidiorem sermonem esse, Some nations (said he) are cho∣lerike, others bold; some fearfull, others prone to wine and women; the people of Athens are said to be sudden, and exceeding bold to attempt any thing; the Lacede∣monians are slow and deliberat: I will not denie, but that all the region of Asia brings* 1.1392 forth vaine wits, and ours great talkers. The people of Athens (said Plutarch) were cholerike and pitifull, taking pleasure in flatteries, and enduring easily a scoffe: but those of Carthage were cruell and reuengefull, humble to their superiours, and imperious to their subiects, faint hearted in aduersitie, and insolent in prosperitie. The people of Rome contrarie vnto them were patient in their losses, constant in their victories, mo∣derat [ K] in their passions, hating flatterers, and taking delight in graue and seuere men: so as the elder Cato demaunding the Censorship of the people, said, That they had need of a seuere Censor, threatning to punish vice with seueritie: yet the people desired ra∣ther to chuse him that threatned them, being but of a meane calling, than the greatest* 1.1393 noble men▪ that flattered them. The like they did to L. Torquatus, whome the people did chuse Consull without his priuitie: vnderstanding of his election, he told the peo∣ple, That his disposition was such, as he could not tollerat their vices, neither could the people endure his commaundements; and therefore if they were wise, they should

make another choyce: yet was he chosen againe by the people. That which I say may [ A] be easily discerned by the difference of the Athenian and Roman Orators: for these did more respect the maiestie of the people, than those of Athens, who abused the peo∣ple with such insolencie, as one of them hauing assembled the people for matters of state, after that he had made them to attend him long, in the end he came into the plea∣ding place, with a garland of roses, saying vnto them, That hee had resolued that day to feast his friends, and so departed: whereat the people laughed. Another time Alcibiades speaking to the people, let flie a quaile out of his bosome, and the people run after it, and brought it to him againe. If he had done this in Carthage (saith Plutarch) before the people, they would haue stoned him: the Romans would not haue suffered it vn∣punished; for that a citisen of Rome was depriued of his Bourgeship, for that hee had [ B] yawned too lowd before a Censor, as Valerius Maximus doth testifie.

Therefore a wise gouernour of any Commonweale must know their humours, be∣fore he attempt any thing in the alteration of the state and lawes. For one of the grea∣test, and it may be the chiefest foundation of a Commonweale, is to accommodat the estate to the humor of the citisens; and the lawes and ordinanees to the nature of the place, persons, and time. For although Baldus saith, That reason and naturall equitie is not restrained nor limited to a certaine place: that is to bee vnderstood, when as the reason is vniuersall, and not whereas a particular reason of places and persons re∣ceiues* 1.1394 a priuate consideration. For which cause wee must varie the estate of the Commonweale to the diuersitie of places; like vnto a good Architect, which doth fit [ C] his building according to the stuffe hee finds vpon the place: So should a wise Politi∣tian doe, who may not chuse what people he will. As Isocrates said in the prayses of Busiris king of Aegypt, whome he esteemeth very much, for that hee could chuse a countrey and a people the fittest in all the world to gouerne. Let vs first speake of the nature of the people of the North and South, and then of the East, and West, and the difference betwixt the mountainers & those that liue in vallies, or in moorish places, or that are subiect to violent winds: then will we shew how much discipline may change the nature and disposition of men, reiecting the opinions of Polybius, and Galen, who held, That the countrey and nature of the place did rule necessarily in the manners of men. And the better to vnderstand the infinit varietie which may be betwixt the peo∣ple [ D] * 1.1395 of the North and South, we will diuide all the nations that inhabit the earth, or this side the Equator, into three parts: the first shal be of thirtie degrees on this side the Equator, which we will attribute to the burning Regions, and people of the South: & the thirtie degrees next, to those that inbabit the temperat regions, vnto the sixtieth degree towards the Pole, and from thence vnto the Pole shall bee the thirtie degrees of the nations of the North, and the regions that be exceeding cold. The like diuision may be made of regions beyond the Equator, towards the Antartike Pole: then wee will diuide the thirtie degrees of the burning regions into the moitie, the fifteene first* 1.1396 being more moderat, betwixt the Equator and the Tropickes; the other fifteene more burning, vnder the Tropicks: and by the same meanes we will take the fifteene degrees [ E] following of the temperat region, which stretcheth vnto the 45 degree, which hold more of the South, and the other fifteene vnto the sixtieth degree, the which are more distempered in cold, and incline more to the North: and in the fifteene following, vn∣to the 75 degree, although that men bee much afflicted with cold, yet are there many nations and Commonweales. But as for the other fifteene adioyning to the Pole, wee must make no account of them; for that there are few men, which liue in caues like vnto brute beasts (as marchants do report, and histories haue certified.) I* 1.1397 haue giuen the reason of these diuisions in a particular booke of the Method of Histo∣ries,

and therefore need lesse now to enter any further into it. These points being con∣cluded, [ F] it shall be more easie to iudge of the nature and disposition of the people. For it is not sufficient to say, that the people of the North haue force, with bignesse & beau∣tie of the bodie, and little wit: and contrariwise, that the Southerne nations are weake, little, blacke, and haue great wits: for that experience doth teach vs, that those people which liue in the extremities of the North, are little, leane, and tamed with cold; the which Hipocrates doth confesse, the which we must reconcile with the rest, in setting* 1.1398 the limits as I haue said. And the saying of Hipocrates shall bee vnderstood of those nations that inhabit beyond the 70 degree towards the Poles. We will also allow of the opinion of Hippocrates, and after him of Aristotle, who haue written, That the people of the North haue a flaxen and fine haire. And yet Galen saith, That they [ G] haue the haire red: the which we must vnderstand of those that are about the 60 de∣gree, whereof there are many in England, whome the inhabitants say are issued from the Danes and Swedens, who inuaded England; noting them by their red haire. But from the Baltique sea vnto the 45 degree, and on this side, the people haue commonly flaxen haires. And in old times, when as nations were not so mingled as since they haue bene, they did know a Northerne man by his flaxen haire and his greene eyes; as Plutarch, Tacitus, Iuuenal, and in our times the Baron of Herbestein haue obserued: and* 1.1399 as I haue discoursed in my booke of the Method of Histories, and shewed that Amiot in his translation of Plutarch, vpon the towne of Marius, tearmes them red and ches∣nut eyes: wheras he should haue called them greene eyes: the which is verie apparant. [ H] But those which are about the 60 degree, haue in a manner all eyes like vnto Owles, and the colour of the water lookes white in their eyes: they haue a weake sight by day, and see better in the darke, like vnto night Owles, which they call Nictalopes. Of this I was assured of the ambassadour Pruinski, a Lituanian, and of Holster Commissarie of the warres, borne at Ostolcome in Sweden, who is haired like a Kow, and eyed like an Owle: which colour, force, and bignesse, comes (as Aristotle saith) of the interiour heat: as the inhabitants of Affrike haue blacke eyes, for the little heat they haue in their interiour parts, being exhaled by the heat and drought of the sunne: whereas the cold doth keepe in the heat in the Northerne regions, if it be not so vehement as it doth in a maner quench it: for which cause those that inhabit beyond the 75 degree, are weake, [ I] little, and tamed with extreme cold, the which is so vehement, as many die; as the mar∣chants report. And euen the baron of Heberstein writes, That the spittle freezeth* 1.1400 sometimes before it falles to the ground, the which may seeme incredible. But it is most certaine that the Baltique sea freezeth in such sort, as whole armies passe from the maine land to the ilands; although the heat in sommer is sometimes so violent, as it burnes not onely the fruits of the earth, but also the houses and villages, as the same au∣thor writes that it hath happened in Moscouie, in the yeare 1524. The which also chan∣ced in Polonia, in the yeare 1552, as Thomas Cromer writes. And the like chaunced in England, in the yeare 1556, as I haue seene by letters from M. de Nouailles ambassador in England fot the French king: in the which he doth assure, That the heat had bene so [ K] vehement, as the flame kindled by the sunne, burnt the fruits and villages throughout a whole countrey. The which Aristotle doth affirme in his Problemes, That the heat* 1.1401 is more violent in cold countries than in hoat: but that is to bee vnderstood in watry places. And whereas there is some mountaine which doubleth the heat by reuerbe∣ration; as it happened in the towne of Naim in Gascoine, the which was wholy burnt with the heat of the sunne at noone day, in the yeare 1540: and the towne of Mont∣cornet neere vnto Laon, the which was burnt in the moneth of May, in the yere 1574, after a straunge manner, the fire flying through the streets, and through places farre di∣stant

from the houses where it first began: for the situation thereof is waterish, as I [ A] haue said; and the grossenesse of the vapour retaines the heat, the which the maisters of boat houses know full well; who to spare wood, cast water into their stoues. The Northerne parts then being full of waters, lakes, and fountaines, the vapors which are drawne vp into the ayre, receiue and retaine the heat more violently: as in the Sou∣therne parts it is more vehement vpon the earth. For euen as the heat is more violent in mettall than in wood, and in great wood than in small brush: so the sun hath more* 1.1402 effect vpon the earth than in the ayre; and in a vaporous ayre in moyst regions, than in a dry countrey, whereus the ayre is subtill, and without any sencible bodies: which may be the cause that God hath made the Southerne countries more rainie, and lesse waterish: and those places which are moist in the Southerne parts, lie commonly to∣wards [ B] the North, and are couered with mountaines towards the South, as Aquitaine* 1.1403 (which is so called for the aboundance of waters) hath the Pyrenean hilles. Barberie hath mount Atlas, which is wonderfully high, out of the which the springs and riuers rise all towards the North (as we read in Leo of Affrike) also the sun casting his beams perpendicularly vpon the countrey, would make that inhabitable, the which is one of the most fruitfull and best peopled countries in the world. And euen as in winter the places vnder ground, and the inward parts of creatures, retaine the heat which doth eua∣porat in summer: euen so it fares with people that inhabit the Northerne parts, which haue the inward heat more vehement than those of the Southerne regions: which heat causeth the forces and naturall powers to be greater in the one than in the other: [ C] and which also doth cause the one to eat more, and to disgest better than the other, for the coolenesse of the region which keeps in the naturall heat. So as those armies which come from the Southerne parts into the North, are more vigorous and lustie; as it was seene in the armie of Hannibal passing into Italy, and the armie of Moores and Ara∣bians, which haue come into Europe: and of seuen thousand Spaniards which passed into Germanie, vnder the emperour Charles the fift: and of fortie thousand Gascoines, which went to succour the king of Sweden, who obtained goodly victories. And con∣trariwise the armies that come out of the North, grow weake and languish, the more* 1.1404 they goe towards the South, yea euen in sommer; as it appeared in the Cimbrians, of whome Plutarch witnesseth, That they were all molten with sweat, and languished [ D] with heat which they felt in Prouence, the which would soone haue consumed them all, although they had not bene vanquished by the Romans: as it happened to the French before Naples, & to the Lansquenets which passed into Italie, vnder the com∣maund of Charles of Bourbon and of George Fronsperg, of the which after they had sackt Rome, there died ten thousand without any blow, before the yeare was expired, as Guichardine writes. This doth also plainely appeare in the troupes of cattell which goe out of the North into the South, they loose their fatnesse, and their milke, and fall away: the which Plinie hath noted, and the marchants find it true by daily experience. And euen as the Spaniard doubles his appetite and forces, comming out of Spaine in∣to Fraunce; euen so the French loose their appetites and languish, going into Spaine: [ E] and if he will eat and drinke as he doth in Fraunce, he is in daunger not to continue it long. And euen the nations of the Northerne regions fall a languishing and fainting of the heart, when as the Southerne winds blow: the same reason doth teach vs, why that men and beasts, yea and birds which most suddenly feele this alteration, grow far in winter, and leane in sommer. If Leo of Affrike, and Francis of Aluares, (who haue* 1.1405 written the histories of Affrike and Ethiopia) had well obserued this reason, which is naturall, they had not so highly commended the abstinence of those people: for they cannot haue any appetite, the interiour heat wanting in them. Neither must we blame

the people of the North, for that they are more hungry, and deuoure more than they [ F] * 1.1406 of the South, considering the inward heat and greatnesse of the men. The same effects are found in the Antartike regions: for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 read in the Histories of the Indies, That Magellan found neere vnto the strait which he called by his own name Giants Patage∣nes, so great and mightie, that eight Spaniards armed were troubled to hold one; but otherwise verie simple. The people of the North get it by force, and they of the South by policie: so they of the middest participat of the one and the other, and are more fit for warre, by the iudgement of Vegetius and Vitruuius: and therefore they haue erected great empires, the which haue flourished in armes and lawes. And the wisedome of God hath so well distributed his graces, as he hath neuer ioined fo•…•…ce with excellencie of wit, neither in men nor beasts: for there is nothing more cruell than i•…•…iustice armed [ G] with power. The people therfore of the middle regions haue more force than they of* 1.1407 the South, & lesse pollicie: and more wit than they of the North, & lesse force; and are more fit to commaund and gouerne Commonweales, and more iust in their actions. And if we looke well into the histories of all nations, we shall find, That euen as great armies and mightie powers haue come out of the North; euen so the hidden know∣ledge of Philosophie, the Mathematikes, and other contemplatiue sciences, are come out of the South: and the politike sciences, lawes, and the studie thereof, the grace of well speaking and discoursing, haue had their beginning in the middle regions, and all* 1.1408 great empires haue bene there established; as the empire of the Assyrians, Medes, Persi∣ans, Perthians, Grecians, Romans, Celtes. And although that the Arabians & Moors [ H] had for a time ceised vpon the empire of Persia, Syria, Aegypt, and Barbarie, & brought a good part of Spaine vnder subiection, yet could they not subdue Greece nor Italie. And whereas they would haue subiected Fraunce, they were vanquished, and their ar∣mie of 300 thousand men (which they had brought) defeated. In like sort the Ro∣mans haue stretched forth their power ouer all the nations of the South and East, but they preuailed little against them of the North and West: & although they were con∣querors ouer all other people, yet they imploied all their forces, & had somewhat to do to make resistance against the Northerne nations, who neither had walled townes, for∣tresses, nor castles; as Tacitus saith, speaking of the Germans. And although that Tra∣ian had made an admirable bridge vpon the riuer of Danow, and vanquished Deceba∣lus [ I] king of Daciens; yet the emperour Adrian his successour, caused it to bee broken downe, fearing least the people of the North (hauing such a passage open) should en∣ter into the heart of the Roman empire: as they did after that the emperour Constan∣tine had discharged the Roman legions, which guarded the riuer of Rhine and Da∣now: For soone after the Almans, then the Gothes, Ostrogothes, Vandales, Francs,* 1.1409 Bourguignons, Herules, Huns, Hongres, Lombards; and in succession of time, Nor∣mans, Tartars, Turkes, and other nations of Scithia, inuaded the Prouinces which the Romans had held. And although the English haue had great victories ouer the French and conquered the country which lieth South to them, yet for these nine hundred yeres they could neuer expell the Scottish men out of the island; and yet it is well knowne [ K] how much more populous France is than England, and England than Scotland. We may obserue the like in the Turkes, a Northerne nation, who hath extended the great∣nesse of their empire to the goodliest regions of Asia, Affrica, and Europe, hauing in a manner subdued all the ilands of the Mediterrannean sea; yet haue they bene defeated by the Tartarians, & are much trouled to make head against the Moscouits. We read, that God did threaten his people by the oracles of his prophets with the nations of* 1.1410 the North, foretelling that warre murder, and the ruine of Commonweales should come from thence. For although that men be much diminished in numbers, force, pro∣portion,

vigour, and age, in respect of the auntients (a complaint of most writers by [ A] the historie of Plinie) so hardly vpon the face of the earth shall you now find a citie comparable to Capua (containing thirteene miles in circuit) much lesse matchable to the famous Babylon, which though it were situated foure square in a leuell soile, yet could a good foot man hardly trauell round about it in three dayes: but this notwith∣standing in multitudes of people, in strength of bodies, and large proportion of mem∣bers, the Northerne prouinces do at this day farre excell the Southerne. In regard whereof that militarie discipline of the Romans, which priuileged souldiours at fiftie yeares from future seruice, was not allowable amongst the Lacedemonians; who being nothing inferiour to the Romans, either for strength of bodie, or warlike experience, yet freed their people from the seruice thereof, at fortie: the reason being, for that they [ B] * 1.1411 were so much the more vnable to hold out so long as the Romans, by how much the one nation approached more neere to the South than the other. So bring a Scithian from his natiue habitation to the South, and you shall find him presently to droop, and fall away with sweat and faintnesse. And therefore the pirats of the Mediterrannean finding by experience, that the English and Dutch captaines are vnfit for paines taking in those hoat countries, in their markets prize them at a verie low rate. For the people of the North are inwardly hoat, enioying a most dry aire, and therefore more thriftie than the Southerne, who inwardly are cold, according to the propertie of the South, a climat moist by nature. Wherein the Grecians deriuing, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. ab humore, from moisture, are to be beleeued; experience teaching vs, That when the [ C] winds blow from the South, we expect showers; but when from the North, faire wea∣ther and cleere skies. For which reason the people of the North are and haue alwaies bene great drinkers, witnesse the Greeke prouerbe, To drinke like a Scythian, the which Tacitus hath not forgotten, speaking of the manners of the Germans, Diem noctemque (inquit) continuare potando nulli probrū, ita vt craebrae inter vinolentos rixae fiebant, They held it no disgrace (saith he) to sit all day and night drinking: so as oftentimes there fell out iarres among these drunkards. The which is not the fault of the men, but of the region: For such as trauell from the South to the North, will eat and drinke no lesse than they that are home bred. But Tacitus was deceiued, in saying, That the Germans did drinke more and eat lesse, by reason of the coldnesse and barrennesse of the coun∣trey. [ D] But contrariwise seeing that thirst is nothing else but an appetite of cold and moi∣sture, and that hunger is an appetite of drought and heat; and that the people of the North haue the interiour heat much more in comparison than those of the South, they* 1.1412 must of necessitie drinke more. In like sort the people of the Northerne regions haue their skins softer, more hairie, and subiect to sweat than the people of the South; which haue the skin hard, little haire and curled, and the skin withered with drinesse, enduring heat easile without sweating: but they cannot well beare with cold, not wet; as appeared in the Spaniards, which died of cold in great numbers vppon the high mountaines of Peruana. And no wonder, for men bred and brought vp in hoat regi∣ons, in colder places inwardly waxe chill, whose bodies if any extraordinarie or sudden [ E] alteration of wether attache (an accident often happening in those Sotherly quarters, especially vpon the tops of those high hils) it must needes follow, that their naturall heat, both inward and outward, do vtterly forsake them: the contrarie whereof beti∣deth the Scythian, who by nature being inwardly hoat, by cold becommeth so much the more able and couragious, by how much the cold forceth the outward heat vnto the heart, the true seat and center of liuely heat. Yea the report, how subiect the Sou∣therne people through want of inward heat are to loosenesse and the bloody flixe, al∣most passeth credit, albeit most true: Whereas on the contrarie the countries situated

Northwards, abounding with riuers and lakes, do enure mens bodies to fogges & cold [ F] moistures, and that in such able manner, that Scythians do oftentimes defeat their ene∣mies by their ambuscadoes hidden in deepe marishes; testified by Herodianus, who writeth, That the Germans infested the Romans with their missiue weapons, them∣selues standing safe in the middest of the waters. Which secret of nature Galen not well vnderstanding, seemeth to wonder at, especially for bathing their new borne in∣fants in cold •…•…unning riuers; a custome vsed in like manner by the Ausonij,

Natos ad flumina primùm, Deferimus, saeuoque gelu dur•…•…mus & vndis:

Our new-borne babes at first to springs we bring, [ G] T'endure cold stormes their bodies so enuring.

The ground of which German custome Iulianus surnamed the Apostata writeth to be, that this people held an opinion, That the true borne children would flote vpon the waters, but the base and bastards would sinke to the bottome. And euen as the peo∣ple* 1.1413 of the North doe languish soone with heat, so are they soone wearied and tyred with labour in the Southerne parts, or in a hoat season. The which was first knowne at the battell of Plombin, whereas the Celtes being inuironed with two armies of the Romans, fought valiantly: but after they had spent their first furie, they were soone vanquished. Polybius saith, That to vanquish the Celtes, you must but ward their blows [ H] for a time, and yet they were held inuincible, Caesar holds the same opinion of the Gaules, That in the beginning of a battell they were more than men, but in the end lesse than women. The which is more naturall to the Germans, and other people of the North (as Tacitus saith) who had knowne them by long experience: For the Gaules, especially those of Languedouich, hold the middle region betwixt the cold and extreame heat, although the qualitie of the Westerne region makes the country more cold. And those which are in the middest are impatient of cold or heat: the which Cae∣sar doth witnesse of the Gaules, who suffet cold more easily than the Spaniards, and heat than the Germans. And euen as the people of the middle regions hold of the two extreames in humor, so doe they agree with the one and the other in manners and [ I] * 1.1414 complexions: and as God by his admirable wisedome doth vnite all things by conue∣nient meanes to their extremities. In like sort we see that hee hath obserued the same order betwixt the nations of the North and South, which can neuer concurre together for the contrarietie of manners and humors that is betwixt them. The which is a thing verie considerable, when there is any question to treat a peace, or to make a league betwixt two nations so contrarie, or to lead them both forth to the warre toge∣ther; you must place that nation betwixt them that doth participat of both their na∣tures, and that haue their affections more moderat. As Galen saith, That the Germans and Arabians haue not that commendable ciuilitie which is in them that are borne in Asia the lesse, the which is not onely betwixt the Pole and the Equator; but also be∣twixt [ K] the East Indies and Fraunce Westward: A countrey for this vertue so highly* 1.1415 commended by Tully, that he doubteth not to affirme, That therein not onely rested the mirror of ciuilitie, but that from thence it hath bin deriued to all forreine nations. But I am not of their opinions, who draw their arguments of ciuilitie and ba•…•…barisme from the effects of heate and cold, finding euery day by common experience, that the Southerne people go beyond al other nations in quicknes of wit, whereas barbarisme and rude behauiour proceede from ignorance and want of education, a lesson long ago verified by Herodotus, who for good wits and ciuill behauiour commendeth the

Aegyptians before all other people of what nation soeuer. And after him Caesar (in his [ A] Commentaries of the ciuill warres) gaue them the like priuilege, saying, That the Ale∣xandrians did so artificially counterfeit the Roman engines of warre, as it seemed the Romans were but their apes, he vseth these words, Ipsi homines ingeniosissimi ac subti∣lissimi, The men themselues were verie wittie and politike: And yet Aegypt is partly vnder the Tropique, whereas the heat is more violent than vnder the Equator, by the iudgement of Possidonius and the Spaniards. The Romans held the like opinion of the people of Affrike, whom they called Paenos, who had often deceiued the Romans, and ouerthrowne their forces by policie. So Columella tearmes them Gentem acutissi∣mam, A most subtill nation: But yet they had not such excellent wits as the Aegyptians, neither are they so neer the South. And without any further search we haue the proofe [ B] therof in this realm, where the difference is apparent in regard of the English, who com∣plained to Philip of Comines with admiration, for that the French lost most commonly in their warres against them, and won still in their treaties. Wee may write the like of the Spaniards, who neuer made treatie for these hundred yeares with the French,* 1.1416 but they had the aduantage: the which were long to repeate in particular. I will onely produce the treatie of Cambresis, made in the yeare 1559. It cannot bee denied but the forces of Fraunce were great and sufficient to withstand a mightie enemie, yet the Spaniard got more by this treatie, without striking stroke, than they had done be∣fore* 1.1417 in fortie yeares, neuer hoping (as they confessed afterwards) to draw Sauoy no•…•… [ C] Piedmont out of the hands of the French: For although the duke of Sauoie, a vertu∣ous and a generous prince, deserued much, as well for the equitie of his cause, as for the alliance of the house of Fraunce, yet he expected not so happie an issue of his affaires: the which was cunningly handled by the Spaniard, which reaped both thankes, and the greatest fruits of this treatie, hauing so much diminished the state of Fraunce (which stretched euen vnto the gates of Milan) and set the duke of Sauoy as it were a barre be∣twixt Italie and Fraunce, to shut vp the passage that the French might pretend no more in Italie. It cannot be denied, that such as had the charge to capitulat for the French, did not shew so great discretion, faith, and loyaltie, as they might: but I vnderstand from one of good credit, that it was resolued in the councell of Spaine, That they should pro∣long [ D] the treatie all they could; for that the nature of the French was so sudden and* 1.1418 actiue, as they would easily yeeld to that which was demanded, being tired with many iourneies, and the ordinarie tediousnesse of the Spaniard, the which was not forgotten in this treatie. It was also obserued, That in all the sittings and assemblies made by the deputies, alwaies the French were first come, and although they had set all their people to watch, that they might sometimes enter the last; yet were they still deceiued by the subtiltie of the Spaniards, and impatience of the French, who seemed by this meanes to sue for peace. This fault is not to bee imputed to them that had the charge to treat a peace, but vnto nature, which is hardly vanquished. For we read the like of the ambas∣sadours of Fraunce, conferring with the ambassadours of the emperour, of Venice, [ E] Spaine, and Ferrare, before Francis Sforce duke of Milan. Our manner (saith Philip de Comines) is not to speake treatably, as they doe: for wee speake sometimes two or three together, so as the Duke said, Ho, one to one. Whereby we may iudge as in any other obseruations, That the nature of the Spaniard (being much more miridio∣nall* 1.1419 than we) is colder, more melancholike, more staied, more contemplatiue, and by consequence more ingenious than the French; who by nature cannot stay to contem∣plat, being cholerike and full of spleene, the which makes him more actiue and prompt, yea so sudden, as he seemes vnto the Spaniard to run, when hee goes but his ordinarie pace: for which cause both the Spaniard and the Italian desire to haue French men to

serue them, for their diligence and quicknesse in all their actions: so as yerely there go [ F] infinit numbers into Spaine; as I haue seene being at Narbone, especially out of A•…•…∣uergne* 1.1420 and Limosin, to build, plant, till their lands, and doe all manuall workes, which the Spaniard cannot doe, but would rather die for hunger, he is so slothfull and heauie in al his actions. When as N. Strossie Prior of Capoua, attempted to surprise Valencia in Spaine, by meanes of the French gallies, whereof he was then Admirall: the practise being discouered, the Viceroy sought to expell all the French out of Valencia, which were found to be ten thousand: for whose loyaltie the Spaniards stood bound, rather than they should depart: which shewes how greatly that countrey is peopled with French. And without doubt those which are bred of the mixture of those two nati∣ons, are more accomplished than either of them: For in the Spaniard wee desire more [ G] viuacitie and cheerefulnesse, and to haue the actions and passions of the French more moderat: and it seemes the Italian doth participat of the one and the other, Italie bee∣ing in the most temperat situation that can be, betwixt the Pole and the Equator, and in the middest of Asia, Affrike, and Europe, bending a little towards the East & South. And euen as they which liue at the extremities of the Poles, are Flegmatike, and at the South melancholie; euen so they which are thirtie degrees on this side the Pole, are more sanguin; and they which approach neerer vnto the middest, more sanguin and cholerike; and then drawing towards the South, more sanguin and melancholike: so* 1.1421 their complexion is more blacke and yellow, blacke being the colour of melancholy, and yellow of choler. Galen confesseth, That flegme makes men heauie and dull; blood [ H] cheerefull and strong; choler, actiue and nimble; and melancholy, constant and graue:* 1.1422 and according to the mixture of these foure humors, more or lesse, so many varieties there be, which Theodore Duca of the house of Lascare emperour of Constantinople hath laboured to comprehend in 92 kinds, not onely for the foure humors, but also for the three parts of the soule, Reason, Anger, & Appetite (or Desire:) but for that his opi∣nions are not grounded vpon the proofe of any example, nor vpon necessarie reason; and for that he makes no distinction of the parts of the world, neither of moist places, hilly nor windie, from those that are drie, plaine, and temperat: neither for that he hath not denied those people which haue bene brought vp in ciuill discipline, from the rude and barbarous, in this varietie of soules and humors which he hath supposed, wee will [ I] follow that discipline which seemeth most agreeing to reason and nature, & hath beene confirmed by many examples. Auntient histories do agree, That the people of the North are not malitious nor craftie, as the nations of the South be. And Tacitus spea∣king* 1.1423 of the Germans, saith, It is a nation that is neither subtill nor craftie, discouering their secrets as it were in jest, and then they goe easily from their promises. The like iudgement we find of the Scythians in Herodotus, Iustin, Strabo, Plinie, and Vegetius, & therefore auntient princes as well as at this day, had no other guards for their persons than Scythians, Thracians, Germans, Swissers, and Circassians. And euen the Seigne•…•…∣rie of Rhaguse or of Genes, haue no other guards but Germans and Swissers. And which is more, the kings of Affrike beyond mount Atlas, haue none other guard but [ K] souldiours of Europe; who although they be Mahometans, yet had they rather trust in Christians that haue abiured their faith, than in those of the countrey; the which was first put in practise by the great Mansor emperour of Affrike and of Spaine: and here∣tofore the king of Tunis had 1500 light horsemen of Christians renigadoes, and his guard of Turkish and Christian slaues, as Leo of Affrike saith; knowing well that the people of the North haue more force than subtiltie, and hauing receiued entertain∣ment of any prince, they alwayes remaine faithfull for the guard of his person, and to reuenge his iniuries (although he be a tyrant) neuer aspiring to his estate. And therfore

Chereas captaine of the guard to the emperour Caligula, hauing slaine the emperor, was [ A] * 1.1424 presently murdered by the guard, which were Germans, who could not (as Iosephus writeth) forbeare reuenge. In like sort the antients haue obserued a barbarous crueltie in the people of the North: for euen Thucidides son to Olorus king of Thrace, tearmes the Thracians a most cruell nation: and Taritus speaking of the Germans, They doe not (saith he) put the guiltie to death after order of law, but by crueltie, as enemies. I will let passe the auntient, and content my selfe with late examples. Wee haue none more notable than that of George captaine of the rebels in Hungarie, beeing taken by them of Transiluania, they caused his souldiours and companions to fast three dayes, and then gaue them to eat their captaine halfe roasted, and his bowels boyled. I omit* 1.1425 the straunge cruelties of Dracula duke of Transiluania, and of Otton Trucces, who cau∣sed [ B] the murtherer of his lieutenant to be roasted with a slow fire, during the commons 〈◊〉〈◊〉: and of late Grombache a German, was condemned to haue his heart pulled out being aliue, and to haue his face beaten therewithall, by Augustus duke of Saxonie in the castle of Goth. We find also, that the breaking vpon the wheele was inuented in Germany, and the impaling or setting men vpon stakes aliue, in Tartaria. Neither is it lesse cruell in Tartaria, to force them that are condemned, to breake their owne neckes, or els to whip and torment them: Which makes men to thinke, that the cruelties of the king of Moscouie published and printed, are verie likely. For the lesse reason and iudgement men haue, the more they approach to the nature of brute beasts, who can∣no more yeeld to reason and gouerne their passions than brute beasts. And contrari∣wise, [ C] * 1.1426 the people of the South are cruell and reuengefull, by reason of melancholie, which doth inflame the passions of the soule with an exceeding violence, the which is not easily suppressed. Polybius speaking of the wartes of the Speudians, and Carthagi∣neans, people of Affrike, he saith, That there was neuer seene nor heard of any 〈◊〉〈◊〉, where there was more treacherie and crueltie: and yet they are but toyes in respect of* 1.1427 the horrible treacheries mentioned by Leo of Affrike (and in our age) betwixt Muleas∣ses and his owne children. And euen the king of Tenesme beeing solicited by Ioseph king of Marocco to submit himselfe vnder his obedience, which his grandfather had reiected, he slew his ambassadours; wherewith the king of Marocco beeing insenced, put a million of people to the sword in the realme of Tenesme, leauing him neither [ D] towne, castle, house, beast, nor tree. And speaking of Homar Essuein a minister to Ma∣homet, seeking to make himselfe king, after that he had forced the fort of Vngiasen, hee was not content to put all to the sword, but he cut & tare the children out of their mo∣thers wombes. And the same author writes, That Isaak king of Tombut in Affrike, hauing taken the king of Gagao, he caused him presently to bee put to death, and his children to be guelt to serue him as slaues, doing the like vnto al the kings he takes. We read of the like cruelties or greater at the West▪Indies, newly discouered: for the Bra∣silians are not contented to eat the flesh of their enemies, but will bathe their children in their blood. But the crueltie is more remarkable, when as they doe execute any one that is condemned by law; the which should be done without passion, and free from [ E] reuenge. Yet we read of punishments that were vsed in old time among the Persians, which exceed all crueltie: and in Aegypt at this day they flea them aliue which rob by the high way, then they stuffe the skin full of hai•…•… and set it vpon an Asse, by his side* 1.1428 that is so fleaed: Which cruelties the people that liue betwixt both these extreames can neither see nor heate without horrour: and therefore it seemes, that for this cause the Romans suffred them that were condemned, to die of hunger, and the Greeks gaue them hemlocke (which is a sweet poison) to drinke: and those of Chio did temper it with water, and the Athenians with wine, to take away the bitternesse thereof, as Theo∣phrastus

saith. We may therefore note the difference of crueltie betwixt the people [ F] of the North and South: for that the first are transported with a brutish violence, like beasts without reason: and the other (like vnto foxes) imploy all their wits to glut themselues with reuenge: and euen as the bodie cannot bee purged of melancholy but with great difficultie, so the passions and perturbations of the mind, which grow by a setled melancholy, are not easily pacified. So as they which are possessed with this hu∣mor, are more subiect vnto frensie than any others, if they find not wherewithall to sa∣tisfie* 1.1429 their affections. And therefore there are more mad men in the Southerne regi∣ons, than towards the North. Leo of Affrike doth write, That in the kingdoms of Fez and Marocco there are great numbers: And euen in Grenado (which is more Sou∣thernly) there are many hospitals for mad men onely. The varietie of mad men shews [ G] the naturall humour of the people: for although there bee store of fooles and mad men in all places and of all sorts, yet those of the Southerne parts haue many ter∣rible visions, they preach and speake many languages without learning them, and are sometimes possest with euill spirits, hauing leane bodies, more like vnto ghosts then those corpulent and sanguin men towards the North, which do nothing but dance,* 1.1430 laugh and leape in their fooleries: and in Germanie it is called the disease of S. Victus, the which is cured by musick: whether that the sweet harmonie thereof doth recall the reason which was distempered, or whether that musick doth cure the infirmities of the bodie by the mind, as the phisick doth cure the mind by the bodie, or that euill spirits which do sometimes torment mad men are expelled with this diuine harmonie, [ H] delighting in nothing but in discords: or as we reade that the euill spirit hearing the sound of a harp fled, and left Saul in rest, which seemes to haue been the cause why Eli∣zeus when he would prophecie before the kings of Iuda and Samaria, he caused one to play of an Instrument. And when as Saul was encountred by the holie troupe of the Prophets playing vpon instruments of musick, presently the spirit of God fell vpon him. Oftentimes euill spirits doe applie themselues to the humor of mad men: for chollerike men strike in their furie, which happens not in those that are of a sanguin complexion, and much lesse in them that be flegmatike, which haue a Lethargie, the which is a dull and sleeping furie. And for that the melancholike man is the wiser, if he chance to fall mad, his furie is the more incurable, for that a melancholike humor suf∣fers [ I] not it selfe to be gouerned as the rest: those that be sanguin, although they be not so often furious, yet are they often mad, the which is neuer incident to wise men, for Tully sayth, Furor in sapientem cadere potest, insania non potest, & furioso curator datur,* 1.1431 non insano; quia insanus dicitur, qui suis cupiditatibus imperare nescit: Furie may well fall into a wise man, but not madnes: a gouernor is giuen to a furious man, but not to a mad man, for he is called mad that cannot rule his owne desires. As touching that which we haue said, that the people of the South are commonly more graue, more discreet, and more moderate in all their actions: it is plainely seene not only in diuers other nations, but also in this realme, which seemes to be the cause that those which haue made the customes, haue limited them to be of full age that liue towards the [ K] North at 25. yeares, and the others at 19 or 20 yeares, except it bee in those countries which border vpon the sea, whereas the people (by reason of their trafficke) are more politike. I cannot without the note of ingratitude to mine owne countrie forget the iudgement which the auncients haue giuen of the citie of Angiers, as it is to be seene in the letters pattents of king Charles the 5 called the wise, the which he granted for the priuiledges of the Vniuersitie of the said citie in these words, Quod{que} inter regiones alias Regni nostri, ciuitas Andegauensis veluti fons scientiarum irriguus, viros alti consilij solet ab antiquo propagatione quasi naturali prouidere: For that among other prouinces of

this our realme, the citie of Angers like vnto a flowing spring of all sciences, is wont to [ A] send forth men of great knowledge and iudgement, as it were by a naturall propaga∣tion. These letters are dated the first of August in the yeare 1373.

We haue yet another notable difference betwixt the people of the South and of the North, for that these are more chast and abstinent, and those of the South much giuen to lust, the which growes by reason of the spongious melancholie, so as all Mon∣sters do commonly come from Affrike, which Ptolomie saith to be vnder Scorpio and* 1.1432 Venus, adding moreouer, that all Affrike did worship Venus: and Titus Liuius speaking of the Numidians (who were the most Southerly of all the Romans subiects or allies) The Numidians (sayth he) were giuen to venerie more than all the other Barba∣rians. Wee read also that the kings of Affrike and Persia had alwaies great troupes [ B] of wiues and concubines, the which is not to be imputed to their depraued customes, for that at the West Indies king Alcazares had 400 wiues: and the father of Attaba∣lipa the last king of Peru, (who was defeated by Pizarre) had 200 wiues, and fiftie children: and the king of Giolo had 600 children: so many had Hierotimus king of the Parthians, who had also a great number of wiues: and Surenus Generall of that armie of the Parthians which defeated Crassus, had ten thousand. The Scythians and Germaines haue enough of one wife: and Caesar in his Commentaries sayth, that the Englishmen in his time had but one woman to ten or twelue men: and many men in* 1.1433 the North parts knowing their owne insufficiencies, geld themselues in despight, cut∣ting [ C] the vaines Parotides vnder the eares, as Hippocrates sayth: who seeking out the cause of this disabilitie, concludes, that is for the coldnes of the bellie, and for that, they are commonly on horseback: wherein he is deceiued, for Aristotle holdeth, that agi∣tation doth prouoke; and as for want of heate, it is most certaine that those which dwell in cold countries abound with heate inwardly, as it appeares by the corpulencie and strength of those Northen nations: and contrarywise those of the South are very cold. It is the nature of melancholie which abounds most in them of the South, the which being frothie, prouokes to lust, as Aristotle writes in his Problemes, where he* 1.1434 demaunds why melancholike men are most lecherous: the which is notorious in the Hare, the which is the most melancholike of all other creatures, and which only con∣ceiues [ D] being big with yong, as well the male as the female, as M. Varro, and other wri∣ters do witnesse, and experience hath taught vs; so as we may say they are much decei∣ued which haue so much extolled the pudicitie and chastitie of the Scythians, Ger∣maines, and other Northen nations, as Caesar writes in his Commentaries. Among the Germaines (sayth he) it is a dishonest and villanous thing for a man to know a wo∣man before the age of 25 yeares, which thing they conceale not: and Tacitus sayth,* 1.1435 there are none but the Germaines among the barbarous nations that content them∣selues with one wife: yea sometimes they liue in perpetuall chastetie, as the Emperour Henry 2. did, and Casimir 1. king of Poland, and Ladislaus king of Bohemia would ne∣uer marrie; the which was not for that they were chaste, but rather through a naturall [ E] weakenes: and Ihon 2. great Duke of Muscouia, did so abhorre women, as he did euen sound at the very sight of them, as the Baron of Herbestein doth write, speaking of the Muscouites, They neuer see their wiues (saith he) vntill the day of their marriage. The people of the North are so little subiect to iealousie, as Alcomer a Germaine, and Ireni∣cus do write in commendation of their countrie, that men and women throughout all Germanie doth bathe together pel mel, yea and with strangers, without any touch of iealousie, the which as Munster sayth, is not knowne in Germanie: whereas contra∣riwise those of the South are so passionate, as oftentimes they dye of that disease. Being* 1.1436 sent into England with an Ambassage, I heard Mendoza the spanish Ambassadour

say, That it was a shamefull thing to see men & women sit together at holie sermons: [ F] to whome Doctor Dale Master of Requests answered pleasantly, That it was a more shamefull thing for Spaniards to thinke of satisfying of their lusts euen in holie places, the which was far from Englishmens minds. We reade in the historie of the Indies that the king of Puna was so iealous, as he did cut off the priuie parts, with the noses and armes of those Eunukes that attended of his women. The people that inhabit the middle regions hold a mediocritie in all this, but the most part of them allow but one lawfull wife: and although that Iulius Caesar did persuade Helu•…•…dius Cinna to publish the law of Poligamie (or manie wiues) to the end that Cesarion (whom he had by the Queene Cleopatr•…•…) might be legitimate, yet this lawe was reiected: and the same lawe being reuiued by Ihon Leiden a cobler, hauing made himselfe king of Munster in [ G] Westphalia, did more trouble their estate than all the other lawes and alterations which he made. But the Romaine Emperours made a generall lawe to all nations without any distinction, noting him with infamie that had more than one wife: and since, that punishment of infamie hath been made capitall within this realme. But the Romane lawe hath been of no force in Affrike, for the inconueniences that happened; as it is incident to all those that seeke to applie the lawes of the people of the South to* 1.1437 them of the North, making no difference of their dispositions, wherein many haue beene much deceiued, and euen Cardan, who sayth, That man is wiser than all other creatures, for that he is more hote and moyst; the which is quite contrarie to the truth, being most apparant that the wisest beasts are colder than any other, in the opinion of [ H] Aristotle. In like sort among militarie punishments, one was, to let the souldier bloud that had offended, for that those which abound in bloud had the passions of the mind more violent and lesse obedient vnto reason. Of all beasts the Elephant is held to be the wisest, of the Antients, for that their bloud is coldest; and the most melancholike of all others, the which makes them leapers: and to this leprosie the people of the* 1.1438 South are much subiect, the which was called by the Antients Elephantiasis, a disease vnknowne in Greece before Plutarch, or in Italie before Pompey, as Plinie writes. But he deceiues himselfe to say, that it was proper to the Egyptians, for all the coast of Af∣frike abounds with them; and in Ethiopia it is so common, as the leapers are not sepa∣rated from the sound. But Leprosie differs from Elephantiasis, the which is a great swel∣ling [ I] in the thighes and legs, and leprosie is a canker or infection ouer the whole bodie. It may be this melancholie is the cause of long life, for all the Ancients consent, that the Elephant liues three and foure hundred yeares, and Rauens more, who haue little* 1.1439 bloud, and that very melancholie. Francis Aluarez reporteth, that he had seene Abuna Mare Bishop of Ethiopia who was 150 yeares old, and yet verie lustie, which was the greatest age that euer was found in the Censors registers at Rome. And we must not wonder if Homer sayth, that Memnon king of Ethiopia liued fiue hundred yeares, for Xenophon long after writes, that in the same countrie there were men that liued sixe hundred yeares: but those of the South haue verie drie bodies, and are subiect to the falling sicknes, quartaine agues, and the Kings euill. Hereby we may iudge, that [ K] the people of the South are infected with great diseases of the bodie, and notorious vices of the minde: and contrarywise there are no people that haue their bo∣dies better disposed to liue long, and their minds apter for great vertues. So Ti∣tus* 1.1440 Liuius hauing much commended Hannibal for his heroicall vertues, These great vertues (saied hee) were accompanied with as great vices, inhumane cruelty, trea∣cherie, impietie, and contempt of all religion: for greatest spirits are subiect to grea∣test vertues and vices. Wherein the auntient writers haue bene deceiued, commen∣ding so highly the vertue, integritie, and bountie of the Scythians, and other people of

the North, and condemning the vices of the South: For he deserues no prayse for his [ A] bountie, that hath no wit, and that cannot be wicked, for that hee knoweth no euill;* 1.1441 but he that knoweth euill, and how to put it in practise, and yet is an honest man. In like sort Machiauel was ouerseene, saying, That the Spaniards, Italians, and Frenchmen, were the wickedest people in the world; shewing thereby, that he had neuer read any good booke, nor knowne the disposition and differences of nations. But if wee shall looke more narrowly into the disposition of the people of the North, of the South, and of them that are betwixt both; we shall find that their natures are like vnto young men, old men, and them of middle age, and to the qualities which are attributed vnto them. In like sort euerie one of those three in the gouernment of the Commonweale vseth that which he hath most at commaund: The nations of the North, by force; [ B] those in the middest, by equitie and iustice; and the Southerne parts, by religion. The* 1.1442 magistrat (saith Tacitus) commaunds nothing in Germanie, but with the sword in his hand. And Caesar writes in his Commentaries, That the Germans haue no care of reli∣gion, and make no account of any thing but of warre and of hunting. And the Schy∣thians (saith Solinus) did sticke a sword into the ground, the which they did worship, placing the end of all their actions, lawes, religions, and iudgements, in their force and armes. We find that combats came first from the people of the North, as wee haue said elswhere: all the lawes of the Saliens, Francons, English, Ripuaries, and other Nor∣therne nations are full of them: And the law of Fronton king of Denmarke would haue all controuersies decided by single combat: Which lawes could neuer be abro∣gated, [ C] although that both popes and other princes haue laboured much, not conside∣ring that the naturall disposition of them of the North, is quite contrarie to them of the South. And at this present in Germany they make great account of the Reisters law, the which is neither diuine, humane, nor canonicall; but the stronger commands the weaker: as Brennus captaine of the Gaules said vnto the treasuror Sulpitius. The middle nations are more reasonable and lesse strong, they haue recourse vnto reason, vnto judges, and vnto suits. It is most certaine, that lawes and the manner of pleading are come from the people of the middle nations; as from Asia the lesse (whereas great Orators and Pleaders were in credit) from Greece, Italie, and Fraunce: whereof a cer∣taine Poet speaketh, Gallia causidicos docuit facunda Britannos, Eloquent Fraunce hath [ D] taught the pleading Brittons. It is not at this day alone, that Fraunce hath beene full* 1.1443 of suits and contentions, the which cannot be altered and taken away, vnlesse they change the nature and disposition of the people: and it is much better to decide all controuersies by law, than by the sword; the one is fit for reasonable creatures, the o∣ther for brute beasts: and to conclude, all great Orators, Law-makers, Lawyers, Hi∣storiographers, Poets, Comedians, and others which draw vnto them the hearts of men with goodly discourses and sweet words, are in a manner all of the middle nati∣ons. We see in the histories both of the Greeks and Latins, before they attempted the least warre, the matter was debated with many solemne orations, denominations, and protestations: the which the people of the North do not vse, who presently fall to [ E] * 1.1444 armes, and euen as the one vse force only like vnto Lions, so they of the middest arme themselues with lawes and reasons. In like sort the people of the South haue recourse vnto craft and subtiltie, like vnto Foxes; or vnto religion: for eloquent discourses agree not with the grosse wits of the Northerne people, and they are too base for them of the South, who allow not of any legall reasons or rhetoricall suppositions, which hold truth and falshood in suspence, but they require certaine demonstrations or diuine o∣racles, which exceed any humaine discourse. So we see that the people of the South, the Aegyptians, Caldeans, and Arabians, haue brought to light the hidden sciences both

naturall and mathematicall, which torment the greatest wits, and force them to con∣fesse [ F] the truth: and all religions haue in a manner taken their beginning from the peo∣ple of the South, and from thence haue been dispersed ouer the whole earth: not that God hath any acception of places and persons, or that he doth not suffer his diuine light to shine vpon all men; but euen as the Sunne is seene more easily in a cleere and still water than in that which is troubled and filthie, so in my opinion the heauenly light doth shine far more brighter in pure and cleane spirits, than in those which are poluted with base and earthly affections. And if it be so that the true purifying of the soule is by his heauenly light, and by the force of contemplation in the most perfect subiect; without doubt they shall soonest attaine vnto it which haue their soules raui∣shed vp into heauen; the which we see happen vnto melancholike men, which haue [ G] * 1.1445 their spirits setled and giuen to contemplation, the which is called by the Hebrewes and Accademiks a pretious death, for that it drawes the soule out of this earthlie bodie* 1.1446 vnto spirituall things. It is no meruaile then if the people of the South be better go∣uerned by religion, than by force or reason, the which is a point verie considerable to draw the people, when as neither force nor reason can preuaile: as we reade in the hi∣storie of the Indies, that Christopher Colombus when he could not draw the people of* 1.1447 the West Indies vnto humanitie by any flatterie or faire meanes, he shewed them the Moone the which they did worship, giuing them to vnderstand that she should soone lose her light: three dayes after seeing the Moone ecclipsed, they were so amazed, as they did what he commanded them. So the more we draw towards the South, the [ H] more deuout we finde men, and the more firme and constant in their religion, as in Spaine, and more in Affrike: whereas Francis Aluarez, and Leo of Affrike do say, that religion is much more reuerenced and honoured there than in Europe, where among other obseruatiōs Leo notes, That in one citie of Fez there are seauen hundred temples,* 1.1448 and the greatest is 1500 paces in compasse, 31 gates, and within it 900 lamps, the yearely reuenue of which temple is 73000 ducates. But Aluarez reports far stranger things of the greatnes of temples, of the incredible fasts and deuotion of the people of Ethiopia, and that the greatest part of the nobilitie and the people make verie strict vowes of religion. The greatest reason that hath so long maintained Ethiopia in that goodlie and florishing estate, and that doth still hold the subiects in the obedience of [ I] their prince and gouernour, is the assured persuasion which they haue (as Aluarez saith) That good and euill comes not vnto them by their friends or enemies, but by the will of God. As for suites, there are fewer than in any part of the world: and which is more strange, they keepe no records in writing of any decrees, iudgements, testaments, or contracts, except the accounts of the receit and expences. Who so should seeke to gouerne those nations by the lawes and ordinances vsed in Turkie, Greece, Italie, France, and other midle regions, he should ruine their estate. In like sort he that should accustome the people of the North to the pleading of France and Italie, should finde himselfe much troubled, as it hapned to Mathias king of Hongarie, who sent for Iud∣ges out of Italie to reforme the iurisdiction of Hongarie, but in a short time the people [ K] were so troubled with this canonicall pleading, as the king was constrained (at the re∣quest of his Estates) to send back his Italian Iudges into their countrie. So Ferdinand king of Spaine sending Pedrarias Viceroy to the West Indies, the which then were newly discouered, he did expresly forbid him to carrie any lawyer or aduocate with* 1.1449 him, to the end he should not sow any seeds of sutes and pleading where as there was not yet any. But who so should seeke to roote out all sutes and processes in France and Italie, he should thrust the people into perpetuall seditions: for euen the Iudges them∣selues being vnable to determine and end sutes, for the difficultie and contrarietie of

reasons that are of either side, they oftentimes depute arbitrators, or else they prolong [ A] the sute of purpose to giue the parties occasion to agree friendly, and to discharge their choller vpon the Iudges and aduocates, else they would fall to armes, whereby it ap∣peares that the people of the middle region are more capable to gouerne a com∣monweale, as hauing more naturall reason, the which is proper to humaine actions, and as it were the touchstone to destinguish the difference betwixt good and euill, be∣twixt right and wrong, and betwixt honest and dishonest things. Wisedome is fit to commaund, and force to execute, the which is proper to the people of the North, but* 1.1450 they of the South being lesse capable of gouerment, giue themselues wholly to the contemplation of naturall and diuine sciences, and to discerne truth from falshood. And euen as the wisedome to know good and euill is greatest in the people of the mid∣dest, [ B] and the knowledge of truth and falshood in the people of the South, euen so those* 1.1451 arts which consist in handie works, are greater in the people of the North then in any other, and therefore the Spaniards and the Italians admire so many and so diuers kinds of works made with the hand, as are brought out of Germanie, Flanders, and England. And as there are three principall parts in the soule of man, that is to say, the imagina∣tiue or common sence, reason, and the intellectuall part, euen so in euery well ordered Commonweale the Priests and Philosophers are imployed in the search of diuine and hidden sciences, being as it were the hart of the citie, the magistrates and officers to commaund, iudge, and prouide for the gouernment of the State, being as it were the reason of the citie: and the common people applie themselues to labour and [ C] mechanicall arts, the which is conformable to common sence.

We may conclude the like of the vniuersall Commonweale of this world, the which God hath so ordained by his admirable wisedome: As the people of the South are* 1.1452 made and appointed for the search of hidden sciences, that they may instruct other na∣tions: Those of the North for labour and manuall artes: and those of the middle be∣twixt the two extreames, to negotiat, traffique, iudge, plead, command, establish Com∣monweales; and to make lawes and ordinances for other nations: whereunto those of the North are not so apt for want of wisedome: neither are the people of the South, be it that they be too much giuen to diuine and naturall contemplations; or for want* 1.1453 of that alacritie and promptnesse, which is required in humane actions; be it that hee [ D] cannot yeeld in his opinions, dissemble, nor endure the toyle which is necessarie for a man of state; or that he is soone wearie of publike affaires, or that hee is oftentimes ex∣pelied by ambitious courtiers: as it happened to the wise men of Persia, who were sud∣denly put from the gouernment of the state, after the death of Cambises: and to the Pi∣thagorians in Italie. And it seemes this was figured by the fable of Iupiter, who expel∣led his father Saturne out of his kingdome: that is to say, an ambitious and politike courtier dispossessed a Philosopher giuen to contemplation: For who so shall wel ob∣serue the nature of Planets, he shall find in my opinion, that the diuision of them doth agree with the three regions aboue mentioned, according vnto their naturall order, gi∣uing the highest Planet, which is Saturne, to the Southerne region, Iupiter to the mid∣dle, [ E] * 1.1454 and Mars to the Septentrionall parts, the Sunne remaining in the middest, as the spring of light equally common to them all. Then followes Venus, proper to the peo∣ple of the South, then Mercurie to them of the middle regions: and last of all is the Moone for the North parts, which sheweth the naturall inclination of the people of the North to warre and hunting, fit for Mars and Diana: and the people of the South to contemplation, besides their disposition to venerie. And the nations betwixt both the qualitie of Iupiter and Mercurie, fit for politike gouernments: the which hath a straunge sympathie in mans bodie, which is the image of the vniuersall world, and of a

well ordered Commonweale: for setting the right hand of man towards the North, [ F] going from the East into the West, according vnto the naturall motion of the world,* 1.1455 and the true constitution thereof; as I haue shewed in another place: the right part which is the more strong and masculine, hauing the lyuer and the gall, which the He∣brewes attribute to the Moone and Mars, sheweth plainely the nature of the people of the North to be sanguin and warlike. The left side, which is the feminine part (so cal∣led by the Philosophers) and the weaker, hauing the spleene and the melancholike hu∣mor, discouers the qualitie of the people of the South. Euen so we find more women in the Southerne parts, and more men in the North: for else it were impossible that euerie man in the South countries should haue so many wiues.* 1.1456

And thus much as touching the generall qualities of all people: for as for the parti∣cular, [ G] there are in all places and in all countries men of all humors, and subiect to that which I haue said more or lesse. Moreouer the particular situation of places, doth much alter the nature of the countrey. For although there is not any certaine place, whereas we may distinguish the East from the West, as we may the South from the North: yet all auntients haue held, That the people of the East are more mild, more courteous, more tractable, and more ingenious, than those of the West, and lesse war∣like, Behold (saith Iulian the emperour) how the Persians and Syrians are mild and tractable. Who sees not the furie of the Celtes & Germans, & how iealous they are of libertie? the Romans are courteous and warlike, the Aegyptians wittie and subtill, and withall effeminat. The Spaniards haue obserued, That the people of Sina (the whic•…•… [ H] * 1.1457 are farthest Eastward) are the most ingenious and courteous people in the world: and those of Brezill, which are farre Westward, the most cruell and barbarous. To con∣clude, if we looke well into histories, we shall find, that the people of the West do par∣ticipat much of the nature of the North; and the people of the East with them of the South in the same latitude. The naturall bountie of the ayre, and of the Easterly winds, is the cause that men are more faire, and of a bigger proportion: and it is straunge, if the plague or any other infectious disease comes from the West into the East, or from the North into the South, it continues not: whereas if they begin in the East, or in any part of the South, they are long and verie infectious: as it hath bene proued by ex∣perience in old times, and at this day the coniecture is infallible in the countrey of Lan∣guedoc, [ I] whereas the plague is ordinarie. I haue noted many examples in another place, the which I omit now for breuitie sake: yet the difference of manners and dispositions of people, is much more notorious betwixt the North and the South, than betwixt the East and the West. But the greatest chaunge in particular, is the difference of hil∣ly places from vallies: and of vallies turned towards the North or towards the South,* 1.1458 in the same climat or like latitude, yea in the same degree, which causeth a wonderfull difference betwixt the one and the other: as it is plainly seene in mountaines which stretch from the West to the East: as the Appenin, which diuideth in a manner all Ita∣lie in two, mount Saint Adrian in Spaine, the mountaines of Anuergne in Fraunce, and the Py•…•…enees betwixt Fraunce and Spaine, mount Taurus in Asia, and Atlas in Af∣frike, [ K] which runs from the Atlantike sea vnto the confines of Aegypt aboue six hundred leagues; mount Imaus, which diuides Tartarie from South Asia, the Alpes which be∣gin in France, and continue vnto Thrace: and mount Calphat, which diuides Polo∣nia from Hungarie; the which causeth them of Tuscane to be of a contrarie humor to them of Lombardie, and farre more ingenious: as also wee see them of Arragon and Valence, and other people beyond the Pyrenean hilles, to bee of a different disposition to them of Gasconie and Languedoc, who hold much of the nature of the North; and the people on this side mount Atlas are farre lesse ingenious than the Numidians, and

other nations which are on the other side mount Atlas: for the one are very [ A] white, and the other exceeding blacke; the one subiect to many infirmities, the other sound, cheerefull, and of long life. We must not then maruell if the Florentine (who is towards the East and South, hauing the mountaines at his backe vpon the North & West) be of more subtill spirit than the Venetians, and more aduised in his priuat af∣faires:* 1.1459 and yet the Florentines in their assemblies spoile all through the subtiltie of their wits: whereas the Venetians in their councels resolue grauely, as wee haue obserued for these two hundred yeres: for those that haue least wit, yeeld to reason, change their opinions, and referre themselues to men of best iudgement: but so many great spirits being subtill and ambitious, are obstinat, and will hardly yeeld from their opinions: & for that euerie man holds himselfe able to commaund, they will haue a Popular estate, [ B] the which they cannot maintaine without quarrels and ciuill dissentions, by reason of a naturall obstinacie, proper to the people of the South, which are melancholike, and to those which for the particular situation of the place, doe participat of the nature of the South. And euen as they which goe from Bouloigne to Florence, or from Car∣•…•…assonne* 1.1460 to Valence, find a great alteration from cold to hoat, in the same degree of lati∣tude, by reason of the diuersitie of the one vallie turning to the South, and the other to the North: in like sort shall they find a diuersitie of spirits. And therefore Plato gaue God thankes, That he was a Grecian, and not a Barbarian; an Athenian, & not a The∣ban; although there be not twentie leagues betwixt Thebes and Athens: but the situa∣tion [ C] of Athens was towards the south, inclining towards Pyrene, hauing a little moun∣taine behind it, and the riuer Asopus betwixth the two cities: so the one was giuen to learning and knowledge, and the other to armes. And although they had one kind of Popular gouernment, yet was there no sedition in Thebes, whereas the Athenians had many quarrels and dissentions for the state. In like sort the Cantons of the Swissers haue maintained their Popular estate verie wisely these foure hundred yeres: the which the Florentines and the Geneuois could neuer (with the excellencie of their wits) doe ten yeares together, without some mutines. For the people of the North, and those that liue vpon mountaines, being fierce and warlike, trusting in their force and strength, desire Popular estates, or at the least electiue Monarchies: neither can they easily en∣dure [ D] * 1.1461 to be commaunded imperiously. So all their kings are electiue, whome they ex∣pell if they insult or tyrannize: as I haue obserued of the kings of Sweden, Denmarke, Norway, Poland, Bohemia, and Tartarie, which are electiue.

That which I haue spoken of the nature of the Northerne countries, agrees with the mountaines, the which are oftentimes more cold than the regions that are farre Northward: for in many places they haue snow and yce perpetually: and euen vnder the Equator the mountaines of Peru are so high and cold, as many Spaniards died for cold, and lay long dead before they corrupted; as we read in the histories of the West Indies. Leo of Affrike hath no cause to wonder, why the inhabitants of the high moun∣taine of Megeza in Affrike are white, tall, and strong; and those of the vallie are little, [ E] weake, and blacke: for generally both the men, beasts, and the trees of the mountaine, are of a stronger constitution than the others. And old men vpon mount Atlas of 100 yeres old, are vigorus, as Leo doth testifie. This force and vigour doth cause the moun∣tainers* 1.1462 to loue popular libertie, who cannot endure to be braued; as wee haue said of the Swissers and Grisons. And in like sort the inhabitants of the mountaines of Bugia, Fez, Marocco, and Arabia, liue in all libertie, without any commaunder: not through the assurance of any places that are fortified by nature, but for that they are sauage and cannot be reclaimed. The which should serue for an aunswere vnto Plutarchs demand, Why the inhabitants of the high towne of Athens required a Popular estate, & those

of the low towne the gouernment of few: considering the reason that I haue giuen. [ F] He should therefore wrong himselfe verie much, that should seeke to chaunge the Po∣pular estate of the Swissers, Grisons, and other mountainers, into a Monarchie: For although a Monarchie be farre better of it selfe, yet is it not so fit for that subiect.

We must therefore carefully obserue what euerie nation desires, and what they ab∣hor•…•…e; and first you must draw them to a milder kind of life, before you propound a royaltie vnto them, the which is effected by quietnesse and ease, inuring them to the studies of sciences and musicke. And for this cause Polybius saith, That the auntient lawgiuers of Arcadia, had strictly bound the inhabitants of the mountaines of Arca∣dia, to learne musicke, vpon great penalties: thereby to temper the naturall sauagnesse of that people. Titus Liuius also speaking of the Aetolians dwelling on mountaines, [ G] the most warlike and rebellious people of all Greece, he sayth, Ferociores Aetoli quam pro ingenijs Grecorum, The Aetolians were more fierce than was agreeable to the hu∣mor of the Greekes: They troubled the Romans more (although they had but three townes) than all the rest of the Greekes. In like sort, the inhabitants of the mountaine of Genes defeated the Roman armies, and continued warre against them one hundred yeares, neither could they euer bring them in subiection vntill they had transported them from the mountaines into the vallies, after which time they became good & qui∣et subiects; as we read in Titus Liuius. We must not then maruell, if by the Swissers* 1.1463 lawes euerie man is bound to weare a sword, and to haue his house furnished with of∣fensiue and defensiue armes: which other people forbad for the most part. And con∣trariwise [ H] the inhabitants of vallies are commonly effeminat and delicat: and euen the naturall fertilitie of the vallies, giue the inhabitants thereof occasion to glut themselues with pleasure.

As for the inhabitants vpon the Sea coast, and of great townes of traffique, all wri∣ters* 1.1464 haue obserued, That they are more subtill, politike, and cunning, than those that lie farre from the sea and traffique. Therefore Caesar speaking of the inhabitants of Tour∣nay, These men (saith he) for that they are farre from the ports of the sea, are not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & effeminat with the marchandise and delights of straungers And to that end Tully said, That the inhabitants of the riuer of Genes, were called deceiuers and conseners; & those of the mountaines, rude and vnciuill: for that these were not accustomed to traffique, to [ I] •…•…ell and to deceiue. Wherfore Ioseph speaking of the inhabitants of Ierusalem & Spar∣ta, saith, That they were remote from the sea, & lesse corrupted than others. For which cause Plato forbids them to build his Commonweale neere vnto the sea, saying, That such men are deceitfull and treacherous. And it seemeth that the prouerbe which saith, That Ilanders are commonly deceitfull; should be applied to this that we haue spoken, for that they are more giuen to traffique, and by consequence to know the diuersitie of men and their humors, wherein the policie of trading doth consist, to dissemble his words and countenance, to deceiue, lie, and to cousen the simple for gaine, the which is* 1.1465 the end of many marchants. And to this end the Hebrewes applie that text of Scrip∣ture, where it is said, Non eris mercator in populo tuo, There shall be no marchant among [ K] the people: which some do interpret a deceiuer or cousener; but the Hebrew word signifies Marchant.

There is also a great varietie for the difference of places subiect to violent winds, which makes people to differ much in manners, although they be in the same latitude and climat: For we see plainely, that those people are more graue and staied, when the* 1.1466 ayre is calme and temperat, than those which liue in regions beaten with violent winds: as Fraunce, and especially Languedoc, high Germanie, Hungarie, Thrace, Circassia, the countrey of Genes, Portugall, and Persia, whereas men haue more turbulent spirits,

than those of Italie, Natolia, Assiria, and Aegypt, whereas the calmnesse of the ayre [ A] make men farre more mild. We doe also see in moorish places another difference of men, contrarie in humour to them of the mountaines. The barrennesse and fruitful∣nesse of places doth in some sort chaunge the naturall inclination of the heauens: And* 1.1467 therefore Titus Liuius said, That men of a fat and fertill soile, are most commonly effe∣minat and cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren countrey makes men temperat by necessitie, and by consequence careful, vigilant, and industrious: as the Athenians were, whereas idlenesse was punished capitally: Neither by Solons law were the children bound to reliue the parents, if they had not taught them some meanes whereby to get their liuing. So as the barrennesse of the soyle doth not onely make men more temperat, apt to labour, and of a more subtill spirit; but also it makes townes more po∣pulous: [ B] for an enemie affects not a barren countrey, and the inhabitants liuing in safetie doe multiplie, and are forced to traffique or to labour. Such a one was the citie of Athens, the most populous of all Greece: and Nuremberg, which is seated in the most barren soyle that can be, yet is it one of the greatest cities of the empire, and full of the* 1.1468 best artisans in the world: and so are the cities of Limoges, Genes, and Gand. But those that dwell in vallies become soft and slothfull through the richnesse of the soyle. And as they that lie vpon the sea for their traffique, and those of barren countries for their so∣brietie, are industrious: in like sort those which make the frontiers of two estates bee∣ing enemies, are more fierce and warlike than the rest, for that they are continually in [ C] warre, which makes men barbarous,, mutinous, and cruell; as peace makes men quiet, courteous, and tractable▪ And for this cause the English heretofore were held so muti∣nous and vnruly, as euen their princes could not keepe them in awe: yet since that they* 1.1469 haue treated of peace and alliance with France & Scotland, & that they haue bene go∣uerned by a mild and peacefull princesse, they are growne verie ciuill and full of cour∣tesie. Whereas contrariwise the French, which did not yeeld to any nation in cour∣tesie and humanitie, are much chaunged in their dispositious, and are become fierce & barbarous since the ciuill warres: as it chaunced (as Plutarch saith) to the inhabitants of Sicilie, who by reason of their continuall wars, wete growne like vuro brute beasts.

But he that would see what force education, lawes, and customes, haue to chaunge [ D] nature, let him looke into the people of Germanie, who in the time of Tacitus the Pro∣consull,* 1.1470 had neither lawes, religion, knowledge, nor any forme of a Commonweale; whereas now they seeme to exceed other nations in goodly cities, and well peopled, in armes, varietie of artes, and ciuill discipline: And the inhabitants of Bugia (which in old time was Carthage, the which in former times had contended with the Romans for the empire of the world, being the most warlike people of all Affrike) by the continu∣ance of peace, and the practise of musike (wherewith they are much delighted) they are become so effeminat and timerous, that Peter of Nauarre comming thither with four∣teene ships onely, the king with all the inhabitants fled, and without striking stroke abandoned the citie, whereas the Spaniards built goodly forts without any opposition. [ E] Therefore Plato maintained, That there were two arts necessarie in al cities, Wrestling,* 1.1471 and Musicke; the one being the nurce of the mind, the other of the bodie. If they neg∣lect wrestling, the force of the bodie must languish: if the studie of Musicke, they will become rude and barbarous: if both, then must both bodie and mind grow dull with idlenesse and sloth: For commonly we see those whose minds are delighted with the sweet sound of Musicke, to be verie mild and courteous. What should I speake of the Romans, & of that famous citie, which had so often triumphed ouer Europe, Asia, and Affrike, whilest that it flourished in armes and learning; which hath now lost the beautie and vertues of their fathers, through sloth, to the eternall infamie of their idle

prelats. Whereby it appeares how much education preuailes: whereof Licurgus [ F] made triall, hauing bred vp two grayhounds of one litter, the one in hunting, the other to the pottage pot, and then made triall of them before all the people of Lacedemon, bringing forth a quick hare, and pots of meat; so as the one followed the hare, and the other ran to the meat. It is most certaine that if lawes and customes be not well main∣tained and kept, the people will soone returne to their naturall dispositions: and if they be transplanted into another countrey, they shall not be chaunged so soone, as plants which draw their nourishment from the earth: yet in the end they shall be altered, as we may see of the Gothes, which did inuade. Spaine, and high Languedoc; and the auntient Gaules which did people Germanie, about the blacke forrest and Francford, with their Collonies. Caesar saith, That in his time (which was some fiue hundred yeres [ G] after their passage) they had chaunged their manners and naturall disposition with that of Germany.

But it is needfull to purge an errour into the which many haue fallen, hauing taxed the French of lightnesse, imitating therein Caesar, Tacitus, Trebellius, and Pollio. If they tearme a certaine alacritie and promptnesse in all their actions, Lightnesse; the iniurie pleaseth me, the which is common to all the people of the middle regions betwixt the Pole and the Equator: for euen in like sort Titus Liu•…•…us doth call them of Asia, Greece, and Syria, Leuissima hominum genera, Light kind of men: the which the ambassadaur of the Rhodians did freely confesse in the open Senat at Rome. And Caesar himselfe doth interpret that which he would say, acknowledging that the Gaules haue good [ H] wits, and prompt, and tractable. And Scaliger borne at Ve•…•…ona, writes, That there is not any nation of a quicker & more liuely spirit than the French; be it in armes or lear∣ning, be it in the trade of marchandise, or in well speaking: but aboue all, their hearts are generous and loyall, keeping their faith more constantly than any nation. And Baptista Mantuanus, the most excellent Poet of his age, writes thus of the French,

Hoat fierie spirits haue the Gaules, their bodies passing white, And of that white haue they their names; a crimson colour bright Their womans faces garnisheth, wherewith a comely grace Being mixt, Nature out of two sundrie colours one doth raise: [ I] Frolike they are, of cheerefull hew, delight in rounds and rime, Prone vnto Venus sports, to banqueting, and when they see their time As prone vnto Church seruice. They list not beare the yoke, Hypocrisie they flie amaine, and what is falsly spoke: Hating the sullen Saturnist, they giue themselues to game, To hunting, hawking, hils and dales theile thorow them amaine. I, they in warres delight them too, the barbed horse to ride; Their brigantines, their bow, and speare, to vse it is their pride: Whole nights abroad to sleepe on ground it is their chiefest ioy, And to be slurd with sunne, and rust, th' account it nothing coy, [ K] With dust to be orespred, to sweat vnder the weight of armes, For countrey, kin, and eke for king, to vnder goe all harmes; Yea death it selfe to them is sweet. Thus farre Mantuan.

The constancie of the French appeares plainely by the religion which hath bene re∣ceiued* 1.1472 and allowed by our predecessors, for the which we haue contended these three∣score yeres with such obstinacie, as no nation in the world hath endured such burnings, spoylings, tortures, and ciuill wars, as we haue caused vnto our selues. Wherby Caesars

testimony appeares to be very true, writing, That all the nations of the Gauls was much [ A] giuen to religion, which is far from lighntesse and inconstancie. But that fierie vigour, as Veronensis sayth, which we see in the french, and the wonderfull alacritie in doing of things proceedes from choller: from thence grow the violent motions of the mind, from thence come murthers, when as from words they fall to blowes, and choller en∣clining vnto rashnes breakes forth sodenly, the which if it be restrained within the bound of reason it doth greatly increase wisedome the gouernesse of mans life, as Galen sayth, writing of a chollerike humor, but if it be distempered, it turnes into rashnes,* 1.1473 which properly we call lightnes, but this inconstancie is much more proper and inci∣dent to the people of the North. We haue said (speaking in generall) that the people of the South are of a contrarie humour and disposition to them of the North: these [ B] are great and strong, they are little and weake: they of the north hot and moyst, the o∣thers cold and dry; the one hath a big voyce and greene eyes, the other hath a weake voyce and black eyes; the one hath a flaxen haire and a faire skin, the other hath both* 1.1474 haire and skin black; the one feareth cold, and the other heate; the one is ioyfull and pleasant, the other sad; the one is fearefull and peaceable, the other is hardie and muti∣nous; the one is sociable, the other solitarie; the one is giuen to drinke, the other so∣ber; the one rude and grosse witted, the other aduised and ceremonious; the one is prodigall and greedie, the other is couetous and holds fast; the one is a souldier, the o∣ther a philosopher; the one fit for armes and labour, the other for knowledge and rest. If then the inhabitants of the South be wilfull and obstinate, as Plutarch sayth, [ C] speaking of the Affricans, maintaining his resolutions very wilfully, it is most certaine that the other is changeable, and hauing no cōstancie, those of the middle regions hold the vertue of the meane, betwixt wilfulnes and lightnes, not being changeable in their resolutions without reason, like vnto the people of the North, nor yet so setled in their opinions, as they will not be altered without the ruine of an estate. Tacitus writing of the Germains, saith, that they hold it no dishonor to denie their word. The Eastgoths and Weastgoths being expelled by Attila, they required some land to inhabit from the Emperour Valens, swearing to imbrate the Christian religion, which hauing gran∣ted them, they treacherously seazed on Valens, and burnt him aliue, and the people of Gronland which are neerest vnto the Pole, being of an inconstant humor, as Munster [ D] * 1.1475 saith, did easily imbrace the Christian religion, and then afterwards fell againe to their Idolatrie. And as for the Muscouites, the Baron of Heberstein saith in their historie, that he hath not knowne any nation more dis•…•…oyall, which will haue all men to keepe their faith with them, and they with no man. This falshood or treacherie comes from distrust, or from feare, and both the one and the other from want of spirit and wit: for a wise and considerate man as those of the middle region be, is not distrustfull, for that he foreseeth what may happen, and with courage and constancie doth execute what he hath resolued, the which the people of the South do not so well, being fearefull, nor they of the North which want wit. And to make it manifest how distrustfull and suspi∣tious the people of the North be, looke into the realme of Denmarke and Sweden, [ E] whereas the magistrates do hide men in the Innes to heare what is spoken. The go∣uerment* 1.1476 of euery Citie is of great force in the alteration of the peoples natures and dis∣positions: if they be oppressed with tyrannie and seruitude, they grow faintharted and deiected: they which liue in popular estates and enioy their liberties, must of necessitie be more bold and warlike, wherein not only the nature of the heauens and regions in generall are to be considered, but also the particularities of the regions. What may grow in the minds of men from the ayre, water, winds, hills and vallies, what from reli∣gion, lawes, customes, discipline, and from the state of euery commonweale, and

not to obserue the climate alone, for we see in climates that be alike and of the same ele∣uation [ F] foure notable differences of people in colour, without speaking of other quali∣ties,* 1.1477 for that the West Indians are generallie of a duskish colour like vnto a roasted quinze, vnlesse it be a handfull of men that are black, whom the tempest carried from the coast of Affrike: and in Siuill of Spaine the men are white, at Cape Bonne Espe∣rance black, at the riuer of Plate of a chestnut colour, all being in like latitude, and like climates, as we reade in the histories of the Indies which the Spaniards haue left in wri∣ting: the cause may be the change from one countrie to another, and that the Sunne in Capricorne is neerer vnto the earth by all the eccentricall latitude, the which are a∣boue foure hundred thousand leagues. The transportation of Collonies works a great difference in men, but the nature of the heauens, winds, waters and earth, are of more [ G] force. The Colonie of the Saxons which Charlemaine brought into Flanders, differed much from all the French, but by little and little they were so changed as they retaine nothing of the Saxon but the language, the which is much altered, pronouncing their aspirations more lightly, and interlacing the vowels with the consonants: as the Sa∣xon when he calles a horse Pferd, the Flemings say Perd, and so of many others. For alwaies the people of the North, or that dwell vpon mountaines, hauing a more in∣ward heate, deliuer their words with greater vehemencie and more aspiration than the people of the East or South, who interlace their vowels sweetly, and auoid aspirations all they can (and for the same reason women who are of a colder complexion than men, speake more sweetly) the which was verified in one tribe of the people of Israell, [ H] for those of the tribe of Ephraim which remained in the mountaine and towards the North, which they called Gallaad, were not only more rough and audacious and bold than those that dwelt in the valies, of the same tribe, but did also pronounce the conso∣nants and aspirations which the others could not pronounce; so as being vanquished, and flying from the battaile, not able to distinguish the one from the other being of one nation, they watched them at the passage of Iordain, demaunding of them how they called the passage or foord, which was named Schibolet, the which they pronoun∣ced Sibolet, which doth properly signifie an eare of corne, although that they be both oftentimes confounded, by which meanes there were 42000 men slaine. It is most certaine that at that time the Hebrewes held the purenes of bloud inuiolable, and that [ I] it was but one tribe. That which I haue said, That the nature of the place doth greatly change the nature and pronunciation of men; may be generally obserued, and especi∣ally in Gasconie in the countrie which is called Labdac, for that the people put L. in stead of other consonants. We do also see the Polonia•…•…s, which are more Eastward than Germanie, to pronounce much more sweetly: and the Geneuois being more Southerly than the Venetian these men pronounce Cabre, and the Geneuois say Cra∣be, whereby the Venetians distinguished them that fled, hauing gotten a great victorie* 1.1478 against the Geneuois, making them to pronounce Cabre, and killing all them that could not do it. The like did the inhabitants of Montpellier in a sedition which hap∣ned in the time of king Charles the fift, seeking to kill the strangers, they shewed them [ K] beanes, which the strangers called Febues, and the inhabitants of the countrie called them Haues; like vnto the Sabins, which did pronounce Fircus Faedus, for Hircus Hae∣dus, as Marcus Varro sayth. And thus much touching the naturall inclination of peo∣ple, the which notwithstanding carrie no necessitie as I haue sayd, but are of great consequence for the setling of a Commonweale, lawes and customes, and to know in what manner to treat with the one and the other. Let vs now speake of other meanes to preuent the changes of Commonweales, which groweth through aboundance of riches.

CHAP. II. [ A] The meanes to preuent the changes of Commonweales, which happen through the great riches of some, and exceeding pouertie of others.

AMong all the causes of seditions and changes of Commonweales* 1.1479 there is none greater than the excessiue wealth of some fewe subiects, and the extreme pouertie of the greatest part. All anti∣ent histories are full, whereas it appeares that all they which haue pretended any discontentment against the state, haue al∣wayes [ B] imbraced the first occasion to spoile the rich: yet these changes and mutenies were more ordinarie in old time than at this day, for the infinite number of slaues which were thirtie or fortie for one free man; and the greatest reward of their seruice, was to see themselues freed, although they rea∣ped no other benefit but only libertie, which many bought with that which they had spared all their life time, or else with what they borrowed, binding themselues to re∣store it, besides the duties they did owe to them that did infranchise them: besides, they had many children, which happens most commonly to them that labour most,* 1.1480 and liue most continently, so as seeing themselues in libertie and opprest with pouer∣tie, [ C] they were forced to borrow vpon interest, to sell their children, or to satisfie their creditors with their fruites and labours; and the longer they liued, the more they were indebted, and the lesse able to pay: for the Hebrewes called vsurie a biting, which doth not only wast the debtor vnto the bones, but doth also suck both bloud and marrow, so as in the end the number of the poore being increased, and not able to indure this want, they did rise against the rich, and expelled them from their houses and townes, or else they liued on them at discretion. And therefore Plato called riches and pouertie* 1.1481 the two antient plagues of a Commonweale, not only for the necessitie that doth op∣presse the hongrie, but also for the shame, the which is more insupportable to many than pouertie it selfe: for the preuenting whereof, some haue sought an equalitie, the [ D] which many haue commended, tearming it the nurse of peace, and loue betwixt sub∣iects; and contrariwise inequalitie the spring of all diuisions, factions, hatred and partia∣lities: for he that hath more than an other, and sees himselfe to haue greater wealth, he will also be higher in honor, in delights, in pleasures, in diet and in apparell, hauing no great regard of vertue: the poore on their part conceiue an extreme hatred and iea∣lousie, seeing themselues thus troden vnder foote, they thinke themselues more wor∣thie than the rich, and yet are opprest with pouertie, honger, miserie and reproch. And therefore many antient law giuers did equally diuide the goods and lands among the* 1.1482 subiects, as in our time Thomas Moore Chancellor of England in his Commonweale sayth, That the only way of safetie for an estate, is when as men liue in common: the [ E] which cannot be whereas is any proprietie. And Plato hauing charge to frame the Commonweale and new Colonie of the Thebans and Phociens, by the consent of the subiects which sent Ambassadors to him to that end, he departed, leauing it vnfini∣shed, for that the rich would not impart any of their wealth vnto the poore: the which Licurgus did with the hazard of his life, for after that he had banished the vse of gold and siluer, he made an equall distribution of the lands. And although that Solon could not do the like, yet his will was good, for that he made frustrate all bonds, and granted a generall abolition of debts. And after that the vse of gold and siluer was allowed in Lacedemon after the victorie of Lisander, and that the testamentarie law was brought

in, the which was partly the cause of inequalitie of goods: King Agis seeking to bring [ F] in the antient equalitie, he caused all bonds and obligations to be brought into a pub∣like place and there burnt them, saying, That he had neuer seene a goodlier fier: then he began to deuide his owne goods equally, but when he sought to distribute the lands, he was cast into prison by the Ephores and there slaine. In like sort Nabis the tyrant hauing taken the citie of Argos, published two Edicts, the one to free them of all debts, the other to deuide the lands equally: Duas faces (sayth Titus Liuius) no∣•…•…antibus res ad plebem in optimates accendendam: Two firebrands for them that sought for innouations to kindle and incense the people against the better sort. And al∣though the Romains haue in that point seemed more iust than other nations, yet haue they often granted a generall recision of debts sometimes for a fourth part, [ G] sometimes for a third, and sometimes for all; hauing no better meanes to pacifie the mutinies and seditions of the multitude, least it should happen vnto them as it did vnto the chiefe men among the Thuriens, who hauing gotten all the lands into their hands, the people seeing themselues opprest with debt and vsurie, and without any meanes to satisfie, they fell vpon the rich and expelled them from their goods and houses. These reasons may be held goodly in shew, when as in truth there is nothing* 1.1483 more pernitious and dangerous to Commonweales, than equalitie of goods, the which haue no firmer support and foundation than faith, without the which neither iustice, nor publike societie can stand, neither can there be any faith, if there be not a due obseruation of conuentions and lawfull promises. If then bonds be broken, contracts [ H] disanulled, and debts abolished, what can there be expected but the vtter subuersion of an estate? for there can be no trust one in an other. Moreouer such generall abolitions do most commonly hurt the poore, and ruine many, for the poore widowes, orphe∣lins, and meaner sort hauing nothing but some little rent, are vndone when this aboli∣tion* 1.1484 of debts comes; whereas the vsurers preuent it, and oftentimes gaine by it: as it happened when as Solon and Agis did publish an abolition of debts, for the vsurers (hauing some intelligence thereof) borrowed money of all men, to defraud their cre∣ditors. Besides, the hope of these abolitions do incourage the prodigall to borrow at what rate soeuer, and when their credit is crackt to ioyne with the poore which are dis∣contented and desperate, and to stir vp seditions: whereas if the hope of these aboliti∣ons [ I] were not, euery one would seeke to gouerne his estate wisely, and to liue in peace. If it be vniust for the creditor to lose his goods, and the debter to gaine that which is not his, how much more vniust is it to take land from the lawfull owners to enrich* 1.1485 other men with their spoyles: for they that seeke to be freed from their debts, pretend the oppression of vsurie, and the barren nature of siluer, the which cannot be in lawfull* 1.1486 successions, so as we may rightly say, that such a diuision of another mans goods, is a meere robberie vnder a shew of equalitie, and the ruine not onely of a Commonweale, but of all humane societie. To say, That equalitie is the nurce of friendship; is but to abuse the ignorant: for it is most certaine, that there is neuer greater hatred, nor more capitall quarrels, than betwixt equals: and the iealousie betwixt equals, is the spring and [ K] fountaine of troubles, seditions, and ciuill warres. Whereas contrariwise the poore and the weake yeeld and obey willingly the great, rich, and mightie, for the helpe and pro∣fit which they expect: which was one of the reasons which moued Hippodamus the law giuer of the Milesians, to ordaine, That the poore should marrie with the rich, not one∣ly to auoid inequalitie, but also to make their friendship the more firme. And whatso∣euer they say of Solon, it appeares sufficiently by the institution of his Commonweale, that he made foure degrees of citisens according to their reuenewes, and as many de∣grees* 1.1487 of state and honours: the rich had fiue hundred measures of corne, wine, or oyle,

in rent; the next three hundred, others two hundred, and those which had lesse might [ A] beare no office of honour. And euen Plato hath made three estates in his second Com∣monweale, one richer than another, ordaining, That euery one of the fiue thousand & fortie citisens, should leaue one of his children sole heire. And as for that which Licur∣gus did, who would haue equalitie perpetually obserued in succession, diuiding the lands by the powle; it was impossible, for that he might see before his eyes, or soone af∣ter,* 1.1488 this equalitie quite altered, some hauing twelue or fifteene children, others one or two, or none at all: the which would be more ridiculous in those countries whereas pluralitie of wiues is tollerated, as in Asia, and in a manner throughout all Affrike, and at the new found lands, whereas it falles out oftentimes, that one man hath fiftie chil∣dren. Some haue sought to preuent this inconuenience, as Hippodamus law-maker to [ B] the Milesians, who would not allow aboue ten thousand citisens, the which Aristotle did like well of, but by that meanes they must banish the ouerplus, or else execute the cruell law of Plato approued by Aristotle, who hauing limited the number of his citi∣sens* 1.1489 to fiue thousand and fortie, ordained that they should cause the rest to miscarrie as soone as they were conceiued, and those that were borne lame or crooked should be cast off: the which cannot be spoken without great impietie, that the goodliest crea∣ture which God hath made, should not only be made away after it is borne, but also be destroyed in the mothers womb. Whereunto Thomas Moore Chancellor of England seemes to agree, who would not haue lesse than ten, nor more than 16 children in one familie: as if he might commaund nature. And although that Phidon law-giuer to the [ C] Corinthians did seeme to foresee it more wisely, forbidding expresly to build any more in Corinth (as they made a defence not to build in the suburbs of Paris, by the kings Edict in the yeare 1558,) yet the subiects multiplying they must either erect a new* 1.1490 Colonie, or banish them iniuriously. But in my opinion they erre much which doubt ofscarcitie by the multitude of children and citisens, when as no cities are more rich nor more famous in arts and disciplines than those which abound most with citisens. It is indeed lesse to feare that by reason of so great a multitude of citisens there will be deuisions, for that there is nothing that doth keepe a citie more free from mutinies and* 1.1491 factions than the multitude of citisens, for that there are many which be as a meane betwixt the rich and the poore, the good and the wicked, the wise and the simple, and [ D] artificers and noblemen, which may recoucile these extremes when they disagree: and there is nothing more dangerous than to haue the subiects diuided into two factions without a meane, the which doth vsually fall out in cities where there are but few citi∣sens. Laying aside therefore this opinion of equalitie in a Commonweale alreadie fra∣med, rauishing and taking away another mans goods, whereas they should preserue to euery man his owne, according vnto the law of nature; and reiecting also them that would limit the number of the citisens, we will maintaine that this deuision of portions ought not to be allowed but in the framing of a new Commonweale in a conquered* 1.1492 countrie: the which diuision should be made by families, and not by the powle, reser∣uing alwaies some prerogatiue for one of the familie, and some right for the elder in [ E] euerie house, according to the law of God; who doth shew vs with his finger what course to take, for hauing chosen the tribe of Leui to giue him the right of the elder a∣boue the other twelue, he gaue them no lands but only houses in cities, appointing them the tenth of euery tribe (which was twelue tenths) without any labour, the which was twise as much at the least as any tribe had, all things deducted. And among the Leuites the right of the elder was reserued to the house of Aaron, which had the tenth of the Leuites, and all the oblations and first fruites: and to euery priuat house he as∣signed* 1.1493 twise as much of the goods and lands vnto the elder as to any other of the

heires, excluding the daughters wholie from the succession, but for want of males in [ F] the same degree, whereby we may iudge that the law of God hath directly reiected all equalitie, giuing to one more than to another: and yet he hath kept among the twelue tribes, except that of Leui, an equall deuision of inheritances; and among the yongers an equall deuision of the succession, except the right of the elder, the which was not of two third parts, nor of foure fiue parts, nor of all; but of the halfe, to the end that such inequalitie should not be the cause of the great wealth of some few subiects, and the ex∣treame pouertie of an infinit number: which is the occasion of murthers among bre∣thren, of diuisions in families, and of mutinies and ciuill wars among subiects. And to the end the diuisions thus made may remaine indifferent, there must not be any prohi∣bition of alienation, either in a mans life, or by testament; as it is vsed in some places, if [ G] we will obserue the law of God, which ordaines, That all successions sold, shall returne the fiftieth yeare to the house, familie, or tribe, from the which it was sold: whereby the poore that are afflicted, and forced to sell to supply their necessities, shall haue means to sell the fruits and reuenewes of their lands to the fiftieth yeare, the which shall returne afterwards to them or to their heires: ill husbands shall be forced to liue in penurie, and the couetousnesse of the rich shall be preuented.

As for abolition of debts, it was a thing of a daungerous consequence, as it is said, not* 1.1494 so much for the losse of the creditor (the which is of no great moment, when the questi∣on is of the publike state) as for that it opens a way for the breach of faith in lawfull conuentions, and giues occasions to mutines to trouble the state, hoping still to haue [ H] abolition of debts, or at the least an abatement of interests which haue bene long due, reducing them to the fiue and twentieth penie: the which hath bene obserued in Ve∣nice. We see by the law of God, that debts are not cut off, but it giues the debtor re∣spight the seuenth yeare, and suspends the debt. But the true meanes to preuent vsurers to ease the poore for euer, and to maintaine lawfull contracts, is to obserue the law of God, which hath defended all kinds of vsuries among the subiects: For the law were* 1.1495 vniust in regard of straungers, if it were lawfull for them to deliuer out money vpon in∣terest vnto the subiect, from whome he should draw his whole estate, if the subiect might not vse the like prerogatiue vnto straungers. This law hath bene alwaies much esteemed of all lawgiuers, and of the greatest Polititians, that is to say, of Solon, Licur∣gus, [ I] Plato, Aristotle, and euen the ten commissionars deputed to reforme the customes of Rome, and to make choyce of the most profitable lawes, would not allow aboue one in the hundred for interest; the which they called Vnciarium, for that the vsurie of* 1.1496 euerie moneth came but to an ounce, which was the twelfth part of the hundreth crowne which had bene borrowed, and the vsurer which exacted any more, was con∣demned to restore foure fold: esteeming the vsurer (as Cato said) worse than a theefe, which was condemned but in the double. The same law was afterwards published* 1.1497 anew at the request of the Tribune Duilius in the yeare of the foundation of Rome 396: and ten yeres after Torquatus and Plautius being Consuls, it was reduced to halfe an ounce in the moneth, and a halfe penie in the hundred: so as it did not equall the [ K] principall but in two hundred yeares. But the yeare following vsurie was quite forbid∣den* 1.1498 by the law Genutia, for the dayly seditions which happened by the contempt of those lawes of vsurie: for what moderation soeuer you make of vsurie, if it bee any thing tollerated it will soone encrease. And those which maintaine vnder a co∣lor of religion, That moderat vsurie or rents, after foure or fiue in the hundred, are honest and iust, for that the debtor reapes more profit than the creditor, a∣buse the word of God, which doth expresly forbid it. For although some would take light interest for the good of the debtor, yet many would abuse it. For euen

as a hatchet at the first makes but a little rift, but in the end breakes all in sunder: so the [ A] sufferance of vnlawfull things, how small soeuer, growes in the end to all impunitie: as they which haue forbidden vsurie among Christians, and yet haue allowed it for the church and hospitals; and some also haue found it conuenient for the Commonweale and the treasure; but there is nothing that giues the subiect more occasion to breake a law, than to defend a thing, and tollerat it with some exceptions. The which is an or∣dinarie fault among princes and prelats, seeking to exempt and free themselues from those things which are forbidden to the subiect: & who would find that bad in particu∣lar, which is publikely allowed? And for that all defences in matter of lawes are vnpro∣fitable* 1.1499 without some punishment, the which are not regarded if they be not duly exe∣cuted, therefore the law Genutia being ill executed, was by little and little neglected. [ B] And therefore in England they haue prouided, that when as any edict was made, they presently appointed a Magistrat or Commissarie, to see the law obserued, who conti∣nued in that charge vntill the law were disanulled. But the couetousnesse of vsurers did so exceed, as they lent after twentie foure in the hundred, vntill that the law Gabinia did moderat the greatest interest, at twelue in the hundred, vnlesse it were in venturing at sea, whereas the creditor tooke vpon him the hazard: But this law was ill executed in the prouinces, whereas they did take fortie eight in the hundred for a yeare, For the extreame necessitie of him that borrowes, and the insatiable couetousnesse of him that lends, will alwayes find a thousand deuises to defraud the law. The punishment of vsurie was verie seuere in the Commonweale of the Candiots: and therefore hee that [ C] would borrow seemes as if he would take it violently from the creditor: so as if the debtor did not pay the intrest, which they could not recouer by law, he was accused as a theefe and robber: the which was but a grosse shift, in regard of their sales they make at this day, the Notarie putting in this cause, And the rest in money. It is true, that at the first councell of Nice, the bishops procured the emperour to forbid vsurie in money and fruits: the which in regard of fruits, were so much and halfe so much more: that is to say, fiftie for a hundred. But it was not obserued, especially for fruits, whereas he that borrowes in a time of dearth is glad to pay it againe and halfe as much more after har∣uest. Wherein it seemes there is great reason, for hee that lends might haue gained [ D] * 1.1500 more if he had sold it in a time of scarcitie, as they do commonly. Besides there is no∣thing deerer than that which nourisheth, nor any thing more necessarie. And there∣fore* 1.1501 the emperour Iustinian hauing rated vsurie for the countrey man at foure in the hundred in money, he decreed, They should pay but twelue in the hundred in fruits, and not fiftie in the hundred as had bene formerly vsed. Charles of Molins had no cause to seeke to correct the Greeke and Latine text of the law, against the truth of all copies, that hee might defend the edict of Lewes the twelfth, and the decrees of the court of parliament, which made equall the interest in fruits and money: but the diffe∣rence is great betwixt the one and the other: for by Iustinians law, the poore labou∣rer reaped great profit, being freed for thirteen bushels of corne after haruest, for twelue [ E] which he had borrowed in a time of death: and yet by this correction which Molins giues, he should be freed for a third part of a bushell, the which is verie absurd; seeing that before Iustinians decree, it was lawfull to take fiftie in the hundred for fruits. It is farre better to relie vpon the law of God, which doth absolutely forbid vsurie, and the creditors good deeds shall be more meritorious and more honourable to lend without* 1.1502 profit, than to receiue of the poore laborer, in the qualitie of vsurie, a handfull of corne, for so great and necessarie a good turne. Therefore Nehemias (after the peoples re∣turne from captiuitie) did forbid them to take any more vsurie, as they had done before taking twelue in the hundred, as well in money as in fruits: and according to this exam∣ple

the decree of Nice was made: but after that Calixtus the 3, & Martin the 5, popes, [ F] had giuen way to rents & annuities, the which were little before that time in vse, the in∣terest hath growne so high, as the vsurie limited by Iustinian, & partly practised by the Cantons of the Swissers, is farre more easie and more supportable, although the laws of Fraunce and Venice do not allow any man to demaund aboue fiue yeares arrerages past: For this sufferance of interest, without interest hath growne to be a law, wherby the vsurers doe sucke the blood of the poore with all impunitie, especially in sea towns, where there is a common bourse or banke; as at Genes, where there are some worth foure or fiue hundred thousand duckets, others aboue a million, as Adam Centenier, & they say that Thomas Marin hath twise as much. So as the marchant for the sweetnes* 1.1503 of gaine giues ouer his traffique, the artificer scornes his shop, the labourer leaues his [ G] labour, the shepheard his flocke, and the noble man sels his land of inheritance, to make fortie or fiftie pounds a yeare rent in annuities, in stead often pounds a yeare in fee sim∣ple land. Then afterwards when as the rents faile, and the money is spent, as they know which know not any other good meanes to liue, giue themselues to theeuing, or to stir vp seditions a•…•…d ciuill warres, that they might robbe secretly: the which is the more to be feared, when as one of the estates of the Commonweale, and the least in force and number, hath in a manner as much wealth as all the rest; as it hath beene seene hereto∣fore in the state of the Church: whereas the hundred part of the subiects in the We∣sterne Commonweales, making the third estate, had the tythes of what nature soeuer, and against the lawes of the ptimitiue Church (as the Popes themselues confesse) and [ H] haue seized vpon testamentarie legacies, as well mouables as immouables, Dutchies* 1.1504 Counties, Baronies, Lordships, Castles, houses both within and without Townes, rents of all sorts, and bonds made freely; and yet they tooke successions of all sides: they sold, exchaunged, purchased, and imploied the reuenewes of their benifices for other acqui∣sitions; and all without taxe, subsidie, or any charge, euen in those places whereas the taxes are personall. So as it was necessarie to enioyne the Cleargie to put away such land as had bene left vnto the church within a certaine time, vppon paine of confiscati∣on: as by a law made in England by king Edward the first, which did forbid all church men to purchase any land; as it appeareth in Magna Carta: the which hath beene since* 1.1505 renewed by the emperour Charles the fift in Flanders, vpon paine of confiscation: the [ I] which seemes to haue bene forbidden in old time. For we find that earles of Flanders haue bene heirs vnto priests: which custome was abolished by pope Vrbin the fift. For the same reason the parliament at Paris did prohibit the Chartrens and Celestines of Paris, to purchase any more, against the opinion of the abbat of Palerme. Yet these defences were grounded vpon the chapter, Nuper de decimis. And at Venice it hath bene enacted, and church men were commanded to dispossesse themselues of all lands, prohibiting to leaue any legacie to a Cleargie man, nor to make a will by the mouth or writing of a cleargie man. And by a law made at the request of the states of Otle∣ans, the twentie seuenth article, all cleargie men are forbidden to receiue a testament or last wil, in the which any thing is giuen him (the which is verie ill executed) for the abu∣ses [ K] * 1.1506 that were committed. Not a hundred yeares since within this realme, they would not haue laid any dead bodie in holy buriall, if hee had not bequeathed some legacie vnto the church; so as they tooke out a commission from the officiall directed to the first priest of the place: who taking a view of his goods that had died intestat, beque∣thed what he pleased vnto the church in his name that was dead▪ the which was repro∣ued by two decrees of the parliament of Paris, one in the yeare 1388, and the other in the yeare 1401. I haue also a declaration drawne out of the Treasure of France, by the which the twentie barrons of Normandy named in the act, dated in the yere 1202,

declare vnto Philip Augustus, That the goods of him that dies without making a will, [ A] belonged vnto him, hauing laine three dayes sicke before his death: and by the confir∣mation of the priuileges of Rochell, graunted by Richard king of England and earle of Poitou, it is said, That the goods of the Rochelois should not bee confiscat, although* 1.1507 they died intestat: the which was also common in Spaine, vntill the ordinance made by Ferdinand in the yere 1392, bearing these words, Que no sellauen quintos da los que mue∣ren sin fazer testamento dexando hijos o parientes dentro del quarto grado que pueden ha∣uer & heredar sus bienes, vz. The fift shal not be leuied of those which die intestat, so as they haue any children, or kinsfolke within the fourth degree fit to succeed. It is no wonder then if the clergy were rich, seeing that euerie man was forced to make a wil & to leaue the church a legacie, vnder rigorous paines; being also straitly defended for ma∣ny [ B] yeares, not to alienat nor rent out the goods of the church, vpon paine of nullitie. By the commaundement of Charles the ninth a suruay was made of all the reuenewes of the church within this realme, the which was found to amount to twelue hundred* 1.1508 and thirtie thousand pounds starling a yere rent, not comprehending the ordinarie and extraordinarie alms. But Allemont president of the accounts at Paris, made an estimat, That of twelue parts of all the reuenewes of Fraunce, the Cleargie enioyed seuen. And by the registers of the chamber of accompts it appeeres, that within this realme there are twelue Archbishopricks, 104 Bishopriks, 540 Abbaies, and 27400 parishes or cures (taking euery towne for a cure, and the least village for one where there is a [ C] parish) besides Priories and begging friers. Their reuenues had been far greater if Pope* 1.1509 Iohn the 22 had not disanulled the decree of Pope Nicholas, who had allowed all beg∣ging friers to enioy the frutes of lands, and the Pope should haue the proprietie, the which was a grosse cunning to frustrate the vowes of pouertie▪ for that the propertie is fruitlesse and in vaine, as the law saith, if the vsufruct were perpetuall, as bodies and col∣ledges be. I do not speake of the well imploying of their goods, but I say that this great inequalitie (it may be) hath ministred occasion of troubles and seditions against the* 1.1510 Clergie, throughout all Europe, when as in shew they made a cullour of religion: for if this occasion had not been, they had found out some other, as they did in time of our predecessors against the Templers and the Iewes; or else they would haue required a [ D] new deuision of lands, as Philip the Roman Tribune did for the people, pretending that there were but two thousand men in Rome which possessed all, although they were numbred in all to be aboue three hundred thousand; and those few did so increase in wealth, as Marcus Crassus by a declaration of the Censors, was esteemed to be worth sixe millions of crownes: and fiftie yeares after Lentulus the high Priest was found to be worth ten millions of crownes. The Romains laboured to preuent these inconue∣niences, publishing many lawes touching the deuision of lands: among the which the law Quintia and Apuleia, would haue the conquered lands deuided among the peo∣ple,* 1.1511 the which if they had bin well executed, those seditions had bin preuented which so troubled the Commonweale: but the mischiefe was, that the conquered lands were [ E] farmed out by fauour to priuat men, with a pretence of benefit to the Commonweale, vpon condition to pay the tenth of graine, and the fift of fr•…•…tes, and some rent for the pastures: yet this rent and other duties were not paied, for that great men held them in other mens names: for which cause Sextus Titius the Tribune presented a request vnto the people, to the end that the receiuers of the reuenues might 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the arrerages that were due, the which was granted, but being not well executed, it was a meanes to pre∣sent other requests vnto the people, that the lands and reuenues of the Commonweale which priuate men held without paying any thing, might be deuided among the peo∣ple: the which did greatly amaze the rich, and caused them to suborne Thorius the

Tribune vnder hand, That by his intercession vnto the people the lands should remain [ F] still in their possessions, and the arrerages should be paied vnto the receiuers of the re∣uenues: which law they caused afterwards to be abrogated, when as the magistrates themselues held the lands, of the which they could not be dispossest, nor forced to pay without great disturbance to the state. In the end the law Sempronia was published by force, at the request of Tiberius Gracchus, the which differed from the law Licinia, by the which all men were forbidden (of what estate or qualitie soeuer) to hold aboue fiue hundred acres of the Commonweales land, a hundred kine, and fiue hundred sheepe and goates, and to forfeit the ouerplus: but the law Sempronia spake of nothing but of the publike lands, ordaining that euery yeare there should be three Commissio∣ners appointed by the people to distribute vnto the poore the surplusage of fiue hun∣dred [ G] * 1.1512 acres that should be found in any one familie: but the Tribune was slaine the last day of the publication, in a sedition moued by the Nobles: yet Caius Gracchus his bro∣ther being Tribune of the people ten yeres after, caused it to be put in execution, but he was slaine also in the pursuite thereof, after whose death the Senate to pacifie the peo∣ple caused it to be executed against many. And to the end those lands should not re∣maine waste, the poore wanting cattell and meanes to till it, it was ordained that accor∣ding vnto the law Sempronia of Tiberius Gracchus, the treasure of king Attalus (who had made the people of Rome his heire) should be distributed among the poore, to whom they had giuen part of the lands: by which meanes many of the poore were prouided for. And to take away occasion of future seditions, they sent away part of the [ H] poorer sort into Colonies, to whome they did distribute countries conqueted from the enemie. But there was one article in the law of C. Gracchus which was most neces∣sarie, and yet it was abrogated, Prohibiting the poore to sell or make away those lands that were assigned vnto them: for the rich seeing that the poore had no meanes to en∣tertaine those lands, redeemed them.

There was also another cause of this inequalitie of goods, which was by the liber∣tie* 1.1513 that euerie one had to dispose freely of his goods, and to whom he pleased, by the law of the twelue Tables. All other people, except the Athenians (where Solon first published this law) had not free libertie to dispose of their lands. And Licurgus hauing deuided the lands of the inhabitants of the citie into seuen thousand parts (some say [ I] more, others say lesse) and the lands of the countrie into twelue thousand equall parts, he did not suffer any one to dispose thereof; but contrariwise, to the end that in pro∣cesse of time the seuen thousand parts of inheritance might not be sold, or diminished into many members, it was decreed, That the elder of the house, or the next of kin should succeed to the whole inheritance; and, that he could not haue but one part of the seuen thousand; and he must be also a Spartaine borne. Others were excluded from the succession, as Plutarch saith, speaking of king Agesilaus, who in the beginning was bred vp straightly as a younger brother, for that hee was issued of a younger house. This for a time did entertaine the 7000 families in equalitie, vntill that one of the Ephores being incensed against his eldest sonne, presented a request vnto the Seigneu∣rie, [ K] the which passed for a law, by the which euery man had libertie to dispose of his goods by will. These testamentarie lawes being receiued in Greece, and afterwards published in Rome, and incerted in the twelue tables, were the cause of great alterati∣ons. But the people of the East and West might not dispose of lands by testament: a custome which is yet obserued in some parts of France, Germanie, and other nations* 1.1514 of the North. And therefore Tacitus writes, that the Germaines had no vse of Testa∣ments, the which many haue vnaduisedly attributed to ignorance and barbarisme. And euen in Polonia it is expresly forbidden by the lawes of the two Sigismonds, ac∣cording

vnto the antient customes, to dispose of lands by testament. The Oxiles and [ A] the Phytales had a stricter custome, forbidding them to pawne any lands. And by the custome of Amiens and other customes of the Lowcountries of Flanders, no Noble∣man might sell away their seigneuries vntill they had solemnely sworne pouertie: the* 1.1515 which is also strictly obserued in Spaine. We haue also said before, that the law of God did expresly defend all alienation of lands, either in a mans life or by testament, re∣seruing the right of the elder in euery familie, without any difference of noble or vil∣lain, according to Licurgus law in his deuision of 7000 parts in Lacedemon: and those of Caux in Normandie, as well the Gentlemen as others, do much better preserue the dignitie and beautie of their antient houses and families, the which by this meanes are not dismembred, and all the estate of the Commonweale in generall: the which is the [ B] more firme and stable being grounded vpon good houses and families, and as great and immoueable pillers, the which could not support the burthen of a great building, if they were weake, although they were many. And it seemes that the greatnes of France, Spaine, and England is supported by great and noble families, and by corpora∣tions* 1.1516 and Colleges, the which being dismembred into peeces, will be the ruine of the State. But this opinion is more probable than necessarie, vnlesse it be in an Aristocrati∣call estate: for it is most certaine that in a Monarchie there is nothing more to be fea∣red than great men, and corporations, especially if it be tyranicall. As for a popular e∣state which requires equalitie in all things, how can it endure so great inequalitie in fa∣milies, [ C] whereas some should haue all, and others die of hunger: seeing that all the sedi∣tions which haue happened in Rome and in Greece haue been grounded vpon this* 1.1517 point. There remaines an Aristocratie where as the noble and great men are vnequall with the common people, and in this case the right of the elder may mainetaine the estate, as in the seigneurie of Sparta, whereas the seuen thousand parts equally diuided vnto the elder of euery familie, maintained the State: and as for the yonger brethren, vertue aduanced them to offices and honors according to their merits: and common∣ly they proued the most famous, hauing (as Plutarch said) nothing to aduance them but their vertues. It was the antient custome of the Gaules: and without doubt our Nobilitie would be much more esteemed, if the prohibition of selling of their seigneu∣ries [ D] were dulie executed, according to the lawes and ordinances of this realme, and of the Empire, where it is better obserued. The like defences were made in Polonia, by the laws of Albert, & Sigismond Augustus kings in the yere 1495 & 1538, & by an edict* 1.1518 made by Peter duke of Brittaine, forbidding the common people to purchase the seig∣neuries of noble men, vpon paine of confiscation. And although that Lewis the 12 dis∣anulled those defences in the yeare 1505, yet king Francis the first renewed the Edict in the yeare 1535 vnder the same paine of confiscation. The meanes to vnite the nobili∣tie* 1.1519 and the common people more strictly together, is to marrie the yonger children of noble houses being poore (in an Aristocraticall estate) with the Plebeians that are rich, as they did in Rome after the law Canuleia; the which is practised at this day by the [ E] Venetians, and almost in euery Commonweale, whereas the nobilitie hath any prero∣gatiue ouer the common people: the which is the surest way to maintaine the nobilitie in wealth, honour, and dignitie. And yet it is necessarie to moderat the dowries of wo∣men in what estate soeuer, least that meane houses be not beggered to enrich the nobles: wherein the antient lawgiuers haue been much troubled to obserue this equa∣litie, and to prouide that ancient houses and families might not be dismembred and rui∣ned by the daughters. The law of God would not allow the daughters to succeed if there were any brethren: and although there were not any, yet the daughters that were heires were commanded to marrie the next kinsman of that familie: to the end

saith the law, that the inheritance may not be drawne from the house by the daugh∣ters. [ F] This law was obserued in Greece, where as the next kinsman married the heire, neither might the daughter marrie with any other. In Persia and Armenia the daugh∣ter had nothing of the house but the moueables: a custome which is yet obserued in all* 1.1520 the East, and almost throughout all Affrike, although that Iustinian the Emperour, or rather Theodora his wife, hauing alwayes fauored her owne sexe, reformed that cu∣stome of Armenia, terming it barbarous, not regarding the intention of the antient lawgiuers. Hippodamus lawgiuer to the Milesians, would not frustrate the daughters of all succession, but he ordained that the rich should marrie with the poore, wherein he did obserue the equalitie of goods, and entertained loue betwixt the couples, and be∣twixt the poore and the rich. It is most certaine that if the daughters be made equall [ G] with the sonnes in the right of succession, families shall be soone dismembred: for com∣monly there are more women than men, be it in Commonweales in generall, or in* 1.1521 priuate families: the which was first verified at Athens, where as the pluralitie of wo∣men gaue name vnto the citie: and within these twentie yeares at Venice, (whether comes a world of strangers) there was found vpon a suruaie two thousand women more than men: whether it be that they are not subiect to the dangers of warre and trauell, or that nature is apter to produce those things that are lesse perfect. And there∣fore Aristotle said in his Politikes, That of fiue parts of inheritance the women of Sparta held three, the which came by the permission of the testamentarie law; and for this cause (saith he) they cōmanded absolutely ouer their husbands, whom they called [ H] Ladies. But to preuent this inconuenience at Rome, Voconius Saxa the Tribune, by the persuasion of Cato the Censor, presented a request vnto the people, the which passed* 1.1522 for a law, whereby it was enacted, That the females should not succeed so long as there were any male carrying the name, in what degree of consanguinitie soeuer he were; and, that they might not haue giuen them by testament aboue the fourth part of the goods; nor more than the least of the Testators heires. This law retained the antient families in their dignities, and the goods in some equalitie, keeping women in some sort in awe: yet they found a meanes to defraud it, by legacies and feofments made in trust to friends, with request to restore the successions or legacies vnto the women which could not recouer them by order of law not by petition, before Augustus time; who [ I] following the pernitious counsell of Trebatius, tooke an occasion to abrogate the law, demanding a dispensation of the law Voconia of the Senat, for his wife Liuia: so as this law being troden vnder foot, the Roman citisens began to be slaues vnto their wiues, who were their mistresses both in name and effect. Then might you haue seene women wearing two rich successions at their eares, as Seneca saith; and the daughter of a Proconsull who did weare at one time in apparell and iewels the value of three mil∣lions of crownes, the inequalitie of goods being then at the highest, after which time the Roman empire declined still vntill it was wholie ruined. By the antient custome of Marseilles it was not lawfull to giue aboue a hundred crownes in marriage with a daughter, and fiue crownes in apparell. And by the Statutes at Venice it is forbidden [ K] * 1.1523 to giue aboue 1600 ducats to a noble mans daughter: and if a Gentleman of Venice marrie a citisens daughter, he may not take aboue two thousand ducats; nor the fe∣males succeed so long as there is any male of the familie: but in truth this law is as ill obserued as that of king Charles the 9, which forbids to giue vnto a daughter in mar∣riage* 1.1524 aboue a thousand pounds starling, and yet the ordinance of king Charles the 5 doth giue no more vnto the daughters of the house of France. And although that Eli∣zabeth of France, daughter to Philip the faire were married vnto the king of England, yet had she but twelue hundred pounds starling to her dowrie. Some one will say vn∣to

me, that it was very much, considering the scarcetie of gold and siluer in those daies: [ A] but the difference also is very great betwixt a thousand pounds, and foure hundred thousand crownes. It is true that she was the goodliest Princesse of her age, and of the greatest house that was at that day. And if we will seeke higher, we shall find in the law* 1.1525 of God that the marriage of a daughter at the most was taxed but at fiftie sicles, which make fower pounds starling of our money, in which penaltie he was condemned that had seduced a virgin, whom also he was forced by the law to bring home, if the father of the maiden so pleased: which makes me beleeue that the antient custome of the Persians is likely, for that the Commissioners deputed yearely to marrie the maids* 1.1526 gaue the honestest and fairest to them that offred most, and with that money they married them that were lesse esteemed (that none might be vnprouided for) with this [ B] caution to them that married the deformed, Neuer to put away their wiues, but in re∣storing of their dowries▪ by the which they prouided for the marriage of maids, the modestie of wiues, the dignitie of husbands, and the publike honestie whereon wise lawgiuers should haue a speciall care, as Plato had. For to take from the daughters all meanes to prefer themselues according to their qualities, were to giue occasion of a greater inconuenience. And it seemes that the customes of Aniou and of Maine haue* 1.1527 giuen them a third part in successions, of gentlemen in fee simple, the which is left to the yonger males but for terme of life, to the end the daughters should not be vnproui∣ded for, hauing not meanes to aduance themselues like vnto the males: for the refor∣mation [ C] of which custome they haue heretofore made great complaints: the which might as well be done, as in the custome of Mondidier, and in that of Vendosme, (an an∣tient dependance of the countrie of Aniou, before that it was erected to a Countie or a Duchie) where as a yonger brother of the house of Aniou, hauing taken his elder brother prisoner, made him to change the custome of Aniou in regard of the Chaste∣leine of Vendosme, the which he had but for terme of life. And although that in Brit∣taine by the decree of Cont Geoffrie in the yeare 1181 the eldest in gentlemens houses caried away all the succession, and maintained the yonger at his owne pleasure: yet to preuent infinit inconueniences, Arthur the first duke of Brittanie enacted, That the yonger children should haue a third part of the succession for terme of life, as it is ob∣serued [ D] in the countrie of Caux, by a decree of the Parlament at Rouen, the daughters portions being deducted. I haue hitherto treated of subiects only, but we must also take heed least that strangers set footing within the realme, and purchase the goods of the naturall subiect: and preuenting all idle vagabonds which desguise themselues like Egiptians, when as in truth they are very theeues, whom all Magistrates and Gouer∣nors are commanded to expell out of the real me by a law made at the estates of Or∣leance, as it was in like manner decreed in Spaine by Ferdinand in the yeare 1492 in these words, Que los Egiptianos consennores salgan del Reyno dentro sessenta dias: That all the Egiptians with their women shall depart out of the realme within threescore [ E] daies. This swarme of caterpillers do multiplie in the Pyrenees, the Alps, the moun∣taines of Arabia, and other hillie and barren places, and then come downe like wasps to cate the honie from the bees. Thus in my opinion I haue set downe briefly the fit∣test meanes to preuent the extreme pouertie of the greatest part of the subiects, and the excessiue wealth of a small number, leauing to discourse hereafter, If the lands appoin∣ted for the seruice of the warre may be dismembred or sold. Let vs now see if the goods of men condemned should be left vnto their heires.

CHAP. III. [ F] Whether the goods of men condemned should be applied vnto the common treasure, or to the Church; or els left vnto the heires.

THis Chapter depends vpon the former, for one of the causes which brings the subiects to extreame pouertie, is to take the goods of the condemned from their lawfull heires, and especially from children, if they haue no other support nor hope, but in the suc∣cession of their parents: and the more children they haue, the greater their pouertie shall be, to whome the succession of their fathers be∣longs [ G] by the law of nature, and who by the law of God should not suffer for their fa∣thers offences. By which confiscations not onely the lawes of God and nature seeme to be violated, but the children (who haply haue benebred vp in delights) are often∣times* 1.1528 reduced to such pouertie and miserie, as they are thrust into despaire, and attempt any villanie, either to be reuenged, or to flie from want which doth oppresse them. For we may not hope, that they which haue bene bred vp as maisters, will serue as slaues: and if they haue not in former times learned any thing, they will not now begin, when as they haue no meanes. Besides the shame they haue either to beg, or to suffer the re∣proach of infamie, doth force them to banish themselues, and to ioyne with theeues & robbers: so as for one sometimes there goe forth two or three worse than hee that had [ H] lost both life and goods: so as the punishment which serueth not onely for a reuenge of the offence, but also to diminish the number of the wicked, and for the saftie of the good, produceth quite contrarie effects. These reasons briefly run ouer, and amplified by some examples, seeme necessarie to shew that the law of Iustinian the emperour, re∣ceiued and practised in many countries, is most iust and profitable: whereby it was enacted, That the goods of them that were condemned should be left vnto their heirs,* 1.1529 vnlesse it were in case of high treason. Contrariwise some may say, that this is a new law, and contrarie to all the auntient lawes and ordinances of the wisest princes & law∣giuers, who would haue the goods of any one condemned, adiudged vnto the pub∣like, without some especiall cause to moue them to the contrarie: bee it for reparation [ I] of faults, which oft times is pecuniarie, and is to be paid to the Commonweale interes∣sed, for els there should bee no meanes to punish by fines, the which is an ordinarie kind of punishment: be it for the qualitie of the crimes, and of those that haue robbed the Commonweale, which must be satisfied out of his goods that hath offended: or to terrifie the wicked, which commit all the villanies in the world to enrich their children,* 1.1530 and many times they care not to loose their liues, yea to damne themselues, so as their children may be heires of their robberies and thefts. It is needlesse to proue this by examples, the which are infinit: I will onely produce one of Cassius Licinius, who being accused and condemned of many thefts and extortions, and seeing Cicero (who was then president) putting on his purple robe, to pronounce the sentence of confisca∣tion [ K] and banishment, he sent one to tell Cicero that he was dead during the processe, & before the condemnation, choaking himselfe in view of the judges with a table napkin, to the end he might saue his goods for his children: Then Cicero (saith Valerius) would not pronounce the sentence. It was in the power of the accused to saue his life in aban∣doning of his goods, according vnto the conclusions of his accusers: as Verres and ma∣ny others in like case did▪ for by the law Sempronia they might not condemne a bour∣gesse of Rome to death, nor whip them by the law Portia. And although that Plu∣tarch, and Cicero himselfe writes to his friend Atticus, That hee had condemned Lici∣nius,

it is to be vnderstood by the aduice and opinion of all the judges, not that he had [ A] pronounced the sentence, for those lawes were not yet made against them which killed themselues before sentence. And a hundred and fiftie yeares after, if any one being ac∣cused and guiltie of any crime, had killed himselfe through dispaire or griefe, he was bu∣ried and his testament was of force, in the time of cruell Tiberius, Pretium festinand•…•…,* 1.1531 (saith Tacitus) that is to say, Murtherers in their persons had that aduantage ouer others. But whether that he were condemned after his death, or that he died of griefe, it appeares plainely that many make no difficultie to damne themselues to enrich their children. And it may be there is nothing that doth more restraine the wicked from offending, than the feare of confiscation, whereby their children should be left beggers.* 1.1532 Therefore the law saith, That the Commonweale hath a great interest, that the chil∣dren [ B] of them that are condemned, should be poore and needie. Neither can wee say, that the law of God or nature is therein broken, nor is the sonne punished for the fa∣ther, for that the fathers goods are not the childrens: and there is no succession of him whose goods are iustly taken away before he is dead.

And if any one feares that want wil driue the children to dispaire, and to all kinds of wickednesse: much more reason hath he to feare, that wicked children will abuse their fathers goods, to the ruine of good men and of the Commonweale. And therefore the law excludes the sonnes of him that is condemned for high treason, from all successi∣ons direct and collaterall, and leaues vnto the daughters (who haue lesse power to re∣uenge) a fourth part of their mothers goods. But there is a greater inconuenience if [ C] * 1.1533 the goods of the condemned be left vnto their heirs, then shall the accusers and infor∣mers haue no rewards, and wickednesse shall remaine vnpunished.

These be the inconueniences on either part, but to resolue of that which is most fit, is most necessarie that the true debts being either publike or priuat, and the charges of informations, should be deducted out of the goods of the condemned, if they haue wherewithall: else there should be no punishment of the wicked. Yet this clause ought not to be annexed vnto the sentence, and hath bene reproued by many decrees of the court of parliament, to the end that the judges may know, that they ought to do iustice although the condemned hath not any thing. In like sort it is necessarie that fines & amercements should be le•…•…ied out of their goods that are condemned in any summe [ D] of money, prouided alwayes, that it be taken out of their mouable goods▪ or out of that* 1.1534 which they haue purchased, and not out of those lands which come by succession, the which must be left vnto the heire. And in capitall crimes, that the mouables & lands purchased, should be forfeited and sold to them that would giue most, for the charges of the processe, and the reward of informers; and the rest to be imployed to publike & charitable vses, the succession remaining to the lawful heires: in so doing you shal pre∣uent the extreame pouertie of the children, the couetousnesse of slaunderers, the tyran∣ny of bad princes, the euasion of the wicked, and the impunitie of offences. For to for∣feit those lands which are tyed vnto the house, were no reason, seeing it is not lawfull to* 1.1535 alienat them by testament, nor in many places to dispose therof in their life time: by the [ E] which should follow a great inequalitie of goods. And for this reason the goods and lands purchased must be sold, and not applied vnto the church or publike treasure, least that in the end all priuat mens estates should come to the publike, or to the church: for that it is not lawfull to alienat those goods which are vnited to the reuenewes of the Commonweale, or to the church. Moreouer informers and accusers must bee rewar∣ded, not with the possessions of the condemned (which might animat them to accuse good men wrongfully) but with some peece of mony: For the desire to haue the house or inheritance of another man, the which they could not obtaine for money, would

be a great occasion of false accusers to ruine the innocent. Yet must informers haue [ F] some reward, else the wicked shall continue their villanies with all impunitie. And as a good huntsman will neuer faile to reward his dogges with the intrails of the beast, to make them the more liuely: so a wise law-giuer must reward them which seize vppon the wolues and lions of the Commonweales. And for that there is nothing (after the honour due vnto God) of greater consequence than the punishment of offences, wee must seeke all meanes possible to attaine vnto it. But the difficultie is not small, to take the confiscations from the publike, to imploy them as I haue said, and especially in a Moarchy. Yet there are many reasons, the which a wise and vertuous prince will more esteeme for his reputation, than all the goods in the world gotten by confiscati∣ons.* 1.1536 For if the publike reuenewes be great, or the charges and impositions laid vppon [ G] the subiect sufficient, the confiscations ought not to be adiudged vnto the treasure, if the Commonweale be poore, much lesse may you inrich it with confiscations. Inso doing you shall open a gate for false accusers to make marchandise of the blood of the poore subiects, and for princes to become tyrants. So we see that the height of all ty∣ranny hath bene in proscriptions and coufiscation of the subiects goods. By this means Tiberius the emperour made the way to a most cruell butcherie, leauing to the value of* 1.1537 sixtie seuen millions of crownes gotten the most part by confiscations. And after him his nephewes Caligula and Nero, polluted their hands with the blood of the best and most vertuous men in all the empire, and all for their goods. It is well knowne that Nero had no colour to put to death his maister Seneca, but for his wealth. Neither [ H] shall there be at any time false accusers wanting, knowing they shall neuer bee called in question for their slaunders, being supported by the prince, who reaps part of the pro∣fit. Plinie the younger speaking of those times, Wee haue (saith hee) seene the iudge∣ments of informers, like vnto theeues and robbers: for there was no testament, nor any mans estate assured. And therefore by the lawes, the kings procurator is enioyned to name the informer, least the accusation in the end should proue slaunderous: the which is necessarily obserued in Spaine, before that the kings procurator is admitted to accuse any man, by an edict of Ferdinand, made in the yere 1492, in these tearmes, Que ningun fiscal pueda accusar a conse•…•…o persone particular sin dar primerimente delator, That no fis∣call or publike officer may accuse any priuat person before the Councell, but hee shall [ I] first giue in the accusers name. If confiscations haue beene alwayes odious in euerie Commonweale, much more daungerous be they in a Monarchy than in a Popular or Aristocraticall estate, where false accusers are not so easily receiued.

If any one will obiect, That we need not to feare these inconueniences in a Royall estate, hauing to doe with good princes: I annswere, that this right of confiscation is* 1.1538 one of the greatest means that euer was inuented, to make a good prince a tyrant, espe∣cially if the prince be poore. For he that hath no pretext to put his subiect to death; if* 1.1539 he hopes to haue his goods thereby, he will neuer want crime, accusers, nor flatterets. And oftentimes the wiues of princes kindle this fire, & inflame their husbands to al cru∣eltie, to enioy the goods of them that are condemned. Achab king of Samaria could [ K] not get Naboths vinyard, neither for price nor praier, but queene Iesabel subborned two false witnesses, to condemne the innocent as guiltie of treason both against God and man. And Faustine did still importune the emperour Marcus Aurelius her husband, to put to death the poore innocent children of Auidius Cassius, beeing condemned for treason, whose goods the emperour left vnto his children; as the kings of Persia were woont to doe, euen in cases of high treason, and hath bene often practised in this realm. And by the lawes of Polonia, confiscation hath no place but in the highest degree of treason: and oftentimes it is giuen vnto the kinsfolkes. But it is a hard matter to recouer

the goods which are once forfeited, be it by right or wrong; for they hold it for a rule, [ A] That amercements once adiudged to the crowne and receiued, are neuer restored, al∣though the iudgement were false. The which is the more to bee feared, for that the goods of them that are condemned for treason, are forfeited to the prince, and not to the lords of the soyle, who cannot pretend any thing if another mans subiect bee con∣demned for treason, as they may doe in all other crimes. And although we may num∣ber as many good and vertuous kings in this realme, as euer were in any Monarchie vpon this earth, yet wee shall see that the reuenewes haue beene more augmented by confiscations and forced gifts, than by any thing else. Was there euer prince in the world in vertue, pietie, and integritie, like vnto our king Saint Lewes? and yet by the meanes aforesaid, hauing caused Peter of Dreux to be condemned, he did confiscat, and [ B] then vnite vnto his crowne the earldome of Dreux: as he did also vnto Thibaut king of Nauarre and earle of Champagne, who was in the like daunger, if he had not resigned Bray, Fortione, and Monstrueil: and Raymond earle of Tholouse, the countrey of Lan∣guedoc.* 1.1540 The countries of Guienne, Aniou, Maine, Touraine, and Auuergne, are come vnto the crowne by confiscations in the time of Philip Augustus. The dutchie of Alen∣con,* 1.1541 and the earledome of Perch, are also come by confiscations. In like case a 1.1542 Perigort, b 1.1543 Ponthieu, c 1.1544 la Marche, d 1.1545 Angoulesme, e 1.1546 l'Isle in Iourdaine, the marquisat of Salusses, and f 1.1547 all the goods of Charles of Bourbon, with many other priuat Seigneuries, haue bene forfeited for high treason, according to the custome of other Commonweales, and the antient laws. But the custome of Scotland in cases of treasons is more cruell, [ C] whereas all the goods of him that is condemned accrue vnto the exchequer, without any regard of wife, children, nor creditors.

If any man will say, That the king freeing himself of those lands which hold not im∣mediatly of him, according to the edict of Philip the Faire, and giuing the most part of them which hold directly of him, vnto such as shall deserue well, the which he may do before they be incorporat vnto the crowne: hee shall not appropriat vnto the publike all the goods of priuat men, as else he might do in time. And to preuent this inconue∣nience, the king cannot recouer those lands which hold directly of him, offring the price to them that bought them: for so he might by purchase get all his subiects lands. I doe therefore thinke this more conuenient, than to adiudge the confiscations vnto [ D] the people; as they did in Rome by the law Cornelia, which Sylla the Dictator did publish, after that he had enriched his friends and partisans with the spoyles of his ene∣mies. But there is as small reason to giue them to the flatterers of princes, and to the horse leaches of the court, as it is vsuall in all gouerned Monarchies, which opens a gap vnto false accusers, giuing vnto the vnworthy the rewards of the well deseruing. Who doth not remember (although I grieue to remember) the blood of innocent citisens shed for gaine vnder a colour of religion, to glut these horseleaches of the court? Therefore to auoide these inconueniences of either part as much as may be, I see no better meanes than that which I haue said, That deducting the charges of the suit, his iust debts being publick or priuate, and the rewards of the accusers; the surplusage of [ E] his inheritance should be left vnto the heires, and that which was purchased to chari∣table vses▪ prouided alwaies that that which is giuen to the informers, or to the colle∣ges in charitie, shall be only in money and not in lands, for the reasons that I haue for∣merly* 1.1548 giuen. As for charitable works, there neuer wants meanes to imploy it, either in diuine things, or in publike works, or else about the sicke or the poore. In old time at Rome amercements were adiudged to the treasurie of Churches, to be imployed in sa∣crifices, and therefore they called amercements Sacramenta, as Sextus Pompeius saith: for which cause Titius Romilius refused the peoples bountie, which had decreed that

they should restore vnto him the fine in the which he had bene condemned, saying, [ F] That things consecrated vnto God should not be taken from him. The like was also obserued in Greece for the tenth of the goods that were confiscate, the which were adiudged vnto the Church, as we may see in the sentence giuen against Archiptolome, Antiphon, and his consorts in Athence in the forme that followeth. The 16 day of Pry∣tanee, Demonicus Dalopeie being Register, and Philostratus Captaine, at the pursuite of Andron touching Archiptolemus, Onomaches, and Antiphon, whome the Captaine hath accused that they went to Lacedemon to the preiudice of the Commonweale, and that they departed from the Camp in one of the enemies ships; the Senat hath de∣creed, That they should be apprehended, and that the Captaine with ten Senators na∣med by the Senat, should determine of them, to the end they might be punished, that [ G] the Thesmothetes should call them the next day, and bring them before the Iudges, and that the Captaine or any other might accuse them, to the end that iudgement be∣ing* 1.1549 giuen, execution might follow, according to the lawes made against traitors. And vnder the decree the sentence is set downe in this sort, Archiptolemus and Antiphon were condemned and deliuered into the hands of eleuen executioners of iustice, their goods forfaited, and the tenth reserued vnto the goddesse Minerua, and their houses razed: afterwards they did adiudge all vnto the publike treasor, and yet the law did al∣low the Iudges to dispose in their sentence as they should thinke the cause deserued for publike or charitable vses, as we haue a commendable custome in this realme. That which I haue said of successions should principallie take place, when as there is any [ H] question of lands holden in fee, for the prerogatiue and qualitie of the fee, affected to the antient families for the seruice of the Commonweal. Wherin the Germans haue well prouided, for in all confiscations the next of kin are preferred before the publike* 1.1550 treasurie when there is any question of land in fee; wherby flatterers haue no means to accuse wrongfully, nor Princes to put good men to death for their fees▪ which seemes to haue been the reason that by the lawes of God the amercement was consecrated vnto God, and giuen to the high Priests, if he that had offended were not in presence, or had no heires. And for that this Chapter concernes rewards and punishments, order requires that we discourse of the one and the other. [ I]

CHAP. IIII. Of reward and punishment.

IT is needfull to treate here briefly of rewards and punishments, for he that would discourse thereof at large should make a great volume, for that these two points concerne all Commonweales, so as if punishments and rewards be well and wisely distributed, the Commonweale shall be alwaies happie and florish, and con∣trariwise* 1.1551 if the good be not rewarded and the bad punished ac∣cording to their deserts, there is no hope that a Commonweale [ K] can long continue. There is not any thing that hath bred greater troubles, seditions, ciuill warres, and ruines of Commonweales than the contempt of good men, and the libertie which is giuen to the wicked to offend with all impunitie. It is not so necessa∣rie to discourse of punishments, as of rewards, for that all lawes and bookes of lawyers are full of them, but I find not any one that hath written of rewards: either for that good men are so rare, and wicked men abound; or for that it seemes more profitable for a Commonweale to restraine the wicked with the feare of punishment, than to in∣courage the good to vertue with rewards. But for that punishmēts are odious of them∣selues,

and rewards fauourable, therefore wise Princes haue accustomed to referre pu∣nishments [ A] vnto the Magistrate, and to reserue rewards vnto themselues, to get the loue of the subiects, and to flie their hatred: for which cause Lawyers and Magistrates haue treated amplie of punishments, and but few haue made any mention of rewards. And although the word merit is taken in the best sence, as Seneca saith, Altius iniuriae quam merita descendunt, Iniuries make a deeper impression than merits, yet we will vse it in∣differently and according vnto the vulgar phrase. Euery reward is either honorable, or* 1.1552 profitable, or both together, else it is no reward, speaking popularly and politikely, see∣ing we are in the middest of a Commonweale, and not in the schooles of the Acade∣mikes and Stoikes, which hold nothing to be profitable that is not honest; nor hono∣rable which is not profitable: the which is a goodly paradoxe, and yet contrarie to [ B] the rules of policie, which doe neuer ballance profit with the counterpoise of honour: for the more profit rewards haue in them, the lesse honourable are they, and alwayes the profit doth diminish the beautie and dignitie of the honour. And euen those are most esteemed and honoured, wherein they imploy their goods to maintaine the ho∣nour. So as when we speake of rewards, we vnderstand triumphes, statues, honoura∣ble charges, estates, and offices, which are therefore called honors: for that many times the priuat estates of famous men are wasted thereby: the rest haue more profit than honour in them, as benefices, militarie gifts, immunities of all or some charges; as of ta∣xes, imposts, wardship, exemptions from the warre; and from ordinarie judges, letters [ C] of estate, of freedome, of legitimation, of faires, of gentrie, of knighthood, and such like. But if the office be hurtfull, and without honour, it is no longer a reward, but a charge or burthen. Neither may wee confound a reward and a benefit; for a reward is giuen* 1.1553 vpon good desert, and a benefit vpon speciall fauour. And as Commonweals be diuers, so the distribution of honours and rewards is verie different in a Monarchy, and in the other two estates. In a Popular estate rewards are more honourable than profitable: for the common people hunt only after profit, caring little for honour, the which they* 1.1554 doe willingly giue to them that are ambitious. But in a Monarchie the prince is more iealous of honour than of profit, especially if he be a tyrant, who takes nothing more disdainefully, than to see his subiect honoured and respected; fearing least the sweet in∣tising [ D] bait of honour, should make him aspire and attempt against his estate: or els for that a tirant cannot endure the light of vertue: as we read of the emperor Caligula, who* 1.1555 was iealous and enuious of the honor that was done to God himself: and the emperor Domitian, who was the most base and cowardly tyrant that euer was, yet could hee ne∣uer endure that any honour should be done vnto them that had best deserued, but hee put them to death. Sometimes princes in stead of recompencing of worthy men, they put them to death, banish them, or condemne them to perpetuall prison, for the safetie of their estates. So did Alexander the Great to Parmenio his constable, Iustinian to Bel∣lisarius, Edward the fourth to the earle of Warwike; and infinit others, who for the re∣ward of their prowesse haue bene slaine, poisoned, or ill intreated by their princes. And [ E] for this cause, as Tacitus writes, the Germans did attribut all the honour of their goodly exploits vnto their princes, to free themselues from enuie which followes vertue. And therefore we neuer see Monarches, & much lesse tyrants, to graunt triumphes and ho∣nourable entries vnto his subiects, what victorie soeuer they haue gotten of the ene∣mie.* 1.1556 But contrariwise a discreet captaine, in stead of a triumph at his returne from vi∣ctorie, humbling himselfe before his prince, he saith, Sir, your victorie is my glorie, al∣though the prince were not present: for hee that commaunds deserues the honour of the victorie, euen in a Popular estate: as it was adiudged betwixt the Consull Luctatius and Valerius his lieutenant, vpon a controuersie they had for the triumph, the which

Valerius pretended to be due vnto him, for that the Consull was absent the day of the [ F] battell. So we may say, that the honour of the victorie is alwayes due vnto the prince, although he be absent the day of the battell: as Charles the fift, king of France was, who gaue his armes vnto one of his gentlemen, and retired himselfe out of the fight, fearing to fall into his enemies hands: And for this cause he was called wise, remembring how preiudiciall his fathers captiuitie was vnto Fraunce. The like we may say of Popular* 1.1557 estates, that the generals victories belong vnto the people vnder whose ensigns they haue fought, but the honor of the triumph is giuen vnto the Generall: the which is not obserued in a Monarchy. Which is the chiefe, and it may be the onely occasion, why in Popular estates well gouerned, there are more vertuous men than in a Monarchy: For that honor which is the onely reward of vertue is taken away, or at the least much [ G] restrained from them that deserue it in a Monarchy, and is graunted in a lawfull Popu∣lar* 1.1558 estate, euen in matters of armes. For as a generous and noble minded man doth more esteeme honour than all the treasure of the world; so without doubt he will wil∣lingly sacrifice his life and goods for the glorie he expects: and the greater the honours be, the more men there will be of merit and fame. And therefore the Commonweale of Rome hath had more great Captaines, wise Senators, eloquent Orators, and lear∣ned Lawyers, than any other Commonweale, either Barbarians, Greeks, or Latines: For he that had put to rout a legion of the enemies, it was at his thoice to demand the triumph, or at the least some honourable charge; one of the which could not bee deni∣ed him. As for the triumph, which was the highest point of honour a Roman citisen [ H] could aspire vnto, there were no people vnder heauen where it was solemnised with more state and pompe than at Rome: For he that triumphed, made his entrie more* 1.1559 honourable than a king could doe in his realme, dragging the captiue kings & com∣maunders in chaines after his chariot, hee sitting on high attired with a purple robe wrought with gold, and a crowne of baies accompanied with his victorious armie, be∣ing braue with the spoyles of their enemies, with a sound of trumpets and clarons, ra∣uishing the hearts of all men, partly with incredible ioy, and partly with amazement & admiration: and in this manner the Generall went vpto the Capitoll to doe sacrifice. Aboue all (saith Polybius) that which did most inflame the youth to aspire to honour, were the triumphall statues or images liuely drawne of his parents and predecessors, to [ I] accompnie him to the Capitoll. And after he had done the solemne sacrifice, hee was conducted home to his house by the greatest noble men and captaines. And those which died were publikely praysed before the people, according vnto the merits of their forepassed lines. And not onely the men, but also the women, as we read in Titus Liuius, Matronis honor additus, vt eorum sicut virorum solemnis laudatio esset, There was honour giuen vnto matrons, that there might bee a solemne commendation of them as of men. I know there are preachers which will say, That this desire of honour is vaine, which euerie good man should flie: but I hold that there is nothing more ne∣cessarie for youth (as Theophrastus said) the which doth enflame them with an honest ambition; who when as they see themselues commended, then do vertues spring and [ K] take deeper root in them. And Thomas Aquinus saith, That a prince must bee nouri∣shed with the desire of true glorie, to giue him the taste of vertue. We haue no reason then to maruell, if neuer any Commonweale did bring forth such famous men, and so many, as Rome did: For the honours which were graunted in other Commonweals, came nor neere vnto them which were giuen in Rome. It was a great reward of ho∣nour* 1.1560 at Athens, and in the Olympike games, to be crowned with a crowne of gold in the open theatre before all the people, and commended by an Orator; or to obtaine a statue of brasse, or to be enterrained of the publike charge, or to be the first, or of the

first rank in places of honors, for himselfe & his house; the which Demochares required [ A] of the people for Demosthenes, after that he had made a repetition of his prayses, wher∣in there was no lesse profit than honour. But the Romans (to giue them to vnderstand that they must not esteeme honour by profit) had no crowne in greater estimation,* 1.1561 than that of grasse or greene corne, the which they held more pretious than all the crownes of gold of other nations. Neither was it euer giuen to any, but to Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator, with this title, Patrie seruatori, To the preseruer of his countrey. Wherein the wisedome of the auntient Romans is greatly to be commen∣ded, hauing thereby banished couetousnesse and the desire of gainefull rewards; and planted the loue of vertue in the subiects hearts, with the price of honour. And where∣as other princes are greatly troubled to find money, to emptie their coffers, to sell their [ B] reuenewes, to oppresse their subiects, to forfeit some, and to spoile others, to recom∣pence their slaues and flatterers (although that vertue cannot bee valued by any price) the Romans gaue nothing but honours, for that the captaines respected nothing lesse than profit: and euen a priuat Roman souldiour refused a chaine of gold of Labienus lieutenant to Caesar, for that he had hazarded his life couragiously against the enemie, saying, That he would not the reward of the couetous, but of the vertuous; the which* 1.1562 is honour, that we must haue alwayes before our eyes. But vertue must not follow, but goe before honour: as it was decreed by the auntient high Priests at Rome, when as Consull Marcus Marcellus had built a temple to Honour and Vertue; to the end the vows and sacrifices of the one should not be confounded with the other, they resolued [ C] to make a wall to diuide the temple in two, but yet so, as they must passe thorow the temple of Vertue, to enter into that of Honour. And to speake truely, the auntient Ro∣mans onely did vnderstand the merits of vertue, and the true points of honour. For although the Senator Agrippa left not wherewithall to defray his funerall, nor the Consull Fabricius nor the Dictator Cincinnatus wherewithall to feed their families, yet the one was drawne from the plo•…•…gh to the Dictatorship, and the other refused halfe the kingdomes of Pyrrhus, to maintaine his reputation and honour. The Com∣monweale was neuer so furnished with worthy men, as in those dayes, neither were ho∣nours and dignities better distributed than in that age. But when as this pretious re∣ward [ D] * 1.1563 of vertue was imparted to the vicious and vnworthy, it grew contemtible, so as euery one scorned it, and held it dishonourable: as it happened of the gold rings which all the gentlemen of Rome neglected, seeing Flauius a libertine to Appius and a popu∣lar man, created Aedile, or chiefe ouerseer of the victuals; the which they were not ac∣customed to giue to any but gentlemen, although he had deserued well of the people. And the which is most to be feared, good men will abandon the place wholly to the wicked, for that they will haue no communication nor fellowship with them: as Cato the younger did, who being chosen by lot with diuers other judges to iudge Gabinius, and seeing that they pretended to absolue him, beeing corrupted with gifts, hee retired himselfe before the people, and brake the tables that were offered vnto him. So did the chast women in this realme, who cast away their girdles of gold, the which none might [ E] weare that had stained their honours, who notwithstanding did weare girdles, & then they said, Que bonne renommee valoit meux que ceinture doree, That a good name was better than a golden girdle. For alwaies vertuous men haue impatiently endured to bee equalled with the wicked in the reward of honour. Haue wee not seene that the onely meanes that king Charles the seuenth found to make a number of vn∣worthy men, who had gotten the order of knights of the Starre, by women or fauour, to leaue it, he decreed, That the archers of the watch at Paris, should weare a star vpon* 1.1564 their cassockes, which was the marke of Saint Owen: whereuppon all the knights of

this disorder left the starre. As in like case the people of Athens disanulled the law of [ F] Ostracisme, by the which the best men were banished their countrey for three yeares, when as Hyperbolus one of the worst and wickedest men of Athens had bene condem∣ned by that law.

It is a daungerous and very pernitious thing in euery Commonweale, to grant ho∣nours and rewards without any difference, or to sell them for money; although that they which thinke to win honour in buying their offices, abuse themselues as much as those which thought to flie with the golden wings of Euripides, making that which should be the lightest of all others, of the heauiest mettall: for then the precious trea∣sure of honour turnes to dishonour; and honour being once lost, then do they exceed* 1.1565 in all vice and wickednesse: the which shall neuer happen if the distribution of rewards [ G] and punishments be ordered by a harmoniacall iustice, as wee will shew in the end of this worke. If a Consull be allowed a triumph, it is reason that captains and lieutenants should haue the estates and offices, the horsmen the crowns and horses, and the priuat soldiors also should haue part of the arms & spoils. And in the bestowing of offices they* 1.1566 must also haue a respect vnto the qualitie of persons: to Gentlemen the offices of Con∣sull, and Gouernments; to the Plebeians the Tribunes places, and other meane offices fit for their qualities and merits: and if the vertue of a meane man or of a priuate soul∣dier be so great that hee exceeds all others, it is reason that he haue his part in the grea∣test dignities, as it was decreed by the law Canuleia, to appease the seditions betwixt the nobilitie of Rome and the people: but he that would make a Consull, a knight of [ H] the Order, or a master of the horse, of a base fellow that had neuer caried arms, without doubt he should blemish the dignitie of rewards, and put the whole estate in danger of ruine. In old time there was more difficultie to create a simple Knight, than is now to make a Generall: they must haue deserued well, and prepare themselues for it with great solemnitie. And euen Kings children and Princes of the bloud were not admit∣ted* 1.1567 to be Knights but with great ceremonies: as we may reade of Saint Lewis, when he made his sonne Philip the 3. Knight, who afterwards created Philip the faire Knight in the yeare 1284 and he his three children in the presence of all his Princes: and which is more, king Francis the first after the battaile of Marignan caused himselfe to be dub∣bed knight by Captaine Bayard, taking his sword from him. But since that cowards and [ I] housedoues caried away this price of honor, true knights neuer esteemed it: so as Charles the sixt at the siege of Bourges made aboue fiue hundred knights banerets, & many other knights, which had not power to raise a banner, as Monstrelet said. In like sort that militarie girdle which the Roman Emperours did vse to giue as a reward of honor to them that had deserued well of the Commonweale; as the coller of the or∣der, the which they tooke away in reproch, as Iulian the Emperour did from Iouinian and other christian Captaines; and the honor of a Patrician, the which the Emperours of the East did esteeme as the highest point of honor and fauour: in the beginning it was not giuen but vnto the greatest Princes and noble men. As we read that the Em∣perour Anastasius sent the order of a Patrician to king Clouis in the citie of Tours, but [ K] after that it was imparted to men of base condition and vnworthie of that honor, it grew contemptible, so as Princes haue bin of necessitie glad to forge new honors, new prizes, and new rewards. As Edward the third king of England made the order of Saint George, or of the Garter: and soone after the 6 of Ianuary 1351 king Ihon did institute the order of the Starre in the Castell of Saint Owen: and long after that Philip the se∣cond* 1.1568 duke of Burgogne erected the order of the golden Fleece: and 40 yeres after him Lewis the II king of France made the order of Saint Michaell; as also after him the dukes of Sauoy haue instituted the order of the Anonciado, and other Princes haue

done the like, to honor with the title of Knighthood those that deserued well, whose [ A] seruices they cannot otherwise reward. By the first article of the golden Fleece, the* 1.1569 which was instituted the tenth of Ianuary 1429 no man might be Knight of that or∣der, vnlesse he were a Gentleman of name and armes, and without reproch: by the se∣cond, he might not carrie any other order of what Prince soeuer, but with the priuitie & consent of the chiefe of the order: the seuenth article wils, That all personall quarrels and dissentions of Knights among themselues shall be decided by Iudges of the order, the which is a bodie and Colledge, with a Chancellor, Treasorer, King at armes, Re∣gister, a priuat Seale of the order, and soueraigne iurisdiction, without appeale or ciuill request. Lewis the II imitating the example of Philip Duke of Bourgogne, who had entertained him in the time of his disgrace with his father, instituting the order of Saint [ B] Michell into a Colledge, the first day of August in the yeare 1469 he set downe those articles whereof I haue made mention, and all other articles specified in the institution* 1.1570 of the Fleece: and besides in the 37 article it is said, That when any assemblie shall be made the life and conuersation of euery Knight shall be examined one after an other, during which examination they shall depart out of the Chapter, and be called againe to heare the admonitions and censures of the Chancellor of the order: and in the 38 article it is said, That an examination and censure shall be made of the soueraigne and head of the order, which is the King, as of the rest to be punished and corrected, accor∣ding to the aduice of the brethren of the order, if he hath committed any thing against [ C] the honor, estate, and dutie of Knighthood, or against the statutes of the order: and in the 42 article it is decreed, That any Knights place being voyd, the Chapter shall pro∣ceed to a new election, and the Soueraignes voice shall stand but for two: and both he and all the Knights of the order shall be bound to take a solemne oth at their entrie into the Chapter, to chuse the worthiest that they know, without respect to hatred, friend∣ship, fauour, bloud, or any other occasion, which might▪ diuert them from the right: which oth shall be made in the Soueraignes hands from the first vnto the last: and in the last article there is an expresse clause, That neither the King nor his successors, nor the chapter of the order may not derogate from the articles of the institution. Behold briefly the institution of the order and Colledge of honor, the goodliest and the most [ D] royall that euer was in any Commonweale, to draw, yea to force mens minds vnto vertue. It may be some one will say, that the first institution of 31 Knights in the order of the golden Fleece, of 36 in the order of France, and of 24 in the order of the Garter instituted at Windsor, cuts off the way to vertue, for that it is expresly defended in the last article of the ordinances of Lewis the II, not to increase that number, although the Soueraigne Prince and the whole Chapter were so resolued; but in my opinion it is one of the chiefest articles that ought to haue bene dulie obserued: to auoid the incon∣ueniences which we haue seene by the infinite number of the order of Saint Michell,* 1.1571 for the number is sufficient to receiue them that shall deserue that honor: and the fewer there are, the more it will be desired of all men: as at a prize, the which is the more [ E] greedily desired, for that euery man hopes for it, and few carrie it. And in this number soueraigne Princes are not comprehended, to whom they present the order only for honor, for that they cannot be tyed to the lawes of the order, and retaine the rights and prerogatiues of soueraigntie. And although the number were small, yet were there but foureteene Knightes at the first institution of the order, the which are named in the ordinance: and in the time of King Francis the first the number was neuer full. So it is most certaine, that there is nothing that doth more blemish the greatnes of the honor, than to impart it to so many And for this cause many seeing the smal account was held of the order, procured to haue their Seigneuries erected into Earledomes, Marquisats,

and Duchies, which number hath so increased in a short time, as the multitude hath [ F] bred contempt, so as Charls the ninth enacted by an edict, That after that time all Du∣chies, Marquisats and Counties should be vnited vnto the Crowne, if the Dukes, Marquises and Earles dyed without heires males issued of their bodies, although the said Seigneuries had not in former times belonged vnto the Crowne: the which is a verie necessarie Edict to restraine the insatiable ambition of such as had not deserued these titles of honor, whereof the Prince should be iealous. And generally in all gifts, rewards, and titles of honor it is expedient (for the greater grace of the benefi) tthat he only which holds the Soueraigntie should bestow it on him that hath deserued; who will thinke himselfe much more honored, when his Prince hath giuen him his reward, seene him, heard him, and graced him. Also the Prince aboue all things must be iea∣lous [ G] that the thanks of his bountie may remaine, banishing from his court those sellers of smoke, or punishing them as Alexander Seuerus did, who caused one to be tyed* 1.1572 vnto a post, as Spartian saith, and smothered him with smoke, causing it to be proclai∣med by the trompet, So perish all such as sell smoke. He was fauored by the Empe∣rour, who as soone as he knew the name of any one whom the Emperour meant to grace either with honor or office, he went vnto him, promising him his fauour, the which he sold at a high rate, and like a horseleech of the Court he suckt the bloud of the subiects to the dishonor of his Prince, who should hold nothing more deere than the thanks of his gifts and bountie; else if he indure that his houshold seruants steale a∣way the fauours of his subiects, it is to be feared that in the end they will make them∣selues [ H] masters, as Absolon did, who shewing himselfe affable and courteous to all the subiects, abusing the charges of honor, offices, and benefices, giuing them vnder the fa∣uour of the King his father to whom he pleased; he stole from him (saith the scripture) his subiects hearts, and expelled him from his royall throne. We read also of Otho, who hauing receiued 2500 crownes for a dispensation which the Emperour Galba gaue at his request, he gaue them among the Captaines of the guards, the which was a chiefe meanes for him to vsurp the State, after that he had caused Galba to be slaine. This gift was like vnto the Eagle which the Emperour Iulian caried in his Standard, the which pulled off her owne feathers, whereof they made arrowes to shoot at her. For* 1.1573 the same occasion the last kings issued from Meroue and Charlemaigne were expelled [ I] from their estates by the Maiors of the pallace, who gaue all offices and benefices to whom they pleased without the kings priuitie or consent: and therefore Loup Abbot of Ferrieres did write vnto Charles the 3 king of France, aduising him to haue a speciall care that his flatterers and courtiers did not steale from him the thanks of his liberalitie. Some will say, that it is impossible for a Prince to refuse his mother, brethren, children, and friends: I must confesse it is a hard matter to auoid it, yet I haue seene a King who* 1.1574 being importuned by his brother for another, said vnto him in the presence of the su∣tor, Brother, at this time I will do nothing for your sake, but for the loue of this man who hath deserued well, to whom he graciously granted what his brother had deman∣ded. But if the Prince will wholie yeeld himselfe to the appetite of his followers, we [ K] may well say that he is but a cipher, which giues all power vnto others, & reserues no∣thing to himselfe: he must therefore know which be good and vertuous men, and that haue well deserued. And least the Prince should be forced to denie many importunate beggers, he must make choise of wise and faithfull masters of requests, to receiue euery mans petition, who may dissuade such as demaund any thing that is vniust or against the good of the State, or at the least they must acquaint the Prince therewith that he may not be surprised in his answer: By this meanes importunat beggers shall be kept backe by goodmen, neither shall they haue any cause to bee discontented with the

Prince, who they will thinke vnderstands not thereof, or else he will satisfie them with [ A] * 1.1575 pertinent reasons, wherein the Emperour Titus is greatly commended, for that he ne∣uer sent away any man discontented, whether he granted or refused what he deman∣ded, and therefore they called him, The delight of mankind. Moreouer an impudent begger knowing that his petition shall be viewed, red and examined by a wise Chan∣cellor, or an vnderstanding master of requests will not presume to pursue a thing that is vniust; for Princes neuer want flatterers and impudent beggers, the which haue no other end but to drinke the bloud, eate the boanes, & suck the marrow both of Prince and subiect: and those which haue best deserued of the Commonweale, are common∣ly* 1.1576 most kept back, not only for that their honor forbids them to flatter, and to beg the reward of vertue, which should be offred vnto them: but also for the charges and ex∣pences [ B] of the pursuite, and many times without all hope. And if their petitions be once reiected, they will not make a second attempt, no more then Callicratidas a Lacede∣monian Captaine (one of the most vertuous of his age) who was mockt of the Cour∣tiers of yong Cyrus, for that he had not the patience to court it long: and contrariwise Lisander a flattering courtier, if euer any were, obtained whatsoeuer he demaunded.* 1.1577 A modest and bashfull man is amazed in this case, where as the impudent preuaile, knowing well the humor of Princes, who alwaies loue them to whom they haue done most good, and the most part hate them to whom they are most bound: and to say the truth, the nature of a benefit is such, as it doth no lesse bind him that giues, than him [ C] that receiues it: and contrariwise thanks and the acknowledging of a benefit is trouble∣some to an ingratefull person, and reuenge is sweet, wherof Tacitus giues the reason,* 1.1578 saying, Proniores ad vindictam sumus quàm ad gratiam, quia gratia oneri, vltio in questu •…•…betur: We are more prone to reuenge then to giue thanks, for thanks is held a bur∣then, and reuenge a gaine. And although that many Princes neither pay, nor giue any thing but words, yet the least promise that is made vnto them they hold as a firme bond. There is yet an other point which hinders and cuts off the rewards of good men, which is, that if a wise Prince bestowes any office, priuiledge, or gift to whom soe∣uer, before he can enioy it, he must giue the one halfe in rewards: and oftentimes their promises are sold so deere, as they carrie away little or nothing at all, the which is an in∣curable [ D] disease but by seuere and rigorous punishments, for the which they must of ne∣cessitie* 1.1579 prouide, seeing that punishments and rewards are the two firmest supports of a Commonweale. The best meanes to preuent it is for the Prince to cause the gift to be brought and deliuered, and if it were possible to be present thereat himselfe, specially if it be to a man of worth: for the gift comming in this sort from the Princes own hand, hath more efficacie and grace, then a hundred times as much giuen him by an other repiningly, or curtalled for the most part. The like censure is to be made of praise or commendations, which the Prince deliuers with his owne mouth to him that hath deserued it, the which hath more effect then all the wealth that he can giue him: and a reproch or blame is as a stabbe vnto generous minds to force them to do well. But it is [ E] impossible euer to see a iust distribution of punishments and rewards, so long as Prin∣ces shall set to sale dignities, honors, offices, and benefices, the which is the most dange∣rous and pernitious plague in a Commonweale. All nations haue prouided for it by* 1.1580 good and wholesome lawes; and euen in this realme the ordinance of S. Lewis notes them with infamie that haue vsed the fauour of any man to procure them offices of iustice, the which was reasonablie well executed vntill the raigne of king Francis the first, and in England it is yet rigorously obserued, as I haue vnderstood by M. Randall the english Ambassador; the which was also strictly decreed by an edict of Ferdinand, great Grandfather by the mothers side to Philip, made in the yeare 1492 where as the

forme of choosing of offices of iustice is set downe: Que no se puedan vender, ny trocar [ F] officios de Alcaldia, ny AlquaZiladgo, ny regimiento, ny veyntes quatria, ny fiel executoria, ny iuraderia. It is not needfull to set down the inconueniences & miseries that a Com∣monweale is subiect vnto by the sale of offices, the labour were infinite being so well knowne to all men. But it is more difficult in a popular State to perswade them that this trafficke is good, then where as the richest men hold the Soueraignetie. it is the onely meanes to exclude the poorer sort from offices, who in a popular estate will* 1.1581 haue their parts without paying any money, and yet hardly shall they obserue these prohibitions, when as the common people shall reape some benefit by choosing of ambitious men. As for a Monarke, pouertie sometimes forceth him to breake good lawes to supplie his wants, but after they haue once made a breach, it is impossible to [ G] repaire it. It was forbidden by the law Petilia to go to fayers and assemblies, to sue for the peoples fauour & voyces. By the law Papiria no man might weare a white gowne. The law Calphurnia declared him incapable for euer to beare any office that had been condemned of ambition, vnlesse he had accused and conuicted an other, and he that had caused his competitor to be condemned of ambition, he obtained his office; after∣wards punishment was made greater by the law Tullia, published at the request of Ci∣cero, whereby it was decreed that a Senator condemned of ambition should be bani∣shed for ten yeares, but it was not obserued by the rich, who sent their broakers into the assemblie of the States with great sommes of money to corrupt the people, so as Caesar fearing to haue one ioyned with him in the Consulship that might crosse his [ H] designes, he offred his friend Luceius as much money as was needfull to purchase the peoples voyces: whereof the Senat being aduertised, they appointed a great somme of money for his competitor Marcus Bibulus to buy the peoples suffrages, as Suetonius doth testifie. This was vpon the declining of the popular estate, the which was ouer∣throwne* 1.1582 by this meanes; for vndoubtedly they which make sale of estates, offices, and benefices, they sell the most sacred thing in the world which is Iustice, they sell the Commonweale, they sell the bloud of the subiects, they sell the lawes, and taking a∣way all the rewards of honor, vertue, learning, pietie, and religion, they open the gates to thefts, corruption, couetousnes, iniustice, arrogancie, impietie, and to be short, to all vice and villanie. Neither must the Prince excuse himselfe by his pouertie, for there is [ I] no auailable excuse, or that hath any colour to seeke the ruine of an estate, vnder a* 1.1583 pretence of pouertie. And it is a ridiculous thing for a Prince to pretend pouertie, see∣ing he hath so many meanes to preuent it if he please. We reade that the Empire of Rome was neuer more poore and indebted then vnder the Emperour Heliogabalus that monster of nature, and yet Alexander Seuerus his successor, one of the wisest and most vertuous Princesse that euer was would neuer indure the sale of offices, saying in the open Senat, Non patiar mercatores potestatum, I will not indure these marchants, or* 1.1584 buyers of dignities: and yet this good Emperour did so abate the taxes and imposts, as he that paied one and thirtie crownes vnder Heliogabalus, paied but one crowne vnder Alexander, resoluing, if he had liued, to take but the third part of it, but he raigned but [ K] foureteene yeares after that he had freed his predecessors debts, and defeated the Par∣thians and the people of the north, leauing to his successor an Empire florishing in armes and lawes. But his court was wisely ordred, excessiue prodigalities were cut off, rewards were equallie destributed, & the theeues of the publike treasure were seuerely punished. He was called Seuerus, by reason of his seueritie. He hated flatterers as a* 1.1585 plague to all Princes, neither durst the horseleeches of the court come neere him. He was very wise in all things, but especially in the discouering of mens humors, and of a great iudgement in decerning of euery mans merits; being reuerent with a seuere kind

of maiestie. We haue shewed before, that the softnes or simplicitie of a Prince is dan∣gerous [ A] to an estate. After that the great king Francis the first became (through his old age) austere and not so accessible, the flatterers and horseleeches of the court came not* 1.1586 neere him, so as the treasure was so well husbanded, as after his death they found seuen∣teene hundred thousand crownes in readie money, besides the quarter of March which was readie to be receiued: and his realme full of learned men, great Captaines, good Architects, and all sorts of handicrafts, and the frontires of his estate extending euen vnto the gates of Milan, being assured by a firme firme peace with all Princes. And although that he had been encountred with great and mightie enemies, and had been taken pri∣soner and paied his ransome, yet did he build Cities, Townes, Castles, and stately Palla∣ces: but the facilitie and too great bountie of his successor Henry the second brought [ B] * 1.1587 the estate indebted within little more than twelue yeares after, foure millions three hundred fortie eight thousand three hundred nintie three pounds eighteene shillings starling (as I learned out of the accounts) and the countries of Sauoy and Piedmont, with all that which they had conquered in thirtie yeares before, lost, and the rest much ingaged. I omit to speake how much France was falne from her antient dignitie and beautie, how worthie men were kept from their degrees, vertuous men troden vnder foote, and the learned contemned: and all these miseries came vpon the realme, for that* 1.1588 he did prodigallie giue dignities, offices, benefices, and the treasure to the vnworthie, and suffered the wicked with all impunitie. That Prince then that will enioy a happie estate let him refer the punishment of offences to the Magistrate, as it is expedient, and [ C] reserue rewards vnto himselfe, giuing by little and little according to euery ones merit, that the thanks may be the more durable; and commaund punishments to be done at an instant, to the end they may be the lesse grieuous to them that suffer them, and the feare deeper grauen in the harts of others, terrifying them from their wicked and dis∣ordred liues. These lawes of punishments and rewards being dulie obserued in a Com∣monweale, vertue shall be alwaies honorablie rewarded, the wicked shall be banished, publick debts shall be paied, and the State shall flourish with all aboundance. But for that the frauds of courtiers are so many, and such infinit deuises to rob the treasurie, so as the wisest Princes may be circumuented, a law was made by Philip of Valois, and [ D] * 1.1589 verified in the court of Parliament, and chamber of accompts, whereby it was enacted, That all gifts giuen by the king should be void, if his letters pattents did not containe whatsoeuer had been giuen to him or to any of his predecessors in former times by the Princes bountie: which law although it were most profitable, yet was it abrogated two yeares after by their meanes that were interessed, finding how much it did preiu∣dice them, so as it was enacted that it should bee sufficient to haue the derogatorie an∣nexed to their pattents, as I haue seene in the auntient registers of the court: but that also was taken away, least any remembrance of benefits should hinder the Princes bountie.

There was another law made by Charles the 8. whereby all gifts aboue ten pounds starling should be enrolled: but since they haue vsed so much fraud, as one in this realm [ E] was not ashamed to bragge in a great assembly, That he had gotten (besides his offices) fiue thousand pounds starling a yeare of good rent, and yet there was not any one gift made vnto him to be found in all the registers of the chamber, although it were appa∣rant that he had nothing but from the king. We must not therefore wonder at great debts, seeing the treasure is exhausted after so strange a manner, as hee that hath most* 1.1590 receiued, makes a shew to haue had nothing. For to giue so much to one man, although he deserue well, doth not onely waste the treasure of the Commonweale, but also stirre vp the discontented to seditions and rebellions. And one of the best meanes to preserue

an estate in her greatnesse, is to bestow gifts and rewards on many, to continue euerie [ F] one in his dutie, and that they may ballance one another. Also an aduised prince must giue sparingly to the importunat, and offer to them that beg not, so as they bee of good desert, for some can neuer aske, nor yet take it when it is offered them. As Antigonus king of Asia said, That he had two friends, whereof the one could neuer be satisfied, & the other could neuer be forced to take any thing. To such men Dionisius the elder, lord of Siracusa, behaued himselfe wisely, For to vs (said Aristippus) which demaund* 1.1591 much he giues little, and to Plato who craues nothing, he giues too much. This was a safe kind of giuing, retaining both the money and the thankes. Yet princes haue ma∣ny other means to grace and reward a seruant, than with mony, the which is lesse estee∣med by men of honour, than a good looke, an alliance, a marriage, or a gracious re∣membrance. [ G] And sometimes the gift is such, as it brings more profit to him that giues it, than to him that receiues it. Charles the fift, emperour, being come into Spaine, to* 1.1592 requite the well deseruing of the duke of Calabria (who had refused the crowne and kingdome of Spaine, which was offered vnto him by the estates) being then a prisoner, he freed him out of prison, and married him to one of the richest princesses that was then liuing, widow to king Ferdinand: with the which deed the people receiued great content, the duke great honour, wealth, and libertie, and the emperour the loue of the duke, the loue of the people, and the assurance of his estate, without any charge: And moreouer by this meanes hee kept the widow from marrying with any forren prince: giuing to the duke a wife that was aged and barren, to the end that the dukes [ H] line (which made a pretence to the realme of Naples) should be extinct with him.

It is a principal point which a prince ought to respect, That his bountie and rewards be giuen with a cheerfull heart: for some are so vnpleasing, as they neuer giue any thing without reproach, the which taketh away the grace of the gift, especially if the gift be in stead of a reward or recompence. But they do much worse, which giue one & the same office, or one confiscatton to many, without aduertising either the one or the other: the which is no benefit, but an iniurie. This is to cast the golden apple among subiects* 1.1593 to ruine them. And oftentimes we see them consumed with suits, and murder one ano∣ther with the sword: whereby the prince shall not onely loose the fruits of his bountie, but the loue of his subiects, and reape for thankes eternall hatred. The which is a grosse [ I] errour in matters of state, and yet vsuall among princes; not so much through forger∣fulnesse of that which is past, but of set purpose, being falsly instructed from their youth, That they must be liberall and refuse no man, thereby to win the hearts of all men: and yet the end is quite contrarie to that which they haue propounded, giuing one thing to many. And to refuse no man, is not to be liberall nor wise, but prodigall and indiscreet. I would not onely haue the prince liberall, but bountifull, so as he proue not prodigall: for from a prodigall he will grow to be an exactor, and of an exactor a tyrant: and after that he hath giuen his owne, he must of force pull from others to giue. The laws ofli∣beralitie* 1.1594 commaund, That he should obserue well to whome he giues, what hee giues, at what time, in what place, and to what end, and his owne abilitie that giues. But a so∣ueraigne [ K] prince must withall remember, that rewards must goe before gifts, and that he must first recompence them that haue well deserued, before he giue to such as haue nothing deserued; and aboue all, let him measure his bountie according to his abilitie. The Romans to releeue the pouertie of Horatius Cocles (who alone had withstood the enemies armie, and saued the citie from sacking, and the citisens from ruine) they gaue him an acre of land, or little more; the which was much at that time, hauing but two leagues compasse about the citie. But Alexander the Great gaue kingdomes and em∣pires, and thousands of talents: if he had done otherwise it had beene against his maie∣stie

and greatnesse. Alphonsus the fift, king of Castile, gaue the kingdome of Portu∣gall [ A] * 1.1595 to Henrie of Boulogne of the house of Loraine, from whome are issued the kings of Portugall for these fiue hundred and fiftie yeares: it was for a reward of his vertue, marrying him to his bastard daughter. But yet was he blamed, to haue giuen away so goodly an estate, his owne not being at that time much greater. In like sort wee may say, that the custome of the auntient Romans was commendable, to nourish vpon the publike charge three children borne at one birth, for a reward of the memoriall victo∣rie obtained by the three Horatij against the Curiatij. But Solons law, which would haue their children which had beene slaine in the warres for their countrey, maintained by the publike, could not continue, although it were practised throughout all Greece, as we read in Aristotle, for it did quite waste and consume their treasure. [ B]

If any one suppose, that the bountie and greatnesse of a prince shall not appeare, if he giue to none but to such as shall deserue; I will yeeld vnto him. I know that bountie &* 1.1596 magnificence is well befitting a great prince: neither must wee thinke it strange if the prince aduance one of a poore and base condition to honour and wealth, so as there be vertue and merit in him: else if the prince shall raise an vnworthie person aboue good men, or equall him in ranke with great personages, in doing good to the one hee shall wrong all the rest. That worthy saying of Chilo is extant, one demanding of him what God did, He casts downe the proud (aunswered he) from aboue, and raiseth the poore and deiected to the highest degree of honour. A good prince should imitat God, aduancing the poore and vertuous to honours and riches. But when as the col∣ledge [ C] of Cardinals did admonish Pope Iulio the third, hauing created P. M. du Mont Cardinall, being a young boy whome he loued, saying, That it was a great dishonour to blemish so honourable an order with so base a man, hauing neither vertue in him, nor learning, neither nobilitie nor goods, nor any marke which might merit (as they said) to approach to such a degree: But the pope (who was verie pleasant) turning vnto the cardinals, What vertue, (saith he) what nobilitie, what learning, what honor,* 1.1597 did you finde in me, to make me pope? It is most certaine, that a vicious and vnwor∣thy prince, will alwayes haue his friends and followers of his owne humor: as it ap∣peares by the emperour. Heliogabalus, who gaue the greatest offices, and inriched the [ D] most detestable villaines in all the empire: wherewith his subiects and guard being in∣censed, they slew that monster of mankind, with his mother, and threw them into the common priuies. But without any further search, we haue seene the proofe before our* 1.1598 eyes, how disdainefully it hath bene taken to see the due rewards of good subiects, and vertuous men, giuen to the vicious, to straungers, and to the vnworthy, the which hath put the goodliest realme of Europe in combustion. For wee find, that the gifts in the yeare 1572 amounted to 270000 pounds starling: and the yeare following to 204400 pounds: and in the yeare 1574 there was giuen 54700 pounds: and in the six moneths following they gaue 95500 pounds starling, besides pensions which were not lesse than twentie thousand pounds starling: and the greatest part of all this treasure grew by the sale of offices, & by confiscations, which was the cause of all our miseries: and yet by [ E] the law of Fraunce, England, and Spaine, such buyers should be held infamous: which lawes should be reuiued, and that commendable custome which was practised vnder* 1.1599 Seuerus maintained, who caused his name to be set vp in all publike places, whome hee meant to preferre to any gouernment, giuing leaue to all men to accuse him, yet with the paine of death to him that did it falsely, saying, That it was great shame to bee lesse carefull of the life and conuersation of a gouernour, than the Christians were of the qualities of their bishops and ministers, whome they examined with all rigour before they were admitted. The which is much more expedient than the manner of exami∣nation

which the Venetians, Genouois, Luquois, and Florentines, do vse, after that the [ F] officer hath left his charge. For a bad and corrupt magistrat growne rich with thefts, will not sticke to corrupt a judge, to saue both his life and his goods corruptly gotten. It is better therefore to preuent a disease, than to labour to cure it, and better late than neuer, that the feare of this search might keepe officers within the bounds of their du∣tie. But yet Solons law was farre better, by the which the life of the officer was exami∣ned both before his admittance to the office, and after he had left it: as we read in the* 1.1600 pleadings of Demosthenes. Hauing then examined the life and manners of such as aspire to dignities, offices, benefices, knighthoods, exemptions, immunities, gifts and rewards. If their liues be polluted and wicked, they are not onely to be reiected, but also to bee punished. And rewards are to be distributed to good men, according to euerie mans [ G] merit: and by an harmoniacall proportion you must giue the purse to the most loyall, armes to the most valiant, iustice to the most iust, the cenfure to the most vpright, la∣bour* 1.1601 to the strongest, the gouernment to the wisest, the priesthood to the deuoutest: yet hauing respect to the nobilitie, riches, age, and power of euerie one, and to the qua∣litie of the charges and offices. For it were a ridiculous thing to seeke a judge that were a warrior, a prelat couragious, and a souldiour with a conscience. We haue treated of Rewards, Triumphes, and Honours, which are for the most part giuen vnto men of warre: Let vs now see if it be fit to exercise the subiect in armes.

CHAP. V. [ H] Whether it bee more conuenient to trayne vp the subiects in armes, and to fortifie their townes or not.

IT is one of the highest questions of State, and it may be of the greatest difficultie to resolue, for the inconueniences that may rise on either part, the which I will treat of as briefly as I may, set∣ting down what I hold most conuenient, leauing notwithstan∣ding the resolution to the wise polititians. To follow the opini∣on of Aristotle simply, and to maintaine that a citie ought to be well fortified, well situated for the sending forth of an armie, and [ I] of hard accesse for the enemie; were not to decide the difficulties which might be ob∣iected, whether it should haue place in a Monarchie, as well as in a Popular estate, or in a tyranie as in a monarchie; seeing that we haue shewed before that Commonweals contrarie one vnto an other, or at the least very different, must be gouerned by contra∣rie or very different maximes. Besides, for the well training the subiect vp in armes, there is nothing more contrarie than to fortifie their townes, for that the fortification of them make the inhabitants effeminate and cowards: as Cleomenes king of Lacede∣monia doth witnes, who seeing the strong fortifications of a towne, he cryed out, O goodly retreat for women. And for this cause Licurgus the lawgiuer would neuer al∣low* 1.1602 the city of Sparta to be fortified, fearing least the subiects relying on the strength of [ K] their walls should grow faintharted, knowing well that there was no such fortresse as of men, who will alwaies fight for their goods, liues, and honors, for their wiues, chil∣dren, and countrie, so long as they haue no hope in flight, or of any retreat to saue themselues. These two things then are contrarie, to haue warlike citisens, and fortified cities: for valiant and warlike men haue no need of castles, and those which dwell in strong places desire no warre. So we see the Tartarians in Scythia, and the Aethiopi∣ans and Arabians in Affrike, which are held to bee most warlike: and yet they haue no forts but tents, and some villages without wall or ditch. And euen the great Negus or

Preste-Ian, which is the greatest lord in all Affrike, hauing (as they say) fiftie kings vn∣der [ A] * 1.1603 him that doe him homage, hath no forts nor castles, but his tents, but that fort on∣ly which is built vpon the top of the mountaine Anga, whereas all the princes of the blood are kept with a sure guard, least they should draw the subiects from the obedi∣ence of their prince by seditious factions. Yet there is no prince vnder heauen more reuerenced and respected of his subiects, nor more redoubted of his enemies, than in Tartaria, and Aethiopia. Forts are held fruitlesse and of small consequence in the opi∣nion* 1.1604 of the greatest captaines, who hold him that is maister of the field, to bee maister of all the townes. It is well knowne, that after the battell of Arbella in Chaldea, wher∣as Darius the last king of Persia was defeated, that there was neither citie nor fort in all the whole Persian empire, that held out one day against Alexander the Great, al∣though [ B] there were an infinit number, and the conqueror had but thirtie thousand men. After that Paulus Aemilius had vanquished Perseus king of Macedon in battaile, there was not any one towne that made resistance, but all the whole kingdome yeelded in a moment. After the battell of Pharsalia, who forsooke not Pompey? all the townes and strong places of the East, which before were shut against Caesar, did now open their gates vnto him without any difficultie. And without any further search, it is well knowne, that after the victorie which king Lewes the twelft obtained against the Vene∣tians, he was presently maister of the townes. As in like case after the battaile of Ma∣rignan, all Lombardie, and euen the castell of Milan, yeelded vnto king Francis; and [ C] vpon his taking prisoner at Pauia, he lost all on the other side of the Alpes.

But there is a more necessarie reason against the fortifying of places, it is to bee fea∣red, that an enemie entring the stronger, and taking those strong places, hee will hold them, and by that meanes the whole countrey: whereas otherwise hauing once spoy∣led it, he shall be forced to leaue it. For this reason Iohn Maria de la Rouere duke of Vrbin, rased all the forts of his countrey, and retired himselfe to Venice, finding his for∣ces too weake to encounter the enemie; assuring him that the duke of Valentinois comming with all the power of the church could not hold it, being hated to the death, and the duke of Vrbin beloued and respected of his subiects; as it proued true. for pope* 1.1605 Alexander being dead, the duke of Vrbin was receiued with great ioy of his subiects, [ D] and all other princes that were feudatories to the church, were either taken or slaine in their places of strength. And for the same cause the Geneuois, after the battaile of Pauia being reuolted from the king of Fraunce, besieged their fort called the Lanterne, and then rased it. As also the Milanois did the castle I of, the which was built before the Sforces were lords of Milan, to the end that forreine princes should bring them no more in subiection by meanes of their fort. So the auntient Siracusians did Acradina, and the Romans the cities of Corinth, Carthage, and Numance, the which they had neuer rased, if the fort of Acrocorinth and other places, strong by nature and easie to be fortified, had not forced them vnto it, least the inhabitants should make vse of them, as Philip the younger, king of Macedonie had done, who called the cities of Corinth, [ E] Chalcide, and Demetrias, the shackles and fetters of Greece. Which forts Titus Fla∣minius rased to the ground, to free them from the seruitude of the Macedonians, and to take away all feare of tyrants. The which is another strong reason to take all occasion from princes to tyrannize ouer their subiects, as those doe which assure themselues by Cittadels, which the people called Tyrants nests; and tyrants tearmed them a scourge for villaines, in contempt and scorne of the poore subiects: as Grislerus lieurenant to the emperour in Swisserland did, who built a fort in the vallie of Vri, and calling it Zwing Vri, that is to say, the yoake of Vri, which was the first occasion that moued the* 1.1606 Cantons of the Swissers to reuolt, as we read in their histories. And Salomon was the

first that made a Citadell in Ierusalem, beginning euen then to intreat his subiects ill, [ F] exacting new tributes of them, giuing occasion to his successour to continue them, and for the ten tribes to reuolt, and to chuse themselues a king: for commonly Citadels breed a •…•…ealousie and distrust betwixt the prince and his subiects, the which is the nurce of all hatred, feare, and rebellion. And euen as castles and Citadels giue bad princes oc∣casion to afflict their subiects, so townes well walled and fortified, do oftentimes cause subiects to rebell against their princes and lords; as I haue shewed elsewhere. And ther∣fore the kings of England neuer suffer their subiects to fortifie their houses, the which is more strictly obserued in Moscouie, to auoid the rebellion of subiects, who are easi∣ly moued thereunto, trusting in their walles. And the inhabitants of Telesse in the realme of Thunis, relied so much in the strength of their citie wals, as commonly they [ G] slew their gouernours, not able to endure any commaund: so as the king of Thu∣nis going thither with a mightie armic, he demaunded of them, Who liued? they an∣swered him, The red wall: but hauing forced the towne, he rased it, and put all the in∣habitants to the sword: as Hannibal did at Saguntum, Sylla at Athens, the emperor Se∣uerus at Bizantium, Dagobert at 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Nabuchodonosor and Vespasian to the citie of Ierusalem, all which were reuolted for the trust they had in their •…•…orts, eating euen their children through the tediousnesse of sieges, and in the end haue bene rased, and the in∣habitants rooted out: the which would haue easily compounded, if the confi∣dence* 1.1607 of their strong places had not abused them. For commonly wee see, that weake townes and ill fortified, doe soone compound and send away the enemie, for some [ H] peece of money, without any infamie or dishonour: as it hath bene seene by the citie of Paris, the which was neuer taken since that Caesar forced it, the which had beene long since rased if it had bene fortified, hauing bene so often threatned by the enemie: but still they haue preserued themselues by treaties and compositions, the which they had not done being well fortified, either for feare of reproach and dishonour which follow them, which treat with an enemie when they may resist: or for the obstinacie of the in∣habitants, or the heads of a faction, who had rather die, than yeeld vnto an enemie, ha∣uing* 1.1608 no hope to escape, & seeing their houses on fire, they striue in ruining it, to quench it with the blood of their fellow citisens. But there be no cities so strong, that can long resist the canon, and much lesse famine: For if the besieged be few in number, they shal [ I] be soone wearie and tired: if there be many, they shall be the soo•…•…er star•…•…ed.

If then forts and citadels make a bad prince to tyrannize, an enemie to ceize vppon* 1.1609 the countrey, subiects to be cowards towards an enemie, rebels to their prince, and se∣ditious among themselues? we cannot say they be profitable, or necessarie; but con∣trariwise hurtfull and pernitious to a Commonweale.

As for the other question, Whether we should traine the subiects vp in armes, and seeke warre rather than peace: It seemes we should not call that in doubt: for we must esteeme that Commonweale most happie, whereas the king is obedient to the lawes of God and nature, the magistrats vnto the king, priuat men to the Magistrats, the chil∣dren to the parents, the seruants to the maisters, & the subiects vnited together in loue, [ K] and all ioyntly with their prince to enioy the sweetnesse of peace and true tranquilitie of mind. But warre is contrarie to this which I haue said, and souldiours are sworne enemies to this kind of life. It is impossible for a Commonweale to flourish in religi∣on, iustice, charitie, integritie of life, and in all the liberall sciences and mechanike artes, if the citisens enioy not a firme and an assured peace. And who is more enemie to a peaceable man, than a furious souldiour? to a mild countrey man, than a bloodie warrior? to a philosopher, than a captaine? to the wise, than fooles? For the greatest delight that souldiours take, is to forrage and spoyle the country, rob the peasant, burne

villages, besiege, batter, force and sacke townes; massacre good and bad, young and [ A] old, all ages, and all sexes; force virgines, wash themselues in the blood of the murthe∣red, prophane holy things, rase temples, blaspheme the name of God, and tread vnder∣•…•…oot all dluine and humane lawes. These are the fruits of warre, pleasing and delight∣full to all souldiors, but abominable to all good men, & detestable before God. What* 1.1610 need examples in so manifest a matter? who can thinke of them without horror? or heare them spoken of without sighing? Who knowes not the wounds of the hus∣bandman? who sees not their miseries? who heares not their complaints? Euery mans field, ca•…•…tell, and corne, wherewith we liue and draw our breath, are in the power of sol∣diours, that is (as many do interp•…•…et it) of robbers. If it be so, I see no reason why wee should instruct citisens in this cruell and execrable kind of life, or to arme them, but to [ B] * 1.1611 repulfe violence in time of extreame necessitie. For those which take small occasions to make warre, are like vnto flies, which cannot hold themselues vppon a smooth poli∣shed glasse, but vp on rough places. And those which seeke warre to inrich themselues with their neighbours spoyles, shall be in continuall torment, leading a miserable life: for desire hath no bounds, although in show they seeme to be contented with the de∣sire of a kingdome: euen like vnto a slaue, who desires onely to be freed of his bands; being vnbound, he affecteth his libertie; and being free, he demaunds to bee made a ci∣tisen; after that he desires to be a magistrat; and being come to highest place of magi∣stracie, he affects to be a king; and being a king, hee will bee an absolute and sole mo∣narch; and in the end he will be worshipped as a God. How much more happy then [ C] is a prince, or a small Commonweale (although there be nothing little where there is content) enioying an assured rest, and a peace without enemies, without warre, and without enuie. For the bounds of a well ordered Commonweale are not limited by the sword, as Agesilaus boasted, but by iustice, as Pompey said to the king of the Par∣thians, when as he would haue the riuer of Euphrates to distinguish the bounds of the Roman and Parthian empires.

This haue I briefly obiected against the fortifying of cities, & militarie discipline: but many things may be said on the contrarie part, That townes without wals lie open* 1.1612 to the spoyle of theeues and robbers, and the liues and liberties of the citisens, to the [ D] mercie of their enemies. Moreouer a towne without walles seemes to be a bait to in∣tice any one that would inuade it, who else would haue no desire, and lesse power, if it* 1.1613 were well fortified: like vnto men that trauell vnarmed, they encourage theeues to kill them, to haue their spoiles. For it is manifest, that the sacke of cities is a bait for souldi∣diours, and he will willingly be an enemie to them that are weake, that durst not look of them being armed. Besides, the first, and in a manner the onely occasion to gather men together into one societie and communaltie, was for the tuition of euery one in* 1.1614 particular, and of all in generall, and of their wiues, children, goods, and possessions, the which cannot be in safetie without wals. For, to say, that men will make a wall against the enemie, that may well be when as they must fight: but those which must make defence, are not commonly the fourth part of the inhabitants, for that there are [ E] alwayes more women than men, besides children, old men, sicke men and impotent, who can haue no recourse but vnto walles.

It is a ridiculous thing to say, That men without walls will be more valiant: if that were true, what need we any offensiue armes to affront the enemie, nay rather it should be necessarie to command euery man to fight naked, as Isadas did, being one of the goodliest and most valiant gentlemen of Sparta, who seeing Epaminondas with an ar∣mie of Thebans fighting with the Lacedemonians, and labouring to enter into their citie, he stript himselfe naked, and with a pertuisan in one hand, and a sword in the o∣ther,

he chargeth the enemie desperatly, whereas he did valiant exploits: for the which [ F] * 1.1615 the seigneurie gaue him a crowne, but he was condemned in a fine, hauing so rashly a∣bandoned his life vnto the enemie, being vnarmed. In like sort should the Senat of Sparta haue been condemned in a great fine, for that they had abandoned the people and so great a citie to the mercie of their enemies; hauing no walls, the which without doubt had then fallen into the Thebans power if they had not been fortified with dit∣ches and rampars. If a rampar did then auaile for the safetie of the citisens, who doubts but walls will be more profitable? and if walls make the citisens cowards, mutinous, and rebels, why did they not fill vp the ditches of Lacedemon? But the euent doth shew which of the two is most profitable, for Cleomines king of Sparta hauing lost the battaile of Selaria, hauing no place of retreat was forced to flie into Aegypt, abando∣ning [ G] his estate and countrie to the enemie, who presently entred into the citie of Spar∣ta without any resistance. And if walls make men cowards, Lisander hauing taken A∣thens, would not haue razed the walls, the which Themistocles and Pericles had caused to be built for the defence of that citie, the which was afterwards the most flourishing of all the East. To say that the enemie shall not be able to hold a countrie if there be no walled townes, I yeeld vnto it: but who shall keepe him from the spoile of cities, from burning of houses, from murthering of men, rauishing of women, and leading children into captiuitie, according to the antient warres, that is, of the stronger? all hi∣stories are full of these calamities. There is also as small reason to thinke that weake* 1.1616 townes and without walls will compound with the enemie, and not stand out; where [ H] as contrariwise an enemie that shall see the entrie easie, will neuer allow of any reaso∣nable composition, which otherwise he would do, finding a difficultie to besiege and to force a town well fortified. Moreouer who sees not but a small fort doth oftentimes* 1.1617 stay a great and mightie armie, whereof we haue too many examples: and many times those which do besiege are besieged with cold, hunger, and diseases, and for one they kill within, there are a hundred slaine without. Constantinople did indure the Turks siege eight yeares, vntill they were relieued by Tamberlan emperour of the Tartars, who defeated Baiazet king of the Turks with all his armie. Euen so the king of Fez indu•…•…ed a siege seuen yeares in the towne of Fauzara against the king of Marocco, whose armie in the end was consumed with the plague in the yeare 1412. And the [ I] * 1.1618 towne of Mecna in Affrike held out also seuen yeares, whereas the enemies died for the most part, and were forced to depart with shame and losse. And in our age the citie of Metz (although it were nothing so well fortified as it is at this day) did long resist the armie of the emperour Charles the fift, and was a buckler vnto all France, which had been in great danger if the emperour had not found this towne well fortified, from whence he was forced to depart, being both himselfe and his armie besieged with hun∣ger, cold, & many diseases. The citie of Tyre held out-great Alexander seuen moneths, during which time the king of Persia had good meanes to leauie forces, and to prouide for his estate. And if walls made men faintharted and cowards, why did the Romans fortifie their citie, being the most valiant people that euer were? And it was auaileable [ K] for them to haue good walls, when as Marcius Coriolanus, the Tarquins, Hanni•…•…all, and others did besiege them, and burnt euen vnto their gates. And euen when as the Gaules had forced and wholie burnt the citie, their estate had been vtterly ruined if they had not retired into the Capitoll. The like had happened vnto the Pope and Cardinals af∣ter that the armie of Charles of Bourbon had sackt Rome, if they had not fled into the castell S. Ange, where they were besieged as long as the antient Romans were in the Capitoll. And euery man knowes that countries without forts are presently conque∣red vpon the first battaile that is woon within the countrie, as we reade of England,

which the Saxons conquered from the antient Brittains, who were expelled, and their [ A] * 1.1619 enemies tooke possession. After the Saxons the Danes entred, who were lords of it for the most part: then William the Conqueror by the meanes of one only victorie became absolute lord, and tooke possession thereof. And during the quarels betwixt the houses of Lancaster and Yorke, the realme was lost and recouered thrise in sixe moneths: as if Henry the sixt, Edward the fourth, and the earle of Warwike had plaied at base: and although that Edward in the end inioyed the realme, yet soone after his death his bro∣ther Richard duke of Glocester (hauing made himselfe king by the murther of his ne∣phues) was defeated and slaine by the earle of Richmond, who had bin banished into France, from whence he brought some small ayde which king Lewis the 11 had giuen* 1.1620 him. The which happens not in fortified countries where there is any retreat: for which [ B] cause the Romans did neuer camp but they cast vp a trench about the armie of 25 foot broad, and most commonlie with palissadoes; neither did they euer giue battaile but they left a garrison within their camp, to make good the retreat if their enemies were the stronger, the which hath relieued them in great losses, as Paulus Aemilius did wisely discourse vnto the armie before that he gaue battaile vnto the king of Macedon, saying, Maiores nostri castra munita portum ad omnes casus exercitus ducebant esse, vn∣de ad pugnam exirent, quo iactati pugnae receptum haberent & qui castris exutus erat, eti∣amsi pugnando acie vicisset, pro victo habebatur: Our elders held a camp well fortified, a safe retreat for all euents, from the which they went forth to fight, and retired if they [ C] were beaten, and he that had lost his camp, although he had ouercome in fighting, yet was he held as vanquished. The experience of many ages, and of the antient Com∣monweales of the Persians, Egiptians, Greeks, Latins, Gaules, and other nations, which haue alwaies fortified and vittailed their townes, ports and places that were fit to be fortified, to assure and defend their friends, and to incounter and resist their enemies, giues vs to vnderstand, that it is necessarie to vse it; and euen the Tartars within these hundred yeares build and fortifie their places: for how valiant soeuer a nation be, yet* 1.1621 can they not long resist nor vanquish him which is much more stronger. These reasons shall serue to prooue that it is necessarie to fortifie towns. We will in like maner hold, that the citisens must be instructed in martiall discipline, for that seeing by the lawes of [ D] God and nature we may defend our liues from violence, and our goods from spoyle, we must then conclude, That it is needful to accustome the subiects to armes, not only defensiue, but also offensiue, to protect the good, and offend the wicked. I call all those theeues and wicked which make warre vniustly, and take away an other mans goods wrongfully, and euen as wee ought to punish and take reuenge on subiects that bee theeues and robbers, so must we of strangers what royall title soeuer they carrie, this is grounded vpon the law of God and nature. Neither is it true that Tully writ, That no* 1.1622 warre was iust but for the recouerie of ones owne; or, that was denounced before vnto the enemie: for the proclaiming of warre makes it not iust, but the cause must be neces∣sarie: there can be none then more iust than to defend the liues of innocents. There are [ E] other priuate considerations besides these: for the best meanes to maintaine an estate,* 1.1623 and to preserue it from rebellions, seditions, and ciuill warres, and to entertaine them in loue, is to haue an enemie against whom they may oppose themselues. This appeares by the example of all Commonweales, and namely of the Romans, who neuer could find a more safe and surer remedie against ciuill warres, than to affront the subiects with an enemie: for being on a time at warre among themselues, the enemie entred the* 1.1624 towne, and seazed vpon the Capitoll, but suddenly they were reconciled, and expelled him: a while after the Veientes seeing them returne to ciuill warres, they began to wast and spoyle the Roman territories, but the Romans were soone agreed, discharging

their choller vpon them, so as they neuer ceased vntill they had razed their citie, and [ F] made the inhabitants subiect. And about the same time the princes and people of Tuscane hauing conspired against the Roman state, sought to nourish seditions and diuisions among them, saying, That their power was inuincible, and would alwayes grow, if it were not made weake by ciuill warres, the which is the only poyson to make* 1.1625 Empires and States mortall, which else would be immortall. In like case the people of Spaine being reuolted from the emperour Charles the fift, forcing in a manner the duke of Calabria to accept of the Crowne, being thus in armes one against an other, king Francis the first sent an armie which recouered Fontarabie and the kingdome of Na∣uarre, but sodenly this ciuill warre was pacified among the Spanyards, who with one common consent fell vpon the french, and recouered that from them which they had [ G] conquered, else the state of Spaine had been in great danger, as many haue supposed, if the french had temporized a while. And without any further search, we haue a presi∣dent of this realme, the which was in great hazard in the yeare 1562, if the english had not set footing into France, hauing seazed vpon Newhauen, but presently the ciuill* 1.1626 warres ceassed, and the subiects agreed to fall vpon their common enemie, which the english perceiuing, they haue since resolued to let the french fight and ruine one ano∣ther, and afterwards to inuade the realme without any difficultie or resistance. But I will returne to forraine examples, (and I would to God we had no domesticall presi∣dents) to shew that it is a hard thing and almost impossible, to maintaine subiects in peace and loue, if they be not in war against some enemie. It is apparant in all the hi∣stories [ H] of the Romans, who after they had vanquished their enemies, presently fell to mutinie, for which cause the Senat entertained warre, and deuised enemies when they had none, to keepe them from ciuill warres, the which they continued vntill they had extended their frontiers vnto the ilands of Orcades, to the Atlantike sea, to the riuers of* 1.1627 Danubius and Euphrates, and to the deserts of Arabia: and hauing no more enemies to make head against them, they murthered one an other most cruelly, and so much the more, for that they were growne mightie, and had few enemies, as in the ciuill warre betwixt Caesar and Pompey for rule, whereof Cicero speaking said, Bellum pium ac neces∣sarium visum est, ciuibus tamen exitiabile, nisi Pompeius vicerit, calamitosum etiam si vi∣cerit: It seemes, said he, to be a godly and necessarie warre, yet fatall vnto the citisens [ I] vnlesse that Pompey win, and lamentable if he do win: But it was more cruell betwixt Augustus and Marc Anthonie: for which cause the emperour Augustus hauing chan∣ged the popular estate into a Monarkie, was not so ill aduised as to discharge the fortie legions, but he sent them into prouinces, & vpon the frontiers of barbarous nations, to entertaine them in martiall discipline, and to preuent all occasions of ciuill warres at Rome. But the emperour Constantine the great (following the counsell of some Bi∣shops* 1.1628 and ministers vnacquainted with matters of State) discharged the legions, which made them forget the antient militarie discipline, and opened a gate to barbarous na∣tions, who inuaded the Roman empire of all sides, whereby it appeeres that lawes, iustice, religion, subiects, and the whole estate next vnder God, is in the protection of [ K] * 1.1629 armes, as vnder a strong shield. There is yet an other reason of great moment, to shew that it is necessarie to entertaine martiall discipline, and to make warre, for that there is no citie so holy, nor so well gouerned that hath not in it many theeues, murtherers, idle persons, vagabonds, mutins, adulterers, and diceplayers, which leade a wicked life, and corrupt the simplicitie of good subiects; neither can lawes, magistrates, nor any punishment keepe them in awe. And euen it is commonlie said that gibets are set vp* 1.1630 but for beggers, for that statutes and ordinances in many places are like vnto spiders webs, as Anacharsis said vnto Solon, for that none but weake flies are taken in them, and

great beasts breake easily through them. There is no better meanes then to purge the [ A] Commonweale of this infectious filth, then to send them to the warre, the which is as it were a purging medicine to expell corrupted humors out of the vniuersall bodie of the state. This was the principall occasion which moued Charles the wise king of France to send succors so willinglie vnto the bastard of Castille vnder the conduct of Bertrand of Guesclin Constable, the which purged France of an infinite number of theeues: Euen so did Lewis the II to the Earle of Richmond; and both the one and the other not only purged France of idle persons, but also returned with honor to haue setled two kings in their estates, from the which they were expelled. Moreouer, the mi∣litarie discipline of the Romans which should be common to all nations, made a co∣ward* 1.1631 valiant, an intemperat man modest, a slothfull man actiue, a prodigall man fru∣gall, [ B] and a licentious man continent: neither is it sufficient for a captaine or souldier to know how to fight, but there are many other excellent arts which be companions to this vertue, that is to say labor in busines, resolution in dangers, temperance in desires, industrie in action, speed in execution, and counsell in prouiding, these are necessarie for the arte of warre. The subiect then being instructed in militarie discipline, is not infe∣cted with lust, licentiousnes, impietie and sloth, but being wicked and impious, they in∣ure themselues to all kinds of vertue if they learne the precepts of the Roman militarie* 1.1632 discipline and arte of commanding. Besides, there is nothing that containes the people within the dutie of honor and vertue more then the feare of a warlike enemie. The people of Rome (saith Polibius) were neuer more vertuous, nor the subiects more o∣bedient [ C] vnto the magistrates, nor the magistrates vnto the lawes, then when as Pyrrhus* 1.1633 at one time, and Hanniball at an other were at the gates of Rome; but after that Perseus and Antiochus were vanquished, hauing no enemie left whom they might feare, then vices began to take roote, and the people fell into superfluities and delights, wich cor∣rupted all good manners, and blemished the beautie of their antient vertue. O how wisely did Scipio oppose himselfe in open Senat, that the citie of Carthage should not* 1.1634 be razed, foretelling they either should haue ciuill warres, or that the vertue of the Ro∣mans would soone decay, hauing no enemy to contend withall, for euen as moderate libertie puffes men vp, and makes them proane to all vices, so feare retaines them in their duties: and we must not doubt but the great politian and gouernour of all the [ D] world as he hath giuen to euery thing his contrarie, so hath he suffred warres and ha∣tred among nations to punish one by an other, and to keepe them all in feare, which is the only comptroller of vertue, as Samuell in an oration which he made vnto the peo∣ple said, That God had stirred them vp enemies, to keepe them in awe, try them, and punish them. And that I may conclude briefly, if there be no respect had of so many* 1.1635 commodities, yet let vs haue a care of the health and necessitie of the Commonweale, least it grow wast and desolate through the spoiles and insolencie of the enemie, for when as the enemies forces are neere, although there be no inuasion, yet the flocks are forsaken, the tillage is abandoned, and all trafficke ceasseth; and oftentimes the whole yeares fruits are lost at the tumor of any danger, or the terror of warre. Who will [ E] then doubt but the subiects should be trained vp in armes, in the which there is not only much glorie and profit, but also the health of the citisens, the help of their neigh∣bors, the fortunes of the subiects, and the securitie of them all. By these reasons it ap∣peares, that they are much abused which thinke that the only end of warre is peace. And if it were so, what better meanes were there to haue peace in despight of the ene∣mie,* 1.1636 then to let him know that you haue meanes to make warre? Neuer wise Prince nor good Captaine made a peace vnarmed, and as Manlius Capitolinus said, Ostendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis, videant vos paratos ad vim, ius ipsiremittent: Shew them

warre said he, and you shall haue peace, let them see you readie for force, and they will [ F] do you right. These reasons are partly true and partly probable, and may of either side dazle the eyes of the cleerest sighted if they looke not neerely vnto them. To the end we may resolue something, let vs distinguish of Commonweales. I hold then that in a* 1.1637 popular estate it is necessarie to traine the subiects vp in armes, to auoid the abouena∣med inconueniences, vnto the which a popular estate is by nature subiect; and if the people be warlike and mutinous by nature, as the nations of the North be, being trai∣ned vp to armes and martiall discipline, it shall be expedient to affront them often with their enemies, and not to admit any peace but vpon good termes, as a dangerous thing* 1.1638 to a warlike nation. And a peace being concluded, you must notwithstanding entertain your souldiers vpon the frontiers, as the emperor Augustus did, although he had chan∣ged [ G] the popular estate into a Monarchie: or else send them to Princes that are in league, to be entertained in the art of warre; as the Swissers haue wisely done, being a people bred in the mountaines apt to warre, and hardly maintained in peace, inioying a popular libertie; and by this meanes they haue alwayes had souldiers nourished and entertained at another mans cost, besides their publike and priuat pensions (which haue been great, as I haue formerly shewed) and the assurance of their estate, by means of alliances contracted with so mightie a king. And as for forts, it is not needfull in a popular estate to haue their townes too well fortified (except it be the chiefe citie,* 1.1639 which is the seate of the popular estate) and much lesse any Castels or Citadels, least some one thrust on with an ambitious desire of rule surprise them, and change the po∣pular [ H] estate into a Monarchie: as Denis the tyrant did, hauing surprised Acradina the* 1.1640 fort of Siracusa by fraud. Or else the enemie may take them & fortifie them, as the La∣cedemonians did, hauing razed the walls of Athens, they left a garrison in the Ca∣stell: and doing the like vnto the popular estate of Thebes, they tooke their fort called Cadmee, leauing a garrison in it. For there is no meanes to subiect a people, or to change a Democratia into a Monarchie but by Cittadels, so did the tyrants in old time: and in our age Cosme de Medicis duke of Florence had made two Cittadels in Florence, with a garrison of strangers, hauing found by experience that it was impos∣sible* 1.1641 to change the popular estate into a Monarchie, and to assure his life among the people: and therefore the Cantons of Vri, Vnderuald, Glaris, and Appenzell, which [ I] are all popular, haue no walles, like vnto the rest which are gouerned Aristocratically. We will giue the same censure of Aristocratia in regard of fortresses, as of a popular estate, the which is so much more to be feared, for that it is more easie for one of the* 1.1642 commanders to win the common people to his will, and to incense them against the chiefe men. But as for royall Monarchies, if their bounds and limits be large, it is not expedient for the Prince to build Cittadels, not places of strength, but vpon the frontiers, to the end the people may be without feare of tyranizing; and yet hauing for∣tified the frontiers of his estate with places impregnable, the subiects will stil thinke it is against the enemie, and the Prince at neede may vse them against all enemies, both strangers and subiects in case they rebell: the which nature hath taught vs, which hath [ K] armed the head and the extremities of all beasts, leauing the middest, the bowels, and* 1.1643 the other parts vnarmed. But the Monarke is ill aduised that doth inuiron a towne with mightie walls, if he doth not withall build a good Cittadell, for that nothing doth more animate the subiects to reuolt, the which they would not so easily attempt, see∣ing before their eyes Cittadels well fortified. It is also necessarie as well in a Monar∣chie as in an Aristocritie, that the gouernor of the towne depend not of the captaine of the Cittadell, nor the captaine of the gouernor, neither that the captaine of the Citta∣dell be a Prince, or a great man: the which is well obserued in Turkie, according to the

rule of the antient Sultans of Egipt, as also our kings do, but the Venetians more strict∣lie [ A] then all others, for that they are forced to fortifie their townes, to defend the sub∣iects against their enemies, and fearing the rebellion of their subiects, who haue no share in the gouerment, they haue strong Cittadels in their townes, whither they do* 1.1644 euery yeare send new Captaines besides the Potestates or Gouernors, least that he should hold the Cittadell as his inheritance. And those of Rhagouse (which haue but one citie and a small territorie) are forced to change their Captaine euery day, who is* 1.1645 brought into the fort with his face couered. In like sort the Athenians changed the Captaine of their fortresse euery day, the which was one of the nine Archontes, for the distrust they had that one of the subiects should make himselfe lord. For the pre∣uenting whereof, it shall be needfull to remoue Cittadels from the capitall townes in [ B] a popular estate, or an Aristocraticall estate, as the Venetians haue done wisely at Ve∣nice,* 1.1646 to take all occasion from the duke, and to free the gentlemen from suspition of any alteration in the state. It was wisely prouided in England, Turkie, Muscouie, and in a manner by all the kings of the East and of Affrike, that no subiect should fortifie his house in the countrie, for if the maister of a priuate castell be a great man, he will soone take an occasion to reuolt, if he be poore, to rob; and for this cause the imperiall townes of Germany haue oftentimes razed gentlemens castels, that rebels and theeues might haue no retreat, the which the Swissers haue done throughout all their coun∣trey, hauing expelled the antient lords. But this were a dangerous thing in an antient [ C] Monarchie to ruine priuate mens castels which are of strength, but well they may pro∣hibit their subiects not to build any more without licence from the Soueraigne, who may not easily grant it, for that it is sufficient to haue a house able to defend him from theeues, and thus much for fortifications. But the question is not small, if in Aristocra∣tia, the better sort only, which command, are to be trained vp in armes, or all the peo∣ple, or else wholie to banish the arte of warre. If the common people do once become souldiers, it is to be feared they will attempt to change the state, to haue a part in the gouerment, if they be not alwayes imployed against the enemies, as I haue shewed be∣fore by many examples; and if none but the better sort be armed, they shall be soone defeated, and will cause a necessarie change of their estate: but if they will quite banish [ D] the arte of warre out of their Commonweale, they shall remaine a skorne and pray to all their neighbors, if they be not strictly allied vnto the strongest, or else if they haue not townes that be inaccessible and forts impregnable, as the Venetians, who fearing* 1.1647 the aboue named inconueniences, haue banished the arte of warre out of their Com∣monweale, as Cardinall Contarenus saith: the which is rather to be attributed to sloth, then to any set or positiue law, for that within these two hundred yeares they were ve∣rie warlike, and obtained great victories of the Geneuois, but pleasing themselues with the continuall fruits of peace and ease, they haue neglected the practise of armes, im∣ploying* 1.1648 strangers in their warres: neither can they indure any gentleman of the seig∣neurie to be a commander, but if they know any Venetian gentleman that aspires to [ E] the warres, and that followes the courts of other Princes, by and by they call him home, desiring rather to haue an Almain a Bargamasco, or a stranger for their gene∣rall, if they make warre by land, than one of their owne lords, and an armie of strangers rather than of subiects: but withall they send a Prouidador or Commissarie, by whose councell the Generall is gouerned. And although there be many inconueniences, to haue a Commissarie commaund a Generall, a citisen strangers: one that vnderstands nothing in matters of warre, them that are bred vp in armes: yet by this meanes they auoid many other daungers which are not lesse: the which we haue seene fall out in their Commonweale, whereas they vsed none but their own subiects and forces. Their

histories are full of conspiracies, seditions & ciuil wars, which they had in the middest of [ F] * 1.1649 their city. The Carthagineans, being not yet wel instructed in the art of war, were wont to send for Lacedemonian captaines, which should lead a Carthaginean armie vnder a Generall of Carthage; yet would they neuer haue both Generall and armie strangers, least their Commonweale should fall into the power of straungers. If warre be not to be vndertaken, but for the repelling of iniuries, and to enioy peace, and that it sufficeth to make a Commonweale happie to keepe their owne, to haue their places neere vn∣to their enemies well manned and fortified, and to enioy the fruits of a desired peace;* 1.1650 without doubt the Seigneurie of Venice may iustly tearme it selfe happie, which hath not onely the seat of their empire by nature and art inexpugnable, but also haue their townes and fortresses vpon the continent so well fortified, as they neither need to feare [ G] the inuasions of their enemies, nor the rebellions of their subiects: caring little for any new conquests, or to extend their bounds. We see the Venetians do flie from all oc∣casions* 1.1651 of warre, as from the plague, and they neuer enter into it but by constraint, and seeke for peace at what price soeuer, euen with the losse of their reuenewes; as we may see in the treatie which they made with pope Iulio the second, the emperor Maximili∣an, and the king of Naples, in the yere 1508, their ambassadours being humbled at their feet, yeelding to all which they demanded. As they did in like maner to Sultan Selim in the yeare 1570, abandoning the holy league to purchase his peace, after they had lost a goodly kingdome. And euen as beasts which haue no offensiue armes, as hates that haue no gall, as Stagges and Does seeke to saue themselues from the hounds and [ H] hawke, by flight; so they are not to be blamed, nor that Commonweale to bee lesse esteemed, which sues for peace, hauing no meanes to resist: the which would be disho∣nourable to a warlike nation, or for a conquering prince, who cannot demaund a peace of his enemie without blushing. There was nothing that did so long protract the con∣clusion* 1.1652 of a peace betwixt king Henrie the second, and the emperour Charles the fift, as a certaine rumor spred abroad, That the emperour demaunded a peace: which was to get the highest point of honour, which a generous prince may desire, yea if he were en∣tred into anothers countrey. As the same emperour did in the yeare 1544, hauing thrust all the forces of the empire, and his owne, into this realme, with those of the king of England on another side, who had alreadie diuided the realme betwixt them (as [ I] Sleidan saith) if the pope had not forced the emperour to make a peace: which the king would neither demaund, nor accept, but with reasonable conditions. Although that* 1.1653 Lewis the eleuenth demaunded it of Edward the fourth, king of England, as soone as he was entred into Picardie, and bought it deerely, caring little that the earle of Lude and other his fauourites called him cowardly king. But his father Charles the seuenth did a stranger thing for to obtaine a peace of the duke of Bourgongne, his vassall and natu∣rall subiect; he sent the constable of France, the chauncellor, a marshall of France, and many other great personages, to treat a peace with him, who in open assembly, and in the name of the king their maister, craued pardon of the duke, for the death of Iohn* 1.1654 duke of Bourgongne, confessing openly, That the king had done ill, being young, in∣discreet, [ K] and ill councelled; intreating the duke, that he would forget his discontent: the duke said, That he did pardon the king for the honour of God, and compassion of the people of Fraunce, and to obey the councell of the pope and other christian princes that had intreated him. A slaue could not behaue himselfe more humbly and abiectly vnto his maister, than the king did vnto his subiect, to restore the realme to his first beautie, and to exepll the English, as he did soone after. The Romans would rather haue lost their estate, than once to haue dreamt of it: For wee cannot find that at any time during seuen hundred yeares, that they had warres with all nations, that

they euer demaunded peace but of the Gaules, who held them besieged in the Capitol, [ A] after they had burnt their citie: and of Coriolanus: But contrariwise being vanquished* 1.1655 by the power of king Perseus, they would neuer accept of any peace of the victor, vn∣lesse he would submit himselfe and his kingdome vnto their mercie, although he offred to pay them tribute. And when as king Pyrrhus (after that hee had obtained two nota∣ble victories, and was maister almost of all Italie) sent his ambassadour to Rome, to treat a peace vpon reasonable conditions: they were aunswered, That the Romans would not treat of any peace, except that Pyrrhus did first depart out of Italie; and that they did contend with him for their honours and dignities, not for their liues and for∣tunes. The king receiuing this aunswere, said, That the Romans could not liue in qui∣et,* 1.1656 neither conquerors, nor conquered. This was the aunswere of a valiant people, who [ B] knew their owne forces to be able to make head against an enemie: the which would be very much vnbefitting a weake prince, who must (like vnto a wise pilot) strike sails, & yeeld vnto the tempest, that he may recouer a safe port, & not to make necessitie sub∣iect to ambition: as the Vauoide of Transiluania did, who said openly, That he had ra∣ther bee slaue vnto the Turke, than allied vnto Ferdinand, and so afterwards it fell out. Wee haue an example of the great Knez of Moscouie, who seeing the Pro∣cope of Tartaria entred into his countrey with eighteene legions, knowing well that* 1.1657 he was vnable to make resistance, he went to meet him vnarmed, and humbling him∣selfe before him, he saued his people and his estate from an ineuitable ruine, yet holding his count•…•…ey by yeelding homage to the Procope. But being at this day equall or grea∣ter [ C] in forces, & freed from the seruitude of the Tartar, all princes would scorne him, if he should demaund a peace, especially hauing receiued an iniurie. For that prince that beares an iniurie, will soone endure to haue a law prescribed him; and if he once suffer his enemie to giue him a law, he shall soone be reduced into slauerie. But howsoeuer, a mightie prince (if he be wise and valiant) will neuer seeke for war nor peace, if necessitie (which is not subiect to the lawes of honour nor force) doth not constraine him, nei∣ther* 1.1658 will he euer giue battaile, if there be not more apparant profit in the victorie, than of losse if the enemies should vanquish: as the emperour Augustus said, who for this reason neuer gaue battaile but vpon necessitie. But it is not vnfitting a poore p•…•…ince, [ D] or a small seigneurie, or for him that makes no profession of armes, to demaund peace in his losse. As pope Iulio the third, who demaunded peace of king Henrie the second, calling him before God, to iudge of the wrong which hee had done him: The king graunted him a peace, and said, That he would appeare before God; but hee doubted the pope would not shew himselfe. Wherewith the pope, who was of a pleasant dis∣position (seeing the letters which were signed by the king in the campe lying at Metz, in the yeare 1552) was very glad, although in shew he seemed to bee grieued, saying, That it was not the king that had indited those letters, but the capitall enemie of the church. And as the greatnesse of courage and magnanimitie is the light of all other vertues, and which doth aduance princes to the highest point of honour; so is it the [ E] onely vertue which doth most daunt an enemie, although he be mightie and warlike,* 1.1659 and oftentimes giues the victorie without blowes: as Furius Camillus hauing sent home the children of the Falisques, whome their Schoolemaister had brought into his campe, he conquered their citie without striking stroke. And Fabricius hauing sent vnto king Pyrrhus the Physitian which offred to poison him, refusing halfe his king∣domes and his treasure, (although he were one of the poorest gentlemen in Rome) and causing their ransomes to be paid, whome Pyrrhus had freely set at libertie, beeing loath the Romans should be bound in any respect vnto so great a king. Or as Scipio who hauing conquered a good part of Spaine with little paine, sent backe a ladie of sin∣gular

beautie vnto her husband, prince of the Celtiberians, imitating the example of [ F] Cyrus. These vertuous acts tooke from their enemies all courage, to make any more warre against so valiant and magnanimious a people, who could neither bee vanqui∣shed* 1.1660 by honour, nor vanquished by treacherie: the which was more apparant after the battaile of Cannes, Hannibal hauing appointed eight thousand Roman prisoners to be ransomed for an hundred crowns a peece one with another, hoping that the Romans who had lost so many men, would willingly pay their ransoms: but the Senat decreed, That no one should be redeemed at any rate, giuing all to vnderstand, That either they must vanquish, or be slaues to the enemie: Wherewith Hannibal was so amased, and daunted, as he dispaired euer to vanquish the Romans. And contrariwise the Romans did assure their estate, which was much shaken and abandoned of all friends and allies. [ G] For the Senat did well imagin, that Hannibal hauing sucked so much blood of the Ro∣mans, he would also exhaust their treasure, in drawing from them eight hundred thou∣sand crownes, and restoring vnto them the veriest cowards of all the Roman armie; making euery one to resolue either to vanquish or die, hauing lost all hope of libertie, whereby they became fearefull and inuincible. And euen as they neuer fainted in their losses; so were they neuer proud nor arrogant in their victories. For when as Antio∣chus the Great hauing lost a goodly armie, sent his ambassadours to both the Scipioes, offring to accept of what conditions the Romans pleased: Whereunto Scipio the Af∣frican made an answere worthy of a great and vertuous prince, That the Romans lost* 1.1661 no part of their courage when they were vanquished, nor of their modestie, when they [ H] did vanquish, demaunding no harder conditions after their victorie than before. But the aduantag•…•… which the Romans had, was, that they made warre in their enemies countrey, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 magazins of souldiors in Italy, to supply their armies if they were de∣feated: or if they conquered those countries where they made warre, they might add them to their empire, & plant them with their owne colonies. A wise prince will neuer attend an enemie in his own country, if he may stop his entrie, vnlesse he hath another army ready, or a sure retrait into some places of strength, els he hazards his whole estate* 1.1662 vpon a victorie; as Antiochus, Perseus, Iuba, and Ptolome the last king of Aegypt did a∣gainst the Romans: Darius against Alexander, and oftentimes the French against the English. And for this cause Lewis the grosse vnderstanding that the emperour Henry [ I] came with a mightie power to make warre in Fraunce (the king hauing receiued Pope Gelasius into his protection, and suffered him to excommunicat the emperor) he gathered together an armie of two hundred thousand men, as Suggerius abbat of Saint Den•…•…s i•…•… Fraunce hath left in writing, and went as farre as the Rhin vpon the territories of the empire, which was the onely cause that made the emperour to lay aside armes, and to accept of what peace it pleased the king. In like sort Philip Augustus aduertised that the emperour Otho the second, the king of England, with the potentats of the Low countries, came into his realme with a mightie armie, he fortified his places, marched out of his frontiers, and defeated them in battaile. And if king Francis the first, when as he lost his armie before Pauia, and himselfe taken prisoner, had receiued such an [ K] ouerthrow in the hart of Fraunce, this realme had bene in great daunger; but chaun∣cing in Italie, the conquerors contented themselues with the victorie; and the subiects in the meane time had leasure to rally their forces, and to fortifie their frontiers.

Many hold opinion, That a soueraigne prince should not hazard his person on a day of battaile, especially if the enemie be entred into the hart of his realme: It is true, if he be a coward and base minded: but hauing the reputation of a valiant and gene∣rous* 1.1663 prince, he doubles the courage and force of his armie, and so much the more if he be beloued of his armie, and his presence works a wonderfull effect, when he is seene of

them all, and euerie one seene of him, for oftentimes shame retaines a flying armie, see∣ing [ A] the presence of their king, and fearing least he should fall into some daunger, Vrget enim (vt ait Maro) presentia Turni, The presence of Turnus (as Maro saith) doth vrge them to fight. As it happened to Caesar before Therouenne; and in Spaine, fighting for his life against Pompeis children, where the battaile had bene lost if he had not bene present. And many beleeue that the victories which Edward the fourth got in nine battails, was, for that he did alwaies fight on foot. How many princes and great men do willingly follow the kings person, which else would not march vnder any others commaund. For when as Eumenes was very sicke his armie refused to fight, vnlesse he* 1.1664 were brought into the campe in a litter; such confidence they had in his presence. Yet would I not that a soueraigne prince or a Generall, should do the office of a priuat sol∣diour, [ B] putting his life rashly in daunger; as it is said of Pelopidas, Marcellus, Gaston de Foix duke of Nemours, and many others, whose death hath drawne after it the hazard of the state.

I will not here treat of the art of warre, which many haue handled, but onely that which concernes the state. I conclude then, that a prince hauing well manned and for∣tified his frontiers, if he doubts that the enemie will enter into his countrey, let him pre∣uent him, and put the warre as farre from him as he may: and if he be entred, not to ha∣zard his estate and person rashly vpon the euent of a battaile, especially if hee haue to deale with a warlike people, who commonly get the victory being brought to dispaire, knowing well, that there is no meanes for them to escape death in anothers countrey, [ C] if they be vanquished, hauing neither fort, retreat, nor any succour. Amongst many we haue a lamentable example of our king Iohn, who chose rather to hazard his life, his no∣bilitie, and his whole estate, in a doubtfull battaile at Poitiers, than to graunt a peace vnto the prince of Wales, and the English armie, who demaunded only to depart with their liues: there did ten thousand desparat men defeat an armie of fortie fiue thousand* 1.1665 French, and led away the king captiue. Gaston of Foix committed the like errour, ha∣uing defeated the enemie at Rauenne, seeking to pursue a squadron of Spaniards that fled, he lost his life, and left all that hee had conquered in Italie in prey to the enemie. What should I speake of auntient examples, the histories are full of them: but there is [ D] none more famous than that of Caesar, whose armie was in despaire through famine &* 1.1666 want, being enuironed both by sea and land with the enemies townes and legions, and had soone perished for hunger, if they had not vanquished, yet would Pompey needs giue that battell of Pharsalia, hauing twice as many men as Caesar. In so great a despaire of things, the Generall of the Volsques did incourage his armie with a briefe speech, after this maner, Armati armatis obstant virtute pares, sed necessitate superiores estis, Armed men stand against armed men, equall in vertue, but in necessitie you exceed them. And another captaine of the Samnites said, Iustum est bellum quibus necessarium, & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes, That war is iust to whome it is necessarie, and those armes religious to them that haue no hope but in armes. And therefore Fabius [ E] Maximus (the last of that familie) endured all the scornes and disgraces of his enemies,* 1.1667 rather than he would commit the fortune of the Commonweale to a doubtfull battell: and in the end he reaped the honor, To haue preserued his countrey. Whereas Han∣nibal hauing hazarded a battaile against Scipio, who went to besiege Car•…•…hage, to draw the enemie out of Italie, lost both his armie and the estate. It is no good consequence to say, that the Romans fought three battails with Pyrrhus, and as many with Hannibal, in the heart of Italie, for that they had magazins of men of warre, as well out of their owne countries, as from their allies: the which they could not want, for that by the laws euerie one was forced to carrie armes at seuenteene yeares of age, and were not freed

from them vntill fiftie fiue: neither was it lawful for any man to demaund an office or [ F] * 1.1668 benefice, that had not carried armes ten yeares. And at one time there were two thou∣sand citisens excluded from the Bourgeship, for that they had bene foure yeares toge∣ther absent from the warres, except they which had bene dispensed withall vpon some iust cause (as Titus Liuius saith) to the which discipline they were at the first constrai∣ned by the incursions of their bordering neighbours, being iealous of their greatnesse: But hauing afterwards brought all the people of Italie vnder their subiection, or treated alliances with them, and finding that a people giuen to armes, could not liue idly in peace without ciuill warres, they found it expedient for the good of the Common∣weale, to seeke out new enemies, making warre sometimes to reuenge the wrongs* 1.1669 done vnto their confederats: and sometimes defending them against their enemies, [ G] graunting triumphes, honourahle estates, and great rewards to valiant captaines. The which was wisely ordained by the Senat, as an healthfull remedie against ciuill warres; the which Bebius the Tribune of the people did obiect vnto the Fathers, That warre was sowne vpon warre, that the people might neuer be at quiet: and therefore there was no distinction betwixt militarie charges and offices of iustice: So as one and the selfe same citisen, might be a valiant Captaine, a wise Senator, a good Iudge, and a great Orator: as it is said of Cato the Censor, who was well skilled in tillage, as it appeareth by his bookes, yet was he not ashamed to leaue his armes to goe to the plough; or to leaue the plough to plead, sometimes to be a Iudge, to sacrifice, or to play the Oratour before the people or Senat. And Caesar was high Priest, and in Tullies opinion a most [ H] excellent Orator, and the best captaine of his age. There were many not onely in Ita∣lie, but also in Greece, that excelled in the art of warre and policie. We read in Iulius Pollux, That the Athenians were bound to go to warre at foureteene yeares, and conti∣nued vntill threescore. Therefore Aristides, Pericles, Phocion, Leosthenes, Demetrius the Phalerian, Alcibiades, Themistocles, and infinit other Grecians, were like vnto the* 1.1670 auntient Romans, and did excell in the art of warre and policie. But the wisest politi∣tians did seperat the art of warre from other vocations. In the Commonweale of Creet euerie man was not allowed to carrie armes, but certaine speciall persons: nor in* 1.1671 old times in Fraunce, whereas the horsemen had this charge, and the Druides were exempt. In Aegypt none but the Calasires were men of warre: the which Licurgus [ I] * 1.1672 did allow. And therefore Plato diuided the citisens into three orders, Keepers, Men at armes, and Labourers: imitating the Aegyptians, who made three seuerall kindes of estates. By little and little the Athenians made a distinction of Armes, Policie, and Iu∣stice;* 1.1673 and so did the Romans. And truely in this short course of our life, there are few that doe excell in politike arts, but in both not any. It seemes that Augustus did first take from Senators, Proconsuls, and Gouernours of Prouinces, the power to weare armes: so as in succession of time they called offices without armes dignities; as wee* 1.1674 read in Cassiodorus, Quamuis inquit, omnia dignitatum officia manu secludantur armata,* 1.1675 & ciuilibus vestibus induti videantur, qui districtionem publicam docentur operari: tua ta∣men dignitas à terroribus eruatur, quae gladio bellico rebus etiam pacatis accingitur: arma [ K] ista iuris sunt, non furoris, Although (saith hee) that all offices of dignitie bee excluded from armed hands, and that they seeme to bee attired with ciuill garments, that are taught to labour in the difficulties of the Commonweale: yet the dignitie seemes to be pluckt from terrours, the which is guirt with a warlike sword, euen in the quietest times: these be the armes of Iustice, not of Furie. And consequently all nations by degrees, haue separated souldiours from schollers and men of justice, beeing a difficult thing to excell in one art, but impossible in all; nor worthily to exercise many victories. Moreouer it was a thing almost impossible, to traine all the subiects of a Common∣weale

vp to armes, and to maintaine them in the obedience of the laws and magistrats. [ A] This was haply the cause which made king Francis the first, to cast the seuen legions of foot, which he had erected within this realme, in the yeare 1534, euery legion contai∣ning six thousand foot. And although that his sonne Henry did renew them twentie yeares after, yet was he forced to alter his opinion, seeing the Commonweale trou∣bled, and mutinies growne in many places, by meanes of those legions. And yet in the opinion of straungers, and of those that haue iudicially examined the goodly ordinan∣ces that were made to that end, there was neuer any thing better instituted for the art of* 1.1676 warre, the which is as necessarie in this realme, as in any part of the world, being enui∣roned with warlike and mightie nations, which make a common practise to spoyle: like to a countrey of conquest. Yea if they had entertained but foure legions of foot, [ B] besides the troopes of horse, for the defence of the realme, and placed them as it were in garrison vpon the frontiers, they had prouided wisely for the safetie of the Common∣weale. Fraunce is not the twentieth part of the Roman empire, for the guard where∣of Augustus Caesar said, That fortie legions did suffice, being but fiue thousand men in a legion. The foure legions of foot and troopes of horse, paied in time of peace, accor∣ding to the ordinance of king Francis the first, would not haue cost three hundred and fiftie thousand pounds starling, and yet is it halfe as much more as the legions had in Augustus his time: and the whole pay of the men at armes of Fraunce, in the yeare 1560, came but to 235300 pounds starling, as well the old bands, as the men at armes. [ C] And Augustus entertained fortie legions of horse aud foot, besides his and the citie* 1.1677 guards, and two nauies for the defence of both seas, keeping the empire safe from for∣ren and ciuill warres, and all for twelue hundred thousand pounds starling a yeare, with an excellent description of all orders: the which other princes should propound vnto themselues, to imitat such as Orosius, Dion, Tranquillus, & other writers haue described it in their monuments: and yet was it not lawfull for the Roman souldiours (notwith∣standing their small entertainment) to rob and spoyle: as we see at this day. This was the meanes to maintaine martiall discipline, to defend the rights of citisens, and allies, and to repell the enemie: Else if you be prest with warre, you shall be forced not only to abandon your neighbours, but also your countrey: or else in this extremitie you [ D] must vse vntrained souldiours, who become captaines before they were euer souldi∣ours:* 1.1678 or else forced with necessitie you must beg and buy forren succours at a deere rate. I doe not thinke that forren succours are to bee reiected, as many suppose: for there is no great empire can be angmented▪ without the succours of confederats, nei∣ther can they long resist the violence of an enemie: but I allow of those succours which come from allies, that are vnited together in an offensiue and defensiue league, as the Cantons of the Swissers be: or at the least in a defensiue league, as they bee with the house of Fraunce. For by this meanes they are not onely the more strengthned, but* 1.1679 they also take from the enemie those succours which he might draw from them, and the occasion from all men to make warre against either of them, vnlesse hee meane to [ E] be a professed enemie vnto them both. But I desire that the confederats should be ti∣ed by a mutuall bond, and altogether equall, to auoid the reproaches, quarrels, and in∣conueniences that grow of inequalitie. Those leagues and treaties be vnequall, when as one is bound to pay the diets or assemblies of their allies, although they did raise but one companie of souldiours, and notwithstanding bee tied to pay them a continuall pension, besides their entertainment in the time of warre, and succours of horse and foot at need without pension or pay. These treaties did our kings of Fraunce make with the Cantons of the Swissers, least other princes should draw them to their suc∣cours. It is also necessarie in an offensiue and defensiue league which is equall, That the

conquests should be common (as it hath alwaies been among the Cantons, when as [ F] they haue made warre in common) and that whatsoeuer is conquered by the one, should be priuate, wherein the antient Italians were circumuented by the Romans in their treaties, for the Romans hauing made an offensiue and defensiue league with their neighbors the Italians, they had alwayes for one Romaine legion two from their allies readie paied, and the Generall of the armie was alwaies a Romaine; and yet their* 1.1680 allies had no pension nor entertainement from the Romans, nor any part of their con∣quests which were made in common, nor in dignities and offices, except some townes of the Latins; which was the cause of the sociall or confederats warre in Italie against the Romans, who were reduced to that extremitie, as they were forced to giue the right of a citisen, with part of their offices, and their voyces at elections, almost to all [ G] their allies in Italie. The Athenians with the like fraude did circumuent their neigh∣bors and confederats, from whom they did exact tributes contrarie to their treaties, neither did they euer vndertake any warre but one without the forces of their allies, whereupon most of them fell off vnto the Lacedemonians when occasion was offred.

It may also be doubted whether it be fit to haue many allies, or mercinarie soul∣diers of diuers languages, for the difficultie there is to speake vnto them, and to incou∣rage them by orations, a thing very necessarie in warre. But experience hath taught vs, that diuers nations and diuers tongues are easie to gouerne and leade, as Anniball did shew, hauing an armie consisting of Carthaginians, Mauritanians, Numidians, Spaniards, Italians, Gaules, and Greeks, and yet in fifteene yeares space he neuer had [ H] mutinie in his camp, & obtained great victories; but if such an armie be once mutined, there is no meanes to pacifie it: this is the opinion of Polibius, a captaine of great expe∣rience, and Schoolemaster to Scipio Affricanus. That which we haue spoken touching the succors of allies, is not to be vnderstood that an estate should wholie relie vpon them, but a well gouerned Commonweale must be supported by her owne forces, and alwayes be stronger than the succours she hath from her allies: for he alwayes commands the state that is master of the force, and will make himselfe an absolute lord vpon the least occasion, if he haue any desire, the which neuer wants in ambitious minds. And if allies and confederates be to be feared in an others countrie when they are the stronger, what assurance can we haue of strange forces, which haue no offen∣siue [ I] * 1.1681 nor defensiue league with vs? there is no doubt, but in danger they will be more carefull of their owne liues than of an other mans, and will attribute vnto themselues the profit and honor of the victorie, exhausting their treasures, and growing souldiers at their cost whom they serue. How often haue we seene the stranger being the stron∣ger, make himselfe absolute lord ouer them that called him? We haue in our age the example of Cairadin that famous pirat, called in by the inhabitants of Alger, to expell the Spaniards out of their fort; hauing vanquished them, he slew Selim their king with all his familie, and made himselfe king thereof, leauing the state to Ariadin Barbarousse his brother. And Saladin a Tartar being called by the Caliph and the inhabitants of Caire to expell the Christians out of Soria, after the victorie he s•…•…ew the Caliph; and [ K] made himselfe absolute lord▪ and least that they of the countrie should attempt any thing against him, he alwayes imployed Tartarians and Circassians (that were slaues) in the warre, and for his guard, forbidding all others to beare any armes: and by this meanes he and his successors inioyed that kingdome, vntill that Sultan Selim Empe∣rout of the Turks made himselfe lord thereof. By the same means the Herules, Gothes, and Lombards became lords of Italy, the French of Gaule, the English Saxons of Brit∣taine, the Scottishmen of Scotland, hauing expelled the Brittons and the Picts, who had called them to their succours; and the Turke of the empire of the East and the

realme of Hongary, being intreated by the Emperours of Constantinople and the [ A] states of Hongary. And the Emperour Charles the fift had reduced Germanie into the forme of a Prouince, and made it hereditarie by the same fraude that the rest, when as a part of Germanie vnder colour of religion called in the Spaniards and Italians, for hauing subdued the princes of Saxony, he labored to subiect the rest vnder the spa∣nish empire, intending to make Philip his sonne king of Germanie, if Henry the second had not freed them with the forces of France, who for this cause was called by the Germaines in their printed bookes the protector of the Empire, and the deliuerer of the Princes. The which the princes of Germanie hauing foreseene, did bind the Em∣perour Charles the fift in the twelft article of his oth, that he should neuer bring an ar∣mie of strangers into Germanie; but since the Emperours death the Electors did [ B] sweare neuer to choose a fortaine prince Emperour; yet if the States of the countrie cannot agree vpon a soueraigne prince, it is better to haue a prince from a farre coun∣trie than a neighbour. And for this cause the Aetolians made Antiochus king of Asia their Generall for a yeare, the Tarentines king Pyrrhus, the Polonians Henry Duke of Aniou; Leo king of Armenia one of the children of Andrew king of Hongarie, to giue him his daughter and his estate: else it is to be feared that a neighbour prince cho∣sen Generall but for a yeare, will make himselfe perpetuall, or if he be perpetuall, will grow hereditarie, taking from the subiects their right of election: or if the estate be gi∣uen to one that is a king and to his heires, it is to be doubted he will make it a tributarie [ C] prouince to free his owne countrie from taxes and impositions, which happilie was the cause why they did not choose the Emperours eldest sonne king of Polonia, for it is not to be expected that he will euer beare that affection to strangers that he doth vn∣to his owne, but will easily▪ abandon an others estate at need, to defend his owne. To* 1.1682 conclude, in my opinion a Commonweale well ordained, of what nature soeuer, should be fortified vpon the approches and frontires, in the which forts there should be good garrisons trained vp dayly to armes, hauing certaine lands appointed for soul∣diers the which they should enioy only for their liues, as in old time the fees and feuda∣taries were, and at this day the Timars and Timariots in Turkie, the which are giuen vnto souldiers like vnto benefices, vpon condition they should be readie with horse and [ D] armes whensoeuer occasion of warre required: which lands neuer go vnto their heires, but are bestowed by the princes free gift vpon the most valiant souldiers, with a clause not to alienate them, that souldiers might not rob and steale as now they do with all impunitie. And vntill that these lands in fee may be disposed according to their first in∣stitution, it shall be fit to erect some legions of foote and horse according to the estate and greatnes of euery Commonweale, that they may be bred vp in martiall discipline from their youth in garrisons vpon the frontires in time of peace, as the antient Ro∣mans did, who knew not what it was to liue at discretion, and much lesse to rob, spoile, and murther, as they do at this day, but their camp was a schoole of honor, sobrietie, chastitie, iustice, and all other vertues, in the which no man might reuenge his owne [ E] iniuries, nor vse any violence. And to the end this discipline may be obserued, as they do at this day in the Turks armie, it is necessarie that good Captaines and souldiers be recompenced, especially when they grow aged, with some exemptions, priuiledges, impunities, and rewards, after the manner of the Romans. And although the third part of the reuenues be imployed about the entertainement of souldiers, it were not too much: for thereby you should be assured of men at need to defend the state, especially if it be enuied and enuironed about with warlike nations, as those people be that are sci∣tuate in the temperate and fertile regions of France, Italie, Hongarie, Greece, Asia the lesse, Soria, Egipt, Persia, and the ilands lying in the Mediterranean sea: for the nations

lying vpon the extremities of hot and cold, as the Ethiopians, Numidians, Negros, [ F] * 1.1683 Tartars, Gothes, Muscouites, Scottishmen, and Swedens, haue no neede of great forts, nor to entertaine any legions in time of peace, hauing no enemies but such as they make themselues; the people of the North being by nature too warlike, all horsemen, or for the most part, and giuen to armes, without any need to traine them vp in it, vn∣lesse it be to discharge the countrie, or as I haue said, for that they cannot be kept in peace. And to the end the state may not be brought in danger by any treacherous and faithlesse allies, or that strangers suck not the bloud of the subiects growing warlike at an others charge, being readie to inuade the estate, let all offensiue and defensiue leagues and alliances be equall, receiuing as great succours at neede as they shall be bound to giue; and yet the succours of the confederate must not be such as they may force or [ G] prescribe a law. Moreouer, it must not be allowed for all other subiects to carrie armes, least the laborer and handicrafts man should take a delight in theeuing and robbing, leauing the plough and shop, hauing no experience of armes, and when as they are to march against an enemie, they forsake their coulors and flie at the first charge, putting a whole armie in disorder, especiallie the handicrafts man, and they that sit alwaies, be∣ing* 1.1684 bred vp in the shadow, whom all antient and wise Captaines haue held vnfit for warre, whatsoeuer Sir Thomas Moore saith in his Commonweale. Seeing that wee haue discoursed of men of warre, of forts and of succors that are drawne from them that are in league, let vs now speake of the suretie of treaties and leagues betwixt Princes and Commonweales. [ H]

CHAP. VI. Of the suertie of alliances and treaties betwixt Princes and Commonweales, and of the lawes of armes.

THis treatie depends of the former, the which ought not to be omit∣ted, seeing that neither lawyer nor polititian hath euer handled it: and yet there is nothing in all affaires of state that doth more trouble Princes and Commonweales, then to assure the treaties which they [ I] make one with an other, be it betwixt friends or enemies, with those that be newters, or with subiects. Some assure themselues vpon their simple faith mutuallie giuen, others demaund hostages, and many require some places of strength: some there are which rest not satisfied if they disarme not the vanquished for their better assurance, but that which hath been held the strongest assurance, is, when it is confirmed by alliance and neerenes of bloud. And euen as there is a diffe∣rence betwixt friends and enemies, the conquerours and the conquered, those that are equall in power and the weake, the prince and the subiect, so in like sort their treaties must be diuers, and their assurances diuers. But this maxime holds generall and vn∣doubted, that in all kinds of treaties there is no greater assurance then that the clauses [ K] and conditions inserted in the treaties be fit and sortable for the parties, and agreeing with the subiect that is treated of. There was neuer any thing more true then the ad∣uice* 1.1685 of that Consull which said in open Senat, Neminem populum diutiùs ea conditione esse posse, cuius eum poeniteat, No people can continue long in that estate whereof they are wearie. The question was touching the Priuernates whom the Romans had van∣quished, for that they had broken the league, they demanded of their Ambassador what punishment they had deserued? The paines, answered he, of such as should liue in libertie. Then the Consull replied, If we pardon you, shall we be assured of a peace?

the Ambassador answered, Si bonam dederitis, & fidam & perpetuam, sin malam haud [ A] diuturnam: If you giue vs a good peace, you shall haue it kept faithfullie and perpe∣tually; if a bad one, it shall be soone broken. The yonger Senators found these answers too proud and haughtie, but the wiser sort said▪ That this people which contended only for their libertie deserued to be made citisens of Rome, else they would neuer be good subiects, nor trustie friends: and according to this aduice the decree of the Senat did passe in force of a priuiledge, and was confirmed by the people; and yet had they yeelded themselues to the mercie of the Romans, as all the other cities of the Latins their allies had done, who had conspired against the Romains. The assurance which the antient Romans tooke of those whom they would make ubiect after they had vanquished them, was to seaze vpon all their places of strength, to put in garrisons, to [ B] receiue hostages, and to disarme the vanquished. Mos autem, inquit Liuius, Romanis vetustus erat, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur 〈◊〉〈◊〉, non prius Imperio in eum tanquam pacatum vti, quam omnia diuina humanaque dedid•…•…sset, obsides accepti arma adempta, praesidia vrbibus imposita forent: It was an antient custome among the Romans towards those with whom they had not ioyned in league, nor contracted friendship vpon equall •…•…earmes; neuer to gouerne them peaceably, vntill they had yeel∣ded vp all, deliuered hostages, disarmed them, and put garrisons into their townes. For we may not thinke euer to keepe that people in subiection which hath alwayes liued* 1.1686 in libertie, if they be not disarmed. To take away part of their libertie, is to incense them more, than if they were wholie subiected: as Lewis the 12 did vnto the Geneuois, who [ C] had put themselues vnder his protection when they were in danger, which being past, they reuolted, and allied themselues vnto his enemies; against whom he went in per∣son, besieged them, and forced them to yeeld; then he condemned them in two hun∣dred thousand crownes, putting a strong garrison into their fort called the Lanterne; yet he suffered them to liue after their owne lawes and with their old magistrates, ta∣king* 1.1687 only from them the stamp of their coine. It had been farre better either to haue made them good subiects, or to haue restored them to their perfect libertie: for king Lewis the 11 to whom they had giuen themselues, made answere, That he gaue them vnto the diuell▪ refusing to receiue a yearely pension for the protection of such dis•…•…oyall [ D] allies, who had reuolted from king Charles the 6, hauing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them into his prote∣ction to defend them against the Venetians. And the Earles of Sauoy receiued those of Berne into their protection, beeing opprest by the lords of Bourdorg; but the feare being past, they desired nothing more than to be freed from their protection, the which the Earle willinglie granted, chusing rather to haue faithfull fellowes, than faithlesse allies. But king Francis the first in my opinion committed a greater error, who refused two hundred thousand crownes in his necessitie, the which the Geneuois offred him to be freed from his protection, giuing him to vnderstand that vpon the first occasion they would reuolt, as they did after the battaile of Pauia, and afterwards expelled the garrison which remained in their fort, and razed it to the ground: he should either haue •…•…ade them faithfull and free confederats, being tied together by an equall league; or [ E] els haue made them subiects, and so haue taken from them the gouernment of their estate.

But some one will say, that it is a breach of faith to infringe the treaties, and to change the protection into a soueraignetie. I answere, that it is and alwayes shall be lawfull for the Patron to make himselfe absolute lord, if the client be disloyall. We read that Augustus made those people subiect which had abused their libertie. And therefore king Charles the 9 (hauing discouered the secret practises of the Spaniards with the inhabitants of Thoul, Metz, and Verdun) was inforced somewhat to re∣straine

their liberties, for in all treaties of protection there is an expresse clause, That [ F] those which are in protection shall retaine their estate and soueraigntie: but there is no great assurance if the Protector holds his clients forts, for that he may make them subiect when he pleaseth. Who knowes not that the cities of Constance, Vtrech,* 1.1688 Cambray, Vienna in Austria, and many others which haue put themselues in the pro∣tection of the house of Austria, haue now lost their liberties. The kingdome of Hon∣garie hath runne the same fortune: for after the death of king Ihon, the estates of the countrie sent Ambassadours to the Turke to receiue their yong king and the realme into his protection, fearing least Ferdinand should make himselfe lord thereof, preten∣ding the realme to belong vnto him by vertue of certaine treaties made betwixt the house of Austria, and the kings of Hongarie; but those treaties had no sure ground, for [ G] the realme being electiue, the king could not take this prerogatiue from the people without their consent: and if the house of Austria lying so neere and being so famous for their glorious deeds, had made offer of any one of their princes to haue bin chosen, they had caried it without any difficultie; but the estates had rather make choise of Mathew Coruin for their king, than to lose the right of election: and although that the new king and the estates of the countrie did ratifie the former treaties with the house of Austria, yet were they not kept, for that they seemed to be made by force against all law and reason, wherefore they did chuse rather to put themselues vnder the Turks* 1.1689 protection; who soone after made himselfe absolute lord, knowing well that Ferdinand would carrie it, who notwithstanding had some part, but he was forced to agree with [ H] the Turke, paying yeerely a good summe of money, which the Emperour tearmes a Pension, & the Turke a Tribute, vanting that the Emperor is his Tributarie. But there is a great difference betwixt a pensionar and a tributarie, for tribute is paied by the sub∣iect, or by him who to inioy his libertie paies that which is promised vnto him which hath forced him thereunto. A pension is voluntarily giuen by him that is in protection,* 1.1690 or by him that is equall in a treatie of alliance to haue peace, and to withhold the pen∣sionar from ioyning with his enemies, or to haue succours when he shall require them; as in the treaties of equall league betwixt the kings of France, and the Cantons of the Swissers, vpon that condition that our kings might at their pleasures leauie an armie* 1.1691 of Swissers for the defence of this realme, and should likewise help them against the [ I] incursions of their enemies: and for that it was needfull to make many leuies of Swis∣sers for the guard of this crowne: fearing also least the enemies thereof should draw them from the societie of the French, our kings haue willingly graunted a thousand crownes yearely pension to euery Canton, notwithstanding that king Francis the first, three yeares before the treatie, had gotten of the Swissers at Marignan one of the goodlyest victories that euer Prince obtayned. And although we haue sayd, That protection rightlie was that, when as one takes the defence of an other freely with∣out any reward, for that the mightie are bound to defend the weake against the in∣iuries of their enemies: yet for the assurance of treaties and protections, they vse* 1.1692 to receiue a pension from him that puts himselfe into protection, to the end that [ K] the Protector beeing bound not onely by his oath, but also in receiuing a pen∣sion, should bee more readie to succour his adherent a need. This was held by the Antients, against the honor and maiestie of the Empire: but since that, they haue confounded honestie with profit, they haue begun to make marchandise of prote∣ction; whereof Saluian of Marseilles doth greatlie complayne, saying, That the weake putting themselues in the protection of the mightie, giue all they haue to be protected. It is well knowne that they of Luques, Parma, Sienna, and manie others, pay great pensions to be protected: And oftentimes a pension is payed to

the protector, not so much to warrant him from his enemies, as from the prote∣ctor [ A] himselfe: as it happened after the battaile of Pauia, all the potentates of Italie turned their vowes to the Spanyard, and to free themselues from inuasion, they put themselues into their protection. Amongst others the Luquois payed vnto the Emperour Charles the fift, tenne thousand ducates▪ the Siennois fifteene thou∣sand, and the duke of Ferrare fifteene thousand, the which he paied to the Viceroy of Naples, vnder colour of lending, without hope of restitution, being in the pro∣tection* 1.1693 of the French. But it is shamefull and dishonourable, to take into protecti∣on, to receiue a pension, and to abandon the client in his great need. Not long since Si∣gismund Augustus king of Poland had taken the protection of the inhabitants of Lif∣land, against the king of Moscouia: but hauing made a league with the Moscouite, he [ B] is not onely said to haue abandoned his clients, but to haue betrayed them vnto their enemie. But if he that is in protection as a soueraigne, and in subiection as a vassall and subiect, demaunds aid of his protector, he hath double reason to defend him, especially if they attempt any thing against his honour and person: as it happened in the yeare 1563, in the Moneth of March, when as the Inquisition at Rome sent out a Citation* 1.1694 against the queene of Nauarre, to appeare personally at Rome within six moneths, and not by any procurator, vpon paine of confiscation of all her goods, estates, and seigneu∣ries. King Charles the ninth tooke her into his protection, saying, That she was neere∣ly allied vnto him in blood, that she was a widow, and tied to the house of Fraunce, a [ C] vassall and subiect vnto the king; and that by treaties of popes, and generall councels she might not be drawne out of the realm for what cause soeuer: seeing that pope Cle∣ment the seuenth sent two cardinals into England, to heare king Henrie the eight, tou∣ching the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 betwixt him and Katherine of Spaine. And for that the Citation and threat made vnto such a princesse, toucht his honour and the estates, the king of France did aduertise all his neighbour princes and allies, by his ambassadors, giuing the popes legat to vnderstand, That his maister should not take it ill, if hee did punish those that were the cause of this enterprise: as Lewis the young did in the like case to Thibaud earle of Champagne, who had caused the earle of Vermandois to be censured by the pope: intreating the pope moreouer, to reuoke his sentences giuen as well by himselfe, [ D] as by his deputies: else he should not hold it strange if hee vsed the meanes which had bene accustomed in like cases.

But it falls out oft, that those which are receiued into protection, after the daunger is past, make warre against their protectour: We haue many examples, and without fur∣ther search, in our memorie we haue seene many princes of Germany cast themselues* 1.1695 into the protection of king Henrie the second, to be freed from the captiuitie and sla∣uery* 1.1696 which did threaten them: the king receiued them into protection, and in stead of* 1.1697 taking any pension, he gaue them two hundred thousand crownes towards their wars, and leuied an armie of threescore thousand men at his owne charge for the libertie of the empire. And although by the 34 article of the treatie of Protection, it was con∣cluded, [ E] That the confederat princes should suffer the king to seize vpon the imperiall townes, speaking French, yet the emperour was no sooner chased away, & the empire restored to her former beautie, by meanes of the French, but the chiefe of the confede∣rats and adherents, forsooke the kings protection: and which is more, tooke armes a∣gainst their protectour. And at an imperiall diet, held in the yere 1565, it was decreed, To send an ambassage into Fraunce, to demaund those three imperiall townes which are in the protection of France, Thoul, Verdun, and Metz, although that Verdun hath for these hundred and sixtie yeares bene in the protection of Fraunce, paying thirtie pound starling onely for a yearely pension. But this imperiall decree tooke no effect,

and the king was aduertised by letters of the first of December 1559, from a pensioner [ F] of his, That the estates of the empire would be wel pleased, to haue the king hold those townes of the empire, doing homage for them: which shewed, that he held not these* 1.1698 townes but vpon good and iust considerations. And for that the protectour cannot be inuaded by him that is in protection, being alwayes the weaker: those which put themselues into protection, haue need of greater securitie than the protectors, least vn∣der a colour of patronage they loose their liberties.

Some one may obiect, That it is an absurd thing to demaund securitie of the prote∣ctor, seeing that the client puts himselfe in his protection: and by an auntient decree of the court of parliament, the vassal demaunding securitie against his lord, was reiected. But the deceit and treacherie of man hath so farre extended, as the wisest haue held it [ G] necessarie to succor the vassall against the violence of his patron, whom the soueraigne prince shall take into his safegard, if there be iust cause: with greater reason the client is to seeke all the securitie that may be from the protector. The first assurance depends* 1.1699 vpon reasonable conditions annexed vnto the treatie: the second of the letters of prote∣ction, which the protector must deliuer vnto the clients, to testifie, That all the rights of soueraigntie and maiestie remaine absolute vnto the client: and this is to be done in Monarchies, at the comming of a new prince: for the protection is dissolued by the death of the client, as well as of the patron: neither is the succession tied vnto the pro∣tection. And therefore the inhabitants of Mets, after the death of Henry the second, demaunded to haue new letters of protection from Charles his sonne: not for that they [ H] should be more safe from their enemies, but to shew that they were not in subiection, the which is generall in all treaties made betwixt princes, and it hath beene alwayes obserued, to renew leagues and alliances, which else should be dissolued •…•…y death. So Perseus king of Macedon, after the death of his father, sent an ambassage to the Senat of Rome, to renew the league they had with his father, and to the end he might be cal∣led king by the Senat. But when as the Senat offered to renew the same conditions of the league which they had with Philip his father, Perseus refused them, saying, That the treatie made with his father, did nothing concerne him: and if they would contract a new league, they must first agree vpon the conditions. So Henrie the seuenth, king of England hauing receiued the duke of Suffolke from the Archduke Philip, father vnto [ I] * 1.1700 the emperour Charles the fift, vpon condition, That he should not put him to death, he kept his faith; but he being dead, his sonne Henry the eight caused his head to bee cut off, saying, That he was not tied vnto the treatie which his father had made.

But for that protections are more daungerous for the adherents or clients, than all other treaties, it is needfull to haue greater securitie: for oft times wee see, that for want of securitie the protection is chaunged into a seigneurie. And sometimes hee thinkes himselfe well assured, that makes the wolfe the keeper of his flocke. And therefore protections must be limited to a certaine time, especially in Popular and Aristocraticall estates, which neuer die. And therefore the inhabitants of Geneua hauing put them∣selues in the protection of them of Berne, would not haue the protection continue [ K] aboue thirtie yeares, the which did expire in the yeare 1558, and then the Geneuois made an equall league with the Bernois, the which was not without great difficultie, being almost brought into subiection, by the practises of some citisens that were exe∣cuted. Since the first impression of these books, a Printer of Geneua put them sudden∣ly to the presse, making an aduertisement in the beginning, wherein hee doth controll some places: but he deserues to be punished by the Seigneurie: First, for that hee hath attempted against another mans workes, who hath spoken as honourably of Geneua, as of any Commonweale whatsoeuer. Secondly, for that he hath infringed the ordi∣nances

of the Seigneurie of Geneua, published the fift of Iune, 1559: whereby it is [ A] expresly defended, To make any inuectiue against such authors as are set forth. For if the author deserued any reproachfull words from the Printer, he should not haue prin∣ted them, and much lesse set them to sale. But as for his reprehensions all men of iudge∣ment haue esteemed them as they deserue. And heretofore this good Printer hath bene aunswered, who maintaines, That it is lawfull for the subiect to kil his prince, kin∣dling by this meanes the fire of sedition and rebellion in all places. And whereas hee saith, That Geneua hath not bene in the protection of Berne, the author refers him∣selfe vnto the treatie that was made in the yeare 1536. But the fault growes, for that they knew not what protection was, which our auntient treaties call Auouoison, and in Latine Aduocatio. The like may be said of Rotuille, and of Mulhouse, which are [ B] allied with the Cantons of the Swissers, but it is an alliance of protection. As in like case the abbat and towne of Saint Gall, which are also allied, but yet in the protection of Zurich, Lucerne, Swits, and Glaris, as I haue seene by the treaties which the abbat of Orbez, (hauing remained long ambassedour in Swisserland) imparted vnto me from the first vnto the last: those of Valdaost, were in like daunger to them of Ge∣neua, for the Valoisians would haue made them subiect, vnder a colour of protecti∣on, in the yeare 1559, if the king of Fraunce bad not defended them. And euen as the vassall is freed from the fealtie and homage which he oweth vnto his lord, if hee bee ill intreated by him, as it was adiudged by the court of parliament, for the lady of Raiz against the duke of Brittaine: in like sort the client is exempt from the power of the [ C] * 1.1701 protector, if he doth infringe and breake the lawes of protection. But the chiefest cau∣tion and assurance, is, when as the protector is not ceised of the places of strength, nor hath not any garrisons in his clients townes. There is nothing more true, than what was spoken by Brutus the Tribune of the people, vnto the nobilitie of Rome, That there was one onely assurance for the weake against the mightie, which was, That if the mightie would, they could not hurt them: for that ambitious men that haue power ouer another, neuer want will. And therefore it was wisely prouided by the Scots, when as they came into the protection of the English, made in the yeare 1559, That the queene of England, who tooke their protection, should giue hostages, the which should be chaunged euery six moneths: and that she should not build any forts in Scot∣land, [ D] but with the consent of the Scottish men. Wherein the Athenians did erre, who hauing put themselues first into the protection of Antipater, then of Cassander, of Pto∣lomey, and in the end of Demetrius the Besieger, they suffered their protectors to seize vpon their forts, and to put in garrisons, who presently made themselues soueraigne lords. The which Demosthenes had well and wisely foreseene, when as one commen∣ded vnto him the mildnesse and courtesie of Antipater: hee aunswered, Wee desire no lord and maister, how mild and gratious soeuer: and him did Antipater pursue euen into Italie, and slue him. But the Athenians were circumuented by the same fraud as they had done their associats: For the Persians being expelled out of Greece, all the cities of Greece made an equall league, for the defence of their estates and liberties, con∣cluding, [ E] That they should haue one common treasurie in Apolloes temple, whither all the associats should yearely bring their money, that an account might bee giuen of the receits and expences by a common consent. Euerie citie sent ambassadours for the swearing of their league: Aristides surnamed the Iust, came for the Athenians, who af∣ter solemne sacrifice, did cast peeces of burning yron into the sea, calling heauen and earth, and all their gods, to witnesse, and saying, As this fire is quencht in the water, so let them suddenly perish, that shall breake their faith. But the Athenians seeing the* 1.1702 common treasure great, fortified their citie ports, & passages therewith, and made pro∣uision

of nauie, ships, & gallies well armed. And then finding themselues the stronger, [ F] they changed the equal league into protection, & protection into subiection. So as the* 1.1703 appellations of all the confederat cities came vnto Athens; as we read in Xenophon, & all charges and impositions were taxed by the Athenians, who had freed themselues from all imposts: the which chanced for that the Athenians trained their subiects vp in arms, at their confederats costs. And so did the Lacedemonians to all their confederats, whom vnder colour of an equall league, they imperiously forced to obey: for that for the most part they were all mechanike people. And contrariwise in Lacedemon there was not any Spartan that was an Artisan, being against Licurgus his lawes: so as the ci∣tie of Sparta was farre more mightie, and held in a manner all their other allies in sub∣iection; as we read in Plutarch. We see that the Latines fell almost into the like diffi∣cultie, [ G] after that they had made an equall league with the Romans, against whom they tooke armes: for that the Romans commaunded them imperiously as their subiects: whereof Setin captaine of the Latines complained, saying, Sub vmbra foederis aequi ser∣uitutem patimur, We are (saith he) slaues vnto the Romans, vnder colour of an equall league. And a little after, Consilia populorum Latinorum habita, responsumque non ambi∣guum imperantibus milites Romanis datum, absisterent imperare ijs, quorum auxilio ege∣rent: Latinos pro sua libertate potius quam pro alieno imperio arma laturos, The Latines hauing held a councell, and giuen a plaine aunswere to the Romans which commaun∣ded the souldiours, they wished them to forbeare to commaund them whose aid they needed: the Latines would rather take arms for their owne liberties, than for anothers [ H] rule and empire. We read, that Licortas captaine generall of the Acheans, vsed the like complaints to Appius the Consull, after that the Acheans had treated an equall league with the Romans, Foedus Romanorum cum Acheis specie quidem aequum esse: re precariam libertatem, •…•…pud Romanos etiam imperium esse, The league which the Ro∣mans haue with the Acheans, in shew it is equall, but in effect it is an intreated libertie, and with the Romans it is emperie or absolute command. For the same cause the Sam∣nites made warre against the Romans, renouncing their league: for that vnder a colour of societie, they would commaund absolutely ouer them. And for the same reason the cities of Italie allied vnto the Romans by an equall league, reuolted from their alliance for that the Romans drew from them an infinit succour of men and money, so that in [ I] * 1.1704 all their warres they had two of their allies for one Roman, and by that meanes con∣quered the greatest empire that euer was, and yet their associats had no part of the con∣quest, but some pillage, after that the Romans had taken what they pleased: which* 1.1705 was the cause of the confederats warre in Italie, the which had no end, vntill that the allies were made citisens of Rome, to haue part of honours and offices. And yet what equall league soeuer the Romans made, they were still the stronger, & held their allies as it were in subiection. How imperiously the Romans behaued themselues towards their confederats, the speech of the Consull Appius vnto the Generall of the Acheans, contending for the libertie of the Lacedemonians, is a sufficient testimonie, saying, Dum liceret voluntate sua facere gratiam inirent, ne mox inuiti & coacti facerent, Whilest [ K] they might do it of their owne free will, they should deserue thankes; else they should be soone forced thereunto against their wills. And in the treatie made with the Aetoli∣ans (to whome they would not graunt any peace, vnlesse they submitted themselues wholly vnto their mercie) there are these words, Imperium maiestatemque populi Roma∣nor•…•…m gens Aetolorum conseruato sine dolo malo; hostes eosdem habeto quos populus Roma∣nus, armaque in eos ferto: & bellum pariter gerito, obsides arbitrio Consulis 40, & talenta 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dato, You Aetolians shall maintaine the empire and maiestie of the people o•…•… Rome, without any fraud or guile, their enemies shall be yours, you shall carry arms,

and make warre against them with the people of Rome: you shall giue fortie hosta∣ges [ A] at the Consuls discretion, and fiftie talents. They left them the free gouernment of the state, but with such conditions, as they were little better than subiects; hauing vn∣furnished them of men and money, and taken the best amongst them for hostages. These words of the league, Maiestatem Romanorum conseruato, Maintaine the maiestie of the Romans; shewes, that the league betwixt the Romans and the Aetolians was vn∣equall, and that the one did respect the maiestie of the other with all honour. And al∣though the Romans gaue lawes vnto the Aetolians, yet they did enioy their estate and soueraigntie: as they did in all Greece, which they freed from the power of the kings of Macedon. And after that they had vanquished and taken Perseus king of Macedon, they freed all the people, and discharged them of the moitie of their imposts, suffering [ B] them to gouerne their owne estates: and for their better assurance, they commaunded vpon paine of death, That all Gouernours, Captaines, Lieutenants, Presidents, Councellours of state, Gentlemen in ordinarie, and euen the kings Pages and Footmen (qui seruire regibus humiliter alijs superbe imperare consueuerunt, Which had beene ac∣customed to serue their kings humbly, and to commaund others imperiously) to depart out of Macedon, and to passe into Italy. And not content therewith, they diuided Macedon into foure prouinces, forbidding vpon paine of death, That the one should haue no accesse, communication, traffique, commerce, nor alliance of marriage, with another: and moreouer, that the moitie of those charges which were paid to the king, should be carried yearely into the treasurie of Rome. And so the people of Macedo∣nie [ C] * 1.1706 receiued a law from the victor, and remained tributaries, yet they enioyed the go∣uernment of their estates. The Consull Mummius vsed the like policie, hauing sub∣iected the estate of Achaia, he rased Corinth, and abolished the societies & communal∣ties of Greece; yet he suffered the free people to enioy their laws and magistrats, easing them of part of their tributes: the which was a subtill meanes to draw vnto the amitie of the Romans all the people which had bene held in slauish subiection, and to make tyrants to tremble, or at the least to force soueraigne kings and princes to gouerne their subiects iustly, seeing that the prize and reward of the Romans victorie, was the liberty* 1.1707 of people, and ruine of tyrants. Whereby they reaped the greatest honour that men might in this world, To be iust and wise. [ D]

It is also a double wrong which the lord receiues from his subiect, hauing put him∣selfe in the protection of another, and from him that hath receiued him, if hee hold not of him by fealtie and homage, or hath some liuing in the protectors countrey. And for that Charles of Lorraine bishop of Metz, put himselfe into the protection of the em∣pire, and obtained a safegard for him and his, of all that which he held in the country of Messin, in the yeare 1565, the king of Fraunce his lieutenant opposed himselfe to the publication of this safegard: whereby he (hauing recourse vnto the empire) brought in question his obedience due vnto his prince, the protection of Metz, & his kings right. And yet many princes receiue all that seeke it, without discretion, the which is the cause of many inconueniences, if the protection be not iust. It is a dangerous thing to vn∣dertake [ E] the protection of another prince, but it is more dangerous to vndergoe it with∣out a iust cause, being the chiefe subiect of all wars, & the ruine of cities and kingdoms, when as subiects fall from the obedience of their naturall prince, to obey another. And generally all treaties of alliance made with a prince or warlike people, draw after them a subiection and necessitie to take armes alwayes for his succour, and to run the same fortune: as the Romans confederats, who by their treaties were bound to furnish men and money for their succours, and all the profit and honour of the conquests came vn∣to the Romans. They make no such treaties at this day, yet the victor prescribes a law

vnto the vanquished. And therefore many haue bene of opinion, That it was expedi∣ent [ F] * 1.1708 for a prince to be a Neuter, and not to meddle with any other princes warres: the chief reason is, That the losse is common, but the fruit of the victorie is his only whose quarrell they maintaine; besides, he must declare himselfe an enemie to those princes which haue not wronged him: but he that shall stand indifferent, is oftentimes a means to reconcile enemies: and maintaining himselfe in the loue of them all, hee shall reape thanks and honour of euerie side. And if all princes be in league one against another, who shal mediat a peace? Moreouer it seems there is no better meanes to maintaine the greatnes of an estate, than to see the neighbor princes ruine one another. For the great∣nes of a prince (to speake properly) is nothing els but the ruine & fall of his neighbors:* 1.1709 & his strength is no other thing, but the weaknesse of another. And therfore Flaminius [ G] said vnto the Consull Attilius, intending to ruine the citie of the Aetolians, That it was not so expedient to weaken the Aetolians, as to oppose against the greatnesse of young Philip king of Macedon. These reasons may helpe them that defend neutralitie: but it seemes they are subiect to greater inconueniences. First in matter of state it is a maxime, That he must either be the stronger, or of the stronger faction (and this rule doth not admit many exceptions, be it in the selfe same Commonweale, or among* 1.1710 sundrie princes) els hee must alwayes remaine a prey at the victors discretion: as the Roman ambassadour said vnto the Acheans, whome Antiochus king of Persia persua∣ded, That they would remaine neuters betwixt him and the Romans. And it seemes, that whosoeuer will maintaine himselfe, must of necessitie bee a friend or an enemie. [ H] Whereof we haue an example in Lewes the eleuenth, king of Fraunce, against whom they made warre of all sides, so long as he continued a newter: but after that he had al∣lied the Swissers more strictly among thēselues, & the citie of Strausbourg with them, and that he had entred into that league, neuer any enemies durst assault him, (as Philip de Commines saith:) for neutralitie, Neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit, It neither* 1.1711 purchaseth friends, nor takes away enemies: as an auntient captaine of the Samnites said. And the like conclusion was made among the estates of the Aetolians, by Ariste∣mus their Generall, saying, Romanos aut socios habere oportet, aut hostes, media via nulla est, We must haue the Romans either confederats or enemies, there is no meane. We* 1.1712 haue infinit examples in al histories: Ferdinand king of Aragon found no better means [ I] to pull the kingdome of Nauarre from Peter of Albret, than in persuading him to bee a neuter betwixt him and the king of Fraunce, that hee might bee abandoned at need. And the inhabitants of Iabes remaining neuters, and not ingaging themselues in the warre which the people of Israel made against the tribe of Beniamin, they were all slaine, and their townes rased. As also the Thebans fell into great daunger, being neuters, when as king Xerxes came into Greece. As in the like case the towne of Lays in Soria, was surprised, spoiled, sacked, and burnt, by a small troupe of the tribe of Dan: for that (as the historie saith) they were not in league with any soueraigne prince* 1.1713 or state. And without any further search, the Florentines after they had left the alli∣ance of the house of Fraunce, refusing to enter into league with the pope, the emperor, [ K] the king of England, and the king of Spaine, against the king of Fraunce, they soone felt the fruits of their neutralitie.

But it were an vniust thing, will some one say, to ioyne in league against France, with whom they had been so strictly conioyned: I confesse it, so should they not haue left it at need as they did; for the league is not only broken if thou beest an enemie to my associates, or if thou ioynest with my enemies, but also if for feare thou doest aban∣don thy associates, being bound by the league to succour them; as a Roman Ambassa∣dor said, Sisocios meos pro hostibus habeas, aut cum hostibus te coniungas, If thou takest

my associates for thine enemies, or ioynest with mine enemies. Yet some may say, that [ A] neutralitie may well be granted with the consent of other princes, which seemeth to be the best support without any feare of the victors. The estates of Lorraine, Bourgongue and Sauoy haue maintained themselues in a free peace, so long as they had an alliance of tranquilitie, but after that the Duke of Sauoy had once vnited himselfe to the Spa∣nish faction, he was expelled his countrie by the french. But there is a great difference to be a neuter without the friendship either of the one or the other, and a neuter allied* 1.1714 to both parties, and these are farre more assured, than if they were enemies to both fa∣ctions: for they are free from the victors inuasion, and if there be any treatie of peace betwixt both parties, they are comprehended of either side. And if neutralitie be com∣mendable in that manner, as I haue said, it is farre more commendable in a Prince that [ B] doth exceede all others in power and dignitie, that he may haue the honor to be the vmper and moderator; as it happens alwaies, that quarrels betwixt Princes are deci∣ded by friends that stand indifferent, and especially by those which exceede the rest in power and greatnes, as heretofore many Popes which knew well how to mainetaine their ranke, and reconcile Christian Princes, haue reaped honor, thanks, and assurance* 1.1715 for their persons and estates, and those which haue followed either the one or the other partie, haue drawne after them the ruine of other Princes. It was thought very strange in Spaine that Pope Alexander the 6 a naturall Spanyard, should enter into league with Lewis the 12, king of France against the Spanyards; and when as the Spanyards [ C] had the better in Italie, he told the french Ambassador that he would remaine a neuter, and be a common father to both parties, but it was too late now to make a shew to quench that fier which he himselfe had kindled. As in the like case the Duke of Alua Viceroy of Naples being aduertised of a request made by the Procurator of the cham∣ber of Rome against the Emperour, touching the confiscation and reunion of the realme of Naples to the reuenues of S. Peter, he did write vnto Pope Theatin, who had entred into league with the house of France, that he should remaine as neuter for the dignitie which he had aboue all other Christian Princes, but the truce being broken, the armies in field, and their ensignes displayed, the end was miserable, for the Pope re∣nounced the league, leauing the french in their greatest neede, and it was concluded by [ D] a treatie which he made with the Spanyard that he should continue newter. Neuer was the hatred of any Prince so pernitious vnto his enemie, as the fauour of Theatin was then vnto the french, without the which they had not bin reduced to such extre∣mitie, as in one day to lose all they had conquered in thirtie yeares. It is more strange, for that the memory is more fresh of the like errors committed by pope Clement the 7, fauoring one of these princes against the aduice of Lewis Canosa his Ambassador, who aduertised him by letters written out of France, that the greatnes and suertie of his estate was to shew himselfe a neuter: so soone after he see himselfe prisoner to the im∣perials and the citie of Rome sackt after a strange manner, and both himselfe and his Cardinals ransomed at the victors discretion. I enter not into the worthines of the [ E] fact, neither is it in question to know who deserued most fauour, but only, that hee which alone may be iudge and moderator of honor, should neuer make himselfe a partie, although he were assured that he should incurre no danger, much more when his estate is in question, and that he can haue no securitie but hazard by the victorie. There are others who to win fauour of all sides forbids their subiects by publike pro∣clamations to giue ayde or succour to the enemies of their associates, and yet vnder∣hand they suffer them to passe, yea sometimes they send them, so did the Aetolians, saith Titus Liuius, Qui iuuentutem aduersus suos socios, publica tantum auctoritate demp∣ta, militare sinunt, & contrariae saepè acies in vtra{que} parte Aetolica auxilia habent, Which

suffer there your yong men vnderhand to goe to warre against their owne confede∣rates, [ F] * 1.1716 and oftentimes troupes of Aetolians are seene in either armie. Such allies are more dangerous than enemies. But it may be some one will say that it is dangerous to suffer a Prince so to increase in power as he may giue law vnto the rest, and inuade their estates when he pleaseth. It is true, and there is no greater occasion then that, to induce a neuter to seeke by all meanes to hinder him; for the suretie of Princes and Commonweales consists in the equall counterpeeze of power. So when as the Ro∣mans made warre against king Perseus, some fauored the king, others supported the Romans, Tertia pars (said Titus Liuius) optima eadem & prudentissima, si vtique optio domini potioris daretur, sub Romanis quàm sub Rege esse mallebat: si liberum inde arbi∣trium neutram partem vole bat altera oppressa fieri potentiorem: it a inter vtrosque condi∣tionem [ G] ciuitatum optimam fore, protegente semper altero inopem ab alterius iniuria, & illihatis vtriusque partis viribus parem esse: A third part, saith Titus Liuius being the best and the wisest, if they were to make choise of their lord, had rather subiect them∣selues vnto the Romans than vnder the king, but if they might haue their free will, they would haue neither of them superior, with the ruine of the other, so as betwixt both the cities should be secure, the one alwayes protecting the weake from the iniuries of the other, and they both should remaine equall, their forces being not impaired: So as the wisest haue held opinion, that there was nothing better for the suretie of estates, then to haue the power of great Princes as equall as might be; yet those which were of this opinion, when as the Romans and Macedonians were in warre, remained neuters, [ H] although they were tyed to the power of the Romans, and to the king of Macedon, and it succeeded well for them: for there is a difference in wishing the parties to be equall, and in making himselfe a partisan. It is therefore commendable for the greatest* 1.1717 and mightiest Princes to remaine neuters, although it be not so concluded betwixt other Princes, as I haue said before. And this is necessarie for the common good of all Princes and States, which cannot be reconciled but by their common allies, or by them that are neuters. But those that be neuters do many times kindle the fier in stead of quenching it; the which may be excusable, if the preseruation of their estate depends vpon the warre which they entertaine betwixt others; but it can hardly be concealed, and the matter once discouered, the parties most commonly agree to fall vpon their [ I] common enemie, as it happened to the Venetians, who were alwayes wont to sow di∣uision among their neighbours, and to fish in a troubled water. Lewis the twelfth disco∣uering it, he allied himselfe with all the other Princes, and then they all iointly made a* 1.1718 league against the Venetians, who were reduced to that extremitie, as they yeelded Creme, Bresse, Bergame, Cremona, and Guiradadde, being members of the Duchie of Milan, vnto the french king, and to the Pope Fauence, Rimini, Rauenne, and Cer∣uie, being of the patrimonie of S. Peter: to the Empire Padoua, Vincentia, and Vero∣na: to the Emperour the places of Friuli and Treuisan, being the inheritance of the house of Austria: to Ferdinand the ports and places ingaged by the kings of Naples to the seigneurie of Venice, and to call home their magistrates from the imperiall townes, [ K] and out of all the countrie which they held vpon the firme land. Whereas before the warre the Pope would haue been contented with some one place, but this tooke not effect, for Dominike Treuiran Procurator of S. Marke stayed the Senat, saying, That the Venetians were alwayes accustomed to take townes and castels, but hauing once taken them, it were absurd to restore them. It is therefore more sase for him that re∣maines a neuter to meditate a peace, than to nourish warre, and in so doing to purchase* 1.1719 honor and the loue of others with the assurance of his owne estate, as the Athenians procured a peace betwixt the Rhodians and Demetrius the besieger, to the great con∣tent

of both parties, who were tyred with warre, and yet were loth to demaund a [ A] peace one of another: by which meanes the Athenians did reape great honor and pro∣fit to their estate. The which is so much the more necessarie, if he which is a neuter be allied to them that are in warre, and hath occasion to draw succors from his allies: as our kings haue alwayes done betwixt the Catholike and Protestant Swissers, and be∣twixt the Grisons and the Swissers, as well for the lawes of friendship, as fearing that in the meane time he should want the ayd of his confederats. And sometimes those which are wearied with the warre, stirre vp a third partie being a neuter, for the desire they haue of peace, and the shame they haue to seeke it: as the Florentines not able to subdue the Pisans, by reason of the Venetian succors, who desired nothing more than to retire themselues, they did procure the duke of Ferrare vnderhand to mediate an [ B] agreement. It is the greatest point of honor that a Prince can attaine vnto, to be cho∣sen judge and vmpier of other princes quarrels, as in old time the Romans were, for* 1.1720 the great opinion which was held of their vertue & integritie: & since, this prerogatiue hath been giuen vnto the Popes among other Christian Princes, who oftentimes haue been chosen iudges and arbitrators of all their controuersies: as in the treaties betwixt king Charles the 5, and Charles king of Nauarre, made in the yeare 1365; and betwixt Philip Augustus and Richard king of England: If the Pope were not a partie, as Inno∣cent the 4 was against the Emperour Frederick the 2, then the Emperour made choise of the Parliament of Paris for arbitrator, which was the Senat of Peeres and Princes, [ C] and the Councell of France. And Pope Clement the 7 making a league with the kings of France and England against the Emperour in the yeare 1528, he caused it to be in∣serted in the treatie, That if it were needfull to conclude a peace with the Emperor, he should haue the honor to be arbitrator. Paule the 3 did the like betwixt the king of France and the Emperour in the treaties of Marseilles and Soissons. One of the most necessarie things for the assurance of treaties of peace and alliance, is to name some great and mightier Prince to be iudge and vmpier in case of contrauention, that they may haue recourse vnto him to meditate an agreement betwixt them; who being equall, cannot with their honors refuse warre, nor demaund peace. But to the end that other Princes be not driuen to that exigent, it shall be necessarie for them all to ioyne [ D] together in league, to keepe downe the power of any one that might bring the weaker into subiection: or else if they be in league, to send Ambassadors to meditate a peace before the victorie, as the Athenians, the Rhodians, the king of Egipt, and the seigneu∣rie of Chio did, betwixt Philip the yong, king of Macedon, and the Aetolians, fearing the greatnes of the king of Macedon, as we reade in Titus Liuius. And for this cause af∣ter the taking of king Francis the first before Pauia, the Pope, the Venetians, the Flo∣rentines, the Duke of Ferrare, and other Potentates of Italie, made a league with the* 1.1721 king of England for the deliuerie of the king of France: not for that the afflicted fortune of the French did moue them vnto pitie (as it is vsuall to kings, to whom the name of maiestie seemes holie) but for feare of the imperiall Eagle, which hauing couered a [ E] great part of Europe with her wings, might gripe and teare in sunder those pettie prin∣ces with her tallents: and yet they themselues had not many yeares before ioyned in league with the Emperour against king Francis after the battaile of Marignan, and re∣stored Francis Sforce to the Duchie of Milan; hauing found by experience how dange∣rous* 1.1722 the neighbourhood of a mightie Prince was, for if he be iust and vpright, his suc∣cessor will not resemble him, for which cause Methridates king of Pontus seeing the Roman empire to reach vp to heauen, he entred into league with the kings of Parthia, Armenia, and Egipt, and with many cities of Greece against the Romans, who had seazed vpon the greatest part of Europe vnder coulor of iustice, causing in one day

fortie fiue thousand Roman citisens to be slaine throughout all Asia, by a secret con∣spiracie, [ F] but it was then too late to make a league against a power which was inuin∣cible. And therefore at this day if great Princes conclude a peace, all others seeke to be comprehended therein, as well to assure their estates, as to hold those great princes in an equall counterpeize, least that the one by his greatnes oppresse the rest: as in the treatie of peace made at Cambray in the yeare 1559, all estates and Christian Princes were comprehended by the king of France, or the Catholike king, or by them both togither, and any others that the two kings should name within sixe moneths. But they must be named particularly, and not in generall tearmes by the names of allies or* 1.1723 neuters, for if there be not a speciall expression, they may iustly pretend ignorance; for that affaiers of state are sometimes managed so secretlie and so sodenly, as a league is [ G] made before the enterprise can be discouered, notwithstanding all the diligence of Am∣bassadors to learne out the conditions of the treatie: as it happened in the treatie of Cambray made in October 1508, whereas the Pope, the Emperour, the Empire, the king of France, the king of Arragon and Naples, the king of Castill, the Dukes of Lor∣raine, Ferrare, and Mantoue, entred into league against the seigneurie of Venice, the which was concluded before the Venetians had any notice thereof, although they had ambassadors in a manner with all these Princes: and without doubt if they had had any intelligence thereof, they might easily haue preuented it, seeing that after the conclusion thereof, and the warre begun, they found meanes to withdraw the Pope, and to make him a mortall enemie to the French, which was the only meanes to pre∣serue [ H] their estate from ineuitable ruine. The like happened vnto the protestant Prin∣ces, against whome the treatie of Soissons was made in September in the yeare 1544, betwixt the king of France and the Emperour, where by the first article it was agreed, that the two princes should ioyne their forces together to make warre against them, the which they could neuer beleeue, vntill they had seene the preparations made against them. They might easily haue preuented the storme which fell vpon them: for that the Emperour had no great desier to make warre against them, and the king lesse, who did secretly fauour them; so as in giuing the Emperour some succors, or sen∣ding an ambassador vnto him, they had been comprehended in the treatie, for they had no enemie but the Pope, who was then a neuter betwixt the Emperour and the King. [ I] Sometimes the league is so strong, and the hatred so great, as it is a hard matter to hin∣der* 1.1724 it, and much more to breake it, being concluded. King Francis the first was well aduertised of the league made betwixt the Pope, the Emperour, the king of England, the Venetians, the Dukes of Milan and Mantoue, the Commonweales of Genes, Flo∣rence, Luques, and Sienna, all confederates against his estate; yet could he not preuent it, but in quitting the duchie of Milan. Those which had concluded a peace and perpe∣tuall amitie with him, and those which were tied vnto him by a defensiue league, brake their faith, and made open warre against him: the which was not held strange, for many make no esteeme of the breach of faith in matter of treaties betwixt princes, especiallie if they may reape any profit thereby: yea some are so treacherous, as they [ K] sweare most when as they intend most fraud, as Lisander was wont to say, That men must be circumuented and deceiued with oathes, and children with toyes; but he felt* 1.1725 the grieuous punishment of his disloyaltie. Doubtlesse, periurie is more detestable than atheisme, for that the atheist who beleeues there is no God, is not so wicked and impious, as he that knowes there is a God which hath a care of humane things, yet vnder coulor of a false and counterfeit oath, is not ashamed to skorne and abuse his deitie: so as we may rightly say, That treacherie is alwayes ioyned with impietie and basenesse of mind; for hee that willinglie forsweares himselfe to deceiue another,

shewes plainely that he skornes God, and feares his enemie. It were better neuer to [ A] call the immortall God, or him they hold to be a God, to be a witnes of their fraud, but only themselues; as Richard Earle of Poitiers sonne to the king of England did, who giuing a confirmation of the priuiledges of Rochell, vsed these words, Teste meipso, My selfe being witnes. Seeing then that faith is the only foundation and sup∣port of iustice whereon not only Commonweales, but all humaine societie is groun∣ded, it must remaine sacred and inuiolable in those things which are not vniust, especi∣ally betwixt princes: for seeing they are the warrants of faith and oathes, what remedie shall the subiects haue against their power for the oathes which they take among* 1.1726 themselues, if they be the first which breake and violate their faith. I speake of iust things, for it is a double impietie to sweare to do a wicked act, and in this case he that [ B] breakes his oath is no treacher, but deserues reward. And in like case, if the Prince hath promised not to do a thing which is allowable by the law of nature and iust, he is not periured although he make breach thereof; neither are priuate men tyed by their* 1.1727 oath, if they haue promised to do more than is allowable by the Ciuill law. Those things which are by nature vniust and vnlawfull no man may promise, neither may any man vrge them if they be promised. But wise Princes ought not to sweare any thing vnto other Princes that is not allowable by the law of nature and nations, not force any Prince that is weaker then themselues to sweare to vnreasonable conditions. And to take away all ambiguitie of words, it shall be needfull to shew what is vniust, [ C] else he that is bound will take the word iust in generall to make vse of it in some speciall case, as in the treatie made in the moneth of May, in the yeare 1412, betwixt Henry king of England and his children on the one part, and the Dukes of Berry, Orleans, and Bourbon, the Earles of Alancon and Armaignac, and the lord of Albret on the other part, who sware to serue the king of England with their bodies and goods in all his iust quarrels when they should be required. There was no expresse reseruation of their soueraigne, against whom the king of England meant to imploy them by vertue of this contract, the which he could not do. There is neuer any iust cause to take armes against ones prince or countrie, as an auntient orator said, yet are not those princes free from the note of treacherie, which infringe their faith in matters which they haue [ D] sworne to their preiudice, being forced thereunto by the victor as some Doctors haue maintained, being as ill informed of the estate of Commonweales, as of auntient histo∣ries, and of the ground of true iustice, discoursing of treaties made betwixt princes, as of contracts and conuentions among priuat men, the which is an opinion of most dan∣gerous consequence, which error hath taken such roote within these two or three hun∣dred yeares, as there is no league (how firme soeuer) made betwixt princes, but it is broken, so as this opinion goes now for a grounded maxime, that the prince which is* 1.1728 forced to make a league or peace to his hurt and preiudice, may go from it when oc∣casion is offred. But it is strange that neither the first lawgiuers and lawyers, nor the Romans who were the patrons of iustice, did neuer thinke of this shift and euasion. [ E] For it is manifest, that most treaties of peace are made by force, either for feare of the victor, or of him that is the stronger; and what feare is more iust then of the losse of life? yet neuer any prince or lawgiuer did refuse to performe that which he had promi∣sed vnto the victor, as if it had been forced. Quae enim viro forti, inquit Tullius, vis potest* 1.1729 adhiberi? What force can be vsed▪ sayth▪ Tully, to a valiant and resolute man? It appea∣red in the Consull Marcus Attilius Reg•…•…lus, who being taken prisoner by the Cartha∣ginians and sent to Rome vpon his word, swearing that he would returne vnlesse he could procure some noblemen that were captaines to be set at libertie, from the which he dissuaded the Senat, yet did he not refuse to returne, although it were to an assured

death, nor yet the Consull Mancinus to the Spanyards, when as he could not per∣suade [ F] the Senat to the conditions of peace. What grauer schoolemasters of the lawes of armes, what better interpreters of the Roman lawes can we desire, than the Roman Consuls? they went willingly vnto torments rather than they would treacherously breake their faith. The Consull Posthumius and his companion with sixe hundred Captaines, Lieutenants and Gentlemen of the Roman armie, being surprized by the enemie in the straights of the Appenine hills, whereas they could neither aduance, re∣tire, nor yet fight; being set at libertie vpon their words, and hauing disputed of the law of nations in open Senat, and before all the people, touching accords and treaties made in warre; they did neuer pretend force nor feare, but it was only said, that they could not treat of any conditions of peace with the enemie, without an especiall charge and [ G] commission from the people of Rome: whereupon the Consuls which had sworne the peace, and those which had giuen themselues as hostages for the whole armie, yeel∣ded themselues willinglie to the enemie, to dispose of their liues at their pleasure, and so they were deliuered vnto them by the Heralds.

In the treatie of Madrill, made the 14 of February 1526, it was said, That king Fran∣cis* 1.1730 the first being come vnto the first towne of his realme, he should ratifie the articles which he had sworne in prison, and cause them to be ratified by the Daulphin of France when as he came to age: and by the last article it was agreed, That if the king would not obserue the peace which he had sworne, he should returne prisoner into Spaine, giuing his two sonnes Francis and Henry for hostages. Being at libertie, all [ H] Princes offred themselues, and ioyned with him in league against the Emperour Charles the fift, to pull downe his power whom they had raised vp to heauen. The king hauing assembled all his princes and noblemen in his court of Parliament to re∣solue what was to be done touching the treatie of Madrill: Selua the first president, see∣king to prooue that the king was not tyed vnto the treatie, he grounded himselfe vpon the authoritie of Cardinall Zabarella, who held, That whatsoeuer was done by force or feare, was not to be ratified; confirming it by the example of Ihon king of Cipres, who being taken prisoner by the Geneuois, gaue his sonne for hostage, and yet kept not his promise. I wonder the President of so great a Senat did not blush not only to* 1.1731 commend a man that was ignorant of the lawes of armes, but also to arme himselfe [ I] with such foolish arguments, yet this was the chiefest ground of the breach of the trea∣tie of Madrill, adding thereunto, that the king could not giue away or renounce the soueraigntie of the Lowcountries, nor the duchie of Burgongne, without the expresse consent of the estates. This indeed was sufficient to breake the treatie, the rest were im∣pertinent. But all these obiections were neuer brought in question by the antients, they neuer required, That a prince being set at libertie out of his enemies power, should rati∣fie that which he had sworne being a prisoner: a ridiculous thing, that were to call the treatie in question, and leaue it to the discretion of him that was a prisoner, whether he shall obserue that which he hath sworne or not. Moreouer the antients neuer regarded* 1.1732 the breach of treaties, when as they tooke hostages: for that he is not tied to any lawes [ K] of the treatie, nor to any other, neither is he forced to sweare; for hostages are giuen to be pledge for him that is captiue, and to suffer, if he shall make a breach of the conditi∣ons agreed vpon. And were not he simple, that hauing a good pledge, should com∣plaine of his debtor, that he hath broke promise with him: therefore the Consull Post∣humius maintained before the people, That there was no contrauention in the treatie made betwixt him and the Samnites, seeing it was no treatie of peace, or league, but a simple promise, the which did bind them onely which had consented thereunto, Quid enim (inquit ille) obsidebus aut sponsoribus in foedere opu•…•… esset, sipraecatione res transigi∣tur?

Nomina Consulum Legatorum, Tribunorum militum extant: si ex foedere res acta [ A] esset, preterquam duorum foecialium non extarent, What need (saith he) should there bee of hostages and sureties in a league or peace, if it be concluded by intreatie? the names of the Consuls, Lieutenants, and Tribunes, which vndertooke it, are extant: if it be ended by a league, there should be no names ioyned vnto it, but of the two heraulds. Whereby it appeares, that king Francis the first, and the king of Cipres, who left their children for hostages, were absolued of their promises by their enemies themselues, for that they had pledges, and did not trust in their prisoners oath. And by the law of arms a prisoner which hath his libertie giuen him vpon his word, is bound to returne to pri∣son againe. And by a proclamation made by the Senat of Rome, all prisoners were enioyned vpon paine of death (the which were verie many, being let goe vppon their [ B] words by king Pyrrhus, to goe visit their friends) should returne at a certaine day, but no man gaue any hostage. And if the prisoner be held in bonds, he may escape, neither* 1.1733 is he bound to him that tooke him: as king Francis the first said vnto Granuella the em∣perours ambassadour. For as a Roman Consull was wont to say, Vult quisque sibi cre∣di, & habita fides ipsam obligat fidem, Euery man desires to be beleeued, & a trust repo∣sed, binds the faith it selfe.

If any one say vnto me, That the king had sworne to returne, if the treatie tooke not effect: and that king Iohn returned prisoner into England, for that he could not ac∣complish the conditions of the treatie, by which he had giuen a great part of the realme to the English, and promised three millions of crownes: I aunswere, that there was no [ C] fault in the king, for the estates opposed against the alienation of the reuenues of the crowne: and as for his returne, neither he nor king Iohn were tied vnto it, seeing they had taken their children for hostages. And therefore king Francis seeing that the em∣perour would not remit the vniust conditions of the treatie, with the councell and con∣sent of his princes and subiects hee proclaimed a new warre against him: wherewith the emperour being moued, said, That the king had carried himselfe basely; and that he had broken his oath, and that hee would willingly hazard his life with him in single combat, to make an end of so great a warre. The king being aduertised by his ambassa∣dour, That the emperour had touched his honour and reputation; hee caused all the [ D] princes to assemble in his court of parliament; and after that hee had called Perrenot Granuelle ambassadour for Spaine, he said vnto him, That Charles of Austria (hauing* 1.1734 said vnto the herauld of Fraunce, That the king had broken his faith) had spoken falsly, and that as often as he should say so, he did lie: and that hee should appoint a time and place for the combat, where he would meet him. The king of England finding in like* 1.1735 sort that he was touched, vsed the like chalenge, and with the like solemnities. It was done like generous princes, to let all the world vnderstand, that there is nothing more foule and impious than the breach of faith, especially in princes. Neither was there euer prince so disloyall, that would maintaine it to be lawfull to breake their faith. But some haue pretended that they haue bene circumuented in their treaties, by the fraud of their enemies: others, that they haue erred in fact, or haue bene seduced by euill coun∣cell: [ E] or that things were so chaunged, as the wisest could not haue foreseene them: or that it should be impossible to obserue the treaties without the ineuitable losse, or appa∣rent daunger of the whole state. In which cases they would pretend, That an oath doth not bind, the condition or the cause of the oath being impossible or vniust. Some there be which maintaine, That the pope may dispence not onely with the oath of o∣ther princes, but also of himselfe: but they haue bene confuted by other Canonists. So pope Iulio the second finding no meanes to breake his faith with king Lewis the twelft, that he might fly from the treatie of Cambray, he did not say, that hee was not tied to

his oath, but he tooke occasion to aduance a factor in Rome to the bishoprike of Arles [ F] in Prouence, without the priuitie of the king or his ambassadour, which did reside at Rome: where with the king being incensed (as the case deserued) he caused all the fruits which the beneficers of Rome had in Fraunce, to be seized on: then the pope hauing found what he sought for, declared himselfe an open enemie vnto the king. So Gui•…•…∣chardin writes, That pope Iulio was woont to bragge, That all the treaties which hee made with the French, Spaniards, and Germans (all which he called barbarous) was but to abuse them, and to ruine one by another, that he might expell them all out of Italy. There are others which curse and condemne traytors, yet they loue the treason, and hold the fruits thereof sweet: as it is •…•…itten of Philip king of Macedon: and the Lace∣demonians condemned Phebidas their captaine, for that contrarie to the tenor of the [ G] treatie made with the Thebans, hee had seized vpon their castle called Cadmee, & yet they kept the place still, as Plutarch writes. Some which can find no iust cause nor* 1.1736 colourable to falsifie their faith, and haue any respect to their honour, they aske aduise and councell of lawyers: as the marquesse of Pesquiere, who aspiring to make himselfe king of Naples, caused many consultations to bee made vnder hand, to know if hee which were vassall to the king of Naples, might (with his faith and honour saued) obey the pope, who was soueraigne lord of the realme of Naples, rather than the king, who was but a feudatarie: hauing two strings to his bow, for he made his account, that if the warre were attempted by the duke of Milan with the popes consent, against Charles the fift, should succeed well, he should then be king of Naples: but if hee should faile, [ H] then would he begge the dutchie of Milan, as a reward for his seruice, the duke beeing conuicted of rebellion. But this conspiracie being discouered, hee caused Maron the dukes chauncellour to be apprehended and put into the castle, and making of his pro∣cesse, he suffred him to escape, fearing he should speake too plainely, if he were ill intrea∣ted: and soone after he died of thought, knowing well that his treacherie and disloyal∣tie was discouered, and inexcusable, seeing that he betrayed both the emperour and the duke, and all those of the league by the same meanes: the which is the most detestable treacherie of all others. Yet do I not blame him, that to assure himselfe hath two strings to his bow, so as it be done with a respect to his faith and honour: as it is repor∣ted of Themistocles, who secretly aduertised the king of Persia, That vnlesse he departed [ I] suddenly out of Europe, the Greekes had resolued to breake the bridge which hee had made vpon the sea Hellespont, to passe his armie out of Asia into Europe: desiring him to keepe it secret. This he did to assure himselfe of the fauour of the king of Persia, if he did vanquish; or to haue the honour to haue expelled him out of Greece, if hee mar∣ched away, as he did. But these subtill deuises beeing discouered by princes that are in league, do oftentimes cause good friends to become sworne enemies: as the Epirots, who agreed with the Acheans their confederats, to make warre against the Aetolians, and yet they did signifie by their ambassadour, That they would not take armes against them. Another time they plaid the like part with Antiochus, promising him al friend∣ship, so as they might not be in disgrace with the Romans, Idagebatur (inquit Titus Li∣uius) vt sirex abstinuisset Epiro, integra sibi essent omnia apud Romanos, & conciliata apud [ K] regem gratia, quòd accepturi fuissent venientem, That was done (saith Titus Liuius) that if the king did forbeare to enter into Epirus, they should continue in fauour with the Romans, and they should purchase grace with the king, that they would haue receiued him if he had come. But their councels being discouered, they procured to themselues a miserable slauerie with the flight of Perseus. The lawyers hold it for a maxime, That faith is not to be kept with them that haue broken their faith. But they pas•…•…e on further and say, That by a decree made at the councell of Constans, it was ordained, That no

faith should be kept with the enemies of the faith: for that the emperour Sigismond ha∣uing [ A] giuen his faith to Lancelot king of Bohemia, and a safe conduct to Iohn Hus, and Ierosme of Prague, would not suffer any to proceed against them: but to free him of that doubt, there were many Lawyers, Canonists, and Diuines, especially Nicholas ab∣bat of Palerme, and Lewis du Pont surnamed Romain, which concluded in this opini∣on, the which passed for a decree, and was confirmed by the councell. So as Iohn Hus and his companion were executed, although that neither the councell nor the emperor had any iurisdiction ouer them: neither was the king of Bohemia (their naturall lord) of their opinion, to whom notwithstanding the emperour had giuen his faith, but they regarded it not. Whereat we must not maruell, seeing that Bartol (the first lawyer of* 1.1737 his age) maintaines, That faith is not to be kept with priuat enemies, but with captains [ B] in chiefe. According to which decree the cardinall Saint Iulian was sent Legat into Hongarie, to breake the treaties of peace concluded with the Turke: against the* 1.1738 which Humiades father to Mathew Coruin king of Hongarie opposed himselfe ve∣hemently, shewing that the peace was concluded with very reasonable and pro∣fitable conditions for the Christians, notwithstanding the Legat shewed him this decree made by the Councell, by the which they might not hold no faith with the enemies of the faith. The Hongarians building thereon, brake the peace. But the Emperour of the Turks hauing notice of this decree, and of the breach of the peace, leauied a mightie armie, and hath neuer ceased since, both he and his suc∣cessors, to increase in power▪ and to build that great Empire vpon the ruine of Chri∣stendome; [ C] for euen the Emperour Sigismond himselfe was chased away with all the armie of Christians, and the Ambassador which had carried this decree, was in his returne slaine by certaine th•…•…es that were Christians, whereby it appeared that God was displeased with that decree, for if it be lawfull to breake ones faith with infidels, then is it not lawfull to giue it; but contrariwise if it bee lawfull to capitu∣late with infidels, it is also necessarie to keepe promise with them. The Emperour Charles the fift made a league of friendship by his Ambassadour Robert Inglish with the king of Persia, who was pursued by the Sangiac of Soria euen vnto the frontiers of Persia, and yet he had no other reproch to make against king Francis the first but that he had made a league with the Turke. It is well knowne that the kings [ D] of Poland, the Venetians, Geneuois, and Rhagusians haue the like with them. And the same Emperour Charles the fift gaue his faith vnto Martin Luther (whom the Pope had cursed as an enemie to the Church) to come to imperiall diet at Wormes, in the yeare 1519, whereas Echius seeing that hee would not abiure his opinion, alleaged the decree of Constance, according to the tenor whereof hee v•…•…ged them to proceed against him, without any respect to the faith which the Emperour had giuen. But there was not any prince which did not abhorre this request of Echius, and detested his decree. And therefore the emperour to maintaine the publike faith, sent Martin Luther backe safe to his owne home, with certaine troupes of horse. I know not how it came in the fathers minds at the councell of Constans, to take all faith from [ E] heretikes, when as the pope himselfe at his first installing, doth take an oath of the Iewes, suffring them to enioy their religion with all libertie. Yea and many times the princes of Germanie and Italie do admit Iewes to be witnesses in their suits, the forme of the Iewes oath is set downe in the decrees of the Imperiall chamber, Lib. 1. the 86 chapter, where it is said, That they should sweare to keep their faith with the Christians as loyally as their predecessors did with the Gifans that were Idolaters. So Iosua com∣maunder* 1.1739 ouer the Israelites, hauing bene circumuented by the Gabionites beeing Pa∣gans and Infidels, in a treatie which he had made with them, to saue them, and foure

townes which they had: and hauing afterwards discouered their fraud, beeing persua∣ded [ F] by the Captaines of the Israelites to breake the peace, he would not do it, saying, That they had giuen their faith, to the end saith the text, that the furie of God whom they had called to witnesse should not fall vpon them. As for that which we said, That no faith is to be kept with them that haue broken their faith: it is but agreeable with the law of nature, and all histories are full of them. And in our time Sinan Bascha hauing capitulated with them of Tripoli in Barbarie, and sworne by his maisters head to suf∣fer* 1.1740 the knights of Rhodes to depart with their baggage after, that the towne was yeel∣ded, notwithstanding his oath he made all the inhabitants slaues, except two hundred which he set at libertie at the request of Aramont the french Ambassador: and being challenged of his oath, he answered, That no faith was to be kept with them, for that [ G] they had sworne at Rhodes neuer to carrie armes against the Turks, reproching them that they were worse than dogs, which had nether God, faith, nor law, the which might haue been refelled by them of Tripoli, but that might ouercame right, for that they were not tyed to the oath taken by the knights of Rhodes; nor, if the Tripolitans had formerly sworne, could he now take reuenge thereof by this new accord. For former periurie and treacherie may not be repeated nor reuenged when as they haue once* 1.1741 concluded a peace and agreement together, else there should neuer be any assurance of peace, nor end of treacherie. But if one Prince hath broken his promise and deceiued an other, he hath no cause to complaine if he be required with the like: as the Romans hauing vanquished the Epirots (who had broken their faith with them, and put garri∣sons [ H] into their townes during the warres of Macedonie) presently after the taking of Perseus, they made it to be giuen out that they would also set the Epirots at libertie, and withdraw their garrisons, inioyning ten men of the chiefe of euery citie to bring all the gold and siluer, and then sodenly they gaue a watchword to the garrisons to sack* 1.1742 and spoile the cities, the which was done, and in this sort they spoyled 70 cities. In the punishment of this treacherie, the Romans behaued themselues more cruelly than was needfull, for that the reuenge should not extend but to them that had committed the periurie; and this dissembling was against the antient honor of the Romans. But if per∣iurie were couered by a new treatie, it were not lawfull to reuenge it: yet there are some so base and treacherous as when they sweare, they haue no thought but for to sweare [ I] and breake their faith, as Charles Duke of Bourgongne gaue a safegard to the Earle of S. Paul Constable of France to sell him dishonorablie to Lewis the II king of France. But Antony Spinola Gouernor of the Is•…•…e of Corsica for the Geneuois, committed a fouler act, adding crueltie to his periurie; for hauing called all the Princes of the island together vnder colour of councell, and inuiting them to a banquet, he commanded them to be slaine, the historie is fresh. And the banished men of Cynethe a citie of Greece, being called home, and receiued by a new treatie made with them which had expelled them, they sware to forget all iniuries past, and to liue together in peace and amitie: but in swearing (saith Polybius) they studied of nothing els, but how to betray the citie, as they did, to be reuenged of the iniurie (which they had couered by a new ac∣cord) [ K] expelling all their enemies. But God to reuenge their disloyaltie, suffered the Ar∣cadians, to whome they had betrayed the citie, to kill all those which had put it into their hands. Oftentimes princes and seigneuries forsake their leagues for feare, who* 1.1743 commonly doe follow the victors partie: as after the battaile of Pauia, all that were in league with the king of Fraunce in Italie, forsooke him: and after the battaile of Can∣nes, almost all the Romans associats in Italie left them: and euen the Rhodians after the taking of the king Perseus (with whome they were in league) they made a procla∣mation, That no man vpon paine of death, should say or doe anything in fauour of

Feare may well excuse base minded men from giuing aid, but not from periurie: [ A] but what colour or excuse can he haue, that comes to capitulat with an intent to de∣ceiue* 1.1744 and circumuent? It is inexcusable to men, and detestable before God. And yet the emperour Maximilian the first was wont to say, That he made no treaties with the French, but to abuse king Lewes the twelft, and to bee reuenged of seuenteene iniuries which he had receiued from the French, although he could not specifie one: for euery man knowes, that for these two hundred yeres, Europe neuer had prince more religi∣ous than Charles the eight, nor more vpright and iust than Lewis the twelfth, who raig∣ned in the time of Maximilian. Yea the last, who alone among all others, was called Father of the people, did shew how loyall he was both in deed and word, hauing trea∣ted a peace with Ferdinand king of Arragon, from whome hee had receiued many [ B] wrongs and losses, yet when as Ferdinand was come vnto the port of Sauonne, the king of Fraunce entred into his gallie▪, accompanied onely with two or three noble men, Ferdinand beeing amazed at his great assurance and bountie, went out of his gally, and lodged in the castle of Sauonne. It was in the power of the king of Fraunce to retaine him (as Charles of Bourgongne did in the like case to Lewes the eleuenth at Peronne) but hee was so free from any so vild adisposition, as he omit∣ted no pompe nor magnificence to giue him all the content that might bee. The con∣fidence of both kings is disallowed by treacherous men, who shew plainely how per∣fidiously they would haue dealt: but to all good men it must needs seeme commenda∣ble, [ C] which detest that in others, which they themselues hold dishonest. But if princes being in warre, haue made a truce, and concluded a parle, they must come vnarmed,* 1.1745 least the one (being secretly armed) should by fraud murther his enemie, as Iphicrates the Athenian did Iason the tyrant: or as Mithridates, who slue the prince of Armenia his sisters sonne. Or if the one comes weakely accompanied and with small force, then must he take hostages from the other, or some places of strength, before he approach, as it is commonly vsed. So did king Perseus, who being come with a great traine vnto the frontiers of his realme, and would haue passed the riuer which diuided the two kingdomes, Q. Martius Philippus the Roman ambassadour required hostages, if hee meant to passe with aboue three in his companie: Perseus gaue the chiefe of his friends, but Martius gaue not any, for that he had but three men with him. If there be questi∣on [ D] * 1.1746 to giue hostages for the deliuerie of some great prince that is a prisoner, it must be done with equall forces on either side; and in deliuering the hostages, to receiue the captiue at the same instant; as they did when as king Francis the first came out of Spain from prison: else it were to be feared, that a disloyall prince would hold both prisoners and hostages: as Triphon the gouernour of Soria did, hauing taken Ionathan by trea∣cherie, he promised to set him at libertie for threescore thousand crownes, and his two sonnes hostage: hauing deliuered him the ransome and hostages, hee kept the money and slue the hostages with the prisoner: commaunding his pupill the king of Soria to be cruelly murthered. We must by all meanes shun these pestilent kind of men, and [ E] not contract any league or friendship with them, vnlesse it be forced. Yea if they had contracted mariage, yet there is no assurance, if the prince be treacherous and disloyall: as Alphonsus king of Naples was, who slue Cont Iames the duke of Millans ambassa∣dour. Such a one they write was Caracalla emperour of Rome (who neuer shewed a good countenance, but to such as he meant to murther) hauing made a peace with the Parthians, he demaunded the kings daughter, the which was graunted him: so as hee went into Persia wel accompanied to marie-her, being all armed vnder their garments, who vpon a signe giuen, when as they thought of nothing but of good cheere, he cau∣sed all the noble men that were at the marriage to be slaine, and so fled away: being not

ashamed to boast, That it was lawfull to vse his enemies in that sort. This murther was [ F] not so cruell, as the excuse was detestable and odious: but God did not let his disloyal∣tie to be long vnpunished, suffering one of his houshould seruants to murther him as he was at the stoole, and to enioy the empire for his reward. They say, that Caesar Borgi∣as sonne to pope Alexander the sixt, was like vnto this monster, whome Machiauel doth produce for the paragon of princes: he had learned of his father to poyson such as he inuited to a banquet: it cannot be said, Which did exceed other in treachery: Ale∣xander* 1.1747 the father neuer did that which he said, and Caesar his sonne neuer spake that which he did: and both of them did religiously hold, That faith was to be giuen to all men, but to be kept with no man. Caesar gaue his faith, and sware great oathes for the assurance of the peace which he had made with the princes that were in league against [ G] him: and hauing drawne them together vpon his faith, hee murthered them cruelly whereat his father laughing, said, That he had shewed them a Spanish tricke. But it was an extreame folly for the princes to put their liues into the hands of the most dis∣loyall and perfidious man liuing, and knowne for such a one: and euen at such a time as he was but subiect to the pope, and had no power to giue his faith to them he put to death: so as the pope might haue excused them as his subiects and vassals, without any note of treacherie. But the pope was poisoned with the same poison which hee had prepared for his friends and companions: and his sonne escaping the force of the poy∣son, was ouerreacht with the same fraud that he had circumuented his enemies. For when as Consaluus Viceroy of Naples had giuen him his faith (not being so skilfull in [ H] the law of armes and herauldry, as he was to commaund in warre) Borgias came to Naples, which when as king Ferdinand vnderstood, he commanded him to keepe Bor∣gias* 1.1748 prisoner: the Viceroy shewes his charge, and Borgias did vrge him with his oath and faith: but the Viceroy could not giue his faith without the kings expresse commis∣sion, much lesse release a subiect that is captiue, when as the king forbids it. Neither should Borgias haue entred rashly into his enemies countrey. We read that Albret earle of Franconie committed the like errour to the duke of Valentinois: for beeing besieged by the emperour Lewis of Bauiere, Othon the Archbishop of Ments per∣suaded him to come vnto the emperour vpon his faith, swearing, That if hee were not reconciled to the emperour, he should returne safe with him vnto his castle. This good [ I] bishop being gone forth, made shew as if he had forgotten something in the castle, and returned backe with the earle. After that he had deliuered the earle into the emperors hands, being vrged of his promise, he said, That he was returned: like vnto the souldi∣our in Polybius, who notwithstanding his shift, was sent backe by the Senat of Rome, with his hands, and feet bound to the enemie. But although the Archduke could not giue his faith vnto a rebell, without warrant from the emperour, yet for that hee had fraudulently drawne a man into danger, who was ignorant of the laws of armes (other∣wise than Consuluus had done) he was not free from the foule crime of treacherie: like vnto Paches, who persuaded Hippias, that he should come forth of his castle to a parle, swearing, That he should returne safe: the captaine being come forth, the castle was ea∣sily [ K] taken: then did he bring Hippias backe safe into the castle according to his promise, and there slue him. In like sort Saturnius the Tribune with his complices, hauing sei∣zed vpon the capitoll by conspiracie and rebellion, comming forth vpon the Consuls faith and safegard, they were slaine, and their memorie condemned. The like chance happened in Luques in the yeare 1522, when as Vincent Poge and his companions had slaine the Gonfaloniet in the palace, the magistrats gaue them their faith and assurance, that they should not be called in question for the fact, so as they would depart the citie: for that they were then in armes, and the stronger: yet soone after they were pursued

and punished as they deserued. And to the end that by the promise of magistrats, the [ A] publike faith and assurance should not be broken, the Seigneurie of Venice made a de∣cree in the councell of ten, published in the yere 1506, That no gouernor nor magistrat should giue any safeconduct to a banished man: the which was reserued for the Seig∣neurie onely; who by another decree made in the yeare 1512, did forbid to take any one prisoner, to whome the Seigneurie had giuen a safeconduct: not that princes and soueraigne states are bound to giue their faith vnto subiects, and much lesse vnto bani∣shed men; but hauing once giuen it they must keepe it inuiolable. We haue no better schoolemasters of the lawes of armes, and of the publike faith, than the auntient Ro∣mans, and yet we read that Pompey the Great did capitulat with pirats, giuing them a sure retreat in some townes & prouinces, to liue there vnder the obedience of the Ro∣mans: [ B] for he was aduertised, that the pirats had nine hundred sayle of ships, and aboue fiue hundred townes vpon the sea coast, commaunding the whole sea, so as the gouer∣nours could not passe to their prouinces, nor marchants traffique: and that so great a power could not be defeated, without exposing the estate of the people of Rome to ap∣parent daunger; the maiestie whereof stood and was absolute by meanes of this treaty: and if he had not kept the faith which he had giuen them, or if the Senat had not ratifi∣ed the treatie, he had polluted the honour of the Romans, and blemished the fame of so worthy an exploit. Not that I would haue states to enter into any league, or haue any commerce with pirats and theeues, (for that they ought not to bee partakers of the law of nations, as I haue said before.) And although that Tacferin chiefe of an armie of [ C] theeues in Affrike, sent ambassadours to Rome, to the end they should appoint lands & places for him and his to inhabit, else he would proclaime perpetuall warre against the Romans; yet the emperour Tiberius taking this for an indignitie, would not so much as heare his ambassadours, saying in open Senat, That the auntient Romans would ne∣uer heare, nor treat in any sort with Spartacus the slaue, by his profession a Fencer, and captaine of the theeues, although he had gathered together threescore thousand slaues, and defeated the Romans in three battailes: but after that he had bene vanquished by Crassus, all that escaped were hanged. Whereby it appeares, that it is dishonourable* 1.1749 for a prince or state, to treat with theeues: but hauing once plighted their faith vnto [ D] them, it is against their dignitie to breake it. There is a rare example of the emperour Augustus, who made a proclamation, That whosoeuer could bring vnto him Croco∣tus, captaine of the theeues in Spaine, should haue 25000 crownes: whereof he being aduertised, he went and presented himselfe to Augustus, and demaunded the reward: the which the emperour caused to be giuen vnto him, and withall pardoned him, to* 1.1750 giue an example to others, that they must keepe their faith, without any respect to the parties merit.

There is great difference, whether faith be giuen to a theefe, a friend, an enemie, or a subiect: for a subiect which ought to maintaine the honour, estate, and life of his soue∣raigne prince, if he proue treacherous and disloyall vnto him, and that hee hath giuen him a protectiō, or if he come to capitulat with him, if the prince doth infringe his oath [ E] with him, he hath not so great cause to complain as a theefe, if the theese be not his sub∣iect: as the legion of Bulgarian theeues, which being come into France to dwell there, king Dagobert gaue them his faith, finding it daungerous suddenly to breake such a troupe of loose and desperat men: but soone after vpon a certaine day, a watchword being giuen, they were all slaine. But there is a great difference, whether a soueraigne prince doth capitulat with his friends or his enemies, & that those subiects which haue rebelled against his maiestie, be comprehended in the treatie: Many haue made a que∣stion, if the prince breaking his faith with those rebels, and seeking reuenge of them,

whether the enemie be thereby wronged, and if the assurance giuen, or the truce, bee [ F] thereby broken? as it oftentimes falles out, the which doth most afflict princes: as Ti∣tus Liuius saith of Philip king of Macedon, Vnares Philippū maxime angebat, quod cum leges a Romanis victo imponerentur seuiendi ius in Macedonas, qui in bello ab se defecerant ademptū erat, One thing tormented Philip, that hauing laws prescribed him by the Ro∣mans, he might not tyrannize ouer the Macedonians who had fallen from him during* 1.1751 the wars. I hold that in this case the treatie is broken, and that the enemie or the prince which hath contracted securitie for an other princes subiects, may take it for an iniurie, & seeke his reuenge, although the subiect were guiltie of treason in the highest degree. As the Barons of Naples, who went to Naples vpon assurance giuen, and an oath ta∣ken by Ferdinand king of Naples, vnto the Pope, soueraigne lord of Naples, the king [ G] of Spaine, the Venetians, and the Florentines, who were bound, and had all sworne to entertaine the treatie, yet they were imprisoned by Ferdinand king of Naples, who put them all to death, although he had receiued them vnder his fathers assurance and his owne. But there is no breach of the treatie if a priuat person seekes reuenge of for∣mer wrongs of them that are comprehended in the treatie vnlesse; he hath precisely promised that he shall not suffer any pursuit to be made against them for any thing that had been committed before the treatie; or that assurance was giuen them in generall tearmes to returne vnto their houses. For a generall clause in generall tearmes hath the same force that a speciall clause in a speciall case, which may not be stretcht from the places, times, persons and cases, contained in the articles of the treatie or safeconduit: [ H] all which notwithstanding were neglected by pope Leo the tenth, who hauing giuen his faith and a pasport vnto Paul Baillon (who had expelled his nephew out of Perouze) when he came to Rome he was committed prisoner, and his processe made, not only for his rebellion, but for many other crimes, for the which he was conuicted and exe∣cuted. The historie reports, that the pope had not only giuen his faith vnto him, but to all his friends in generall: true it is they were all his vassals. He did the like vnto Al∣phonso* 1.1752 Cardinall of Sienne, being accused that he had attempted to poyson the Pope: to draw him into his snares he gaue him his faith, and to the Ambassador of Spaine in the name of the Catholike king; yet he came no sooner to Rome but his processe was made: whereupon the ambassador of Spaine complained greatly, but the Pope (who [ I] wanted no lawyers) answered him, That a safegard or protection how ample soeuer, is of no force, if the crime committed be not expresly set downe: so as presently after the Cardinall was sttangled in prison. But the Spanish Ambassador could not stipulate* 1.1753 a protection for any one without a commission from his maister, as we haue shewed before; the ignorance whereof hath oftentimes been a great plague and ruine to prin∣ces. Pope Clement the 7 circumuented the Florentines in our age with the like fraude, hauing promised the Spanish Ambassador to maintaine their estate free: but hauing seazed of the citie, he made it subiect to Alexander his brothers bastard, who put the chiefe men to death, after the proscription of many, saying, That treason was alwayes excepted: the which was a friuolous and idle excuse, seeing that he was neuer lord of [ K] Florence. Therefore in all treaties it is most safe to set downe particularly the number and qualitie of the iudges, for the differences that may arise among the associates, so as the number be equall of either side; with authoritie to the arbitrators to chuse an vmpier, if they cannot agree among themselues: as in the league made by the foure first Cantons in the yeare 1481, where it was sayd in the fourth and fift Article, that in all controuersies they should chuse an equall number to determine of them. And in the alliance betwixt the house of Austria and the twelue Cantons, the Bishops of Bohe∣mia and Constance are named: but in the treatie betwixt the king of France and the

Swissers, in the yeare 1516 in the 17 Article it is said, that in matters of controuersie, [ A] euery one should chuse two arbitrators, and if they could not agree, the plaintife should chuse a fift out of the Valesiians or from Coire to be vmpier, who might not al∣ter any thing of their opinions, but chuse the one of them. It were more conuenient that the fift had been chosen by the foure which could not agree, for that the Swissers were alwayes demanders, and named whom they pleased, so as the king had alwayes the worser cause.

There is an other point which doth commonly deceiue Princes, which is, to treate with Ambassadors, deputies, or Lieutenants, without an especiall commission: for not∣withstanding any promise which he shall make to haue it ratified by his maister, yet is there no assurance, for that the Prince which promiseth stands bound for his part, and [ B] the other remaines at libertie to accept or reiect the conditions of the treatie; and hap∣pelie in the meane time there falls out some accident which breeds an alteration: as it happened betwixt the Samnites and the Numantines, and (without any farther search) to Lewis the 12, who treated a peace with the Archduke Philip passing through France in the yeare 1503, by vertue of an ample Commission which he had from his father in law, promising moreouer to cause him to ratifie it: but Ferdinand attended the issue of the warres of Naples, whereas the French were vanquished in two battailes, and expel∣led the realme, so as he refused to ratifie what his sonne in law Philip had concluded with the king of France, saying, that the Archduke had no especiall commission. At [ C] the least there must be a time prefixt for the ratifying of the treatie, or a resolute clause for the want thereof: for in matters of State, and of treaties betwixt Princes and Com∣monweales, a silent ratification is not sure. And this was the cause of the breach of the treatie of Bretigny, the which Charles the fift then Regent of France had not ratified touching the soueraigntie of Guienne. And the same occasion made them of Carthage breake the peace betwixt them and the Romans: for after the first warre, they had made two treaties, in the first all the associates of both nations were comprehended in generall tearmes only; and it was said, that the treatie made with Luctatius the Con∣sull should hold if the people of Rome did like of it, the which they would not ratifie, but sent an expresse commission into Affrike with the articles they would haue con∣cluded, [ D] and Asdruball Generall of the Carthaginians confirmed them. In this treatie the Saguntines were expresly comprehended, as allied vnto the Romans, but this trea∣tie was not expresly ratified by the Carthaginians; vpon which point the Senat of Car∣thage stood, maintaining that Hanniball might lawfully make warre against the Sa∣guntines: and yet the Carthaginians hauing obserued the treatie made by their Gene∣rall in all other clauses, they had ratified it in fact, which is more than words. It is there∣fore the more sure not to conclude anything without an especiall commission, or ex∣presse ratification, for there neuer wants excuses and deuises to couer their disloyal∣ties, the histories are full of them, as of the Calcedonians against the Bizantines, of Cle∣omenis against the Argiues, and of the Thracians against the Thessalians, who when as [ E] they had concluded a truce for certaine dayes, they spoyled their fields by night: and as the Flemings, who fearing to pay two millions of florens into the popes treasurie, (as it was cōcluded by the treatie of peace, if they did rebell against the king of France) they councelled Edward the third, king of England, to quallifie himself king of France, and then they would take armes for him, the which was done. Others distinguish vpon the word, as king Lewis the II, who making a shew that he had need of the good councell and aduice of Lewis of Luxembourg Constable of France, he said, That he wanted his head. And the Emperour Charles the fift by a subtill alteration of a letter denied that which others thought hee had affirmed, writing touching the deliuerie of

the princes of Germanie out of prison. But George Cornarus found a more subtill inter∣pretation, [ F] seeing that he could find no meanes to breake the treatie made with the king of France, said, That the treatie was made with the king for the preseruation of his estate, and not to recouer them when they were lost. But when all failes, and that there is no other excuse, he that is the stronger, is in the right, and the weaker hath wrong, as Atabalippa king of Peru (being prisoner to Francis Pizarre, Captaine of the Spanyards) he promised the value of ten millions and three hundred thousand ducats for his ransome, the which he payed: the Spanyards hauing resolued to put him to death, said, That there was no meanes for his libertie, vnlesse he became a Christian: he to saue his life was baptized, but with much griefe of mind, saying, That the immor∣tall sonne was to be preferred before mortall gods, but terrified with such imminent [ G] danger, he imbraced the Christian religion. What shall I say more? The Spanyards hauing a king that was penitent, confessing and obedient to all their lawes, they put him to death, without any regard of faith or oath, like vnto the wicked Millanois, whom it were a sinne to name, who hauing taken his enemie at an aduantage, set a dagger at his throat, threatning to kill him, if he did not aske him pardon for all the in∣iuries he had done him, the which was done: then he threatned him with death if he did not denie God; he abiured God and all his works with horrible execrations, but his aduersarie not satisfied therewith, caused him to repeate those curtesies often, least they should be counterfer, and then he slue this blasphemer, saying, That he was reuen∣ged both of bodie and soule. Behold the reward which this denier of God receiued, [ H] for putting his trust in the promises of a murtherer. In the treatie made betwixt king Lewis the 11 and Charles Duke of Bourgongne, in the yeare 1475, he made the king to sweare first by the word of a king, then by the faith of his bodie, and by his creator, by the faith and law which he had taken in his baptisme, and vpon the Euangelists and the* 1.1754 Canon of the Masse, and in the end vpon the true Crosse. I omit to write what he pro∣fited by this oath, and what succeeded. But the Earle of S. Paule would not giue any* 1.1755 credit to all this, when as the king gaue him a safeconduit, vnlesse he would sweare by the crosse of S. Lau, which was kept at Angers, the which he refused to do, hauing re∣solued to put him to death, and fearing aboue all things this crosse, whereupon the lord of Lescut required him to sweare before he would come vnto his seruice, and he kept [ I] his oath. The like was done in the treatie of peace betwixt Charles Regent of France, and the king of Nauarre, when as the Bishop of Lizieux said Masse in a tent pitcht be∣twixt the two armies, and receiued the oath vpon the hoste: for better assurance of the treatie, the Bishop diuided the hoste in two, giuing the one halfe to the king of Na∣uarre, the which he refused, excusing himselfe that he had broke his fast, neither would the Regent take the other part, so as either suspected the other of periurie. The Aunti∣ents vsed sacrifices with effusion of bloud, with many imprecations and execrations against the breakers of the league: and the kings of Parthia and Armenia when they entred into any offensiue and defensiue league, they tied their thombs, and drawing* 1.1756 forth the blood, they suckt it one after an other: as in the like case the king of Calange [ K] * 1.1757 at the East Indies, making an alliance with the Portugalls, drue blood from his left hand and rubd his face and tongue therewith. But there is no assurance in any oathes if* 1.1758 the Prince be disloyall: and if he be iust, his simple word shall be a law vnto him, and his faith an oracle. It is forbidden by the holie scriptures to sweare by any but by the name of the eternall God, for it is he alone that can reuenge the breakers of their faith and the scorners of his name, and not they which haue neither power nor care of hu∣mane things, the which the thirtie Ambassadors of Carthage feared when as the Ro∣mans had agreed to graunt them a peace, an auntient Senator (knowing the disloyaltie

of the Carthaginians) asked them in open Senat, By what gods they would sweare: [ A] they answered, that they would sweare by the same gods which had so sharply puni∣shed their disloyaltie. For he offends no lesse that thinks to mock God, than he which doth it in deed, neither is he to be credited although he hath sworne. The princes par∣tisans of the houses of Orleance and Bourgongne did sweare sixe treaties of peace in lesse then twelue yeares, and not any one was kept, as we read in our histories. And for that among all the treaties made among princes, there is not any one that hath more need of assurance, and that is more difficult to entertaine, than that which is made with the subiect, hauing conspired against his prince; I am of opinion that in this case* 1.1759 the treatie should be made with neighbour princes, to warrant the subiects, or else spee∣dily to depart the countrie. And if any one will obiect that the subiect ought not to [ B] haue any safegard or protection from his lord, as it was adiudged by a decree of the court of Parliament for the Earle of Tonerre, I confesse it: But I say, the subiect must either do thus, or else depart the countrie, when they haue to do with a soueraigne Prince. For there is no greater torment vnto a Prince, than to be forced to capitulate with his subiect, and to keepe his faith with him. Lewis the 11 gaue a good testimonie thereof to the Duke of Nemours, to the Earle of S. Paul, to the Duke of Brittanie, to the Earle of Armaignac, and to all his subiects that had rebelled, all which almost hee put to death; and the historie of Flanders puts his owne brother in the number, affir∣ming* 1.1760 that he was poisoned. And not long since the yonger brother to the king of Fez besieged the king his brother with an armie, and forced him to conclude a peace with [ C] such conditions as he pleased, and then he entred into the Castell with a small traine to do his homage, but sodenly he was strangled by the kings commandement, and cast out at a window in view of his armie, which hauing lost their head, yeelded presently. In like sort the Duke of Yorke hauing taken armes against Henry the sixt king of Eng∣land, hauing gotten the victorie he made an agreement with the king vpon condition that after his decease the Crowne should come vnto the house of Yorke; and the prince of Wales, sonne to king Henry the 6 should be excluded, and in the meane time he should remaine Regent of England: but soone after being taken he was beheaded with his accord, being crowned with a crowne of white paper. You must not gall the Lion [ D] so hard as the bloud may follow, for seeing his owne bloud and feeling the smart, if he haue his libertie he will be reuenged: I would I had not so many examples as haue bin seene in our time. But when as I say it is necessary that neighbour princes and allies be comprehended in the treatie made betwixt the prince and his subiects as pledges and warrants, I do not meane that it shall be lawfull for forraine princes to thrust their neighbours subiects into rebellion, vnder coulor of protection or amitie: and in truth the beginning and spring of all the warres betwixt king Francis the first, and the Empe∣rour Charles the fift, was for the protection of Robert de la March, whom king Francis receiued, as du Bellay hath well obserued. But a wise prince may meditate an accord be∣twixt another prince and his subiects, and if he finds that the outragious proceeding [ E] * 1.1761 of a Tyrant against his subiects be irreconcileable, then ought he to take vpon him the protection of the afflicted with a generous resolution: as that great Hercules did, who purchased to himselfe immortall praise and reputation, for that he tooke vpon him the protection of afflicted people against the violence and crueltie of tyrants (which the fables call monsters) whom he went through the world to conquer: wherein the aun∣tient Romans did also exceed all other nations. And without any more search, king Lewis the 12 receiued into his protection the Bentiuoles, with the houses of Ferrara and Mirandula, against the oppression of pope Iulio the 2: but he caused to be inserted into the protection, That it was without preiudice to the rights and dignity of the Ro∣man

church: and for the same cause king Henry the 2 tooke the protection of the same [ F] princes of Mirandula against the violence of pope Iulio the 3, and of many princes of Germanie against the Emperour Charles the 5 for the libertie of the Empire, and enter∣tained the league of the sea townes which the Emperour sought to breake, & to change the Empire into an hereditarie kingdome else he which persuadeth: another Princes subiects to rebell vnder culour of protection (which should be as a holie anchor for people vniustly tyranized) he doth open the gate of rebellion to his owne subiects, and brings his owne estate into danger, with an euerlasting shame and dishonor. And therefore in all societies and leagues among princes it is alwaies excepted, That the one shall not take the protection of anothers subiects, whether the cause be iust or vniust. The only reason which hindred the treatie of peace betwixt king Antiochus the great, [ G] and Ptolomie king of Egipt, was the protection of Acheus, who of gouernor of Asia had made himselfe king, and had withdrawne it from his soueraigne prince, as Polibius saith. And for this cause Sigismond Augustus king of Polonia, to haue peace with the king of Muscouie, was forced to leaue the protection of Rigie in Liuonia. And whatso∣euer some say, that it is lawfull for the vassall to free himselfe from the subiection of his* 1.1762 lord, if he be ill intreated; it is to be vnderstood of an vndervassall, which hath recourse vnto his soueraigne lord, and not of a leege vassall which holds immediatly, and with∣out the meanes of any other vassall, who in some other respect may be a soueraigne: as the subiects of Guienne and of Poitou rebelled iustly against the king of England vassall to the king of France, for that he denied them iustice, and for that cause he was [ H] depriued of those fees which he held on this side the sea, according to the Canon law, although that many are contented to take away the iurisdiction only. And of late daies the Geneuois expelled the Marquis of Final out of his estate at the complaint of his subiects, and tooke them into their protection: who when as hee complained vn∣to the Emperour of the wrong which was done vnto him, the Geneuois aunswe∣red, That they had freed but their owne subiects from the tyrannie of the Mar∣quis: yet hee preuailed against them, notwithstanding they pleaded that hee was their vassall. Else euery one might vnder colour of ill vsage rebell against his lord, and put himselfe in the protection or subiection of another: as some subiects of the Duke of Sauoy, hauing been thirtie yeares or there abouts vnder the seigneurie of Berne, seeing [ I] now that they would turne them ouer to their antient lord, they beseeched the Bernois instantly, not to abandon them, being afraid of ill vsage: but they were denied their re∣quest, as I haue vnderstood by letters from the Ambassador Coignet. And although* 1.1763 that hee that is banished by his prince may be receiued into protection by another prince, or into subiection, without any breach of the treatie (which forbids the recei∣uing of another princes subiects into protection) for that those which are banished for euer, are no more subiects: but if those banished men would attempt any thing against their auntient Lord, the prince which hath receiued them ought not to suffer them. And therefore the princes of Germanie sent Ambassadors to king Henry the 2, to re∣quire him not to receiue Albert Marquis of Brandebourg into his protection, being [ K] banished by a decree of the Imperiall Chamber: the king made answere in the moneth of August, in the yere 1554, That although the house of France had alwaies been the support of afflicted princes, yet would he not shew any fauour vnto the Marquis a∣gainst the holy Empire. Yet notwithstanding if the prince exceeding others in power and dignitie, be duly informed that another princes subiect be tyrannized, he is bound not only to receiue him into protection, but also to free him from the subiection of ano∣ther; as the law takes the slaue out of the power of a cruell maister: but it more befitteth to free the subiect from the subiection of another, and to set him at libertie, than to sub∣iect

him to himselfe, as the Romans did all Greece and Macedonie, which they deliue∣red [ A] from the dominion of kings, to set them at full libertie. So did pope Agapet (who freed the successors of Gautier d'Iuetot from the subiection of the kings of France, for that king Lothair had slaine him with his owne hand in the Church, at what time as he craued pardon of him) to giue example to other princes not to vse any such cruelties to their subiects: and for the like crueltie Henry king of Sweden was expelled his estate by his owne subiects, in the yeare 1567. But it was held very strange that pope Iohn the 22 in the treatie made betwixt Philip the long king of France and the Flemings, caused it to be set downe, That if the king did infringe the treatie, it might be lawful for his subiects to take armes against him, to the which the Princes and Barons of France did oppose, causing that clause to be razed; and it was more strange that it should [ B] come out of the mouth of a french pope, a naturall subiect to France, and who had once been Chancellor. But the prince may well sweare that if he breake the treatie made by him, his subiects shall be freed from their obedience, as it was in the treatie of Arras, and hath been vsed among our first kings of this realme: as in the treatie which was made betwixt Lewis and Charles the bald brethren, the oath which either of them made was with this condition, That if it chanced, which God forbid, that I should breake my oath, I then absolue you from the faith which you owe me. Lewis sware first in the Roman toung these words which follow, the which the President Fauchet, a man well read in our Antiquities, did shew me in Guytard an historian and prince of [ C] the bloud, Pro deo amur, & pro Christian poblo & nostro commun saluament dist di en auant, inquant des sanir podirmedunat, si saluerio cist meon fradre Karle, & in adiudha, & in cad vna causa si com hom par dreit son fradre saluar dist, ino quid il vn altre sifaret. Et abludher nul plaid nunquam prindraij qui meon vol cist, meon fradre Karle in damno sit: That is to say, For the loue of God and the Christian people, and for our common health from this day forward, so long as God shall giue me knowledge and power, I will defend my brother Charles, and will aide him in euery thing as any man by right ought to saue his brother, and not as another would do: And by my will I will haue no quarrell with him, if my brother Charles doth me no wrong. King Lewis hauing made an end of this oath, king Charles spake the same words in the Germaine toong [ D] thus, In God est &c. Then both the armies subiects to the two princes sware thus, Si Ludouigs sagrament que son fradre Carlo iurat, conseruat, & Carlus meo sender de suo par no lostaint, si io retornar non luit pois, ne io veuls cui eo retornar ne pois, in nulla adiudha contra Ludouig: That is to say, If Lewis keepes his oath made with his brother, and Charles my lord for his part doth not hold it, if I cannot preuent it, I will not returne with him in peace, nor do him any obedience. The subiects of Charles sware in the Roman toong, and the subiects of Lewis in the Dutch. But to returne to our purpose: it is dangerous to take the protection of another, especially of those which are subiect to princes allies, but vpon a iust cause, so is it more strange to leaue an associat in danger. But it is a question, whether a prince may take the protection of another prince vniust∣ly [ E] * 1.1764 oppressed, without breach of the league: for it is most certaine that we aide priuate allies and common allies, if they be wronged by one of the allies: but he that is not comprehended in the league, may not be defended against him that is allied, without breach of the league: on the other side it is a thing which seemes very cruell, to leaue a poore prince to the mercie of one more mightie that doth oppresse him and seekes to take his estate from him.

The Senat of Rome was much troubled herewith, for that the Capouans being as∣sailed, & vniustly oppressed by the Samnites, had recourse vnto the Romans, who had a good desire to aid them: considering withall, that the Samnites would be too migh∣tie

& insupportable, if they had once seized vpon the Seigneurie of Capoua, and that [ F] it was a meanes to subdue the Romans: notwithstanding it was resolued by the Senat not to giue any succours vnto the Capouans, considering the league which they had sworne with the Samnites, Tanta vtilitate (saith Titus Liuius) fides antiquior fuit, Faith was of more respect than so great a benefit. I will set downe word by word, the aun∣swere which was made vnto the six ambassadours, the which deserues to bee grauen in letters of gold, Legatis Campanorum auxilia contra Samnites petentibus, Consul ex autho∣ritate Senatus sic respondit: Auxilio vos Campani dignos censet Senatus: sed ita vobis∣cum amicitiam iustitui par est, ne qua vetustior amicitia ac societas violetur: Samnites no∣biscum foedere iuncti sunt: itaque arma Deos prius quàm homines violatura, aduersus Sam∣nites, vobis negamus: Legatos sicut fas est, precatum ad Socios mittemus, ne qua vobis vis [ G] fiat, The Consull with the authoritie of the Senat did aunswere in this sort vnto the ambassadours of the Campanois, demaunding succours against the Samnites. The Se∣nat holds you of Campania to be worthy of succours, but it is fit so to ioyne friendship with you, as a more auntient league and societie may not be violated: the Samnites are linkt vnto vs in league, and therefore we denie you armes against the Samnites, where∣by we should wrong the gods rather than men: but we will send ambassadours (as we may lawfully) to request our associats, not to offer you any violence. The ambassa∣dours of Capoua had a secret charge, to offer the subiection of Capoua vnto the Ro∣mans, in case they should refuse to giue them succours: who seeing themselues reiected, made this offer▪ Quandoquidem nostra tueri non vultis, vestra certe defendetis: itaque po∣pulum [ H] Campanum vrbemque Capouam, agros, delubra Deum, diuina humanaque omnia in vestram P. C. populique Romani ditionem dedimus. Tum iam fides agi visa, deditos non prodi, Seeing you will not protect vs and ours, yet at the least you shall defend your owne: we yeeld therefore into your power O reuerent fathers, and of the people of Rome, the people of Campania, and the citie of Capoua, with their fields, churches, and all diuine and humane rights. Now is your faith ingaged, not to betray them that* 1.1765 yeeld vnto you. Whereby it appeares, that the stranger is not to be succoured against the allie, vnlesse he yeeld himselfe a subiect vnto him whose protection he pretends: for in that case euery one is bound to defend his subiects against the iniuries of the mightie. If the Athenians had made the same aunswere to the Corcyrians, demaunding aid a∣gainst [ I] the Corinthians their allies, they had not fallen into a warre which set all Greece on fire for the space of twentie eight yeres, and was not ended, but with the ruine of the Athenians, who were made subiect vnto the Lacedemonians, as they had deserued, what colour of iustice soeuer they pretend, that the league ought to cease if one of the associats doth make warre vniustly against a straunger. If this interpretation might take place, there should be no league nor alliance vnbroken. And therefore in contracting of leagues and new societies, the more auntient associats (although they are held to be excepted by law) must be precisely excepted: so as no aid is to be giuen vnto the latter confederats against the more auntient, vnlesse they haue first begun the warre. As in the league made betwixt the house of Fraunce and the Cantons of the Swissers, in the [ K] yeare 1521, in the which the auntient allies were excepted: but there was a derogato∣ry clause, in these words, If the auntient allies did not make warre against the king of Fraunce, which was the principall subiect of the treatie. But it may so fall out, that three princes being in league, one may make warre against the other, and require aid of the third. In this case there are many distinctions. If the treatie of alliance be but of ami∣tie and friendship, it is most certaine that he is not in that case bound to giue any suc∣cours, if the treatie imports a defensiue league, he must aid the most auntient ally by a precident alliance: If the associats be of one standing, he owes succours vnto him that

is vnited vnto him by an offensiue and desensiue league. If it be offensiue and defensiue [ A] of all parts, he must not succour neither the one nor the other: but he may well mediat a peace, and cause their quarrels to bee compounded by their common allies: as it is commonly vsed, making warre against him that will not referre his cause to arbitrators, or yeeld to their arbitrement, as it is expresly set downe in the treatie of Stance, made betwixt the eight Cantons. Arbitrements are not to be reiected, how great soeuer prin∣ces be: as Henry king of Sueden did vpon the controuersies hee had with the king of Denmarke, who offered to referre his cause to Henry the second, king of Fraunce: the which the king of Sueden refused, saying, That he was as great a king as the rest. But the Romans, who exceeded all nations in riches and power, if they had any controuersie with their allies, they referred it to the arbitrement of their common confederats, Roma∣nus [ B] Legatus (saith Titus Liuius) ad communes socios vocabat. And if it be not lawfull by the law of armes, to allow of the combat, when there is any proofe by witnesse or* 1.1766 otherwise, what an iniustice were it, to suffer two princes or states to enter into warre, if a third may reconcile them, or els ioyne with him that is wronged. It were a simple part to suffer his neighbours house to burne, the which hee might quench with his ho∣nour. Moreouer it may be doubted, whethet the league be broken, if thou shalt offer violence to any confederats father or brother, being not comprehended in the league. If they bee subiects, there is no question: if they bee absolute of themselues, it may be doubted; for that the father and the sonne are held to be all one: but in my opinion there is nothing done against the league, vnlesse the fathers person were excepted in the [ C] treatie. And although the father may pursue an iniurie done vnto his sonne by action, yet may he not attempt warre by the law of armes, for a sonne that is out of the fathers iurisdiction, and not excepted in the treatie, although hee bee wronged by his confede∣rats: for that the fathers power hath nothing common with the lawes of armes and maiestie, much lesse may the league be broken for brethren that are wronged. But to auoid all these inconueniences, the most safest way is, to limit all leagues to a certaine time, to the end they may add or take away from the treatie, or giue ouer the league altogether, if they thinke it expedient for them: and especially betwixt Popular estates* 1.1767 and those which are gouerned Aristocratically, the which neuer die. For in Monar∣chies [ D] societies and leagues are dissolued by the death of princes, as wee haue said. Yet princes making treaties with Seigneuries and Popular states, haue beene accu∣stomed to continue the time of the league after the princes death▪ as it was in the league betwixt the Cantons of the Swissers, and Francis the first, where the time was limited for the kings life, and fiue yeares after, and since it hath alwayes so continued: but that condition did bind the Swissers, and not Francis his successor, who might at his plea∣sure hold, or go from the league: for that an oath is personall, and to speake properly, cannot be taken for the successor.

But some one will say vnto me, That the first clause in all the auntient treaties and leagues, which the Romans made with other states and Seigneuries, was, That they should be perpetuall. And therefore the Hebrewes did call the strongest and best assu∣red [ E] alliances, treaties of salt, for that salt of all things compounded of the elements, is least corruptible: as they also call a statue or image that is euerlasting, A statue of Salt, not that the holy Scripture meanes, that Lots wife was turned into a salt stone, as many beleeue. But in my opinion there is nothing more pernitious in treaties than to make them perpetuall: for he that feeles himselfe any thing ouercharged with the treatie: hath reason to breake it, seeing it is perpetuall: but if it be limited, hee hath no cause to complaine. Moreouer it is easie to continue leagues and alliances alreadie made, and to renew them before the time prefixt be expired: as hath beene alwayes done with

the Cantons for these fiftie yeares: and although we were assured of a perpetuall ami∣tie [ F] and friendship, and that there should bee no cause of griefe or dislike, yet friendships grow cold, and haue need to be reuiued and quickned by new treaties. And therefore in the treatie betwixt the Vallesians and the fiue small Cantons, it is set downe in the last article, that the league should be renued euery tenth yeare. And in the treaties be∣twixt the eight Cantons it is said, that the alliances should be renued euery fiue yeares. The Romans did sweare a league and perpetuall amitie with the inhabitants of Lau∣rentum, and yet was it renewed euery yeare, Cum Laurentibus (inquit Liuius) renouari foedus iussum, renouaturque ex eo quotannis post diem decimum Latinarum, Beeing com∣maunded (saith Liuie) to renew the league with the Laurentines, it was thereuppon re∣newed euerie yeare after the tenth day of the Latines. And the same author saith, Adi∣re [ G] iusst sunt Legati Romani Cretam, & Rhodū, & renouare amicitiam, simul, speculari num solicitati animi sociorum ab rege Perseo fuissent, The Roman ambassadours were com∣maunded to go to Creet and Rhodes, to renew the league, and to discouer if their con∣federats minds had bene corrupted by king Perseus. There was a league of perpetuall friendship made in the yeare 1336, betwixt Philip of Valois, and Alphonso king of Ca∣stile:* 1.1768 and afterwards it was renewed betwixt king Iohn and Peter king of Castile, in the yeare 1352: and betwixt Charles the fift, king of Fraunce, and Henrie king of Castile: and yet euerie one of these leagues was made perpetuall for the associats and their suc∣cessors. As was also betwixt the houses of Scotland and Fraunce, for these three hun∣dred* 1.1769 yeares, that they haue continued in good and perpetuall league and amitie, vnto [ H] the yeare 1556. There is also another reason why the time of leagues and alliances should be limited, for that there is an ordinarie clause annexed to all treaties, Not to make any peace or truce, or to enter into league with a common enemie, or with them that are not comprehended in the treatie, without the consent of all the associats, or of the greatest part: But if one of the allies will not consent thereunto, must the rest be in∣gaged in his hatred, and in a continuall warre, if the league bee perpetuall? That were against all diuine and humane lawes, if the occasion of this hatred doth cease, and that a peace may be made without the preiudice to the allies. But this clause is ill practised, for if any one of the associats hath an intent to goe from the league, hee is so farre from demaunding the consent of the rest, as sometimes he doth treat so secretly, as all is con∣cluded [ I] before that any thing can be discouered, and oftentimes they abandon their as∣sociat vnto their enemies. We haue a notable example in our memorie, of the treatie* 1.1770 of Chambort, made in the yeare 1552, betwixt the king of Fraunce of the one part, and the duke Maurice, the marquesse Albert, and the Lantgraue of Hesse on the other; where it is said in the two & twentieth article, That if any of the associats should make any peace or agreement, or haue any secret practise with the emperor, or his adherents, without the consent of his other allies, he should be punished as a petiured, without all* 1.1771 remission, in the view of all the armie. And yet within six moneths after, the elector Maurice agreed with the emperor at a treatie at Passau, neither aduertising king Hen∣rie (who was chiefe of the league) nor yet comprehending him in the treatie. Against [ K] whome the marquesse Albert exclaimed, saying, That it was a base and villanous act, calling the duke traitor, and disloyall to his countrey, the emperour, and the king of France. And yet he did worse than his companion: for after that he had drawne great summes of money from the king, he turned to the emperour, and made open warre against the king: so as the imperiall souldiors called Maurice Bachelor, or Graduat, &* 1.1772 Albert Doctor, for the notable tricks which he plaied. And of late memorie the Seig∣neurie of Venice concluded a peace with Sultan Selim, so secretly, as it was published at Constantinople, at the comming of the French ambassadour, before that any one of

the confederats of the holy league was aduertised thereof, although it were expresly [ A] forbidden in the treatie, that not any one of the confederats might make a peace or truce with the Turke, without the consent of all the rest. So the auntient Romans ha∣uing to doe with faithlesse and disloiall people, they did not willingly conclude a peace, but a truce for many yeares, as they did with the Veientes, Veientibus pacem petentibus in annos centum induciae datae, The Veientes requiring a peace, they had a truce graun∣ted them for an hundred yeares. And in another place, Indutiae Veientibus pacem peten∣tibus* 1.1773 in annos 40 datae, A truce of fortie yeares was graunted vnto the Veientes, who de∣maunded a peace. And in another place, Cum populo Cerite inducias in centum annos fa∣ctas, There was a truce made with the people of Cerites for an hundred yeares. And in another place, Hetruriae populi pacem petentes in annos 30 inducias impetrarunt, The [ B] people of Hetruria demaunding a peace, they obtained a truce for thirtie yeares. For alwayes a truce is more holy, and lesse violable than a peace. And if wee shall well ob∣serue the end of those which haue broken any truce, we shall find that it hath bene mise∣rable, and many times the ruine of states. So the Romans haue alwayes punished se∣uerely the breakers of any truce: the first example was showne vpon the person of Metius Dictator of the Albanois, who was pulled in peeces with foure horses, and the citie of Alba rased: the people of Veientes were rooted out, hauing rebelled seuen times against the articles of the truce: the citie of Carthage was burnt to ashes: the peo∣ple of Capoua slaine for the most part, and the rest made slaues: the inhabitants of Co∣rinth [ C] massacred, and their citie burnt to ashes: the Samnites were ruined, hauing infrin∣ged their faith seuen times, as we read in Titus Liuius, Strabo, with infinit others, which were impossible to set downe in particular, which carrie an euerlasting testimonie of Gods iust iudgements against treacherous and disloyall princes, and faithlesse people, which mocke at oathes. As for treacherous and disloyall subiects, they were neuer vn∣punished, In Veliternos veteres ciues grauiter saeuitum, quod toties rebellarent, muri dis∣iecti,* 1.1774 Senatus abductus, They punished the Veliternians (who were auntient citisens) ve∣rie seuerely, their walles were cast downe, and their Senat carried away. And after the second Punike warre, the Roman subiects which had bene traitors were excepted, Per∣fugae (inquit Liuius) bello punico 380 Romam missi, virgis in Comitio caesi, & de Saxo de∣iecti, [ D] In the Punike warre 380 runnawayes (saith Liuie) beeing sent to Rome, were whipt in the open assemblie, and cast downe the rocke. And if the enemie hauing gi∣uen hostages, did infringe their treaties, the hostages were publikely put to death: as it happened vnto three hundred hostages of the Volsques, which were slaine: and in like case the hostages of the Tarentines, Fugientes retracti, ac virgis diu caesi, de Tarpeio deie∣cti* 1.1775 sunt, Fleeing they were fetcht backe, and being beaten long with rods, they were cast from the mount Tarpeia (saith Titus Liuius.) But since that they haue made a trade of the breach of faith, they haue also made a conscience to put hostages to death: as Nar∣ses, who pardoned the hostages of the Luquoies, hauing broken their faith: and Charles duke of Bourgongne had no sooner set three hundred hostages of the Leegeois at li∣bertie [ E] (the which he might iustly haue put to death, whatsoeuer Comines saith) but they attempted a new warre against him.

The clause that hostages should be subiect vnto capitall punishments, was vnknowne to the auntients, for it was alwayes lawfull not only to kill hostages that fled, but also if they that had giuen hostages had infringed their faith. But since they haue thought it fit to expresse those words in their promises, least that hostages should pleade igno∣rance of the law of armes, or that it should seeme too cruell that one should suffer for anothers offence. I will not denie but the Romans haue somewhat blemished the brightnes of their auntient integritie and iustice, the which happened vnto them not so

much through their owne fault, as by the Grecians and Carthaginians, whose treache∣rie [ F] they had often tried: witnes that which Liuie writes of the Ambassadors that were sent into Greece, when as they made report of their charge in open Senat: he saith thus, L. Martius & Attilius Romam reuersi, nulla alia re magis gloriabantur, quam decepto* 1.1776 per inducias & spem pacis Rege, quae magna pars Senatus probabat: sed veteres moris anti∣qui memores, nouam istam sapientiam improbabant, nec astu magis quam vera virtute bel∣lage ssisse maiores, denunciare bella, & saepe locum finire, quo dimicanturi essent. L. Martius and Attilius being returned to Rome, gloried in nothing more, than that they had cir∣cumuented the king with a truce, and the hope of peace: the which the greatest part of the Senat did allow of, but the most auntient (remembring their customes of old) did disallow of this new kind of wisedome, for that the auntients did not make warre by [ G] craft and pollicie, but by vertue, proclaiming warre, and oftentimes appointing the place where they would fight. Yea they were accustomed to renounce their alliance and friendship that had wronged them, before they would begin any warre. Veteres, saith Suetonius, bellum indicturi, renunciabant amicitiam, The auntients when they* 1.1777 would make warre against any one, they renounced his friendship: a custome which was obserued among priuat men, euen in the time of the Emperour Tiberius: for Ger∣manicus being grieuously wronged by Piso gouernor of Soria, sent him word that he renounced his friendship: and Henry the 5 king of England sent word to Lewis duke of Orleance by his ambassador, That he could not defie him, vnlesse he renounced his friendship, and sent back the alliance. And at this day those which be brethren in armes, [ H] and princes which do weare one anothers order, they send back the order before they make warre. But the Greeks who had taught the Romans their deceits and disloyal∣ties, were punished, as we may see in Liuie, where he saith, Phocenses cum pacti essent nihil hostile se a Romanis passuros port as aperuerunt, tum clamor est sublatus à militibus, Phocenses nunquam fidos socios, impune eludere: ab hac voce milites vrbem diripiunt, Ae∣milius primo resistere, captas, non deditas vrbes diripi, The Phocenses when they had contracted that they would not indure any hostile acte of the Romans, they opened their gates; then began there a crie among the souldiers, that the Phocenses being ne∣uer faithfull associates did laugh at them vnpunished: at this crie the souldiers spoile the towne, at the first Aemilius made resistance, saying, That they vsed to spoyle cities that [ I] were taken by force, and not that yeelded. But the Romans to repaire this error, left their citie in full libertie, and restored them the lands they had taken from them. So Po∣libius who was a Greeke borne, and gouernor to Scipio the Affrican, speaking of the Greeks, saith, That a word among the Romans was sufficient, but in Greece for the lending of a hundred crownes they must haue ten notaries, and twise as many seales, and yet would they breake their faith. But it is far worse at this day, where there is no assurance neither in letters, seales, nor safegards, yea ambassadors are not assured, for we haue seen Rincon and Fregose ambassadors to the king of France slaine by the offi∣cers of the Emperour Charles the 5, and yet no iustice was done of them: whereas the Romans deliuered Minutius and Manlius to their enemies, and at another time Fa∣bius [ K] and Apronius, to dispose of them at their pleasures, for that they had somewhat wronged the ambassadors, the which is forbidden by the law of armes. If faith be not kept with ambassadors, what shall we hope of others? yea some haue gloried in killing them, as Helene Queene of Russia, being intreated by her enemies to make a league, to the end she might marrie with their king, she buried all the ambassadors aliue▪ and before they were aduertised thereof, she sent them word that she would haue ambassa∣dors of greater worth, whereupon they sent her fiftie more of the noblest of the whole countrie, all which she caused to be burned aliue, and vnder promise of marriage she

murthered fiue thousand which she had made dronke. It is not needfull heere to re∣hearse [ A] how many cities and people haue been ruined and rooted out for the breach of faith with ambassadors, who are and ought to be sacred and inuiolable. And ambassa∣dors are also to be warned that they exceed not their charge, nor speake not any thing to the dishonor of the prince or people to whom they are sent, for a wise ambassador will alwaies deliuer his charge, if in things that be odious sparingly, and in those that be pleasing full, to the end that he may entertaine princes in friendship, and appease hatred; for that princes do oftentimes fall into mortall quarrels through the indiscretion of am∣bassadours. Amongst many we haue the example of Stephen Vauoide of Valachia, to whome the Procope of Tartaria sent an hundred ambassadours, threatning to waste all his countrey with fire and sword, if he sent not backe the Procopes sonne, whom he [ B] had taken prisoner. The Vauoide incensed at these threats, put them all to death, ex∣cept one whome he sent home maimed of his members, to bee a messenger of this strange calamitie. Others reuenge not iniuries done vnto them by ambassadours so in∣discreetly, but yet as cruelly, least they should seeme to haue broken their faith, dismis∣sing them, and yet sending others after them to kill them: as Tuca queene of Sclauonia did, who sent some to murther the yongest of the three Roman ambassadours, hauing threatned her, the which was afterwards the cause of her ruine, and of her estate. But the fact of the king of Mofcouie was most barbarous, who seeing an Italian ambassadour to put on his hat before he was bidden, he caused it to bee nailed fast vnto his head; a most cruell and barbarous deed, yet was there an error in the ambassador, who should [ C] hold the ranke and dignitie of the prince his maister, so as it bee not with the contempt of the prince to whome he is sent: for sometimes ambassadours relying vpon the great∣nesse of their master, forget themselues to meaner princes, especially men that are bred vp in Popular estates, accustomed to speake with all libertie, thinke they may doe so with Monarches, who are not accustomed to heare free speeches, and much lesse that the truth should be spoken vnto them: for which cause Philip the young, king of Ma∣cedonie, seeing the Roman ambassadour question too boldly with him, hee could not forbeare to braue him with reproaches. And Popilius the Roman Legat vsed Antio∣chus king of Asia with greater presumption, making a circle with a rod about the kings [ D] person, willing him to giue him aunswere, before he went out of that circle: here Liuie saith, Obstupefactus est rex tam violento imperio, The king was amazed at so violent a commaund: and yet he did what the Romans commanded, hauing tried their power. Marius the elder vsed the like libertie towards Mithridates king of Pontus or Ama∣sia, who although he neither were ambassadour, nor had any publike charge, yet he said vnto the king, That he must obey the commaundement of the people of Rome, or be the stronger. Then did Mithridates find that true which was spoken of the Romans, That they were of a freer speech than any other nation. And sometimes too great li∣bertie without any iniurie offends princes. For which cause Marc Anthonie caused an ambassador which was sent from Augustus to be whipt, for that he talked too free∣ly to queene Cleopatra. But those princes are wisest, which hauing receiued any affront [ E] from ambassadours, demaund reparation from their maisters: as Charles earle of Cha∣rolois, said vnto the ambassadours of Lewis the eleuenth, That his Chauncellour had braued him, but the king would shortly repent it; and so it fell out: for the same yere he imbarqued the king in a most daungerous warre, with the hazard of his estate. And therefore king Francis the first, doubting that he should heare something of an herauld which was sent from the emperour Charles the fift, that might bee some impeach vnto his maiestie, he caused a gibe•…•… to be set vp before the court gate, when he heard that hee approached, letting him vnderstand, that he would hang him, if he opened his mouth,

for hauing giuen the emperour the lie, he knew well that the herauld could not bring [ F] him any aunswere, without some touch to his honour and dignitie. Some there bee that will attempt warre against their associats for any small iniurie: as the Scots did in old time against the Picts, for taking away their dogges, hauing liued together almost six hundred yeares in great peace and amitie. A good prince must trie all meanes, and dissemble many things, before he come to armes. I do not agree with Bartol, who saith, That the peace is not violated, if any one hath vndertaken that hee shall not bee wron∣ged, and yet his things are stolne away by him with whome he hath made a peace: for that there was nothing that did sooner moue the antient Romans to make warre, than for things taken away, and iniuries done. M. Aurelius the emperour said well, Putas∣ne non aliter vim inferri quam si homines vulnerentur: vis est etiam cum quod per Iudi∣cem [ G] debuit, per te ipse arripis, Doest thou thinke that violence is not offered, vnlesse that men be wounded. It is violence, when thou takest that of thine owne authoritie, which thou shouldest recouer by law. But some make breach of their faith, by a craftie interpretation of the law. As that which Bartol proues, If by the truce it be lawfull for a French man to passe into England, vpon condition, That if after the truce he be found within their limits, it shall be lawfull to kill him: if before the end of the truce he depart out of England, and by a storme is driuen backe into England after the truce expired: in this case he saith, they may lawfully kill him. In my opinion they may ransome him by law, but not kill him: for that he doth nothing against the truce, that by tem∣pest [ H] is cast vpon his enemies countrey. It would seeme vn∣iustand iniurious, to repaire that which happens accidentally with the losse of life.

Finis Libri quinti.

[ I] [ K]

THE SIXT BOOKE OF [ A] [ B] OR CONCERNING A COMMONVVEALE.

CHAP. I. ¶ Of Censuring or Reformation, and wheher it be expedient to inroll and number the subiects, and to force them to make a declaration, or giue a certificat of their priuate estates.

HItherto wee haue described at large the first part of the de∣finition [ C] of a commonweale: that is, the true gouerning of many families with absolute power, and that which de∣pends of the said definition. It remaynes now to speake of the second part: that is, of that which is common to an e∣state; and which consists in the managing of the treasure, rents, and reuennues, in taxes, imposts, coynes and other charges for the maintenance of a commonweale. And for the better vnderstanding hereof, let vs first treat of Censuring. Census in pro∣per tearmes is nothing else but a valuation of euery mans goods: and for that wee [ D] are to treat of reuenues, it is verie needfull to speake of censuring, and to shew, that of all the Magistrats of a commonweale, there are not many more necessary: and if the necessitie be apparant, the profit is farre greater, be it either to vnderstand the* 1.1778 number and qualities of the citisens, or the valuation of euery mans goods; or else for the well gouerning and awing of the subiect. And calling to mind the farthest bounds of antiquity, I doe much wonder, how so goodly a charge, so profitable and so necessarie, hath bene laid aside so carelesly, seeing that all the ancient Greeks and Latines did vse it, some yearely (saith Aristotle) others from three, foure, or from fiue yeares to fiue yeares, making an estimation of euery mans wealth and priuate estate: whereof Demosthenes hauing made an abstract out of the publike registers, [ E] said (speaking vnto the people) that all the reuenues of the countrey of Attica did amount vnto threescore thousand talents, or thirtie six millions of crownes. Euen* 1.1779 so the Romans (who did imitate the Grecians) could wel imbrace this custome, and bring it vnto Rome: for which cause king Seruius is much commended in histories. And although the people of Rome had disanulled and abolished all the edicts and ordinances of their kings, after they had expelled them, yet this law of censuring or surueying continued still, as the foundation of their treasure, imposts, and pub∣like charges, &c. was continued in the Consuls persons. But after that the Consuls were distract & drawne away for warlike imployments, they then created Censors,

threescore and six yeares after that the Consuls had executed it. L. Papirius, and [ F] L. Sempronius being the first that were called Censores, and they held the office fiue yeares: but ten yeares after L. Aemilius Mamercus limited the time of the Censors office to eighteene moneths. And soone after, this custome was followed by all the cities of Italy, and namely by the Roman Colonies, who brought their Registers and Inrollments to Rome. Afterwards this charge was still continued; and euen Caesar the Dictator tooke the paines to go from house to house to supply the Cen∣sors charge, although he called himselfe Magister morum, or Master of the manners. And as soone as the Emperour Augustus was returned to Rome, after his victorie a∣gainst Marc Anthonie, the Senate by a publike decree gaue him the office of Censor,* 1.1780 calling him Prefectus morum, or Controller of manners, who thrice numbred the [ G] citisens of Rome, and valued euerie mans goods: and not onely of the Citisens of Rome, dispearsed throughout the whole empire, but of all the subiects of euerie prouince: And was there euer Emperour that left so goodly an estate of an empire, as he did?

Afterwards it was discontinued vnder the tyranny of Tiberius and Caligula, and reuiued againe by Claudius the Emperour, which made the 74 Lustre. It was left a∣gaine* 1.1781 vnder Neron, and continued againe vnder Vespatian, who made the 75 Lustre: and then it left vnder the tyranny of Domitian, who called himselfe Perpetuall Censor, and yet made no suruey. A hundred and fiftie yeres after, or thereabouts, the Emperour Decius caused the Senate to declare Valerian Censor, with ample au∣thoritie. [ H] And since that this office was laid aside, the empire hath alwaies declined. True it is, that the Emperours of Greece did erect an office, which they called Magistrum Census, or The master of inrollments, who kept the publike registers con∣taining all testaments and publike acts, with the names and ages of euerie person; yet not with such dignity and power as the auntient Censors. But it is certaine, that all townes subiect to the Roman empire, had their Censors, euen vnder Traian the Emperour, and that the Senators of euerie •…•…owne were chosen by the Censors, as wee may read in an epistle written by Plinie they younger to the Emperour Traian. And (not to goe out of this realme) we read, that king Childebert, at the persuasion [ I] and instance of Marouëus Bishop of Poitiers, made an edict, commaunding all his subiects to be inrolled, and their goods to bee valued; the which is yet sometimes put in practise at Venice, Genes, and Luques, whereas there bee Censors created: and namely at Venice in the yeere 1566 they made three Magistrats to reforme the peoples manners, whom they called, I Seignori sopra il ben viuere de la citta: The Magistrats for the well liuing of the citisens: for that the name of Censor in a free citie abounding with all kind of delights, seemed harsh and seuere.

Few yeares before the creation of this Magistrat, hauing set forth my booke of the Method of Histories, I did therein much maruell, that in so great a number of officers, wherein the Venetians did exceed other cities, they had forgotten Censors, [ K] which were most necessarie. The commonweale of Geneue in stead of Censors haue deputed ten Antients, the which are chosen as magistrats, whereof foure are of the counsell of threescore, and six of the counsell of two hundred; which hold the* 1.1782 subiects of that state in such awe, as few offences remaine vnpunished: so as with∣out doubt this commonweale will flourish, if not through armes and wealth, yet by their vertues and pietie, so long as they shall maintaine the authoritie of those Auntients. Whereby it doth plainely appeare, that the best and most flourishing* 1.1783 cities could not long subsist without Censors: wherein many ignorant diuines a∣buse themselues, in thinking that Dauid was grieuously reprehended by God, and

punished, for that he commaunded his people should bee numbred; when as God [ A] * 1.1784 commaunded Moyses the Emperour of the Israelites to doe it after their departure out of Fgypt, and againe before they entred into the land of promise; and not on∣ly to number them, but to note euerie family, and to take the name of euerie parti∣cular person before they had conquered anie thing, the which hee should leaue to posteritie: but the fault which Dauid committed, was in forgetting Gods com∣maundement, charging him, that when he did number the people euery one should offer vnto God two groats of siluer (as Ioseph hath verie well obserued) being com∣maunded in the text of the law, to exact that holy tribute for an expiation of their sinnes, so often as he should please to haue the people numbred: then he adds, Least a plague should be among the people. But in my opinion heerein was the greater [ B] offence, that the prince too arrogantly trusting more in the force of his legions, than in the power and helpe of the Almighty, did not number all his people, but those onely that were able to beare armes, omitting the tribe of Leui (which attended the sacrifice) and the tribe of Beniamin. And whereas the law commaunds euerie one to put halfe a sickle, or two siluer groats; that is done in my opinion, to abolish* 1.1785 the impietie of the heathen, who taking the number of their subiects, offred a piece of siluer for euerie one vnto their gods: as also God commaunded they should sprinckle the bloud of the sacrifice aboue, and of eyther side of the altar, forbidding them expressely, not to offer any more bloud vnto their deuils, that he might call his people from the inhumane and hatefull worship of deuils. And it seemes that king [ C] Seruius had borowed this ceremony from the people of the East, when as hee com∣maunded a boxe to be set in Iuno Lucinas temple, into the which they put a denier for euerie one that was borne: and another in the temple of Iuuenta, where they did also put a denier for euerie one that had attayned to seuenteene yeres of age, at what time they put on a playne gowne without purple: and the third was in the tem∣ple of Venus Libitina, into the which they put a denier for euerie one that died: which custome continued inuiolable, euen when as the office of Censor was neg∣lected.

We read, that the Athenians were inrolled in the publike registers at the age of [ D] 14 yeeres, yet wee find no mention made of the tribute. But the numbring of the people which God commaunded to be made, was but of such as could cary armes, from 20 yeeres vpward; in the which it seemes that old men aboue 60 were not comprised, & yet they were found by pole to amount to six hundred thirtie thou∣sand* 1.1786 fiue hundred and fifty, besides the tribe of Leui which made twentie two thou∣sand, from a moneth old vpward, which was in all six hundred fifty two thousand fiue hundred and fiftie. And fortie yeeres after the number was taken, when as all those which came forth were dead, except Moyses, Iosua, and Caleb, they were found* 1.1787 to bee six hundred twentie foure thousand seuen hundred seuenty three, compre∣hending the Leuits, besides the women, slaues, old men, and youth vnder twentie [ E] yeres, which were at the least twice as many. But Titus Liuius speaking of the num∣ber of the citisens that were found in Rome, sayth in his third booke, Censa sunt ciui∣um capita 415 millia, preter orbos orbasque, the number of the citisens is 415000 be∣sides the blind. Florus in his 59 booke saith, Censa sunt ciuium capita 313 millia 823 preter pupillos & viduas, the citisens are numbred at 313823 besides widdowes and pupils. Fiue yeeres after he sayth, Censa sunt ciuium capita 390 millia 936, The num∣ber of the citisens is 390936. And in the following suruey, 394356. And in the next inrollment 450000 and in the other after that 150000. I omit the former surueyes, which are all greater than this last: but it seemes the Citisens of Rome were not

excluded, as it may appeare in that which I haue noted, for that there were none but [ F] widowes and orphelines excepted: and yet Florus saith in his 27 booke, Censa sunt 137000 ciuium, ex quo numero apparuit quantum hominū tot preliorum aduer sa fortuna po∣puli Romani abstulisset: The number of the citisens were 137000: wherby it appeares how many men the Romanes lost in their vnfortunate warres. And in the former view he sayth, Censa sunt ciuium capita 270 millia: The check-roll of all the citisens comes to 270000. as if he would inferre, that the losses which they had receiued a∣gainst Hanibal, had carried away 133000 citisens: for if the women had beene comprehended which went not to the war, there had remayned none but women, for that they be alwayes as many or more than men, as I haue before shewed. And in Athens there was a suruey taken, whereas the number of women was greater than [ G] that of men, as Pausanias saith. But the scruple is decided by Titus Liuius, where he saith, speaking of the seuenth inrollment, Ciuium qui puberes essent, supra centum de∣cem millia erant: mulierum autem & puerorum, seruorum{que} & mercatorum, & sordi∣das artes exercentium (siquidem Romanorum nemini cauponariam, aut operosam artem tractare licuit) triplo plus quàm turbae ciuilis. The citisens of full age were aboue 110000 of women, children, slaues, marchants: and of those which vsed base trades (for no Roman might be a victualer or handycrafts man) the number was thrice as many as of the ciuill sort: whereby it appeares, that marchants, handycraftsmen, women, nor children, were not registred: as for slaues they were not nūbred among the citisens, but among moueable goods, the which were commonly fiftie for one: [ H] and euen in Athens there were found a hundred times more slaues than free men, by a suruey that was taken, whereas for ten thousand strangers, and twentie thou∣sand citisens, there were foure hundred thousand slaues. And of the number that was taken at Venice about thirtie yeares since, there were found two thousand wo∣men more than men, as I haue formerly noted.

The benefits which redounded to the publike by this numbring of the people,* 1.1788 were infinite: for first they knew the number, age and qualitie of the persons, and what numbers they could draw foorth, either to go to the warres, or to remaine at home; either to bee sent abroad in colonies, or to bee imployed in publike works of [ I] reparations, and fortifications: thereby they shall know what prouision of victuals is necessarie for euerie citie, and especially in a time of siege, the which is impossible to preuent, if they know not the number of the people. And if there were no o∣ther benefit but the knowledge of euerie mans age, it cuts off a million of sutes and quarrels the which are inuented touching the minoritie and maioritie of persons:* 1.1789 for which cause king Frauncis the first commaunded his chauncellour Poyet, to pup∣lish an edict, inioyning all curats to keepe a register of all such as should bee borne: but for that the registers are not kept as they ought, this law is ill obserued. And in regard of the quality, we see an infinit number of sutes touching the nobility, which should be auoyded by this meanes: and the sutes of forgerie & falshood, for the dis∣guising [ K] * 1.1790 and concealing of names of the parents, countrie, estate, and qualitie, of eue∣rie one, whether hee bee a citisen or a stranger, a bastard or lawfully borne, a noble∣man or a patrician, a plebeian or a nobleman, and of what name & house he comes, for want of registers and censors can hardly be found out.

This appeared plainely, when as Pericles numbred the citisens of Athens, for the prerogatiues and priuiledges they had aboue strangers, where there were found thirteene thousand three hundred and sixty citisens, and fiue thousand strangers which carryed themselues as citisens, and were sould for slaues by a publicke de∣cree.* 1.1791 Moreouer, to order and gouerne the bodies & colleges of citisens according

to the estate and age of euerie person, as they did vse in Rome and in Greece, it is [ A] more than necessary to know the number of the subiects; to gather their voices in elections the number is also requisite; to deuide the people into tens, hundreds, and thousands, it is also necessarie to know the number of them. But one of the greatest and most necessary fruits that can bee gathered by this censuring and numbring of the subiects, is the discouery of euery mans estate and faculty, and whereby he gets his liuing, therby to expell all drones out of a commonweale, which sucke the hony* 1.1792 from the Bees, and to banish vagabonds, idle persons, theeues, cooseners, & ruffians, which liue and conuerse among good men, as woolues do among sheepe, spending their liues in theeuing, dising, robbing, drinking and whooring; who although they walke in darkenesse, yet hereby they should bee seene, noted and knowne. And as [ B] for the valuation of goods, it is no lesse necessarie than the numbring of persons. Casiodorus speaketh thus, Orbis Romanus agris diuisus censu{que} descriptus est, vt possessio sua nulla haberet incerta, quam pro tributorum susceper at quantitate soluenda, The Ro∣mane territories were deuided, and euery priuate mans land laid out, that no mans possession should bee vncertaine, the which he had taken for the payment of a cer∣taine rent or tribute. If then a suruey were taken of all the Roman empire, and the lands distributed accordingly, that it might bee knowne what burthen euery one* 1.1793 was to beare in regard of the goods he inioyed; how much more necessary is it now, when as there bee a thousand sorts of imposts in euery commonweale, which the auntients did neuer know? This poynt is of such consequence, as it should suffice, [ C] if it serued for nothing else, but to cause euery one to bring in a declaration of his goods and reuennues: as was done in Prouence in the yeare 1471: whereby it did afterwardes plainely appeare that the commons were oppressed by the cleargie and nobilitie, if it had not beene prouided for by an edict made by Frauncis the first, in the yere 1534, and by another of his successors: wherupon the three estates of Pro∣uence (beeing growne into great sutes) were called before the Parliament at Paris, where a prouinciall decree was made, That all men of what qualitie soeuer, should pay their charges & imposts according to the register made in the yeare 1471, when as there were three thousand houses charged with a soulz vpon the pound, without [ D] respect of families or persons, but to the lands subiect to contribution. They were also constrained in the yere 1516 to make a suruey and declaration of all the bene∣fices of this realme, in regard of the tithes, the which by reason of the daily alterati∣ons and changes require a newe suruey or numbring: for some Incumbent payes more than a moytie of his benefice, when as another payeth not the thirtith part for the tithes. The like was required by Marill as the kings aduocate for the subsidie of Prouence.

By this meanes the poore mens iust complaints shall be releeued, whom the rich are accustomed to ouercharge, and to free themselues throughout all the realme of Fraunce, as well as in Prouence & Languedocke: By this meanes, mutinies (which [ E] are vsuall in euerie commonweale, for the vnequalitie of charges) shall cease: and moreouer all sutes depending before Iudges for reliefe, should be quite cut off: by* 1.1794 this meanes the concussions, malice or fauour of the assessors and other officers, who haue charge to make an equall distribution of the tribute or impost, shall bee disco∣uered, or at least the controuersie shall be decided by the Censors register: or else they might put in practise the custome of the antient Athenians, wheras if any one were ouercharged that had lesse wealth than another, hee might force him that was lesse taxed to take his charge, or to change estates with him: as Isocrates, who lost a∣gainst Lysimachides, and wonne against Megalides.

By this meanes yow shall know who be miserable, who prodigall, which be ban∣querouts, [ F] who rich, which poore, who cooseners, which vsurers, & by what gaines some get so much wealth, and others are oppressed with so great want, and how to redresse it: for that by the extreame pouerty of some, and the exceeding wealth of others, we see so many seditions, trouble, & ciuill warres arise. Moreouer, all edicts and decrees, and generally all iudgements and sentences touching fines & amerce∣ments, should be ordred, and justice equally administred, when as euery mansestate were knowne, seeing that the punishment may not exceed the offence. Also, all de∣ceits in mariages, in bargaines and sales, in all priuat & publike negotiations should be discouered and knowne.

I omit a multitude of sutes touching successions, diuisions, and morgages, the [ G] which are concealed for the most part, and should bee made plaine by the registers without search, the which should ease the subiects charge, and preuent the falshood of witnesses. It may bee some will say vnto me, That it were a hard thing to expose the pouertie of some to be scorned, and the wealth of others to bee enuied. Behold the greatest argument that can bee obiected to hinder so good and commendable a thing. But I answere, That all enuy will cease against those whom they hold to bee rich and are not, and the mockerie against such as haue wealth and were held poore. And shall the enuie of the malicious, or the derision of the scorner, hinder so good and commendable a thing? Neuer wise prince nor good law-maker did regard en∣uie or scorne, when there is question of good lawes. Although this law (whereof [ H] question is made) concernes onely moueable goods and not lands. To say, that it is neither good nor comely to know priuate mens wealth or wants, the course, traffike and negotiation of marchants, which consists most commonly in bookes of credit, nor to lay open the secrets of families; I answere, that there are none but cooseners & deceiuers that are loth to haue their liues laid open, & their actions knowne: good men that feare not the light, will bee alwaies glad to haue their estates knowne, with their qualities, wealth and maner of liuing. An Architect said one day to Liuius Dru∣cius the Tribune, That he would make the lights of his house in such sort, as no man should ouer-looke him: To whom Drusus answered, I pray you make it in such sort [ I] * 1.1795 as euery one may looke into it & see mine actions. Velleius Paterculus who writes the historie saith, that this man was sanctus & integer vitae, of a holy & vpright life. But the office of Censor is chiefly against the wicked: And in old times euery Roman kept a register of his actions and expences, and of all his goods: But vppon the de∣clining of the empire, when as vices began to spring vp, they neglected it, saith Asco∣nius, for that many were condemned by their registers. And I find not that euer a∣ny but tyrants theeues and bankerouts hated the office of Censor, and haue hindred* 1.1796 all they could the valuation of goods, as I haue noted of Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, and Domitian. It is therefore a meere mockery, to pretend that this would bee a meanes [ K] for tyrants to oppresse their subiects with exactions: for there is no tyrant so cruell, but he wil more willingly take from the rich than from the poore; whereas for want of a Censor the poore are pinched, and the rich saue themselues. We also see that by the practises of the vsurers & the rich citisens of Rome, of six Censors chosen successiue∣ly in one yeare, not anie one could intend his charge: whereupon the Tribunes ma∣king their complaints before the people, said, That the Senatours feared the registers and publike informations, which discouered euerie mans estate, and their actiue and passiue debts, whereby they should find, that some of the Citisens were oppressed by the others, and ruined by the vsurers. And then the tribunes protested, that they would not suffer any debtour to bee adiudged to his creditors, nor inrolled to go to

the warres, vntill they had first seene a declaration of the debts, to the end they might [ A] prouide as they should find it needfull. Then did the debtors flocke together about the Tribune, to giue him ayd and assistaunce. Why should a good creditor feare to haue his debts and contracts viewed, or his lands (lawfully purchased) knowne? why should he hinder the knowledge of his goods, lawfully gotten by his industie and la∣bour? It shalbe alwaies honorable vnto him; and if he be an honest man, if he loues the preseruation of the common weale, and the reliefe of the poore, he will make no difficultie to giue a declaration of his goods for the reliefe of the publike, if need shall require. If he be wicked, if hee bee an vsurer, an extortioner, a publike theefe, and a obber of priuate men, he hath reason to oppose himselfe all he can, that his goods, his life, nor his actions may be knowne: but there is no reason to aske the vinteners [ B] aduice if they shall suppresse alehouses; or the strumpet, if they shall put downe the stues; nor of bankers, if they shall abolish vsurie; nor of the wicked, if they should haue Censors.

The auntient Greeks and Latines haue alwaies spoken of censuring, as of a diuine thing, the which hath alwayes preserued the greatnesse of the Roman empire so long as Censors were in credit. Titus Liuius speaking of king Seruius, who first ordained that euerie one should giue a certificate of his goods, saith, Censuminstituit rem salu∣berimam* 1.1797 tanto imperio, He instituted the office of Censor, a wholesome thing for so great an empire. But after that Censors were created in the Consuls place, and that by little and little they began to take knowledge of the life and manners of euerie [ C] one, then began they to respect the Censors, and to reuerence them more than all o∣ther magistrats: whereof Titus Liuius saieth, Hic annus Censurae initium fuit, a par∣ua origine ortae, quae deinde incremento aucta est, vt morum disciplinae{que} Romanae penes eam regimen, Senatus, equitum{que} centuriae, decoris, dedecoris{que} discrimen sub ditione eius ma∣gistratus, publicorum ius, priuatorum{que} locorum vectigalia populi Romani sub nutu atque arbitrio essent, This yeare was the beginning of the Censors office, springing from a small matter, the which was afterwards so augmented, as hee controlled the man∣ners and discipline of the Romans, the assemblies of the Senate, and of knights, also the distinction of honour and infamie were subiect to this magistrat; and the publike [ D] rites, with the reuenues of priuat places belonging to the people of Rome, were cen∣sured* 1.1798 by him. The Censors office then was to receiue the number of the persons, and the valuation of their goods, to be superintendant of the treasure, to farme out the imposts, customes, and all the reuenues of the commonweale, to reforme abuses, to place and displace Senatours, to dismisse the men at armes, and to censure the life and manners of euerie one. Plutarch speakes in a higher stile, tearming the office of Censor, Most sacred and mightie. It may be some will say, that the charge was ouer great: yet two Censors were sufficient in so great an empire. But their charges may be deuided: for to place and displace Senators, that charge was giuen vnto the Cen∣sors, to ease the people, saith Festus: the which could not be done in a monarchie, [ E] * 1.1799 whereas the prince makes choyce of all magistrats, especially of his counsell. Yet it were necessarie, that the ouerseers of the treasure should be true Censors, that is, men without blame or reproch: for you must alwayes commit the purse to the most trustie, and the reformation of abuses to the most vpright. As for the reformation of abuses, it is the goodliest thing that euer was inuented in any commonweale, and it hath best maintained the greatnesse of that empire: •…•… for euen as the Censors were alwayes chosen out of the most vertuous men of the commonweale, so did they striue to conforme the subiects to the true patterne of honour and vertue. This was done from fiue yeres to fiue yeres: & after that they had setled the estate of

the treasure, and farmed out the reuenues. And if they discontinued this charge (as [ F] oftentimes it fell out by reason of the tediousnesse of the warres) then did it plainely appeare, that the people grew corrupted in manners, and that commonweale decli∣ned, like vnto a bodie which leaues his ordinarie purging: this was manifest during the second Punike warre, when as they had no time to attend that charge conueni∣ently, but as soone as Hannibal was retired into the territories of Naples, then the Censors (saith Titus Liuius) Ad mores hominum regendos animum aduerterunt, castigan∣daquè vitia▪ quae velut diutinos morbos aegra corpora ex sesegignunt, nata bello erant, The Censors applyed themselues to reforme mens maners, and to punish vices, the which had sprung vp by reason of the warres, as continuall feauers doe in sicke and corrupt bodies. And yet they dealt not with any abuses, but such as were not to be censured [ G] by the Iudges: for the magistrats and the people tooke knowledge of murthers, pa∣ricides, thefts, concussions, and such like crimes, the which are punished by the lawes. Is it not sufficient, will some one say, to punish crimes and offences by the law? My answere is, That the lawes punish those offences onely, which trouble the quiet of a commonweale: and yet the greatest offendors doe easily escape the punishment of the law, euen as great beasts do easily breake through the spiders web. And who is so ill aduised, as to measure honour and vertue by the lawes? Quis est (saith Seneca) qui se profitetur legibus omnibus innocentem? vt haec it a sit, auàm augusta est innocencia adle∣gem bonum esse: quanto latiùs patet officiornm quàm iuris regula? quàm multa pietas, [ H] humanitas, liberalitas, iusticia, fides exigunt, quae extra publicas tabulas sunt! What is he that professeth himselfe an innocent by all lawes? how strict is innocency, to bee good according to the lawe? how much larger are the rules of dutie than of law? how many things doe piety, humanity, liberalitie, iustice, and faith, challenge at our* 1.1800 hands, the which are not inserted in the publike tables? It is manifest, that the most detestable vices, and that most corrupt a commonweale, are neuer called into iudge∣ment. Treacherie is not punished by the law, beeing one of the most abominable vices: But the Censors (saith Tully) were not so curious of any thing, as to punish periury. Drunkennesse, gaming, palliardise, and loosenesse of life, are suffered with all impunity; and who can redresse these disorders but the Censor? We see most com∣monweales [ I] swarme with vagabounds, idle persons, and ruffians, who by their deeds and examples corrupt good citisens; and there is no meane to expel this vermine, but* 1.1801 by the Censor. There is yet one speciall reason which shewes that the Censors of∣fice is now more necessarie than euer: for that in old times the master of euery fami∣ly had absolute commaund, the father ouer his children, the master ouer his slaues had absolute power of life and death, without any appeale; and the husband had the like authority ouer the wife in foure cases, as wee haue shewed elsewhere: but all this now ceasing, what iustice may we expect of the impiety of children against their fathers and mothers? of the ill gouernment of maried couples? of the contempt of masters? How many virgins doe we see sold and dishonoured by the parents them∣selues, [ K] or that rather suffer them to liue loosly than to be maried, thinking it better to cast forth their children, or to kill them, than to nourish them? and how can all this be preuented but by a Censor?

I dispute not of the conscience to God, the which is the chiefest and most prin∣cipal thing that ought to be cared for in euerie family & common weale; the which care although it hath beene alwayes committed vnto Bishops, ministers, and other spirituall officers, yet the magistrat ought to haue a speciall regard that it be aboue all things held in reuerence: for although the law of God commaunds that euerie one appeare before him at the three great feasts of the yeare at the least, yet there are

some which neuer goe, and so by this contempt of religion, hath sprung vp by little [ A] and little, the detestable sect of Atheists, which haue nothing but blasphemy in their mouthes, and contempt of diuine and humane lawes; whereby do follow infinite murthers, paricides, poysonings, treasons, periuries, adulteries, and incests: neither is it to bee expected, that eyther prince, or magistrat shall reduce those subiects vn∣der the obedience of the lawes, that haue trodden all religion vnder foot. But this depends of the ouerseears or Censors, who vse diuine lawes when as mans decrees are of no force: for that Legum metus non scelera, sed licentiam comprimit, The feare of lawes doth not suppresse the crimes, but the libertie. There haue beene and are at this day infinite numbers, who although they offend not the princes lawes, yet liue they most wickedly, and as Lactantius said well, Possunt enim leges de∣lict [ B] a punire, conscientiam munire non possunt. Lawes may well punish offences, but they cannot fortifie and amend the conscience. And as for the bringing vp of youth (the which is one of the chiefest charges of a commonweale, whereof as of yong plants they should haue the greatest care) wee see it is neglected, and that which should be publike, is left to euery mans discretion, vsing it at his pleasure, some in one sort, some in another, the which I will not touch heere, hauing treated thereof in an other place. And for that Licurgus said, That thereon consisted the foundation of a commonweale; he appoynted the great Pedonome to be Censor of the youth, and to gouerne them according to the lawes, not at the parents discretion: for as the [ C] scope and end of a citie is all one, so the education of all the citisens, according to A∣ristotles opinion, should be all one: and so did the Atheniens decree by a publike e∣dict, made at the request of Sophocles, knowing well, that in vaine were lawes made, if youth (as Aristole said) were not instructed in good manners. All this depends on the care and vigilancie of Censors, first to haue a care of the manners and behauiour of schoolemasters.

I will passe ouer with silence the abuses which are committed in suffering of com∣medies* 1.1802 and enterludes, the which is a most pernitious plague to a commonweale: for there is nothing that doth more corrupt the citisens good manners, simplicitie, and naturall bountie; the which hath the more power & effect, for that their words, [ D] accents, gesture, motions, and actions, gouerned with all the art that may be, and of a most filthy and dishonest subiect, leaues a liuely impression in their soules which apply thereunto all their sences. To conclude, wee may well say that the Comme∣dians stage is an apprentiship of all impudencie, loosenesse, whooredome, cooze∣ning, deceit and wickednesse. And therefore Aristotle did not without cause say, That they must haue a care least the subiects went to commedies: he had said better, That they should pull downe their theaters, and shut the commedians out of the citie gates: Quia (said Seneca) nihil tam moribus alienum, quàm in spectaculo desidere: For there is nothing more contrarie to good manners, than to haunt plaies. And therefore Philip Augustus king of Fraunce, did by a publike edict banish all players [ E] out of his realme. If any one will say, that both Greeks and Romans did allow of plaies: I answere, that it was for a superstition they had vnto their gods; but the wisest haue alwaies blamed them: for although a Tragedie hath something in it more stately and heroike, and which doth make the hearts of men lesse effeminat, yet Solon hauing seene the Tragedie of Thespis plaied, did much mislike it: Where∣of Thespis excusing himselfe, said, It was but a play: No (replyed Solon) but this play turnes to earnest. Much more had he blamed Commedies, that were then vn∣knowne: and now adayes they put at the end of euerie Tragedie (as poyson into meat) a comedie or jigge. And although that comedies were more tollerable a∣mong

those that dwell in the Southerne parts, beeing more heauie and melan∣choly [ F] by nature, & for their naturall constancie lesse subiect to change; yet should they be vtterly defended to those that liue towards the North, being of a sanguine complexion, light and inconstant, hauing in a manner all the force of their soule in the imagination of the common and brutall sence. But there is no hope to see playes forbidden by the magistrats, for commonly they are the first at them.

It is the proper charge of the graue and wise Censors, who will bee carefull to entertaine the honest Gimnasticall exercises, to keepe the bodie in health: and of musike to restraine the appetites vnder the obedience of reason: I meane musike, which doth not onely signifie harmonie, but also all liberall and honest sciences;* 1.1803 hauing a speciall care, that this naturall musike be not altered, nor corrupted, as it is [ G] at this day, seeing there is no thing that slips more sweetly and insensibly into the interiour affections of the mind. And if we may not preuaile so much as to haue the Ionique and Lidian songs, that is to say, the fift and seuenth tunes banished out of a commonweale, and defended from all youth (as both Plato and Aristotle said it was necessarie) at the least let not the Diatonie musike (which is more naturall than the Chromatique or Enharmonique) be corrupted by other medlies: and that the Dorien songs, or of the first tune (the which is proper to sweetnesse and seemely grauitie) be not disguised into manie tunes, and so deuided, as most part of musi∣cians become fooles or mad men, for that they cannot tast of a naturall musicke, no more than a weake stomake corrupted with delicates, can digest good and sub∣stantiall [ H] meat. All this depends of the Censors dutie: for that neither Iudges no•…•… any other officers will euer regard it.

They also complaine of excesse in apparell, and that the sumptuarie lawes are trodden vnder foot. It shall nueer be reformed, if therebee not Censors to see the lawes executed, as in old time the Nomophylaces, or Law keepers, did in Athens. And therefore an auntient Oratour said, That the Tribune which first restrained the Censors authoritie, had ruined the commonweale: It was Clodius, one of the wickedest men of his time, which law was sixe yeares after disanulled by the law Caecilia. [ I]

Seeing then that to censure is so goodly, profitable, and necessarie a thing, let vs now see, if Censors ought to haue any jurisdiction: for it seemes it should be but a iest without some jurisdiction. Yet I say, that the Censor ought not to haue any* 1.1804 jurisdiction at all, to the end that his charge be not intangled with sutes and con∣trouersies. In like sort, the auntient Roman Censors had no jurisdiction; but a looke, a word, and a dash with a pen, was more bloudie, and touched more to the quick, than all the decrees and iudgements of the magistrat. When as they made their scrutiny or suruey, you should haue seene foure or fi•…•…e hundred Senators, the order of horsemen, and all the people stand trembling before them: the Senatour fearing lest he should be put from the Senat; the horseman from his horse, & rankt [ K] among the baser sort: and the simple citisen to be rased out of his order and from his line, and placed among the tributaries: as Titus Liuius doth testifie, That 66 Senators were rased at one time out of the register, and excluded the Senat. And yet lest this great honour and authoritie of the Censors should make way to a* 1.1805 tyranny, if they were armed with power and iurisdiction, or if any should be con∣demned without hearing; it was therefore wel aduised they should haue nothing but the censuring and reformation. And therefore Tully said▪ That the iudgement of the Censors did onely make men blush: and for that it did but touch the name, the Censors correction was called Ignominia, Ignominie; the which differs from

infamy, depending vpon the Iudge that hath publike iurisdiction, and in causes that [ A] * 1.1806 make men infamous. And therefore the Pretor did note them as infamous, that were cassiered with ignominy, the which had beene ridiculous, if they had beene infamous. And yet the doubt which Lawyers haue made, If ignominious men should suffer as the infamous; shewes plainly, that Ignominy and Infamy is not all one, as manie haue supposed.

By the auntient custome of Greece, it was lawfull to kill any one, or any of his children that was noted infamous, as the Orator Libanius saith in his pleading for Halirhotius. Now although the Censor had rased any Senator out of the Register booke, yet if he would make petition vnto the people he was admitted, and some∣times absolued and restored: but if there were any accuser that did second the [ B] Censor, or if the Censor himselfe would accuse any as a priuate man, if the accused* 1.1807 were found guiltie, and condemned by the people, or by Commissioners deputed by the people, then was he not onely ignominious, but also infamous, and declared incapable euer to beare office: and therfore those which were censured, they were not iudged, but yet they were as a man may say, foreiudged: and if the Censor were an eloquent man, he would oppose himselfe as an accuser of those that would seeke to bee restored against his censure: as Cato did against Lucius Flaminius, ma∣king an oration against his filthy and disordred life, hauing rased him out of the re∣gister of Senators. But those that were better aduised, and had some hope of resti∣tution, [ C] sued for some office, or honorable commission from the people, the which if they obtained, they were freed from all censure of ignominie, or else they were re∣stored by the other Censors fiue yeares after: if hee did performe neither the one nor the other, he was not admitted into the Senat: neither could a horseman reco∣uer his horse nor his ranke. And (Vlpianus speaking of these men) doubts whether they are to be admitted as witnesses. And for the better confirmation hereof, Cicero brings in an example of Caius Geta, who was excluded the Senate by the Censors,* 1.1808 and yet afterwards he was chosen Censor: and a little after speaking of censuring, he saith▪ That the auntients would haue the Censors office to carrie a certaine feare, and not a punishent. The which was partly the cause why the Claudian law [ D] was disanulled, the which would not haue any Senator excluded the Senat, nor ra∣sed out of the registers, if he were not accused before both by the Censors, and con∣demned by either of them, the which had imbased the office of Censor, being so reuerend, as the Senate of Rome would not permit the Censors (after their charge expired) to bee accused, or called in question for anie thing that they had done du∣ring their charge: the which was lawfull against all other magistrats. And it seemes for the same reason the Emperour Constantine did teare the libels of accusation propounded against the Surueilans or Ouerseers at the Councell of Nice, saying, That he would not iudge them that were Censors of euerie mans life. And for the same cause Charlemaine in his constitutions hath made a Canon, That no prelate [ E] should be iudged without 72 witnesses, freeing the Pope from the censure of any man: the which hath bene obserued vntill the councell of Constance, where it was decreed, That the Pope should be iudged by the Councell. I will not heere dispute if the ecclesiasticall iurisdiction be well grounded; but it is to be feared, that hauing presumed so much, they are likely to lose both iurisdiction & all ecclesiasticall cen∣sure, the which hath alwaies bene of great consequence: for euen as the auntient Diuides (who were antient Iudges and Prelats in Gaule) did excommunicat kings* 1.1809 and princes that would not obey their decrees, euen so the ecclesiasticall censure amongst Christians, hath not onely maintained discipline and good manners for

many ages, but hath also made Tyrants to tremble, and reduced Kings and Empe∣rours [ F] vnto reason, pulling oftentimes their crownes from their heads, and their scepters out of their hands, forcing them to make peace or warre, to chaunge their dissolute life, to do justice, and to reforme the lawes. All the histories are full, but there is none so famous, as of Saint Ambrose, who did censure Theodosius the Great, and Nicholas 1 Pope, who censured Lothaire King of Italy: and Innocent, who did excommunicate Lewis 7 King of Fraunce, to whom for three yeres space no priest durst administer the Sacrament.

True it is, that the abuse of a censure of so great consequence, hath made the ministers, the discipline, and their censure to be contemned, the which consisted in interdiction, suspension, and excommunication: for many vppon light causes, [ G] and without cause did excommunicate, yea they haue set downe 39 causes wher∣in a man did incurre excommunication ipso facto, without iudgement or sentence; and which is more, they did excommunicate Corporations, Colleges, Vniuer∣sities, Emperours, Kings, and Kingdomes, without distinction of age, sexe, inno∣cents, or mad men, although since (but too late) they haue somewhat corrected this abuse: but in this kingdome it was decreed by the statutes of Orleance, that they should not vse any excommunication, but in crimes and publike scandall. The Prelats, Bishops, and Popes, haue alwayes pretended the censure of man∣ners and religion to belong vnto them, as a thing whereof judges and magistrats [ H] take no knowledge, but in case of execution. And since the auntients and ouer∣seers haue vsed the like prerogatiue in many places, a thing which is verie necessa∣ry, if there be no Censors, as well to reforme the peoples manners, and to watch ouer them, as to countenance the dignity of Pastors Bishops and Ministers, whom we cannot esteeme and honour too much, for the charge and dignitie which they beare; God did wisely prouide, making choice of his ministers, and giuing the prerogatiue of honour vnto the tribe of Leui, aboue all the tribes, and to the fa∣mily of Aaron, of the which the Priests only were, aboue all the Leuits, giuing them the tenths of cattell, fruits, and of all heritages, with great honours and priuiledges: and by an article of the law of God it is said, That he that shall disobey the sentence [ I] * 1.1810 of the high Priest, shall be put to death. And they that shall abase the estate of the Ministers, Bishops, and Auncients, and seeke to take from them, all ecclesiasticall censure, with their goods and honours, to see them poore and scorned, they con∣temne God, and regard not religion, the which is a matter verie considerable: and* 1.1811 it was partly the chiefe cause, why the chiefe Minister of Losanna forsooke the towne, for that the heads of the Cantons could not indure that the Antients should haue the censuring of manners: yet the one is most necessarie in euerie well gouer∣ned commonweale, either to create Censors▪ or to submit themselues to the censure of the Bishops.

The Seigneurie of Geneue reserues this prerogatiue to their Bishops, Ministers, [ K] and Auntients, to haue the priuiledge of a Corporation, and to censure the liues, and manners of men in their consistorie, and yet without any iurisdiction to com∣maund, or to execute their sentences, either by themselues, or by the officers of the Seigneurie, but for disobedience they excommunicate him, a matter of greater con∣sequence: for the person excommunicated, after a certayne time is pursued crimi∣nally before the magistrate, by the Inquisitour of the faith, as in the catholike church, but not so soone: for there hath beene some one excommunicate fifteene yeeres, and afterwards conuented before the Inquisitor of the faith, who meant to proceed against him, hee hath appealed to the Parliament, where his appellation

was reiected, & he condemned in a fine, decreeing, that he should be seized on, and [ A] carried to the Bishops prison, commaunding the Inquisitor to proceed in his triall, euen vnto a definitiue sentence, and to certifie the Court. It was in those daies, when as it was lawfull to excommunicate any man euen for pettie debts, al∣though the debtors had made it knowne that they had not any thing. But after the edict made at Orleance, and confirmed by the Parliament, the Bishops and Aunti∣ents could not vse such censures within this realme. At Lions M^r de Moulin was much discontēted against the consistorie, saying, That vnder colour of their censure they attempted vppon the temporall iurisdiction, and yet hee blamed it in the catho∣like church. But taking away suspension, interdiction, and excommunication, the ecclesiasticall censure is of no force, and by the same inconuenience, good manners [ B] and discipline is abolished: but there is no reason, that for disobedience in slight matters, they should vse such censures.

The auntient Censors did set notes and marks vppon the registers against those that deserued it, to aduertise their successors in their charge of those that were so no∣ted, if they did not amend. In my opinion that should suffice, and not to proceed against them by any amercements, or to excommunicate them for want of paiment. I leaue it to the wise to decide, whether it bee better to diuide the temporall censure (touching maners & other things aboue specified) from the ecclesiasticall censure, or to ioyne them together. But yet it were better to allow both to the Bishops & An∣tients, [ C] than to take all from them, and thereby to depriue the commonweale of that which is most necessarie: for wee see those estates which doe vse it, to flourish in lawes and good manners: we see whooredome, vsurie, mummeries, and excesse in all things rooted out, the blaspheamer, ruffian, and idle vagabound banished; and without doubt, those commonweales which shall vse such censure, shall continue and flourish in all vertues: they which neglect lawes, vertue, and religion, will bee contemned, as it happened in Rome not long before the ruine of the empire; when as in stead of Censors, they created an office which they called The Tribune of Plai∣sirs, as we may note in Cassiodorus. But for that the Censors office was first institu∣ted in regard of taxes, subsidies, and imposts, and to make a stocke for publike neces∣sities, [ D] let vs also speake of treasure.

CHAP. II. Of Treasure.

IF Treasure be the sinewes of a commonweale, as an auntient Ora∣tor said, it is verie necessary to haue the true knowledge thereof, first* 1.1812 to see by what honest meanes to gather money together; second∣ly, to imploy it to the profit and honour of the commonweale; and lastly, to spare and to reserue some part for all needfull euents, least [ E] the publike treasurie being exhaust, the commonweale might bee oppressed with sudden calamitie. We will therefore handle these three poynts eue∣rie one in order.

Touching the first poynt. There are many craftsmasters in matters of imposts, which know many meanes to raise vp great summes of money, but they neuer had the true knowledge of honour and honestie. But leauing these cunning politicians I will follow those, who as they haue had a great care of the treasure, so haue they sought by honest meanes to increase the reuenues of the commonweale, lest the citie by want should be drawne into danger, and the prince forced by vnlawfull meanes

to sucke the priuat wealth and bloud of his subiects, as it hath happened to those that [ F] seemed best acquainted with politike affaires: amongst the which the Lacedemoni∣ans are named, whom not content with their owne territories, as their master Licur∣gus* 1.1813 had taught them, taking from them all vse of gold and siluer, inioyning them to make money of iron, least that strangers should grow in loue with the Lacede∣monians countrie, or they with that of strangers, supposing thereby not onely to free his citisens from iniuries, but also from forraine vices: But they had no sooner past their frontiers but they fell to borrowing, some of the king of Persia, as Lysander and Callicratides: some of the king of Egypt, as Agesilaus, and Cleomenes, kings of Lacedemon. For which cause the Seigniorie of Sparta hauing soone wonne all Greece, and gathered together a great masse of treasure, they decreed, That all the [ G] gold and siiluer which they had taken from their enemies, should be kept in the pub∣like Treasurie, to serue them at their need, with defence not to vse it for anie priuat occasion: but their treasure without ground or supply beeing soone wasted, they were forced to returne to borrowing to make warre (the which is not entertayned and maintayned by diet, as an auntient Captaine said) whereby their commonweale* 1.1814 decaied vnder king Cleomenes. Euerie commonweale therefore must prouide to haue their treasure built of a sure and durable foundation. There are onely seuen meanes in generall for the making of a publike treasure, in the which all other are conteined. The first is, by the reuenues of the commonweale: The second, by con∣quest* 1.1815 from the enemie: The third, by the liberalitie and gift of friends: The fourth [ H] by the pensions & tribute of their alies: The fifth, vpon traffike: The sixt, vpon mar∣chants, which bring in and carrie out marchandise: And the seuenth vppon the sub∣iects imposts.

Touching the first, which growes by the reuenues, there is not any seemes to mee more honest & sure. So we read that all the antient monarchs and law-giuers, which builded new cities, or transported new colonies, they assigned (besides the streets, temples, theaters, & the possessions of priuat men) certaine places fit for the common∣weale, and free to all in general; the which were called Commons, and let out to pri∣uate men for a certaine time, or for euer, paying a yeerely rent into the Treasurie or [ I] * 1.1816 Exchequer, to supply the charges of the commonweale. We read that Romulus the founder of Rome & of the Roman commonweale, diuided all the lands into three parts; appoynting a third for the temporall of the Church, a third for the rents of the commonweale, and the surplusage to be deuided among priuate men, the which at that time were three thousand citisens, euerie one of the which hauing two iournies,* 1.1817 or acres of land: so as of eighteene thousand iournies or acres of land, lying in the territories of Rome, they reserued six thousand for the sacrifices, six thousand for the reuenues of the commonweale and intertainment of the kings house, and six thou∣sand for the citisens. Yet Plutarch sets downe twise as manie citisens, and saith that [ K] Romulus would set no limits of the territorie of Rome, lest it should be seene what he* 1.1818 had vsurped from his neighbours, and that his successor Numa diuided the reuenues to poore citisens: but the first opinion is the more likely and the more common; for the deuision of two iournies or acres continued a long time, as Pliny saith, spea∣king to Cincinatus the Dictator, the which was two hundred and threescore yeares after Romulus: Aranti sua duo iuger a Cincinato viator inquit, vela corpus & audi manda∣ta Senatus: Cincinatus plowing his two acres, Passenger (saith he) vncouer thy bodie, and heare the commaundements of the Senat. And Denis Halicarnasseus holds the first opinion; hee was in houshould with Marcus Varro, the true Register of all Ro∣man antiquities. But since by the law Licinia, euerie citisen was allowed to haue

seuen journies or acres of land. If it be true which wee read in Pliny, or Collumella: [ A] Post exactos Reges Liciniana illa septem iugera, quae plebis Tribunus viritim diuiserat, maiores questus antiquis retulêre, quàm nunc nobis praebent amplissima veruacta, After the expulsion of the kings, those seuen acres which the Tribune deuided to euerie one by the law Licinia, did yeeld our auncestours more profit, than now our large fields. And the oration of Marcus Curius is well knowne, noting him as a pernitious citisen that could not be contented with seuen acres. In this diuision Romulus did imitate the Egyptians, who in old time diuided all the reuenues of Egypt into three parts: The first was for the sacrifices and sacrificers; The second, to entertaine the kings house, and to defray the publike charges; And the third for the Calasiris, the [ B] which were the men of warre, alwaies entertained to serue at need: all the other citi∣sens were either husbandmen, or slaues. Wee read also, that Ezechiel, in reforming the abuses of the princes of the Hebrewes, appoynted certaine lands for the sacri∣fices, some common for the people, besides the reuenues for the entertainement of the kings house, and to serue for publike expences. To the end (saith hee) that the princes shall no more grieue my people with exactions and imposts. Although from the beginning of the Israelits kingdome, the kings had some reuenues; for the towne of Ziceleg, with some land being giuen to Dauid by king Achis, continued for euer as part of the kings reuenues, and was neuer alienated. Of the regall reuenues some are publike, some are priuate, the last may bee sould and made away, the first [ C] neuer. And to the end that princes should not bee forced to ouercharge their sub∣iects with imposts, or to seeke any vnlawfull meanes to forfeit their goods, all Mo∣narchs and States haue held it for a generall and vndoubted law, That the publike* 1.1819 reuenues should be holy, sacred, and inalienable, either by contract or prescription. In like sort, kings (especially in this realme) graunting their Letters pattents for the reunion of crowne lands, declare, that they haue taken an oath comming to the crowne, in no sort to sell or make away the reuenues: and although it were duely and directly made away, were it for euer, yet is it alwayes subiect to bee redeemed, and in such sort as the prescription of a hundred yeares, which giues a iust title to the possessor, doth not touch the reuenues of the crowne. The edicts, decrees, and [ D] * 1.1820 ordinances of this realme are notorious, not onely against priuate men, but euen against princes of the bloud, who haue beene put from the deuision of the reue∣nues, & the prescription of a hundred yeres. And this is not peculiar to this realme alone, but common to the kings of England, Spayne, Poland, and Hungarie, who are accustomed to sweare not to alienate the reuenues of the crowne. The which is also obserued in popular & Aristocritall states: and euen at Venice the law allowes no prescription (the which many would limit to six score yeares:) nor yet the Can∣tons of the Swissers: for king Henry 2 hauing requested the Siegniorie of Lucerne to ingage themselues for a certaine summe of money, Hugo the chiefe magistrat made answere vnto the Ambassador, That both the Senat and Commons of Lu∣cerne [ E] had sworne, neuer to pawne nor ingage their lands. Wee read also, that the same ordinances were religiously obserued in two the most goodly commonweales that euer were, Athens and Rome, whereas two great personages, Themistocles and Cato the Censor, caused all the publike reuenues to bee seized on, the which had through tract of time, and sufferance of magistrats beene vsurped by priuate men, saying in their orations, Nec mortales contra deum immortalem, nec priuatos contra* 1.1821 Rempub▪ praescribere posse, That mortall men could neuer prescribe against the im∣mortali God, nor priuate men against the commonweale. And therefore the court of Parliament vppon a ciuill request obtained by the kings Proctor generall, against

a decree made in fauour of the successors of Foelix of Nogaret, to whom king Phi∣lip [ F] the faire 260 yeares before had giuen the lands and Seigniorie of Caluisson, for his vertues and well deseruing of the commonweale, whereby it was reuoked vnto the Councell: shewing therby that prescription hath no place, when there is any question of the reuenues of the crowne. And the court of Parliament at Ro∣uan, by a sentence giuen the 14 of Februarie, 1511, betwixt the kings proctor and the religious of S. Omer, adiudging the possession of certaine goods vnto the king, allowing the religious to releeue themselues by some other meanes, and to proue it duely, by way of inquest, and for cause, which words (and for cause) are not to bee vnderstood for the poore subiects of the countrie onely, but generally for all. And oftentimes the treaties made betwixt princes haue no other difficulties, but for the [ G] preseruation of the reuenues, the which princes cannot alienate to the preiudice of the publike. Henry 8 king of England in a treatie made with the Pope and poten∣tates of Italy, in the yeare 1527, caused this clause to be added, That they might not giue away any thing of the crowne of Fraunce, for the redeeming of king Frauncis: and vpon this poynt the breach of the treatie of Madrid was grounded, for that the auncient custome of this realme, conformable to the edicts or ordinances of other nations, requires the consent of the three estates: the which is obserued in Poland, by a law made by Alexander king of Poland, according to the disposition the common law, vnlesse the sale were made at such time as the enemy had inuaded the countrie: [ H] and that the forme be obserued from poynt to poynt, as in the alienation of pupils goods (the commonweale being alwayes regarded as a pupill) and if there be any thing omitted, it is all of no force, or at the least it is subiect to rescission, without re∣stitution vnto the purchasor of the thing purchased. Neyther can the prince chal∣lenge* 1.1822 that vnto himselfe which belongs vnto the publike, no more than a husband can his wiues dowrie, wherin the prince hath lesse right; for the husband may abuse the fruits of his wiues dowrie at his pleasure, but a prince may well vse, but not abuse the fruits of a publike dowrie: as the citisens that were in societie with the Atheni∣ans complained, that the publike money was to be put in Apolloes treasury, and not to be wasted by the Athenians. [ I]

Our kings haue and doe acknowledge, that the proprietie of the crowne lands is not the princes: for king Charles the 5 and 7, would not haue the crowne lands paw∣ned, vnlesse the Parliament at the instance of the kings Proctor had so decreed, as we may see in the auntient registers of the court of Parliament, and chamber of ac∣counts; and the reason is, for that the reuenues belong vnto the commonweale, as wise princes haue alwaies acknowledged: & when as king Lewis the 8 died (hauing giuen much by his testament to poore widdowes and orphans) hee commaunded all his jewels and moueables to be sould to performe his legacies, least that any thing belonging to the crowne should be sould, as hauing no interest in it. And for this cause Pertinax the Roman Emperour caused his name being written vppon the [ K] publike lands, to be rased out, saying, That it was the very inheritance of the com∣monweale, and not the Emperours, although they enioy the rents for the mainte∣nance of their houses and the commonweale. And we doe also read, that Antonius Pius liued of his owne inheritance, applying nothing that belonged to the publike, to his priuat vse: whom king Lewis 12 (called the father of his countrie) doth seeme to imitate, who would not mingle his patrimony & reuenues, with that of the pub∣like;* 1.1823 erecting the chamber of Blois for his lands at Blois, Coussy, and Montfort: and yet many haue erroniously confounded the publike with the princes priuate lands. Neyther is it lawfull for soueraigne princes to abuse the fruits and reuenues

of the crowne lands, although the commonweale be in quiet and free from all trou∣ble; [ A] for that they haue the vse onely, and ought (the commonweale and their house being maintained) to keepe the surplusage for publike necessitie: although that Pe∣ricles said to the Ambassadours of the confederats, That they had no interest in the imployment of the treasure, so as they were maintayned in peace: for it was con∣tained in the treatie of aliance, that the money which should be raised in the time of peace, should be gared in Apolloes temple, and that it should not bee imployed but by a common consent. But there is great difference betwixt the Treasurie or Ex∣chequer in a monarchy, and in popular states: for a prince may haue a treasurie of his priuate patrimony, the which was called Fiscus by the Auntients, and that of* 1.1824 the publike reuenues Aerarium: the one being diuided from the other by the aun∣tient [ B] lawes, the which can haue no place in a popular or Aristocraticall estate. Yet there neuer wanted flatterers to persuade princes to sell the reuenues of the crowne to make a greater benefit; the which is a tyrannical opinion, and the ruine of a com∣monweale: for it is well knowne, that the publike reuenues consist chiefly in that which Dukes, Marqueses, Earles, and Barons did sometimes possesse, the which, ei∣ther by succession, dowrie, or by confiscation, haue come vnto the state in Lord∣ships, coppiholds, in fees, alienations, sales, seazures, rents, amercements, rights, confiscations, and other regalities, the which are not subiect to imposts and ordi∣narie charges, and oftentimes are gotten by them which are free from all charges. [ C] Moreouer, commissions graunted to sell the publike reuenues, for the making of money speedily, allow it to be sould for ten yeares purchase, when as priuate lands* 1.1825 in fee with iustice are sould for thirtie yeares purchase, and those that haue dignities at fiftie yeres and more: so as some with purchase of the publike lands, reape in one yeare more profit by the iurisdiction, than they paid for the land. Others haue paid* 1.1826 nothing at all, taking the valuation of the reuenue by extracts from the Chamber of accounts, giuen in by the receiuers in ten yeares, who oftentimes haue not receiued any thing, for that the profit of inferiour iustice is made in the chiefe and regall court. As for sales, the purchaser hath more profit, than the interest of the money which they haue payed can amount vnto: as also the receiuers of the reuenues [ D] are not accustomed▪ to giue any account of casualties, but for a small part. But in farming out the crowne lands, the farmours are lyable to subsidies, and are charged according to their abilities.

There are infinite more abuses which the commonweale sustaines by the sale of their reuenues, but the greatest is, that the money which is made is not put out to rent (like vnto those that thinke to be good husbands) but is most commonly wasted and giuen vnto them that haue least deserued, and so for want of money to redeeme this land, the commonweale falles to decay: then doe they also sell the commons wherby the poore are releeued. It were more fit to sell the waste lands of the com∣monweale,* 1.1827 the which no man will hire, and brings no benefit to the common∣weale, [ E] to the end the Treasury may bee enriched, and that the citisens may profit by the tilling thereof: but if they may haue a farmour, it is not lawfull to sell it, although that Aristotle commends them of Constantinople, who sould their lands for a continuall rent, the which is a meere alienation, and money taken before, dimi∣nisheth the rent: the which was expressely defended by an edict made by Charles the ninth. And although that afterwards he made an other edict for the renting out of waste lands, and paying of fines, by the persuasion of such as sought to make money: yet the Parliament of Paris vpon the verification of the said edict, decreed, That the rents should not be redeemed, and that there should bee no fine payed at

the beginning; and for that the Commissioners for this sale did sue vnto the King [ F] that it might bee lawfull to giue money at the entry, the Court (all the Chambers being assembled) decreed, That the purchasers might not giue aboue a third of the summe at the entry, in regard of the value of the lands: the which third part should* 1.1828 be receyued by the Receyuers of the reuenues apart, to bee imployed to redeeme the reuenues that were sould, imposing a quadruple penaltie to bee leuied, as well vppon the receyuers, as of those that had gotten any assignation of the said money. And it is not heere needfull to relate what losses the king and commonweale haue sustayned by such alienations of waste lands. King Frauncis the second comming* 1.1829 to the crowne, commaunded his Proctors and magistrats to redeeme the publike re∣uenues from priuate occupiers: wherein he complayned, that the crowne lands and [ G] reuenues were so dismembred and wasted, as that which remayned did not suffice for the charges that were laid vpon them. But our king hath farre greater cause to complayne now, when as there scarce remaynes any thing that is to bee sould. In the generall accounts of the treasure made in Ianuary, in the yeare 1572, there was* 1.1830 no receit made of any reuenues, although there were six & thirtie thousand crownes a yeare in the receit, when as king Frauncis died, as it appeareth by an account of the treasure made in the yeare 1569: and by the same estate the alienation of the reue∣nues,* 1.1831 impositions, and subsidies amounted to fourteene millions nine hundred six∣tie and one thousand foure hundred and seuentie liures, fifteene soulz, and eight de∣niers; not comprehending twelue hundred thousand liures for the fourth and halfe [ H] fourth, and foure hundred and fiftie thousand liures, in regard of fifteene liures vp∣pon the strike of salt, the which the country of Guienne redeemed in the yeares 1549, and 1553. whereby is plainely appeares, that the kings reuenues are almost all ingaged and made away, for fifteene or sixteene millions at the most, the which is worth aboue fiftie millions: for that Earledomes, Baronies, and other Seigniories haue not beene sould for aboue nine yeares purchase: and if it were redeemed and let to farme, it would amount yearely to almost three millions, the which would suffice to entertaine the kings house in state, and to pay most of the officers their wa∣ges, not medling with any of the other ordinarie or extraordinarie charges. And if [ I] wee may compare a small kingdome with a greater, the reuenues of the crowne of* 1.1832 England, comprehending the land subsidies, taxes, customes, imposts, and all other charges, amount to little more than sixscore and ten thousand pounds starling a yeare, hauing a good part of the temporall lands of the church annexed vnto it, and yet the Queene doth maintayne her Court and the estate of her realme verie roy∣ally and redeemed the reuenues.

True it is, that a setled peace for these fifteene yeres hath much preuailed for the maintenance of the state of England; and warre for the ruine of Fraunce, if God had not sent our King Henrie 3 from heauen to restore it to his first beautie. But we must obserue that for the preseruation of the reuenues of a commonweale, most [ K] commonly that of a monarchy is better husbanded than in a popular state, or in* 1.1833 that which is gouerned by few of the better sort; whereas the magistrats and ouer∣seers of the treasure conuert the publike to their owne priuate profit: and euery one striues to gratify his friends, or to purchase the peoples fauour with the preiudise of the commonweale: as Caesar did in his first Consulship, who deuided the territory of Capua among the people, and abated the rents of the farmes a third part, after that hee had beene well bribed. And ten yeares after Quintus Metellus Tribune of the people, to winne their fauour, published a law to take away the toles in all the ports of Italy. In like sort, Pericles to haue credit with the people of Athens, made

distribution of great summes of money, the which had come into the treasure. This [ A] happens not in a monarchie, for Monarchs which haue no more certaine reuenues than their lands, and that haue no power to impose subsidies or other charges vpon their subiects but with their owne consents, or vppon vrgent necessitie, are not so prodigall of their crowne lands. It is not needfull to discourse any further of reue∣nues, being impossible to order it better than was by the edict of king Charles 9 if it were duely executed.

The second meanes to gather treasure together, is by conquest vpon the enemy* 1.1834 to recouer the treasure wasted in warre: So did the antient Romans; for although the sacke and spoyle of townes forced, belonged to the Captaines and souldiers, yet [ B] the treasure was carried into the treasurie of Rome. And as for the townes yeelded or taken by capitulation, the armie had but their pay, and sometimes a double pay, (before that the discipline of war was corrupted) & the treasure of the vanquished was carried to Rome, if they had not otherwise capitulated. All the gold and sil∣uer (saith Titus Liuius) and all the brasse that was taken from the Samnites, was car∣ried to the treasurie. And speaking of the Gaules beyond the Alpes, he saith, That Furius Camillus carryed into the Capitoll 170000 pounds of siluer which hee had taken from them: and that Flaminius caused to bee brought out of Spaine of the spoyles of Greece, the value of three millions & eight hundred thousand crownes, besides siluer, rich moueables, armes and ships. Paulus Aemilius brought thrice as [ C] much out of Macedony. Caesar caused aboue fourtie millions to be deliuered into the publike treasurie, by the report of Appian. Wee may see from the 33 booke of Titus Liuius to the 34, infinite treasures brought to the Treasurie of Rome of the spoyles of conquered nations. And although all were not brought in by the Ge∣nerals, yet fearing to bee charged with corruption, or to bee frustrate of their try∣umphs, they alwayes deliuered in great summes: for Scipio Asiaticus was accused and condemned of corruption, in a great fine, and yet he brought into the treasurie aboue two millions of gold: and Scipio the Affrican his brother, was also inclu∣ded in the accusation, although he had brought aboue fiue millions of gold of his conquests into the treasurie, besides the value of ten millions and fiue hundred [ D] thousand crownes: wherein king Antiochus was condemned: by meanes of the vi∣ctorie they had obtayned, and yet both of them were exiled and died poore. And although that Lucullus was the first (as Plutarch saieth) that inriched himselfe with the spoyle of his enemies, yet did he bring more into the Treasurie than any of the rest, except Caesar: the which I thought fit to obserue, for that commonly wee im∣ploy the treasure for the charge of the warres, and yet in all victories and conquests there neuer comes a crowne into the Exchequer, and oftentimes the sacke & spoile is giuen before the townes be taken or yeelded.

The Romans were not contented with their treasures and spoyles, but they con∣demned* 1.1835 the vanquished to loose a part of their territories, the which commonly [ E] was the seuenth part. Since, some haue bene condemned to loose a fourth or a third part of their lands, as in Italy, beeing subdued by Odocres king of the Herules. And soone after Hortarius king of the Lumbards condemned the vanquished to pay him yerely the moytie of their reuenues: as also the Romans had done vnto the Doriens long before. But William the Conqueror, after he had conquered the realme of Eng∣land, declared all the countrey in generall, & euery mans inheritance in particular for∣feyted vnto him by the law of armes, intreating the Englishmen as his farmours. Yet the Romans haue alwayes shewed themselues courteous and affable in that poynt, sending Colonies from their citie to inhabit the conquered countryes, distributing

to euery one a certayne quantitie: and by this meanes they freed their Citie from [ F] * 1.1836 beggers, mutinies, and idle persons, and did fortifie themselues with their owne men against the vanquished, the which by little and little did linke themselues in marria∣ges, and did willingly obey the Romans, who by this meanes also haue filled the world with their Colonies, with an immortall glory of their iustice, wisdome, and power: wheras most part of conquering princes plant Garrisons, which serue onely to spoyle and oppresse the subiects. If our kings after the taking of Naples and Mi∣lan had practised this course, they had yet continued in obedience to our kings. And it is no maruell if they reuolt against the Spanyard vppon the first occasion, as* 1.1837 well as the countrey of Flaunders hath done, hauing nothing but Garrisons there without Colonies. Yet wee find, that Sultan Mahumet king of the Turkes, found [ G] meanes to inrich his treasure by meanes of Christian slaues, which hee sent in Co∣lonies into conquered countries, giuing to euery one fifteene acres of land and two oxen, and seed for one yeare: and at the end of twelue yeares he tooke the moytie of* 1.1838 their fruits, the which hee continued for euer. Amurath the first dealt more mildly with the Timariots, giuing them certayne lands and rents, to some more, and to others lesse, vpon condition they should attend him in the wars when they were cal∣led, with a certayne number of horse: and if the Timariot chanced to die, the fruits should acrue vnto the Prince, vntill that hee had aduaunced some other, by way of gift. And generally the tenth of all successions belonged to the prince (the which [ H] grew by the law of armes, and by the princes conquering another mans countrey) and not by way of imposition vppon the auntient subiects. Whereby it appeareth, that the greatest and clearest reuenues which the Turke hath, are in manner casuall, and the warre is defrayed without any new charge.

The kings of Castile haue done in manner the like at the West Indies, and name∣ly the Emperour Charles 5, hauing conquered Peru, gaue the lands to the Captaines and Spanish souldiers by way of gift onely; and beeing dead, they returned to the* 1.1839 Emperour, vntill that another were aduaunced in his place: taking moreouer the fift of all the pearle and mynes; so as euerie two yeares there comes clearely into the kings treasurie in Spayne, neere foure millions of gold, the which is called, The port [ I] of Ciuill. But it is reason, that the conquests which are made vpon the enemie, and which augment their treasure, should also ease their subiects: as they did in Rome after the conquest of the realme of Macedon, the Romans were freed from taxes, imposts, and subsidies.

The third meanes to augment the treasure, is by liberalitie of friends or subiects, be it by legacie, or by donation during life: the which wee will speake briefly of, for* 1.1840 that it is vncertaine, besides there are few princes that giue, and fewer that receiue without requitall: for if a prince giues to one that is more rich and mightie, it seemes it is for feare, or vpon some bond, & somtimes he that receiues it, accounts it as a tribute. The Emperour of the Turkes sets to the view of all the world, as [ K] * 1.1841 well those presents which are sent him from his friends, as those that come from tributaries, to shew how much hee is feared of strangers, defraying the Ambassa∣dors charges with great bountie, the which neuer prince nor people did. But we find that the Auntients vsed an other kind of bountie and liberalitie than they doe at this day: for at this day they giue not often but to such as are in greatnesse and prosperitie, and the Auntients gaue in aduersitie. When as Hannibal had in a manner quite vanquished the Romans, and taken from them almost all Italy, the king of Egypt sent the value of 400 thousand crownes to Rome in pure gift; the which the Romans refused, giuing great thanks to the king. They did the like

to Hierom king of Sicile, who gaue them a crowne of gold waying 320 pound, and [ A] a Victorie of gold, with fiue thousand bushels of wheat: but they accepted no∣thing but the image of Victory as a happy presage. They shewed the same reso∣lutions to the Ambraciotes, and to many other Princes and Seigniories, who at that time offered them great presents, although they were in extreme necessitie: so as there was a combate of honour, in the one to giue, and in the other to refuse. But the Romans haue surmounted all other nations in courage and resolution in their aduersities: as for other princes and people they were not so nice to take, yea of∣tentimes they demaunded; as the Seigniorie of the Rhodes, when their Colossus fell downe & brake some of their ships, they sent Ambassadors to kings and princes* 1.1842 to beg, hauing small meanes, and it succeeded well: for king Hierom sent them [ B] threescore thousand crownes in guift, and many others imitated him: yea the king of Egypt gaue them in gold the value of eighteen hundred thousand crowns, and in siluer much more, with twentie thousand bushels of wheat, and three thousand beasts for sacrifices, besides great store of stuffe, and an infinite number of Architects and workemen the which hee entertayned at his owne charge for the building of a Colledge: so as the Seigniorie of Rhodes for an old broken image, and some crased ships, were greatly enriched by the bountie of other princes.

It was common to the kings of Egypt to glorie in their bountie to others: for [ C] wee read in a manner the like of Ptolomie the first, toward the citie and inhabitants of Ierusalem, to whom he sent the value of two hundred threescore and sixteene* 1.1843 thousand crownes, to redeeme a hundred thousand slaues of their nation; and ninetie thousand crownes for the sacrifices, besides a table of massy gold to set in Gods Temple: and the great presents he gaue to the 72 Interpreters, which tran∣slated the Bible out of Hebrew into Greeke. And as it was and will be alwayes tolle∣rable for pettie princes and small Siegniories to accept the honorable gifts of great princes and monarchs: so was it conuenient for the Romans to refuse such libera∣lities (and to beg it had beene infamous) and to accept, by guift or legacie, great realmes and royall successions; which they gaue them which had raigned peace∣fully [ D] vnder their protections, for an honest recompence of their justice, when as they died without heires males lawfully begotten. By this meanes Ptolomie king of* 1.1844 Cyrene, Attalus king of Asia, Eumenes king of Pergame, Nicomedes king of Bithinia, Coctius king of the Alpes, and Polemon king of Pontus, left the people of Rome heires of their goods & kingdoms. As for guifts from the subiect, the which the an∣tients called oblations, there were few or none at all: for charitable gifts which be* 1.1845 voluntarie, are now demaunded: and although the kings of Spaine, England and others vse intreaties to obtaine them, yet most commonly there is more force in these requests, than in commissions and letters of commaundement. I vnderstand by the word Gift, that which is liberally offered by the subiect vnto his prince; as [ E] the gold which they called Coronarium, the which the Iewes gaue vnto the Em∣perours, to be maintayned in the priuileges of their religion; and the magistrats of the townes and communalties of the empire: the which in time proued a forced subsidy, vntill that this force was taken away, the guifts remaining voluntary to gratyfie the Emperour, when as hee had obtayned any victorie against his ene∣mies.

The like may bee sayed of the imposts which in Spayne they call Seruice, the* 1.1846 which was freely graunted to the kings of Spayne to entertayne their estate more honorably; and since it was almost conuerted into an ordinary charge. Wee find

likewise that the kings of Persia contented themselues with the voluntary gifts and [ F] presents of diuers kinds that came from their subiects: but Darius Histaspes (he that got the kingdome by the neying of his horse) chaunged those kinds into coynes of gold and siluer, and the gifts into tributes and necessary charges, appoynting Trea∣surers* 1.1847 and Receyuers in euerie gouernment (which were 127 in number) to make a diuision of the taxes and subsidies, which amounted then to foureteene thousand fiue hundred and threescore Euboique talents, the which is valued at ten millions one hundred fourescore and twelue thousand crownes. But this antient custome of Persia is maintayned at this present in Aethiopia, whereas the gouernours of fiftie gouernments bring vnto the Negus, king of Aethiopia, the gifts and oblations of* 1.1848 his subiects in graine, wine, cattell, handy works, gold and siluer, without any other [ G] commission, or letters patents: so as for the greatnes of his maiesty, it is more befit∣ting to haue them obedient vnto him, than to send foorth his commissions to exact and beg of his subiects. As for successions and testamentary legacies giuen to prin∣ces by their subiects, it is at this day very rare, and yet in old time it was one of the greatest meanes whereby princes did augment their treasures: for wee read that the Emperour Augustus hauing giuen by will the value of eleuen millions and two hundred thousand crownes to be distributed among the people of Rome, and the legions; he withall protested, that he left not to his heyres but three millions and seuen hundred thousand crownes, although he shewed, that he had receyued from his friends not many yeares before his death, the summe of thirtie and fiue millions [ H] of crownes. True it is, that hee was accustomed to leaue vnto the children of the Testators, the legacies and successions that were giuen him, neuer taking any thing of their testaments whom he had not knowne: wherewith Cicero reproched Marc Antonie in open Senat, That hee had inriched himselfe by their testaments whom hee had neuer knowne; and yet Cicero confesseth that hee himselfe had gotten by testaments a million of crownes. But tyrants tooke all without any distinction: for there was no better meanes for any one to assure his testament, than to giue some∣what vnto the tyrant: but if the testament were imperfect, the tyrant seazed vppon the whole succession, the which is reproued by the law, for which cause the custom [ I] to make Emperours and Princes their heyres, ceased.

The fourth meanes to augment and intertayne the treasure, is by pensions from their alies, which are payed in time of peace, as well as in warre, for protection and* 1.1849 defence against their enemies; or else to haue counsell, ayd, and comfort at need, according to the tenor of the treatie. I say, that a pension is payed by friends and alies; for a soueraigne prince which hath capitulated with another to pay him some thing yearely to haue peace without any treatie of amitie or alyance, is a tributary:* 1.1850 as Amiochus king of Asia, the Seigniory of Carthage, the kings of Sclauonia, and many other princes and states were tributaries to the Romans, the kings of Arabia and Idumea to Dauid, and the princes of Asia to the kings of Persia. And for this [ K] reason the treaties of aliance betwixt the house of Fraunce, and the Cantons of the Swissers, specify, That the king shall giue an ordinary pension of a hundred pounds to euery Canton for a peace, and two thousand for an aliance, besides all extraordi∣nary* 1.1851 pensions, and their pay in time of warre, & they to do him seruice in his court for the guard of his person: which doeth shew, that the Swissers and Grisons are pensioners to the king, considering the mutuall aliance, and the seruice they owe for this pension. In like sort he is no tributary that corrupteth his enemies Captaynes, as Pericles did to the Lacedemonian Captaynes, not (as Theophrastus sayd) to pur∣chase a peace, but to deferre the warre. But wee may say, that the Cantons neuer

made a more profitable league for their estate, both to inrich themselues, & to traine [ A] * 1.1852 their subiects vp in armes at another mans cost, and also to send swaggerers and idle persons out of their countrie. By the account of him that payed the Cantons, the ordinary and extraordinarie pensions came yearely at the least to six score or seuen score thousand liures: and in the yere 1573 they came to two hundred eigh∣teene thousand liures. The pensions that were payd to the Germaine Commaun∣ders* 1.1853 the same yeare, amounted to six score and twelue thousand liures, besides their* 1.1854 entertainement in warre.

It is necessarie for great princes to giue pensions to the Secretaries, spies, Cap∣taines, Orators, and houshold seruants of their enemies, to discouer their counsels [ B] and enterprises: and experience hath often taught, That there is no greater meanes to maintayne his estate, and to ruine his enemies: for the strongest place is easily ta∣ken, so that an asse laden with gold may enter it; as Philip the first king of Macedon said, who by his gifts & liberalitie subiected almost all Greece vnto him. And the kings of Persia had no better means to keepe the forces of Grece out of Asia, than by goodly pensions: for it is hard that he which receiueth should not doe some seruice* 1.1855 in requitall of his money; for he is tyed by bond, or forced through shame, or moo∣ued with hope of a greater benefit, or with feare least hee that had corrupted him should accuse him: for princes do seldome giue any great pensions vnto strangers, vnlesse they first sweare against their natiue countrie: as a Germane prince sayd at [ C] * 1.1856 a dyet at Wormes in the yeare 1552. There was the same yeare a prince, who since is dead, the which offered to an Ambassador in his masters name, that for two thou∣sand crownes a yeare pension, he would discouer vnto him all the secrets, practises, and negotiations of his countrie, and to imploy all his meanes to preuent any thing that might be done in preiudice of him that should pay the pension. These men are much to be feared, especially in a popular estate, in the which it is more easie for a few priuat men that gouerne the commonweale to betray it, than in a monarchy, wherein the prince accounts all that is publike his owne, and therefore hath care of it as of his owne. But such rewards and corruptions can neuer bee profitable to them that giue it, if it bee not kept secret, the which is impossible, if there be many. [ D]

The kings of Persia and Macedone gaue none pensions but a small number of Orators and Captaynes of the Grecians: and the king of Egypt for seuen thousand crownes pension, which he gaue to Aratus, had the whole estate of the Atheians at his deuotion. And therefore it seemes strange to me, why our kings (besides the ordinary pension of the Swissers) haue giuen extraordinarily to about two thou∣sand of them which exceeded the rest in credit and dignitie; as king Henrie the se∣cond did, the which were knowne by their names and surnames, and gaue their ac∣quittances; beside the priuate pensions, the which were payed by roll, and came yerely to 49299 liures: happely it had bene better to haue giuen the moity of these pensions to few men of authoritie, and secretly without any acquittance: for some∣times [ E] * 1.1857 a pensionar had rather lose the greatest reward of any prince, than to giue a note of his hand for the receit of the money: as that English lord Hastings, to whom king Lewis 11 gaue 2000 crownes pension, the bringer demaunded an acquittance for his discharge onely vnto the king as he said; whereunto the lord Hastings answe∣red, That he would receiue his pension, but he would giue him no acquittance: the which the king demaunded earnestly, to make vse of it in time, and to bring him in suspition of a traitor to his countrie. There are also somethings not only secret, but also dishonest, for the which pensions are giuen, although some hold nothing foule nor vnlawfull that is done for the benefit of his country; for my part I hold this fact

no lesse odious, that shall suborne the houshould seruants of princes to murder their [ F] masters, or if they cannot kill them by force, to poyson them, than hee that shall take a reward for so fowle a fact. Wherein Pericles was commended, who giuing vp his accounts, set downe an article of ten thousand crownes disbursed without warrant, shewing neither acquittance nor cause of it: the which the people allowed without any further inquiry, knowing well the wisdome and loyaltie of the man in the go∣uernment of the commonweale. It is most certaine, that a secret pensionar giuing* 1.1858 an acquittance, is alwayes in feare to be discouered, whereby hee shall neither dare, nor be able to doe any thing in fauour of him that giues him a pension. Besides, it is dangerous when pensions are giuen publikely, the iealousie of such as haue none will be a cause of quarrels and partialities, as hath oftentimes happened in Swisser∣land, [ G] in such sort, as those which had lesse than others, or none at all, were very vehe∣ment to haue the priuat pensions put into the receiuers hands with the generall pen∣sions: the which the king denyed, saying, That he would rather restraine his liberalitie.

The fift meanes to gather together treasure, is by trafike, which the prince or the state vseth by his factors; although there be few princes that doe vse it: and by the* 1.1859 lawes of this realme, England, and Germanie, it is not lawfull for the gentry to trade in marchandise, else must he lose his qualitie: and by the law Claudia, no Senator of Rome might haue a vessell at sea contayning aboue fourtie bushels. Questus omnis (inquit Lauius) patribus indecorus visus est, All gaine (saith Titus Liuius) was held vn∣seemely [ H] for the fathers. And afterwards by the Emperours decrees it was general∣ly defended for all gentlemen and souldiers, and by the Canons for all church men to trade in marchandise. And the Persians in a mockery called Darius, Marchant, for that he forced them to those charges, which at the first they gaue him volunta∣rily. But yet in my opinion it is more seemely for a prince to be a marchant, than a tyrant; and for a gentleman to traffike, than to steale. Who is ignorant, that the kings of Portugall being restrayned within straight limits, and not well able to maintaine their estates, yet loth to oppresse their subiects, haue for these hundred yeares traded without reproch, and to the great inriching of their states? In the yeare 1475 they [ I] discouered the rich mynes of gold in Guinee, vnder the conduct of Iohn bastard of* 1.1860 Portugall; and twelue yeares after the spices of Calicut, and of the East; and conti∣nuing their course to the Indies, haue so wel traffiked there, as they are become lords of the best ports of Affrike, and haue seazed vppon the Ile of Ormus in despite of the king of Persia: they haue taken a great part of the kingdome of Marocco, and of Guinee, & forced the kings of Cambar, Calecut, Malache, and Canauor to do them homage, treating a league & commerce with the great Cham of Tartaria: they haue pulled from the Turks & Sultans of Egypt the greatest riches of the Indies, and filled Europe with the treasures of the East, passing euē to the Molucques: which the kings of Castile pretend to belong to them, by a deuision made by pope Alexander 6, not∣withstanding [ K] the marchants of Genua & Florence desired to free it for 35000 duc∣cats, which Iohn 3 king of Portugal had paid vnto the emperor Charles 5, & to giue 100000 ducats more that they might haue free passage to those ilands which; the K. of Portugal would not yeld vnto, making acount of the profit he draws from thence as of an infinit treasure, besides the gaine that comes to his subiects, hauing much im∣paired the wealth of the princes of the East, & of the Venetians, who haue indured so great a losse, as of all the calamities they indured during their warres with king Lewis 12, they receiued no such losse as from the Portugals, taking from them their gayne of the Easterne parts.

Neither doth the Trade of Marchandize ingrosse dishonour, or imbase the [ A] * 1.1861 the Signiories and nobilitie of Italie, neither did Tully disallowe of it, but of such as sold by retayle, whome hee tearmed Sordido. As for the traffique which Princes practise vpon their Subiects, it is no traffique, but an impost or exacti∣on: which is, to forbid them to trade, and to put his subiects corne and wine in∣to his receiuers handes, to pay them at an vnder rate, and to sell it vnto strangers, or to the Subiects themselues, at his owne pleasure. This was one of the reasons* 1.1862 which made Alphonso King of Naples most odious; for that he gaue his Swine to his Subiects to make fat, and if by chaunce they died, he made them pay for them: he bought the oyle in Apulia, and gaue his owne price; and the wheat in grasse, and sold it a gaine at the higgest price he could, forbidding all others to sell [ B] vntill he had sold his. But of all the traffiques and marchandize which Princes* 1.1863 vse, there is not any more pernitious nor base, than the sale of honors, offices, and benefices, as I haue formerly sayd, the which may neuer be tolerated, but in the extreame necessitie of the Common weale, as the Venetians did, hauing spent in seuen yeres, that Lewis 12 made war against them, fiue Millions of Duc∣kats, whereof they had made 50000 Duckats of the sale of Offices. The like reason mou'd King Francis 1 in the yere 1527, to diuide the Ciuile from the cri∣minall Magistrates, setting all Offices to sale to them that would giue most. The which was more sowle and dishonorable in Pope Adrian, who three yeares before, not onely sold offices, but also benefices, as he did the Bishopricke of [ C] Cremona for 20000 Duckats, and had also resolued to leaue two hundred and twentie thousand Duckats, by halfe a Duckat for euerie chimney within the ter∣ritories of the Church, making his pretext of warre against the Turke. But for that these traffiques are so filthie, and of such dangerous consequence, the which being once begun, doe neuer cease, it were better to trie all other meanes, than once to giue way vnto them.

The sixt means to encrease treasure, is vpon the marchandize that are brought* 1.1864 in, or carryed out, the which is one of the antientest and most vsuall in euerie Common-weale, and grounded vpon equitie; which kind of custome the La∣tines called Portoria, as they did the tribute of the publique farmes Decimas, and [ D] of pastures Scripturam, and it is reason, that hee that will gaine by another mans subiects, should pay some right to his Prince or Common weale. Wherof there be diuers kindes, the which were reduced within this Realme to one impost of twenty Deniers vpon the liure or pound, by an Edict made by King Henrie the 2.* 1.1865 and after reuoked, lest the customes and imposts should bee confounded, the which might prooue preiudiciall. King Charles 5 abated the custome halfe, but afterwardes he restored it, the which was the twentieth part of the price, or fiue in the hundred, and so the ancient Romanes tooke for custome of forraine marchandize: but afterwards the Emperours exacted the eight part, the which they called Octuarium vectigal, as in our time they haue demaunded the twelfe [ E] part of the price. The Emperour of Turkie takes ten of the hundred of all Marchant strangers going out of Alexandria, and of his Subiects fiue in the hun∣dred. But in this Realme the contrarie is practised touching the salt, for the which the stranger payes nothing, but the duties of a Marchant, and the subiect payes fortie and fiue liures vpon the measure, contrarie to the Marchants rights. And although the Salt of France bee the best and most plentifull in all Europe, wherewith the lowe Countreys, England, and Denmarke doe store themselues, yet is it farre deerer to vs, than to them: for since that the Store houses of Salt

were let out, and the officers of the Custome suppressed, the measure of Salt [ F] which the Marchant sold for ten shillings starling, is now come to fiftie foure shillings: and since these warres, to eight pounds besides the Kings rights, and the carriage: so as all comprehended, it hath been sometimes sold for a hundred and eighteene Crownes the measure, whereby the poore subiect hath beene ruined and the stranger enriched, yea sometimes the stranger brings it againe secretly to sell in France. This priuiledge was giuen vnto strangers by Francis the 1. that they might bring commodities and money into this Realme, rather than into Spaine: notwithstanding since it hath been verie manifest, that the stranger cannot be without the Salt of France: for Charles the 5. hauing forbid∣den his subiects of the lowe Countreys not to fetch any Salt in France, the estates [ G] of the countrey made it knowne, that their fish (which is their greatest mar∣chandize) grew drie, and was spoyled with the salt that came from Spaine and Bourgongne, getting leaue with great importunitie to fetch their salt out of France, being the sweeter. It is most certaine that no salt can bee made of salt water on this side the 47 degree, by reason of the cold: and the salt of Spaine is too corosiue: so as if the stranger payd but a fourth part of that which the sub∣iect payes for the Kings rights, there would come an infinite masse of money into the Treasorie, for we often see the ships of England and the low Countreys come into France, onely with their ballast (hauing no commodities to exchange with them) to buy salt, wine, and corne, the which abound in this Realme, and [ H] * 1.1866 will neuer fayle; whereas the Mynes of mettall, which growe in the bowels of the Earth, are wasted in few yeares: yet strangers seeke it in the center of the earth to bring into this Realme, and to carrie away commodities necessarie for the life of man: which a wise Prince should not suffer to be transported, but for the ease of his subiects, and encrease of his Treasure, the which cannot be done without raysing of the foraine custome: for the greater the forraine custome shall be, the greater benefite shall come into the Exchequer: and if the stranger fearing the impost, shall buy the lesse, then the subiect shall haue it the better cheape; for all wares, the greatest treasures will be where there are most thinges [ I] necessarie for the life of man: although there be neither Mynes of gold nor sil∣uer, (as there are fewe or none at all in this Realme,) yet notwithstanding doth feed a great part of Europe as King Agrippa sayd; and the countrey of Egypt hath neither Mynes of gold nor siluer, and yet both Affricke and Europe, are much releeued with corne which growes there. If anyone will say, that by the treaties of traffique betwixt Princes, they cannot raise a forraine custome, I must answere, that this may take place amonge those which haue treated with that condition, but there are few of them; and yet it hath neuer been much regarded: for euen in the lowe countreys and in England, the french Marchants were forced in the yeare 1557 to pay a crowne vpon euerie tunne of wine that* 1.1867 came into the port, and the subiects payd nine french crownes for the impost, [ K] without any regard to the treatise of trafficke. And the yeare following, the the Queene of England did raise the forraine custome a third part, imposing thir∣teene shillings and a pennie vpon euerie peece of cloth, the which is a matter of great consequence: and I haue been assured from a Marchant of Antwerpe, that in the yeare 1565 there came in lesse than three moneths into the lowe coun∣treys a hundred thousand peeces of cloth, accounting three karsies or three cottons to a cloth. It is therefore expedient to raise the forraine customes to strangers of such commodities as they cannot want, and by that means increase

the treasure and ease the subiects; and also to abate the custome of marchan∣dise [ A] comming in, if the subiect cannot passe without them, you must raise the custome of things made by hand, and not to suffer any to bee brought out of* 1.1868 strange countreys, and not to suffer any raw stuffs to be caried out of the land, as iron, copper, steele, wooll, flaxe, raw silke, and such like, that the subiect may haue the benefit of the workmanship, and the prince the forraine custome, as Philip king of Spaine, had forbidden his subiects by an edict made in the yere 1563, to requite the queene of England, who had made the like three moneths before, the like edict was made in France by King Henrie the second in the yeare 1552, concerning wools: but there was a Florentin, who hauing gotten a pasport by a* 1.1869 courtiers means, caried away more wooll at one instant, than all other marchants [ B] had done before in a yere; and hauing it made into cloth at Florence, hee retur∣ned it into France, by the which he gained infinitly, the workmanship exceeding the stuffe fifteen parts: the which is a great incongruitie in matter of state and reuenewes, to forbid a traffique vnto the subiect, and then giue leaue vnto a stranger: for both king & Commonweale in generall receiue an irreparable losse, and the marchants in particular are ruined. Behold six means to gather together treasure without oppression of the subiects, vnlesse the custome of forrain mar∣chandise that be necessary for the life of man were excessiue. The seuenth means* 1.1870 is vpon the subiect, the which they must neuer vse, vnlesse all the rest faile, and that necessitie forceth them to haue a care of the Commonweale, being sodenly [ C] oppressed either by the enemie, or by some other vnexpected accident; in this case seeing the defence of euerie one in particular, depends vpon the preserua∣tion* 1.1871 of the generall, it is fit that euerie man straine himselfe; then are impositions laide vpon the subiects most iust and necessarie, and those charges which are then imposed vpon the citisens are religious and godly, without the which the citie were quite ruined. But to the end this extraordinary charge imposed du∣ring the warre, may not continue in time of peace, it is fit to proceed by way of borrowing; for that money is easilier found, when as he that lends hopes to re∣ceiue both his money againe, and thanks for his willingnesse. For when as Han∣nibal was in Italie, and did besiege euen Rome it selfe, the senate hauing con∣sumed [ D] their treasure, would not impose new tributes vpon their subiects and confederats, (a verie daungerous thing, being then prest by the enemie) but the senators with one consent, brought their gold and siluer vnto the receiuers, being followed by the people with great ioy. And Titus Liuius saith; Senectato∣res prosequisque aurum, argentum, aes in publicum conferunt, tanto certamine iniecto, vt prima inter primos sua nomina vellent in publicis tabulis esse, vt nec Triumuiri mensarij accipiendo, nec scribae referendo sufficerent. The senators bought their gold and siluer into the publicke with great contention, who should bee in∣rolled, so as the receiuers were not sufficient to tell it, nor the registers to in∣roll them. After the victorie obtained against the Carthaginiens, the senate [ E] decreed to pay what had been borrowed; but for that there was not sufficient in the common coffers to satisfie them, the creditors presented a request to haue part of the citie lands assigned vnto them, the which shuld be valued by the con∣suls, vpon condition, that it might be alwaies redeemed, and to pay an asse of smal rent to the receiuers for euerie acre, only for a marke, and as a witnes that it was the city lands, the which was done. If the commonweale hath not wherwithall to pay▪ neither in mony nor lands, & the enemy doth presse it, then is there no redier* 1.1872 means, than to make choise of those which are ablest to bare arms, which shuld be

armed and entertained at the charge of others, as the antient Romaines did, so [ F] * 1.1873 as the common good and health of the citisents was defended by some, with the wealth of others. This kind of tribute is called rash and extraordinarie. From hence these extraordinarie charges first tooke their beginning, the which after∣wards became ordinarie. As we read that Denis the tyrant, sometimes sought oc∣casions of war, or of fortifications, to the end he might haue cause to raise new* 1.1874 imposts, the which he continued, after that he had treated with the enemie, or discontinued the fortresses begun.

If my wishes might take place, I would desire that such detestable inuentions might be buried with the author. There be three kinds of tributes that bee le∣uied [ G] of the subiect, some extraordinarie; others ordinarie; and the third which holds of both, and is called casuall: vnder which kinds is contained as well the* 1.1875 reuenewes that rise of iurisdictions, seales, coynes, waights, and measure, as the money that is receiued vpon things sold, of what nature soeuer, or by gifts, le∣gacies, or successions, or by the sale of offices, or in manner of a taxe, be it in the regard of euerie mans person, (which kind of tribute is called Capitatio by the Latines:) bee it in respect of the moouable or immoouable goods, and of fruits which grow aboue or within the earth, as mynes and treasures, or that which is gathered at ferries, or passages, the which is rightly called Portorium vectigal, or of any other imposition that may be imagined, how filthie and beast∣ly soeuer, for tyrants alwaies thinke the sauor of them sweet; as that tribute [ H] which was vsually exacted from professed whores at Rome; and the sauing of vrine commaunded by Vespasian, the which his sonne taking vnworthily, the father held the first money that hee receiued next of that tribute, to his nose, as∣king him if it smelt ill, and hee denying it, Atqui inquit è lotio est, But sayth he, it comes of the vrine. Of which charges and impositions, the most ancient are reputed reuenewes, as the forraine custome; others are ordinarie, as taxes; and the last are extraordinarie, the which the Latines called temerarium tributum, a rash tribute: as subsidies imposed vpon free townes and priuiledged persons, tenths, charitable gifts equiualent to tenths, the which are leuied by commission. And to speake properly, the taxes, ayds, grants, tolles, and such like were meere [ I] subsidies and extraordinarie charges, before Lewis the ninth, who first leuied the taxe, as president le Maistre hath obserued: but hee doth not say, that it was as a necessarie subsidie during the warres; and that hee made an ordinarie receit thereof; but contrary wise adressing himselfe to Philip his eldest sonne and succes∣sor, he vseth these words in his testament, the which is yet found in the treasurie of France, and is registred in the chamber of accounts: Fili, religiosus imprimis er∣ga Deum esto: benignus & liberalis aduersus egentes, legum ac morum huius imperij cu∣stos* 1.1876 ac vindex acerrimus: à vectigalibus & tributis abstineto, nisi te summa vis neces∣sitatis ac vtilitatis publicae iustissima causa ad hoc impellat, sin minùs, tyrannum te poti∣ùs, quàm regem futurum putato, &c. Sonne, be first deuote and religious towards [ K] God, be mild and charitable to the poore, obserue the good lawes and manners of thy realme seuerely, exact no taxes nor subsidies of thy subiects, vnlesse that vrgent necessitieor the profit of the Commonweale presse thee vnto it; if thou doest otherwise, thou shalt be esteemed a tyrant and no king, &c. Some one will say vnto me, That king Clotaire did exact the third part and reuenewes of churches: and Chilperis the 8 part of euery mans wine growing, and it seems that the impost of the 8 part of the wine, the which now is imposed vpon vinteners, tooke his beginning from hence: and that Lewis the yong during 4 yeres, tooke

the twentieth part of his subiects reuenewes in the yere 1167; yet it is most cer∣taine [ A] that this was but an extraordinarie subsidie during the warre, as that temerarium tributum imposed by king Charles the sixt, for it was decreed in our open Parliament, called by Philip of Valois in the yeare 1338, that no impost should bee raised vpon the people without the consent of the three estates: and in stead of three hundred and fortie thousand pounds starling, which king Lewis the eleuenth did leuie the yeare that he died, besides the ordinarie reuenewes of the crowne, the deputies of the three estates held at Tours, offered vnto Charles the eight, his sonne comming to the crowne, in manner of a beneuolence for two yeares, the like graunt that was made vnto Charles the seuenth, and for his entrance a hundred thousand crownes to bee paide for once onely, the [ B] which he might not afterwards challenge as a due, nor call the graunt a taxe or impost. The which hath been alwaies, and is still obserued in Spaine, England, and Germanie: as Philip Comineus said in open parliament, in the raigne of Charles the eight, That no prince had power to lay any imposition vpon his subiects, nor* 1.1877 to prescribe that right without their consents. And wee see in all commissions sent out for the leuying of taxes, and subsidies, the king vseth that antient prote∣station to free them, as soone as necessitie would suffer him.

And althogh that Philip the long did exact but the fift part of a peny vpon euery* 1.1878 two shillings worth of salt that were sold, yet he publickly protested to discharge the subiects of it. Philip of Vallois vsed the like protestation, being forced by [ C] the extremitie of warre to double the sayd custome, declaring by his letters pa∣tents in the yeare 1328, that he meant not to haue the imposition vpon the salt in∣corporate to the reuenewes; and yet there is no custome seems more easie than that of salt, the which is common to all the subiects: yet in the popular estate of the Romaines, and in the hottest of their Punicke warres, the impost of salt be∣ing set on foot by Liuius and Claudius censures; Liuius was called Salinator in de∣rision: but a peace being graunted to them of Carthage, it was taken away a∣gaine: either for that there was nothing more necessarie for the life of man, or for that it was done without the peoples commaund. And for that the lightest kinds of tributes and imposts seeme heauie and burdensome vnto the [ D] poore and weake, yet could not the senators maintaine the treasurie of Rome without new impositions: the people being freed from all taxes and customes by the law Valeria, after the expulsion of their kings: therefore C. Manlius the* 1.1879 Consull made a law with the authoritie of the Senate, (the Armie lying at Sutri∣um) that such as were made free, should pay the twentieth part of all their sub∣stance into the Exchequer: with which tribute, although the citisens were no∣thing oppressed, yet being vnderstood, the Tribune made a defence vpon paine of death, That no man should attempt the like without the peoples priuitie. And Augustus made the law Iulia, That whatsoeuer should come to any one by inhe∣ritance,* 1.1880 legacie, or gift for death, the twentieth part thereof should belong vnto [ E] the common treasure, both these impositions were profitable to the Common∣weale, and pleasing to either of them: to the one, for that they possesse anothers inheritance; and to the other, for that they obtaine their liberties. But for that the emperours which succeeded Augustus exacted the twentieth part of all in∣heritances and legacies, Traian therefore abrogated the said law Iulia, the which many haue labored to reuiue, changing the name of it: yet had they not then the hundred part of those tributes, which since the necessity of some, and the couetousnesse of others haue inuented. And when as Samuel prince of

the Israelites spake vnto the people, who demaunded a King of him, he added [ F] threats of bitter tributes, Ergo inquit regem habituri estis qui decimas fructuum, im∣peraturus est, Therefore sayd he, you shall haue a King which shall command* 1.1881 the tenths of your fruits. Neither did Cipselus the first Tyrant of Corinth, ex∣act any other tribute of his subiects, but the tenths of their fruits: there were then no taxes, subsidies, tolles, and a thousand such like. So the greatest part of the Inuenters of these new Imposts haue lost their liues; as Philistus parasite to Dyonisius the tyrant, who being drawn out of the tyrants castle, was slaine by the people of Syracusa: and Parthenius or Proclerus, who was slaine by the people of* 1.1882 Treues, for giuing counsell to king Theodoret to oppresse his subiects with new subsidies: and of late daies George Prescon Parasite to Henrie king of Sueden, was [ G] cruelly put to death in the kings pallace, and the king himselfe expelled his e∣state. What shall I speake of Achaeus King of the Lidiens, whom his subiects did hang by the feet with his head downeward into a riuer, for the subsidies which hee imposed vppon his people: and Theodoric king of France lost his crowne for it. How comes it that the Netherlanders haue reuolted from the Spaniard, but for that the duke of Alua would exact the tenth pennie of eue∣rie thing which was sold, whereby he would haue gathered an infinite treasor, or rather the wealth of all the countrey, being most certaine that one thing might besold often in a short time, and well knowne that the marchandise sold in one day amounted to seuentie thousand ducats, as a Spaniard himselfe did write. [ H] The Histories are full of these examples, for nothing doth sooner cause changes, seditions, and ruines of States, than excessiue charges and imposts. But as the Prince must haue a care not to impose any charges, but when warre doth force him, so must he take them away when he hath obtained a peace: yet must they not runne from one extreame vnto another, and abolish all imposts and taxes, ha∣uing neither lands nor reuenewes to maintaine the Common weale; as Nero* 1.1883 the Emperour would haue done, who hauing wasted all the treasure, sought to abolish the tributes, whereof the Senate being aduertised, they thanked him for his good will to the people, yet they dissuaded him from doing it, saying it would be the ruine of the Commonweale. Many seditious citisens, and desirous of [ I] innouations, did of late yeares promise immunitie of taxes and subsidies to our people: but neither could they doe it, or if they had could, they would not, or if it were done, should we haue any Commonweale, being as it were the ground and foundation of a Commonweale. There were more reasons to haue the ex∣cessiue gifts cut off and reuoked, and that an account should be made of the trea∣sure wasted: but to take away all impositions before that the reuenewes bee re∣deemed and the debts payd; it were not to repaire, but to ruine the state. And most of these men which seeme to vnderstand the affaires of state so well, are greatly abused with an old inueterate opinion, that all charges and imposts must be reduced to that proportion that they were in the time of king Lewis the 12, [ K] and consider not that since that time gold and siluer hath come in so great abun∣dance* 1.1884 from the new found Lands, namely from Peru, as all things are growne ten times deerer than they were; as I haue prooued against the Paradox of Malestroit: the which may bee easily seene in the antient customes and contracts of this Realme, where wee shall find the value of fruits and victuals to bee ten, yea twelue times lesse than it is at this day. Wee find in the Registers of the chamber of Accounts, That the Chancellor of France in the time of S. Lewis, had for the charges of himself, his horses, and seruants, seuen soulz Parisis allowed

him a day; the which is not eight pence halfe-penie of our money: and if hee [ A] stayd in any Abbey, or other place where he spent nothing for his horses, it was then abated in his wages. I haue shewed that Charles the 5. king of France payd but 31000 crownes for the countie of Anxerre: and that the duchie of Berrie was bought by Philip the 1 of Herpin, for threescore thousand crownes: and the countie of Venice and Auignon were engaged for fortie thousand Flo∣rins. To conclude, I haue made manifest that many Earledomes, Baronies, and great Signiories haue beene sold a hundred or sixe score yeares since, twentie times better cheape than they are nowe, for the aboundance of gold and sil∣uer that is come frō new found Lands: as it happened at Rome, when as Paulus Aemilius brought such infinit store of gold and siluer from the realme of Ma∣cedon, [ B] suddenly the value of lands did rise to bee treble in price: and at what time Caesar brought the treasure and spoyles of Egypt to Rome, then did Vsurie fall, and the price of lands did rise: euen as it happened to the Spaniards after the conquest of Peru by Frauncis Pizara, a small vessell of wine in that country cost 300 ducats, a Spanish cape of Frizado a thousand ducats, and a Iennet sixe thousand; the which was by reason of the aboundance of gold and siluer which they found at Peru, and brought into Spaine: and namely of the ransome* 1.1885 of king Atabalipa; who paid the value of ten millions, three hundred twentie and sixe thousand ducats, besides twise as much that came to priuate men, cap∣taines, soldiors, and euen to the receiuers themselues, as Augustus Zarata ma∣ster [ C] of the Accounts to the king of Spaine doth testifie. Since great store of gold and siluer hath beene brought out of Spaine into France to buy corne and o∣ther necessarie commodities, which are transported into Spaine in great abun∣dance, so as the prices of all things haue risen: and so by consequence the wages of officers, the pay of souldiors, the pensions of captaines, and in like sort eue∣rie mans employment, and by the same reason the rents of Farmes haue, risen; for he that had but ten pounds a yeere rent, hath now a thousand of the same fruits he then gathered: wherein they are greatly abused that would reduce the prices of corne and victuals to the antient orders. We must then conclude, that the account of the reuenewes vnder king Charles the 6 in the yere 1449, [ D] which came but to fortie thousand pounds starling; was not much lesse (in* 1.1886 regard of the value of things) than the reuenewes of fourteen hundred thou∣sand pounds starling, the same yeare that Charles the ninth died, in the yeare one* 1.1887 thousand, fiue hundred▪ seuentie & foure; and yet the people complained at both times that they were oppressed with tributes. And the ransom which king Lewis the 9 paid to the sultan of Egypt of fiftie thousand pounds starling, was not much lesse than that of king Francis the 1 of three millions of crownes: and although that king Iohn were set at the same ransome by the king of England, yet was it held so excessiue, as they were six yeares in leuying of it; but Frauncis the same yeare a peace was concluded, sent his ransome into Spaine. We must iudge the [ E] like of the yearely pension of 900. pounds, that was assigned vnto Charles the faire, sonne to Philip, not to be lesse, than that of ten thousand pounds starling yearely, that was giuen first to Henrie, and then to Frauncis dukes of Aniou from king Charles the 9 their brother. And much more honourable might they liue with that pencion, which I made mention of vnder Philip, than with that which Charles the 9 gaue vnto his brethren. Nor the Dowries of 400000 crownes assigned to euerie one of the daughters of king Henrie the 2, were not so great as those of sixtie thousand crownes assigned to the daughters of

France by the law of king Charles the 5. The like may be spoken of other [ F] people, as in old time in the East, so at this present in the West. For we read in Strabo, that Ptolomie the piper, the last king of Egypt of that race, did raise vp∣pon* 1.1888 the countrey of Egypt the value of seuen millions, and fiue hundred thou∣sand crownes a yeare, and sultan Solyman did leuie but a hundred thousand du∣cats of the same countrey, as appeared by an extract of the reuenewes made by Gritty a Venetian, in the yeare 1520, when as the estate of the whole reue∣newes* 1.1889 came not to aboue foure millions; for foure yeares after he raised it vnto six millions, as Paulus Iouius saith, and now he leuieth aboue twelue millions year∣ly, for the great abundance of gold and siluer, that is brought out of the West and East; which summe notwithstanding may seeme but little, for that we read in [ G] Plutarch, that the dictator Silla did taxe the charges of Asia the lesse, before the conquests of Lucullus and Pompee, at twelue millions of crownes, the which is not aboue the sixt part of the Turks empire.

Sometimes the bountie of the land, and the great trade, and oftentimes the vn∣reasonable greedinesse of princes to heape vp treasure, make some richer than others: It is well knowne that Charles the fift gathered more reuenewes out of the duchie of Milan; then king Francis the first, at the same time did leuie in this his realme, which flowed in all abundance; who doth not know that he com∣maunded more out of the lowe Countreys, than the reuenewes of England [ H] were esteemed in those daies. Some one not long since, (seeking to perswade Charles the ninth to encrease his taxes) did pernitiously maintaine in open coun∣sell, that Cosme duke of Florence did raise out of his estate six millions, hauing* 1.1890 but a small territorie: the which was false, for hee receiued out of the estate of Florence, but twelue hundred thousand crownes, and out of that of Sienna two hundred thousand at the most. But a new prince shall doe wisely at his first en∣trance, to cut off the extraordinarie exactions of his predecessor, or at the least a great part of them, as well in regard of his owne dutie, as to get the good will of the people, if he be required; yea before he be required, and not to imitate Roboam, who following the wicked counsell of wicked men, did not onely re∣fuse the humble petitions of his subiects, but vowed openly that he would bee [ I] crueller than his father had been, whereupon ten tribes fell from him, and crea∣ted them a new king. True it is, that to hold a certaine estate of impositions, they must be made in their proper kinds, as in corne, wine, and oyles; and as for mar∣chandise in siluer, it is the forme which the kings of Poland haue alwaies, and doe still vse, and the king of Ethiopia receiues cloth and other marchandise for his custome. But to require to haue taxes and subsidies quite taken away, or reduced to the antient custome, without any regard of the value of things, or the changes that haue happened; this were not to relieue, but to ruine an estate.

It is an ordinarie thing in changes from a tyrannie to a popular estate, to abo∣lish [ K] all imposts, taxes, and subsidies for a signe of libertie, as they did in Rome, at the request of the consull Valerius, after they had expelled their kings: but eue∣rie man was faine to goe to the warre at his owne charge▪ then afterwards to pay the soldiors, and afterwards to taxe themselues by the raising of new imposts. True it is, that the Romaines did therein shew themselues verie iust: for at that time there were none that bare the charges, but the noble and the rich, the poo∣rer sort went free; and now adaies we see none but the poore pay, and the rich goe scot-free. The like was in Suisserland, and at Lindaw, after they had expelled

their Lords. Other doe free the chife cities and great Lords, and charge the [ A] weaker lort: as the Athenians did, when they were the stronger, they did free their owne citie against the tenor of the allyance made with the other cities of Grece, and in stead of sixtie tallents, they so augmented it, as in lesse than three∣score yeares they made them pay twelue hundred yearly, the which amounts to* 1.1891 720000 crownes. And when as Themistocles captaine of the Athenians, deman∣ded the tribute of the Adriens, saying; That hee would bring with him two* 1.1892 mightie gods, Force and Loue: they answered, That they had two more migh∣tie, Pouertie and Impossibilitie.

And commonly the greater cities lay the burthen vpon the champian coun∣trey, [ B] and the richest peasants vpon the poorer, as it hath been heretofore in this realme, whereas the great cities were freed; and in old time the citie of Babilon (the greatest that euer was) remained free from all charges: the which is done lest the greater should hinder the imposts. But it fals out as in mans bodie, where as the strongest and noblest members cast all superfluous and vicious humors vpon the weaker, and when as apostume is so swolne as the weaker part can en∣dure no more, then must it breake or infect all the members: euen so it fals out when as the rich cities, the nobilitie and the clergie, lay all the charge vpon the poore labourer, he sinks vnder his burthen like vnto Aesops Asse, and the horse which would carrie nothing; that is to say, the nobilitie and the clergie, are for∣ced some to carrie the tenths and extraordinarie subsidies, others to sell their [ C] goods, to make warre at their owne charge, and to pay the taxes and imposts di∣rectly or indirectly. For the like cause, the nobilitie and clergie of the realme of Denmarke haue been forced to taxe themselues since the yeare 1563, to main∣taine the charges of the warre; but it was vpon condition, that the king should not meddle with the money. The nobilitie and clergie of England, euerie man (according to his abilitie) was subiect to taxes & subsidies, according to the anti∣ent custome of the Grekes and Romaines; yea almost of all nations. I except our* 1.1893 nation the French, with whom, as Caesar saith rightly: Nihil est plebe contemptius, Nothing is more contemptible than the common people.

To remedie this inconuenience, the antients did wisely order, That all char∣ges [ D] * 1.1894 should be reall, and not personall; as it is put in practise in Languedoc, and since in Prouence by prouision, according to the disposition of the lawes, to the end that the rich and the poore, the noble and the peasant, the priest and the laborer▪ should pay the charge of their land that is to be taxed: the law exempts neither bishop nor nobleman. In other gouernments, if there be a clergieman, a noble man, a counsellor, & a vigneron, the last paies for all, and the others are free,* 1.1895 not only for their sees, but also for other tailable lands. If then necessitie force the prince to raise some extraordinary imposts, it is needfull it should be such as eue∣rie one may beare his part, as is the impost of salt, wine, and such like things. And to take away occasion of seditions, which doe often chaunce for the impost of [ E] small things sold by retaile, it were expedient to conuert that impost into a ge∣nerall summe, as it was put in practise by Charles the fift, with the consent of the* 1.1896 estates, for the freeing of king Iohn, the which was 12 deniers vpon euerie liure, or two shillings of goods that were sold; the which was changed to an equiua∣lent, first in the countrey of Languedoc in the time of king Lewis the eleuenth, yeelding for the said impost 6000 pounds starling yearly: and the like hath been also done in Auuergne for the salt, the which the countrey hath exchanged into a certaine summe: and for the same reason the impost which was taken vpon all

small wares, haue ben abolished in many Commonweales, for the complaints, se∣ditions, [ F] * 1.1897 and exclamations of the poore people against the toll-gatherers, who al∣waies tooke more in the kinde than they ought. But if any one shall demaund of me, which kind of imposts are most pleasing vnto God, most profitable to the Commonweale, and most desired of good men, for the reliefe of the poore: it is that which is layd on those things which serue onely to corrupt the subiects, as all kinds of dainties, perfumes, cloth of gold and siluer, silkes, cipresse, laces,* 1.1898 rich colours, womens painting, pearles, precious stones, and all kinds of works of gold, siluer or enamell, & such like things, which are not to be forbidden: for such is the nature of man, as they esteem nothing more sweet & goodly than that which is stricktly forbidden them; and the more superfluities are defended, the [ G] more they are desired, especially of men that are simple and ill bred: you must therefore raise them so in price, by means of the impost, as none but the rich and those that are curious shalbe able to buy them. And therefore these princes that liue towards the North, lay great imposts vpon wine, the which although it be dere, yet their subiects are so desirous thereof, as they drinke themselues drunke. And for this cause Cato the censor was commended, for that he layd a great im∣post vpon the sale of slaues, that should exceed fiftie crownes price, for that such marchandise could not be warranted.

The emperour Augustus did more wisely, who to correct the disordinate* 1.1899 lust of his subiects, made lawes for marriages, by the which he imposed a taxe [ H] in manner of a fine, vpon those that did not marrie after the age of 25 yeares, or that were married and had no children, inioyning them to bring a part into the treasurie of such successions or legacies as were casually left them, giuing good∣ly immunities and priuiledges to such as had children: by which lawes Augustus purchased the commendation of a wise prince. For hereby he did both punish whoredome, adultery, & sodomie, and also force euery one to seek him a lawfull wife and children, taking away nothing of any mans present estate, but onely the tenth part of that inheritance which came vnto him accidentally from his friends, filling the treasury with money, and the Commonweale with good and [ I] vertuous citisens. Which law Iustinian the emperour did vnaduisedly blame, and likewise Constantin, who abrogated the law for punishing them that liued vn∣maried, or that had no children. But the emperors Honorius and Theodosius gaue the priuiledge of children to all subiects, which was to giue way to adulteries and to all detestable vices, causing marriages and the procreation of children to grow in contempt, whereby the citie grew bare of citisens, and the empire be∣ing found in a manner wast, was seazed on by a deluge of Gothes, and other bar∣barous nations of the North. These kinds of impositions which are inuented for the punishment of vice, seeme not onely iust, but verie profitable.

There was also another impost of ten shillings vpon euerie sute in law that* 1.1900 was not criminall, to punish those that were too apt to plead, the which many [ K] haue found strange, and in the end haue taken it away: but there was neuer any more needfull in this realme, where there are more sutes than in all the rest of Europe, the which haue much increased since the time of king Charles the sixt, when as an edict was made, to take away the antient custome, by the which no man was condemned to pay any charges that had lost his sute: for in former* 1.1901 times they were not so apt to plead: and it may be▪ our antient fathers▪ knowing the dispositions of the French, had brought in this custome (although it were vniust of itselfe) to diuert the subiects from attempting of sutes rashly. And al∣though

the Romaines in a free Commonweale could hardly beare any imposi∣tion [ A] or tributes, yet did they willingly endure a taxe set vpon sutes and contro∣uersies, much more heauie than that which was imposed in the time of Charles the ninth, by the which, he that did attempt a sute against any man, was forced to consigne two crownes into an officers hands; the which hee should receiue againe from the aduerse partie, if he did recouer his suit, or if he were vanqui∣shed, to loose them as a punishment of his rashnesse: but the Romaines tooke the tenth part in all ciuile causes, and the fift in criminall, as Pompeius Festus doth witnesse: yet Marcus Varro writes, that either of the parties did lay downe fiue hundred asses, which coms to about 10 shillings of four mony; and he which won, recouered his money which he had consigned, and this was besides the thing [ B] for which they contended, the which was called Sponsio & sacramentum, and if any one refused to consigne, hee yeelded to the other. The Hebrews did al∣waies cause him that did willingly denie a debt, to pay it double, as wee read in their pandects. And although the consignations which were made in Rome vpon* 1.1902 suits were diuers, yet the emperour Caligula extorted against reason, the forti∣eth pennie of all that was demaunded by law, without any prefixion or limitati∣on, whether the cause were iust or vniust. But of all marchandise which tend to pleasure▪ lust, and pompe, the imposition is honest and profitable, seruing to no other end but to corrupt the simplicitie of the subiect, the deerest of all (which is Amber gris) the which is valued but at twelue pounds starling, should be pri∣sed [ C] at 300 crownes.

The law sets no impost vpon marchandise, but vpon spices, and such pretious* 1.1903 marchandise, as are specially named, as skins of Parthia and Babilon, silkes, fine linnen cloth, painting, Indian haire, wild beasts, and Eunukes. Such impositi∣ons are alwaies commendable, and farre more supportable without comparison, than that which is layd vpon the asse, the oxe, wine, and such like. And all good princes haue abhorred that impost which they called Capitatio, for to lay a charge vpon mens persons for their worke, were to make warre to good wits, if they haue not some great trade, and by that means haue gathered together great wealth, for the which they must beare some charge; the which is not properly [ D] Capitatio, but with the weaker sort they must deale mildly, especially with the husbandman, which doth not till his own land. Neither are those impositions to be allowed which employ all their studies to inuent new taxes & exactions, see∣king by all means to incorage princes thereunto; as that multiplier (whose name I concele for honors sake) who not many yeres since at a parliament held at Blois, made a declaration, That the king (besides al other ordinary charges) might with oppression or grieuance of poore or rich, raise thirtie millions: the king sent this man to the three estates, to expound the heauenly gift of God.

And although we had many excellent wits and of great iudgement, yet had he abused many with his opinion, if we had not laid open his errour and deceit. [ E] He supposed that France was two hundred leagues long from Bologne to Mar∣seilles, and as much from Mont S. Bernard, to S. Iohn de Luz; and by this he con∣cluded that France had fortie thousand leagues in square, and that euerie league contained fiue thousand acres of ground, which amounted to two hundred millions of acres, of the which he abated the one halfe for waters, waies and wast land, and of the rest hee would haue the king take a soulz for an acre, the* 1.1904 which amounts to fiue millions: then he made an estimate of six hundred thou∣sand townes and villages, and in them twentie millions of fiers, of the which he

would haue the king take six pence of euerie fier, which comes to six millions [ F] * 1.1905 and two hundred and fiftie thousand liures. Moreouer he made an account of fifteen millions of all sorts of marchandise, of the which he tooke a soulz of the marchant for euerie thousand liures, making the former twelue millions. And vpon the said six hundred thousand townes and villages, one with another ele∣uen soulz apeece, the which comes to twelue millions, and six millions and a hundred of liures more, which then the foure tenths came vnto, all which make thirtie millions, besides the aids, taxes, customes, grants, imposts, subsidies, and reuenewes of the crowne, which came then to fifteen millions, wherein his de∣ceit was verie apparent; first making France square, the which is in fourme of a Lorange much lesse than a square; next he makes the fertill land equall to that [ G] which is wast and fruitlesse (although there is not any land, be it neuer so fertill, whereas two third parts at the least lyes not wast) taxing the nobilitie and the clergie as well as the rest. And as for 600000 townes and villages, it is an impu∣dent lye; for that by the extracts drawne out of the chamber of accounts, and brought to Blois to the estates, there were found to be twentie seuen thousand* 1.1906 and foure hundred parishes in France, taking the greatest towne but for one parish, and the smalest villages hauing a parish for another: and in truth the num∣ber of parishes taken by king Henrie the second in the yeare 1554, came but to 24824 parishes, besides Bourgogne & Poictou, and the impost of three pounds starling vpon euerie parish, came but to threescore and fourteen thousand foure [ H] hundred eightie one pounds. Ierosme Laski a Polonois, father to the Palatin Laski, whom we haue seen Ambassador in France, inuented another manner of meanes than this former, to encrease the treasure, giuing aduise to raise three* 1.1907 imposts vpon the subiects, and to make three mounts of pietie (for so he calleth them.) The first was in taking the moitie of euerie subiects reuenews, for once: the second was the twentieth part of his reuenewes yearely; and the third was to haue the eight part of things sold in grosse, or by retaile. But his aduise was reiected as pernitious and most impossible: for in matter of impositions there is nothing that doth more kindle seditions, than to charge the subiect with many things at once, especially a war-like people, and bred vp in libertie, as those [ I] of Polonia bee. And yet he gaue a goodly name to a wicked and pernitious in∣uention, calling the grounds of such impositions, Mounts of pietie. For the* 1.1908 mounts of pietie in the cities of Italie are profitable, honest▪ and charitable, & inuented to ease the poore; and those of Laski do ruin them. There are mounts of pietie at Florence, Sienna, Luques, and other cities, whereas he that hath one daughter, the day of her birth hee may put what summe he will into the mount of pietie, vpon condition to receiue ten times as much to marrie her withall, when she comes to the age of eighteene yeare; but if she dies before, then doth it accrue vnto the mount, vnlesse the father hath other daughters, to whom the portion shall come successiuely. Another mount of pietie is, for the lending of [ K] money to poore men at fiue in the hundred, giuing a sufficient pawne, and not aboue ten crownes; if the debter paies not his ten crownes at the time prefixt, the pawne is sold to him that wil giue most, and the surplusage deliuered vnto the debtor: this is done to preuent excessiue vsuries, (wherewith the poore in those countreys are ruined) and the seazure and selling of moouables at an vnder price.

Notwithstanding I find that the emperour Antonine surnamed the Pius or godly, inuented a better mount of pietie, which was to deliuer out the money

that came cleere into the treasurie, all charges paid for fiue in the hundred vpon [ A] * 1.1909 good and sufficient caution. By whose example Seuerus restored the treasure that was wasted, and the marchants and poore men gained much by traffique: and the publicke in a great summe did also gaine much: for if they lent a million, at the yeares end they did get fiftie thousand crownes for the publicke, and pri∣uate men got twise as much by traffique: and besides all this, the greatest benefit that did arise, the publicke treasure was assured out of the pawes of theeues and horse leeches of the court. And for this reason onely as it seems, the emperour Augustus long before, was accustomed to lend the money which came cleere* 1.1910 into the Exchequer, without any interest, giuing good assurance of land; and vp∣on a penaltie to forfeit the double, if it were not paid at the day: by this means the [ B] publicke treasure was not idle, nor wasted by the princes prodigalitie, nor ex∣hausted by theft, but a great benefit redounded to all in generall, and to many in* 1.1911 particular. And here some one may obiect, that although Augustus did not lend the publicke money for interest, yet hee imposed a penaltie of the double, if it were not paid at the prefixed day, the which is greater than any vsurie and ther∣fore forbidden by the law. In my opinion, that penaltie is then disallowed by the law when we stipulate any thing fraudulently, and aboue the lawfull inte∣rest: but he that hath taken the publicke money, and restores it not at the appoin∣ted day, he commits theft; it is therefore the penaltie of theft, and not of vsurie.

Those princes therefore did wisely in old time, which prouided for [ C] the necessitie of the Commonweale, and the profite of priuate men. But the contrarie is vsed in our daies; for princes in stead of giuing out vpon reasona∣ble interest, borrow and pay vnreasonable vsurie: and not onely princes,* 1.1912 but also lords and Commonweales, some more, some lesse: those which haue been held the most frugall, as the Venetians, borrow alwaies at fiue in the hundred, without any hope to recouer the principall, or at foureteene in the hunded, so long as the creditor shall liue. The colledge of Saint George at Genes takes money of all men at fiue in the hundred, and deliuers it out againe at the highest interest to princes and marchants; whereby they are so enriched, as they haue redeemed the Isle of Corsica, and the lands [ D] of the Commonweale. Priuate men had rather take fiue in the hundred of the colledge, to bee assured of their principall, than much more of priuate men, who oftentimes become Bankerupts: the Venetians haue alwaies lost, and shall loose, so long as they shall take eight in the hundred or more: or else they must abate their interest, as they haue by little and little abated Mount Vec∣chio, cutting the creditors so short, as they dare not so easily put in their money as they were woont.

This meanes was also brought into Fraunce by the cardinall of Tournon, at such time as hee was in credit with king Frauncis the first, whom he per∣suaded (by the instigation of certaine Italians) that there was no other meanes [ E] * 1.1913 to draw the money from all parts into Fraunce, and to frustrate the enemie here∣after, than to settle a banke at Lion, to take euerie mans money, and to pay him eight in the hundred, so as in short time hee should get into his hands all the money of Italie and Germanie: but in effect the cardinall sought to assure an hundred thousand crowns which he had in his coffers, & to get all the interest he could. Letters patents being granted, at the opening of the bank, euery man came running from France, Germanie and Italie, so as king Frauncis the first, when he died, was found indebted to the banke of Lion, fiue hundred thousand crowns,

the which he had in his coffers and sometimes more, and a peace concluded with [ F] all the princes of the earth. But the raigne of Henrie his sonne grew most lamen∣table, for hauing wasted his fathers treasure, and standing in need of money in the yeare 1554 borrowed at ten, twelue, and sixteene in the hundred, of the Caponyes, Albicis, and the Foucquers of Germanie, and when he was not able to pay the interest, he promised the creditors interest vpon interest. The empe∣rour Charles 5 did the like for his part; true it is, he payd but ten and twelue in the hundred. And the same yeare Henrie the eight king of England, borrowed a hundred thousand crowns of the German marchants at twelue in the hundred: euerie one hoping to draw money and wealth vnto him by the desire of vsurie. And whereas our king Henrie the second thought to draw most money vnto him [ G] by paying of more interest than the emperour or king of England, he began to loose his credit, for the wisest husbands concluded that in the end he would not be able to pay neither principall nor interest; for the interest of sixteene in the hundred, came at the least to eighteene in the hundred▪ detaining the interest which he could not pay: whereas the emperour made shew that he would free himselfe, giuing cities and communalties for cautions, paying the old debts with new borrowing, and euerie man lent him seeing him pay so willingly. But at this day many will free both principall and interest, to haue but thirtie paid them for a hundred; so as after the death of Henrie, all was filled with the complaint of creditors: and such princes and Signiories as had money in the banke at Lion, [ H] were much altered, and not onely the Signiories of the Cantons, the princes of Germanie and others had their parts there but also Bashas & marchants of Tur∣kie were there in their Factors names for aboue fiue hundred thousand crowns;* 1.1914 and nothing did more with hold the great Turke from succoring of the French in their last voyage of Naples, vnder the duke of Guise, than the not paying of foure thousand crownes for interest to Rustan Basha, besides the ten thousand which la Vigne the ambassador carried him in the yeare 1556, fearing to loose his principall, as I haue learned by letters and instructions from la Vigne, for ma∣ny did not buy rents for a certaine summe of money, but would haue the inte∣rest pure and simple, and vppon condition that they should haue their principall [ I] againe: as many Italians doe with priuate men, to whom they lend their money* 1.1915 simply hauing them bound both bodie and goods, without making any menti∣on of interest, and yet by a verball agreement, they promise sixteene or twenty in the hundred; if he faile to pay the interest, they seaze vppon bodie and goods for the principall: and although the interest be paid, if they haue need of their principall▪ they proceed by way of execution against the debtor, for he hath ne∣uer any quittance nor witnes for the interest which hee receiueth. Behold by what meanes they draw the money out of this realme.

There are other trickes which I forbeare to touch, but for this cause king Le∣wis the ninth in the yeare 1254, and Philip the Faire in the yere 1300 did banish all [ K] * 1.1916 Bankers and Italian marchants out of Fraunce, confiscating their goods: and to discouer the debts that were owing them, it was decreed that the debtors shuld be freed from all arrerages and interests, paying the principall to the treasurers. And since, in the yeare of our Lord one thousand three hundred fortie and seuen, Philip of Valois for the like cause did forfeit all their goods: for it was ve∣rified by the processe that was made, that for foure and twentie thou∣sand pounds starling, they had in few yeares profited two millions and foure hundred and fortie thousand pounds starling: and in hatred of such

vsurie the Lombards letters haue been alwaies taxed in the Chancery at double▪ [ A] and although these people haue been often banished the realme, yet there were neuer more in any place, nor will euer bee wanting, so long as princes take vp at interest. Since and before that the banke of Lion was broken, most of the cities of this realme haue lent vnto the king vpon the reuenews, customes, imposts, and tenths for reasonable interest, and those which held themselues to be of best iudgment in matters of state and treasure, aduised it for two ends, the one to haue money at need; the other to bind the cities and communalties more vnto their prince, yet we haue neuer seene more rebellions since the establishment of this realme. And as for the treasure, it hath been so well husbanded, as in lesse than twelue yeares that king Henrie the second raigned, hee did owe more than his [ B] * 1.1917 predecessors had leuied fortie yeares before, for all charges: for by an account made in the yeare 1560, king Frauncis the second, successor to Henrie, did owe two millions three hundred twelue thousand six hundred and ten liures, eigh∣teen soulz six deniers, of money lent freely, for the which he paid no interest: and fifteene millions nine hundred twentie six thousand fiue hundred fiftie and fiue liures, 12 soulz and 8 deniers, for the which he paid interest: and he ought more for arrerages seuen hundred threescore and fifteene thousand, nine hundred threescore and nineteene liures, foure soulz, and foure deniers: besides the debt of Ferrara, and other debts for marriages, which came to eight millions fiue hun∣dred and fourteen thousand fiue hundred fourescore and twelue liures, eigh∣teene [ C] soulz and eleuen deniers: and other remainders due, to the summe of fif∣teene hundred threescore and foure thousand, seuen hundred fourescore and se∣uen liures, two soulz, and six deniers: so as by the last article the king remained indebted one and forty millions, a hundred fourescore three thousand, one hun∣dred threescore and fifteen liures, three soulz, six deniers: comprehending four∣teene millions nine hundred threescore and one thousand seuen hundred four∣score and seuen liures fifteene soulz and eight deniers, for the aides, reuenewes, and customes engaged, to cities, corporations, and colledges, and to priuat men: amōgst the which the citie of Paris hath had yerely three millions one hundred & so many thousand liures, comprehending the tenths: moreouer the clergie hath [ D] furnished aboue threescore millions in the time of king Francis 2, and Charles 9. Although the emperour Charles 5, and his successor haue run the same fortune, for that they took vp at interest, being indebted aboue fifty millions, for the which* 1.1918 all the lands, and reuenews of Naples and Milan were engaged to the Genewais and other priuate persons, who now are called in question, for that they had ta∣ken of the king of Spaine in his necessitie thirtie and fortie in the hundred; and to effect it, they haue caused the catholicke king to be censured by an admonition from the Pope, if he continued those excessiue vsuries; who embracing this occa∣sion, defrauded his creditors of ten yeres interest. We must not think that the Spa∣niards will suffer themselues to bee easily gulled by the bankers of Italie, as the [ E] French do, who suffer them to inioy the farmes & al the best reuenews of France, the taxes, imposts, customes and doanne of Lion, by meanes of which farmes they ransome the subiects, and transport the coynes, contrary to the laws of this realme, which forbid to suffer strangers to enrich themselues by the reuenews of the crowne: nay, it hath been more insupportable to preferre them before na∣turall subiects, which offered much more, & yet they had an abatement of twen∣tie thousand crownes at one instant out of the custome of Lion, to the perpetuall infamie of the French: and least they should be molested and drawn in question of

theft, they haue gotten an euocation of all their causes to the priuie councell. [ F] The originall of all these miseries growes from Frauncis the first, who began to take vp money at intrest, hauing 1800000 crowns in his coffers, and peace with∣in his realme: no well aduised prince will euer take that course, for thereby hee shall ruine the foundation of his treasure, if he will keepe his faith and pay; but if he will not, or cannot pay, then must he breake and loose his credite, which is the ruine of an estate: for he must borrow, leuie taxes, impositions, and in the end by slaunders, and tyrannies forfeit his subiects goods. Then is it most fit and necessarie for a prince to borrow money vpon interest of his allies and subiects, if that hee bee in danger to loose his estate, by some generall reuolt, or the con∣spiracie* 1.1919 of some great men against him▪ for extreame remedies are to be sought [ G] in extreamest dangers: as we read that Eumenes did, who borrowed a great sum of money at extreame interest, of those that had conspired his death. Agrippa king of Iudea, recouered his realme by the meanes of his creditors, who trou∣bled both heauen and earth for the assurance they had to bee payd: and this was also the chiefe meanes to restore Edward the fourth king of England, being ex∣pelled his kingdome. But if the princes creditors haue assurance to bee paid by his successors, or that they haue lands in pawne, then this course is vnprofitable. I haue set downe the meanes which in my opinion are profitable and honest to gather together treasure, the which is the first point of this chapter: the second is how to employ the treasure of the Commonweale well and honourably, the [ H] which wee haue partly toucht in the chapter of rewards and punishments. Let vs adde hereunto what remaines.

In old time the first article set downe in the expences of the treasure, was for almes deeds; the second for the kings house; and the third for reparations: but the order is quite changed. As for almes-deeds, the wise and antient princes* 1.1920 of the Hebrews, haue left this discipline to posteritie, the which they receiued from the holy Prophets, who sayd, That the surest preseruation and defence of treasure, were Almes deeds, and liberalitie to the needie; the which they restrai∣ned to the tenth part of euerie mans goods, which should bee employed vpon the ministers of the church and the poore. And if we will looke aduisedly in∣to [ I] it, we shall not find any prince, state, or family that hath flourished more in ri∣ches, honours, and all happinesse, than those which had most care of the poore and needie. In old time there were no princes vnder heauen more charitable than our kings of Fraunce, since Robert sonne to Hugh Capet, who gaue the first example to his subiects and successors to be charitable to the poore, feeding a* 1.1921 thousand daily, giuing them horses to follow the court, to blesse him and pray for him; and to speake truly, there was neuer king in this realme that raigned lon∣ger and in greater peace. We may iustly say of our kings, that there is no race vn∣der heauen that hath so entertained the greatnes of their maiestie in armes and laws, and out of the which there hath issued more princes▪ or that haue raigned [ K] longer without offence to all other princes, Christians, Turks, Tartars, Persians, Indians, and Ethiopians. What prince euer was more charitable to the poore, than Lewis the ninth, who hath founded twentie eight hospitals and colledges in this realme; and had commonly in his traine six score poore folks, and in Lent twelue score, feeding them with meat from his owne table? he also liued in great honor, being feared of his enemies, reuerenced of his friends, honored of his subiects: and after that he had raigned 44 yeres, he left fiue sonnes, and foure daughters, and a kingdome flourishing in armes and laws to his successor, recom∣mending

vnto him aboue all things to be deuout to God, and charitable to the [ A] poore. Neither may we forget Iames the fift king of Scotland, who was called Rex egentium, The king of the needie; who as he exceeded all the princes of his time in bountie, so did he surmount all his predecessors in riches. And contra∣riwise we see great families, states, realmes, and empires come to pouertie and ruine, hauing contemned the poore, and abandoned the subiect to the spoile of the soldior, and the thefts of toll-gatherers: when as king Henrie the second in the yeare 1549, did exact that extraordinarie tribute which they called Taillon, he promised not to employ that money to any other vse, than to the entertain∣ment of his men at armes, and not to confound it with the ordinarie receits, that the subiect might be freed from the spoile of souldiers. The like was said, when [ B] as the realme was charged with the paiment of 50000 footmen in the time of king Frauncis the first, the which should be leuied vpon walled townes and their suburbes, which felt nothing of the oppression of the souldier; but notwith∣standing since they haue made it equall to towne, village, and hamlet, in the yere 1555, whereby the poore countreyman hath ben doubly oppressed, for they pay, and are spoiled of all sides. And yet with all these charges, they would hold them∣selues happy, if they might bee freed in prouiding corne and victuals for the souldiors at an vnder▪rate, what may then bee hoped for in those ci∣ties whereas the souldiers robbe and spoile the poore subiects with all impuni∣tie,* 1.1922 and insult more ouer the citizens than against the enemie? but for an excuse, [ C] they pretend they are not paid, neither would they be, to the end they might haue some colour for their thefts. There is no meanes to redresse these calami∣ties, and to restore in some sort militarie discipline, which is now quite decaied, but in paying the souldiers: for as Cassiodorus said, Disciplinam seruare non potest ieiunus exercitus, dum quod deest semper presumit armatus, A fasting armie can ne∣uer obserue good discipline, for what they want, they will presume to take by force: the which cannot bee done vnlesse there bee a great care had of the treasure. The kings house therefore entertained, the souldiers and the officers payd, and due rewards giuen to them that deserue them, it is great reason the poore should be remembred. And if the treasurie bee well furnished, a part [ D] would be employed to repaire townes, to fortifie vpon the frontiers, to furnish places of strength, make the passages euen, build bridges, fortifie the ports, send ships to sea, build publicke houses, beautifie temples, erect colledges for honor, vertue, and learning: for besides necessitie of reparations, it brings great pro∣fite* 1.1923 to the Commonweale. For by this means arts and artificers are entertained, the poore people are eased, the idle are set to worke, cities are beautified and diseases expelled: finally hatred against princes (which doth often times stirre vp the subiects to rebellion) is quite suppressed, when as the impositions which he hath leuied, redounds not only to the general, but also to euery priuat mans good. And therefore the emperour Alexander Seuerus was accustomed to leaue many [ E] imposts and tolles to cities, to be employed in the necessarie reparations thereof.

This which I haue sayd is more expedient in an Aristocratia, or a Popular state, than in a Monarchie; for that the subiects being many, are with more dif∣ficultie maintained in peace and vnion by few commaunders: vnlesse the mul∣titude being employed in the publicke works, may make some gaine, and not to inure them to the distribution of corne and money, as they vsually did in Popular states, and especially the Tarentins: the which is not only the ruine of the treasure, but likewise of the citie. So Pericles was also blamed, hauing

first accustomed the Atheniens to these distributions: the which he did to gaine [ F] the peoples fauor. But when he was once master of them, he emploied the pub∣licke treasure, not only to fortifie the citie, but also to beautifie it, and to fill it with* 1.1924 good artificers: yet durst hee not attempt this before the citie was in peace and their treasure full, hauing then a hundred thousand tallents; that is to say, three∣score millions of crownes, if we may beleeue Demosthenes: which summe be∣cause* 1.1925 it is vnreasonable, it may be, we should read a hundred tallents, which make threescore thousand pounds, for that wee shewed before, that the Athenians (when as they had charged their allies with great tributes) did neuer leuy aboue two thousand tallents yearely at the most, and in Pericles time they did scarce ex∣act a thousand tallents. And being accused by his enemies to haue misemploied [ G] the publicke treasure, hee made this resolute answere vnto the people, That if* 1.1926 they were not well pleased with the walles, fortresses, and temples which hee built, hee would take the charge vpon himselfe, vpon condition, that his name should be grauen thereon, and that it was his gi•…•…t: but the people allowed the charge, knowing well that all men in generall, and euerie man in particular, reaped profit and honour thereby, for that the marchant did gaine in furnishing of stuffe; sea-men, and those that brought it, for their carriage; and artificers in working it; so as the profit was distributed to all sorts of people, and the glorie of their stately workes, gaue a perpetuall testimonie to posteritie of the great∣nes of this Commonweale. But the greatest benefit, and which doth most import [ H] the preseruation of an estate is, That the two greatest plagues of a Common weale, Idlenesse and Pouertie, are banished: a verie necessarie thing in a popu∣lar and aristocraticall state; and especially in those countries, where they haue great spirits, and but barren soyle, as at Athens: if idlenesse get footing in such a countrey, it will neuer be without mutinies and thefts, which Solon foreseeing,* 1.1927 he did inflict great punishments vpon idle persons: and so did Amasis king of E∣gypt, who condemned idle men to be put to death, if they had not wherewithall to liue, knowing the Egyptians to be the most ingenuous in the world, and the most subiect to mutinie, if they were not employed. We see Piramides built in that countrey almost three thousand yeares since, lest the pleople should haue [ I] languished with idlenesse: we haue also presidents of the wisest emperours of Rome, which haue in like sort emploied their treasure, & giuen the subiects ex∣ample to imitate them: as Augustus, who did iustly vant, That he had found Rome built with bricke, but that he had left it built with marble: and in truth he em∣ployed foure millions and fiue hundred thousand crownes in building of the Ca∣pitoll alone: he was followed by the emperour Vespasian, who made great and excellent workes throughout the whole empire, rather to entertaine the mea∣ner sort, than for any other end: for when as an excellent workeman promised him to set vp pillers in the Capitoll, of an excessiue greatnes, with small charge and few labourers; he recompenced him verie well, saying, Let me I pray you, [ K] nourish the poore: and yet he protested in open senate comming to the empire, That there was need of a milliart of crownes to free and restore that Common* 1.1928 weale.

What shall I say of the emperour Claudius, who enioying an assured peace, cau∣sed the chanell of Fucina to be made, to accommodate the citie with good wa∣ters, employing dayly thirtie thousand men for eleuen yeares together. And without search of antient histories, it is well knowne that the signiorie of Ve∣nice doth entertaine continuall in their Arsenall, three or foure thousand per∣sons

which get their liuing by the labour of their hands, the which doth much [ A] content the citisens, seeing the publicke treasure employed so charitably. But these employments are goodly and befitting a great prince which is not indeb∣ted, when the reuenewes are not pawned, when as the Commonweale is in per∣fect peace, when the soldiers are paide, and rewards duly administred to euerie one: otherwise to increase the subsidies to build great pallaces, more stately than necessarie, being indebted, and to suffer the buildings of his predecessors to runne to ruine, thereby to purchase vaine glorie, that were to leaue a marke of his tyrannie, and a perpetuall testimonie to posteritie, I hat he hath built with the* 1.1929 bloud of his subiects: and often times the subiects ruine the buildings of ty∣rants, to deface their memory from off the earth, wheras they shuld by vertuous [ B] and charitable actions, graue their names in heauen. The golden pallace of Nero, which comprehended a great part of Rome, was contemned by his successors, who would not vouchsafe to lodge in it, for the crueltie and villanie of him that had built it; and soone after it was ruined▪ as being made of spoiles, exactions and confiscations, the which follow a prodigall prince at the heeles: for of neces∣sitie, of a prodigall he must become an oppressor, and of an oppressor a tyrant.

There were neuer two tyrants more cruell and prodigall, than Nero and Ca∣ligula;* 1.1930 for the first, in fifteen yeares that hee raigned, had giuen away the value of fiftie and fiue millions of crownes: and the last, in one yere had wasted three∣score and seuen millions, so as hauing not where withall to de•…•…ay his houshold [ C] charges, he was forced to beg the offrings in his owne person: then falling to pre∣scriptions of priuate men, after that he had wasted the publick tresure, he filled all with cruell confiscations. This miserie of excessiue prodigalitie happens often to princes, through forgetfulnesse of the gifts which they haue be•…•…owed, not well vndestanding the botome of their treasuries. And for this cause, it was wisely decreed by Frauncis the first▪ that euerie yere the generals of the treasure, should send vnto the treasurer, two briefes of the publicke reuenewes of euery prouince: the one by coniecture the first day of the yeare; the other a true note of the yeare that was past: and in like case the treasurer should make two briefs of the whole treasure in generall, to the end that the king and his counsell might [ D] plainly know what money was in his coffers, thereby to gouerne his gifts, rewards, and expences: but most commonly hee that hath power to dispose of it, seeth nothing. I will put for an example an estimate of the treasure which was made in lanuarie in the yere 1572, where in a chapter of the receit, there was an article set downe of 200000 pounds starling of casuall things: and by a true ac∣count* 1.1931 made in the end of the yeare, it was found, that they amounted to two hundred and fourescore thousand pounds starling, and yet it was verified▪ that there was but fiftie thousand pounds employed to the kings profit. Such was the calamitie of those times when as children and women ruled. But in my o∣pinion, the king had done better, if he had seen the generall account of his re∣uenews, [ E] the which is contained in two sheets of paper, and withall had had a re∣gister of his gifts and rewards: or if his priuie gifts be not inrolled, that he had a small briefe or remembrance of that which he had giuen to whom, and where∣fore: which are three chiefe points, whereof a prince must be verie carefull, to the end, that if he will be liberall, it should be to such as deserue it. And to this* 1.1932 end, it were expedient the prince had a briefe register of affaires of state, and a rolle of the worthiest men of his realme, for there is no memorie so perfect, but may be confounded with the multiplicitie of affaires, whereby he shall commit

great incongruities in matters of state: for a briefe note of affaires shall put him [ F] in mind of that which he hath to do, and of all enterprises, the which oftentimes remaine imperfect and ill executed through forgetfulnesse. There is no better example hereof, than that of king Lewis the eleuenth, who was held one of the most politicke princes of his age, yet hee ran willingly into the snare of Charles earle of Carolois, hauing forgotten that hee had sent his ambassadors into the countrey of Liege, to stirre them to warre against him: the earle aduertised here∣of, detained him prisoner: the which had not happened, if he had kept a register of his former actions. If any flatterers of the court will obiect, That the register would be too great, that the prince should be too much troubled, and that hee could not liue long: why then haue those princes and great monarchs which [ G] haue been so carefull of matters of state, and gouerned the whole world with their lawes, liued so long? as Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian, Traian, Adrian, and the Antonines, all Romaine emperours and politicke gouernours, who themselues made registers of their owne affaires, imitating the example of Augustus, who liued 74 yeares, leauing three Bookes written with his owne hand; the first was* 1.1933 his deeds and publicke actions; the second was his testament; the third was an estate of all the Romaine empire, wherein was contained a particular estate of euerie prouince, what troupes of souldiers, what treasure, what armes, what shipping and what munition, with a diligence worthie of a great monarch: yet for all this he did not omit to doe iustice ordinarily and to heare all commers, [ H] reading all the bookes of politike gouernment, that he could get, as Suetonius saith, remembring that which Demetrius the Phalerien said vnto Ptolome Phila∣delph king of Egypt, that he should find goodly secrets in bookes, which no man durst tell him. Vespasian in like sort, made an excellent abridgement of the em∣pire, and yet he liued 70 yeares.

The empire of Persia was greater than that of the Romaines, stretching from the farthest bounds of India, vnto Hellespont, and the desert of Libia, hauing vn∣der it 127 Prouinces, and yet the kings of Persia carried with them continually a register of their affaires of state and of their gifts: and when as Darius Longue∣main had escaped the conspirators hands, by the aduertisement which Mardo∣cheus [ I] had giuen him, the king a while after reading this register by night, and fin∣ding that Mardocheus had receiued no reward for so great a seruice done vnto the king hee caused him to bee sent for, giuing him great honours and prefer∣ments. But without any further search, the king of Spaine doth vsually looke vp∣on a register of his affaires, carrying an abridgement of letters which he writes to gouernors, captaines, and ambassadors, if the matter be not verie secret. For the same cause Charles surnamed the wise, king of France, made a Register of his priuie councell, and the first was Peter Barrier, who was not busied (as at this day) with expeditions and acts of •…•…ustice, but onely to inroll the affaires of state. But aboue all it is necessarie for a prince to haue a register in his counsell, of gifts, [ K] offices, benefices, & exemptions: the which is most commonly in the hands of a secretarie▪ and •…•…et the hundred part of the gifts are not entred. For the redres∣sing whereof, there are two antient lawes, the one made by Philip of Valois, of the which I haue formerly made mention, by the which the gift was reuoked, if the donatarie made not mention of the benefits graunted to him and his* 1.1934 predecessors: the other is of Charles the eight, whereb•…•… all gifts aboue ten pounds were of no force, if they were not verified in the chamber of accounts. The first law was soone taken away by another, saying, That it was sufficient

by the Letters of gift, if it were derogated from the first decree. And as for the [ A] law made by Charles the eight, it is out of practise, vnder color of secret gifts and pentions, the which must not be knowne: so as the antient laws (decreeing, that the articles set downe in the chapter of expences, shall not bee allowed without an order, a commaundement, and a discharge) are now of little or no force in that respect: for the treasurer is discharged, bringing the kings hand onely, with∣out any mention of him to whom the reward was giuen, nor wherefore. There was yet a law made by king Frauncis the first, and confirmed by his successor, wherby it was decreed, There should be foure keys to the place where the trea∣sure was kept, whereof the king should haue one, and the rest should be in Com∣missioners hands appointed by him: and the distribution of money should bee [ B] made by the kings commaundement, in the presence of the treasurer and comp∣troller of the Exchequer: But king Henrie the second by a speciall edict dischar∣ged the treasurers and officers of the treasurie, that afterwards they might not be called to any account. True it is, that one of these commissioners had giuen him at one time a hundred thousand crownes, if the common report were true; the which was much at that time, but little in regard of prodigalities practised* 1.1935 of late. For after that king Frauncis the first had ordred it by sparing, all the pub∣like treasure lay open to the spoile of great men and flatterers. But an edict made in fraud should be no hindrance, but that such as had mannaged the publike trea∣sure might bee called to an account; as it was required at a Parliament held at [ C] Orleans; and that excessiue gifts should be reuoked or at the least cut lesse: as the Emperour Galba did, who reuoked Neroes gifts, leauing but the tenth part to the donatorie; not that they should enquire too curiously of all gifts bestowed by the prince, the which might prooue verie dangerous.

Charles the seuenth did limit by a law, what summe of money the king might take yearely to dispose of at his pleasure: which summe being verie little, seemed in those daies exceeding great. There is nothing more profitable for the prince, nor necessary for the subiects, than to haue the rewards which they giue, knowne and examined by their officers: for that princes shall alwaies maintaine their fa∣fauors, giuing liberally, and the officers shalbe subiect to the hatred and dislike of [ D] such as haue their gifts reuoked or cut lesse: so as by means of recouerie, the mo∣ney should returne into the treasurie againe, and few would beg, yea they would scarce take it when it should be offered them, if they knew their gifts shuld be re∣uoked or examined in the chamber of accounts. If bountie be commendable and worthie of a great and rich Monarch, it is ill beseeming a poore and needie prince, for he must flea his subiects, and racke them to the verie bones. King* 1.1936 Frauncis the first, leauing a goodly kingdome, flourishing in armes and laws, and in all arts and sciences, to his successor, with seuenteen hundred thousand crowns in treasure, and the quarter of March readie to be receiued; yet did he not giue away the hundred part in rewards in 32 yeares that he had raigned, as his sonne [ E] Henrie did in two: for he had scarce closed his eyes, when as the confirmation of offices (which is due to the king at his first comming to the crowne) where∣of an infinit masse of money was then made, was giuen to one horse leech in court. And although that Frauncis the father gaue pensions to Germans, Eng∣lish,* 1.1937 Italians, Suisses, Albaneses, Spaniards, and Grisons; yet all his pensions, besides the Cantons were but 13000 pounds starling a yere at the most, as I haue seene by an extract out of the chamber of accounts, the which was made the* 1.1938 yeare that hee dyed: and in the same extract there is but 42769 pounds,

foure shillings starling, which hee gaue in pension to his subiects, princes of [ F] bloud, knights of the order, captaines in great numbers, lieutenants, councellors of state, men of iustice, ambassadors, scollers studying, and many excellent work∣men, and learned personages. O noble prince, who could so well make choise of worthy persons, and moderat his bountie.

We haue entreated of two points of this chapter: first how a Commonweale should gather together, and then how they shall employ: the last point is, what reserue they shall make for any necessitie, that they be not forced to begin warre* 1.1939 by borrowing, or subsidies; whereof the Romanes were verie carefull: for al∣though they had continuall warres vntill Augustus time, after the defeat of Marc Anthonie, yet had they neuer toucht the treasure which grew of the [ G] twentieth pence of slaues infranchised, vntill that Hannibal had reduced them* 1.1940 to extreame want; then was there found foure hundred and fiftie thousand crownes in their treasurie, the which was one of the chiefest meanes to saue their estate.

The emperour of Turkie obserues this order carefully, for besides the trea∣sury of ordinarie receits, which is in the princes Seraigle, there is another in the castle of seuen towers at Constantinople, where the antient treasure is reserued,* 1.1941 the which they meddle not with, if the necessitie bee not verie vrgent. Our Ancestors were accustomed in time of necessitie, when the treasure was wa∣sted to haue recourse to the kings forrests, where there was an infinit number [ H] of tall timber▪trees fit for all vses, of the which they made great summes of mo∣ney; but during the ciuile warres, they are so cut downe, as hereafter they will bee onely fit to make faggots: whereby the commonweale is much damnified, and will be more dayly, vnlesse there be some speedie remedie: for there is such want of timber, as they shall bee forced to fetch it out of other countreys for their ships and buildings; they do also cut them downe so hastily, as the trees cannot grow to beare any fruit to feed our swine; and in the end we shall be for∣ced to fetch wood from other parts for firing. And for that it hath been alwaies held a matter of some difficultie to keepe treasure safely, beeing verie hard for princes to shake off importune beggars: therefore the kings of Persia and the [ I] Romaines, that they might preserue this holy treasure from s•…•…elth, they reduced* 1.1942 a great part of their money into thicke brickes. It is also sayd, that Charles the fift king of Fraunce, had caused the great Hart in the pallace at Paris to be made after the same forme that they should cast one all of gold, of the treasure which he had gathered together. And the better to assure it against theeues, the anti∣ents did lay their treasure in temples, as the Greekes in the temple of Apollo, Delphique, and Deliaque: the Romaines in the temple of Saturne and Opis: the antient Gaules in hallowed Lakes: the Hebrews sometimes in temples, sometimes in sepulchres: for wee read that the high priest and king of the Iewes, Hircanus, found great treasures in Dauids sepulchre. But seeing there [ K] are no sepulchres so religious, no temples so holy, that theeues will not force and enter: therefore the kings of Morocco hauing moulten a great quantitie of gould in forme of a bowle, pierced through with a barre of yron, they did hang it on the toppe of the pinnacle of the great Church at Marocco. The antient Egyptians fearing to giue occasion to their neigh∣bours and enemies to inuade their estate, and make warre against them for their treasure (as they did to king Ezechias, hauing shewed his treasures to the ambassadors of the king of Assiria) employed it for the most part* 1.1943

in building of their Pyramides, beautifying of cities, bringing of riuers, and [ A] repayring the bankes of Nile. The law of God forbids to heape toge∣ther much gould and siluer; lest that thereby the prince should bee a•…•…u∣red* 1.1944 to oppresse his subiects, or the enemie to inuade the citisens; inuiting the prince thereby to bee charitable to the poore and needie: yet a meane is to bee vsed.

No man in my opinion will allow of the insatiable couetousnesse of Iohn 22 Pope of Rome, in whose coffers they found (hee being dead) twentie three millions of gold, as many haue written; or of Sardanapalus, who left fortie mil∣lions of crowns; or of Cyrus, who left fiftie millions; or of Tiberius Caesar, who had gathered together seuentie seuen millions, the which his successor wasted in [ B] one yere; or of Darius Ochus the last king of the Persians, in whose treasury Alex∣ander the great found fourscore millions of gold. We read in the holy scripture that Dauid left sixscore millions, the which is the greatest treasure that was euer* 1.1945 heard of: but there is some question touching the valuation of their tallent; for they write that he had gathered together a hundred thousand tallents of gold, and a thousand thousand tallents of siluer, which summe, if it bee accounted by tallents of Attica, although they be small it will seeme wonderfull: our interpre∣ters of the Bible doe falsely thinke them Attike tallants. I find Siclum in the scrip∣tures to be taken two waies, the which the Greeks call Statera, and the Latines Talentum, one waie it is a pound of six ounces, as in the first booke of Paralip the [ C] 21 chapter; another way it is taken for halfe an ounce, as in the first booke of Sa∣muel, the 24 chapter. If Dauids treasure be numbered by the sicle or tallent of halfe an ounce, the summe will not seeme great; if it be referred to six ounces, it will comprehend fiftie thousand pound waight of gold, and ten times as much in sil∣uer: but if it be valued by the Attike tallent, the wealth of the Romanes neuer came nere it; as we may see by an extract out of the treasury vnder the empire of Traian, at which time it was at the greatest; for the whole sum of their treasure (the which was kept in Egypt) came but to 74 thousand tallents, the which a∣mounts* 1.1946 to 44 millions, and foure hundred thousand crownes; vnlesse they had another treasurie at Rome, as it is likely, (although it appeare not by the extract) [ D] hauing 200000 foot, and 40000 horse in garrisons on the frontiers of the empire and in the prouinces entertained: three hundred Elephants for the warre, two thousand chariots for warre, and munition to arme •…•…00000 men, fifteen hun∣dred galleys of three and fiue owers on a side, besides two thousand vessels for the sea, and furniture to arme and rigge twise as many, with fourescore great ships stately adorned.

But our kings of Fraunce haue not offended in this point against the lawes of God, by heaping vp of too great treasures, and it is not to be feared that they will hereafter breake it: for they which say, that king Charles the fift left in his treasu∣rie eighteene millions of crownes, are much deceiued, for he found the coffers [ E] empty, he paid his predecessors debts, he redeemed the reuenews of the crown, conquered Guienne from the English, purchased the countie of Anxerre, and a great part of the earledome of Eureux, restored Henrie king of Castill being expelled his realme, maintained and succored the kings of Scotland, against the kings of England, and raigned but 17 yeares, and yet he did not leuie for all char∣ges aboue 43756 pounds starling yerely, comprehending the reuenews of the crowne lands: although that in his time the ayds and custome of 8 shillings vp∣pon euerie fire were laid vpon the subiects: and his successor fortie yeares after

did leuie but 45000 pounds starling: and Charles the seuenth, the yeare that he [ F] * 1.1947 died, receiued for all charges and reuenews, but 170000 pounds starling, as it ap∣peares plainly in the chamber of accounts, & yet had he imposed the tax in forme of an ordinarie impost, the which at that time came but to 1800 pounds: and twentie yeares after when as Lewis the eleuenth died, the whole receit came but to 470000 pounds, the which was reduced to 120000 pounds, at the request of the Parliament, held at Tours at the comming of Charles the 8 vnto the crowne,* 1.1948 besides the reuenews of the crowne which amounted yearely by estimation to 100000 pounds: so as the whole reuenews when as Charles the eight died, came not to aboue 250000 pounds. The like request was made vnto king Charles the ninth, by a parliament held at Orleans, at his comming to the crowne: but the [ G] necessitie was found so great as there was more need to augment than to dimi∣nish the the charge. Yet there was great hope to free the king out of debt, and to take away the subsidies & extraordinary charges, (if the realme had not ben plun∣ged in ciuile warre) considering the good order was taken the first yeare: for the interest was moderated to fiue in the hundred, all officers wages for that yeare were diminished and halfe taken awaie, and the confirmation of offices graun∣ted them freely. And as for the expences, all was so well ordred, as by the ac∣counts of that yere, there came into the kings coffers 230577 pounds starling: so as in few yeares all had been discharged, without any diminution of the kings houshold seruants, the which were six hundred, besides such as were entertai∣ned [ H] for hunting & hawking, for they may well be spared without deminution of the maiestie of a king or the dignity of his house, by cutting off his ordinary traine and houshold seruants, the which oftentimes doth cause strangers to contemne him, and his subiects to rebell against him: as it chanced vnto Lewis the eleuenth, who hauing put the nobilitie from him & discharged the gentlemen of his house, vsed his taylor for an herald at armes, his barbar for an ambassador, and his Phi∣sition for chancellor, (as Antiochus king of Syria did his phisitian Apolophanes, whom he made president of his counsell) & in mockerie of other kings, he ware a greasie hat, and very course cloth in his apparell: and euen in the chamber of* 1.1949 accounts, there is set downe in a note of expences two shillings for a new paire [ I] of sleeues to an old dublet: and in another Item three halfe pence for a box of grease to blacke his boots withall; and yet he raised the charges more than his predecessor did by 300000 pounds starling a yeare, and sold much of the reue∣news. As for the officers of the crowne, it was wisely aduised at the estates of Orleans, to reduce them to the antient number, as they were in the time of king Lewis the twelfe, by suppression without any disbursement. But there were some good husbands which gaue them afterwards to vnderstand, that the suppression of offices was a decrease of parties casuall, wherby the number was afterwards much augmented: And Balley president of the accounts told the king boldly and plainly, being at S. Maur desfosses, that the suppression of those officers which had [ K] been created by the new law, was both pernitious to the publicke, and hurtfull to his treasure, seeing but for three augmentations in the chamber of accounts* 1.1950 onely, they had payd aboue threescore thousand pounds starling: but he doth not say that it is like vnto cold water which encreaseth the fit to him that hath a burning Feuer: for it is well knowne that the king or people pay wages to most of these officers after ten or twentie for the hundred, which was the prin∣cipall cause of the suppression of subalternall offices by a law made by Fraun∣cis the second. Moreouer they set not downe the prerogatiues which belong

to the officers of the chamber of accompts, that is to say, their ordinarie wages, their [ A] rights of wood, their liuerie at Easter, their rights at Hallontide, their roses, their prero∣gatiue* 1.1951 of herings, their rights at Twelfetide, their rights of the stable of vertue, and of white salt, besides paper, parchment, pens, counters, purses, waxe candles, red waxe, pen∣kniues, bodkins, scrapers and strings: they did not shew also that the other profits of offices came to much more than their wages: they will not confesse that whereas there be now seauen chambers of accompts, there was then but one; and whereas now there be two hundred officers or thereabouts in the chamber of accompts at Paris, there* 1.1952 was wont to be but one Treasorer of France President of the chamber, and •…•…oure ma∣sters of accompts that were Clarks, by an erection that was made at Viuiers in Brie in the yeare 1319, afterwards they added foure lay men, which sufficed for all that were [ B] accomptable: the kingdome of Nauarre, and all the Lowcountries being then in the hands of the kings of France. And yet we haue seen in our da•…•…es, that those which haue stollen the kings treasure and the subiects wealth, haue escaped, being indebted in great sommes of money; and infinit others which haue neuer accompted. And which is more, not long since an accomptant had gotten into his possession a great and notable somme of money, wherewith he stood charged by his accompt, who by collusion with a nobleman that should haue a third part, he obtained the rest by gift, and for his discharge, he produced the kings b•…•…l signed to the nobleman. So as to call accomptants to their duties, they must oftentimes depute Commissioners with double charges, and [ C] the fault cannot be imputed to any other, but to those officers that are created to that end. And although that all treasorers, receiuers, comptrollers, and other accomptants should make a good and loyall accompt, and pay what remaines due; yet notwith∣standing there is so great a number in this realme, as a third part of the receit is spent in gages, charges, vacations, riding voyages, and the conduct of money; as hath been well verified by the estates of the countrie of Languedock in the yeare 1556, where I was then present: who for that cause deputed Martin Durant, Syndic or Procurator of that countrie, to present a request vnto the king to be discharged of all officers of re∣ceit,* 1.1953 making offer to bring all the money that was to be leuied vpon the subiect freely into the kings cofers, without any charge either for officers wages, or for carriage: [ D] shewing also particularly that the third part of the receipts went to officers, promising to deliuer vnto the king a full crowne, whereas hee did not receiue foure shillings, whereby he should saue 20000. pounds starling yearely in the two generalities of Languedoc, only for ordinarie charges: for then the charge of Languedoc came to threescore thousand pounds yearely. But since the officers of the finances or treasor are so increased, as Maximinus Lullier, Prouost of marchants at Paris, and President of the chamber of accompts, said in open Parlament at Blois, That of the crowne there came not eighteene pence cleere into the kings co•…•…ers: the which seemes incredible, yet he was held a man most expert in accompts. We must then conclude, that the subiect was much opprest by the polling of officers, seeing they made these offers: which we [ E] may not thinke new, for that in old times they had no other receiuers but the Viconts, Bayliffes, and Seneshals. That request made by the Syndic of Languedoc did much please king Henry, but it displeased the flatterers in court, and the officers of the ac∣compts, so as it was reiected, for the friuolous difficulties they made which had interest therein, the which is not heere needfull to rehearse, so as it was concluded that recei∣uers and treasorers were necessarie. Seeing then that accomptants and masters of ac∣compts is a necessarie euill (as Alexander Seuerus said) The •…•…ewer there are, the better shall it be for the Commonweale; for the kings treasure will still decrease when it pas∣seth through the hands of so many officers. These were the complaints and expostu∣lations

which the estates of France made vnto king Charles the 6 in the yeare 1412, [ F] for that he had fiue Treasorers, and that in old time there were but two: and that in like sort there were but three Iudges of the reuenues in the yeare 1372, and now there are almost three hundred within this realme. And in the yeare 1360 there was but one Receiuer generall, who did reside at Paris, & now there are 34, what would they now say to see so great a multitude. The Romans in old time had but one receiuer in euery Prouince: all customes and duties were let out to farme, and the farmers brought in their rents to the receiuer. The first office that was giuen to gentlemen of good fami∣lies, and that aspired to greater dignities, was the office of Questura, or Receiuer for a yeare only, and without any comptroller to make triall of their diligence and loyaltie. He that was found guiltie of extorsion, was declared incapeable neuer to beare any ho∣norable [ G] * 1.1954 charge, besides infamie and the losse of his goods, the which was a wise course to assure their treasure. But it is a strange thing and very absurd in this realme, to see so many men giue money to their maister to pick his purse. The Emperour of Turkie doth otherwise, for he neuer sels office, and for so great an Empire there are verie few* 1.1955 Treasorers: the Collectors (which they call Protogeres) giue the money vnto the Su∣bachis (which are as it were the Viconts of Normandie, who in old times had the same charge) then they deliuer it to the Sangiacs (who are as it were gouernors of the countrie) who conuey it vnto the Bellerbeis, and they send in safety vnto the Defrer∣derlers, which are two generals of the Treasor, the one in Asia, and the other in Europe, who deliuer it to the great Comptroller, and he giues it to Casmander Baschi, great [ H] maister of the treasor, who hath ten commanders or deputies vnder him for extraordi∣narie payments, there is but one treasorer, and for all officers of accompts, there are but 25 Comptrollers which examine the accoumpts. One thing is worthie obseruation, that they haue no treasorers nor receiuers but Eunukes, after the Persian and old Gre∣cian manner, and that wisely, for they that neither haue children, nor can be seduced with the flatteries and inticements of women, it is not to be feared that they will steale the publike treasor with the hazard of their liues and •…•…ame. As for Treasorers in France, it is more then necessarie that such offices be giuen to gentlemen of honor and of noble houses, as it was vsuall in old time, and is yet practised in England for the reason that I haue said. By an Edict made by king Henry the second in September in the yeare 1554 [ I] it was decreed, that the chiefe Treasorers should take their places before the Stewards of the kings house, of the councellers of the court of Parliament, of the accompts and aides, if they be not in their assemblies: and by an Edict made by Charles the 9, he commaunds all vassals which hold directly of the king, to do homage and fealtie vnto the Treasorers of France, the which would much discontent an infinite number of Dukes, Earles, Barons, and great personages, who would not for any thing kneele before a base fellow that had bought his office. Thus much concerning treasure, and for that it consists in coyne of gold, siluer, copper and buillon, it is necessarie to write something thereof.

[ K]

CHAP. III. [ A] Of Coines, and the meanes how to preuent that they be not altered, nor falsified.

LOoking well into the best grounds, and strongest supports of a Commonweale; in my opinion, hee must exactly vnderstand this point, that will wisely settle an estate, or reforme the abuses: for that there is nothing that doth more trouble and afflict the poore peo∣ple, than to falsifie the Coines, and to alter the course thereof: for both rich, and poore, euerie one in particular, and all in generall, re∣ceiue [ B] an infinit losse and preiudice, the which cannot precisely in euery point bee de∣scribed,* 1.1956 it breeds so many inconueniences. The Coine may not be corrupted, no not altered, without great preiudice to the Commonweale: for if money (which must rule the price of all things) be mutable and vncertaine, no man can make a true estate of what he hath, contracts and bargaines shall be vncertaine, charges, taxes, wages, pen∣sions, rents, interests, and vacations shall be doubtfull, fines also and amercements li∣mited by the lawes and customes shall be changeable and vncertaine: to conclude, the estate of the treasure and of many affaires both publike and priuate shall be in suspence: whereof the Edict made by Gratidianus the Tribune at Rome is a good argument, who (contrarie to the opinion of his fellow Tribunes) set a certaine price of a kind of [ C] coyne called Victoriatus, vpon a penaltie, whereby he purchased so great glorie to him∣selfe and his posteritie, as they did erect his statues in euery streete, and offred frankin∣sence and waxe vnto them. And Tully saith, Neminem vnquam multitudint ob id vnum fuisse cariorem, Neuer any man (for that cause only) was deerer to the people. The Prince may not make any false money, no more than he may kill or rob, neither can he alter the weight of his coyne to the preiudice of his subiects, and much lesse of stran∣gers, which treate with him, and traffick with his people, for that he is subiect to the law of nations, vnlesse he will lose the name and maiesti•…•… of a king, and be tearmed a counterfetter of money: as Dante the poet called Philip le Bel, for that he did first among [ D] our princes corrupt the coyne, and mingle copper with siluer, which was the cause of great troubles among his subiects, and a pernitious president to forraine Princes: whereof he repented himselfe too late, restoring the coyne, and inioyning his sonne Lewis Hutin not to abate the goodnes of his coynes. And for this cause Peter the 4 king of Arragon did confiscate the estate of the king of Maiorque and Minorque, whom he pretended to be his vassall, for that he had abated the coyne: and yet the* 1.1957 kings of Arragon themselues did erre in that point, so as pope Innocent the 3 did forbid them as his vassals not to vse it: whereupon the kings of Arragon comming to the crowne doth sweare not to change the waight and price of their money, which hath been allowed. But it is not sufficient to make such protestations, vnlesse the value and waight of money be ordred as it ought, to the end that neither prince nor subiect may [ E] falsifie it if they would, the which they will alwayes do, hauing the meanes, what pu∣nishment soeuer be inflicted. The ground of all these counterfet coyners, washers, clip∣pers, and boylers of money, growes by the mixtures which are made of mettals, for one mettall being pure and simple cannot be supposed for another, differing by nature in colour, waight, substance, and sound. To preuent all these inconueniences, you must ordaine that in euery Commonweale the coynes be of one mettall without mixture, and publish the Edict of the Emperour Tacitus, who defended vpon losse of life and* 1.1958 goods, to mingle gold with siluer, nor siluer with copper, nor copper with tinne or

lead. But we may except from this law the mixture of copper with tinne, which makes [ F] the sounding mettall, whereof bels and ordinance are cast, not so much vsed in old times as now: for it is not necessarie to mixe the twentieth part of lead with pure tinne to make it more malliable, seeing it may be cast and put in worke without any such mixture, the which hurts the bountie of the tinne, and can neuer be drawne from the lead. This law must not only hold in coynes, but in all plate and works of gold or siluer, in the which falsehood and corruption is more ordinarie than in coynes, for that the triall is not so easie, and oftentimes the workemanship is as deere as the sub∣stance it selfe: wherein Archimides is much deceiued, seeking to find out what the gold∣smith had stolne out of that great crowne of king Hieron, and not to deface the fashion, (for as then they had no vse of the touchstone) he tooke two lumps or masses one of [ G] gold, and another of siluer, putting either of them into a vessell full of water, and by the effusion of the water he iudged the proportion of the gold and siluer, then filling it* 1.1959 againe with water, he put the crowne into it, the which cast forth lesse water then the masse of siluer, and more then that of gold, whereby he coniectured that the gold∣smith had stolne a fift part: but his iudgement was vncertaine, for he supposed the mix∣ture or allaie to be of pure siluer, when as the goldsmith to make the gold more firme, and to giue it the better luster, makes it most commonly of copper, being also of lesse charge, the which is much lighter then siluer, which makes the gold looke paler; and so by consequence copper hath a greater bodie then siluer in a masse of an equall waight, and differs as much as thirteene do from eleuen: and if the allaie or mixture were of [ H] copper and siluer, it was impossible to make a true iudgement, vnlesse he could distin∣guish how much there was of either; and although it were knowne, yet shall he erre insensibly in measuring the drops of water, through the difference of the masse and proportion of the mettals: there is no refiner nor goldsmith in the world so cunning that can precisely iudge by the touchstone how much siluer or copper is mixt with gold, if the allaie be not of one pure mettall. And although that goldsmiths and iewel∣lers haue falsly complained that they cannot worke in gold vnder two and twentie Carrats without losse, or in fine gold aboue 23 Carrats and three quarters, according to the decree of king Francis the first published in the yeare 1511: yet notwithstanding all good orders they make worke at twentie, yea oftentimes at nineteene Carrats, so [ I] as in twentie foure marks there is fiue marks of copper or siluer, the which in time is made into base money by those which vse to counterfe•…•…. It is therefore necessarie to obserue the same proportion and mixture in gold that is wrought, as in coynes vpon the like penalties, to the end that the vse of gold in plate and moueables may be pure. And for that it is impossible (as refiners say) to refine gold to 24 Carats, but there must be a little of some other mettall with it; nor siluer at twelue deniers, but there must be some allaie, and euen the purest refining according to the lawes is of 23 Carrats and three quarters, and hath a fourth part of a Carrat of allaie, and of siluer eleuen deniers, two graines and three quarters, such are the royals of Spaine, or else eleuen deniers and eighteene graines, as is the siluer at Paris, the which is of all others the best, for that it [ K] hath but a fortie sixt part of copper mixt with it. And in the best Spanish siluer there is a thirtie sixt part of copper, and without any great charge (besides the difficultie and length of time) they may worke gold in plate, or in coyne of 23 Carrats, and siluer of eleuen deniers twelue graines pure, without any allaie: for in so doing, the proportion of gold to siluer shall be equall, for the allaie shall be alike in the one and the other, that is to say, that in 24 pounds of siluer at eleuen deniers and twelue graines; and in 24 pounds of gold at 23 Carrats: there is a pound of other mettall in the gold which is not gold, and so likewise in the siluer which is not siluer, be it copper or any other

mettall, and such siluer is called in this realme, the kings siluer, in the which the 24 part [ A] is copper, and by this meanes the coynes of gold and siluer shall be stronger, and more durable, whereby they get much in the working in the fier, and in sodring, and they keepe it from wasting and brittlenes.

And to the end the iust proportion of gold to siluer, obserued in al Europe & neigh∣bour nations, (of twelue for one, or thereabouts) may bee also kept in the weight of money: it is needfull to coine money of gold and siluer of the same weight of sixteen, two and thirtie, and threescore and foure peeces to the Marke, without any alteration either in raising or abating; to auoid on the one side the difficultie of stamping it, and on the other side the brittlenesse of fine gold and siluer, if the coine were lighter than one denier. Whereas on the other side also, if they make any come weighing aboue [ B] halfe an ounce, it is easily counterfeited, by reason of the thicknesse thereof: as we see in the Portugueses of gold, and the Dollers of siluer, which weigh aboue an ounce: as al∣so that coine of three Markes and a halfe, which the emperour Heliogabulus caused to be made: and that which was coined with the stampe of Constantinople, weighing a marke of gold, whereof the emperour Tiberius presented fistie to our king Childeric. By which meanes neither chaungers, nor marchants, nor goldsmiths, shall euer be able to deceiue the common people, which is ignorant of the bountie and weight: for they shall be alwayes forced to giue twelue peeces of siluer for one of gold; and euery one of the peeces of siluer, shall weigh as much as the peece of gold of the same marke: as [ C] we see in the single Royals of Spaine, which weigh as much as the French Crowne, which are (according to the weight set downe in the yeare 1540) two deniers sixteene graines; and that twelue single are iust the value of a French Crowne. Why then may not all coynes of gold and siluer be equall in weight? and all of one weight of both mettals haue one stampe, or caracture? Why may there not be the same likenesse & proportion of both mettalls? If this might be effected (as I hope it will) all meanes to falsifie money would be taken away. And to the end the simpler sort may not be abu∣sed in the chaunge of the said peeces, as well of gold, as of siluer; nor to take the single for the double (as they do oftentimes in Royals of Spayne, and in the new coyne of king Henry the second) it is needfull that the stampes be diuers, and not alike as those of [ D] Spaine. And yet as touching siluer, to the end they shall hold the certaine titles of Soulz, pettie Denier, and Liure, as it is specified in the edict of king Henry the second, made in the yeare 1551; and by reason of the payment of rents, amercements, and the lords rights, according to the customes and ordinances; the Soulz shall be of three De∣niers weight of the kings siluer (as it is said) and of sixtie three to the Marke: so foure shall be worth a Liure, as it hath gone heretofore, the which is the iustest price that can be giuen: and euery peece may be diuided into three, so as euery one shall weigh a Denier, and shall goe for foure small Deniers or Pence, and shall be called a common Denier, to the end the Soulz may alwayes be worth twelue Deniers: & that the com∣plaints of the lords for their rents and rights, beeing vsually paid in blanch, or copper [ E] money, may cease, being now conuerted vnto Soulzes, such as they were in the time of Saint Lewis▪ that is, sixtie foure to a Marke of the kings siluer. And as for other grow∣ing out of annuities, purchased for money, the rent must be paid according to the value of the Soulz which it held at that time, when as the rent was purchased; the which was but foure Deniers an hundred yeares since, and is now but the third part of the aunti∣ent Soulz: the which it will be needfull to put in vse. Such was the Drachma, or Groat of siluer, vsed throughout all Greece, which was the eight part of the ounce, which wee call a Gros, and of the same weight with the Soulz which Saint Lewis caused to be coi∣ned, the which were called Gros Tournois, or of Tours, and Soulz Tournois: By the

which Soulz Tournois, or of Tours, all antient contracts are ordered, and many trea∣ties [ F] not onely within the realme, but also among straungers: as in the treatie made be∣twixt the Bernois, and the three small Cantons of the Swissers, where it is said, That the Souldiors pay, should be a Soulz Tournois. The like was in this realme, and for that cause it was called Sold, and it was like vnto the pay of the Romans, as Tacitus said, and of the Grecians, as we read in Pollux. For the Drachma, or Groat, is of the same weight with the Soulz Tournois. The Venetians haue followed the antients, and haue made the ounce of eight Groats, or Drachmaes, and the Drachma of 24 Deniers, and the Denier of two Halfepence, or twentie foure graines: as we vse in France, from which order we may not stray, as being most auntient in all Greece, and the Orientall regions. [ G]

True it is, that the auntient Romans hauing their ounce equall with the Greeks, that is to say, of 576 graines, they diuided it into seuen Deniers of their money, and their Denier was in value an Atticque Drachma, or groat, & three seuen parts more. Wher∣in* 1.1960 Buda was deceiued, saying, That there were eight Deniers in the ounce, and that the Romans Denier, or Peny, was equall with the Attique Drachma, and the Roman pound like vnto the Attique Myne; being most certaine that the Roman pound had but twelue ounces, and the Greeke Myne sixteene ounces, according to the marchants pound weight within this realme: the which George Agricola hath well obserued by the calcull of Plinie, Appian, Suetonius, and Celsus. But at this day it is straunge to see the great diuersitie of pounds and ounces in all nations, nay in one and the same kingdom [ H] there are in a manner an infinit sort of pounds: whereof I will make mention of some few. An hundred weight at Paris, make 116 pound at Lion, at Rouan 96⅔, at Tho∣louse 121 pound, at Marseilles 123, at Geneua 89, at Venice 165½, at Genoa 155, at Basil 98, at London 109½. That of Pa•…•…is and Strausbourg agrees, so do they of Basil, Nuremberg, and Francford, and they of Thoulouse, Mompellier, and Auignon, agree in the same pound weight: but they of Tours haue a lighter pound, for fifteene ounces at Paris makes sixteene at Tours. The like difference of weight is to be obserued in the East, and in Affrike, for 100 rowls at Thessalonica, make 91 pounds at Paris: 100 rowls at Damasco, make 120 pounds at Paris, 100 rowles in Siria, make at Paris 503 pounds and foureteene ounces: the like may be written of many others. But the lightest pound [ I] weight of all, is that of Naples, for there an hundred pound weight, make but seuentie foure at Paris. But all this diuersitie of weight may easily bee reconciled in coynes, if they coine their peeces of gold and siluer of the same weight, the same name, and the same bountie, that is to say, that there be no more abatement in the gold, than in the sil∣uer, whereby they can neither raise nor abate the price; as they do oftner than there are monethes, either at the peoples pleasure, or of those that haue authoritie and credit with princes, who borrow all the money they can, and then they raise the price of mo∣ney: so as one hauing borrowed an hundred thousand crownes, raised it suddenly six pence in the crowne, whereby he gained two thousand and fiue hundred pounds star∣ling. Another abated the course of money in March, and raised it againe in Aprill, after [ K] he had receiued the quarters rent. By this meanes also you shall cut off all falsifying and counterfeiting of coines, and the most ignorant shall know the bountie of the one and the other coine by the sight, the sound, and weight, without either fire or touchstone. For seeing that all nations for these two thousand yeares and more, haue alwaies kept, and still do keepe an equall proportion from gold to siluer, it will bee impossible either for the subiect or the prince, to raise, pull downe, or to alter, the prices of coines of gold or siluer, if base money bee banished the Commonweale, and gold set at 23 carats. And yet for that the smallest coines are profitable to the poorer sort, it is needfull to

coyne a third kind of money of copper, without any other mixture, as they haue be∣gun, [ A] and as it is practised in Spaine and Italie: or else diuide the marke of silue in 15036 peeces, euerie peece weighing nine graines, that the poore may buy the smallest things therewith. For whereas the queene of England hath banished all base and copper money, and reduced all her coines to two kinds onely, the least peece of money, which is a peny, being in value about ten Deniers, shee takes from her subiects the meanes to buy any thing at a lesse price; and which is worst, they cannot giue lesse alms to a poore bodie, than of a peny, which holds many from giuing, as I haue shewed in the Para∣dox against Malestroit: the which the Chauncelour of England caused to be translated in the yeare 1569, hoping to redresse it. But it were farre more expedient, to haue no other coine but of gold and siluer, if it were possible to coyne any money lesse than the [ B] penie, and that they would diuide the Marke of siluer (as in Lorraine) into a thousand* 1.1961 peeces, which they called Andegauenses: for that Rene duke of Aniou and of Lorraine caused them to be coined, two hundred whereof make but sixpence; and fortie, one Soulz of our base money: and yet they are of reasonable fine siluer. But making it but halfe so little, it would be more firme, and of the same hieght that I haue spoken, and they may be cut and stamped at one instant. For the price of copper being vncertaine in all places, it is not fit to make money of, the which must alwayes be kept as certaine as may be: besides, there is no mettall so subiect to rust, the which doth consume both the stampe and substance: and contrariwise neither gold nor siluer do euer rust. And as for the price, we read, that during the Punike warres, the pound of siluer was worth [ C] eight hundred and fortie pound weight of copper, after twelue ounces to the pound; & then the Denier of pure siluer, which was but the seuenth part of an ounce, was raised from ten pounds of copper to sixteene (as Plinie saith) which was after the rate of eight hundred ninetie six pounds of copper, for one pound weight of siluer, the pound weighing twelue ounces. Afterwards the least coine, which was a pound of copper, was halfe abated by the law Papiria, so as the price of copper was double that which it was* 1.1962 before: and when as siluer came in great aboundance, it was reduced to a fourth, re∣maining in the same value, which was 224 pound of copper for a pound of siluer: the which is neere the estimation of copper in this realme, whereas one hundred pounds, [ D] at sixteene ounces to the pound, are worth but thirtie six shillings starling: and in Ger∣manie it is better cheape, although their mouables are thereof; yea in some places the churches are couered with copper: but in Italy it is deerer, and in Spaine and Affrike much more, for it is very scant there.

Some one may obiect, That the aboundance of siluer may also cause an abatement of the price, as we read in Titus Liuius, that by the treatie made betwixt the Aetolians and Romans, it was said, That the Aetolians should pay for ten pounds of siluer one pound of gold: and yet by a law made by Constantine, the pound of gold is esteemed at 41 pound⅖: for he would haue them pay fiue Soulz of gold for one pound of siluer, making seuentie two Soulz of gold in a pound; so as fiue Soulz is iust the fourteenth part of a pound, and two fifts more: and now the price is twelue for one, or little lesse. [ E] True it is, that heretofore the * 1.1963 Marke of pure gold was esteemed one hundred eightie fiue Liures; and the * 1.1964 Marke of siluer fifteene Liures fifteene Soulz Tournois: so as for one Marke of pure gold vnwrought, they must haue eleuen Markes, fiue ounces, twen∣tie three Deniers, and fiue graines, of the kings siluer vnwrought. Towards the North, where there are many mynes of siluer, and few of gold, gold is somewhat deerer. The pope of Rome more greedie of gold than of siluer, did value the Marke of gold at 12 Markes and foure fifts of siluer: the which is at this present the price of gold and siluer, and was almost two thousand fiue hundred yeares since. For wee read in Herodotus,

that the pound of gold was valued at thirteene pounds of siluer: and the Hebrewes in [ F] their Pandects, set a Denier of gold for fiue and twentie of siluer, the coines of gold be∣ing double to them of siluer; which were twelue and a halfe for one. Wee read also, that in the time of the Persians, & when as the Commonweals of Greece did flourish, that an ounce of gold was worth a pound of siluer: for Stater Doricus of the weight of an ounce, was valued at a pound of siluer, as Iulius Pellux saith. And in Augustus his time, the king of the Indians, had the same estimation of gold to siluer, the which was then brought to Rome: and therefore hee commended the iustice of the Ro∣mans; as wee read in Plini•…•…. Whereby we may coniecture, that the price of these two mettals holds in a manner throughout all Europe, after the auntient estimation. But the value of gold was raised vnder the last emperours, by reason of the spoyle ther∣of [ G] which had bene made for the guilding of things: as Nero his great pallace all guilt, the which had galleries of one thousand paces long: and after him Vespasian, who im∣ploied* 1.1965 seuen millions and two hundred thousand crownes, to guild the Capitoll. And Agrippa couered all the temple Pantheon with copper, and then guilt it, to keepe it from rusting. And oftentimes siluer is guilt, although of it selfe it will neuer take rust. Doubtlesse we may well allow the holy ornaments to be of gold, for that the law com∣maunds it: but to haue vessels of gold, beds, bookes, yea and their bridles guilt, argues the madnesse of frantike men: the which if the prince doth not punish very seuerely, the price of gold must of necessitie rise: whereof our nation did vehemently complaine vn∣to the prince, at the estates held at Blois. Moreouer siluer hauing no hold, is little im∣ployed [ H] to siluer withall: besides, the mynes of the North yeeld great store of siluer, & no gold: yet the alteration of price which is made, in processe of time is insensible, which can be no let but the valuation of coines made of these two mettals shall be equall in all states, banishing away all base money. Moreouer a generall traffique dispersed more now ouer the face of the whole earth than euer, cannot allow of any great alteration of gold and siluer, but by a common consent of all nations. But it is impossible to hold the price of things, retaining this base money, the which is altogether diuers and vne∣quall: for euen as the price of all things doth fall, as the value of money decreaseth, (as the law saith) so doth it rise in raising the price of mony. And it must rise & fall, for that there is no prince which holds the laws of mynting equall with other Commonweals, [ I] nor yet in his owne: for that the Aloy of the Soulz differs from that of the Teston, and of pettie Deniers Doubles, Lyards, & peeces of six, and three blankes, the which conti∣nue not long in one estate. The first beginning in this realme to abase the siluer coine, and to mixe the 24 part of copper therewith, was to giue occasion to marchants to bring siluer into this realme, where there is none growing: for eleuen Deniers and a halfe in Fraunce, was as much as twelue Deniers in another countrey. But this deuise was needlesse, considering the great riches of Fraunce, the which they will alwaies fetch bringing gold and siluer from all parts. This mischiefe tooke deeper root in the time of Philip the Faire, who did impaire the blanched money the one halfe, in the yeare 1300, adding as much copper vnto it, as there was siluer: a while after it was brought [ K] to a third, so as the new Soulz was worth but a third part of the auntient. And in the yeare 1322 the Aloie of Soulzes was so weake, as the Marke of silue•…•… was worth 80 * 1.1966 Liures Tournois, and had 1600 peeces for a Marke of copper. True it is, that in the same yeare that Charles the seuenth recouered his crowne which had beene taken from him, he caused a new coine to be made in the moneth of October, the which was strong and good, so as the Marke of siluer was set at eight * 1.1967 Liures: but in the yeare 1453, •…•…e caused Soulzes to be coined of fiue Deniers of Aloie, and since they haue still decreased: so as king Francis the first, in the yeare 1540, caused some to bee coyned of

three Deniers of sixteene graines: king Henry at three Deniers and twelue graines: so [ A] as the auntient Soulz of the kings siluer was worth almost foure: and king Charles the ninth brought it to three Deniers, the estimation still continuing alike: for that the price of the crowne did arise. And in the yeare 1577, vnder king Henry the third, they decrease almost halfe in weight, and a fourth part in goodnesse, from those of Francis the first. Other princes haue done no better; for the Crutzer of Germany, which in old time was siluer at eleuen Deniers & foure graines, is now at foure Deniers and sixteene graines: the Soulz of Wirtzburg, and the Reichs groschem at six Deniers, that is halfe siluer, and halfe copper. The Scheslind, the Rape, the Denier of Strausbourg, at foure Deniers and twelue graines: the Rapephening at foure Deniers three graines, and the Florines of siluer at eleuen Deniers foure graines: as also the peeces bee of fiue and of [ B] ten Crutzers, the Soulz of Flanders or Patars, whereof twentie are worth twentie and foure of ours, are but three Deniers and eighteene graines of Aloie, and more than two third parts is copper: the peece of foure Patars is at seuen deniers ten graines: the Brelingues of Gueldres, are at eight deniers, and the third is copper. In former times the Soulz, or Groat of England, was at ten deniers twentie two graines: and neuer did all this base coine continue aboue twentie or thirtie yeares at one rate or standard, or at the same weight; and from thence growes the difference of the great Liure Tournois, of the lesse, and of the meane, the Liure or pound of Normandie, the Liure of Britta∣nie,* 1.1968 and the Liure of Paris, the which are all different, as wee may yet see it in the taxes of the popes chamber. And in Spaine the Liure or pound of Barcellona, Tole∣do, [ C] Molorque; In England the pound starling is worth ten of ours: And in Scotland there are two sorts of Pounds, the one starling, the other ordinarie. There is no prince in Italie, that hath not his Pound different from others: as in like case the Marke hath generally eight ounces: but the ounce of the Low countries is weaker by six graines than ours, and then that of Cologne by nine graines, that of Nuremberg six graines, and contrariwise that of Paris is stronger by an ounce. The Marke of Naples hath nine ounces, that of Salerne hath ten: and there is no towne almost in all Italie, but dif∣fers in his Marke, which makes the value of their coines so diuers, being so different in their weight & standard: the which troubles the poore people much, who loose great∣ly [ D] by exchange, and generally they which vnderstand not the poier, as they say, or the difference, as the Banquers speake: that is the value of money of exchange from one place to another. And therefore they say of a man that is well practised in affairs, That he vnderstands the poier, as a matter of hard conceit. For they haue made the matter of coines so obscure, by reason of their mixtures, as for the most part they vnderstand nothing therein. For euen as artisans, marchants, and euery one in his facultie, disgui∣seth oftentimes his worke: and as many Physitians speake Latine before women, vsing Greeke caracters, and Arabike words, and Latine words abridged, yea some times they blot their paper that it may not be read, fearing that if their secrets were discouered, they should be little esteemed: so these Mynt-maisters, in stead of speaking plainely, and to say, that the Marke of gold of twelue parts, hath two of copper, or of some other met∣tall, [ E] they say, It is gold of twentie carats: and in stead of saying, that a peece of three blankes is halfe copper, they say it is siluer of six deniers fine, two deniers of weight, and fifteene deniers of course, giuing to deniers and carats, the essence, qualitie, and quantity, of gold and siluer against, nature. And in stead of saying, the Marke hath threescore peeces, they say, it is of fiue Soulz currant. Againe they make some coines certaine or stable, some vncertaine and variable, and the third imaginarie, when as nothing can bee called firme in matters of coine, hauing so diminished the weight, and impaired the bountie of the gold and siluer. For the Ducat which goes currant at Venice, Rome,

Naples, Palermo, and Mess•…•…na, is an imaginarie coyne; it was in old time the same [ F] peece of gold weighing an Angell, or else a Medin of Barbarie, or an Imperiall of Flan∣ders, almost of the same weight and touch with the auntient Ducat, worth ten Carlius of siluer, and the Carlin ten Soulz of the countrey, at 46 peeces to the Marke of gold, and six to the ounce, the which they diuide into thirtie Tarijs, and the Tarij into twen∣tie graines, the which is one grosse vpon the ounce, more than the common ounce, which hath but eight grosse. The law calleth this coine of gold Solidus, the which (as the Angell) hath fortie eight peeces for the marke, and seuentie two for the Roman pound at twelue ounces, the which hath long time bene currant; as it appeareth by the lawes among the Grecians, Germans, English, French, and Burguignons, and it is no∣thing els but our French Crowne of the Sunne. But our Mynt-maisters hauing not [ G] well vnderstood the word Solidus, haue within these fiftie yeares set the Sunne vppon it, tearming it erroneously Aureum Solarem: but the common people retaining their old speech, call it yet the Crowne Sold, of Solidus; the which in old time weighted four deniers, as the Angell. But since princes by little and little, and by graine and graine, haue brought it to three deniers, the which is the old Crowne. And in the time of king Iohn the old Crowne being diminished by little and little, as by the auntient Crowne Sold of three graines, they did coyne Crownes of two deniers and twentie graines weight, of the same standard with the auntient, the which they called Francs, on foot, and on horsebacke (for then they called all French men Francs, as yet in all the East all the nations of the West are called Franques) at which time the Crowne of Bur∣gongne, [ H] which they call Ride, was also coyned of the same weight and goodnesse: the which haue continued vntill the time of Charles the eight, that the Franc Crowne was diminished six graines in weight, and three quarters of a Carat in finenesse: for the old Crownes were of twentie three and three quarters of a Carat, and the Crownes with the Crowne at twentie three Carats. Afterwards king Francis the first correcting somewhat the Crowne with a Crowne, caused the Crowne Sold to be coined at two deniers and sixteene graines, and of the same goodnesse with the other, hauing an eight part of Aloie put to it: the which continued vnto king Henrie, who added foure grains of weight vnto it: and by Charles the ninth it was diminished fiue graines, in the yeare 1561. But the old Crownes, or Ducats of Venice, Genes, Florence, Sienna, Castile, [ I] Portugall, and Hongarie, haue kept twentie three Carats three quarters, and two de∣niers, and eighteene graines of weight, vntill the yeare 1540, that the emperour Charles the fift impaired the fioenesse of the Crownes of Spaine, of one Carat and three quar∣ters, and three graines in weight, causing them to be coined at twentie two Carats, and two deniers fifteene graines of weight. The Crownes of Castile, Valencia, and Arra∣gon, the which they call Pistolets, giuing an ill example to other princes to do the like: as the princes of Italie did, who haue caused some to be made at twentie two Carats & vnder, weighing two deniers and sixteene grains, as be the Crownes of Rome, Luques, Bologne, Salusses, Genes, Sienna, Sicile, Milan, Ancona, Mantoue, Ferrara, Florence, and the new Crownes of Venice. True it is, that Pope Paul the third, began to make [ K] Crownes to be coined in his name at twentie one Carats and a halfe, and two deniers, and foureteene graines of weight; and those of Auignon, which were made at the same time vnder the name of Alexander Farneze legat and the Popes nephew, are baser, and fiue deniers lighter in weight; the which brings an infinit losse to the subiect, and bene∣fit to counterfeit coyners, myntmen, and marchants, which draw the good money out of the countrey, and coine baser in another place. The which is more ordinarie in sil∣uer coine of high value, and aboue eleuen deniers pure, as the Royals of Castile, which hold all eleuen deniers three graines of pure siluer: out of the which other princes here∣tofore

haue gained verie much: for being conuerted into French Testons out of ten [ A] thousand pounds starling, they did gaine six hundred and fiftie pounds, nothing impai∣ring the goodnesse of the Teston of Fraunce, which holds ten deniers 17 grains of fine. And by the same meanes the Swissers which conuerted the testons of France into testons of Soleure, Lucerne, and Vnderuall, gained vpon euery marke one and fortie* 1.1969 soulz and eleuen deniers tournois: and for those of Lucerne, Soleure, and Vnderuall, were but of nine deniers and eighteene graines, which is in the whole marke 23 graines of pure siluer lesse then those of France, the which were worth 25 soulz tournois. And as for the waight, those of France are at the least of 25 testons, and fiue eight parts of a teston to the marke, so as the testons of Soleure, are lighter in waight three eight parts of a teston in the marke, the which was worth foure soulz three deniers tournois. And [ B] for that the testons of Soleure & Lucerne cannot be valued but for siluer of base aloye, the which they call Billon, being vnder ten deniers of fi•…•…e siluer, after the estimation of* 1.1970 fourteene liures seuenteene soulz foure deniers tournois, the marke of pure siluer, and the testons of France for that they were aboue ten deniers of fine siluer were valued for siluer of high aloye, the which are worth after the same proportion fifteene liures thirteene soulz tournois, the marke of fine siluer; and by reason of the difference of the bountie of the siluer the said testons were lesse then those of France 41 soulz eleuen deniers tournois in the marke, abating for euery peece of the said testons one soulz eleuen deniers. Those of Berne for that they were of nine deniers twentie graines of [ C] fine siluer for the marke were worth one denier tournois in euery peece more then those of Soleure, in gayning therefore but twelue pence vpon a marke it is a great gaine. The Flemings do the like, conuerting the testons of France in royalls of Flan∣ders. Euery Prince hath prouided well by his lawes that neither gold nor siluer should be transported vnto strangers vpon grieuous punishments, but it is not possible to haue them well executed, but that much will be transported both by sea and land. And al∣though none should be transported, yet the subiects should alwayes haue good means to melt, alter and falsifie both gold and siluer coyne, if there be diuersitie of standards; which growes either by licenses graunted to some goldsmiths, or done against the lawes; for they purse vp that which wants in the fines of the siluer which they worke, [ D] as well for the abatement which is allowed them, as for the enamell and solder which they vse, mocking the lawes which are made vpon the price of the marke of gold and siluer, setting what price they please vpon their works, so as it is alwaies sold at a higher rate by the goldsmith then the lawes do allow, siluer by fortie and fiue soulz, and gold at twelue or thirteene liures vpon the marke, so as gold and siluer is bought dearer from the goldsmith and marchant, then from the mint master, who cannot exceed the kings lawes, neither in buying of stuffes nor in coyning. And as soone as the gold or siluer is coyned into money of better waight and goodnes then that of neighbor princes, pre∣sently it is molt by the refiners and goldsmiths to put into plate, or to haue it coyned by strangers after their standard, wherein the changers serue as instruments, and vnder [ E] colour of furnishing the people with money, trafficke with the goldsmiths and mar∣chant strangers: for it is certaine and hath been found true, that within these 25 yeares that the pettie soulz was decried, there hath been coyned in this realme aboue two mil∣lions fiue hundred thousand pounds starling, besides the peeces of three & sixe blanks,* 1.1971 which are no more to be found, for that the refiners and goldsmiths found profit in them, so as they which haue great store of gold and siluer plate, can make more vse of it▪ for hauing bought it deere from the goldsmiths, they are loth to sell it with so great losse: and euen king Charles the 9 lost much, hauing exchanged his plate into coyne, whereas before the standard of money coyned was equall with that of the goldsmiths,

so as they could lose nothing in plate but the fashion, the which continues yet as a pro∣uerbe, [ F] It is siluer plate, there is nothing lost but the fashion. Therefore to preuent all these inconueniences, the standard of coyned money, and of works of gold and siluer, must be all one, that is of three and twentie Carats without any alaie or mixture, in gold; and eleuen deniers, and eleuen graines in siluer. They had found some meanes to reforme these abuses, letting out to farme the reuenues of the mint, and the confisca∣tions and amercements that should grow by forfeitures, the which was let out in the yeare 1564 for fiue thousand pound starling a yeare: yet it was abolished at Moulins in the yeare 1566, and the mints were farmed out to such as offred to coyne the greatest quantitie of marks of gold and siluer: by this meanes some branches were cut off, but the rootes of these abuses remained still, so as the fraud will neuer cease. The root of [ G] abuses is the confusion of three mettals, gold, siluer, and copper; which ceasing, neither shall the subiect nor the stranger be able to commit any fraud, but it shall bee soone dis∣couered. But euen as copper and brasse money was not allowed in this realme, for that there was none coyned, so billon or mixture being forbidden, the strangers base money* 1.1972 shall be also banished the realme: but so long as the Prince or Commonweale shall coyne base money, there is no hope that strangers subiects will euer cease to counter∣fet in priuat, or to receiue all strange coynes. There is also another benefit both to the generall and particular, which growes (as I haue said) by the defence of the mixture of mettals, whereby they shall auoide hereafter the losse of siluer, the which is accounted for nothing in gold of 14 Carats and vpward, and is lost for the charges of the refining, [ H] the which is done by strong water: for they must haue sixe shillings starling at the least, yea eight to deuide a marke, yet the losse is very great in a great somme, as all the florins of Germanie are but sixteene Carats, or sixteene and a halfe at the most, so as in a hundred thousand marks there are thirtie three thousand marks losse, and of foure∣teene Carats fortie thousand marks and more. And besides that which I haue said, the abuses of officers of the mint shall cease in regard of the abatements, cut of the which* 1.1973 the officers were payed their wages; for the abolishing whereof, Henry the 2 king of France ordained, that they should be payed by the receiuers of the same places: which decree although it were holie and good, yet was it afterwards disanulled by king Charles the 9, for that the chamber of accompts at Paris gaue the king to vnderstand [ I] that hee lost yearely aboue a thousand pounds starling, whereas hee should reape profit by his mints; for now the officers were paied, and did in a manner nothing. But the true meanes to preuent all, is to suppresse all the officers of mints, but only in one towne, where they should coyne all sorts of moneys, and to cause them to be payed by the receiuer of the place, the lords right remaining: the which notwithstanding the auntients did not know, and there was nothing deducted out of the money, no not the right of Brassage, as it were verie necessarie, or rather that a taxe were laied vpon the subiect for the coyning of money, thereby to take away the lords right, or any other duties, as they did in old time in Normandie, and at this day in Polonia, to pre∣uent the notable losse which the subiects do suffer. By this meanes also the diuersitie of [ K] the price of the marke (which breedes a million of abuses) shall cease, and forraine coynes shall not be receiued but only to melt, without reckning of any thing for the lords rights, notwithstanding letters of permission obtained by neighbour Princes, to deliuer forth their money in his realme at the same rates as in their owne territories. And for the taking away of all occasions for the falsifying, altering, or changing the standard receiued for coynes of gold & siluer, it shall be needfull to haue all the money coyned in one citie only, whereas the iudges of the mint shall remaine, and to suppresse all others (if the monarchie or Commonweale haue not so large limits, as of necessitie

they must haue more) in which place all the refiners shall worke▪ with a prohibition [ A] vpon paine of death not to refine in any other place, for from them come the great abuses, and to giue notice vnto the ordinarie iudges by preuention to punish all abuses that shall be committed; for it is well knowne what abuses there haue been in this realme in the coyning of money. It is therefore necessarie to imitate the Romans, who for all the subiects of Italie had the temple of Iuno only where they did coyne three sorts of money pure and simple, gold, siluer, and copper, and there had three maisters of the mint, who caused it to be resined and stampt publickly in view of all the world. And to the end that no man should be abused in the price of the coynes, there was also a place appointed where to take the essay or triall of money, at the request of Marius Gratidianus. We reade also that in this realme by a law made by Charlemaigne, it was [ B] forbidden to coine any money but in his Pallace, although his Empire stretched ouer all Germanie, Italie, and the greatest part of Spaine: but since that king Philip the faire, Charles his sonne, and king Iohn had established many mints in this realme, and many masters, prouost and other officers in euery mint, abuses haue also multiplied. But here some one may obiect, that the Persians, Greeks and Romans did coyne money of pure gold, siluer and copper at the highest value that could be, and yet did they falsifie it, as we reade in Demosthenes oration against Timocrates. I answere, that it is impos∣sible to purge the Commonweale cleane of these people, but for a thousand that are now you shall not then find ten, the value of gold and siluer being knowne to euery [ C] man as I haue declared. And if there be any prince so ill aduised as to alter the bountie of his money to gaine thereby, as Marc Anthonie did, who coined siluer that was very base, it will be sooner reiected, besides the blame he shall receiue of all men, and the ha∣zard of the rebellion of his subiects, the which was great at such time as Philip the faire imbased the money. Whatsoeuer the reasons be, it is most certaine there were neuer fewer coyners of counterfet money than in the Romans time, when as they had no money either of gold or siluer but of a high standard; and therefore Liuius Drusus the Tribune was blamed, for that he had presented a request vnto the people to haue an eight part of copper mingled with the siluer money, or as the mintmen say, they should coine money of ten deniers and twelue graines fine: which shewes that euen in those [ D] daies they would not admit any confusion or mixture of gold or siluer, and that their siluer was of the highest rate, as also their gold, as we may see in their medalles of gold, the which are of 23 carats and three quarters; and we find some marked with the Em∣perour Vespasian, where there wants but the 32 part of a Carat but it had been 24 Ca∣rats; the which is the purest and finest gold that can be seene. But it sufficeth for the rea∣sons that I haue alledged, that the gold be of 23 Carats, and the siluer at eleuen Deniers and twelue graines pure. And let them not excuse themselues that they cannot com∣mand the fire, and therefore they demaund a fourth or an eight part of alaie: the which is the cause of many abuses. Yet some may say that it is more expedient to coine dobles and deniers of baser siluer, to auoide the heauines of copper money. I say, that if it be [ E] allowed to coyne base money how small soeuer, that it will proue very preiudiciall, and will be practised in liards and soulzes. And although they did coyne nothing but Dobles and Deniers, yet should they alwaies open a gap for coyners to deceiue the common people for whom this money is made, in the which he hath no knowledge, neither doth he care to haue any, for the small value, without inquiring of the bountie thereof. I haue a letter of Iames Pinatel written to king Henry the 2, in the which are these words: Sir, I thought good to aduertise you that within these sixe moneths they haue coyned in one of your mints, soulzes that are too base by foure shillings in waight vpon euery marke, and foure soulz in the goodnes of the mettall: when i•…•… shall please

your Maiestie I will shew you the worke, and I will acquaint you with the losse which [ F] you and your subiects do receiue, the which will grow greater if you preuent it not with all rigour. It was at that time that he coyned the peeces of sixe blanks, or three pence by the kings commandement, of foure deniers of siluer, and two deniers of cop∣per, and foure deniers and foureteene graines of waight; the which was the best mix∣ture of base money that was then in France, so in like sort they were soone molten, and few of them are now to be seene. Euery man knowes that the losse which the king and the subiect receiued of two shillings fiue pence vpon the marke, came to aboue fiue and twentie in the hundred, and yet the same Pinatel (hauing gotten vnder hand a commission from the generals of the mint, in the yeare 1552) caused Dobles and De∣niers to be coined at Villeneufue of Auignon, and at Villefranche of Rouergue, which [ G] were valued but at twelue soulz the marke; and that it was verified that by this meanes he had stollen little lesse than fortie thousand pounds starling, and had purchased his pardon for fiue thousand pounds, the which he gaue vnto a Ladie, a fauorite of the kings, who did only defer this wicked mans punishment, but not quite free him. I con∣clude therefore that we must not by any meanes allow of any mixtures, no not in the smallest coynes, if we will purge the Commonweale of all counterfet money. By this meanes also the domage shall cease which the poore receiue by the decrying of mo∣ney, or deminution of the price thereof, after they haue made them baser; neither shall they haue any credit with princes which suggest vnto them the profit that they may receiue by their mints, as a certaine officer of the mint did, who gaue the councell of [ H] the treasor to vnderstand, and did also write vnto king Charles the 9, That he might make a great proffit of his mints for the ease of his people: and in truth by his compu∣tation it was found that euery marke of pure gold wrought would yeeld vnto the king sixteene shillings starling, whereas he receiued but two shillings sixe pence, and foure deniers: and for the marke of siluer wrought the king should get foure shillings, whereas now he gained but sixteene deniers being wrought in testons. He aduised to coine money of the kings siluer of twelue soulz tournois currant, and of thirtie peeces to the marke, of the waight of sixe deniers nine grains, the halfe and the quarters after the rate; and of gold coines of 24 Carat, and one Carat of alaie, of thirtie peeces to the marke, & of the same waight with the siluer of six liures tournois. He would also haue [ I] them coine small base money of three deniers of goodnes, and 320 to the marke, and of three deniers currant, and all other kind of billon or base money vnder ten deniers* 1.1974 fine, rating the marke at foureteene * 1.1975 liures tournois. This was his aduice, but it was reiected as it deserued, for it is a very ridiculous thing to thinke that the king can draw so great a profit from his mints, and yet ease his people, if that be true which Plato saith, That no man gaines but another looseth: and the losse by an ineuitable necessitie fell vpon the subiect, seeing the stranger felt not of it. It is very necessarie that some great prince should mediate that by his ambassadors with other princes, to the end that all by a generall consent should forbid the coining of base money, setting the value of gold and siluer as it hath been formerlie said, and vsing the marke at eight gros or [ K] drachmas, and of 570 graines to the ounce, the which is the most common; and there∣fore should not be of any great difficultie, for that the Catholike King and Queene of England haue alreadie banished all base money, and all the coines of gold in Spaine (except the Pistolets, and the money of Portugall) are at the highest value, and their coines of siluer at eleuen deniers and three graines, the which is the highest that is. And it should be good to haue the money cast in forme of a medall, as the auntient Greeks, Latins, Hebrews, Persians and Aegiptians did, for the charge should be much lesse, the facilitie greater, and the roundnesse more perfect, to preuent all clippers, it

should not be subiect to bow and breake, and the marke would continue for euer, we [ A] should not be troubled with hammering, neither should there be any need of a cutter, of the cisers, or of any helpe at the waight, which falls not out so in that which is stampt; moreouer, they shall make more in one day than they can do now in a yeare. They should also take away all meanes from false coyners to mingle mettals so easily as they do with the presse and the stamp, whereas the peece stretcheth out in breadth which couers the thicknes, whereas the mould would make all medalls of the same mettall equall in bignes, waight, breadth and forme: whereas if a counterfetter would mixe copper with gold more than the allowance of 23 carats, the volume of copper which is in an equall waight twise as big and an eight part more, than that of gold, or twise and an eight part lighter than gold in an equall masse, would make the [ B] medall much greater, and discouer the falsehood. For it is most certaine, that if a masse of gold equall to a masse of copper doth waigh 1550 ferlins, that of copper shall waigh but 729 ferlins, the which is as seauenteene to eight in a grosse waight; as I haue learned of Francis de Foix that great Archimedes of our age, who first discouered the true pro∣portion of metalls in waight and quantitie. We will hold the same opinion of siluer, which hath a greater masse than gold in an equall waight, and that gold is heauier than siluer in an equall masse, once more and foure fiue parts, which is 1551 in com∣parison of 998, or of nine to fiue: and of copper to siluer, as of eleuen to thirteene, or precisely, as 729 to 998, which approch neerer in waight and substance than the rest, [ C] except lead, the which is heauier than siluer, and differs as fifteene to foureteene, or more precisely, as 998 to 929; but they can make no vse of it to counterfet, for that it flies from all other mettalls but from tinne: and much lesse can they vse tinne, being a poison to all other mettalls, and cannot be cast for siluer, for that it is lighter as much as nine is to thirteene, or precisely as 600 is to 929: and much lesse being disguised for gold, the which is heauier than tinne in an equall masse, or of a lesse volume in an equall waight, as much as is betwixt eighteene and seauen, or •…•…ustly betwixt 1551 and 600, the which is twise and two seauen parts heauier. As for •…•…ron, those that do coun∣terfet can make no vse of it by melting, for that it will not be mixt neither with gold nor siluer; and the brasing of plates vpon iron is not hard to discouer. Plinie calles it [ D] Feoruminatio, and we, brazing or soldring, the which the counterfetters of his time did vse. The Seigneur of Villemor, Commissarie of the warres, did shew me an auntient medall of iron couered with siluer, yet the waight and the bignes doth easily discouer the falsehood, if they looke narrowly into it, for that siluer is heauier than iron in an equall masse, or lesse in quantitie being of equall waight, as much as is from foure to three, or precisely from 998, to 634. And as for gold, it is impossible that this ferrumi∣nation and soldring can any thing auaile coyners, seeing that gold is lesse of bodie than iron in an equall waight, or more heauie in an equall masse, as much as is from sixe to nine, or of 1556 to 634. It is not to be feared that quicksiluer can falsifie these two met∣tals, although it approcheth as neere to gold in waight as three to foure, or 1558 to [ E] 1551, for that they haue not so great knowledge to fixe it, but it euaporates into smoke. And thus much as touching the forme of coynes, and the profit that shall come by casting, as it was in old time, and vntill their mines of gold and siluer were worne and spent, and these two mettals worne, lost, hidden, and dispersed, then were they for∣ced to make their money so thin, as they could not marke them but with the hammer, the which hath since been the occasion of many abuses; but euen as the first man ha∣uing little gold and siluer, stampt it with the hammer, and afterwards hauing greater store began to cast it, in like sort must we now returne to casting. They began to come with a mill, but by proofe it appeared that it did not marke well, and that there was al∣waies

thirtie marks of clippings vpon a hundred marks of substance, whereas there is [ F] but one or two at the hammer, and the sound also did differ from that which was stampt: and which is more, the peeces were found not to be alwaies of one waight, for that the plates were sometimes drawne thinner of one side then of another. As for that which I haue said, that the marke of gold and siluer should be diuided into peeces equall of waight, without fraction of peeces vpon the marke, nor of deniers vpon the peece, nor of graines vpon the denier, the profit is very apparant, as well for the chan∣ges of marks of peeces, as for the value, waight, and vndoubted course: so did the aun∣tients for the peece of gold or siluer waighing foure drachmas, the which is halfe an ounce, shall be equall to the sicle of the Hebrews, and the peece of two drachmas or of 32 to the marke shall be equall to the stater Atticus, to the old Philip, to the rose noble, [ G] and to the medalls of gold of the auntient Romans, which the law called Aureus: and the peece of one groat, sold tournois or drachma of 64 to the marke, shall be equall to the Attique drachma, and to the Zuza of the Hebrews, the which in Greece, and throughout all the East was a hirelings daies worke. True it is that the siluer pennie of the Romans was more in waight than three seuen parts, then a souldiers daies pay in Augustus time, the which is a little more then a single roiall of Spaine. And if the al∣terations and changes which are made sodenly be hurtfull and pernitious, they may proceed by little and little, causing money to be coined as I haue said. Vpon these dif∣ficulties (being deputed for the Prouince of Vermandois, at a Parliament held at Blois) I was called with the first President and three Generals of the mint, and Marcel Su∣perintendent [ H] of the Treasure, to repaire the abuses of money, and in the end all that I haue heere said was held to be very necessary, and yet the difficultie and diseases of the Commonweale which were incurable, would not at that time allow of it: which was as much to say, that it were better the sick should perish in languishing, than to cause him* 1.1976 to drinke a troublesome potion to cure him. I confesse that siluer mixt will come but to a moitie, being purified to eleuen deniers, twelue graines; but it will continue for euer if the standard be once setled as I haue said, if it be not done the Commonweale must needs come to ruine.

CHAP. IIII. [ I] A Comparison of the three lawfull Commonweales, that is, a popular estate, an Aristocraticall, and a royall; and that a royall Monarchie is the best.

WEe haue hitherto in my opinion discou•…•…sed at large of all the parts of a Commonweale, it remaines for a conclusion to know the commodities and discommodities of euery kind of State, and then to make choise of the best, the which was necessarie to reserue vnto the end, after that we had [ K] discoursed both in generall & in particular of all the points of a Commonweale. Seeing then there are but three sorts of Commonweales, that is, when as the whole people, or the greatest part commaunds with absolute power, or else the least part of the citisens, or one alone; and that either of the three may be honest and commendable, or vicious, we must not only flie that which is most vicious, but also chuse the best. The tyrannie of one absolute prince is pernitious, & of many much worse: but there is no tyrannie so dangerous as that of a multitude; for so doth Cicero

call it: yet is it not so bad as Anarchia, where there is no forme of a Commonweale, [ A] no man commands, and no man obeyes. Let vs therefore she those that be vicious, and make choise of the best of these three lawfull gouernments: and to the end that all may be made plaine, I will set downe the commodities and discommodities of euery one apart. First, some one may say, that a popular estate is the most commendable, as that which seekes an equalitie and indifferencie in all lawes, without fauour or acception of* 1.1977 persons, and which reduceth their ciuill constitutions to the lawes of nature: for euen as nature hath not distributed riches, estates and honors more to one than to another, so a popular estate tends to that end, to make all men equall, the which cannot be done, but by imparting riches, honors & iustice equally to al men without priuilege or prerogatiue whatsoeuer; as Licurgus did, hauing changed the royall estate into a po∣pular, [ B] he burnt all obligations, banished gold and siluer, and diuided the lands by equall lots; then tooke he great pleasure to see the shocks of corne equall in the field, thereby cutting off couetousnes and arrogancie, two of the most pernitious plagues of a Com∣monweale, and not only those, but he also banished rapine, theft, extorsion, slanders, partialities and factions, which can haue no place when all are equall, and that one can haue no preheminence ouer another. If then societie betwixt man and man cannot be maintained without friendship, and that the nurse of friendship is equalitie; seeing there is no equalitie but in a popular state, of necessitie that forme of Commonweale must be the best: in the which a naturall libertie and iustice is equally distributed to all men without feare of tyranie, crueltie, or exaction; and the sweernes of a sociable life seemes [ C] to draw men to the felicitie which nature hath taught vs. There is one point that seems very considerable, to shew that a popular estate is the goodliest, the most excellent, and the most perfect, which is, That in a Democraty there haue alwaies been greater com∣manders in armes, and worthier men in lawes, greater orators, philosophers and handi∣crafts men than in the other two estates: whereas the faction of few great men among themselues, and the iealousie of a Monarke keepes the subiects from all noble at∣tempts. And it seemes that the true marke of a Commonweale consists in a popular estate only, in the which the whole people inioyes the publick, diuiding the common treasure amongst them, with the spoiles, rewards, honors and conquests, whereas few [ D] noblemen in Aristocratia, and one in a Monarchie seeme to conuert all the publicke good to their owne priuate commodities. To conclude, if there be nothing more to be desired than to haue the magistrates obedient to the lawes, and the subiects to the magistrates, it seemes it is best obserued in a popular state, whereas the law alone is ladie and mistres ouer all. These reasons are produced by popular men to maintaine a po∣pular* 1.1978 estate; they haue a goodly shew, but in effect they are like vnto spiders webs, the which are very subtill and fine, but haue no great force: for first of all, there was neuer Commonweale where this equalitie of goods and honors was obserued, as we haue shewed before concerning goods; and as for honors, they should do therein contrarie to the law of nature, which hath made some more iudicious and more ingenious than [ E] others, and by consequence hath ordained some to gouerne, and others to obey; some she hath made wise and discreet, others foolish and mad; to some she hath giuen excel∣lencie of wit to gouerne and command, to others force of bodie to execute their com∣mandements. And as for the naturall libertie they so much preach of in a popular estate, if that were of force, there should neither be magistrates, lawes, nor any forme of state whatsoeuer; else there should be no equalitie: and yet there is no forme of Com∣monweale which hath so many lawes, so many magistrates, nor so many comptrollers as a popular estare. And as for the publick reuenues and treasor, it is most certaine that there is no Commonweale where it is worse gouerned than by the people, as we haue

declared elsewhere. Whereof amongst many others, Xenophon is a worthy witnesse: [ F] I cannot (said he) allow of the Athenians estate, for that they haue followed that for me of Commonweale, whereas the wicked are alwayes in greatest credit, and men of ho∣nour and vertue troden vnder foot. If Xenophon (who was one of the greatest cap∣taines of his age, and who then carried away the prize to haue happely ioyned the mannaging of affaires with armes and Philosophie) hath giuen such a censure of his Commonweale, which was the most popular, and amongst the popular the most estee∣med, and best ordered; or to speake more properly, the least vicious (as Plutarch saith;) What iudgement would he haue giuen of other Democraties, and Ochlocraties? Wherein Machiauel is much deceiued, to say, That a Popular estate is the best: and yet forgetting his first opinion, in anther place hee said, That the onely meanes to re∣store [ G] Italie to her libertie, is to haue one prince, labouring to frame the most Tyranni∣call estate in the world. And in another place he confesseth, That the estate of Venice is the goodliest of all, the which is more Aristocraticall: so as no man can iudge what this wicked and inconstant man meanes. If we shall beleeue Plato, wee shall find that he hath blamed a Popular estate, tearming it, A Faire where euery thing is to bee sold. We haue the like opinion of Aristotle, saying, That neither Popular nor Aristocra∣ticall* 1.1979 estate is good, vsing the authoritie of Homer, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And the Orator Maximus Tirius holds, That a Democraty is pernitious, blaming for this cause the estate of the Athenians, Syracusians, Carthagineans and Ephesians: for it is impos∣sible (saith Seneca) that he shall please the people, that honours vertue. And therefore [ H] Phocion (one of the wisest, and most vertuous men that euer was) was alwaies opposit to the people of Athens, and the people to him: and as on a certaine day the Athenians allowed of his counsell, he turned to his companions, saying, Quid malū mihi accidit, vt populi sensus cum meis congruerent, What ill haue I done, that the people concur with me in opinion? And how can a multitude, that is to say, a Beast with many heads, with∣out iugemēt, or reason, giue any good councel? To aske councell of a multitude (as they did in oldtimes in Popular Commonweals) is to seeke for wisdome of a mad man. The which Anacharsis seeing, & that the magistrats and antients deliuered their opinions in open assembly, and then the people concluded; he said, That in Athens wise men pro∣pounded, and fooles disposed. And admit one might draw a good resolution from a [ I] multitude, who is he so sencelesse, that would thinke it fit to publish a matter of state in an open assembly? Is it not to prophane holy things? and yet holy things beeing pro∣phaned, may be purified: but a secret concerning affaires of estate, being once published and spred abroad, there can nothing be expected but preiudice and dishonour to the Commonweale. And for this cause especially the Commonweale of Athens, of Sira∣cusa, and of Florence, haue bene ruined. I omit the difficultie to assemble the people in one place, the disorder that is in a multitude, the varietie and inconstancie of people ga∣thered together of all sorts: and yet (if it please not the magistrat) neither shall Senat nor people be assembled: as it happened in Caesars Consulship, who to preuaile in his attempts (hauing terrified Bibulus his companion, and drawne his sword vpon him) he [ K] would not suffer the Senat to be assembled so long as his office continued. And if the Tribune were vnited with the Consull, neither there the Senat nor the people could be assembled: so as the authoritie of the Senat, and the soueraigne maiestie, was by this meanes subiect vnto six or seuen: whereby the state was brought into great danger, in not resoluing speedily in vrgent affaires. For by the lawes of Solon, and of the twelue tables, the people must bee assembeld three times, before they should allow of any law that was published. Oftentimes it chaunced, that the flying of a bird on the right hand, or the crying of a rat, or the falling sicknesse (it may be of some drunken man) hindred

the assembly; or at the least protestation of some stamering sooth-sayer, or the oppo∣sition [ A] of a magistrat, all was dissolued. Whereof Cicero and Cato himselfe complained verie much, for the power and fauour of competitors (which were alwaies many in number) to haue offices, and being enemies one to another, hindred the assembly of the people, or troubled it being assembled; and the magistrats which were in office sup∣ported them, to continue their power: so as sometimes a whole yeare was spent with∣out the creation of a new magistrat: as it happened when as Pompey the Great was cho∣sen Consull alone. And therefore the Grisons, who maintaine a Popular estate, assem∣ble the people but euery two yeares at Coire, for the creating of new magistrats, and* 1.1980 the making of new lawes. For there is nothing more daungerous, nor more contrarie to a Popular estate, than to continue magistrats long in their office. What is more ab∣surd, [ B] than to allow of the rashnesse of a light and inconstant multitude for a law, who in discerning and giuing of honours, are commonly carried away with a blind and incon∣siderat violence, rather than with any setled iudgement? What is more foolish, than in the greatest extremities of a Commonweale, to seeke councell from a mad multitude? for the magistrat can do nothing without commaund, and if they might they would not; neither dare they, being terrified with the peoples furie, who impute all mischaun∣ces, and their owne errours, vnto the magistrats. So as Philip the first, king of Mace∣don, hauing inuaded and spoyled the confines of Attica, there was not any magistrat that durst assemble the estates, the people came to the place of assemblies vncalled,* 1.1981 whereas they found no man that durst speake vnto them, as Demosthenes writeth. The [ C] like happened at Florence, when as the emperours armie approached to besiege them, at the instance of pope Clement the seuenth, al the people were so amazed, as they knew not what to resolue: For by the lawes of Florence, all the citisens should assemble be∣fore the Towne house, to resolue vpon the articles propounded by the chiefe magi∣strat, and then they were quite daunted. It is the weaknesse of a multitude (saith Titus Liuius) to waxe proud, and to insult with all licentiousnesse in prosperitie, and to be de∣iected and amazed with any aduersitie. And how is it possible that the soueraigne ma∣iestie of an estate shall be maintained by a multitude, guided by a magistrat, who often∣times must keepe them in awe by seueritie, Et in qua regenda plus poena, quam obsequium [ D] valet (said Titus Liuius) In the gouernment whereof punishment more than obedi∣ence preuailes. So Phocion, seeing that the Athenians would not giue him audience, he cried out, O fustuarium Corcyraeum, quou•…•…s talento pretio sius, O scourge of Corfu, more* 1.1982 pretious than any talent: Which shewes the maiestie doth perish and decay in a mul∣titude, whereon the chiefe ground of a Commonweale consists. But passing on, all men that haue written of estates, do hold, That the chiefe end of all Commonweales, is to flourish in pietie, iustice, valour, honour, and vertue; by the which humane society is preserued. But a Popular estate hath bene alwaies opposit, and an enemie to all good men. For the preseruation of a Popular estate (if we shall beleeue Xenophon) is to ad∣uance the most vitious and vnworthy men to offices and dignities. And if the people should be so ill aduised, as to giue offices of honour vnto vertuous men, they loose their [ E] * 1.1983 power: for that good men would fauour none but the good, which are alwayes fewer in number: and the wicked and vicious (which is the greatest part of the people) should be excluded from all honour, and by little and little banished: so as in the end wise men should seize vpon the estate, and take that from the people. The Athenians therefore (said Xenophon) gaue audience to the most wicked, knowing well, that they would speake pleasing things, and profitable to the vicious, as most of the people be. I cannot* 1.1984 (said Xenophon) but blame the Athenians, to haue chosen the most vicious forme of a Commonweale: but hauing chosen it, I doe much esteeme them they doe so

carefully maintaine it, in reiecting, chasing away, and banishing the noble, wise, and ver∣tuous; [ F] & aduancing the impudent, wicked, & vicious: for the which vice thou so much blamest (saith he) is the preseruation of a Popular estate. And as for iustice, the people (saith hee) haue no regard of it, so as they may get profit by their iudgements, which they sell to them that will giue most, seeking by all meanes to ruine the rich, the noble, and the vertuous, whome they torment continually, for the capitall hatred they beare against all good men, being contrarie to their naturall dispositions. And therefore a Popular state is the sinke and refuge of all turbulent spirits, mutines, seditions, and ba∣nished men, which giue councell, comfort, and aid, vnto the people to ruine great men: For as for the lawes they haue no respect of them, for that in Athens the peo∣ples will is a law. This is Xenophons opinion, touching the Commonweale of Athens, [ G] who saith, it was the best ordered of al the Popular Commonweals in his time: neither would he haue them to change any thing to maintain the people in their grea•…•…nes. The like censure Marcellus the lawyer hath of a strumpet, saying, That shee hath not well done to haue abandoned her honour; but hauing lo•…•…t all modestie, it was not ill done, to get what she could by her trade. So Xenophon concludes, That a Popular estate is nothing worth, but to maintaine it so being once setled, they must banish all honor and vertue: that is to say, the greatest tyranny is not so daungerous, as a Popular estate thus gouerned.

But there is yet one plague more capitall in Popular estates, the which is, Impunitie* 1.1985 to the wicked, so as they be citisens, that is to say, pettie kings: and euen in the Popular [ H] estate of Rome, it was forbidden to all magistrats vpon paine of death, To condemne to death, or to banish any citisen, nor to depriue him of his libertie or priuilege of a ci∣tisen, nor to whip him with rods. For it is a setled law almost in all Popular estates, Ne ciuis quisquam quantumcumque scelus siue in deos, siue in homines admiserit, capite feria∣tur, That no citisen should die the death, what offence soeuer he had committed either against the gods, or men. Therefore Verres (omitting the rest) being accused and con∣demned of theft, and of a hundred thousand concussions, extortions, and false iudge∣ments; was thought to be seuerely punished, for that hee was enioyned to depart out of Rome: and why, for that Popular states would haue their libertie defended with the lenitie of lawes, and not with the sharpnesse of punishments. And yet they banished [ I] Ruti•…•…ius, Metellus, Coriolanus, the two Scipions, brethren, and Tully: as in Ephesus they banished the vertuous Hermodorus: in Athens they expelled Aristides the iust, The∣mistocles* 1.1986 died in exile, Miltiodes in prison, Socrates by poyson. And although that Phocion the most iust and vertuous man of his age, had bene chosen Generall fortie and fiue times, without any reproach or blame, yet (without any accusation or information against him or his companions) a base pleader, of the scumme of the people, steps vp be∣fore the multitude, and demaunds, If they would haue Phocion and his companions put to death: wherewith all in generall did arise vp, and holding vp their hands, con∣demned him, not excluding any slaue, woman, nor straunger from this condemnation, for the which many ware garlands of flowers. Which Phocion hearing, said, Me [ K] quidam a vobis damnari facile patior: sed cur isti? For my part, I am contented to bee condemned by you: but why these men? To whome the people being mad, aunswe∣red, Quoniam tibi sunt amici. Neither was the furie of this mad people pacified, vntill they were all without sentence, accusation, or cause, put to death. Neither is there any hope, if a multitude begin once to insult ouer the good, that either shame or reason shal reclaime them from their furie and madnesse. Yet notwithstanding the wicked do com∣monly escape the peoples hands: which Demosthenes seeing, and that they had absol∣ued Antipaphon, a most capitall offender, he proceeded, and caused him to be condem∣ned,

and afterwards put to death by a decree of the Areopagits, little regarding the peo∣ple, [ A] for the which he was not blamed. Whereby it appeares, that there was neither iustice nor maiestie in a Popular estate. And as in a Popular Commonweale thus go∣uerned, all offices are sold to them that will giue most, so the magistrats sell by retaile that which they haue bought in grosse. And euen Mar•…•…us durst carrie bushels of siluer into the assemblies at Rome, to purchase the peoples voices: the like wee read of Pom∣pey. It is no maruell then if we read of infinit corruptions and concussions in Rome: but it was more fowle and odious in Athens, whereas when Stratocles and Damoclides entred into their offices, they did openly brag▪ That they went to a golden haruest. If offices, lawes, iustice, and honours, were so vnworthily sold in these great Common∣weales, being inriched with the spoyles of other people; what shall we iudge of Popu∣lar [ B] estates opprest with want and need? Wee haue the example of the Megarences,* 1.1987 who hauing expelled their prince Theagines, established a Popular estate so licentious, as it was lawfull for the poore to goe and spoyle the rich, as it is in Plato. Euen so wee read, that the Swissers did long after they had expelled the nobilitie. If they would haue any one spoyled by the multitude, they did set the picture of a man with boughes vnder him at his doore, and then was he presently stript of all that he had, were he the richest or most innocent citisen. And they which doe so highly commend the Popular estate of the Romans, should rather haue extolled the worthy deeds of noble and va∣liant men, than the cities forme: they should set before their eyes the seditions and ci∣uill [ C] warres, wherewith that citie had bene shaken, and represent the people of the one side of a mountaine, and the nobilitie of another, diuided three times; and many times the furious Tribunes with their turbulent Orations, to threaten death or banishment to the best citisens: Sometime Saturnine the Tribune, with a rabble of rascals, slaues, and artisans, armed with staues and stones, to come into the open assembly of the people, and to expell the honester partie, and kill him that was chosen Consull by the peoples suffrages. The which the Tribunes alone did not, being enraged against the Consuls, but euen the Consuls among themselues. How many murthers of citisens haue beene seene in the middest of the citie, in the field of Mars, in the court, in the temples of their gods, yea in Iupiters capitoll, Tiberius and Caius Gracehus, Drusus, Saturninus, and Sul∣pitius, [ D] were cruelly slaine: when as the Consull Cassius made a proclamation, That all the Latines, and Heniques, which had no houses within Rome, should depart the citie. Virginius his companion made a decree to the contrarie, not so much to crosse his companions authoritie, but to set the citisens and straungers together by the eares in the middest of the citie. What was more vnworthy, or more contrarie to ciuill socie∣tie, than to see a citisen vnder an innocent gowne, to come armed to the assembly, to sue for offices, as if they went to warre, and oftentimes the contrarie factions fell to blowes. And Tully saith, Lapidationes in foro saepe vidi•…•…us, non saepe▪ sed tamen nimis sae∣pe gladios, We haue oftentimes seene stones cast in the assembly of the estates, and swords drawne, not so often, but yet too often. And a little after, Meministis (inquit) cor∣poribus [ E] ciuium Tiberim compleri: cloacas refarciri, e foro spongijs effundi sanguinem, You remember (said he) that the riuer of Tibe•…•… hath bene filled with the bodies of citisens, that the common priuies haue bene stuffed full, and the blood suckt vp in the market place with sponges. To conclude, if we shall rip vp all the Popular estates that euer were, we shall find, that either they haue had warre alwayes with the enemie, or with∣in the state: or else that they haue bene gouerned in shew by the people; but in effect by some of the citisens, or by the wisest among them, who held the place of a prince and monarch. Whilest that the Commonweale of Athens did flourish, it was gouer∣ned by the Senat of the Areopagits: and when as their power and authoritie was re∣strained,

Pericles (saith Thucidides) was a very Monarch, although in shew it were Po∣pular. [ F] And Peter Soderin (in an Oration hee made vnto the people of Florence, to change the estate) said, That in the time of Laurence de Medius, the Commonweale* 1.1988 in shew was Popular, but in effect a meere Tyranny, for that Laurence gouerned all a∣lone: but he doth not say, that it was neuer more flourishing, and that before they were neuer ten yeares free from seditions, and the most bloody factions that euer were. In like sort the Popular estate of the Romans, which had bene afflicted with so many for∣ren and intestine warres, was it not maintained and flourished both in armes, and laws, by the Senat, and was not the authoritie thereof supported, by Menenius Agrippa, Furi∣us Camillus, Papirius Cursor, Fabius Maximus, Scipio, Cato, Scaurus, Pompey, and diuers others? who maintained the beautie of the Senat, and restrained the people, keeping [ G] them within the bounds of honour? We do also read, that Pelopidas, and Epaminon∣das, were as it were lords of the Popular estate of the Thebans, after whose death the people found presently, that they had lost their chiefe pilots: as it happened in the like case vnto the Athenians, after the death of Pericles, Then (said Plutarch) the people did* 1.1989 float vp and downe, like a ship without a helme: and as euery one would gouerne and commaund, some to set saile, others to go to harbrough, a storme came (saith Polybius) and the ship perished. And although the Athenians, after they had lost the soueraign∣rie of Greece, gouerned their citie & territorie popularly, yet Demosthenes spake plaine∣ly, and openly before the people, That the estate of Athens was vnder the power of Orators and Pleaders, of whome the captaines depended, who had at the least three [ H] hundred men bribed, to passe whatsoeuer they pleased for money. A common disease* 1.1990 (saith Plutarch) in all Popular estates. Liuius writeth thus of the Popular estates of the Tarentines, In potestate Iuniorum plebem, in manu plebis, rem Tarentinam esse, The estate of Tarentum was in the peoples hands, and the people in the power of the younger sort. And a little before the declining of the Popular estate of Rome, Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey, whome they called a triple head, gouerned and held all the Senat and peo∣ple in their power and subiection: but two of them being slaine, the third became an absolute Lord. Whereby we may gather, that a Popular commaund cannot subsist without a wise pilat and gouernor, and leauing it to the most sufficient, in the end they make themselues masters, and the people serues but for a maske. [ I]

But some one will say, Doe we not see that the Cantons of the Swissers haue setled a* 1.1991 goodly Popular estate, & haue continued their gouernment aboue three hundred and fiftie yeares, and by this meanes haue not onely preserued themselues from tyranny, but haue also chased away tyrants their neighbours? The aunswere hereunto is dou∣ble: First, the situation of the countrey, and the disposition of the people agrees best with a Popular estate. Secondly, the most seditious, & mutinous, go to the seruice of o∣ther forren princes: and the rest of the common people being more mild & tractable, are easily kept in awe. Moreouer all the heads of the Cantons & Popular states, hauing entred into an offensiue and defensiue league, are strictly tied and vnited together; like vnto those that goe by night, or that are in a slipperie or daungerous way, holding [ K] one another by the hand: and in this sort they maintaine themselues against the power of Monarchs, as in old time the Athenians and Thebans did. Besides, the foundation of their Popular estate was built and cimented with the blood of the nobilitie, and of the chiefest, especially at the battaile of Sampac; then afterwards at that at Basil, when as king Lewes the 11 (beeing then but Daulphin) had the victorie: then all the nobi∣litie of the countrey, which had followed him, were banished, and the rest retired them∣selues willingly, after the treatie of the ten Cantons, made in the yeare 1510, and at the chaunge of religion in the yeare 1529: so as there remaines but a very few at Berne and

Zurich, whereas the estate is Aristocraticall. And not only the Cantons, but also those [ A] at Strausbourg, Lyndaw, Sienne, Genes, and Florence (to settle a popular libertie) slue or banished the nobilitie: as they haue done in many townes of Germanie. After they of Florence had made away their nobilitie, they diuided themselues into three factions, the greater, the meane, and the popular: and as the greater sort entred into factions, and slue one another, the meaner thought to become maisters, who were so incensed one against another, as the whole citie was nothing but fire and blood, murthering one another, vntill that the scumme of the people tooke vpon them the gouernment, they alwayes hated them that looked like gentlemen, or that ware a sword, or that had got∣ten to any degree of honour, in what Commonweale soeuer, or that had gathered together more riches than the rest: which made them of Strausbourg (after they had [ B] slaine all the nobilitie, to settle a Popular estate) to decree, That whosoeuer did aspire to be Grand Bourgmaster, should proue that his grandfather was a day labourer, an ar∣tificer, a butcher, or of some such like condition. And the auntients (to assure Popular estates) did striue to equall all citisens in goods, honours, power, and rewards: and if any one were more vertuous, more iust, or more wise, than the rest, he was banished, as I haue shewed before, seeking to make an equalitie, if it were possible: and euen Plato did wish, That wiues and children should be common to all, to the end that no man might say, This is mine, or, That is thine: for those words of Meum, and Tuum (said he) were the breeders of discord, and the ruine of states. By the which there will grow many ab∣surdities: for in so doing, a citie shall be ruined, and become a houshold (as Aristotle [ C] said) although that a houshold or familie (which is the true image of a Commonweale) hath but one head. And for this cause an auntient * 1.1992 lawmaker, beeing importuned by some one, to make his country a Popular estate: Make it (saith he) in thine owne house. And if they say, That it is a goodly thing so to vnite citisens and a citie, as to make one houshold of it, they must then take away the pluralitie of heads and commaunders, which are in a Popular estate, to make a Monarch, as the true fathers of a familie; and to cut off this equalitie of goods, power, honour, and commaundement, which they seeke to make in a Popular estate: for that it is incompatible in a familie. But the grea∣test inconuenience is, that in taking away these words of Mine, and Thine, they ruine [ D] the foundation of all Commonweales, the which were chiefly established, to yeeld vn∣to* 1.1993 euery man that which is his owne, and to forbid theft; as it is commaunded by the word of God, who will haue euery man to enioy the proprietie of his owne goods: and we may not say, that nature hath made all things common, for the law of the mo∣ther is not contrarie to the commaundement of the father (as Salomon said) figuring by an Allegorie the commaundements of God, and the law of nature. But the true popu∣lar libertie consisteth in nothing else, but in the enioying of our priuat goods sincerely, without feare to be wronged, in honour, life, wife or familie, the which euen theeues & robbers labour to keepe. And as for the power of commaund, which popular men would make equall, there is lesse reason than in goods: for discretion and wisedome is [ E] not equally giuen to all men, and in a Popular estate they must of necessitie chuse the* 1.1994 most sufficient magistrats, to commaund, and to administer iustice. Moreouer, where∣as there is no forme of soueraigntie, nor of a Commonweale, yet a•…•…e the people con∣strained to chuse a magistrat or captaine to commaund them, and to doe iustice: as in the countrey of Gusula in Affrike, where there is neither king, nor any forme of a Com∣monweale, the people on their Faire day chuse a captaine to doe iustice, and to assure the course of traffique. And on the frontiers of the kingdome of Fez, the inhabitants of the mountaine of Magnan (who in like sort haue no forme of a Commonweale) if they see any straunger to passe by, which seemes to excell the rest in wisedome, him

they stay by force, to administer iustice vnto them. It is a maxime in Popular states, [ F] * 1.1995 That when as the persons are equall which are to vndergo a charge, to cast lots: and if one exceeds another, then they chuse the most sufficient. And who doth not see the great difference among men, that some haue lesse iudgement than bruit beasts; and o∣thers haue such cleere marks of diuine light, as they seeme rather angels than men? and* 1.1996 yet those which seeke equalitie, will haue the soueraigne power of life, honour, and goods, giuen vnto furious, ignorant, and mad men, as well as vnto iudicious and wise men: for the voices in all assemblies are numbred, without any due consideration of euerie mans worth: and alwayes the number of fooles, wicked and ignorant men, doth farre exceed the good, if that be true which Salomon saith, That there is not one among a thousand: the which is confirmed by the Poet, [ G]

A good man and a wise, one such as out of all mankind, Though Apollo sought and searcht himselfe, yet could he scarcely find.

And yet there is a naturall reason, which doth teach vs, that the equalitie they seeke, doth ruine the grounds of all loue and amitie, the which can hardly subsist among equals, for that there are neuer more quarrels & dissentions, than among them that are equall; either for that the one seekes to supplant the other, or for that the one may liue* 1.1997 without the other. And it seemes that God hath imparted his benefits and graces, to countries and nations, in such a measure, as there is no man but hath need of another: to [ H] the end that through mutuall courtesie and good offices, euerie nation in particular, and all in generall, should be constrained to contract alliances and friendships together: as it is seene in a mans bodie, the which is the figure of a wel ordered Commonweale, there is no member but receiues helpe and succour from the rest, and that which seems most idle, disgests the nourishment for all the rest: as Menenius Agrippa a Roman Senator,* 1.1998 did wisely shew vnto the common people, which were fallen from the nobilitie, & did seeke to equall themselues vnto them in power and authoritie. Popular gouernments in the beginning seeme pleasing and goodly, contrarie to Monarchies: the which are like vnto great riuers, which at their first springs haue small and weake currents, but in∣creasing by their long course, their streames grow bigger, & more rough, and run with [ I] more spacious chanels, the farther they are from their heads and springs. But Popular states are like vnto the wind, the which is most vehement where it riseth, but at the length it is broken and groweth weake. I haue discoursed hereof the more at large, to shew the inconueniences which follow a Popular estate, to the end I might reduce them to reason which seeke to withdraw the subiect from the obedience of their natu∣rall* 1.1999 prince, through a false hope of libertie, in framing of Popular states: the which in effect is nothing else, but the most pernitious tyranny that can be imagined, if it bee not gouerned by wise and vertuous men. And therefore among the Cantons of the Swis∣sers (those which are best ordered) although they haue established a forme of Popular Commonweale, yet they gouerne themselues Aristocratically, hauing two or three [ K] councels, to the end the people deale not in affaires of state as little as may be; assem∣bling seldome but by quarters, or parishes, which they call Schaffes (as in old time the inhabitants of Mantinea a Popular state did) fearing the tumults and rebellions which* 1.2000 fall out commonly when they are altogether. But seeing it is not in the power of good citisens, nor of wise polititians, to change a Popular estate into a Monarchie: the chiefe grounds then of a Popular estate consists in the strict obseruation of lawes and ordi∣nances, being of it selfe quite different and disagreeing from the lawes and order of na∣ture, which giues the commauud vnto the wisest: a thing verie incompatible with the

people: for if a multitude (being impatient of command) haue not good lawes and [ A] statutes before their eyes, as lights to guide them, the estate will be soone ruined. And therefore the Swissers do obserue their lawes verie seuerely, else their estate had not bene so durable: for euen as weake & crased bodies fall soone into diseases, if they leaue the good diet and order prescribed them by the Physitian; so is it in a Popular state, if they doe not obserue their laws and ordinances. And thus much to satisfie them which are not contented, although the greatest men that euer were, haue disallowed of a Po∣pular estate.

Let vs see now if an Aristocraticall gouernment bee any thing better than the rest, as many hold opinion: for if a mediocratie be commendable in all things, and that we* 1.2001 must flie all vicious extreames; it followes then, that these two vicious extreams being [ B] reiected, we must hold the meane, which is an Aristocritie, or a certaine number of the most apparant citisens: as if there were ten thousand citisens, let them make choyce of an hundred; the which were a iust proportionable number betwixt one & a thousand: increasing or diminishing the number according to the multitude of the subiects, wher∣in they shall hold that commendable & desired mediocritie betwixt a Monarchy and a Democratie. There is yet another argument of no lesse efficacie, to proue that an Aristocraticall estate is the best, which is, That the power of soueraigne commaund, by naturall reason, is to be giuen to the most worthy: and dignitie cannot consist but in vertue, in nobilitie, or in riches, or in all three together. If then wee desire to chuse one [ C] of the three, or to ioyne them all together, the estate shall bee alwaies Aristocraticall: for the noble, rich, wise, and valiant men, make alwayes the least part of the citisens, in what place soeuer; by naturall reason then that gouernment must bee Aristocraticall, when as the least part of the citisens commaund the state, or whereunto the best and most vertuous men are admitted.

A man may also say, that the soueraigntie should be giuen onely to the most rich, as* 1.2002 to them that haue most interest in the preseruation of the whole state. Without doubt the most rich haue the greatest interest, and beare a greater charge than the poore, who hauing little to loose, abandon the Commonweale at need. And therefore Q. Flami∣nius did wisely commit the gouernment of the cities of Thessalie, to the most rich, as [ D] to them that had most interest in the preseruation of the state. Moreouer it seems that necessitie doth guide vs to an Aristocraticall estate: for although that in a Popular estate, and in a Monarchy, the monarch or the people in shew haue the soueraigntie, yet in effect they are forced to commit the gouernment to the Senat, or priuie Councell, who consult, and many times determine of greatest affaires: so as it is alwaies an Opti∣macie. And if the monarch, or people, be so ill aduised as to gouerne otherwise than by a wise councell, there can nothing bee expected but an ineuitable ruine of the state. I omit other reasons lesse necessarie, as euery one may coniecture, to conclude, that an Aristocratie is the most commendable state. And yet I say, that all together are not sufficient to proue it: for as for that commendable mediocritie which we seeke, it is not [ E] reall, diuiding things in the middest, but consists in reason: as liberalitie a mea•…•…e betwixt two vicious extreames, yet doth it approach neerer vnto prodigali•…•…e than vnto coue∣tousnesse. The meane which they seeke betwixt one and all in generall, is reall; neither can it euer be alike, for that there are some cities which haue not a thousand citisens, and others that haue aboue three hundred thousand: so as an Aristocraticall estate shall be alwaies mutable and variable, for the vncertaintie of the number: and it will often fall out, that a great Aristocraticall estate shall haue more commaunders, than a Popular state in a small citie shall haue citisens: as if there be foure hundred thousand citisens, to obserue a true Geometricall proportion, there must be foure thousand gouernours or

commaunders: so as by a necessarie consequence, the inconueniences which are inci∣dent [ F] to a Popular estate, will also fall out in an Aristocratie, by reason of the multitude* 1.2003 of lords: for the more gouernours there be, the more factions will grow, their consul∣tations will be more hard to determine, and are sooner discouered. And therefore those* 1.2004 Aristocraticall estates are more durable and assured, that haue fewest lords: as the La∣cedemonians, who had but thirtie gouernours, and the Pharsalians twentie; they did long maintaine their estates, whereas others decaied soone. It is not then the middle number betwixt one and all, which makes that commendable meane, seeing that there be as many kinds of vicious Commonweales, as of commendable and vertuous.

As for the other point, That they must giue the soueraigntie vnto the most worthy, It is true; but the argument makes more for a Monarchy, than for an Aristocratie: for [ G] among the most noble, the most wise, the most rich, and the most valiant, there is al∣wayes some one that doth excell the rest, to whome by that reason the soueraigntie doth belong: For it is impossible to find them all equall in all respects. And as for the Senat, or Councell, we haue shewed before, that it is diuided from maiestie, and hath no power to commaund, in what estate soeuer: else doth it loose the name and marke of a* 1.2005 Senat, the which is ordained to no other end, but to giue councell to them that haue the soueraigntie, to whome belong the resolution & decision of the councell. But Plato had another argument for an Aristocratical estate, saying, That it was verie hard to find any one man so wise and vertuous, as was requisit for the gouernment of an estate, and by that meanes a Monarchie were not sure. But this argument is captious, and may be [ H] * 1.2006 vsed against himselfe: for if it be hard to find any one prince so wise as he desireth, how shall they find out so great a number as is needfull in a Seigneurie. And Peter Soderin Gonfalonier of Florence, speaking vnto the people against an Aristocraticall estate, he vsed the same argument which Maecenas did before Augustus against Marcus Agrippa,* 1.2007 saying, That the gouernment of few lords, is the gouernment of few tyrants: and that it was better at all euents to haue but one tyrant. For if any one will say, that among many there will haply be some number of good men, we must then rather chuse a Po∣pular estate, for that in a great number there will be found more vertuous than in a lesse. But both the one and the other is vnprofitable: for as well in all Aristocraticall and Po∣polar estates, as in all corporations and colledges, the greatest part doth still ouer-rule [ I] the sounder and the better: and the more men there be, the lesse effects are there of ver∣tue and wisedome (euen as a little salt cast into a great lake, looseth his force:) so as the good men shall be alwayes vanquished in number by the vicious, and ambitious: and* 1.2008 for one tyrant there shall be a hundred which will crosse the resolution of the lesser but of the sounder part: as it is alwaies seene as well in the diets and assemblies of the prin∣ces of Germanie, whereas the spirituall princes of the empire, being the greatest num∣ber, haue alwaies crost the princes temporall: so as by their means the emperour Charls the fift, caused the empire to declare it selfe an enemie to the house of France, the which had not bene so in many ages: to the end the temporall princes should haue no hope of any succours from Fraunce in their necessities, whereinto they soone after fell. And [ K] * 1.2009 to make short, it hath bene alwayes seene, that the more heads there be in a Seigneurie, the more controuersies arise, and lesse resolution. And therefore the Seigneurie of Ve∣nice to auoid these inconueniences, commits all affaires of state to the mannaging of a dozen persons, and most commonly to seuen, especially to keepe their affaires secret, whererein consists the health and preseruation of an estate.

But let vs suppose, that a priuie Councell in an Aristocraticall estate, bee so secret, as nothing is discouered; yet is it a difficult thing for few commaunders to maintaine their estate against a multitude, which hath no part in honourable charges: for that most

commonly the lords scorne and contemne the popular, and the poore carrie alwaies [ A] a capital hatred against the great: so as vpon the least dissention among the nobles (the which is ineuitable if they be men of faction, and giuen to armes) the most factious and* 1.2010 ambitious flieth vnto the multitude, and ruines the state: as I haue noted before of the Seigneuries of Gènes, Florence, Cologne, Zurich, Strausbourg, Lindaw, and the aunti∣ent Phocians, Samians, Therenecians, Amphipolites, Corcyrians, Cnidians, Myteleni∣ans, and Hostienses; in the which the multitude hath expelled, banished, spoyled, and slaine the nobles. And what guard soeuer they keepe, yet do they liue in continuall di∣strust, and sometimes in such feare, as they doe not assemble together but in places of* 1.2011 strength: as in the citie of Benize•…•…e, lying in the realme of Telesin in Barbarie, all the lords and commaunders keepe themselues in forts, fearing the people should mutine a∣gainst [ B] them, or that one of them should murther the rest. So in old time the inhabi∣tants of Miletum, after they had expelled their two tyrants, they fell cruelly •…•…o armes among themselues, the nobles against the people: but in the end the rich hauing van∣quished the poore, they framed an Aristocraticall estate, where they liued in such feare, and distrust, as they went into ships to hold their councels, fearing (saith Plutarch) to be surprised and slaine by the people: like vnto the lords of the Samiens, who were all massacred by the multitude, at such time as they were in councell. So as in an Aristo∣craty the lords dare not traine the people vp to arms, nor put weapons into their hands: neither can they go to the warre, but they are in daunger to loose the estate, if they bee once defeated: neither can they assure themselues of straungers, fearing they should bee [ C] subiected by them. To which daungers a Popular estate is not subiect, euerie one ha∣uing a part in the state. An Aristocraticall estate then, is not onely in daunger of for∣raine enemies, but of the people, whome they must content or keepe in awe by force: to content them without making them partakers of the gouernment, were very hard; & to admit them to charges of honour, without alteration of the state, from an Aristocra∣tie to a Popular, were impossible: to keepe them in subiection by force, that were not safe, although it might be done, for that were to shew an open feare and distrust of them whome they must win by loue and courtesie: else vpon any forraine war against the state, or among the gouernours themselues, the people will bee easily drawne to [ D] armes, and to shake off their yoake. And therefore the Venetians to maintaine their* 1.2012 Aristocraticall estate, impart some small offices vnto the people, contract alliances with them, borrow of them to bind them to the maintenance of the state; and disarme them quite: and to make them more mild and pliable, they giue them full scope and liber•…•…ie to all sorts of pleasures: and sometimes they make their richest citisens bourgesses. If they haue any warre against the straunger, they soone compound it at what price soe∣uer: and aboue all things they labour to quench and pacifie all partialities and hatred among the gentlemen: so as the rich being drunke with delights, and the poore hauing meanes to traffique, and to exercise themselues in mechanike arts, with the commoditie of the place, lying vpon the sea, being by nature strong, they haue no great occasion, & [ E] lesse power to rebell. By these meanes the Venetians (next vnder God) haue main∣tained their estate, and not by the forme of an Aristocraticall gouernment, as many do hold. And although the nature of the situation of Venice, the honour of the people, the wisedome of the Seigneures, and the lawes, be fit for an Aristocraticall estate, yet is it not aboue foure hundred yeares, that they haue instituted this forme of Common∣weale, neither could they auoid many seditions and ciuill warres; as of the Bochoni∣ans,* 1.2013 Faleriennes, Topoliennes, Baiamontaines, and the cruell factions of the Iustinians, the Sceuoles, Seliens, Bassiens; the murther of eighteene dukes, and of a great number of Senators, as we may read in their histories. Wherein Paulus Iouius was deceiued,

who held, That the estate of Venice had continued eight hundred yeares: and Paulus [ F] Manutius, and du Moulin, haue erred more, saying, That it had bene of twelue hundred yeares standing: for it is well verified by the auntient registers of their Seigneurie, that before Cebastian Cian duke of Venice, in the yeare 1175, it was a meere Monarchy: and yet there hath not bene any Aristocraticall estat, to our knowledge, that hath so long continued, but haue bene for the most part chaunged into cruell Tyrannies, or bloodie Popular estates, as we haue shewed elsewhere. And to make it more apparant, I will produce for a new example the state of Genes, who hauing peace with the Vene∣tians, by meanes of the protection of Fraunce, soone after the Adornes, and Fregoses, diuided the state (the which at that time was Aristocraticall) into two factions, whence ensued many murthers of the chiefe men: so as the people fell to armes, freed them∣selues [ G] from subiection, and tooke the gouernment of the state from the gentlemen: and in succession of time made a law, whereby none might bee duke of Genes, vnlesse* 1.2014 hee were a Plebeian: and since they haue published another law, prohibiting the no∣bles to haue aboue a third part of all other officers. And soone after in a sedition they expelled all their gentlemen, chusing eight Tribunes, and after they had reiected the protection of Fraunce, they chose a Dyer of silke for their duke, whome king Lewes the twelft caused to bee hanged▪ after that hee had taken the citie: but when as Andrew Doria reuolted, and that hee had power to dispose of the state at his pleasure, hee made choyce of all such as had six houses within the citie, and of some others of name and marke, which were not so rich, and diuided them all into eight and twentie tribes, the [ H] which they called Alberghi, making them gentlemen, and giuing them the gouern∣ment of the state, and debarred the rest of the common people, onely with this excep∣tion, To haue libertie euerie yeare to make ten of the Plebeians gentlemen, and to re∣ceiue them into the number of the nobilitie: the which notwithstanding was not well executed. So of foure and twentie thousand citisens, there were not aboue twelue hundred, or thereabouts, that had any part in the state: and of this number it was de∣creed, That euery yeare there should be a great Councell made of foure hundred, the which should chuse the Duke and the eight Gouernours, which they call the Seigneu∣rie, to manage all affairs of state for the space of two yeres that they should be in charge, vnlesse matter were of great importance, then to assemble the Senat of an hundred gen∣tlemen. [ I] And as for the duke, hee might not bee chosen but out of the noblest families, with a guard of 500 Lansquenets, besides the generall of the armie, and the fortie cen∣tiners. I omit other officers, as the Procurators of the Seigneurie, the Podestat, or Ma∣ior, the Iudges of the Rota, the seuen extraordinarie Iudges, the fiue Syndiks, the Cen∣sors, and the officers of Saint George. The estate of Genes hath continued in this sort 43 yeares, vnder the protection of the house of Austria. From the yeare 1528, vnto the yeare 1549, that Iohn Flisco beeing chosen duke of Genes after Benedict Gentil, would haue made his power perpetuall, and to effect it, he laboured to subiect the Seigneurie of Genes vnto the crowne of France, hauing alreadie defeated Andrew Dories armie, & slain his nephew, he fell into the seal leaping from one gally to another, the which ouer∣threw [ K] all his desseins. Since the seigneury hath taken again the forme established by An∣drew Doria, the which was cōtinued vnto the yere 1574, that it was diuided into two fa∣ctions; the one of the antient, the other of the new gentlemen, who are yet at ciuill war: and the antient seeing themselues expelled by the new, haue ceized vpon the places of strength, and forts without the citie, being in danger to be quite ruined, or at the least to fall into a Popular estate, as they did in the yeare 1506. The sedition happened for the qualitie of their nobilitie: for after that Andrew Doria had setled the state (as I haue said) & excluded the Plebeians from being dukes of Genes, the gentlemen of the antient

houses (which were but foure, the Dorias, the Spinolas, the Grimoaldes, and the Fies∣ques) [ A] * 1.2015 caused their genealogies to be drawne and registred in publicke acts, diuiding themselues by this meanes from the Plebeians that were newly ennobled; who disdai∣ning thereat, and finding themselues the greater number and the stronger, they haue chased away the antient houses, and if they be not soone reconciled, the people in the end will expell them all.

I haue shewed before, that the great Councell or Senat in an Aristocraticall estate, ought to be perpetuall, to the end there may be some firme ground, or foundation whereon the annuall change of all officers may relie. And as for the Duke, it were strange if he should not ceaze vpon the Soueraigntie, hauing fiue hundred men for his guard, seeing that he hath two yeares to remaine in charge: considering the factions [ B] that are made to attaine vnto this dignitie of honour. We see then that the chiefe* 1.2016 ground and support of an Aristocratie, consists in the mutuall loue of the comman∣ders: for if they agree and be of one mind, they will maintaine themselues, and gouerne much better than the people: But if there be any factions among them, then there is no State so difficult to maintaine, for the reasons before mentioned; especially, if the Commanders be martiall men: for souldiers hate nothing more than peace. And we may not marueile if the Aristocratie of the Venetians, Rhagusians and Luquois, haue continued some ages: for they are not giuen to armes, neither haue they any thing in greater recommendation than their trafficke and commoditie. And to conclude [ C] * 1.2017 briefly, there is no forme of Aristocratie more perfect and goodly, nor more assured, than whereas they make choise of men of vertue and reputation to commaund; or at the least that they be not infamous: and if any one dies, to substitute another in his place by election, as they do vse at Geneua. If any one of the Councell of 25 dies, the most antient of the 60 succeeds him most commonly, although it be done by election: and the most antient of the great Councell of 200 comes into the Councell of 60, and the two hundred chuse one of the honestest Burgesses or citisens that is without re∣proch. Whereby few command and gouerne the state, and yet euery man hopes to attaine vnto it, not by mony nor ambition, but by honour and vertue. This may pro∣perly be called an Aristocratie, the which is least subiect vnto dangers, and to the re∣bellion [ D] of Lords or subiects.

Such a Seigneurie will obserue the lawes duly, and administer iustice vprightly: if they be contented with their estate, and seeke not ambitiously to wrest from another, as the Lacedemonians did. For it is impossible that a Seigneurie of few Lords and Commanders, should get and maintaine a great Empire, as a Monarke may: also the ruine and change of so great a Seigneurie is not so much to be feared, as of a great and mightie Monarchie, which draweth after it the ruine of the greatest familes, and of∣tentimes of allies and of neighbour States that are in his protection: Like vnto a great building which raised on high, blind the sight of others, and falling, ruines with her weight those that are neere it, with a fearefull noyse to them that heare it. Behold the [ E] commodities and discommodities of a popular and Aristocraticall estate. Now we* 1.2018 are to speake of a Monarchie, which all great men haue preferred before all other Commonweales: yet we find it is subiect vnto many dangers, whether the change of the Monarke be from bad to good, or from good to better: although there were no* 1.2019 other thing but the change of him that hath the Soueraigntie: yet is it much to be fea∣red in all states: for we commonly see in the change of Princes, new desseines, new lawes, new officers, new friends, new enemies, new habits, and a new forme of liuing: for most commonly all Princes take a delight to change and alter all things, that they may be spoken of; the which doth many times cause great inconueniences, not only

to the subiects in particular, but also to the whole bodie of the state. But if this were [ F] not, and the Prince were as wise and vertuous as might be desired, yet the leagues and treaties made with his Predecessor end with him: whereupon alliances being ended, Princes fall to armes, and the stornger assailes the weaker, or prescribes him a law. The which cannot chance in popular and Aristraticall estates, when as they make perpe∣tuall leagues, for that the people dies not; so as other Princes and priuat men desire rather to contract with a Seigneurie than with a Prince, for the assurance of treaties and bonds, wherunto the successors of Princes are not tied, vnlesse they be their heires, as manie maintaine and practise. The other inconuenience in a Monarchie is, the danger to fall into ciuill warre, by the diuisions and factions of such as aspire vnto the crowne, especially if it be electiue, the which doth oftentimes draw after it the ruine of [ G] the state: Yea, in a successiue right there is no small danger, if there be many in one degree, who many times kill one another, or at the least diuide the subiects. We haue too many examples before our eyes: and oftentimes the lawfull successour is expelled by an vsurper. But admit there were no contention for the Monarchie, yet if the Mo∣narke be a child, there will be some diuision for the gouernement, betwixt the mother and the Princes, or betwixt the Princes themselues. And God (to be reuenged of his people) threatens to giue them for Princes children and women. And although the* 1.2020 infant haue a tutor by the appointment of his predecessour, or by the custome, yet is it to be feared, that he will make himselfe absolute Lord▪ as Triphon did, who cruelly* 1.2021 slue his pupill the king of Siria, to make himselfe king. The which is more to be feared, [ H] if the tutor marrieth the pupils mother, as Lewis Sforce did, who by that meanes mur∣thered the young prince, and made himselfe duke of Milan. And although for the auoiding of this danger, they giue the gouernement to the neerest of kinne, and the nourishment of the infant to the mother; yet haue there bene murthering mothers since, who haue not onely sold and betrayed the state, but euen the liues of their chil∣dren, as the mother of Charilaus king of Lacedemon did. And sometimes the tutor* 1.2022 continues his gouernment, and leaues nothing vnto the king but the title, as the duke of Northumberland did to Edward the sixt king of England: and Appelles to young Philip king of Macedon, who could not inioy his estate, vntill he had slaine his tutor.* 1.2023 And if the prince comes to the crowne being yong and out of gouernment, there is no [ I] lesse danger: for then when as he should haue a dozen wise maisters to restraine his li∣centious appetits, the which are then most violent, he is altogether free and at liberty: so as commonly the courts of yong princes abound in follies, maskes, and licentious∣nesse, and the subiects follow the princes humor; so as for one vice there multiplies ten, as I haue said before. If the prince be warlike, he will hazzard his subiects, his e∣state, and his person, to make proofe of his valour. And although he come vnto the state being of a competent age and wise, the which is rare, and the greatest gift which a people can craue at Gods hands: yet soueraigntie hath his mischiefe, most common∣ly the wise become foolish, the valliant cowards, and the good grow wicked. It were* 1.2024 time lost to repeat examples, the which are too ordinarie. To conclude, if the prince [ K] be subtill and wicked, he will plant a tyrannie: if he be cruell, he will make a butcherie of the commonweale; or a brothell house if he be licentious, or both together if hee be couetous, he will pull both haire and skinne from his subiects: if he be prodigall, he will sucke their bloud and marrow to glut some dosaine of horseleeches that are about his person. And yet he will do worse than all this, if he be a sot and ignorant, as we haue sayd elsewhere. Yea, so much the more is a tyrannie to be feared, for that a tyrant hath no maister nor companion to oppose against him. These bee the dangers of a Mo∣narchie, the which in truth are great, but there is greater perill in an Aristocraticall e∣state,

and much more in a Popular: for the dangers which we haue set downe for the most part cease, when as the Monarchie comes by right of succession, as we will shew hereafter. But seditions, factions, and ciuill warre, are in a manner continuall: yea,* 1.2025 sometimes greater for the attaining vnto offices, in Aristocraticall and Popular com∣monweales, than for the state in a Monarchie; the which admits no sedition for offices, [ A] nor for the state, but after the death of the prince, and that very seldome. But the chiefe point of a commonweale, which is the right of soueraigntie, cannot be, nor sub∣sist (to speake properly) but in a Monarchie: for none can be soueraigne in a common∣weale* 1.2026 but one alone: if they be two, or three, or more, no one is soueraigne, for that no one of them can giue or take a law from his companion. And although we ima∣gin a bodie of many lords, or of a whole people to hold the soueraigntie; yet hath it [ B] no true ground, nor support, if there bee not a head with absolute and soueraigne power, to vnite them together: the which a simple magistrat without soueraigne au∣thoritie cannot do. And if it chance that the lords, or the tribes of the people be diui∣ded (as it often fals out) then must they fall to armes one against another. And al∣though the greatest part be of one opinion, yet may it so happen, as the lesser part ha∣uing many legions, and making a head, may oppose it selfe against the greater num∣ber, and get the victorie. We see the difficulties which are, and alwayes haue bene in Popular states and seigneuries, whereas they hold contrary parts, and for diuerse ma∣gistrats: some demaund peace, others warre, some will haue this law, others that; some will haue one commander, others another; some will treat a league with the [ C] king of France, others with the king of Spaine, corrupted or drawne some one way some another, making open warre: as it hath bene seene in our age among the Gri∣sons. Moreouer, sometimes it happens by the custome of the countrey, that a law, the prince, or a magistrat, is not admitted, if all that haue voices giue not their consent: as in Polonia whereas the lesser part must change their opinion, and ioyne with the grea∣ter number, either by loue or force, and for this cause they come armed to the field to chuse their king, and to force the lesser part to consent: the which cannot happen where there is a soueraigne head, of whom depends the resolution of all things. More∣ouer, in a Popular and Aristocraticall estate, alwayes the greater number will bee be∣leeued,* 1.2027 although the wiser and the most vertuous bee fewest in number; so as most [ D] commonly the sounder and the better part is forced to yeeld vnto the greater, at the appetite of an impudent Tribune, or a brasen faced Orator. But a soueraigne Mo∣narch may ioyne with the sounder and the better part, and make choise of wise men, and well practised in matters of state: whereas necessitie doth force them in other com∣monweales to admit wise men and fooles and altogether to offices and councell. It is also impossible for a Popular state, or an Aristocratie, to command with soueraigne power, or to do any act which cannot bee done but by one person onely: as to con∣duct an armie and such like things: but they must create magistrats and commissaries to that end, who haue neither the soueraigne power, authoritie, nor maiestie of a Mo∣narch. And what power soeuer they haue by vertue of their places, yet Popular and [ E] * 1.2028 Aristocraticall commonweales, finding themselues imbarked in any dangerous warre, either against the enemie, or among themselues, or in difficultie to proceed criminally against some mightie citisen, or to giue order for the plague, or to create magistrats, or to do anie other thing of great consequence, did vsually create a Dictator, as a soue∣raigne Monarch: knowing well that a Monarchie was the anckor whereunto of neces∣sitie they must haue recourse, Trepid•…•… patres, saith Titus Liuius, ad summum anxilium decurrunt, Dictatorem dici placet, The fearefull fathers flie vnto their last refuge, they thought it best to name a Dictator. And when as Hanniball made all Italie to tremble,

Ad Dictatorem dicendum remedium iamdiu desideratum Ciuit as confugit, The citie fled [ F] * 1.2029 vnto the remedie so long desired, which was to name a Dictator. And the reason was, for that they held the Dictator for a god, and his commandements for oracles, Dict•…•…∣toris Edictum pro numine semper obseruatum, The Dictators Edict was alwayes reli∣giously* 1.2030 obserued. And euen the enemies besieging the citie of Rome, abandoned the siege, hearing that they had created a Dictator, Tantus erat Dictatoris terror apud hostes, vt eo creato statim a menibus disceserint, So great was the feare of a Dictator with the enemies, as he was no sooner created, but they departed from the wals. For* 1.2031 oftentimes euen the Consuls and their commaundements were neglected and troden vnder foote: and such as had offended retired to their companions, that is to say, to the people, to whom they might appeale. The which Appius the Consull seeing, hee [ G] * 1.2032 sayd, Minas esse Consul•…•…m non imperium, vbi ad eos qui vna peccauer unt prouocare liceat agedum, Dictatorem a quo prouocatio non est creemas, They were but the threats, sayd he, of Consuls without any commanding power, seeing they might appeale vnto them who had offended in the like manner, Go to then, let vs create a Dictator from whom there is no appeale. The impunitie of vices, and the contempt of magistrats in a Po∣pular estate, doth sufficiently shew that Monarchs are necessarie for the preseruation of the societie of mankind, seeing that the Romans who for the error of one Prince, had all kings in hatred, made a Dictator for the conduct of all their great affaires. So did the Lacedemonians in their extremities create a magistrat with power like vnto the Dictator, whom they called Harmoste: and the Thessaliens, him whom they called [ H] * 1.2033 Archus: as in the like case the Mityleniens their great Aezimnere; to whom the great Prouidador of the Venetians may be in some sort compared: finding by experience that an absolute power vnited in one person, is more eminent and of greater effect▪ and that the same power imparted to two, three, or many lords, or to a whole communal∣tie, declines and looseth his force, like vnto a •…•…agot vnbound and diuided into manie parts. And therefore Tacitus saith, that for the execution of great exploits the power of commanding must be restrained to one alone: the which is confirmed by Titus Li∣uius, who sayd, that three Tribunes created with Consularie power, gaue a sufficient testimonie that the force of command imparted to manie, is fruitlesse: and especially in millitarie causes, the which Hanniball did find, hauing against him an armie of 60000 [ I] * 1.2034 men, commanded by two Consuls, Paulus Aemilius, and Terentius Varro, whom hee defeated: and Amurath against the Christian Princes at the battell of Nicopolis: and the emperour Charles the fift against the two commaunders of the protestants. And we may not marueile if the duke of Vrbin with a few hierlings made head against so migh∣tie an armie, led by the chiefe commanders or generals, the which depended not one of another, that is to say, Rance Vitelli, and Laurence de Medicis: for euen Leo writes in his historie, that the people of Affricke hold it for an infallible Maxime, that a prince* 1.2035 which is but weake in forces, shall alwayes defeate a stronger armie that hath two ge∣nerals. For whilest that Cleomenes king of Lacedemon did gouerne absolutely alone, he obtained great and goodly victories, and was neuer vanquished: but after that hee [ K] had called home the king which was banished to impart his soueraigne authoritie vnto him, soone after he was ouerthrowne and put to flight. And for this cause Aristides the iust, being chosen generall with Miltiades to commaund the armie either of them* 1.2036 his daie, (as the Romane Consuls were wont to do) he resigned all his power and au∣thoritie to his companion, who gaue the Persians a great ouerthrow. There are a thousand such like examples, which do shew vs the necessitie to haue one head or com∣mander, not onely in warre (where there is greatest danger) but also to obey one so∣ueraigne* 1.2037 prince in a Commonweale: for euen as an armie is ill led, and most common∣ly

defeated that hath many Generals; euen so is a Commonweale that hath manie [ A] lords, either by diuision, or a diuersitie of opinions, or by the diminution of power gi∣uen to manie, or by the difficultie there is to agree and resolue vpon any thing, or for that the subiects know not whom to obey, or by the discouerie of matters which should be kept secret, or through altogether. And therefore whereas we sayd before, that in a well ordered state, the soueraigne power must remaine in one onely, without communicating any part thereof vnto the state (for in that case it should be a Popular gouernment and no Monarchie) and that all wise Politicians, Philosophers, Diuines, and Historiographers haue highly commended a Monarchie aboue all other Com∣monweales, it is not to please the prince, that they hold this opinion, but for the safetie and happinesse of the subiects: And contrariwise, when as they shall limit and restraine [ B] the soueraigne power of a Monarch, to subiect him to the generall estates, or to the councell, the soueraigntie hath no firme foundation, but they frame a popular confu∣sion, or a miserable Anarchie, which is the plague of all states, & Commonweales; the which must be duly considered, not giuing credit to their goodly discourses, which per∣swade subiects, that it is necessarie to subiect Monarchs, and to prescribe their prince a law; for that it is not onely the ruine of the Monarch, but also of the subiects. It is yet more strange, that many hold an opinion that the prince is subiect to his lawes, that is to say, subiect to his will, whereon the ciuill lawes (which he hath made) depend; a thing impossible by nature. And vnder this colour and ill digested opinion, they make a mixture and confusion of ciuill lawes with the lawes of nature, and of both ioyntly [ C] with the lawes of God: so as they suppose, when as the prince forbids to kill, to steale, or to commit adulterie, that it is the princes law. But for that we haue layd open this poynt at large, I will now passe it ouer. It shall suffice that we haue made apparant demonstration, that a pure absolute Monarchie is the surest Commonweale, and without comparison the best of all. Wherein many are abused, which maintaine that an Optimacie is the best kind of gouernment: for that many commanders haue more* 1.2038 iudgement, wisedome, and councell then one alone; But there is a great difference be∣twixt councell and commandement: The aduice and councell of many graue and wise men may be better than of one, as they say commonly that many men see more than [ D] one alone: but to resolue, to determine and to command, one will alwayes performe it better than many: and then he which hath aduisedly digested all their opinions, will soone resolue without contention, the which many cannot easily performe: Besides ambition is so naturall among commanders that are equall in power, as some will ra∣ther see the ruine of the Commonweale, than acknowledge any one to be wiser than themselues: Others know what is good, but shame keepes them from changing of their opinions, fearing to loose the least point of their reputations: So as it is necessarie to haue a soueraigne prince, which may haue power to resolue and determine of the opinions of his councell.

If then a commonweale be but one body, how is it possible it should haue manie* 1.2039 heads, but that it must proue a monster, as the emperour Tiberius sayd vnto the Se∣nate, [ E] else it were no bodie, but a hideous monster with many heads. But some one will say that new princes make new lawes, new institutions, new ordinances: we will con∣fesse that it happens in some, who to shew their power make lawes sometimes without any reason, but this is more frequent and usuall without comparison in Popular and Aristocraticall estates: For new magistrats so often created, and which play the pettie kings in their Commonweales, would bee loth the yeare should passe away without giuing some cause to speake of them, either for good, or euil: for proofe whereof we find more lawes published at Rome and at Athens, then throughout all the world:

For alwayes through iealousie one vndid what another had made: and all, as they said, [ F] was to make themselues famous, and to rob the honour of their companions, with the preiudice of the Commonweale. But to auoid these inconueniences, and insatiable ambitions in an Optimacie, or Popular state, you must not in any sort suffer the law or ordinance to carrie the name of the magistrat, as they vsed in Rome and Athens, which was the cause of so many lawes. And to say that treaties and leagues die with the Prince, that happens not alwayes, for most commonly they are continued and prorogued by an expresse clause, some yeares after the death of the prince, as it hath bene alwayes obserued betwixt the house of France and the Cantons of the Suissers, the which haue beene for the kings life, and fiue yeares after. Moreouer, we haue former∣ly shewed, that it is expedient allyances and leagues should not bee perpetuall; and [ G] for this cause states and commonweales do oftentimes limit their treaties to a certaine time. And as for bonds and treaties of peace, they are accustomed for their better as∣surance to haue them confirmed by the estates, or published in soueraigne courts, and oftentimes they bind in particular the greatest noblemen: although there bee farre greater assurance in matter of obligation and promises made by a prince than by a mul∣titude: and the rather for that the lawes of honour are in much more recommendation to a soueraigne prince, than to a multitude of artisans or marchants, who are kings in a* 1.2040 name collectiue, and nothing in particular. And as for the troubles which the go∣uernement of a young king do cause, that happens rarely, and is more incident at the election of magistrats: For at the chusing of a Gonfalonier of Genes for two yeares [ H] onely, the Commonweale is euer in combustion. There is no reason to ballance the cruelties and extorsions of a tyrant, with the actions of good princes: we know wel that a peaceable Optimacie and wisely gouerned, if it may be, is better than a cruell tyran∣nie. But the question is, whether it be better to haue a iust and vpright king, or manie good lords: and whether a tyrannie of fiftie tyrants be not more dangerous, than of one tyrant alone: And if there be not much more danger in Popular and Aristocra∣ticall estates, than in a Monarchie. Yea it is most certaine that a tyrannicall Monar∣chie is sometimes more to be desired than a Democratie or Optimacie, how good so∣euer:* 1.2041 For if many wise and skilfull pilots hinder one another in striuing to gouerne the helme; euen so will many lords do, euery one seeking to gouerne the Common∣weale, [ I] be they neuer so wise and vertuous. Although it be not needfull to insist much vpon this proofe, that a Monarchie is the most sure, seeing that a familie which is the true image of a Commonweale can haue but one head, and that all the lawes of na∣ture* 1.2042 guide vs vnto a Monarchie, whether that we behold this little world which hath but one bodie, and but one head for all the members, whereon depends the will, mo∣uing and feeling: or if we looke to this great world which hath but one soueraigne God: or if we erect our eyes to heauen, we shall see but one sunne: and euen in sociable creatures, we see they cannot admit many kings, nor many lords, how good soeuer. Solyman emperour of the Turkes vsed this example, hearing the great cries and accla∣mations* 1.2043 of ioy which the whole armie made vnto Sultan Mustapha his son returning [ K] out of Persia, he put him to death through iealousie, causing him to be strangled in his withdrawing chamber, and his dead body to be cast out before the whole armie: then he made a proclamation, that there was but one God in heauen, and one Sultan vpon earth: Two dayes after he put Sultan Gobe to death, for that he had wept for his bro∣ther; and Sultan Mehemet the third brother, for that he fled for feare; leauing but one sonne liuing, to auoid the danger of many lords. We also see that all nations of the earth from all antiquitie, euen when they were guided by a naturall instinct, had no o∣ther forme of gouernement than a Monarchie, that is to say, the Assirians, Medes,

Persians, Aegyptians, Indians, Parthians, Macedonians, Celtes, Gauls, Scythians, Arabi∣ans, [ A] * 1.2044 Turks, Moscouits, Tartars, Polonians, Danes, Spaniards, English, Affricans, and Perusians, where there is no mention of any Optimacie, or Popular estate. Yea all the auntient people of Greece and Italie, before they were corrupted with ambition, had none but kings and monarches, as the Athenians, Lacedemonians, Corinthians, Acheans, Sicyonians, Candiots, Sicilians, Ethiopians, Latines, and Hetrusques, the which haue flourished in arms & laws, foure, fiue, six, & seuen hundred yeres; yea some haue continued eight or nine hundred yeares, others twelue or thirteen hundred yeres. And yet some wonder that the Popular estate of the Romans▪ or the Seigneuries of Lacedemon, and Venice, had continued foure hundred yeres, or thereabouts, after they had expelled their kings doubtlesse they haue reason to maruel, to see two or three Cō∣monweales [ B] among a hundred, able to continue any time, beeing instituted against the order of nature: but no man is amazed to see many great & mightie Monarchies con∣tinue a thousand, or twelue hundred yeares, for that it is according to the right lawes of nature. And although the name of a king were hatefull vnto the Romans, yet many of the•…•… in particular affect to be soueraignes: for not many moneths before Augustus his birth, it was found out by oracles, that nature should soone bring forth a great Mo∣narch* 1.2045 of the Romans. For this cause the Senat decreed, That all infants should bee slaine that were to be borne that yeare: but euery one in particular did hinder the car∣rying of this decree into Saturnes temple, for that euery one (saith the historie) did hope [ C] his sonne should be a Monarch. In like sort the princes of Persia being assembled toge∣ther to consult which forme of gouerment were the better, they concluded a Monar∣chy. The same argument was called in question by Augustus among his friends, being desirous to liue at rest, and to leaue the state, after that hee had p•…•…t the nauie of Mare Anthonie to flight: but it was resolued, That a Monarchy was the most safe without all comparison, and the effects did verifie it: for in former times the Romans could not liue ten yeares together without ciuill warres, or some sedition: and Augustus main∣tained them quietly in peace almost fiftie yeares, the which continued long after his death. Experience is the mistresse of all things, and as the touchstone, resolues all doubts. Therefore the Capadocians hauing lost their king, they were persuaded by the [ D] Romans, to take a Popular estate: but they refused it, and demaunded a king: so as the Romans gaue them power to chuse one, and they aduanced Ariobarzanes; finding the calamities of Popular states▪ To conclude, if we seeke authoritie, we shall find that the greatest schollers that euer were, haue held a Monarchy to be the best: as Homer, Hero∣dotus, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Plutarch, Philon, Apolonius, Saint Ierosme, Cyprian, Ma∣ximus Tirius, and many others. And euen in the law of God, it is said, When as the people shall chuse a king, like vnto other nations, he shall not take a straunger: Wher∣by he not onely sheweth, that God approueth a Monarchy, teaching a king how hee should gouerne, but also that other nations in those dayes had nothing but Monar∣chies, as Samuel saith. He also made Moyses king ouer his people, for so hee is called [ E] * 1.2046 in the law of God. And although that God gouerned his people •…•…or a time without a king, sending them alwaies by an especial fauor certaine captains, as princes & judges to free them from the subiection of their neighbors, whome the holy Scripture calls Mes∣sies, and Sauiours: yet was there neuer any Optimacie, or Popular estate among them,* 1.2047 but contrariwise they were a long time without either prince or magistrat, beeing gui∣ded* 1.2048 onely by the grace of God, who for this cause is called their king. And after their returne out of Babilon, they were still subiect to the kings of Persia, or of Aegypt, or of* 1.2049 Syria: vntill that Iudas Machabeus of the familie of the Azmoneans, descended from Aaron (hauing rebelled against Antiochus the Noble, king of Syria) brought the of∣fice

of high priest, and the soueraigntie vnto his house, who were afterwards subdued [ F] by the Romans. For as for their Senat, which consisted of seuentie one, the king making the seuentie two, and the most part of the line of Dauid; they busied not themselues in any thing else, but in iudging of causes of great consequence, as of the high priest, or of some tribe, or of crimes of high treason, or of false prophets: & for this cause they were onely called Iudges, whome by the corrupt Greeke word they called Sanedrim. The Caldean interpretor saith, That although they had power to make lawes, euen vnder kings, yet was it no soueraigne authoritie. True it is, that Rabin Magmon calling them Doctors or Informers, saith, That they had also power to create twentie three criminal Iudges, whome they called Iudges of soules; and seuen Iudges for ciuill causes, whom they tearmed Iudges of goods in euerie citie; and ten Iudges for gouenment, among [ G] the which there was one priest, or as Ioseph saith, two Leuites assistant to euery magi∣strat: and three other Arbitrators, whereof either of the parties did chuse one, and the two that were chosen did name a third. The which I haue particularly set downe, to confute their opinion, which maintaine with Ioseph the Historian, That the Hebrewes* 1.2050 haue vsed a kind of Aristocraticall gouernment, taking the Senat of seuentie one for so∣ueraigne lords: all whome Herod, the eldest sonne of captaine Antipater put to death, for that they had condemned him, and had executed him, but for the fauour of Hirca∣nus king and high priest, who gaue him his pardon, or at the least staied the decree of the Senat; and afterwards he murthered his sauiour. Which sheweth plainely, that the Senat had no soueraigne power, and that it was no Optimacie: although that Iose∣phus [ H] * 1.2051 brings in the Iewes complaynig, Quod Hircanus & Aristobulus formam Reipub▪ in regnum mutarent, That Hircanus, and Aristobulus, had chaunged the forme of the Commonweale into a Monarchy. In my opinion these reasons, with many others (which are not needfull to be here particularly exprest) are sufficient to shew, that of the three kinds of lawfull gouernments, a perfect Monarchy is the most excelleu•…•…: and among the disordered, the Democratie the most vicious. A lawfull Monarchy (as a strong and able bodie) may easily be maintained: but Popular states, and Aristocra∣ties, as feeble and weake, and subiect to many infirmities, must be preserued by diet and good gouernment. And for that it is not alwayes in the power of wise and politike states-men, to chuse the best kind of gouernment, nor to alter and change the worst, [ I] they must in this case doe like vnto skilfull ship maisters, which yeeld vnto the tempest; they strike their sailes, and cast forth euen their most pretious marchandise, to attaine vnto a safe port. Euen so a wise man that seekes to change a state from bad to good, or from good to better; he must first insinuat with the greatest, and by obsequious obser∣uation draw them to his will. But if he be not assured to effect it, let him not attempt it: as Dion did, who ruined the Tyranny of Siracusa, suddenly to erect an Optimacie, by the councell and aduice of Plato: and not able to effect it, he was slaine: so as it be∣came an estate of a turbulent multitude, much more miserable without all comparison than any tyranny. As also the Pithagorians did, who laboured suddenly to change all the Popular estates of Italie, into meere Optimacies, hauing not force sufficient to ef∣fect [ K] it, but they were all slaine, or banished. But if this Popular infirmitie cannot be cu∣red by any physicke, it must bee borne withall, beeing better to haue a bad Common∣weale than none at all; and attend the time vntill the tyranny of one, of few, or of ma∣ny, be mounted to the highest precipice or downfall, from whence at the first storme they may be cast downe, or fall of themselues. Else if the tyrant be but shaken, and not quite ouerthrowne, he will commit horrible murthers of the best citisens, to fortifie and* 1.2052 settle his tyranny. For a tyrant that hath once escaped the hands of such as had conspi∣red against him, he becomes mad and furious, like vnto a wild beast that sees his owne

blood. We haue too many examples, and without any further search, we haue seene [ A] Cosmo de Medicis (whome the banished men of Florence called Tyrant, although hee were esteemed of many others to be a good and a wise prince) build forts, & increased his Monarchy with the ruines of such as had conspired against his life and state, and yet neuer any one conspiracie tooke effect. Besides, a Tyrannie is much more insupporta∣ble, if the tyrant hath no large limits and great territories: for being poore and hungry, he oppresseth and deuours his subiects continually; & if he be cruell, he soone attaines to his desire: whereas a rich and mightie Monarch hath wherewithall to glut his ap∣petite,* 1.2053 and if he be cruell hee will stand in feare that some one in so great a multitude will take reuenge. Euen then as the subiects are happie vnder a great and mightie Mo∣narch, if he haue any sparke of iustice before his eyes: so a small estate is best befitting [ B] an Aristocraticall gouernment, who will maintaine their subiects more happily than a poore tyrant should do. We see eighteene Cantons of the Swissers, besides the Gri∣sons, whose gouernments are Popular, and Aristocraticall, hauing in length from Ge∣neua vnto Constance but two hundred and fiftie thousand paces, and a hundred and threescore in bredth from the Alpes vnto mount Iura, most of which countrey is full of rockes, and very barren; yet haue they maintained their subiects a long time in great happinesse: but if they should enuie and desire their neighbors estate, they should soone loose their owne. And contrariwise the greater the Monarch is, the more goodly and flourishing it is, and the subiect more happie, liuing in an assured peace. But if it chance [ C] to be diuided into Democraties, or Optimacies, or into many tyrannies, the people are either tyrannised, or in sedition among themselues, or in continuall warre against their neighbours. Seeing then a Monarchy is the most sure of all Commonweales, and amongst all Monarchies a Royall is the goodliest: let vs say, whether it bee better to haue it by a successiue right, or by election.

CHAP. V. That a well ordered Commonweale dependeth not either of lot, either of choyce, and much lesse of women; but by discent to be deriued from a most honou∣nourable [ D] stocke: and that it ought to be giuen but to one alone, without partition.

IT is not enough to say, that a Royall and lawfull Monarchy is* 1.2054 better than either a Democratie, or an Aristocratie, except a man say also, such a Monarchy as is by successiue right diuolued vnto the next heire male of the name, and that without partition. For albeit that the lawfull Monarchy be alwayes to bee preferred be∣fore other Commonweals, yet neuerthelesse so it is, that amongst Monarchies that which commeth by a successiue right vnto the [ E] heires males, of name, neerest in blood, and without partition, is much more commen∣dable and sure, than are the other which come by lot, or by choyce, or will, to the heirs male, but not to the neerest; or vnto the neerest, but yet by the mothers side; or that is the neerest by the fathers side, but yet is to make partition of the whole Monarchy with other the coheires; or else of some part thereof. All which it is needfull for vs by necessary reasons, and examples, to declare; to take away the opinion that many im∣print into another princes subiects, and by that meanes entertaine rebellions, so to chaunge well ordered Monarchies, and to moue as it were both heauen and earth. All which they do vnder the vaile of vertue, of pietie, and of iustice. Yea some there are to

be found, which haue bene so bold, as to publish bookes, and to maintaine against their [ F] naturall prince, come vnto the crowne by lawfull succession, That the right of choyce is better in a Monarchy: as was done in England the seuenth of September, in the yere 1566, the queene then present at the disputation of the schollers of Oxford; the questi∣on* 1.2055 being, That it were better to haue kings chosen by election, than by succession. Which new doctrine not a little troubled, not the queene onely, but euen the nobilitie also of that kingdome, then there present. For why, from such beginnings wee see the subiects to proceed vnto mutinies, vnto rebellions, and at length euen vnto open wars. And who is he that would not be moued to heare the inuectiue speech of an eloquent man, detesting the cruelties, the exactions, and rapines of a tyrant? who neither hath the honour of God, neither the truth, neither iustice, in regard: who driueth away the [ G] good men, and ioyneth himselfe vnto the euill: and in the end ioyneth thereunto this exclamation, O how happie is that Monarchy, wherein the estates of the people make* 1.2056 choyce of a iust and vpright king, who aboue all things feareth God, and honoureth vertue: who regardeth the good, and chastiseth the euil: who vnto the honest appoin∣teth due rewards, and vnto the wicked condigne punishments: who abhorreth flatte∣rers, who keepeth his faith and promise; who banisheth the blood suckers and deuisors of new exactions out of the court, who spareth his subiects blood as his owne, who re∣uengeth the wrong done to others, and pardoneth the iniurie done vnto himselfe; and who in briefe more esteemeth of religion and vertue, than of all other things in the world. And so hauing set these prayses, with the counterpoise of a tyranny repleat with [ H] all vices, the vulgar sort forthwith conceiueth an opinion, that there is nothing more happy, than the Monarchy which falleth into election: yea and not they of the sim∣pler sort onely, and such as haue small vnderstanding in the knowledge of matters of policie, but euen they also which are accounted of all others the most sufficient, are of∣tentimes deceiued, and much mistaken, in regarding nothing but the apparant good on the one side, without respect vnto the innumerable absurdities and inconueniences which are to be found on the other. For euen Aristotle himselfe is of opinion▪ That Monarchs should be created by election, calling the people barbarous, which haue their kings by right of succession. And for which cause he deemed the Carthaginen∣sians more happy than the Lacedemonians, for that these had their kings by successi∣on [ I] from the fathers to the sonne in the stocke and line of Hercules, whereas the others* 1.2057 still had them by election and choyce. But so he might call the Assyrians barbarous, the Medes, the Persians, the Aegyptians, the people of Asia, the Parthians, the Armenians, the Indians, the Affricans, the Turkes, the Tartars, the Arabians, the Moscouites, the Celtes, the Englishmen, the Scots, the Frenchmen, the Spaniards, the Perusines, the Nu∣midians, the Ethiopians; and an infinit number of other people, who still haue, and al∣wayes before had, their kings by right of succession. Yea and wee find in Greece (the countrey of Aristotle himselfe) that the Athenians, the Lacedemonians, Sicyonians, the Corinthians, the Thebans, the Epirots, the Macedonians, had more than by the space of six hundred yeares, had their kings by right of lawfull succession, before that [ K] ambition had blinded them to chaunge their Monarchies into Democraties and Ari∣stocraties. Which had likewise taken place in Italie also, whereas the Hetruscians and Latines for many worlds of yeares had their kings still descending from the fathers to the sonnes. Now if so many people and nations were all barbarous, where then should humanitie and ciuilitie haue place? It should be onely in Polonia, in Denmarke, and in Sweden: for that almost these people alone haue their kings by election: and yet of them almost none, but such as were themselues also royally descended. Cicero saith, humanitie and courtesie to haue taken beginning in the lesser Asia, and from thence to

haue bene diuided vnto all the other parts of the world: and yet for all that the people [ A] of Asia had no other kings, but by succession from the father to the son, or some other the neerest of kin. And of all the auntient kings of Greece, we find none but Timondas, who was chosen king of Corinth, and Pittacus of Nigropont. And at such time as the royall name and line sailed, oftentimes the strongest or the mightiest carried it away▪ as it chaunced after the death of Alexander the Great, who was in right line descended from Hercules, and the kings of Macedon, who had continued aboue fiue hundred yeares: whose lieutenants afterwards made themselues kings, Antipater of Macedon, Antigonus of Asia the lesse, Nicanor of the vpper Asia, Lysimachus of Thracia: so that there is not one to be found among them, which was made king by election. So that e∣uen Greece itself (the nurse of learning & knowledge) shuld by this reason, in the iudge∣ment [ B] of Aristoile, be deemed barbarous. Howbeit that the word Barbarous, was in auntient time no word of disgrace, but attributed vnto them which spake a strange lan∣guage and not the naturall language of the countrey. For so the Hebrewes called also the auntient Aegyptians, then of all nations the most courteous and learned, Barbarous, that is to say, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for that they vsed the Aegyptian tongue, and not the Hebrew.* 1.2058

But in all Monarchies which go by election, there is one daunger thereunto alwaies* 1.2059 incident, which is, that after the death of the king, the estate remaineth a meere Anar∣chy, without king, without lord, without gouernment, still in danger of ruine; as a ship without a maister, which oweth the wracke of it selfe vnto the first storme or wind that ariseth: theeues and murderers in the meane time at their pleasures committing their [ C] murders, and such other their most hainous outrages, with hope of impunitie; as the common manner is after the death of the popes, of the kings of Tunes, and in former times after the death of the Sultans of Aegypt. For there haue bene such as haue com∣mitted* 1.2060 fiftie sundrie murders, and yet haue alwayes had the popes pardon therefore: the popes at their first entrance into the papacie, still pardoning all men their offences whatsoeuer: and so murders and reuenges commonly referred vnto the popes death, re∣maine then vnpunished. So that in the yeare 1522, there were two executed at Rome, whereof the one tearmed himselfe Pater noster, and the other Aue Maria, who at diuers times had stabbed and murdered an hundred and sixteene men, as was then pro∣ued. [ D] And the first thing that they commonly doe, the Papall seat being vacant, is to breake open the prisons, to kill the gailors, to enlarge the offendors, to reuenge iniuries by all meanes: which continueth vntill that the colledge of cardinals haue agreed of a successor, wherein sometime they haue beene at such discord and variance among themselues, as that the seat hath bene vacant two yeres and foure moneths together: as it chanced after the death of Clement the 5: yea & sometime 10 yeres, as after the electi∣on of the duke of Sauoy surnamed Foelix. We read also oftentimes two or three popes, and as many emperors, to haue bene chosen at once; and the empire to haue stood va∣cant a yeare or two together, yea whole eighteene yeares, after that William countie of Holland the emperour, was slaine. And albeit that the princes electors made offer [ E] of the empire vnto the king of Spayne, Alphonsus the tenth, yet so it was that he would not accept thereof, for the manifest daunger that he was to put himselfe into by taking vpon him sueh an estate, exposed vnto the will and pleasure of the subiects, vnto the enuie of princes, and the violence of murtherers: all which time of vacancie the wicked neuerthelesse are out of frame in all kind of loose libertie. Which in some sort to re∣medie, the Polonians (who haue their kings by election) double the penalties for the offences committed during the choyce of the king, as I haue learned of Zamoschy now Chauncellour of Polonia, but as then ambassadour in Fraunce. So wee read also that during the elections of the Sultans of Aegypt (before it was by the Turkes subdued, and

by them vnto their empire vnited) the poore subiects, and the best townes and cities in [ F] the whole kingdome, were sacked and rifled by the Mammalukes: vntill that some one of them by the consent of all the rest was chosen Sultan.

Now if some (to remedie the matter) shall say, That in the meane time there might* 1.2061 a gouernour be established: he is therein deceiued, it being a no lesse hard matter, to make choyce of a lieutenant or gouernour, than of a king. But admit he might so bee made without any contradiction, by the consent of all the estates to whome it belon∣geth, to name their gouernour, yet who should be the suretie and warrant for his faith? Who should let him (hauing the power in his hand) to inuade the estate? who should disarme him being not willing thereunto? Wee see how Gostauus father of Iohn king of Sweden behaued himselfe, who of a gouernour made himselfe a king, without ex∣pecting [ G] of any other election at all, and so lest the regall power by strong garrisons con∣firmed vnto his posteritie. And to leaue the gouernment vnto the Senat, as they do in Polonia, and did of auntient time in Rome, is no lesse daungerous, least in the meane time some of the stronger and bolder sort should possesse themselues of the fortresses and stronger places: as did Pompey Columna, and Anthonie Sauelle, who ceized vppon the Capitoll at Rome, proclaiming vnto the people libertie. And in the time of such vacancie ciuill warres and dissentions are impossible to be auoided, not only amongst the most warlike nations, but euen amongst the church men also: so that it was neuer* 1.2062 possible to prouide so well, but that two and twentie popes had their heads chopt off, and many moe of them by strong factions driuen out of their seats: not to speake in the [ H] meane time of them (in number almost infinit) who haue by poyson (the common death of the bishops of Rome) perished. Yea we read that euen in the primitiue church, viz. in the yeare of our Lord 356, there were six hundred persons slaine in the verie ci∣tie of Rome, about the election of Damasus and Vrsicinus, whether of them should bee pope. Neither was that onely done at Rome, but almost in euerie towne and citie,* 1.2063 which had in them any bishops, all places were so filled with so many of Laodicia, that from thence forward it should not be lawfull for the people, to meddle with the choice of the bishops and prelats, or the bestowing of the ecclesiasticall preferments. Where∣fore Athanasius, and Augustine, both bishops, appointed whome they would haue to succeed them in their bishoprikes, the one at Alexandria, and the other at Hippona. [ I] What should I speake of the Roman ciuill warres, and after them of the Germans, about the choice of their emperours? their bookes, their histories, and all their monu∣ments, are full thereof. Wherein we cannot without iudignation and horror, remem∣ber the miserable wasting countries, the mutuall slaughter of citisens, and sacking of most noble cities, mischiefs still done either by the one side or the other.

And yet there is another inconuenience also, not to be omitted, which is, That king∣domes* 1.2064 going by election, haue nothing in them which at one time or other is not sub∣iect vnto all mens spoiles: so that euen the publike demaines, and such as before were common, and wherein euerie man had a common interest: we see them in a little time conuerted euen vnto particular mens vses: so as we see it to haue happened in the de∣maine [ K] of Saint Peter at Rome, as also in the demaine of the German empire. For the princes elect knowing wel that they cannot long raigne, nor that they cannot leaue vn∣to their children any thing of the estate, more than what they thinke they can by de∣ceit and fraud purloine and hold, care not to giue any thing vnto the magistrats their friends: or by open sales and donations, to make their owne profit of the publike re∣uenues and possessions. So Rodolph the emperour for money exempted all the towns and cities of Tuscanie from the fealtie and obedience which they ought vnto the Ger∣man empire: Robert also the emperour, gaue three of the imperiall townes vnto his

sonne: Henry the first ceased vpon Saxonie: Fredericke the second enfranchised Nu∣remberg: [ A] Otho the third enfranchised Isne: Lewes of Bauiere did the like for the towne of Egre: Henry the fist sold all he could: and Charles the fourth being not able to pay the hundred thousand crownes which he had promised to euery one of the princes e∣lectors, sold vnto them all the tributes of the empire, to haue them to chuse his sonne Charles emperour, as he indeed was: but afterwards againe thrust out euen by the same princes who had before made choice of him. So that the principall and strongest sinewes of that Commonweale being cut in sunder, the whole body of the empire be∣came so weake and feeble, that Charles duke of Burgundie doubted not to wake warre vpon the Germaine princes.* 1.2065

Another point there is also well worth the consideration, which is, That a man of [ B] base degree suddenly mounted vnto the highest degree of honour, thinketh himselfe to bee a god vpon earth. For as the wise Hebrew saith, There is nothing more intolle∣rable than the slaue become a lord. And on the other side such is the feruent loue of the father toward his sonnes, that he will rather confound heauen and earth together (if he haue power so to do) than not to leaue vnto them the crowne, but to let it rest in the voyces and choice of the ignorant people,

But let vs yet go further, for why these are not the greatest inconueniences. For* 1.2066 where the people is to chuse their king, they must either make choice of a stranger, or of a naturall subiect: Now if choice bee to bee made out of the naturall subiects, then [ C] euery the most impudent and audatious fellow will by all right and wrong seeke to aspire vnto the soueraigntie: and if there bee many of them of equall power and* 1.2067 grace, it is impossible but that there should be great factions, wherin the people should become partakers: or in case they were not equall, neither in vertue nor wealth, yet so it is that they would presume themselues to be equall, and neuer agree one of them to obey another, but wishing rather to endure the commaund euen of strange and wic∣ked princes, than of another subiect their equall. As it happened in Armenia (as Ta∣citus reporteth) where the nobilitie could endure none to bee their king but a meere stranger. And of late in Polonia Sigismundus Augustus the king beeing dead, and a controuersie arising amongst the nobilitie, euery one of them longing after the king∣dome; [ D] a decree was made whereby all the naturall subiects were embarred from ob∣taining of the kingdome: as I learned of the Polonian embassador, whom I was com∣manded to attend after they were entred into the confines of this kingdome, to con∣duct them vnto Henry the king.

And in the remēbrance of our fathers when as the Aegyptian Sultans were chosen by the voyces of the pretorian souldiers or Mammalukes, & they not able to endure one of them to be greater than another, had slaine diuerse of their Sultans: they at last to stint the strife, by their common consent sent their embassadors vnto Campson king of Caramania to become their Sultan, and to take vpon him the kingdome of Aegypt being by them offred him. With the same calamities the Germaine princes also troub∣led, [ E] after diuerse murthers of the emperours of their owne country, oftentimes made choyce of strangers, yea and those right small princes: as of one William earle of Hol∣land, and of Henrie earle of Lutzembourg, one while also making choice of the king of England, and another while of the king of Spaine: yea, sometime such forraine prin∣ces refusing that same empire so offered them: For so Alphonsus the tenth king of Spaine refused the imperiall crowne by the princes electors offered him, which after∣wards stood emptie aboue eighteene yeares, as we haue before sayd. Sigismund also* 1.2068 the first king of Polonia, refused the kingdome of Hungarie, of Bohemia and Den∣marke, being thereunto inuited by the Estates. So also Lewes the twelfth refused the

Seignorie of Pisa: and the antient Romans (as saith Appian) refused diuerse people [ F] which would haue submitted themselues vnder their obeysance. But admit that the strange prince do not refuse a kingdome so offered him: which if it bee farre off from the bounds of his owne kingdome, hee must than either leaue his owne, or gouerne the strange kingdome by his deputies or lieutenants: both things absurd and incon∣uenient.* 1.2069 For who is he so foolish that had not rather to looke to his owne things than to other mens? and what nation or people can with patience endure to be gouer∣ned by deputies? so to haue him whom they would not, and to want him whom they made choice of. So Lewes king of Hungarie at the request of his wife daughter to Casimire king of Polonia, tooke vpon him the kingdome of Polonia conferted vnto him by the voyces of the people: into which kingdome he was inuested, and receiued [ G] with the greatest acclamations, and applauses of all men that might be: who yet short∣ly after, whether it were for that he found himselfe offended with the sharpnesse of the Polonian aire: or that he was allured with the pleasures and delights of Hungarie, or that he was by the vowes and requests of his owne people recalled: returned home, leauing his wife vnto the Polonians (her countremen) with a traine of the Hungari∣ans to attend vpon her: where so it was that the Polonians mindfull of the Great Ca∣simire her father, for a space endured the womans soueraigntie, but could in no wise endure her traine of Hungarians. And so also not long ago Henry, Charles the French kings brother called vnto the kingdome of Polonia, his brother being dead, withall speed returned vnto his owne naturall kingdome: howbeit the Polonians would by [ H] no meanes endure the gouernement of his deputies or lieutenants, but by voyce chose vnto themselues a king: although that they could by no right or reason do so, but by the consent of Henry, vnto whom they had giuen all the soueraigne rights, whereunto they had not annexed any clause or condition (when as question was of the king∣dome of France to fall vnto him) that hee should not in his absence by his deputies or lieutenants gouerne that kingdome bestowed vpon him: as hath bene alwayes lawfull for all princes to do. For it is an old axiome, a donation once consummate and per∣fected not to admit any moe conditions. But admit both the kingdomes confine to∣gether, as doth Polonia and Hungarie; what doubt is there but that he will, if he can, make one kingdome of two? or change an Aristocratique estate into a right Monar∣chie: [ I] yea, and that by force of armes, if the nobilitie or people shall withstand him, whereof we haue an example of the Emperour Charles the fifth, who after the ouer∣throw of the Germaine princes had changed the Aristocracie of the Germaines into a kingdome, and had caused his sonne Philip to be sent for out of Spaine into Germa∣nie, to haue made him king of the Germaines, had not Henry the second the French* 1.2070 king most mightily withstood him, and so broken his designes. The occasion of Iu∣lius Pflugius the Bishop is yet extant wherein hee laboureth to persuade that one thing especially, viz. that the most sure foundations of the Germaine empire might be layd. And in case that the prince cannot ioyne the kingdome which he hath got by election confining vpon him, vnto his owne naturall kingdome: yet will he so much as in him [ K] lieth draw all the profits, fruits, and reuenues of the strange kingdome vnto his owne: and hauing taken away the voyces from the nobilitie whom hee hath in his power, shall appoint or cause them to chuse whomsoeuer pleaseth him to succeed him: as the kings of Denmarke, of Thunes, yea and the Germaine emperours also themselues by a custome of long receiued from their ancestors haue vsed to do: in such sort as that the rights of elections by voyces, seeme to be vtterly taken away. So Ladislaus king of Bohemia, the sonne of Albertus, and the emperour Fredericke the third his nephew,* 1.2071 by the voyce of the people chosen king of Hungarie by a certaine bond of fealtie, left

that kingdome vnto his nearest kinsmen all most hereditarie. And albeit that Mat∣thias [ A] Coruinus the sonne of the noble Huniades (Ladislaus being dead without issue) by the voyces of the people obtained that kingdome (they alwaies pretending that the right of the choice of the king belonged to them; and that the succession of the next of kinne was not to take place) yet for all that Fredericke his nearest kinsman was about both with his owne power, and the strength of the whole empire to haue inuaded that kingdome, and had vndoubtedly so done, had not Matthias by his promise put him in hope of the kingdome for himselfe and his posteritie: if he should himselfe die without issue, as by chance he did. Howbeit, yet neuerthelesse that Matthias being dead, the Hungarians made choice of another Ladislaus king of Bohemia and Polonia also: with∣out regard of the conuention and agreement before made with Fredericke, which was [ B] the cause of a most great and cruell warre for the kingdome of Hungarie: which could by no meanes be appeased: vntill that by all the degrees of the people of that kingdom it was decreed that it should from thenceforth be hereditarie: and that after the death of Dadislaus Maximilian the sonne of Fredericke should succeed in that kingdome, as in∣deed he did: But his nephew being left vnder age, and the estates of the kingdome pre∣tending them to haue the right to make their choice of his gouernours; against Fre∣dericke who sought to step into the gouernement of Hungarie, and to take vpon him the guard and protection of the yong king his nephew: the people of Hungarie, yea, and the sister of Ferdinand (the yong kings mother) chose rather to cast themselues in∣to Solyman the great Turkes lappe, and so to betray both king and kingdome, rather [ C] * 1.2072 than to endure the gouernement of the emperour Ferdinand in such sort, that they for the maintenance of the right of their election, are now fallen into the perpetuall serui∣tude of the Turke: hauing not onely lost the right of their election, which they so striue for; but in hazard also to loose their lawes, libertie, and religion: as the com∣mon custome of all strange princes is (as much as in them lieth) to change the lawes, customes, and religion of the people by them subdued, or oppressed, and to enure them, or otherwise to enforce them to embrace and follow their fashions, manners, and reli∣gions: and was as should seeme the principal cause why God forbid his people to make choice of a strange prince to raigne ouer them.

And yet in matter of election the way being open to manie competitours, if the [ D] * 1.2073 matter be to be tried by force, alwayes the most wicked and deceitfull: or else the most hardie and aduenterous, put all vpon hazard to attaine thereunto: And if it hap the most vertuous to be chosen, his life is still in danger of the competitours being of grea∣ter power: as in Germanie it hath bene seene: where within this 360 yeares, since that Monarchie fell into election, there haue bene eight or nine emperours slaine or poy∣soned,* 1.2074 and among others, William of Holland, Rodolph, Albert, Henry the seuenth, Fredericke the second, Lewis of Bauaria, Charles the nephew of Henry, and Gunther: besides all them who were most shamefully thrust out of the imperiall seate. And of 15 Sultans which were chosen kings of Aegypt, there were seuen of them slaine: namely, Turqueman, Melaschall, Cothus, Bandocader, Mehemet, Cercasse, and Geapalt. And of the [ E] Romane emperours after the death of Augustus, there were seuen one after another massacred, poysoned, or strangled: and that three of them in one yeare, oppressed on∣ly by the conspiracie of citisens. Yea, the pretorian souldiers sometimes slew the em∣perours to haue a new, onely vpon hope of gifts and largesses. But still hee of whom the Senators made choice, displeased the legions and men of warre: yea oftentimes e∣uery armie created an emperour, in such sort as that at one time there were thirtie Ro∣mane emperours chosen in diuerse places, and among them one woman, viz. Zenobia: all the empire being in ciuill warres and combustion who should carry away the state,

no end thereof being to be found vntill that the rest were by the power of one all op∣pressed. [ F] Neither was there any assurance in the estate, if the sonnes either lawfull or adoptiue succeeded not their fathers without election, so as did Tiberius, Titus, Traian,* 1.2075 Adrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Commodus. But if any of the empe∣rours gaue not order for the adopting of his successour, in case hee had himselfe no children, the commonweale alwayes fell againe into ciuill wars. And for this cause the* 1.2076 emperour Adrian fearing lest the estate should fall into election, he himselfe hauing no children, thought it not enough to adopt Antoninus Pius, but also caused him to adopt Marcus Aurelius, and Aelius Vetus: following therein the wisedome of Augustus, who to preuent the warres oftentimes arising about election, adopted his two little nephews Caius and Lucius: who both dying without issue, hee adopted also his third [ G] nephew Agrippa, and with him Tiberius his sonne in law: yet with condition that hee should first adopt Germanicus. And they which were so adopted and appointed heires of the empire, were called principes iuuentutis, or princes of the youth: and afterward of the Germaines; reges Romanorum, or kings of the Romans: to the end that euen in estates and Monarchies going by election, there might yet be some certaine successor. For so Henry the third the emperour whilest he yet liued caused his sonne to be chosen king of the Romans, and his grand child to be also by him adopted. And Charles the fourth after that caused his sonne Wenceslaus by the electors to bee designed to the em∣pire, but not without a great summe of money: vnto whome succeeded his brother Sigismund, who afterward adopted his sonne in law Fredericke the third; who againe [ H] caused Maximilian his sonne to be adopted emperour. Neither was it to be doubted but that Philip, Maximilian his sonne, should haue raigned ouer the Germaines, had not his vntimely death preuented his fathers hope. And all bee it that the estates and princes of the empire, the imperiall sea•…•…e being as then vacant, had many great princes competitors in the same; yet so it was that they deemed the grand child of Maximi∣lian (Charles, then a very yong man, and neerest vnto Maximilian in bloud) by a certaine successiue right worthie to be preferred before the rest of the princes. And allbeit that* 1.2077 the Bohemians, the Polonians, the Hungarians, Danes, and Tartars, will by no meanes suffer the election of their kings to bee taken from them; yet they thinke that their kings sonnes ought still in their choice to be preferred before all others, that so by [ I] the benefit of succession all the occasions of ciuill wars might bee preuented and taken away. For which cause Sigismundus Augustus king of Polonia and last of the house of Iagellon, hauing but two sisters, assembled the estates of the kingdome to consult con∣cerning his successor; hauing before vnited the dukedome of Lituania vnto the king∣dome of Polonia: whereunto for all that the estates would not consent, fearing to loose their right of election; or that he should haue giuen them a king contrarie to their good liking. And at the same time as it were, the parliament of England was holden at London in October 1566, where the estates preferred a request vnto the Queene for the prouiding of a successor vnto the crowne, to auoid (as they sayd) the euident dangers whereinto the kingdome was like to fall, if it were not foreseene and prouided for; and that they were resolued not to speake of any subsidie, or other thing whatsoe∣uer, [ K] vntill that matter were determined. With which request howbeit that the Queene was much troubled; saying, That they would make her graue before she were dead: yet so it was that she promised them therein to follow the counsell and aduise of such as were the wisest in her land. For a kingdome going by succession still falleth into e∣election when there is none left neere of kin, neither of the fathers side nor of the mo∣thers;* 1.2078 in which case it is necessary to prouide before that the matter so fall out, where∣as otherwise the estate is in great hazard to be quite ouerthrowne: as it happened vn∣to

the estate of Milan in the yeare 1448, after the death of Philip Maria the last of the [ A] •…•…eires male of the house of Anglerie, which in successiue right had holden Milan soure hundred yeares: when as the people seeing themselues in full libertie without any lord or soueraigne, resolued to maintaine a Popular estate: razed the castle Ioue,* 1.2079 burnt the last dukes testament, chose twelue Senators; and after that hauing made choice of Charles Gonzaga for their generall, most cruelly butchered all them which tooke part with Frances Sforce, who being a man but basely borne aspired to the soue∣raigntie, as hauing maried the base daughter of Philip the last duke, as also by the adop∣tion which the duke had made of him. At which selfe same time the emperour Frede∣ricke the third claimed that dutchie, as a fee deuolued to the empire for default of heires males. And Charles of Orleans on the other side claimed it as belonging vnto him in [ B] the right of his mother Valentine, both the naturall and lawfull sister of the last duke. During which quarrels the Venetians (as their vsuall manner is) to fish in troubled water, without any right at all, possessed themselues of Cremona, Laude, & Placence, all members of the dutchie of Milan. The duke of Sauoye tooke also Nouarre and Versel: Sforce, Pauie, and Derthone: and the people of Milan vnable now to mannage their estate at home, or to defend their territorie abroad; and yet abhorring the go∣uernement of one, and not well knowing vnto what Saint to commend themselues, voluntarily submitted themselues with their citie vnto the Venetians, by whom for all that they were reiected. So that in fine all the Christian princes and states their neigh∣bours, were vp in armes and together by the eares for the estate; and for all that the last [ C] duke prouided not for his successor as he ought to haue done, in following that which was resolued and agreed vpon at the treatie of the mariage made betwixt Lewes duke of Orleans and Valentine his sister: neither in taking vnto him Charles of Orleans his nephew, and right heire of his dukedome so to haue adopted him, and brought him vp neere vnto his person, but adopted Sforce who had maried his base daughter, being but the first gentleman of his house.

But the royall stocke being extinct, the last thereof may by right adopt vnto him∣selfe* 1.2080 his successor, except the nobilitie or people claime the right of the choice of their prince to belong vnto themselues. For if the last prince of the bloud shall appoint no [ D] man to succed him, the soueraigntie is to fall vnto the people. It beeing a common matter for Monarchies neuer to fall into election, but when the Monarch dying with∣out heires hath not prouided a successor. For so the line of Charles the great beeing vtterly extinct, when as the last king of the Germaines had adopted none to succeed him, Henry the Faulconer duke of Saxonie was by generall consent of all men created emperour: wherein for all that the Germaine writers are at varience among them∣selues: one of them thinking Arnulphus; and another Charles the sonne of Lewes king* 1.2081 of the Germaines to haue bene chosen emperour, and that not by the voyces of the people, but of the fiftie princes onely: and that electiue right to haue beene at length conferred vnto seuen of them who were thereof called the princes electors: and that to haue happened about the yeare 1250. But let vs now come vnto our owne histo∣ries. [ E] Many there be which haue reported the kings of France in antient time to haue bene created by choyce, and so that kingdome to haue fallen into election: but all that vntruly. For why that must needs haue bene done in the raigne of the Merouignes, or the Carlingues, or of the Capets.

Now concerning the first line which is of the Merouignes; Agathius a Greeke au∣thor of great authoritie and antiquitie (for he flourished about the yeare 500) writeth the French nation hauing chosen the best forme of a Commonweale that was pos∣sible (that is to say the royall Monarchie) to haue therein surpassed all their neigh∣bours:

neither to haue had any other kings but by the right of succession. And the [ F] same author in another place sayth, Theodebert the sonne of Theodoric and nephew •…•…o Clodoueus, being yet vnder age and the gouernement of his tutor, to haue beene called vnto the crown according vnto the maner and fashion of their ancestors. Cedrinus also another Greek author, and he also very antient (who writ in the yeare 1058 in the time of Philip the first the king of France) reporteth the French men to haue had no other kings, but by a successiue right, after the antient manner of their ancestors. Wherein he sheweth the aforesayd three lines of the kings of France to haue vsed the right of succession. And if so bee that first Charles, and after him Carlomaine the children of Pipin caused themselues to be both chosen by the nobilitie (as indeed they were) yet was not that done but onely so by the power and fauour of the nobilitie to assure their [ G] estates, & to stop the mouths of such as were yet left of the house of the Merouignes, as in like case some of them did also of the house of Capet, who had thrust out them of the house of Charlemaigne. As for that which is reported of Otho, him by the consent and voyces of the nobilitie to haue bene created king: he at the time of his death ha∣uing called together the princes of the kingdome, protested him to haue so done, not so much that he himselfe might reigne, as to keepe the kingdome and the Common∣weale wherewith he was put in trust, in safetie vnto Lewes the Stammerer to whom he was appointed tutor. Robert Otho his brother in chalenging the kingdome as it were in the right of succession after him, was slaine in the battell of Soissons. Rodolph also sonne vnto the duke of Bourgundie caused himselfe also to be chosen, to exclude Charles the [ H] Simple, from whom in the castle of Berone wherin he then was kept prisoner, Harbert countie of Vermandois had in fauour of this Rodolpe extorted his resignation of the crowne. And after that Hugh Capet had wrested the scepter out of the hands of Charles of Loraine, he caused his sonne Robert whilest hee himselfe yet liued, to bee crowned; and he likewise his sonne also, Henry the first; and Henry, his sonne also: and so vntill that one of the daughters of Baldwin earle of Holland and regent of France, descended from the eldest daughter of the aforesaid Charles of Loraine, and so lineally from Char∣lemaigne, was maried vnto Philip the first, and was mother vnto Lewes the Grosse: wherby the secret grudgings & hatred of the people against the Capets were appeased, & the fire of ioy and blisse kindled, to see one of the race of Charlemaigne, and so of the [ I] bloud of Saint Arnulph, ioyned with the stocke of Capets. And if any coniecture there be, wherfore any man should thinke the kings of France to haue bene by election crea∣ted; it may best seeme to be drawne from the manner of the coronation of the kings: For before the king that is to crowned take his oath, the two Bishops of Laon and* 1.2082 Beauuois standing on both sides of the king, and lifting him vp a little from his throne, and then turning themselues vnto the people there present, demaund of them whether they will haue that man to reigne ouer them or not: whereunto they giuing their consent, the Archbishop of Reims taketh his oath. So that they which write the kingdome of France to go by election, haue had no further regard but onely vnto the manner and forme of the chusing of the king (if it ought at all to bee called a choice) [ K] the manner whereof isyet to bee seene in the Librarie of Beauuois, and which I haue also taken out of the Librarie of Rheimes, and deserueth well to be set downe at large, whereby it is to bee vnderstood, in what sort our kings haue beene in antient time crowned.

The title of the antient written booke of Rheimes is this, LIBER IVLIANI AD ERRIGIVM REGEM: The booke of Iulian vnto king Errigius: (meaning Errichius the father of Philip the first) The words of the booke are these, Anno 1058 indictione xij Henrico regnante xxxij, & iiij Cal. Iunij, in die Pentecostes Phi∣lippus

rex hoc ordine in maiore ecclesia ante altare sanctae Mariae à venerabili Archiepisco∣pr [ A] consecratus est incoata Missa antequam epistola legeretur, Dominus Archiepiscopus ver∣•…•… ad eum, & exposuit ei fidem catholicam, sciscitans ab eo vtrum hanc crederet, & de∣fendere vellet: quo annuente delata est eius professio; quam accipiens ipse legit, dum ad huc septennis esset, eique subscripsit: erat autem prosessio eius haec: EGO Philippus, Deo propi∣tiante mox futurus rex Francorum, in die ordinationis meae promitto coram Deo, & sanctis eius, quòd vnicuique de vobis commissis canonicum priuilegium, & debitam legem, atque iu∣stitiam conseruabo, & defensionem adiuuante Domino, quantum potero, exhibebo, sicut rex insuo regno vnicuique Episcopo & ecclesi•…•… sibi commissae per rectum exhibere debet: po∣pulo quoque nobis credito me dispensationem legum in suo iure consistentem, nostra auctori∣tate concessurum. Qua perlecta posuit eum in manus Archiepiscopi, ante stante Archie∣piscopo [ B] Suessionensi, &c. Accipiens Archiepiscopus baculum S. Rhemigij, disseruit quietè & pacifice, quomodo ad eum maximè pertineret electio regis & consecratio, ex quo sanctus Rhemigius Ludouicum baptizauit & consecrauit. disseruit etiam quomodo per ìllum bacu∣lum hanc consecrandi potestatem & totum Galliae principatum Ormisdas papa sancto dede∣rit Rhemigio: & quomodo victor Papa sibi & ecclesiae suae concesserit. Tunc annuente pa∣tre eius Henrico, elegit eum in regem post eum. Legati Romanae sedis, cùm idsine Papae nu∣tu fieri licitum non esse dissertum ibi sit: honoris tamen & amoris gratia tum ibi assuerunt: Legati Lotarius Sol; Archiepiscopi, Episcopi, Abbates, Clerici; Dux Aquitaniae, filius, Lega∣tus Ducis Burgundiae, Legati Marchionis, & Legati Comitis Andegauensis: pòst Comites [ C] Vandensis, Vermadensis, Ponticensis, Suessionensis, Aruer nensis, pòst milites & populi tam matores quàm minores vno ore consentientes laudauerunt, ter proclamantes: LAVD∣MVS, VOLV MVS, FIAT. In the yeare 1058, the twelft of the indiction, of the raigne of king Henry the xxxij, the iiij of the Calends of Iune, on Whitsunday, king Philip was in the great church, before the altar of blessed Marie, by the most re∣uerend Archbishop in this order crowned: Masse now alreadie being begun, & before the reading of the Epistle: the Lord Archbishop turning himselfe vnto him, declared vnto him the Catholike faith, asking him whether he beleeued the same, and would also defend it? Wherunto he graunting, his profession of the same was brought forth, which he taking read it, (being as then but seuen yeares old) and subscribed to the same, [ D] whose profession was this, I Philip, by the grace of God, by and by about to be the king of France, vpon the day of my inuesting do promise before God and his saints, to keep canonicall priuilege, with due law and iustice to euery one of you the committies: as also so much as in me lieth by the helpe of God, to defend you, as a king in this king∣dome of right ought to doe vnto euerie Bishop, and to the church committed to his charge: as also by our authoritie to graunt vnto the people committed vnto vs, the ad∣ministration of our lawes, standing in their full power. Which profession so read, hee* 1.2083 put it into the Archbishops hands, &c. (Here are twentie Bishops and many Abbats by name reckoned vp, and immediatly aster) The Archbishop taking the staffe of Saint Rhimigius, calmely and quietly declared, How that vnto him especially belonged the [ E] choice and consecrating of the new king, euer since that Rhemigius baptized and con∣secrated king * 1.2084 Lewes: declaring also, how by that staffe of Hormisdas the pope gaue vnto Saint Rhemigius this power of consecrating the kings, with all the kingdome of Fraunce: and how the Pope Victor graunted the same also vnto him and his church. And so his father Henrie consenting thereunto, chose him to bee king after him. The Legats of the See of Rome hauing there reasoned it, not to be a thing lawfull without the licence of the Pope, were yet for loue and honours sake there present: as were also other ambassadours, as Lotarius Sol, with other Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Clarks, the young Duke of Aquitane, the ambassadours of the Duke of Burgundie, the ambas∣sadours

of the Marquesse, the ambassadors of the Earle of Angiers, after them the Earls [ F] of Vandosme, Vermandoise, Soissons, and Auuerne: after that the souldiors, and peo∣ple, as well the greater as the lesser, with one consent commended him, crying •…•…ut thrice aloud, We prayse him, We will haue him: Let it be done. These things wee haue word for word written, the which were neuer yet put in print. They therefore which thinke the kings of Fraunce to haue beene in auntient time created by the voyces of the people, vnderstand not the bishops of Rheimes to haue affirmed, that to haue bene giuen vnto them by a certaine singular priuilege from the bishops of Rome: howbeit that it can in no wise agree with the faith & obedience which the archbishops of Rheims haue vsed to giue vnto the kings of Fraunce. Wee read also, that Charles (he which for want of wit was surnamed the simple) was crowned by Fulke the arch∣bishop [ G] of Rheims, in the right of his neerenesse of blood, and not in the right of any ele∣ction by voyces. Whereby Otho so chosen, prerended himselfe to be king: and vnto whom complaining of the iniurie done him by the archbishop in crowning of Charls: Fulke aunswered, That he had made choyce of Charles, according to the manner and custome of his auncestors, who had not vsed to chuse kings, but of the royall stocke & race of kings. Whose letters written vnto that effect to Otho are yet extant. Wher∣by it appeares, that if euer any man had the right of election, it belonged vnto the arch∣bishop of Rheims, or that at leastwise he was in the possession thereof: and yet for all that, that he could not make choyce of any other king, but of the princes of the blood. But to shew that the right of the crowne of Fraunce still descended vnto the heire male [ H] next of blood and name, it appeareth not onely by the authoritie of them whome wee haue before noted, but yet more also by the cruell and bloodie warre, that was betwixt Lotaire, Lewes, and Charles the Bauld, grounded vpon this, That their father had giuen the better part, and the regall seat of Fraunce, to Charles the Bauld his youngest sonne: howbeit that all the three brethren were kings, gouerning their diuided kingdoms with royall soueraigntie. And for that Henry the first, king of Fraunce, the younger sonne of Robert, had bene chosen by his father, and his elder brother the duke of Burgundie reie∣cted: he fearing least the children of his elder brother, should in their fathers right lay claime vnto the crowne, and so put all France into ciuill warres, as it had before bene in the wars betwixt him and his brother; to preuent the same, hee caused his son Philip, [ I] so soone as he was but seuen yeares old▪ to be crowned king of Fraunce. Which yet was done without any forme of election at all: except perhaps, that some would ab∣surdly say, The election of the kings to belong vnto the archbiships of Rheims, as giuen them by the pope, mistaking the consecration, for the creation of them. Howbeit that the verie consecrating of them, properly belonged not vnto the archbishops of Rheims alone: king Lewes the Grosse being consecrated by the archbishop of Sens, in the citie of Orleans. Besides that the archbishops of Rheims foolishly pretend them to haue that from the pope: wherein the popes themselues haue no right, no more than they haue vnto the empire, which they haue made subiect vnto their elections; and by thru∣sting the sickle into another mans haruest (as saith Albericus the lawyer) haue against al [ K] right made lawes concerning the estate of princes, binding the emperour to giue vnto him the oath of fidelitie: chalenging vnto himselfe the power to depose him; as all other kings also. Howbeit that the bishops of Rome do themselues by their decrees confesse, the French kings to be altogether free from the popes obedience & seruitude: neither to acknowledge any one greater than themselues, next vnto God. And that is it for which they say in this realme, That the king neuer dieth. Which auntient prouerb* 1.2085 sheweth well, that the kingdome neuer went by election, & the kings thereof hold their scepters neither of the pope, neither of the archbishop of Rheims, nor of the people, but

onely of God alone. And I remember a lawyer, a most famous pleader of his time, [ A] who to serue the cause he had in hand, said in his pleading, That the people of Fraunce had giuen the power vnto the king: alleaging therefore the words of the great lawyer Vlpian, where he speaking of the Roman emperour saith, Lege Regia de eius imperio la∣ta, populus ei & in eum omnem suam potestatem Contulit, By a royall law made concer∣ning his power, the people conferred vnto him and vpon him all his power: whereat the kings people suddenly arise, requesting the court in sull audience, That those words might be rased out of the plea; shewing that the kings of Fraunce had neuer receiued their power from the people. Yea the court therefore sharply reproued the said law∣yer, causing the words, at the request of the Attourney generall, to bee rased out of the plea, forbidding him any more to vse such speeches: who neuer after, as euery man [ B] knoweth, pleaded cause in that court. But yet this is made more plaine by the solem∣nitie commonly vsed at the kings burials, where the kings garments, weapons, scepter, and armes, are so soone as the king is buried cast away; an herauld at armes with a loud voyce proclaiming thrice, Rex est mortuus, or, The king is dead. And euen he the same man, presently after aduancing a banner with the Lillies in it, the proper armes of this nation, crieth likewise, Viuat Rex N. eique vitam diuturnam ac felicem Deus largia∣tur, God saue king N. and graunt him long and happy life. The like manners and cu∣stomes vse the English, the Scots, and Spaniards, with whom (as with vs) the kingdom is by right of succession giuen vnto the neerest of kin. The like ceremonies are vsed al∣so [ C] amongst the Bohemians, the Danes, and Polonians, but yet not before that another king be by voyces created.

But now those daungers which we haue said to follow the election of a prince, be∣long* 1.2086 not more vnto the kings and princes themselues, than vnto them that chuse them: for if the king be to be chosen by the voyces of the whole people, all must needs be full of seditions, factions, and murders. But if the nobilitie, or some other estate onely, shall chalenge vnto themselues alone the right of chusing of the prince, the rest of the estates will grudge and repine thereat, that which is of right due to all, to be giuen to some few.* 1.2087 yet could nothing be deuised more commodious or expedient for the auoiding of the factions of the seditious, and of ciuill warres, than to take from the multitude of princes [ D] and magistrats, the election of the soueraigne prince or king, & to communicat it with some few. For so the German princes (who in auntient time were fiftie foure, and now almost foure hundred) haue giuen all the right of their voyces, for the chusing of the emperour, vnto the seuen Princes Electors. Neither yet in so great fewnesse of them, doe they still well agree, but sometime being at discord among themselues, haue chosen two emperours at once: as namely Albert of Austria, and Lewes of Bauaria, who for the space of eight yeares made most cruell warres, which of them should as emperour rule and raigne one of them ouer the other, all that while one of them still spoiling and ruinating the townes, castles, and villages, of the others fauourits and part takers. So in like manner the cardinals (who were but twelue) after the death of pope Clement the 4, [ E] for the great dissentions and factions of the mightie, differred the election of the next pope three yeares▪ and in fine chose the archdeacon of Leedes▪ who was then gone to Hierusalem, and was afterwards called Gregorie the tenth: & who for that cause bound the colledge of cardinals vnto most strait laws in the choyce of the pope, and yet could he not so prouide, but that after his death, they at once made choyce of three popes, and oftentimes of two; insomuch that at the last it was needfull to shut them vp, and to starue them with hunger, if within a certaine appointed time, they did not denounce him pope, who had at the most two parts of the voyces: which yet is more straitly kept in the chusing of the Grand Maister of the Knights of the order of Saint Iohn:

for they mure vp the twentie foure electors, before nominated by the knight, without [ F] * 1.2088 either meat or drinke, who must chuse one who is not of that number of the twentie foure, and that within a short time limited them. There haue bene seene also such fa∣ctions, suits, and murders, to haue happened in this realme, about the election euen of the inferiour bishops, as haue oftentimes troubled the state euen of the most famous cities, and wherein he that was the most vitious and ignorant most commonly carried away the matter: than which no greater cause seemeth to haue beene, wherefore the voyces for the chusing of bishops haue bene taken from the colledges of priests and monkes, and giuen to princes: as the Chauncellour Prat declared, at such time as que∣stion was in parliament, for the verifying of the agreement made betwixt king Francis the first, and Leo the tenth: For which cause also the bishops and abbats in Moscouie, [ G] are drawne out by lot.

And yet neuerthelesse the onely colour that men haue to maintaine election, is to* 1.2089 say, That the more worthy men are so chosen to be emperors, popes, bishops, and pre∣lats. Wherein I referre them vnto the histories of all ages, which will say the contra∣rie: and that there haue seldome bene more vicious and wicked men, than were the most part of them who were by choyce and election preferred; which wee need not now by examples to verifie: but thus much onely I say, that if the right of succession had taken place, Nero, Heliogabalus, Otho, Vitellius, and such others, the monsters of na∣ture, had neuer come vnto the Roman empire: Augustus, Traian, Adrian, both the Antonines, with other the emperours excelling in vertue and wisedome, who by adop∣tion [ H] (as by the lawfull right of succession) obtained the empire, should haue beene ex∣cluded. But were it so that the better princes were still to bee chosen by the suffrages and voyces of the nobilitie, or of the people, or of other the wiser sort: yet so many and so great inconueniences are on euery side attending, as that it were better to want good princes (howbeit that we cannot by this meanes haue them) than to haue them with so great daunger of the subiects created and chosen, especially so long as the right of succession may take place. But the line of the monarchs fayling, and the right deuol∣ued* 1.2090 vnto the estates: in this case it is much surer to proceed by lot, hauing made choice of the most worthiest persons, or of such as be equall in nobilitie, or in vertue, or in power, to the end that one of them may be drawne by lot, rather than to enter into [ I] tearmes of election: prouided that the name of God be first called vpon, in following the forme of the auntient Hebrewes, who still said, Lord God direct thy lot, to the end that all sorcerie and witchcraft may be from hence absent. So the great Prophet Sa∣muel, when question was for the making of a new king, caused all the people to bee as∣sembled, and the lot to be drawne for all the twelue Tribes, which falling vppon the Tribe of Beniamin, and lot cast also vpon the families of that Tribe, in the familie of Cis* 1.2091 the lot fell vpon Saul, whome Samuel by the commaundement of God had before an∣nointed, to the end that the people should not thinke that the kingdome was vnto him by chaunce onely fallen. But after that the Monarchy is once established, men haue commonly had regard vnto the prerogatiue of successiue right, without vsing either of [ K] election, or lot. So the seuen great princes of Persia, Cambyses being dead without is∣sue, vsed lot, or rather the neying of an horse for the chusing of their king. Yet wee see Darius hauing once by lot got the kingdome, the soueraigntie of the state to haue bene afterward by successiue right deriued vnto his posteritie.

Now it is not enough that successiue right take place in the descending of a king∣dome,* 1.2092 but that the neerest of kin vnto the soueraigne monarch succeed him also: my meaning is, among the males, and those of his name, which is (to speake properly) the elder, as the first descended of him. For so the order of nature willeth that the elder

should goe foremost next after the father, and that the rest should euery one of them [ A] follow in their degree, and so by consequence, that he should be preferred before the others. And this law a man may say to be naturall, and such as hath beene alwayes al∣most to all people common. For so said Perseus, that by the right of nature common vnto all nations, and by the custome inuiolably obserued in the kingdome of Macedon, the elder was still to succeed into that kingdome. And for that reason (as saith Diodo∣rus) Alexander the Great carried away the crowne of that kingdome, from the rest of his brethren. As the manner was also in the kingdome of Parthia, where the eldest of the house of Arsaces their first king, and the neerest of his blood succeeded: following therein (saith Iustin) the auntient custome of the Parthies. In like manner amongst the Hebrewes, the kingdome of Iuda was giuen to Ioram, for that (as saith the Scripture) he [ B] was the eldest. And so Herodotus himselfe (the most auntient of all the Greeke histo∣riographers) saith, That generally in all kingdomes the custome was, that the elder should by right of succession haue and enioy the scepter and diadem: yea and more than foure hundred yeres before Herodotus (as saith Coruinus Messala, in his booke de∣dicated to Augustus the emperour) Ilus as the elder brother, was preferred vnto the kingdome of the Latines, before Assaracus the yonger brother. We read them also of the West Indies (although men of all others most deuoid of humanitie) to haue also vsed this same natural▪ law, for the eldest to succeed before the younger. And that when Francis Pizarra Generall of the Spaniards, conquering the kingdome of Peru, caused [ C] Attabalippa the king to be put to death: all the people thereat reioyced, to see him die that had caused his elder brother to be slaine, so to become king himselfe, contrarie to the custome of the countrey, and his fathers will conformable thereunto: who hauing two hundred children, yet by his will appointed that Gaca his eldest sonne should alone succeed him in his kingdome, without diuiding of the same. And albeit that the chil∣dren were twins, yet so it is, that the prerogatiue of the kingdome is to be kept vnto him that is first borne, & so to be left, witnessed by most manifest proof: least such like quar∣rell should arise for the prerogatiue of birthright, as did betwixt Iames king of Scots, and the duke of Albanie, being twins: which kingdome the duke complained to bee wrongfully taken from him: king Iames maintaining the contrarie, for that he was the [ D] first borne. And so alwayes when men would force and violat this naturall successiue right, great troubles and ciuill warres haue thereof ensued: as it happened for the king∣dom* 1.2093 of Alba, inuaded by Aemulius, being of right due vnto Numitor the elder brother: & to Aristobulus king of Iudea, thrust out of the kingdome by the sentence and doome of Pompey the Great, to make an end of the ciuill warres and seditions: the kingdome being so restored vnto his elder brother Hircanus, without respect to that which Ari∣stobulus alleaged, his said brother not to haue bene fit to beare armes, neither yet to go∣uerne a kingdome. A reason and colour for which the fathers and fauourits haue oft time troubled the right of their children, to set the crowne due vnto the elder, vpon the head of the younger. As did Ptolomey the first of that name king of Aegypt, who con∣trarie [ E] vnto the law of nations (as saith Iustin) preferred the younger brother vnto the kingdome before the elder, which was the cause that one of them slue the other. In which errour Ptolomee surnamed Physcon offended also, who persuaded by his wife Cleopatra, preferred the younger brother before the elder: but was no sooner dead, but that the people expulsed the younger, and restored the scepter vnto the elder. Anaxan∣drides also king of Lacedemonia, preferred Dorieus before Cleomenes his elder brother, for that he was the more ciuill: and yet the historie saith, that the people thereof grie∣uously complained, as of a thing done contrarie to the law of nations. And albeit that king Pyrrhus said, That his will was, that he of his children should succeed him, which

had the sharpest sword; meaning thereby the most valiantest of them: yet the people [ F] after his death preferred the eldest, although vnfittest for warres. For whatsoeuer va∣lour, courtesie, beautie, or wisdome there be in the yonger more than in the elder; yet should not the father therefore, contrarie vnto the law of nations, preferre the younger before the elder: howbeit that the exteriour forme and feature of the bodie hath decei∣ued many. Foolishly therefore do those parents, which ouercome with the flatterie of their younger sonnes, and disinheriting the elder of their kingdomes, haue incensed their children most cruelly to murther one another: so as did the father of Atreus,* 1.2094 and Thyestes, who willing to preferre the younger before the elder, as the fitter for the mannaging of the affaires of state, so filled and foyled his house with most cruell and horrible tragedies. But more foolelishly doe they, which search into the natiuities of [ G] their children, so to bestow the kingdome vpon him whom the starres seeme to fauour most: as did Alphonsus the 10, king of Castile, who by this means would haue preferred the yonger brother before the elder: who for the disgrace so offered him, slue his yon∣ger brother, and caused his said father for griefe to die in prison. In like case almost Ga∣briel the yonger sonne of the Marquesse of Salusse, by the consent of his mother cast his elder brother into prison, pretending that he was out of his wits: who yet breaking out of prison, recouered his principalitie, & hauing chased out his brother, coupt vp his mother in the same prison, wherein hee himselfe had but a little before beene shut vp. And not to seeke further from home, wee haue seene all this realme on fire with ciuill warres, for that Lewes the Deuout, at the intreatie of his second wife, had preferred [ H] Charles the Bauld, before Lothaire his elder brother. Wherefore pope Pius the second did wisely, in reiecting the request of Charles the seuenth the French king, desirous to haue preferred Charles his yonger sonne before Lewes the 11 his elder brother: howbe∣it that the king had reason so to do, considering that Lewes had without any iust occasi∣on, twice taken vp armes against him, so to haue taken from him the crowne, and to haue pluckt the scepter out of his hand.

Now it is so farre from that the first begotten, or eldest sonne, should for cowardise or want of courage, be imbarred to succeed vnto the crowne, as that if he be misse sha∣pen and deformed also, yet ought not the prerogatiue he hath vnto the crowne by his birthright for that to be taken from him. Howbeit that it much concerneth the Com∣monweale [ I] to haue kings that be not deformed. Wherunto Lycurgus and Plato, would great regard to be had, and especially Lycurgus, who willed the deformed children to be slaine. But the * 1.2095 law of God hath decided this doubt, commanding the yonger not to be preferred before the elder, for what loue or fauour soeuer. Which is not onely to take place when question is of the right of the elder, but also when the next heire male of the fathers side is to succeed vnto the crowne, albeit that he bee deformed. For one ought not for one inconuenience to break so good a law, or to open a gap so dangerous vnto Monarchies: which to be so the estates & people of Hungarie shewed by a most* 1.2096 notable example: contrarie vnto the will & disposition of Ladislaus their king, who ha∣uing no issue, adopted Alme his brothers yongest son, so to make him king after him, re∣iecting [ K] Coloman his elder brother, whom he in a sort banished, sending him a great way off, to studie in Paris: causing him also afterwards to enter into the orders of priest∣hood, & withall bestowing vpon him a bishoprike, so to take from him all the hope for him to succeed vnto the crowne. For he was a man altogether deformed, goggle eyed, euill spoken, lame, & crooked backed; & yet for all that Ladislaus being dead, the estates of that kingdom draue out the yonger, refusing to haue any other king but the elder brother, whome they called home, and by their ambassadors afterward obtained of the pope, to haue him dispenced with, and discharged of his orders, and married also.

In like case Agesilaus, a lawe dwarfe, hauing by the meanes of Lysander a prince of the [ A] same bloud excluded Leotichides as Alcibiades his bastard, succeeded into the kingdom, not as the kings son, but as next of the fathers side, and of the bloud of Hercules: his ad∣uersaries in vaine complaining the kingdom to hault. And howbeit that Lysander who had preferred Agesilaus to the kingdome afterwards did what he might to haue abro∣gated the antient royall law, and to haue published an edict whereby the nearest of bloud should not haue succeeded into the kingdome, but that the most sufficient of the bloud royall should still be chosen; yet was there none found of his opinion.* 1.2097

Some there bee which would adiudge kingdomes vnto the yonger being borne kings sons, their elder brethren being borne before that their fathers were king: as was iudged for Xerxes, declared king against Artabazus his elder brother begot by Darius [ B] before the kingdom of Persia fell vnto him: which iudgement was yet grounded vpon equitie: For that the kingdome was but lately fallen, not by any successiue right, but euen by lot or rather as it were by chance vnto Darius. But where the kingdome is descended by a lawfull succession from former ancestors, the eldest or neerest of the fa∣thers stocke is to succeed, although he be borne before his father was possessed of the kingdome. Whereby is vnderstood what is to be iudged of the question, which Bar∣tholus writeth to haue happened in his time; as whether Philip earle of Valois his son borne before his father was king of France, should as king succeed him in the king∣dome; or else his yonger sonne which he had after that he was king? Howbeit that I [ C] read in our histories him to haue left behind him none but his onely sonne Iohn. But this same question might well haue bin disputed in the time of king Charles the second, who before he was king had his sonne Lewes: who yet without any question obtained the kingdome, although he had his brother Charles borne whilest his father was king. For now question was of an antient kingdome deuolued vnto the next of name: wher∣as otherwise the yong sonne of a king conquering a new kingdome should be preferred before his other brethren borne before their father was a king. For as the children of base men are not ennobled, being borne before their father was made noble; neither he to be accounted a priests sonne, which was borne before his father was a priest: so he also which is borne of a father before that he was king, not capable of the kingdome [ D] by right of succession, cannot pretend any right to the crowne, although he be the eldest or neerest of kin: but if he be enabled to attaine thereunto by lawfull succession, the kingdome of right belongeth vnto him, how be it that hee were not the soone of a king. As was obserued in the kingdome of Persia whereinto Artaxerxes succeeded, although he was borne before his father was king: as claiming the kingdome from his great grandfather. And albeit that his mother Parysatis thrust all Asia into ciuill warre to turne the estate vnto her best beloued sonne the yong Cyrus, yet so it is that by the iudgement of God he was in battell by his elder brother ouerthrowne and so slain. In like sort and vpon the same doubt which happened about the succession of the king∣dome of Hungarie, Geica the elder brother borne before his father had obtained the [ E] kingdome, was by the consent of all the estates proclaimed king: which neuer after was called in doubt, in what kindome soeuer. Whereas otherwise there would en∣sue many intollerabe absurdities: for if the king should leaue but one sonne borne be∣fore that he was king, he could not succeed him. But yet whereas we haue sayd, The soueraigntie to be due to euery one that is next of kinne; extendeth farre, not onely vn∣to them who the eldest being dead come in stead of the eldest, but vnto their infinit posteritie also. For so Demetrius reasoned in the Senat at Rome, his brother Antio∣chus king of Syria being dead: for as (sayd he) the right of nations hath before giuen the kingdome vnto mine elder brother, euen by the selfe same right ought I now to

succeed him in the same. [ F]

But it may de doubted if the grandfather yet reigning, the eldest sonne shall die lea∣uing* 1.2098 a sonne, the grandfathers nephew; Whether the kingdome be due vnto the next brother or to the nephew, who is one degree farther off. Vpon which question many haue resolued it to be due vnto the next brother. And indeed Scipio Africanus willing as an vmpire to haue appeased the like controuersie betwixt Corbis and Orsua the vnkle and the nephew, for the kingdome of Numidia, and not knowing what in this point to resolue vpon, appointed the kingdome to be tried by combat betwixt them two: they both of themselues refusing to haue any other god or man for iudge but Mars: In which combat Corbis being both the elder and the cunninger ouercame his nephew, as Liuie writeth. Which like kind of combats betwixt the vncle and the nephew [ G] * 1.2099 haue ofted in antient time beene vndertaken among the Germaine princes: which was the onely cause that stirred vp Barnard king of Italie to take vp armes against the em∣perour Lewes the Deuout; alleadging that the empire of right belonged vnto him as the onely sonne of Pepin the eldest sonne of Charlemaigne, and not to Lewes the De∣uout the yonger brother of Pepin: howbeit that Lewes yet caried it away, though not so much by right as by force of armes, and so preuailing against Bernard kept him* 1.2100 shut vp in perpetuall prison. And euen yet at this present the kingdome of Moscouie is alwayes giuen vnto the yonger brother, after the death of the grandfather, without respect vnto the children of the elder brother: and that more is, the yonger brother succeedeth in the kingdome vnto the elder brother, although the elder brother being [ H] king leaue behind him a sonne yet vnder age: For so Basilius the Great, king of Mosco∣uie succeeded in the kingdome after his elder brother who had children. For which reason also Henry of Lancaster the sonne of Iohn of Gaunt deposed Richard the eldest sonne of Edward the Blacke prince: alleaging that his father beeing by death preuen∣ted, he could not succed Edward his grandfather in the kingdome: which yet was but an vniust quarrell pickt. So in like case Robert of Naples the yonger brother, by the sen∣tence of the Pope and of the colledge of cardinals, obtained the kingdome of Naples: the sonne of the elder brother king of Hungarie being so excluded. An vsuall matter amongst the Vandals, as Procopius writeth: for so Honorius got the kingdome of Gen∣sericus his grandfather, howbeit that Gerso his eldest sonne dying had left sonnes; [ I] which he obtained not so much by his grandfathers will, as by the antient law of al∣most all the Nomades and Northren nations.

And which I see to haue bene common euen vnto our ancestors also: for so Gon∣tran preuailed against Childebert the eldest sonne of Sigisbert in the obtaining of the kingdom of France. So Mauld ouercame Robert her nephew, the son of Robert her elder brother, for the countie of Arthoise, the Senat of France desciding the matter; and so obtained her fathers whole inheritance. Henry also sonne to Theobald earle of Cham∣paigne in like sute ouercome his eldest brothers sonne. But when Iohn Montfort in like sute for the dukedome of Britaine was ouerthrown, by his aunt the daughter of Vide of Britaine; what by right he could not, he by force obtained, not without a most cruell [ K] and bloudie warre. And so (as we sayd) Robert the sonne of Charles the second, by the iudgement of the Pope obtained the kingdome of Naples, Charles his nephew the elder brothers sonne, king of Hungarie, in vaine reclaiming. Sanxius also the sonne of Alphonsus the tenth king of Castile, his father fauouring of him thrust his elder brothers sonnes out of the hope of the kingdome. Iohn also hauing slaine Arthure, Godfrey his elder brothers sonne, tooke vpon him the kingdome of England. Vnlike was the quartell of Siluius, who after the death of Ascanius, in the right of his mother tooke from Iulus, Ascanius his sonne, the kingdome of the Latins: For that Lauinia had Sil∣uius

by Aeneas but not Ascanius. But not fewer, yea and I know not whether moe [ A] nephews to haue obtained their grandfathers kingdomes, their vncles yet liuing, ac∣cording to the antient law of the Lacedemonians. As for Lycurgus, he gaue vnto Cha∣rilaus his eldest brothers sonne, his kingdome, which he might easily haue taken vnto himselfe, the childs mother consenting thereunto. Arcus also the elder brothers sonne, after the death of his grandfather obtained the same kingdome, his vncle Acrotatus yet liuing. So also Iohn the sonne of Ferdinand succeeded to Alphonsus his grandfather king of Portugall, Henry his vncle being yet aliue. And not long after Sebastian the son of Iohn the eldest brother tooke vpon him the kingdome of Emanuel his grandfather, and not Henry his vncle, Lewes of Niuers also after the death of his grandfather got the counties of the Low countries his vncle yet liuing and looking on. But Robert the [ B] second, king of Naples (whose father by the sentence of the Pope had ouercome his elder brothers sonne) when question was betwixt the vncle and the nephew for the countie of S. Seuerine, by the councell of the lawyers gaue sentence on the nephews side. The like sentence was giuen by the iudges of the court of Paris betwixt the heires of Iohn Vaste the sonne of the earle of Foix, and the heire of Francis Phebe, who being the sonne of the elder brother had got his grandfathers inheritance, his vncle yet liuing. So also was it iudged for the dukedome of Britaine against Iohn Montfort. Others haue left it as a thing doubtfull to be tried by combat. For as Scipio Africanus permitted the combat betwixt Orsue and Corbis whom hee could not by law appease: the same we read to haue happened first vnder Otho the Great, and after that vnder Henry the first [ C] in Germanie; and the vncle to haue bene ouercome by their brothers sonnes. But the nephew of Agathocles king of Syracusa slew his vncle, going about to haue taken vpon him his grandfathers kingdome.

Neither want there probable reasons on both sides. For the nephew it auaileth* 1.2101 that his father being dead he falleth into the power of his grandfather, & so is made his heire by the law of the twelue tables: and together with his vncles is admitted into his portion of his grandfathers inheritance, he dying intestat. And if the father substitute an heire vnto his sonne, that substitution ceaseth if the sonne beget children, onely vpon the coniecture of the fathers kind affection towards his sonne, as Papinian the lawyer hath answered. Yea, by the Roman lawes, brothers sonnes are admitted vnto [ D] their vncles inheritance: but then how much more true and iust is it for them to bee admitted vnto the inheritance of their grandfathers? That is also moreouer, that by the antient customes of Fees the nephew may by right receiue the whole benefit, his vncles being quite excluded. But no reason is more effectuall, than that an inheritance nei∣ther entered vpon, neither so much as yet fallen, is not onely deriued from the grand∣father to the nephews; but euen the verie vncertaine hope of a matter in trust being so but vnder a condition conceiued.

Neither yet for all this is the vncles cause on the other side altogether without rea∣son,* 1.2102 if a man will but more neerly looke into these matters, and without guile inter∣pret the law of the twelue tables. For why this law still admitteth the nearest of kinne [ E] vnto the inheritance: but now the sonne is nearer vnto the father than the nephew, who but by a false supposall and fiction is deemed to be the same person with his dead father. But admitting that a faigned supposall is in some cases to bee borne withall: yet seemeth it not reason that such a false fiction should preuaile against the truth, espe∣cially vnto another mans harme or preiudice of his right. Neither doth the kindnesse of nature suffer the sonnes to be spoyled of their fathers wealth and goods, that all might be giuen vnto the nephew, who is farthest off from the grandfather: which must needs be not onely in the obtaining of a kingdome, but also of a dukedome, or of an earle∣dome,

or of an indiuisible fee, by reason of that imaginarie fiction whereof wee haue [ F] spoken, the nephew to be supposed to represent the person of his dead father. And so farre it was from that the Roman lawes should suffer the sonnes to be disturbed by the nephewes, as that things committed euen but vpon trust come not vnto the nephewes before that all the sonnes one of them substituted vnto another, be dead. But admit that the sonnes, contrarie vnto the lawes both of nature, and of the Romans, may be disin∣herited, that so way may be made for the nephew (which we see in indiuisible successi∣on to be still done) yet is it an vnreasonable, and vniust thing, an infant, a child, or one vnder age, of no experience in matters of warre, or in the other ciuill and weightie af∣faires of the Commonweale, to be called vnto the soueraigntie of a kingdome; and a∣nother neerer than he, that excelleth both in yeares and wisedome, to be in the meane [ G] time debarred of his fathers kingdome. For which reason the lawyers haue giuen the tuition of the fathers enfranchised slaue vnto the vncle, the nephew being excluded: but by how much more then is the tuition of the kingdome to be committed vnto the vn∣cle, rather than vnto the nephew? And last of all so it is, that vncles vnto whom the tu∣ition of their yong royall nephewes is almost still committed, commonly thinke of no∣thing else, but of the murthering and killing of them: whereof innumerable examples (and yet not all) are in histories reported, all which if I should goe about to gather to∣gether, I should so become tedious. Besides that, it is in sacred writ set downe, * 1.2103 That Commonweale to be miserable and vnfortunat, where children beare rule.

Howbeit that the old receiued custome of our auncestours, and iudgements in this [ H] case often giuen, haue called me backe from this opinion. For those inconueniences which we haue spoken of, happen but seldome: which being such, the lawmakers are not greatly to respect. For if we would rehearse all the kings of Fraunce euen from the time of Charles the Great, we shall scarcely, or els not at all, in the space of twelue hun∣dred yeares, find the vncle and the nephew, after the death of the grandfather, to haue met together as competitors in the succession of this kingdome. Wee read it in the space of about fiue or six hundred yeares to haue happened once in England, once in Castile, twice in Portugall, and once in Sicilia. Wherefore let the sentence as well of the auntient, as of the later lawyers preuaile for the nephew against the vncle: not on∣ly in direct, but euen in oblique, and collaterall succession also. Which we haue some∣what [ I] the more curiously reasoned of, for that succession of the kingdome of Fraunce, which seemeth to be euen neere at hand. But if cosin Germans, or the vncle and the nephew, shall in the right of themselues without any fained supposall of representation, lay claime vnto the crowne of a king their kinsman, dead without heires male, be it that they were fiftie degrees off, yet he that is descended of the elder, albeit that hee were himselfe the younger, shall carry it away from the elder: as it may and hath oftentimes enow happened in this realme. And yet neuerthelesse in particular successions in colla∣terall lines, they shall equally diuide the diuisible inheritance into parts: but if the inhe∣ritance be indiuisible, the elder of the two in like degree is to bee preferred before the younger, and to enioy the right of his eldership, albeit that the younger bee descended [ K] from the more auntient auncestors: as was adiudged in the court of Paris, betwixt Vil∣liers, and Baynecourt, cosens germans, for the inheritance of Francis Bloqui, without any regard vnto the race of the elder auncestours, considering that they came vnto the suc∣cession of their chiefe ot head, and not by false supposall, or by the way of represen∣tation.

And yet is it not sufficient, that the next heires male of name succeed, but it is need∣full also, that the kingdome, how great soeuer it be, with all the soueraigne rights ther∣of, bee wholly giuen to one without partition: as Gensericus king of the Vandales

wisely appointed. For otherwise if a Monarchy be diuided, it is no more to be accoun∣ted [ A] * 1.2104 a Monarchy, but rather a Poliarchy, or Monarchy diuided into many Monar∣chies. Which was not by the law Salique with vs (as some suppose) prouided for, or fooreseene. For we find that Aribert, brother to Dagobert the eldest sonne of Clotaire the second, was also king with his brother, one of them holding nothing of the other. Clodoueus also the eldest sonne of Dagobert, was king of Paris, and Sigebert his brother king of Metz. And after the death of Clodoueus his foure sonnes diuided the realme in∣to foure kingdomes: for Childebert was king of Paris, Clodoueus king of Orleans, Clo∣taire of Soissons, and Theodoric of Metz. But the rest being dead, all in fine came to Clotaire, whose eldest sonne Cherebert was king of Paris, Chilperic of Soissons, Gontran of Orleans, and Sigebert of Metz, all kings: which multitude of kings were scarece euer [ B] quiet from ciuill warres. For which it was wisely prouided by the successors of Hugh Capet, who ordained three kings of great consequence for the maintaining of this Mo∣narchy in the greatnesse thereof. First they excluded the bastards of the house of* 1.2105 Fraunce, from all entrance vnto the kingdome, not allowing them so much as to be ac∣counted in the number of their naturall children: that so from thenceforth they might thinke of the begetting of lawfull children, their base borne children being now quite excluded from the crowne. Howbeit that it was permitted vnto the bastards of other princes of the blood, and of other noble houses, to be by their fathers auouched, and to beare the name, the armes, the stile and noble titles of their naturall fathers: prouiding also better, by taking away of the masters of the palace, whose power was now become [ C] dreadfull vnto the people, and daungerous vnto the kings. Secondarily they ordained all the soueraigne royall rights, to be wholly and entirely giuen to the eldest brother alone, and from thenceforth not to be communicated with the younger brethren, but to be all enforced to yeeld vnto their elder brother all obedience and fealtie. And lastly, that such lands as by the kings appointment were assigned vnto the kings sonnes, to be holden in fealtie, they dying without heires male, should againe freely returne vnto the crowne. And the kings sisters to haue their dowrie in money onely: that so not onely the rights of soueraigntie, but euen the crowne lands also, might so much as possible was be kept whole & entire vnto the eldest brother. And as for the bastards of France, [ D] we find them in former times to haue had their parts in the kingdome together with the kings other lawfull sonnes: as the bastard brother of Charles the Simple, had part in the kingdome, and so after the manner of our auncestors was called a king. True it is, that Theodoric the kings bastard was excluded, for that he was begot of a bondwo∣man, who yet neuerthelesse demaunded his part of the kingdome, vnto whome for all that aunswere was giuen, That he must first be made a free man.

And as for diuiding of a Monarchy, I haue said, that being diuided, it is no more a* 1.2106 Monarchy, no more than a crowne or robe diuided into parts, is any more to bee ac∣connted a robe or a crowne: the inuiolat nature of vnitie being such, as that it can abide no partition. Neither find we the auntient kings of Persia, Aegypt, Parthia, or Assyria, [ E] at any time to haue diuided their most great and spatious kingdomes: neither yet any other kings to haue vsed any such partition of their realmes. Iosaphat king of the Iewes hauing six sonnes, left his kingdom whole and entire vnto his eldest sonne Ioram, assig∣ning vnto the rest certaine yearely annuities, or pensions. The first that opened this daungerous gap, was Aristodemus king of Lacedemonia, who yet diuided not his king∣dome vnto his two sonnes, Proculus and Euristhenes, but left the kingdome vndiuided vnto them both: and so thinking to haue made them both kings, tooke from them both all soueraigne authoritie and power. After whose example the kingdome of the Messenians, neere vnto the Lacedemonians, was by the father giuen vndiuided vnto

Leucippus and Amphareus, being brethren: the chiefe cause why those two kingdoms [ F] were chaunged into Aristocraties. And yet two inconueniences propounded, it is bet∣ter* 1.2107 two kingdomes to be giuen vnto two kings, than one kingdome to be giuen to ma∣ny: as it hath sometimes happened, the father to haue diuided vnto his sonnes diuers kingdomes, before they were into one vnited: for so Iames king of Aragon appointed Peter his eldest sonne to be king of Aragon, and Iames his younger sonne to bee king of Maiorque: howbeit that afterward the elder brother tooke the yonger prisoner, and in prison starued him, whome much lesse he would haue endured to haue bene partner with him in the kingdome, and so vnited both the kingdomes into one. So it befell also the children of Boleslaus the second, king of Polonia, who hauing diuided the king∣dome vnto his foure sonnes, and leauing nothing vnto the fift, kindled such a fire of se∣dition, [ G] as could not afterward be quenched, but with much blood of the subiects. Yet* 1.2108 this diuision of kingdomes is well to bee borne withall, when it is made by him which hath conquered them, who may giue his conquests got by his owne prowesse and va∣lour, vnto his yonger sonnes, as he seeth good, according to their age or deserts: leauing yet still vnto the eldest, the auntient kingdome or territorie: as did William the Con∣querour, who left the dukedome of Normandie, and the other countries which he had from his father, vnto his eldest sonne Robert Curteyse, who succeeded him not in the kingdome of England, for that he was not the sonne of a king (as saith the Norman hi∣storie) but left that kingdome which he had conquered vnto William Rufus, which hee had not as yet vnited vnto his other countries: leauing vnto Henrie his third sonne no∣thing [ H] but a yerely pension: and yet for all that Robert the eldest brother, desirous also to haue had the kingdome from Henry the third brother, who after the death of William Rufus his brother, had ceised thereon, in seeking too greedily thereafter, lost both the one and the other: and being taken by the third brother (who now carried away all) was by him cast in prison, and so depriued of his sight there miserably died. And albe∣it* 1.2109 that this disposition of the Conquerours was right iust, as grounded both vppon rea∣son and authoritie, yet had it bene much more saftie, to haue left the whole kingdome, and all the soueraigne rights thereof vnto one alone: as was done amongst the chil∣dren of Charles Countie of Prouince, and of Philip Valois king of Fraunce, where the eldest had all: which is by farre the surest for the estate, without respect vnto the other [ I] legitimat children, which are not to haue place, where question is of soueraigntie, or of demaines vnited to a Monarchy. For if honourable fees be not to be diuided, by how much lesse can kingdomes themselues, and soueraigne rights so bee? As dukedomes, counties, and marquisats, yea and in many places baronies also, are not suffered to fall into partition: prouided yet that the yonger brethren bee in some sort recompensed: which recompensing is not in a Monarchy, which suffereth neither diuision nor esti∣mation to take place. But well of long time the vse hath bene, to giue certaine lands* 1.2110 and fees for the maintainance of the younger brethren of the house of Fraunce: which haue bene again adiudged vnto the crowne, they which had them being dead without issue: as was decided for the inheritance of Robert earle of Cleremont brother to saint [ K] Lewes, vnto whome that inheritance was adiudged: his other brethren Charles and Al∣phonsus earle of Poitiers both excluded. The like iudgement being also giuen against Charles, concerning the succession into the inheritance of Alphonsus, dying also with∣out issue: Charles his brother enioying no part thereof, the inheritance by a decree of the Senat, being adiudged from him, and giuen vnto the crowne. For which cause the succeeding kings better aduised, and to the intent that the matter should bee no more doubted of, haue prouided, that in the letters patents concerning the lands and pensi∣ons giuen vnto their younger brethren, it should expresly be comprised, that they dying

without heires male, those lands vnto them so giuen should againe returne vnto the [ A] crowne: as was done in the graunt of the lands giuen to Lewes duke of Aniou, king Iohn his sonne. And albeit that Renate the yonger sonne of Lewes the third, duke of Aniou, succeeded his elder brother into the inheritance, yet was it rather by suffe∣rance, than for any right he had so to doe as heire male. For otherwise the earle of Ni∣uers after the death of Charles duke of Bourgundie (his nie kinsman dead without any heires male) might iustly haue claimed the dutchie, considering that in the letters pa∣tents of Philip the Hardy, the dukedome of Bourgundie was giuen vnto him and to his children, as well females as males, without any exception of sexe. Yet pretended the earle no right thereunto, but the duke being dead, king Lewes the eleuenth in his owne right claimed the dukedome of Bourgundie. True it is, that the French kings in that [ B] point sometime fauour the princes of the blood, suffering them to enioy the inheri∣tance of their kinsmen, dying without heires male. So Philip of Valois obtaining the kingdome, resigned the earledome of Valois vnto his younger brother Charls. And Charles the sixt the French king being dead, Charles of Angoulesme succeeded vn∣to the dutchie of Orleans, and yet his sonnes sonne Iohn of Angoulesme succeeded not vnto the said dutchy of Orleans, Lewes the twelft hauing got the kingdome, annexing the same dukedome vnto the crowne. For they are deceiued which write Peter of Bur∣bon, lord of Beauieu, to haue succeeded his brother Iohn into the lands which hee had receiued from the kings his auncestors, by lawfull right rather than by the graunt and fauour of king Lewes the eleuenth, whose sister Anne the said Peter had maried, whom [ C] he most entirely loued. And so Lewes the twelft was content also, that Susan of Burbon the onely daughter of Peter of Burbon, marrying Charles of Burbon, should hold such lands, long before giuen to the crowne: but the said Susan beeing dead without issue, those lands were forthwith ceized vpon, and againe annexed vnto the crowne, namely the counties of Auergne, and Clermont, and the dukedome of Burbon, howbeit that it was not in the letters patents comprised: which thing is thought especially to haue mo∣ued Charles of Burbon to haue entred into rebellion against the king. So also we find, that after the death of Iohn the third, duke of Alanson, the dutchy of Alanson was at the motion of the kings Attourney generall ceized vpon for the king; howbeit that the duke had left two daughters his heires, vnto whome were reserued onely the lands by [ D] their father purchased. All which was done to the intent so much as was possible, to keepe the kingdome vndiuided, and so to come whole and entire vnto the kings, and not rent and torne, with the parts thereof as the limmes pluckt away: as it hath also bene wisely foreseene, and prouided for, in the dutchies of Sauoy, Milan, Loraine, Man∣tua,* 1.2111 and Cleue, which indiuisibly belong vnto the next of kin. And albeit that the Ger∣man princes do equally diuide all the fees of the empire, excepting the princes electors, yet is that contrarie vnto the custome and manner of their auncestours (who as Taci∣tus writeth) gaue all their lands and inheritances vnto the eldest, and their mouables & money onely vnto the rest. And so we read Abraham the Patriarch to haue done, gi∣uing his whole inheritance vnto his eldest sonne, and money vnto the rest, whome hee [ E] sent from him whilest he himselfe yet liued.

But haply here some man may say, it to be expedient if the Monarchie be great, as* 1.2112 were those of the Persians, the Romans, the Frenchmen, and the Spaniards; and that the prince or monarch haue many children, or that there be many competitors, that then the surest way is to diuide it: so as did Augustus, Marcus Antonius, Sextus Pom∣peius, who by lot diuided the Roman empire, and so of one great Monarchie made three. And this expediencie should seeme vnto me good, if that princes after that they had bounded out their frontiers, could bound out also their desires. But there are no

mountaines so high, no riuers so broad, nor seas so deepe, that were euer yet able to stay [ F] the course of their ambitious and insatiable desires: as these three great men of whom I but euen now spoke, by proofe shewed: not onely the island of Sicilia (although it were but a most strait prouince) but euen the ayre which we breath, together with life it selfe, being taken from Sextus Pompeius, the bonds of confederacie being in short time broken amongst the consederats. Neither could Antonius endure the gouernment of Augustus, neither Augustus the gouernment of Anthonie, although he were a great way off from him▪ So that one of the three being before slaine, the other two could neuer be at quiet, vntill they had one of them quite ruinated the other. And if at any time it haue happened, some of the emperours of the East, and of the West, in so great an empire to haue liued in peace, it was not long, but almost a miracle, neither such as [ G] to be drawne into examples for vs to imitate: whereas to the contrarie for one example of them, which haue in vnitie and concord gouerned together, there are to be found an hundred which haue massacred one another. Whereof there is no more notable ex∣ample, than the mightie Othoman familie, wherein many most horrible murders haue bene for the empire committed, the parents not sparing their owne children, neither the children their parents: insomuch that within this two hundred yeares past, they haue not ceased still to kill one another, vntill there be but one of them left aliue. And in the* 1.2113 little isle of Gerbe, six kings haue in lesse time than fifteene yeares beene slaine one of them by another, being not able to endure a companion or partaker one of them with another in the soueraigntie. And albeit that Galeace the second, and Barnabas, two most [ H] louing brethren, brought vp euen from their cradles together, hauing oftentimes endu∣red like daungers; being both banished, and both at one and the selfe same time called home againe, and both two established lieutenants of the empire, and alwayes compa∣nions in armes together; had equally diuided the principalitie of Milan betwixt them, which they so held and defended, as that it seemed a thing impossible to seperat them a funder: yet at length Galeace onely for the ambitious desire of soueraigntie, most cru∣elly slue his said brother, together with all his children. So Abimelech the bastard slue threescore and nine of his brethren, that he might all alone raigne. And Berdeboc king of Tartarie with like slaughter, and for like cause, slue his twelue brethren. Sephadin also caused the ten sonnes of his brother Saladin to be all murthered, that he might himselfe [ I] alone raigne in Aegypt. The successors of Alexander also most part of them slue one another, not sparing either their parents, or children. For as for one brother to kill ano∣ther, it was so common a matter (as Plutarch writeth) as that it seemed almost a mira∣cle vnto the ambassadour of Ptolomey, that Demetrius standing on the right hand of Antigonus his father, with a boare speare in his hand, could abstaine from killing of his father. But yet greater was the crueltie of king Deiotarus, who at one time slew twelue of his sonnes, for no other cause, but so the better to assure his kingdome vnto the thir∣teenth, whome he best loued▪ For alwayes amongst equals, the ambitious desires they haue to be one of them greater than another, still armeth them one against another: Wheras in a Monarchy, where there is but one soueraigne, and vnto whom the prin∣ces [ K] of the blood are all subiect, being prouided of yearely pensions, or lands giuen them for their maintenance; it is certaine, that to haue alwaies some farther fauour from their soueraigne, they will still yeeld them more obeysance. And therefore our kings which* 1.2114 haue bene better aduised, haue not giuen vnto their brethren, or the princes of the blood, the places of lieutenants generall of their armies, either of the high constable: but rather vnto some other of the meaner nobilitie, such as were Bertrand, Gueschlin, Oliuer Clisson, Simon earle of Montfort, with others of like qualitie, men of great ser∣uice, and vnder whome the princes of the blood might march; and yet neuerthelesse

without all hope of aspiring to the soueraigntie. So as did the auntient Romans, and [ A] namely Augustus, who amongst other the secrets of his gouernment, had this for one, Not to giue the place of a Generall, or of a Gouernour of the frontiers, and especially of Aegypt, vnto any the noble Senators of auntient houses, but onely vnto men of meaner estate. And albeit that the kings of the Northerne parts haue as it were alwaies called the princes of their blood vnto their councell; yet so it is, that other Monarches keepe them backe so much as they can: whether it be for the distrust they haue in them, or to keepe their councell in such libertie, as that it may not be diminished by the great∣nesse of the princes of the blood: or that it is to take away the ambition and iealousie which is ineuitable amongst princes of the same blood, if the king shall chance to fauor one of them more than another. And although there be many princes neere vnto the [ B] Othoman blood, as namely the Michaloglies, the Ebranes, the Turacanes; yet are they ne∣uer of the priuie councel, either yet admitted to any great place of honor, or command. And in the Monarchy of the Aethiopians (which is one of the greatest, and most aunti∣entest* 1.2115 in the world) there is no prince of the blood, which commeth neere the court, but are all trained vp in all honour and vertue, within a most strong castle, built vppon the mountaine Anga (one of the highest in all Affrike) kept with a perpetuall & strong garrison: from whence at such time as the king dieth, he which excelleth the rest in ver∣tue, is from the mountaine called vnto the kingdome. Which (as they say) was first ordained by one Abraham king of Aethiopia, by diuine reuelation, to auoid the factions [ C] and ciuill warres of princes among themselues; as also the massacres which oft times happen in other kingdomes, about the soueraigntie; as also to haue alwaies princes of the blood roiall, whome they call The Children of Israel (assuredly supposing them to be of the blood of the Hebrewes: beside that, the Aethiopian language taketh much of the Hebrew) to the intent the estate should not fall into combustion, the kings line fayling: or els for that the princes of the blood should not at libertie seeke to aduance themselues by force: or being aduanced, should not seeke to inuade the estate. For a* 1.2116 man may hold it for a maxime, That in euery Commonweale, if too much power be giuen vnto a prince or great lord of the blood, it is alwayes to be feared, least he should at one time or other ceize vpon the estate; seeing that euen the basest companions [ D] mounted vnto hie degree, are not without cause to be feared. So Sultan Solyman made Abraham Bassa of a slaue so great, by heaping honors vpon honours vpon him, as that in fine fearing his power, he was glad to cause his throat to be cut as hee was sleeping, and afterwards found him be worth thirtie millions of gold. But this is more to bee feared in a little kingdome or estate, than in a great: for that the subiects coupt vp as it were all in one place, are the more easily kept vnder by the power of the stronger. So when Iames Appian prince of Sienna, too much fauouring Peter Gambecourt, a man of base degree, had made him too great in honour and wealth, he was by him (before he was aware) thrust out of his estate. The like pranke Calippus serued Dion; Brutus, Cae∣sar; Macrin, Caracalla; Maximinus, the emperour Alexander; Philip, the yong Gor∣dianus: [ E] and an infinit number of others, who exalted from most base degree, haue dri∣uen out their maisters by whome they grew, and so made themselues lords. Who would haue thought that Agathocles a Potters sonne, of a common souldior chosen a Generall, durst haue slaine all the nobilitie and richer sort of the citisens of Syracusa, & made himselfe a king? Now if such a base companion as he durst doe so much, how much more warily is it then to be foreseene, that too great a commaund or power bee not giuen vnto princes or great men, either at home, or in seruice abroad? And this is it for which many haue holden, that by law the poynts reserued vnto the maiestie of a soueraigne prince, are neuer to bee communicated vnto a subiect, no not so much as

by commission, to the intent that no gap by any way be opened for the subiect to en∣ter [ F] by into the soueraigne estate of his prince.

We haue said also, that a Monarchy ought to descend vnto the heires male, consi∣dering* 1.2117 that the rule and gouernment of women, is directly against the law of nature, which hath giuen vnto men wisedome, strength, courage, and power▪ to commaund; and taken the same from women. Yea the * 1.2118 law of God hath expresly ordained, That the woman should be subiect vnto the man, and that not onely in the gouernment of kingdomes and empires, but also in euery particular mans house & familie: he * 1.2119 threat∣ning of his enemies, To giue them women to be mistresses ouer them; as of all mise∣ries and calamities the worst. Yea and the law it selfe forbiddeth women all charges and offices proper vnto men; as to iudge, to sue, and other such like things: and that not [ G] onely for lacke of wisedome (as saith Martian, when as amongst all the goddesses one∣ly Pallas had no mother, but was borne of Iupiters braine, to shew that wisdom procee∣ded not from women) but also for that mens actions are contrarie vnto their sexe, and to feminine modestie and chastitie. Neither was there any thing which more incen∣sed the Senat of Rome, against the emperour Heliogabalus, than to see his mother to come into the Senat, though she came but only to see, & not to say any thing. Which was also thought a right strange thing to our auncestors, that Maud, grandmother to* 1.2120 Philip the Long, should be assistant vnto Robert Contie of Artoise, and Margret Coun∣tie of Flanders, at the iudgement of the Countie of Clairmont. Now if it be an ab∣surd and rediculous thing, for women to busie themselues in mens publike actions and [ H] affaires, belonging properly vnto men: much more vnseemely is it, those things which belong vnto soueraigntie, to lie open vnto womens pleasure. For first the woman vn∣to whome the soueraigntie is deuolued, of these two things must doe one; either shee must marrie, or else continue vnmarried, and so her selfe rule. If shee shall marrie, yet is it stil a Gynecocratie, or womans gouernment; for that the marriage is made with that condition, That the soueraigntie is still with the woman, and not with the husband: as was expresly excepted at such time as Isabella queene of Castile marde Ferdinand king of Arrogon: and in our time, betwixt Mary queene of England, and Philip prince of Spaine, whome they called the queenes husband. And in like case in the matrimoniall contracts betwixt Sigismund archduke of Austria (who was afterward emperour) and [ I] Mary queene of Hungarie, whome the subiects in scorne called King Marie. In which case the husband is chiefe of his familie, and maister of his domesticall houshold; and yet for all that in publike affaires remaineth subiect vnto his wife. For why, the publike power (as saith the law) is neuer bound vnto the domesticall power. And for this cause the Consull Fabius caused his father (the great Fabius) to alight from his horse to doe him honour, as to the Consull in publike: who yet for all that by vertue of his fatherly power, might without giuing cause or reason why, haue put him to death at home in his owne house. But if the queene shall remaine vnmarried (which is the most true wo∣mans* 1.2121 soueraigntie) the Commonweale must needs so be in great daunger: For that the people being of a great and couragious spirit, will deeme a womans gouernment [ K] but ignominious, and not long to be endured; some both by their speaking & writing, scoffing and deriding their sexe, othersome their womanly wantonnesse, and others their womannish intollerablenesse: whereas nothing is more daungerous vnto an estate, than to haue them which beare the soueraigntie contemned and derided of their subiects, of the maintenance of whose maiestie, dependeth the preseruation both of the lawes, and of the estate, which should bee troden vnder foot for the womans sake, against whome there shall neuer want mockings, reproaches, slaunderous libels, and so in fine rebellions & ciuill war, especially if she (impatient of such vnworthy reproach)

shall seeke to bee thereof reuenged, which can hardly without ciuill tumult bee done. [ A] But if she shall chance to beare but the least extraordinarie fauor to any one of her sub∣iects, beside the enuie which he is to endure, to whome such fauour is showne, men will still on her part misconster the same. For if the wisest, and most chast haue euen in that respect had much adoe to keepe themselues from false reports, much lesse can a soue∣raigne princesse couer her fauours; no more than can a light firebrand set vpon an high watch tower: which may serue for cause enough to kindle the fire of iealousie among the subiects, and to arme them one of them against another▪ Besides that, it is almost naturall vnto women, to take pleasure & delight in the number and quarrels of their su∣ters. But if the subiects be so minded, as by force or otherwise to suffer in the soueraigne estate a womans gouernment, then is it not to be doubted, but that euerie one of the [ B] subiects shall be constrained to endure the like in their owne priuat houses also. For it* 1.2122 is a rule in policie, that whatsoeuer thing is found good, and sufferable in publike, the same is to be drawne into consequence and example in particular. Which was the cause the Persian princes preferred a request vnto Darius Memnon (whome the holy Scripture calleth Assuerus) That the disobedience of the queene Vasthi his wife, should not remaine vnpunished, least her pride should giue occasion vnto the other subiects wiues to he disobedient vnto their husbands. For as the familie is out of order, where the woman commaundeth ouer the husband, considering that the head of the familie hath lost his dignitie to become a slaue: euen so a Commonweale (to speake proper∣ly) looseth the name, where a woman holdeth the soueraigntie, how wise soeuer shee [ C] * 1.2123 be; but so much the more if she be vniust withall, and not able to rule her owne immo∣derat lusts and desires. I suppose there is none which knoweth not what tragedies Ione queene of Naples (who of her vnchastitie was called Lupa, or a shee wolfe) stirred vp of her selfe, who most cruelly murthered three kings her husbands, and was therefore her selfe also strangled, as she well deserued. I speake not of the horrible and brutish lusts of Semyramis, the first that by a straunge meanes set foot into the Assyrian Monar∣chy. For hauing obtained of the king, to haue the soueraigne commaund but for one day, she the same day commaunded the king himselfe to be slaine. What should I say of Athalia queene of Iuda, who seeing her husband slaine, put to death all the princes [ D] of the blood (excepting one which escaped) and so by force held the soueraigntie, vntil that she was at last by the people her selfe also murthered. With like wickednesse also Cleopatra flue her brother, that so she might alone enioy the kingdom of Aegypt. There was also one Zenobia, who stiled her selfe an empresse (together with the thirtie▪ vsur∣ping tyrants) and was by the emperour Aurelian ouercome. And in like case did Hi∣rene empresse of Constantinople, coupt vp at last into a monasterie her selfe. In briefe I find no people to haue liked of the soueraigntie of womans gouernment: howbeit that many haue endured the same: as did the Neapolitans the gouernment of Con∣stance, last of the race of the Norman kings, that raigned in Naples. And after that of Ioland the daughter of Iohn Brenne, married to the emperor Frederike the second, who [ E] gaue that kingdome to Manfred his base sonne, whose daughter Constance marrying into the house of Aragon, kindled the fire of the warres which continued two hundred yeares, betwixt the houses of Aniou and Aragon; and could neuer bee quenched but with the great effusion of the blood of many most valiant and worthy men; and all for hauing▪ giuen an entrance vnto a daughter into the succession of the kingdome of Naples. But when the colledge of cardinals saw the Christian Common∣weale, and especially Italie, to haue endured so many and so great slaughters, in so long and such mortall warres, and all for distaffe soueraigntie; it was by them decreed, That from that time forward, the kingdome of Naples should no more descend vnto wo∣men;

as in the inuestitute made to Alphonsus king of Arragon, in the yeare 1455, and [ F] afterward to Ferdinand king of Arragon, in the yeare 1458, it is expresly set downe, That the daughters should not succeed vnto the kingdome of Naples, so long as there were any heires male, either in the direct or collaterall line, euen vnto the fift degree. But that gap for the succession of daughters being opened in Italie, was afterwards also put in practise in the kingdomes of Hungarie, and of Polonia, which fell to Marie and* 1.2124 Hedwige, the daughters and heires of Lewes king of Hungarie, and of Polonia; which had neuer before bene seene. At which selfe same time almost, Mary Volmar (contrary vnto the lawes and auntient customes of the countries) succeeded into the kingdomes of Norway, Sweden, and Denmarke. The like example was after also followed in the kingdome of Castile, whereinto Isabel of Castile succeeded her father, hauing gained [ G] the fauour of the nobilitie: who albeit that shee was one of the wisest princesses that euer were, yet did the estates of the countrey thereof complaine, and the people thereat grudge, complayning themselues, Neuer before to haue endured a womans gouern∣ment. And whereas she alleaged Socina the daughter of Alphonsus, to haue before in like manner brought the kingdome of Castile vnto Sillon her husband: aunswere was thereunto made by the subiects, That to haue bene done rather by force, than by any right; and that from that time the estates of Castile had protested, That it was contrary vnto the lawes of the country. Which hasted the marriage betwixt Ferdinand and the said Isabella, so to keepe the people vnder. And albeit that Henry king of Castile, had by his last will and testament at the time of his death declared, That the kingdome of [ H] Castile after him belonged vnto Lewes the ninth the French king▪ in the right of his mother Blaunch of Castile; and that the barons of Castile had writ vnto the said French king, that he should come to take possession of the kingdome: yet so it was, that hee ne∣uer durst vndertake to lay claime vnto the same, howbeit that he had the consent of the nobilitie of the kingdome by letters vnder their hands and seales, which are yet to bee seene in the records of Fraunce. Now by the same craft that Isabel had wrested vnto her selfe the kingdome of Castile, did Ferdinand the sonne of Leonore also gaine the kingdome of Arragon: as did also after him the earle of Barcelone, hauing married Petronella the daughter of the king of Arragon. Which happened also in the king∣dome of Nauarre, whereunto Henry the Large, earle of Champaigne succeeded in the [ I] right of his wife, the king of Nauarres daughter: whose daughter and heire Ioane, mar∣ried vnto Philip the Faire the French king, brought vnto him the carledome of Cham∣paigne, with the kingdome of Nauarre: but the heires male of Philip the Faire fai∣ling, that kingdome of Nauarre in the right of three women fell vnto the hou∣ses of Eureux, of Foix, of Albert, and of Vendosme: so that this kingdome in lesse than foure hundred yeares, was transported into six strange houses, and vnto seuen straunge princes, the queenes husbands. But yet by the way it is worth the noting, foure women all of one name to haue opened the way vnto womens soueraigntie, in the kingdomes of Hungatie, of Norway, of Sweden, of Denmarke, of England, and Scotland. True it is, that Maud daughter to Henry the first, king of England, before brought the king∣dome [ K] of England vnto the house of Aniou in Fraunce: but that was after the death of * 1.2125 Stephen earle of Bolloine nephew o Henry, in the right of his sister Adela; in such sort, as that a cosin descended of a daughter was preferred before the kings own daugh∣ter: which daughters sonne yet succeeded king Stephen, in such sort as that no womans gouernment seemed at all to haue bene. For which reason Edward the the third, king of England, vpon the difference which he had for the crowne of Fraunce, alleaged the kingdome of Fraunce by the right meaning of the law Salique, to belong vnto him: saying, That law to stand in force and take place, when the next heire male descended

of the daughter (as was he frō Isabel sister to Charls the Faire) was preferred before him, [ A] who was descended of the heirs male farther off. Which exposition for all that was re∣iected by the councell of France, as neuer to take place, but when heirs male of the same name and stocke, in what line and degree soeuer it were vtterly failed: & that the king∣dome were in daunger to fall into election. And so albeit that the emperour Charles the fift marrying of his sister vnto Christiern king of Denmarke, and caused this clause to be inserted into the matrimoniall contracts: That the males fayling, the eldest daughter issuing of that marriage, should succeed vnto the kingdome: yet so it was neuerthelesse, that the estates of that countrey had thereof no regard, for that the kingdome went by election: yea so farre off was it, that such the kings priuat agreement could take from the nobilitie of Denmarke, the power to chuse their kings: or yet neuer any one of the [ B] same kings three daughters to raigne ouer them: as that the said king himselfe was by the estates thrust out of his kingdome banished, and so afterwards also miserably died in prison. The Polonians also after the death of Sigismundus Augustus, excluded not on∣ly the kings sister, but euen his nephew the king of Sweden his sonne also, who gaue a million of gold vnto the Commonweale, to haue his sonne afterward chosen: how be∣it that their predecessours had before receiued Hedwig the daughter of Lewes: and that when as there was no heire male, neither in the direct nor collaterall line of the house of Iagellon, they neuerthelesse made choyce of Henrie of Fraunce.

Now if the princesse the inheritrix shall marrie (which is necessarie, so to haue an [ C] * 1.2126 assured successour) her husband must either be a straunger, or a subiect: if a straunger, hee will instruct the people in straunge lawes, in straunge religion, in straunge man∣ners and fashions: yea and giue the honourable places and commaunds vnto straun∣gers also. But as for a subiect, the princesse would thinke her selfe much dishonoured, to marrie her seruant, seeing that soueraigne princes still make great difficultie to mar∣rie a subiect. Ioyne hereunto also the iealousie that is to be feared, if shee shall marrie him whome she best loueth, reiecting the more noble and greater lords, who alwaies contemne them which are of base degree.

And not to speake of many difficulties which fell out about these matters, euen the verie same, yea and greater too, presented themselues at the treatie of the marriage [ D] agreed vpon betwixt Philip prince of Castile, and Mary queene of England: wherein the first article contained, That no straunger being not a naturall English man borne, should bee preferred to any office, benefice, or charge whatsoeuer. And in the fourth article it was set downe, That Philip prince of Castile should not carrie the queene his wife against her will out of the realme of England, neither the children begot betwixt them two: the which articles were confirmed by the estates of the land, the second of Aprill, in the yeare one thousand fiue hundred fiftie three, where beside that which I haue said, it was also more solemnly prouided, That the queene alone and of her selfe should enioy all the royalties, and soueraigne rights of the said realms, lands, countries, and subiects, absolutely; without that her husband should by the courtesie of England [ E] pretend any thing vnto the crowne and soueraigntie of the realme, or other right what∣soeuer: and that the letters and mandates should be of none effect, if they were not sig∣ned by the queene, whatsoeuer signe or consent they had of her husband: and yet without which the consent of the queene should suffice. I haue also learned by the let∣ters of Nouaile ambassadour of Fraunce, who then was in England, that it was also decreed, That no Spaniard should haue the keeping of any fortresses or strong holds belonging vnto the Crowne of England, either on this side, or beyond the sea: neither that the Englishmen should by the Spaniards be constrained to goe vnto the wars out of the realme.

And albeit that a most gallant & mightie prince flourishing with kingdoms, wealth, [ F] youth, and friends, had married an old woman (for why, he seemed not to haue marri∣ed a wife) and such an one as by whome he was not to hope for any issue, yet could not the Englishmen patiently endure the Spaniards to set any foot into England, with whome for all that they had neuer before had any hostilitie, but had alwayes bene great friends. Yea the emperour Charles the fift on the other side wisely foreseeing all things, and fearing least some treason might be wrought against the prince his onely sonne, whome alone he had begot vnto the hope of so great an empire, required to haue fiftie young noble English gentlemen deliuered vnto him to be kept as hostages, so long as his sonne Philip was in England: howbeit that as such distrust drew after it the hatred of the English nation, so was also that article taken away, and nothing thereof obtai∣ned. [ G] But the marriage made, shortly after aboue 18 hundred English men, for religions sake went out of their countrey, into voluntarie exile and banishment. And yet beside all this, the fame was, how that the English men had conspired at one and the very selfe same instant, to haue slaine all the Spaniards: for that (as the report went) they vnder the colour of a marriage, and of religion, went about to aspire vnto the soueraigntie of England. Neither was it to haue bene doubted, but that the conspiracie of the English men had sorted to effect, or els that the Spaniards had effected their designes, and so taken vnto themselues the soueraigntie, had not the death of the queene (very profita∣ble for the kingdome) giuen an end vnto the designes both of the one and of the others. [ H]

For neuer strange prince can be assured of his life, commaunding in a strange coun∣trey,* 1.2127 if he haue not strong guards, for the assurance of his person, and sure garrisons for the keeping of his castles and strong holds. For being maister of the forts, hee must needs be also maister of the estate: for the more assurance whereof hee must alwayes aduance straungers; a thing intollerable to euery nation in the world. Whereof wee haue a million of examples, out of which we will remember but one of our own: what time king William raigned in Sicilie, in the yeare 1168, the people of the kingdome of Naples were so incensed to see a French man promoted to the honour of the Chaun∣cellourship amongst them, as that they conspired at once to kill all the Frenchmen that then were in the kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie, as indeed they did. But if the do∣mesticall [ I] seruant of a straunge prince, shall chaunce to kill a naturall subiect in a strange* 1.2128 countrey, or passe himselfe in any insolence, dannger by and by hangeth ouer all the straungers heads, the least quarrell that may be seruing to cut the strangers throats, if they be not all the stronger. As it happened in Polonia during the raigne of the daugh∣ter of Cazimire the Great, king of Polonia, and wife to Lewes king of Hungarie, chosen also king of Polonia, to the great contentment of all the estates of that realme: and yet neuerthelesse for one Polonian slaine by an Hungarian gentleman, all the people of Cracouia ranne vpon the Hungarians, and in that hurle slue them all, except such as by chaunce saued themselues in the castle, who yet were there besieged together with the queene: neither was there any meanes to appease the peoples rage, but that the [ K] queene the inheritrixe and mistresse of Polonia, must with all the Hungarians her fol∣lowers void the realme. But yet greater butcherie was there made of them of Austria, in Hungarie, when Mary the eldest daughter of Lewes king of Hungarie, had married Sigismund archduke of Austria, who going about to take vpon him the gouernment, was by his wiues mother (a most ambitious woman) driuen out of the kingdom: who not able to endure to see him raigne▪, to be sure to shut him quite out, was about by her ambassadours to haue called in Charles the French king, and so to haue put the king∣dome into the power of the French. Which the Hungarians perceiuing, sent for

Charles the king of Naples, and vncle to Mary, Sigismund his wife, to take vppon him [ A] the gouernment of the kingdome of Hungarie: who was no sooner come, but that he was by the practise and commaund of the cruell queene Mother (whome hee least fea∣red) slaine: which murder was with like crueltie also reuenged, shee her selfe being by like treason by the gouernour of Croatia slaine, and her bodie throwne into the riuer. After whose death Sigismund returning with a strong armie, put himselfe in full posses∣sion of the kingdome, wherof he now disposed at his pleasure, and filled all places with the slaughter of them which were of the faction against him. But let vs come to our owne domesticall examples, and vnto those wounds which but lately receeiued, bleed with the least touching, neither can but with most bitter griefe be felt. Frances duke of Alanson being sent for, came to take vpon him the gouernment of the Low coun∣tries, [ B] where he was with great ioy and triumph receiued: but hauing no strong garri∣sons, no strong castles, nor cities to trust vnto, neither could by my intreatie (who fore∣saw what would afterwards happen) be persuaded so to haue; receiued such a slaughter and disgrace, as I cannot without much griefe remember the same. And to go farther, we haue examples of the Scots yet fresh in memorie, who for the space of seuen hun∣dred yeares, had with the straitest alliance that might be, bene allied vnto the house of Fraunce, and from thence receiued all the fauors that it was possible for them to hope for: yet when Mary queene of Scots had married Frances the Dalphin of France, and that the Frenchmen went about to dominier ouer the Scots, they forthwith chose ra∣ther [ C] to cast themselues into the lap of the English, and so to put themselues into the protection of them with whome they had not before so well agreed, than to endure to see the Frenchmen to commaund in their countrey: neither ceased they vntill that by the helpe and power of the English, they had driuen the Frenchmen againe quite out of Scotland. Neither are strange princes to hope, by reason to rule the desires of so∣ueraigne princesses their wiues: from whom if they will seeke to be diuorsed, they must also banish themselues. For what prince euer bare himselfe more modestly, than did the wise emperour Marcus Aurelius? And yet when he with too much patience bare with the wantonnesse of his wife Faustine (as some of his friends thought) who for her too dissolute life ▪would haue persuaded him to haue bene diuorced from her; Then must [ D] we (said he) againe vnto her restore her dowrie: which was euen the Roman empire, howbeit that he had the empire in the right of himselfe also, by the adoption of Anto∣ninus Pius the father of Faustine.

And yet there is another daunger also, if the princesse heire vnto a soueraigne estate* 1.2129 be disposed to marry a straunger; which is, that the neighbour princes and people also, as wooers, enter into diuers iealous conceits one of them against another: & so striuing for another bodies kingdome, oftentimes turne the queene from marrying at all. Yea sometimes also seeking euen by force of armes to haue her: as did the wooers of Venda queene of Russia, who hauing long •…•…ought who should haue her, the victor thought at last by force to haue obtained that which he by long sute and entreatie could not gaine: [ E] howbeit that she seeing no other remedie, but to fall into his hands, for despight drow∣ned her selfe, chusing rather to loose her life, than by force to loose her chastitie. Nei∣ther are queenes marriages so easily made as are kings: for why, kings are oftentimes deceiued with painted tables, and counterfeits, marrying them by their deputies whom they neuer saw: whereas queenes will most commonly see the men themselues aliue, talke with them, and make good proofe of them: yea and oftentimes refuse them also* 1.2130 after that they haue seene them. For neither would Isabel queene of Castile, marrie Ferdinand before she had seene him: neither could Elisabeth queene of England be by any man persuaded to promise marriage vnto any man, but vnto himselfe present. And

so it was aunswered vnto Henry king of Sweden, seeking the long ambassage of Iohn his [ F] brother, who now raigneth, to haue married her: aunswer (I say) was made, That of al the princes in the world, there was none vnto whome (next vnto almightie God) shee was more in kindnesse beholden, than vnto the king of Sweden, for that hee alone had requested to haue had her for his wife, whilest she was yet a prisoner, and so out of pri∣son to haue brought her vnto a kingdome: neuerthelesse to haue so resolued and set downe with her selfe, neuer to marry any man whom she had not before seene. Which aunswere made also vnto the archduke of Austria, suing vnto her for marriage, in part brake off the hope which both of them had conceiued of marriage, both of them fea∣ring in presence to suffer the disgrace of a deniall; and especially he, least he should be enforced with shame to returne home. As afterwards it happened vnto Francis duke [ G] of Alanson, seeking to haue aspired vnto the same marriage, who although hee had twice passed ouer into England, and thought the queene by long and honourable am∣bassages, as it were affianced vnto him, yet returned hee, fed vp but with a vaine hope, and the matter left vndone.

Now if the law of nature be violated in the soueraigne gouernment of women, yet much more is the ciuill law, and the law of nations thereby broken, which will that the wife follow her husband, albeit that he haue neither fire, nor dwelling place. Wherein all the lawyers and diuines in one agree; and that she ought to reuerence her husband: as also that the fruits of the wiues dowrie, yea euen of all the wiues goods, belong vnto her husband; not onely such as arise of the lands themselues, but euen such as fall vnto [ H] her by escheat, or confiscation of the goods of the condemned; howbeit that such goods be a thousand times better, or more worthy, than the wiues fee brought in dow∣rie vnto her husband: yet neuerthelesse do all such things in proprietie belong vnto the husband, what lordship soeuer that it be, which is so fallen by escheat or confiscation: as also all fruits of dowrie▪ and the rights of patronage depending of the wiues dowrie: which we see to haue bene vsed not of priuat men onely, but euen of kings also: as if a straunger shall marrie a queene, the profits of the kingdome shall belong vnto the hus∣band, although the soueraigntie, and kingdome it selfe belong still vnto the wife. For so the interpretors of the law decide it, and that by the example of Isabella and Socina. Moreouer it is holden in law, That the wiues vassall ought to succour the husband be∣fore [ I] the wife, in case they be both of them in like daunger: all which is directly contra∣rie to such conditions, and lawes, as princes straungers are enforced to receiue from their wiues, being princesses inheritors. Besides that, honor, dignitie, & nobilitie, depen∣deth wholly of men, and so of the husband, and not of the wife: which is so true by the receiued customes and laws of all people: as that noble women which marrie base hus∣bands in so doing loose their former nobilitie: neither can their children chalenge vnto themselues any nobilitie by the mothers side: which Ancaran the lawyer saith to take place euen in queenes which marrie base men, no princes: of which opinion the rest of the lawyers are also.

All these absurdities and inconueniences follow womens soueraigntie in gouern∣ment, [ K] * 1.2131 which thereof tooke beginning: for that they which had no male children, had rather their daughters should succeed in their lands and fee, than such as were not of their stocke and house, and especially the heires male failing, both in the direct & col∣laterall line: after which point so by them gained, they began to succeed also vnto lands and fees in the right line, and were preferred before the males in the collateral line: which manner of inheriting was by little and little permitted to be vnderstnod, and ex∣tended also vnto Honours, Dignities, Counties, Marquisats, Dutchies, Principalities, yea and at last euen vnto Kingdomes. Howbeit that by the lawes of Fees, women

were excluded from all succession in fee, although there were no heires male either in [ A] the direct or collaterall line, except it were so expresly set downe in the inuestiture of the fee. But the law Salique cutteth the matter short, and expresly forbiddeth, That the woman should by any meanes succeed into any fee, of what nature or condition soeuer it were: which is no late, new, or fained law, as many suppose, but written and enrolled in the most auntient lawes of the Saliens, the words of which law are these, De terra ve∣ro Salica nullo portio haereditatis mulieri veniat: sed ad virilem sexum tota terrae haeredi∣tas perueniat: In English thus▪ But of the land Salique no portion of the inheritance shall come vnto a woman: but all the inheritance of that land shall come vnto the male sexe. And so also in the edict or decree of Childebert king of Fraunce, is euen the very same comprehended which is in the lawes Salique, where the nephewes being in direct [ B] line, by way of * 1.2132 representation together called vnto the succession of their grandfa∣ther, the women are still excluded. And yet if there had bene no law Salique, at such time as contention was for the kingdome of Fraunce, betwixt Philip earle of Va∣lois, and king Edward of England: Philip alleaging for himselfe the law Salique, accor∣ding to the law Voconia; and Edward defending his cause and right by the antient Ro∣man lawes, concerning inheritance: a decree was made by the generall consent of all the Senators and princes of Fraunce, Ne quis in ea disceptatione peregrinarum legum au∣ctoritate vteretur: sed legem quisque Salicam pro suo iure interpretari studeret, viz. That* 1.2133 no man in that controuersie should vse the authoritie of forraine lawes; but that euery man according to his right should interpret the law Salique. And why so if there had [ C] bene no Salique law at all? And howbeit that after the death of Lewes Hutin the king of Fraunce, the duke of Burgundie called Iane the daughter of Hutin, vnto the successi∣on of her fathers crowne and kingdome: yet was it by the generall consent of all the estates assembled in parliament at Paris, resolued to the contrarie, As that daughters should not succeed vnto the crowne: & so the opinion of the duke was reiected. About which time, or a little before, Baldus called the law Salique, or the custome for the males onely to succeed vnto the crowne, Ius gentium Gallo•…•…, The law of the French nati∣on. Neither is it long agoe, since that in a suit in the parliament of Burdeaux, betwixt certaine gentlemen about the right of their gentrie; a will was brought out, written in [ D] most auntient letters, wherein the testator diuided vnto his sonnes his Salique land; which the judges interpreted to be his prediall fees, or reuenewes in land. Which was alwayes in Germanie obserued also, vntill that the emperour Frederike the second gaue this priuilege as a singular benefit vnto the house of Austria, That the line of the males failing, the daughters or females might succeed. Which thing the emperour could not doe, without the expresse will and consent of the estates of the empire. For which cause Othocarus king of Bohemia, being also of the house of Austria, without regard of Frederikes graunt, by right of kindred claimed the dukedome of Austria, and leuied a strong army against Rodolph, who by vertue of Frederikes graunt, claimed the duke∣dome as belonging vnto himselfe. Which priuilege for women so to succeed, was af∣terwards extended vnto the princes of the house of Bauiere also. Yet was there neuer [ E] people so effeminat, or cowardly, as vnder the colour of succession in fee, to endure that women should step into the soueraigntie: and yet lesse in Asia, and in Affrike, than in Europe. Howbeit that with whatsoeuer madnesse other princes and people haue bene astonied, which haue endured womens soueraigntie, yet haue the Frenchmen (God be thanked) by the benefit of the law Salique, alwayes hitherto preserued them∣selues from this disgrace. For why, this Salique law which M. Cirier Councellour of the parliament, said to haue bene made with a great quantitie of the salt of wisdome, was not onely alleaged and put in practise, in the raigne of Philip Valois, and of Charls

the Faire, against whome the daughters pretended no claime vnto the kingdome: but [ F] also in the time of Clotha•…•…re, Sigebert, and Childebert, who were all preferred before the kings their predecessours daughters, who neuer laid claime vnto the crowne. And that is it for which Baldus the notable lawyer, speaking of the house of Burbon, holdeth, That the male of the •…•…ame blood and name, beeing a thousand degrees off, should sooner succeed vnto the crowne and kingdome of Fraunce, than any woman much neerer. Which is not onely to take place in kingdomes, but euen in dukedoms and other principalities also, which haue the marks and rights of soueraigntie belong∣ing vnto them. Which lawes also we see all people, excepting some few, to haue al∣wayes before embraced. And so the princes of Sauoy, by the authoritie of this Salique law, haue alwayes excluded the women from the gouernment: for so wee read Con∣stance [ G] the daughter of the duke of Sauoy, to haue by Peter of Sauoy her vncle bene excluded from the gouernment: and that euen by the sentence and doome of the jud∣ges and arbitrators, chosen for the deciding of the matter in the yeare one thousand two hundred fiftie six. Yet doubt I not but that many are afraid of womens soueraign∣tie, who yet indeed doubt not to shew themselues most obedient vnto womens lusts. But it is no matter (as old Cato was woont to say) whether that the soueraigntie it selfe be giuen to women, or that the emperours and kings bee themselues obedient vnto womens pleasures and commands.

Seeing then it appeareth plainely enough (as I suppose) the estate of a Monarchy to be of all other estates most sure; a•…•…d amongst Monarchies, the Royall Monarchy [ H] to bee best: as also amongst kings them to excell which bee descended from the race and stocke of kings: and in briefe, that in the royall race the neerest of the blood is still to be preferred before the rest that were farther off: and that the soueraigntie (the fe∣male sexe excluded) ought to bee still vndiuided. Let vs now also at last see how it* 1.2134 ought to be gouerned, as whether by iustice Distributiue, Commutatiue, or Harmo∣nicall. For why, the fairest conclusion that can bee made in this worke, is to conclude of iustice, as the foundation of all Commonweales, and of such consequence, as that Plato himselfe harh entituled his bookes of Commonweals, Bookes of Law, or of Iustice, howbeit that he speaketh in them rather like a Philosopher, than a Lawgiuer, [ I] or Lawyer.

(▪)

CHAP. VI. [ A] Of the three kinds of Iustice, Distributiue, Commutatiue, and Harmonicall: and what proportion they haue vnto an estate Royall, Aristocra∣tique and Popular.

LEt vs then say in continuing of our purpose, that it is not e∣nough to maintaine, that a Monarchy is the best estate of a Commonweal, & which in it hath the least inconuenience; except wee also (as we said) add thereunto, a Monarchy Roi∣all. [ B] Neither yet sufficeth it to say, that the Royall Monarchy is most excellent, if we should not also shew that vnto the ab∣solute perfection thereof it ought to be fast knit together by an Aristocratique and Popular kind of gouernment: that is to say, by an Harmonicall mixture of Iustice, composed of* 1.2135 Iustice Distributiue, or Geometricall; and Commutatiue, or Arithmeticall: which are proper vnto the estates Aristocratique, and Popular. In which doing, the estate of the Monarchy shall be simple, and yet the gouernment so compound and mixt, without any confusion at all of the three kind of Estates, or Commonweales. For wee haue be∣fore [ C] shewed, that there is great difference betwixt the mingling, or rather confounding of the three estates of Commonweales in one (a thing altogether impossible) and the making of the gouernment of a Monarchy, to bee Aristocratique and Popular. For as amongst Monarchies, the Royall Monarchy so gouerned (as I haue said) is the most commendable: euen so amongst kingdomes, that which holdeth most, or com∣meth neerest vnto this Harmonicall Iustice, is of others the most perfect. Which things for that they may seeme obscure, neither are to my remembrance by any mans writings declared; I must endeuor my selfe that they may by manifest and plaine de∣monstration be vnderstood. Iustice therefore I say to be The right diuision of rewards* 1.2136 and punishments, and of that which of right vnto euery man belongeth; which the He∣brewes [ D] by a straunge word call Credata: for the difference betwixt this and the other Iustice giuen vnto men by God, whereby we are iustified, which they call Tsedaca. For that by these, as by most certaine guides, wee must enter into this most religious and stately temple of Iustice. But this equall diuision which we seeke for, can in no wise be accomplished, or performed, but by a moderat mixture, and confusion of equalitie, and similitude together, which is the true proportion Harmonicall, and whereof no man hath as yet spoken.

Plato hauing presupposed the best forme of a Commonweale, to be that which was composed of a Tyrannicall and Popular estate: in framing the same, is contrarie vnto himselfe, hauing established a Commonweale not onely Popular, but altogether al∣so [ E] Popularly gouerned; giuing vnto the whole assembly of his citisens, the power to make, and to abrogat lawes, to place and displace all manner of officers, to determine of peace and warre, to iudge of the goods, the life, and honour, of euery particular man in soueraigntie: which is indeed the true Popular estate, and Popularly also gouerned. And albeit that he had so (as we say) formed his Commonweale, yet neuerthelesse hee said▪ That the Commonweale could neuer be happie, if it were not by Geometricall proportion gouerned; saying that God (whome euerie wise lawmaker ought to imi∣tat) in the gouernment of the world alwayes vseth Geometricall proportion. The same Plato hauing also (as some say) oftentimes in his mouth these three words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is to say, God alwayes to be playing the Geometritian: which [ F] words indeed sauour well of Plato his stile, howbeit that they be not in all his works to be found.

Now certaine it is, that Distributiue, or Geometricall Iustice, is most contrarie vnto the Popular estate and gouernment by Plato set downe: the people still seeking after nothing more, than for equalitie in all things; a thing proper vnto Commutatiue, or Arithmeticall Iustice. Which was the cause for which Xenophon (Plato his compani∣on,* 1.2137 and both of them iealous one of anothers glory) being of opinion, That Common∣weales ought to be framed, and the lawes administred according vnto Arithmeticall proportion and equalitie, bringeth in Cyrus yet a boy, corrected and chastised, for that he being chosen king, had chaunged but the seruants garments, appointing better ap∣parell [ G] vnto them of the better sort, and meaner vnto them of the meaner sort: as hauing therein regard vnto decencie, and the proportion Geometricall. After which chastise∣ment, Cyrus is by his maister taught, to giue vnto euery man that which vnto him be∣longeth, and to remember that he was a Persian borne, and was therefore to vse the Persian lawes and customes, which gaue vnto euery man that which was vnto him proper: and not the manners and fashions of the Medes, who thought it meet, that to be vnto euery man giuen, which was decent and conuenient for him. Which writings of Xenophon, Plato hauing read, and knowing right well that it was himselfe, and not Cy∣rus, which had bene corrected; forthwith reproued the Cyropaedia, without naming of any partie. This diuersitie of opinions, betwixt Xenophon and Plato (famous among [ H] the Greeks) was the cause of two great factions, the one of the Nobilitie and richer sort, who held for Geometricall Iustice, and the Aristocraticall estate; the other of the baser and poorer sort, who maintained Commutatiue or Arithmeticall Iustice, and there∣fore wished to haue had all estates and Commonweales Popular. Now of these two factions arise a third, which was of opinion, That in euerie Commonweale Arithme∣ticall Iustice was to be kept in iust equalitie, when question was of the goods of any one in particular, or for the recompensing of offences and forfeitures: but if question were of common rewards to be bestowed out of the common treasure, or for the diui∣sion of countries conquered, or for the inflicting of common punishments, that then Distributiue, or Geometricall Iustice, was to be obserued and kept, hauing regard vnto [ I] the good or euill deserts, and the qualitie or calling of euery man: insomuch that these men vsed two proportions, and yet for all that diuersly, sometime the one and some∣time the other: as Aristotle said it ought to be done, but yet not naming either Plato or Xenophon, who yet had both first touched this string.

But as for Harmonicall Iustice, not one of the auntient writers either Greekes or* 1.2138 Latines, neither yet any other, euer made mention, whether it were for the distribution of Iustice, or for the gouernment of the Commonweale: which for all that is of the rest the most diuine, and most excellent and best fitting a Royall estate; gouerned in part Aristocratically, and in part Popularly. But forasmuch as this point we heare speake of, euill vnderstood, draweth after it a number of errours, whether it be in making of laws, [ K] or in the interpretation of them, or in all sorts of iudgements; and to the end also that euerie man may vnderstand, that this third opinion of Aristotle can no more be main∣tained than the other; it is needfull for vs to borrow the principles of the Mathemati∣tians, and the Lawyers resolutions. For why, it seemeth that the Lawyers for not re∣garding the Mathematitians, and Philosophers, as not hauing iudicial experience, haue not declared or manifested this point, which is of right great consequence (as I haue said) and that as well for the administration of Iustice, as for the maintaining of the af∣faires of state, as also of the whole Commonweale in generall.

Now the Geometricall proportion is that which is made of an vnequall excesse of [ A] * 1.2139 like magnitudes among themselues: but the Arithmeticall proportion is euery way both in progression, and excesse equall: and the Harmonicall proportion is of them both, by a wonderfull cunning (confused and combined together) made, and yet is vn∣to them both vnlike: the first of these proportions is semblable, the second is equall, & the third is in part equall, and in part semblable; as is to be seene by the examples in the margent set: where the proportion is treble of 3 to 9, and of 9 to 27, and of 27 to 81: and the proportion Arithmeticall following, beginneth of the same number of 3, and the same difference of 3 to 9: but the difference of 9 to 15 is not like, but yet equall: for betwixt these numbers there are alwayes six differing. And the proportion Harmoni∣call beginneth of 3 also, but the differences are not alwayes alike, neither altogether [ B] equall also, but therein is both the one and the other sweetly mixt and combind toge∣ther▪ as may well by Mathematicall demonstrations be vnderstood, whereinto it is not needfull for vs further at this time to enter: howbeit that certaine markes of them ma∣nifest enough, are in the auntient Roman lawes to be found; and by numbers in Geo∣metricall proportion set downe and reported. But the difference of the Geometricall* 1.2140 and Arithmetical proportion, is in this to be noted, That in the proportion Arithmeti∣call are alwayes the selfe same reasons, and the differences equall: whereas in the Geo∣metricall proportion they are alwayes semblable, but not the selfe same, neither yet e∣quall: except a man would say, that things semblable are also equall; which were no∣thing [ C] else, but improperly to speake: so as Solon did, who to gaine the hearts both of the nobilitie, and of the people of Athens, promised to make them lawes equall for all sorts of men: wherein the nobilitie and better sort of the people thought him to haue meant the Geometricall equalitie; and the common people, the Arithmeticall; and so to haue bene all equall: Which was the cause that both the one and the other by com∣mon consent made choyce of him for their lawmaker. Wherefore the Geometricall* 1.2141 gouernment of an estate is, when like are ioyned with like: as for example, by the laws of the twelue Tables, the Patricij, or Nobilitie, was forbidden to marrie with the com∣minaltie, and order taken, that noble men should marrie none but noble women: and they of the baser sort such also as were of like condition with themselues, slaues also [ D] marrying with slaues, as differing from both the other sort. Which law is also yet in∣uiolably kept among the Rhagusians. So were to be deemed also, if the law were, that princes should not marrie but with priuces, the rich with the rich, the poore with the poore, and slaues with slaues, by a Geometricall proportion. But if it were by law* 1.2142 prouided, that marriages should be made by lot; that law would bee vnto the people most acceptable and pleasing, to make all equall: for that so the noble and rich ladies should by lot oftentimes fall vnto the poore and baser sort of men; the slaue might mar∣rie the prince, the base artificer might haue to wife a woman honourably descended, most vnlike to his estate: So that by lot should the Popular equalitie bee preserued, agreeing with the Arithmeticall proportion: but the wealth and dignitie of the nobili∣tie [ E] and richer sort be quite ouerthrowne. And that is it for which Euripides saith, A* 1.2143 lawfull equalitie to be most agreeable vnto mans nature, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But both these formes of gouernment according to either Arithmeticall, or Ge∣ometricall proportion, draw after them diuers inconueniences: For in the one the poorer and vulgar sort are cast downe, and in the other the nobilitie and richer sort are contemned and disgraced. Whereas the Harmonicall manner of gouernment, with a most sweet consent, preserueth both (so much as possibly is) not confounding all sorts of people hand ouer head together. And not to go out of the example by vs propoun∣ded of marriages, he that would keepe the Harmonicall gouernment, should not re∣quire

in the marriages of the nobilitie, the noble descent too farre fet both on the one [ F] * 1.2144 side and the other: as many of the Germans most daungerously doe, who most curi∣ously search out their great great grandfathers fathers, of like nobilitie on both sides, to ioyne together their nobilitie in marriage: which is too farre to remoue and seperat the nobilitie, not from the baser sort onely, but euen from it selfe also; considering that they content not themselues, that the gentleman be noble by the father onely, as it sufficeth in the kingdome of Polonia, by the decree of Alexander king of Polonia: or by the father, and the grandfather, as is sufficient in this realme, by a law of king Frances the 1: or by father, and mother, and grandfather, on both sides, as is set downe by the new de∣crees of the knights of Sauoy: but they will that the right gentleman shew that hee is descended of two hundred and threescore noble persons, if the interpretation that many [ G] giue of a right gentleman be true: Some others will haue seuen degrees of nobilitie to suffice, deriued from the fathers and mothers side without disparagement. But such lawes are daungerous, and full of seditions: and for this cause the law concerning mar∣riages, which Appius the Decemuir is said to haue put into the Twelue Tables, was at the motion of Canuleius the Tribune as daungerous, repealed: for that thereby the subiects loue was rent in sunder, and the citie by seditions ouerthrowne: which tumults and seditions the law being once abrogated, and alliances made betwixt the nobilitie and the comminaltie, vpon the sudden ceased: howbeit that noble women haue sel∣dome married from the nobilitie, but noble men haue oftentimes married with meane women: for that nobilitie is still to bee obtained from the father. And indeed it best [ H] * 1.2145 agreeth with Harmonicall proportion, if a rich base woman marrie with a poore gen∣tleman; or a poore gentlewoman with a rich common person: and she that in beauty and feature excelleth, vnto him which hath some one or other rare perfection of the mind: in which matches they better agree, than if they were in all respects equall: as amongst marchants there is no partnership or societie better, or more assured, than when the rich lazie marchant is partner with the poore industrious man; for that there is betwixt them both equalitie, and similitude: equalitie, in that both the one and the other haue in them some good thing: and similitude, in that they both two haue in them some defect or want. And this is it for which the auntient Greekes aptly fained, Loue to haue bene begotten of Porus and Penia, that is to say, of Plentie and Pouertie, [ I] loue growing betwixt them two: so as in song the Meane betwixt the Base and the Treble, maketh a sweet and melodious consent and harmonie. For why, it is by nature to all men engrafied, for them still to loue most, the thing themselues want most: so commonly the foule seeketh after the faire; the poore, the rich; the coward, the vali∣ant: whereas if the rich and noble should likewise marrie with the noble and rich, they should one of them make lesse account and reckoning of the other, for that one of them little wanted the others helpe. For as the maister of a feast ought not without discre∣tion to place his guests hand ouer head, as they first came into the house, without any respect had of their age, sexe, or condition: so also ought he not to set all his best guests in the highest and most honourable places: neither all the wise men together with the [ K] wise, neither old men with old men, nor young men with young men, women with women, nor fools with fooles: following therein the Geometricall proportion, which seeketh after nothing else but the semblablenesse of things; a thing of it selfe foolish and vnpleasant. But the wisest maister of a feast will place and enterlace quiet men betwixt* 1.2146 quarrellers, wise men amongst fooles; that so they may by their talke in some sort as with a medicine be cured: so betwixt cauillers shall he set a quiet man, and vnto an old babler ioyne a still and silent man, so to giue him occasion to speake, and teach the other to speake lesse: by a poore man he shall place a rich, that so hee may extend his

bountie vnto him, and he againe for the same of the other receiue thanks: so amongst [ A] seuere and tetricall men, he shall mingle others of a more ciuill and courteous dispositi∣on; in which doing he shall not onely auoid the enuie and heart-burning of such as might complaine themselues to be placed in too low places, or not in such order as they desired (a thing hardly to be auoided where question is of degree and place;) but also of such a most beautifull harmonicall, and orderly placing, shal arise a most sweet consent, as wel of euery one of the guests with other, as also of them altogether. Which beauti∣fulnesse of Harmonicall order, he which will with Geometricall semblablenesse, or Arithmeticall confusion, inuert or trouble, he shall so take from out of the feast all the profit, all the sweetnesse, and loue, which should still be amongst guests. And for this* 1.2147 cause men say, Scipio Africanus to haue bene blamed by the wiser sort of men, and such [ B] as saw farthest into matters of state, for that hee first of all others had made lawes con∣cerning the Theatre, giuing therein the first places vnto the Senators, and so in the be∣holding of the playes separating them from the people; when as by the space of 558 yeares before, euen from the foundation of the citie, the Senators had indifferently to∣gether with the poore stood to behold the playes: which sepation so made, much alie∣anated the one of them from the other, and was the cause of many great and daunge∣rous tumults and broyles afterwards in that Commonweale. Neither is it enough that the lawes and magistrats constraine the subiects for feare of punishment to forbeare to wrong one another, and so to liue in peace; but they must also bring to passe, that al∣though there were no lawes at all, yet they should be at vnitie among themselues, and [ C] one of them still loue another. For that the foundation of marriages, as all other hu∣mane* 1.2148 societies, which are almost innumerable, resteth in loue and friendship, which can∣not long continue without that Harmonical & mutual concord which I haue alreadie spoke of: and which cannot possibly either by Geometrical or Arithmeticall Iustice & gouernmēt be done, for that the proportion both of the one & of the other, is for most part disioyned a•…•…d separat: wheras the nature of the Harmonicall proportion alwaies vniteth together the extreams, by reason that it hath accord both with the one and with the other: as by the examples propounded we are taught.

Now the equall gouernment and by proportion Arithmeticall, is naturall vnto Po∣pular [ D] * 1.2149 estates, who would that men still should equally diuide estates, honours, offices, benefits, common treasures, countries conquered: and if lawes be to be made, or offi∣cers ordained, or that iudgement be to be giuen of life and death, their desire is, that all the people should thereunto be called, and that the voice of the greatest foole and bed∣lem should be of as great weight and force, as the voyce of the wisest man: in briefe, the more popular sort thinke it best, that all should be cast into lot and weight: as the aun∣tient Greekes, who in three words set forth the true Popular estates, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is to say, All by lot and ballance: or else to measure all things by a most right rule, and euery way with Arithmeticall proportion equall. Which for that it is most stearne and inflexible, is after our phrase called Right, and to do iustice, is said, To do Right: which maner of speech seemeth to haue bene taken from the Hebrews, who [ E] call their bookes of Law and Iustice, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, The Booke of Right, or as the Chaldean interpretor translateth it, The Booke of Rightnesse: either for that the way of vertue and iustice hath no windings or turnings, nor suffereth vs this way or that way to turne out of the right way; or else for that it is the selfe same vnto all men, with∣out respect of any mans person, not to bee moued with loue or hatred towards any man. Such an one as many haue though Policletus his rule to haue bene, so straight and hard, as that it might more easily be broken than bowed either vnto the one side or the other: vnto the patterne & straightnesse whereof all artificers directed their rules. Such

is also the forme of a Popular gouernment, when all goeth by lot, and by strait and im∣mutable [ F] lawes, without any iust and indifferent interpretation, without any priuilege or acception of person: in such sort, as that the nobles are subiect euen vnto the selfe same punishments that the baser sort are; the fines and penalties being alike vppon the rich and vpon the poore, and the like reward appointed for the strong, and for the weake, for the captaine, and for the souldiour.

But now to the contrarie, the Aristocratike gouernment according to Geometricall* 1.2150 proportion, is like vnto the Lesbian rule, which being made of lead, was euerie way so pliant and flexible, as that it might be vnto euery stone so aptly fitted and applied, as that no part (so much as possible was) might thereof be lost: wheras others, who were woont to apply the stone vnto the straight rule, oftentimes lost much thereof. So say [ G] some, that judges ought in iudgement to apply the lawes vnto the causes in question before them, and according to the varietie of the persons, times, & places, so to decline from that inflexible straightnesse. Howbeit in mine opinion▪ as it is impossible for a rule so pliant euery way, as was the Libian Rule, to keepe the name of a rule: so must also the strength and name of the law perish, which the judge may at his pleasure euery way turne like a nose of waxe, and so become the master and moderator of the law, where∣of indeed •…•…e ought to be but the vpright minister.

Wherefore a little to decline from that inflexible straightnesse of Polycletus his rule, as also from the vncertaine pliantnesse of the Lesbian rule, that is to say, from the Arith∣meticall, and Geometricall proportion of gouernment of estates; a certaine third kind [ H] of rule is by vs to be deuised, not so stiffe, but that it may bee easily bowed when need shall be, and yet forthwith become also straight againe: that is to say, Harmonicall Iu∣stice: which I thinke may well bee done, if wee shall conclude and shut vp the gouernment of estate within those foure tearmes which wee haue before combi∣ned, viz. the Law, Equitie, the Execution of the law, and the Office or Dutie of the* 1.2151* 1.2152 Magistrat or Iudge: whether it be in the administration of iustice, or the gouernment of the estate: which haue amongst themselues the same proportion which these foure numbers haue, viz. 4, 6, 8, 12. For what the proportion is of 4 to 6, the same the pro∣portion is of 8 to 12: and againe the same reason is of 4 to 8, that there is of 6 to 12. So the Law also hath respect vnto Equitie; as hath the Execution of the Law, vnto the [ I] Dutie of the Magistrat: or els contrariwise, For Execution serueth vnto the Law, as doth the Dutie of the Magistrat vnto Equitie. But if you shall transpose these numbers before set in Harmonicall proportion, and so make the Magistrat superiour vnto Equi∣tie; and the Execution of the Law, to be aboue the Law it selfe; both the Harmonie of the Commonweale, and musicall consent thereof, shall perish. As for Geometricall proportion, the tearmes thereof being transposed, is yet alwayes like vnto it selfe, whe∣ther it be in continuall proportion, as in these foure numbers, 2, 4, 8, 16; or in proporti∣on disioyned, as 2, 4, 3, 6: conuert the order of the numbers, and say, 6, 3, 4, 2, or 3, 2, 4, 6; or in what order soeuer you shall place them, there shall alwayes be the same proporti∣on of the first vnto the second, which is of the third vnto the fourth; and againe of the [ K] first vnto the third, which is of the second vnto the fourth. And albeit that a continuat proportion is more pleasing than that which ariseth of diuided numbers, yet maketh it of it selfe no consent; as for example, 2, 4, 8, 16: and much lesse if it consist of Arith∣meticall proportions, whether that they be diuided in this sort, 2, 4, 5, 7, or els ioyned as 2, 4, 6, 8: both which proportions as farre differ from Harmonicall proportion, as* 1.2153 doth warme water from that which is most cold, or else scaulding hoat. And so in like case may we say, that if the prince, or the nobilitie, or the people, all together hauing the soueraigntie, whether it be in a Monarchy, in an Aristocratike, or Popular estate, go∣uerne

themselues without any law, leauing all vnto the discretion of the magistrats, [ A] or else of themselues distribute the rewards and punishments, according to the greatnes, qualitie, or desert, of euery man; howbeit that this manner of gouernment might seeme in apparance faire and good, as not hauing therein either fraud or fauour (a thing for all that impossible:) yet for all that could not this maner of gouernment be of any con∣tinuance, or assurance, for that it hath not in it any bond wherewith to bind the greater vnto the lesser, nor by consequence any accord at all: and much lesse shall it haue of suretie, if all be gouerned by equalitie and immutable lawes, without applying of the equitie thereof according vnto the particular varietie of the places, of the times, and of the persons: if all honours and rewards shall be giuen to all men indifferently, by Arith∣meticall proportion alike, without respect of honour, person, or desert: in which state [ B] of a Commonweale all the glorie of vertue must needes decay and perish. Wherefore as two simple medicines in the extremitie of heat & cold, and so in operation and pow∣er* 1.2154 most vnlike one of them vnto the other, are of themselues apart vnto men deadly &* 1.2155 daungerous; and yet being compound & tempered one of them with the other, make oftentimes a right wholesome and soueraigne medicine: so also these two proportions of Arithmeticall and Geometricall gouernment, the one gouerning by law onely, and the other by discretion without any law at all, do ruinat and destroy estates and Commonweales: but being by Harmonicall proportion compounded and combined together, serue well to preserue and maintaine the same. [ C]

Wherefore Aristotle is deceiued, in deeming the Commonweale then to be hap∣py,* 1.2156 when it shall chaunce to haue a prince of so great vertue and wisdome, as that hee both can and will with greatest equitie, gouerne his subiects without lawes. For why, the law is not made for the prince, but for the subiects in generall, and especially for the magistrats; who haue their eyes oft times so blinded with fauour, hatred, or corrup∣tion, as that they cannot so much as see any small glympse of the beautie of equitie, law and iustice.

And albeit that the magistrats were angels, or that they could not in any sort bee misseled or deceiued, yet neuerthelesse were it needfull to haue laws, wherewith as with a certaine candle, the ignorant might be directed in the thickest darknesse of mens acti∣ons; [ D] and the wicked for feare of punishment also terrified. For albeit that the eternall law of things honest and dishonest be in the hearts of euery one of vs, by the immortall God written, yet were no penalties so in mens minds by God registred, whereby the wicked might be from their iniurious and wicked life reclaimed. Wherefore the same immortall and most mightie God, who hath euen naturally engrafted in vs the know∣ledge of right and wrong, with his owne mouth published his laws, and thereunto an∣nexed also penalties: before which lawes no penalties were appointed, neither any law maker so much as once before remembred or spoken of. For proofe whereof let it be, that neither Orpheus, nor Homer, nor Musaeus, the most auntient Greeke writers; nei∣ther* 1.2157 any other which were before Moyses (who was more auntient than all the Paynim [ E] gods) in all their workes so much as once vse the word Law: kings by their hand, their word, and soueraigne power, commaunding all things.

The first occasion of making of lawes, was the chaunging of Monarchies into Po∣pular* 1.2158 and Aristocratique Commonweales: which they first did at Athens, in the time of Draco, and afterward of Solon: and in Lacedemonia, in the time of Lycurgus, who tooke from the two kings the soueraignty. Whose examples the other cities of Greece and Italie set before themselues to behold and imitate, viz. The Dorians, the Ionians, the Cretensians, the Locrensians, they of Elis, Crotona, Tarentum, and Rome, with di∣uers other townes in Italie: in which cities the people were euer at variance and discord

with the nobilitie; the poorer sort still seeking to be equall with the noble and richer: [ F] * 1.2159 which could not possibly be, but by the equalitie of lawes; which lawes they of the ri∣cher on the contrarie side vtterly reiected, seeking by all meanes to be therefrom free & priuileged: as they who with their wealth & power defended the Commonweale; and therefore thought it reason in honours and preferments, to bee aboue them of the inferiour sort: who indeed hauing so got the great estates and principall charges in the Commonweale, alwayes fauoured the richer sort, and them that were like vnto them∣selues, still contemning and oppressing the poore. Whereof proceeded the hard speeches and complaints of them of the meaner sort: which that they might in the ci∣tie of Rome haue some end, Terentius Arsa Tribune of the people, in the absence of the Consuls, blaming the pride of the Senators before the people, bitterly inueyed [ G] against the power of the Consuls; alleaging, That for one lord now there were two, with an immoderat and infinit power, who themselues loosed and discharged from all feare of lawes, turned all the penalties thereof vpon the poore people. Which their insolencie that it might not still endure, he said, He would publish a law for the creating of Fiue men, for to appoint lawes concerning the power of the Consuls, who from thenceforth should not vse further power, than that which the people should giue them ouer themselues, and not to haue their lust and insolencie any more for law. Six yeres was this law with great contention and strife betwixt the nobilitie and people de∣bated, and at length in the behalfe of the people established. But here it shall not bee a∣misse out of Liuie to set downe the very speeches and complaints of the nobilitie, ac∣counting [ H] it better to liue vnder the soueraigne power of a king without law, than to liue in subiection vnto the law, Regem hominem esse à quo impetres vbi ius, vbi iniuria opus sit, esse gratiae locum, esse beneficio, & irasci, & ignoscere posse, inter amicum & inimi∣cum discrimen nosce, leges rem surdam & inexor abilem esse, salubriorem melior emque ino∣pi quàm potenti; nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere simodum excesseris: periculosum esse in tot humanis erroribus sola innocentia viuere: The king (they said) to be a man of whom thou maiest obtaine something where need is, in right or wrong: fauour to bee able to doe something with him, as desert also, who knew both how to bee angry, and to grant pardon: as also to put a difference betwixt a friend and a foe: as for the law it to bee but a deafe and inexorable thing, whholsomer and better for the begger than the gen∣tleman; [ I] to haue no release nor mercie, if thou shalt once transgresse the same: it to be a very daungerous thing in so many mens frailties, to liue only vpon a mans innocencie: Thus much Liuie. After that the lawes of the Twelue Tables were made, where amongst others there was one very popular, and quite contrarie vnto the commaund and power of the nobilitie, and was this, Priuilegia nisi commitijs centuriatis ne irrogan∣to: qui secus faxit, Capital esto, Let no priuileges be graunted but in the great assemblies of the estates: who so shall otherwise do, let him die the death. By which strict lawes the judges and magistrats for a time so gouerned the people, as that there was no place left for pardon or arbitrarie iudgement, to be giuen according vnto equitie and consci∣ence without law. As it also happened, after that king Frauncis the first had subdued [ K] Sauoy, the new Gouernours and Magistrats oftentimes gaue iudgement contrarie vn∣to the custome of the countrey, and written law, hauing more regard vnto the equitie* 1.2160 of causes, than vnto the law. For which cause the estates of the countrey by their am∣bassadours requested of the king, That from thenceforth it should not bee lawfull for the Gouernours or Iudges, to iudge according vnto arbitrarie equitie: which was no other thing, than to bind them vnto the strict lawes, without turning either this way or that way, than which nothing can be more contrary vnto the minds and proceedings of fauourable or corrupt judges. And therefore Charondas the Carthaginensian law∣giuer

(a man very popular) forbid the magistrats in any thing, to depart from the words [ A] of the law, how vniust soeuer they seemed for to be. Francis Conan Maister of the Re∣quests, being commaunded to heare the aforesaid ambassadour of the Sauoyans, wri∣teth himselfe to haue greatly maruelled, that they should request so vnreasonable a thing: as viz. That it should not be lawfull for their magistrats to iudge according to the equitie of the cause, but the strictnesse of the law: and reprehendeth also D. Faber, for saying, That in this realm there are none but the soueraigne courts, which can iudge according to the equitie of the cause: saying moreouer, That he himselfe doubted not so to do, when as yet he was the least judge in Fraunce. Howbeit that the ambassadors thought their judges by the strict obseruing of the lawes, to bee better kept within the compasse of their duties, if the colour of equitie being taken away, they should still [ B] * 1.2161 iudge according to the very law. Accursius not so elegantly as aptly vnto that he meant it, willed the vnlearned judges, strictly to stand vpon the very words of the law: like vnskilfull riders, who doubting to be able to sit the horse they are mounted vppon, for feare of falling hold fast by the saddle.

But for the better vnderstanding and explaining of this matter, it is to be considered, that the word Equitie is diuersly taken. For Equitie referred vnto a soueraigne prince, is as much as for him to declare or expound, or correct the law: but referred vnto a ma∣gistrat or iudge, is nothing else, but for him to asswage and mitigat the rigor of the law: or as occasion shall require aggrauat the too much •…•…enitie thereof: or else to supply the defect thereof when as it hath not sufficiently prouided for the present case offered, that [ C] so the purport and meaning of the law saued, the health and welfare both of the lawes and Commonweale may be respected and prouided for. In which sence not the soue∣raigne* 1.2162 courts onely, but euen the least judges of all haue power to iudge & pronounce sentence according vnto the equitie of the cause; whether it be by vertue of their office, or that the proceeding before them is by way of request; or that the prince hath sent them some commission, or other letters of iustice for such their proceeding, which they may either accept or reiect: following therein the lawes of our kings, and the clause of the letters carrying these words, So farre forth as shall seeme right and iust: or that the prince by his expresse rescript or edict committeth any thing vnto their conscience by [ D] these words, Wherewith wee charge their conscience: as oft times wee see those things which for the infinit varietie of causes, cannot by lawes be prouided for, to bee by the prince committed vnto the religion and conscience of the magistrats, without any ex∣ception of such judges or magistrats: in which case the least judges haue as much pow∣er as the greatest: and yet neuerthelesse they cannot (as may the soueraigne courts) frustrat appeales, neither quite and cleane absolue and discharge the accused, but onely vntill they be commaunded againe to make their appearance in iudgement, after the manner and forme of the Lacedemonians (as saith Plutarch) when they are any way at∣tainted of crime: neither can they also releeue, or hold for well releeued, a man appea∣ling* 1.2163 from a judge royall: nor other such like thing. Neither is it any noueltie, many things to be in iudgement lawfull for the greater magistrats or judges, which are not [ E] lawfull for the lesser: when as in the Pandects of the Hebrewes we read it to haue bene lawfull onely for the court of the wise and graue Senators (which they properly call Hacanim, and corruptly Sanadrim) to iudge of causes according vnto equitie: but not for the other lesser judges also.* 1.2164

But now whereas by the orders and customes of all the cities of Italie, it is prouided, That the Iudges may not swarue from the very words of the law, excludeth not thereby either the equitie, or yet the reasonable exposition of the law: as Alexander the most famous lawyer of his time, according to the opinion of Bartholus, aunswered: who in

that respect put no difference betwixt the great magistrat and the little. For that to say [ F] truely, the law without equitie, is as a bodie without a soule, for that it concerning but things in generall, leaueth the particular circumstances, which are infinit, to be by equa∣litie sought out according to the exigence of the places, times, and persons: whereunto it behoueth the magistrat or judge so to apply the laws, whether it be in tearmes of iu∣stice, or in matter of estate, as that thereof ensue neither any inconuenience nor absurdi∣tie* 1.2165 whatsoeuer. Howbeit yet that the magistrat must not so farre bend the law, as to breake the same, although that it seeme to be right hard: whereas it is of it selfe cleere enough. For so saith Vlpian, Dura lex est: sic tamen scripta, An hard law it is (saith he) but yet so it is written. A hard law he called it, but yet not an vniust law: for why, it is not lawfull rashly to blame the law, of iniustice. But yet it is another thing, if the law [ G] cannot without iniurie be applied vnto the particular matter that is in question: for that in this case (as the lawyer sayth) the law is by the decree of the magistrat to be qualified and moderated. But when he saith the Magistrat, he sufficieutly sheweth that it belon∣geth not vnto the other particular judges so to do, but onely vnto the Pretor, as graun∣ted vnto him by the Pretorian law, at the institution of his office: whereby power was giuen him to supply, expound, and correct the lawes.

But forasmuch as that greatly concerned the rights of soueraigntie, princes after∣wards* 1.2166 (the Popular estate being taken away) reserued vnto themselues the expoun∣ding and correcting of the laws, especially in cases doubtful, arising betwixt the Law and Equitie; about the true vnderstanding and exposition of the law. And therefore the [ H] judges and gouernours of prouinces, in auntient time doubting of the law, still demaun∣ded the emperours aduise and opinion, when as the case presented, exceeded the tearmes of equitie arising of the law: or that which seemed vnto them iust, was contra∣rie vnto the positiue law: in which case if the prince were so farre off, as that his exposi∣tion was not in time conuenient to be had; and that to delay the cause, seemed vnto the estate daungerous; the magistrats were then to follow the very words of the law. For that it belongeth not vnto the magistrat to iudge of the law (as saith a certaine auntient Doctor) but onely to iudge according vnto the law: and for that in doing otherwise, he shall incurre the note of common infamie. And to this purpose I remember that Bar∣tholemew, one of the Presidents of the enquiries in the parliament of Thoulouze, in that [ I] the councellors of his chamber, his fellow judges, would haue giuen iudgement con∣trarie vnto the law: he hauing caused all the rest of the judges of the other courts to bee assembled, by an edict then made at the request of the kings subiects, compelled the iud∣ges his fellowes, in their iudgements to follow the law: Which law when it should seeme vnto the court vniust, they should then for the amending thereof, haue recourse vnto the king, as in such case had bene accustomed: it being not lawfull for the judges sworne vnto the lawes, of their owne authoritie to depart therefrom, seemed they vnto them neuer so iniust or iniurious. Whereby it appeareth the magistrat to stand as it were in the middle betwixt the law and the equitie thereof: but yet to bee himselfe in the power of the law, so as is equitie in the power of the magistrat: yet so as nothing [ K] * 1.2167 be by him deceitfully done, or in preiudice of the law. For why, it beseemeth the iudge alwayes to performe the dutie of a good and innocent vpright man. For where I say that cases forgotten by the lawmaker, and which for the infinit varietie of them, cannot be in the lawes comprised, are in the discretion of the magistrat, it is yet still to bee re∣ferred vnto equitie, and that the judge ought still to be (as we said) an vpright and iust man, not in any thing vsing fraud, deceit, or extortion. Wherein Alexander the most famous lawyer seemeth vnto me to haue bene deceiued, in saying, That the judge which hath the arbitrarie power to iudge according to his owne mind, may if hee so

please iudge vniustly: an opinion contrarie vnto the law both of God and nature, and [ A] of all other lawyers also reiected: who are all of aduise, That a judge hauing arbitrary power to iudge according to his owne good liking, is not to be fined, howbeit that he haue vniustly iudged: prouided that he haue therein done nothing by fraud or deceit. And by the law of Luitprand king of the Lombards, it is set downe, That the magistrat shall pay fortie shillings for a fine, if he iudge contrarie vnto the law, the one halfe vnto the king, & the other halfe vnto the partie: but if he shal vniustly iudge in that belongeth vnto his place and office without law; he is not therefore to be fined: prouided yet that he haue therein done nothing fraudulently or deceitfully: as is yet also obserued and kept in all the courts and benches of this realme. Howbeit that the auntient Romans thus held not themselues content, but caused their judges to sweare, Not to iudge con∣trarie [ B] vnto their owne conscience: and still before that they pronounced sentence, the Cryer with a lowd voyce cried out vnto them, Ne se paterentur sui dissimiles esse, That they would not suffer themselues to be vnlike themselues; as saith Cassiodore. And in like case the judges of Greece were sworne to iudge according vnto the lawes: and in case there were neither law nor decree, concerning the matter in question before them, that then they should •…•…udge according vnto equitie, vsing these words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Whereunto that saying of Seneca alludeth, Melior videtur conditio bonae causae si ad iudicem quàm si ad ar bitrum quis mittatur: quia illum formula includit, & certos ter minos ponit: huius libera, & nullis astricta vinculis religio, & detrahere aliquid potest & adijcere, & sententiam suam non prout lex aut iustitia suadet: sed prout humanit as aut mi∣sericordia [ C] impulit regere, The estate of a good cause (saith he) seemeth better, if it be re∣ferred vnto a judge, rather than to an arbitrator: for that the prescript forme of law en∣closeth him in, and prescribeth vnto him certaine limits and bounds; whereas the o∣thers free conscience, and bound to no bonds, may both detract and add something, and moderat his sentence, not as law and iustice shall require, but euen as courtesie and pitie shall lead him. Which so great a power the wise lawmakers would neuer haue left vn∣to* 1.2168 the judges, had it bene possible to haue comprehended all things in lawes: as some haue bene bold to say, That there is no case which is not contained in the Roman law: a thing as impossible, as to number the sand of the sea, or to comprehend that which [ D] is in greatnesse infinit, in that which is it selfe contained within a most little compasse, or as it were within most strait bounds shut vp. And therefore the court of parlia∣ment at Paris, fearing least men should draw into the consequence of lawes, the decrees that it should make; caused it to be registred, That if there were any notable doubt, or that the matter so deserued, their decree or sentence should not bee drawne into conse∣quence, or be in any wise preiudiciall, but that it might bee lawfull in like case to iudge otherwise: & that for the infinit varietie of things doubtfull: wherby sometimes it com∣meth* 1.2169 to passe euen contrarie, or most vnlike iudgements to bee giuen euen of the selfe same or verie like cases, and yet both most iust: as sometimes it chaunceth two trauel∣lers comming from diuers countries, to ariue at the same place, by wayes altogether [ E] contrarie. Neither ought the judges or lawmakers to ioyne their reasons vnto their iudgements or lawes, a thing both daungerous and foolish, as giuing thereby occasion vnto the subiects, to forge therof new suits and delaies, or exceptions of error, or other∣wise* 1.2170 to deceiue the lawes. And that is it for which the auntient lawes and decrees were most briefly set downe, and as it were but in three words, which so cut off all the deceits that could against the same lawes be imagined or deuised. Wherefore it is a most per∣nitious thing, to gather together the decrees or iudgements of any court, to publish the same, with out hauing red them in the records themselues, or knowing the reasons that induced the court to make the decree, which the judges oftentimes cause to bee recor∣ded

apart from the sentence or iudgement, least any should be thereby deceiued. How∣beit [ F] that it is a thing of it selfe also verie daungerous, to iudge by example and not by lawes, such iudgements being still to be chaunged euen by the least and lightest varie∣tie and chaunge of the circumstances, of the persons, or of the places, or of the times: which infinit varieties can in no lawes, no tables, no pandects, no bookes, be they neuer so many or so great, be all of them contained or comprehended. And albeit that Solon was wrongfully blamed for making so few lawes, yet Lycurgus neuerthelesse made* 1.2171 fewer, yea so few as that he forbad them to be at all written, so to haue them the bet∣ter remembred; leauing most part of causes vnto the discretion of the magistrats. As did also Sir Thomas Moore Chauncelour of England, leauing in his Vtopia all penalties, ex∣cepting the punishment for adulterie, vnto the discretion of the magistrats: than which [ G] nothing can (as many thinke) be better or more profitably deuised, so that the magi∣strats and judges be still chosen not for their wealth and substance but for their vertue and knowledge. For it is most apparant euen to euerie mans eye, that the moe lawes there bee, the more suites there are about the interpretation thereof.* 1.2172

Wherefore Plato in his bookes of Lawes, forbiddeth lawes to bee written con∣cerning the execution of the law, or concerning iurisdiction, traffique, occupa∣tions, iniuries, customes, tributes, or shipping. Which although we cannot altogether be without, yet might we of such laws cut off a great part. Which is also in this realme of Fraunce to be seene, which hath in it moe laws and customes than all the neighbor nations; and so also moe suites than all the rest of Europe beside: which began then [ H] especially to encrease, when as first king Charls the seuenth (as I suppose) and other kings after him, to the imitation of Iustinian, commanded heapes of lawes to be written, with a whole traine of reasons for the making of the same: contrarie vnto the auntient man∣ner of the lawes and wise lawmakers: as if his purpose had bene rather to persuade than to command lawes. And this is it for which a certaine craftie corrupt judge (whom I remember to haue bene banished for his infamous and bad life) seeing a new edict or law (whereafter he still gaped) brought to be confirmed, commonly said, Behold ten thousand crownes in fees, or as some others say, Behold moe suites and heapes of gold.* 1.2173 For why, the Frenchmen are so sharpe witted in raising of suits, as that there is no point of the law, no sillable, no letter, out of which they cannot wrest either true or at least [ I] wise probable arguments and reasons, for the furthering of suites, and troubling euen of the best judges of the world. Howbeit the iust and vpright judge, which shall not bee constrained to sell by retaile what others haue bought in grosse, may with a right few and good lawes gouerne a whole Commonweale: as was in Lacedemonia, and other flourishing Commonweales to be seene, who but with a few lawes right well main∣tained themselues; others in the meane time with their Codes and Pandects beeing in few yeares destroyed, troubled with seditions, or with immortall suites and delaies. For we oftentimes see suites of an hundred yeares old, as that of the Countie de Rais, which hath bene so well maintained, as that the originall parties and the beginners thereof are dead, and the suite yet aliue: Not vnlike that old woman Ptolomais, of whome Suidas [ K] speaketh, who so long, and with such obstinacie of mind and delayes maintained her suite, that she died before that it could be ended.

Now certaine it is, that of the multitude of laws, with their reasons annexed vnto* 1.2174 them, and in this realme published since the time of Charles the seuenth, is come the heape of suites; not so many being to be found in a thousand yeres before, as haue bene within this hundred or sixscore yeares, and yet all forsooth full of reasons: howbeit that there is not one reason set downe in all the lawes of Solon, Draco, Lycurgus, Numa,* 1.2175 nor in the Twelue Tables, neither yet commonly in the law of God it selfe. And how∣beit

that some may say, That the infinit multitude of people which aboundeth in this [ A] realme, may helpe to encrease the multitude of suits: so it is▪ that there were a great ma∣ny moe in the time of Caesar, and yet moe than there was then about fiue hundred yeares before, as he himselfe writeth in the sixt booke of his Commentaries. And Io∣sephus in the Oration of Agrippa, sayth, That there were aboue three hundred nati∣ons in Gaule: And yet neuerthelesse Cicero writing vnto Trebatius the lawyer (then one of Caesars lieutenants) meerely saith, him to haue gained but a few in France to his occupation. Wherefore they which haue brought in such a multitude of lawes, as thinking thereby to cut vp all deceit by the roots, and so to restraine suits: in so doing imitat Hercules, who hauing cut of one of Hydraies heads, see seuen others forthwith to arise thereof. For euen so one doubt or suit being by law cut off▪ wee see seuen others [ B] of new sprung vp, of that heape of words and reasons without reason heaped together in persuading of the law: it being indeed a thing impossible in all the bookes of the world to comprehend all the cases which may happen, and ten thousand suites arising vpon euery reason of the law giuen. So that Seneca thereof said well, Nihil mihi vide∣tur frigidus quàm lex cum prologo: iubeat lex, non suadeat, Nothing (saith he) seemeth vnto me more cold, than a law with a prologue: let the law commaund, and not per∣suade: except the reason of the law be from it inseparable. And howbeit that the De∣cemuiri,* 1.2176 or Ten Commissioners, appointed by the Romans to reforme the lawes, and to establish new, had twelue tables comprehended whatsoeuer could by mans wit bee [ C] foreseene: saying and thinking also them to haue therein comprised all occurrents that might happen: yet shortly after they found themselues farre from their account, and so many things to be wanting in those their laws, as that they were enforced to giue pow∣er to the Prouost of the citie, to amend the lawes, to heape lawes vpon lawes, to abro∣gat the greater part of the lawes of the twelue tables: and in briefe to leaue vnto the magistrats discretion the greater part of the iudgements concerning mens particular causes or interest. And howbeit also, that in respect of publike causes, they did what they might to haue shut vp the judges within the barres and bonds of the lawes, yet so it was, that in fine they seeing the inconueniences which continually fell out in all mat∣ters, in seeking to doe equall iustice to all men, according to the Arithmeticall proporti∣on, [ D] were constrained (after that the Popular estate was chaunged into a Monarchy) to make a great Prouost in the citie of Rome, to whom they gaue power accordingly to iudge of all the crimes committed in Rome, and within fortie leagues round about the citie: which power was also giuen vnto the Proconsuls, and other gouernours of pro∣uinces euery one of them within the compasse of his owne iurisdiction. Now he which extraordinarily iudgeth of offences, is not in his iudgements bound or subiect vnto the lawes, but may giue such iudgement as shall seeme vnto himselfe good; prouided yet that he therein exceed not measure, as saith the law: which measure consisteth in the Harmonicall proportion which we haue before spoken of.

Yet such extraordinarie power by the prince giuen vnto the magistrats, whether it [ E] * 1.2177 be for iudgement, or for mannaging of wars, or for the gouerning of a citie, or for any thing else doing, hath many degrees: for either his power is giuen him next vnto the prince, greater than which none can be: or else power is giuen him by vertue of his of∣fice, so that he may iudge as he seeth cause, or else may iudge in such sort as might the prince himselfe; which power little differeth from the highest, and such as can in no wise by the highest magistrat vnto another magistrat or Commissioner be giuen. But if in the princes rescript or commission it be contained, That the appointed magistrat shall iudge of the cause in question according as reason, equitie, religion, or wisedome, shall lead him, or some other such meane of speech, in all these cases it is certaine, that his

power is stil limited and referred vnto the iudgement of an honest man, and the tearms [ F] of equitie: whereunto the prince himselfe ought to referre all his owne iudgements al∣so. Wherein many are deceiued, which thinke it lawfull for the prince to iudge accor∣ding to his conscience; but not for the subiect, except it be in matters and causes crimi∣nall: in which case they are of opinion, that the magistrat may as well as the prince iudge according to his conscience: which if it be right in the one, why is it not right in the other? and if it be wrong in the one, why should it not be so in the other? when as* 1.2178 indeed it is lawfull for no man in iudgement to swarue from equitie and conscience, and that iniurie like an Ape is alwayes like vnto it selfe, filthy still, whether it bee clothed in purple, or in a pied coat. And in iudging it is one thing to bee freed from the law, and another to be freed from conscience. [ G]

But if the varietie of a fact in question be not knowne but vnto the prince himself, or* 1.2179 magistrat alone; neither the one nor the other can therein be iudge, but witnesses one∣ly: as Azo (the great lawyer) answered vnto the Gouernour of Bolonia Lagrasse, who without any other witnesse had seene a murder done, telling him, That hee could not in that case be iudge. Which selfe same aunswere was also giuen vnto king Henry the second of Fraunce, by the judges who were extraordinarily appointed to iudge of diuers causes at Melun, where the king hauing himself taken an Italian (one with whom he was familiarly acquainted) in a fact deseruing death, committed him to prison; who soone wearie of his imprisonment, preferred a request vnto the judges, That for asmuch as he was not conuict of any crime, neither yet so much as by any man accused, hee [ H] might therefore as reason would, be discharged and set at libertie. Whereupon Cotel∣lus chiefe judge of the court, with three other of the judges went vnto the king, to vn∣derstand of him what occasion he had for the imprisonmēt of the man, or what he had to lay vnto his charge? Whom the king commaunded to bee forthwith condemned, for that he himselfe had taken him in such a fact as well deserued death, which yet hee would not discouer. Wherunto the chiefe judge aunswered, Nos iurati sumus, nisi sce∣leris conuictum, & ex animi nostri sententia damnaturos esse neminem, We are sworne (said he) to condemne no man except he be of some capitall crime conuict, and accor∣ding to our conscience. With which aunswere the king (otherwise a most curteous and gentle prince) much moued, for that the judges seemed to doubt of his fidelitie [ I] and credit, deepely swore, That hee himselfe had taken the villaine in a fact deseruing death. Wherefore Anne Montmorancie Great Constable of Fraunce, perceiuing the judges to be bound by their oath, to iudge but according vnto the laws, and that in per∣forming the kings command they should rather seeme manquellers and murderers, than vpright judges: taking the king a little aside, persuaded him to deferre the execu∣tion of the man vntill night, least the people might hap to be troubled with the nouelty of the matter. And so the guiltie partie the night following was by the commaunde∣ment of the king thrust into a sacke, and in the riuer drowned. Yea the same king also in a ciuill cause, serued but as a witnesse in the great suit about the inheritance of George of Amboise, where he was before the judges sworne as a priuat man, and his testimo∣nie [ K] accounted but for one. Wherefore Paulus Tertius was not without cause blamed, for that he being Pope, had caused a certaine gentleman to be put to death, who had confessed vnto him (being then a Cardinall) a secret murder by him done: which thing yet the same gentleman afterward constantly denied him to haue either said or done. Howbeit it were much better and more indifferent, the prince or the magistrat to iudge according vnto their consciences in ciuill, than in criminall causes: for that in the one, question is but of mens good; wheras in the other still mens fame, yea oftentimes their liues, and whole estates is in daunger: wherein the proofes ought to bee more cleerer

than the day it selfe. [ A]

But yet the difference is right great, and much it concerneth, whether the magistrats in their iudgements be bound vnto the lawes or not, or else be altogether from the laws loose & free: for that in the one, question is onely of fact; but in the other, of law, equi∣tie, and reason, and especially when question is of matter of great importance or conse∣quence, and wherein the law is to be expounded: which in auntient time was giuen in* 1.2180 Rome vnto the Great Prouost, as we haue before said; but by the law of God was re∣serued vnto the High Priest; or vnto him that was by God chosen to bee soueraigne judge of the people: or in their absence vnto the Leuites. Which power in the latter times of the Iewes Commonweale (and about two hundred yeares before Christ, vn∣der the latter princes of the house of the Asmoneans) was by custome, but not by law, [ B] giuen vnto the Senat of the wise Sages. As amongst the Celts our auncestours, the Priests and Druides, for that they were the makers of the sacrifices, and keepers of the holy rites, were made also the keepers and guarders of Iustice, as of all other things the most sacred. The president or chiefe of which Druides (as Ammianus reporteth) still carried about his necke a pretious stone, hanging downe vnto his breast, with the pi∣cture of Truth engrauen in it. Which most auntient custome of the Hebrewes, and of* 1.2181 the Aegyptians, euen yet continueth in all Asia, and in the greater part of Affrike also, viz. That the Priests should haue Iustice in their hand, and the▪ Great Bishop the ex∣position of the Lawes, and the deciding of the most high and difficult causes. So the [ C] Great Bishops, whome the Turkes call their Muphti, hath himselfe alone the expoun∣ding or declaring of the doubts arising of the obscure lawes, especially when question is betwixt the written Law and Equitie it selfe. Which exposition of such doubtfull lawes, the Roman emperours reserued vnto themselues, as proper vnto the soueraign∣tie of their imperiall maiestie. So the Persian kings had also their Muphti, as the san∣ctuarie both of their publike and priuat lawes, who was still resiant in the great citie of Tauris. So had the Tartars theirs in the famous citie of Samarcand: and the kings of Afrike euerie one of them their Great Bishops also: who at Athens were called Nemo∣phylaces, and in other places Thesmothetae. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, that such masters and interpretors of equitie when law •…•…aileth, ought still to be most wise and vp∣right [ D] men, as also in most high authoritie and power placed.

And now verily if the lawes of Arithmeticall Iustice might take place but euen in* 1.2182 priuat iudgements onely, as when question is of the exchange of things, then no doubt should in such priuat iudgements be seene, but all the question should consist in fact on∣ly: so that no place should be left for the opinion of the judges, neither yet for equitie, things being holden and shut vp within most strict and strait lawes: which wee said could not be done, and if it could, yet will we forthwith shew the same to bee most vnfit and absurd. But yet first let vs shew, that publike iudgements neither can nor ought to* 1.2183 be handled or made according to the Geometricall lawes or proportion of Iustice. Which neuer to haue bene before done, is manifest by all the lawes which carry with [ E] them amercements or fines, which are to be found in the laws of Draco, Solon, or of the Twelue Tables: as also by the lawes and customes of the auntient Saliens, Ripuaries, Saxons, English, and French men, where almost all the penalties are pecuniarie, and the same fines most often indifferently set downe as well for the rich as for the poore, ac∣cording vnto equall Arithmeticall Iustice. All which lawes were to be repealed if pe∣cuniarie amercements and fines were according to the opinion of Plato, after the Geo∣metricall proportion of Iustice, to be of the offendors exacted. These words also, Ne magistratibus mulctam poenamue lenire liceas, That it should not bee lawfull for the ma∣gistrat to mitigat the fine or penaltie: a clause most commonly annexed vnto all pe∣nall

edicts and laws; were to no purpose, but to be quite omitted, & the matter left vn∣to [ F] the discretion of the magistrat, at his pleasure to aggrauat or ease the fine or penaltie. Yea that law common vnto al nations, whereby it is prouided, That the partie condem∣ned not hauing wherewith to pay the fine due for the fault by him committed, should satisfie* 1.2184 the same with corporall punishment to be inflicted vpon him, were also to bee abrogated and taken away.

But here perhaps some man will obiect & say, It to bee great iniustice to condemne a poore man in a fine of 65 crownes, for a foolish rash appeale by him made vnto any the higher courts (as the maner with vs is) and yet to exact no greater fine for the same offence of the richest of all. For why, Geometricall proportion of Iustice, which exa∣cteth sixtie crownes for a fine, of him which is in all but worth an hundred crownes, re∣quireth [ G] threescore thousand crownes of him which is worth an hundred thousand crownes. For that the like Geometricall proportion is of threescore to an hundred, that is of threescore thousand to an hundred thousand. Thus we see the rich man by Geo∣metricall proportion of Iustice, to be much more grieuously fined than the poore: and so contrariwise the Arithmeticall proportion of Iustice, in the imposing of penalties and fines, to be the meanes for the rich to vndoe the poore, and all vnder the colour of iustice. Which inconueniences our auncestors foreseeing, by laws gaue leaue vnto the judges, beside the ordinarie fines, to impose extraordinarie fines also vpon offendors, if the weightinesse of the cause so require: which maner of proceeding the antient Greeks also vsed, calling this extraordinarie manner of amercement or fine, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, [ H] as Demosthenes writeth, and which is yet vsed by the Roman lawes: which draweth* 1.2185 very neere vnto the true Harmonical Iustice, if by the same lawes it were permitted vn∣to the judges, or at leastwise vnto the soueraigne courts to deminish also the fine, ha∣uing regard vnto the equalitie and condition of the poore and simple, as they alwayes do in the parliament at Roan. And whereas the receiuers of the fines requested of the the king, That it might bee lawfull for the judges to encrease, but not to diminish the fines imposed vpon such as should rashly appeale▪ Liso•…•…res the President, and D, Amours the kings Attourney, were deputed & sent from the parliament at Roan vnto the king, to make him acquainted with diuers things concerning the demaine, & generall refor∣mation of Normandie (wherein I then was a partie for the king) and amongst other [ I] things, to request him, That it might please his maiestie, not to constraine them to con∣demne all such as should rashly appeale vnto the superiour courts, in the selfe same fine of threescore pound Paris: which vnto me seemed a thing vnreasonable, hauing also in antient time before bin done, by an edict of the emperor Claudius. In which doing the true Harmonicall Iustice should be obserued and kept, which in part equall, in part sem∣blable, are alike; there should be an equalitie betwixt men of the middle sort of wealth, according to the Arithmeticall proportion of Iustice: and a Geometricall proportion also betwixt the great lords and the poorer sort: Whereof the former should in this case be left vnto the disposing of the law, and the other vnto the conscience and discre∣tion of the judges. For there is nothing more vniust, than the perpetuall equalitie of [ K] * 1.2186 fines and punishments. For proofe whereof let the law but lately made by king Charls the ninth concerning apparell, serue for an example: whereby a fine of 1000 crownes was imposed vpon all such as should either much or little transgresse the same, without respect of any the offenders abilitie, age, or condition: with prohibition for the judges in any sort to mitigat or lessen the same. Which law concerning all men in generall, and yet made by Arithmeticall proportion of Iustice, was shortly after by the iniquie of it selfe rent in sunder, and by the magistrats themselues, as well as by other priuat men neglected. Whereas the law of Philip the Faire concerning apparell was much

more iust and indifferent, as neere approaching vnto Harmonicall Iustice: and ap∣pointing [ A] diuers punishments, according to the diuersitie of the offendors; as vnto a Duke, an Earle, a Baron, and a Bishop, a fine of an hundred pound, the Banaret fiftie pound, the Knight and pettie Landlard fortie, Deanes, Archdeacons, Abbats, & other clarkes, hauing dignities or ecclesiasticall preferments, 25 pound: vnto the other lay men offending, of what estate soeuer they were, if they were worth a thousand pound, was appointed a fine of twentie fiue dound: and if they were worth lesse, they were to pay an hundred shillings: the other clearkes without dignitie or promotion, were they secular or religious that offended against the law, paid the fine of an hundred shillings, as did the others, Wherein we see vnequall punishments appointed for per∣sons vnequall, following therein Geometricall Iustice: and yet for all that we see also [ B] equall punishments for persons vnequall, following therein Arithmeticall Iustice: and both the one and the other so mixt together, as that thereof ariseth also that Harmoni∣call Iustice which we so much seeke after. The same proportion is obserued in the law, allowing of euery mans apparell and attire also: as where it is said, That no woman ci∣tisen should weare a chaine: also that no bourgesse or common person of either sexe, should weare any gold or pretious stones, neither girdles of gold, nor any crowne of gold or siluer, or any rich furres; which is not forbidden the nobilitie, and yet in them also there is some difference: as in that it is said, That the Duke, the Countie, the Ba∣ron, which hath six thousand pound land, may make themselues foure new sutes of ap∣parell in a yeare, but no more; and their wiues as many: and gownemen, and clearkes, [ C] which haue no dignities nor preferments, should not make them gownes of cloath a∣boue sixt•…•…ene shillings the elne Paris; & for their followers not aboue twelue shillings. Many other such like articles there were, and yet was there no mention neither more nor lesse either of silke or veluet, or other such like thing. So that hee which would in* 1.2187 penall lawes particularly keepe Geometricall Iustice, in setting downe the penalties ac∣cording to the equalitie of the offences, and abilitie of the offenders, shall neuer make penall law: For that the varietie of persons, of facts, of time, and place, is infinit and in∣comprehensible; and such as should alwaies present vnto the judges, cases stil much vn∣like one of them vnto another. So also the perpetuall equalitie of penalties according [ D] * 1.2188 to Arithmeticall proportion, is as vniust and vnreasonable, as if a Physitian should pre∣scribe the same medicine to all diseases: as is to bee seene by the lawes of the Romans concerning the charges to be bestowed at feasts & banquets: wherby the morsels were equally cut vnto all euen alike, and the penaltie also equall without respect of rich or poore, of noble or base: amongst whome yet it had bene no hard matter to haue kept the Geometricall proportion, as neerest vnto true iustice, euery mans wealth beeing with them enrolled in the Censors bookes: whereas with vs at this present it were a thing most hard, or rather impossible so to do▪ as hauing no Censors, by whom mens wealth might be reasonably knowne. But the Popular estate of the Roman Common∣weale still sought after the Arithmeticall equalitie of lawes and penalties. Which equa∣litie the estate being chaunged into a Monarchie, the princes by little and little chan∣ged, [ E] and so moderated the penalties before vpon the nobilitie imposed; as is by the re∣script of Antoninus Pius vnto the gouernour of one of the prouinces to be seene: who had in hold a noble gentleman conuict before him, for murdering of his wife by him taken in adulterie: wherein he willed him to moderat the penaltie of the law Cornelia; and if the murtherer were of base condition, to banish him for euer, but if hee were of any dignitie or reputation, that then it should suffice to banish him for a time.

Now it is a notable difference in termes of iustice, that the qualitie and condition of the person should in iudgment deliuer him from death, who should otherwise haue

bene condemned: for the murtherer sayth the law, ought to be put to death, i•…•… hee be [ F] * 1.2189 not a man of some dignitie and honour. And the Law Viscellia willeth that the stea∣lers of beasts, if they bee slaues, should be cast vnto the wild beasts; but if they were freemen, they should be beheaded, or condemned into the mynes: but if they were of any nobilitie, it should then suffice to banish them for a time. In like sort also, that the burners of villages or houses should bee giuen vnto the beasts, if they were men of base condition: but if they were of any noble house, then to be beheaded, or els con∣fined. And generally, the slaues were euer more seuerely punished, than were men by state and condition free: for these were neuer beaten with rods, or with small cudgels, whereas the slaues were still beaten with clubs, or els whipt with whips made of small coards. Howbeit that Plato sayth, That the free Citisen ought to bee with greater se∣ueritie [ G] punished, than the slaue; for that as (sayth he) the slaue is not so well taught as is hee: which his opinion sauoreth indeed of a Philosopher, rather than of a Iudge or of a Lawyer; yea the law of God deliuereth from death the master, who in too seuere correcting of his slaues, shall by chaunce kill him. And therfore it ought not to seeme strange, if the father were by the people of Rome openly stoned, for whipping his son with whippes as a slaue, as Valerius writeth. And indeed amongst free borne men, the Citisen is lesse to be punished than the stranger, the noble lesse than the base, the magi∣strat lesse than the priuat man, the graue and modest lesse than the vicious and disso∣lute, and the souldier lesse than the countreyman. Wee must not (sayeth Labeo the Lawyer) suffer a base fellow to enter an action of fraud against a man of honour and [ H] dignitie: neither an obscure and loose prodigall man against a modest man of good gouernment; yea the auntient Romans neuer condemned any Decurion, or Captain of ten men (for what fault soeuer hee had committed) into the mynes, or to the gal∣lowes. The night theefe sayth the law, if hee shall with weapon stand vpon his de∣fence, is to be condemned into the mynes; but men of reputation and qualitie offen∣ding, to bee onely for a time banished, and souldiers with disgrace cassiered. Neither* 1.2190 must wee thinke this Geometricall manner of punishing to haue bene proper vnto the Romans, or to any other people in particular onely, but to haue beene common al∣most vnto all other people also, as namely vnto the French, the Saliens, the English, and the Ripuaries: and yet must wee doe as doe the barbarous Indians, which for the [ I] same offences set downe most grieuous punishments as well for the noble as the base, without any proportion at all; and yet in the manner of the executing thereof make great difference: for of the baser sort they cut off their noses and eares, and for the same offence cut off the noble mens haires, or the sleeues of their garments: a com∣mon custome amongst the Persians, where they whipped the garments of the condemned, and in stead of the hayre of their heads, pluckt off the wooll of their caps.

Neither are wee to stay vppon the opinion of Aristotle, who would Geometri∣call* 1.2191 iustice to take place in bestowing of rewards, and diuiding of spoyles: but Arith∣meticall iustice equally to bee executed in the inflicting of punishments, which is not [ K] onely to ouerthrow the principles of Philosophy, which will that things contrarie, as reward and punishment, should be ordered by the same rules, but also the resolution of all the greatest Lawyers and Law-makers that euer were: with whom also the Cano∣nists,* 1.2192 the Orators, the Historiographers, and Poets in opinion agree, and haue alwaies more easily punished the noble than the baser sort: (howbeit that the most easie pu∣nishment of all may vnto a noble man seeme most great) that so others may bee the more enflamed vnto vertue, and the loue of true nobilitie, when as they shall vnder∣stand the remembrance of the infinit rewards of the vertue of most famous men, and

such as haue well deserued of the Commonweale being also dead, yet still to redound [ A] vnto their posteritie. But here I measure nobilitie by vertue, & not by mony, the flowre of youth, the princes fauour, or euill meanes whatsoeuer obtained. The auntient nobi∣litie of M. Aemilius Scaurus (as saith Valerius) saued his life euen in flourishing time of the Popular estate: which respect of nobilitie was yet much better kept after the change of the estate; for then they began by little and little to behead the nobilitie with a sword, after the manner of the Northerne people, in stead that the Romans before vsed the hatchet in the execution of all sorts of men. And for that the Centurion sent to execute Papinian (the most famous lawier, Traian the emperours neere kinsman, and before proclaimed the defendor both of the emperours and of the empire) had with an hatchet cut off his head, he was therefore sharply reproued by the emperour Caracalla, [ B] telling him, That he ought to haue executed his command with a sword, as which had lesse paine, and also lesse infamie. Wherein Gouean the lawyer was deceiued, who wri∣teth more griefe to haue bene in the execution with the sword, than with the hatchet, Men die (saith Seneca) more easily with no kind of death, than being beheaded with the sword. And by the same reason and proportion of Iustice, hee that wrongeth a noble man is more grieuously to be punished, than hee which wrongeth a common person; & he which doth iniurie vnto a citisen, than he which doth iniurie vnto a stranger. For in the lawes of the Salians, if a Saxon or Frizlander had any way wronged a free borne Salian, he was almost foure times more grieuously fined, than if a Salian had wronged a Saxon or a Frizlander. So also by the lawes of Alphonsus the tenth, king of Castile, a [ C] wrong done vnto a noble man was fined at fiue hundred shillings, and a wrong done vnto a common person at three hundred. And by the like law of Charles the Great, he that had slaine a subdeacon was fined at three hundred shillings, if a deacon at foure hundred shillings, if a priest▪at fiue hundred, if a bishop at nine hundred: which penalties (the authoritie of the bishops being encreased) were doubled. I here speake not of the equitie or iniquitie of these lawes, but vse them onely as examples, to shew that Arith∣meticall Iustice by the lawes of many nations, neither hath had, neither yet ought to haue place, when question is of fines and punishments; and that men of honour, and of marke, ought more easily to be punished, and their iniuries more seuerely reuenged, [ D] than those done to the common sort: wherat they yet oftentimes grudge & murmute, and thinke themselues to be therein greatly wronged. Yea Andrew Riccee a Polonian writeth it to be a great iniustice, That the nobilitie offending are not punished with the same punishment that the common people are; the rich as the poore, the citisen as the straunger, without any respect of degree or persons: than which nothing could bee more absurdly written, of him which would take vpon him to reforme the lawes and customes of his owne countrey and Commonweale. The like complaint was against N. Memmius Maister of the Requests in court, for that he being by the king appoin∣ted judge in the triall of Vlmeus the president, had suffered the man conuicted of most capitall crimes to escape the punishment thereunto due, and yet had condemned his clearke to be hanged, who had but done his maisters commaundement: Which king [ E] Francis vnderstanding, merirly said, Theeues by a wicked consent to releeue one ano∣ther. Howbeit that Memmius a man most famous not onely in his issue, but also for his wealth, honours, vertue, and deepe knowledge in the law, is releeued euen by the equitie of his sentence; whereby he depriued the said president of all his honours and goods, and afterward hauing caused him to bee most shamefully set vppon the pillorie naked, and marked in the face with an hoat yron, to bee banished. But for that his clearke and domesticall seruant, and minister of such his villanies, was but a base and obscure fellow, hauing neither goods nor office to loose, neither much

regard of his good name, he could not otherwise worthily be punished than by death, [ F] hauing so well deserued the same. Whereas had he bene his slaue, he had bene more to haue bene fauoured, for that then he must of necessitie haue obeyed his maister. Nei∣had the president bene so grieuously punished, had he not being a judge, vnto his most base and corrupt dealings ioyned also most shamefull forgerie and extortion, and that in the administration of iustice, which he had as then in keeping. For this prerogatiue hath alwayes by our auncestours bene reserued vnto the nobles, and such as otherwise are in honourable place, That being for any offence or crime condemned to die, they should not therefore be hanged, for the infamie of the punishment: wherein all writers agree. Howbeit that concerning other punishments they are not all of one opinion, Seneca (as we said) accounting heading for the easiest: and the Hebrewes in their Pandects, in the [ G] * 1.2193 Title of Punishments, appointing stoning for the most grieuous, the second burning, the third beheading, and the fourth strangling. Howbeit that they deeme him most in∣famous, and by the law of God accursed, which is hanged on the tree.

and in this Bartholus (the famous lawyer) is deceiued, saying, That the manner and custome in France, was to hang the noble or gentlemen condemned: and that that pu∣nishment was not there accounted villanous or infamous, seeing that in his time (which was in the raigne of Philip the Long, about the yeare of our Lord 1318) the nobilitie of Fraunce was as famous and as honourable, as the nobilitie of any place of the world. Yet true it is, that the noble man which is a traytor vnto his prince, deserueth to be han∣ged; so to be more grieuously punished than the base companion, who offendeth not [ H] * 1.2194 so much as he, as not so straitly bound to preserue the life and estate of his prince. For the more a man is obliged and bound in fidelitie vnto his prince, the more grieuously he is be punished aboue the common person: Viri fortes (saith Cicero speaking of Ca∣tilin the rebell) acerbioribus supplicijs ciuem pernitiosum quàm acer bissimum hostem coer∣cendum putant, Worthy men (saith he) iudge the daungerous citisen to bee with grea∣ter punishment chastised, than the cruellest enemie that is. And therefore Liuie saith, the fugitiue traytors during the Carthaginensian warre, to haue beene more seuerely puni∣shed, than the fugitiue slaues: and the Roman traytors more sharply than the Latines, who were then still beheaded, but the Roman traytors hanged. Howbeit that in all other offences the Romans were more easily punished than others. For Scipio Afri∣canus [ I] (saith Florius) caused the Roman souldiour not keeping his ranke, to bee beaten with a vine, but other souldiors with a trunchion or cudgell of other sadder wood: the vine (as saith Plinie) being the dishonour of the punishment.

Yet whereas we said, That the punishment of noble men ought to bee more easie than the punishment of the base and obscurer sort, that so others might bee the more stirred vp vnto vertue; it is a common opinion, and almost of euerie man receiued: but not yet altogether true. For that in right Geometricall proportion, the noble man for* 1.2195 his offence hauing lost his honour and reputation, is as grieuously indeed punished, as is the base companion that is whipt, who cannot indeed of the honour and reputation which he hath not, loose any thing: as children and women are no lesse hurt with a soft [ K] ferula, than are the strong with cudgels or whips. And therefore Scipio commaunding the Roman souldiors to be beaten with the vine, euen for the same cause for which he commaunded the Latine souldiors to be beaten with cudgels, followed therein the equalitie, or rather the Geometricall proportion of punishment. For which cause Gal∣ba the emperour caused the Gibbet to be painted white, and set higher than the rest, to lessen the paine of a citisen of Rome, complayning that hee should bee hanged as other theeues were: howbeit that he had poisoned his pupill. So if a Physitian or an Apo∣thecarie shall poyson a man, he is more grieuously to be punished than if another man

had done it. And so in the same proportion of iustice, the judge which doth iniurie, the [ A] * 1.2196 priest which committeth sacrilege, the notarie or register which committeth forgerie, the goldsmith which coyneth false money, the guardian which rauisheth his pupill, the prince which breaketh his faith and league; and generally whosoeuer offendeth in his owne vocation, and in such things as whereof he is himselfe a keeper, ought to bee therefore the more grieuously punished than others: for that his offence is therein the more grieuous. And therefore Metius the Dictator of the Albans, was by the com∣maundement of Tullus Hostilius, with foure horses drawne in peeces, for hauing bro∣ken his faith with the Romans. And Solon hauing caused his lawes to be published, and sworne by all the Athenians, appointed the Areopagits to be the keepers and interpre∣tors thereof; and if they should breake the same, to pay therefore a statue of gold of the [ B] weight of themselues. Now had Aristotle himselfe neuer so little a while bene a judge, or looked into the lawes of his countrey, he would neuer haue written, That the equal Arithmeticall Iustice were to be obserued and kept in the inflicting of punishments: but that in all things, and especially in matters of punishments, the Geometricall pro∣portion of Iustice were much better and more tollerable; as neerer vnto the Harmo∣nicall Iustice which we seeke after, being partaker of both. Neither by this Harmoni∣call* 1.2197 proportion is more fauour shewed vnto the noble than vnto the base, howbeit that vnto many it seeme contrarie. For proofe whereof, let it be, that a rich man and a poore being guiltie of the selfe same crime, the rich man is in shew more grieuously fined than the poore: howbeit that in truth the one is not more heauily fined than the other, but [ C] both of them indifferently according to their wealth and abilitie. There is with vs a most auntient law extant, whereby the poore common persons which make resistance against the magistrat commaunding them to be apprehended, are fined at threescore shillings; but the noble man at a thousand and two hundred. And for that money is* 1.2198 more plentie in one place than in another, and in this our age than in antient time, wise lawmakers haue bene constrained to chaunge their pecuniarie punishments or fines, ac∣cording to the varietie of times & places. In the flourishing time of the Roman Com∣monweal, & namely vnder Traian the emperor (who is reported to haue extended the bounds of that great empire farthest) he was by the law accounted a poore man, which was not worth fiftie * 1.2199 crownes, that is to say a crowne of gold. Which decision of the [ D] Romans, the Hebrewes in their Pandects following, haue forbidden all them that are so much worth to begge. The customes of Fraunce in many places, call him a poore man, who with two or three witnesses of his owne parish, hath sworne himselfe to be poore.

But when the lawes of the Twelue Tables were made, the pouertie of men was so great, as that he was accounted a right rich man, which was worth a pound of gold. And therefore the Decemuiri by those lawes set downe a fine of twentie fiue Asses, or small peeces of brasse, for him which should with his fist giue any man a blow vppon the face: which was an heauie penaltie (as the world then went) for that it was by Arithmeticall proportion indifferently exacted of all men alike. But after that mens [ E] wealth encreased, one Neratius a rich fellow (as the time then was) and most insolent* 1.2200 withall, tooke a pleasure to giue such as he thought good, as he met them in the streets, a good and sound buffet or box; on the eare and so by and by commaunded a slaue, which carried a bagge full of such small coyne after him, to pay vnto him whome hee had so strucken twentie fiue of those small brasen peeces, the •…•…ine set downe in the xii Tables: which was the cause that the law was abrogated, and order taken, that from thenceforth euery man should esteeme the iniurie vnto himselfe done yet with power still reserued vnto the magistrat, to do therein as should seeme vnto him reasonable.

Whereby it was then plainely perceiued and knowne Arithmeticall proportion not [ F] to be good in the imposing of penalties and fines. So also by the auntient customes of the Normans, he that strucke a common person with his fist, was fined at a shilling; but he that strucke him with his open hand, was to pay the fine of fi•…•…e shillings: but were he a gentleman that had receiued such iniurie, he was not to redresse the same by law, but by force of armes and combat: whereby it oftentimes came to passe, that hee which had before receiued the iniurie, was also in the quarrel slaine, without any punish∣ment therfore, and that by the sufferance of the law. The like we may say of the Athe∣nian law, which condemned him in an hundred crownes fine, which should presume to cause a galliard to be daunced in the Theatre: which Demades the Orator well know∣ing,* 1.2201 yet to make his playes which he gaue vnto the people more gratious, amongst the [ G] musitians brought in also vpon the stage a dauncing trull there to daunce; yet before she entred, paying the aforesaid fine of an hundred crownes by the law set downe, which was indeed nothing else but a mockerie of the law, and a cause for others also to tread both it and the rest vnder foot. VVhich inconueniences the Polonians to auoid (for that almost all the penalties of their lawes are fines in money) alwaies ioyne vnto their lawes these or like words, Lex haec quia poenalis est annua esto, This law for that it is pe∣nall let it be but for a yeare in force.

But beside these chaunges of penalties and fines, some others haue beene constrai∣ned* 1.2202 to chaunge such pecuniarie penalties or fines into corporall, yea euen into capitall punishments also: and that especially when the countrey groweth rich, so that men be∣gin [ H] to contemne the fines, or that the offence groweth too common: in which cases the Hebrew lawyers are of opinion, That the penalties of the lawes are to bee encrea∣sed, and punishment with rigour executed. And therefore the law of the Britons ap∣pointeth theeues to be hanged, yeelding therefore this reason, Ne eorum a•…•…geatur mul∣titudo, Least the multitude of them should be encreased. An vniust law indeed, and the reason thereof foolish; and such a law as by the antiquitie of it selfe is almost growne out of vse, for that it hath no distinction either of place, or of the equalitie of the per∣sons offending, or of the age, or of the sexe, or of the time, or of the felonie committed; but punisheth all felons alike. When as in all executions of punishments, the lighter offences are the more lightly to be punished, yea and oftentimes also pardoned: as on∣ly [ I] in respect of age, the indifferent and equall law would that men should in all iudge∣ments pardon youth, or at leastwise more easily punish it. So ought the judges also* 1.2203 more fauourably to chastise women than men: either for that their passions are more vehement than men, or that for want of reason, discretion, and learning, they are lesse able to gouerne their affections: or for that they be more tender and daintie, and there∣fore haue the sharper feeling of punishment than men. Which beeing so, a man may deeme the law of the Venetians vniust, which for the first felonie committed, condem∣neth* 1.2204 the woman to be whipt, and marked with an hoat yron; and after that her hand cut off: and for the second offence, to haue her nose and lips cut off: whereas the man by the same law, and for like fact, is to lose but one of his eyes and his hand. By which [ K] law women, contrarie vnto equitie, are more seuerely punished than men: & the means whereby to get their liuing being taken from them, they both haue more occasion to steale than before whilest they had their limmes. Wherefore better it were accor∣ding to Arithmeticall Iustice (howbeit that in matters of penalties it be vniust) to pu∣nish them both alike: or else according to Geometrical Iustice, which commeth much neerer vnto the true Harmonicall Iustice, which hath regard in particular to all the cir∣cumstances concurring. But that law and judge is verie vn•…•…ust, which more seuerely punisheth the tender and feeble, young folkes or women, the sickly or old, than the

strong and lustie. And in briefe all lawes carrying with them penalties certaine, and [ A] * 1.2205 such as it is not lawfull for the magistrat according to the exigence of the cause, to mo∣derat or aggrauat, are vniust. Wherein euen the wisest and best experienced may well be deceiued, if they haue not this Harmonicall Iustice still before their eyes. For where is there in the world so great wisedome, so great iustice, such a number of learned law yers, as in the court of parliament at Paris? who yet without any restriction or limita∣tion at all, published a law against falsi•…•…iers and forgers, made by king Francis the first, whereby capitall punishment was appointed for forgerie, whether it were in ciuill or criminall causes, without distinction of forgers, •…•…udges, clearkes, notaries, souldiours, or plaine countrey men. Which law for all that by the wise conniuence of that court is since growne out of vse: howbeit that the penaltie thereunto annexed yet remaineth [ B] to terrifie forgers withall: whome for all that the court punisheth with arbitrarie pu∣nishment, according to discretion, and not according to the rigour of the law, in such sort as that scarcely one of fiftie is condemned to die. For why, the same court shortly after perceiued the intollerable inconueniences and absurdities which that law drew after it, punishing with death him that had falsified but the least scedule of an hundred shillings, as well as him that had falsified the decrees of the court, or the kings seale, or borne false witnesse to condemne the innocent; as also for a meere ciuill cause, where question were but of fiue shillings: and all without regard or difference of persons. Nei∣ther is the law of Venice any better or vpright, which appointeth no lesse punishment [ C] for falsifying and forgerie, than the cutting out of the tongue: without any distinction of the manner of the forgerie, or respect of the degree, sexe, or age of the offendor, or other circumstances whatsoeuer. But the law of Milan sauoureth more of equitie and Harmonicall Iustice: for it willeth, That he which forgeth or falsifieth an act, or bea∣reth false witnesse in a matter which exceedeth not twentie crownes, shall for the first time be condemned in foure times the value, and three dayes shamefully to bee carried about with a paper myter vpon his head: and for the second time to haue his hand cut off: and for the third time to be burnt. But if the cause exceeded twentie crownes, and so vnto the summe of fiue hundred, that then he should for the first time haue his hand cut off, and for the second time be burnt. But if so be that the matter exceeded fiue hun∣dred [ D] crownes, that then the judge for the first time might deale with him according to his discretion, but that for the second offence the forger should be burnt. Wherein both the Geometricall & Arithmeticall proportion of iustice are in some sort mixt, as in the measure and proportioning of the fine: but without any regard of sexe, age, or conditi∣on, which it beseemed a lawmaker especially to haue marked. The law of God (of all* 1.2206 other lawes the best) commaundeth the man conuict of false witnesse bearing, to en∣dure so much losse himselfe, as he would haue done hurt vnto the other: as if he would by his false witnesse take from another man an hundred crownes, hee should bee forced himselfe to pay the selfe same summe: or if hee went about by his false testimonie to take away another mans life, that he himselfelfe should therefore loose his owne life: [ E] as for the rest they were referred unto the conscience of the judges. Neither is it enough for this equalitie of punishment to aunswere as did Draco the Athenian lawgiuer, who being asked, Why he appointed death as well for stealing of an apple, as for killing of ones father: aunswered, That he would haue appointed a more grieuous punishment for killing of a mans father, if he had knowne any punishment worse than death. But Lycurgus left all kind of punishment, yea and that concerned euery man else as well in publike as in priuat iudgements, vnto the discretion of the magistrats: whom he doub∣ted not to excell in all fidelitie and integritie, so long as they should keepe his lawes and customes: but yet haply fearing that in restraining of the magistrats power vnto the

strait bonds of lawes and penalties, should so fall into such absurdities and difficulties of [ F] iudgements, as we haue before spoke of: and wherewith they are i•…•… Popular estates, but especially in Italie, much troubled. By the law of the Venetians hee that shall so strike any man, as that he shall draw blood of him, is therefore to pay twentie fiue pound: but if he kill him, he is therefore to be hanged. Which law if it might euery where take place, how many men should we find like vnto Neratius, who vppon such a price would soundly buffe•…•… and bastinado such as they liked not of, as they met them. But how much more wisely did the emperour Adrian in like case take order, appoin∣ting* 1.2207 him that went about to kill a man, although indeed he killed him not, to bee there∣fore worthy of death: and yet that he which had indeed slaine a man, without any pur∣pose so to haue done, should be therefore acquited. For that offences are to be weigh∣ed [ G] * 1.2208 according to the will and purpose of the offendor, and not according to the euent of the fact: howbeit that the purpose and endeuor is more easily to be punished, than the effect and deed it selfe; and the conceit of a villanie lesse than the villanie it selfe done: wherein all the diuines with the lawyers agree. Howbeit that in truth hee more gree∣uously offendeth against almightie God, which persuadeth another man to do a villa∣nie, than he which doth it: for that beside the wickednesse first by himselfe conceiued, he leaueth also the liuely impression thereof engrauen as it were in another mans hart: whereas he which of himselfe doth amisse, carried headlong with the force of lust or anger, seemeth scarcely to haue bene willing to haue done it: and hee which hath a∣gainst her will enforced an honest woman, whome hee could not otherwise persuade, [ H] yet leaueth her soule and spirit pure and cleane. But judges doe one way punish and* 1.2209 consider of offences, and Philosophers another: they punish such offences and trans∣gressions onely as are sensibly to be seene, and which a man may as it were with his fin∣ger touch, and such as trouble the common rest and quiet: but these men (viz. the Philosophers) enter euen into the most secret thoughts & cogitations of mens minds: wherein Sir Thomas Moore, sometime Chauncellour of England, is also deceiued, who maketh the intent equall to the effect: and the will vnto the deed done.

But if an offence be not onely intended, but effected also, and so the effect ioyned* 1.2210 vnto the intent; we must not in the punishing thereof vse Arithmeticall proportion of iustice: as in the law of Milan, hee that shall without the citie steale the value of a [ I] crowne or more, is therefore to be put to death; but if lesse, the punishment is left vnto the discretion of the judges: and yet for all that in this realme he is punished with death as a theefe which hath by the high way robbed any man, whether hee had money or none: as I haue indeed seene one hanged for taking but eighteene pence from a trauel∣ler by the high way. The Roman lawes commaund notable theeues and robbers to be hanged, and so left hanging vpon the gibbet: which then was accounted the most grieuous punishment: but they then by the word Latro, vnderstood him whom we cal an Assasin, or Murtherer, which killeth men vpon the high way: but as for him which but robbeth passengers, the law calleth him Grassatorem, and willeth him also to bee condemned to death, but yet not hanged as the murtherer. Which wee haue here [ K] the more precisely set downe, to note the errour of Accursius and some other the lear∣ned lawyers, who call him also Latronem, or a robber, whome the Latines call Furem, or a theefe; making them as it were all one: and hauing in part therein giuen occasion for men to punish theeues with more grieuous punishment than haply were meet and conuenient, viz. with death.

The like absurditie is seene almost in all the lawes of Italie: as in that of Venice con∣cerning* 1.2211 theft, which willeth to put out one of his eies which shal steale any thing worth aboue fiue pound, vnto ten; and from ten vnto twentie, to put out one of his eyes, and

to cut off one of his hands: and from twentie vnto thirtie to put out both his eyes, and [ A] from thirtie to fortie to loose his eies & an hand: but if he shall steale aboue the summe of fortie pounds, then to be punished with death. An vnreasonable law truly, not one∣ly for the rigour and hardnesse thereof, and the confused manner of the persons so to be equally punished, but euen in this respect also, that he which hauing the meanes out of a great masse of gold, to steale a thousand pounds, and yet contenteth himselfe with fiftie, shall therefore be punished with death: and hee that breaketh an emptie chest, with an intent to haue taken away a great summe of money if he could, shall yet escape vnpunished. The same punishments almost are also set downe by the law of Parma. Yet hath it oftentimes seemed vnto me a thing right straunge, why some which vse so seuere punishment against theeues, yet punished murders but by fines in money. For [ B] we see plainely, that the paine of death is too cruell to reuenge a simple felonie, and yet not sufficient to restraine the same: and yet the punishment of him that doth both rob* 1.2212 and kill, to be but like: in which doing he hath more suretie to commit the murther, as also more hope to conceale the same. So that where the punishment for theft and murder is alike, there it is more saftetie to kill a man, than simply to rob or steale. And yet more straunge and absurd are the lawes of the Polonians, the Danes, the Swedens, and Moscouits, and especially the law of Casimir the Great, king of Polonia, which for* 1.2213 the fine of thirtie crownes, acquiteth one gentleman that hath slaine another: and if he haue maimed him of an arme or of a legge, then to bee acquited for fifteene crownes. [ C] But if a base fellow shall kill a gentleman, the fine is double, and if he shall kill a base or common person, the fine is but ten crownes, without any other corporall punishment, although he had laine in wait to kill him. Which impunitie for the killing of men be∣ing suffered, or rather by law allowed, innumerable murders thereof ensued. Howbeit that afterwards the kingdome encreasing in wealth, the penaltie of the law was dou∣bled in the raigne of Sigismund the first, and order taken, that the murderer beeing ap∣prehended, should beside the fine be also kept prisoner in the common gaile for a yere and six weekes. But that which was in that law worst of all, and the head of all mis∣chiefe, was, that after three yeares the offendor might prescribe against the murder by him committed, whatsoeuer it were: neither could the lord which had slaine his vassall [ D] farmer (whome they call K•…•…eton) be therefore either ciuilly or criminally called into question or sued. For a like edict or law made at Milan (at such time as the Torresans held that Seigneurie) whereby it was decreed, That a gentleman might for a certaine fine be acquited for the killing of a base or common person: the common people ther∣with enraged, rise vp all in a mutinie, & hauing driuen out the nobilitie possessed them∣selues of the Seigneurie. As for the author of the law Napus Tarresan, he by them cast in prison, there miserably died eaten vp with lice, and that worthily, for hauing there∣in so much contemned the law of God, which forbiddeth to haue pitie vpon the wil∣full murderer, commaunding him to be drawne euen from his sacred alter and put to death: yet leauing vnto the discretion of the magistrat the manner of his execution, ac∣cording [ E] to the greatnesse of the murder committed; to the end that the equalitie of ca∣pitall* 1.2214 punishment common to all murderers by Arithmeticall proportion of iustice, should so by Geometricall proportion be moderated, hauing respect vnto the circum∣stances of the place, of the time, and of the persons, which are infinit. For men right well knowe, that he which wilfully killeth a man (as lying in wait for him) is more grie∣uously to be punished, than he which killeth a man in his rage and choler: and hee which killeth by night, more than he which killeth by day: and he which poysoneth a man, more than he which killeth him with the sword: and the murderer by the high way worse than those: as also he that shhall kill a man in a sacred place, more than in a

prophane: and before his prince, more than in any other place: (which is the onely ir∣remissible [ F] case, by the laws of Polonia) & he that shal kill the magistrat executing of his office, more than if he were a priuat man: and he that shall kill his father, more than he which shall kill the magistrat: and he which shall kill his prince, more than all the rest. Of which varietie of cases ariseth an incredible varietie of capitall punishments to bee vpon the offendors inflicted. The same we may say also of such persons as are still vn∣der the guard and protection of other men, of whome they cannot possibly be aware; as the pupill of his tutor, the wife of her husband, the sicke patient of his physitian; the guest of his hoast, betwixt all whome faith is much more required: in which cases the murderers are still more grieuously to be punished. As in like case the breakers of hou∣ses, and they which by ladders clime into houses by night, deserue to be more seuerely [ G] punished, than such as shall steale in, the doores standing wide open. And therefore in Tartarie and Moscouie the least theft of all is punished with death: for that there are but few townes and houses for them to keepe themselues and their goods in. And in the West Indies, before the comming of the Spaniards, the theefe was still aliue vpon a sharpe stake impaled, for whatsoeuer theft it was. For why, all their gardens and grounds are bounded about but with a thrid, beyond which to passe was accounted a great crime: and yet greater than that it was to breake the thrid; and that in secret also than openly and in euery mans sight. Howbeit that in other crimes, as whooredome, adulterie, incest, and such other like, the offences publikely committed, are more seuere∣ly* 1.2215 to be punished, than such as are secret done: for that the euill example and scan∣dall [ H] thereof, is worse than the offence it selfe. Wherein both the diuines and layers all agree.

All these circumstances, with a million of others like of diuers sorts, cannot all after one fashion be cut, or by the selfe same law be iudged, according to the vnequall equali∣tie of Arithmeticall Iustice: neither can they in speciall lawes and articles bee all com∣prehended, were the volume of the law neuer so great: so as is in Geometricall Iustice requisit, which leaueth all vnto the magistrats discretion, without any law at all. And yet for all that is this Geometricall Iustice lesse vniust than the other, which leaueth nothing vnto the power and authoritie of the judge, more than the examination of the fact, and the numbring of a sort of beanes, as at Athens: or of tables of diuers colours, [ I] * 1.2216 with letters of absolution or condemnation set vpon them, as at Rome: or of certaine balles and lots, as at Venice: without any power to iudge at all. For why, it is the law, and not the judge, which appointeth the same punishment for all: of which equalitie of iustice ariseth the greatest iniustice, some such being condemned, as deserued much lesse than the penaltie of the law being equal vnto all: and some others againe acquited, which deserued ten times more: besides that, sometimes also diuers most vnlike crimes some great, some lesse, and some almost none at all, are vnder one law passed, and so with the selfe same paine punished. As by seuen articles of the Salique law, robbers, poisoners, adulterers, burners of houses, and such as haue slaine or sold a natural French man, or haue digged vp the bodie of the dead, are all condemned in the selfe same fine [ K] of two hundred shillings. Which law altogether ouerthroweth the foundation of iu∣stice, grounded especially vpon that, That the punishment should still bee equall vnto the offence done. Which the auntients declared by this word, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, The law of Retribution, or of equall punishment: which first written in the law of* 1.2217 God, set downe in the lawes of Solon, transcript into the lawes of the Twelue Tables, commaunded by the Pythagorians, practised by the Greeke and Latine cities, and for the antiquitie thereof reuerent; is yet by Fauorinus, Aristotle, and many others, with∣out iust cause impugned; they too grossely taking these words of the law, Atooth for

a tooth, a hand for a hand, and an eye for an eye. For who is so simple, as to think, that he [ A] * 1.2218 which hath malitiously put out his eye which had but one, to suffer the like if but one eye be therefore taken from him also? Wherefore hee is to bee quite depriued of his sight, that is to say, requited with like; which cannot be, but by putting out of both his eyes: except the blind man may otherwise be satisfied. As was decreed by the people of Locris, at the request of one which had but one eye, which his enemie threatned to put out, vpon the penaltie therefore to loose another of his owne. Wherefore then to render like for like, is to make him also starke blind, who had made another man blind. So that to requite like with like, is indeed nothing els, but to punish offences with punishments aunswerable vnto them: that is to say, great offences with great punish∣ments, meane with meane, and so little offences also lightly: which they also meant, [ B] when they said, A hand for a hand, a tooth for a tooth, and an eye for an eye. And so the auntient Hebrewes, the best interpretors of God his law, haue vnderstood it, expoun∣ded it, and also practised it: as is in their Pandects to be seene, in the Title of Penalties. Yea Rabi Kanan denieth the law of like punishment to haue any where in the cities of the Hebrewes taken place, in such sort, as that he should haue an eye put out, which had put out another mans eye: but the estimation of the eye put out, was vsually by the discretion of the judges in money valued. For proofe whereof let it be, that before the law of like punishment, there was a * 1.2219 law, wherby it was ordained, That if two men fighting, one of them should hurt another, but not yet vnto death, hee which had done [ C] the hurt, should pay the Physitians for the healing thereof. But to what end should he so pay the Physitian, if he which did the hurt were in like sort to be himselfe wounded? It should also thereof folow more absurdly, that many delicat and tender persons, in receiuing of such wounds as he had giuen to others, should thereof themselues die and perish. Besides that also, he which had the harme done him, hauing lost his hand wherewith he should get his liuing, if the others hand were also to be for the same cut off; he so wanting his hand wherewith to get his liuing, might haply so starue. Wher∣fore such a literall exposition of the law of like punishment, by Aristotle and Fauorin deuised, is but vaine and deceitfull. But Aristotle who so much blameth the law of like* 1.2220 punishment, is himselfe in such errours entangled as he sought to eschew. For he saith, [ D] That in punishing of him which hath deceiued his companion, or committed adultery, we are not to respect whether he were an honest man, or an euill liuer before or not; but to punish the offence with Arithmeticall equalitie, or Commutatiue Iustice, as hee tearmeth it. But what indifferent equalitie shall that be of the same punishment, if it shall by Arithmeticall proportion be inflicted vpon persons of qualitie and condition so farre vnlike? Or what Shoomaker is so ignorant or foolish, as to shape one fashioned shoo, or of the same last, to euery mans foot? Creditors also in time equall, but in the* 1.2221 summe of their debt vnequall, are of the goods of their broken debtor to bee paid by proportion Geometricall: as if thirtie crownes bee made of the goods of the broken debtor; he of the two creditors to whome there is but an hundred crownes due, shall [ E] receiue ten crownes; whereas the other creditor to whome there is two hundred due, shall receiue twentie: who if they were by Arithmeticall proportion to be paid, should each of them receiue fifteene. And yet in this case question is but of a meere ciuill parti∣cular cause resting in exchaunge; which in the opinion of Aristotle, is alwaies by Arith∣meticall proportion to be ordered: which is not onely in this case here propounded* 1.2222 false, but euen in all other also, wherein question is of that which vnto euery man pro∣perly belongeth, as we shall forthwith declare. Yet where Aristotle saith in punishing of offences no regard ought to be had, whether the offendor were before good or bad: it sufficiently sheweth him to haue had no knowledge of the order and manner of

iudgements, or of iudiciall proceedings. For why, nothing is more diligently enquired [ F] after by the judges, than what the former life of the partie accused hath bene. Neither is it any new matter, when as the Persians, long before Aristotles time, not only enqui∣red after the whole liues of them which were accused (as yet they still doe) but if their good deserts were greater than their offences, they fully acquited them also: as Xeno∣phon writeth. And for the same cause the theefe taken in the third theft, is almost euery where condemned to die, howbeit that the third theft be much les•…•…e than the first: and so he also which hath the more often offended, is more seuerely to be punished than he which hath more seldome gone astray. Wherein Aristotle is againe deceiued, in that he deemeth a stolne thing ought by Arithmeticall proportion to bee made euen with particular interest of him from whome it was taken or stolne. Whereas the lawes of [ G] Solon, the lawes of the Twelue Tables, and the emperours by their lawes, condemne him which hath stolne any thing, to restore the double or the treble, yea and some∣time foure fold the worth of the thing stolne, beside the perpetuall infamie thereof en∣suing. Yea the law of God willeth, That for an oxe stolne, restitution should bee made •…•…iue •…•…old vnto him from whom he was so stolne: both for that a more profitable beast is not by God giuen vnto man, as also for the necessitie there is to leaue such beasts oft times in the field: where they roaming vp and downe, haue for their more assurance the greater penaltie set vpon them being stolne: and hereunto some other people haue ioyned corporall punishment, yea euen vnto the paine of death.

And not to speake of criminall causes onely, but of meere ciuill causes also, one in the [ H] * 1.2223 selfe same fact gaineth the cause, & in another place looseth the same: one hath interest for his debt, and another hath nothing: and amongst them which shall in the same case haue interest, some one shall pay ten times so much as another: which for that they bee matters common vnto all such as haue any experience in iudiciall causes, there need not many examples; one therefore shall suffice for the manifesting of the matter. A Lapi∣darie breaketh a diamond which he by couenant should haue enchased in a ring; he is bound to pay the price of the stone be it neuer so great, yea although hee therein haue vsed no fraud or deceit, but euen for that onely that he tooke it vpon him to do it as a workeman: whereas yet had he bene a man of another condition or occupation, hee should not haue paid the price of the pretious stone so broken, except hee had before [ I] taken the daunger thereof vppon him, or by fraud or deceit broken the stone.

Now all the lawes both auntient and new, with the common course and experience* 1.2224 of iudgements, teach vs that Harmonicall proportion of iustice ought as well to take place when question is but of priuat mens right and interest, and so in pure ciuill causes, as well as when question is of penalties and fines: as also that Arithmeticall equalitie and proportion is therein most of all vniust. And therefore Iustinian the emperor pub∣lishing the law concerning vsurie, ordained, That the nobilitie should not take aboue fiue in the hundred, the marchants eight in the hundred, corporations and colledges ten, and the rest six in the hundred: and particularly that none should exact of the hus∣bandman aboue fiue in the hundred. Which law let it seeme in Aristotle his iudge∣ment [ K] vniust, yet doth it carrie a good shew of that Harmonicall Iustice which wee seeke after, tempered of Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportion: Arithmeticall e∣qualitie being therein obserued amongst the noble men, who are all vnder one article comprised, the great, the meaner, and the least: the marchants in another both rich and poore: and the countrey men in another article, howbeit that they much differ one of them from another: and the rest of the sub•…•…ects all in another article beeing of diuers qualities and conditions also: And then the Geometricall proportion shewing it selfe betwixt the nobilitie and the marchants, betwixt the marchants and the colledges, and

againe a certaine of the other subiects compared among themselues, and with their [ A] superiours. And this proportion of Harmonicall Iustice is also in some sort kept, and yet cut somewhat short by the law of Orleans, established by Charles the ninth at the request of the people: whereby the debtor condemned for money too long detained, is bound to pay after eight in the hundred interest vnto marchants, and vnto other lesse; but vnto husbandmen, persons hired, and all sorts of labourers, the double of the money due: both the chiefe points of which law is now growne out of vse, howbeit that it was with the greatest consent of the courts published. For why, that which con∣cerneth euery priuat mans right and interest, consisteth in matter of fact, & not in matter of law; as Paulus the lawyer most wisely aunswered, which his one reason hath euen by the root ouerthrowne all the long discourses of all the interpretors, so diuers and so [ B] vnlike themselues, concerning euery priuat mans right and interest: all which Iustinian the emperour had thought himselfe to haue beene able to haue comprehended vnder* 1.2225 one law. And therefore that which toucheth euery priuat mans right and interest how farre it concerneth him, is by our lawes wisely left vnto the discretion of the judges, for that it can no more certainly by positiue law be defined or set downe, than can the great Ocean sea into a small chanell be enclosed or shut vp. But yet the inequalitie is much greater in the law of Venice, which forbiddeth to take interest either in commodities or in money, aboue six in the hundred: which although it be a thing tollerable, and is called of the Latines Vsura ciuilis, or, Ciuill interest: yet is that law not so long agoe made, now againe growne out of vse, and not either publikely or priuatly kept: for that [ C] it in euery respect containing Arithmeticall equalitie, regardeth not the most vnlike condition and qualitie of persons.

And howbeit that in the particular contracts and conuentions, and exchaunge of* 1.2226 things, that Arithmeticall proportion of equalitie be best to be liked; yet is it not euen therein alwayes obserued and kept, the very countrey men and labourers, by a certaine naturall reason well deeming, that they ought oftentimes to take lesse for their hier of the poore than of the rich, howbeit that they take as great paines for the one as for the other. So the Surgeon which taketh of the rich man fiue hundred crownes to cut him of the stone, haply taketh of the poore porter no more but fiue: and yet for all that in effect taketh ten times more of the poore man than of the rich: For the rich man being [ D] worth fiftie thousand crownes, so payeth but the hundred part of his goods, whereas the poore man being but worth fiftie crownes, paieth fiue, the tenth part of his sub∣stance. Whereas if we should exactly keepe the Geometricall or Arithmeticall pro∣portion alone, the patient should die of the stone, and the Surgion for lacke of worke starue: whereas now by keeping the Harmonicall mediocritie, it goeth well with them both, the poore man cured with the rich, and the Surgion so gaining wealth, and the other their health. After which proportion euen the judges themselues haue vsed to esteeme their paines, and therefore to demaund their honourable fees: which we see to haue alwayes bene lawfull for them to doe, so that therein they exceed not measure. As I remember it to haue happened vnto a certaine Prouost of Paris, whose name I will [ E] * 1.2227 easily passe ouer, who for adiudging the lawful possession of a litigious benefice, hauing for his owne fees set downe thirtie crownes, whereas his duetie was but three, and ap∣peale therefore by the partie grieued made vnto the higher court; was thither sent for; where he being by Ranconet President of the court hardly charged for the wrong by him done: aunswered, That it was a good fat benefice that he had giuen sentence for: and that forasmuch as he did many such things for poore men without any fee at all, that it was but right and reason that the richer when they came should make him an amends therefore in paying of him deeper fees. Whereunto the President pleasantly▪

said, Him in so doing to serue them as his Taylor did him, who tooke of him twice as [ F] much for the making of him a veluet gowne, as he did for making of him one of cloth. So the law of Milan, which appointeth, That the judge may for his fee take the hun∣dred part of the value of the suit, so that hee exceed not two hundred crownes, would seeme vnto Ranconet vniust: euery corrupt judge so without any proportion at all, ex∣torting from all men, what he saw good. For that such the suit may be for a slight mat∣ter but often crowns, as that therein oftentimes more paines is to be taken by the •…•…udge than in a suit of ten thousand crownes: the marchant so still gaining by the rich, what he looseth by the poore.

Wherefore both in making of lawes, and in deciding of causes, and in the whole* 1.2228 gouernment of the Commonweale, we must still so much as possible is, obserue and [ G] keepe that Harmonicall proportion, if we will at all maintaine equitie & iustice: wher•…•… as otherwise it will be right hard for vs in the administration of iustice, not to doe great wrong. As doth the law of inheritance, which adiudgeth all vnto the eldest, whether he be noble or base; of auntient time vsed by Lycurgus in the inheritances of the Lace∣demonians, and with vs in the countrey of Caux. Lesse vniust, and yet vniust too, is the law which giueth all the noble mans inheritance vnto his eldest son; and an annui∣tie of the third or of the fift part vnto the younger brethren, for them to haue during their, liues as they doe at Amboise and Aniou; and yet dealing therein more fauou∣rably with the women, who hold that vnto themselues in proprietie, which the yon∣ger brethren haue but for tearme of life. Neither is the custome of the Germans much [ H] lesse vniust, who hauing abrogated the old law, where of Tacitus maketh mention, di∣uide the inheritance equally amongst their sonnes, making the eldest and the youngest both equall in the succession of their inheritance, according vnto Arithmeticall pro∣portion, without any difference of persons at all. But how much more vprightly and iustly hath the law of God dealt herein? which following the Harmonicall proportion* 1.2229 of iustice, giueth onely vnto the sonnes the land, and vnto the daughters part of the mouables, or money to marry them with; to the end the houses should not by them be dismembred: and amongst the males allotteth two parts vnto the eldest, and to the rest euerie one of them a part: and the father dying without heires male, the same law commaundeth the women to diuide the inheritance indifferently amongst them, and [ I] yet to marrie with the next of their house or tribe, that the land might not bee carried out of their stocke and kindred. Wherein Geometricall proportion is to be seene be∣twixt the eldest and the rest, as also betwixt the males and the females: and Arithmeti∣call equalitie betwixt the younger brethren, as amongst the daughters also. So when it is said by the law of God, That he which hath deserued to bee chastised or beaten, shall be punished according to the fault by him committed; yet is it by the same law forbid∣den to giue him aboue fortie stripes. Which law is made according to Harmonicall iustice: For why, it is left vnto the discretion of the judge, after such a proportion, to iudge vnto fortie stripes, according vnto the equalitie of the persons and of the offences committed: Wherein the Arithmeticall equalitie is also seene, in that it is forbidden [ K] the magistrat to exceed fortie stripes, the certain number by the law appointed. Wher∣in he that hath the more offended, and yet hath not deserued death, is no more puni∣shed in this respect of fortie stripes, than he which hath lesse offended. Whereof the law yeeldeth this reason, least the partie condemned, lamed with many stripes, should so become vnprofitable both vnto himselfe and the Commonweale. For that it might haue bene obiected, That he which more grieuously offended, was the more grieuous∣ly also to haue bene punished, euen aboue the said number of fortie stripes: howbeit that indeed it is better to stay within a measure, than through too much seueritie to do

any thing vniustly, which vnto vs is a certaine argument drawne from the law of God, [ A] That the true iustice, and the fairest gouernment, is that which is by Harmonicall pro∣portion maintained.* 1.2230

And albeit that the Popular estate more willingly embraceth the equall lawes and Arithmeticall Iustice: and the Aristocratike estate contrariwise loueth better the Geo∣metricall proportion of iustice: yet so it is, that both the one and the other are for the preseruation of themselues constrained to intermingle with themselues the Harmoni∣call proportion. Whereas otherwise the Aristocraticall Seignorie excluding the common people farre from al estates, offices, and dignities, not making them in any sort partakers of the spoyles of their enemies, nor of the countries conquered from them; it cannot be that the estate can so long stand, but that the common people beeing neuer [ B] so little moued, or neuer so small occasion presented, shall reuolt, and so chaunge the estate, as I haue by many examples here before declared. And therefore the Venetian Seignorie, which is the most true Aristocratie (if euer there were any) gouerneth it selfe Aristocratically, bestowing the great honours, dignities, benefices, and magistracies, vp∣pon the Venetian gentlemen; and the meaner offices which haue no power belonging vnto them, vpon the common people: following therein the Geometricall proportion of the great to the great, and of the little to the little. And yet to content the common people, the Seignorie hath left vnto them the estate of the Chauncellour, which is one of the most worthy and most honourable places in the citie, and perpetuall also: and more than that, the offices of the Secretaries of the estate also, which are places verie [ C] honourable. Yea moreouer an iniurie done by a Venetian gentleman vnto the least in∣habitant of the citie, is right seuerely corrected and punished: and so a great sweetnesse and libertie of life giuen vnto all, which sauoureth more of popular libertie than of Aristocraticall gouernment. And that more is, the creation of their magistrats is made part by choyce, and part by lot: the one proper vnto the the Aristocratique gouern∣ment,* 1.2231 and the other vnto the Popular estate: so that a man may well say, that the estate of that Seignorie is pure and simply Aristocratique, and yet somewhat gouerned by Proportion Harmonicall, which hath made this Commonweale so faire and flou∣rishing.

Now we haue oftentimes said, and must yet againe say (for that many haue vppon [ D] * 1.2232 this rocke suffered shipwracke) that the estate of a Commonweale may oftentimes be the same with the gouernment thereof, but yet more often quite different from the same. For the estate may be Popular, and yet the gouernment Aristocraticall: as in Rome after the kings were driuen out (wee said) the estate of that Commonweale to haue bene Popular, for that then all the soueraigne rights were in the power of the whole people in generall; and yet the manner of the gouernment of that citie and Commonweale to haue bene from the Popular gouernment most farre different. For that the Senators alone enioyed the great benefices, honours, dignities, and places of commaund: all the wayes and entrances thereunto being by the nobilitie holden fast stopt vp against the comminaltie, yea and that so straitly, as that it was not lawfull or [ E] permitted for any of the common sort to marrie with any of the nobilitie; either for any noble woman to marrie but with some one of the nobilitie, but the noble still mar∣rying with the noble, & the base with such as themselues were: and the chiefe and prin∣cipall voyces which were giuen in their greatest assemblies of estate, and most regarded, were still taken by their wealth and yeares. So that the estate being then Popular, and the manner of the gouernment Aristocraticall, according to Geometricall proportion, the people oftentimes reuolted from the nobilitie: neither was the estate euer quiet from ciuill tumults and seditions, vntill that the common people had by little and little

got to be partakers also in the greatest benefices, honours, offices, and places of com∣maund, [ F] that were in the Commonweale: and that it was permitted them also to allie themselues in marriage with the nobilitie, as also to haue their voyces as well as they. And so long as this Harmonical gouernment (that is to say intermingled with the Ari∣stocratique and Popular estate) continued, the Senat yet bearing the greater sway, so long that Commonweale flourished both in armes and lawes; but after that the go∣uernment (through the ambition of the Tribunes) became altogether Popular, and as the heauier weight in a ballance ouerweighed the lighter, all then went to wracke: no otherwise than as when the sweet harmonie of musicke being dissolued, and the har∣monicall numbers altered into numbers of proportion altogether equall and like, ther∣of followeth a most great vnpleasant and foule discord: the like whereof there raised [ G] amongst the citisens neuer ceased, vntill that the estate was quite thereby chaunged, and indeed vtterly ouerthrowne. So may wee also iudge of all other Common∣weales; neither haue wee thereof any better 'example than of the popular estates of the Swissers, which the more that they are popularly gouerned, the harder they are to be maintained, as the mountayne Cantons, and the Grisons: whereas the Cantons of Berne, Basil, and Zuricke, which are gouerned more Aristocratically, and yet hold the Harmonicall meane betwixt the Aristocratike & Popular gouernment, are a great deale the more pleasing, and more tractable, and more assured in greatnes, power, arms and lawes.

Now as the Aristocraticall estate founded vppon Geometricall proportion, and go∣uerned [ H] * 1.2233 also aristocratically, giueth vnto the nobilitie and richer sort the estates and ho∣nours: and the Popular estate contrariewise grounded vppon Arithmeticall proporti∣on, and gouerned popularly, equally deuideth the monies, spoyles, conquests, offices, honours, and preferments vnto all alike, without any difference or respect of the great or of the little, of the noble or of the base and common person: So the royall estate also by a necessarie consequence framed vnto the harmonicall proportion, if it be roy∣ally ordered and gouerned, that is to say, Harmonically; there is no doubt but that of all other estates it is the fayrest, the happiest, and most perfect. But here I speake not of a lordly monarchie, where the Monarch, though a naturall prince borne, holdeth all his subiects vnderfoot as slaues, disposing of their goods as of his owne: and yet [ I] much lesse of a tyrannicall monarchie, where the Monarch being no naturall Lord, abuseth neuerthelesse the subiects and their goods at his pleasure, as if they were his verie slaues; and yet worse also when he maketh them slaues vnto his owne cruelties. But my speech and meaning is of a lawfull King, whether he be so by election, for his vertue and religion, by voyce chosen, so as was Numa; or by diuine lot, as was Saul; or that he haue by strong hand and force of armes, as a conquerour got his kingdome, as haue many; or that hee haue it by a lawfull and orderly succession, as haue all (except some few) who with no lesse loue and care fauoureth and defendeth his subiects, than if they were his owne children. And yet such a King may neuerthelesse if he will, go∣uerne his kingdome popularly and by equall Arithmeticall proportion, calling all his [ K] subiects indifferently without respect of persons vnto all honours and preferments whatsoeuer, without making choyce of their deserts or sufficiencie, whether it be that they be chosen by lot or by order one of them after another: howbeit that there bee* 1.2234 few or rather no such monarchies indeed. So the King may also gouerne his estate or kingdome Aristocratically, bestowing the honorable estates and charges therein with the distribution of punishmehts and rewards by Geometricall proportion, making still choice of the nobilitie of some, and of the riches of others, still reiecting the base poorer sort, and yet without any regard had vnto the deserts or vertues of them whom

he so preferred; but onely vnto him that is best monyed or most noble. Both which [ A] * 1.2235 manner of gouernments, howbeit that they bee euill and blameworthy, yet is this Aristocratique and Geometricall proportion of gouernment much more tollerable and more sure, than is that popular and turbulent gouernment, scarcely any where to bee found, as neerer approching vnto the sweet Harmonicall gouernment. For it may be, that the king to assure his estate against the insurrection of the base com∣mon people, may haue need to strengthen himself with the nobilitie, which come nee∣rer vnto his qualitie and condition, than doth the base artificers and common sort of people, vnto whom he cannot descend, neither with them wel haue any societie at all, if he will in any good sort maintaine the maiestie of his royal estate and soueraigntie, as it seemeth he must of necessitie do, if he shall make them partakers of the most honoura∣ble [ B] charges of his estate and kingdome. But such an Aristocratique kind of gouernment is also euill and dangerous, not vnto the common peaple only, but euen vnto the nobi∣litie & prince also: who may so stil stand in feare of the discontented vulgar sort, which is alwayes farre in number moe than is the nobilitie or the rich: and hauing got some seditious leader, and so taking vp of armes, becommeth the stronger part, and so some∣times reuolting from their prince, driueth out the nobilitie, and fortifie themselues a∣gainst their princes power: as it happened among the Swissers, and in other auntient Commonweales by vs before noted. The reason whereof is euident, for that the common people is not bound by any good accord either with the prince, or with [ C] the nobilitie, no more than these three numbers 4, 6, 7: where the first maketh good accord with the second, that is to say, a fift: but the third maketh a discord, the most irkesome and vnpleasant that may bee, marring wholly the sweet consent of the two first, for that it hath not any Harmonicall proportion either vnto the first or vnto the second, neither vnto both together.

But it may be, and commonly so is, that the prince giueth all the greatest honours* 1.2236 and preferments vnto the nobilitie and great lords, and vnto the meaner and baser sort of the people the lesser and meaner offices onely; as to be clearkes, sergeants, notaries, pettie receiuers, and such other meane officers of townes, or of some small iurisdicti∣ons. Wherein he shall so keepe the Geometricall proportion, and Aristocraticall go∣uernment. [ D] Which manner of gouernment for all that is yet faultie, howbeit that it be more tollerable than the former Popular Arithmeticall gouernment, as hauing in it some equall and semblable proportion: For as the office of the Constable is proper vnto a great Lord, so is also the office of a Sergeant vnto a poore base fellow. But forasmuch as there is no sociable bond betwixt the prince and the porter; so also is there not any similitude betwixt the office of the Great Constable and of a Sergeant: no more than there is amongst these foure numbers disposed by proportion Geome∣tricall disiunct, 3, 6, 5, 10: where the two first haue the same reason that the two last haue, and the reason of the first vnto third, is that of the second vnto the fourth: yet the reason of the second vnto the third is discordant and different from the others, and so [ E] disioyneth the extreames, which so maketh an absurd and foolish discord. And so also are the orders of citisens and subiects, disioyned one of them from another, so that no fast or sure band can bee found amongst them. For that the nobilitie thin∣keth it an indignitie for them to bee busied with the small offices of the comminaltie: and the common people againe take it in euill part themselues to be excluded from the greatest honours of the nobilitie. As in Rome it was not otherwise lawfull for any of the nobility, whom they called Patricij, to sue for the Tribuneship, but that first he must renounce his nobilitie, & become a commoner: for as then the Consulship belonged

onely vnto the nobilie, and the Tribuneship vnto the comminaltie. Which power [ F] once granted vnto the people, they forthwith let their weapons fal, and all the sedition & tumults before common betwixt them and the nobilitie ceased: For why, the com∣mon sort thought themselues now equall with the best, wherin the welfare of that citie consisted: whereas otherwise the force of the furious multitude could by no violence haue bin withstood. For what the proportiō was of the Consulship vnto the Tribune∣ship, the same the proportion was of one of the nobilitie vnto a commoner: & againe, the same respect was of a noble man vnto the Consulship, that was of a commoner vn∣to the Tribuneship, in Geometricall similitude. But forasmuch as it was not lawfull neither for a noble man to obtaine the Tribuneship, neither for a commoner to enioy the Consulship, the people was disioyned from the nobilitie, and a perpetuall discord [ G] betwixt the Consuls and the Tribunes still troubled the citie: in such sort, as in these numbers thus placed is to be seene, 2, 4, 9, 18: wherein are found two eights by Geo∣metricall proportion disiunct, and which yet mixed together make the most hard dis∣cord that is possible, by reason of the disproportion which is betwixt 4 and 9, which is intollerable, and marreth all the harmonie. So was there also almost a perpetuall dis∣cord* 1.2237 betwixt the nobilitie & the people, vntill that the Consulship, the Censorship, the Pretorship, and the chiefe Benefices, excepting some few, were communicated vnto the people also. Whereas might it with the same moderation haue beene lawfull for the nobilitie to haue obtained the Tribuneship also, yet so as that the number of the commoners in that societie of the Tribunes might yet still haue bene the greater, and [ H] the nobles not enforced to renouce their nobilitie: no doubt but that the estate so Har∣monically gouerned had bene much the more assured, better ordered, and of much longer continuance than it was, by reason of the sweet agreement of the citisens among themselues, and that Harmonicall mixture of the offices and places of authoritie and commaund in the estate and Commonweale: as in these foure numbers by Harmoni∣call proportion conioyned, is plainely to be seene, 4, 6, 8, 12: where the proportion of the first number vnto the second, and of the third vnto the fourth, is a Diapente, or a fift: and againe the proportion of the first vnto the third, and of the second vnto the fourth, is a Diapason, or an eight: and the proportion of the second vnto the third, a Diatessa∣ron, or a fourth: which with a continuall proportion ioyning the first with the last, and [ I] the middle to both, and so indeed all to all, bringeth forth a most sweet & pleasant har∣monie. But it was so farre off, that gentlemen of auntient houses were in Rome recei∣ued into the Tribuneship (if they first renounced not their nobilitie, and caused them∣selues to be adopted by some base commoner) as it was for the base commoners to aspire vnto the Consulship: which they neuer did, except they had before obtained the greatest honours of the field, as did Marius; or else by their eloquence, as did Cicero; or by both together, as did Cato the Censor. Which yet was a matter of such difficul∣tie, as that Cicero boasteth of himselfe vnto the people, That hee was the first new man (now they then called him a new man, who the first of his house and familie had ob∣tained honours) who of them of his ranke had obtained to be Consull: and that the [ K] people vnder his conduct had cut in sunder and for euer after laid open for vertue that honourable place, which the nobilitie had before with strong garrisons holden, and by all meanes shut vp. So that it ought not to seeme strange if the Commonweale were then troubled with the seditions of the people, when as in such a multitude of the com∣mon sort, so few of them euen in Cicero his time aspired vnto those so great honours, the nobilitie of great and auntient houses commonly still enioying of them.* 1.2238

Wherefore it becommeth a good gouernor in a Popular or Aristocratique estate, and especially a wise king in his kingdome, to vse Harmonicall proportion in the go∣uernment

thereof, sweetly intermingling the nobilitie with the comminaltie, the rich [ A] with the poore; & yet neuerthelesse with such discretion, as that the nobilitie still haue a certaine preheminence aboue the base comminaltie. For why, it is good reason that the gentleman excelling in deeds of armes and martiall prowesse, or in the knowledge of the law, as wel as the base common person, should in the administration of iustice, or in the mannaging of the wars, be preferred before him. As also that the rich in all other respects equall vnto the poore, should be preferred vnto such places and estates as haue more honour than profit: and the poore man contrariwise to enioy those offices and roomes which haue more profit than honour: both of them so resting reasonably con∣tented, he which is rich enough seeking but after honour, and the poore man after his profit. For which cause and consideration, the wise Roman Proconsull Titus Flami∣nius [ B] taking order for the Thessalian Commonweale, left the gouernment and soue∣raigntie of the townes and cities by him conquered, vnto them of the richer sort and of best abilitie: wisely deeming, that they would be more carefull for the preseruation and keeping of them, than would the poore, who hauing not much to loose, had no great interest therein. Now if two or three magistrats were to bee chosen, it were better to ioyne a noble man with a commoner, a rich man with a poore, a young man with an old; than two noblemen, or two rich men, or two poore men, or two young men to∣gether; who oftentimes fall out into quarrels betwixt themselues, and so hinder one another in their charges: as commonly it happeneth betwixt equals. Besides that, of such a coniunction of magistrats of diuers state and condition (as wee now speake of) [ C] should arise this great profit, That euery one of such magistrats would seeke to main∣taine* 1.2239 the prerogatiue & right of them of their owne estate and such as themselues were: As in our soueraigne courts, and in other corporations and societies also, by our cu∣stomes composed of men of all sorts, we see iustice and right to bee commonly better, and more vprightly vnto euery man administred, than if they wholly consisted of no∣ble men, or of commoners, or of clergie men, or of any one estate alone.

But now in ciuill societies there is no meane better to bind and combine the little ones with the great, the base with the noble, the poore with the rich, than by commu∣nicating of the offices, estates, dignities, and preferments, vnto all men, as well the base as the noble, according vnto euery mans vertues and deserts, as wee haue before decla∣red. [ D] Which deserts both now are & euer were of most diuers sort & condition: so that he which would stil giue the honorable charges and preferments of the estate vnto ver∣tuous and religious men onely, should vttterly ouerthrow the whole Commonweale:* 1.2240 for that such vertuous and deuout men are alwayes in number much fewer than the euill and wicked, by whome they might easily be ouercome and thrust out of their go∣uernment. Whereas in coupling the poore vertuous men (as I haue said) sometime with the noble, and sometime with the rich, howbeit that they were deuoid of vertue; yet so neuerthelesse they should feele themselues honoured, in being so ioined with the vertuous, mounted vnto honourable place. In which doing all the nobilitie shall on the one side reioyce to see euen bare nobilitie rspected, and a place for it left in the Com∣monweale, [ E] together with men excelling in vertue and knowledge: and all the baser fort of the common people on the other side rauished with an incredible pleasure to feelethemselues all honoured, as indeed they are, when they shall see a poore Phy∣sitians sonne Chauncellour of a great kingdome; or a poore souldior to become at length Great Constable: as was seene in the person of Michael D' l' Hospitall, and Ber∣trand Guescheling: who both of them, with many others, for their noble vertues were worthily exalted euen vnto the highest degrees of honours. But all the subiects grieue and take it in euill part, when as men neither for the honour of their house, nor for any

their vertues noble, but rather for their loose and lewd liues infamous, shall be placed in [ F] the highest degree of honour and command: not for that I thinke it necessarie the vn∣worthy* 1.2241 citisens or subiects to be altogether kept from all offices & places of command (a thing which can in no wise be) but that euen they such vnworthy persons may bee sometimes capable also of certaine offices; prouided alwayes that they bee in number but few, that their ignorance or wickednesse may not take any great effect in the estate wherein they are. For we must not onely giue the purse vnto the trustiest, armes vnto the most valiant, iudgement vnto the most vpright, censure vnto the most entire, labor vnto the strongest, gouernment vnto wisest, priesthood vnto the deuourest, as Geome∣tricall Iustice requireth (howbeit that it were impossible so to doe, for the scarcetie of good and vertuous men:) but we must also, to make an harmonie of one of them with [ G] another, mingle them which haue wherewith in some sort to supply that which wan∣teth in the other. For otherwise there shall be no more harmonie than if one should separat the concords of musique which are in themselues good, but yet would make no good consent if they were not bound together: for that the default of the one is sup∣plied by the other. In which doing, the wise prince shall set his subiects in a most sweet quiet, bound together with an indissoluble bond one of them vnto another, together with himselfe, and the Commonweale. As is in the foure first numbers to bee seene: which God hath in Harmonicall proportion disposed to show vnto vs, that the Royal estate is Harmonicall, and also to be Harmonically gouerned. For two to three ma∣keth

[illustration]

a fift; three to foure, a fourth; two to foure, an eight; [ H] and againe afterwards, one to two, maketh an eight; one to three, a twelft, holding the fift and the eight; & one to foure, a double eight, or Diapason: which containeth the whole ground and compasse of all tunes and concords of musicke, beyond which he which will passe vnto fiue, shall in so doing marre the harmonie, and make an intollerable discord. So may one say of a point to a line, as also of the plaine superfi∣cies, and of the solid bodie also of any thing. Now the soue∣raigne prince is exalted aboue all his subiects, and exempt out of the ranke of them: whose maiestie suffereth no more diui∣sion [ I] than doth the vnitie it selfe, which is not set nor accounted among the numbers, howbeit that they all from it take both their force and power. But the three estates stand* 1.2242 orderly disposed as they are, and as they alwayes haue yet beene in euery well ordered Commonweale, viz. the Ecclesiasticall order first for the dignitie which it beareth: & the prerogatiue of the ministerie and function thereof towards God, being yet compo∣sed both of noble and of base. Then after them follow the Martiall men, in whose protection all the rest of the subiects in some sort rest: which order and estate is also composed both of the noble and vnnoble. And in the third and last, are set the com∣mon people of all sorts and vocations, as schollers, marchants, artificers, and labourers: euerie one of which estates hauing part and interest into the offices and honourable [ K] charges of the Commonweale, with great respect and regard still to bee had vnto the merits and deserts, as also vnto the qualitie of the persons, there may therof be formed a pleasant harmonie of all the subiects among themselues; as also of them altogether* 1.2243 with their soueraigne prince. Which is also declared, and in some sort figured euen in the nature of man himselfe, being the verie true image of a well ordered Common∣weale: and that not in his bodie onely, which still hath but one head, and all the rest of the members aptly fitted thereunto; but euen in his mind also, wherein Vnderstanding holdeth the chiefe place, Reason the next, the Angrie Power desitous of reuenge, the

third, and brutist lust and desire the last. Whereof the mind or vnderstanding like vn∣to [ A] the vnitie in numbers indiuisible, pure, and simple, is of it selfe free from all concreti∣on, and from all the other faculties of the soule apart separated and diuided: the angry power with desire of reuenge resting in the heart, representeth the souldiors and other martiall men: and sensuall lust and desire resting in the liuer vnder the midriffe, be•…•…oke∣neth the common people. And as from the liuer (the fountaine of bloud) the other members are all nourished, so husbandmen, marchants, and artificers doe giue vnto the rest of the subiects nourishment. And as many men for lacke of vnderstanding liue like beast, smoued with that only which is present and before them, without mounting any higher vnto the contemplation of things intellectuall and diuine, whom the sa∣cred scriptures call also beasts: euen so also the Aristocratique and popular Common∣weales [ B] * 1.2244 without vnderstanding, that is to say, without a prince, are in some sort able to maintaine and defend themselues, though not long: being indeed about to become much more happie if they had a soueraigue prince, which with his authoritie and power might (as doth the vnderstanding) reconcile all the parts, and so vnite and bind them fast in happinesse together: for why no gouernment is more happie or blessed, than where the reasonable soule of man is gouerned by wisedome, anger and desire of reuenge by true valour, lust by temperance; and that vnderstanding bearing the rule, and as it were holding the reines, guideth the chariot, whereafter all the rest follow whether soeuer he will lead them: for so all honestie, all the lustre of vertue and dutie shall euery where flourish. But when the power and commaund of vnderstanding bea∣ten [ C] downe and quite ouerthrowne, anger as a mutinous and vnruly souldior, and in∣temperat lust as a turbulent and seditious people, shall take vpon them the gouerne∣ment, and so inuading the state, shake wisedome and vnderstanding, and thrust it out of place: euery Commonweale must needs euen like the powers of the soule and mind needs so fall into all manner of reproch and filthinesse of vices. So that nothing is more like vnto a well gouerned Commonweale, than that most faire and fit compari∣son of the soule and the powers thereof, there being therein so established a most Har∣monicall proportion of iustice, which giueth to euerie part of the soule that which vn∣to it of right belongeth. The like whereof we may say also of the three estates of a Commonweale, guided by Wisedome, Fortitude, & Temperance: which th•…•…ee mo∣rall [ D] vertues vnited together, and with their king, that is to say, the intellectuall and con∣templatiue vertue, there is thereby established a most faire and Harmonicall forme of a Commonweale. For that as of vnitie dependeth the vnion of all numbers, which haue* 1.2245 no power but from it: so also is one soueraigne prince in euerie Commonweale neces∣sarie, from the power of whome all others orderly depend. But as there cannot bee good musicke wherein there is not some discord, which must of necessitie be intermin∣gled* 1.2246 to giue the better grace vnto the Harmonie (which the good Musitian doth, to make the consent of the fourth, the fift, and the eight, the more pleasing and tunable, some discord running before which may make the consent much more sweet vnto the eare; as do also cunning cookes, who to giue the better tast vnto their good meates, [ E] serue in therewith certaine dishes of sharpe and vnsauerie sauces; and as the cunning painter, to grace his picture, and to giue a better show vnto his brighter colours, still shadoweth the same with blacke, or some other darke colour (for that the nature of all things in the world is such, as to loose their grace, if they tast not sometime of dis∣grace; and that pleasure alwayes continuing becommeth vnsauorie, daungerous and vnpleasant): So also is it necessarie that there should be some fooles amongst wise men, some vnworthy of their charge amongst men of great experience, and some euill and vitious men amongst the good and vertuous, to giue them the greater lustre, and to

make the difference knowne (euen by the pointing of the finger, and the sight of the [ F] eye) betwixt vertue and vice, knowledge and ignorance. For when sools, vitious, and wicked men, are contemned & despised, then the wise, vertuous, and good men, receiue the true reward and guerdon for their vertue, which is honour. And it seemeth the an∣tient Greekes in their fables, to haue aptly shadowed forth vnto vs that which wee haue spoken of these three kinds of Iustice, giuing vnto Themis three daughters, viz. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: that is to say, Vpright Law, Equitie, and Peace: which are referred* 1.2247 vnto the three formes of Iustice, Arithmeticall, Geometricall, and Harmonicall: how∣beit that peace which shadoweth forth Harmonicall Iustice, is the onely scope and summe of all the lawes and iudgements, as also of the true Royall gouernment: so as is Harmonicall Iustice the end both of Arithmeticall and Geometricall gouernment [ G] also.

But these things thus declared, it remaineth for vs to know (as the chiefe point of* 1.2248 this our present discourse) Whether it be true that Plato saith, God to gouerne this world by Geometricall proportion: For that he hath taken it as a ground, to shew that a well ordered Commonweale ought (to the imitation of the world) to be gouerned by Geometricall Iustice: Which I haue shewed to be contrarie, by the nature of the vnitie, Harmonically referred vnto the three first numbers: as also by the intellectuall power, compared vnto the three other powers of the soule: and by a point compared to a line, a plaine superficies, or other solid bodie. But let vs goe farther, for if Plato had looked neerer into the wonderfull Fabrike of the world, hee should haue marked that [ H] which hee forgot in his Timeo, viz. The Great God of nature to haue Harmonically composed this world of Matter and Forme, of which the one is maintained by the helpe of the other, and that by the proportion of equalitie and similitude combined & bound together. And for that the Matter was to no vse without the Forme, and that the forme could haue no being without the matter, neither in the whole vniuersall, nei∣ther yet in the parts thereof: he made the world equall to the one, and semblable to the other: equall vnto the matter whereof it is made, for that it comprehendeth all: and semblable or like vnto the forme, in such sort as is the Harmonicall proportion com∣posed of the Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportions equall to the one, and sem∣blable to the other, being one of them separate from another vnperfect. [ I]

[illustration]

And as the Pythagorians sacrificed the great sacrifice Heca∣tombe, not for the sustendure of the right angle, which de∣pendeth of the two sides (as many thinke) but for hauing in the selfesame figure found the equalitie and similitude of two other figures, the third figure being equall vnto the first, and like vnto the second: so do we also owe the immortall euerla∣sting sacrifice of praise and thanksgiuing vnto almightie God, for that he hath by an admirable bond of Harmonie, bound together this world of matter and forme, equall to the one, and like to the other: equall indeed to the matter, so that there is nothing thereof wanting, or yet superflu∣ous: [ K] but yet like vnto that euerlasting forme, which he the most wise workeman had in his mind before conceiued, before he made that so great and excellent a worke: as we read in the holy * Scripture.* 1.2249

And as for the motion or mouing of the celestiall Spheres, wee see that God hath made one motion equall, which is the swift motion of the superiour Sphere: and ano∣ther vnequall, which is the motion of the Planets (contrarie vnto the former:) and the third the motion of Trepidation, which containeth and bindeth together both the one and the other. And so if we should enter into the particular nature of other world∣ly

creatures also, we should find a perpetuall Harmonicall bond, which vniteth the ex∣treames [ A] by indissoluble meanes, taking yet part both of the one and of the other.* 1.2250 Which coherence is neither agreeable vnto Arithmeticall nor Geometricall, but euen proper vnto the Harmonicall proportion onely: wherein the sweetnesse of the con∣sent consisteth in tunes aptly mixt together: and the harsh discord, when as the tunes are such as cannot fitly be mingled together. So we see the earth and stones to be as it were ioyned together by clay and chaulke, as in meane betwixt both: and so betwixt the stones and mettals, the Marcasites, the Calamites, and other diuers kinds of mine∣rall stones to grow: So stones and plants also to be ioyned together by diuers kinds of Corall, which are as it were stonie plants, yet hauing in them life, and growing vppon roots: Betwixt plants and liuing creatures, the Zoophytes, or Plantbeasts, which haue [ B] feeling and motion, but yet take life by the roots whereby they grow. And againe be∣twixt the creatures which liue by land onely, and those which liue by water onely, are those which they call Amphibia, or creatures liuing by land and water both, as doth the Beuer, the Otter, the Tortoise, and such like: as betwixt the fishes and the fouls are a certaine kind of flying fishes: So betwixt men and beasts, are to bee seene Apes and Munkies; except we shall with Plato agree, who placed a woman in the middle betwixt a man and a beast. And so betwixt beasts and angels God hath placed man, who is in part mortall, and in part immortall: binding also this elementarie world, with the hea∣uens or the celestiall world, by the aethereall region. And as a discord sometimes (as we said) giueth grace vnto the sweetest Harmonie▪ so God also hath here in this world [ C] mingled the bad with the good, and placed vertues in the middest of vices, bringing forth also certaine monsters in nature, and suffering the eclipses and defects of the cele∣stiall lights: as also the Surd reasons in Geometricall demonstrations: to the end that there of might arise the greater good, and that by such meanes the power and beautie of Gods workes might be the better knowne, which might otherwise haue beene hid and folded vp in most thicke and obscure darkenesse. And therefore it is, that God ha∣uing hardened Pharaoes heart, which the wise Hebrewes expound to be the enemie of God and Nature, saith thus vnto him, Excitaui ego te vt demonstrarem in te ipso poten∣tiae meae vim ac decus, vt toto terrarum or be gesta mea omnium vna commemoratione prae∣dicarentur, [ D] I haue stirred thee vp (saith he) that I might in thee declare the force & glo∣rie of my power, that so all my acts might with one report of all men bee praised throughout the whole world. And these things truely belong vnto the most true re∣port of the things then done in Aegypt: but there lieth hidden therein a more diuine meaning than that, concerning the great Pharao, the worker and father of all mischiefe, whome the sacred Scriptures declare by the name of Leuiathan: and yet in this all the diuines agree, this of all others the greatest enemie of God and man, to bee still by the becke, word, and power of God, kept in and restrained: and all the force and power of those mischiefes and euils by him and his wrought (which we so much both fret and maruell at, and without which the power of the good should neither bee, neither yet be at all perceiued) to be shut vp within the bounds of this elementarie world: and a∣boue [ E] the same to be nothing but that which is holy and cleane from all filth and wic∣kednesse; in such sort, as that that little staine of euils here shall much more profit than hurt. Whereof Augustine speaking, saith well, Qui Deum immortalem vllum mali de∣decus perpessurum negat, nisi maius bonum consequi certo sciret, Who denieth that the immortall God would euer suffer any euill or wickednesse to bee done, but that hee most certainly knoweth a greater good to ensue thereof. Wherefore as of Treble and Base voyces is made a most sweet and melodious Harmonie, so also of vices and vertues, of the different qualities of the elements, of the contrarie motions of the cele∣stiall

Spheres, and of the Sympathies and Antipathies of things, by indissoluble [ F] meanes bound together, is composed the Harmonie of the whole world, and of all the parts thereof: So also a well ordered Commonweale is composed of good and bad, of the rich and of the poore, of wisemen and of fools, of the strong and of the weake, allied by them which are in the meane betwixt both: which so by a wonderfull disa∣greeing concord, ioyne the highest with the lowest, and so all to all, yet so as that the good are still stronger than the bad; so as hee the most wise workeman of all others, and gouernour of the world hath by his eternall law decreed. And as he himselfe be∣ing of an infinit force and power ruleth ouer the angels, so also the angels ouer men, men ouer beasts, the soule ouer the the bodie, the man ouer the woman, reason ouer af∣fection: and so euery good thing commaunding ouer that which is worse, with a cer∣taine [ G] combining of powers keepeth all things vnder most right and lawful commands.* 1.2251 Wherefore what the vnitie is in numbers, the vnderstanding in the powers of the soule, and the center in a circle: so likewise in this world that most mightie king, in vni∣tie simple, in nature indiuisible, in puritie most holy, exalted farre aboue the Fabrike of the celestiall Spheres, ioyning this elementarie world with the celestiall and intelligible heauens; with a certaine secure care preserueth from distruction this triple world, bound together with a most sweet and Harmonicall consent: vnto the imitation of whome, euerie good prince which wisheth his Kingdome and Commonweale not in safetie onely, but euen good and blessed also, is to frame and con∣forme himselfe. [ H]

Laus Deo vni & trino in secula seculorum. Amen.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The definition of a Commonweale.
• * 1.2

  That a common weale ought to be a lawfull gouern∣ment.
• * 1.3

  A notable exā∣ple of fauour, ex∣tended vnto an offender, submit∣ting himself vn∣to his Prince.
• * 1.4

  Pirats and rob bers are not to haue the fauour of iust enemies.
• * 1.5

  The notable an∣swere of Deme∣trius •…•…pirat, vnto Alexander the great.
• * 1.6

  How arch pirats may in some sort be fauoured.
• * 1.7

  The auncient definition of a Commonweal•…•… defectiue.
• * 1.8

  •…•…
• * 1.9

  The chief fellci∣tie of one citisē▪ and of a Citie or common weale all one; and wherein it consi∣steth.
• * 1.10

  Aristotle blamed
• * 1.11

  Things requisit for the first be∣ginning of a growing com∣monweale.
• * 1.12

  A notable dis∣course of the course that men hold for the at∣taining of felici∣tie.
• * 1.13

  A small commō∣weale may yet be happie.
• * 1.14

  Aristotle bla∣med.
• * 1.15

  A notable com∣parison.
• * 1.16

  A man is called the little world.
• * 1.17

  GOD.
• * 1.18

  Gen. cap. 2. Deut. Exod. cap. 20.
• * 1.19

  A fit comparisō.
• * 1.20

  Plato, Plutarch in the liues of Lysan∣der, Agesilaus, and Lycurgus.
• * 1.21

  Dionis Hali∣car. li. pri.
• * 1.22

  The definition of a familie.
• * 1.23

  The good go∣uernment of a familie the true modell for the gouernment of a Common weale.
• * 1.24

  No perfect fa∣milie without a wife.
• * 1.25

  How many per∣sons be requisite to make vp an whole and entire familie, and how many families make a Citie.
• * 1.26

  Iustin. lib. 4.
• * 1.27

  It is not the greatnes of the number that ma∣keth the Commō∣weale, but the vnion of the people vnder one soueraigne commaund.
• * 1.28

  Sometimes one▪ familie may be greater than some Common weale.
• * 1.29

  Plut. in Emili. The greatest & best peopled ci∣tie no more a cō∣mon weale than the least.
• * 1.30

  The multitude of people no bin∣derance to the vnitie of a com∣mon weale▪ so that they be vn∣der one soue∣raigne commād.
• * 1.31

  Fraunce.
• * 1.32

  Ester. cap. 1
• * 1.33

  Herodotus, 〈◊〉〈◊〉. in Ar∣ta•…•….
• * 1.34

  Many thing•…•… common vnto citisens among themselues.
• * 1.35

  No common∣weale where no∣thing is common
• * 1.36

  Dionisius H•…•…∣ly carnasseus lib. 2.
• * 1.37

  Plato his opini∣on for the com∣munitie of all things in a com∣monweale, refu∣ted.
• * 1.38

  The chief diffe∣rence betwixt a Familie and a Commonweale.
• * 1.39

  Sleidan.
• * 1.40

  Things common smally regarded
• * 1.41

  Particular fa∣milies may haue also their parti∣cular lawes: and how.
• * 1.42

  Anno 1370. and 1431.
• * 1.43

  Fraunce.
• * 1.44

  The great bene∣fit which often∣times commeth vnto a Common∣weale, by certain priuat lawes and customs granted vnto some great and honourable houses & fami∣lies.
• * 1.45

  Liuitie lib. 5
• * 1.46

  The diuision of power and com∣maund.
• * 1.47

  Domesticall power of foure sorts.
• * 1.48

  The first & grea∣test commaund is the commaund of Reason ouer our affections, & so ouer our selues.
• * 1.49

  Gen. cap. 2.
• * 1.50

  Gen. cap. 3
• * 1.51

  Gen. cap. 4
• * 1.52

  Gen. cap. 1.
• * 1.53

  Rabbi May∣mon. lib. x. ne∣more.
• * 1.54

  A man hath no power ouer his Concubine, or her that is but vnto him betro∣thed.
• * 1.55

  How the Hus∣band sometimes hash not of right power ouer his Wife, and why.
• * 1.56

  * Numeri. 3.
• * 1.57

  The wife by all the lawes of God and man bound to obey her hus∣band.
• * 1.58

  Foure •…•… •…•…seswher∣in a man by Ro∣mulus his-law had power of life and death ouer his wife.
• * 1.59

  * Tacitus lib. 2
• * 1.60

  Liui. lib. 33.
• * 1.61

  Iustin. lib. 32.
• * 1.62

  Lib. 6. Belli Gallici.
• * 1.63

  That it was law∣full for a man to kill his wife for drinking of wine
• * 1.64

  Dion. Halic. lib. 2. Plin. li. 14 cap. 13. Vaser. de instit. antiq.
• * 1.65

  Cicero de nat. lib. 3. & de Re∣pub. lib. 1. Ps•…•…. in Problem. Rom. cap. 6. Arnob. lib. 2. aduersus gen∣tes. Tertul in Apolog. cap▪ 6. Gellius lib. 10 cap. 23. & Alci∣mus Siculus apud Athenae•…•…∣um.
• * 1.66

  The punishment of wiues▪ 〈◊〉〈◊〉 adulier•…•….
• * 1.67

  Leuit. •…•…0. Da∣niel 12. Deu. 24▪
• * 1.68

  No action of in∣iurie to be ad∣•…•…tted betwixt a man & his wife, and why.
• * 1.69

  The ha•…•…red be∣twixt man and wife of all others most deadly.
• * 1.70

  Diuorcement by the law of God allowed.
• * 1.71

  Whether in di∣uorcement it be better to ex▪
• * 1.72

  pressethe cause thereof, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to haue the same concealed.
• * 1.73

  In the yeare of Christ 1240.
• * 1.74

  Plut. in Alci.
• * 1.75

  * Plut. in Aemi.
• * 1.76

  Diuorcement necessarie.
• * 1.77

  Wiues to be corrected rather with words then with stripes.
• * 1.78

  Plut. in Laco∣nicis.
• * 1.79

  Arist. lib. 2. Politic.
• * 1.80

  Tranquillus in Claudio.
• * 1.81

  The authoritie and power of the husband •…•…uer his wife.
• * 1.82

  The power of the Father ouer his children is the onely naturall power.
• * 1.83

  The dutie of pa∣rents towards their children: and their great dutie againe to∣wards them.
• * 1.84

  Exod. 22. Deut. 5.
• * 1.85

  Gen 27. 28.
• * 1.86

  Valer. Max. lib. 2.
• * 1.87

  Leui. 20▪
• * 1.88

  Deu. 17. Exo. 21
• * 1.89

  Parents how vnwilling to haue their chil∣dren publickly punished.
• * 1.90

  Good iustice done vpon a diso∣bedient child.
• * 1.91

  That parents should haue power of life and death ouer their children.
• * 1.92

  Deut. 21.
• * 1.93

  Caesar lib. 6. Comment.
• * 1.94

  Anotable exam∣ple of a fathers seueritie against his sonne, being a great officer.
• * 1.95

  Valer. Maxi▪ lib. 4.
• * 1.96

  Dion. Haly∣car. lib. 7. & Li∣uius lib. 3.
• * 1.97

  The rare pietie of a daughter to∣ward her father.
• * 1.98

  Leuit 11. iob. 38.
• * 1.99

  The power of fa∣thers ouer their children much profitable to the Commonweale: and the want thereof much hurtfull.
• * 1.100

  How the power of life and death ouer their chil∣dren was in Rome first taken from their pa∣rents.
• * 1.101

  Note.
• * 1.102

  How parents were woont to emancipat their children.
• * 1.103

  Whether pa∣rents be bound to nourish their children: and how long.
• * 1.104

  Whether the sonne may resist his father offe∣ring him violēcei or for any cause kill his father. Souldiors in an∣tient times were beaten with vines.
• * 1.105

  Plin. lib. 12.
• * 1.106

  A strange exam ple of a most vn∣naturall sonne.
• * 1.107

  Obiections a∣gainst the power of fathers ouer their children.
• * 1.108

  Plu. in Lycurg.
• * 1.109

  Numer. 23.
• * 1.110

  Deut. 21.
• * 1.111

  Adoptiue chil∣dren as well in the power of their adoptiue fathers, as were the children be∣got in lawfull matrimonie.
• * 1.112

  Gen. cap. vl•…•….
• * 1.113

  Exod. 1.
• * 1.114

  Lib. 2. cap. 3
• * 1.115

  Tacit. lib. de moribus Ger∣manorum.
• * 1.116

  Tranquil in Galba.
• * 1.117

  Vopiscus in Aureliano.
• * 1.118

  Procopius.
• * 1.119

  Martinus. V.
• * 1.120

  Cicero pro do∣mo.
• * 1.121

  Whereof a Fa∣milie tooke name.
• * 1.122

  The diuision of Slaues.
• * 1.123

  Cromer in hist. Polon. & in statutis Pol.
• * 1.124

  A cruell law a∣gainst debters.
• * 1.125

  Domestical ser∣uants cannot make themselues slaues by any contract that they make with their macters.
• * 1.126

  Prentises of England by co∣uenant, for a time slaues.
• * 1.127

  Plutar in vita Caesaris.
• * 1.128

  Mercinarie la∣bourers no slaues
• * 1.129

  Two notable que∣stions concer∣ning slauerie.
• * 1.130

  Slauerie in the opinion of Aristo tle, a thing natu∣rall, but not so in the iudgement of the Lawyers.
• * 1.131

  Reasons to proue that seruitude or slauery is pro∣fitable vnto a Commonweale: as also agreeable vnto nature.
• * 1.132

  How seruitude i•…•… agreeable vn∣to nature: and how not.
• * 1.133

  The former rea∣son•…•… answered: and slauerie pro∣ued not to bee a thing agreeable vnto nature:
• * 1.134

  * Caes. lib. 6. Belli Gallici.
• * 1.135

  Plut. in The∣mist. & Artax.
• * 1.136

  Iud. 11.
• * 1.137

  Euripides.
• * 1.138

  Ieseph▪ in bello Iudaico.
• * 1.139

  The miserable estate and condi∣tion of slauer.
• * 1.140

  Colum. lib. 1
• * 1.141

  Lib. tertio de fra.
• * 1.142

  Vir. 6. Aeneid
• * 1.143

  Plut. in▪ vita Titi Flaminii.
• * 1.144

  * Lib. 14.
• * 1.145

  * Sene. lib. 3. de Benefic.
• * 1.146

  * Plu. in Thes.
• * 1.147

  To great a mul∣titude of slaues daungerous in a Commonweale.
• * 1.148

  Why slaues were not suffred to beare armes.
• * 1.149

  * Appian. in bellis ciuilib. * Ios. in bello Iudaico.
• * 1.150

  The cause why Christian princes by little and lit∣tle released their slaues.
• * 1.151

  The beginning of a•…•…mes houses and hospital•…•….
• * 1.152

  Nicephorus.
• * 1.153

  A time wherein there were no 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the Christian Com∣monweale.
• * 1.154

  When slaues ceased in France
• * 1.155

  * Tertul. in de resurrection.
• * 1.156

  viz. France.
• * 1.157

  Slaues by com∣ming into France become free.
• * 1.158

  Now it commeth to paste tha•…•… •…•…es 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be so many 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the world.
• * 1.159

  * Exod. 2•…•….
• * 1.160

  Deut. •…•…5.
• * 1.161

  Leuit. 2•…•…. Herom. 32. Num. 13.
• * 1.162

  Exod. 12. Numer. 49.
• * 1.163

  Hier. 34.
• * 1.164

  The Portugals the first that called in slauery againe into Europe.
• * 1.165

  No man noble a∣mong the Turkes but for his valor or his vertue.
• * 1.166

  Reasons for the bringing in a∣gaine of slauery answered.
• * 1.167

  An horrible ex∣ample of the crueltie of a faithlesse slaue.
• * 1.168

  Reasons for th•…•… maintaining of slauerie in a Commonweale.
• * 1.169

  The same rea∣sons answered.
• * 1.170

  The old saying, That no man can be a good master, but he which hath be∣fore bene a good 〈◊〉〈◊〉, refuted.
• * 1.171

  The definition of a Citisen.
• * 1.172

  That violence and oppression gaue the begin∣ning vnto Com∣monweals.
• * 1.173

  That kings were not first chosen for their iustice and vertue.
• * 1.174

  A Citisen must be a free subiect.
• * 1.175

  Slaues not to bee accounted Citi∣sens.
• * 1.176

  * Cice. offici∣orum. lib. 1.
• * 1.177

  The diuision of subiects.
• * 1.178

  Why Fabius was called Ma∣ximus.
• * 1.179

  The naturall citisen.
• * 1.180

  * Plut. in Peri.
• * 1.181

  The naturalised citisen.
• * 1.182

  The citisen of honour properly no citisen.
• * 1.183

  The enclosure of wals make not a citie, but the gouernment of the citisens vn∣der the self same lawes: although they dwell in •…•…∣uers townes or prouinces disper∣sed.
• * 1.184

  * viz. France.
• * 1.185

  The difference betwixt a citisen and a burgesse.
• * 1.186

  * Arist. Politic. lib. 3. cap. 6.
• * 1.187

  * Cice ad A•…•…ticum. lib. 4.
• * 1.188

  That the citi∣sens, and not the wals or buil∣dings of a citie, make a citie.
• * 1.189

  The Carthagi∣nensian ambas∣sadors deceiued for not well vn∣derstanding what a citie in •…•…uth is.
• * 1.190

  Aristotle his de∣finition of a Ci∣tisen impugned.
• * 1.191

  * Lib. 3. cap. 1. & cap. 4. Polit. * Topi. lib. 6. * Pol. li. 3. ca. 1
• * 1.192

  Who indeed be citisens.
• * 1.193

  The diuers sorts of citisens in Rome.
• * 1.194

  The cause of the confederat warre in Italle against the Ro∣mans.
• * 1.195

  Plu. in Syl•…•…
• * 1.196

  * Liui. lib. 26.
• * 1.197

  No one priue∣ledge more com∣mon vnto the Roman citisens in generall, than that the magi∣strat might not proceed against them in cases concerning life or libertie, •…•…ith∣out the peoples leaue.
• * 1.198

  The greatest & chiefest priue∣lege proper vnto the citisens of Rome.
• * 1.199

  Plut. in Ale∣xandro.
• * 1.200

  The greatnes of the priueleges and immunities which a man en∣ioyeth, maketh him neuer a whit the more therefore a citi∣sen.
• * 1.201

  Honourable citi∣sens.
• * 1.202

  A citisen of Rome might at his pleasure giue vp his free∣dome.
• * 1.203

  Not citisens on∣ly but euen strangers also in some places prohibited to de∣part.
• * 1.204

  Cice. in orat▪ pro Corn Bal.
• * 1.205

  The subiect may not depart out of his countrey without the leaue of his prince.
• * 1.206

  The Canaries.
• * 1.207

  Not lawfull for any man to for∣sake his natiue countrey.
• * 1.208

  Why princes of∣tentimes by large gifts and priue∣leges draw into their countries ingenious stran∣gers.
• * 1.209

  To haue dwelt long in another princes countrey maketh him ne∣uer a whit the more the strange princes subiect.
• * 1.210

  Better sometimes to be a straunger than a naturall citisen.
• * 1.211

  The true diffe∣rence betuixt a citisen and a stranger.
• * 1.212

  The greatest pri∣ueledge that a naturall citisen had in auntiens time aboue a straunger.
• * 1.213

  viz. France.
• * 1.214

  Strāgers in ma∣ny places hardly del•…•… withall.
• * 1.215

  Other differences betwixt a citisen and a straunger.
• * 1.216

  Plu. in Lycurg.
• * 1.217

  A stranger sub∣mitting himself vnto the power of another prince, is yet the subiect of his naturall prince.
• * 1.218

  No subiect can exempt himselfe from the po•…•…er of his naturall prince.
• * 1.219

  Neu Castell.
• * 1.220

  The diuision of citisens or sub∣iects into three estates▪ •…•… thing obserued in all Commonweale.
• * 1.221

  * Lib. a. Polit.
• * 1.222

  Protection.
• * 1.223

  How in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of peace prin•…•… are said to be on•…•… of them in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 protection of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 another.
• * 1.224

  To protect others is a thing most honourable.
• * 1.225

  How whole cities sometimes put themselues into the protection of some one honou∣rable house of the Roman Se∣nators.
• * 1.226

  Great difference betwixt the free borne clients and the clients en∣franchised.
• * 1.227

  The difference betwixt the free borne client and the vassall. This right is of the Latins called Ius-commissi: & of the French Droit de co∣mise.
• * 1.228

  Vassalage but new: protection most auntient.
• * 1.229

  The difference betwixt patro∣nage, vassallage, and protection.
• * 1.230

  What protection be•…•…ixt gre•…•… princes is.
• * 1.231

  Whether a soue∣raigne prince submitting him∣selfe vnto the protection of ano ther prince, loo∣seth thereby his own soueraignty, and so becom∣meth the other princes subiect.
• * 1.232

  Protection im∣porteth not sub∣iection.
• * 1.233

  Alliance equall▪ or vnequall▪ Vnequall of two sorts.
• * 1.234

  Alliance equall.
• * 1.235

  Alliance defen∣siue only, or both defensiue and offensiue.
• * 1.236

  Alliance of neutralitie.
• * 1.237

  Coallies 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they be. Coallies alwaies comprised in the league of their allies.
• * 1.238

  N•…•… alliance 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vnsure or weake, than the simple alliance of commerce and •…•…raffick.
• * 1.239

  Who indeed are to be accounted enemies.
• * 1.240

  In all alliance•…•… the soueraigneti•…•… i•…•… still vnto all Princes, & peo∣ple to bee reser∣ued safe and vn∣touched.
• * 1.241

  Alliance ma∣keth not but that men may still bee one of them strangers vnto another, & not of the same Ci•…•…ie or Com∣monweale.
• * 1.242

  That the Can∣•…•… of the Swis∣sers are not one, but diuers Com∣monweales.
• * 1.243

  The beginning of the Swissers revols from the Empire, and the first establishing of their Com∣monweales.
• * 1.244

  Geneua the las•…•… that entred into league with the Swissers, vnder the protection of the Bernois.
• * 1.245

  The Cantons of the Swissers di∣uided among themselues for religion.
• * 1.246

  None of the can∣tons may make alliance with a∣ny prince, wish∣out the whole consent of the rest of the cantons
• * 1.247

  The alliance of the auntient Commonweals of Gaule.
• * 1.248

  The league of •…•…e Achaeans.
• * 1.249

  Whereof the Swissers tooke their name.
• * 1.250

  The league of the Aetolians.
• * 1.251

  The league of the Lycians.
• * 1.252

  The league of the 13. Cities of Ionia. The 12. Cities of Tus∣canie: and the 47. Cities of the Latines.
• * 1.253

  Lib. 27.
• * 1.254

  A General cho∣sen by many Ci∣ties or States in League together, maketh not them that haue so cho∣sen him euer a what the more one Common∣weale.
• * 1.255

  The Swissers in all their leagues with forren Princes •…•…till ex∣ceps the Empire
• * 1.256

  Not lawfull for subiects to en∣treat of any par∣ticular league or alliance among themselues, or with forren prin∣ces, without the leaue or con∣sent of their own soueraignes.
• * 1.257

  A foule and re∣bellious league of subiects a∣gainst their prince.
• * 1.258

  The definition of Maiesty or Soue∣raigntie.
• * 1.259

  That Soueraign∣tie consisteth in a perpetuall power.
• * 1.260

  * Liui. lib 7.
• * 1.261

  The dictator of Rome, neither soueraigne prince nor magistrat.
• * 1.262

  Who is to be called an abso∣lute soueraigne.
• * 1.263

  The great Ar∣chon of Athens no soueraigne.
• * 1.264

  The Amymones soueraigne ma∣gistrats, and •…•…es not simple soue∣raignes.
• * 1.265

  The Regents of Fraunce▪
• * 1.266

  The Senat of Millan, or Na∣ples, what power it hath in the absence of the king of Spaine.
• * 1.267

  Princes, lieute∣nants or gouer∣nours of coun tries for tearme of life, yes no so∣ueraignes.
• * 1.268

  Henrie duke of Aniou.
• * 1.269

  How the people may create a so∣ueraigne Mo∣narch.
• * 1.270

  The regall, or royall law.
• * 1.271

  Hector Boet. in hist. Scot.
• * 1.272

  Vnto soueraign∣tie belongeth ab∣solute power, and what that abso∣lute power is.
• * 1.273

  The forme of chusing the great king of Tartarie.
• * 1.274

  The forme of in∣uesting the duke of Carinthia.
• * 1.275

  Anno. 133•…•….
• * 1.276

  The manner of crowning of the kings of Ar∣ragon.
• * 1.277

  viz. Fraunce.
• * 1.278

  That a subiect may be dispenced withall from all the lawes and customes of his Commonweale, yet be neither prince nor soue∣raigne.
• * 1.279

  A soueraigne prince is not bound to giue a reason of his do∣ings.
• * 1.280

  That the lawes, letters pattents, priueleges, grants of princes haue no force, but during the life of the princes that granted them.
• * 1.281

  viz. Fraunce.
• * 1.282

  A soueraigne prince is not sub∣iect vnto the lawes and ordi∣nances that he himselfe maketh
• * 1.283

  All princes and people are sub∣iect vnto the lawes of God and nature.
• * 1.284

  Innocentius Quartus.
• * 1.285

  Whether •…•… prince be sub∣iict vnto the lawes of his coū∣trey that he hath sworne to keepe, or not.
• * 1.286

  The word of a prince ought to be as an Oracle.
• * 1.287

  The reason of the law ceasing, the law it selfe ought also to cease.
• * 1.288

  Soueraigne prin ces no•…•… bound vnto their laws▪ may yet by their contracts bind themselues vnto their subiects.
• * 1.289

  Whether Soue∣raigne princes well aduised, ought to bind themselues by oath to keepe the lawes of their predecessors.
• * 1.290

  The oath of Phi lip the first, son to Henry the first, king of Fraunce, at the time of his Coro∣nation.
• * 1.291

  Chap. 9.
• * 1.292

  The auntient Hebrew kings not sworne when they were an∣nointed by the Prophet•…•….
• * 1.293

  Lawes royall which concerne the state of the realme not to be•…•… infringed by a soueraign prince.
• * 1.294

  Parliaments impaire not, but most of all show the maiestie and greatnesse of a soueraign prince
• * 1.295

  The parlements of Fraunce.
• * 1.296

  The parliament of Spaine.
• * 1.297

  The parliaments of England.
• * 1.298

  D. Dale.
• * 1.299

  Polydor. in hist. Anglor•…•….
• * 1.300

  The principall point of soue∣raigntie.
• * 1.301

  Laws in Fraunce altred by the prince, without the assembling or consent of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.302

  An oath cannot be made but by the lesser to the greater.
• * 1.303

  A principalitie no Monarch.
• * 1.304

  The Roman em∣perours for most part tyrants.
• * 1.305

  Sueton. in Ca∣ligula.
• * 1.306

  Why Traian & some other good princes haue sworne to obserue and keepe the lawes.
• * 1.307

  Two great incon∣ueniences ensu ing vnto soue∣raigne princes by swearing to obserue the laws.
• * 1.308

  Examples to proue that lawes once made and e∣stablished, may not by them that haue the soue∣raigntie be a∣gaine chaunged.
• * 1.309

  The lawes of the Athenians to be chaunged.
• * 1.310

  Polydore.
• * 1.311

  The former rea∣sons aunswered.
• * 1.312

  Ahashuerosh Hester.
• * 1.313

  Plut▪ in Peri.
• * 1.314

  Demetri. Demost.
• * 1.315

  The clause of perpetuitie why annexed vnto lawes, and yet n•…•… lawes perpetuall.
• * 1.316

  * Plut. in Sol.
• * 1.317

  The soueraigne prince more of curtesie than of neces•…•…itie bound to obserue the lawes.
• * 1.318

  Liuius lib. 3.
• * 1.319

  All princes bound and sub∣iect vnto the lawes of God and nature, and to their owne iust conuentions.
• * 1.320

  An obiection that princes are bound to the ci∣uill lawes.
• * 1.321

  The answere, de∣claring to what lawes a prince is bound, and to what lawes not.
• * 1.322

  A law may be good, iust, and reasonable, and yet the prince no way subiect or bound there∣unto.
• * 1.323

  That a soue▪ prince is bound to his owne con∣tracts, aswell as other men be.
• * 1.324

  A notable say∣ing.
• * 1.325

  A soueraigne prince lesse in iustice to be re∣spected or relee∣ued, than his subiects, when question is of his promise.
• * 1.326

  That •…•… soue▪ raigne prince is bound to his own ciuil couenants.
• * 1.327

  What account was made of the Roman ciuill lawes in France.
• * 1.328

  The Roman lawes forbidden to be •…•…aught in Spaine.
• * 1.329

  Neither pope nor emperour exempted from the law of na∣ture.
• * 1.330

  A dangerous opinion, and not to be taught to princes.
• * 1.331

  That a prince•…•… power ought al∣waies to be mea∣sured with the foot of iustice.
• * 1.332

  Priuat mens los∣ses by princes sometimes to bee sufferd, for the greater benef•…•… of the Common∣weale.
• * 1.333

  The law of for∣getfulnes neces∣sarie for the en∣ding of ciuile warres, and com∣posing of contro∣uersies betwixt princes.
• * 1.334

  How it is to bee vnderstood, All to be the princes.
• * 1.335

  The king in some cases lesse priui∣ledged than the subiect.
• * 1.336

  Whether a so∣ueraigne prince be bound to the promises or con∣uentions of the kings his prede∣cessours or not.
• * 1.337

  The letters of the French king vnto the Swissers
• * 1.338

  Anno. 1463
• * 1.339

  The king neuer dieth.
• * 1.340

  These Vicarij were slaues com∣maunded.
• * 1.341

  The county of A•…•…ti.
• * 1.342

  The difference betwixt him which is onely in the simple prote∣ction of another prince, and him that oweth vnto him fealtie and homage.
• * 1.343

  Nine degrees of subiection of in∣feriors towards their superiors.
• * 1.344

  The difference of a vassall, or a liege man from a naturall sub∣iect.
• * 1.345

  The king•…•… of Scots vassals to the English.
• * 1.346

  The kings of Denmarke in antient time vassals vnto the German empire.
• * 1.347

  A fee is not to be giuen vp but simply and with∣out fraud.
• * 1.348

  The auntient countie•…•… of Bri∣taigne, vassals to the kings of France.
• * 1.349

  Roialties reser∣ued vnto the dukes of Bri∣taigne, notwith∣standing their homage due vn∣to the French king.
• * 1.350

  The prince that holdeth of ano∣ther, is himselfe no absolute So∣ueraigne.
• * 1.351

  Homage a per∣sonall seruice, and not to be performed by a deputie.
• * 1.352

  The forme of the homage made by the kings of England vnto the kings of Fraunce.
• * 1.353

  Homage a base & seruile thing, and therefore de∣tested of honora∣ble princes.
• * 1.354

  The wearing of a cap was in auntient time the marke of them that were but lately made free, to couer their heads that were shauen when they were slaues.
• * 1.355

  Charles the fift a naturall subiect of these French Kings▪
• * 1.356

  Charls the fift vassall and liegeman vnto the pope and the Church of Rome.
• * 1.357

  The kingdom•…•… of Naples and Sicilie holden of the pope.
• * 1.358

  The ounce is worth ten crownes
• * 1.359

  Pius Quintus the pope angrie with Ferdinand the emperour for not recei•…•…ing of him the im∣periall crowne.
• * 1.360

  The same man cannot be liegeman to diuers princ•…•….
• * 1.361

  The vasia•…•… ought first to serue his most auntient Lord
• * 1.362

  The act of the oath of the king of Arragon giue to the pope.
• * 1.363

  The inuestiture of the kingdomes of Sardinia and Corsica granted by the pope.
• * 1.364

  The kingdom of Portugall hol∣den of the pope.
• * 1.365

  The islands of the Canaries▪ holden of the pope.
• * 1.366

  The maiestie of Charles the fift impugned by this French au∣thor.
• * 1.367

  Title pretended by the French vnto the king∣dom of Castile.
• * 1.368

  The author haply is in this partiall, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mistaken.
• * 1.369

  The emperour n•…•… absolute so∣ueraigne.
• * 1.370

  No prince in I∣talie which hol∣deth not of the pope, or of the empire.
• * 1.371

  The duke of Milan.
• * 1.372

  The duke of Mantua.
• * 1.373

  The duke of Ferrara.
• * 1.374

  The Florentine•…•…
• * 1.375

  The Genowayes.
• * 1.376

  That a prince cannot alienat any thing of the publike demaine but that his suc∣cessors may again resume the same.
• * 1.377

  〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.378

  That princes haue not the proprietie of the publike demaine but onely the bare vse.
• * 1.379

  Genes threat∣ned by Maxi∣milian the Em∣peror.
• * 1.380

  The imperial townes and cities subiect vnto appeales made vnto the imperiall chamber
• * 1.381

  The Swissers Commonweal•…•… to be subiect either to the Empire or the king of France.
• * 1.382

  The Duke of Loraine no absolute Soue∣raigne, but vassall of the German empire.
• * 1.383

  The duchie of Lor•…•…ine deuol∣ued vnto the counties of Vaudemont.
• * 1.384

  The right sou•…•…∣raigntie and li∣bertie not to be prescribed agai•…•…st.
• * 1.385

  The Duchie of Sauoie to hold of the empire.
• * 1.386

  The dukes of Saxonie and the county Palatine lieutenants of the empire.
• * 1.387

  Charles the fixt of Fraunce by the emperour made perpetual lieutenant of the empire.
• * 1.388

  The soneraignty of the king∣dome of Arles bought of the emperour by the French king.
• * 1.389

  Edward the third King of England made perpetual Lieu∣tenant of the Empire
• * 1.390

  The Kingdome of France not to hold any thing of the Empire.
• * 1.391

  Alciat and Bar∣tholus taxed.
• * 1.392

  The Germane Empire not now the tenth part of the Romane em∣pire.
• * 1.393

  The kings of Polonia hold nothing of the empire.
• * 1.394

  The fruit that came of the strife betwixt the German empe∣ror and the pope for the soueraign tie of the Chri∣stian Common∣weale.
• * 1.395

  The immoderat and absurd pow er which some attribute vnto the pope.
• * 1.396

  The beginning of the popes greatnes.
• * 1.397

  The popes put themselues into the protection of the French Kings, Pipin and Charlemaigne his sonne, the popes great champion.
• * 1.398

  How the French Kinges lost the prerogatione they had in the chusing of the Pope.
• * 1.399

  When the pope began first to ex∣communicat Princes.
• * 1.400

  The increasing of the popes power.
• * 1.401

  Why the kings of Arragonmade themselues the popes vassals for the kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie, and sub∣mitted also vnto him the rest of their kingdoms.
• * 1.402

  How the citie of Rome was brought vnder the popes obey∣sance.
• * 1.403

  The great daun, get princes were sometimes in by reason of the popes excom∣munication.
• * 1.404

  Thomas Cramerus. Soveraigntie by the pope pre∣tended vnto the Kingdome of Hungarie.
• * 1.405

  The Grand Ma∣ster of S. Iohn Hiersualem feudatarie both to the king of Spaine and the pope.
• * 1.406

  The kingdome of Nauarre hol∣den of the pope.
• * 1.407

  The pope of right vassall vn∣to the German empire for the cities he holdeth thereof in fee.
• * 1.408

  Right pretended by the German Emperours to the election of the pope.
• * 1.409

  Popes chosen and placed by the Germane em∣perour.
• * 1.410

  The eight em∣perours excom∣municated by the pope were these▪ Fredericke the first, Frede∣rick the second, Philip, Conrade, Otho the fourth, Lewes of Baua∣ria▪ Henrie the fourth, and Hen∣ry the fift.
• * 1.411

  Base seruices to be done by the emperour to the pope.
• * 1.412

  Clement the s•…•…∣uenth.
• * 1.413

  The humble subscription Charls the fift vsed in his let∣ters to the pope.
• * 1.414

  The base submis∣sion of the Duke of Venice and of Fredericke the second vnto the pope.
• * 1.415

  The maiestie of the emperours greatly dimini∣shed by the pope
• * 1.416

  The French kings not afraid of the pops ex communication.
• * 1.417

  The clause, Au∣ctoritate Apost∣olica, vsually put into the popes buls or decrees, reiected in France.
• * 1.418

  The princes se•…•…ing the great Negus of Aethiopia no kings nor soue∣raigns.
• * 1.419

  The Mahomi∣taine princes by their lawe forbidden to cal themselus lords or soueraigns.
• * 1.420

  Diuers Mahomi∣taine kings tri∣butaries vnto the king of portugal
• * 1.421

  Portugall of auntient time a member of the kingdom of Ca∣stile.
• * 1.422

  Difference be∣twixt a pention and a tribute.
• * 1.423

  The Moscoui•…•… an absolute so∣ueraigne prince.
• * 1.424

  The notable say∣ing of Eumenes to king Antigo∣nus.
• * 1.425

  Plutar. in Eu∣mene.
• * 1.426

  Degrees of ho∣nour among so∣ueraigne princes being equall.
• * 1.427

  The order of the Cantons of the Swissars.
• * 1.428

  Degrees of ho∣nour betwixt so∣ueraign princes being in alliance together.
• * 1.429

  The title of a king belongeth not vnto an o∣ther mans vassal neither to him which holdeth nothing of his owne in soue∣raigntie. The maiestie of the emperour still impugned by this French author▪ and the French kings too much exalted.
• * 1.430

  Contention at the counsel of Trent betwixt the Spanish and French em∣bassadours about their places.
• * 1.431

  A good order for the auoiding of contētion be∣twixt the ambas∣sadors of great princes, for their places▪
• * 1.432

  The French pre∣ferred before the Spanish.
• * 1.433

  [illustration]
• * 1.434

  The armes of the antient empe∣rors of Constan∣tinople.
• * 1.435

  Soueraigne princes God his lieutenants vpon earth.
• * 1.436

  How Samuel his speech vnto the people concer∣ning the power of a king, by them de∣maunded, is to be vnderstood.
• * 1.437

  ▪ Arist. li. 4. d•…•… Repub.
• * 1.438

  Polyb. lib. 6▪ de militari ac do∣mestica Rom. dis∣ciplina.
• * 1.439

  * Dioys. Halycar lib. 4.
• * 1.440

  * Lib. 7.
• * 1.441

  A probable er∣rour.
• * 1.442

  The dukes of Milan, Sauoy, Ferrara, and Florence▪ with such other like great princes no soueraigns: and the reasons why
• * 1.443

  The greatest ma∣gistrats or lieu∣tenants no soue∣raigns.
• * 1.444

  A fit compari∣son.
• * 1.445

  Soueraigntie ad∣mitteth no com∣panion or perta∣ker therin.
• * 1.446

  What lawe pro∣perly is.
• * 1.447

  The difference betwixt Senatus consultum, and Plebiscitum, a decree of the Senate and of the people.
• * 1.448

  What an edict is.
• * 1.449

  That the senate of Rome had no power to make lawes, but annu∣all decrees only.
• * 1.450

  A pretie quip of Anacharsis.
• * 1.451

  Cicero pro Ra•…•… birio Perduel∣lionis r•…•…o.
• * 1.452

  Maiestie proper only vnto a so∣ueraigne prince.
• * 1.453

  The duke of Ve∣nice no soue∣raigne prince.
• * 1.454

  The order of the Venetian Com∣monweale.
• * 1.455

  Magistrats edicts confirmed by him or them that haue the so∣ueraigntie be∣come lawes▪
• * 1.456

  The first and cheife marke of soueraigntie.
• * 1.457

  It belongeth on∣ly vnto soue∣raigne princes to grant priuile∣ges, and what a priuilege is.
• * 1.458

  ▪ Cicero pro do∣m•…•… sua et post re•…•… ditum in Senaetu.
• * 1.459

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 difference betwixt the be∣ginning of cust∣omes and lawes: and that both of them depend of the power of the soueraign prince.
• * 1.460

  That the power to make lawes cannot be vnto subiects commu∣nicated.
• * 1.461

  What power the magistrate hath to interpret the lawe.
• * 1.462

  All the other markes of soue∣raigntie contai∣ned vnder the first.
• * 1.463

  Other the marks of Soueraigntie
• * 1.464

  The second marke of Soue∣raigntie.
• * 1.465

  The greatest daunger in war.
• * 1.466

  The Senate in Rome had no power to de∣nounce warre without the con∣sent of the peo∣ple.
• * 1.467

  Lib. 1▪ Dec. 3.
• * 1.468

  Lib. 1. Dec. 2.
• * 1.469

  Lib. 8. Dec. 1▪
• * 1.470

  Lib. 9. Dec. 1.
• * 1.471

  Lib. 8. Dec. 1.
• * 1.472

  Lib. 5. Dec. 1.
• * 1.473

  No peace by the Generall con∣cluded with the enemie good without the confirmati∣on of him or them that haue the soueraigntie.
• * 1.474

  The Romains oftentimes dis∣claymed the peace by their ge nerals made with their enemies without the con∣sent of the peo∣ple.
• * 1.475

  Hard for the po∣pular or Aristo∣craticall estats by the multitude well to mannage martiall affaires: and why.
• * 1.476

  The third mark of soueraigntie.
• * 1.477

  The lesser ma∣gistrates in a po∣pular estate somtime created by the greater▪ but not without power from them which had the soueraigntie
• * 1.478

  Great magistrats somtime chosen by the estats of the countrey, or otherwise: but still approued and confirmed by the king.
• * 1.479

  * Cassiodorus. lib. 1. Epist. 6.
• * 1.480

  The fourth marke of soue∣raigntie.
• * 1.481

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. 1. & 7. & 10.
• * 1.482

  * Flauius Volpis∣cus in Florian•…•….
• * 1.483

  A soueraigne prince cannot by any edict prohi∣bit his subiects to appeale from his magistrates or to prefer their humble requests vnto himselfe.
• * 1.484

  No marke or right of soue∣raigntie is by the prince to be bestowed vpon his subiect or a stranger.
• * 1.485

  The fift marke of soueraigntie
• * 1.486

  Things properly belonging vnto the soueraigntie of a prince can in no wise be im∣parted vnto a subiect.
• * 1.487

  Priuileges wrongfully wrested from kings cannot by any new confir∣mation be made good.
• * 1.488

  The great priui∣lege of the cha∣piter of the church of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in granting par∣don vnto the condemned•…•….
• * 1.489

  A great priuilege granted vnto the Vestall Virgines and the Cardi∣nalls in Rome.
• * 1.490

  What is by the lawe of God death, ought not by the prince to be in any wise pardoned.
• * 1.491

  Deut 19. & 21.
• * 1.492

  Whie grieuous offences are to be seuerely pun∣ished and not in any wise pardo∣ned.
• * 1.493

  The most grati∣ous and comm∣endable pardon that a prince can giue.
• * 1.494

  The sixt marke of soueraigntie
• * 1.495

  The seuenth marke of soue∣raigntie.
• * 1.496

  The right and power to coine monie the inse∣perable marke of soueraigntie^c to be granted vn∣to subiects.
• * 1.497

  King Seruius the first that coined monie in Rome.
• * 1.498

  Plutarch in The∣seo.
• * 1.499

  Philip of Mace∣don the first that coined monie in Grece with his owne image thereon.
• * 1.500

  The eight marke of soueraigntie.
• * 1.501

  The great varie∣tie of waights and measures hurtfull to a commonweale.
• * 1.502

  Lib. 3.
• * 1.503

  The ninth marke of soueraigntie.
• * 1.504

  The Romaine commonweale greatly relieued by the great riches by Paulus Emilius brought to Rome, after the ouerthrowe of king Perseus
• * 1.505

  Herodianus.
• * 1.506

  To lay an impo∣sition vpon salt, no marke of so∣ueraigntie.
• * 1.507

  The kings which layed the first imposition vpon salt.
• * 1.508

  How farre of a soueraign prince may lay impositi ons vpon the sea, from his owne coast.
• * 1.509

  Wrackes by what small right they belong to soueraigne prin∣ces.
• * 1.510

  To grant letters of Marque, or of reprisall now to belong only vn∣to the soueraign prince.
• * 1.511

  Small things and yet proper only vnto soueraign princes.
• * 1.512

  To seale with yealowe wax graunted vnto a great prince as a fauour.
• * 1.513

  To be able to chang the sub∣iects language a marke of soue∣raigntie.
• * 1.514

  The cause whie the French tounge is so∣much confoun∣ded with latine.
• * 1.515

  A soueraigne prince may ac∣cording to his cōscience discide matters beyond either lawe, or custome.
• * 1.516

  The title of ma∣iestie proper to soueraigne prin∣ces.
• * 1.517

  Titles dewe to God beseeme not princes.
• * 1.518

  Markes of soue∣raigntie ought to be such as are proper to all so∣ueraign princes in generall.
• * 1.519

  Soueraign rights cannot by the prince be aliena∣ted neither by any other be pre∣scribed against.
• * 1.520

  That there are but three sorts of commonweales viz: a Monarchie a Democratie: and an Aristocra∣tie.
• * 1.521

  The diuers opi∣nions of the aun∣tient writers con∣cerning diuers sorts of com∣monweals.
• * 1.522

  No fourth estate of a common∣weale to be made of a confusion of a Monarchie, a Democratie and an Aristocratie.
• * 1.523

  That the Lace∣demonian com∣monweale was meare aristocra∣ticall, and not composed of the confusion or mixture of the three sorts of commonweals.
• * 1.524

  Gasper Contare∣us, Nicholas Ma∣chiauel, Sir Tho∣mas Moore. The cause that induced Polybi∣us and others to say that the La∣cedemonian estat was a state com∣posed of the mixture of the three states and forms of a com∣monweale. The historie of a Lacoedemonian commonweale.
• * 1.525

  The Romaine commonweale a meare popular state and not composed of the three formes of commoweals.
• * 1.526

  No soueraigntie in the Romaine Consulls
• * 1.527

  The smal power of the Romaine Senate: and that therein was no resemblance of an Aristocratie
• * 1.528

  Liuius lib. 4.
• * 1.529

  Liuius lib. 27.
• * 1.530

  Liuiu. lib. 26. •…•…
• * 1.531

  The people of Rome in their assemblies did •…•…e in token of the•…•… soueraigntie.
• * 1.532

  The Venetian estate a pure A∣ristocratie and not composed of the three formes of commonweals
• * 1.533

  A viewe taken of the Citizens and gentlemen of Venice.
• * 1.534

  The soueraign∣tie of the Vene∣tian estate to be in the grand counsel.
• * 1.535

  The small au∣thoritie and power the Duke of Venice hath.
• * 1.536

  The state of the Germaine empire and of the Swissers, A∣ristocraticall and not mixt.
• * 1.537

  The estate of France a pure Monarchie and not mixed.
• * 1.538

  The power of a soueraign prince in nothing dimi nished by his parliament, but rather much the more therby ma∣nifested.
• * 1.539

  The forme the courtes of parli∣ament in Fraunce hold in writing to the king.
• * 1.540

  Plato his com∣monweale a pure popular estate and not mixt.
• * 1.541

  That it is impos∣sible to compose one common∣weale of the mix ture of the three formes of com∣monweals.
• * 1.542

  To diuide the rights of soue∣raigntie daunge∣rous to all com∣monweals.
• * 1.543

  In what state soe∣uer the lesser number beareth rule ouer th•…•… grea ter it is to be ac∣counted an Arist∣ocratie.
• * 1.544

  What a principa litie is.
• * 1.545

  What a Princi∣palitie is.
• * 1.546

  In matter of state he that is maister of the forces, is master of the men, of the▪ lawes, and of all the commonweale.
• * 1.547

  A true soueraig•…•… commaundeth all others his subiects, but is himselfe by none com∣maunded.
• * 1.548

  A very hard matter for two princes in one and the same commonweale long to hold the soueraigntie togeather.
• * 1.549

  I the king, and I the queene.
• * 1.550

  A common∣weale better go∣uerned by three great soueraigns then by two.
• * 1.551

  Three sortes of monarchies. Great difference betwixt the state, and the gouernment of the state of a commonweale.
• * 1.552

  The three sorts of Monarchies aptly described.
• * 1.553

  The lordly Mo∣narchie the first that was a∣mongst men.
• * 1.554

  Nemrod the first Monarkie.
• * 1.555

  A lordly Mo∣narchie, not to be accounted a tirannie and whie.
• * 1.556

  The great Turk and the Mosco∣uite the only lordly Monarque in Europe
• * 1.557

  How the goods and landes of subiects belong vnto the soue∣raigne prince.
• * 1.558

  The Hunnes the first that brough the lord∣ly soueraign∣mēt of Monarks into Europ.
• * 1.559

  * Plutar in 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.560

  The great Negus of AEthiopia a lordly Mo∣narque.
• * 1.561

  The beginning of tenants and fees, and what in auntient time they were.
• * 1.562

  The markes of lordly Monar∣chies more to be seene in the Nor∣thren countries then in any o∣ther parts of Eu∣rop.
• * 1.563

  Charls the fift made himselfe the lordly Mo∣norque of Peru.
• * 1.564

  All persons of what degree soe∣uer sorbidden by the Mahometain lawes, the great Caliph only ex∣cepted.
• * 1.565

  A lordly monar∣kie no tiranny.
• * 1.566

  Whie the lordly monarchie is more durable then the royall monarchie.
• * 1.567

  A royall Mo∣narque.
• * 1.568

  The difference betwixt a royall and a lordly Mo∣narque.
• * 1.569

  The true markes of a royall Mo∣narque.
• * 1.570

  * Polit lib. 3.
• * 1.571

  Aristotle bla∣med.
• * 1.572

  The opinion of Aristotle con∣cerning kings impugned. Arist. Polit. 3
• * 1.573

  Plutar i•…•… These.
• * 1.574

  The difference of Monarques h•…•…w it is to be gathe∣red.
• * 1.575

  Antigonus the first of the suc∣cessours of Alex∣ander that stiled himselfe king.
• * 1.576

  * Tacit•…•… lib 2. Appianu•…•…, Liuius Val. Max.
• * 1.577

  Tritemi•…•… cap. 17.
• * 1.578

  Daungerous for soueraign prin∣ces to cause their sonnes whilst they themselues yet liue to be crowned king•…•… with them.
• * 1.579

  À tirannicall Monarchie.
• * 1.580

  The name of a tirant in aunti∣ent time taken in good part: and how the same became odious.
• * 1.581

  A louer of his brother.
• * 1.582

  A louer of his mother.
• * 1.583

  A louer of his father.
• * 1.584

  A soueraign princes actions are not by his subiects to be rashly censured▪
• * 1.585

  The best king.
• * 1.586

  The greatest dif∣ference betwixt a king and a ty∣rant.
• * 1.587

  Tirants slaine by effeminate and weake persons.
• * 1.588

  Tirants neuer in safetie.
• * 1.589

  Plutar in A∣rat•…•… et Timoleone
• * 1.590

  Tyrants alwayes infamous and detested.
• * 1.591

  Tyrants still tor∣mented with the feare of future in famy.
• * 1.592

  Tyrants often∣times to hasten their owne deathes in seeke∣ing to eschu•…•… the same.
• * 1.593

  The happie es∣tate of a good Royal prince, in comparison of a Tyrant.
• * 1.594

  The worthie praise of Scipio Africanus.
• * 1.595

  Necessarie seueri∣tie not to be ac∣counted tirannie but to be in a so∣ueraigne prince much commen∣ded.
• * 1.596

  Seueritie in a prince more wholsome for the Common∣weale th•…•…n le•…•…∣tie.
• * 1.597

  Diuers causes in∣ducing princes vnto Tyranie.
• * 1.598

  A true Paradox.
• * 1.599

  The happie es∣tate of Fraunce vnder king Francis the first, a wayward and hard Prince.
• * 1.600

  The lenitie and immoderat boū∣tie of king Henry the second, most hurtfull vnto the kingdome of Fraunce.
• * 1.601

  How the para∣doxe, That of an euill and craftie man is made a good king, is to be vnderstood.
• * 1.602

  Who is proper∣ly a Tyrant and that hee may lawfully be of any man slaine.
• * 1.603

  Whether a Ty∣rant may be lawfully slayne before he be law∣fully tried and conuicted▪
• * 1.604

  Whether a Ty∣rant hauing aspired vnto the soueraigntie, and afterwards confirmed therin by the consent of the people in general, may yet lawfully be slay•…•…▪
• * 1.605

  Lib. de▪ legibus.
• * 1.606

  Long prescripti∣on serueth in staed of a iust ti∣tle.
• * 1.607

  Whether a law∣ful soueraign prince tiranizing may of his sub∣iects be lawfully •…•…ayne or not.
• * 1.608

  That a prince ty∣•…•…anizing may by an other straung prince be lawful∣ly slaine.
• * 1.609

  That it is not lawfull for the subiects either by the way of fact, or iustice to at∣tempt any thing against the ho∣nour, life, or dig∣nitie of their so∣ueraigne prince, be he neuer so e∣uill or wicked.
• * 1.610

  Treason but thought of puni∣shed with death.
• * 1.611

  That soueraigne princes whatsoe∣uer •…•…ught to bee vnto their sub∣iects sacred and inuiolat.
• * 1.612

  Dan. cap. •…•….
• * 1.613

  Bar•…•…e. 1. Hier. 29
• * 1.614

  Hier. 2•…•…. Ezec. •…•…9
• * 1.615

  * Exod. 23. 28.
• * 1.616

  The warrs of the Germaine prin∣ces against Charies the fi•…•…t in Germanie in Luthers iudg∣ment not lawful. Sledan. lib. 4.
• * 1.617

  What great in∣conuenie•…•…cies should ensu•…•…e if it were lawful for subiects vnder the colour of ty∣rants to kil their soueraign princes
• * 1.618

  The miserable state and condi∣tion of a Tyrant whilst he liueth.
• * 1.619

  The policie of some Tyrants to auert from them∣selues the peo∣ples rage.
• * 1.620

  That not only the good acts and decrees of Tyrants, but eue•…•… their euill acts and decrees also are oftentimes of necessitie af∣ter their death▪ to be r•…•…tained in a commonweal.
• * 1.621

  The successours of Tyrants how farre they are bound to that which the Ty∣rants their pre∣decessoures haue promised.
• * 1.622

  Naturall equitie in all cases can∣not in any lawe be comprised, but is oft times to be left vnto the reli∣gious arbitremēt of men expert in matters of state.
• * 1.623

  Murthers euen of euill and tyran∣nicall princes, not to be rewar∣ded, but seuerely punished.
• * 1.624

  Lenitie of soue∣raign princes to∣wards them of their owne blood offending them; and so in their daunger, or otherwise their honorable prisoners: vnto themselues both commendable and profitable
• * 1.625

  The keeping of great princes pri∣soners, daunge∣rous.
• * 1.626

  What an Aristo∣cratie is.
• * 1.627

  Three sorts of Aristocraties.
• * 1.628

  Impossible to es∣tablish an Aris∣tocratie only of good men.
• * 1.629

  Whersoeuer the lesser part of the people hath the soueraignties there is one kind or other of an Aristocratie.
• * 1.630

  The lesser part of the people in an Aristocratie not to be defined by any certaine number.
• * 1.631

  The Aristocra∣tical estate of the Pharsalians.
• * 1.632

  The estate of the Lacedemonians.
• * 1.633

  The auntient es∣tate of them of Marseilles.
• * 1.634

  The Aristocra∣ticall estate of Genua framed by Andrew Doria.
• * 1.635

  The estate of Ge∣neua
• * 1.636

  The state of the) Swissers.
• * 1.637

  The estate of the Swissers Aristo∣craticall, •…•…et tem∣perated with a certaine mixtu•…•… of popularitie.
• * 1.638

  The estate of the Rhagusians.
• * 1.639

  The estate of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Luca.
• * 1.640

  Whether the Germaine em∣pire be a Monar∣chie, or a •…•…eere Aristocratie.
• * 1.641

  In whom the so∣ueraigntie of the Germaine em∣pire consistteth.
• * 1.642

  The princes E∣lectors hold their states of the empire and not of the emperour.
• * 1.643

  Lib. 2. cap. 28.
• * 1.644

  The maiestie of the empire not to rest in the em∣perour but in the whole assemblie of the estates of the empire.
• * 1.645

  How the empe∣rour determi∣neth the quarels and controuer∣sies betwixt the princes, or the imperial town•…•… of the empire.
• * 1.646

  Glorious flatte∣ring •…•…itles giuen to princes neuer awhit encrease their souer•…•…ign ti•…•….
• * 1.647

  How the empe∣rour bestowe•…•… the fees of the empire.
• * 1.648

  The maiestie of the Germaine emperour by this French author still empaired
• * 1.649

  A great pollicy in Aristocratical estates to giue vnto him least power to whom they giue most honour.
• * 1.650

  The estate of Nuremberg Aristocraticall.
• * 1.651

  Most of the I•…•…∣periall cities of Germanie go•…•…∣uerned in form•…•… o•…•… Aristocraties.
• * 1.652

  Four sortes of A∣ristocraties by Aristotle set downe.
• * 1.653

  P•…•…lit lib. 4. Cap. •…•….
• * 1.654

  * Lib. 4. Cap. 7.
• * 1.655

  Aristot. by the author impug∣ned.
• * 1.656

  Hard to iudge who is a good man.
• * 1.657

  Poli•…•…. lib. 3. Cap. 5.
• * 1.658

  A wise and ve•…•…∣tuous king the greatest orna∣ment and stay of a Commonwe•…•…
• * 1.659

  Neuer worse go∣uernment then where the great∣est multitude of lawes w•…•….
• * 1.660

  No forme of a commonweale worse then a cor∣rupt Aristocratie
• * 1.661

  What a popular estate is.
• * 1.662

  Great difference whether voyces▪ be taken by Poll o•…•… by Tribes & companies, in a popular Com∣monweale.
• * 1.663

  The small num∣ber of the people of Rome, and how they were diuided in the time of Rom•…•…∣lus, and how they were againe di∣uided in the time of King Seruius▪ with the manner of their giuing of voyces.
• * 1.664

  How the people of Rome wrested vnto it selfe the soueraigntie, and how that state of an Aristocratie became a Demo∣c•…•…atie, or a meere popular state.
• * 1.665

  How Fabius by great wisedome ouerthrew the popular deuise of Appius, and so obtained the name of Maxi∣mus.
• * 1.666

  Marius popular.
• * 1.667

  No Common∣weal so popular as that all the people gaue therein voice, it being suffici∣ent that the greater part of the tribes still caried aw ay the matter.
• * 1.668

  The cantons of the Swissers much ruled by their great men, but the Grisons not so.
• * 1.669

  Aristotle his opi∣nion concerning an Aristocratical or popular Com∣monweale.
• * 1.670

  To iudge of an estate we are not to consider who haue the magis∣tracies or offices but who they be in whom the so∣ueraigntie rest∣eth.
• * 1.671

  That the state of a commonweale may be of one sort, and yet the gouernment therof of another and that quite contrarie.
• * 1.672

  That the state of a Commonweal may be of one sort and the go∣uernment of an other, withour confusion of the states.
• * 1.673

  Soueraigntie all∣waies by nature of itselfe indiui∣sible.
• * 1.674

  The popularitie of the mountain 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.675

  The true nature of the people.
• * 1.676

  The beginning▪ of the popular estate of the Swissars.
• * 1.677

  The auntient Gretians and Ita∣lians in their popular libertie more insolent than were the Swissars.
• * 1.678

  Why in popular commonweales they oftentimes bannished the most wise and vertuous men.
• * 1.679

  The inequalitie of the nobilitie and of the vul∣gar or common∣people, not pos∣sible to be brought to any good conformity in one and the same state.
• * 1.680

  The definitio•…•… of a Senat.
• * 1.681

  That a wise prince needeth not allwaies to be aduised by his counsell. The wonderfull secresie of Iulius Caesar in all his affaires.
• * 1.682

  Secrecie in a prince most needfull.
• * 1.683

  Whether it be lesse daungerous vnto a Com∣monweale to haue a good prince assisted with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 coun∣sel, or an euill prince directed by good coun∣sell.
• * 1.684

  The great bene∣fit that a prince hath by follow∣ing the good ad∣uise of his wise counsel, and the daungers to him ensuing by the reiecting therof:
• * 1.685

  Great learning in a prince somtime daungerous.
• * 1.686

  Senators from whom they haue their lawfull power.
• * 1.687

  Whereof a Sena∣tor tooke name: and that a Senate ought to consist of men wel struc∣ken in yeares.
• * 1.688

  Deut. Cap. 1.
• * 1.689

  Youngmen by Solon forbidden to be admitted into the Senat, seemed they ne∣uer •…•…o wise.
• * 1.690

  The Senat the soule of the com∣monweale.
• * 1.691

  Politique wise∣dome euer to be ioyned with fait•…•… and justice.
• * 1.692

  A Senatour to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 too much concei∣ted of his owne opinion, a thing vnto the Com∣monweale dan∣gerous.
• * 1.693

  The dutie of a wise Senator.
• * 1.694

  Learning neces∣sarie for a Sena∣tor, but vpright integritie more.
• * 1.695

  That a Councel∣lor of estate ought not to be pensionar to another prince.
• * 1.696

  Out of doores with the priests.
• * 1.697

  Nobility of birth and also wealth to be in a Sena∣tor required.
• * 1.698

  The number of Senators com∣monly •…•…oe in an Aristocratique or popular Com monweale, than in a Monarchie.
• * 1.699

  Of whom it is fittest to make choice for Sena∣tors in an Aristo∣cratique or popu∣lar Common∣weale.
• * 1.700

  The daunger of hauing many Se∣nators.
• * 1.701

  The counsel of the Areopagi i•…•… Athens.
• * 1.702

  * Select counse∣lours.
• * 1.703

  The counsel 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Carthagi∣nensians.
• * 1.704

  Augustus the first in Rome who out of the whol body of the Senate made choice of some fewe of the wiser sort, to be of his priuie coun∣sels
• * 1.705

  In small Com∣monweales the priuie Counsell is not to be diui∣ded from the Se∣nat.
• * 1.706

  Maecenas and A∣grippa▪ the onely men with whom Augustus the emperour resol∣ued of his great∣est affaires.
• * 1.707

  Diuers counsels at diuers times erected in France for matters of state.
• * 1.708

  Seauen counsels in Spaine.
• * 1.709

  Diuers counsels in Venice.
• * 1.710

  The counsel•…•… of the Cantons of the Swistars.
• * 1.711

  The counsel of Geneus.
• * 1.712

  A priuie counsell besids the Senat necessarie in eue∣rie Common∣weale.
• * 1.713

  The manner of consultation in the Senat of a po∣pular or Aristo∣cratique estate, and in the Senat of a Monarchie much different.
• * 1.714

  The manner of the proceding in their consultati∣ons in matters of state, in Venice.
• * 1.715

  The policie of the Romain em∣perours to drawe the Senat from matters of state by busiyng it with other ex∣traordinarie causes.
• * 1.716

  The Senators of Rome as Sena∣tors no iudges, but when they were thereunto extraordinarilie by commission appoynted.
• * 1.717

  The court of Pa∣ris sometime the auntient Senat of Fraunce by the king forbidden to deale with matters of state.
• * 1.718

  The priuie coun∣sel of Fraunce al∣most brought in∣to the forme of an ordinarie court by hearing of priuat and particular causes
• * 1.719

  Matters of state not without daunger to be communicated vnto many.
• * 1.720

  Senator•…•… or coun selours of estate not easily to be admitted nor without greate cause to be againe displaced. The auntient counsel of Eng∣land in number fewe.
• * 1.721

  Who they be that ought to propound mat∣ters in the Senat or counsel.
• * 1.722

  A notable cus∣tome of the Ae∣tolians in pro∣pounding of matters in their Senat.
• * 1.723

  The custome of Genes discom∣mended.
• * 1.724

  The laudable custome for the propounding of matters vsed in Fraunce.
• * 1.725

  * Plinius iunior in pan•…•…girico.
• * 1.726

  The fiittest time for counselours to sit in councell
• * 1.727

  What things are in the Senat or councell of the state to be cheif∣ly consulted of.
• * 1.728

  A good rule by the auntient well obserued in all their consultati∣ons for matters of state.
• * 1.729

  Things doubtful or subiect to for∣tune, in consulta∣tion of matters of state not to be at al embrased.
• * 1.730

  Nothing ought of right to be praised by the euents.
• * 1.731

  That the Sena•…•… ought not to in∣termedie with the iurisdiction of the magistrat.
• * 1.732

  Liuius lib. 26
• * 1.733

  What power a Senat or counsel of stateis of right to haue in a well ordered Com∣monweale.
• * 1.734

  Why magist∣rates and soue∣raign courts haue a greater commaunding power then hath a Senat or coun∣sel of state.
• * 1.735

  Whether the Senat in a popu∣lar or Aristocra∣tique estate ought to haue more power then in a Monarchie.
• * 1.736

  What power the Senat or counsel ought to haue in a popular or A∣ristocratique es∣tate.
• * 1.737

  That the Senat of Rome had no power to com∣maund in mat∣ters of state.
• * 1.738

  The dignitie of the great magis∣trats in the Ro∣maine Common∣weale greater then the dignitie▪ of the Senat.
• * 1.739

  •…•…ib. 28.
• * 1.740

  The great power in the Tribunes of Rome.
• * 1.741

  What an autho∣ritie was among the Romans.
• * 1.742

  Martiall disci∣pline respecteth not the com∣mon or dome∣sticall lawes.
• * 1.743

  Why the Ro∣main emperours somtime called the Senators their compani∣ons, or good lords.
• * 1.744

  Viz Fraunce. Senators neither officers nor com∣missioners.
• * 1.745

  For what reason a Senat in a well ordered Com∣monweal should not haue also power to com∣maund.
• * 1.746

  That the Senato•…•… counsell of estate ought to be per∣petual, and not e∣uery yeare chaun∣ged: with the daungers that ensue of such yearely chaunge
• * 1.747

  What an Officer is? what a Com∣missioner is?
• * 1.748

  A publique per∣son who? Two sorts of publique per∣sons.
• * 1.749

  Aristotle his de∣finition of a Ma∣gistrat impug∣ned.
• * 1.750

  The lawiers de∣finitions of ma∣gistrats censured.
• * 1.751

  The principall marke whereby a magistrate is knowne.
• * 1.752

  The auntient bishops in Rom•…•… no magistrats▪ and why.
• * 1.753

  The difference be twixt magistrats and priuat men, as also betwixt magistrates and commissioners.
• * 1.754

  Offices not to be erected, but by ex∣presse edict, or lawe.
• * 1.755

  Offices to be per∣petuall although that the officers oftentimes chaunge.
• * 1.756

  Lawes neuer a∣whit the stronger for being written
• * 1.757

  Al offices in Rome erected by one or other ex∣presse lawe.
• * 1.758

  An officer al∣waies hath an ordinary charge, and in that he differeth from •…•… commissioner whose charge is alwaies extraor∣dinarie.
• * 1.759

  Liui•…•… lib. •…•….
• * 1.760

  Commissions to depend of the pleasure of him or them that haue the soue∣raigntie in the state.
• * 1.761

  The greater the charge is that is giuen by com mission the short∣er time it ought to endure.
• * 1.762

  Large and long commissions daungerous to the state.
• * 1.763

  The difference betwixt an office and a commis∣sion.
• * 1.764

  To fortifie is no magistracie but a certaine charg and ministrie.
• * 1.765

  Commissioners turned into iudg∣es, and yet still knowne by the name of com∣missioners
• * 1.766

  Extraordinarie commissions ex∣tenuating the au∣thoritie of the magistrate odi∣ou•…•….
• * 1.767

  Diuers sortes of commissioners, and from whom they haue their commissions.
• * 1.768

  The gouernour•…•… of the prouinces in the Romaine empire nothing but commissioners
• * 1.769

  The cause of the ciuil war betwixt •…•…illa and Marius.
• * 1.770

  Whether cōmis∣sioners appoin∣ted by the prince, or people hauing the soueraigntie, may appoint their Deputies and so commit the matter to o∣thers.
• * 1.771

  Diuers wai•…•… whereby com∣missioners cease.
• * 1.772

  Whether the acts of a commissio∣ner done after his commission reuoked, and yet before he had knowledg of the reuocation there∣of, be good or not?
• * 1.773

  A good decree of Pope Innocent the fourth.
• * 1.774

  Whether a com∣mission alwaies taketh end by the death of him that graunted it?
• * 1.775

  Whether the power of officers •…•…nd together with the death of the prince?
• * 1.776

  Offices by lawe established, are not but by con∣trarie edicts or lawes to be put downe.
• * 1.777

  The power of an officer or magi∣strat larger, than the power of a commission•…•….
• * 1.778

  In matters of state •…•…e that goeth be∣yond his com∣mission is wor∣thely blamed, al∣though that things fall out •…•…er so wel.
• * 1.779

  Large•…•… commissi∣on•…•… to be giuen to generals for the wars in popu∣lar common∣weals than in Mo∣narchies, and why?
• * 1.780

  General clauses in commissions for things to be done according to the descriptiō of the commissi∣oners how they are to be vnder∣stood?
• * 1.781

  How the aunti∣ent Romaines gaue extraordi∣narie power vnto their generals by commission.
• * 1.782

  The manner of propounding of requests vnto the people for the creating of ma∣gistrates and commissioners in auntient time diuers.
• * 1.783

  How commissi∣ons passe into the nature of offices.
• * 1.784

  What a magis∣trate is.
• * 1.785

  The first com∣monweales go∣uerned without lawes.
• * 1.786

  Moses the first that euer writ laws.
• * 1.787

  Al magistrates to be officers but not al officers to be magistrats.
• * 1.788

  Al magistrates to haue power to commaund.
• * 1.789

  Aristotle by the author impug∣ned.
• * 1.790

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. 3. Politia.
• * 1.791

  Which officer•…•… be also magi∣strats.
• * 1.792

  Acurs•…•… and Bartholus censu∣red.
• * 1.793

  The auntient fynes that the Romaine magis∣trats were to impose vpon of∣fenders.
• * 1.794

  Aulus Gellius a∣mend•…•…d▪
• * 1.795

  The auntient manner of fynes imposed vpon offenders in Rome in Cartel, conuerted into fynes in money.
• * 1.796

  Power to com∣maund stil an∣nexed to iuris∣diction.
• * 1.797

  The authoritie of the bishop of Rome not to be preferred before the authoritie of other princ•…•….
• * 1.798

  Whether the •…•…∣uill magistrat be to put the Bi∣shops sentence into execution, before he vnder∣stand of the equi∣•…•… therof or not?
• * 1.799

  The positiue laws of a kingdome not to be infrin∣ged by the Popes authoritie.
• * 1.800

  The power of the Consuls a•…•… other the great magistrats in Rome.
• * 1.801

  The 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 the Tribun•…•… of the people in Rome.
• * 1.802

  The power of the tribunes shut vp within the wals of Rome.
• * 1.803

  The power of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.804

  The power of the Questors.
• * 1.805

  The power of the Censors.
• * 1.806

  Plutarche noted.
• * 1.807

  Ignominie is a kind of disgrace; but not the same that infamie is.
• * 1.808

  That men may be noated with ig∣nominie and so disgraced, and yet not thereby be∣come infamous.
• * 1.809

  pro Cl•…•…▪
• * 1.810

  The power of the Triumuiri Capi∣tals in Rome.
• * 1.811

  No magistrat without power
• * 1.812

  The great diuer∣sitie of magis∣trats in their ho∣nor, power, and authoriue.
• * 1.813

  Certaine publi•…•… charges dishono∣rable.
• * 1.814

  Three things especially to be respected in the creating of Ma∣gistrats & officer•…•… in euerie Com∣monweale.
• * 1.815

  How much a prince differeth from a magi∣strat, and both of them from a priuat •…•…an.
• * 1.816

  The lawful com∣maunds of so∣ueraigne princes right diuers.
• * 1.817

  The power and force of certaine clauses com∣monly set down in the letters patents, and princes Mandats expounded.
• * 1.818

  The princes charters or let∣ters of iustice no commaunde•…•… vnto the ma∣gistrat to whom they are directed
• * 1.819

  A notable 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.820

  Whether the magistrat be bound to obey his princes vn∣iust commaunds or not?
• * 1.821

  Princes requests to haue the pow∣er of the most strait cōmaund.
• * 1.822

  What commands of the prince, and how far the ma∣gistrat eught to execute the same.
• * 1.823

  The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is no•…•…to censure his princes cōmand, beeing not con∣trari•…•… vnto the lawes of God & nature.
• * 1.824

  How it is to be vnderstood that a prince may de∣rogate from the law of nature.
• * 1.825

  How the Magi∣strat commaun∣ded by his prince to put in execu∣tion old penall lawes, now of themselues or through the neg∣ligence of the magistrats for∣gotten, is to pro∣ceed in the exe∣cution thereof.
• * 1.826

  The 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉-ture not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cleare and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fest.
• * 1.827

  The magistrate bound in ciuil causes to put his princes com∣maunds in execu∣tion, although they seeme vnto himselfe vniust or contrarie vnto lawe.
• * 1.828

  Lawes once esta∣blished ought not by prinat persons to be a∣gaine called into dispute or questi∣on.
• * 1.829

  A notable exam∣ple.
• * 1.830

  How the wordes de expresso or ex∣presissimo manda∣to are in princes graunts, edicts or decrees to be vn∣derstood,
• * 1.831

  Whether a ma∣gistrate be to be suffered to giue vp his place, ra∣ther than to al∣low an edict or commaund of his prince which he for certaine thinketh to be vniust, and con∣trarie vnto reason
• * 1.832

  Wh•…•… the ma∣gistrate is to d•…•… in case the law•…•… otherwise▪ iust, now vpon som•…•… soden occutrents 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to be har•…•… and vniust.
• * 1.833

  Great care to be had by the grea∣ter magistrats in the publication of lawes.
• * 1.834

  Better it is for the magistrat of himselfe to giue way vnto the law contrarie vnto the lawes of God and na∣ture.
• * 1.835

  That a princes faults which cannot be amen∣ded ought by all meanes to be of the magistrate cou•…•…red.
• * 1.836

  A princes com∣maund being be∣gun to bee put in execution, whe∣ther it b•…•… by the princes contrary commaund to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 giuen ouer.
• * 1.837

  Great things by great men vnder∣taken, ought also to be by them performed, or else neuer taken in hand.
• * 1.838

  Whether the ma∣gistrate b•…•… to ex∣amine the trueth of that he is by•…•… the prince com∣maunded, before he proceede to the examination thereof?
• * 1.839

  Whether the ma gistrate ought to enquire of the sufficie•…•…sie of him of whose wisdom and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the prince shal him∣selfe by his re∣scripts or letters testifie; in the be∣stowing of any office or other charge vpon him
• * 1.840

  It much con•…•…∣neth the Com∣monweale what gifts or priuile∣ges be graunted vnto particular men.
• * 1.841

  Priuileg•…•… 〈◊〉〈◊〉 things odious and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vnto the law•…•…, how they are to be interpreted.
• * 1.842

  Priuileges to be most straitly examined.
• * 1.843

  Whether the ma∣gistrat expressely forbidden to exa∣min the trueth of things contained in the princes grants or letters, may yet passe be∣yond such his so∣ueraignes prohi∣bition.
• * 1.844

  Whether the magistrat com∣maunded by his prince any thing contrarie to the common profit, or course of ciuill iustice, ought to obey such his princes commaund, or to giue vp his place.
• * 1.845

  Dangerous vn∣to Common∣weales for the the magistrates to refuse to put in execution their princes Edicts or com∣maunds.
• * 1.846

  A notable exam∣ple of a wise go∣uernour or ma∣gistrat.
• * 1.847

  That the Magi∣strat ought not vpō a vaine show of religion, or •…•… conscience euill grounded, to re∣fuse to execute his princes com∣maunds.
• * 1.848

  The Magistrat a liuing law.
• * 1.849

  The force of the law to consist in the Magistrate, or him that hath the power to com∣maund and con∣straine.
• * 1.850

  What power the Magistrat ought to haue?
• * 1.851

  The first con∣straining power that the magi∣strat hath.
• * 1.852

  The diuers po∣wer of Magi∣strats.
• * 1.853

  The Lighest marque of soue∣raign maiestie is to haue power of life aud death.
• * 1.854

  Two sorts of commmaunding by publique power: the one in soueraigntie, and the other by lawe
• * 1.855

  Whether the power of the sword be proper onely vnto the soueraign prince or common also vnto the magis∣trat to whom the prince hath com∣municated the same?
• * 1.856

  No magistrate in Rome after the kings once dri∣uen out▪ had power o•…•… the sword.
• * 1.857

  The great mo∣destie of the Ro∣maines in their iudgments.
• * 1.858

  Great 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in commonweals to haue now of∣tentimes the power of the sword committed vnto them euen by vertue of the•…•… offices.
• * 1.859

  Al magistrats hauing •…•…thoritie to iudge of capi∣tal crimes, to haue the power of the sword.
• * 1.860

  To whom the proprietie of e∣stats, magistracie, and offices doe properly belong.
• * 1.861

  Dukedomes, earledomes, mar∣quisats, and such like in auntient time but simple commissions, now for most part are become hereditarie.
• * 1.862

  Some publique offices to be with out any iurisdic∣tion or com∣maund at al.
• * 1.863

  The states of the marshalships of Fraunce part of the demaine of the crowne.
• * 1.864

  Marshal magis∣trats and Gene∣rals must of ne∣cessitie haue the power of the sword giuen them.
• * 1.865

  The power and authoritie graun∣ted vnto magis∣trats by vertue of their office, pro∣per vnto the office and not to the person of the ma∣gistrats.
• * 1.866

  The proprietie of offices to belong vnto the Com∣monweale: and to be with the ma∣gistrate but as things left with them in trust.
• * 1.867

  When the power and authoritie li∣eth in the magis∣trate, and when not.
• * 1.868

  Two things to be alwaies in euerie Commonweale by the magistrate principally re∣spected.
• * 1.869

  The difference betwixt a iudg∣ment & a decree, and so likewise of magistrats, which haue pow∣er and authoritie in themselues, and others which haue not.
• * 1.870

  No appealing from the lawe: and why?
• * 1.871

  The Magistrates in Popular and Aristocratique estats much more bound •…•…nto the prescript lawes then in a regall Monarchie.
• * 1.872

  Why in triall of priuat mens right, as also in publique iudge∣ments, many things are to be left vnto the wisedome and conscience of the magistrat?
• * 1.873

  The power of the Prouost or Prae∣tor in the citie of Rome.
• * 1.874

  Papinian.
• * 1.875

  The Magistrat may reuoke his owne decree or commaunds, but not his iudge∣ment once giuen.
• * 1.876

  The Magistrates simple cōmands of right ought to be obeyed.
• * 1.877

  Whether priuat men may by force resist the Magistrate offe∣ring them vio∣lence or wrong.
• * 1.878

  Priuat men are not to iudge whether the Ma∣gistrat do them wrong or not.
• * 1.879

  In what cases the magistrates offe∣ring wrong, may of right in their iudgements be withstood?
• * 1.880

  Violence in Cō∣monweales, to be alwaies detested.
• * 1.881

  Whether the ma∣gistrat may re∣uenge the wrong and iniurie offe∣red him as he sit∣teth in place of iustice.
• * 1.882

  Priuat iniurie soo nest by sufferance buried.
• * 1.883

  That the person of the magistrat ought to be al∣waies sacred and inuiolat•…•….
• * 1.884

  An heauie •…•…∣sure vpon a man for striking of a magistrat.
• * 1.885

  Magistrats to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 relige∣ously respected.
• * 1.886

  The dutie of the magistrat for the maintenance of his reputation.
• * 1.887

  Lenitie of rig•…•… neither of them commendable in a magistrat.
• * 1.888

  Lenitie more hurtful in a ma∣gistrat than seue∣ritie.
• * 1.889

  Grauitie b•…•…st be∣seemeth a magi∣strat.
• * 1.890

  Papirius Cursor a notable man.
• * 1.891

  More seueritie to be required in a Martial ma∣gistrat then in a ciuil which seue∣ritie ought not yet to passe into cruelty.
• * 1.892

  The notorious crueltie of Piso the Proconsull.
• * 1.893

  Three degrees of Magistrats in euery well orde∣red Common∣weale.
• * 1.894

  Daungerous in a Commonweale to giue power to one Magistrat to command ouer all the rest.
• * 1.895

  Soueraign power to commaund o∣uer al magistrats not to be giuen to one alone, but in the most daun∣gerous times of the commonweal
• * 1.896

  In the presence of the soueraigne prince, all the power of the ma∣gistrats holden in suspence.
• * 1.897

  Why the power of the 〈10 words〉〈10 words〉 suspended.
• * 1.898

  Much more ho∣norable for soue∣raign princes to referr the hearing of their own cau∣ses vnto the ma∣gistrats than to iudge thereof themselues.
• * 1.899

  Whether a ma∣gistrat may for∣•…•… a subiect to come vnto the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 being as then within the iurisdiction of his territorie?
• * 1.900

  The power of the lesser magistrates to cease in the presence of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.901

  Whether a com∣panion or fellow in office may stay the proceedings of his equall or superiour in au∣thoritie.
• * 1.902

  Fellowes in of∣fice although they haue no power one of them ouer an o∣ther, yet may they well hinder one an others proceedings, and why?
• * 1.903

  The Magistrat can do nothing in the presence of his compani∣on equall in po∣wer with himself without his ex∣presse consent.
• * 1.904

  Magistrats of like power, or fellows in office, bound to the power or com∣maund of their fellowes, being▪ In number more.
• * 1.905

  The opposition of one of the Tribunes of the people, sufficient to hinder the proceedings of all the magistrate in Rome, as also the proceedings of the rest of his fellow Tribunes.
• * 1.906

  Appeals to be still made from the lesser magi∣strats to the grea∣ter; and not from the greater to the lesser, or to any other, but equal in authoritie with them.
• * 1.907

  Whether the in∣feriour magistrat which may be commaunded by the superior, may also be comman∣ded by the supe∣riour magistrates Lieutenant or deputie.
• * 1.908

  The power of the superior ma∣gistrats ouer the inferior▪ extend∣eth not farther than their owne terri•…•…ory seat and iurisdiction.
• * 1.909

  Honour and dig∣nitie in nothing to communicate with authoritie and power.
• * 1.910

  Whether equall lords or cōpeeres of the same terri∣torie and iurisdi∣ction, may cha∣stice or reforme one another.
• * 1.911

  In a colledge or companie of ma∣gistrats or judges the greater part agreeing in one, may iudge or cha∣stice any one or the lesser part of their fellowes. A difference be∣twixt seruice and iurisdiction.
• * 1.912

  Contention be∣twixt great ma∣gistrats or courts, about their power and iurisdiction, al∣waies vnto the poore subiect hurtfull.
• * 1.913

  Wilful magi∣strats by the prince or their superiors to be enforced to suffer iustice to bee done within their iurisdiction
• * 1.914

  Whether the in∣feriour Magistrat be to haue leaue from the superi∣our, vnto whom appeale was made, to put his owne sentence in execution, the appeale being now let fall.
• * 1.915

  The errour of the word Fatales.
• * 1.916

  Whether soue∣raign princes be bound to restore straungers flying vnto them, vnto their owne prin∣ces demaunding them againe.
• * 1.917

  A notable 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Mahomet the Great, first empe∣rour of th•…•… Turkes.
• * 1.918

  A guilty fugitiue is not by another prince to be de∣tained, but resto∣red after he is by his owne prince demaunded.
• * 1.919

  •…•…. Iudic. 20. cap.
• * 1.920

  A guilties and innocent fugi∣tiue tiue, is not to be restored vnto his angrie prince de∣manding of him.
• * 1.921

  Deut. 16. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 23.
• * 1.922

  The difference betwixt •…•… fami∣lie, a colledge, and a Common∣weale.
• * 1.923

  A Familie the beginning of all ciuill soci∣eties.
• * 1.924

  The beginning of strong townes and cities.
• * 1.925

  The first sort of man, most de∣lighted in theft and murther, and oppressing of others weaker than themselues.
• * 1.926

  Theft and robbe∣rie in auntient time no disgrace nor shame.
• * 1.927

  Theft in auntient time lawfull both amongst the Greekes and Latins.
• * 1.928

  Polyb. Lib. 3.
• * 1.929

  Festus in verbo pagi. The societies of men, why they were first sought out.
• * 1.930

  The happy estate of the people of Israel before they had any king, or other forme of Aristo∣cratique or po∣pular common∣weale.
• * 1.931

  Fraternities, communities, and colleges, why they were first instituted and ordained▪
• * 1.932

  Amitie and friendship the foundation of •…•…l humane and ci∣uil societies and more requisite for the keeping and maintai∣ning thereof than iustice is selfe.
• * 1.933

  Orderly feasts and meetings of old time instituted to maintaine loue and amitie a∣mongst men.
• * 1.934

  The diuisiion of colleges and com∣panions.
• * 1.935

  What a corpora∣tion or college is.
• * 1.936

  No corporation or college to be suffered without the leaue of the soueraige.
• * 1.937

  Euery college of societie must haue somthing common to al the fellowes thereof, being o∣therwise no col∣lege.
• * 1.938

  What number of fellowes ought to be in •…•… college or so∣cietie.
• * 1.939

  What number of fellowes ought to be in a college or societie.
• * 1.940

  Whether the head or principal of a college be to be also accounted a fellowe thereof
• * 1.941

  That a college is a name of right: and consisteth not in the persons of the fellows, but may stil re∣maine, all the fel∣lowes thereof be∣ing dead.
• * 1.942

  Antoninus first that gaue leaue for legacies to be giuen to colleges
• * 1.943

  Augustus a great fauorour of th•…•… Iewes.
• * 1.944

  The colleges of iudges and the chief colleges in a Commonweal.
• * 1.945

  Whether it w•…•… more expedient the colledges of magistrats and judges to be iud∣ged and reformed by their fellowes of the same socie∣tie, or by others.
• * 1.946

  Colleges not ha∣uing any iuris∣diction but only a restraining power, how they are to vse the same.
• * 1.947

  Whether chil∣dren hauing ta∣ken vpon them any vowe of re∣ligion, be yet ne∣uerthelesse bound to honor and obey their parents.
• * 1.948

  That Monks may conuent their Ab∣bot before the or∣dinarie iudge: and also appeale from the in•…•…ust sentence of their Abbot.
• * 1.949

  Panormitan the Abbot.
• * 1.950

  How decrees are in colleges and societies to be made, to bind e∣uery one of them to that is com∣mon to euery one of them in particular, as al∣so to that which is common to them all iointly and indiuisibly together.
• * 1.951

  Whether decres made by the consent of an whole college or societie: may by the greater part thereof againe be abrogated or repealed.
• * 1.952

  The greater part of a Colledge or Communitie al∣waies reputed for the whole, and therefore may as it seemeth good, determine of any thing which con∣cerneth the whole corporation or colledge.
• * 1.953

  For the making of a decree in a colledge, or cor∣poration, the consent is to be giuen in the cō∣•…•…on assembly of the same, & that in time & plac•…•… by the statutes the•…•…eof appoin∣ted.
• * 1.954

  To whom it be∣longeth to call the fellowes to∣gether in a col∣ledge or societie.
• * 1.955

  That it is lawful for all colleges & corporations to make such or∣ders as they shal thinke best for themselues, not derogating from such orders as were giuen them from their soue∣raigne prince, or from the lawes and ordinances of the Common weale.
• * 1.956

  What things Corporations and colleges are in their assem∣blies & meeting•…•… to entreat and consult of?
• * 1.957

  How Corporati∣ons & colleges are to be corre∣cted and punished when they shall offend.
• * 1.958

  How Corporati∣ons and Colleges are said to offend.
• * 1.959

  A notable say∣ing.
• * 1.960

  Of diuers incon∣ueniences at once propounded, it is alwaies best to shunne the grea∣test.
• * 1.961

  The seueritie of the Romans a∣gainst their re∣bellious conspi∣tors.
• * 1.962

  The notable cle∣mencie of the emperour Au∣relianus.
• * 1.963

  The great cru∣eltie of Anto∣nius Caracalla, Theodosius the great, Xerxes, and Sylla.
• * 1.964

  The great mis∣cheite which be∣fel 〈◊〉〈◊〉 earle of Flaunders, in seeking to •…•…ke too sha•…•… reueng vppon the Gan∣toies his rebelli∣ous subiects.
• * 1.965

  No more cruel enemie against the prince, than are his desperate 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Some princes vnto crueltie to ha•…•…e also added contumelie, in reuenge of their rebellious sub∣iects.
• * 1.966

  This Frederike hauing sharply chastised the re∣bellions Milla∣notes his sub∣iects, afterwards in dispite caused such of them as would haue their liues spared with their teeth to drawe a figue out of a mules taile: whereof grewe the dispite ful mocke yet v∣sed by the Itali∣ans, by showing the thombe be∣twixt two fing∣ars, with these words: E•…•…co, la 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.967

  Seueritie in pun∣ishing of rebel∣lion ought stil to be tempered with •…•…gitie.
• * 1.968

  The wisdom of T. Quintus and▪ •…•… Scipio Affrica∣nus in chastising of their muti∣nous souldiours.
• * 1.969

  A notable re∣gard to be had in al general and popular punish∣ments.
• * 1.970

  Tullie. That it beseem∣eth not a soue∣raign prince to be the executor or to behold the general executi∣on of his rebel∣lions subiects.
• * 1.971

  The wise mode∣ration of some great princes in chastising of their rebellions subiects.
• * 1.972

  The wisdome of Charls the fift in the seueritie by him used in cha∣stising the rebel∣lious Gaunties: and in the lenitie to the contrarie by him used to∣wards the Spani∣ards rebelling a∣gainst him in Spaine.
• * 1.973

  How a commu∣nitie or corpora∣tion offending is to be punish∣ed.
• * 1.974

  Whether a com∣monweale can be without com∣munities, corpo∣rations, or colle∣ges.
• * 1.975

  Great harms en∣suing of corpo∣rations or com∣munities euil gouerned.
• * 1.976

  Religion the fairest cullour for a foule matter.
• * 1.977

  Nightly conuen∣ticles vnder the cullour of reli∣gion suspitious and in euerie Commonweale daungerous.
• * 1.978

  The common people hardly to endure any religion contra∣rie or repugnant to their owne.
• * 1.979

  The Iewes, and Catholiques by the protest •…•…nts borue within Franckford, and they of the con∣fession of Gene∣ua forbidden.
• * 1.980

  That a sect or re∣ligion grown so strong, as that it cannot without the extreame pe∣rill of the state and common∣weale be altered, is of a wise prince to be suffered.
• * 1.981

  How a prince fauouring one sect or religion and disciding an other, may with∣out force or f•…•…ur suppresse that religion he dis∣liketh, and ad∣uaunce the other which hee better liketh of.
• * 1.982

  A daungerous practise of such as are neere vnto great princes: to deuise false ca∣lumnies against the professors of any religion, so to bring them into hatred, and to enrich them∣selues with their wealth.
• * 1.983

  The Templers falsely accused, and for their great wealth wrongfully sup∣pressed.
• * 1.984

  The Iewes in like manner wronged.
• * 1.985

  Communities, Corporations, and Colledges, necessarie in euery Common∣weale, but espe∣cially in a po∣pular estate.
• * 1.986

  Communities, Corporations, and Colleges, alwaies hatefull vnto Tyrants.
• * 1.987

  The great benefit and vse of Com∣munities, corpo∣rations, and col∣leges, in a iust Monarchie or royall estat•…•….
• * 1.988

  The generall as∣semblies & mee∣tings of the peo∣ple to consule of matters, necessa∣rie for the good of the Common weals.
• * 1.989

  Buzac a notable theefe and rob∣ber.
• * 1.990

  A measure to be had for the num∣ber of Corpora∣tions and Col∣leges in a Com∣monweale.
• * 1.991

  That it is better or the Com∣monweale, that men of one trade or occupation should be diui∣ded into diuers streets, and quar∣ters of the citie, the•…•… to dwell all in one street to∣gether.
• * 1.992

  A conuenient and decent or∣der to be in all things fit and requisite.
• * 1.993

  Slaues accoun∣ted no citisens and yet indeed worthie to be so reckoned of▪ though in the lowest and basest degree of citisens
• * 1.994

  Why we call such as be noble borne by the name of gentle∣men?
• * 1.995

  Foure kind of libertines or of manumised men in Rome.
• * 1.996

  State free men better then slaues and worse then libertines.
• * 1.997

  The nobilitie alwaies diuided from the vulgar and common people.
• * 1.998

  The first nobi∣litie grounded vpon violence and oppression.
• * 1.999

  True nobilitie grounded vpon vertue.
• * 1.1000

  Nobilitie in di∣uers places di∣ue•…•…sly accounted of, and neither in al places alike.
• * 1.1001

  Whether the bearing of ar•…•…es in the warres make a man therfore a gen∣tleman or not?
• * 1.1002

  Lucius Sic•…•…ius Dentatus, a most worthie and Fa∣mous souldiour, and yet not ther∣fore accounted any gentleman.
• * 1.1003

  Whom the Ro∣maines first ac∣counted a gen∣tleman.
• * 1.1004

  The Patritij who they were in Rome.
• * 1.1005

  The Equites or gentlemen in Rome what place they held▪
• * 1.1006

  The Patritian families in Rome: Syl•…•…ia, Pomp•…•…lia, P•…•…ti∣tia, Mar•…•…ia, Hosti∣lia, Tull•…•…a, Tar∣qu•…•…, Fabia, Antonia, Iunia, Sergia, Iulia, Ge∣gania, Ma•…•…tia, Aemylia, Ch•…•…oe∣lia, Valeria, Ho∣ratia, Posth•…•…∣mia, Mene•…•…ia, Virginia, Sulpi∣tia, Furia, Lucre∣tia, Quinctia, Papiria, Claudia, Ser•…•…ilia, Cormlia, Manilia, Cassia, Aebutia, Pinaria, V•…•…turia, Sempro∣nia, Mutia, Aqui∣la, Quintilia, Hortensia.
• * 1.1007

  The noble Fami∣lies in Rome. Licinia, Aurelia, Decia, Caecilia, Aelia, Domi•…•…ia, Cl•…•…adia, M•…•…tia, P•…•…rlia, Curia, Fabritia, Co•…•…∣cania, Acilia, Ma∣ria, Pompeia, Li∣uia, Iunia. Tullia, Fuluia, Sempro∣nia, Atilia, Cal∣purnia, Marcia, Pompilia, Lucta∣tia, Platia.
• * 1.1008

  Certaine honors in Rome neuer communicated vnto the people.
• * 1.1009

  Statues the signe of nobilitie a∣monge the Ro∣maines: as are armes with vs.
• * 1.1010

  How the aunti∣ent Graetians de∣med their nobi∣litie.
• * 1.1011

  The P•…•…taneion was a place in Athens, wherein the iudges and magistrats sate to consult of the great matters of state.
• * 1.1012

  The lenitie of the graetians in bestowing their honors.
• * 1.1013

  The nobilitie of the Iewes: in whom it especi∣ally rested.
• * 1.1014

  Priesthood ho∣norable.
• * 1.1015

  The most aun∣tient kings to haue bene also preists.
• * 1.1016

  The great honor the Turkish and Arabian princes do vnto their Musties or high preists.
• * 1.1017

  The order of the Venetian Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1018

  The Florentine how they diui∣ded their citisens
• * 1.1019

  The auntients, Egiptians how they diuided their citisens.
• * 1.1020

  True nobilitie to be measured by vertue.
• * 1.1021

  The knowledge of secret and most excellent things, the se∣cond cause of nobilitie.
• * 1.1022

  Integritie to be preferred before knowledge.
• * 1.1023

  Vertue ioyned▪ with noble dis∣cent to be pre∣ferred before no∣bilitie for vertue only.
• * 1.1024

  Ciuil nobilitie by the prince vnworthily be∣stowed, no true nobilitie.
• * 1.1025

  Whether an honorable fe•…•…, make a man noble or no•…•…▪
• * 1.1026

  Nobilitie not to depend of lands or fees.
• * 1.1027

  Of vertue and nobilitie do trafique is to be made.
• * 1.1028

  Wealth & riches be they neuer so great to bring forth no true nobilitie.
• * 1.1029

  Lib. 4. poli•…•….
• * 1.1030

  True nobilitie to by neither got by wealth, not lost by pouertie.
• * 1.1031

  How farre the honor of the auncestours should extend vnto their poste∣ritie.
• * 1.1032

  A good custome of the Turkes, whose reputa∣tion still depen∣deth of their owne worth and vertue, and not of their aun∣cestours.
• * 1.1033

  Noble men by exercising of base trades, to loose their no∣bilitie thereby.
• * 1.1034

  Handycrafts accounted base trades.
• * 1.1035

  Handycrafts men why •…•…hey com∣monly are basely minded.
• * 1.1036

  Eccles. cap. 38.
• * 1.1037

  The Lacedemo∣nian and Roman citisens by Ly∣curgus and Ro∣mulus their law∣giuers forbidden to exercise me∣chanicall or handycrafts.
• * 1.1038

  Al Romaine Ci∣tisens bound to beare armes.
• * 1.1039

  Toga virilis or the mans gowne was by the Ro∣maine citisens worne, when they were come to be seauenteene yeare olde.
• * 1.1040

  The base regard that was had in Rome of artifi∣cers and men of occupation.
• * 1.1041

  Whether to vse the trade of mar∣chandize be a∣gainst a mans cre∣dit and reputation or not?
• * 1.1042

  Amphoras, the Ro∣maine measure is more then our bushel by 16 pound waight.
• * 1.1043

  The Romaine knights and gen∣tlemen to haue vsed the trade of marchandize.
• * 1.1044

  The better sorte of citisens in di∣uers common∣weales forbidden to deale in the trade of mar∣chandize.
• * 1.1045

  The people of God forbid to be marchants.
• * 1.1046

  Eccles. 24. Ezech chap. 82
• * 1.1047

  Chrysost. Ho∣mil▪ 21. in Ma∣t•…•…eum.
• * 1.1048

  The trade of marchandize both honest and necessarie.
• * 1.1049

  The marchants trade in diuers countries diuersly reputed of.
• * 1.1050

  The same thing that in one place is accounted ho∣nest or profitable in some other to be reputed disho∣nest or vnprofi∣table.
• * 1.1051

  Eccles. cap. 38
• * 1.1052

  The vocation of husbandmen and grasiers in auntient time right commenda∣ble, and whie now lesse respected.
• * 1.1053

  The hangmans office in some places respected▪ ▪Deut. 17. and 19.
• * 1.1054

  The author in this custome by him reported much mistaken and deceiued.
• * 1.1055

  Idle people to be thrust out of the citie, or elssetto worke.
• * 1.1056

  How citisens are in a Monarchy to be ordered and placed.
• * 1.1057

  Printers to be a∣mongst men of occupations especially to be regarded.
• * 1.1058

  Citisens but sel∣dome and that also vpon great necessitie to be into orders di∣uided.
• * 1.1059

  Citisens better to be diuided into three parts, than into two.
• * 1.1060

  Whether it bee good for to haue one speaker for all the degrees of citisens, or di∣uers.
• * 1.1061

  Better three parts taking in a com∣monweale than two.
• * 1.1062

  Not good in great assemblies to diuide the people into three degrees and orders.
• * 1.1063

  The beginning of Common∣weals.
• * 1.1064

  The florishing estate of com∣monweales en∣dure not long.
• * 1.1065

  What the con∣uersion and change of a Commonweale is.
• * 1.1066

  The age of a Commonweale how it is to be measured.
• * 1.1067

  Kings which made the Ro∣mans their heires.
• * 1.1068

  Diuers changes of common∣weales.
• * 1.1069

  The naturall change or fall of a Common∣weale.
• * 1.1070

  The most plea∣sing and easie change of a Commonweale.
• * 1.1071

  Six perfect con∣uersions or chan∣ges of Common∣weales.
• * 1.1072

  Vnperfect chan∣ges of Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1073

  A Common∣weale sometime holden in sus∣pence.
• * 1.1074

  An Anarchie.
• * 1.1075

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 27.
• * 1.1076

  A meere Anar∣chie the verie ruine of a Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1077

  Commonweales sometime toge∣ther with the people vtterly extinguished.
• * 1.1078

  A thing vnto Monarchies speciall.
• * 1.1079

  An Heremite a∣gainst his will chosen and crow∣ned king of Tri∣polis.
• * 1.1080

  Some common∣weales euen in their beginning destroyed.
• * 1.1081

  When the flou∣rishing estate of a commonweale is.
• * 1.1082

  The florishing estate of the Ro∣maine common∣weale to haue bene in the time of Papirius Cursor
• * 1.1083

  The excellencie and perfection of a commonweale how it is to be deemed.
• * 1.1084

  The Romain•…•… commonweale at the highest in the time of Traian the emperor, and yet not then in the greatest per∣fection.
• * 1.1085

  The causes of the changes of com∣monweales.
• * 1.1086

  The first monar∣chies to haue ta∣ken their begin∣nings from opres∣sion and tyrannie.
• * 1.1087

  The beginning of Aristocraties.
• * 1.1088

  The greatest ho∣nors and offices euen in Popular estates still be∣stowed vpon the nobilitie and richer sort of the people.
• * 1.1089

  A monarchie of all estates most sure and durable.
• * 1.1090

  Vnto most cruell tirants oftentimes succede most iust and vpright princes.
• * 1.1091

  Princes natures much altered by soueraigntie.
• * 1.1092

  The fairest be∣ginnings of prin∣ces raignes proue not alwaies the best.
• * 1.1093

  Why there be so fewe vertuous princes?
• * 1.1094

  Euil princes euen for their fathers vertues often∣times of their subiects beloued.
• * 1.1095

  A new prince without great vertues hardly to maintaine his estate.
• * 1.1096

  That is nine hun∣dred Thousand crownes.
• * 1.1097

  Couetousnesse, crueltie, and the voluptuous liues of princes, often∣times the causes of the change or ruine of their estates.
• * 1.1098

  Voluptuousnesse more daungerous vnto a prince than crueltie.
• * 1.1099

  Extreme crueltie oftentimes cause of the change of the princes estate
• * 1.1100

  Rewards still gi∣uen vnto the kil∣lers of tyrants▪
• * 1.1101

  Some for desire of reuenge▪ and some for the de∣sire of honor and the deliuerance of their countrie, to haue procured the tyrants deat•…•… and so the chang∣ing of the estate▪
• * 1.1102

  Force and feare, things necessarie for a new prince, for the mainte∣nance of his •…•…state.
• * 1.1103

  The notable wis∣dome of Augu∣stus in his go∣uernment, for the establishing of his estate.
• * 1.1104

  How Aristocra∣ties or Popular estates are chan∣ged into Monar∣chies.
• * 1.1105

  Master of the forces, Master of the Estate.
• * 1.1106

  Orders necessary for the mainte∣nance of Aristo∣cratique and po∣pular common∣weale.
• * 1.1107

  To chaunge the lawes and ordi∣nances concer∣ning the magi∣strats time, or to prorogue his charge, a thing most dangerous in an Aristocra∣tique or Popular Commonweale.
• * 1.1108

  Wonderfull bribes giuen by Caesar in aspi∣ring to the es∣tate.
• * 1.1109

  Aristocratique and Popular Commonweals still ruinated by the subiects, ha∣uing too much power commit∣ted vnto them.
• * 1.1110

  The mutuall chaunge of a popular estate into an Aristo∣cratie, and of an Aristocratie in∣to a Popular estate.
• * 1.1111

  Nothing more profitable for the preserua∣tion of a Po∣pular estate than warres.
• * 1.1112

  Popular estates most commonly to chaunge into Monarchies.
• * 1.1113

  Tyrannicall go∣uernments most commonly to chaunge into po∣pular estates.
• * 1.1114

  The •…•…ickelnesse of the people of∣tentimes cause of the change of the estate.
• * 1.1115

  The fickle and turbulent estate of the Florentines
• * 1.1116

  Antoninus Pog∣gius M•…•…biauel∣lus.
• * 1.1117

  Discord amongst themselues daun∣gerous vnto the gouernours of an Aristocratie.
• * 1.1118

  Multitude of straungers in an Aristocratie daungerous.
• * 1.1119

  The number of the inhabitants of Venice in the yeare 1555.
• * 1.1120

  The change of popular estates into Aristocraties of all others most gentle and quiet.
• * 1.1121

  Aristocraties by some great ou•…•…r throwe of the no∣bilitie oftentimes chaunged into popular estates.
• * 1.1122

  Monarchies hard∣ly chaunged for the losse of the nobilitie.
• * 1.1123

  Ambition and the vnworthie be∣stowing of the great preferments of the common∣weale, thinges most daungerous to an Aristocrati•…•…
• * 1.1124

  Discord among the nobilitie a thing most daun∣gerous to the sta•…•…
• * 1.1125

  Small matters of∣tentimes the caus•…•… of great chaunges in commonweals.
• * 1.1126

  Great men hardly to be called in question to giue an account of their doinges, without the daun∣ger of the estate.
• * 1.1127

  How daungerous a matter it is in e∣uerie common∣weale to bannish a great man.
• * 1.1128

  This was the Ostracisme ba∣nishment.
• * 1.1129

  Great men en•…•…∣mies vnto the estate, are either to be slaine, or by great kindnes to be made therunto faithfull friends.
• * 1.1130

  Small Common∣weales more sub∣iect vnto change than great.
• * 1.1131

  Small occasions serue to raise great dissenti∣on amongst ci∣tisens, and so the change of the estate.
• * 1.1132

  Commonweales most often chan∣ged or ouer∣throwme by for∣rein princes, ta∣king the aduan∣tage of the ciuill discord of the subiects amongst themselues.
• * 1.1133

  A Monarchie not so easily changed or ouerthrowne, as is an Aristo∣cratie or Popu∣lar Common∣weale.
• * 1.1134

  The resolution of Francis the French king, be∣ing prisoner to the Emperour Charles the fift.
• * 1.1135

  The insensible change of es∣tates best and most tollerable.
• * 1.1136

  The insensible •…•…stanging of the Venetian estate, and of the state of the German Em∣pire.
• * 1.1137

  Kingdomes go∣ing by election and so indeede but A•…•…istocraties, long continued in one familie, ea∣sily chaunge at length into Mo∣narchies as by succession dis∣cending.
• * 1.1138

  The most daun∣gerous chaunge of a Monarchie.
• * 1.1139

  These noble fa∣milies are nowe also al or most of them extingui∣shed and come to nought.
• * 1.1140

  Mans will still mutable, and God his iudgments inscrutable, af∣foord no meane for man by thē to foresee the chan∣ges and ruines of Commonweales.
• * 1.1141

  God his inmedi∣ate iudgment most su•…•…den and most dreadfull.
• * 1.1142

  By what naturall causes the ch•…•…n∣ges and ruines of Commonweales are to be foresee•…•…
• * 1.1143

  Ps•…•…l 10•…•…. Leuit. 27. Iob. 12.
• * 1.1144

  Astrologicall pre dictions, not to derogat from the maiestie and power of God.
• * 1.1145

  Nothing done by the necessitie of nature, it selfe be ing still subiect to the power of God:
• * 1.1146

  Esay. 19.
• * 1.1147

  All worldly things still sub∣iect to mutabili∣tie and change.
• * 1.1148

  The notable •…•…∣tors of the Astro∣logers
• * 1.1149

  The sunne in the creation of the world to haue bene in the sign•…•… Libra. Exod. 23. ver. 16 Exod. 11. ver. •…•…
• * 1.1150

  The world to haue taken be∣ginning in Au∣tumne.
• * 1.1151

  The auntient Ro maines to haue begun the yeare in September.
• * 1.1152

  Astrological pre∣dictions vn∣certen.
• * 1.1153

  The rising or fal∣ling of common∣weales not to be iudged or deemed of by the foun∣dation of the townes or cities therein.
• * 1.1154

  Taruntius Firmi∣anus deceiued in his horoscope or figure of the foundation of Rome.
• * 1.1155

  Cardan his error detected and his opinion reiected.
• * 1.1156

  The errour of Peter Cardinall of Arliac.
• * 1.1157

  How a man may without offence presage the chaunges of Ci∣ties and Com∣monweales.
• * 1.1158

  Ioh. 39. and 40.
• * 1.1159

  Vaine feares of∣ten times con∣ceiued, vpon As∣trologers vaine predictions.
• * 1.1160

  Genes. 7.
• * 1.1161

  The vanitie of the Chaldean Astrologers.
• * 1.1162

  The triplicities of the caelestiall signes not to be determinatly as∣signed vnto cer∣taine regions and countries, as the Astrologers ap∣poynt.
• * 1.1163

  The ieast of Cas∣sius vnto a Calde∣an Astrologer.
• * 1.1164

  The coniuncti∣ons of the superi∣or Planets to haue oftentimes wrought great effects for the al∣teration and changing of Commonweales.
• * 1.1165

  The errour of Leouicius.
• * 1.1166

  The opinion of the learned He∣brues concerning the consumation of the world.
• * 1.1167

  By what order and meane some more certain and probable coniec∣ture might be made of the chaunges and ru∣ines of common∣weales.
• * 1.1168

  The greatest and most notable chaunges of es∣tates and Com∣monweales to haue commonly hapned in the moneth of Sep∣tember.
• * 1.1169

  What times of the yeare the no∣table chaunces and chaunges of the world most commonly hap∣pen in.
• * 1.1170

  Leouicius taxed.
• * 1.1171

  Great and marue∣lous effects wrought by the coniunction of the superior Planets.
• * 1.1172

  The opinion of Copernicus con∣cerning the mo∣tion & influence: of the earth, re∣futed.
• * 1.1173

  The most darke and obscur•…•… opi∣nion of Plato concerning the chaunges and ruines of Com∣monweales.
• * 1.1174

  Nothing more obscure than the Platonical num∣bers.
• * 1.1175

  The true discord which indeedma∣ryeth the sweet harmonie of a Commonweale.
• * 1.1176

  Musike to be of great force, for the chaunging or maintaining of a Common∣weale.
• * 1.1177

  Musique most honored in At∣•…•…hadia.
• * 1.1178

  Light musike forbidden in the primatiue church
• * 1.1179

  Numbers to be of greatforce, what∣by to deeme the chaunge and ru∣ine of a Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1180

  The eight booke of Plato de Re∣pub. most diffi∣cult and obscure.
• * 1.1181

  [illustration]

  Sesquitertia i•…•… that which con∣taineth all that an other thing doth, and a third part more.
• * 1.1182

  Obscuritie by Plato and many the auntient wri∣ters of purpose in their writings affected.
• * 1.1183

  Plato discouered and in some sort refuted.
• * 1.1184

  Faciamus ho∣minem: Or let vs make man.
• * 1.1185

  The foure perfect numbers within an hundred thou∣sand, are 6. 496. 6•…•…8▪ and 8128.
• * 1.1186

  Perfect numbers aboue an hun∣dred thousand: 130811, 2096128, 33550336. 536814528.
• * 1.1187

  Plato vainely to attribute the per∣fect or euen numbers vnto heauenly things.
• * 1.1188

  The numbers of seauen and nine to be of great force in the chaunge of worldly things.
• * 1.1189

  Hippocrat. de partis septimestri.
• * 1.1190

  The number of sixe to be of great power in the femaile sexe, and the number of seauen in the maile kind.
• * 1.1191

  The seuenth day of all others most blessed.
• * 1.1192

  The clymacteri∣call yeare of 63, most commonly fatall vnto old men.
• * 1.1193

  Great learned men which dyed at the 93. yeare of their age.
• * 1.1194

  The seauenth and ninth yeares still daungerous or fatall vnto old men; and the sixt yeare vn∣to women.
• * 1.1195

  The Saboath or Seauenth day of all other daies the most blessed.
• * 1.1196

  What a perfect number is?
• * 1.1197

  * In lib. de oppi•…•…i∣cto Dei.
• * 1.1198

  In somnio scipio∣nis.
• * 1.1199

  But four perfect numbers from one to an hun∣dred thousand.
• * 1.1200

  The number 469▪ the onely perfect number which can well bee applied vnto the changes of cities and Com∣monweales.
• * 1.1201

  The numbers of seauen and nine fatall vnto Com∣monweales.
• * 1.1202

  Chap 24.
• * 1.1203

  The number per∣fect of 496 a number proper vnto the chaun∣•…•…es of Commōn∣weales.
• * 1.1204

  The number of sixe to be vnto women fatall.
• * 1.1205

  In his booke: De Methode his∣toriarum.
• * 1.1206

  Hier. 2•…•…. & Daniel 9.
• * 1.1207

  A good discou•…•… of Daniel his seauentie weeks.
• * 1.1208

  Iosephus. Funccius. Mercator. Philo.
• * 1.1209

  In meth•…•…do 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.1210

  Chap. •…•….
• * 1.1211

  Chap. •…•….
• * 1.1212

  * Chap. 23.
• * 1.1213

  How it is lawfull for a man to gesse at the rising and falling of a Com∣mon wealth.
• * 1.1214

  Wise men not to be subiect vnto the power or in∣fluence of the starres, as sensual men be.
• * 1.1215

  The mine of a Commonweale to be by the wis∣dome of the go∣uernour preuen∣ted, or •…•…ls war∣ning thereof to be by him in d•…•…e time giuen vnto his subiects.
• * 1.1216

  Wisdome neuer discouraged with the daungers of the Common∣weale: so long as they see the state wisely and dis∣•…•… gouerned.
• * 1.1217

  What opinion wise men had of the distressed es∣tate of the Ro∣maine Common∣wealea, f•…•…et the great ouerthrowe at Cannas.
• * 1.1218

  The first rule for the keeping and preseruing of Commonweales in their estates.
• * 1.1219

  Violent remedies neuer to be vsed but in desperat•…•… diseases.
• * 1.1220

  A notable ques∣tion.
• * 1.1221

  Auntient lawes though worse still of greater esteeme and re∣uerence than the new though better.
• * 1.1222

  Auntient lawes concerning the estate of a Com∣monweale not to be without great daunger altered.
• * 1.1223

  The extreame daunger he was in, which moued any new law a∣mongst the Lo∣crensians.
• * 1.1224

  Lawes concer∣ning ordinarie pollicie may of∣t•…•…ntimes be changed but not lawes concer∣ning the estate.
• * 1.1225

  The chiefe lawe of all Common∣weales.
• * 1.1226

  No lawe so sa∣cred but that vp∣on vrgent neces∣sitie it is to be chaunged▪
• * 1.1227

  Better to suffer euill lawes by lit∣tle and little to growe out of vse; then vpon the soden with daun∣ger to abrogate them all at once▪
• * 1.1228

  Neither are old lawes to be alto∣gether sodenly without daunger abrogated: or newe lawes rash∣ly •…•…stablished.
• * 1.1229

  Dangerous for a prince vpon the soden to displace or caste offe the anntient seruitor of his predeces∣sours, or great magistrats of the estate.
• * 1.1230

  All alterations of lawes or other great matters in a Commonweale are best to be made by little and little.
• * 1.1231

  The wise course taken of Charles the IX for the abating of the infinite number of officers in the Commonweale.
• * 1.1232

  Not good for a prince to vse the greatnesse of his power in displa∣cing of the great officers of his realme and state.
• * 1.1233

  Religeous houses with great wis∣dome quietly suppressed at Ba∣sill and Coire.
• * 1.1234

  The best and su∣rest way for the suppressing of a tyrant.
• * 1.1235

  The wise polititi∣an in the go∣uernment of the estate is to imi∣tate the works of God in nature who by litle and litle bringeth great things to perfection.
• * 1.1236

  Reasons to show that magistrats ought not to be perpetuall.
• * 1.1237

  Rewards for ver∣tue ought to be vnto all men common.
• * 1.1238

  The root of se∣dition is by all meanes to be cut vp in a Com∣monweale which can hardly be where magistrats and officers be perpetuall.
• * 1.1239

  Perpetuitie of offices the caus•…•… of impunitie of the great officers.
• * 1.1240

  Great magistrat•…•… and officers in doubt to be cal∣led to account where they are but annuall.
• * 1.1241

  Euill magistrats most commonly hold together.
• * 1.1242

  That •…•…o man should be a iudg in his owne countrie.
• * 1.1243

  The ordinarie iudges in Italie straungers.
• * 1.1244

  Lib. 7.
• * 1.1245

  The great office•…•… and preferments of the Common∣weale giuen in perpetuitie bree∣deth a carelesnes of the Common good both in the magistrats them∣selues and others
• * 1.1246

  One man to haue many offices and especially in per∣petuitie, not good for the Commonweale.
• * 1.1247

  Old m•…•…n in dan∣ger to be thrust off the bridges.
• * 1.1248

  Ambitious men neuer satisfied with honors, of∣tentimes the cause of great trobles in a Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1249

  Continuation of great offices of∣tentimes the cause of the change of the estate.
• * 1.1250

  Great inconueni∣ences ensuing by making of offices and dignities he∣reditarie.
• * 1.1251

  The great incon∣ueniences ensu∣ing of hauing the offices in a Commonweale still annuall or changable.
• * 1.1252

  The reason why Tiberius the Emperor would not haue the great officers often chaunged.
• * 1.1253

  New lords new lawes.
• * 1.1254

  Two great errors oftentimes com∣mitted in the go∣uernment of Commonweales.
• * 1.1255

  Michael hospita∣lis chauncelour of France.
• * 1.1256

  Commonweales in nature contra∣rie, by contrarie meanes to be also maintained.
• * 1.1257

  Annuall magi∣strats best in a popular Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1258

  The pollicie and craft of tyrants.
• * 1.1259

  The magistrats in a royall mo∣narchie some per∣petuall and some annuall.
• * 1.1260

  That the colle∣ges and compa∣nies of iudges ought to be pe•…•…∣tuall.
• * 1.1261

  Better many iud∣ges then one alone.
• * 1.1262

  Good that infe∣riour Magistrats & officers should be perpetuall.
• * 1.1263

  That Senators and Counsellors of estate ought to be stìll perpetual.
• * 1.1264

  Lib. de Legibus Cap. 174.
• * 1.1265

  A generall and necessarie rule to be kept in euery Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1266

  No lawe so good but that it draw∣eth after it some discommoditie.
• * 1.1267

  That a good law is not to be chan∣ged for some one discommoditie ensuing thereof.
• * 1.1268

  Dangerous to change all the cheife magi∣strats of a Com∣monweale at once.
• * 1.1269

  That offices in a royal Monar∣chie are rather to be bestowed by order of law, than by the Princes will & pleasure onely.
• * 1.1270

  The erection of the parliament of Paris.
• * 1.1271

  The giuing of offices during the princes pleasure not to be discom∣mended.
• * 1.1272

  That in euery commonweale there ought to be some estates and magistrats perpe∣petuall.
• * 1.1273

  Reasons to show that magistrats ought to be at v∣n tie and concord among them∣selues.
• * 1.1274

  Contrary reasons to show that it is good for the Commonweale, that magistrats should be at dis∣cord and vari∣ance among themselues.
• * 1.1275

  The fruit of •…•…oes.
• * 1.1276

  Lib. •…•….
• * 1.1277

  The resolution of the former que∣stion.
• * 1.1278

  That the num∣ber of the soue∣raigne magistrats in a Common∣weale should still be odd.
• * 1.1279

  The contention of the great ma∣gistrats most dangerous in a popular Com∣monweale: and their too great friendship to be no lesse perilous also.
• * 1.1280

  Philip. 2.
• * 1.1281

  Kings first establi∣shed to iudge his subiects.
• * 1.1282

  Reasons to show that princes themselues in person ought to administer iustice vnto their sub∣iects.
• * 1.1283

  The great good that ensueth whē princes in person themselues do iu∣stice vnto their subiects.
• * 1.1284

  Examples of great Princes, who themselues in person admi∣nistred iustice vnto their sub∣iects.
• * 1.1285

  A notable exam∣ple of the great emperour Adrian for the doing of a poore old woman iustice.
• * 1.1286

  To be necessarie for a prince to vnderstand of the affaires of estate.
• * 1.1287

  Reasons to show that it is not meet for princes themselues in person to admini∣ster iustice vnto their subiects.
• * 1.1288

  Such a prince, such a people.
• * 1.1289

  That an euill prince ought not much to come a∣broad for the peo∣ple to imitat his vices.
• * 1.1290

  The subiects still •…•…eadier to imitate the vices than the vertues of the prince.
• * 1.1291

  600 Crownes.
• * 1.1292

  Princes of all o∣thers most hard∣ly to counterfeit vertues, or to dis∣semble their vices
• * 1.1293

  Too much fami∣liarity of a prince with his subiects; not good: and al∣wayes to be seene of them in his maiestie, a thing vnto them dread∣full.
• * 1.1294

  How princes are to behaue them∣selues, to be of their subiects both beloued and fea•…•…ed.
• * 1.1295

  How a prince is to frame his counte∣nance and speech when he showeth himselfe vnto the people.
• * 1.1296

  The maner of the kings of Borney.
• * 1.1297

  How a prince ought but sel∣dome times to conuerse with his subiects.
• * 1.1298

  How the danger least a prince should be dispos∣sessed of his e∣state by him whom he putteth in trust for the mannaging of his affaires, is to be preuented.
• * 1.1299

  Iustice better to be administred by good and suffici∣ent magistrats, than by the prince himselfe.
• * 1.1300

  An hard charges∣ble, and daunge∣rous matter, for subiects to prose∣cute their suits before the prince.
• * 1.1301

  Why the office to iudge and de∣cide matters, a thing proper vn∣to the au•…•…tiene kings, now be∣longeth vnto ma∣gistrats and judges.
• * 1.1302

  Not good for a loue•…•…gne prince how sufficient so∣euer, to sit in iudgement him∣selfe, for feare of too much lenitie, or else seu: ritie▪ to the peruerting of iustice.
• * 1.1303

  Nothing more contrary vnto true iustice, than lenitie and piti•…•….
• * 1.1304

  The people in a Popular estate easily moued vn∣to pitie.
• * 1.1305

  A most hard thing for a soue∣raigne prince sit∣ting himselfe in iudgement, to keepe a meane betwixt too much lenitie and seueritie.
• * 1.1306

  The most strange & extreame cru∣eltie of Caligula the emperour.
• * 1.1307

  The best and su∣rest meanes for the maintenance of a prince in his estate, is by all good meanes to procure the loue of his subiects: and how the same is to be ob∣tained.
• * 1.1308

  Not lawfull for the French king to be in person assistant in the triall of a prince or peere accused of treason.
• * 1.1309

  The king ought n•…•…t to be judge, where he is him∣selfe a partie, as in matters concer∣ning his owne interest.
• * 1.1310

  A vaine obiecti∣on for the short∣ning of suits, if the prince him∣selfe in person take vpon him the administrati∣on of iustice.
• * 1.1311

  The quicker iu∣stice not alwayes the better.
• * 1.1312

  Causes worthy & well beseeming the princes hea∣ring & deciding.
• * 1.1313

  Claudius the em∣perour derided for taking vppon him the deciding of common cau∣ses and matters.
• * 1.1314

  The great care that a prince should haue of himselfe, which would oftentimes •…•…it in iudgement, or much show himselfe, and espe∣cially vnto stran∣gers.
• * 1.1315

  That princes ought seldome to come to an enteruiew of their persons.
• * 1.1316

  The people v•…•…fie to iudge of mat∣ters.
• * 1.1317

  That the Senat or Magistrats are not to be depri∣ued of their au∣thoritie & power to haue the sam•…•… giuen to the prince.
• * 1.1318

  The Popular Commonweale not to be the best maintained by the most Popular lawes.
• * 1.1319

  The best ordered Commonwealth
• * 1.1320

  The foolish say∣ing of Caligula.
• * 1.1321

  All factions and part-takings dan gerous vnto Commonweales▪
• * 1.1322

  Seditions and fa∣ctions dangerous euen for Tyranni∣call gouernments
• * 1.1323

  An especiall be∣nefit a Monarch hath aboue other Commonweales.
• * 1.1324

  Priuat factions how they are to be suppressed.
• * 1.1325

  Factions and con∣spiracies against the prince or estate, how they are to be repressed and the conspira∣tors punished.
• * 1.1326

  That in a conspi∣racie it is not good to make too strait enquiry to find out all the conspirators.
• * 1.1327

  Torture for the finding out of conspirators ought to be most warily vsed.
• * 1.1328

  Conspirators pre∣uented to haue oftentimes bene right wisely dis∣sembled, and not farther enquired after.
• * 1.1329

  Princes often∣times better to vnderstand of the conspiracies a∣gainst 〈◊〉〈◊〉 prin∣ces, than of such as are against themselues at Rome contriued.
• * 1.1330

  1552.
• * 1.1331

  Conspiracies hard to be concesl•…•…d, being oft times •…•… euen by women reuealed.
• * 1.1332

  The most dange∣rous conspiracie that can be a∣gainst the person of a prince, and the hardest to b•…•…e auoyded.
• * 1.1333

  Of small sparkes oft times do arise the great flames and fiers of sedi∣tion.
• * 1.1334

  That the quarrels of great men ought euen in the beginning to be wisely appea∣sed, or by force of the prince sup∣pressed.
• * 1.1335

  A wise part of Archidamus in making of two great enemies friends.
• * 1.1336

  The craft of ty∣rants in setting other m•…•…n toge∣ther by the eares, sometime daun∣gerous vnto themselues.
• * 1.1337

  The obligation of wicked and desperat men grounded vppon some norable vil∣lanie, in all Com∣monweales most daungerous, and how to be sup∣pressed.
• * 1.1338

  How a soueraign prince is to end the quarrels and controuersies that are betwixt the nobilitie.
• * 1.1339

  Dangerous for a prince not to shew himselfe in∣different in the quarrels and con∣trouersies of his great subiects.
• * 1.1340

  When, and how a soueraigne prince is to vse his force for the appealing of the controuersies and quarrels betwixt his great subiects
• * 1.1341

  The beginning of combats.
• * 1.1342

  Combats when to be admitted.
• * 1.1343

  Combats by di∣uers great prin∣ces forbidden, & for the auoiding of greater incon∣ueniences by them again•…•… al∣lowed.
• * 1.1344

  Of the lie giuen, what is to be thought.
• * 1.1345

  How, and for what cause com∣bats are to be granted.
• * 1.1346

  Combats nor to be admitted for the quarrels and contentions be∣twixt families.
• * 1.1347

  Seditions arising for the execution of iustice, how they are to be preuented.
• * 1.1348

  Nothing more hurtfull vnto a warlike people than peace.
• * 1.1349

  Seditions in a Popular Com∣monweale of all others most dan∣gerous, and how to be appeased.
• * 1.1350

  That the people vp in tumult or sedition, is not by strong hand or open force to be stai•…•…d or appeased
• * 1.1351

  The hungry belly hath no eares.
• * 1.1352

  The wisedome of Pericles to draw the common peo ple of Athens to vnderstand rea∣son.
• * 1.1353

  How, and when the people is to be flattered.
• * 1.1354

  Force neuer to be vsed against the people, where faire meanes may preuaile.
• * 1.1355

  The commenda∣ble deceit of Pa∣•…•…uius, to deceiue the angry people.
• * 1.1356

  The mutinous people best ap∣peased by the good persuasion of some good old vertuous perso∣nage.
• * 1.1357

  Peter Lored an a most notable ci∣tisen.
• * 1.1358

  The reuerend feare of religion a good meane for the appeasing of the seditious people.
• * 1.1359

  Seditions some∣times appeased by the interposi∣tion and media∣tion of friends.
• * 1.1360

  Nothing more daungerous vnto a prince, than in seditions to make himselfe a partie.
• * 1.1361

  It is daungerous to call that into question which ought to be hol∣den as resolued vpon.
• * 1.1362

  Religion once re∣ceiued and setled, to be no more called into que∣stion or doubt.
• * 1.1363

  * Lib. 3.
• * 1.1364

  Disputations of religion dange∣rous.
• * 1.1365

  Lib. 6. De mili∣tari ac domestica Romanorum dis∣iplina.
• * 1.1366

  The power of religion.
• * 1.1367

  Religion not to be enforced.
• * 1.1368

  How a prince wel assured of the truth of his reli∣gion is to draw his subiects ther∣unto, being ther∣fo•…•…e diuided into sects and factions
• * 1.1369

  No man to b•…•… compelled a∣gainst his will to beleeue.
• * 1.1370

  To forbid men the priuat exer∣cise of their reli∣gion, is to make them oftentime•…•… to become Atheists.
• * 1.1371

  Baruc•…•….
• * 1.1372

  〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.1373

  Atheisme worse than the greatest Superstition.
• * 1.1374

  Why many sects better agree in a Commonweale than two onely.
• * 1.1375

  Whether Solons law for part-ta∣king▪ as that eue∣ry man should be of necessitie bound to take ei∣ther the one o•…•… the other part in time of sedition, be good and pro∣fitable vnto Com∣monweals or not
• * 1.1376

  The daungerous estate of them that stand as neu∣ters in time of se∣dition.
• * 1.1377

  Prouerb. 4.
• * 1.1378

  The vse of belles, why in many countries forbid∣den.
• * 1.1379

  The best and su∣rest way to pre∣uent sedition.
• * 1.1380

  The common wearing of wea∣pons in a peacea∣ble Common∣weale, the occasi∣on of many euils.
• * 1.1381

  Impunitie of of∣fendors to draw after it ruine of estates.
• * 1.1382

  The immoderat libertie of speech giuen vnto Ora∣tors a great cause of seditions and rebellions.
• * 1.1383

  The force and power of elo∣quence.
• * 1.1384

  Eloquence in an euill man as dan∣gerous, as a sword in a mad mans hand.
• * 1.1385

  A wise, vertuous, and eloquent preacher, of all others the fittest man to appease rebellions, and to keepe the people in obedience to their prince.
• * 1.1386

  The nature of the people is much to be regarded in the framing of a Commonweale.
• * 1.1387

  Townes vneuen∣ly built vppon mountaines and vallies, are sub∣iect to seditions.
• * 1.1388

  To frame an e∣state, we must ap∣ply it to the na∣ture of the sub∣iects.
• * 1.1389

  Guichardin.
• * 1.1390

  The humours of sundrie people.
• * 1.1391

  Liuius lib. 4.
• * 1.1392

  Notable differen∣ces betweene the Atheniens, Ro∣mans, and Car∣thaginians.
• * 1.1393

  Plut. in Calon•…•… Censorio.
• * 1.1394

  A good Architect fits his building according to the stuffe he finds vpon the place.
• * 1.1395

  A diuision of people.
• * 1.1396

  The heat is grea∣ter vnder the Tro pick, than vnder the Equator.
• * 1.1397

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Saxo Grammaticus.
• * 1.1398

  Aristotle & Hi∣pocrates agree herein.
• * 1.1399

  The difference of the people in the Northerne re∣gions.
• * 1.1400

  In the history of Moscouie.
• * 1.1401

  The heat more vehement in som∣mer in cold countries than in hoat.
• * 1.1402

  Why the sunne is hoater on the earth than in the ayre.
• * 1.1403

  What places in the South are most subiect to waters.
• * 1.1404

  Why the armies of the North lan∣guish when they go towards the South.
• * 1.1405

  Why the people of the South be abstinent.
• * 1.1406

  Why the people of the North are more hungry.
• * 1.1407

  The people of the middle regi∣ons are better tempered in wit and bodie.
• * 1.1408

  The greatest em∣pires were in the middle regions.
• * 1.1409

  The people of the North disper∣sed throughout all the Roman empire.
• * 1.1410

  Esai. 14. 41. Ezec. 16. 51. Dan. 8. 48. Za•…•…h. 11.
• * 1.1411

  Lacedemon more Southerly than Rome.
• * 1.1412

  The reason why they of the North drinke more than in the South.
• * 1.1413

  Proofe to know the bastards from them that were lawfull.
• * 1.1414

  The middle regi∣on participats of both the ex∣treames.
• * 1.1415

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 and hu∣manitie comes from Asia.
• * 1.1416

  The nature of the French.
• * 1.1417

  The Spaniard al∣wayes circum∣uents the French by treacheries.
• * 1.1418

  The reason why the Spaniards circumuent the French.
• * 1.1419

  The nature of the Spaniard.
• * 1.1420

  The Spaniard heauy & slothful
• * 1.1421

  Whence the va∣rietie of comple∣xions doth grow
• * 1.1422

  The disposition of the foure com∣plexions.
• * 1.1423

  The people of the North not subtill.
• * 1.1424

  The people of the North faithful to the prince that entertaineth them
• * 1.1425

  Strange cruelties of the people of the North.
• * 1.1426

  Melancholike men cruell and reuengefull.
• * 1.1427

  Terrible cruelties of the people of the South.
• * 1.1428

  The people be∣twixt both ex∣treames, not sub∣iect to crueltie.
• * 1.1429

  Why the people of the South are more reuengefull then others, and more subiect to madnes.
• * 1.1430

  Why musicke cures mad men, and expels diuels.
• * 1.1431

  The difference betwixt a furious and a mad man.
• * 1.1432

  The people of the South much giuen to women.
• * 1.1433

  A strange manee of gelding of men, which they vsed in Scythia & low Germanie.
• * 1.1434

  Melancholik•…•… men most giuen to lust.
• * 1.1435

  The people of the North ene∣mies to women.
• * 1.1436

  The people of the South much gi∣uen to iealousie.
• * 1.1437

  All lawes agree not with all na∣tions.
• * 1.1438

  Melancholy the cause of wisedom
• * 1.1439

  Melancholy the cause of long life.
• * 1.1440

  The people of the South subiect to extreames.
• * 1.1441

  Posse & noll•…•… no∣bile.
• * 1.1442

  The manner of gouernment in the three tempe∣ratures.
• * 1.1443

  The Frenchmen giuen by nature to pleading.
• * 1.1444

  The seuerall di∣sposition of peo∣ple according to the clima•…•…s.
• * 1.1445

  Melancholike men most giuen to contemplation
• * 1.1446

  Means to gouerne the people of the South.
• * 1.1447

  A fine policie of Colombus the Geneuois.
• * 1.1448

  Religion most re∣spected in the South.
• * 1.1449

  The disposition of the people is greatly to be ob∣serued in the gouernment.
• * 1.1450

  Three vertues proper to three nations of the North, South, & middle region.
• * 1.1451

  Prudenti•…•…. Scienti•…•…. Ars.
• * 1.1452

  The disposition of the three nati∣ons in the go∣uerment of the world.
• * 1.1453

  Why those of the South are not fit to gouerne a state.
• * 1.1454

  The proportion of the Planets to the people.
• * 1.1455

  In Method. hist. cap. 5.
• * 1.1456

  More women in the South than men.
• * 1.1457

  The people of the East more courteous, and more ingenious than those of the VVest.
• * 1.1458

  Remarkable par∣ticularities of places.
• * 1.1459

  The cause or the diuersitie of hu∣mors in Italie.
• * 1.1460

  A mountain•…•… causeth a great difference of peo∣ple that liue in opposit vallies.
• * 1.1461

  Why the people of the North haue electiue kingdomes.
• * 1.1462

  VVhy those that liue vpon moun∣taines loue Po∣pular states.
• * 1.1463

  In Swisserland e∣uery one is boūd to we are a sword.
• * 1.1464

  Inhabitants of vallies are effe∣•…•…inate.
• * 1.1465

  Merchants giuen to lie & deceiue.
• * 1.1466

  The violence of the wind breeds a great varietie in men.
• * 1.1467

  A fertill countrey breeds 〈◊〉〈◊〉 people.
• * 1.1468

  A barren soyl•…•… makes the peo∣ple 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.1469

  People giuen to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fi•…•…rce and sauag•…•….
• * 1.1470

  Education alter•…•… natur•…•….
• * 1.1471

  Wrestling and Musike necessary in all Common∣weales.
• * 1.1472

  The French held to be constant.
• * 1.1473

  Inconstancie in∣cident to them of the North.
• * 1.1474

  The difference of humors be∣twixt them of the North and South.
• * 1.1475

  The people of the North care∣lesse of their faith.
• * 1.1476

  The gouernment of a state alters the peoples di∣spositions.
• * 1.1477

  Great differences of people in co∣lour in the same climats.
• * 1.1478

  The nature of the place doth commonly change the lan∣guage.
• * 1.1479

  The chiefest cause of the change and sub∣uersion of a state
• * 1.1480

  The cause of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in an estate.
• * 1.1481

  The two plagues of all Common∣•…•….
• * 1.1482

  Equalitie the su∣rest maintenanc•…•… of a Common∣weale.
• * 1.1483

  Equalitie of goods dange∣rous to a Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1484

  Abolition of debts ruins the poorer sort.
• * 1.1485

  The equall diui∣sion of lands most iniust.
• * 1.1486

  Equalitie of goods the ruine of humane so∣cietie.
• * 1.1487

  Solons deuision of citisens.
• * 1.1488

  Equalitie impos∣sible to be kept in a state.
• * 1.1489

  A cruell law made by Plato.
• * 1.1490

  It is iniurious to tye a citie to a certaine number.
• * 1.1491

  Great cities are lesse subiect to seditions than others.
• * 1.1492

  The manner how to diuide a conquered citie.
• * 1.1493

  Deuision of land by the law of God.
• * 1.1494

  Abolition of debts pernitious.
• * 1.1495

  Vsurie must bee cut off.
• * 1.1496

  Tacit. lib. 5. Pest. lib. 19.
• * 1.1497

  An vsurer estee∣med worse than a theefe.
• * 1.1498

  Vsurie forbidden in Rome.
• * 1.1499

  Laws are vnpro∣fitable without penalties.
• * 1.1500

  Vsurie in fruits seemes tollerable
• * 1.1501

  Nothing deerer or more necessa∣rie than that which nouri∣sheth.
• * 1.1502

  A meritorious deed to lend without vsurie.
• * 1.1503

  Annuities worse than interest.
• * 1.1504

  The Clergy en∣riched, and o∣thers made poor.
• * 1.1505

  Clergy men for∣bidden to pur∣chase lands.
• * 1.1506

  In old time euery man was forced to leaue some∣thing vnto the church.
• * 1.1507

  The anntient rights o•…•… the duke of Nor∣•…•…andie and earles of Poitou.
• * 1.1508

  The reuenewes of he Clergy in France.
• * 1.1509

  The propertie of land is in vaine whereas the vsu∣fruit is perpetual
• * 1.1510

  An occasion found out to ru∣ine the Cleargy.
• * 1.1511

  The cause of se∣ditions in Rome.
• * 1.1512

  Law•…•… made for the distribution of lands.
• * 1.1513

  The testamenta∣rie law the cause of inequalitie.
• * 1.1514

  In Poland and many other parts of the North, they may not dispose of lands by testament.
• * 1.1515

  In some places noble men may not sell away their seigneuries.
• * 1.1516

  Great kingdoms supported by no∣ble families, especially in an Ari∣stocratical estate, but they are con∣trarie to a Popu∣lar estate, or to a Tyranny.
• * 1.1517

  Inequalitie main tained the estat•…•… of Sparta.
• * 1.1518

  Laws prohibi∣ting noble men to •…•…ell their seig∣neuries.
• * 1.1519

  A meanes to v∣nite the gentry & the plebeians.
• * 1.1520

  I•…•… the East parts the daughters inherit •…•…o lands.
• * 1.1521

  The inequalitie of goods grows, for that the daughters being heires are marri∣ed to the rich.
• * 1.1522

  The law of suc∣cession at Rome, d•…•…frauded.
• * 1.1523

  A commendable law at Venic•…•….
• * 1.1524

  The law of Fraunce for the marriage of daughters.
• * 1.1525

  The law of God for dowries.
• * 1.1526

  The law of Persia.
• * 1.1527

  Custome of Aniou.
• * 1.1528

  It seemes against the law of nature to take the suc∣cession of the father condem∣ned from the child.
• * 1.1529

  Iustinian left the goods of the con∣demned vnto the heire.
• * 1.1530

  Wicked men wil attempt any thing to enrich their children.
• * 1.1531

  A law in fauour of murtherers.
• * 1.1532

  The law of con∣fiscation 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the wicked.
• * 1.1533

  Rewards are ne∣cessary for accu∣sers.
• * 1.1534

  What order is to be obserued in their goods that are condemned.
• * 1.1535

  Lands which come by succes∣sion cannot be forfeited.
• * 1.1536

  The inconueni∣ences which grow in adiud∣ging of confisca∣tions vnto the publike.
• * 1.1537

  Confiscations the cau•…•…e of ty∣ranny.
• * 1.1538

  Confiscations most daungerous in a Monarchy.
• * 1.1539

  Tyrants are enri∣ched by false ac∣cusations, by meanes of con∣fiscations.
• * 1.1540

  1234.
• * 1.1541

  1202.
• a 1.1542

  1458.
• b 1.1543

  1369.
• c 1.1544

  1370.
• d 1.1545

  1302.
• e 1.1546

  1302.
• f 1.1547

  1535.
• * 1.1548

  Informers must be rewarded with money, and not with lands.
• * 1.1549

  The law of A∣thens in cases of treason.
• * 1.1550

  The law of Ger∣manie for con∣fi•…•…cations.
• * 1.1551

  The two princi∣pall foundations of euery Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1552

  Difference of re∣wards.
• * 1.1553

  Different•…•… of re∣ward and benefit
• * 1.1554

  The difference of giuing rewards in a Popular estate and a Mo∣narchy.
• * 1.1555

  A tyrant cannot endure to haue the subiect ho∣noured.
• * 1.1556

  The honour of the souldiors vi∣ctory is due vnto the captaine.
• * 1.1557

  Why Popular estates haue more famous men than Mo∣narchies.
• * 1.1558

  Preferments to honour breeds men of desert.
• * 1.1559

  The description of a triumph at Rome.
• * 1.1560

  The honours gi∣uen at Athens.
• * 1.1561

  The Romans e∣steemed honour more than profit.
• * 1.1562

  A worthy saying of a souldi•…•…r.
• * 1.1563

  The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 re∣fuse honours when they are giuen to the vn∣wo•…•…thy.
• * 1.1564

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturall •…•…∣der of honour and vertue.
• * 1.1565

  The reward of honour turnes to infamie, if it be giuen to the vnworthy.
• * 1.1566

  Harmonicall proportion in the distribution of rewards.
• * 1.1567

  The estimation of honours in old times.
• * 1.1568

  The orders of England, Franc•…•…, and Bourgongne
• * 1.1569

  The law of the Golden Fleec•…•….
• * 1.1570

  The law of the order of Saint Michael.
• * 1.1571

  The excessiu•…•… number of Knights of the order, haue rui∣ned the order.
• * 1.1572

  Sellers of smoke dangerous to an estate.
• * 1.1573

  It is the ruine of princes to giue too great autho∣ritie to his sub∣iects.
• * 1.1574

  Charles the ninth to Henry.
• * 1.1575

  Tranqud. in Tit•…•….
• * 1.1576

  Why good and vertuous men want rewards.
• * 1.1577

  Plut. in Lisand.
• * 1.1578

  Why we are more prone to reuenge than to requite.
• * 1.1579

  Punishments & rewards, the two supports of a Commonweale.
• * 1.1580

  The sale of offi∣ces and benefices most dangerous in a Common∣weale.
• * 1.1581

  Sale of offices least vsed in a Popular estate.
• * 1.1582

  The inconueni∣ences which grow by the sale of offices.
• * 1.1583

  Pouertie no law∣full excuse in a prince for the sale of offices.
• * 1.1584

  A worthy saying of an emperour.
• * 1.1585

  The disposition of the emperour Seuerus.
• * 1.1586

  The good hus∣bandry of king Francis the first.
• * 1.1587

  The prodigality of king Henrie the second.
• * 1.1588

  The cause of the calamities of Fraunce.
• * 1.1589

  In the yeare 1333. 11. May.
• * 1.1590

  In what sort the prince should giue.
• * 1.1591

  A safe kind of giuing.
• * 1.1592

  An excellent po∣licie of the em∣peror Charles the fift.
• * 1.1593

  It is pernitio•…•…s to giue one thing to many.
• * 1.1594

  The law of li∣bertie.
• * 1.1595

  The beginning of the kings of Portugall.
• * 1.1596

  Bountie will be∣sits a great prince
• * 1.1597

  A pleasant aun∣swere of pope Iulius the third.
• * 1.1598

  Aduancements bestowed on the vnworthy in∣cense the subiects
• * 1.1599

  A commendable custome of Ale∣xander Seuerus.
• * 1.1600

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. in or at. de fals•…•… legat. & contr•…•… Tim•…•…r∣chum.
• * 1.1601

  A true distributi∣on of offices and charges.
• * 1.1602

  Reasons against the fortifying of townes.
• * 1.1603

  Francis Aluere•…•… in the historie of Aethiopia.
• * 1.1604

  He that is master of the field, is master of the townes.
• * 1.1605

  The strongest fort is the loue of the subiects.
• * 1.1606

  The first cause of the Swissers reuolt.
• * 1.1607

  Weake townes compound soone to saue them∣selues.
• * 1.1608

  Places of strēgth make the inha∣bitants obstina•…•….
• * 1.1609

  The inconueni∣ences of forts and citadels.
• * 1.1610

  Warre hatefull to God and 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.1611

  The subiect is not to be trained vp in armes.
• * 1.1612

  The inconueni∣ences not to haue fortresses.
• * 1.1613

  A towne vnfor∣tified, is a bait for an enemie.
• * 1.1614

  A communalty cannot be in safetie without some defence.
• * 1.1615

  Isadas punished for his rashnesse, and rewarded for his valour.
• * 1.1616

  Weake townes must •…•…eeld to the victors will
• * 1.1617

  A strong fort is oftentimes the ruine of the ene∣mies armie.
• * 1.1618

  Leo of Affrike.
• * 1.1619

  The realme of England thrice conquered.
• * 1.1620

  The Romans did alwayes fortifie their camps.
• * 1.1621

  A countrey vn∣fortified cannot long resist a strong 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.1622

  The cause makes the warre iust.
• * 1.1623

  War against an enemie, enter∣taines the sub∣iects in loue.
• * 1.1624

  Dion. Halicar. lib. 7. Liui•…•…s lib. 3.
• * 1.1625

  Ciuill warres the ruine of states.
• * 1.1626

  New hauen taken by the English caused the ciuill wars of Fraunce to cease.
• * 1.1627

  Rest the cause of ciuill ware in a warlike citie.
• * 1.1628

  The first occasi∣on to ruine the Roman empire.
• * 1.1629

  Armes the de∣fence of states.
• * 1.1630

  A meane to purge the Com∣monweale of va∣gabonds and idle persons.
• * 1.1631

  The martiall dis∣cipline of the Romans, was a schoole of ver∣tue.
• * 1.1632

  The praise of mi∣litarie discipline.
• * 1.1633

  The feare of ene∣mies keeps sub∣iects in awe.
• * 1.1634

  The prouidence of Scipio the younger.
• * 1.1635

  Wars allowed of God.
• * 1.1636

  The way to haue a peace, is to prepare for force
• * 1.1637

  A resolution of the question.
• * 1.1638

  In a Popular estate the subiects must be trayned vp in armes.
• * 1.1639

  In a Popular e∣state onely the capitall citie must be fortified
• * 1.1640

  Citadels not to be built in a Po∣pular estate.
• * 1.1641

  Citadels the cause of tyrants.
• * 1.1642

  Citadels more dangerous wher∣as few do gouern
• * 1.1643

  To fortifie the frontiers, is ac∣cording to the law of nature.
• * 1.1644

  Citadels in townes of strength, keepe the subiects from rebelling.
• * 1.1645

  Distrust of noble men in an Aristo craticall estate.
• * 1.1646

  Citadels not to be built in the chiefe citie of a Popular estate, nor in a Seig∣neurie.
• * 1.1647

  The Venetians do not practise arm•…•… in their Commonweale.
• * 1.1648

  Why the Vene∣tians neglected armes.
• * 1.1649

  Why the Vene∣tians imploy strangers in their warres.
• * 1.1650

  The seigneury of Venice most happy.
• * 1.1651

  The Venetians desire peace with their losse.
• * 1.1652

  A generous prince demands neither peace nor warre.
• * 1.1653

  Lewes the ele∣uenth reproched by his subiects for demaunding of a peace.
• * 1.1654

  Charles the se∣uenth demaunds a peace basely of the duke of Bourgongne.
• * 1.1655

  The Romans neuer demanded a peace of any but twice.
• * 1.1656

  The Romans of an vndaunted resolution.
• * 1.1657

  Itis no dishonor to submit in time of necessitie.
• * 1.1658

  When a prince should giue bat∣taile.
• * 1.1659

  A shew of cou∣rage doth many times daunt an enemie.
• * 1.1660

  The Romans could neuer be vanquished by honour, not by 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.1661

  A worthy an∣swere of Scipio.
• * 1.1662

  A prince may not hazard his estate vpon one victorie.
• * 1.1663

  The presence of the prince is of great conse∣quence to van∣•…•… an enemie.
• * 1.1664

  How a prince or Generall should carry himselfe in a battaile.
• * 1.1665

  It is daungerous to fight with a desp•…•…rat army.
• * 1.1666

  Necessitie of an inuincible force.
• * 1.1667

  No prince should fight a battaile, but constrained.
• * 1.1668

  Plut. in Gracchis.
• * 1.1669

  The Romans sought occasion of warre.
• * 1.1670

  Plut. in Phocione
• * 1.1671

  Plut. in Licurg.
• * 1.1672

  Herodot.
• * 1.1673

  In Phocione.
• * 1.1674

  Dion. lib. 53
• * 1.1675

  In forma Comi∣tiue, Written to the Gouernour of a Prouince.
• * 1.1676

  The entertain∣ment of legions, very necessarie in a state.
• * 1.1677

  Augustus kept fortie legions continually in pay.
• * 1.1678

  The inconueni∣ences, not to haue trained bands.
• * 1.1679

  It is good to haue mightie friends and allies in an equall league.
• * 1.1680

  Polibius and Liuie. The Romans cir∣cumuented their allies in Italy in their treaties.
• * 1.1681

  Forren force•…•… being the stron∣ger, make them∣selues maister•…•… ouer them that call them to their succours.
• * 1.1682

  The conclusion of the propositi∣on.
• * 1.1683

  Those which in∣habit in fertill countries, being enuironed by greedy enemies, haue need to bee warlike.
• * 1.1684

  Handicraftsmen vnfit for warre.
• * 1.1685

  Plantius Consul, •…•…pud 〈◊〉〈◊〉 li. 8
• * 1.1686

  A free people i•…•… neuer kept in subi•…•…ction, vn∣lesse they •…•…e dis∣armed.
• * 1.1687

  A Popular estat•…•… must either be wholly subie∣cted, or set at free libertie.
• * 1.1688

  Imperiall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 made▪ subiect vn∣der colour of protection.
• * 1.1689

  Hungary mad•…•… subiect vnder shadow of pro∣tection.
• * 1.1690

  The difference betwixt tribute and pension.
• * 1.1691

  Why the king of France gaue pen∣sion vnto the Swissers.
• * 1.1692

  The mighty are bound to defend the weake.
• * 1.1693

  It is dishonoura∣ble to abandon him you haue taken into pro∣tection.
• * 1.1694

  By the comman∣dement of pope Pius the fift.
• * 1.1695

  The Duke of Saxonie.
• * 1.1696

  The Lantgraue of Hesse.
• * 1.1697

  The Marquesse of Brandebourg.
• * 1.1698

  Those which are in protection haue need of greater securiti•…•… than the pro∣tector.
• * 1.1699

  The assurance of the league of protection.
• * 1.1700

  A league made with the father binds not the sonne.
• * 1.1701

  The client is freed from the protection, if the protector make any br•…•…ach.
• * 1.1702

  The league bro∣ken by the •…•…raud of the Athenians
• * 1.1703

  The cities of Greece subiected vnder colour of alliance.
• * 1.1704

  The cause of the sociall warre.
• * 1.1705

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 56.
• * 1.1706

  Macedonie made tributarie to the Romans.
• * 1.1707

  The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Romans victories
• * 1.1708

  Neutralitie is sometimes profi∣table.
• * 1.1709

  How a prince maintaines his greatnesse.
• * 1.1710

  Neutralitie is many times dan∣gerous.
• * 1.1711

  Liuius lib. 5.
• * 1.1712

  Neutralitie is oftentimes the ruine of princes.
• * 1.1713

  Iud. c. 18.
• * 1.1714

  The difference of neutralities.
• * 1.1715

  In what case one should be neuter
• * 1.1716

  Allies are some∣imes dangerous.
• * 1.1717

  It is honourable for great princes to be neuters.
• * 1.1718

  A generall league against the Ve∣netians.
• * 1.1719

  It is most safe for a neuter to mediat peace.
• * 1.1720

  It is honou∣rable for a prince to be an vmpire in other princes quarrels.
• * 1.1721

  Why many prin∣ces made a league against the emperour after the battaile of Pauia.
• * 1.1722

  It is dangerous to be neighbour to a mightie prince.
• * 1.1723

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 treaties the parties compre∣hended must be expresly named.
• * 1.1724

  A league against Fraunce.
• * 1.1725

  Plu•…•…. i•…•… Lisand.
• * 1.1726

  Faith betwixt allies must be kept.
• * 1.1727

  It is no disloial∣tie to breake an vnlawfull oath.
• * 1.1728

  A daungerous opinion in treaties.
• * 1.1729

  A resolute man cannot be forced
• * 1.1730

  The treatie of Madril.
• * 1.1731

  Treaties made by a prisoner may not be broken.
• * 1.1732

  An oath is need∣lesse where ho∣stages are taken.
• * 1.1733

  A prisoner taken in the war, being kept, may escape without 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.1734

  The French king defies the emperour.
• * 1.1735

  The king of England de∣fies him.
• * 1.1736

  Plu. in Epawi∣•…•…da.
• * 1.1737

  If •…•…aith be to be kept with ene∣mies of the faith
• * 1.1738

  L. conuentionum F. •…•…e Pactis.
• * 1.1739

  Faith must be kept with Pa∣gans and Idola∣ters.
• * 1.1740

  Faith is not to be kept with them that haue broken their faith.
• * 1.1741

  Periurie •…•…red by a new treatie, may not be re∣peated.
• * 1.1742

  Fra•…•…d circum∣u•…•…nted by fraud.
• * 1.1743

  Fear•…•… is o•…•…n∣times the cause of a breach.
• * 1.1744

  Feare cannot excuse periutie.
• * 1.1745

  What is to be obserued be∣twixt princes going to parle.
• * 1.1746

  In what sort ho∣stages are to bee giuen for a prince that i•…•… prisoner.
• * 1.1747

  The treacherous disposition of pope Alexander the sixt, and Cae∣sar Borgias his sonne.
• * 1.1748

  Treacherie paied with treachery.
• * 1.1749

  It is dishonoura∣ble for a prince to deale with theeues.
• * 1.1750

  A notable deed of the emperour Augustus.
• * 1.1751

  A prince giuing his faith to his subiects, must keepe it.
• * 1.1752

  Leo the tenth periured to be reuenged.
• * 1.1753

  Ambassadours cannot promise nor take assu∣rance from ano∣ther, without an especiall com∣mission.
• * 1.1754

  A new kind of oath.
• * 1.1755

  Philip Comines.
• * 1.1756

  Tacit. Lib. 4.
• * 1.1757

  In the historie of the Indies.
• * 1.1758

  If the prince bee disloyal, his oath is not to be re∣garded.
• * 1.1759

  The maner •…•… to capitulat b twixt the pi•…•… and the subie•…•…
• * 1.1760

  Meierus.
• * 1.1761

  In what case •…•… forren prince may take vpon him the protecti∣on of another princes subiects.
• * 1.1762

  When the vassal may free himself from his lord.
• * 1.1763

  1561.
• * 1.1764

  If one that is in league may suc∣cour him that is not allied a∣gainst his associ∣at, being wrong∣fully oppressed.
• * 1.1765

  A stranger is not to be succoured against an ally, vnlesse hee make himselfe a sub∣iect.
• * 1.1766

  The Roman le∣gat did appeale to their common confederats.
• * 1.1767

  Leagues must be limited to a cer∣taine time.
• * 1.1768

  Treaties betwixt the kings of France & Spaine
• * 1.1769

  The league be∣twixt the French and Scots.
• * 1.1770

  The treatie of Chambort.
• * 1.1771

  The princes of the empire in the protection of the king of Fraunce.
• * 1.1772

  Why Marquesse Albert was cal∣led Doctor.
• * 1.1773

  Liu. lib. 1. Decad. 1. 7. lib. 2. 8. lib. 7. 9. lib. 9.
• * 1.1774

  Liu. lib. 8.
• * 1.1775

  Liu. lib. 35.
• * 1.1776

  Liu. lib. 42.
• * 1.1777

  Tacit. lib. 5. Liu. lib. 36.
• * 1.1778

  The commendati∣on of censuring, or estimating the subiects estates.
• * 1.1779

  Censors vsed by the Greeks and Romans. Liu. ann•…•… 310▪ ab v. c.
• * 1.1780

  Caesar and Augu∣stus were both created Ceniors.
• * 1.1781

  Lustrum.
• * 1.1782

  Censors in effect created at Venice.
• * 1.1783

  Censors not to be wanted in a well ordred common∣weale.
• * 1.1784

  Num. 1. 2. 3. 4. 21. 26.
• * 1.1785

  The numbring of the people ap∣poynted by God.
• * 1.1786

  The number of the Israelites.
• * 1.1787

  Exod. 120
• * 1.1788

  The profit that may be gathered by the numbring of the people.
• * 1.1789

  A meanes to cut off sutes.
• * 1.1790

  The citisens estates are knowne by the Censors.
• * 1.1791

  The citisens order is knowne.
• * 1.1792

  It expels vaga∣bonds & idle per∣sons out of an estate.
• * 1.1793

  A means to equall the charges and imposts according to euery mans estate.
• * 1.1794

  A meanes to auoid concussion and fa∣uour in them that make deuision of the subiects.
• * 1.1795

  A notable answere of a Tribune.
• * 1.1796

  The Censor hate full to the wicked
• * 1.1797

  The opinion of the auntients tou∣ching Censors.
• * 1.1798

  The charge of the auntient Censors.
• * 1.1799

  The Censors re∣formers of abuses.
• * 1.1800

  The greatest viees are punished by the Censors.
• * 1.1801

  A necessarie rea∣son to confirme the Censors office.
• * 1.1802

  Commedies and playes pernitious to a common∣weale.
• * 1.1803

  Two meanes to maintaine a citie.
• * 1.1804

  The Censors ought to haue no iurisdiction.
• * 1.1805

  The Censors haue no power not iu∣risdiction.
• * 1.1806

  L. 1. de ijs qui n•…•…∣tant infam.
• * 1.1807

  A censure is no iudgement.
• * 1.1808

  Pro Cluentio▪
• * 1.1809

  Caesarin Coment▪
• * 1.1810

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 17.
• * 1.1811

  The pouertie and contempt of the ministers makes religion to bee contemned.
• * 1.1812

  Mony the sinewes of a Common∣weale.
• * 1.1813

  Polib. l. 6. de milit. ac domest. Rom. disciplino.
• * 1.1814

  War is not main∣tained by a diet.
• * 1.1815

  Seuen meanes to gather treasure.
• * 1.1816

  Reuenues the chiefest meanes to make a trea∣sure.
• * 1.1817

  The deuision of the lands about Rome.
• * 1.1818

  The first begin∣ning of publike rents.
• * 1.1819

  The publike reue∣nues by nature are inalienable.
• * 1.1820

  Nulla preseriptia occurrit Regi.
• * 1.1821

  Plut. in Catone Censorie, & The∣mist.
• * 1.1822

  L. si secundum C. de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Reip.
• * 1.1823

  The publike re∣•…•…nues and the princes patrimony differ.
• * 1.1824

  Asconius et vlp. in l. 2. §. hoc interdi∣ctum. Ne quid in loc•…•… pub.
• * 1.1825

  By the edict of Francis 1, in the yeare 1544.
• * 1.1826

  The great prei•…•…∣dice that comes by publike sales.
• * 1.1827

  The waste lands may be sold.
• * 1.1828

  7. May 1566.
• * 1.1829

  In the yeare 1559
• * 1.1830

  In the yeare 1572
• * 1.1831

  What the aliena∣tion of the reue∣nues of Fraunce amount vnto. A liure is two shillings.
• * 1.1832

  The reuenues of the realme of England. Herein the Author is deceeiued.
• * 1.1833

  In a popular state the reuenues are ill husbanded.
• * 1.1834

  The second means to gather treasure.
• * 1.1835

  The punishment of the vanquished.
• * 1.1836

  The great benefit which growes by Colonies.
• * 1.1837

  Pessimus diutur∣•…•… custos est metus.
• * 1.1838

  The Turks order to make many, & for the warre.
• * 1.1839

  The Emperors or∣der at Peru.
• * 1.1840

  The third meones to gather treasure.
• * 1.1841

  The magnificence of the Emperours of Turky.
• * 1.1842

  A good policie of the Rhodiots.
• * 1.1843

  Ioseph in anti•…•….
• * 1.1844

  Six kingdomes gi∣uen to the Ro∣mans by legacie.
• * 1.1845

  Voluntary gifts of the subiects.
• * 1.1846

  Seruice of Spaine.
• * 1.1847

  The reuenues of the realme of Per∣sia vnder the first Darius.
• * 1.1848

  The custome of Aethiopia.
• * 1.1849

  The fourth means to gather treasure.
• * 1.1850

  Who bee tribu∣taries.
• * 1.1851

  The difference of a pension and tribute.
• * 1.1852

  The Swissers pen∣sions came to 14000. pound sterling a yeare.
• * 1.1853

  21800 pound.
• * 1.1854

  12300 pound.
• * 1.1855

  Plut in Lisand▪ & Agesilao.
• * 1.1856

  Whereunto pensi∣oners are bound.
• * 1.1857

  4929 pound 4 shillings.
• * 1.1858

  Plut. in Pericl.
• * 1.1859

  The fift meanes to gather treasure.
• * 1.1860

  The traffike of the kings of Portugal
• * 1.1861

  The Gentlemen of Italie trade in marchandi•…•…e.
• * 1.1862

  The tyrannicall and ba e traf∣fique of king Alphonso.
• * 1.1863

  The most per∣nitious traffick.
• * 1.1864

  The sixt means to make money.
• * 1.1865

  Anno 1551. 1556.
• * 1.1866

  The mynes of Fraunce are ne∣uer wasted.
• * 1.1867

  Impost in Eng∣•…•…and vpon wine.
• * 1.1868

  No raw stuffs to be transported▪
• * 1.1869

  A trade forbid∣den to the sub∣iects, and allow∣ed to strangers, is the ruine of a countrey.
• * 1.1870

  The seuenth means to make money.
• * 1.1871

  The honestest means in time of publicke ne∣cessitie to make money.
• * 1.1872

  Ceassing vsed in old old time▪
• * 1.1873

  Liuius lib. 26.
• * 1.1874

  Detestable in∣uentions of a ty∣rant.
• * 1.1875

  Three kindes of impositions.
• * 1.1876

  •…•…. Lewis his te∣stament.
• * 1.1877

  No Prince can lay any subsidie vpon his sub∣iects without their consents.
• * 1.1878

  The beginning of the custome of salt.
• * 1.1879

  Liuius lib. 2.
• * 1.1880

  The tribute of the twentieth part most plea∣sing.
• * 1.1881

  The tenths of the subiects fruits was the first tribute.
• * 1.1882

  Inuenters of new impositi∣ons most com∣monly slaine.
• * 1.1883

  All Impositions are not to be a∣bolished.
• * 1.1884

  Abundance of gold and siluer hath made things deere.
• * 1.1885

  The great trea∣sure taken at thy Conquest of Peru.
• * 1.1886

  The Reuenewes of France vnder Charles 6. & 9.
• * 1.1887

  The Lord of Ieinuisle in the life of Lewis. 9.
• * 1.1888

  The reuenewes of Egypt vnder Ptolomie.
• * 1.1889

  The Turks re∣uenewes.
• * 1.1890

  The reuenewes of the Du•…•…e of Florence.
• * 1.1891

  The reuenewe•…•… of the Atheni∣ans.
• * 1.1892

  Plut▪ in Themist▪
• * 1.1893

  The French cō∣temne the com∣mon people.
• * 1.1894

  Taxes must be reall to ea •…•… the poore.
• * 1.1895

  Vniust distribu∣tion of subsidies in France.
• * 1.1896

  Not pennie far∣thing.
• * 1.1897

  Iauelleur or Gabelleur.
• * 1.1898

  What impost is most honoura∣ble, profitable, and necessarie.
• * 1.1899

  The wisedome of the emperor Augustus.
• * 1.1900

  An impost vpon sutes.
• * 1.1901

  The cause of many sutes in France.
• * 1.1902

  The extorsion of Caligula.
• * 1.1903

  Interdum & de vectigal.
• * 1.1904

  A soulz is not a pennie farthing.
• * 1.1905

  625000 pounds starling.
• * 1.1906

  In France there are but 27400 parishes.
• * 1.1907

  The aduise of Ierosme Laski for the heaping vp of treasure.
• * 1.1908

  The mounts of pietie •…•…n Italie honest and pro∣fitable.
• * 1.1909

  A commenda∣ble institution made by Anto∣ninus Pius.
• * 1.1910

  Tranquil. in August.
• * 1.1911

  A forfeiture of the double for∣bidden by the law. •…•…. pecun. de vsur.
• * 1.1912

  The ruine of princes is to take vp at inte∣rest.
• * 1.1913

  The originall of the banke of Lion.
• * 1.1914

  The Bashas of Turquie had money at inte∣restin the bank at Lion.
• * 1.1915

  The policie of Italian vsurers.
• * 1.1916

  Antient laws a∣gainst▪ Italian vsurers.
• * 1.1917

  The debts of king Henrie the second.
• * 1.1918

  The debts of Spaine.
• * 1.1919

  Means to assure the estate of a desperat prince.
• * 1.1920

  Means to em∣ploy the trea∣sure.
• * 1.1921

  The charity of the kings of Fraunce to the poore.
• * 1.1922

  The souldior must be payd to preuent all thefts and inso∣lencies.
• * 1.1923

  The benefit of reparations and fortifications.
• * 1.1924

  An infinit trea∣sure in the citie of Athens.
• * 1.1925

  Demosthenes in 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.1926

  Plut. in Pericle.
• * 1.1927

  Idlenesse se∣uerely punished
• * 1.1928

  A thousand mil∣lions of crowns.
• * 1.1929

  A tyrant builds with the bloud of his subiects.
• * 1.1930

  The strange prod•…•…galitie of Nero and Ca∣ligula.
• * 1.1931

  Articles of par∣ties casuall in the yeare 1572.
• * 1.1932

  A prince should haue a list of matters of state and of his chefe men.
• * 1.1933

  The diligence of Augustus.
• * 1.1934

  Good •…•…s a∣brogated.
• * 1.1935

  The reuocati∣on of excessiue g•…•… is necessa∣rie.
• * 1.1936

  Bounty not fit in a poore p•…•…ince.
• * 1.1937

  An infinit masse of money giuen to a woman.
• * 1.1938

  The bounty of great King Frauncis.
• * 1.1939

  Re•…•…nation of treasure.
• * 1.1940

  The treasure of the Romaines called Sanctius ac•…•…arium.
• * 1.1941

  The Turks trea∣s•…•….
• * 1.1942

  The means how to keepe trea∣sure.
• * 1.1943

  Isaie 30.
• * 1.1944

  Deut. 17.
• * 1.1945

  22. Paralip. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 1. The greatest treasure that euer was.
• * 1.1946

  The treasure of the Romaines.
• * 1.1947

  The reuenews of Fraunce vn∣der Charles the 5, 6, 7, Lewis the 11, and Charles the 8.
• * 1.1948

  Diminution of halfe the cha•…•…ge at the comming of Charles 8.
• * 1.1949

  The basenesse of Lewis the eleuenth in his apparell.
• * 1.1950

  Anno 1566. 20 Maie.
• * 1.1951

  The right of the offices of the chamber of ac∣counts.
• * 1.1952

  Erection of the chamber of ac∣counts.
• * 1.1953

  An offer made by the estates of▪ •…•…anguedoc, to king Henry th•…•… 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.1954

  A meane to make deceiuers true and iust.
• * 1.1955

  The order of the receit in Turkie.
• * 1.1956

  Daungerous to a state to alter the coine.
• * 1.1957

  The prince can∣not alter his coyne.
• * 1.1958

  Covnes should be simple with∣out any mixture.
• * 1.1959

  Archimides error in triall of mettals.
• * 1.1960

  Drachma Attica seuen pence starling.
• * 1.1961

  The French copy saith 8000.
• * 1.1962

  Fest. lib. 17. in verb. sestertius.
• * 1.1963

  18. lib. 10. sh.
• * 1.1964

  31. sh. 6. d. starling.
• * 1.1965

  A wonderfull masse to guild the Capitoll,
• * 1.1966

  8. lib. starling.
• * 1.1967

  16. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.1968

  A Liure is two shillings starling
• * 1.1969

  4. sh. 2. d. ob.
• * 1.1970

  Billon.
• * 1.1971

  25. Millions of Liures.
• * 1.1972

  Billon.
• * 1.1973

  Esc•…•…arcetes, & •…•…blages.
• * 1.1974

  Billon.
• * 1.1975

  28. sh. starling.
• * 1.1976

  Billon.
• * 1.1977

  Reasons for a Popular estate.
• * 1.1978

  Reasons against a Popular estate.
• * 1.1979

  A Popular e∣state condemned of many great men.
• * 1.1980

  The Grisons as∣sembled euery two yeares.
• * 1.1981

  A multitude is a∣mazed in danger.
• * 1.1982

  A multitude can∣not maintain•…•… a maiestie.
• * 1.1983

  The end of Po∣pular estates, is to banish vertue.
• * 1.1984

  Xenophon giues a true iudgement of a Popular estate.
• * 1.1985

  Impunitie of vice in a Popu∣lar estate.
• * 1.1986

  The most vertu∣ous are banished, and •…•…he wicked escape, in a Po∣pular estate.
• * 1.1987

  Popular estates exceed in all li∣centiousnesse.
• * 1.1988

  Pericles and Lau▪ rence de Medicis, Monarchs of Athens, and Flo∣rence.
• * 1.1989

  A Popular estate is preserued by a few wisemen.
• * 1.1990

  Corruptions common in Po∣pula•…•… estates.
• * 1.1991

  The reasons why the Swissers▪ maintaine their Popular estate.
• * 1.1992

  Bias.
• * 1.1993

  Taking away the proprietie of goods, we ouer∣throw a Com∣monweale.
• * 1.1994

  Wisdome is not equ•…•…ll in all men, to impart offices equally.
• * 1.1995

  A rule in Popu∣lar states.
• * 1.1996

  An error in equalitie.
• * 1.1997

  All nations haue need one of another.
• * 1.1998

  Equalitie and friendship are incompatible.
• * 1.1999

  A Popular estate a pernitious ty∣ranny, i•…•… not wisely gouerned.
• * 1.2000

  Generall assem∣blies are dange∣rous in Popular estates.
• * 1.2001

  Reasons for an Aristocraticall estate.
• * 1.2002

  The gouernment of a Common∣weale must be giuen to them that haue the most interest in the preseruation thereof.
• * 1.2003

  Many comman∣ders, cause many factions.
• * 1.2004

  Those Aristo∣craticall estates most durable, that haue fewest lords.
• * 1.2005

  No councell in any estate hath any power to command.
• * 1.2006

  Platoes argu∣ment captious.
• * 1.2007

  The estate of few lords, is the estate of •…•…ew ty∣rants.
• * 1.2008

  In all colledges, corporations, & states, the grea∣test number car∣ries it.
• * 1.2009

  Anno. 1543. The princes spirituall of the empire, are more in number than the temporall.
• * 1.2010

  The cause that doth most ruine Aristocraticall estates.
• * 1.2011

  The comman∣ders in an Ari∣stocraticall estate are in continuall feare and distrust
• * 1.2012

  How the estate of Venice 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bene preserued.
• * 1.2013

  Gianot. Donat. de Repub. Vene•…•….
• * 1.2014

  Anno. 1506. The estate of Genes, and the change thereof.
• * 1.2015

  The cause of fa∣ctions at Genes.
• * 1.2016

  The ground and support of an Optimacie.
• * 1.2017

  The best kind of Optimacie.
• * 1.2018

  The discommo∣dities of a Mo∣narchie.
• * 1.2019

  Plato lib. 4. de Legib. Mutati•…•…∣nes in republica putat esse 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.2020

  Isaie. cap. 5.
• * 1.2021

  The tutors to Monarchs do of∣tentimes make thmselues abso∣lute Lords.
• * 1.2022

  Plutar. in Licur.
• * 1.2023

  Po•…•…ib. lib. 7.
• * 1.2024

  Soueraigntie al∣tereth the h•…•… mors of princes.
• * 1.2025

  Comparison of dangers.
• * 1.2026

  Commodities of a Monarchie.
• * 1.2027

  In Popular and Aristocraticall estates the les∣ser part is always ouerruled by the g•…•…eater, the which is contrarie in a Monarchie.
• * 1.2028

  Liuie lib. 3. Lib. 2. Lib. 7. Lib. 4.
• * 1.2029

  Li•…•…is lib. 22.
• * 1.2030

  Lib. 6.
• * 1.2031

  Lib. 5.
• * 1.2032

  Li•…•…e lib. 2.
• * 1.2033

  Dionys. Hali•…•…. lib. 6.
• * 1.2034

  Plurium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bell•…•… 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vtil•…•….
• * 1.2035

  An antient opi∣nion of the Affri∣c•…•….
• * 1.2036

  Plut. in Aristid•…•….
• * 1.2037

  One soueraigne commander most necessarie.
• * 1.2038

  Aliud est consu∣lere aliud imp•…•…∣rare.
• * 1.2039

  One body can∣not haue many heads.
• * 1.2040

  The lawes of ho∣nour are in grea∣ter recommenda∣tiō to a Monarch than to a multi∣tude.
• * 1.2041

  Many gouernors hinder on•…•… ano∣ther.
• * 1.2042

  A Monarchie is naturall.
• * 1.2043

  Anno. 1552.
• * 1.2044

  Examples of the greatest Monar∣chies of the world.
• * 1.2045

  Sueton. in August
• * 1.2046

  Sam. 1. 12. Deut. 33.
• * 1.2047

  Nehem. 10.
• * 1.2048

  Sam. 2. c. 12.
• * 1.2049

  A Monarchy al∣lowed by the law of God.
• * 1.2050

  Lib. •…•…. c. 6. antiq.
• * 1.2051

  Ioseph. de antiq. lib. •…•…4. c. 5.
• * 1.2052

  A tyrant is insup∣portable that hath escaped any •…•…nspiracie.
• * 1.2053

  The subiects are happy vnder a great Monarch.
• * 1.2054

  What Royal •…•…o∣narchie is best.
• * 1.2055

  This question was indeed then in Oxford dispu∣ted, & the right of succession no∣tably defended, and before electi∣on preferred.
• * 1.2056

  To possesse the people with •…•…n opinion, that haue the•…•… king by election, is better than to haue him by suc∣cession, a thing most dangerous vnto soueraigne princes.
• * 1.2057

  Most people to haue had their kings by successi on, rather than by election, con∣trary vnto the o∣pinion of Aristotle.
• * 1.2058

  Psal. 113.
• * 1.2059

  Great daungers incident vnto an estate or king∣dome, where the king or other •…•…o∣ueraigne prince, is to be chosen by election.
• * 1.2060

  The great disor∣ders in Rome, in the vacancie of the papacie, and before the new pope be chosen.
• * 1.2061

  No lesse dange∣rous in the va∣cancy of a king∣dome, to make choyce of a soue∣raigne gouernor than of a king himselfe.
• * 1.2062

  Many popes flaine or poiso∣ned, about their election.
• * 1.2063

  Why the choyce of bishops, and ecclesiasticall prese•…•…ments was taken from the people.
• * 1.2064

  The publike de∣maine most com monly dissipated or embeseled by princes electiue.
• * 1.2065

  Nothing more intollerable than a man of base degree suddenly mounted vp vnto great honor.
• * 1.2066

  Another great in∣conuenience a∣bout the election of soueraigne princes.
• * 1.2067

  No accord where euery man would be a lord.
• * 1.2068

  The imperiall crowne of diuers▪ strange princes refused.
• * 1.2069

  A strange king∣dome hard to be gouerned by lieu∣tenants or depu∣ties.
• * 1.2070

  Charles the fift about to haue made his sonne Philip king of Germanie.
• * 1.2071

  Kingdomes ele∣ctiug oftentimes changed into hereditarie.
• * 1.2072

  The Hungarians for the mainte∣nance of their electiue right now fallen into the perpetuall sernitude and sla∣•…•… •…•…f the Turk.
• * 1.2073

  Princes by ele∣ction created still to be in great danger.
• * 1.2074

  Diuerse electiu•…•… emperours and princes murth•…•…∣red, or els shame∣fully deposed.
• * 1.2075

  No assurance in the estate where the succ•…•…ssion is not established.
• * 1.2076

  The great care the good Roman emperours had for the certainti•…•… of the succession, lest after their death the empire should fall into the dangers en∣suing vpon ele∣ction.
• * 1.2077

  Great regard had of succession, e∣uen in kingdoms going by electi∣on.
• * 1.2078

  Kingdomes go∣ing by succession how they some∣times fall into election.
• * 1.2079

  The dutchie of Milan dismem∣bred the line of the visecounties of the house of Anglerie failing.
• * 1.2080

  Whether the last of the royall stocke may by right adopt vnto himselfe his suc∣cessor.
• * 1.2081

  About what time the seuen princes electors were first appointed for the choice of the em∣perour. The error of thē which haue thought the kingdome of France to haue in antient time gone by election, reiected.
• * 1.2082

  The antient manner of the coronation of the kings of France.
• * 1.2083

  The archbishops of Rheims pre∣tend to haue the choyce of the French kings.
• * 1.2084

  This Iewes is r•…•…her to •…•…e cal∣le•…•… C•…•…o ioue•…•…s, other•…•…se in •…•…n∣tient ti•…•… called H•…•…ndwich.
• * 1.2085

  How it is to be vnderstood. That the king ne∣uer d•…•…eth.
• * 1.2086

  Election no l•…•…sse daungerous vnto the electors, than v•…•…o the kings and soueraigne princes them∣selues so elected.
• * 1.2087

  Election of prin∣ces b•…•…tter to bee made by some few, than by many.
• * 1.2088

  The strait order obserued in chu∣sing the Grand Master of the knights of Malta
• * 1.2089

  Euill men more commonly pre∣ferred than the good, where men are by election promoted.
• * 1.2090

  A good meanes, the line of Mo∣narchs failing, to preuent the dan∣gers still atten∣ding vpon e∣lection.
• * 1.2091

  Some kings first chosen by lot, & yet their children to haue obtained their kingdomes as by a successiue right.
• * 1.2092

  The successiue right of the el∣dest sonne, com∣mon to al people
• * 1.2093

  Great troubles to haue still arisen, where the natu∣rall successiue right of the el∣dest hath bene violated, and the yonger brother preferred.
• * 1.2094

  Great murders & ciuill warres to haue ensued, for hauing preferred the yonger bro∣ther before the elder.
• * 1.2095

  Deut. 21. The elder bro∣ther euen by the law of God to be preferred before the yonger.
• * 1.2096

  A notable example.
• * 1.2097

  Whether a king∣dome ought to descend vnto the yonger sonne borne whilest his father was king: or to the elder, borne before his father had obtai∣ned the king∣dome.
• * 1.2098

  Whether the el∣der brothers son (his father being dead before he was king) be•…•… to succeed into his grandfathers kingdome before his vncle, his grandfathers yonger sonne.
• * 1.2099

  Liuius li. 38.
• * 1.2100

  The manner and order of the suc∣cession of the kingdome of Moscouie.
• * 1.2101

  Reasons for the succession of the nephew before his vncle.
• * 1.2102

  Reasons for the succession of the vncle before his nephew.
• * 1.2103

  Esay. 3.
• * 1.2104

  That a kingdom how great soeuer is not to be diui∣ded, but to be wholly giuen to one without partition.
• * 1.2105

  Three things of great consequēce ordained for the maintainance of the kingdome of France in the greatnesse therof.
• * 1.2106

  A Monarchy di∣uided, no more▪ to be accounted a Monarchy.
• * 1.2107

  To diuide a kingdome, a thing dangerous
• * 1.2108

  How the diuision of kingdoms may be borne.
• * 1.2109

  That a new con∣quered kingdom with all the soue raigne rights thereof, is better left wholly vnto one, than to be diuided among•…•… many.
• * 1.2110

  How the kings younger sonnes are prouided for in Fraunce.
• * 1.2111

  The reason why women inherit not land▪ by thei•…•… auncestors des∣cending vnto them, which lands sometime belonged vnto the crowne of Fraunce.
• * 1.2112

  Great kingdome and monarchies, not to be with any safetie diui∣ded into many.
• * 1.2113

  Soueraigntie ad∣mitteth no part∣nership.
• * 1.2114

  Places of too much power and command, not to be committed vnto princes of the blood, or o∣therwise great lords.
• * 1.2115

  A right strange custome vsed a∣mong the Aethiopians.
• * 1.2116

  Master of the for∣ces, master of the estate.
• * 1.2117

  That a Monar∣chy, in the opini∣on of the author ought to descend onely vnto the heires male.
• * 1.2118

  Genes. 3.
• * 1.2119

  Esay. 8.
• * 1.2120

  This French opi nion is by the examples of ma∣ny worthy wo∣men, and experi∣ence of their most happy gouern∣ments so fully refelled, as that there needeth no further reasons to be vsed, to proue the contrary.
• * 1.2121

  All these dangers with many mo incident vnto womens soue∣raigntie, are and haue bene right well auoided and preuented, by the wisedom of wor∣thy women, who with no lesse dis∣cretion▪ than ma∣ny men, haue maintained the maiestie of their soueraigntie, with the reputa∣tion of their sexe.
• * 1.2122

  What▪ so is good in publike, is al∣wayes good in particular.
• * 1.2123

  The euill exam∣ples of some few ought not to bee preiudiciall vnto others that be good.
• * 1.2124

  The kingdoms of Hungarie, Po∣lonia, Sweden, Norway, & Den∣marke, Castile, Arragon, Na∣uatie, and Eng∣land, to haue fal∣len into Gyneco∣craty, or womens soueraigntie.
• * 1.2125

  But what trou∣bles ensued vp∣on this intrusion of Stephen, and the wrongfull excluding of Maud, the Croni •…•…les will declare.
• * 1.2126

  The inconueni∣ences by the au∣thor supposed to ensue of a Gyne∣cocratie, or wo∣mens soue∣raigntie.
• * 1.2127

  The gre•…•…e daun∣gers strange prin ces commanding in a straunge countrey, are still exposed vnto.
• * 1.2128

  Small occasions serue to stirre vp the natural peo∣ple of any coun∣trey against strangers dwel∣ling amongst them.
• * 1.2129

  Neighbor princes iealous of the marriage o•…•… a so∣ueraign princesse their neighbour.
• * 1.2130

  Women com∣monly more cu∣rious in choice of their husbands, than are men in choyce of their wiues.
• * 1.2131

  The beginning of womens soueraigntie.
• * 1.2132

  Representation is▪ when diuers children together represent their dead fathers per∣son, and so in his right, together with their vncles succeed into their grandfa∣thers inheritance
• * 1.2133

  Poore French shifts, for the a∣uouching and proofe of the Sa∣lique law.
• * 1.2134

  Iustice the foun∣dation of all Commonweales:
• * 1.2135

  That a Royall Monarchy ought to be knit toge∣ther with a cer∣tains kind of mixture of the Aristocratike & Popular gouern∣ment, the royalty yet s•…•…anding whole and pure, without any mixture of those estates.
• * 1.2136

  The definition of Iustice.
• * 1.2137

  Plato couertly by Xenophon re∣proued, for ap∣pointing his Commonweale to be gouerned by Geometricall Proportion.
• * 1.2138

  Harmonicall Iustice of all others the best.
• * 1.2139

  Three kinds of proportion▪ Proportion Geo∣metricall, 3, 9, 27, 81. Proportion A∣rithmeticall, 3, 9, 15, 21, 27. Proportion Har∣monicall, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12.
• * 1.2140

  The difference betwixt Geome∣tricall and Arith∣meticall propor∣tion.
• * 1.2141

  The Geometrical gouernment of an estate.
• * 1.2142

  The gouernment of an estate by A∣rithmeticall pro∣portion.
• * 1.2143

  The gouernment according vnto the Geometricall or Arithmeticall proportion hurt∣full, the one vnto the common peo∣ple, and the other vnto the nobili∣ty: whereas the Harmonicall go∣uernment preser∣ueth both the one and the other.
• * 1.2144

  The wonderfull curiositie of the Germans, in the marriage of the nobilitie.
• * 1.2145

  Harmonical pro∣portion good to be in marriage obserued, and so likewise in the gouernment of the whole Com∣monweale.
• * 1.2146

  Harmonical pro∣portion declared by the order to be kept in a feast.
• * 1.2147

  Scipio blamed for hauing vsed the Geometricall proportion in the placing of the Senators in the Theater.
• * 1.2148

  Loue the founda∣tion of all hu∣mane societies, not to be preser∣ued by Geome∣tricall, or Arith∣meticall, but by Harmonical pro∣portion of iustice
• * 1.2149

  The equall go∣uernment of A∣rithmeticall pro∣portion▪ b•…•…st fitteth Popular estates.
• * 1.2150

  The Geometrical proportion best to agree with the Aristocraticall
• * 1.2151

  The Law. 4. The Ex∣ecution of the Law. 8.
• * 1.2152

  Equi∣tie. 6. The Of∣fice of the Iudge. •…•…2.
• * 1.2153

  Geometricall or Arithmeticall gouernment a∣lone, n•…•… fit meane •…•…o maintaine a Commonweale.
• * 1.2154

  A fit comparison
• * 1.2155

  Harmonicall Iu∣stice compoun∣ded of Arithme∣ticall and Geo∣metrical propor∣tion of gouern∣ment, best for the preseruation of a Commonweale.
• * 1.2156

  Lawes necessarie for the good go∣uernment of a Commonweale, although the prince be neuer so wise or vertu∣ous.
• * 1.2157

  No mention of law, before the law of God was giuen.
• * 1.2158

  The first occasi∣on of the ma∣king of lawes▪
• * 1.2159

  Laws hatefull vnto the rich and mightie.
• * 1.2160

  Nothing more contrary vnto the minds & pro∣ceedings of fa∣uourable or cor∣rupt judges, than to haue their iudgements bound vnto the strictnesse of the law.
• * 1.2161

  The good conn∣cell of Accursius vnto vnlearned judges.
• * 1.2162

  How euen the meanest judges may haue power to iudge accor∣ding to the equi∣tie of the cause without law.
• * 1.2163

  Many things in iudgements law∣full for the grea∣ter magistrats or judges, which are not lawfull for the lesser.
• * 1.2164

  The judgebound vnto the verie words of the law, is not yet therby embarred to vse the equitie of the law or yet the resonable exposition therof
• * 1.2165

  That the magi∣strat ought not to breake the law although it seem vnto him hard.
• * 1.2166

  To whome it be∣longeth to cor∣rect the law.
• * 1.2167

  The magistrat to be in the power of the law, so as is equitie in the power of the magistrat.
• * 1.2168

  Why so many things are by the wise lawmakers left vnto the con∣science and dis∣cretion of the judge.
• * 1.2169

  How it commeth to passe, that euen contrarie or most vnlike iudgemēts may be giuen of the same or verie like cases, and yet both iust.
• * 1.2170

  That the reasons of lawes and iudgements ought not to bee vnto them ioined
• * 1.2171

  Few laws made by the auncient lawmakers.
• * 1.2172

  Moe lawes, moe suits, and moe fees.
• * 1.2173

  The Frenchmen much giuen to suits in law.
• * 1.2174

  The cause of the multitude of suits in Fraunce
• * 1.2175

  No reasons anne∣xed vnto the untient lawes.
• * 1.2176

  By lawes to pro∣uide for all in∣conueniences, a thing impossible▪
• * 1.2177

  Many degrees of extraordinary power, by the prince gran•…•…ted vnto the magi∣strat.
• * 1.2178

  Not lawful for a∣ny man in iudge∣ment to swarue from equitie and conscience.
• * 1.2179

  Whether a prince or magistrat may be iudge of a fact the truth thereof beeing vnto none other knowne but vnto them∣selues alone.
• * 1.2180

  The exposition of the law, to whom it was by the law of God reserued.
• * 1.2181

  The exposition of the lawes, and the deciding of most high and difficult causes both in Asia and Afrike, reserued vnto the Maho∣•…•…tan Priest.
• * 1.2182

  Arithmeticall Iu∣stice vnfit to bee vsed euen in pri∣uat iudgements.
• * 1.2183

  Geometricall pro portion of iustice in publike or pe∣nall iudgements, not to be ad∣mitted.
• * 1.2184

  An obiection a∣gainst Arithme∣ticall proportion in exacting of fines.
• * 1.2185

  Harmonical pro∣portion of iu∣stice best.
• * 1.2186

  Nothing more vniust, than the perpetuall equa∣litie of fines and punishments.
• * 1.2187

  Geometrical pro∣portion of iustice not possible to be kept in the ma∣king of penall lawes.
• * 1.2188

  Arithmeticall e∣qualitie in the appointing of penalties, vnrea∣sonable and vniust.
• * 1.2189

  The qualitie and condition of the person to be in the making o•…•… penall lawes, and inflicting of pu∣nishments much respected.
• * 1.2190

  Geometricall pr•…•… po•…•…tion of puni∣shing, common almost vnto all people.
• * 1.2191

  Aristotle his opi∣nion concerning the execution of Geometricall and Arithmeticall Iu∣stice, reiected.
• * 1.2192

  Nobilitie in pe∣nalties to be in∣flicted, fauoured euen for the ver∣tues of their aun∣cestors: and the iniuries vnto them done, more seuerely punished
• * 1.2193

  Hanging the most shamefull death, heading the easiest, sto∣ning the most grieuous.
• * 1.2194

  Noble man for treason against their soueraigne prince, why to be more seuerely pu∣nished than other meaner persons.
• * 1.2195

  The noble man for his offence hauing lost his honour and repu∣tation, to be as grieuously puni∣shed, as the com∣mon person that is whipt.
• * 1.2196

  He which offen∣de•…•…h in his owne vocation, or in such things as wherewith he is put in trust, to be therefore more seuerely punished than other offen∣ding in the same.
• * 1.2197

  Harmonicall Iu∣stice to be indeed vnto all men in∣different, howbe∣it that at the first shew it seeme more fauourable vnto some than vnto others.
• * 1.2198

  Fines often∣times to be chan∣ged, according vnto the varietie of times and places.
• * 1.2199

  A crowne was then as much worth as the Ro•…•…e noble is now. Who was by the auntient Roman lawes to be ac∣counted a poore man.
• * 1.2200

  The insolency of Neratius, the cause why the lawes of iniuries were changed in Rome.
• * 1.2201

  Demades at A∣thens wilfully transgres•…•…eth the law, and pai•…•…th the fine.
• * 1.2202

  Penalties & fines sometimes chan∣ged into corpo∣rall and capitall punishments, and why.
• * 1.2203

  Why women are more fauourably to be punished than men.
• * 1.2204

  The iniquitie of the Venetian law in the punishing of women.
• * 1.2205

  All lawes carry∣ing with them penalties certain, which may not •…•…y the judge or magistrat be in some sort mode∣rated or aggraua∣ted, to be vniust.
• * 1.2206

  The false witne•…•…▪ how he is by the law of •…•…od to b•…•… punished.
• * 1.2207

  The wise law of Adrian the em∣perour.
• * 1.2208

  Offences how they are to be weighed and punished.
• * 1.2209

  Iudges and Phi∣losophers diuers∣ly do consider offences.
• * 1.2210

  Arithmeticall Iu∣stice not to be vsed in the puni∣shing of offences
• * 1.2211

  The vnreasonable law of the Vene∣tians for the pu∣nishing of thef•…•….
• * 1.2212

  Equalitie of pu∣nishment for vn∣equall offences, the occasion to ha•…•…s the greater offences com∣mitted.
• * 1.2213

  An vnreasonable law for the puni∣shing of murder.
• * 1.2214

  Hainou•…•… offences to deserue more grieuous punish∣ments.
• * 1.2215

  Open offences to be openly puni∣shed.
• * 1.2216

  Arithmeticall e∣qualitie in the administration of iustice, and the punishing of of∣fences, the cause of great iniustice▪
• * 1.2217

  That the punish∣ment ought to be equall vnto the offence done.
• * 1.2218

  How the words of the law, A tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, and an eye for an eye, are to be vn∣derstood.
• * 1.2219

  Exod. 21.
• * 1.2220

  Arithmeticall proportion of iu∣stice not indiffe∣rent in punishing of persons of con dition and quali∣tie farre vnequall.
• * 1.2221

  Arithmetical pro∣portion of iustice not to be admit∣ted euen in meere ciuill cau•…•….
• * 1.2222

  Aistotle impug∣ned for saying, no regard ought to be had, whether the offendor we•…•…e before the offence committed, good or bad.
• * 1.2223

  Arithmeticall Iu∣stice to faile euen in meere ciuill causes.
• * 1.2224

  Harmonicall Iu∣stice to h•…•…ue place when que∣stion is bu•…•… of priua•…•… mens right and interest as well as when question is of pe∣nalti•…•… and fi•…•…es.
• * 1.2225

  That which tou∣cheth euery pri∣uat mans right & how farre it con∣cerneth him, is not possible to be set downe in law, but better to be left vnto the dis∣cretion of the judge.
• * 1.2226

  Arithmetical pro∣portion of iustice not alwayes ob∣serued euen in particular con∣tracts and con∣uentions, wherein it is yet best of all to be liked.
• * 1.2227

  Harmonicall pro∣portion to be v∣sed by the iudges euen in taking of their fees.
• * 1.2228

  Arithmetical pro∣portion most ne∣cessarie to be ob∣serued in the whole gouern∣ment of the Commonweale.
• * 1.2229

  Harmonical pro∣portion of iustice euen by the law of God obserued in the conferring of inheritance, & inflicting of pu∣nishments.
• * 1.2230

  The Aristocra∣tique and Popu∣lar estates, not to be maintained by Geometricall or Arithmeticall iu∣stice, without a mixture of Har∣monicall iustice also.
• * 1.2231

  The estate of Ve∣nice Aristocra∣tique, and the go∣uernment for most part Harmo∣nicall.
• * 1.2232

  That the estate of a Commonweale may be of one sort, and yet the maner of gouern∣ment of another.
• * 1.2233

  The Royall estate Harmonically gouerned, to be the fairest, the happiest, and most perfect.
• * 1.2234

  A Royall estate, and yet gouerned Popularly and according to Arithmeticall proportion.
• * 1.2235

  A Royall estate gouerned Aristo∣cratically, and according to Ge∣ometricall pro∣portion.
• * 1.2236

  Geometrical pro∣portion in distri∣buting of offices, not good.
• * 1.2237

  The reasons why the Consuls and Tribunes were alwayes at discord in Rome.
• * 1.2238

  The Royal estate gouerned H•…•…rmo nically, the s•…•…rest and most perfect.
• * 1.2239

  Iustice better ad∣ministred by ma∣gistrats of diuers sort & condition, than by men all of one estate and degree.
• * 1.2240

  Diuers sorts of deserts, and that vertuous men onely are not to be preferred vnto the honourable places and char∣ges of the Com∣monweale.
• * 1.2241

  Vnworthy per∣sons not alwayes to be excluded from certaine of∣fices and places of commaund in the Cōmonweale.
• * 1.2242

  The order of the three estates in a well ordered Commonweale.
• * 1.2243

  The well ordered Commonweale in some sort figu∣re deuen in the nature of man himselfe.
• * 1.2244

  Ionas the last, and Psal. 49.
• * 1.2245

  One soueraigne prince alwayes most necessarie in a Commonweale
• * 1.2246

  That the bad are to be mingled with the good, for the making of a good Harmo∣nicall proportion in a Cōmonweale
• * 1.2247

  The three daugh∣ters of Themis to represent the three proportions of Iustice.
• * 1.2248

  The world to bee made and gouer∣ned also by Mar∣monicall, and not by Geometricall proportion, con∣trarie to the opi∣nion of Plato.
• * 1.2249

  •…•…en. 1.
• * 1.2250

  The Harmonical bond wherewith the world and the parts thereof are indissolubly bound and vni∣ted together.
• * 1.2251

  Almightie God in the gouernmēt of the world, to be of all worldly princes imitated in the gouern∣ment of their e∣states and king∣domes.