The six bookes of a common-weale. VVritten by I. Bodin a famous lawyer, and a man of great experience in matters of state. Out of the French and Latine copies, done into English, by Richard Knolles

THE FOVRTH BOOKE [ F] [ G] OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEALE.

CHAP. I. ¶ Of the rising, encreasing, flourishing estate, declining, and ruine of Commonweales.

ALl Commonweales take their beginning either from a Fa∣milie, [ H] * 1.1 by little and little encreasing; or els arise at once, as when a multitude of people as a Colony drawne out of ano∣ther Citie or Commonweale, doe as a young swarme of bees fly abroad vnto another place: or as a slip or science pluckt off from a tree, and planted in a straunge soyle, which taking root, bringeth forth much more plentifull and plea∣sant fruit, than doe those trees which grow vp of small ker∣nels, or of their owne accord, Yet both the one and the other of these Commonweales, are established either by the strength of some stronger [ I] than themselues, or by the power of some others, who voluntarily had subiected them∣selues together with their libertie, vnto the power and pleasure of others, to be by them disposed of, as by a soueraigne power without any law at all, or else vpon certaine laws and conditions betwixt them agreed vpon. So the Commonweale hauing taken be∣ginning if it be well rooted and grounded, first assureth it selfe against al externall force, and then against the inward diseases of it self, and so by little & little gathering strength, groweth vp vntill it be come to the full perfection of it selfe: which wee may call the Flourishing estate thereof; which cannot be of any long continuance, by reason of the* 1.2 chaunges of worldly things, which are so mutable and vncertaine, as that the greatest Commonweales oftentimes fall euen all at once with the weight of themselues, some [ K] others by ciuill warres, some by popular diseases, but most by the enemies violence, be∣ing as then ruinated, when as they thought themselues most assured: other some by the wrath of God, being vpon the sudden, and in a moment ouerthrowne: some few by age growing old, and by their inward sicknesse taking end. But yet no Common∣weales, finding or feeling greater chaunges or falles than the fairest of them: which for all that, are not in that to be blamed, especially if the change or alteration come by any externall force, as most commonly it chaunceth, the fairest things being still the most enuied at. And as Demetrius (he which was called the Besieger) deemed no man more happy, than him who had longest quietly liued in the greatest aboundance of al things,

neuer hauing tasted of aduersitie, as a man by fortune deemed most abiect and vnwor∣thie, [ A] with whom shee should contend or striue: so we see some Commonweales so shamefully buried in pleasures and idlenes, or else so to be corrupted, as that they might well moue any man rather to pitie then to enuie at their state. Wherefore the risings and ruines of the Commonweales are well of vs to be considered, and what the causes be of euery such their conuersion and change before that we giue iudgement of them, or propound them as examples to be imitated and followed. Now I call that a Con∣uersion* 1.3 of a Commonweale, when as the state thereof is altogether chaunged: as when a Popular estate is changed into a Monarchie; or an Aristocratie into a Demo∣cratie; or contrarywise: For as for the change of customes, lawes, religion, or place, it is but a certaine kind of alteration, the state and soueraigntie continuing still: which [ B] may also to the contrarie it selfe be changed, without any change of religion, or lawes, or any other things else, besides them which belong vnto soueraigntie. As when in our time the Florentine popular estate was changed into a Monarchie. Neither is the age or continuance of a Commonweale to be measured by the long standing of a ci∣tie, or of the walles thereof, as Paulus Manutius seemeth to haue done: who writeth* 1.4 the Venetian Commonweale that now is, to haue stood twelue hundred yeares; which hath yet suffered three changes, as we shall forthwith declare. Sometime it hap∣neth also no change either of the citie, or of the citisens, of the customes, or religion to be made, or any other force offered, or wrong done to any man; and yet that the state may perish: as when any soueraigne prince willingly subiecteth himselfe, his king∣dome, [ C] and people vnto the power and obeysance of some other Prince, or else by his testament appointeth some popular Commonweale inheritour of his State and king∣dome: As is reported of Attalus king of Asia; of Coctius king of Alpes; of Ptolaemee* 1.5 king of Cyrenae; of Eumenes king of Pergamus; of Nicomedes king of Bithynia; of Polemon king of Pontus, who left the people of Rome heires of those so many their kingdomes: for then those kingdomes were quite taken away, and those Common∣weales brought into the forme of Prouinces, and no change made of their Monar∣chies into a popular Estate. And so contrariwise, if of one or many cities or prouinces* 1.6 be made one or manie Monarchies or popular estates diuided in soueraigntie, that is not to be accounted any conuersion or change, but euen a verie beginning of diuers [ D] new Commonweales: As when the countrie of the Swissers and the Grisons reuol∣ted from the Germaine Empire, they became eighteene Commonweals, euery one of them holding their estates (diuided from the other) in soueraigntie. Sometime also of two is made one and the same Commonweale: as were the Romans and the Sabines, their two kings and people being in the same power and league ioyned and comby∣ned together, neither of them subiect vnto the Lawes or commaund of the other; but with equall power both of them growing together into the same citie. And lest the Sabines so ioyned vnto the Romans should haue seemed to haue accrewed vnto ano∣ther mans kingdome, it pleased them that the names of both the people being taken away or suppressed, they should be called Quirites, which name the Magistrates in [ E] their orations vnto the people euer after vsed: Albeit that Romulus (who because he would not seeme to endure a fellow in the kingdome with him, had not spared his owne brother) caused Tatius king of the Sabines not long after to bee also slaine: wherefore the Sabines Commonweale so perished not, either accrewed vnto the Ro∣maines (as some haue beene of opinion) albeit that other people called them neither Sabines, nor Quirites, but Romans: For that that name once giuen vnto the Citie and the people, could neuer more be changed; or for that the name of the Romans was more stately; or else for that those two people so grew together within the wals

of Rome, yet so as that the one became not subiect vnto the other: as it chanceth [ F] when the one being vanquished, yeeldeth it selfe vnto the other, and so suffereth the lawes of the vanquisher. Which may serue for the disciding of the question of Cune•…•…u the lawier, who doubteth, Whither the subiects of the one Commonweale, if they be ioyned into one and the selfe same bodie with the subiects of another Common∣wealth, be thereby the subiects of them with whom they are so ioyned: which thing Bartholus denieth; and for example thereof alleageth Raimond Countie of Toulouse, not erring indeed in his resolution of the question, but in the example by him produ∣ced, not hauing good regard vnto the treatie made betwixt the Countie and the estates of Languedoc of the one part, and Lewes the ix the French king on the other part, wherin it was comprised, That the only daughter of the countie Raymond should [ G] be espoused to Alphonsus countie of Poitiers, the kings brother, with condition, that if they died without heires of their bodies lawfully begotten, the countrey of Languedoc should in full right returne vnto the crowne; yet for all that so, as that the customes of the countrey should not be chaunged, neither any taxe▪imposed without the consent of the estates of the countrey▪ which hath alwaies beene obserued, the soueraigntie ouer the country and the inhabitants of Languedoc remaining vnto the kings, as it had before that the countie was therefrom exempted. But most certaine it is, that an estate subiect vnto another, maketh not another Commonweale, but onely a part of the subiects.

But that these things may the better be perceiued, it is to be vnderstood, that al con∣uersions [ H] and chaunges of Commonweales, are either voluntarie or necessarie, or else mingled of both: and as for necessitie, it is also either naturall or violent: For albeit that the birth of things be more faire and pleasing than their death, yet for all that so it is, that the source and course of flowing nature rauishing all things, giueth vs also to vnderstand, that the one cannot be without the other: so that all things which had be∣ginning, although they haue stood many hundred yeares, yet must at length in time take end and perish also. But, as we deeme that death more tollerable which by little and little creepeth on through the weakenesse of age, or the course of some long linge∣ring disease, and that almost without any sensible feeling thereof: so also may wee say the chaunge or fall of a Commonweale, which proceeding as it were of age, and after [ I] hauing endured a long tract of worlds, to be necessarie, and yet not violent: for that nothing can well be called violent, which is agreeing vnto nature: seeing also that the course of euerie things age is certaine, and a certaine ripenesse vnto euerie age appoin∣ted:* 1.7 so that in due time to take end seemeth to bee a thing of euerie thing to bee wi∣shed for.

Now Commonweales be also chaunged some times to the better, and sometimes to the worse, whether such chaunge bee naturall or violent: yet the violent change still hauing violent motions, and so quickely done; and the naturall chaunging still be little and little, and so the lesse felt. But of all chaunges of Commonweales, no voluntarie* 1.8 chaunges is more pleasing or easie than that which is made by the consent and good will of him which hath the soueraigntie, and of his subiects: when as hee which hath [ K] the soueraigntie, chooseth rather to yeelde the same vnto the nobility, or the people, than to hold it himselfe: as we haue heard Sylla, with incredible violence to haue ta∣ken vpon him the Dictatorship, and that not without the most cruell slaughter of the people, and so to haue turned the soueraignty of the Commonweale from a popular estate, into a Monarchie; and yet him the same man within foure yeares after, volun∣tarily and of his owne accord, dispoiling himselfe of the Monarchy, which he had co∣uered vnder the colour of his Dictatorship, to haue againe restored the soueraignty vn∣to

the people, to the great contentment of them all in generall, and the good liking of [ A] euery one of them in particular. So also the nobilite of the state of Sienna, by their common consent, yeelded the soueraignty of that state vnto the people, and abando∣ned the city themselues, which Pandulphus the tyrant, violently afterwards inuaded. And as in mens bodies diuers changes happen from the qualities of the elements, the disposition of the body or the minde, the temperature of the humours, as also from the manner of the education thereof, and diuersity of diet: so also the Commonweale may suffer an vniuersall change or ruine, from friends or enemies externall or inter∣nall, or from both, whether it be from good to euill, or euill to good, and that oft times contrary to the good liking of the subiects, who must sometimes as children and mad folkes, be cured euen against their wills, as Lycurgus, who changed the lawes and roy∣all [ B] state of his country, into a popular gouernment, contrary to the good liking of the subiects, or of the greater part of them; howbeit that in so doing, hee was well beaten of them, and lost one of his eyes (the reward of his vertue) although hee had before renounced the claime and right that he and his successours had vnto the kingdome, as princes of the blood, and nearest vnto the crowne.

But forasmuch as there are but three sorts of Commonweales, as wee haue before [ C] * 1.9 declared: there are also but six perfect conuersions or chaunges thereof, viz. of a Mo∣narchie into a Popular estate, or of a Popular estate into a Monarchie: and so like∣wise of a Monarchie into an Aristocratie, and of an Aristocraty into a Monarchie: and of an Aristocratie into a Popular estate, and of a Popular estate into an Aristocratie. So also of euerie estate there be six other imperfect chaunges, or rather alterations; that is to wit, from the Royall estate vnto the Lordlike: from the Lordlike estate vnto the Tyrannicall: from the Tyrannycall vnto the Royall, or from the Royall into the Ty∣rannicall: from the Tyrannicall into the Lordlike, and from the Lordlike into the* 1.10 Royall. So might one also say of an Aristocratie, lawfull, lordlike or factious: And of a Popular estate, lawfull, lordlike, and turbulent. I call it an vnperfect chaunge, as the [ D] change of a lawfull Aristocratie into a faction; or of a Royall estate into a tyranny: for that therein is nothing but the chaunging of the qualities of good gouernors into euil, the Monarchie yet still remaining in the one, and the Aristocratie in the other. I speake not here of the chaunging of a Monarchie into a Duarchie (or soueraigne gouernment of two) for that we haue before declared such a Duarchie to bee comprehended vnder an Oligarchie (or gouernment of few) otherwise a man might make also a Truarchie of three princes, ruling together in one Commonweale (as it chaunced in the Trium∣uirat of Marcus Antonius, Augustus, and Lepidus) as also a Tetrarchie (or gouernment [ E] of foure) and so other chaunges of Commonweals in number infinit: whereof there is not onely no rule or precept to be giuen, but are also of themselues most absurd: For when wee once passe the soueraigne gouernment of one, wee forthwith enter into the popularitie of moe: which as the lawyers say, is still contained in the number of two.

But besides these conuersions and chaunges of estates, which wee haue alreadie* 1.11 spoke of, it happeneth some time that the estate of a Commonweale is holden in su∣spence and sufferance: as after the death of Romulus, the people of Rome was a yeare without a Monarchie, a Popular estate, or Aristocratie: For the hundred Senatours which commaunded one of them after another, had no soueraigne power, neither commaunded but onely by commission: true it is, that one might say, That the soue∣raigntie was againe returned vnto the people, and the charge of commaund vnto the Senators, vntill that by common consent they had chosen them a king.

And some times againe it chaunceth, that the Royall, Aristocratike, or Popular* 1.12

Commonweale being quite extinguished, there ensueth a meere Anarchie: when as [ F] there is neither soueraigntie, nor magistrats, nor commissioners, which haue power to commaund; as it chaunced the people of Israel after the death of Iephte, when as their* 1.13 estate was brought to a meere Anarchie, and vpholden onely by the prouidence and power of God alone, the best and greatest king: for so it is in holy writ reported. So likewise at Syracusa, after the death of Dion, and in Florence after that the nobilitie was thence driuen out by the people: which so continued a certaine time without go∣uernment, as a ship without a pilot or gouernour. And so after the death of Abusahit king of Fez, that kingdome was in most miserable case eight yeares without a king. As also after diuers murthers of many the Aegyptian Sultans, the Mammalukes made choyce of Campson Gaurus, hauing liued a certaine time in a pure Anarchie. And in [ G] like manner the Russians, being wearie and spent with ciuill warres, for lacke of a soue∣raigne, of themselues made choice of three of the German princes to rule ouer them.

Wherefore when an estate is come vnto a meere Anarchie, that is to say, when no* 1.14 man either commaundeth or obeyeth, it is to bee accounted the verie ruine and destru∣ction, and not the chaunging of a Commonweale: although that the families and col∣ledges therein continue friends together. But if the nobilitie or people haue power to create the prince, and he being dead the magistrats shall themselues retaine the soue∣raigne power and commaund: yet is it not therefore to bee deemed an Anarchyie, for that the soueraigntie is still like againe to fall either vnto the nobilitie, or to the people. [ H]

The last point is, when as an Estate or Commonweale is together with all the peo∣pled* 1.15 quite extinguished: as it hapned vnto the people and seigneurie of Thebes, which Alexander the Great vtterly rooted out, together with their city, sauing only the house of Pindarus the Poet: vpon the entrance whereof was written▪ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Burne you not Pindarus his house. So also the Madianites, the Amorites, the Ie∣busites, and Phaerezites, were by the people of Israel vtterly destroyed: which was not the chaunging of one estate into another, but a meere ruine of the estate with the peo∣ple together. But yet it may well be, that some one member of a Commonweale, or that some one prouince thereof may be destroyed, or a towne rased, and all the people therein slaine, and yet the Commonweale stand: as it chaunced to the towne of Arzil∣le, [ I] in the kingdome of Fez, which the Englishmen rased, and put all the people therein to the sword: and to Sebastia, in the kingdome of Amasia, which Tamarlan the Tattar king vsed in like sort: and to the towne of Bizance, a member of the Roman empire, which after it had bene three yeares besieged by the emperour Seuerus, was in the end taken, sacked, rased, and all the people slaine, and the scite thereof giuen to the Perin∣thians, who reedified it, being afterwards called Constantinople, and now corruptly Stamboll, the choyce seat of the Turkish emperours.

But this is in Monarchies speciall and proper, that the Monarches one of them often∣times* 1.16 by force driuen out by another, do not yet therefore chaunge their estate: as in a few moneths in our remembrance it happened in the kingdome of Telesin, where the [ K] king Abuchemo was by the people driuen out of his kingdome, and Abyamein chosen king in his stead: who forthwith after was also cast out by Hariadenus Barbarussa, who long time raigned not there, but that Abuchemo returning with the forces of the empe∣rour Charles the fift chased away Barbarussa, and tooke sharpe reuenge vpon his dissoi∣all subiects, making himselfe the emperours tributarie and vassall: but was againe not long after driuen out againe by Barbarussa: the state of a Monarchie yet neuer chaun∣ging, no more than did the Roman empire, for hauing had foure emperours in one yeare; one of them slaine by another: the estate of the Monarchie neuerthelesse still re∣maining

as the prise and reward of the victor. [ A]

Sometime also rule and soueraigntie is euen thrust vpon men by force and against their will: as first Claudius, and then Gordianus the elder were euen drawne and enfor∣ced to take vpon them the Roman empire. And in our remembrance the inhabitants of Tripolis in Barbarie, after they were reuolted from Iachia king of Tunes, chose Mu∣camen* 1.17 for their king: who being shortly after poysoned, they vpon the sudden enforced a religious Hermit to take vpon him the crowne and the kingdome; wherein he raig∣ned against his will, vntil that Peter of Nauarre, by force tooke the citie of Tripolis, to∣gether with the king, whome he sent prisoner into Sicilie: but was afterwards by the emperour Charles the fift (to his great contentment) sent backe againe to liue in his solitarie cell in Affricke. [ B] * 1.18

But as of men some perish and die in the most flourishing time of their age, some others in their youth, some in their childhood, and some before they could bee well borne; so wee also see some kingdomes and cities to bee cut vp and destroyed before they could strengthen themselues with lawes and armes, othersome as abortiues to be dead and extinguished before they were borne: as in our time the kingdome of the Anabaptists at Munster (the metropoliticall citie of Westphalia) was taken away and subuerted before it was well thought to haue bene borne. Iohn of Leiden, a Sadler, and their ringleader, who had there by the space of three yeares borne himselfe for a king, and taken vpon him the soueraigntie (though still by the imperiall hoast besieged) be∣ing at last together with the citie taken and publikely executed. [ C]

Now when I speake of the flourishing estate of a Commonweale, my meaning is* 1.19 not, that it should be come to the height of most absolute perfection: for that in these transitorie things there is nothing so perfect, and in mans actions lesse than in any thing in the world: but I call that the flourishing estate of a Commonweale, when it hath attained vnto the highest degree of the perfection and beautie thereof; or to say better, then when it is least imperfect, and farthest from all kind of vice: which cannot be wel knowne, but after the declination, chaunge, or ruine of euerie Commonweale: As the Romans hauing made proofe of the Royall, Tyrannicall, Aristocratike, and Popular estates and Commonweales, yet neuer flourished more than in the Popular estate: neither did that their Popular estate euer flourish more in armes and lawes, than in the [ D] time of Papirius Cursor: Illa aetate, qua nulla virtutum feracior fuit, nemo erat, quo magis innixares Romana, quàm in Papirio Cursore staret, In that time (saith Liuie) than which* 1.20 none was more plentifull of vertues, there was no man on whome the Roman Com∣monweale resting staied, than vpon Papirius Cursor. This was the iudgement of the Romans, of the most flourishing time of their Commonweale▪ for neuer after was the militarie and domesticall discipline, the lawes and ordinances better executed, faith bet∣ter kept, religion more sincerely embraced, nor vices more seuerely punished▪ So that it ought not to seeme straunge, if there was neuer than then greater store of most va∣liant and worthy men.

Now if any man shal obiect and say, That the Romans were then but poore, as not [ E] yet got out of Italie, neither hauing as yet extended their armes into Grecia, Asia, and Afrike, no not hauing as then so much as subdued Italie, neither that the Capitoll did as then glister with guilded vaults, but was couered with shards: I say againe▪ That ver¦tue* 1.21 is not to be measured by the foot of wealth and riches; neither the excellencie and perfection of a Commonweale, by the largenesse of the bounds thereof, but by the bounds of vertue it selfe. So that I deeme those their vntrimmed and rough shades and groues, to haue had in them more maiestie and honor, than had afterwards their plea∣sant

greene woods, with the trees most artificially planted in order of the cu•…•…ious [ F] Quincunx, and reckon Rome homely and vntrimmed, more stately and replenished with maiestie, than when it was neuer so well deckt, and with precious ointments per∣fumed. For neuer was the power of the Romans greater than in the time of Traian the emperour, who ioyned vnto the Roman empire, not onely Arabia Felix, but many other great prouinces also beyond the riuer Euphrates, and with incredible workman∣ship* 1.22 hauing built a bridge ouer the Danubie, (the remainders whereof are yet to bee seene) subdued Decebald, with the kingdom of Dacia, & with the Roman legions dan∣ted the most cruell and barbarous nations that then liued; when as the citie of Rome it selfe, being head of the whole empire, did so abound and flow with ambition, coue∣tousnesse, pleasures and delights, as that it seemed to retaine no more but the shadow of [ G] the auntient vertue thereof. Neither was the Lacedemonian Commonweale then most flourishing, when as it had by force of armes subdued all Grecia, with some parts of Asia also: for now they contrarie vnto the lawes, had giuen way for gold and siluer to enter into the citie, now the discipline of Lycurgus seemed to haue beene almost ex∣tinct, and so indeed not long after that same Commonweale came headlong tumbling downe. And thus much concerning the differences of the changes of Commonweales, which it is needfull for vs to note, the better to conceiue such conuersions and changes of estates, which none haue touched heretofore.

Now as for the causes of the chaunges of Commonweales, although they bee* 1.23 right many, and hard to be all reckoned, yet so it is that they may bee brought into [ H] some certaine number, which may suffice for▪ our instruction. The most common cause of the chaunge of Commonweales is, that when the posteritie of princes fai∣ling, the great men fall out among themselues, and so take vp armes for the gouern∣ment of the state: or for the too great pouertie of the greater part of the subiects, and the excessiue riches of some few: or for the vnequall diuision of estates and honours, or for ambition and the great desire some haue to commaund, or for the reuenge of iniuries, or for the crueltie and oppression of Tyrants, or for the feare that some haue to bee punished for their deserts, or for the chaunging of lawes or of religion, or for the desire of some at full to enioy their pleasures, or for the casting out of them which with their excessiue and beastly pleasures pollute and defile the place of maiestie and [ I] honour. All which causes wee will particularly entreate of, and as need shall bee, ma∣nifest the same with examples.

Wee haue now here before declared, That Commonweales had their begin∣ning* 1.24 by violent tyrannies: whereof some haue afterwards continued in the state of Lordlike Monarchies, and othersome in Royall Monarchies by right of succession: vnto whome diuers chaunges haue also happened for the causes by vs before touched. And that it is so, all the Histories, both sacred and prophane agree, That the first soueraigntie and forme of a Commonweale had beginning by the Monarchie of the Assyrians, and that the first prince called Nimroth (which is to say a Bitter Ruler) [ K] whome the Histories for the most part call Ninus, by force and tyranny made him∣selfe a soueraigne prince; and that after him his successours continued that Lordlike Monarchie, taking vnto themselues the whole and entire disposition of their sub∣iects and their goods, vntill that Arbaces gouernour of the Medes, draue out Sarda∣napalus, which was the last king of the Assyrians, and made himselfe king, without any forme of fashion of election at all. The cause why, being for that Sardanapalus drowned in vaine pleasures and delights, was more amongst women than hee was amongst men: a thing which men of courage and valour take most impatiently, to see

themselues subiect to such an one, as hath nothing of a man more than the figure [ A] onely. We see also, that the princes of the Medes descended from Artabazus, the kings of Persia, of Aegypt, of the Hebrews, the Macedonians, the Corinthians, the Si∣cionians, the Athenians, the Celtes, and Lacedemonians, are all come by right of suc∣cession vnto their kingdomes and principalities, for most part founded by force and vi∣olence; but afterward by iustice and good lawes polished, vntill that their posteritie* 1.25 failed (which oftentimes drew after it the chaunging of the estate) or that the princes abusing their power, and euill entreating their subiects, were themselues driuen out or slaine: and the subiects fearing againe to fall into a Tyrannicall gouernment, if they should giue the soueraigntie to one alone, or not willing to endure the commaund of one of their owne companions, founded amongst them the Aristocraticall estates, lit∣tle [ B] regarding the common people: at which time if there were any of the poorer or popular sort, which would also haue had part in the seigneurie or gouernment, they sung vnto them the fables of the Hares, which would commaund together with the* 1.26 Lions: Or if it were that the Monarchie chaunged into a Popular estate, yet so it was neuerthelesse, that the nobilitie or richer sort still carried away all the great offices and places of state: as for example, Solon hauing founded the Popular estate in Athens, yet would not that the poore and common sort of the people should haue part in the estates. Neither the Romans hauing chased out their kings (albeit that they had esta∣blished a Popular estate) yet so it was, that the honorable offices and preferments were still reserued vnto the nobilitie onely. Wee also read, that the first tyrants beeing dri∣uen [ C] out, the men at armes and gentlemen were indeed alwaies chosen vnto the honou∣rable places of estate, and the vulgar people still excluded: vntill that Aristides and Pe∣ricles in Athens, and Canuleius and the other Tribunes in Rome, first opened the gate of honourable offices and preferments vnto all the people in generall. But afterwards* 1.27 when as it was by long experience found out, That Monarchies were more sure, more profitable, and more durable also, than were the Popular estates, or Aristocraties; and amongst the Monarchies, them also which were founded in the succession of the next heires male: these successiue Monarchies were generally receiued almost throughout all the world, and the Popular and Aristocratike estates driuen out. Yea the people sometime fearing the death of their princes, without heires male, persuaded them whi∣lest [ D] they yet liue, to make choice of their successours: as diuers of the emperours of Rome did, and as they yet at this present time doe in many places of Affrike: or else the right of the election of the prince remaineth in the people, the prince beeing dead without heires: yea and in some places the people hauing power for the election of their prince, albeit that their princes haue heires male also: as in the kingdomes of Po∣lonia, Bohemia, Hungarie, Denmarke, Sweden, and Norway, where they haue oft times thrust their kings out of their kingdomes▪ for staining the maiestie of their go∣uernment with tyrannie, licentious liuing, or cowardise. So sometimes also the peo∣ple hauing had a cruell tyrant, chose for him a iust and courteous prince: or hauing had an idle, an effeminat, or contemplatiue prince, make choyce of some valiant captaine: [ E] as did the Romans, who after the death of Numa Pompilius (to rule their religion to∣gether with their policie) made choice of Tullus Hostilius, a good captaine. Yea most* 1.28 commonly it chaunceth, that vnto the greatest and most cruell tyrants succeeded the most iust and vpright princes, as men ashamed to follow or imitat the doings of them whose ends they abhorre; or els vpon certaine conditions, hauing taken the soueraign∣tie vppon them, and so hauing their lesson by writing, haue also their power therein somewhat diminished. So after the vnfortunat end of Marcus Antonius, a man altoge∣ther giuen to riot and voluptuous pleasure, succeeded the great Augustus, a most wise &

sober prince. So after the miserable death of Nero a most cruell tyrant, succeeded Galba, [ F] an emperor most gratious: So after the strange euent of the most drunken and licen∣cious Vitellus, succeeded Vespatian the most continent: And vnto the monster of na∣ture* 1.29 Heliogabalus slaine and drawne in the same faction that was Vitellus, succeeded Alexander Seuerus the most vertuous: a thing most strange, considering that he was his cosin germaine, and together with him nourished and brought vp: and that the power to commaund in soueraigntie hath this mischiefe in it, that often times it ma∣keth of a good man, an euill; of an humble man a proud; of a mercifull man a tyrant; of a wise man a foole; and of a valiant man a coward. For what could be more notable then the first fiue yeares of Nero his raigne? what more excellent then his youth? or who for modestie was to be compared in the beginning to Tiberius? who so behaued [ G] himselfe (as saith Suetonius) as if he had almost beene a priuat man: and being of one called Lord, commaunded him, that he should no more by way of reproach so call him: and against slaunderous and infamous libels made of him, oft times said no more, but that in a free citie, men ought also to haue their tongues free: but speaking vnto the Senat: I haue had this good fortune (said he) to haue you for my gratious Masters, and so long as I liue I will acknowledge you for my good Lords: for a good prince (said he) must be the slaue not onely of the Senat, but also of all the citisens in generall, and often times of euery one of them in particular. Neither did he any thing in the be∣ginning of his raigne, no not euen in the least things, without the aduise of the Senat; and yet afterwards hauing well tasted of the power of soueraigntie, hee became the [ H] most detestable tyrant that euer was for crueltie and voluptuous pleasures. So we read also that Herod the elder raigned six yeares as a good and iust king (as saith Philo) and one and thirtie yeares as a most cruell tyrant, who caused seauentie Senators of the the house of Dauid to be all slaine, which was indeed the whole bodie of the Senate except Semneas, and afterward put to death his wife a most noble gentlewoman, with three of his owne children: and now lying at the point of death, gaue commaunde∣ment to kill all the best and chiefe of the Nobilitie of the whole land, to the intent that* 1.30 great mourning might thereby be after his death. Which examples I haue amongst many other marked, whose beginnings were too faire to continue long: the reason whereof may well be, for that he which at the first seemeth to be so notable wise and [ I] worthie, must needs dissemble much: wherein Tiberius the emperour is said to haue excelled all others. Whereas of them which haue so curiously learned the art of false semblant and dissimulation, and haue their countenances at commaund, nothing that good is, true, or honest, is to be expected; but all things vaine, salse, and fained, ful of hi∣pocrisie and craft: Whereas he which at the first discouereth his imperfections (albeit that he be not therein wise) yet can he not possibly be a man exceedingly mischieuous or naught: yea of such an one it is to be hoped, that he may at length proue an vpright and iust man: such an one as Iohn the French king is reputed to haue bene, who was of such a stomacke, as that he could by no meanes endure to looke ar•…•… •…•…t vppon him [ K] * 1.31 whome he hated or liked not of: And yet for all that we read not of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thing by him either dishonourable or wickedly done. Neither ought it vnto any man to seeme straunge, if there haue bene but few princes for their vertues famous: for if euery where there be such a scarcitie of good and valiant men, and that kings are not chosen out of the number of such: and that they to whome their kingdomes come by succession, commonly haue their education polluted with so many vices, as that hard it is to say which of them is the greatest: it is almost a myracle if one of them shall bee able to get out of such a gulfe of all maner of vices. Yet if any such there shall be, as shall for his vertues become famous, he as a toarch vpon an high place or watch tower, filleth al

things with the light and brightnesse of himselfe: neither is onely whilest he yet liueth [ A] * 1.32 highly commended: but being dead, leaueth vnto his children and posteritie also, the most fragrant and sweet smelles of his vertue and worth, who though they shall right wickedly liue, yet are they the rather borne with, for their fathers vertues sake. Camby∣ses did many most cruell and shamefull things, yet was hee alwaies both loued and ho∣noured of his subiects, and redoubted of his enemies, and all for the great loue they bore vnto his father Cyrus, which was so well grauen in the harts of the people (as saith Plutarch) that they loued euen all such as had a great and rising nose, such an one as Cy∣rus had. And the emperour Commodus, albeit that he were a most cruell tyrant, and had in one day commaunded the great Prouost of Rome to kill all the beholders of the playes in the Theatre (which were not fewer than threescore thousand persons) for [ B] that they could not forbeare laughing, to see him in stead of an emperour, so cunningly to play the Fencer, as if he had bene one inded; yet was hee neuerthelesse of the people alwaies beloued, for the loue they bare vnto the remembrance of Marcus Aurelius his father.* 1.33

Wherefore we see kingdomes which come by succession, seldome times to suffer chaunge or innouation, albeit that a wicked sonne succeed a good father: for that his kingdome is like vnto a great tree which hath taken as deepe root as it spreadeth bran∣ches: whereas he which commeth but newly vnto a kingdome commended nor strengthened with no vertue or power of his auncestours, is indeed like vnto an high tree: which for that it is not well rooted, is with the wind and tempest easily ouer∣throwne. [ C] For which cause a tyrant the sonne of a tyrant, must needs raigne in great daunger, except he be with great wealth and the power of his neighbor princes streng∣thened, or by long discent of his auncestours haue obtained his kingdome. Neither can the verues of a new prince deliuer his vngracious sonne from the conspiracies of his subiects: as it happened vnto Hierome a tyrant of Sicilie, who succeeded to Hiero his grandfather, a new prince in his kingdome, which he had by no right or claime gained, but was yet for his manifold and great vertues, of a priuat man, thought right worthy of that so great a kingdome, which hee so held almost sixtie yeares, without force or garrison, to the great contentment of all men; beloued not of his owne subiects onely, but of all his neighbour princes also, and especially of the people of Rome, to whome [ D] he was most deere: whose nephew, that he might seeme to excell his grandfather in magnificence and state, thought it better for the assurance of his estate, to strengthen himselfe with strong garrisons of men, and so afterwards wholly giuing himselfe ouer vnto riot and excesse, bare himselfe proudly towards all men, and so drew all mens ha∣tred vpon him: and as for the counsel, the most assured foundation of his grandfathers kingdome, he altogether set it at naught: & to heape vp his mishaps, without any cause why, renounced the amitie and alliance of the Romans. And so hauing lost both all the ornaments of his honour, and the stayes of his assurance, was by the conspiracie of his subiects himselfe with all his friends and kinsfolkes most miserably slaine, and his Monarchie forthwith chaunged into a Popular estate. The like end almost had Dio∣nysius [ E] the younger, another king of the same countrey also, and sonne to Dionysius the elder, who by fraud inuaded the estate, which he of long time held with strong garri∣sons and fortresses, without the stay or alliance of any other forren prince: but he once dead, and this his sonne a man vnskilfull of the gouernment, and altogether giuen to riot, succeeding in his place, and banishing his vncle Dion, and confiscating his goods, he was by the same Dion, returning out of exile againe into his owne countrey, with an armie thrust out of his kingdome, and all the fortresses of his tyrannie ouerthrowne: which Dion not long after being also slaine, the Monarchie was againe chaunged into a

Popular estate. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, new princes without great vertues [ F] hardly to maintaine their estate: which although it be a thing right, manifest, yet ap∣peareth it more plainely by the example of Herod the elder, vpon whome Caesar for the valour of Antipater his father, by a decree of the Senat bestowed the kingdome of the Iewes: who although he were in great fauour with Marcus Antonius, and Octauianus Augustus, yet for the better assurance of his kingdome, built most strong castles, and to gaine the good will of his subiects, bestowed great masses of money for reliefe of the poorer sort, and eased the people of a third part of their woonted tributes: but know∣ing how little he had for all that gained, he tooke also an oath of alleagiance of his sub∣iects, seeking to gaine them of the better sort with extraordinarie fauours and good turnes: and yet for all that he could do, he was so hated of his subiects, that beeing be∣come [ G] sickly, the people much reioyced thereat: which he perceiuing, it had almost dri∣uen him into a phrensie. But he being dead, the Iewes sent fiftie ambassadors to Rome, that so eased of that regall gouernment, they might become subiects vnto the Romans, and so happily had obtained to haue bene, had not Herod his sonne bene then in great fauour with Augustus the emperour, vnto whome the elder Herod had before by his* 1.34 will left fifteene hundred talents of gold. Howbeit yet, that all the successours and po∣steritie of Herod, which were in number many, in lesse than threescore yeares, all in poore estate perished, as well for that he being but a new man, was not descended of royall race: as for that his prowesse and valour fayled in his successours.

But these conuersions and chaungings of kingdomes and Commonweales chance [ H] * 1.35 so much the rather, if the tyrant be too great an exactor, too cruell, or too much giuen to his voluptuous and vnlawfull pleasures, or be delighted in all these together: as was Nero, Tiberius, and Caligula: and yet of these, wantonnesse and whoredome hath rui∣nated moe princes than all the other causes: and so is it also much more daungerous vnto a prince for his estate than crueltie: for crueltie keepeth men in feare and awe, & bringeth a terrour vpon the subiects; whereas wantonnesse bringeth after it an hate and contempt also of the tyrant; forasmuch as euerie man deemeth the effeminat man to be also faint hearted, and farre vnworthie to commaund a whole people, which hath* 1.36 not power ouer himselfe. So we see that Sardanapalus king of Assyria, Canades king of Persia, Dionysius the younger, and Hierosme, kings of Sicilie, Heliogabalus, Amyntas, [ I] Chideric, Periander, Pisistratus, Tarquin, Aristocrates king of the Messenians, Timocrates king of Cyrene, Andronicus emperour of Constantinoble, Rhoderike king of Spaine, Appius Claudius, Galeace Sfortia, Alexander Medices, the Cardinall Petruce Tyrant of Sienne, Lugrac and Megal, kings of Scots, all for wantonnesse to haue lost their estates, and most of them slaine vpon the fact doing. Neither is it long since Delmendin and Delmedin, two of the greatest cities of Affrike, were by rebellion dismembred from the kingdome of Fez, and brought vnder the obeysance of the Portugals, for a maiden by force taken from her husband to whome she was betrothed, by the gouernour, who was therefore afterwards slaine: as was also Ahusahid king of Fez himselfe with his six children all massacred by a secretarie of his, for hauing abused his wife. Neither for any [ K] other cause did the people of Constantine (a sea towne in Affrike) chose rather to suf∣fer the commaund of Delcaid a Christian renegat, than to obey the king of Tunes his sonne. And why in our time was Muleasses thrust out of his kingdome, and so lost his estate, but for intemperance? and yet neuerthelesse was so drowned in delights, as that returning out of Germanie, without hope that the emperour Charles the fift (in whom his greatest trust was) would afford him any aid, and banished as he was out of his king∣dom, yet spent he an hundred crowns vpon the dressing of one peacock, as Paulus Ioui∣us reporteth: and to the end he might better conceiue the pleasure of musick, stil coue∣red

his eyes, as hauing learned a double pleasure, not to bee so well perceiued by two [ A] sences at once: yet such was the iudgement of God vppon him, as that by the com∣maundement of his sonnes he had his eyes put out with an hot barre of Iron, by little and little drying vp the humors of them, and depriued of his kingdome also.* 1.37

But for the crueltie of a prince, the estate easily chaungeth not, if he be not more cru∣ell than the wild beasts themselues, such as were Phaleris, Alexander Phereus, Nero, Vi∣tellius, Dometian, Commodus, Caracalla, Maximinus, Ecelinus of Padua, and Iohn Maria of Millan, who were all slaine, or driuen out of their dominions, and their Tyrannical estates for the most part chaunged into estates Popular. Which befell them not so much for the crueltie by them vsed against the common sort of people (wherof no rec∣koning nor account is made in a Tyrannicall estate) as for crueltie committed in the [ B] person of the great and best friended, who are alwayes of tyrants to bee feared: vnto whome euen contumely and disgrace is oftentimes more grieuous than crueltie it self: wherof we haue a domesticall example of that Bodile, who for that he was by the com∣maundement of Childeric king of Fraunce whipped, slew not onely the king, but the queene also, being then great with child. So was also the emperour Iustinus the third slaine by Atelia generall of his armie, whose sonne he had slaine, and in despight prosti∣tuted his wife vnto his seruants. And Archetaus king of Macedon, was likewise slaine by him whome he had put into the hands of Euripides the poet, to be whipt: as was his nephew also king of Macedon, slaine by him whome hee had without punishment suffered to be abused against nature by Antipater, and scorned him crauing of him re∣uenge. [ C]

The Aristocratike estate also of them of Mitylen, was chaunged into a Popular, for that it chaunced certaine gentlemen as they went along the streets with their bastana∣does, in sport to strike all such of the common people as they met: Whereupon one Megacles tooke occasion to stirre vp the comminaltie to fall vpon the nobilitie, and so to kill them. And not to seeke for examples farther, Henry, of late king of Sweden (but now a prisoner) was also thrust out of his kingdome, for that he not onely disdainfully reiected the request of a certaine gentleman his subiect, but also with his owne hand most cruelly stabbed him with his dagger: wherwith the nobilitie and people moued, tooke him prisoner, and enforcing him to resigne his kingdome, gaue it to his younger [ D] brother, who now raigneth. And almost alwaies the tyrants-quellers haue receiued* 1.38 either the estate or goods of the tyrants by them slaine, or the greatest honours and preferments in the state, as rewards due to their deserts. So both the one and the other Brutus, obtained the greatest estates in Rome; the one of them for hauing driuen out the proud king Tarquin, and the other for hauing slayne Caesar. And Arbaces gouer∣nour of the Medes hauing brought Sardanapalus king of Assyria to such extremitie, as that he was glad to burne himselfe aliue together with his concubines and treasures, for reward enioyed his kingdome. So Lewes of Gonzaga hauing slaine Bonacolse, tyrant of Mantua, was by the subiects chosen their prince, his posteritie euer since by the space of about two hundred and fiftie yeares hauing enioyed that estate. And the Venetians [ E] hauing slaine the tyrant Eceline, obtained the seigneurie of Padua.

Some others there be, which seeke the tyrants death, and so the chaunge of the* 1.39 estate; hauing nothing before their eyes but the desire of reuenge, and that without ei∣ther the feare of God, the regard of their countrey, or loue of their neerest and deerest friends: as he which to be reuenged of king Roderike, who had rauished his wife, drew the Mahometan Moores into Spaine, who draue out the king, and there vsing an hun∣dred thousand cruelties, possessed the kingdome of Spayne, which they held by the space of seuen hundred yeares after. And some others there bee also, who neither for

hope of bearing of rule, of preferment; or of wealth: neither for reuenge of wrongs, nor [ F] for any other priuat iniuries receiued, are yet induced to the killing of a tyrant, without hope to be able by any means to escape therefore a most sharpe and cruell death, respe∣cting onely the deliuerance of their countrey, and the honour of the fact: such as were Harmodius; and Aristogiton in Athens, and those which slew Domitian and Caligula the cruell emperours. A thing which most commonly happeneth in the Popular estates, wherein the new tyrants by force or fraud hauing oppressed the libertie of the people, are neuer assured of themselues, or of their estate, without great and strong garrisons about them. So we see Alexander Medices, nephew to pope Clement the seuenth, & sonne in law to the emperour Charles the fift, by whose forces and power hee obtained the soueraigntie of Florence, and draue out them also that were of greatest power and [ G] courage in the state, to haue compassed himselfe with great and strong garrisons, and alwaies to haue gone armed, in such sort as that it seemed almost impossible to find the meanes to come neere him, and yet for all that to haue bene slaine by the conspiracie of Laurence Medices, not onely his neere kinsman, but his most familiar and domesti∣call friend also▪ when as the said Laurence had promised to prostitute vnto him his owne sister; that so he might the better deliuer the man disarmed (euen as he was kis∣sing and embrasing his sister, who me he thought to haue rauished) to the murtherer to be slaine▪ which was so couertly done, as that the souldiours of his guard, whome he kept for the saftie of his person, making merrie in a dining chamber fast by, perceiued nothing of the murther of their prince. And yet in so doing, the said Laurence neither [ H] deliuered his countrey from tyrannny (whereinto it by and by after againe fell) neither himselfe from daunger, being at length by a murtherous fellow himselfe also slaine at Venice. And Cosmu•…•… Medices, who after the death of Alexander, by the helpe of the garrison souldiours, the supportation of his friends, and fauor of the pope, obtained the same gouernment▪ albeit that he was reported to haue bene one of the wisest princes of his age, or of long time before him, and a right great justicier, euen by the report of his enemies themselues, and had diuers strong castles euen in the citie it selfe: yet ne∣uerthelesse was he an hundred times in daunger of his person, by the conspiracies of his subiects against him, being not able to endure a maister ouer them, albeit that hee were both iust and vertuous. And he which now raigneth, not long since missed not [ I] much to haue bene •…•…laine by the conspiracie of Puccinus, neither can bee safe without a strong garrison, so long as the citisens his subiects shall either remember or hope for the rewards of their valour and libertie. And for this cause Dionysius the elder of Syracu∣sa, being chosen generall, and hauing made himselfe maister of all, and chaunged the Popular estate into a Monarchie, had alwaies forty thousand souldiors in readinesse at his call to set forward, beside a great garrison still attendant about his person, and di∣uers strong holds, onely to keepe the people of Syracusa with a part of Sicilia in subie∣ction. And yet neuerthelesse was he no tyrant, as we call a tyrant, that is to say, a cruell, vitious, and naughtie man: neither was he euer amorous of other mens wiues, but to the contrarie sharply reproued his sonne (as saith Plutarch) for hauing taken away one [ K] of his subiects daughters, saying, That he should neuer haue one to succeed him in his estate, if he vsed such fashions: as indeed it fell out with him, being shortly after his death chased out of his kingdome.

Now if any man shall obiect and say vnto mee, That force and feare are two euill* 1.40 masters for the maintaining of an estate: true it is, and yet needfull for a new prince to vse, who by force changeth a Popular estate into a Monarchie, a thing altogether con∣trarie vnto a Monarchy Royall; which the lesse guard it hath, the surer it is: & there∣fore the wise king Numa put from him the three hundred archers which Romulus his

predecessour had taken vnto him for his guard, saying, That hee would not distrust a [ A] people which had willingly and of themselues put their trust in him: neither yet com∣maund ouer them which should distrust him. But Seruius hauing of a slaue made himselfe a king, beset himselfe with strong guards, and that wisely, as beeing forsaken of the Senators, who tooke his seruile gouernment in great euill part: For as iust, plea∣sing, & gracious, as he was, yet had it bene a thing impossible for him without guards, garrisons, and fortresses, long to haue maintained himselfe and his so new an estate, but that he should haue fallen into the hands of his enemies. There was neuer a more gratious, magnificent, noble, couragious, or courteous prince then Caesar; and yet notwithstanding, all these his great vertues were not able to preserue him, but that he was by his sonne Brutus and other the conspirators with incredible consent and fideli∣tie [ B] combyned against him, in the middest of the Senat most cruelly slaine: who being before warned to take vnto him a guard for the safetie of his person, frankly answered▪ that he had rather to die once for all, than still to languish in feare: wherein he did not wisely so to refuse a guard, hauing pardoned his greatest enemies (whom he suffered still to liue) and desiring to chaunge into a Monarchie the free estate of the most war∣like people that euer was in the world. Which his course Augustus his successour followed not, but first caused to be put to death all the conspiratours against Caesar, (not so much in reuenge of the death of his vncle Caesar, as he pretended, as so to pro∣uide* 1.41 for his owne safetie) after that hee still guarded with a strong guard about him, easely kept himselfe from the violence of his enemies: And albeit that hauing quite [ C] discomfited and ouerthrowne Sextus Pompeius, and Lepidus, and ouercome Marcus Anthonius in battell at Actium, (who afterwards also slew himselfe) and the other citi∣sens of greatest force and courage, either in battell slaine or otherwise taken out of the way; he might haue seemed to haue beene able to haue raigned in great securitie: yet neuerthelesse hee dispersed fortie legions into the prouinces, placed three legions in Italie, and that not farre from the citie, kept a strong guard about him for the safetie of his person: forbid the Senators without leaue to depart out of Italie, and commit∣ted the gouernment of his legions not vnto any the great Lords, but to gentlemen onely, or some of the meanest of the nobilitie. As for the creating of the officers of the citie, he diuided it betwixt himselfe and the people; yet so as that of such as stood [ D] for them, he would bring some of them by the hand vnto the people, and so recom∣mending vnto their choice them whom he wished to haue preferred vnto the offices and honors: he tooke from the people their free choice, and had the magistrats still be∣holden and bound vnto him. Iustice he daily administred, without intermission, re∣ceiuing and answering euery mans request, hauing alwaies before him the records of the publike reuenues of his forces, and of the prouinces, so that he alone seemed to dis∣charge all the dueties of all the officers. Whereby it euidently appeareth him to haue beene a sole Monarque, and soueraigne Prince, whatsoeuer faire title of a Tribune of the people, or of a Prince, was by one or other giuen vnto him. That is also reported to haue beene of him verie popularly done, in that he commaunded debts due to the [ E] Commonweale, which were growne by the ciuill warres, and the records of the debters to be torne and burnt. And yet this so mightie a Prince, endued with so great vertue & wisedome hardly escaped the hands of the wicked conspirators against him, albeit that the most desperat and daungerous sort of them were now long before dead. But after that the subiects hauing by little and little made proofe of his justice and wise∣dome, tasted of the sweetnes of long peace and assured tranquillitie, in steed of cruell and bloodie ciuill warres,, and that they had to doe, rather with a father than with a lord (as saith Seneca) and so began to loue and reuerence him: he againe on his part

discharged his guard, going as a priuat man sometimes with one man, and sometimes [ F] with an other without any other companie; and so laide the foundation of that great Monarchie, with the most happie successe that euer Prince did.

Now all Monarchies newly established by the change of an Aristocratie, or Popu∣lar* 1.42 estate, haue as it were taken their beginning, after that some one of the magistrats, captaines, or gouernours, hauing the power of the state in his hand, hath of a compa∣nion made himselfe Lord and soueraigne, or else that some straunger hath subdued them, or that those states haue willingly submitted themselues vnto the lawes & com∣mandements of some other man. As for the first point, and the most ordinarie change of these estates we haue examples enowe. For so Pisistratus, when he had got the chiefe office in the common weale, inuaded the libertie of the people: as did also Cyp∣selus [ G] at Corinth, Thrasybulus, Gelo, Dionysius, Hiero, Agathocles at Syracusa, Panaetius, and Icetes at Leonce, Phalaris at Agrigentum, Phidon at Argos, Periander at Am∣brace, Archelaus in Ca•…•…die, Euagoras in Cyprus, Polycrates in Samos, Anaxilaus at Rhegium, Nicocles at Sicyon, Alexander at Pheree, Mamercus at Catana, the De∣cemuiri at Rome, and there after them Sylla and Caesar: the Scaligers at Verona, the Bentinoli at Bolonia, the Manfreds at Fauentia, the Malatestes at Atiminum, the Ba∣leones at Perusium, the Vitelles at Tifernas, the Sforces at Millan, and diuers others of like sort, who of gouernors of cities and armies haue taken vpon them the soueraign∣tie. For in matters of estate it may be holden for an vndoubted maxime, that he is* 1.43 master of the estate, which is master of the forces. Wherefore in well ordered Aristo∣cratique [ H] and popular Commonweales, the greatest honours are graunted without power of commaund, and the greatest powers to commaund are not graunted with∣out a companion therein: or if it be dangerous to diuide the power of commaund to* 1.44 many, as in matters of warre it is; then the power so graunted vnto the magistrat or Generall ought to be but short. And therefore the Romans made chiefe commaun∣ders their two Consuls: and the Carthaginensians their two Suffets, who euery other day commaunded by turnes: For albeit that the dissention which is commonly be∣twixt them which are in power equall, is sometimes an hinderance for the execution of good and profitable things: yet so it is that such a commonweale so gouerned is not so subiect to be turned into a Monarchie, as it were if it had but one chiefe and so∣ueraigne [ I] magistrat: as the great Archon at Athens, the Prytani with the Rhodians, the yearely Generall with the Achaeans and the Aetolians, and the Duke at Genes. And for the same cause the Dictatorship in Rome continued no longer then the charge required, which neuer passed six monethes at the longest; yea and sometime lasted but one day; which time expired, the power to commaund ceased: and if so be that the Dictator did for any longer time retaine his forces, he might therefore be accused of treason. And in Thebes, so long as it was a Popular estate, the law was that the Gene∣rall of the armie should be put to death, if he retained the forces aboue a day after the appointed time: which was the cause that the great capitaines Epaminondas and Pelo∣pidas were condemned to death, for hauing retained their forces foure monethes after [ K] the time, howbeit that they were by necessitie constrayned so to doe, neither could without the great danger of the State haue otherwise done. And so for the same rea∣son almost all the Magistracies are annuall, in Aristocratique and Popular Common∣weales. Howbeit that in Venice the six Councelours for the estate which are assistant vnto the Duke, continue but two monethes in their charge: and he that had the kee∣ping of the principall fortresse of Athens, had the keyes thereof but for one day onely: no more then hath the captaine of the castle of Rhaguse, who chosen by lot, hath the charge but for a day, and is led into the castle hoodwinkt. It behoueth also in popu∣lar

& Aristocraticall Commonweales so much as possible is, to beware that the lawes [ A] * 1.45 and ordinances concerning the Magistrats time be not changed, neither their charge prorogued, if the necessity be not verie great: as the Romans did to Camillus, to whom the Dictatorship was prorogued for six monthes, which had neuer to any other per∣son beene graunted. And namely by the law Sempronia it was straitly forbidden that the gouernments of Prouinces should be graunted vnto any for longer time than fiue yeares: which law had it beene kept, Caesar had neuer inuaded the estate as he did, ha∣uing the gouernment of the Gaules by the consent of Pompeius and Crassus graunted for fiue yeares more than the law allowed of; whereunto in that point was derogated in fauour of him. Which was a notable ouersight, considering that they had to doe with the most ambitious man that euer was; who so well grounded his power to [ B] continue, that he gaue at one time vnto Paulus the Consull nine hundred thousand* 1.46 crownes, to the intent that he should not oppose himselfe against his enterpises; and vnto the Tribune Curio, fifteene hundred thousand crownes to take his part. The people of Rome moreouer allowing him pay for ten legions of souldiers so long as the warres in Fraunce should last. Which so great a power was ioyned with the har∣diest hart that then liued, and the most valiant that euer was, and discended of so noble an house, as that in an oration vnto the people he doubted not to say, That by the fa∣thers side he was discended from the gods, and by the mothers side from kings; and yet withall so modest, as that his great enemie Cato said, That there was neuer so mo∣dest a tyrant as he, and withall so vigilant: as that Cicero an other great enemie of his, [ C] (who conspired his death) calleth him in one of his Epistles, The monster of wisdome & incredible diligence: and moreouer so magnificall and popular as euer any was▪ spa∣ring for no cost for the setting forth of playes, iusts, tournies, feastes, largesses, & other publike delights: In which doing he vpon the publike charge woon the harts of the common people, and gained the honour of a most gratious and charitable man to∣wards the poore. And yet for all that hauing by this meanes gained the soueraigntie, he sought for nothing more than by all meanes to clip and cut off the wealth & power of the people, and to take from them their priuileges: for of three hundred and twen∣tie thousand citisens which still liued of the publique corne which they receiued, he retained but an hundred and fiftie thousand, and sent fourescore thousand ouer the sea [ D] into diuers Colonies a farre off: and beside that tooke away most part of their frater∣nities, corporations, and colleges. In briefe it hath alwaies beene seene in all changes* 1.47 of Aristocratique and popular Commonweales, them to haue beene still ruinated, which haue at any time giuen too much power vnto the subiects whereby to exalt themselues: Which thing Iulian the Apostatament by that his embleanie or deuise of an Eagle shot thorow with arrowes fethered with his owne feathers, being before pluckt from her. For so do the soueraigne gouernors and magistrats of those estates, especially when too great power is giuen to him which is of too ambitious and hautie a mind. And thus much concerning the chaunge of a Popular or Aristocraticall estate [ E] into a Monarchie, wherein one of the subiects maketh himselfe Lord thereof.

But the chaunge of a Popular estate into an Aristocratie chanceth commonly vpon* 1.48 the losse of some great battell, or other notable detriment of the state, receiued from the enemie: as to the contrarie the Popular power then most encreaseth when it re∣turneth from the warres with some great victorie ouer their enemies. Of which man∣ner of chaunges as there are many examples, so is there none more fit than those of the Athenians and Syracusians, two Commonweales of the selfe same time; when as the Athenians by the default of Niceas their generall, vanquished by the Syracusians and so discomfited, forthwith chaunged their Popular estate into an Aristocratie of foure

hundred men, who yet bare themselues for fiue thousand by the deceit of Pisander: so [ F] that the people complayning themselues to be so spoiled of the soueraigntie, and com∣ming to giue voice in the councell, was thence repulsed & driuen backe by the forces which the foure hundred had in their power, wherwith they slew diuers of the people and discouraged the rest: at which verie time the Syracusians proud of their victorie (to the contrarie) chaunged their Aristocratie into a Popular estate. And within a while after the Athenians hauing heard news of the great victorie of Alcibiades against the Lacedemonians, tooke vp armes against the foure hundred of the nobilitie, whom they by the leading of Thrasybulus thrust out or slew, and so againe chaunged the Ari∣stocratie into a Popular estate. And in like manner the Thebans ouercome by the Enophites, chaunged their Popular estate into an Aristocratie. And albeit that the [ G] Romans hauing lost two great battels vnto Pirrhus changed not their popular estate, yet so it was that indeed it was then a faire Aristocratie of three hundred Senators which gouerned the estate, and but in appearance and show a Democratie, or a Po∣pular estate, the people being neuer than then more calme and tractable. But so soone as the Romans had gained the estate of Tarentum, the people forthwith began to set vp their hornes, demaunding to haue part in the lands which the nobilitie had of long time possessed. And yet neuerthelesse afterwards, when as Hannibal had brought the Roman estate into great extremitie, the people became as humble as was possible: but after that the Carthaginensians were ouercome, king Perseus ouerthrowne, Antio∣chus put to flight, the kingdome of Macedonia and Asia subuerted▪ then immediatly [ H] againe followed the sturres for the diuision of lands, and the turbulent seditions of the Gracchies, wherewith the Tribunes armed the people in most insolent manner, insul∣ting vpon the nobilitie. In like manner the Florentines ouerthrew their Oligarchie, established by Pope Clement the seuenth, restoring the people againe vnto their won∣ted libertie: for so soone as newes was brought vnto Florence, That Rome was by the imperials sackt, and the Pope with the rest of the Cardinals and Bishops besieged▪ it is not to be beleeued, with what pride the headstrong people began to rage against them of the house of Medices; with what •…•…urie they cast downe their statues, defaced their armes, and reuersed all their decrees and lawes. The Popular estates of the Swis∣sers indeed first tooke their beginning from the pride and insolencie of the gouernours [ I] of those places, but yet had their greatest encreasings after the victorie of Sempach, about the yeare 1377, at which time the nobilitie being with a great slaughter ouer∣throwne by the rural people, there was no more talking of Aristocraties, nor of acknow∣ledging of the soueraigntie of the empire ouer them, in what sort soeuer. But the chiefe cause of these conuersions and chaunges of these estates, is the rash vnstaidnesse and vn∣constancie of the people, without discourse or iudgement moued with euerie wind; which as it is with a little losse discouraged, so is it also after any victorie intollerable; neither hath it any more deadly or dangerous enemie, than too much felicitie and pro∣sperous successe of the affaires thereof; nor a wiser maister than aduersitie and distresse, wherewith it daunted and discouraged, learneth to rest vpon the councell of the wiser [ K] sort, leauing the helme of the estate for them to gouerne, which they themselues in such tempestuous times know not how to hold. Whereby it is to bee perceiued, nothing* 1.49 to be more profitable for the preseruation of a Popular estate, than to haue warres, and to make enemies for it if otherwise it haue none. Which was the principall reason that moued Scipio the yonger so much as in him lay, to hinder the rasing of the famous citie of Carthage, wisely foreseeing, that the people of Rome being altogether mar∣tiall and warlike, if it had no enemies abroad would at length be enforced to make war vpon it selfe. For which cause also Onomadesme generall of the Commonweale of

Chio, hauing appeased the ciuill warres, and driuen out the most mutinous, would by [ A] no meanes banish the the rest, albeit that he was earnestly persuaded so to doe, saying That so it would be daungerous, least (that hauing cast ōut all the enemies) they should fall together by the eares with their friends. Howbeit that this reason which hath place for the straunge and forren enemies, is not yet to bee receiued for the maintaining of enemies at home amongst the citisens themselues: and yet in this case hee did but that which best beseemed him, and was also most expedient. For he that will haue the vp∣per hand in ciuill warre, if he shall banish all them that take part with the faction con∣trarie to his owne, he shall then haue no hostages at all left, if the banished shall prepare new warres against him: but hauing slaine the most outragious and daungerous, and banished the most mutinous, he ought still to retaine the remnant; for otherwise hee is [ B] to feare least all the exiled together, making warre vppon him, without feare of their friends at home, should so by force ouerthrow their enemies, and chaunge the Popular estate into an Aristocratie. As it happened vnto the Heracleans, the Cumans, and the Megarenses, who were chaunged from Popular estates into Aristocraties, for that the people had wholly driuen out the nobilitie, who with their friends combining their forces, and possessed of these three commonweales, ouerthrew therein the Popular estates, and againe established Aristocraties.* 1.50

Yet amongst other conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales, the chaunge of a Popular estate into a Monarchy oftenest happeneth; and that either by ciuill warres, [ C] or through the ignorance of the people, hauing giuen too much power to some one of the subiects, as we haue before said. For Cicero speaking of the ciuill warres betwixt Caesar and Pompey, saith, Ex victoria cum multa, tum certe Tyrannis existit, Of victorie ensue many things, but especially a Tyrannicall gouernment. For that almost alwaies in ciuill warres the people is diuided: wherein if it so fall out, that the leaders of the fa∣ctions bring the matter vnto the tryall of a battaile, no man can doubt but that hee who therein shall carrie away the victorie, possessed of the forces and powers, shall either for ambition and the desire of honour, or for the saftie of his person, keepe vnto himself the* 1.51 soueraigntie. Whereas contrariwise Tyrannicall gouernments (for the most part) chaunge into Popular estates. For that the people which neuer knoweth how to keep [ D] a meane, the Tyrannicall gouernment once taken away, desiring to communicat the soueraigntie vnto them all, for the hatred that it beareth against Tyrants, and the feare that it hath to fall againe into tyranny, becommeth so furious and passionat, as without reason or discretion to fall vpon all the kinsmen and friends of the tyrant, and not to leaue one of them aliue: whereof for the most part ensueth the slaughter, exile, & pro∣scription of the nobilitie; in which case euerie man of valour, courage, and worth, chu∣seth rather to shunne the furie of the most headstrong people, as the raging of a wild beast, rather than to beare rule ouer it. As it happened at Athens, after that Pisistratus was slaine; at Rome, after Tarquin the proud was driuen out: at Syracusa, after Hiero slaine, and againe after that Dionysius was banished: at Florence, after that the duke of [ E] Athens (who afterwards died Generall in the expedition of Poitiers) was driuen out: at Milan, after that Galuagno the tyrant had there lost his estate, where the people of Milan for fiftie yeares after, held a Popular estate, vntill that at last it was againe chan∣ged into a Tyrannicall gouernment by the Toresa•…•…s. Neither did the Swissars other∣wise establish that thei Popular estate (which by the space of 260 yeares hath conti∣nued euen vnto this day) but by killing of the tyrannicall deputies of the empire, tyran∣nizing ouer them. The like we see to haue happened in Thessalie, after that Alexan∣der the tyrant of the Phereans was slaine: and in Sienna, after that Alexander Dichi the new tyrant, was by the conspiracie of Hierome Seuerin slaine, and his partakers of the

nobilitie De Monte Nouo cast out, slaine, and banished, the people forthwith tooke vp∣on [ F] it the soueraigntie. Neither is it to be doubted, but that the Florentines, after the death of Alexander Medices the new tyrant, would haue taken the gouernment from them of the house of Medices, and reestablished their Popular estate, if they had cer∣tainly knowne the tyrant to haue beene slaine: but when as almost onely Laurence Medices with Caracciolus the muttherer were priuie to the murther (supposed to bee not onely the tyrants familiar and domesticall acquaintance, but his most inward friend also) no man could by him be persuaded, that he had slaine the tyrant: but so by pre∣sent flight making shift for himselfe, gaue opportunitie to young Cosmus Medices his cosen (who then had the forces of the estate in his power) to take vppon them the so∣ueraigntie. But this conuersion or chaunge of Tyrannicall gouernments into Demo∣craties, [ G] or of Democraties into Tyrannicall gouernments, most commonly happe∣neth, as we haue said, by occasion of ciuill warres: for if a strange enemie become lord of any Popular estate, he commonly ioyneth it vnto his owne: which is not then to be called a change, but a destruction of that Commonweal, so vnited vnto the victors; except the victor (which seldome times happeneth) restore vnto the vanquished their libertie and gouernment: as the Lacedemonians chose rather that the confederat ci∣ties of the Athenians, by them ouerthrowne in the Peloponesian warre, yea and that euen the citie of Athens it selfe also, should enioy their wonted libertie, than to be ioy∣ned vnto the Lacedemonian estate: howbeit yet that the Lacedemonians in euerie place established Aristocraties for Popular estates, quite contrarie vnto the manner and [ H] fashion of the Athenians, who in all places went about to ouerthrow Aristocraties, and to establish Democraties or Popular estates. So that it differeth much, whether the conuersions or chaunges of Commonweales proceed from a forren and straunge ene∣mie, or else from the citisens themselues.

Sometime also the people are so fickle and fantasticall, as that it is almost a thing im∣possible* 1.52 for them to hold any one estate, which it is not by and by againe wearie of: as we may say of the auntient Athenians, Samians, Syracusans, Florentines, and Geno∣wayes; who after they had changed from one estate or forme of gouernment, would by and by haue another. Which phantasticall disease most commonly chanceth vn∣to such Popular estates, as wherein the subiects be too wise and of too subtill spirits, as [ I] were those whome we haue before spoken of: For amongst them euerie man thin∣keth himselfe worthy to be a commaunder, whereas where the subiects be more gros∣ser witted, they the more easily endure to be by others ruled, and more easily yeeld vn∣to other mens aduises, than doe they whome you must with the multitude of argu∣ments and subtiltie of wit conuince, before you shall persuade them vnto any thing: so subtillising their reasons, as that oftentimes they vanish euen into smoke; whereof ariseth an obstinacie of conceit, alwaies enemie vnto wise councels, with diuers chan∣ges of Commonweales. As a man may easily see in Thucidides, Xenophon, and Plu∣tarch, the Athenians lesse than in an hundred yeares, six times to haue chaunged their estate; and since them the Florentines seuen times: which so happened not neither vn∣to [ K] the Venetians, nor Swissers, men not of so sharpe a wit. For who knoweth not the Florentines to be most sharpe witted men? but the Swissers to haue alwaies bene men of a more dull spirit? And yet when as they both almost at the same time, chaunged their Monarchie into a Popular estate, the Swissers haue therein so maintained them∣selues now almost three hundred yeres: wheras the Florentines not long after changed their estate into an Aristocratie; they which in nobilitie and wealth exceed the rest, al∣together disdaining to be made equall with the common sort of the people. But the* 1.53 nobilitie hauing so got the soueraigntie, began also to striue amongst themselues for

the principalitie: and with mutuall hatred and proscriptions so weakned themselues [ A] and their estate, as that they were by the people taking vp armes against them easily ouercome and put to flight. But the nobilitie (and so the Aristocraticall estate) thus ouerthrowne, the popular sort, and they of them especially which were called the Grandes (or great ones) began to striue and contend among themselues, for the go∣uernment of the state: and yet these much more cruelly than had before the nobilitie; for that they contended not by forme of iustice, or of law, but by verie force of armes, and dint of sword; who hauing with mutuall slaughters spent themselues, the middle sort of the people (for they were diuided into three sorts) began to take vpon them the mannaging of the estate: but these also falling together by the eares for places of ho∣nour and commaund, the verie basest and refuse of the rascal people, became too strong [ B] for them, filling all places with the blood and slaughter of them, vntill they had driuen out and slaine the most part of them. Now these also of the baser sort become masters of the estate, and hauing no moe enemies left with whome to striue, began at length to struggle with it selfe, and made such cruell warre vpon it selfe, that the blood ran down the streets, yea & that most part of the houses were with fire quite consumed, vntill that they of Luca moued with their great miseries and distresse, comming in great compa∣nies to Florence, exhorted them their neighbours to lay downe armes, and to seeke for peace: by whose good speeches they persuaded at last, ceased from their slaughters & butchering of one another. Whereupon to end the matter, they sent ambassadours vnto the pope, to send them some one descended of royall blood, to rule and raigne [ C] ouer them: where by good fortune there was then at Rome Charles of Fraunce brother to king Lewes the ninth, who at the request of the pope, and of the Florentines themselues, came to Florence, and with the good liking of the people in generall, tooke vpon him the gouernment, ended their quarrels, and reconciled the citisens among themselues, together with the Commonweale: and so hauing appeased the citisens, and reformed the Commonweale, being inuited to the kingdome of Naples, he left in the citie of Florence his deputies. But he was scarce well gone out of the citie, but that the Florentines wearie of the gouernment of the deputies, came againe vnto their po∣pular gouernment, and so with all renewed their ciuill warres. For redresse whereof [ D] they sent for the duke of Athens, who hauing taken vpon him the soueraigntie, com∣maunded the citisens to lay downe armes, and for the safetie of his person, tooke vnto him a strong guard, so to keepe vnder the seditious and rebellious persons. But the ci∣tisens now supposing themselues so to be spoyled of their libertie, and brought into bondage by the terrour of his guard, turned their old mutuall hatred all vppon the prince, first secretly, and afterwards three conspiracies breaking forth into open force, one after another in the citie: yea at last the citisens altogether burst out into such ha∣tred against the prince, that they besieged the pallace wherein he lay, together with the souldiours which guarded him: neither could that so strait a siege be broken vp, vntill the prince was content himselfe with all his familie to void the city: which for safegard [ E] of his life he was glad to do, not hauing yet a whole yeare gouerned the state. So the citie deliuered of the feare of a master, appointed a forme of an Aristocratie, not much vnlike vnto a Popular estate; deuising new names for their officers and magistrats, still chaunging and rechaunging them with the manner of their state and gouernment, of∣tentimes no better ordered, than if it had bene committed to mad men, or children without discretion: scarcely twentie yeares together keeping the same forme of state. But as sicke men in the heat of burning feuers, desire to be remoued now hither, and by and by againe thither, or from one bed to another, as if the disease were in the places where they lay, and not in the verie entrals of their bodies: euen so the Florentines

were still turning and tumbling of their estate, vntill they light vpon Cosmus Medices, [ F] of all Physitians the most skilfull, who cured the citie of these popular diseases, by esta∣blishing therein a Monarchie, and building therin three strong citadels, furnished with good & sure garrisons; so leauing vnto his posteritie a well grounded soueraigne state, by himselfe holden by the space of almost fortie yeares: than which nothing could haue bin wished for of almightie God, better or more wholsome for such a most sediti∣ous citie. And thus much briefly concerning the Florentine state, which haply might seeme incredible, had they not bene committed to the remembrance of all posteritie, euen by the * writings of the Florentines themselues. The like tragedies we see to haue* 1.54 bene plaid also by the people of Affrike (who in sharpnesse of wit are said to passe the Italians) when they made proofe of Popular estates: whereof I will set downe but one [ G] or two examples amongst many: as namely the inhabitants of Segelmessa, a citie vpon the sea coast in the kingdome of Bugia, reuolting from their king, established among themselues a Popular estate, but shortly after entred into such factions and ciuill sediti∣ons, as that not able to endure either the gouernment of their king, or yet the gouern∣ment of themselues, they by common consent laid all their houses and the walles of their citie euen with the ground, that so they might euerie one of them as kings and princes rule and raigne in their owne houses abroad in the countrey. The people also of Togoda, a citie in the frontiers of the kingdome of Fez, wearie of their Aristocratie, forsooke their countrey. For which causes the people of Affrike, not able to endure the Aristocratique or Popular estates, haue almost euerie where established Royall [ H] Monarchies.

Now albeit that Aristocratike estates seeme to many both better and more assured* 1.55 and durable also than the Popular, yet so it is, that the gouernors therof if they bee not of accord among themselues, are still therein in double daunger: the one from the fa∣ction among themselues, the other from the insurrection or rebellion of the people, who neuer faile to fall vpon them if they once find them at variance among them∣selues, as we haue before shewed of the Florentines. The like whereof happened at Vienna, at Genes, and diuers other Commonweales in Germanie also. As it also chan∣ced in the Peloponesian warre, vnto all the cities of Greece which were then gouer∣ned by the nobilitie or richer sort. Which is also yet more daungerous, when the go∣uernours [ I] giue leaue to all straungers to come and dwell in their cities or countries: who by little and little encreasing, and in wealth and credit growing equall with the na∣turall subiects or citisens, and hauing no part in the gouernment, if they shall chance to be surcharged, or otherwise euill entreated of the gouernours of the state, will vppon* 1.56 the least occasion rise vp against them, and so haply chase euen the naturall lords out of their own countrey: As it chaunced at Sienna, at Genes, at Zurike, and at Cullen; where the straungers encreasing, and seeing themselues surcharged and euill entreated, without hauing any part or interest in the estate, draue out the gouernours and slew most part of them. And namely they of Lindaw, after they had slaine the gouernors, chaunged their Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate: as also did the inha∣bitants [ K] of Strasburg, who in detestation of the Aristocraticall gouernment, which they had chaunged into a Popular, after they had driuen out, banished, or slaine their lords and gouernours, solemnly by law prouided, That no man should haue the great estate, or any other publike charge in the citie, except hee could first well proue his grandfather to haue bene some verie base fellow, and so himselfe to be descended from the meanest sort of the rascall people. Which yet is no new matter: For we read, that the straungers in the Commonweale of Corfu encreased so fast, that in the end they seised vpon all the nobilitie, whom they cast into prison, and there murthered them;

chaunging afterwards that Aristocraticall estate into a Popular gouernment. The like [ A] hapned vnto the Aristocratique Commonweales of the Samians, the Sibarites, the Trezenians, the Amphipolits, the Chalcidians, the Thurians, the Cnidians, and them of Chio, who were all by strangers changed into popular estates, hauing with their multitude thrust out the naturall Lords and gouernours. Which is the thing most to be feared in the Venetian estate, which we haue before showed to be a meere Aristo∣cratie, and receptacle of all straungers, who haue there so well encreased, that for one Venetian gentleman there are an hundred citisens, as well noble as base descended of straungers; which may well be proued by the number of them which was there taken 20 yeares agoe, or thereabouts: wherein were found nine and fiftie thousand three hundred fortie nine citisens, aboue twentie yeares old; and threescore seauen [ B] thousand fiue hundred fiftie seauen women: two thousand one hundred eightie fiue* 1.57 Religious men, 1157 Iewes: which are in all, an hundred thirtie and two thousand three hundred and thirtie persons; whereunto putting a third part more for the num∣ber of them which are vnder twentie yeares old, (taking the ordinary age and the liues of men to be 60 yeares, as the law pre•…•…ineth) it amounteth to the number of about an hundred seauentie six thousand foure hundred and fortie citisens, beside straungers. In which number the nobility or gentlemen were not comprehended, who could not be aboue three or foure thousand, accounting as well them that were absent, as them that were present. And truely I cannot but maruell why the Venetians haue publi∣shed, yea and that more is haue suffered to be put in print the number that then was [ C] taken. The Athenians long agoe committed the like errour, and when the citie was most populous, found that vpon the number taken, there were in the citie twentie thousand citisens, ten thousand straungers, and foure hundred thousand slaues: which open number and account the Romans would not take of their straungers, and so much lesse of their slaues: whom they would not either by their countenance or at∣tire haue knowne from the rest of the citisens: Howbeit that some were of opinion that the slaues ought to be knowne by their apparell; yet their opinion preuayled which thought the same to be daungerous, and a thing to bee feared, lest the slaues entering into the number of themselues, should make their masters their slaues, for so Seneca writeth. We read in the hystorie of Cardinall Bembus, that the greatest as∣semblie [ D] of the gentlemen of Venice in his time (when as that Commonweale was most populous) was but fifteene hundred; which their fewnesse they by most certein tokens, and their attire, make still to appeare. But that which hath most maintained their seignorie against the commotion of the citisens, Is the mutuall amitie and con∣cord of the gouernours and gentlemen among themselues; and the sweetnes of liber∣tie, which is greater in that citie than in any other place of the world: so that beeing drowned in pleasure and delights, and hauing also part in certeine honors and meane offices, whereof the gentlemen are not capable, they haue no occasion to stirre for the chaunging of the estate; as had those of whom I haue before spoken, who were not onely debarred of all offices, but by the gouernors of the State surcharged and [ E] euill entreated also.

Now all these changes of Aristocraties into popular Commonweales haue beene* 1.58 violent and bloodie, as it happeneth almost alwaies: whereas to the contrarie it com∣meth to passe that Popular estates chaunge into Aristocraties by a more gentle and insensible chaunge. As when entrance is giuen vnto straungers, who in tract of time by little and little plant themselues, and multiplie, without hauing any part in the estate and gouernment, it falleth out in the end that the naturall citisen employed in publique charges, or in the warres, or by popular diseases wasted, do so decay; the

straungers still encreasing: whereby it commeth to passe, that the lesser part of the in∣habitants [ F] hold the soueraigntie, which wee haue shewed to bee a right Aristocratie. Such were the changes of those Commonweals which we haue before noted, from the people vnto the nobilitie, and such as haue indeed happened vnto the Venetians, the Luques, them of Rhaguse, & of Genes, which being in auntient time Popular estates, haue by little and little as it were without feeling, changed into Aristocraties: ioyning hereunto also, that the poorer sort of the citisens hauing much a do to liue, & so wholly intentiue vnto their domesticall and priuat affaires, shun all publike charges without profit: and so by succession and prescription of time exclude themselues with their fa∣milies from entermeddling with the state. And this maner of change in the estate, is of all others most gentle and easie, and least subiect vnto tumults and sturres: neither can [ G] otherwise be letted, but that it wil in time chaunge, but by keeping of strangers from en∣tring into the citie: or by sending of them out into colonies, or else together with the rest admitting them vnto the honors and preferments in the estate: and so much the more if the people be giuen to warre. For otherwise it is to be feared, that the nobilitie not daring to put armes into the subiects hands, but being constrained to go to warres themselues, should be all at once ouerthrowne, and so the people inuade to soueraign∣tie: as it happened to the seigneurie of Tarentum, which in one battell against the Iapi∣ges lost almost all the nobilitie: after which the people seeing themselues the stronger,* 1.59 changed the Aristocraty into a Popular estate, in the time of Themistocles. And for this cause the nobilitie of the Argiues, being almost all slaine by Cleomenes king of Lacede∣monia, [ H] they that remained yet aliue, fearing the rebellion of the people, of themselues receiued the comminaltie into the fellowship of the gouernment, and so of their owne accord seemed willingly to grant that which the people otherwise haue taken from them by force, & whether they would or no: by which means their Aristocratie most quietly and sweetly chaunged into a Popular estate. So one of the things that gaue ad∣uantage vnto the people of Rome ouer the nobilitie, was the victorie of the Vientes, who in one battell slew 300 of the Fabians, all gentlemen of one house, when as not long after twelue families of the Potitij, who ascribed the beginning of their houses vn∣to the gods, were in one and the same yere quite extinguished & brought to naught, as Liuie writeth. And therefore the Venetians, better citisens than warriors, if they bee to [ I] make warre (which they neuer doe but vpon great necessitie) vse commonly to chuse their generall one of their nobilitie, their souldiors for the most part beeing stran∣gers and mercenarie men. But this inconuenience for the changing of the estate, for the losse of the nobilitie, cannot happen in a Monarchie, if all the princes of the blood bee* 1.60 not slaine together with the rest of the nobilitie: as the maner of the Turks is to doe in all places where they haue any purpose absolutely to command, where they spare not so much as a gentleman: whereof haue ensued the destruction of many Common∣weals in the East, and great encreasing of the Turkish empire. But this change, or rather vnion or encreasement of one estate by another, proceedeth from externall force. So in France also, when as almost all the nobilitie of France was slaine in the expedition of [ K] Fontenay, neere vnto Auxerre, by the ciuill warre betwixt Lothaire the eldest sonne of Lewes the Gentle, on the one part, and Lewes and Charles the Bald on the other: yet for all that all their three Monarchies stood still firme: and namely when the countrey of Champagne had lost so much of the nobilitie in those wars, as that for the restoring therof, the gentlewomen had especial priuilege to ennoble their husbands with whom they should marrie, and yet for all that the Monarchy in the state therof felt no change at all. And thus are the great and notable changes commonly made in Aristocratike and Popular Commonweales.

But nothing is so much in an Aristocratie to be feared, as least some gracious man [ A] * 1.61 of the nobilitie, or of the people, desirous of rule & authoritie, should stirre vp the peo∣ple against the nobilitie, and become leader of them himselfe. For therof ensueth the most certaine destruction of an Aristocratie, together with the nobilitie. In this sort Thr•…•…syllus first, and afterward Thrasybulus at Athens, Marius and Caesar at Rome, Fra. Valori, and P. Sodorin at Florence, armed the people against the nobilitie: which is also so much the more to be feared, if the great honours of the estate bee bestowed vppon most filthy and wicked men, and other vertuous men and such as haue well deserued of the Commonweale, kept backe and excluded. Which thing seemeth not grieuous onely to euerie good man, and not to be borne withall, but ministreth occasion also vnto the seditious and popular, to enflame the people against the nobilitie. Neither [ B] for any other cause did the people of the Orites by force wrest the power and gouern∣ment from the nobilitie, than for that they had preferred vnto the chiefe honours one Heracleotes, a man for his euill life infamous. Which thing also was the destruction of Nero and Heliogabalus, for that they had bestowed the greatest honours and prefer∣ments of the empire, vpon most wicked and corrupt men. Which of all other things is most to be feared and shunned in an Aristocratie Aristocratically gouerned: that is to say, where the people is kept from all honours and places of commaund: which al∣though it be of it selfe an hard thing patiently to endure, yet were it the better to bee borne, if the gouernment were committed to good men: but when it is giuen to wic∣ked and vnworthy men, euerie audacious fellow vppon occasion offered, will easily [ C] draw the people from the nobilitie, and so much the rather, by how much the nobilitie shall be at lesse vnitie among themselues. Which plague, as it is in all estates and go∣uernments,* 1.62 so is it especially in an Aristocratie to be eschewed and fled. Now discord oft times ariseth euen of most small matters, which as sparkes raise the great fiers of ciuill warres, which at length take hold euen of the whole bodie of the estate of a citie or Commonweale. As it happened at Florence, for the refusall made by a gentleman of the noble house of Bondelmont, to marrie a gentlewoman to whome hee had before giuen his promise, gaue occasion to the raising of a faction amongst the nobilitie, who so wasted and deuoured one another, as that the people to end the quarrel, easily draue* 1.63 out all the rest, and commaunded the state of the citie. And for like occasion arose [ D] great ciuill warres amongst the Ardeates, for an inheretrix, whome her mother would haue married vnto a gentleman, and her guardions to a base obscure man: which di∣uided the people from the nobilitie, in such sort, that the nobilitie vanquished and put to flight by the people, tooke their refuge vnto the Romans, and the people vnto the Volsians, who were afterwards vanquished by the Romans. So also the citie & Com∣monweale of Delphos, for the same occasion, was chaunged from an Aristocratie vn∣to a Popular estate. The state of Mitelin was also chaunged from an Aristocratie into a Popular estate, vpon a suit betwixt the nobilititie and the people, Which of them should haue the tuition of two orphans. And the state of the Commonweale of the Hestiens, for a suit in matter of inheritance betwixt two priuat men. And the sacred [ E] warre which chaunged not, but euen vtterly ruinated the estate of the Phocenses, was grounded vpon the marriage of an inheritrix, whome two of their great lords stroue to haue. And that more is, the Aetolians and Arcadians, for a long time sore weakened one another with mutuall warres, and all but fo•…•… a boares head: as they of Carthage and of Bizaque did also for a small frigot. So betwixt the Scots and the Picts, was rai∣sed a most cruell warre, and all but for certaine dogges, which the Scots had taken from the Picts, and neuer could be againe reconciled, howbeit that they had for six hundred yeares before liued in good peace and amitie together. And the war betwixt the duke

of Burgundy and the Swissers, which could no otherwise be ended, but by the death of [ F] the duke himself, was all but for a wagon load of sheepe skins which he had taken from the Swissers.* 1.64

Sometime also the changes and ruines of Commonweales come, when the great ones are to be brought in question, to cause them to giue an account of their actions, whether it be for right or wrong: wherein euen they which are guiltlesse (and especi∣ally in Popular estates) not without cause alwaies feare the calumnies and doubtfull is∣sues of iudgements, which most commonly endaunger the liues, the goods, and ho∣nour of such as are accused. And to leaue forren examples, wee haue store enow of our owne, and that of such as of late haue set on fire all the kingdome with ciuill wars when it was but spoken of, for calling them to account for two and fortie millions. And [ G] no maruell if they so feared to be brought in question for embeseling of the common treasure and reuenewes, when as Pericles, a man of greatest integritie, and which had most magnificently spent euen his owne wealth for the Athenian Commonweale, ra∣ther than he would hazard the account that they demaunded of him for the treasure of Athens, which he had mannaged, and so generally of his actions, raised the Pelopone∣sian warre, which neuer after tooke end vntill it had ruinated diuers Commonweals, and wholly chaunged the estate of all the cities of Greece. Who alwaies hauing bene a good husband, and had the charge of the common treasure of that Commonweale, by the space of almost fiftie yeares, was therefore yet found neuer the richer, as Thucy∣dides, a most true historiographer, and Pericles his most mortall enemie reporteth of [ H] him: who caused him to be banished with the banishment of the Ostracisme. And euen for the selfe same cause the Rhodians and they of Choos had their estates chan∣ged from Aristocraties into Popular estates. And albeit that Caesar was of himselfe most ambitious and desirous of soueraigntie: yet was he not so much desirous to beare rule, as affraid to be called to account by priuat men, for such things as he had done, as his enemies had openly boasted that he should, so soone as hee was discharged of his charge: not the least cause that moued him to ceise vpon the estate. For what assu∣rance could he haue of himselfe, seeing before the two Scipioes (Africanus the honor of his time, and Scipio Asiaticus) Rotulus and Cicero, by the iudgement of the people condemned? Now if good men were to feare, what should the wicked do? who be∣sides [ I] that they are in hope the better to escape, the Commonweale beeing all on a broile, are also resolued, that the common treasures can neuer more easily be robbed, or good men spoiled and slaine, than in the time of ciuill warres: euer taking it for an aduantage to fish in the troubled water. And although it may fortune such wicked men also to perish (as oftentimes it happeneth them which haue bene the authors of ci∣uill warres, themselues to die a most miserable death) yet haue they still in their mouths that desperat saying of Cateline▪ That the fire (forsooth) which had taken hold of his house, which he could not with water quench, hee would yet quench with the vtter ru∣ine of the same. And truly much he missed not, but that hee had vtterly ouerthrowne the Roman Commonweale, or stept into the soueraigntie, had not Cicero the watchful [ K] Consul, and Ca. Antonius his companion (although it were with much a do) slaine him so desperat a citisen, with all his fellows. Neither ought Cicero (by his good leaue bee it said) to haue driuen Catiline out of the citie, but to haue oppressed him euen there, the conspiracie once detected. For it is not to be hoped, but that he which seeth himself ba∣nished from his house, & from his country, if he haue power, wil forthwith put himself in arms, as he did. And had he gained the battell against Ca▪ Antonius, hee had put the* 1.65 whole estate in great danger, being one of the most noble gentlemen, and best allied of all them that were in Rome. Certeine it is that by his departure out of the citie, a great

and dangerous sinke of the Commonweale was so well clensed; yet had it beene bet∣ter [ A] for him to haue beene there oppressed, than armed against his owne countrie. But of such great and dangerous enemies, the wiser sort aduiseth vs, to make them our* 1.66 verie good friends, or else vtterly to destroy them, rather than to driue them out of the citie; except we should for honour banish them: as they did in the cities of Athens, Argos, and Ephesus, where the great Lordes mightie in wealth, fauour, or vertue, were for a certeine time (which for all that neuer exceeded ten yeares) constrained to absent themselues, without any losse of goods or reputation; which was an honourable kind of banishment. Of whom so banished, not any one of them is reported to haue there∣fore made warre vpon his countrie. But to banish a great Lord with losse of his good•…•… and contumely, is not to quench but to kindle the fire of warre against the estate: For [ B] that oft times such a banished man by the helpe of his friends aspireth vnto the soue∣raigntie; as did Dion banished out of Syracusa by Dionysius the yonger, against whom for all that he yet tooke not vp armes vntill he was by him proscribed. And Martius Coriolanus, who cast into exile, brought the Romans to such extremitie, as that had he not suffered himselfe to haue beene ouercome with the prayers and teares of his mother, and the other women whom the Romans had sent vnto him, the Roman state had there taken end. In like manner the banished men of the house of Medices, and the nobilitie of Zurich in the yeare 133•…•…, thrust out of their cities, by the helpe and power of their friends and allies besieged their owne natiue countries, and for a long [ C] time wearied the citisens their countrymen with a most doubtfull and daungerous warre. But yet here some man may say, That it is more safetie to keepe a wicked and a daungerous citisen without the wals, than to bee troubled with such a plague in the verie entrailes of the Commonweale. Whereto I yeeld: but yet how much greater a follie is it to let him whom thou oughtest to kill, to escape out of the citie, who once got out, is both willing and able to stirre vp, and maintaine warre? Artaxerxes king of Persia had cast in prison Cyrus the yonger, guiltie of high treason, and had comman∣ded him in princely manner to be bound with chaines of gold; and afterwards ouer∣come with his mothers requests enlarged him: but he had no sooner got his libertie, but that he made most grieuous warre vpon the king, and was like enough by his bro∣thers [ D] death to haue obtained the kingdome, or else haue vndone his countrie; had he not by the kings armie beene circumuented and slaine. I said we must kill such people,* 1.67 or make them our good friends: as did Augustus, hauing discouered the conspiracie of Cinna against him, and hauing him in his power attainted and conuinced by his owne letters, yet neuerthelesse pardoned him; and not so content, tooke him by the hand, and swore a bond of mutuall friendship with him, and afterwards bestowed the greatest honours and preferments of the estate vpon him, at the time that Cinna ex∣pected nothing but the sentence of condemnation, and so present execution; vsing these words of grace and fauour vnto him: Vitam tibi Cinna iterum do, priùs hosti, nunc insidiatori ac parricidae; Ex hodierno die amicitia inter nos incipiat, contendamus vtrum [ E] ego meliore fide vitam tibi dederim, an tu debeas, Cinna (said he) thy life I giue thee againe, being before mine enemie, and now a traitour and a murtherer; But from this day, let vs begin to be friends, and from henceforth let vs striue, whether I with greater trust haue giuen thee thy life, or thou with greater faithfulnesse doest ow it. After which time he neuer had a more faithfull friend; being also afterwards by him appoin∣ted heire of all his goods. Augustus had before put to death an infinite number of such as had sworne and conspired his death: but now had a purpose in Cinna to proue if by gentlenesse and mercie he could gaine the hearts of men, wherein he was not de∣ceiued: for from that time there was neuer any found which durst attempt any thing

against him. So the Venetians also hauing taken prisoner Gonzaga the duke of Man∣tua, [ F] of all others their most mortall enemie, (who had ioyned all his forces and power with king Lewes of Fraunce for the ouerthrow of the Venetian state) did not onely set him at libertie, but made him Generall also of their forces; by which so honorable a kindnesse he bound, for euer after continued their most fast and loiall friend. And this is it for which Pontius the old capitaine of the Samnites said, That the great armie of the Romans surprised in the straites of the Appenine mountaines was either franke and freely to bee set at libertie, or else all to be put to the sword: for that so it should come to passe, that either the power of the Romans should by so great a slaughter be greatly weakned, or else hauing receiued from the Samnites so great a benefit, as the life and libertie of so many men, they should for euer after keepe good league and [ G] friendship with them.

But these conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales do more often happen in* 1.68 little and small cities or estates, than in great kingdomes full of great prouinces, and people. For that a small Commonweale is soone diuided into two parts or factions: Whereas a great Commonweale is much more hardly diuided; for that betwixt the great Lords and the meanest subiects, betwixt the rich and the poore, betwixt the good and the bad, there are a great number of the middle sort which bind the one with the other, by meanes that they participate both with the one and the other, as hauing some accord and agreement with both the extreames. And that it is for which we see the little Commonweales of Italie, & the auntient Commonweals of Greece, [ H] which had but one, two, or three townes or cities belonging to them, in one age to haue suffered moe alterations and chaunges than are in many ages reported to haue beene in this kingdome of Fraunce, or in the kingdome of Spayne. For it is not to be doubted but that the extreames are alwaies contrarie one of them to the other, and so at discord and variance betwixt themselues, if there be not some meanes which may binde and ioine the one of them with the other; which we see by the eye, not onely betwixt the nobilitie and base common people, betwixt the rich and the poore, be∣twixt the good and the bad, but euen in the same citie also, where as but the diuersitie of places seperate but by some riuer, or wast vacant peece of ground without building vpon it, doth oft times set the citisens at odds, and giue occasion to the chaunging 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [ I] * 1.69 the estate. So the citie of Fez was neuer at quiet, neither could the slaughters & mur∣thers euer be appeased or staied, vntill that Ioseph king of Marocco and of Fez, of two townes standing somewhat distant one of them from the other by continuate buil∣ding made them both one, and that now the greatest citie of Fez, whereby he gained the praise and commendation of a most wise & discreet prince; for that he so not onely ioyned houses to houses, and wals to wals, but bound also the mindes of the citisens and inhabitants of both places (before burning with an incredible hatred one of them against an other, and alwaies diuided in warres) now in perpetuall loue and friendship together. Which hapned also vnto the Clazomenians, where one part of the citie standing in the maine, and the other part in an Island, there was alwaies discord and [ K] warre betwixt them of the Isle and the other citisens. And so at Athens they which dwelt by the hauens side commonly called Piraeus, were at continuall discord and va∣riance with them of the vpper Towne which they called Astu or the Citie, vntill that Pericles with long walles ioyned the Hauen vnto the Citie. For which cause also such tumults and quarrels fell betwixt the citisens of Venice, and the mariners and other the seafaring men, as had brought the citie into extreame perill and daunger had not Peter Lauredan with his great authoritie and wisedome appeased the same.

But most often it hapneth the chaunges of Commonweales to follow after ciuill

discord, especially if some neighbour prince shall vpon the suddein oppresse a citie or [ A] * 1.70 State weakned with the slaughter of the citisens or subiects, or else the citisens or sub∣iects themselues being by the eares together: As the Englishmen haue often times van∣quished and ouerrunne the French being at variance among themselues: And the king of Fez easely tooke the citie of Tefza, the citisens being almost all consumed and spent with ciuill warre, And in the memorie of our fathers Philip the second duke of Bourgondie ioyned vnto the boundes of his dukedome Dinan and Bo•…•…ines, two cities in the countrie of Liege (parted in sunder but with a riuer) after that they had with long warres weakned themselues, which two cities for all that he could not be∣fore by any force subdue; howbeit that in taking of them he did but marrie the one of [ B] them vnto the other, as saith Philip Commines. So also whilest the kings of Marocco were in armes together for the soueraigntie, the Gouernour of Thunes and of Tele∣sin dismembred those two prouinces to make himselfe a kingdome of. And by the same meanes Lachares seeing the Athenians in combustion, in the time of Demetrius the besieger, stept into the Seignorie. And that more is, we read that foure thousand fiue hundred slaues and banished men inuaded the Capitoll, and missed but a little to haue made themselues lords of Rome, whilest the Nobilitie and Common people in the meane time were together by the eares in an vproar in the middest of the citie, who thereupon fell to agreement among themselues; not vnlike vnto two dogges, who readie to pull one an others throat out, seing a wolfe, fall both vpon him. Wher∣fore such ciuill discord is most daungerous vnto cities or estates, especially if there be [ C] no societie or allyance betwixt the State so troubled, and the neighbour Princes: for that the enemie so at hand, may oppresse the state (the citisens or subiects so at vari∣ance among themselues) before that any helpe can come. Whereat we are not to matuell, for they to whom neither the huge height of steepe mountaines, neither the vnmeasurable depth of the botomlesse sea, nor the most solitarie desarts, nor the grea∣test and strongest fortifications, nor the innumerable multitude of enemies can serue for the staying of their ambitious and auaritious couses and desires; how should they content themselues with their owne, without encroaching vppon their neighbours, whose frontiers touch theirs, and that fit occasion presenteth it selfe for them so to do? which is there the more to be feared where the Commonweale is but little: as is that [ D] of Rhaguse, of Geneua, and of Luque, which haue but one Towne, and the territorie vene strait; so that he which shall gaine the towne, shall withall become master of the Estate also: which so chaunceth not in great and spacious Commonweale, wherein many castles, cities, countries, and prouinces are in mutuall helpe together combyned, so that one citie thereof being taken, or a countrie or prouince thereof spoyled, yet followeth not the ruine of the Estate, one of them still succoring an other, as many members in one bodie, which at need helpe one an other.

Yet for all that a Monarchie hath this aduantage proper vnto it selfe, aboue the* 1.71 Aristocratique and Popular estates, That in these commonly there is but one towne [ E] or citie wherein the Seigneurie lyeth, which is as an house or place of retrait for them which haue the mannaging of those estates to retire vnto; which once taken by the enemie, the estate is withall vndone: whereas a Monarke chaungeth himselfe from place to place as occasion requireth: neither doth the taking of him by the enemie bring with it the losse of the Estate. As when the citie of Capua was taken, their estate was also ouerthrowne by the Romans, neither was there so much as one towne or fortresse which made resistance against them; for that the Senat and the people which had the soueraigntie were all together taken prisoners. The citie of Sienna also being taken by the duke of Florence, all the other townes and fortresses of that Seigneurie

at the same time yeelded themselues vnto him also. But the king taken prisoner, is [ F] most commonly for his ransome set at libertie; wherewith if the enemie hold not him selfe content, the Estates may proceed to a new election, or take the next of blood if they haue other princes: yea sometime the captiue king himselfe had rather to yeeld vp his estate, or else to die a prisoner, than to grieue his subiects with his too heauie a ransome. As indeed that which most troubled the Emperour Charles the fift was the resolution of king Francis then his prisoner, who gaue him to vnderstand that he was* 1.72 vpon the point to resigne his kingdome vnto his eldest sonne, if he would not accept of the conditions by him offered: For why, the realme and all the Estate stood yet whole without any chaunge taking, or any alteration suffering. And albeit that Spayne, Italie, England, all the Low Countries, the Pope, the Venetians, and all the Poten∣tates [ G] of Italie had combyned themselues against the house of Fraunce, ouerthrowne our legions at Pauie, and caried away the king with the flower of the nobilitie into Spayne; yet was there not any which durst enter into Fraunce to conquer it, knowing the lawes and nature of that Monarchie. For as a building grounded vpon deepe foundations, & built with durable matter, well vnited and ioyned in euery part, feareth neither winde nor tempest, but easily resisteth all force and violence; euen so a Com∣monweale grounded vpon good lawes, well vnited and ioyned in all the members thereofe, asily suffereth not alteration: as also to the contrarie we see some states and Commonweales so euill built and set together, as that they ow their fall and ruine vn∣to the first wind that bloweth, or tempest that ariseth. [ H]

And yet is there no kingdome which shall not in continuance of time be chaunged,* 1.73 and at length also be ouerthrowne. But they are in better case which least feele such their chaunges by little and little made, whether it be from euill to good, or from good to better; as we haue showed by the example of the Venetian Commonweale: which at the beginning was a pure Monarchie, which afterward was sweetly chaunged into a Popular estate, and now by little and little is chaunged into an Aristocratie, and that in such quiet sort, as that it was not well by any man perceiued that the estate was at all chaunged. An other example we haue also of the Germaine Empire, which foun∣ded* 1.74 by Charlemaigne and discending to his posteritie, so long continued a true Mo∣narchie vnder one soueraigne princes gouernment, vntill that the line of Charlemaigne [ I] fayling, the Emperours begun to be created by election; at which time it was right easie for the princes which had the choice by little and little to clip the Eagles wings, and to prescribe lawes and conditions vnto the Emperour to rule by; and yet right happie was he which could thereunto aspire vpon any condition whatsoeuer: where∣by the state of the Monarchie began by little and little to decay, and the state of an Aristocratie to encrease in the Princes and Estates of the Empire, in such sort as that at this present the Emperours haue nothing more but as it were the bare name and title of an Emperour, the soueraigntie resting in the Estates of the Empire it selfe. So that had not eleuen most noble Princes of the house of Austria for their worthy deeds right famous, as it were in a successiue right (one of them whilest he himselfe yet li∣ueth, [ K] still procuring an other of the same house to be designed Emperour) in some sort maintained the maiestie of the Germaine Empire, the Emperours for their estate had now long ago beene like vnto the Dukes of Venice, and happely inferiour too. The •…•…ke chaunge hapned vnto the Polonians, the lyne of Iagellon failing: as also the Danes, after that Christierne their king was by them his subiects imprisoned, and his brother to be chosen king in his place, sworne to such conditions as the nobilitie would: and after that Frederike which now raigneth hath beene constrained to confirme the same, (as I haue before noted) whereby it manifestly appeareth, that the Nobilitie there

hold as it were the soueraigntie, and that by little and little that kingdome will change [ A] into an Aristocratie if Frederike should die without children.

And albeit that the estates of Hungarie, Bohemia, Polonia, and Denmarke, haue al∣wayes* 1.75 pretended the right of election of their kings, although they haue children, (which prerogatiue they stil maintaine) yet commonly the kings their parents appoin∣ted their children vnto the succession of their kingdomes, who so chosen in their fa∣thers places, better maintaine the rights of soueraigntie than do straungers (who haue the same oft times cut short, and so their soueraigne power in them restrained) so that the kingdomes so descending, as it were in succession from the great grandfathers vnto their nephewes, the soueraigne rights by little and little without violence returne again from the nobilitie vnto the kings themselues: which is both an easie chaunge, & most [ B] wholsome for the Commonweale. For so Cazimir the Great, king of Polonia, worthi∣ly defended the soueraigne rights by him receiued from his great grandfather: but hee dead without issue, the Polonians indeed called Lewes king of Hungarie (and Cazimir his nephew) vnto the kingdome of Polonia, but with the soueraigntie therein much diminished; he for the gaining of the kingdome yeelding to whatsoeuer the estates de∣sired. But Lewes dead also without heires male, Iagello duke of Lithuania marrying one of the daughters and heires of Lewes, and so with her obtaining the kingdome of Polonia, yet more impaired the soueraigne rights than they had before bene: the prin∣ces of whose posteritie neuerthelesse as it were in successiue right, for the space of aboue [ C] two hundred yeares, tooke vpon them the gouernment of the kingdome, and notably maintained the rights of their soueraigntie, vntill the death of Sigismundus Augustus, last heire male of that house: vnto whome by right of election succeeded Henrie of Fraunce, Charles the ninth the French kings brother: but with oathes and conditions bound vnto the estates, so much derogating from the rights of a soueraigne Monarch, as that indeed he might haue seemed rather a prince than a king. And to say yet more, I being sent to Mets, to assist them which were thither sent with the duke, to receiue the ambassadours of Polonia, and to parle with them, it was told me by Salomon Sbo∣roschi one of the ambassadours, That the estates of Polonia had yet cut much shorter the power of the new elected king, had it not bene in the regard they had of the honor [ D] of the house of Fraunce. Thus we see Monarchies peaceably by little and little to change into Aristocraties, if so it be that the Monarchie be not by auntient lawes and immutable customes, maintained in the maiestie thereof. As we see in the creation of the pope, where the Consistorie (or Colledge of Cardinals) derogat nothing from the soueraigne maiestie that he hath in all the demaine of the church, and the fees depen∣ding thereon: no more than do the order of the knights of Malta in any thing dimi∣nish the power of the Grand maister, who hath the power of life and death, and to di∣spose of the reuenewes, estates, and offices of the countrey, yeelding fealtie and homage vnto the king of Spaine for the isle of Malta, which Charles the fift the emperour vpon this condition gaue them. And albeit that the colledge of cardinals after the death of [ E] pope Iulius the second, determined in the conclaue, to moderat the popes power: yet shortly after they flew from that they had before decreed, in such sort that Leo the tenth, then by them chosen, tooke vpon him more power than had any pope of long time before him.

But that chaunge is of others most daungerous to a Monarchie, when as the king* 1.76 dying without issue, there is some one who in wealth and power exceedeth the rest; & so much the more, if he be also ambitious and desirous of rule: For no doubt, but that hauing the power in his hand, hee will, if hee can, take the soueraigntie from the other weake princes. For so Hugh Capet the right line of Charlemaigne ended, being Prouost

of the citie of Paris, and a man of great wealth, and no lesse fauoured of the people, ex∣cluded [ F] from the kingdome Charles duke of Loraine, who with his sonne Otho were the onely men left of all the posteritie of Charlemaigne. Which is also to bee feared of the great Othoman princes, who although they haue their families of the Machal∣oglies, of the Ebranes, and the Turacans, of the princes house and blood, to succeed in the Turkish empire: yet for all that if the Othoman familie should altogether perish, it is to be thought, that some one of the Bassaes or other great men, in greatest fauour with the Ianzaries, and the other souldiours of the court will carrie away the estate and so∣ueraigntie from the other princes of the aforesaid families, being but weake, and far off* 1.77 from the Grand Signior, which might so raise the greatest ciuill warres in the East, for the great opinion which the people hath of long conceiued of the valour and maiesty [ G] of the Othoman familie. A notable example of such change of state wee haue in the chaunge of the Lacedemonian kingdome: where Cleomenes the king vanquished and put to flight by Antigonus, the kingdome was chaunged into a Popular estate, which so continued for three yeares: during which time the people made choyce of fiue Prouosts, or chiefe magistrats, whome they called Ephori, chosen out of the people themselues: but newes being brought of the death of Cleomenes, slaine in Aegypt, two of the fiue Ephori conspired against the other three their companions and fellowes in office: and so as they were doing sacrifice, caused them to be slaine: which done, they proceed to the election of Agesipolis for their king, a prince of the royall blood. But whereas before Cleomenes they were woont to haue two kings: one Lycurgus a man [ H] gracious with the people, but otherwise none of the blood royall, by corruption and briberie caused himselfe also by the people to be chosen king, Chilon, a noble gentle∣man, discended from Hercules, being for his pouerty and want of ability excluded, who not able to endure so great an indignity offered vnto his house and family, procured all the magistrats to be slaine: Lycurgus himselfe onely escaping, who after great effu∣sion of blood, held the soueraignty himselfe alone, hauing before almost quite destroy∣ed the royall race of the Heraclides posterity of Hercules. And thus much concerning the chaunge and ruine of Commonweales, which whether they may by any meanes be forseene and preuented, let vs now also see. [ I]

CHAP. II. ¶ Whether there be any meane to know the chaunges and ruines, which are to chaunce vnto Commonweales.

SEeing that there is nothing in this world which commeth to passe by chaunce or fortune, as all diuines and the wiser sort of the Philoso∣phers haue with one common consent resolued: Wee will here in the first place set downe this maxime for a ground or foundation, That the chaunges and ruines of Commonweals, are humane, or naturall, or diuine; that is to say, That they come to passe eitheir by the onely [ K] councell and iudgement of God, without any other meine causes: or by ordinarie and naturall meanes of causes and effects, by almightie God bound in such fit order and consequence, as that those things which are first haue coherence with the last; and those which are in the middest with them both: and all with all combined and bound toge∣ther with an indissoluble knot and tying: which Plato according to the opinion of Homer hath called the Golden Chaine, that is to say, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or by the will of man, which the diuines confesse to be free, at the least concerning ciuill actions: how∣beit that indeed it is no will at all, which in any sort whatsoeuer is enforced and bound.

Which will of man is so mutable and vncertaine, as that it should be impossible to giue [ A] * 1.78 thereby any iudgement, to know the changes and ruines which are to fall vpon Com∣monweales. As for the councell of God, it is inscrutable, but that he sometime by secret inspiration declareth his will, as he hath done vnto his Prophets, causing them many worlds of yeres before to see the falles of many the greatest empires and Monarchies, which posteritie hath by experience found to be true. But this diuine power of the al∣mightie most seldome times showeth it selfe immediatly without the comming be∣twixt of meane causes; neither doth he it without greatest force and most sudden vio∣lence: as when he in one and the selfe same moment with wonderfull fire, and reuen∣ging flames, destroyed the fiue cities with Sodome and Gomorrha: and so chaunged* 1.79 also the place then full of most sweet waters and aboundance of fish, with a most stin∣king [ B] & lothsome tast, as that it yet is vnto all kind of fish pestilent & deadly: and as for the ground it selfe, before of wonderful fertility, he so couered it with ashes and stinking sulpher, as that he seemeth in that countrey to haue left no place for wholsome plants, or any kind of graine to grow in. So also he ouerwhelmed Bura and Helice, two cities of Greece, with such a deluge of water, and that so suddenly, that euen they also which were about to haue fled out of the cities into the ships, being by the wonderfull rising of the waters, vnable to come to the hauen, were so all drowed. By the like wrath of God a great earthquake in a moment swallowed vp three and twentie cities in Italie, where afterward the Fennes called Pontinae burst out. As in like manner twelue cities of Asia are reported to haue bene all at once vpon the sudden with an earthquake de∣uoured. [ C]

Wherefore seeing that mans wil is still diuers and mutable, & God his iudgements most secret and inscrutable: there remaineth onely to know, whether that by naturall causes (which not altogether obscure, but by a certaine constant order of causes and ef∣fects gouerned, kept their course) a man may iudge of the issue and successe of Com∣monweales.* 1.80 Yet by these naturall causes hauing in them this power (which are many and diuers) we meane not ciuill causes, whereunto the chaunge and ruine of cities and Commonweales must needs immediatly follow: as when good deserts goe vnrewar∣ded, and great offences vnregarded, who knoweth not but that such a state or Com∣monweale must needs in short time perish and come to naught? For of all causes none [ D] is more certaine, none more weightie, and in bri•…•…fe none neerer vnto the change or ru∣ine of a citie or Commonweale, than these. But the causes which we here seeke after, are the celestial and more remote causes▪ yet proceeding from a certaine naturall course and force: howbeit that it be good also to behold and foresee all maner of causes what soeuer. For as a painter doth one way consider of a mans bodie, and the Physitian ano∣ther: and the naturall Philosopher one way considereth of the mind of man, & the di∣uine another: so also the Politiitan doth one way, the Astrologer another, and the di∣uine a third way, iudge of the change & ruine of Commonweals. The Polititian in the ruine of a citie or Commonweale, blameth the iniuries and wrongs done by the prince [ E] vnto his subsects, the corruptnesse of the magistrats, with the iniquitie of the laws: The Astrologer considereth and beholdeth the force and power of the heauenly starres and planets, and thereof thinketh diuers motions to arise in mens minds, for the change and innouation of estates and Commonweales: But the Diuine constantly affirmeth all plagues, wars, dearth, destructions of cities and nations, to proceed from the contempt* 1.81 * of God and of his religion, and God therefore to be angrie, and to stupifie the wise∣dome euen of the most wisest magistrats, and to arme euen his starres against princes. And euerie one of these haue their causes, by the helpe and concourse whereof wise men may guesse the change or ruine of a citie or Commonweale. In which point we

see many to erre and be deceiued, which thinke, that to looke into the starres, and to [ F] * 1.82 search after their secret influencies and vertues, is in some sort to diminish the maiestie and power of almightie God: whereas to the contrarie it is thereby made much more glorious and beautifull, to do so great things by his creatures, as if he did then imme∣diatly by his owne mightie hand, without any other meane at all.

Now what man is there of sound iudgement, which feeleth not the wonderfull* 1.83 force and effect of the celestiall bodies in nature in generall? Which yet for all that no necessitie of nature worketh, for that it may by almighty God be stil kept back and re∣strained, being himselfe free from the lawes of nature, which hee himselfe hath com∣maunded; not as by a decree of a Senat, or of a people, but euen of himselfe: who be∣ing of all others the greatest, can do nothing but that which is right and iust, for that he [ G] is himselfe the best, and hath a * 1.84 perpetuall care of all people and nations, but yet ther∣of himselfe secure, for that he is himselfe the greatest. But as all things which had be∣ginning haue also a loose and fraile dissoluable nature (as by most certaine and vn∣doubtfull demonstration is to be proued) it must thereof needs follow also, not onely* 1.85 cities and Commonweals, but euen also other things, which from their first beginning haue innumerable worlds of yeares flourished, must at length in tract of time fall also and take end. And albeit that Plato the prince of Phylosophers, hauing not as yet the knowledge of the celestiall motions, and so much lesse of their effects (which as then was couered in most thicke darknesse and clouds) when as he with a notable inuen∣tion had conceited such a forme of a Commonweale, as seemed vnto many to bee [ H] euerlasting, if it erred not from the lawes and orders by him set downe; yet for all that he said, That it should in time perish: as he which most manifestly saw the vanitie of all things, which as they had a beginning, so were they also to take ending; nothing be∣ing still firme and stable, besides him which was the father of all things. Which being so, there be no so notable orders, no so religious lawes, no such wisedome or valour of man, which can still presetue estates or Commonweales from ruine and most certaine destruction. By which reasons, Secundus (a Philosopher of the Stoike sect) greatly com∣forted Pompey, discouraged and almost desperat after the Pharsalian ouerthrow. Nei∣ther yet therefore do they which thinke the course of naturall causes to concerne the changes and ruines of cities and Commonweals, thereby bind the free will of man, and [ I] much lesse almightie God himselfe vnto a fatall necessitie: no not if we should deeme all things to be done by a continuat and interlaced course of forerunning naturall cau∣ses; seeing that euen nature it selfe is by the power of God kept in & restrained. Wher∣fore we oftentimes see both plants, and other liuing creatures, which by nature haue a certaine period of their liues, by some externall force to hasten or preuent the tearmes by nature prefined, and so sooner to die than by nature they should. And as for man∣kind, we haue it oftentimes in holy writ recorded, That they which lead an vpright & vertuous life, shall liue long: whereas the wicked should shorten their dayes, and bring themselues vnto a most speedie confusion and end. Whereby it appeareth certaine prefixed bounds of euerie mans life, to be by God appoined, which by sinne may bee [ K] cut shorter, and by vertue extended farther. So kingdomes also haue their beginnings, their encreasings, their flourishing estates, their changings, and ruines: yet when these chaunges shall be, or ruines, or destructions betide them, we see it by no learning to bee perceiued or vnderstood. For as for that which Plato hath written, Kingdomes then to fall and take end, when as the sweet consent and harmonie of them should perish and decay; is a thing not worth the refutation: whereof yet for all that more in due place shall be said.

Now many there be, which haue thought the conuersions and chaunges of estates

and Commonwealas, to depend of the force, power and motion of the superiour cele∣stiall [ A] bodies: which to discouer, were a matter of infinit difficultie, which yet for all that should not be so great, if Commonweales should as men and other things take their beginning. And albeit that the state and ruine of Commonweales should wholly next vnto God depend of those eternall lights, and of their mutuall coniunctions and oppositions, yet could thereof no certaine doctrine be deliuered or gathered, for the* 1.86 great varietie and inconstancy of them which haue obserued the force and course of the celestiall stars & orbes; insomuch, that some one hath written the same star in the selfe same moment to haue beene in his direct motion, and another hath likewise written the same to be retrograde, which yet for all that, was to bee seene in the hea∣uens stationarie and immoueable. So that they are by their owne rashnesse to be re∣felled, [ B] which vaunt themselues to be able without error, to foretell the force and pow∣er of the starres, vpon cities and Commonweales; as also what effects they shall for many yeares to come produce, when as in the very motion of the moone, which of all the other planets hath in it least difficulty there is not one of them which well agreeth with one another. So Cyprian Leouicius, following the table of Alphonsus, (the eui∣dent error of whom Copernicus hath declared) hath made so apparant faults, as that the great coniunctions of the superior planets were seene one or two moneths after his cal∣culation. And albeit that Gerardus Mercator haue endeuoured by certaine eclipses of the sun & of the moone, by antient writers set downe, more curiously than any other, [ C] to iudge of the course and order of the whole time from the beginning of the world; yet so it is, that all his obseruations threaten a fall, as grounded vpon a false supposition: which can in no wise be true, For he supposeth that in the creation of the world, the sunne was in the signe Leo, without any probable reason, following the opinion of Iulius Maternus, contrary to the opinion of the Arabians, and of all other the Astro∣logers, who write, that the sunne was then in the signe Aries▪ being yet both therein de∣ceiued▪ these, six signes; and Mercator too. For why it is manifestly to bee proued, not onely by the most antient orders and customes of all people, but by the most diuine testimonies of holy scripture also, The sunne in the creation of the world, to haue bene* 1.87 in the signe Libra: wherby the Feast of the gathering of the fruits is commanded to be [ D] kept the last day of the yere, that is to say, the two and twentith day of the seuenth mo∣neth; which Moses hath expresly written to haue bene the first, before the departure of the people out of Aegypt. Which to the intent it might be the lesse doubted of, wee reade to be oftentimes by him repeated: for when he had cōmanded the feast day Abib, that is to say, The feast of weeks, which the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: he ioyneth herun∣to these words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, And the feast of the gathering of fruits in the end of the yere. But the last moment of the yeare past, is the beginning of the yere following; as Orus Apollo writeth, the Aegyptians to haue declared the reuolution of the yeare, by a dragon turned about into a circle. But Iosephus, the best interpreter of antiquity, declareth the moneth Abib, which of th Chaldaies is called Niscan, and of [ E] vs before, March, but now Aprill, to haue beene in order the first for the deliuerance of the people out of the bondage of Aegypt: but yet the moneth which of the Chal∣deis is called Ethanim, of the Hebrewes Tisri, which was our October, but afterward fell into our September, to haue bene by nature the first. All which, not onely Iose∣phus, but almost all the Hebrew Rabines also, namely Eleazar, Abraham, Ezra, Iona∣thas the Chaldean interpreter, with almost all the rest, constantly affirme. Which for that it hath great force for the discerning of the ruines of Commonweales, is of vs* 1.88 more manifestly to be explaned. The antient schoole of the Hebrewes, begin the rea∣ding of Moises his bookes, the Genesis, in Autumne: and Samuel, the most antient Ra∣bine

of the Hebrewes, appointeth the first Tecupa, or yearely conuersion of the yeare, [ F] in the Autumne equinoctiall: whereby it is manifest, the doctrine and customes of that most antient nation, to concurre and agree with the law of God. The same was the doctrine of the old Aegyptians and Chaldies also, concerning the beginning of the yeare, from whom all the mathematicall scienses tooke not onely their beginning, but were from them to all other nations of the world deriued also. So Iulius Firmicus wri∣teth, the Aegyptians hauing receiued it from their ancestors, to haue deliuered it vnto posterity, The sunne in the beginning of the world to haue bene placed in the last part of Libra. The same was also the opinion of the Indians, who are yet worshippers of the Sunne, & of the Moone, as the Spaniards haue reported. And although the yere of the Grecians, tooke beginning from the summer Solstitium, yet neuerthelesse the people [ G] of Asia beganne their Olimpiades and the beginning of the yere from Autumne. The Romans also from the remembrance of most auntient aniquitie, began the yeare from* 1.89 the Ides of September, Lex vetusta est (saith Liuie) & priscis scripta literis, vt qui Prae∣tor maximus sit, Idibus Septembris cl•…•…uum pangat, It is an old law (saith he) and written in old auntient letters, that he which was the great Prouost, should euer the Ides of September driue or fasten a naile. This naile Festus calleth annalem, or an annuall naile, Qui quotannis figebatur in dextra parte capitolij vt per eos clauos numerus colligeretur an∣norum▪ Which was euerie yeare fastned in the right side of the Capitoll, that so by those nayles the number of the yeares might be gathered. Augustus appointed also the Olympic games in the moneth of September. And albeit that the Astrologers (as [ H] other people also for the most part) follow a new manner of account of the yeare, set downe by Moyses, and begin their account of the spring diuision, yet neuerthelesse they begin their tables of the celestiall motions receiued from the Aegyptians and Chaldeies from the Autumne diuision. VVhich antiquities, with the authoritie of so many and so worthy men, although they make the matter manifest enough and out of all doubt▪ yet euen nature it selfe leadeth vs thither also, as that wee must needs con∣fesse the beginning of the world to haue bene in Autumne. For if we grant, as we must needs, man as all other liuing creatures also, to haue bene by almightie God created in such state and perfection as that they should need no nurses; so also is it to be thought him to haue prouided for all liuing creatures, and especially for mankind, ripe fruits for [ I] him to feed vpon, and most beautifull to behold, planted in most faire gardens, as is in the sacred booke of Genesis to be seene: which can in no wise be done, but that the world must be created in the beginning of Autumne. For why, Adam was created about Iordan, whereas corne in the spring time yet shooteth not on eare; and the mo∣neth Abib is so called, for that the corne in the spring time in those places runneth but vp in spindle, and the trees but scarcely bud: neither is the law of nature, or the season of the spring, or of Autumne, from the beginning of the world chaunged. Where∣fore Plutarch in his Symposiaques, when he pleasantly questioneth, Whether egges or birds were first? resolueth birds to haue bene first created: and so whatsoeuer things els are contained in the whole world, to haue bene in all parts created perfect For other∣wise [ K] if God should haue created man a crying child, or calues for oxen, or egges for birds, he must also haue created nurses to haue suckled them, and birds to haue hatched them: which if it be absurd and foolish to say, so must also of necessitie those things bee absurd, whereof these things follow, viz. the world to haue bene created in the begin∣ning of the spring, and young shoots to haue bene made for fruitfull trees, and so like∣wise other things to haue bene created young, and not in their perfection. Whereby it is euident them greatly to erre & be deceiued, which accounting & taking the begin∣ning of the world from the spring, and the beginning of the day from noone, doe with

their vaine coniectures go about to blot out and extinguish the authoritie of the sacred [ A] scriptures, as also the most auntient records of the Indians, the Chaldes, the Aegypti∣ans, and Latines, and all forsooth because cold weather still followeth after Autumne: they fearing (as I suppose) least Adam being a naked child, should haue taken cold. See∣ing therefore the Astrologers, euen as these men also to haue laid false principles and grounds, of the celestiall motions, and much to differ amongst themselues, concerning* 1.90 the course of the starres and planets, they can therefore (I say) set downe nothing cer∣taine, concerning mans affaires, or the ruines of cities and Commonweals.

But yet it hath lesse probalitie by the foundation of townes and cities, to iudge of* 1.91 the rising or falling of Commonweales: as many do also of houses before they lay the foundations of them, to foresee and let that they should not be burnt or rased, or sicke [ B] of the falling sicknesse: which to doe is a meere folly, differing little from extreame madnesse, as though natures most constant order should depend of mans lightnesse, and the force of the celestiall Spheres, of the will and pleasure of a base carpenter or mason. Indeed by the law it is prouided, That the value of houses burnt should bee deemed by their age and continuance, for so it is read in the old Hetruscian copie: al∣though that D. Cuias a most diligent interpretor of auntient readings, be of their opini∣on, which for aetatibus, thinke it ought to be read quantitatibus (as who should say by their quantities, rather than by their age) whereunto the lawyer neuer had respect. For his meaning was, That houses according to the stuffe and matter they were built of, were to be esteemed of longer or shorter continuance: as if an house were built of clay [ C] or morter, it was esteemed to be able to last some fourescore yeares: in such sort as that if it had cost an hundred crownes at first to build, being burnt fortie yeares after, there should halfe the price thereof be abated in the estimation thereof: For as for houses built with bricke (they as Plinie saith) if they be built vpright are euerlasting. And so Victruuius, and all other builders were woont to esteeme of the losse sustained, by the age and continuance of the houses burnt. For to esteeme of them by the elle, or by the greatnesse, so a barne built of clay or straw should be esteemed more worth than smal∣ler buildings built of marble or of porphiree, as the temple of Porphiree at Sienna, one of the least, but most costly buildings of Europe. But the deciding of such questions we must referre to Victruuius, and other builders. And as for that some thinke we are [ D] by the foundations of cities and other buildings, to iudge what shall be the state or successe of a kingdome or monarchie should lesse need the refutation: but that M, Var∣ro (whome Tullie writeth to haue in learning excelled all other Greeks and Latins) commaunded Tarentius Firmianus to declare vnto him the Horoscope of the citie of Rome: for so Plutarch and Antimachus Lyrius report. Whereupon he by the pro∣gresse of that Commonweale gathering the causes thereof; and by things ensuing af∣ter, gessing at things forepast, & so by ret•…•…ogradation iudging the causes by the effects, by most light and vaine coniectures affirmeth the foundation of the citie to haue bene laid in the third yeare of the sixt Olympiade, the one and twentieth day of Aprill, a lit∣tle [ E] before three of the clocke in the afternoone, Saturne, Mars, and Venus, being as then in Scorpio, Iupiter in Pisces, the sunne in Taurus, the moone in Libra, Gemini holding the heart, or middle of the heauens, and Virgo rising. But seeing that the chiefe points of this figute belonging vnto Mercurie, and that this whole celestial Scheame betoke∣neth men of traffique, or otherwise studious of Philosophie, and all kind of learning, how can it come to passe, that these things should agree, or bee applied vnto the Ro∣mans, a people of all others most couragious and warlike? Howbeit that Taruntius in this his figure, or Horoscope of the foundation of Rome, is most shamefully deceiued, as hauing therein placed the celestiall orbes in a situation quite contrarie vnto nature,

viz. Venus opposit vnto the Sunne: which yet can neuer be aboue eight and fortie de∣grees [ F] * 1.92 at the most distant from the Sunne: which yet were a thing excusable and wor∣thy to be pardoned, if it had bene by him done by forgetfulnesse: as it happened to Au∣gerius Ferrerius an excellent Mathematician, who in his booke of Astronomicall iudgements, hath set Venus and Mercurie, one of them opposit vnto another, and both of them opposit vnto the Sunne: a thing by nature impossible, and hee himselfe ac∣knowledging that Mercurie can neuer be six and thirtie degrees from the Sunne. Yet true it is, that Iohn Picus earle of Mirandula, grounding vpon this demonstration of the celestial motions, without cause blameth Iulius Maturnus, for that he placed the Sunne in the first house, and Mercurie in the tenth, which cannot be (saith he) except the sun should be from Mercurie the fourth part of the circle (or three signes distant:) not ha∣uing [ G] regard, that the globe may so be placed, to encline vnto the North, as that the sun rising, Mercurie may come vnto the meridian, yea vnto the tenth house two houres be∣fore noone, and yet not be thirtie dgrees from the sunne. But Plutarch writeth Anti∣machus Lyrius to haue left recorded, the Sunne to haue bene then ecclipsed, which yet he saith to haue bene the diametre of the circle distant from the Moone. And yet there is another greater absurditie in that theame of Taruntius, in that hee placeth the sunne in Taurus the xxj day of Aprill, which then entred not thereinto vntill the thir∣tith of April. Howbeit also that Lucas Gauricus, who collected the celestiall theames of many most famous cities, differeth altogether from this theame of Rome, by Tarun∣tius before set downe: for he placeth Libra in the East, as doth also Manlius. But of all [ H] absurd things none is more absurd, than by the ouerthrow of cities to measure the de∣struction of the estate or Commonweale, whereas before we haue declared, that a city oftentimes may be ouerthrowne and laid euen flat with the ground, and yet the state and Commonweal therof remaine, as we haue before shewed of the citie of Carthage: as oftentimes to the contrarie the estate and Commonweale may perish, the walls and other buildings yet standing all whole.

Wherefore then I rest not vpon such opinions, and much lesse vpon that which Cardan saith, who to seeme more subtilly than others to handle these hidden and ob∣scure matters, & to raise an admiration of himselfe with men vnskilfull of these things, maintaineth the beginnings and encreasings of the greatest cities and Empires to haue [ I] come from that Starre which is the last in the taile of Vrsa Maior, which he saith to haue bene verticall vnto the great citie of Rome at the foundation thereof, and from thence euen by the helpe and working of the same Starre translateth the Roman Em∣pire to Constantinople, and so afterwards into Fraunce, and so from thence into Ger∣manie: which although they be so set downe but by a most brainsicke man, yet do* 1.93 men ignorant of the celestiall motions wonderfully admire the same, and are therfore by vs to be refuted. For perceiuing that last starre of Vrsa Maior to be daily vnto ma∣nie people verticall, though perpendicular vnto them onely which are subiect vnto the circle which that starre describeth, Cardican saith it should be verticall at such time as the Sun toucheth the Meridian circle: in which state he supposeth it to haue beene, [ K] at such time as Romulus the founder of the citie laied the foundation thereof: which could not by nature so be, viz. that the last starre of Vrsa maior in the same howre, that is to say at noonetide, should together with the Sun touch the verticall circle: For that starre being now in the xxj degree of Virgo, by proportion of the motion of the fixed statres, by reason of the motion of the eight Sphere, it must needs haue beene in the xix degree of Leo at such time as the foundation of the citie of Rome was laied, and the Sun in the xix. degree of Aries, as the foregoings of the Sun declare. So that that starre was the third part of the circle, or foure signes and twentie degrees distant

from the verticall, when as it ought to haue beene in the same signe, and in the same [ A] degree of the signe wherein the Sunne was, if Cardan his doctrine were true: who yet when he knew the same starre to haue beene verticall vnto many great cities at the time of their foundation, since the beginning of the world, the Sun also then being in the Meridian; he to meet with that obiection, said the Monarchie to be due but to one of them. But why that to the Romans from whose verticall it is distant twelue de∣grees, rather then to the Scottish fishermen which dwell neere vnto the Orcades? or vnto them of Norway, and other the Northren people? vnto whom the same starre is not onely verticall, the sun touching the Meridian in September, but is also directly perpendicular? Yet is it also more straunge, to say the same starre to haue giuen the Empire to Constantinople, considering that that citie was built nine hundred yeares [ B] before that the Empire was thither translated. Ioining hereunto also that the horo∣scope of the citie of Constantinople found in the Popes librarie in the Vatican written in Greeke letters, calculated by Porphyrie (as some affirme) and copied out by Lu∣cas Gauricus the Bishop, declareth the Sunne then to haue beene in the xvij degree of Taurus, the Moone in the v of Leo, Saturne in the xx of Cancer, Iupiter and Venus coniunct in the same signe, Mars in the twelft, Mercurie in the first of Gemini, Aqua∣rius holding the verticall of heauen, and the xxiij of Gemini in the Leuant; which he setteth downe to haue beene in May vpon a Munday, two howres after the sunne ri∣sing. An other celestiall Theame of the same Citie is also taken out of the Vatican, [ C] calculated by Valens of Antioch, later than the former by fortie minutes. But yet that is verie absurd which Gauricus the good Bishop to come to his acconut supposeth the citie of Constantinople to haue beene built in the yeare of our Lord 638, three hun∣dred yeares after the death of Porphyrie: which yet it is manifest to haue flourished aboue 500. yeares before Christ: which he thinketh also to haue beene afterwards taken by the Turks armie in the yeare of Christ 1430. when as in truth it was by them woon and sackt in the yeare of our Lord 1453, the xxix day of May, being 1800 yeare before taken by the French men: wherein they raigned vntill the time of Clyarus king of Thracia, as Polybius (tutor vnto Scipio Affricanus) writeth; at which time it was called Bizance. And againe afterwards also was taken by Pausanias king of Lacede∣monia [ D] in the Median warre. And yet more, afterwards also was besieged by Alci∣biades generall of the Athenians. And long time after, three yeares together againe besieged by Seuerus the Emperour, who after he had sacked it, razed it also downe to the ground, and carrying away the rest of the citisens into captiuitie, gaue the ground whereon it stood vnto the Perinthians about the yeare of our Lord two hundred: which yet not long after was againe reedified, and by Constantine the great wonderful∣ly enriched after that he had thither translated the seat of his Empire. And yet againe after that, was with fire and sword most cruelly wasted by the armie of Galienus the Emperour, all the citisens therein being either slaine, or else caried away into captiui∣tie. Yet ceased it not for all that to be still the seat of the Greeke empire, vntill that the [ E] Frenchmen and Flemings vnder the conduct of Baldwin Earle of Flaunders seized thereon; which they held together with the Empire, vntill that about fiftie yeares af∣ter they were by the Palaeologi againe driuen out: who hauing so recouered the citie there raigned, vntill that it was by Mahomet the great Turke woon. All which chan∣ges of the Empire, and ruines of the citie, Gauricus neuer touched; neither did Cardan himselfe so much as suspect them: otherwise I suppose he would neuer haue written things so absurd, and so disagreeing with themselues. But great maruell it is that this Cardans starre hath had such power as to graunt the Empires of the world to Italie, Greece, Fraunce, and Germanie, when as it was to them but verticall, and yet hath

had no power at all vpon the realmes of Norway and Sweden, where it is not onely [ F] verticall, the Sunne being at the Meridian in the moneth of August, but is also perpen∣dicular: and yet neuerthelesse distant from Rome and Constantinople in latitude twelue degrees at the least. Besides that, why should he giue vnto this Starre (which some foolish Astrologers take to be Saturnia) more power than to others, both for their greatnesse & nature more notable? why doth he exclude from the gouernment of the world Regulus the greatest of all the sixe starres? whie Medusa, Spica, the great Dog, the Vultur, all most faire and beautifull starres? whie in briefe a thousand and threescore others, (for so many there are accounted beside the wandering starres) vnto whom the Hebrew Mathematicians had added thirtie six mo also? Sufficeth it for this time to haue reiected these errours so grosse, as the day it selfe is cleere. [ G]

But for asmuch as it were a thing infinite to refell all mens errours in this kind of* 1.94 matter, I will onely touch theirs, who haue thought themselues wiser than the rest, and haue beene had in reputation as best seene in the iudgement of the heauens for the chaunges of Commonweales: such as was Peter of Arliac Chauncelour of Paris, and afterwards Cardinall in the yeare 1416: For he writeth the beginnings, channges, and ruines of religions and Commonweales, to depend of the motion and coniuncti∣on of the superiour Planets. And to mee it seemeth right straunge, whie Iohn Picus Earle of Mirandula hath without farther search; accounted of the shamefull errours of this man, concerning the knowledge of the Celestiall Spheres, as of most certeine & approued demonstrations; who hauing noted six and thirtie great coniunctions of [ H] the superiour planets, Iupiter & Saturne, since an hundred and fifteene yeares after the creation of the world, vnto the yeare of our Lord Christ 1385, there are not of them six true, and scarce any of them set in such place and time as they ought to be. Leu∣pold, Alcabice, and Ptolomee were also of the same opinion, viz. the remouings of people, warres, plagues, deluges, plentie, dearth, the chaunges of Estates and Com∣monweales, to depend of the motion and coniuction of the Planets, and especially of the superiour planets Saturne I say and Iupiter, and so much the more if Mars be also in coniunction with them both. And so indeed as oft as they are in coniunction toge∣ther, such things thereof ensue as often times draw euen the wiser sort into admita∣tion: howbeit that no necessitie be imposed vpon man kind by the influence of the [ I] heauens. But howsoeuer that be, it is manifest the Cardinall of Arliac to haue beene most grieuously deceiued, who reckning vp those great coniunctions from the begin∣ning, supposeth it by his account to haue beene seauen thousand yeares since the cre∣ation of the world, following therein the errours of Alphonsus, Eusebius, and Beda; which the great consent not of the Hebrewes onely, but of all Christians also hath long ago reiected: so soone as by the old interpretation of the Bible it was perceiued them to haue erred in their account aboue a thousand fiue hundred yeares: whereas all Churches at this present follow the more certeine account of Philo the Iew, who followed almost the mean betwixt Iosephus and the later Hebrewes: for Iosephus diffe∣reth 342 yeares, and Philo but an 160 from the other Hebrewes. Whereof it is to be [ K] gathered this present yeare, which is from the birth of our Sauiour Christ 1583, (wherin Bodin writ these things in Latin) to haue beene 5531, or at most 5555 since the crea∣tion of the world. Wherefore Arliac is deceiued, who put the coniunction of the superiour Planets seauen thousand yeres ago, in the 320 yeare after the creation of the world: which after that computation must haue happened twelue hundred yeares before that the world was made. The same man doth suppose also that at the creation of the world, the Horoscope whereof he discribeth, the first degree of Cancer to haue beene then rising, the Sunne then to haue beene in Aries, (which to be false we haue

by necessarie arguments before proued) the Moone and Venus in Taurus, Saturne in [ A] Aquatius, Iupiter in Pisces, Mars in Scorpio, Mercurie in Gemini: which is all false and quite contrarie vnto the nature and motion of the celestiall Spheres, which is ma∣nifest vnto euery man which shall more narrowly looke thereinto, or take account of the motions of the Planets from thence vnto these times: not to speake of that, that he placed the Sunne in the xix degree of Aries, and Mercurie in the xv of Gemini, ha∣uing so against nature diuided the one of them from the other six and fiftie degrees, as we haue before declared: viz. that Mercurie when he is farthest from the Sunne, ne∣uer to be farther off than six and thirtie degrees. Which may suffice in passing by, ot show that the Hypothesis of the Cardinal of Arliac and his foundation being false, the rest that is thereon built cannot stand. But this he had propounded vnto himselfe, It to [ B] be a thing contrarie vnto the maiestie of the Planets, if in the creation of the world he should place them other where than euery one of them in their owne throne and cha∣riot: which deuises of the vnskilfull, are more light and farther from the antiquirie of the Chaldeis, than that they deserue to be refelled.

But how much more certainlie and better do they, which hauing consideratlie looked thorow the antiquities of the Hebrewes, and the animaduertions of Coperni∣cus (who most diligently corrected the errors of Alphonsus, and of the Arabians) going orderly retrograde from these oppositions and coniunctions of the Planets which we now behold, vnto the verie first beginning, iudge of the reuolution of the time past, as also of the chaunge and state of Commonweales; if yet by this meanes [ C] any such iudgement, free from impietie and rashnesse may be made. Neither is it to be hoped (except happelie in an innumerable sort of worlds) that the three superiour Planets shall meet together in the first point of Aries, whereof our wisards rashly di∣uine a generall destruction of Commonweales, as also of the whole world then to ensue by fyre from heauen. Howbeit that in the yeare of our Lord Christ 1909, there shall be a meeting together of the three superiour Planets in the ninth degree of Aries: which yet for all that is no true coniunction, as not made by the centers, but by the Orbes and Spheres of the Planets. And in the yeare 1584, Saturne and Mars shall be in coniunction in the first point and 46 minutes of Aries, and Iupiter in the same signe, but distant from them twelue degrees, with the Sunne and Mercurie: which coniun∣ction [ D] shall scarce chaunce againe in the reuolution of eight hundred yeares. And in* 1.95 this sort it is lawfull for a man looking into the yearely course of time, by writing to commend vnto posteritie the chaunges of cities and Commonweales, and so by things precedent and alreadie forepassed to iudge also of things to come: yet sauing alwaies the maiestie of almightie God, who is himselfe bound vnto no lawes of nature, nei∣ther hath thereunto bound any of his seruants. Wherein many greatly offend, who thinke the power and influence of the celestiall Spheres to be nothing, when as yet for all that their strength and power hath alwaies beene most great and effectuall, not onely vpon these elements which we here see, and so vpon all other sorts of liuing [ E] creatures, but euen vpon them also which liue like beasts, as * in sacred writ is to be* 1.96 seene, and yet of the good nothing at all to be feared. So many stood in great doubt in the yeare 1524, wherein the three superiour Planets, Saturne, Iupiter, and Mars were in coniunction in the tenth degree of Pisces, the rest of the Planets together with the Dragons head being in Aquarius & Pisces, both of them waterie Signes. Which selfe same yeare in the moneth of Februarie were twentie other coniunctions of the* 1.97 Planets also among themselues, besides the sixe starres; which of all other things, was a thing most worthie the admiration. So that hereupon the Astrologers all the world ouer agreeing together for the destruction of the world, with a great feare terrifyed

the minds of many weake men; in that they so constantly all with one consent affir∣med, [ A] the world to be now againe ouerwhelmed with an vniuersall deluge and inun∣dation of waters; in somuch that many miscreants caused shippes to be made for them to saue themselues in from such the rage of the waters, and especially Auriolus Presi∣dent of Tholose a most cunning lawier, but a man either ignorant, or a contemne•…•… of the lawes of God, howbeit that he heard the promises of God still preached vnto him, and the oath by him made vnto * 1.98 Noah that he would no more destroy the world by water. And true it is that in that yeare were flouds and inundations of wa∣ters in diuers countries, but yet no such generall deluge as was foretold and feared, neither any cities or countries at all knowne to be drowned. Wherefore to affirme any thing of the chaunges and ruines of Commonweales, it sufficeth not to be∣hold [ G] onely those great coniunctions of the three superiour Planets, but also diligently to obserue and note the meane coniunctions, which are euery two hundred and fortie, and euery twentie yeare: as also the eclipse of the Sunne, and of the Moone, with the oppositions and coniunctions of the inferiour Planets amongst themselues, and with superiour planets, and in briefe their mutuall traiections, as also the force and power of the fixe starres, and their respect towards others. True it is that many of the aun∣tient writers haue noted either dearth, or popular diseases, great mortalitie of liuing creatures, or the remouing of people, inundations of waters, or the destruction of cities, or chaunges of kingdomes to haue followed such coniunction of the superiour planets; yet not in euery place generally, but in certaine countries and places onely, [ H] whereby they haue by a certain coniecture iudged this or that signe to be by God de∣puted vnto this or that countrie. And hereof according to the power of the foure elements they haue diuided the twelue celestiall signes into foure parts, and haue there∣of left certaine instructions to posteritie: whereof for all that because they were not by long experience approued they could make no certaine art: as the Chaldies haue* 1.99 fained, who vaunted themselues to haue spent 470 thousand yeares in the practise of natiuities, the better to perswade men of the certaintie of their knowledge, and to make it thereby the more saleable. Which the Chaldean bables spred abroad farre and wide vnto all people, but vnto none more foolishly then to the Indian Chinois, who say 783 thousand and seauen hundred sixtie two yeares, to be the last yeare past [ I] since the creation of the world. Others there be which in that matter lie not so loudly and yet impudently enough. For Linus the most auntient writer of the Greekes, Or∣pheus and Heraclitus, shut vp the period of the greatest yeare within the reuolution of 360 thousand yeares, whereof they supposed an hundred fourescore foure thousand to be past. But a certaine Aegiptian priest vaunted before Solon, the Aegiptians his coun∣trie men to haue an historie of twentie thousand yeares written in Hieroglyphicall letters. And a little while after Herodotus (called the father of historie) vnderstood from the same Aegiptians, recordes of thirteene thousand yeares to be extant in their sacred letters. Diodorus yonger then the rest going into Aegipt to find out the trueth, heard certaine Priests to say antiquities of three and thirtie thousand yeares old to be [ K] found amongst the Aegiptians: but when he came to wey the trueth of the matter in equall ballance, he found all their antiquitie to consist but of three thousand seauen hundred yeares: the computation of which time from the beginning of the world, agreeth altogether with Philo, or within little lesse then two hundred yeres. And truely Callisthenes perswaded by the speech of Aristotle his master, when as others at the sacking of Babylon greedely sought after the Persian wealth, he diligently searched out and gathered together the bookes and antiquities of the Chaldies, and there noted all the historie of the Chaldies to haue bene comprehended in 1903 yeares: which time

well agreeth with the sacred historie, if we account the time from Nimrod, who first [ A] obtained the soueraigntie of the Chaldies: which historie is to be thought so much the truer, for that it is so reported by Simplicius a mortall enemie of the Christians, as wee haue elswhere declared. And therefore Ptolomey, who farthest repeating from vtter∣most remembrance the antiquities of the Chaldies (of them I say, which had noted the stedie courses of the celestiall Spheres) bringeth the beginnings of the celestiall mo∣tions no farther than from Nabonassar, and from those eclipses of the moone which happened in the time of his raigne, that is, the yeare of the world 3750: But Ptolo∣mey flourished in the time of Adrian the emperour, about foure hundred yeares af∣ter Nabonassar. Wherefore it ought not to seeme straunge to any man, if he neuerso∣much as once suspected the motion of trepidation, neither vnderstood the reuolution [ B] of the eight Sphere: yea he well obserued not the Equinoctials: For hee saith, The Equinoctium to haue bene the the twentie sixt of September, after the sunne rising: which Hisparchus had taught to haue happened 285 yeares the same day of the mo∣neth, about midnight, whose errours could scarcely be perceiued in the time of our an∣cestors: as not long ago Io. Regiomontanus shewed the motion of trepidation, before vnto Astronomers vnknowne. Wherefore by what meanes could they by any art conclude mens fortunes, or the chaunges and ruines of cities and Commonweales, who vnderstood not so much as the celestiall motions, and much lesse the histories of all nations, when as yet they scarcely knew the tenth part of the world? [ C]

Wherefore they do foolishly which attribute the Quadripartite booke to Ptolomey,* 1.100 wherein the fiery Triplicitie is giuen to Europe, and those countries which lye betwixt the West and the North; the ayrie triplicitie vnto Asia, and those places which are seated betwixt the North and the East; the watrie triplicitie vnto Affrike, and the earth∣ly triplicitie vnto the other places. Neither haue those things followed the coniuncti∣ons of the superiour planets, which should haue followed had their rules beene true. Now if any man thinke (as many there be which think right foolishly) the places of the signes being chaunged, the force and nature of the celestiall Spheres to be chaunged al∣so; he must surely vtterly subuert all the knowledge of the force and power of the stars by them before set downe and deliuered: seeing that the fix starres are found since the [ D] beginning of the world to haue passed through the fourth part of the eight Sphere: but since the time wherein the course of the celestiall Spheres began first to bee of the Chaldeis noted vnder king Nabonassar vnto this our time, to haue ouergone almost a whole signe, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or which is all one, the Equinoctials in the same space, to haue preuented the staies of the wandering starres, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and yet neuer∣thelesse the force and power of the celestiall houses approued in mens natiuities, is still the selfe same that it is reported to haue before bene: which thing to be so, Cardan him∣selfe confesseth: whom yet for all that it ashamed him not to write the Britons, Spani∣ards, & Normans, in auntient time gentle and modest nations, to be now (the regions of the starres being changed) become slie, craftie, and deceitfull theeues; for that they [ E] were in antient time gouerned by Sagit•…•…ary, but now by Scorpio▪ vnto whom the same may be aunswered which Cassius did vnto a certain Chaldean Astrologer, who forbad him to fight with the Parthians before the moone was out of Scorpio: vnto whom* 1.101 Cassius pleasantly aunswered, Non Scorpiones metuo, sed Sagittarios, I feare not (said he) Scorpions, but Sagittaries; meaning the Parthian archers, by whom the Roman legi∣ons wherwith Crassus in Chaldea discomfited and ouerthrowne. And truely if Cardans opinion were true, the nature of all things must needs so be subuerted, which yet is still the same which euer it was: For the people toward the North are now taller and stronger, and more warlike than the rest of the people of the world; and such Vitru∣uius,

Plinie, Caesar, Strabo, and Plutarch, haue writ them to haue beene sixteene hundred [ F] yeare agoe: and therefore them to be pleasant, drunkards, grosse witted, hoarce, gray eyed, yellow haired: but Southerne people to bee sad, small of stature, leane, weake, smooth, blacke eyed, curled haire, and cleere of voice. And yet it is manifest, the con∣iunctions* 1.102 of the superiour planets in the same celestiall house, viz. in Scorpio to haue showed their force (if it were any) in Asia, and Europe, and not in Affrike, which they say to be gouerned by the signe of Scorpio. For before the chaunge of the Ro∣man empire was made, and that Popular estates transferred vnto the soueraigntie of Caesar alone, the superiour planets with a great coniunction met together in Scorpio: which coniunction chaunged againe about seauen hundred yeares after: at which time innumerable legions of the Arabians hauing receiued the new doctrine of Muhamed, [ G] rebelled against the Greeke emperours, subdued a great part of the East Asia, abolished the orders, customes, rites, ceremonies, and lawes of the Christians, when as yet Asia is in situation contrarie vnto Europe. The same coniunction happened in the yeare of our Lord 1•…•…64, after which ensued diuers motions of the people, almost in all parts of the world. For Ladamachus king of the Tartars was by his subiects thrust out of his kingdome: Henrie the sixt, king of England was by his subiects also taken and in prison slain, Edward the iiij of a subiect made king: Frederike the third driuen out of Hungary by Matthias Coruinus, who of a prisoner was chosen a king: Lewes the eleuenth the French king, by his nobilitie and vassals besieged in his principall citie, and brought in daunger to haue lost his estate. At which time also Alexander (commonly called [ H] Scanderbeg) the king of Albania his soone, brought vp in the Turkes court, reuolted from the Turke, and tooke vp armes against him. Yet is it worth the noting, that the great coniunctions of superiour planets, show their effects more in Scorpio, a martial signe, than in any other the rest of the signes, and so much the more if Mars be there als•…•…, or else some one of the other planets be also in coniunction or opposition with them. With like coniunction the same planets met together also in Sagittarie, in the yeare of our Lord Christ 74: at which time all the land of Palestine was sacked, the ci∣tie of Hierusalem burnt and rased, and eleuen hundred thousand dead in the warres: at which selfe same time were seene in Europe great ciuill warres, and foure emperours slaine the same yeare. Two hundred and fortie yeres after, another coniunction of the [ I] same planets chaunced in Capricorne, after which ensued wonderfull chaunges not onely of Commonweales, but euen of empires and kingdomes also: Constantine the Great being therein chiefe doer: who hauing put to flight and slaine foure emperors, and translated the seat of the empire from the West into the East, by a perpetuall law tooke away the vaine and superstitious worshipping of the Paynim gods. We see al∣so, that after the coniunction of the same planers in Aquarius, in the yeare 430, the Gothes, the Ostrogothes, the Francons, the Gepiges, the Heruli, the Hunnes, & other Northerne people going out like swarmes of bees, ouerranne and ransacked the pro∣uinces of the Roman empire, and most cruelly sacked the verie citie it selfe, sometime the seat of the empire. And againe in the yeare 1524, when as the coniunction of the [ K] same superiour planets, (yea twentie other coniunctions) had happened in Pisces, most great motions of the people ensued thereafter in many places in Europe: the people in armes against the nobilitie set all Germany on a broyle: in which warre an hundred thousand men are reported to haue bene slaine: the Rhodes by the Turkes was taken from the Christians: Frederike, his brother Christierne being driuen out of his king∣dome, possessed the kingdome of Denmarke: Gostauus of a priuat man became king of Sweden: Francis the French king ouerthrowne at Pauia was taken prisoner by the Spaniards. Besides that, it is to be seene, that after the great coniunction of the same

superiour planets in Leo, in the yeare 796 king Charlemaigne ouerthrew the estates of [ A] the Lombards, tooke their king, and conquered Italie. At which very selfe same time the Polonians made choyce of their first king: with diuers other notable and remar∣kable chaunges. So also fortie yeares after, the same coniunction happened in the signe of Sagittarie, when as the Moores sacked diuers countries, inuaded a part of Greece, and ouerran Italie: and the Danes were then vp in great ciuill warres: when as at the same time Charlemaigne made himselfe Lord of Germanie, tooke away the Paynim superstition in Saxonie, and chaunged all the Commonweales and principali∣ties in Germanie, and Hungarie, which he brought vnder his obeysance. With this great coniunction happened also foure eclipses: which hath not happened since: but six hundred thirtie six yeares after, viz. in the yeare 1544, in which time haply there [ B] had bene moe notable changes seene, if the great coniunction which hapned the yeare following in Scorpio, had happened the same yeare. And yet neuerthelesse as it was, all Germanie was vp in armes; which warres continued seuen yeares after. In briefe, if any foreknowledge be to be had from celestiall things, for the chaunges of Common∣weales, we must consider the coniunctions of superior planets, since 570 yeres, with the coniunctions, eclipses, and aspects of inferiour planets, and of the fix starres at the time of the great coniunctions, and to compare them with the truth of histories, and of times with coniunctions before past; and not wholly to rest vpon opinion of them, which haue determinatly assigned the Triplicities vnto regions, which I haue by euident ex∣amples before shewed not to be of any good assurance, but rather to stay vpon the na∣ture [ C] of the signes and of the planets. And yet for all that to referre the causes and effects of them vnto the great God of nature, and not to tie them vnto his creatures. As did* 1.103 Ciprianus Leouitius, who of a coniunction of almost all the planets, than to come toge∣ther with an eclips of the sunne in the yeare 1584 by his writings (as from an oracle) denounced the end of the world euen then to come, saying, Procul dubio alterum aduen∣tum filij Dei & hominis in maiestate gloriae suae praenuntiat, Without all doubt (saith he) it foreshoweth another comming of the sonne of God and man in the maiestie of his glorie. But seeing he had so strongly assured men then of the consummation of the world, why did he yet write his Ephemerides for thirtie yeares after, when as the cele∣stiall signes and all Commonweales should according to his predictions haue before [ D] perished? But therein he found himselfe as wel deceiued, as was before him Albumar, who with like rashnesse had written, That the Christian religion should take end in the yeare 1460. And Abraham the Iew (surnamed The Prince of Astrologers) who pro∣phesied, That in the yeare 1464 should be borne a great captaine (whom they call Mes∣sias) who should deliuer the Iewes his countrey men from the seruitude of the Christi∣ans. And Arnold the Spaniard, who with like follie prophesied of the comming of Antichrist, in the yeare of our Lord 136. But Leouicius might haue knowne, that since the creation of the world vnto this time, there haue beene two hundred and threescore coniunctions of the superious planets, wherein were twentie foure great ones; that is [ E] to say, such as still come againe after the reuolution of two hundred and fortie yeares, Iupiter and Saturne meeting together in the same triplicitie (as they call it) and the les∣ser euerie twentie yeares: and the meanest planets, as of Saturne and Mars, euerie thertie yeares in the signe Cancer: and the greatest of all, viz. of Iupiter and Saturne in Aries, which commeth againe about euerie eight hundred yeares. Howbeit that Mes∣sahala calleth it the greatest coniunction of all, when as the three superior planets meet together in Aries: which yet I see not shall chaunce in the yeare 1584, as Leouicius sup∣poseth, when as Iupiter shall be distant twelue degrees from the full coniunction of Sa∣turne and Mars: which cannot rightly be called a coniunction so much as by their

Spheres. But whereas the same coniunction, yea and a greater too, together with the [ F] most darke eclipses of the sunne, and of the moone, happened in the raigne of Charles the Great, yet wee see not the world therefore to haue taken end. True it is, that the Hebrew learned men write, the destruction of all this elementarie world, and so of all* 1.104 mankind, & of all Commonweales, to ensue after euerie seuen thousand yeares, by the inundation of waters, or els by fire, and so to rest a thousand yeares: after which God shal againe restore that which is perished: and that this shal be done seuen times, which maketh nine and fortie thousand yeres compleat, and that then this elementarie world and the celestiall also, with all the bodies thereof shall take end, the maiestie of the great eternall God, with all the blessed spirits yet still remaining. Which they say to bee by the word of God, howbeit verie obscurely declared: when as the tilling of the ground [ G] is commaunded euery seuenth yeare to be left off: and after seuen times seuen, not on∣ly the tilling of the ground is commaunded to be left off, but euen slaues and debtors to be set free, and euerie man to returne againe vnto his owne lands and dwelling. Tru∣ly it is by long obseruation at length knowne and found out, the motion of trepidati∣on of the eight Sphere to accomplish the course thereof, in the reuolution of seuen thousand yeares, and the ninth Sphere in the space of fortie nine thousand yeares. Whereof Io. Regiomontanus hath since within this foure and twentie yeares made plaine demonstration: of the truth of which motion neither the auntient Chaldies nor Aegyptians had any knowledge, but were thereof altogether ignorant. And albeit that the auntient learned Hebrewes, haue by the gift and goodnesse of God, had not onely [ H] the knowledge of diuine and celestiall things, but euen the hidden and secret causes of nature also reuealed and made knowne vnto them, and that from them the knowledge of most goodly things is vnto other men come: as Porphyrie the greatest of all the Phi∣losophers of his time confesseth: and that this doctrine of the Hebrewes curteth off the impietie of them which hold the eternitie of the world, or els that God was for an in∣numerable world of yeares altogether idle: yet doe these so learned Hebrewes attri∣bute nothing vnto fatall necessitie, either feare any the decrees of the celestiall starres, but affirme all things to be gouerned and changed by the will and pleasure of almigh∣tie God: as by him which as oft as he will is of power to shake the nature of all things, yea euen the verie foundations of the world it selfe, as was well seene in the generall [ I] deluge, which ouerwhelmed the whole world 1656 yeares after the creation thereof.

Yet doubt I not but that some more certaine precepts might be giuen of the chaun∣ges,* 1.105 and ruines of Commonweales, if a man would enter into a certaine account of the time past euen from the beginning of the world: and so comparing one thing with another, and knitting one thing vnto another, shall proceed farther, and set in order the varietie of Historiographers at varience among themselues: and also going back∣wards, shall of all the eclipses of the Sunne and of the Moone, euen to the beginning of the world, by most certaine demonstrations comprehend the reason of the whole time past: and compare the histories of the most true writers amongst themselues, and with the oppositions and coniunctions of the celestial starres and bodies, knit and con∣ioyne [ K] the same with numbers, whose force in all the course of nature is greatest: which things foulded vp in infinit obscurities, and hidden and shut vp in the most secret places of nature, are to be showed not by vaine coniectures, but by most euident and manifest arguments. Which is not to be hoped for from them which are more desirous of words than of matter or knowledge: who vpon an obstinat opinion confound the be∣ginning of the world, and beginning the yere at the spring, which they ought to begin at Autumne, and the day at noone, which they ought to begin at euen, not remem∣bring darknesse to haue bene before light, confusion before order, and a rude confused

Chaos before the world it selfe: beside that it is in the sacred bookes of Genesis so of∣ten [ A] repeated, Vespere & mane dies vnus, The euening and morning were made one day. Truely I commend many things in Gerardus Mercator a most pure writer for the ob∣seruation of time: but in that I cannot commend him, that he beginneth the yeare els∣where than of Libra; whereas we haue by most certaine reasons not onely out of the most auntient customes of almost all nations; but also out of the most pure fountains* 1.106 of sacred scriptures, declared the yeare to haue taken beginning in Autumne. Which we will againe show by the great and notable changes of estates and Commonweals: whereby things to come may be the better and more certainly perceiued, and the grea∣test chaunces, alterations, and changes, seene to haue happened about Autumne, that is to say, a little before, or a little after the Autumnall equinoctiall in September, the Sun [ B] then entring into Libra: where the law of God appointeth the beginning of the yeare. And first it is manifest, the generall deluge to haue begun and also ended in Autumne. We read also, the great earthquakes, wherewith oft times great cities, and whole coun∣tries haue bene destroyed, to haue happened in Autumne, such as was that trembling of the earth at Constantinople, wherein thirteene thousand men were lost in the yeare 1509, in the moneth of September: in which moneth, and in the same citie, the earth againe grieuously shooke in the yeare 1479. So also in the yeare of Christ 545 such an earthquake happened in September, that almost all Europe shooke therewith. The same moneth of September, wherein the battell was fought at Actium, ten thousand [ C] men perished in the land of Palestine with an earthquake. And not long agoe, viz. in the yeare 1526, and 27, in the moneth of September a great earthquake happened at Puteoli. The third day of the same moneth, in the yeare of our Lord 1556, such a tem∣pest of raine and thunder happened at Lucerne, as that a greater (as is reported) was neuer seene: which selfe same month & day the towne hall at Maidenburg in Germa∣nie, with the citisens dauncing therein, were all together with lightning consumed. The victorie of Augustus also against Antonius in the battaile at Actium, was by him ob∣tained the second of September, where question was of the greatest empire that euer was, and the matter tried with the greatest forces that euer were assembled in any wars whatsoeuer: by which victorie the empire both of the East and of the West, fell into [ D] the power of Augustus himselfe alone. The third day of the same moneth the Mace∣donian empire, which had so long, aud with so great glorie flourished, was by Paulus Aemilius chaunged from a great kingdome into diuers Popular estates, the king Per∣seus being by him ouercome and taken prisoner. Sultan Soliman on the like day tooke Buda the chiefe citie of Hungarie, with the greatest part of that kingdome. The same day and moneth Rhoderike king of Spaine was by the Moores ouercome and chased out of his kingdome, which wrought a wonderfull chaunge in the state of all that Mo∣narchie. On the same day and moneth reuoluing, Lewes the twelth the French king tooke the citie of Milan, with Lewes Sfortia duke thereof, whome he depriued of his estate. The like day the emperour Charles the sift passed ouer into Affrike, and inua∣ded [ E] the kingdome of Algiers. The day following, that is to say, the fourth of September Sultan Soliman died before Sigeth, which being one of the strongest holds of Chri∣stendome, was by the Turkes taken the seuenth day after. The ninth of September, in the yeare of our Lord 1544, Iames king of Scots was by the English men slaine, and his armie ouerthrowne. The same day in the reuolution of the yeare, the councell of Possi was gathered in Fraunce, Charles the ninth then raigning in the yeare 1561, and a decree made for the receiuing of the new religion, which raised most great troubles in France. The same day and moneth Alexander the Great at Arbela ouerthrew Darius king of Persia, with his armie of foure hundred thousand men; and so ioyned the king∣dome

of Persia vnto his owne. The tenth of September Iohn duke of Burgundie, was [ F] by the commandement of Charles the seuenth slaine, wherof great wars arose through∣out all Fraunce. The like day and moneth was Peter Louys the tyrant of Placence slaine by the conspiratours. We read also, that the eleuenth of September the Palae∣ologues, the Greeke emperours tooke the imperiall citie of Constantinople, and draue out thence the earles of Flaunders, who had there possessed the empire 560 yeres. The fourteenth day of September the Swiffers were with a great slaughter ouerthrowne by the French, in the expedition of Mirignan: which selfe same day also the Turkes great armie laid siege to Vienna, the Metropoliticall citie of Austria. The seuenteenth day the French armie was by the English ouerthrowne at Poitiers, and king Iohn of France by them taken prisoner. Which day also, (or rather the like in the reuolution of the [ G] yeare) a peace was concluded at Soissons, betwixt Francis the first, the French king, & the emperour Charles the fift, being both readie with their great armies to haue fought for the kingdome, to the great hazard of both their estates, in the yeare 1544: a thing the more to be noted, for that the same yeare, moneth, and day, was also a great coniun∣ction of the superior planets. The same day of the same moneth, in the yeare 1575 the Christian fleet with a great slaughter ouerthrew the Turkes great fleet in the battell of Lepanto. The eighteenth day of the same moneth Boulleine was deliuered vnto the Englishmen. And the foure and twentieth of September Constantine the Great, in a bloudie battell ouercame Maxentius the emperour, in the yeare of our Lord 333, and so of a simple straunge captaine made himselfe a great Monarch (which wrought a [ H] most notable and maruellous chaunge almost throughout the whole world) and so from thenceforth commaunded the account of the yeare to bee begun in September▪ and in the Greeke feasts vnto that day is added, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Wee find also, that in the yeare 1136, in the moneth of September there was a great coniunction both of the superiour and inferiour planets, in so much that the Astrologers of the East, by their letters written from all parts (as saith the Cronicle of Saint Denis) threatned the world with great calamities, and the people with the chaunge of their estates, which afterwards indeed chaunced: howbeit that in that the author of the historie erred, that he saith, How that the same yeare there was an eclips of the Sun the eleuenth of Aprill, and another of the Moone [ I] the fift of the same moneth, a thing by nature impossible. It is also right memorable, that the seuenteenth day of September, in the yeare 1567 Charles the ninth the French king, was by his subiects assailed neere vnto Meaux, where by speedie flight, and the helpe of the Swissers he hardly with life escaped the hands of the conspiratours: the which selfe same day, moneth, and yeare, Henry king of Sweden was by his rebellious subiects dispoiled of his estate, and east in prison, where he yet remaineth, without any great hope to be euer with life from thence againe deliuered. The battell Montcon∣tour was fought also in September. And the eighteenth day of September Baiazet at Nicopolis with a notable ouerthrow defeated a great armie of the Christians, of three hundred thousand men. And the same day Saladin tooke the citie of Hierusalem, on [ K] which Pompey had before taken it. Pope Boniface the eight also was in September 1303 by the French taken prisoner, and depriued of his papall dignitie. We read also many the greatest princes and monarches of the world, to haue as this moneth died: as namely the great emperour Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian, Titus, Domitian, Aurelia∣nus, Theodosius the Great, Valentinianus, Gratianus, Basilius, Constantine the fift, Leo the fourth, Rodolphe, Frederike the fourth, Charles the fift, all Roman or Greeke emperors. And of the French kings, Pipin, Lewes the younger, Philip the third, Charles the fift sur∣named the Wise, and Lewes his kinsman king of Hungaria and Polonia, with other

most noble and famous Monarkes in number infinite. But that is worth the marking [ A] that Lothaire and Charles the bauld, the one the king of Fraunce, and the other the German Emperour (and both of them the sonnes of Lewes the deuout emperour) both dyed the xxix of September, the first of them in the yeare 855, and the other 877. So Charles the fift, and Sultan Solyman, two of the greatest Emperours that were these many ages, were both borne in one yeare, and so both also in one moneth dyed, viz. in September. Antonius Pius also and Francis the first the French king, both of them great & famous Monarques, were both borne in September, and died both in March the moneth opposite to September. Octauius Augustus was also borne in September,* 1.107 and so likewise in the same moneth of September dyed. Whereby it is to be vnder∣stood, Autumne and especially that moneth wherein the world was created, viz. [ B] September, in a sort to carie as a marke therof the notable chaunces of many the most noble and renowmed Princes, as also the straunge chaunges which haue happened aswell vnto the whole world, as vnto particular Estates and Commonweales. The next conuersions and chaunges of cities and Commonweales we see to happen into the signe of Aries, which is an other period of the Sunne, and the third and fourth sort of chaunges to fall out about the Winter or Sommer Solstitium, or farthest stayes of the Sunne: not for that the creation of the world is to be deriued from Aries, but for the notable periods of the Sunne in those times. Wherefore Leouicius following the dreames of vnskilful men, ought not to refer the creation and destruction of the world vnto the moneth of March; and much lesse to threaten vnto the world euen a present [ C] consummation and end. But he the same man had before by his writings promised vnto Maximilian the Emperour the soueraigntie of all Europe, with power to correct and chastice the crueltie and tirannie of other Princes (for so he writeth) of whom for* 1.108 all that it beseemeth him to haue more modestly writ: But Maximilian was so farre from the soueraigntie which he had in his vaine hope conceiued, as that he yet liuing, and with the German hoast also looking on: Sultan Solyman without any empeach∣ment hauing farre and wide wasted the borders of the Empire, besieged and forced Sigeth the strongest place of the Empire, yea of all Europe: showing well that he should not haue too far assured himselfe vpon the prophecie of Luther, who hath left in writing that the power of the Turkes should from thenceforth diminish, which yet [ D] more encreaseth than euer it did. But it is straunge that Leouicius saw nothing of the straunge chaunge of the three kingdomes his next neighbours: which sith he saw not, how could he haue such certein knowledge of the end of the world, neuer as yet vnto the Angels themselues reuealed? For all which he bringeth no other reason, but that the Christian religion must together with the world take end in the waterie triplicitie, for that Christ Iesus himselfe was borne vnder the waterie triplicitie; willing as should seeme to bring in an other deluge: Wherein he showeth no lesse impietie then igno∣rance, whether we respect the maximes of the Astrologers, who affirme and say that neuer planet ruinateth his owne house, which should yet happen vnto Iupiter being [ E] in Pisces. (For certein it is in the signe Pisces in the great coniunction in the yeare 1583 and 84, and that the coniunction of these two planets in that Signe is alwaies friendly:) or that we follow the opinion of Plato, and of the Hebrewes, and of all other Philosophers, who generally say, That the world is to be successiuely destroied first by water, and then againe by fire: or else that we rest our selues (as indeed we ought) vpon the promises of God, who cannot lye, which he in mercie made to Noah neuer to drowne the world againe. But as we ought not rashly certeinly to af∣firme any thing of the chaunges and ruines of Monarchies and Commonweales: So can we not denie but that the effects are right great and wonderfull in the coniunction

of the higher planets, when they chaunge the triplicitie, and especially when the three [ A] * 1.109 superiour planets are in coniunction together: or that such their coniunction haue concurrence with the the eclipses of the Sunne or of the Moone: as it happened the day before the taking of Perseus king of Macedon, and the battell of Arbella in Chal∣dea, which drew after them the ruine of two great Monarches, and the chaunge of di∣uers Commonweals, there appeared two most great and darke eclipses of the Moone. As there did also in the beginning of the Peloponesian warre, wherewith all Grecia was on a fire, the Sunne vpon a faire day was wonderfully darkened, euen at such time as Pericles the Athenian Generall began to set saile.

But as for them which contemne the force of the heauenly starres, or els are altoge∣ther ignorant thereof; they stand as men amased, to see in the same instant such conuer∣sions [ G] and chaunges of Commonweales, and such great and turbulent motions of the people together and at once raised. As namely Polybius (himselfe an Atheist) in his hi∣storie exceedingly maruelleth, That in the hundred and thirtieth Olympiade in one selfe same time there was seene vpon the sudden a new chaunge of princes almost throughout the whole world. As namely Philip the younger to become king of Ma∣cedon, Achaeus to be king of Asia, which he vsurped vpon Antiochus, Ptolomeus Philo∣pater to become king of Aegypt, Lycurgus the younger, king of Lacedemonia, Anti∣ochus king of Syria, Hanniball generall of the Carthaginensians: and all these people as it were at the same instant vp in armes one of them against another; the Carthagi∣nensians against the Romans, Ptolomey against Antiochus, the Achaeans and Macedo∣nians, [ H] against the Aetolians and Lacedemonians. And afterward also three of the most famous generals of the world, namely Scipio Affricanus, Hannibal, and Philopoemenes, to haue all died (as Liuie writeth) in one yeare. These great chaunges are more euident to be seene after the coniunction of the two superiour planets, with the Sunne, or Mars: as it happened in the yeare 1564, that the superiour planets were in coniunction in the signe Leo, together with the Sunne & Mercurie: So haue we afterwards seene strange motions and sturres almost all Europe ouer. We haue seene in the same time, in the same yeare, in the same moneth, in the same day, viz. the twentie seuenth of Septem∣ber, in the yeare 1567, the French king guarded with the Swissers, assailed and in daun∣ger to haue bene taken by his subiects: and Henrie king of Sweden dispoyled of his [ I] estate, and by his owne subiects cast in prison: and euen as it were at the same time Mary the most noble queene of the Scots spoiled of her kingdome by her subiects, and by them imprisoned, by whome it beseemed her to haue bene deliuered: and the king of Thunes driuen out of his kingdome by the king of Algiers: the Arabians vp in armes against the Turkes, the Moores of Granado and the Flemings against the king Catholike, the Englishmen against their queene, and all Fraunce in combustion. The same coniunction of the three superiour planets happened also an hundred yeares be∣fore, viz. in the yeare 1464, but not so precisely, neither in the signe of Leo, but onely in the signe of Pisces, and yet by and by after all the people were seene vp in armes, and not onely the princes among themselues, but the subiects also against their princes, as [ K] we haue before said.

Now as for that which Copernicus (the great Astrologer of his time) saith, The chan∣ges* 1.110 and ruines of kingdomes and Commonweales, to depend of the Eccentrique mo∣tion of the earth, it is such, as that it deserueth no aunswere or account to bee thereof made. For that he for the ground thereof supposeth two things most absurd: the one That the influences which all Philosophers attribute vnto the starres, proceed from the earth, and not from the heauens: the other, That the earth it selfe moueth with the same motions, which all the Astrologers of former times (except Eudoxus) haue alwais

giuen vnto the heauens. And yet more straunge it is to make the Sunne immouable [ A] and the center of the world; and the earth fiftie thousand leagues distant from the cen∣ter, and to make part of the heauens, & of the planets, to be mouable, and part of them immouable. Which old opinion of Eudoxus, Ptolomey hath by probable arguments and reasons refuted. Whereunto Copernicus hath well aunswered: vnto whome Me∣lancthon hath onely with this verse right well replied, God in the heauens hath a taber∣nacle for the Sunne, which commeth out as a bridegroome out of his chamber, and reioyceth as a Giant to runne his course. It goeth out from the vttermost part of the heauen, and run∣neth about to the end of it againe: and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof. So also might he say, That Iosua commaunded the Sunne and Moone to stay their course. But vnto all this might be aunswered, That the Scripture oftentimes accommodateth [ B] and sitteth it selfe vnto our weake sences: as when it calleth the Moone the greatest light next vnto the Sunne, which yet neuerthelesse is the least of all the starres except Mercurie. But this doctrine of Copernicus might by a manifest demonstration, which no man hath yet vsed, easily be refelled, viz. that one simple bodie hath but one sim∣ple motion proper vnto the same: as is manifestly to be proued by the principles of naturall Philosophie: then seeing that the earth is one of the simple bodies, as the other elements be, we must necessarily conclude, that it cannot haue but one onely motion proper vnto it selfe: and yet for all that Copernicus hath assigned vnto it three diuers motions: whereof it can haue but one proper vnto it selfe, so that the other must needs [ C] be violent, a thing altogether impossible: and so by the same consequence impossible also, that the alterations and chaunges of Commonweales, should proceed from the Eccentrique motion of the earth.

But let vs now come vnto the opinion of Plato, who thought the chaunges and* 1.111 ruines of Commonweales to ensue, when as the consent of the sweetnesse which pro∣ceedeth from the harmonie thereof is interrupted and broken. Which chaunceth when in the nuptiall number (as he tearmeth it) you depart farthest from those con∣cords which the Musitions call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. As for the nuptiall num∣ber he defineth it to be, that number which beginning of an vnitie, as of a mayden inuiolate is diuided in a double or triple sort of consent, in such sort as that the male, [ D] that is to say the odd numbers shall in continuate order be placed on the right hand, and the female, that is to say, the euen numbers on the left hand in this sort and order. As for the middle places they are to be filled with numbers

[illustration]

perfect, imperfect, quadrate, spherique, and cubique, so that no sort of numbers be wanting. But this order of numbers may be infinite, for that the force and power of tune and con∣sent, is in diuision as infinite, as any other dimension whatso∣euer. So that the forme of a well ordered Commonweale shall so long be firme and sure, as it shall keepe right consent and tune, well agreeing vnto the sweet delite of the eare. The Dupla or Diapason, [ E] which is of one to two; the Sesquialtera, which is the proportion of two to three, which maketh 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or a fift; the Sesquitertia or proportion of three to foure, which maketh 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or a fourth. The Tripla porportion which maketh 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which for that it comprehendeth al concords and consents is cal∣led 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or a gathering of all together. Now if you go farther as vnto that propor∣tion which is of foure to nine, the proportion of these numbers being not harmoni∣call, their followeth thereof an vnpleasant discord, which marreth the whole harmo∣nie of a Commonwealte. And this in mine opinion is that which Plato would say, for no man as yet hath explaned this point; so that antiquitie it selfe hath not without

cause long since complained, nothing to be more obscure than the Platonicall num∣bers. [ F] * 1.112 For Forrester the Germaine is farre from the mind of Plato, when as he seeketh after triple and quadruple proportions, for that in so doing he ouerthroweth the foun∣dations of the nuptiall number & the sides of the Triangle, which consist of the dou∣ble and triple proportion. But in him is also absurd, that he thinketh the same propor∣tion to be betwixt 27. and 64▪ which is of three to foure, a thing by nature impossible, and contrarie to the grounds of the Mathematiques. But Plato willeth vs also to fill the vacant place of the propounded triangle of the nuptiall

[illustration]

number with such other numbers as proportionally arise of the mutuall coniunction of the male and female numbers, yet still continuing the harmonie, for that the same concords [ G] are amongst them to be found, which we haue alreadie set downe amongst the other foure first numbers: as of the ma∣riage of two to three: viz. of two times three is begot the number of six, which placed in the middest filleth vp the emptie place betwixt 4. and 9, which two numbers by no meanes make any consent or harmonie, but the propor∣tion of either of them vnto sixe, is the same which is is of three to foure, that is to say, Sesquialtera or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or a fift. And so also if the number of two be as it were ma∣ried or in proportion ioyned vnto six, or the number of three, so combyned vnto six; as viz. two times six, or three times six, thereof shall arise two numbers, viz. 12. and 18, which shall fill the emptie space of the triangle betwixt 8. and 27. So if the number [ H] of two be proportionally ioyned vnto twelue, and the number of three to eighteene (as viz. two times twelue, or three times eighteene) thereof shall arise the numbers of 24. and of 54. And againe, if three be ioyned vnto twelue, or that which is all one, two to eighteene, thereof ariseth the number of 36. which three proportionate num∣bers of 24. 36. and 54. shall fill vp the vacant place of the triangle betwixt 16. and 81, the mutuall proportion of which numbers so put into the void places of the triangle, and so filled with the numbers next, still keepe a perpetuall sweet course, although the sides of the triangle were infinitely extended, of which triange let this be the forme. If therefore choice be had of such proportions as make a sweet consent in the perpe∣tuall course of numbers, the Commonwealth shall so be euerlasting: if so be that the [ I] * 1.113 state of Commonweales depend of harmonie. But that harmonie (as saith Plato) is sometime broken, so that the sweet consent thereof must needs perish, and so Com∣monweales at length come to ruine and decay. But to say the truth, is it not much more to be feared, lest the subiects or citisens erring or declyning from the sweet and naturall harmonie of well tuned lawes, and customes, shall in steed of them embrace most wicked and pernitious lawes and fashions? And yet for all that will I not denie but that harmonie and musike haue great force & power for the chaunging of a Com∣monweale, in which point both Plato and Aristotle well agree. Howbeit that Cicero is of opinion it to be a thing impossible, that for the musique of a Commonweal* 1.114 chaunged, the Commonweale should it selfe therefore take chaunge. Whereof for [ K] all that we haue a most memorable example, of the Commonweale of the Cyne∣thenses in Arcadia, who hauing giuen ouer the pleasure of musique, shortly after fell into such sedition and ciuill warres, as wherein no kind of crueltie was forgotten, or not put in execution: whereat euery man marueling why this people was become so wilde and barbarors, seeing that all the rest of the people of Arcadia were wonderfull ciuill, courteous, and tractable: Polybius was the first which noted it so to haue happe∣ned, for that they had left to take pleasure and delight in musique; which from all anti∣quitie had beene alwaies more honored and esteemed in Arcadia than in any place

of the world else, in such sort as that by the lawes and customes of that countrie euery [ A] one was vppon great paines bound to exercise him selfe therein, vntill he was thirtie yeares old, which was the meane (as sayth Polybius) the first lawgiuers of that people wisely deuised, to quiet and tame them, being by nature rough and barbarous, as com∣monly* 1.115 all the inhabitants of the mountaines and cold countries be. The like we may almost also say of the French nation, whom Iulian the Apostata in his time calleth a barbarous and fierce people and of all others most desirous of libertie, who yet now at this day are in ciuilitie inferiour to no people of all Europe, none being more tra∣ctable vnto their magistrates or obedient vnto their Princes than they, as men by na∣ture well, but by instruction better taught, and in the iudgement of all their neigh∣bours most skilfull in Musike. Wherein that is also worth the noting, that almost all [ B] the French songes & tunes (wherewith the countrie people are euen yet much deligh∣ted) are still Ionique or Lidian, that is to say, of the fift or seuenth tune. Which tunes Plato and Aristotle forbid the youth and women to vse: for that they be of great force and power to mollifie and effeminate the minds of men; and therefore would haue them to vse the Dorian tune, which our men call the first tune, to the intent that so they might be the better instructed with a certaine pleasant modestie, mixt with grauitie, a thing proper vnto this Dorian Musike. Which prohibition might haue serued better in the lesser Asia, where they haue no other songes but of the fift or sea∣uenth tune; and namely in the countries of Lydia and Ionia: But the people of the cold and mountaine Northern countries, which are ordinarily more sauage or at least [ C] wise lesse courteous than the people of the South and the inhabitants of the plaine countries, can no way better tame and mollifie themselues than by vsing the Lydian and Ionique harmonie. Which kind of Musike was also forbidden in the primitiue Church; wherein it was not permitted to sing Psalmes or prayses vnto God but in the Dorian or first tune, which at this present is yet in the Church most in vse. But as men which would tame wilde and sauage beasts, disarme them first of their teeth and clawes; so the Lydian and Ionique harmonie disarmeth the more outragious and* 1.116 barbarous people of their sauage and cruell nature, and maketh them quiet and tracta∣ble: As it is happened vnto the Frenchmen, who happely had not beene so pliant and [ D] obedient vnto the lawes and statutes of this kingdome, if the nature which Iulian the Emperour saieth to haue beene in them so hautie and impatient of seruitude, had not by Musique beene attempered and mollified.

But of all those things which we haue yet brought to iudge of the future chaun∣ges* 1.117 and ruines of Commonweales, we see no rule (whether it be of Astrologie or mu∣sike) certain and sure: howbeit that we haue by them some probable coniectures, whereof yet none seemeth vnto mee more certain or easie, than that which may be drawen from numbers. For why I thinke almightie God who with wonderfull wis∣dome hath so couched together the nature of all things, and with certain their num∣bers, meanes, measures, and consent, bound together all things to come: to haue also [ E] within their certaine numbers so shut vp and enclosed Commonweales, as that after a certaine period of yeares once past, yet must they needes then perish and take end, al∣though they vse neuer so good lawes and customes: as Plato with Aristotle therein agree. But when that period shall be, neither of them declareth: except some there be which suppose Plato to signifie it by certaine obscure numbers in his eight booke De Republica: at which rocke not onely all the Academikes, but euen almost all the sects of other Philosophers also, haue suffered shipwracke. And first of all Aristotle skip∣peth ouer this place as ouer a dich, neither doth here carpe his maister (as his manner is) when as for the obscuritie thereof he had not wherefore he might reproue him.

Proclus also hauing curiously enough enterpreted seauen of Plato his bookes de Re∣publica: [ A] * 1.118 would not so much as touch the eight, stayed (as I suppose) with the diffi∣cultie of the matter. Theon also of Smyrna (for there is an other Theon also of Alexan∣dria; who writt a commentarie vpon Ptolomee in Greeke) a man most skilfull not in Plato his philosophie onely: but in the Mathematiques also: at such time as he ex∣pounded Plato his Commonweale there stucke fast, neither tooke vpon him to ex∣pound this place. Cicero in one word excuseth the difficultie of Plato his numbers. Marsilius Ficinus (in mine opinion) the sharpest of all the Academikes plainely con∣fesseth himselfe not to know what Plato in that place ment: fearing lest it should so fall out with him as it did with Iamblichus, who seemeth to haue bene willing in three words not to haue manifested a thing of it selfe most obscure, but rather to haue made [ G] it darker. Philo the Iewe euerie where imitating of Plato, thought that obscure and hidden number to be fiftie, and that he saieth to be signified by the right cornered Scalenus, such an one as Pithagoras comprehended in the three numbers 3, 4, 5. and therunto he supposeth those wordes of Plato to be referred, sesqui tertia radix quina∣rio coniuncta: sesqui tertia the radix or root ioyned vnto the number of fiue for the proportion of 3, 2, 4. is the proportion sesqui tertia. But in that he is deceiued for that he hath brought in a plaine number, whenas it appeareth Plato his meaning to haue bene to haue a solid number sought out, which should in it selfe containe all kind of numbers, excepting the numbers perfect. Yet Philo of these radicall numbers, 3, 4, 5,* 1.119 brought euerie one of them apart into themselues maketh three quadrats: whereof [ H] are made 50 numbers, all plaine: but the wordes of Plato make mention of the hun∣dred cube. Beside that there be Dimetients incommensurable vnto the sides, as in the number of Plato: whose wordes it pleaseth mee heare to set downe, and to interpret the same: as well for that the interpretors doe in the interpretation thereof verie much differ amongst themselues: as also for that hee sayth the ignorance of that num∣ber to bee vnto the Gouernours of Cities and Common-weales almost capitall. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. [ I] which is as I interprer it, Truly the compasse of such things which take their beginning from God, is by the perfect number comprehended: but the compas of worldly things is con∣tained by that number wherein are found numbers exceeding, and numbers exceeded by encrease and decrease, three spaces in foure tearmes comprehended; whereof are made numbers among themselues both like, and vnlike, numbers encreased, and diminished, which may be called by their owne names, and compared among themselues: whose ses∣quitertiall radix ioyned vnto the number of fiue, maketh two consents thrice encreased, one equall equally: an hundred times an hundred: an other equall, on one part of it selfe longer, of an hundred dimetients, which might among themselues be compared, the num∣bers of fiue detracted lesse by the vnitie: but two of ineffable proportion: but an hundred [ K] Cubes of the ternarie it selfe. And this number made by Geometricall proportion, is in worldly things most mightie, to them which haue either the better or the worse begin∣ning. Here Plato is s•…•…ylie led away, not vnlike the fish Polypus, hauing on euery side* 1.120 cast out his blacking like ynke, lest otherwise he should haue beene entangled and caught. Wherein truely he seemed to haue imitated Heraclitus, to vnderstand whose writings he said a man had need of a most skilfull interpretour. Which obscure kind of writing and speaking by Heraclitus deuised (when as he most often would beat into his Schollers eares that his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say speake obscurelie) is oft times vsed

not of Plato onely, but euen of Aristotle him selfe also, to the intent that so ha∣uing [ A] cast a mist before his eyes aswell of the learned as of the vnlearned, concerning the knowledge of most difficult things, and shut vp in the hidden secrets of nature, they might themselues become therefore the more admirable. Which thing we es∣pecially note in the bookes of nature; which bookes Aristotle boasteth himselfe of purpose to haue so writ, as that he would not haue them to be vnderstood, imitating therein Plato his most obscure Timaeus: Which thing Lucilius writ also of him selfe, that he had rather not to be at all vnderstood, then to be reprehended or found fault with all. But let vs discouer Plato his deceit by those things which he himselfe writeth* 1.121 more plainly, that we may more certeinly iudge of those things which he fouldeth vp in such obscuritie of words: for he would that those things which take their beginning [ B] from God, should be contained within the perfect number. But what thing is there at length which oweth not the first beginning of the being thereof vnto almightie God, either immediatly without any other meane cause, or else some other the meane or middle causes comming betweene. And that God himselfe without any other meane cause created the Angels, and other the celestiall bodies not onely Plato, but euen the Manichies also themselues confesse; who yet most wickedly thought all earthly things to haue had their beginning from the prince of euils. True it is that the earth brought forth plants & other liuing creatures, the waters also fishes, and foules; yet both of them by the commaundement of almightie God: But vnto the creation of [ C] Man he would also haue the * 1.122 Angels present. Howbeit that Aristotle was of opini∣on the formes of all things to be in a sort diuinely infused into them, when as he writ in all things to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or some diuine thing. As for the mind of man he calleth it not obscurely or doubtfully but euen plainely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: which is (as I inter∣pret it) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from aboue, from God, or from heauen, not out of the power of the seed, as he saith of other liuing creatures: of whom for all that Virgil in generall saith: Igneus est ollis vigor & caelestis origo, A fierie force they haue, and a celestiall beginning. Wherefore we must confesse all things to be included in perfect numbers if we will beleeue Plato. But let vs graunt vnto the Academikes (which yet is an impietie to do) these earthly things which we speake of, to haue had their begin∣ning [ D] else where then from almightie God, shall therefore the perfect numbers as better, be attributed vnto heauenly things? yea the perfect numbers should rather agree vnto earthly things, for that the perfect numbers how many soeuer they be are euen, and of the female kind, for otherwise they were not perfect: neither are more than * foure* 1.123 within an hundred thousand: there beeing also other perfect numbers * aboue that number of an hundred thousand, but such as cannot be applied either vnto diuine, or humaine or worldlie things. Wherefore seeing that the number of six is the first of* 1.124 the perfect numbers, it ought by the opinion of Plato to agree vnto things immedi∣ately by God himselfe created; and yet we see the same number neuerthelesse to agree vnto most vile and abiect liuing creatures. For Aristotle writeth the Hare (by the [ E] law of God an vncleane creature, & forbidden his holie people to eate of) to liue at the most but six yeares. The like number of yeares the same man attributeth also vnto Mice. And vnto certaine kinds of flyes, as vnto waspes and Bees six yeares are by Vir∣gill allotted, and their hiues are still made six cornered; all which base creatures ex∣cept the Hare are engendered of putrifcation. But as saith the Poet: Numero Deus impare gaudet, God delighteth in an odd number. And odd numbers are attributed vnto men: For that which Seneca writeth: Septimus quisque annus aetati notam impri∣mit, Euery seauenth yeare imprinteth some marke into age, is to be vnderstood onely of the male sexe: for experience showeth vs euen vnto the view of the eye, that the

number of six maketh a chaunge, and leaueth a marke vnto the female kind: So that [ F] as men begin to feele the heat of youth at fourteene yeares; women wax ripe at twelue, and so holding on from six to six, still so find in themselues some notable chaunge in the disposition either of their bodies, or of their mindes. All diuine Holy∣daies* 1.125 also are concluded in septenaries, or such other odd numbers. In many places also Diamonds grow by nature it selfe pollished six square, as Plinie in his 33. booke reporteth, which in the mountaines of the Pyrenes is a common matter. Wherefore it is an absurd thing that Plato attributeth the beginning and ending of diuine things vnto perfect numbers onely. But Porphyree the most famous philosopher of his time, when he enterpreted that of Plato out of his Timaeus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, writeth the estate of all Commonweales, and the life of spirits to be determined, at the [ G] farthest in the reuolution of a thousand yeares. Plutarch in his booke entituled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 supposeth the life of Spirits to extend longer, but yet nei∣ther of them sought after the perfect numbers. But if so be that Plato in so great few∣nesse of perfect numbers, could not tell which of them should agree to things sprung from a diuine beginning; by what numbers then should he discide so great varietie of worldly things? or if he knew that number, why did he pray and make vowes vnto the Muses that they would show him it.

Wherefore it behoueth a man of deeper consideration to seeke out such numbers* 1.126 as may signifie the conuersions & chaunges of worldly things, and which are by long experience, and not by light and vaine coniectures approued: such as I deeme the [ H] numbers of seauen and nine and their quadrate and cubike numbers: viz. 49, 81, 343, 729, to be. For as the number of six (which is of all perfect numbers the first) chaun∣geth the manners, habit, or nature of the Female kind, so most * 1.127 auncient antiquitie hath by experience proued the number of seauen in some sort to chaunge the Male kind also: and that as the numbers of seauen or nine vse commonly to giue vnto men* 1.128 the beginning and time of their birth, that so the number growing of the multiplying of either of them, hath beene wont to bring vnto them their end and destruction. Which same thing I transfer and applie vnto Commonweales also, so that the num∣bers of seauen and nine, and such as arise of their quadrate and cubike numbers, do often times bring ruine and destruction vnto Commonweales. For that which we [ I] haue alleaged out of Seneca and Censorius euery seauenth yeare to imprint some marke into the age of man, and so the daungers of mens liues & substance to happen still vpon their seauenth yeares: vnderstand that to belong especially vnto men. Of which mine opinion I haue vse aud experience the authour: For it is euery sixt yeare which leaueth a most certaine note of it selfe vnto women. And first to begin withall the strength of bodie and of mind is increased in them the sixt yeare, or else therein they die: the twelft yeare they begin to wax warme, and the eighteenth yeare are rea∣die for husbands: and if diseases fall vpon them in their sixt yeares, they are so often times in daunger: The like whereof happeneth vnto men the seauenth, the fourteenth, and one and twentieth yeare: So that Plato not without cause attributeth the euen [ K] numbers vnto the female sexe, and the odd numbers vnto the male. And for this cause Plutarch saith, The auntient Romans to haue vsed to giue name vnto their male chil∣dren the ninth day, for that the seauenth was more daungerous, and vnto their female children or daughters the eight day: for that (as saith he) the euen number is proper vnto the female sexe: And therefore I suppose them of old time to haue vsed euery eight day to do sacrifice vnto Neptune, for that the element of water agreeth vnto wo∣men, as doth the firie element vnto men: As also that they thought the number of seauen to be feared. Howbeit that the law of God commaundeth the male children

to be circumcised the eight day: which the sacred interpretors of the Hebrewes thinke [ A] * 1.129 to haue beene done, that so there might be one Sabaoth betwixt the birth of the child and the circumcision thereof, and so more strength might thereby be giuen vnto the child. For why, Moyses doth in sacred writ teach vs, God most plentifully to blesse the Seauenth day (which was the birth day of the world) with his grace and all other good things: which aboundance and stoare of his good blessings is no where seene to be giuen vnto the rest of the other dayes, by a certaine wonderfull cause of nature from all Philosophers hidden.

Yet nothing seemeth in mans nature more wonderfull than that the yeare three∣score* 1.130 three hath bene still noted to be vnto almost all old men fatall, Obseruandum est (saieth Au. Gellius) in multa hominum memoria, expertumque in senioribus plerisque [ B] omnibus sexagesimum tertium vitae annum cum periculo & clade aliqua venire, aut corpo∣ris morbis grauioris, aut vitae interitus, aut animi aegritudinis, It is a thing obser∣ued (sayeth hee) in the great remembrance of men, and also by experience pro∣ued in many old men, The threescore and third yeare of their age to come vnto them all with some danger and hurt, either of the body, or of some great disease, or of losse of life, or of some tormenting griefe of mind. Yea there is an epistle of Augustus the emperour vnto his nephew Caius, bearing date the ninth of the Calends of Octo∣ber, written to the same purpose, in this sort, Aue mi Cai, meus ocellus iucūdissimus, quem semper medius fidius desidero quùm a me abes: sed praecipuè diebus talibus qualis est hodi∣ernus: oculi mei requir unt meum Caium: quem vbicum{que} & hoc die fuisti, spero laetum & [ C] bene valentem celebrasse quartum & sexagesimum natalem meum: nam vt vides 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 communem seniorum omnium tertium & sexagesimum euasimus, &c. All haile my Caius (sayth he) my most sweet delight, whom of my faith I alwaies long for when thou art from me, but especially on such daies as this is mine eyes doe now seeke after my Caius, whome wheresoeuer thou hast this day bene, I hope that thou merrie and in good health, hast celebrated my threescore & fourth birth day: for as you see we haue escaped the threescore and third yeare, the common Climacteriall yeare of all old men, &c. Howbeit that Augustus liued vntill he was seuentie seuen yeares old; as did also Pomponius Atticus, who died at that age. We might reckon vp an infinit number not only of the poore and baser sort, but euen of the nobler sort also, who ended their [ D] * 1.131 daies in the threescore and third yeare of their age: but we will onely reckon vp some such as were for their learning famous, who as at that age died, viz. Aristotle, Cicero, Crysippus, S. Bernard, Boccace, Erasmus, Luthar, Melancthon, Siluius, Alexander Imolen∣sis, the most famous lawier of his time, Cardinall Cusan, Linacre, and Sturmius: And therfore the old Greeke diuines seeme to haue consecrated the number of seauen vnto Apollo, and of nine vnto the Muses, as Plutarque writeth.

Now if any man will more curiously search out these things, whether it be in the* 1.132 sacred or profane histories, he shal find the liues of men for the most part to haue expi∣red and taken end still in the seauenth or ninth yeares of their age: and women in the [ E] sixt. Plato is said to haue died at the age of fourscore and one, which is nine times nine yeares: Theophrastus at 84, which are twelue times seauen yeares, which period few men passe; or els they passe to xiii times seauen, as did S. Hierom and Isocrates, who liued 91 yeares. Plinie, Bartholus, and Caesar liued fiftie sixe yeares, which is eight times seauen yeares: Lamech liued 777 yeares, and Methusala (who of all others liued the longest) 970 yeares: Abraham liued an hundred seauentie and fiue yeares, which are fiue and twentie times seauen yeares: Iacob 147 yeares, which are xxi septinaries, or spaces of seauen yeres: Isaac liued 190 yeares, which make xx times nine yeares: Dauid liued seauentie yeares, which make ten times seauen yeares. An infinit thing it were

to recken vp all which are in histories found to haue ended their daies at these afore∣said [ A] periods of seauens and nines. He also who of our auncestors and of histories is cal∣led Ioannes de temporibus liued 361 yeares, that is to say three and fiftie times seauen yeares. It is manifest also men to be alwaies borne in the ninth or seauenth monethe whom the Graeks therfore call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and that they which are borne either soo∣ner or later liue not. For which cause Hippocrates writeth a child to be fully made and perfected in all the parts and limbs thereof the seauenth day: and afterward to take encrease: and being borne the seauenth moneth to liue: but none to haue liued being borne in the eight moneth: a child also in the seuenth yeare to haue all the teeth, and that men (as Plinie writeth it to haue bene euen from the farthest memorie of men ob∣serued) hauing bene kept from meat seuen dayes, albeit they may liue longer, shall yet [ G] * 1.133 neuerthelesse at length die thereof. The law of God hath most religiously also both consecrated and commaunded, the seuenth day to be kept holy, as the birth day of the world, and of all that therein is: which one day of all others God almightie blessed, and which day all antiquitie hath by long experience reported to be so vnlike the other daies of the weeke, as that it is taken vp as an old prouerbe, No seuenth day 〈◊〉〈◊〉 passe wherein the sunne is not at one time or other therein to be seene. Vpon which day the auntient Hebrewes constantly affirme, The rage of diuels to be restrained, wisedome to be into the minds of men infused, their bodies to be strengthened, and their fields with encrease of fruit to be blessed. The seuenth yeare also is by the law of God holy, as is also the seuenth time seuen yeare, which is the yeare of Iubilie: neither is if to be [ H] doubted, but that a certaine secret force is in them, both for the chaunge and ruine of Commonweales. So that it ought not to seeme straunge, if that this number of seuen be of the Hebrews called sacred or holy: which Caluin (following Galen, as I suppose) calleth Perfect (where he entreateth of the rest of the Sabboth day) which hee euen to astonishment woundereth to be so often and so religiously propounded, to bee of all men obserued and kept, in so much that euen the paine of death is propounded vnto the breakers thereof: so that the whole summe of all God his lawes may seeme to bee therein contained: yet is not therefore the number of seauen a number perfect, for that it is odd and masculine: whereas all perfect numbers are euen and feminine. For why,* 1.134 the Mathematitians define that to be perfect, which may bee diuided into the same [ I] whole parts, whereof it is made, so that in such diuision nothing be wanting or super∣fluous. As 1, 2, 3, make sixe: which three numbers do also equally diuide sixe into equall parts, as it was of them made, as it is in other perfect numbers also. Lactantius* 1.135 in the same errour offended, who calleth the number of three and ten, perfect and full numbers: and also Cicero, who deceiued many, in calling the numbers of seuen and* 1.136 eightfull numbers; which Macrobius vnderstandeth to bee solide, and others to bee perfect numbers: neither of which can truely bee said of the number of seuen: as for the number of eight it is indeed a solid, but not therefore a perfect number. With like errour is Plutarch himselfe deceiued, who writeth, Three to be a number perfect: howbeit that Aristotle deemeth the force of that number to be of great force in the [ K] whole course of nature. Philo was herein also deceiued, in taking ten to bee the most perfect number.* 1.137

Now indeed there are but foure perfect numbers from one vnto an hundred thou∣sand, viz. 6, 28, 496, and 8128, amongst which the last cannot serue for the changing of Commonweales, for that it exceedeth the age of the world: neither the two first, for that they are too little: so that but one of them can be well applied vnto the chaun∣ges of cities and Commonweals, viz. the number of * 1.138 496, which is made of seuentie septenaries of yeares, and a perfect number: it being also a thing by most auntient anti∣quitie

obserued, All cities in the reuolution of fiue hundred yeares, to suffer either some [ A] great chaunge, or else some vtter ruine. But these numbers touching the chaunge or ruine of cities and Commonweales, may be two wayes applyed, viz. vnto the princes themselues, or els vnto the continuance of their kingdomes and empires. As if a man should say, This kingdome of Fraunce to fall and take end, after that threescore and three kings had therein raigned, this number consisting of the numbers of seuen and* 1.139 nine, conuerted in themselues. As Esaias, who liuing in the time of Romulus, prophe∣sied, That nine kings should more yet raigne in Iudea, and that the tenth should toge∣ther with the people be led away into captiuitie, and so that kingdome to take end: As also that there should be nine kings of the Persians, or as that the seuenth king of the Romans should be thrust out of his kingdom: which number of princes well agreeth [ B] with the number of the yeares which they raigned in Iurie, viz. 182, a number consi∣sting of six & twenty septenaries: & at Rome 244, for in the 75 septenarie, that is to say, in the 245 yere Tarquin the proud, last king of Rome, was thrust out of his kingdome. Hieremie the Prophet then liued, when as the prophesie of Esay was fulfilled, and him∣selfe prophesied, That the people should be againe deliuered in the seuentie yeare of their captiuitie, as indeed they were, and the temple againe restored. The same Prophet * 1.140 Esayas prophesied also, The most famous citie of Tyre to be in 70 yeres after vnpeo∣pled and left desolat, and afterwards within seuentie yeares moe after the ruine therof, to be againe restored. The same number agreeth vnto the Athenian Commonweale, [ C] wherein seauen princes, whome they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, raigned also 70 yeres▪ the taking of which citie, and the victorie of the Athenians at Salamine, is reported to haue happe∣ned vpon the verie like day. As for the number which of the Academikes is called fa∣talis n•…•…merus, or a Fatall number, viz. 1728 (being indeed a quadrat number) seemeth to haue bene expired from the raigne of Ninus vnto the victorie of Alexander the Great, at Arbela, and the ouerthrow of the Persian empire. For Herodotus, Diodorus, Trogus Pompeius, Iustin, and Ctesias, begin that empire from Ninus. And at such time as Hierusalem ouerwhelmed with most bitter calamities, was won and rased, the tem∣ple ouerthrowne, king Sedechias slaine, and the people carried away into captiuitie: at the selfe same time the Aegyptians rebelled against the kings of Assyria, the Athenians [ D] shooke off the tyrannicall yoke of the Pisistratides, and the Romans expulsed the proud Tarquins. Now the temple had before stood 427 yeares, a time cousisting of whole septenaries. But for that in the computation of times, there is great difference amongst the Historiographers, we will vse the Roman Fasts or Calenders, which can∣not lie. Wherein we see, that from the foundation of the citie, and of the Roman Commonweale vnto the battaile of Actium, wherein Marcus Antonius was by Augustus vanquished, and the whole empire brought vnder the power of one onely Monarch, and a generall peace established throughout the world, there are accounted 729 yeares, the solide number of nine. The same number of yeres passed from the con∣quest of the kingdome of the Lombards by Charlemaigne, vnto the conquest of the [ E] same countrey by Lewes the twelfth the French king, vpon the Venetians and the Sfor∣ces. The like number of yeares is accounted also from the ouerthrow of the kingdom of the Picts, and the great victorie of the Scots vnto the captiuitie of Marie Steward their queene. As also from Egbert king of the West Saxons (who hauing vanqui∣shed the East Saxons, made himselfe the sole Monarch of England, and called the peo∣ple Englishmen) vnto queene Marie, who was the first woman that tooke vpon her the soueraigntie of that people in fourteene hundred and fortie yeares space. So from the raigne of Augustus, after the victorie by him obtained at Actium, and the temple of I•…•…nus the fourth time shut vp, vnto Augustus the last of all the Roman emperors, slaine

by Odouacer king of the Herules, and the empire possessed by the Gothes, there are ac∣counted [ F] 496 yeares, which we said to be a perfect number, as consisting of seuentie sep∣tinaries; with the perfect number of six: For by the Fasts the yeare following Odoua∣cer began to raigne. Wherein it is also worth the noting, that as the first emperour Augustus with wonderfull felicitie and wisedome, both established and encreased that so great a Monarchy, which he held more than fortie yeres: so Augustulus the last of the Roman emperours diminished both in name and soueraigntie, held that his empire scarce a whole yeare, which happened the tenth of the calends of September. As it happened to Constantine the Great, who established the seat of the empire at Constan∣tinople: and to Constantine the last Christian emperour, there dispoyled of his estate, and slaine by Mahomet king of the Turkes, surnamed the Great. Now from the [ G] building of the citie vnto this Augustulus, are accounted 1225 yeares: which number consisteth of whole septinaries: which thing Vectius the great sooth-saier foretold, as* 1.141 Censorinus out of Marcus Varro writeth. The same number of yeares wee find from Ninus king of Assyria, vnto the death of Sardanapalus, whome Arbaces gouernour of Media dispoyled of his gouernment, and translated the kingdome vnto the Medes. Now from Saul the first king of the elect people of God vnto that Sedechias was slain, and his kingdome ouerthrowne, returneth that perfect number of 496 yeres. But whereas Iosephus reporteth the burning of both the Temples, and the taking of the citie, to haue chaunced the selfesame day, viz. the ninth day of the first moneth; he in that agreeth not with the booke of the Kings, neither with the Prophet Hieremy, [ H] who both otherwise report the same. So many yeares, viz. 496. are accounted from Caranus first king of the Macedons, vnto Alexander the Great last king of that coun∣trey, discended of the line and issue of Hercules, and of Aeacus. Some there bee which adde certaine yeares moe, and some others which detract some also. Wherefore my meaning is not to alleage any other than the records set downe by the most certaine Historiographers, and such as euery man may draw euen out of the verie fasts and ca∣lenders of the Romans themselues. Of which sort is that, that from the foundation of the citie of Rome, vnto the sacking therof by the French men, are accounted 364 yeres, which number consisteth of whole septinaries: As also from the building of the citie, vnto the slaughter at Cannas, Terentius Varro being then Consull (at which time the [ I] Commonweale was fallen into extreame danger) are numbred 536 yeres, that is to say 77 septinaries of yeres: And from thence vnto the slaughter by the Romans, receiued from the Germans, vnder the conduct of Quinctilius Varro, are passed 224 yeares, a number consisting of whole septenaries: both which ouerthrowes happened the se∣cond day of August, as is by the auntient Romans reported. Neither is that lesse me∣morable which Tarapha a most certaine Historiographer amongst the Spaniards re∣porteth, The Moores and Arabians to haue inuaded Spaine in the yere of Christ 707, and that also the seuenth yeare of the raigne of king Roderike, and to haue holden the same kingdome 770 yeares, neither could vtterly be from thence againe expulsed, be∣fore the time of Ferdinand king of Arragon and Castile. It is also worth the noting, [ K] that from the execution of Aman, and the deliuerie of the Iewes at the intercession of Hester, vnto the victorie of Iudas Machabeus against Antiochus the noble king of Sy∣ria and his lieutenant, there passed 343 yeares, which is the solid number of seuen, that is to say seuen times seuen septenaries: both which victories happened the thirteenth day of the moneth Adar, as the Hebrewes haue well noted. The same number of yeares passed from the time that Octauianus (hauing vanquished Marcus Antonius, and vnited the whole Roman empire vnder his owne obeysance) was by the Senat called Augustus, vnto Constantine the Great; a time notable for the straunge chaunces which

then happened in the whole empire, as well in the lawes politique, as in matters of reli∣gion. [ A] Tacitus hath also noted in another singularitie, That the citie of Rome was by Nero burnt, on the like day that it had long before beene burnt by the Gaules, which was the fourteenth of the calends of August: wherēin some haue gone so farre, as to number how many yeares, moneths and dayes, passed betwixt both those fiers.

But that the numbers of six are almost vnto women fatall, I thought it not needfull* 1.142 by examples to proue, least I might be thought to stand vpon triflles, only that I note, that in the yeare 1582, at such time as the prince of Orenge had receiued a mortall wound, the one and twentieth of March, being the fortie ninth yeare of his age, and that all men dispaired of his life, he yet recouered his health at his entrance into his fiftieth yeare: But Carola Charlet of Burbon his wife within two monethes after [ B] died, when as shee entred into the six and thirtieth yeare of her age, which is the quadrat of the number of six: euen as the prince her husband was wounded in the nine and fortieth yeare of his age, the quadrat of the septenarie or number of seuen: which I thought not to haue written, but that I was told the same by the prince of Orenge himselfe, as a thing by him noted, when as I was of councell with Francis duke of Alanson at Anwerpe.

But now for that we are by way of discourse come so farre, the last that remayneth is for me to aunswere some thing to them which take pleasure rather to carpe than to commend my writings: for that * 1.143 I said I vnderstood not the prophecies of Daniel concerning the rising and ruine of Empires and kingdomes. For I doubt not but that [ C] if he (amongst others a most wise man) would in their due times haue plainly set downe such things as he by diuine inspiration had conceiued and declared, all things then whereof we now doubt, should without all doubt be vnto vs most plaine and cleere. Truely he defineth the state of his owne citie, king Cyrus then beginning his raigne, what time the captiuitie was ended, according to * 1.144 the prophecie of Ieremie, (which he beginneth from the destruction of the Citie and of the Temple, and not from the raigne of Ioachim as some suppose) and the holie people returned. He defi∣neth* 1.145 it (I say) by seauentie weekes of yeares, that is by 490. yeares, and that right plainly; when as the prophecie was made in the last yeare of the captiuitie, which was the seauentieth from the destruction of the Citie and of the Temple: that so the pro∣phecies [ D] might in good order with the prophecies, and times with times be continued: whereas they which longer protract the times leaue an hundred and twentie yeares at one gaping. But the Prophet expresly taught, that the beginning of the time ought to be accounted from the time of the prophecie giuen, wherein the people againe re∣turned as if it had beene before dead, and appointed vnto it selfe a Prince and other magistrates, from whence the restoring of the Citie is to be accounted, and not from the repairing of the walles and buildings. In which case Pompee said well: Vrbe de∣serta, in parietibus Rempublicam non consistere, That the citie being forsaken, the Com∣monweale consisted not in the walles thereof. But many * 1.146 Historiographers from [ E] the time of Cyrus vnto the raigne of Herode the great (who hauing taken Hierusalem and slaine all the Senators together with the king himselfe, and spoiled the Iewes of their kingdome) do account 490. yeares. Others there be which recken otherwise, and so great varietie and difference there is amongst them, as that all the opinions of all of them, may well be refelled, not onely by euery one of them a part, but euen by all of them together. As for those things which Daniel writ concerning the Empires, he openly and plainly hath called the Medes, the Persians, and Grecians vnto the Em∣pire of Babylon; but besides them none. The fourth Empire (by him spoken of) we haue showed not to belong vnto the Romans, seeing that question is there concerning

Babylon, which the Romans neuer subdued; which when they passing ouer the riuer [ F] Euphrates had vnfortunately attempted, they receiued many and great ouerthrowes of the most inuincible Parthians. But yet more foolishy do they who attribute that fourth Empire vnto the Germans, who neuer so much as dreamed of any the least part of the Babylonians Empire. Which things for that they be by vs else where dis∣puted we will here let passe. Which things for all that Frankbergerus the Saxon and Bishop of Lipsic, by the authoritie of Luther, and one Dresserus a meere schoolman with rayling without any reason at all refelleth, whom I shall yet count an eloquent man, if he shall but learne aswell to speake, as he hath learned to speake euill: But for that the angrie man (a common fault of the wise) is angrie with me, for that I dare not rashly iudge of the diuine oracles, least in so doing I might offend in such his mat∣ters, [ G] and so farre from all mens senses: he should haue taught me why he thinketh the Prophet Daniel to haue there omitted fiftie empires, which I haue * 1.147 noted to haue bin ten times greater than the German empire, and such as haue in them also contained a great part of the Babylonian empire? Why also Daniel in his first chapter hath writ of himselfe, That he liued in the first yeare of the raigne of Cyrus king of Persia? And yet more, why he should write himself to haue receiued that diuine oracle or prophesie in the * 1.148 third yeare of the raigne of king Cyrus? And why in the chapter following doth he make mention of Darius king of Persia▪ who was inuested in that kingdome seuen and thirtie yeares after that Cyrus began to raigne? For neither Berosus a most true interpretor of the Chaldean antiquities, whome Ctesias and most of the auntient [ H] writers, haue followed: neither Megusthenes the Cronicler of the Persian affaires, nei∣ther Herodotus, called the Father of Historie, neither any of the Greeke or Hebrew hi∣storiographers, report any to haue bene before Darius Hystaspes: I except onely Iose∣phus, who in that place dissenteth from Berosus. But least we should seeme to deale to sharply, and to presse them too farre, What is the reason why Daniel in the eleuenth chapter of his prophesie writeth, That Darius should haue three Persians his successors and that the fourth should come out of Grecia, who by mightie force and strong hand should obtaine the empire? But that this was Alexander the Great no man doubteth, who thrust Darius Codomaenus out of the Persian empire, whose father was Darius Achos, his grandfather Darius Mnemon, and his great grandfather Darius Nothus, vn∣to [ I] whome Daniel turneth his speech. Which if it be so, Daniel must needes haue liued two hundred and twentie yeares, if he were a youth growne when as hee was carried captiue into Chaldea, which he must needes be, for that hee then spoke both most elo∣quently and wisely. And thus much euerie man may most plainely gather both out of the sacred scriptures, and also out of the auntient histories of Herodotus and Iosephus. For Cyrus died in the 30 yeare of his raigne, Cambyses in the 6, Darius Hystaspes in the 37, Xerxes in the 21, Artaxerxes in the 44, Darius Nothus in the 19, Darius Mne∣mon in the 36, Darius Achos in the •…•…6, Darius Cadomanus in the 10, all making the summe of 228 yeares. For Daniel was taken prisoner together with king Ioachim. But let the interpretors of these diuine oracles suppose all things to bee manifest vnto [ K] them, and let euerie one of them with great confidence at their pleasure deter∣mine of these Daniels weekes. Yet how can these which euen most subtilly hane discussed all these matters, defend that of the Prophets Zacharias * 1.149 and Aggaeus, who writ their prophecies in the end of the seauentieth yeare of the captiuitie, Darius Nothus* 1.150 as they will haue it then raigning. This is now (say those Prophets) the seauentieth yeare▪ And if it be so that they will haue the seauentie yeares to be accounted not from the destruction of the Temple, but from the Edict of Xerxes, then truly Zerubabel and Nehemiah the chiefetaines of the people must needs haue liued full two hundred and

fiftie yeares, being so old when Cyrus began his raigne, as that they were able to con∣duct [ A] the people out of Chaldea into the land of Palestine: whom yet the doubt not to proue euen by the testimonie of Nehemiah himselfe, him to haue liued euen to the last Darius. Wherefore all Historiographers are here much troubled and at great variance among themselues: one saying that there were but fiue of these Persian kings: an other six: and others seauen: many eight: some nine: yea and some there be which haue deuised a tenth also. Truely Genebrardus in his Chronologie affirmeth there to haue bene of them onely fiue: but Functius saith ten. Wherefore in so great rietie of opinions one of the two may be: as viz. that none of them all be true, the other can in no wise be, that moe of them then one should at all be true; and which of them it is I can not affirme: neither if I could would I. And in mine opinion [ B] I haue hereof more modestly than they written, that it was not a thing to me well knowne, vnto whom for all that I will yeeld, if they can by any meanes maintaine the certaintie of their owne positions. Howbeit that S. Hierome hath reiected many things which are found in the writings of Daniel: And that the Hebrewes allow not of the rest which are not writ in the Chaldee, but in the Greeke tongue by Theodotion.

Wherefore these examples thus propounded, it is lawfull by a certaine coniectu∣rall* 1.151 gessing to ayme at the rising and falling of Commonweales: as also for a man looking into the precedent causes of things, with the diuers coniunctions and oppo∣sitions of the Planets, to go so farre as the knowledge of such things will beare: not [ C] rashly affirming, or lightly beleeuing any thing concerning such things as are by the Almightie and euer liuing God farre set from the sense and reach of man.

CHAP. III. That it is a most daungerous thing at one and the selfe same time▪ to chaunge the forme, lawes, and customes of a Commonweale.

HOw Cities and Commonweales arise; by what meanes they are also encreased; what diuers alterations and chaunges befall euery one of them; and by what coniectures the fall and ruine of them is to be [ D] by vs gathered, I suppose we haue sufficiently before declared. But for asmuch as the presumptions by vs alreadie noted, are not suffi∣cient to make any certaine demonstration of, but rest vpon such grounds as are farthest off from the senses and capacitie of the common sort of men: Neither that if they were deliuered by way of demonstration, or other more certaine rules, should they therefore inferre any necessitie at all? It remaineth that wee accor∣ding to that wisedome and discretion wherewith almightie God hath of his goodnes endued men, endeuour our selues to rule Estates and Commonweales, and by all meanes to foresee and decline the chaunges and ruines of them. For why, it is one ge∣nerall opinion and doctrine of all Philosophers, yea euen of them which idly dispute [ E] what is done in heauen: a wise man not to be bound or subiect vnto the power or in∣fluence* 1.152 of the starres: but onely they which giue the raines vnto their disordered appe∣tites, and beastly desires, not suffering themselues to be gouerned by the rule of reason, or of other the best lawes: vnto whome Salomon the maister of wisedome hath sharp∣ly threatned the torment of the wheele, saying, That God should cause the wheele to passe ouer them: that is to say, the force and effect of the celestiall Spheres, which ouer the good should haue no power at all. Seeing therefore that the power & influence of the starres may by the power of God, that is, by wisdome (by the gift and goodnesse of almightie God giuen vnto men) be auoided: and that wise physitians haue found the

meanes to chaunge the diseases, and to alter feuers contrarie vnto their naturall courses, [ F] to the intent the more easily to cure them, or at leastwise to asswage them; why should* 1.153 not the wise polititian, or gouernour of a Commonweale, foreseeing the conuersions and chaunges which naturally happen vnto Commonweales, by good lawes and other conuenient remedies preuent the ruine therof: or if the force of the mischiefe be so great, and the destruction so certaine, as that it can by no wisdome of man bee pre∣uented or staied, yet shall he performe that which cunning physitians doe, who by the Symptomes appearing vpon the criticall dayes, and by the causes of the disease, doe more certainlie and better guesse of the sicke mans death in what manner it shall bee: and so yet in good rime giueth thereof warning vnto his ignorant subiects, lest that they should vpon the suddein be vtterly oppressed with the ruine of the falling Estate [ G] and Commonweale. And as the most skilfull Phisitions euen in the state of the disease,* 1.154 and the greatest griefe therof, do yet put their patients in greater comfort, if the Symp∣tomes, be good then if the griefe or fit without them were but easie and gentle; and as to the contrarie when they see a man in the highest degree of health that may be, they are then in the greatest feare, lest he should suddenly fall vnto some extreame sick∣nesse, as the great phisition Hippocrates saith: So also a wise gouernour of a Com∣monweale, seeing the state on all sides beset, and almost ouerwhelmed with ene∣myes, yet if in so great daunger he otherwise see wise men sitting at the helme of the Commonweale, the subiects obedient vnto the Magistrats, and the Magistrats vnto the Lawes; he taketh courage thereat, and promiseth both vnto himselfe and others [ H] good successe; the ignorant people & cowards hauing in the meane time lost their pa∣tience, and lying as men plunged euen into the bothom of dispaire. In which state the Romaine commonweal stood after the third slaughter of their armie at Cannas, when as now many of the friendly and confederate cites, which before had continued in their fidelitie and allegeance, reuolted from the Romaines, following the fortune and* 1.155 victories of Hanniball: For why almost all men now despaired of the estate of the Romaine Empire: at which time of distresse, of all others no man more hurt the Commonweale than did Terentius Varro the Consul, who with some few hauing escaped from so great a slaughter (as wherein threescore thousand of the citisens of Rome were slaine) writ letters vnto the Senat and people of Capua, That the Roman [ I] Commonweale was vndoone, as hauing in that battell lost all the force and flower thereof. Which thing so terrified them of Capua, (although in wealth and power they fa•…•…re exceeded all the rest of the Roman confederates) that they not onely them∣selues forsooke the Romans, but drew with them many of their allies and confederates also vnto Hanniball: when as in deed the Consul should haue extenuated the ouer∣throw and losse receiued. Whereas Scipio, who was afterwards called Africanus, to the contrarie with comfortable speeches then cheered vp diuers of the citisens dispai∣ring of the state of the Commonweale, and by oath constrained such as were about to haue abandoned the citie, to stay there still, and not to stirre, but resolutely to ad∣uenture their liues for the defence of their countrie and Commonweale. Neither was [ K] the Senate terrified with the feare of so many daungers, as wherewith they were on euery side beset and inclosed, but rather seemed with greater wisdome to mannage the Estate than euer it did before. And albeit that the common people (according to their wonted lightnesse and foolish ignorance) almost in euery towne and city sung the prai∣ses of Hanniball, after his so many and so great victories ouer the Romans: Yet for all that, the Senat of euery citie fauoured the Romans: For so saith Liuie, Vnus veluti morbus omnes Italiae populos inuaserat, vt plebs ab optimatibus dissentiret: Senatus Ro∣manis faueret, plebs ad Poenos rem traheret, One disease as it were (saith he) had infected

all the people of Italie, viz. That the people still dissented from the nobilitie; the Senat [ A] still fauoured the Romanes; and the people still enclined vnto the Carthaginensians. Yea Hiero king of Siracusa, accounted the wisest prince of his age, did then much more carefully than before honour and reuerence the amitie and alliance of the Romaines, not doubting in what he could to helpe and releeue them; yea and in that their despe∣rat estate amongst other things sent them a statue of Victorie (of gold) for a present▪ as he which had oftentimes proued the incredible wisdome of that Senat in the manna∣ging of their affaires. Wherein a man may see, that the wiser sort seeing the Romans so aduised and so constant in their extreme necessitie, and that their lawes were neuer more straightly kept, or martiall discipline more seuerely obserued, (as Polybius an eye∣witnesse of those things, himselfe writeth) were alwaies of opinion that the issue of [ B] their affaires would be good: not vnlike the wise physition, who seeing fauourable Symptomes in the strongest fit of his patients disease, is yet still in good hope. Whereas Carthage to the contrarie proud of so many and so great victories, mistres of so many countries and nations, and placed in the height of all worldly felicitie, was neuer than then neerer vnto ruine and destruction: wherof were most certain tokens, for that in that Commonweale was no place left either for law or vertue, all things be∣ing done by the popular rage, or vnruly lust of the common people: so that it must needs shortly after be cast downe headlong from the highest degree of honour, and become subiect vnto the Romans, as not long after it did, Scipio beeing then their ge∣nerall. [ C]

Wherefore the first rule for the keeping and preseruing of Commonweales in* 1.156 their estates, is well to know the nature of euery Commonweale, together with the diseases incident vnto them: whereof we haue more at large discoursed in the former Booke. For it is not enough to know which kind of Commonweale is better than o∣ther, but it behoueth vs also to know the meanes how to maintaine euerie one of them in their estate, if it be not in our power to chaunge the same, or that in chaun∣ging thereof we shall put all to the hasard of vtter ruine and decay. For whie, it is bet∣ter to haue an euill Commonweale than none at all: as with conuenient diet in some* 1.157 sort to preserue the sicke man, than by applying of medicines to an incurable disease so to take away his life quite. For as physitians say, we must neuer apply violent reme∣dies [ D] but vnto desperat diseases; and that whenas there is now no other hope left. And this maxime taketh place in euerie sort of Commonweale, not onely for the chan∣ging of the estate, but euen for the changing of lawes, maners, and customes also: whereunto many hauing no regard haue ruinated and ouerthrowne right faire and great Commonweales, allured with the baite of some one or other good law, which they haue borrowed from some one Commonweale quite contrarie vnto their owne. For as we haue before shewed, many good lawes there be good for the maintenance of a Monarchie, and yet fit for to ruinat a Popular estate: as other also there bee good for the preseruation of the Popular liberty, & yet most fitly seruing for the ouerthrow of a Monarchy: for that those Estates by nature contrary, are by quite contrary laws [ E] both maintained and ruinated.

And albeit ihat some lawes there be good and indifferent to all sorts of Common∣weales, yet so it is, that the antient question of right wise Polititians is not yet well re∣solued, viz. Whether a new law being better, be to be preferred before an old antient law* 1.158 that is worse? For the law be it neuer so good, is nothing worth if it cary with it a con∣tempt of it selfe, or of the rest of the lawes: Now so it is, that newnesse in matter of* 1.159 lawes is alwayes contemptible, whereas to the contrary, the reuerence of antiquity is so great, as that it giueth strength enough vnto a law to cause it to be of it selfe obeyed,

without the authority of any Magistrat at all ioyned vnto it: whereas new edicts and [ F] lawes with all the threats and penalties annexed vnto them, and all that the Magistrats can do, cannot but with great difficulty find intertainment: in such sort, as that the fruit we are to receiue of a new edict or law, is not oft times so great, as the harme which the contempt of the rest of the lawes draweth after it for the nouelty of some one. And to make the matter short, there is nothing more difficult to handle, nor more doubtful in euent, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to bring in new decrees or lawes. And this reason seemeth vnto me very considerable, but yet I will set downe another of no lesse weight, which is, That all the change of laws concerning the estate is dangerous: For to chaunge the customes and lawes concerning inheritance, contracts, or serui∣tude from euill to good, is in some sort tollerable; but to chaunge the laws which con∣cerne [ G] * 1.160 the estare, is as daungerous, as to remoue the foundation or corner stones which vphold the whole weight or burthen of the buildings; in which doing▪ the whole fa∣brike is to be sore shaken, and beside the daunger of falling, receiueth more hurt by the shaking thereof, than it doth good by the new repairation, especially if it bee now be∣come old and ruinous. For euen so it is in a Commonweale now alreadie growne old, wherein if a man neuer so little remoue the foundations that vpholdeth the same, he is in great danger of the ruine therof. For the antient maxime of the most wise politi∣tians ought wel to be waied, That we must not change any thing in the laws of a Common∣weale which hath long maintained it selfe in good estate, whatsoeuer apparent profit may bee thereby pretended. And for these causes the old law of the Athcnians, which was after∣ward [ H] also receiued in Rome, and passed in force of a law, published at the request of Publius Philo, was the most necessarie law that could be in a Commonweale, viz. That it should not be lawfull for any person vpon paine of death to present any request vnto the people, without the priuitie of the Senat. Which law is yet better kept in Venice than in any place of the world els, whereas it is not permitted so much as to present any request euen vnto the Senat, without the aduise of the councell of the Sages. And yet* 1.161 in the Commonweale of the Locrensians, this law was much straiter, Where he which would present any request, to haue it passe in force of a law, was constrained to moue it before the people with a rope about his neck, wherewith hee was there vpon the place to be strangled, if he preuailed not to proue the law by him moued to be good and pro∣fitable [ I] for the Commonweale. Which was the cause that this estate for a most long time stood and flourished, without any thing added or diminished to or from the most antient laws and customes thereof, no man daring to propound any new law to passe, vntill that one of the citisens which had but one •…•…ie, made a request vnto the people, That he which wittingly should put out his eye which had but one, should therefore himselfe haue both his owne put out: For the making of which motion his aduersa∣rie had giuen him cause, hauing oftentimes threatned him to thrust out his eye, and so to depriue him quite of his sight, although he were therefore to endure the penaltie of the law, which was to loose one of his owne. With the equitie, or rather necessi∣tie of whose so reasonable a request the people moued (though with much a do) ena∣cted [ K] the law. Whereby yet nothing was derogated from the law called Lex talioni•…•… (or the law of like punishment) which was then common to almost all nations: For why, it was reason that hee which had maliciously depriued another man of his sight, should himselfe be depriued of his owne sight also.

Now if any man should say, That many lawes must oft times of necessitie bee chan∣ged,* 1.162 as the lawes concerning victuals, or the bringing in, or carrying out of marchan∣dise, or concerning the augmenting or diminishing of the punishment to bee inflicted vpon offendors, which are euen in a short time to be chaunged; I therein agree with

him, for that necessitie hath no law: first, if new lawes giue good hope of fruit and pro∣fit [ A] of them to arise, as of good corne yet in the blade, then are they not to be reiected: but here question is not of lawes concerning ordinarie policie, but of such as concerne the very estate it selfe. Which I both would and wish, if possibly it might be, that they should still be most firme and immutable: not for that the Commonweale ought to serue the laws, seeing that they are al made for the maintenance of the Commonweale, and of the societie of men: neither that any man wisheth the safetie and preseruation of the lawes, but for the Commonweales sake. For why, the first and chiefe law of all* 1.163 Commonweales, is this, SALVS POPVLI SVPREMA LEX ESTO, The welfare of the people, let that be the last law. For what reason moued Themistocles to fortifie the citie of Athens with walles and bulwarkes, euen the verie same reason induced [ B] Theramenes to persuade the Athenians to rase their walles, viz. the welfare of the peo∣ple: whereas otherwise the Lacedemonians had vndone the citisens together with the citie. Wherefore no law is so sacred, but that vpon vrgent necessitie it is to be changed. And therefore Solon after he had published his lawes, caused the Athenians to sweare to* 1.164 obserue and keepe them for the space of one hundred yeare: giuing them thereby to vnderstand, that lawes could neuer be made immutable, neither were to be all at once together chaunged. Lycurgus also in like maner tooke an oath of the Lacedemonians his subiects, to keepe his lawes vntill his returne from the Oracle of Apollo, from whence he afterwards neuer returned, but went himselfe into voluntarie exile, out of his natiue countrey; so to bind his citisens so much as possible was to the perpetuall [ C] * 1.165 keeping of his lawes. And albeit that the iniquitie of some auntient law bee by right euident, yet is it better to endure it, vntill that it in time by little and little of it selfe loose the force, than vpon the sudden by violence to repeale it. For so did the Romans by many the lawes of the twelue tables, which they would not abrogat, but onely by not obseruing them, in that they were vnprofitable or vniust, suffered them so to grow out of vse: which they so did, least in abrogating of them, they might seeme to impaire the credit and authoritie of the rest of the same lawes. Yet after that they had by tract of time bene of long buried as it were in obliuion (which was seuen hundred yeares after that they were first published) it was at the motion of Aebutius the Tribune, decreed, That such of those lawes as were as it were of themselues growne out of vse, should be [ D] reputed as repealed and abrogated, to the end that no man should with them yet stan∣ding in force be entangled.

But for that the nature of man as of all other worldly things also, is most slipperi•…•…* 1.166 and vnconstant, running still headlong from good to euill, and from euill to worse; vi∣ces by little and little still encreasing, not vnlike vnto euill humors, which without sen∣cible feeling encrease mans bodie, vntill it be full of them, breedeth in it many most daungerous diseases, and so at length bringeth it vnto vtter destruction. For remedie where of new lawes must of necessitie be deuised: which must yet for all that by little and little be done, and not violently all at once. As Agis king of Lacedemonia vn∣wisely attempted to haue done: who desiring to reestablish in the Commonweale the [ E] auntient discipline of Lycurgus, now by the negligence of the magistrats almost grown quite out of vse, caused all the obligations and scedules of priuat men to be vppon a sudden brought out & burnt: which done, he was about to haue proceeded to the ma∣king of a new diuision of lands, to the end to haue so made an equalitie of wealth and goods amongst the citisens, as Lycurgus had before done: which although it were a thing desired of many in the Lacedemonian Commonweale (which had indeed so bene founded) yet so it was, that in making too much hast in the doing thereof, he not onely fell from his hope, but thereby kindled such a fire of sedition also, as burnt vp his whole

house, and so afterward dispoiled of his estate, and by his rebellious subiects together [ F] with his mother and other his friends and partakers strangled; made away for a sort of mad and euill minded fellowes to inuade the state, hauing so depriued his countrey of himselfe a good and vertuous prince. Whereas he should before haue made himselfe maister of the forces, or if that had not bene possible, yet to haue sounded the minds of them of the geater sort, and by meanes to haue gained them vnto him one after ano∣ther, as had Lycurgus done before him; and then to haue forbidden them the vse of gold and siluer, that so it might haue growne into as little estimation as iron: and in some time after that, to haue forbidden all sumptuousnesse in apparell, and rich furni∣ture, and not at once to haue encroached vpon the libertie of the people, to haue pro∣ued their patience, and chaunged their discipline: For that to vse such a violent letting [ G] of blood, before the corrupt humors purged, or so strong a medicine, before any pre∣paratiue giuen, is not the way to cure the diseases, but to kill the diseased. Where∣fore in the gouernments of Commonweales, and healing the diseases thereof, we must imitat not the Physitians onely, but euen nature it selfe, or rather the great God of na∣ture whom we see to do all things by little and little, and almost insensibly. The Vene∣tians right wisely during the life of Augustin Barbarin their duke, attempted not in any thing to abridge his power, though by them much misliked and feared; least in so do∣ing they should eithe•…•… haue offered some disgrace vnto him their prince, now growne old, or els haue raised some new sturres, and so haue troubled the quiet of their Com∣monweale. But he once dead, before they proceeded vnto the new election of Lore∣dan, [ H] the seignorie caused such new lawes and decrees to be published, as whereby the power of the dukes was right greatly impeired and diminished. The same wee haue shewed also to haue bene done in the elections of the German emperours, the kings of Polonia, and of Denmarke, who of soueraigne Monarches are now brought vnto the small estates of Generals in chiefe, some of them more, and some lesse: which the more closely to hide, they haue left vnto them the imperiall and roiall markes and cognisan∣ces in their habits, in their titles and ceremonies, but in few things els in effect and deed.

But as it is a daungerous thing for the subiects all at once to abridge or cut short* 1.167 the power of a soueraigne prince or magistrat, who yet hath the power in his hand: so is it also no lesse daungerous for a prince vpon the sudden to displace or cast off the an∣tient [ I] seruitors of his predecessours, or els at once to thrust out some part of the great magistrats and officers of the estate, and to retaine the rest, they which are new chosen or retained, resting ouer charged with enuie, and the other with euill doing or ignorance, and withall depriued of the honour and good, which they haue bought full deere. And it may be that one of the fairest foundations of this monarchy is, that the king dying, the officers of the crowne continue still in their charge, who by that means still maintaine the Commonweale in the estate thereof. And albeit that the officers of the kings house be at the pleasure of the successour to be chaunged, so ought hee yet therein to vse such discretion, as that they which are remoued haue not occasion to in∣nouat or moue any thing as men disgraced, or at leastwise haue no power left them so [ K] to doe, albeit that they were thereunto willing. In which point the emperour Galba being deceiued, and hauing thrust Otho out of the hope hee had conceiued of the em∣pire, to adopt Piso to succeed him in the gouernment, and yet for all that without disar∣ming of Otho, he was shortly after by the same Otho (a man in great fauor with the Pre∣torian souldiours) slaine together with Piso, whome he had before adopted to succeed him in the empire and gouernment of the state. All which perils and daungers are lesse to be feared in an Aristocratike or Popular estate, for that in them they which haue the soueraigntie neuer die; howbeit that there is in them no lesse danger in chaunging of

their soueraigne magistrats, or generals (as we haue before declared) or in making of [ A] lawes which may tend to the impairtng of the power of the people▪ or which may any way seeme profitable vnto the nobilitie, and preiudiciall or hurtfull vnto the people: or in case that victuals and prouisions faile, or that some great extreame dearth arise; in which cases there is alwaies daunger of popular commotions and rebellions. So that* 1.168 in briefe, when question is for the displacing of great magistrats, or for the suppressing of corporations or colledges, or for the cutting short of priuileges, or the augmenting of punishments, or for the reforming of disorders amongst the people, or for the calling of great men to account, or for the reducing of religion to▪ the former course and begin∣ning thereof; which by succession of time, following the naturall corruption of man, hath bin altered & changed from the first puritie therof: there is no better means than [ B] to come thereunto by little and little, without forcing of any thing, if it were possible, as by way of suppression. Whereof we haue a notable example of king Charles the fift (euen he that was surnamed the Wise) who at such time as he was Regent in France (his father being as then prisoner in England) by the euill councell of some, ignorant in matters of estate, at one chop suspended all the officers in Fraunce, of whome also hee suppressed the greatest part, appointing fiftie commissioners for the hearing of such ac∣cusations as should be laid against them for the extortion and briberie by them com∣mitted and vsed: whereupon all Fraunce was in such tumult and vp•…•…ore (for the infinit number that then were of male contents) as that shortly after for remedie thereof, hee [ C] by a decree in the high court of parliament at Paris, whereunto all the nobilitie were as∣sembled, abrogated the former law. Which decree is yet extant in the act of that his court, to this effect and purpose, Cùm regiae potestati & procurationi, quam gerimus, non modò quae ab alijs, sed etiam quae a nobis ipsis & in Rempublicam, & in singulos peccantur emendare consentaneum sit, rebus planè perspectis & cognitis, quae de imperio magistratibus adempto noua lege iussimus, placet abrogari; vt quidem abrogamus, & apertè declaramus, legis illius, quae importunis quorumdam rogationibus erepta est, nullam vim fore, & quae acta gesta sunt, cum magno nostro dolore acta gesta fuisse; nec illam magistratuum ac honorum abrogationem, quam non iure factam esse censitemur cuiquam fraudi esse: aut cuiusquam ius ac dignitatem violare nos vlla ex parte voluisse: ac proinde legem illam iure a nobis [ D] rescindi & abrogaritestamur, vt omnibus magistratibus salua omnia & integra restituan∣tur, Whereas by the regall power and authoritie which we beare, it is fitting for vs to correct and amend, not onely such things as by others, but euen by our selues also are trespassed against the Commonweale, or other men in particular: all things through∣ly looked into, and tried, our pleasure is, That what we haue by a new law commaun∣ded concerning power and authoritie taken from the magistrats, to be againe abroga∣ted, as indeed we abrogat, and plainely declare the force of that law (which was by the importunat suit of some wrested from vs) to be nothing: and that such things as were then done, to haue bene done to our great griefe: neither that that depriuation of offi∣ces or honours, which we confesse to haue bene not lawfully done, to bee impu•…•…ed to [ E] any man: neither that our will was in any part to violat any mans right or honour: And therefore we freely protest, that new law to be of vs rightly repealed and abroga∣ted: and that so all things safe and whole, may so againe bee vnto the magistrats resto∣red. And thus much he. But Charles the ninth comming vnto the crowne, and see∣ing the number of officers through the libertie of the times growne almost infinit, to* 1.169 the great hurt of the Commonweale, in such sort, as that it seemed a thing almost ne∣cessarie to haue depriued them of their honours and fees, yet did he not so, for that it could not without great iniurie be done, when as the money they had before paid for them, could not by reason of the want of coine in the common treasurie, bee againe

repaid vnto them: neither if it could haue bene, could he yet be without imputation & [ F] disgrace, that was so without cause displaced. Besides that, vnto many their credit & re∣putation was in more esteeme & deerer than was their profit, and much the more was it to be feared, that if they should both of their money and preferment be together spoi∣led, least their present credit and profit being impaired, and the hope also of the recoue∣rie of the money they had paid lost▪ should minister vnto many of them occasions for them to raise rebellions and new sturres in the estate of the Commonweale. Where∣fore the want of money in the common treasurie profited vs then mindfull of other things, and fortune so fauoured our vnskilfulnesse and ignorance, as in auntient time it did a painter, who painting of an horse, when as he not knowing how cunningly to ex∣presse the foame of the horses mouth, and wearie of his worke not well sorting to his [ G] mind, in an anger cast his wet spunge at it, and so by fortune expressed that which he by cunning could not do: euen so it pleased that king to lessen the multitude of his officers stil as they died, by chusing no new in their steads, when as he could not againe restore vnto them the money they had paid for their offices; neither yet if the princes wealth &* 1.170 power had bene so great, as with his becke or a wink of his eye, to cause all his subiects to tremble, and so to be able to doe what thing soeuer he list, should he yet seeme to do wisely by force to take away the offices and places before sold vnto his magistrats and officers: For that not onely they which haue receiued the iniurie, but euen other his subiects also, are oft times much moued and incensed with iniuries and wrongs done vnto other men: Besides that, the mightier that a man is, the more iustly and tempe∣rately [ H] he ought to behaue himselfe towards all men, but especiall towards his subiects.* 1.171 Wherefore the Senat and people of Basil did wisely, who hauing renounced the Bi∣shop of Romes Religion (which they now detested) would not vpon the sodaine thrust the Monkes and Nunnes with other the Religious persons out of their Abbies and Monasteries: but onely tooke order, that as they dyed, they should die both for themselues and their successors, expresly forbidding any new to be chosen in their pla∣ces; that so by that meanes their colledges might by little and little by the death of the fellowes be extinguished. Whereby it came to passe, that all the rest of the Carthusi∣ans of their owne accord forsaking their cloister, yet one of them all alone for along time remained therein, and so quietly and without any disturbance held the right of his [ I] couent, being neuer enforced to chaunge either his place, his habit, or old ceremonies, or religion before by him receiued. The like order was taken at Coire in the diet of the Grisons: wherin it was decreed, That the ministers of the reformed religion should be maintained of the profits and reuenewes of the church, the religious men yet neuer∣thelesse still remaining in their cloisters and couents, to bee by their death suppressed, they being now prohibited to chuse any new in stead of them which were dead: as I haue learned by the letters of the ambassadour of Fraunce, who was then at Coire. By which meanes both they which professed the new religion, and they which profes∣sed the old, were both prouided for: whereas otherwise it had beene an vnreasonable thing to haue thrust them, who had learned not onely to liue idly, but euen to doe no∣thing [ K] at all (as Lucilius merrily saith) hauing neither trade nor occupation to liue vp∣pon, out of the old possession of their lands, were it neuer so vniust. Whereof beside the iniurie vnto them done, daunger might haue also ensued, least they not hauing whereof to liue, and so brought into dispaire, might haue attempted some thing against the state; and so haply drawne after them all their friends and allies alo, to the great trouble of the whole Commonweale. For the same cause the king hauing giuen leaue for the free exercise of the new religion in this realme of Fraunce, and seeing that they which vnder the colour thereof were gone out of ther cloisters, demanded a portion in

the lands and inheritance of their parents or neere kinsmen: it was decreed, and that vp∣on [ A] great paine, That they should againe returne vnto their cloisters: which seemed to be a thing directly contrarie vnto the law, whereby free libertie was giuen for euerie man that wold, to professe the new reformed religion. Howbeit that this was indirect∣ly to stop the mouthes of them which departing out of their monasteries, sought to trouble the estate, and vnder the vaile and colour of religion, to trouble the most great and noble houses of this realme: besides that it had beene also necessarie in all the cu∣stomes of this realme, to rase the article concerning the religions, who both by the cannon and ciuill laws, as also by all our lawes and customes, are excluded and shut out from all hope of inheritance.

But now that which we haue said, That the multitude of officers, or of colleges, and [ B] companies, of priuileges, or of wicked men, which through the sufferance of princes, or the negligence of the magistrat, are by little and little growne to the hurt of the Com∣monweale, are by the same meane to be againe suppressed; hath place in all things which concerne the publike state, and hath a reference vnto the nature of the lawes,* 1.172 which haue no force nor effect but for the time to come. And albeit that tyrannie bee a thing most cruell and detestable, yet so it is, that the surest way and meane to suppresse the same, if the tyrant haue neither children nor brethren to succeed him, is together with the death of the tyrant to abolish also the tyrannicall gouernment; & not by force whilest he yet liueth to striue to take from him the gouernment, with the hazard of the [ C] ruine of the whole estate, as oftentimes it chaunceth. But if the tyrant haue children, and doth what he may to destroy the good, and to put the great men one after another to death (as Tarquin the proud, and other tyrants following his steps vsed commonly to doe) or to suppresse the magistrats or other great officers which might stay the course of his tyrannie, to the end that hee may without let or controle∣ment doe whatsoeuer him pleaseth: then in this ease violent remedies are to bee vsed, but with such limitation and restriction as we haue before set downe, and not other∣wise, least so wee might seeme rashly to arme the subiects against their princes.

We ought then in the gouernment of a well ordered estate and Commonweale,* 1.173 to imitat and follow the great God of nature, who in all things proceedeth easily and [ D] by little and little, who of a little seed causeth to grow a tree for height and greatnesse right admirable, and yet for all that insensibly; and still by meanes conioyning the ex∣tremities of nature, as by putting the Spring betwixt Winter and Sommer, and Au∣tumne betwixt Sommer and Winter, moderating the extremities of the times and seasons, which the selfe same wisedome which he vseth in all other things also, and that in such sort, as that no violent force or course therein appeareth. But if it be oftentimes daungerous to chaunge the lawes of an estate or Commonweale, as wee haue before declared: Let vs now see also, if it be not in like sort daungerous oftentimes to chaungethe magistrates, or that it is much better to haue them perpetuall and [ E] without chaunge.

CHAP. IIII. [ F] ¶ Whether it be better in a Commonweale to haue the Magistrats still chaunge∣able, or else perpetuall.

FOrasmuch as both cities, citisens, and Commonweales, vse commonly to be for nothing more turmoiled and troubled than by men for the obtaining of offices and honours, mee thinke this question to bee one of the most profitable and most necessarie of any that can be made in matter of estate, Whether it be better to haue annuall or perpetuall Magistrats [ G] in a Commonweale? Than which question I know not whe∣ther there be any amongst them which concerne a Com∣monweal more harder to decide, or more pleasant to vnder∣stand, and therefore not in any wise by vs in this place to be omitted. Which I say not as meaning to take vpon me the deciding of this question, but onely to touch the rea∣sons which might well be giuen both on the one side and the other, leauing the resolu∣tion therof vnto them which heretofore haue better sounded the proceeding and con∣sequence thereof. Neither is it mine intent or purpose, either to propound and moue this question, to giue foot vnto them which would chaunge the laws alreadie receiued, which the subiects ought to hold for good and wholesome in euerie Commonweale▪ [ H] nor for any desire I haue to chaunge the estate of Commonweals alreadie established, which haue continued by long succession and course of yeares.

Now the first and strongest reason that is to be had to make the magistrats and offi∣cers* 1.174 annuall, is, for that the first and principall end of euerie Commonweale ought to consist in vertue: and that the scope of euerie good and true law▪ giuer, is to make his subiects vertuous. Which to attaine vnto, it behoueth him to propound vnto the view* 1.175 and sight of the whole world, the rewards of vertue, as the marke whereat euerie man ought to aime in best sort he can.

Now most certaine it is, that honour is no other thing than the reward and prize of vertue, which neither ought nor can by the counterpoise of profit be esteemed: wher∣as [ I] rather to the contrarie vertue hath no more capital an enemie, than profit deuised to arise by honour. If then the honourable preferments, offices and commissions bee ta∣ken out of publique place, to be alwayes enclosed & shut vp within the particular hou∣ses of most vnworthy men, who for fauour or money carrie away the same; it is not then to be thought vertue in that estate to be the prize, the corrupt nature of man being such as is right hardly to be drawne vnto vertue, what reward or prise soeuer bee deui∣sed for the alluring of men thereto. And thus much for the first point, which ought to moue princes and wise law giuers, to set preferments, offices, and all such other the re∣wards of vertue, in the eye of all the world, and so to diuide them amongst their sub∣iects, to euery man according to his deserts, which they cannot do, if they grant them [ K] vnto men in perpetuities.

Another point which the wise law giuer ought still to haue before his eyes, is, To* 1.176 cut vp the roots, and to take away the seedes of ciuill sedition, so to maintaine his sub∣iects in good peace and amitie amongst themselues, and one of them with another. Which is a matter of such weight, as that many haue thought it to bee the onely end which the good law maker ought to hope after. For albeit that vertue may oftentimes be banished out of Commonweales, for men to liue in a disordered licentiousnesse of all kind of voluptuous pleasures: yet in that all men agree, that there is no more daun∣gerous

a plague vnto Commonweales, than ciuill sedition and discord. Forasmuch as [ A] it draweth after it the common ruine aswell of the good as of the bad. Now so it is, that the first and principall cause of sedition, is inequalitie; as to the contrarie the mo∣ther nurse of peace and amitie, is equalitie; which is no other thing than naturall equi∣tie, distributing rewards, preferments, honours, and all other things common vnto the subiects indifferently, and in the best sort that may be. From which equalitie the very theeues and robbers themselues may in no wise depart, if they meane to liue together. Hee therefore that shall diuide the honours and offices of estate vnto a small number of men, as needs it must be, when they are giuen for tearme of life, hee I say hath lighted the greatest flames of ielousie of one of them against another, and the greatest fire of sedition that can possibly be raised in a Commonweale. [ B]

Now if there were no more but the two reasons before alleaged, viz. The enioy∣ing* 1.177 of vertue, with the rewards thereunto due, and the auoyding of sedition, the grea∣test plague of a Commonweale; yet were they euen sufficient to let, that offices should not be perpetuall, but rather annuall, to the end that euerie man so hauing therein part and interest, might so also haue occasion to liue in peace. But yet there are farther rea∣sons also, which is, that by such perpetuitie of offices and promotions, not onely the vnitie and concord of subiects, and the true rewards of vertue are so taken away, but that the due punishment by the lawes appointed for offendors are thereby also impea∣ched, or rather quite abolished: Whereof the wise law giuer ought to haue a greater regard than of the rewards to vertue due▪ For that the wise and accomplished man [ C] looketh for no other reward of his vertuous actions, more than vertue it selfe: which a man cannot say of vice, neither of the vitious. And for this cause the lawes both of God and man, euen from the first vnto the last, haue commaunded nothing more, than the punishment of the wicked. And what punishment should a man do vppon them, who are alwaies so high mounted, as that it is impossible to come nigh them? Who shall accuse them? who shall imprison them? who shall condemne them? Shall their companions or fellowes in power? will they cut their owne armes, or rip their owne entrals? beleeue it they will neuer be so euill aduised. What if the great ones bee also partakers of their foule robberies, villanies, and extortion? how shall they then punish [ D] the others? they will rather blush for shame, and be touched with compassion of them which are like vnto themselues, than with the hainousnesse of the offences be en∣duced to take of them punishment. But if any there be so hardie as to accuse, yea or but so much as to complaine of one of these demie gods, he is in daunger of his life, as a false enformer, if hee by proofe cleerer than the sunne it selfe, proue not villanies done in most obscure darkenesse: and admit that all be by them well proued, and that the guiltie magistrat be conuinced and attainted, yet so it is, that this ordinarie clause Frater noster est, He is our brother, shall suffice to couer and burie all the villanies, de∣ceits, and extortion, of the most vniust magistrat that a man could imagine. So that hardly one of a thousand which had deserued punishment, should in fiue hundred yeres be brought to execution. [ E]

But if the magistrats were annuall, it is most certaine, that the feare to be called to ac∣count,* 1.178 would alwaies keepe them in awe, and that they would tremble and quake as often as they heard that thundering threatning which the Tribunes of the people made to Manlius, Priuatum rationem rerum ab se gestarum redditurum, quoniam Consulnol∣uisset, That he being a priuat man, should giue account of such things as hee had done, for that he would not so do being Consull. And indeed what could a man see more faire, than them which had but a little before administred iustice, and taken charge of the common treasure, with other such publike offices, after that they had put off their

robes of dignitie, to come in their common attire as priuat men, to giue an account of [ F] their actions done in the time of their magistracie. And this is it for which Plutarch hath so highly commended the custome of the auntient Romans, who animated the young men to commence their publike accusations against such as had euill acquited themselues in their publike charges, setting them on as grayhounds vpon wolues, or other wild beasts. In which doing not onely the offendors were punished, but euerie man else also vpon an emulation and strife, as it were endeuoured him to doe well; but especially they, who had themselues accused others, as well assured that there ne∣uer wanted some, who still right narrowly looked into all their doings, so that it much concerned them to beare themselues most vprightly in the whole course of their liues. Which benefits those estates and Commonweales must neeedes want, which haue [ G] their magistrats perpetuall, or for tearme of life. For which cause the emperour Clau∣dius wisely renewed an old edict or law, then growne out of vse: which was, That hee to whome the gouernment of any prouince was by lot fallen (as the maner was) should forthwith, all excuses set apart, go vnto his charge; and that the time of his authoritie and charge once expired, he should not forthwith take vppon him any other new pub∣like charge or gouernment, to the intent that the euill behauiour or extortion of the magistrats should not by such continuation of their power and authoritie remaine vn∣punished. For whatsoeuer decrees or lawes bee made, the euill magistrats would still* 1.179 keepe the power in their hands, and doe what they can one for another; in such sort strengthening themselues, as that is a thing almost impossible to haue of them any rea∣son. [ H] Which was the cause that moued Hannibal that great captaine to present a re∣quest vnto the people of Carthage, To make their judges annuall, which before held their places for tearme of life, and that none of them should keepe his place two yeares together, as Liuie reporteth, whose words we thought good thus here to set downe, Iudicum or do ea tempestate dominabatur Carthagine, eo maximè quòd ijdem perpetui iudi∣ces: res, fama, vitaque omnium in illorum potestate erat; qui vnum eius ordinis, & omnes aduersos habebat. horum in tam impotenti regno Praetor factus Annibal, vocare ad se Quae∣storem; idem pro nihilo habuit; nam aduersae factionis erat: & quia ex qu•…•…stura in iudi∣ces potentissimum ordinem referuntur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebant: id in∣dignum ratus Annibal, viatorem ad prehendendum Quaestorem misit, subductumque in [ I] concionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum (prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam essent, nec magistratus) accusauit, & vt secundis auribus accipi orationem animaduertit, legem extemplo promulgauit pertulitque, The order or companie of the judges (saith he) did at that time beare all the sway at Carthage; and well the more, for that the selfe same men were still perpetuall judges: euerie mans wealth, fame, and life, was in their power; he that had one of them of that order against him, had them al his enemies. In this their so insolent a raigne Hannibal being made Pretor, conuented one of the Questors, or publike receiuers before him, which made thereof no recko∣ning, for why, he was of the contrarie faction vnto him: and forasmuch as out of the Questors choyce was still made into the most mightie order of the judges, they still [ K] bare their hautie minds aunswerable vnto the wealth and power they were afterwards to enioy. Which Hannibal taking for a great indignitie, sent a sergeant to lay hands vpon the Questor, and hauing brought him into the generall assemblie of the people, accused not him more than he did the whole order of the judges (through whose pride and wealth, neither the lawes nor the magistrats were (as he said) any thing at all regar∣ded) and perceiuing his speech to be with the good liking of the people receiued, forth∣with enacted, and proclaimed a law, That the judges should be euery yeare chosen, and that none of them should be judges two yeares together. And thus farre he. For why,

it was otherwise a thing impossible to chastise them, a man still hauing them all his [ A] enemies, that should touch but one of them. For that they beeing perpetuall magi∣strats, and commonly allied one of them vnto another, it was impossible to hope to haue any of them punished, and much lesse to haue against them iustice, if a man had any thing to do with them: and in case a man refused one of them, hee must in so do∣ing refuse the whole bench of them also. As not many yeares ago in the court of Pa∣ris (which at this time consisteth of an hundred and fiftie judges) in a suit betwixt Chr. Thuan, chiefe justice in that court, and Iohn Tili, register of the court (who tooke vpon him the defence of his daughter being absent) were, for alliance onely, threescore jud∣ges on the one side, and two and fortie on the other, chalenged and reiected▪ and all vp∣on the same bench. And for this cause it was ordained in the assembly of the estates [ B] of the countrey of Languedoc, holden at Montpelier in the yeare 1556, where then I was, and charge there giuen to Iohn Durande, atturney for that country, That amongst other his instructions, he should especially moue the king, that it might please him to ordaine, that the nie kinsmen or other of alliance vnto the judges, should not from thenceforth be admitted vnto the same bench, neither into the same court. Which same request foure yeares after, was by the estates of Fraunce presented vnto the king in the parliament at Orleance, howbeit that nothing could therein bee obtained, nei∣ther can be, so long as honours and preferments are in perpetuitie giuen in the Com∣monweale. For it is now two hundred and fiftie yeares since that king Charles the fift, [ C] and before him Philip the Faire had ordained, That no man should bee judge in the* 1.180 same countrey wherein he was borne: as in like case Marcus Aurelius made an edict, That no man should be gouernour in his owne countrey. Of which law the profit was thought so great, as that he would haue the same afterwards extended euen vnto them which were but councellours or assistants vnto the gouernours of countries: which was a thing then wel put in execution, as it is at this present in Spaine, & in most* 1.181 of the cities in Italie, where the ordinarie judge is most commonly a stranger. Which was also by the ambassadours of Moscouie requested of the estates of Polonia. How∣beit that the decrees of our kings concerning those matters, were quickly buried, after that the publike offices and charges began to be with vs giuen for tearme of life. And [ D] not to search further into the edicts of the Roman emperours, we find also in Caesar his* 1.182 Commentaries, that the auntient Gaules, and namely they of Autun, had amongst them an inuiolable law, which expresly forbad the magistrats to be continued in their places aboue one yeare, and that two of one familie could not be magistrats together, nor yet one of them, so long as the other who had alreadie bene magistrat should liue. And that more is, it was alwaies expresly forbidden, That two of one familie might be councellors together, neither yet one of them, so long as the other who had alreadie so bene a councellour was aliue.

Moreouer the thing which ought of all others to be most recommended vnto all* 1.183 subiects in generall, & euerie one of them in particular, is the preseruation of the Com∣monweale. [ E] And what regard or care of the publike good should they haue, which therein haue no part? Such as are themselues excluded, and which see the common preferments and offices giuen in prey to some few in perpetuitie? How should they haue any care of that which concerneth them not, neither neere, nor a farre off? And admit that any good and honest man would say, would doe, or vndertake, any thing that were for the common good or profit, being himselfe but a priuat man, who should hearken vnto him? who should support him? who should fauour him? So that euery man leauing to thinke of the publike, entendeth vnto his owne businesse, and hee in that case should be but laughed at, and derided as a foole, which should take more care

of the common welfare than of his owne. As for them who alreadie enioy the pub∣like [ F] preferments and offices, they for the most part haue no great care of the common good, being now for euer assured of that which they most desired. O but how much more happie should both the subiects and Commonweale be, if euerie man in his de∣gree and according to his qualitie, hauing enioyed conuenable preferments, and so ha∣uing learned true wisedome by the mannaging of worldly affaires, should retire them∣selues from these vaine and worldly businesses, to occupie themselues in the contempla∣tion of things naturall and diuine? For most certaine it is, that contemplation is the true mother and mistresse of al true wisedome and happinesse, which men altogether wrap∣ped vp in worldly affaires, neuer so much as once dreamed or tasted of; and yet for all that this is the end, this is the scope, this the chiefe point of all mans felicitie. [ G]

And yet besides these three, there is another great inconuenience also, in that offi∣ces* 1.184 and preferments are in Commonweales graunted vnto men for tearme of life: that is to wit, that some few would haue all, and some one would possesse himselfe of many publike charges and offices at once; as it was in auntient time permitted them in Car∣thage: which for all that seemed both vnto Plato and Aristotle a thing right daunge∣rous, For that it is an hard matter for one man well to discharge one office, but well to discharge many no one man can; and is therefore in euerie well ordered Common∣weale a thing forbidden. Howbeit that the ambitious desires of men alwayes passeth beyond the prohibitions of the lawes, the most vnworthy most commonly burning with the hoatest flames of ambition; not vnlike the weake stomacke, which is alwaies [ H] more desirous of meat which it cannot disgest, than is the stomacke which can better disgest it: thinking it not to stand with their honor and reputation to stay in the meane, or to abate any of their titles and dignities, but contrariwise to mount still higher and higher. In so much that the seigneurie of Venice in some sort to satisfie the ambition of the citisens, gaue leaue vnto him which had borne a greater office, to refuse the lesse being laid vpon him: which is a daungerous course, to measure the publike charges and offices, by the foot of the subiects ambition, and not by the common profit.

Then how much more daungerous is it, to make the magistrats and publike char∣ges perpetuall, onely to serue the ambitious desires of some, and so to make the Com∣monweale subiect vnto the desire and pleasure of some few? For why, it is to be feared [ I] least that they who can neuer satisfie their immoderat desires with the multitude of of∣fices and publike charges, but had rather to burst at the table of ambition, than in time to withdraw themselues: It is (I say) to be feared least some hungrie fellowes shall at length say vnto them, Depart you hence; or if they will not so doe, plucke them away by force, not without their owne daungers, and troubling of the quiet estate of the Commonweale. At the assemblies of the estates of Rome into the place called Cam∣pus* 1.185 Martius, for the chusing of their cheife magistrats, and other their great officers, certaine narrow bridges were in diuers places laid for the citisens to passe ouer by, that so the little tables wherein their voices were contained, might the better be of them re∣ceiued: at which time such as were threescore yeares old, were still warned to giue [ K] place, and not to come to giue their voices, least haply they might by the multitude of the younger sort be oppressed: and not for that such old men were cast headlong from off the bridges into the riuer, as some haue thought. But how much more seemely were it for them which haue quietly of long enioyed the great offices and preferments in the Commonweale, and which are now growne old therein, sweetly to retire them∣selues out of those high places, than violently to be thrust out by others? especially con∣sidering that there is no place more slipperie or daungerous, than are the places of ho∣nour and commaund. Besides that (which worse is) such ambitious men in their fal∣ling

draw after them the fall of many others also, together with the ruine of the whole [ A] * 1.186 Commonweale▪ as did Marius, who hauing passed through all the degrees of ho∣nour, and bene six times Consull (which neuer Roman had bene before him) yet not so content, would needs take vpon him the charge of the wars against king Mithri∣dates (which by lot was fallen vnto Sylla) howbeit that hee was now growne extreame old, to the intent to obtaine the seuenth Consulship, and to continue a perpetuall com∣maunding power vnto himselfe. But Sylla vnderstanding of the commission giuen to Marius, and of the authority by a tumultuous assembly of the people taken from him now absent (and hauing also an army with him) contrarie vnto the law and the custom of their auncestors, straight way returned to Rome with his partakers, seyzed vpon the citie, where he made a most horrible massacre; which afterwards in such sort continu∣ed, [ B] as that all Italie and Spaine was embrued with blood, not onely the captaines and chiefe commaunders of Marius his faction being by Sylla slaine, but euen his compa∣nions, friends, and kinsmen also, being most shamefully proscribed, or els banished, and so the Popular estate brought vnto an extreame tyrannie. So euen for the same occa∣sion three hundred yeares before, the Popular estate was there chaunged into a faction of an Oligarchie; not for hauing of offices in perpetuitie for tearme of life, but onely for hauing continued the charge vnto the Decemuiri, or ten Commissioners, for two yeares together; men appointed for the reforming and amending of the lawes, who would haue so continued the third yeare also, and by force of armes still maintained their commission, encroaching vpon the libertie of the people, had they not by force [ C] of armes (though not without great daunger of the state) bene againe remoued.

So by the same meanes many Popular and Aristocratique estates were chaunged in∣to* 1.187 Monarchies, or at leastwise into tyrannicall gouernments; for hauing giuen the pub∣like charges and commissions vnto their magistrats or commissioners, for longer time than was needfull, or for proroguing of them longer than by the law they should; as to Pisistratus in Athens, to Philon in the citie of Argos, to Cypselus in Corinth, to Dionysi∣us at Syracusa, to Panaetius at Leontium, and to Caesar at Rome. Which Aemylius Mamercus the Dictator foreseeing, presented a request vnto the people, which passed into the force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That the Censors power from that [ D] time forward should continue but for eighteene monethes, which before was establi∣shed for fiue yeares: and the next day after that he was created Dictator, deposed him∣selfe of his Dictatorship, being not willing to hold it more than one day; giuing this reason vnto the people of his so doing, Vt scitas quàm mihi diuturna imperia non place∣ant, That you may know (said he) how little long lasting authoritie and power please me. And for the same occasion the law Cornelia, published at the instance of one of the Tribunes of the people, prouided, That it should not be lawful for any man to seeke to haue one and the same office more than once in ten yeares. Neither missed it much but that Gabinius the Tribune had by the Senators themselues beene slaine in the full Senat, for hauing by his request made vnto the people, procured commission for fiue [ E] yeares together to be graunted vnto Pompey, for the ending of the Piraticall warre: Whereof Dion giueth a notable reason, For that (saith he) the nature of man is such, as that a man hauing for long time borne some honourable charge, commonly hath al other men in contempt and disdaine, neither can well endure to liue in subiection after he hath for a long time commaunded. Which thing Cassiodorus almost in the same sence writeth, Antiquitas, prouinciarum dignitatem voluit annua successione reparari, vt nec diutina potestate vnus in solesceret, & multorum prouectus gaudia reperiret, Anti∣quitie (saith he) would the honour of the prouinces to be repaired with annuall succes∣sion, in such sort as that one man should neither grow insolent with long power, and

preferment be a comfort to many. And haply it was not one of the least causes that [ F] the Assyrian and Persian empires stood so long, for that they euerie yeare chaunged their lieutenants and generals.

But how then commeth it to passe, that euen children by way of complaint sue to* 1.188 be maintained and kept in the possession of the honours and estates that their fathers and grandfathers had? As in fact hath bene seene in the constables of Campagne, of Normandie, and of Britaigne: in the marshals De la Foy, as they tearme them, in the great chamberlaines, and other infinit, euen vnto the sergeants sees of Normandie, as I haue before noted. And namely in Aniou, Touraine, and Maine, the house of Ro∣ches had made the offices of bailifes and stewards hereditarie, had not Lewes the ninth reuoked them, and made them mutable and iusticiable, by his decree in the yeare 1256. [ G] The like is done in Principalities, Dukedomes, Marquisats, and Earledomes, which now are had in perpetuitie, which before were holden but by way of commission, and that during the princes pleasure, which at the first were but annuall, but afterwards per∣petuall: and at last by the fauour of our kings are become hereditarie. Howbeit that other people also as well as we, haue in the same errour offended. So that there is al∣most no place in all Europe (except in England) where offices and dignities are not now hereditarie, in such sort as that commaunding power and authoritie, with the ad∣ministration of iustice, is by right of succession fallen euen vnto women and children, and so of a thing publike made particular, and to be sold to him that wil giue most, as it must needs be, being once brought into the forme of a patrimonie, which hath giuen [ H] occasion more boldly to trucke all estates and offices, when as men see by the lawes and customes euen sacred iustice it selfe prophaned, and set to sale to him that will giue most: Of which inconueniences is proceeded the euill custome of making of all estates and offices perpetuall. For one should doe iniurie to take an office from a marchant, and not restore vnto him againe the money that he paid for it. Thus we see the dan∣gers and absurdities one of them as it were linked in another, by the making of the estates and offices of the Commonweale perpetuall. Besides which reasons by me al∣leaged, we haue also the authoritie of the greatest Law makers, Philosophers, and Lawyers, as also the examples of almost all the auntienr Commonweales; as namely, of the Athenians, the Romans, the Celtes, and others infinit, who haue flourished, and [ I] do yet flourish in diuers places of Italie, Swisserland, and Germanie, as also the authori∣tie of Sir Thomas Moore, chauncellour of England, who in the Commonweale by him deuised, maketh all the magistrats and officers therein annuall, some from six mo∣nethis to six monethes, and othersome from two monethes to two monethes, and all to auoid the inconueniences which I haue before spoke of. And these reasons they for most part vse, which say, That magistrats and officers should not be in a Com∣monweale perpetuall.

But now on the other side, they which maintaine it to bee more for the publike* 1.189 good, to make the estates and offices in a Commonweale perpetuall, alleage, That no∣thing can be well done in a yeares space, when as the magistrat must depart out of his [ K] charge before he well know his dutie; and hauing begun to vnderstand what belong∣eth vnto his place, must yet forthwith leaue the same vnto a new man; and so hee like∣wise vnto another, all still new men; so that the Commonweale is still to fall into the hands of vnsufficient men, and such as want experience. But suppose that the prince or the people, or they which haue the choice of the magistrats, commit not the publike charge but vnto men knowne to be of good experience, yet seeing so many holy daies, dayes not iudiciall, vacations, daies of election, and of triumph, as take vp a great part of the yeares, as well the publike as mens priuat actions must therewith needs be trobled,

warres begun be delaid, iudgements interrupted, actions of the wicked abolished, pu∣nishments [ A] deferred, & in briefe the Commonweal in the greatest dangers therof to be abandoned. Whereof wee haue a million of examples in all histories, both of the Greekes, and of the Latines, which had their offices annuall. And it hath oftentimes happened, that the magistrats and captaines hauing charge to make & performe some warre, were vpon a sudden called home againe, and so all was at a stay: as it happened when question was for the sending of one to succeed Scipio Africanus, the people, the Senat, and the magistrats, found themselues therewith greatly entangled; Mutis (saith Liuie) contentionibus & in Senatu, & ad populum acta res est: postremò eò deducta vt Se∣natui permitterent: patres igitur iurati (sic enim conuenerat) censuerunt vt Consules pro∣uincias inter se compararent, The matter (saith he) was with great contention debated, [ B] both in the Senat, and before the people; at length it was brought to that point, as that the people committed it vnto the Senat: wherefore the Senators beeing sworne (for so it was agreed) determined, That the Consuls should diuide the prouinces betwixt them. Which was a great noueltie to sweare the Senat thereunto. But Scipio vnder∣standing of the decree of the Senat, whereby one of the Consuls was forthwith to suc∣ceed him, without farther delay concluded a peace, more to the aduantage of the ene∣mie than hee would otherwise haue done, if hee had not feared least his successour should haue carried away from him the glorie and honour of his victorie, as it is repor∣ted himselfe to haue oftentimes said. So the warre against king Mithridates was pro∣tracted [ C] aboue twentie yeares, by reason of the continuall chaunging of the Ro∣man Generals, the enemie in the meane while (many faire opportunities by him offered, and by the Romans neglected) farre and wide extending his dominion and empire. Yea sometimes the Generall was to giue vp his charge, when hee was euen vppon the point to ioyne battell with the enemie, although he had none appointed to succeed him: as it happened vnto the great captaines Epaminondas and Pelopidas, whose charge expired euen at such time as they were to giue the enemie battell: who yet neuerthelesse seeing themselues to haue an aduantage of the enemie, and that they could not without the most manifest danger of the state leaue their charge, gaue battel, and so obtained a most glorious victorie, whereby the Thebans with their allies were [ D] preserued, and the Lacedemonians with a great slaughter ouerthrowne. But returning home, in stead of thanks and triumph, they were both accused of high treason, for that they had holden their charge longer than the time by the law appointed, & so brought vnto their triall and conuicted, were by the commissioners condemned to die: howbe∣it that they were afterwards by the people pardoned. Now who knoweth not how many strong places haue bene taken by the enemie, for chaunging of their captaines? how many cities and townes haue bene forced, for hauing put into them new gouer∣nours? and especially at such time as the enemie was nie, & readie to besiege the same: as oftentimes it commeth to passe, that the fauourites carrying away the honor, the old expert captaines are excluded, who right often in reuenge thereof either go ouer vnto [ E] the enemie, or els otherwise disfurnish the place of victuals, and other things necessarie.

And yet there is another reason which might well stay the preferments and offices of the commonweale from being mutable, which reason Tiberius the emperour had* 1.190 still in his mouth, at such time as men complained him to be the first that had for many yeares together continued the estates and offices still in the same mens hands: I do it (said he) to the end that they which are already full of the blood of the people, may as Horseleeches, full and ready to burst, giue the subiects some release, fearing lest such as should come new & all an hungred, should without remorse or respect at all, draw out the rest of their blood, gnaw their bones, and sucke out the very marrow that was yet

left in the subiects. And this vnto me seemeth to be a reason of right great importance: [ F] for it is an olde and true saing, Non parcit populis regnum breue, a short raigne spareth not the people. And yet in the raigne of Tiberius, offices and other places of com∣maund, were vsually giuen and not sold; obtained, but not craued, vpon men of desert bestowed, and not shamefully set to sale to them that would giue most: which opinion of Tiberius ought to bee of much more force in such places as where port sale is made of all preferments and offices of the common weale: for it is to bee presumed (as sayth Alexander Seuerus the emperor, & after him Lewes the 12) that the marchants of offices must sel by retaile, & as deere as they can, that which they had before bought in grosse.

And beside that which we haue already said, how is it possible that he should com∣maund with such authority as beseemeth a magistrat, which seeth that by and by after [ G] he shall but stand for a cipher (as they say) without any authority or power at all? who shall obey him? who shal feare him? who shall do his commaunds? wheras to the con∣trary, if the magistrats power be perpetuall, he shall commaund with dignity, hee shall boldly oppose himselfe against the wicked, and giue ayde and succour vnto the good: he shall reuenge the wrong done vnto the oppressed, and resist the violence of tyrants, and that without feare or misdoubt of being thrust out, or dispoyled of his dignity and office, as hath bene seene by some euen of the greatest princes, astonished with the con∣stancy & immutable assurance of the magistrats, not hauing what to reproue him for: neither yet daring to displace them, fearing also the discontentment of their subiects, vnto whom the brightnes of Iustice and vertue is alwayes redoubtable, and the inte∣grity [ H] of valiant and couragious men right commendable.

In briefe, if we would haue (as all men ought to wish to haue) magistrats wise, stout, and well experimented in the charge committed vnto them, we must wish them to bee perpetual: for why it is impossible that new magistrats should be expert in their charge the first yeare, considering that the life of man is right short, and the nature of authority and power most difficult, whether it be for the training vp of the subiects in warres, or for the maintaining of them in peace; for the administration of Iustice, or for the man∣naging of the publike reuenues: all which cannot in short time of new magistrats be either throughly learned, or duly practised. For as the ruine of families commonly commeth of new seruitors, euen so the fals of Commonweales also proceedeth from [ I] * 1.191 new magistrats, who still bring in new deuises, councels, laws, factions, customs, edicts, stiles, iudgements, ceremonies, actions, and in briefe a new chaunge of all things in the Commonweale; whereof ensueth a contempt of the old laws & customs, as also of the magistrats themselues. All which may well be seene in the antient Commonweals of of the Greeks & Romans, wherein the new magistrats were no sooner placed, but they forthwith forged new edicts & laws, so to cause themselues to be the more spoken of; without regard whether they were profitable for the Commonweal or not: propoun∣ding only this vnto themselues, how to leaue a remembrance of their names vnto po∣steritie: wheras men so sicke of ambition, are still more desirous of a great than of a good name. Howbeit that it is not needfull to vse many arguments to proue & show [ K] as it were vnto the sight of the eye, that the magistrats and officers ought to be perpetu∣all, seeing that we haue the law of God, which cannot bee so bound vnto places or per∣sons, but that a man therefrom may well draw an example to imitate and follow. Now it is not found, that the magistrats and officers established in the law of God were annuall: neither is it found, that they which were once prouided of honorable places and preferments in the Commonweale, were euer after againe remoued to giue place vnto new magistrats, and so to yeeld vnto ambition that which is to vertue due. So wee find also, that Plato would that the offices in his Commonweale should

still for the most part be perpetuall. So that in briefe we see the reasons by vs alleaged, [ A] to be by the sacred scriptures, as also by long experience and tract of time confir∣med, not by the example of small Commonweales, but euen of the greatest and most flourishing monarchies and kingdomes that now are, or euer were in the whole world, as were those of the Assyrians, the Persians, the Aegyptians, the Parthians, the Aethio∣pians, the Turkes, the Tartars, the Moscouites, the Polonians, the Germans, the French men, the Danes, the Swedens, the Englishmen, the Scots, the Spaniards, the Italians; excepting some few Commonweals, which are still turmoiled with the continual chan∣ging of their Magistrats, and perpetuall flouds of sedition and discord for the shortnesse of their offices.

Now it is not like so many people and nations to haue failed of the light of na∣ture, [ B] of iudgement, of reason, & experience, seeing their estate so wisely managed, and to haue so long flourished both in time of peace and war: which could in no wise so long haue stood, had their mutable magistrats bene euery moment to haue bene a∣new chosen. And thus we see the reasons both of the one side and of the other, which might moue some to make their magistrats perpetuall, as some others also to make them annuall. Vnto which reasons sometime are ioyned such flourishes of eloquence, as might at the first well dasse the eyes not onely of the ignorant, but euen of the shar∣pest witted also, to heare the reasons of the one side, without giuing of eare vnto the reasons of the other, which are hereby vs indifferently set downe, that euery man might suspend his iudgement, vntill that euerie thing were in equall ballance well weighed▪ [ C]

But as men oftentimes erre in the maintaining of the societies of men▪ and gouern∣ment* 1.192 of cities and Commonweales; so doe they in two notable things also especially: whereof the one is, That they too narrowly looke into the inconueniences of a law, without weighing of the good that ensueth thereof: the other, That they runne from one extreame into another; and so as it were shunning the water, run all headlong in∣to the fire, when as they should haue staied in the middest. Plato would, that the magi∣strats in his Commonweale should bee all perpetuall: which extremitie seemed vnto Aristotle blame-worthy, who therefore running himselfe into the other extremitie, and reiecting the opinion of his master Plato, opened a way vnto all the citisens, to all [ D] the honours and preferments of his Commonweal, saying, That otherwise to do, were to kindle the fire of sedition in the whole estate: whereas yet neither the one nor the other of them hath made any distinction at all of Commonweales, whereof the reso∣lution of this question especially dependeth. And we haue seene euen in this our time one* of the greatest persons of this realme, and the chiefe man of his cote, who hauing* 1.193 embraced the opinion of Aristotle, hath endeuoured himselfe by all means to change all the offices into commissions, to be holden but by sufferance: who neuer had other thing in his mouth, and yet without any distinction in what forme of Commonweale this chaunge were, without harme to be receiued.

Now most certaine it is, that Commonweales in nature contrarie, are by con∣trarie [ E] * 1.194 lawes and meanes to bee also gouerned and maintained (as wee haue often∣times before said, and yet must oft times say) so that the rules and orders proper to maintaine and preserue Popular estates, serue to the readie ruine and ouerthrow of Monarchies and sole gouernments. The Popular estates are maintained by* 1.195 continuall chaunge of officers, to the end that euerie man according to his qualitie might haue part in the offices, according as they haue part in the soueraigntie, which can in no wise bee where offices be giuen in perpetuitie. Besides that equalitie the nurse of Popular estates is by the annuall succession of magistrates the better main∣tained, and the long custome of continuall commaund giue not an appetite

or desire to some one or other ambitions citisen to aspire vnto the soueraigntie alone. [ F] Whereas to the contrarie in Monarchies it is not necessarie, no nor yet wholesome, that subiects hauing no interest in the soueraigntie, should be nourished in ambition, it being sufficient for them to learne to bee dutifull and obedient vnto their soueraigne prince, and especially if the Monarchy be Lordlike or Tyrannicall: For that the sub∣iects in the one be the princes naturall slaues, and in the other the tyrants slaues by force, it should be a thing impossible for such a Lordlike Monarch, or tyrant to hold their estates, and to giue such yearely or successiue commanding power vnto their sub∣iects.* 1.196 And therefore tyrants, who are no lesse hated and feared of their subiects, than they themselues feare and hate them, hauing little or no trust or confidence in them, for most part guard themselues with straungers onely, and some few of their owne sub∣iects, [ G] such as they know to be vnto themselues most loyall and faithfull, vnto whome they commit the custodie and guard of their owne persons, of their estates, of their for∣ces, and of their wealth, without any desire at all to chaunge them, not onely for that they distrust others, but also for that they would not acquaint them with the sweet∣nesse of power and command, least so some one or other of them therewith enflamed, should be desirous to dispatch the tyrant of his life, so to obtaine his place: or els other∣wise in so doing to gratifie the subiects. Whereas the Lordlike Monarch whome his subiects more willingly obey as his naturall slaues, is not so much hindred or letted from the choice of his magistrats and officers, as is the tyrant, who is not but by force and constraint obeyed of his subiects; and therefore giueth not the preferments or of∣fices [ H] of his estates in perpetuitie, neither yet maketh them annuall; but onely bestow∣eth them as he seeth good, and that for so long as pleaseth him, diuiding them amongst many at his good pleasure, without any law or decree therefore, all depending of his will and pleasure.

But the Royall Monarch, who is in such sort to intreat his subiects, as is the good fa∣ther* 1.197 his louing children, albeit that he be no more bound vnto mans lawes, than are the other Monarches, yet will he neuerthelesse of himselfe establish decrees and lawes, for the placing and displacing of magistrats and officers, to the end they might so bee holden; diuiding the honours and rewards of vertue not to all indifferently, without discretion, but vnto such as deserue the same; hauing still more respect vnto the expe∣rience [ I] and vertue, than vnto the grace and fauour of them who are vnto him most of all commended. And yet for all that, shall in all things obserue and keepe the com∣mendable mediocritie, in such sort, as that he shall make many offices perpetuall, and some changeable also from three yeares to three yeares; and othersome to bee euerie yeare also chaunged; as namely the presidents of the parliaments, of the finances or common receit, or gouernours of prouinces, who could neuer otherwise bee punished for their oppression and misdemeanor, if they had their such great authoritie and pow∣er in the estate and Commonweale still in perpetuitie. He shall also diuide the honors and p•…•…eferments of the state, vnto the richer and nobler sort, albeit that they be not men of so great experience as are some of the poorer and baser sort, so to preuent sturres and [ K] seditions: yet for all that prouided alwayes, that vnto them which of themselues are not of sufficient capacitie be still associat men of good experience in their charge, so to couer and supplie the defect of the others: And yet is not so bound, vnto his own laws, but in case of necessitie hee may againe displace them whome hee hath before ordai∣ned to be perpetuall magistrats, finding them of whome he hath so euill made choice, for the weakenesse of their minds or bodies, to be altogether insufficient for the pub∣like charge to be by them sustained, or for to couer the shame of them which are so in∣sufficient, shall giue them some honest meanes to discharge themselues of such their

charge: as did the most wise emperor Augustus vnto a great number of the Senators, [ A] who vnworthy of their so honourable places, by that meane cleanely displaced themselues, without any force or sturre; or at leastwise shall appoint them depu∣ties for the executing of their charge: yet in the meane time suffering the magistrates and officers themselues, to enioy still their titles of their offices, and woonted pri∣uileges. And to the intent that iustice, the principall and chiefe ground of an estate* 1.198 or Commonweale may bee the more religiously distributed, hee shall for the administration thereof appoint perpetuall colledges and companies of Iudges, and especially of such as are without appeale to iudge of the lives, fame, and goods of the subiects: not onely that these judges should so be the better experimented (as well for hearing the opinion of diuers, as for their long exercise in iudgement:) but also that so [ B] their seuerall power might be in some sort weakened (for feare they should abuse the same) and that so being many of like authoritie and power, they should not so easily be corrupted: not unlike to a great deale of water which is more hardly corrupted than is a little. For as Plinie sayth: Nemo omnes, neminem omnes vnquam fefellerunt: meliùs omnibus quàm singulis creditur. No man euer deceiued all men, neither did all m•…•…n euer deceiue any man: better it is to beleeue all than one. Howbeit, yet that by the wisedome and vertue of some one good judge, a whole companie, or bench of judges of the same court is oftentimes releeued: and their factions and secret practises broken; or being otherwise good men, yet misse-enformed by false accusers and pet∣tie [ C] foggers, cannot know or vnderstand the truth: but are by the wisedome of some one of their companie the better enformed. As I haue knowne one judge alone to haue caused the whole companie of judges to change their opinion, being before re∣solued and set downe to haue put a poore innocent woman to death: whom yet for all that he by most pregnant and liuely reasons clearely and fully acquited of that shee was in danger to haue beene condemned for. Who therefore well deserueth to be na∣med: and was Potier a learned judge of great integritie and vertue: who hath left unto his countrey his two sonnes inheritours of their fathers vertues: one of them Master of the Requests: and the other, Secretarie of the Finances; in vertue not inferior unto their father. Besides that, the experience of many worlds of yeares hath giuen vs suffi∣ciently [ D] to understand many judges, by conferring their opinions together, to giue ther∣by a better and sounder iudgement, than where they iudge euery one of them apart. Howbeit that Aristotle thinketh it better to haue euery judges opinion considered of apart by it selfe: and that he saith to haue beene the vsuall manner of iudgement in many the cities of the Greeks. Now the Romans to haue holden both these fashions and manners of iudgements Asconius Paedianus is the Authour, where he saith: Aliam esse rationem cum vniuersi Iudices constituunt, aliam cum singuli sententiam ferunt, It to be one manner of proceeding when all the judges together determine of a matter, and another when euery one of them deliuer their opinions apart. Wherefore causes are more indifferently and vprightly discided in Europe by a competent number of [ E] judges together: then by seuerall judges in Asia and Africke, whereas one particular* 1.199 judge of a Prouince according to his will and pleasure determineth of all appeales made vnto him from the other particular and inferiout judges in that prouince. And albeit that in Grand Caire (one of the greatest cities of the world) there be foure jud∣ges which haue their diuers and seperate iurisdictions, and euery one of them haue also their diuers Deputies, who iudge also of causes apart and by themselues, yet are the appeales still brought vnto the first judge chiefe of the foure; who alone without any companion or assistant by him selfe at his pleasure discideth all appeales: whom it is no great matter for him to winne, that standeth in his good grace, or that hath the

greatest presents to giue him. Howbeit that the two Cadeleschers are the chiefe of all [ F] the judges, and may at their pleasure place or displace any of the rest of the judges, yea and all of them together also so long as it shall please the Grand Seignor▪ For why amongst the Turkes all power and commaund is but by sufferance and during plea∣sure both giuen and receiued.

Now we haue before said that in the royall Monarchie all the Magistrates and Of∣ficers* 1.200 should neither be perpetuall, neither all still mutable: For that it is not needfull to chaunge the meane officers, as Clarks, Sergeants, Vshers, Notaries, and such other like, who for that they haue no power or authoritie to commaund, cannot hurt the Estate: and yet neuerthelesse the experience of their charge which cannot but in long time and by great practise be got, requireth that they should bee perpetuall. And so [ G] might a man say of other inferiour officers also, being still subiect vnto the power and authoritie of the greater, but cannot yet oft times be chaunged without the great hurt of the Commonweale, and many priuate mens hinderance. The Senators and Coun∣celours of estate also, whose dexteritie for the mannaging of the great affaires of the Commonweale is not but by long experience to be gotten; we see them to haue * 1.201 beene in Rome, in Lacedemonia, and amongst the Areopagi in Athens, perpetuall: and so I thinke they ought to be euery where else, so that in the perpetuall chaunge of mutable magistrates, the Senate should still be constant, firme, and immutable, and that vpon it the other mutable offices and magistrates should as vpon a most sure slay rest: which was not so well prouided for by * Plato, who would haue his Senate to be [ H] * 1.202 euery yeare by lot chosen. But now as for such great magistrates and officers as ac∣knowledge no commaund more than the soueraigne Princes alone, whither it be in martiall affaires, the administration of iustice, or the charge of the publique receit if the royall Monarch shall keepe them but one, two, or three yeares in their charge at the most, he shall so leaue open a way vnto his iustice, for the examining of their actions, and by the same meanes shall cause the wicked and corrupt magistrates to quake, standing alwayes in dread to be called to giue an account of their doings. And for that Magistrats and Officers are not to be chaunged all at once (for that all sudden chaunges in a Commonweale are daungerous) and that the publique actions be not interrupted, the chaunge of such great Magistrates as are in corporations and colleges [ I] together is to be made by the succeeding of them one of them vnto an other: as they doe in the Commonweale of Rhaguse, where the Senate is perpetuall, and the Sena∣tors who are also soueraigne judges, are not but euery one of them one yere in charge: who yet chaunge not all at once, but successiuely, and as it were insensiblie; and in their turne after that they haue for a certaine time liued as priuate men, returne more fresh vnto the same charge againe.

But yet generally in euery Commonweale this rule hath alwayes place without ex∣ception,* 1.203 viz. That the perpetuall Magistrats & Officers should haue either no power at all, or else verie little power to commaund, or else some companion ioyned with them: and that they to whom great power is giuen, haue the same but for a short time, [ K] and by the law limitted to some few monethes or yeares. By which tempering and moderation of power and commaund, the difficulties and daungers shall cease, which might otherwise ensue by the sudden chaunge of all the Magistrates at once, for the interruption of publique actions. Neither need we so to feare lest the Commonweale should be without Magistrates, as a ship without a master to gouerne the same: as it often times chaunced in Rome, for the sute of the magistrates, who one of them hin∣dered an other, or els the same day entered all into their charge, as they all at one and at the selfe same instant departed out of the same together. Neither need we to feare

also lest the wicked by briberie mounted vnto the more hie degrees of honour, should [ A] escape vncorrected: or that the ignorant or vnskilfull should carie away the prefer∣ments of the estate and Commonweale: they which before had charge, hauing for certaine yeares rested themselues, still returning againe with much greater experience then before. Now they which wish for annuall Magistrats, annuall Senators, annuall powers and commaunds, forsee not that (beside the difficulties and daungers by vs before alleaged to ensure thereof) by this meanes either rude artificers or such like ignorant and vnskilfull men, must be called vnto such publike charges as they are neuer able to discharge, or else that the Commonweale must needs be full of most wise men, and such as are of greatest experience and knowledge. Howbeit that can∣not by nature be, that all men can do all things: wheras we see particular men scarcely [ B] well to discharge their particular charges; and in other some to rest great wisedome, who yet haue no skill in gouernment at all. But in doing that which wee haue said there shall not easilie any default fall out, neither shall the subiects haue any iust cause whereof to complaine; the rewards of honour being so exposed to euery mans sight, as the marke whereat euery one should ayme, though few there bee which hit the same, and the fewer officers and rewards there should be, and the dearer that they were prized, the more they should be of all desired: when as euery man should for his vertue be called vpon, and that there should be no cause of sedition, no man being excluded from the merite and reward of his vertue and sufficiencie, so that the causes of sedition [ C] so taken away, the subiects may still liue in all peace and tranquillitie. And if need be we may vse Commissioners or Syndiques, as they did in the time of Lewes the ix, and Philip the faire, for the chastising of the officers, and the calling of them to account.

Now some difficulties concerning the chaunging of Magistrats and Lawes are by vs before set downe, and more I suppose will be imagined: yet were it vnreasonable to looke into the discommodities of a law (and so for the same to reiect it) without con∣sideration* 1.204 also of the profits thereof, seeing that there is no law so good (as saith C•…•…o the Censor) which draweth not after it some incommodities. And in mine opinion that law may alwayes be accounted good and profitable, if the good which may ensue* 1.205 thereof be manifest, and greater then the harme that is to be feared thereof: wherein [ D] many often times offend, which thinke it impossible to haue all discommodities quite taken out of the lawes, the Commonweale yet neuerthelesse still standing in safetie,* 1.206 but so falling into such daungers as they before thought not of, straight waies blame the lawes, and often times chaunge the same, when as in truth they should haue accu∣sed & chaunged them selues. So some good Princes euill aduised often times to their harme cancell a good Law for some one incommoditie they haue seene therein▪ Whereof we will vse no other example then that of Lewes the xj, who comming to the Crowne at once displaced all his fathers auntient seruitours, and remoued also the princes his nie kinsmen from the gouernment of the state: who therefore with a won∣derfull consent conspired with the enemy against him, and brought him to such a strait, [ E] as that they had almost strucke the crowne from his head, and by force wrested the roiall scepter out of his hands. But these sturres againe quieted, and all things well pa∣cified and set in order, fearing lest his sonne should fall into the like daunger, charged him neuer to chaunge them whom he had aduanced; and yet not so contented, made a law, whereby he decreed all offices to be perpetuall; and that such as were once pre∣ferred thereunto, should not be againe displaced, otherwise then by resignation, death, or forfaiture: And by an other Edict declaring the former, published the xx. of Sep∣tember in the yeare 1482 decreed, That no officers hauing forfeited their offices, for what cause soeuer, should be enforced to yeeld vp their offices, except it were so before

adiudged, and the parties condemned. Which edict hee commaunded to stand in [ F] force, not onely whilest he himselfe yet liued, but also during the raigne of his sonne Charles. And albeit that he could not so bind the hands of his successour, yet so it is neuerthelesse, that this his decree & law hath euer since bene inuiolably kept, although the auntient clause, So long as it shall please vs, remaine still in all letters of office. Which words declare no perpetuall power to be giuen vnto the magistrats or officers, but by sufferance onely, except by law or custome it be otherwise prouided. Yet still remaineth that idle clause, that thereby it may be vnderstood, all power and authoritie to haue in auntient times bene giuen by our kings during their pleasure, and so to haue of the magistrats bene holden but by sufferance onely. And albeit that in the raigne of Philip the Faire this string was againe touched, for the giuing of offices in perpetuitie, [ G] yet for all that the matter still rested vndecided. But Philip Valois reuoked the commis∣sions, and ordained, That from that time forward the royall offices should bee perpetu∣all; which well declareth them before to haue beene mutable at the pleasure of the kings, albeit that the officers had not forfeited them. And amongst those praises which they giue vnto king Robert, one of the greatest is, That he neuer displaced officer, if he had not for some foule and infamous fact before forfeited his office. Whereby it is to be gathered, king Robert his auncestours to haue vsed other lawes and customes.

But yet haply it may seeme vnto some, that if offices should still be giuen with that clause, During the Princes pleasure, the magistrats would better discharge their charges for the hope they should haue by this meane to continue still in their places, procee∣ding [ H] still from better to better, and bearing themselues vprightly, for feare otherwise to be displaced. Whereunto I agree, in a well ordered Lordly Monarchy: but the daunger should be greater to open such a gap vnder a prince on euery side beset with flatterers, and compassed in with clawbackes: For why, euerie man seeth, that princes so beset, must either make a most filthy gaine and traffique of their offices, or else take such places and power to commaund, from good men, who almost alwaies haue the courtiers life (polluted with all manner of vices) in hatred and detestation. Besides that* 1.207 this bestowing of offices during pleasure, sauoureth somewhat of tyranny, or of a Lordlike gouernment, rather than of a Royall Monarchy; which (so much as possible is) should by lawes, and not by the princes will and pleasure onely bee gouer∣ned: [ I] So as many a Lordly Monarchie, where the subiects being naturall slaues adore and feare their soueraigne prince, as a god come downe from heauen, accounting his commaunds as the lawes of nature it selfe. Whereas in a Royall Monarchy, where the subiects are as children, it is needfull to rule and gouerne all things by law, as much as possible may be: for otherwise if the king shall without cause exclude some one more than some other from some office or preferment, he that should bee so excluded should hold himselfe iniured, and so rest discontented with his prince; who ought ra∣ther to be beloued than feared of his subiects: which to bee, he ought to take away all occasion of discontentment that men might haue against him; and better meanes is there none, than to leaue all that may be to the disposition of the lawes and customes, [ K] no man so hauing iust cause to complaine of the prince.

The learned Budeus who was of opinion that it were best to haue the magistrats and offices still changeable, without hauing regard vnto the law made by Lewes the xi. hath holden, That in auntient time the Presidents and counsellors of the parliament of Paris were but annuall: and that the solemne oath which they still take the 12. day of nouember, and the letters patents which they still are to haue from the king for the opening of the Parliament, show sufficiently that their estates were not perpetuall, but still at the pleasure of the prince to bee reuoked, and so to bee by them holden but by

sufferance: and so by these reasons drew many to be of the same opiniō with him, who [ A] * 1.208 had they but turned ouer the records of the court, and of the chamber of accounts, they should haue found that that Parliament which before was ambulatorie & moue∣able, and which had no power but by commission, was by Philip the long ordayned to be an ordinarie Court, with ordinarie power, circuite, and iurisdiction; in the ere∣ction whereof was expressed that it should still haue therein one or two Presidents, of whom the first was the Earle of Burgundie the kings nie kinsman, as in like sort the President in the Imperiall chamber, is alway one of the princes of the Empire. And so for a long time also the President of the court of Paris was still a martiall man and not a gowne man as he now is: and euen yet at this present the Great Praetor of the court of Paris, whom we call the chiefe President, is still honored with the qualitie and [ B] title of a martiall man, as of a knight, or as the Latins call it Miles, or a souldiour, al∣though he neuer drew sword: which title the other judges of that court haue not, who then were but three score, but now are an hundred and fiftie. Whereby it is plaine the court of Paris so founded to haue an ordinarie and perpetuall power, nei∣ther to haue need of the Princes annuall rescripts, or letters patents for the disciding and determining of controuersies. Howbeit that king Henry the second comming into the Parliament for the publishing of certaine Edicts and lawes, which in that court could hardly find passage (hauing it put into his mouth by certaine flatterers) said openly, That the Parliament had at all no power, if it pleased not him by sending of his letters Patents euery yeare to giue opening vnto the same; which his speech [ C] astonished many. But certaine it is that the letters patents which are sent to this end, and the annuall oath which the Presidents and Councelours take, is but a matter of formalitie and custome, necessarie at such time as the parliaments were not holden but by commission: But afterwards that they were erected into the forme of ordinarie courts, such auntient solemnities are no more necessarie: for why the annuall Magi∣strats are to take an annuall oath; whereas they which are perpetuall Magistrats are to take it but once for all, without any needlesse reiteration of the same. So the continuall Roman Magistrats euery yeare tooke their oath, for that their power was but annuall: wheras the Senators tooke it but once for all, for that their dignitie was perpetuall and [ D] during the whole time of their liues. The same might be said of the forme of the com∣missions and decrees of that court, conceiued vnder the name and seale of the king, and namely of the letters missiue of the court: which although they bee conceiued in the name of the court, are yet neuerthelesse sealed with the little royall seale with the flowredeluce: howbeit that all the other magistrats, seneschals, bailiefes, prouosts, and gouernours of countries, hauing power of ordinarie commaund or by commission, direct the same vnder their owne names, and their owne seales; which is yet retained of the auntient forme, euer since that the parliament was but the kings priuie councell, which councell for that it had no ordinarie power, did nothing of it selfe, and the com∣missions are alwaies graunted in the name of the king, as hauing the onely power to [ E] commaund in his councell, as we haue before shewed. Which forme hath bene euer since followed in the erection of other parliaments, euen vnto the court of Aides, who giue out all their commissions, vnder the kings name•…•… which hath moued some to say, That the parliaments haue nothing but an extraordinarie power by way of commissi∣on onely. Howbeit that it sufficiently appeareth by that which is by vs before said, them to haue an ordinarie and perpetuall power, which they still hold the king beeing dead: Which if it were but a power holden vpon sufferance, (as some would haue it) it should then together with the death of the king take end, as all other powers and commissions else doe. But these courts and the ordinarie magistrats thereof, the king

being dead neither chaunge their attire, nor vse any mourning garments, or other [ F] signes of sorrow: yea that more is, the first confirmations of the new king are alwaies graunted vnto the Courts of Parliament; as hath beene alwaies vsed since the time of Lewes the eleuenth, in such sort as that their power is not onely ordinarie, but perpe∣tuall also, not onely in the whole bodies of themselues, but euen in euery one of the members, officers, and ministers of the said Courts of Parliament.* 1.209

And yet for all that is not the manner of those Princes to be discommended, who vnto their Officers and Magistrates giue their power but by sufferance, which they (if cause be) at their pleasure againe take from them, as the kings of England haue vsed to doe. For albeit that the auntient and moderne Commonweales, especially the Po∣pular and Aristocratique (more straitly bound vnto the lawes than are Monarchies) [ G] haue their Magistrates and officers for the most part annuall, and that none of them was againe displaced, without iust cause why; yet so it was for all that, that the peo∣ple sometimes reuoked their former choice made, and placed some others whom they knew to be more fit for the charge they were to vndergoe: as it did in establishing the Dictators and others their Captaines and Gouernors, reuoking sometimes (as I say) euen their ordinarie magistrates; as it did Octacilius the Consul, who at the request of Fabius Maximus was remoued from his charge, as a man not sufficient for the man∣naging of so great and daungerous a warre as the State had then in hand. Neither had they for the remouing of their magistrat, regard onely if he had in any thing trespassed, and so deserued to be remoued; but euen vnto the insufficiencie of him also, whither [ H] it were knowne or vnknowne when they receiued him into the Estate, or that it were befallen him afterwards; deeming also weaknesse, or age, madnesse, or other like dis∣eases, such as let and hinder mens reasonable actions, to be sufficient also to displace them from their offices. And namely Lucius Torquatus chosen the third time Consul excused himselfe before the people for the infirmitie of his eyes; saying, That it was not reason to put the gouernment of the Commonweale into his hands, who could not see but by other mens eyes. But O how many are there of the blind, deafe, and dumbe, not hauing in themselues any light of nature, neither wisedome, nor experi∣ence so much as to gouerne themselues, who are not yet content to guide the sayles and tackles, but desire also to lay hands euen vpon the verie helme also of the Com∣monweale? [ I]

Now that which we haue said concerning the meane that ought to be kept in the chaunge and continuation of Magistrats and Officers, hath not onely place in royall Monarchies, but euen in Popular and Aristocratique estates also, where the offices* 1.210 almost all, or for the most part, ought to be euery yeare, or from two yeares to two yeares still mutable: as they do among the Swissers, and diuers other Commonweals. Yet neuerthelesse for the preseruation of the same, there must still be some estates in the Commonweale perpetuall: as namely those whose experience and wisdome is alwayes necessarie for the stay of the rest, such as be the Councellors of estate: And this is it, for which the Senat in Rome, in Athens, and in Lacedemonia, was still per∣petuall. [ K] And why, the Senators still during their liues held their charge and places: for as the hookes and hinges whereupon great burdens rest, must of themselues be strong and vnmoueable; euen so the Senat of the Areopagi, and of other Common∣weales also, were as most strong and sure hinges, whereupon as well all the mutable officers as the whole waight of the Estate and Commonweale rested & reposed them∣selues. The contrarie whereof is to be done in Monarchies, wherein the greater part, and almost all the estates ought to be perpetuall, except some few of the chiefe and principall: as they doe in the kindome of Spayne, where they well know how to

keepe this mediocritie or meane proper vnto the royall estate. And so for the same [ A] cause the Venetians which haue an Aristocratique estate, make their officers euery yeare chaungeable, and some of them from two moneths to two moneths; and yet neuerthelesse haue their Duke, the Procurators of S. Marke, the Chauncelour, and foure Secretaries for the Estate, perpetuall; which the Florentines ordayned in their Estate also (after that they were by Lewes the xij, deliuered from the most cruell ty∣rannie of Countie Valentinus Borgia) taking order that their Duke should from that time forward be perpetuall, to the entent that the Commonweal before in perpetuall motion and chaunge of all their estates and offices, might yet haue some thing firme and stable whereupon to rest and stay it selfe: which good order being in short time after by the most turbulent Florentines abolished, they fell againe into greater tumuls [ B] and ciuill warres then euer they were in before: whereas if they had had but a perpe∣tuall Senate at the least, and the Senators continued in their charge, (who from six moneths to six moneths were stil chaunged and rechaunged) and had but kept a cer∣taine meane betwixt these two extremities, of generall chaunge, and still continuing of all their offices, their estate had beene much the more assured, neither had their Commonweale beene still so tossed and turmoyled with so many and so great surges of sedition, and tempests of ciuill warres. But these things thus by vs declared, let vs now see also whether in a wise and well ordered Commonweale it be good that the Magistrates should be all at vnitie, and of one accord among themselues or not? [ C]

CHAP. V. ¶ Whether the vnitie and concord of Magistrats amongst themselues bee good and wholesome for the Commonweale, or not?

THis question, viz. Whether it be good that the magistrats and offi∣cers of a Commonweale should be of accord, or els at discord and va∣riance among themselues? may perhaps seeme altogether needlesse and vaine. For who euer doubted but that it was alwaies expedient, yea and necessarie too, that the Magistrats in euerie Commonweale [ D] * 1.211 should be of one and the same mind? to the end that they all together might with one consent and heart embrace and seeke after the publike good: And if so it be (as wise men haue alwaies thought) that a well ordered Commonweale ought to resemble a mans bodie, wherein all the members are vnited and conioyned with a maruellous bond, euerie one of them doing their office and dutie; and yet neuerthe∣lesse when need is, one of them still aideth another, one of them releeueth another; and so all together strengthen themselues, to maintaine the health, beautie, and welfare of the whole bodie: but if it should happen them to enter into hatred one of them against another; and that the one hand should cut the other, or the right foot supplant [ E] the left, and that the fingers should scrape out the eyes, and so euerie member should draw vnto it selfe the nourishment of the other next vnto it; it must needs fall out, that the bodie in the end must become maimed, lame, and impotent, in all the actions ther∣of: euen so in like manner may a man deeme of the estate of a Commonweale, the ho∣nour and welfare whereof dependeth of the mutuall loue and good will of the subiects among themselues, as also toward their soueraigne prince. Which sweet vnitie and agreement how is it to be hoped for, if the magistrats which are the principall subiects▪ and such as ought by their example to bind together the rest, be at variance and discord among themselues? But euen to the contrarie the subiects shall become partakers of the factions of the magistrats, they first nourishing secret grudges, and afterward open

enmitie, vntill that at length all breake out into open ciuill warre, all for the mainte∣nance [ F] and vpholding euerie one of them of the chiefe of their factions, to the destructi∣on of the Commonweale: or in case stay be made thereof, and that things fall not out altogether so euill, yet must still publike actions by such ambitious discord of the magi∣strats be hindred, and the Commonweale sore troubled: whereunto it shall happen as it doth vnto a maid, for whome (as Plutarch saith) her suters enter into such a ielousie and passion, as that desiring euerie one of them to haue her to himselfe, they so in stead of louing and embracing of her, most cruelly rent her in peeces amongst them. And what good successe may a man expect of an armie, or what victorie is to bee hoped for ouer the enemie, where the captaines and commaunders are at discord among them∣selues? or what iustice is to be looked for, where the judges are diuided into factions? [ G] Yea it hath bene oftentimes seene some of them to haue beene of contrarie opinions and aduise vnto others, and that vpon a verie iealousie and hatred they had among themselues, and so play as it were at hazard with the life, the goods, and honour of the subiects: as Agesilaus king of the Lacedemonians (albeit that hee was one of the most famous of them that euer was) to impaire the credit and authoritie of Lysander whome he hated, reuersed all his iudgements, and gaue sentence quite contrarie, not so much for the iniquitie of the cause (as he himselfe said) as in despight of him his enemie onely. And to make the matter short, most certaine it is, that dissentions and ciuill warres (the capitall plagues of Commonweales) take foot, root, encrease, and nourishment, of nothing more than of the hatred and enmitie of the magistrats among them∣selues. [ H] Whereof it followeth the vnitie and concord of them among thmselues to be vnto the subiects not onely profitable, but euen necessarie also. Which may all seeme right profitable arguments and reasons for the one side.

But now they which more subtilly reason of these matters, deeme to the contrarie,* 1.212 the health, and welfare of the Commonweale to be best preserued and kept by the dis∣cord of the magistrats. For why (say they) the force and nature of vertue is such, as that it cannot be contrarie vnto vertue; neither that good men, although they bee at neuer so great oddes, can yet be enemies among themselues: but being prouoked by the in∣iuries of the wicked their aduersaries, do still wel the more and more encrease and flou∣rish: neither is the valour of worthy men any where more euident and manifest, than [ I] when they without bitternesse contend among themselues; and so prickt forward with an honest ambition, and enflamed with the heat of men like vnto themselues, as with a fire, are by the emulation of their competitors incited to take in hand great matters, and so still to ouercome their enemies in well doing. So when Taxilas king of the Indians had by his ambassadours freely and without resistance offered his kingdome vnto Ale∣xander the Great, (then bearing downe all the kingdomes of the East before him) if so be he wanted wealth; and withall refused not to receiue wealth also at his hands, if hee had of it too much: Alexander glad of such a match, said vnto him, If we must thus contend and combat together, it shall neuer be said, that you shall take this point of ho∣nour from me, as to be accounted more magnificall, more courteous, or more royall, [ K] than my selfe: and so gaue vnto him another great kingdome, with an infinit masse of treasure. In like manner Tullus Hostilius king of the Romans, said vnto Metius Suffe∣tius Dictator of the Albanians, The ciuill discords which thou obiectest vnto vs, wee deem them as profitable to our citie; for we striue together, whether of vs shall better or more ear∣nestly fight for the good of the Commonweale.

Now if contention and emulation be thus good and profitable amongst valiant & good citisens, and wholesome for Commonweales, how much more then ought it to be thought necessarie for most base and abiect men, for the stirring of them vp to ver∣tue,* 1.213

and deterring of them from vice. For of all the great profits which men vse to reap [ A] from their enemies, none is greater than so to liue as that we seeme not to exceed them in vices, or be ouercome of them in vertues. But if such discord and contention be both honourable and profitable in a citie or Commonweale, wherein the princes and magi∣strats are all good men, and striue but for vertue onely; how much more then shall the contention be profitable, where the good striue against the euill? But in case that all the magistrats be euill, then is discord and contention amongst them not onely profita∣ble, but euen necessarie also, least otherwise they beeing at vnitie and concord among themselues, and in possession of the gouernment, might freely and without feare make hauocke and spoile both of the publike and priuat affaires. In which case it cannot fall out better either for the subiects, or for the whole Commonweale, than if they by their [ B] mutuall hatred and accusations shall openly detect and lay open vnto the world, their owne filthinesse, their foule extortions and robberies, as the sheepe are neuer more as∣sured, than when the wolues deuoure one another; as it happened saith Philip Commi∣nes in England, that whilest the great lords slew or condemned one another, the poore people in the meane while remained safe from their inuasion. Which was the wise councell of Cincinnatus, seeing the Consull Appius openly to withstand the people to hinder them for the doubling the number of their Tribunes: Let be (said Cincinnatus) for the moe they shall be, the worse they will agree. And right needfull oftentimes it was the power of the Tribunes to bee broken and weakned by their owne diuision, [ C] when as by the opposition of any one of them, all the proceedings of the rest were so hindered and stayed. And truely Cincinnatus therein said wisely, for so the Common∣weale stood and flourished, the Tribunes oftentimes being at discord and varience among themselues, which (they being at vnitie and concord) would haue in a moment fallen: and so long it well stood vntil that Pub. Clodius a most wicked man, about foure hundred yeares after presented a request vnto the people, which passed into the force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That from thenceforth the opposition of one of the Tribunes should not hinder the proceeding of the rest of his fellow Tribunes. And therfore Cato the Censor, the beautie of the Romane wisedome (and one to whome was giuen the chiefe prayse for wisedome and vertue amongst the Romans) could nei∣ther [ D] endure the agreement of his seruants in his familie, nor of the Magistrats in the Commonweale, but slily and secretly still sowed hatred and sedition amongst them; that so the wicked and offendors might with their accusations as with mutuall wounds fall, and the good so gaine praise. For why, he thought it a thing almost impossible in so great an accord of slaues and of magistrats, but that the one of them should make spoile of the Commonweale, and the other of his priuat substance, especially being in hope to escape vnpunished, and our of feare for being accused. And therefore doubted not fiftie times to accuse offendors, hee himselfe being also fortie times by others accu∣sed: howbeit that he still bearing himselfe vpon the integritie of his forepassed life, and the commendable things by him done, easily auoided all the slanders by his aduersaries [ E] against him fasly surmised. Neither was that Commonweale euer after fuller of good and valiant citisens, than it was in his time. Yea the Senat of Rome allotted a great summe of money to Mar. Bibulus to buy his Consulship, and the voyces of the people, to the intent to oppose him against Caesar his knowne enemie, who had cunningly set vp Luceius his friend (whome the Senat would haue had excluded) that so hee might doe all things as he thought good, his friend and fellow in office agreeing thereunto. And not to go farther, we haue herefore the witnesse of Iulius Caesar, who in his Com∣mentaries* 1.214 saith, The Gaules to haue had a most auntient custome amongst them, to stirre vp their great lords one of them against another, to the intent that the common

people (which were as he reporteth but slaues) might so bee safe and free from their [ F] outrages and robberies. For so one of them opposing himselfe against another, and euill controlled by the good, and the wicked by themselues; there should be no doubt but that the Commonweale should so be in much more safetie and assurance, than if they were of one accord among themselues. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, the dis∣cord of princes and magistrats to haue alwaies bene vnto Commonweals wholesom: as the meane whereby the wicked (as we said) may by the vertue of the good, or their owne mutuall accusations be weakned. Which seemed a thing profitable not onely vnto the Romans, and our auncestours, but euen vnro Lycurgus the wise law giuer al∣so, who therefore himselfe set dissention betwixt the two kings of Lacedemonia, and appointed also, That there should alwaies two enemies be sent ambassadours for the [ G] state; to the intent they should not by their mutuall consent and good agreement be∣tray the Commonweale: but that being at variance, they might still one of them bee controlled by the other. As for that which is said, the parts of mans bodie which re∣present a well ordered Commonweale, to bee neuer at discord among themselues, is quite contrarie; for were not the humors of mans bodie much contrarie, a man should quickly perish: the preseruation thereof dependeth of the contrarietie of hoat & cold, of moisture and drought, of bitter choller to sweet flegme, of beastly desires to diuine reason; as also the preseruation of the whole world next vnto God dependeth of the contrarietie, which is in the whole and euery part thereof. Euen so the magistrates in [ H] a Commonweale ought in some sort to be at difference among themselues, albeit that they otherwise be right good men, for that trueth, the publike good, and that which is honest, best discouereth it selfe by that which is thereunto contrarie: and is still to bee found in the middest betwixt two extreames. And it seemeth that the Romans had this principall end before their eyes, ordinarily making choyce of their magistrats that were to bee placed in the same charge, still enemies one of them vnto another; or at leastwise of quite contrarie humors and dispositions, as is in all their histories to be seene. As when the Senat foresaw that Claudius Nero should carrie away the Con∣sulship, an hoat and sturting man, and withall a most valiant and couragious captaine to oppose against Hannibal: the Senat (I say) procured to haue ioyned vnto him for his companion or fellow in office Liuius Salinator an old captaine, and a man of [ I] great experience, but yet as cold and staid, as was the other hoat and terrible, and yet fit to heat the old age of Liuius, now a little too cold for the warres: who so ioy∣ned and vnited together, gained a most notable victorie against Hannibal, which was the ruine of the Carthaginians, and the preseruation of the Roman estate. These two men also afterwards were by the people made Censors together; who still at dis∣cord, noted one of them another of infamie, a thing neuer before seene: and yet they thus still at variance, were in all mens iudgements two of the most famous and vertuous men that then were in Rome. With like wisedome the Romans ioyned to∣gether Pabius Maximus, and Marcus Marcellus, in their warres against Hannibal, both of them right great and most expert captaines, but the one of them being a cold, and [ K] the other an exceeding hoat man; the one alway still desirous of battell, and the other still seeking for delay; the one called the Roman Sword, and the other the Bucklet; the one a fierce warrier, and the other a long lingerer: by which contrarie humors of these two so great personages the estate was not onely preserued from ruine and destruction, which must needs otherwise vndoubtedly haue ensued, but farre and wide enlarged also. If then the emulation and discord of the most vertuous magistrats be so profita∣ble vnto a Commonweale, what then is to bee hoped for, when the good magistrats shall oppose themselues against the wicked?

And these reasons may on both sides seeme probable, but what in trueth is to bee [ A] * 1.215 resolued vpon, is not so easie to iudge which to do, not onely the qualitie of the magi∣strats themselues, but the diuers formes of Commonweales, is to bee also considered. And yet I suppose, that in euerie kind of Commonweale it is good that the inferiour magistrats and officers, being vnder the power and authoritie of the greater, should stil be at variance and discord among themselues, and that more in a Popular estate than in any other: For that the people hauing none but the magistrats to gouerne them, is most easie to be pilled and polled, if the magistrats bee not one of them by another controlled. And in a Monarchie it is expedient also, that euen the greatest magistrats should sometime be at oddes, considering that there is a soueraine prince to chastise and correct them; so that hee bee not mad, furious, or a child, or one otherwise sub∣iect [ B] vnto another mans power. But in an Aristocratike or Popular Commonweale it is most daungerous, that the great magistrats should bee at discord among them∣selues, and that especially if they bee not good men, who neuer haue any such con∣tention or debate amongst them, as may hurt the estate or Commonweale: but such as was the honourable difference betwixt Scipio Affricanus, the elder, and Fa∣bius Maximus: betwixt Scipio the younger, and Cato; betwixt Liuius and his com∣panion Nero; or the contention of Lepidus with Fuluius, of Marcus Scaurus with Catulus; or of Themistocles with Aristides: whose notable contention for vertues sake was alwayes vnto the Commonweale wholesome. But if the greatest magi∣strats in a Popular estate bee euill and wicked men, or that their ambition be founded [ C] vppon an euill ground, it is then daungerous least that their differences bee cause of ciuill warres; as it happened betwixt Marius and Scylla, betwixt Caesar and Pompey, Augustus and Marke Anthonie, Thucidides and Pericles. And yet much more dan∣gerous such contentions are in an Aristocratie, than in a Popular Commonweale: For that the gouernours, which are alwaies the fewer in number in an Aristocratique estate, and yet commaund the rest, haue still to doe with the people: who vpon the first occasion take vp armes against their lords, if they once enter into quarrels. For a few lords in an Aristocratie are easily drawne into two parts, by the great magi∣strats, who if they fall into sedition among themselues, as also with the people, it [ D] cannot otherwise bee, but that the chaunge of the estate must thereof needes ensue; the leaders of the factions oppressing their enemies: or else the gouernment of the estate falling wholly into one mans hands, which is not so much to bee feared in a Monarchie, whereas the soueraigne prince vnder his power keepeth all the magistrats in awe.

But in euerie Commonweale it is expedient and necessarie, that the numbet of the* 1.216 soueraigne magistrats, or of them which come neere vnto the soueraigntie, should still be odd, to the end that the dissention amongst them might still be composed by the greater part or number of them; and that the publike actions be not by the equa∣litie of them hindred or letted. And that is it for which the Cantons of Vrie, Vnder∣uald, [ E] Zug, and Glaris (which of all others are most Popular) haue beene glad to make in euerie one of them three soueraigne magistrats, whom they call Amans, & not two, for that the third may easily reconcile two being at variance betwixt thēselues: in stead whereof they of Schwits haue foure, as they of Geneua haue also their foure Sindic∣ques, and they of Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Solure their two Auoyers: and Zuric, Basil, Schaffouse, their two Bourgomasters: as some there were which thought it bet∣ter to haue of such great magistrats moe than foure, and yet in odd number also; as in auntient time the Athenians had their nine Pretors, whome they called Archon∣tas; that so the fewer might still yeeld vnto the rest, or be in number ouercome, which

cannot be where onely two beare the sway, except they had alternatiue power to [ F] commaund each of them his day by turnes, so as had the Carthaginensians Suffetes, and the Roman Consuls, so as we haue before said. And therefore by our laws also are three appointed for the common receit, that so the third might still reconcile the other two his companions at difference betwixt themselues, or els by ioyning himselfe to one of them, make that part the greater. Which odd number of great magistrats is more necessarie in a Popular or Aristocratike estate, than in a Monarchy; and the dis∣cord and dissention of them lesse in this state to be feared than in the other. For that as almightie God the Father of the whole Fabrike of the world, and of nature, doth with an admirable concord and agreement gouerne this world, composed of the contrarie conuersions and motions of the celestiall orbes among themselues, as also of the diffe∣rent [ G] natures of the starres and elements, and of the contrarie force and power of planets and of other liuing creatures: euen so also a king (the liuing image of God himselfe the prince of all things) should of the dissimilitude of magistrats, in some sort, at variance among themselues, keepe and maintaine the welfare of his subiects and people. And as in instruments, and song it selfe, which altogether out of tune, or all in the selfe same tune, the skilfull and learned eare cannot in any sort endure, is yet made a certaine well tuned discord, and agreeing harmonie, of most vnlike voices and tunes, viz. of Bases, Trebles, and Meanes, cunningly confused and mixt betwixt both: euen so also of the mightie, and of the weake, of the hie, and of the low, and others of the middle degree and sort betwixt both; yea euen of the verie discord of the magistrats among them∣selues [ H] ariseth an agreeing welfare of all, the straitest bond of safetie in euerie well orde∣red Commonweale. So Caesar making sharpe warre vpon them of Beauuis, hauing in his armie two captaines deadly enemies one of them vnto the other, commaunded them to turne all that their hatred vpon their enemies, who so in his verie sight with great emulation gained a notable victory ouer their enemies, which their dissention had giuen vnto their enemies, had they not had a generall aboue them, who kept them both in awe. Which as it oftentimes happeneth, so did it also chaunce to Lewes the twelfth the French king, who gained the estates of Bolonia, and ouerthrew the Popes armie, by reason of the discord betwixt the cardinall of Pauie, and the duke of Vrbin, who through iealousie of one of them against the other, so hindred & entangled them∣selues, [ I] as that they gaue victorie vnto the French: into which daunger the Roman estate was like to haue fallen, by the contention risen betwixt Fabius Maximus, and Minutius the Roman generals, which had vndoubtedly giuen Hannibal the victorie, and the Romans the ouerthrow, had not Fabius for the good of the Commonweale forgot his displeasure, and by his valour deliuered his rash companion together with the Roman armie, from a most certaine and present destruction.

Wherefore the contentions of the greater Magistrates are most daungerous in a* 1.217 Popular estate or Commonweale, (where there is no other head to commaund them but the multitude) and especially if he seeke how to serue their owne proud and ambi∣tious desires, rather then the common good. And therefore the Roman Senat seeing [ K] Marcus Lepidus, and Q. Fuluius mortall enemies chosen Censors together, went vn∣to them in great number to perswade them now at length for the Commonwealth sake to become friends, or at least wise to suspend their enmitie, so the better to attend vnto their office, being the fairest and of greatest importance in the whole Common∣weale. The like whereof we read to haue beene often done by the Senat, in setting the busie Tribunes, and proud Consuls agreed, at such time as their dissentions seemed to tend vnto the daunger of the State. But as it is not good that the greatest magi∣strates in a Popular estate should be too great enemies; so also is it not conuenient that

they should be too great friends, especially if they be not good men, and that for the [ A] reasons by vs before alleaged. Which was the cause that the yonger Cato seeing Pom∣pee, Caesar, and Crassus so straitly allied together, and that they so conioyned, were too strong for all the rest of the people; cried out aloud the Commonweale by such com∣byning of the great ones to be bought and sold; foreseeing as it were out of a watch tower the stormes and tempests thereof then at hand. Yet true it is that of two extre∣mities it is better that the great Lords and magistrats in a Popular or Aristocratique estate should be of one accord then at discord: for that being of accord, they will al∣waies like better to commaund others, and so in some sort or other to preserue the Estate such as it is, than together with the Commonweale, quite to ouerthrow their owne power, whereunto their discord would bring them, when they had once giuen [ B] sayles vnto the tempest. In such sort as Liuie said of Caluinus the Campanian: Im∣probum hominem, sed non ad extremum perditum, qui mallet incolumi quàm euersa pa∣tria dominari, A wicked man (saith he) but not altogether desperate, who had rather to rule ouer his countrie yet standing vpright, then ouer the same ouerthrowne. So albeit that Mar. Tullius said, The three-headed alliance of Caesar, Crassus, and Pompee to be a thing greatly to be feared: Yet when he saw Crassus the moderator with the Roman legions slaine in Chaldea, and Iulia Caesars daughter Pompee his wife by vn∣timely* 1.218 death taken away, he cried out: Vtinam Cn. Pompei, amicitiam cum Caesare nunquàm coisses, aut nunquàm diremisses, I would to god, O Pompee, (said he) thou [ C] haddest either neuer made friendship with Caesar, or hauing once made it, haddest neuer broken it. For why their friendship much diminished the Popular power, but their enmitie altogether ruinated the same; one of them being in no wise able to en∣dure his equall, nor the other his superiour, vntill that so by ciuill warre the state was quite at length ouerthrowne, and Caesar become master of all. And as for that which Caesar writeth, our auncestours the auntient Gaules to haue thought the dissention of their princes and great gouernours to haue beene profitable vnto their estates, I can hardly be perswaded therein: when as by the report euen of Caesar himselfe, the dissen∣tion of the princes and of the estates of Fraunce, (then for the most part gouerned by Aristocraties) wrought their owne destruction; some of them praying aide of the Ger∣mans, [ D] and some of them of the Romans, being long a prey both to the one and to the other, and in the end vnto the Romans alone as the onely conquerors. Neither is it true the mutuall slaughters of the Nobilitie of England to haue beene commodi∣ous and profitable vnto the comminaltie and inferiour sort, as Philip Comines writeth; yea at such time as I was Embassadour in England, I vnderstood by some of the inha∣bitants there, them to feare nothing more then the factions of the Nobilitie and their ciuill discord: for the better appeasing and repressing whereof they haue often times vsed to assemble the high court of Parliament, whereunto all the States are assem∣bled. And thus we haue declared in what sort the Magistrates ought to behaue them selues towards their Prince, as also how they ought to beare them selues one of them [ E] towards an other, as also towards other priuate men; and whether they ought to be at vnitie among them selues or not. Now it remaineth for vs briefly to show also, how the Prince ought to behaue him selfe towards his subiects; and whither it be ex∣pedient that he should him selfe iudge them, or be him selfe conuersant among them.

CHAP. VI. [ F] ¶ Whether it be conuenient or expedient for the Maiestie of a soueraigne Prince to iudge his subiects him selfe, or to be much conuersant with them.

IT may seeme vnto some that this question not before reasoned of, hath not in it any doubt, and that it is not needfull for vs far∣ther to enter there into, considering that all the auntient and wise polytitians are of accord, that kings were neuer for other thing established than for the administration of justice, as saith Herodotus speaking of the Medes; and Cicero likewise of the Ro∣mans;* 1.219 as also we read that the first kings of Greece, Aeacus, Mi∣nos, and Radamanthus had no title more honorable then the title of Iudges; who for [ G] they with great equity administred iustice, are by the Poets reported to haue obtayned of Iupiter an euerlasting power & office for iudging of the ghosts in hel. And albeit that Homer calleth princes the pastors, or feeders of the people. Yet so it is that the title of Iudges hath long time after him continued in the person of the princes of Athens, who had the soueraigne gouernment for ten yeares. And not onely the princes of the Medes, the Greeks, and Latins, but euen the Generals also, who were as soueraignes amongst the Hebrewes, had no other title then the title of Iudges: And at such time as they demaunded of Samuel (now wearied with age) a king, they ioyned thereunto, that he might iudge them, as other kings did their people: Which showeth suffici∣ently that the principall charge which they had, was to doe iustice themselues in per∣son. [ H] And the principall reason that might moue the princes themselues to iudge the* 1.220 subiects, is the mutuall obligation which is betwixt the Prince and his subiects: For as the subiect oweth vnto his lord all duety, aide, & obedience; so the Prince also oweth vnto his subiects iustice, guard, & protection: so that the subiects are no more bound to obey the prince, than is the prince to administer vnto them iustice. Neither is it suf∣ficient to haue it done by an other man, as by the Magistrate at the Princes command, seeing that the subiects being commaunded to yeeld their faith and obedience vnto the prince, cannot do it by their Deputies, but onely by themselues in person; and that this obligation betwixt the Prince and the subiect is reciprocall. Howbeit that it is lesse inconuenient that the vassall should giue his faith and homage vnto his Lord [ I] by his deputie, than the Lord to do him iustice by his officer, for that the obeisance of the subiect in this case cannot be called in doubt: whereas the subiect hath no war∣rant that the magistrat or officer shall not suffer himselfe to be by bribes corrupted, which the Prince will not do, who is therefore still aunswerable before God, vnto whom he cannot say that he hath therewith charged the conscience of his Iudges, his owne thereby being not discharged. Besides that it much and notably concerneth Commonweales, that they which hold the soueraignty should themselues doe iustice: that is to wit, the vnion and amitie of the Princes with the subiects, which cannot bet∣ter be nourished and maintained than by the communion of one of them with the o∣ther, which is lost, and brought to nought, when the Princes do nothing but by their [ K] magistrats and officers: For so it seemeth vnto the subiects that their princes disdaine and contemne them, a thing vnto them more grieuous than if the prince should him selfe doe them wrong; and so much the more heauy, as a contumelie or disgrace is* 1.221 more hardly to be borne, than is a simple wrong or iniurie. Whereas to the con∣trarie when the subiects see their Prince to present him selfe in person vnto them to do them iustice, they go away halfe contented, albeit that they haue not that which they desired, or at least wise they will say, The king hath seene our request, he hath heard our difference, he hath taken the paines to iudge our cause. And if so be that the sub∣iects

be by their king seene, heard, or vnderstood, it is almost incredible, how much [ A] they are rauished with contentment and pleasure, if the Prince be neuer so little vertu∣ous, or haue any other commendable qualitie in him. Besides that there is no greater meane to giue authoritie vnto his Magistrats and officers, and to cause iustice it selfe to be both feared and reuerenced, than to see the king him selfe sitting in his regall throne to do his subiects iustice. Moreouer the Magistrats often times doe wrong and iniu∣rie vnto the subiects by standing vpon the nice clauses, words, and sillables of the law, which they dare not passe, as being bound and subiect thereunto. And in case that they make any conscience to iudge according to the strictnesse of the law, they must yet first send their reasons vnto the Prince, and attend his aunswere, and exposition of his Edicts and lawes made according vnto the opinion and aduise of his other officers, [ B] who will often times see the suters purses bothom; in such sort as that many sutes liue longer than the parties and suters them selues, yea and some times are for euer suspen∣ded. Whereas if the Prince him selfe in person shall vouchsafe to iudge the matter, he which is the liuing law, and aboue all ciuill lawes, being accompanied with his Counsell shall doe both good and speedie iustice, as hauing respect vnto the verie ground and equitie of the matter, without farther standing vpon titles and formali∣ties. By this meanes also so many oppositions, appeales, ciuill requests, remouing of causes, infinite decrees, one of them vpon an other, which make sutes immortall, should cease, and iustice without stay or let take course, no appeal being to be made from the Prince. Ioyning hereunto also that the Commonweale should so be relie∣ued [ C] of the great charges and wages which it alloweth vnto Iudges, and of their parti∣cular fees which are aboue measure heauie; besides the bribes and presents which must be giuen, which often times passe the ordinarie fees, in such sort as that the subiects in steed of hauing good and speedie iustice (which the Prince oweth them) are constrai∣ned to paie for it as for the most precious thing in the world: howbeit that oftentimes it happeneth, that the marchant is well paid, and yet the marchandise by him deliuered is right little or nothing worth. And yet there is another verie considerable point al∣so: which is, That the parties contending are sometimes great and honourable, as that they would neuer answere before many judges, in discredit for their vnworthinesse, ini∣quitie, [ D] or other like qualitie, whereby it oftentimes commeth to passe, that they end their suits and differences by combats and dynt of sword: whereas the Prince in pre∣sence might euen with the twinkling of his eye set them agreed. And were it that no other greater profit were thereby to come vnto the Commonweale, then that the prince by vse and exercise of iudgement should haue the force of right and iustice throughly engrafted in his mind; what greater or better thing could there bee wished of almightie God either for the prince or for the subiects, than that hee might most cu∣riously and seriously learne daily to administer iustice? The knowledge of other artes and sciences, which is it selfe a thing most royall, and so most proper vnto kings. For as for the knowledge of armes, and of martiall affaires, it is well fitting a Prince against his enemies, whereas iustice is most necessarie for him at all times, and in all places, [ E] whether it be in peace or warre.

But not to rest altogether vpon reason and arguments, we will also vse the examples* 1.222 herein of the most wise and noble princes. VVhat man was there amongst men to be in wisedome compared with Salomon? And yet we read, That the onely prayer that he made vnto God, was to obtaine wisedome wherewith rightly to iudge his people, which his prayer was so acceptable vnto God, as that he seemed therefore most plenti∣fully, and to the great worlds wonder, to haue powred out vpon him all the treasures both of wisedome and of knowledge; that so all men might vnderstand God not one∣ly

to haue inspired him with wisdome, but also that the office of right iudgement was [ F] euen by God himselfe giuen vnto kings; who was also for experience in great affaires and politike wisedome like vnto the Great Augustus? And yet neuerthelesse wee read that he without ceasing was still busied in the administration of iustice, insomuch that euen when he was sicke, he caused himselfe to bee carried in his horselitter to doe iu∣stice. Howbeit that that was the ordinarie vacant time of the Roman emperours, who for the administration of iustice were commended aboue all the princes of the world,* 1.223 euen so farre, as that a poore old woman to whom the Great emperour Adrian refused to aunswere her preferring vnto him a request, excusing himself, That he was not then at leasure, Raigne no longer then (said she) but discharge thee of thy charge thou bearest. Whereunto the emperor hauing not what to answere, presently staid & did her iustice. [ G] Now then if so great a prince (whose empire was bounded with the same bounds that the course of the sunne was, and troubled with so great affaires) acknowledged the bond, To doe his subiect iustice: what ought they then to doe which hold but the scantlings of that great empire? Ought not euerie one of them to enforce himselfe in his owne person, and to studie with all his power, how to imploy himselfe for the do∣ing of iustice? considering that (as Plinie the yonger saith) there is no more noble Phi∣losophie, than to entreat of the publike affaires, and to doe iustice, putting in practise that which the Philosophers haue taught.

Now if the knowledge of that which is right, and the administration of iustice, bring so many & so great profits vnto princes; how much greater shal the same then be, if they [ H] * 1.224 shall by themselues handle but those things onely which are proper vnto their soue∣raigntie? For as for the rest of the ciuill affaires, a prince may well commit them vnto the magistrats: but the rights of soueraigntie, and the deciding of them, hee can in no wise put off, but together with the soueraigntie it self. Surely they are verie blind, deafe, and dumbe, which neuer but by other mens eies see, and by other mens eares heare, and by another mans tongue, and that oftentimes a straunge tongue also, speake and talke of such things as are theirs, and most proper vnto themselues. Now wee haue before shewed also, not by the examples of straunge nations onely, but euen by the examples of our auncestours also, the idle slothfulnesse of kings, who committed the mannaging of all their affairs vnto their domesticall seruants, to haue thereby brought both them∣selues [ I] and their posteritie vnto destruction.

These arguments and reasons thus by vs before alleaged, make a faire show vnto them who sufficiently vnderstand not, nor by experience know not, the secrets of soue∣raigntie,* 1.225 and hidden knowledge for the maintaining of maiestie: But vnto me looking neerer into the matter, they are not sufficient to resolue this question, nor to maintaine, That a prince ought in person himselfe to administer iustice: Yea vnto mee it seemeth not onely not necessarie, but not profitable vnto the subiects, the prince himselfe to bee vnto them the minister of iustice. True it is, that for them so to do, it should bee not onely profitable, but euen necessarie also, if the princes were themselues such as Scy∣lax faigned vnto himselfe the kings of the Indians to be; that is to say, so much better [ K] than their subiects, as the gods are aboue men. For what can bee more glorious or more royall, than to see a prince by himselfe in the open sight of the people with great integritie and vprightnesse iudge and decide causes, to giue rewards vnto such as haue well deserued of the Commonweale, and to inflict punishment vpon the wicked and offendors. For he must needs be a good and wise man himselfe, which is not deligh∣ted but in the companie of good and wise men: and he must needs excell in integritie and iustice, who himselfe with great equitie administreth iustice. But shall we therfore say, that vitious princes ought to thrust themselues into the sight, and so to communi∣cat

their vices vnto their subiects? the least vice in a prince being like vnto a canker in [ A] a faire face: and so to doe, what were it els, than in the sight of the people to set vp an example of vice, to lead men, to draw them, yea & euen to enforce them to be naught? For there is nothing more naturall, than for the subiects to conforme themselues vnto* 1.226 the manners, vnto the doings and sayings of their prince; there being neither gesture, action, nor countenance in him, be it good or bad, which is not marked, or counterfai∣ted by them which see him, hauing their eyes, their sences, and all their spirits, wholy bent to the imitation of him. So that Plinie well called the princes life a Perpetual Cen∣sorship, whereunto we still direct and conforme our selues. And this is a doctrine from most auntient antiquitie deliuered vnto all posteritie, first by the maister of wisedome himselfe, and after by Plato, Cicero, Liuie, and Cassiodore, repeated as an infallible rule, [ B] That such as the prince of a Commonweale is, such will the people also be. Yea Theodoric king of the Gothes, writing vnto the Senat of Rome, passeth further, vsing these words, Facilius est errare raturam, quam dissimilem sui princeps possit Rempublicam formare, An easier thing it is (said he) for nature to chaunge her course, than for a prince to frame a Commonweale vnlike vnto himselfe. And though examples need not in so plaine a matter, yet we haue seene king Francis the first, in this realme, and Mansor, surnamed the Great, emperour of Affrike and Spaine, who both two in diuers times, and in diuers places, began to haue learning and learned men in estimation; when suddenly the prin∣ces, the nobilitie, the cleargie, yea euen the souldiors and artificers, with all the people in general, gaue themselues so to learning, as that there was neuer found so great a num∣ber [ C] of learned men in all languages, and in all sciences, as in their time. Seeing therefore* 1.227 that the princes example is of so great force and power for the conforming and chaun∣ging of his subiects manners, either to good or bad; great heed is to bee taken, that the prince, except he be by nature wel, and by education better framed and instructed, come not much abroad for the people to behold and imitat: but if he be euill & wicked, then by all meanes to be as a popular and common plague kept out of the sight of his sub∣iects. Yet haply some man may say, That an euill prince should not therefore abstaine or withdraw himselfe from publike affaires, or from the iudgement place or Senat; for that no man was so bad, but that he hath in him some vertues or commendable quali∣tie; or which cannnot at leastwise dissemble some of his vices: of which his vertues & [ D] vices, his subiects may make choyce, in such sort as that they may easily decline the one, and embrace the other. But in mine opinion and iudgement, they will rather imi∣tate* 1.228 his vices, than his vertues: and so much the rather, by how much the corrupt na∣ture of man is more prone and enclined vnto vice than vnto vertue; as also for that there is but one most strait way which leadeth vnto vertue, wheras on both sides there are innumerable crooked by-wayes and turnings vnto vice, whereinto they may more easily fall, than into the straight and right way of vertue. In Alexander the Great were many most rare and heroicall vertues, yet so it was, that he greatly blemished the beautie of them, as also of his other noble acts, by an euill custome that hee had to bee drunke; wherein he tooke such delight, as that hee propounded a talent as a prize vn∣to [ E] * 1.229 him which could drinke most: in which beastly contention and strife fortie toge∣ther with him which had gained the prize burst and perished; hee himselfe almost loo∣king on. Mithridates also king of Amasia, imitating of Alexander the Great herein, surpassed him, that hauing set vp a prize for him that could eat and drinke most, hee (as Plutarch saith) gained the foule victorie in both (if to bee ouercome of intemperance and excesse be to be accounted at all a victorie.) But to counterfeit vertues, or to dis∣semble vices, as it hath alwayes seemed a most hard thing vnto all men, so hath it especi∣ally vnto princes, for that they of all others haue least learned to commaund their de∣sires,

to restraine their lusts, to bridle their affection, which he that knoweth not how [ F] * 1.230 to do, shall neuer be a good or cunning dissembler. Dionysius the younger moued with the fame and vertue of Plato, caused him to be sent for vnto Syracusa, who had no soo∣ner begun to tast of the wisedome, vertue, and learning of the man, but that in a mo∣ment all minstrels, players, drunkards, bauds, harlots, and such like, were quite vanished out of the princes sight, and the court so suddenly chaunged, as if it had bene from hea∣uen inspired. But for that Dionysius had but chaunged his countenance, & not his mind, and cast out the allurements of pleasures, but not pleasures themselues; hee could not long dissemble his vices, eithes yet e•…•…dure Plato, who was no sooner gone out of the court, and disembarqued out of Sicilie, but that the prince forthwith returned vnto his woonted vices, by him before for a while forborne, but not quite forsaken: at which [ G] verie instant minstrels, dauncers, harlots, bauds, and such other vermine of the court, which had before bene driuen out were againe recalled. So much power the prince hath at his pleasure to chaunge and turne the harts of his subiects, but alwayes rather vnto vices and vanities, than vnto vertues. But I doe more willingly remember our own domesticall examples than others; king Francis the elder, for the healing of a wound he had receiued in his head, caused his head to be polled, when suddenly after all his houshold seruants, all the princes, all the nobilitie, the magistrats, the artificers, and people of all sorts in generall, caused their heads to be from that time forward pol∣led also, insomuch that if any did from thenceforth vse the old fashion, and account it an vndecent thing to be polled, he was therefore of all men derided: whereas before [ H] from the beginning of this kingdome, it had alwayes bene the marke of the kings, nei∣ther was it lawfull for any but for the nobilitie and Senators, to weare long haire: all the rest of the meaner sort being befor compelled to poll themselues as slaues, vntil that Peter Lombard bishop of Paris (for the power and authoritie which bishops then had aboue kings) obtained, That it might be lawful for the common people to weare long haire also. True it is, that the flatterers of princes helpe much to conforme the maners and fashions of the people vnto those of the princes, they still rather counterfeiting than imitating euen the vices and defects of the prince, whome if they see laugh, they laugh also, although they know no cause why; if he be lame, they halt downe right al∣so. Alexander the Great, and Alphonsus king of Aragon, beeing both wrie necked, [ I] the one by nature, and the other by custome, the courtly curres to counterfeit that their deformitie, held their neckes also awry; as the Courtier, and Plutarch in the life of Pyr∣rhus writeth. Seeing therefore the nature of man is enclined to follow the vice of the prince, were it not euen to vndoe a people, and to ruinat an estate, to thrust still into the sight of the people a prince euill brought vp; and a pottraitor of vices for them to imi∣tat? And yet it is more daungerous for that for one vice which the prince hath, often∣times those of his traine haue an hundred, who euerie where as they passe, may alter & marre the good disposition of the people; or like swarmes of flies & caterpillers, who hauing deuoured the leaues, and fruit, do also leaue their spaune behind them, able to insect the fields and trees be they neuer so cleane and fruitfull. [ K]

But suppose we the prince not to be vitious (a rare gift, and by the goodnes of God giuen vnto men, when as in euerie age a tollerable prince is scarcely to bee found) but to be of great vertue and perfection, yea euen a man without fault (howbeit that there is a great space betwixt them which are endued with vertues, and them which are with∣out vices) yet is it almost a thing impossible, but that some thing shall at one time or other fall from him, which wel noted may seeme vnto the people foolish or rediculous: wherein much is derogated from the reputation and dignitie which the subiects ought to haue of him. But let vs suppose that also, him to be neither a man euill giuen, nor

foolish; neither yet so to seeme, but to be a man endued with great vertues, and of good [ A] * 1.231 education; yet so it is that too ordinarie conuersation, and too great familiaritie of the subiects with the prince▪ much diminisheth his maiestie, and withall engendreth a cer∣taine contempt of him: of which contempt proceedeth the disobedience of the sub∣iects vnto him and his commaunds, to the ruine of the whole estate. And now againe to the contrarie, if the prince to maintaine his maiestie shall ordinarily show himselfe vnto his subiects, in his greatnesse, with a terrible port, it may be that so hee may bee the more of them redoubted: but it is daungerous least he should be therefore the lesse lo∣ued. Whereas the loue of subiects towards their soueraigne is much more necessarie for the preseruation of an estate, than is feare; and so much the more, for that loue can∣not be without feare to offend him whome wee loue; whereas feare may well be, and [ B] most often is without any loue at all, men commonly hating him whome they feare, and as occasion serueth still seeking to take him out of the way.

And truely vnto me more deepely considering of the matter, almightie God (the* 1.232 soueraigne prince of the whole world) seemeth to haue shewed a short way vnto worldly princes (the true images of himselfe) how they are to communicat them∣selues vnto their subiects, to be of them both beloued and feared: For the communica∣teth himselfe vnto men but by visions and dreames, and that but to a few of the elect & most perfect of them also, men of great integritie of life. But when hee with his owne voyce published the Ten Commaundements, he caused his fire to bee seene heauens high, and the mountaines to tremble with thunder and lightning, with such a dreadfull [ C] sound of trumpets, that the people strucken with feare, and falling flat vpon their faces, besought him, That hee would no more from thenceforth speake vnto them himselfe (for that otherwise they should all die) but onely to commaund such things as he plea∣sed by his seruant Moyses. So that that people of all others most chosen, had but once almightie God (who sheweth himselfe but in spirit to be seene) himselfe sounding forth his lawes; when as yet for all that to allure men the more feruently to loue him, hee at all times, and in all places and countries, doth with great loue, and eternall bountie, fo∣ster and cherish all mankind, yea indeed all sort of liuing creatures, powring continual∣ly vpon them his great and infinit fauours, larges, and bountie. If therefore the wise [ D] prince ought in mannaging of his subiects, to imitate the wisedom of God in the go∣uernment of the world, he must but seldome times come into the sight of his subiects, and that with such a state and maiestie, as best agreeth with his wisedome, power, and greatnesse, and yet make choice of some few most wise and worthy men, with whome to communicat his secret councels, and by them to declare his will and pleasure vnto the rest, and yet incessantly to heape vpon his subiects his graces and fauours; & with great wisedome and power to protect and defend them against their enemies. In the booke De Mundo (or of the world) dedicated to Alexander the Great (and without cause ascribed to Aristotle, as sauouring nothing of his stile) a comparison is made of a soueraigne prince vnto God; as that the great king of Persia was stil resiant in a proud and stately pallace or castle, compassed in with three high walles, full of all pleasures [ E] and delights, neuer sturring abroad, or shewing & acquainting himselfe but with some few of his friends; who yet neuerthelesse by fiers and watches set vpon high places, stil in one day vnderstood and knew all the enemies of his empire, euen from the farthest parts of the East Indies, vnto the straits of Hellespontus. And yet neuer was there any princes vnder heauen more honoured and reuerenced, or better beloued of their sub∣iects than they: or whose commaunds were more iust vnto their subiects, or more of their subiects regarded, or that longer preserued their empire, power, and state. So those princes also which giue themselues ouer, and became slaues vnto their vaine pleasures

and delights, most commonly vsed to withdraw themselues from the sight of the mul∣titude [ F] into some secret places, that so they might at more libertie glut themselues with all kind of pleasures. For so Tiberius Caesar of all others the most cunning dissembler, made choyce of a most desert island, wherein he for many yeres liued in all kind of vo∣luptuous and beastly pleasures. Which was of him right filthily done, but yet more wisely than they who with the most odious smell of their loathsome pleasures pollute and defile as well publike as priuat places: who besides that they offend more by gi∣uing of euill example than by the wickednesse it selfe by them committed, doe also in the minds and conceits of men engender a neglect and contempt of themselues.

Wherefore a prince that wise is, so oft as he should show himselfe vnto the people* 1.233 (which he should most seldome do) should so prepare himselfe, as that he may vnto all [ G] men seeme euen in his face and countenance to carry with him a certaine state and ma∣iestie, yet still mixt with modestie, but especially in his speech, which should alwaies be maiesticall and sententious, and in the manner of phrase, something different from the vulgar. Which if it shall seeme something hard for the prince to performe, or that he haue not the grace of speaking, it is best for him to speake little, or els altogether to be silent: For that we know men in so great matters, as to contemne, or feare; to hate, or loue; to be stil no lesse with opinion, than with any certaine reason, led & moued there∣unto. For if the prouerbe of the wise Hebrew be true, That the foole himselfe in holding his peace is accounted wise, how circumspect and aduised ought a prince to be, when hee openeth his mouth to speake in publike place? considering that his words, his coun∣tenance, [ H] and lookes, are oftentimes accounted and esteemed of as lawes, oracles, and decrees. Wherein Tiberius the emperour, least he should in any thing offend, brought in a new fashion, as to be spoke vnto, and also to giue aunswere by writing, for what matter soeuer it was, Moris erat (saith Tranquillus) eo tempore principem etiam presen∣tem scripto adire, The manner (saith he) at that time was, with writing to goe vnto the prince euen then present; to the end that nothing might escape which had not before bene well thought vpon. For it is not possible but that they which speake much in open assemblies, as in the Senat, or before the people, must many times erre: which done by a prince, shall breed contempt, or at leastwise cause him to bee the lesse estee∣med: so that a Grecian (I wot not who) not vnfitly said, That a prince if hee bee wise [ I] should vnto the people, or in open audience no otherwise speake, than hee would doe in a Tragedie.

But I know that some of contrary opinion vnto mine, wil say, Is it not the true estate and office of a prince, to doe iustice vnto his people? to heare the complaints of his subiects? to see the requests of his own? and by the mouth of euery one to vnderstand of their iust grieuances, which are commonly suppressed, or at leastwise disguised by another man? And why then should the prince hide himselfe from his people? talke but with few, and those of his most inward friends also? or aunswere nothing vnto ma∣ny, of right asking him of many things? yea not to be willing so much as to heare his subiects speake? Things altogether absurd, and not beseeming the maiestie of a soue∣raigne [ K] prince. Whereunto I say, that mine opinion is not, that he should so hide him∣selfe, as not at all to show himselfe; as the kings yet doe euen at this present in the East Indies, and namely the king of Borney, who speaketh not vnto any but vnto his wife* 1.234 and children; neither is seene of any, but still speaketh vnto others by one of his gen∣tlemen through an hole by a reed or cane which he holdeth in his mouth, as he did vn∣to the king Catholike (as we read in the histories of the Indies:) but my meaning is,* 1.235 that he should not be much in the assemblies of the people, neither easie to bee spoke withall of all men, not to vse much discourse with his subiects, except with such as are

neere vnto him, or of his familiar acquaintance; not to take pleasure in iests and taunts, [ A] in play, or other publike exercise: For that by such things the princes maiestie and re∣putation, which ought by all meanes to be whole and vntouched, is greatly impaired and lightned: and so much the more, by how▪ much the prince is of greater estate and maiestie: whereunto good and especiall regard is alwayes to be had. For it were not seemely for a pettie prince in his estate to counterfeit the great kings of Aethiopia, of Tartarie, of Persia, or of Turkie, who suffer not their subiects so much as to looke di∣rectly vpon them, neither are so much of them redoubted and feared for their power, as for the maiesty that they hold when they show themselues vnto their subiects. How∣beit that the kings of Affrike hold yet this maiestie more, as in the historie of Francis D' Aluarez is to be seene, where hee speaketh of the maiestie of the Great Negus, [ B] whome we call Prester Iohn: and in the historie of Leo of Affrike, where hee speaketh of the king of Tombut, before whome his subiects appeare not, but vpon their knees, with dust vpon their heads.

Now if any man shall say, That the kings of the East, and of the South are thus to be honoured, for that their subiects are of an abiect and a seruile nature; but that they of the North, or of the West, whose subiects be of greater courage, are not able to endure such a seruitude and slauerie: this shall be in due place decided, as also what the nature of euerie region is: and yet for all that I see the kings of England, Sweden, Den∣marke, and Polonia, who are situat toward the North, much better to maintaine the maiestie of their estates with their subiects, than doe the kings of Fraunce, or the [ C] princes of Italie; and the kings of Moscouia yet better than all the rest, and yet are not therefore the lesse, but well the more of their subiects obeyed.

Now the greatest daunger that can come vnto a prince, to doe all by others, is, least* 1.236 that they vpon whome he should so discharge himselfe, should take from him his estate and soueraigntie, and so possesse themselues thereof: which for al that hath neuer chan∣ced in this realme, but onely vnder king Childeric, surnamed the Loutish▪ since the time that the kings of Fraunce showed themselues vnto their subiects in their maiestie but once a yeare, viz. the first of May; as we read in our owne histories, and also in Cedri∣nus a Greeke author, who saith, That the auntient kings of Fraunce tooke no other pleasure but to eat and drinke, leauing the mannaging of all their affaires vnto the great [ D] Master of the Pallace. But we must not draw into consequence the example of one king bereft of sence, to ground a maxime of state vpon. Yet is there well one meane to meet with that inconuenience, which is, That the prince for one lieutenant, or for one great Maister of the Pallace, should haue two or three in power and fauour equall: For in so doing he shall neuer be circumuented, their power being so diminished, one of them still bewraying or controlling the other, the kings maiestie being so still the more stately and sure. For Tiberius hauing made Seianus too great; and so Commo∣dus, Perennius; Theodosius the second, Eutropius; Iustinian, Bellisarius; Xerxes, Artae∣banus; and Childeric, Pepin: committing vnto them alone the mannaging of all their affaires, with the guard of their persons, they fell into the daungers which wee spake of, [ E] being in hazard of their estates.

As for the administration of iustice, and the hearing of the complaints and griefes of* 1.237 the subiects, it shall be alwayes better prouided by good and sufficient magistrats, than by the prince in person himselfe. For who knoweth not so many good parts to bee requisit in a good judge, as are not all well to be found in the most sufficient prince in the world? Yea who knoweth not so many things to bee within the compasse of the duetie of a good judge, as may ouerslip and escape euen the most skilfull and carefull men? whereof many must needs escape the prince before he can perceiue them, and

so many times the verie substance of the matter consisteth in that which is ouerslipped. [ F] And if one shall say, that the prince may haue about him both wise and learned coun∣cellors, according to whose aduise and councell he may determine of matters, and so giue iudgement; such as Augustus, Traian, Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, Alexander Seue∣rus, and the other Roman emperours are reported to haue had: who were alwaies ac∣companied with most worthy and excellent personages: truly that seemed not so hard a matter vnto the Roman princes, so brought vp and so enured thereunto, but now we liue after another manner and fashion. And who is there that seeth not, not onely the prince not to be able to endure so many dilatory pleas, so many slights of the lawyers, so many shifts of the plaintifes; such petitions and outcries of such as run from court to to court? but not euen the magistrats themselues without incredible tediousnesse to be [ G] able to endure the same? all which yet they must deuoure. Yea the prince is not able himselfe to conceiue all such things as are the greatest and of most importance in the Commonweale, and how then shall he alone suffice to decide and determine so many suits and causes? But if hee shall take that charge in hand, and not well and orderly dis∣charge the same, in stead of doing of the subiects right, hee shall doe them great iniurie and wrong. Wherein Demetrius (he which was called the Besieger) hath for iust cause beene blamed: who hauing receiued a great number of his subiects requests, put them into the lap of his mantle, and at the first bridge he came vnto, whereby hee was to passe ouer a riuer, shooke them all into the water: Wherof the subiects seeing them∣selues by him contemned, conceiued a mutuall hatred against him, so that shortly after [ H] he was forsaken of his armie, which yeelded it selfe to Pyrrhus together with the king∣dome, which he so gained without battell. Besides that in this course taken, we should be alwaies driuen to haue recourse vnto the commissioners for instructions: and after∣wards vnto the prince for iudgement of the cause: howbeit that it is sometimes hard, and oftentimes pernitious also, to seperat the instructions of the matter from the iudge∣ment.

But suppose that the prince were at leisure, and that hee both could and would see,* 1.238 heare, and iudge all the causes of his people, yet were it a thing not beseeming the ma∣iestie of a king to make such an ordinarie confusion of his court, where beside the sub∣tilties, the countenances and fauours, (not there subiect to enquirie) and the contraritie [ I] of letters, commissions, decrees, and prouisions, which are there dispatched vnder the name (but without the knowledge) of the prince, whereof colour is oftentimes made for the doing of wrong: it is yet moreouer insupportable for the subiects, vnto whome iustice is due in the places where they are, to search for the same at the court, and to fol∣low the prince still remouing from place to place; where it were better for them some∣times to loose their right, than with so great charge to follow the suit. Besides that the most honorable and worthy causes for a prince that wil himselfe intermedd•…•…e in iudge∣ments, are the causes concerning life and honor: who shall be the accusers? who would fall into so great charges to sue the matter in the court? and into the daunger to bee slaine by the accused, if the prince should pardon the fault. For when princes vse scarce∣ly [ K] at any time to condemne the guiltie parties, but doe oftentimes pardon and restore such as be alreadie condemned: by this meanes should ensue not onely no punishment of offences, but euen the greatest impunitie of the offendors: than which there is no more certaine token of a Commonweale in short time about to perish. Wherewith to meet, secret accusations haue bene brought in and admitted by an auntient edict of Conan king of Scots, which is at this day in vse in Scotland, and called the Indict: and yet is better prouided for by the ordinance of Milan (which well deserueth to bee reli∣giously kept in euerie Commonweale) where in euerie towne there is a chest with an

hole in it, in euery principall church, whereof the gouernours haue the key, wherein∣to [ A] it is lawfull for euery one secretly to put his bill of accusation against any man; wher∣in the crime committed, the time, the place, the partie guiltie, and the witnesses, are all of them comprised, with the reward of the moitie of the confiscation allowed vnto the accuser. Which is an easie way for the punishing of offences before ordinarie judges; a thing impossible to prosecute before the prince. For these reasons and the difficulties by vs noted, Tiberius the emperour hauing obtained the empire, protested in the full Senat, and afterwards by his letters made it knowne vnto the officers, That hee would take vppon him nothing which belonged vnto the iurisdiction of the ma∣gistrats;* 1.239 for that it was more that was required of a prince, than of a magistrat. Nei∣ther ought it to seeme vnto any man straunge, why the office to iudge and decide mat∣ters, [ B] proper vnto the auntient kings, should now belong vnto the magistrats? for that when people as yet had no lawes, but that the kings power and will was accounted for law, it was then needfull for subiects causes to bee iudged by the princes: but after that lawes were once established, according vnto which the magistrat was bound to iudge, and due punishment by them appointed for offences, and rewards vnto such as had well deserued; that necessitie was taken away, and translated from the princes vnto the judges.

But here some man may say, That a prince may be so wise, so iust, and so full of vn∣derstanding,* 1.240 as that he will giue no iudgement but such as is agreeable vnto equitie and [ C] reason; and the compasse of his territorie so strait, as that hee may himselfe suffice to iudge and determine all the suits of his subiects, as there bee diuers such princes in the Low countries, in Germanie, & especially in Italie: In this case should it not be a good∣ly and a profitable thing for the Commonweale, the prince himselfe there to admini∣ster iustice? If thou aske me what mine opinion is therein, I thinke it not profitable ei∣ther for that so blessed a prince, either for those his so happie citisens or subiects, or him in person himself to sit in iudgement; not for that the subiects do so much loue and ho∣nour the maiestie of their prince, as not to dare freely enough to speake their minds, and to cause him to vnderstand their right; neither for that they could hardly haue ac∣cesse vnto him, for the multitude of causes which he should still haue before him, ha∣uing [ D] opened this gap: but euen for that nothing is so proper vnto a prince, as clemen∣cie; nothing vnto a king, as mercie; nothing vnto maiestie, as lenitie. And therefore the emperor Titus (a man of so great courtesie, as that he was called Humani generis de∣litias, or the myrror of mankind) gladly took vpon him the office of the great bishop, because he would pronounce sentence of death vpon no man, either pollute his hands with mans blood, when as yet some other emperours who were also bishops (though not so religious as he) least of all others abstained from such capitall iudgements of life and death. Now nothing is more contrarie vnto true iustice, than pitie; neither any* 1.241 thing more repugnant vnto the office and dutie of an vpright judge, than mercie: hee not onely by the ciuill law, but euen by the law of God also being forbidden to haue [ E] pitie (euen of the poore) in iudgement: which we said to be so proper vnto maiestie, as that it cannot be therefrom diuided or seperated. So that a prince sitting in iudgement must take vpon him two contrarie persons, that is to say, of a mercifull father, and of an vpright magistrat; of a most gentle prince, and of an inflexible judge. And if the prince be by nature mild and pitifull, there shall bee none so euill or wicked, who by force of teares and prayers shall not escape the punishment by the law appointed, euen the most cruell men being oftentimes by them ouercome. So we read, that Augustus the great emperour, for wisedome inferiour vnto none, examining a murderer, began in this sort to question with him, I am sure thou hast not killed thy father: in which words he not

onely instructed the guiltie man what he was to aunswere to him both his prince and [ F] judge, but also most courteously gaue him his pardon. Nero also at such time as the condemnation of a man was presented to him to signe, is reported to haue said, Vtinam liter as nescirem, I would to God I knew not letters. And therefore Cicero pleading be∣fore Caesar, before resolued in any wise to haue put Ligarius to death, said, That he plea∣ded not before him as a judge, but as before the father of the people: and hauing some∣what appeased his anger, began thus to presse him farther, Causas, Caesar, egi multas, & quidem tecum, cum te tenuit ratio honorum tuorum, certe nunquam hoc modo; ignoscite iu∣dices: errauit, lapsus est, non putauit, si vnquam posthac: ad parentem sic agi solet, ad iudices, non fecit, non cogitauit, falsi testes, fictum crimen, Dic te Caesar de facto Ligarij iudicem esse &c. Caesar (saith he) I haue pleaded many causes, and that with thee, when thou stoodst [ G] vpon thine honour, but yet neuer pleaded I in this manner: pardon him my lords, he hath erred, he was deceiued, he thought it not, if euer hee shall doe so againe: so men vse to plead before a (soueraigne prince, or a) father: but vnto the judges, we say flatly, He did it not, hee neuer thought it, the crime is forged, the witnesses are false. But say Caesar, thy selfe to be judge of the deed done by Ligarius, &c. And in this sort secretly infinuating vnto Caesar, that he ought not to bee a judge, holding the place of a soue∣raigne: and afterwards highly commending Caesar his noble acts, his valour and his clemencie, moued him so much, as that he chaunged both his colour and countenance, and was in such a sort rauished, as that he could not heare the one halfe of the oration (the shortest of all them that Cicero left in writing) but that he graunted more vnto the [ H] guiltie man than euer he hoped for. If then Caesar himselfe, one of the greatest orators that euer was (euen in the iudgement of his capitall enemie Cicero) and one of the most valiant and wisest men of his time, was so ouercome by the force of eloquence, pardoning him whome he deadly hated, and had before resolued to put to death: what shall the lesse circumspect prince do, be he neuer so little enclined vnto pitie? how shall he be able to endure the filed speech of an eloquent aduocat? the pititious complaints of poore old men? the cries and sighes of distressed women? the weeping and wayling of little children? King Agesilaus a most famous prince of his time, ouercome by the importunat requests of a friend, writ vnto the judges, requesting them, That if the par∣tie accused, in whose behalfe he writ, were not guiltie, hee should bee acquited by the [ I] equitie of his cause: but if he were lawfully conuict, hee should yet neuerthelesse bee for Agesilaus his sake discharged, and so in any case acquited. But O how many should escape the penaltie of the lawes, if judges in such cases should hearken not one∣ly vnto the princes secret letters, but euen vnto their letters pattents also: and then what may wee deeme that a prince himselfe would doo? Wherefore himselfe in per∣son to sit in iudgement, beseemeth not the maiestie of a soueraigne prince.

But now if it bee so hard for a prince in this case not to erre and bee deceiued, then* 1.242 how much more hard is it in a Popular estate, where the people suffer themselues to bee deceiued and led away with faire words, as a man may see almost in all the accu∣sations made both in Athens and Rome, when the people giue sentence; where the [ K] innocent were condemned, and the guiltie acquited: of examples whereof all the hi∣stories are full. As Seruius Galba a great oratour, accused, attainted, and condem∣ned of treason befor the people of Rome; not hauing any more to say for himselfe, but turning his speech and action, wholly framed to the mouing of pitie; and so em∣bracing his children, and with teares commending them vnto the people, so moued the beholders, as that he easily obtained pardon, and so escaped. Whereupon Cato the elder, who had accused him, said That had not Galba abused his children and his teares, hee had beene well whipt. Whereas other noble and valiant men, who could

neither abuse their prayers nor teares, but bearing themselues vpon their integritie, if [ A] but some lying oratour, or false enformer, had accused them, they were most vniustly condemned. And so oftentimes in like manner not oratours, but flatterers: and that not openly, but secretly, doe with diuers deceits circumuent the prince. And there∣fore the nobilitie of Polonia, by force wrested a priuilege from Lewes king of Polo∣nia and Hungarie: That if question were of any of their liues and honours, they should not bee iudged but by the king himselfe: foreseeing, that so they might easily escape the iudgement of the king, but not the judges, who are bound vnto the stricktnesse of the lawes. And hereupon it is come to passe, that none of the nobili∣tie are euer there condemned to death, what offence soeuer they doe, but alwayes [ B] escape either by fine, or at worst, by beeing kept in prison for the space of a yeare and sixe weekes, which is now there passed into the force and strength of a law, and yet is there obserued and kept; as I haue learned of Zamosche the Polonian ambas∣sadour.

But suppose the prince to bee such an one as is not easily to bee moued vnto pitie or* 1.243 compassion, yet then is it to bee feared, least hee in iudgement fall into crueltie. For whereas to keepe the meane is to euerie man a right hard thing, so vnto princes it is of all others most difficult, who easily suffer themselues to be carried into the one ex∣tremitie or other. If hee bee a good prince and an embracer of vertue, hee will haue wicked men in extreme horror & detestation, wherwith euen the wisest men are mo∣ued [ C] with a iust anger, and so oftentimes carried away with a cholerike passion. There need no better example than that of Augustus the emperour, who was accounted to bee one of the most wise and vertuous princes that euer was, and at his first sitting in iudgement endured as it were the paine of the condemned: and suffered not lesse (as saith Seneca) than did they themselues which were executed. And yet neuerthelesse this vertuous prince by continuall custome of iudging and condemning such as were conuict before him (as most necessarie it was) became too much rigorous and cruell, suffering himselfe to bee transported with passion and indignation against the wicked: in such sort, that one day sitting in iudgement, and condemning many the accused to di∣uers punishments: his friend Mecenas beeing not able for the preasse to come neere [ D] him, cast a little billet of paper into his bosome, wherein hee called him an Execu∣tioner or Hangman: whereat Augustus suddenly staied, and finding himselfe transpor∣ted with choler, and so to bee too hastie in iudgement, to stay his anger forthwith brake vp the court. And for this cause our fathers haue right wisely ordayned, That the Criminall Chamber of Parliaments should from three monethes to three mo∣nethes still bee chaunged (which for this cause is called Tournelle: for that all the jud∣ges of the other Chambers iudged euerie one of them by turnes, to the intent that the common custome to condemne and put men to death, should not chaunge the natu∣rall mildnesse of the judges, and make them cruell and hard harted. Besides that it is [ E] a verie hard, and almost impossible thing (as saith Theophrastus) that a good and ho∣nest man, should not enter into choller, seeing the most detestable enormities of the wicked, and so sometimes to become as a man euen furious, and as it were out of his wits. So Claudius the emperour hearing one day the plaintife rehearse the great and manifold villanies of one accused, fell into such an outrage, that taking vp a knife which lay before him, hee threw it into the accused mans face, euen in full iudgement. But if the prince which intermedleth himselfe with iudgement bee by nature cruell, he shall then make a butcherie of his court; as did the emperour Caligula, who by one* 1.244 onely sentence, for diuers crimes condemned fiftie persons, euen vnto the same kind of death, and often tooke pleasure to cut off the heads of many goood men, some∣time

to proue his owne strength, and sometime to proue but the edge of his Cimitar, [ F] If therefore it bee so hard euen for the most wise, to keepe the meane betwixt mildnesse and rigour, which is necessarie for judges, it is not so easily to bee found in princes, who are most commonly extreame in their actions: for the waywardnesse of a priuat man, is indignation in a prince; and the anger of a subiect, is called furie in a king.

But let vs proceed farther, and suppose, that the prince haue the grauitie, the know∣ledge,* 1.245 the wisedome, the discretion, the experience, the patience, and all other the ver∣tues requisit in a good judge: yet so it is, that he cannot be without daunger, if he shall in person iudge his subiects. For the best and fairest rule for the maintenance of the state of a Monarchy, is, that the prince, if it may be, cause himself to be beloued of al, without [ G] the disdaine or hatred of any. Wherunto to attaine, he hath two means, the one by ap∣pointing due punishment to be inflicted vpon the euill, & the other by giuing deserued rewards vnto the good. And for that the one of them is fauorable, & the other odious, it behoueth the prince that would be loued, to reserue vnto himselfe the bestowing of rewards; which are, estates, honors, offices, benifices, pentions, priuileges, prerogatiues, immunities, exemptions, restitutions, and other graces and fauours, which euery well aduised prince ought himselfe to graunt: but as for condemnations, fines, confiscati∣ons, and other punishments, he is not himselfe to meddle with them, but to commit them vnto his most vpright and wise magistrats, for them to doe good and speedie in∣stice therein. In which doing, they which receiue the benefits, shall haue good cause [ H] to loue, respect, and reuerence the prince their benefactor: and those which are con∣demned, shall yet haue no occasion at all to hate him, but shall still discharge their chol∣ler vpon the magistrats and judges. For why, the prince doing good to euery one, and euill to none, shall be beloued of all, and hated of none: which euen nature hath figu∣red out vnto vs in the king of Bees, who neuer hath sting, least he should hurt any. And albeit that the sacred Scriptures teach vs, all plagues, diseases, calamities, and other worldly chaunces to depend of the wrath of God; yet in this all diuines (which more exactly entreat of diuine matters) wholly agree, none of all these things to bee done by almightie God, as by an efficient cause; but by permission onely, and to bee from him diuided, but as from a not letting cause: which cause the manner of the Hebrew phrase [ I] euerie where signifieth by the word Hiphil, ordinarily vsed, when it speaketh of the vengeance of God. We read also in the Poets (though somewhat otherwise) that Iupiter had three kinds of lightning, which they called Manubias Albas, Rubras, Atras, The first is white, which serueth for aduertisement, but hurteth no man, as proceeding onely from Iupiter, and his friendly aspect vnto the Sunne: For which cause Seneca saith, Id solum fulmen placabile est quod mittit Iupiter, That onely lightning (saith hee) is peaceable which Iupiter sendeth. The other is red, and proceedeth from the aspect of Iupiter vnto the inferiour planets, whome they call the inferiour gods, which hur∣teth and blasteth fruits and beasts, but killeth no man. The third is blacke, and made by the aspect of Iupiter vnto the high planets and the sixe starres (which they call the high [ K] gods) which killeth, ouerthroweth and destroieth whatsoeuer it lighteth vpon. For the Theologie of the auntients belonged vnto the Bishops, the Philosophers, and the Po∣ets, as Marcus Varro witnesseth in the one and twentieth booke of worldly things: wherein they all agreed, That the great God, which they thought to be Iupiter (to speake properly and according to the truth) could not be himselfe augrie, neither hurt nor condemne any man, but all things to be done by meane causes, and the ministerie and power of angels. And therefore the auntient Aegyptians deriued a law euen from

Promethius their law giuer, whereby their kings were not onely forbidden to kill any [ A] man, but euen so much as to behold any execution done; least by such looking on, some print of crueltie should remaine in them the beholders. And this vnto mee see∣meth a great secret of this our kingdome, and a thing of great force for the gaining of the subiects loue and good will towards the prince; all rewards, gifts, honours, offices, charges, and commaunds, comming still from the king: but penalties, and punishments alwaies adiudged and inflicted by the magistrats. For at such time as William Poyet (my countrey man) Chauncellor of Fraunce was accused of treason, and by the enuy of his most gratious enemies circumuented, the king who had receiued the wrong would not himselfe be iudge in the cause, neither so much as be present at the triall; yea when the partie accused had refused all the judges of Paris, it was the kings pleasure, that two [ B] judges, men of great integritie, and free from all corruption, should be called and chosen out of euery court of parliament in Fraunce to try him: Whereby may be vnderstood with what an obseruation of law and iustice this kingdome standeth, when as almost at the same time Thomas Moore Chauncellor of England, and Hierome Moron Chan∣cellor of Milan, both of them accused of treason, had for their judges, one of them euen the verie conspirators themselues, guiltie of the same treason against the prince, and the other his great enemies.

But here haply some man may say, the honour of noble personages to require, that when question is of their liues, their honour, or whole estate, the king himselfe should take vpon him the hearing of the matter. For when the duke of Alencon (Charles the [ C] seuenth his nie kinsman) was accused of treason, the court of parliament answered the king, That hee could not be tryed but in the presence of the king, and of the peeres of Fraunce, without being lawfull for them to appoint their substitutes. In like case vp∣pon councell asked by Lewes the eleuenth, when question was for the triall of Renate of Aniou king of Sicilie, the court gaue the same aunswere, viz. That it could not so* 1.246 much as giue an interlocutorie decree against a peere of Fraunce, when question was of his honour, except the king himselfe were there present. I say for all that, that this was not for the king to iudge. For why, it is to be proued, that the king in auntient time was not in person himselfe assistant in the iudgement of treason, although it were in the triall of the princes, or of the peeres; as is to be found in the records of the court, a pro∣testation [ D] the third of March 1386, made by the duke of Burgundie, as chiefe peere of Fraunce, against king Charles the sixt, wherein is contained, That the king ought not to be assistant at the iudgement of the king of Nauarre, arraigned of treason; and that so to be, appertained not but onely to the peeres of Fraunce, saying, The like protesta∣tion to haue beene made against king Charles the fift, to the intent hee should not bee present at the triall of the duke of Brittaine: and in case hee would needs passe on far∣ther, and breake the custome of their auncestors, the peeres of Fraunce demaunded in full parliament, That an act of that their protestation might be vnto them decreed, and so afterwards it was enioyned vnto the clarke by a decree of the court, to deliuer vnto the peeres, and to the kings Attourney generall an act of such their protestation. So [ E] also when question was for the triall of the marquesse of Salusse, vnder the raigne of Francis the first, it was by liuely reasons, and by the authoritie of the lawes both of God and man maintained, That the French king could not in that iudgement be assistant, seeing it concerned the confiscation of the marquisat: and albeit that the kings Attour∣ney generall vrging the matter, the king was at the iudgement present, yet gaue hee not sentence, whereby the marquesse was himselfe condemned, and his goods most iustly confiscat, yet that iudgement for al that seemeth vnto many but extorted, and the other princes rested therewith much discontented. So also Alexander the Great would neuer

take vpon him the person of a judge, neither thought it meet to bee assistant in the [ F] iudgement giuen against Philotas, Calisthenes, and others which conspired against his person, least he should so seeme to haue terrified the judges, or to haue taken from* 1.247 them the free power of iudging: as we read in Quintus Curtius. For if it bee contrarie vnto the law of nature, that the partie should be judge also; & That the king is a partie in all causes which concerne either the publike or his owne proper patrimonie in parti∣cular, in which case he cannot be a judge; by a much stronger reason ought the same to take place in the offence of treason, and especially in the chiefe point, where questi∣on is, the partie accused to haue attempted the honour or life of his prince. And for this cause Lewes the ninth would not pronounce sentence at the iudgement of Peter Mauclere duke of Britaine, albeit that hee was there present when the iudgement was [ G] giuen; neither likewise at the iudgement of Thomas earle of Flaunders. Neither yet Philip the Long the French king, in the cause of Robert earle of Flaunders attainted of treason. Yea that more is, the decrees or sentences are giuen in the name of the peers, and not in the name of the king, albeit that he were himselfe there present: as is to bee seene in the sentence giuen against Robert earle of Flaunders, which beginneth thus, Nos pares Franciae ad requestam & mandatum regis venimus in suam curiam Parisijs & tenuimus curiàm cum xij alijs personis, &c. Wee the peeres of Fraunce at the request and commaundement of the king came into his court at Paris, and with twelue other persons held court. The sentence also against Peter Mauclere, whereby the fee of the countie of Britaine was taken from him, is giuen by one archbishop, two bishops, eight [ H] earles, Mathew Montmorancie the vicount of Beaumont, and Iohn of Soissons, concei∣ued in these words, Notum facimus quod nos coram clarissimo domino nostro Ludouico re∣ge Franciae iudicauimus, &c. We make it knowne, that we before our most noble lord Lewes king of Fraunce haue iudged, &c. By which words it appeareth that the king, al∣beit that he was present, yet gaue not sentence, no not euen in trials concerning soue∣raigntie. So also we may see in the case of the succession of Alphonsus countie of Poi∣tiers, although there were but question of the demaine, the king yet neuerthelesse gaue not therein his opinion or iudgement. Neither in like sort did king Francis, howbeit that he was present at the iudgement of Charles of Burbon the constable attainted of treason▪ And that more is, when question was of the fealtie and homage which the [ I] counties of Champagne ought to doe vnto the king, it was iudged by the peeres of Fraunce, and many earles, the king the present, not to iudge, but to assist them: the forme of which sentence is yet found in these words conceiued, Iudicatum est a paribus regni, videlicet a Rhemensi Archiepiscopo, & Lingonensi, Guillielmo Catalaunensi, Ph. Be∣luacensi, Stephano Nouiomensi episcopis, & Odone duce Burgundiae, & alijs episcopis, & ba∣ronibus, &c. Nobis audientibus & iudicium approbantibus &c. Now if the prince ought to doubt to iudge the causes of his subiects, where it concerneth but their particular, and wherein he himselfe can haue no interest, to the end not to giue occasion of discon∣tentment to them whome he should condemne, whether it were right or wrong, but ought still to maintaine himselfe in the loue and vnitie of his owne people, as in a most [ K] stately and strong tower: then how much more ought he so to doe, when hee is him∣selfe a partie, or the causes capitall, as for rebellion or treason? I remember, that in the triall of Charles duke of Burbon, one Valier examined in the tower of Loches, by the president de Selua, and the bishop of Puy, and other the conspiratours examined at Tarrare by Iohn Brinon president of Roan, deposed, That the occasion which caused the duke to rebell, was the aunswere that king Francis made vnto the articles which the duke had sent vnto the court of parliament, concerning the suit he had against the king and the regent, concerning certaine lands and demaines which the duke claimed as be∣longing

vnto himselfe. Wherein had not the king in any sort medled, but left it all [ A] together vnto his judges and attourneies, he had not giuen occasion to so great a sub∣iect to haue brought both the king himselfe, and the whole realme, into such a daunge∣rous an estate as it was in short time after. For what good iustice soeuer the prince do, alwaies he that shall bee condemned will thinke that hee hath wrong done him.

Now to say as some men do obiect and say, That if the prince in person himselfe* 1.248 should take vpon him the administration of iustice, men should haue a good and quicke dispatch of their suits; and that such numbers of appeales, such exceptions and petitions, with other long delaies of iustice, should be so quite cut off; deserueth not so much as aunswere. For who is he which knoweth not at what great charge he must bee, how many circumstances and delayes, how many windings and turnings, how many repul∣ses [ B] and griefes he must endure that hath any suit in court? Neither is it to be thought, Iudgements to be so much the better, by how much they are the shorter. For albeit that Thucidides (the most famous of them that were of his time, of the councel of the Areo∣pagi in Athens) seemeth to haue beene in the same opinion that some others were, viz. That offences once committed, were forthwith to be punished; yet I verily sup∣pose the opinion of Plutarch, yea of the Hebrewes themselues to bee the truer: for these thinke it necessarie for him that will iudge aright, to vse delaies in publike iudge∣ments. But he in that little booke which he wrot of the slow vengeance of God, plainly* 1.249 teacheth men to be warned by almightie God, if they will be the true imitators of his [ C] iustice, to proceed but slowly and by little and little in the triall of capitall causes, whe∣ther it be that the truth of the matter may the better appeare, or for the drawing of some profit from the offendors before their death, or to draw them to repentance, or for their more griuous punishment (for that the punishment is the greater the longer that it hangeth ouer ones head) or the better or more iustly to iudge of another mans life, being withall in question. For right hard it is for a judge pressed with choller and desire of reuenge, hasted by some, and thrust forward by others, to doe good iustice, what knowledge or feare soeuer hee haue to iudge amisse: and what shall then the prince doe, who hath neither the one nor the other? The iudgements of the inferiour magistrats are corrected by the superiour, by way of appeale: but if the prince himselfe [ D] shall take vpon him to iudge, who shall reforme his decrees? For he that in the former iudgement hath not sufficiently declared his matter vnto the judge, or by ouersight let some thing passe; if yet he may appeale, all may wel be amended: but if the prince him∣selfe shall once giue iudgement, the gate is then after sentence shut vp, and no place left for appeale, or how to amend the errour. Which we say to restraine a prince from in∣termedling with iudgements, except he be a man of great wisedome, or vse therein the* 1.250 assistance of his wise and learned councellors; and the causes such as may seeme wor∣thy the princes hearing and iudgement: following therein the councell of Iethro, who seeing Moyses troubled from morning to night in doing iustice to all men, and in all causes, You kill your selfe (said he) with taking so much paine; chuse mee out of the [ E] wisest and most discreet men of the people to ease your selfe vpon; and if there be any thing high or difficult to iudge, it sufficeth that you take vpon you the hearing thereof, leauing the rest vnto the other magistrats and judges to heare and determine. Which counsell of his father in law Moyses followed. So likewise wee read, that Romulus ha∣uing committed vnto the Senat and the magistrats, the ordinarie administration of iu∣stice, reserued vnto himselfe onely the hearing of matters of greatest importance. And albeit that the Roman emperours afterwards would haue their iudgements to extend something farther, yet was the emperours iurisdiction for the hearing of matters still shut vp and included within certaine bounds: which for all that the princes flatterers, or

else the princes themselues oft times went beyond, sitting in iudgement sometimes [ F] euen of light and ordinarie matters: so as did Claudius the emperour, (the most sottish lout that euer was) who yet would alwayes be iudging and deciding of causes and con∣trouersies: of whome Tranquillus thus writeth, Alium negantem rem cognitionis sed or∣dinarij iuris esse, subito causam apud se agere coegit, He compelled (saith he) another man denying the matter to belong vnto the emperours hearing, but to be onely an ordina∣rie matter, and so to belong to the ordinarie iurisdiction, hee compelled him (I say) euen forthwith and without more adoo, to plead the cause before him, but that so foo∣lishly, as that the lawyers openly mocked him, therefore insomuch that one of them was so bold with him as to say vnto him in Greeke, which yet most of the standers by* 1.251 vnderstood, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, An old man, and a foole too. And another [ G] tript him going out of the iudgement seat, and so gaue him a fall: yea his folly at last proceeded so farre, as that the verie pages and lackies would play with his nose as hee slept, and spot his face with inke. And into this case the prince must needs fall, who void of wisedome, thinketh it a goodly matter in the presence of the people to determine great matters, and so to make himselfe to bee of all men contemned and laughed at: than which nothing can be more daungerous in a Monarchy. Wherefore the prince which will often sit in iudgement, be present in the Senat, or much show himselfe vn∣to the people, him I would haue equall in vnderstanding vnto Salomon, in wisedome* 1.252 to Angustus, and in modestie to Anreltus; or els but seldome to come abroad, and more seldome himselfe to administer iustice, and that so much the lesse in the presence [ H] of straungers, who still iudge such things as seeme not commendable in a prince, not onely in his mind, but euen in the euill feature of his bodie, or vncomelinesse of his at∣tire: and such other small imperfections (which the subiects for the loue and reuerence which they beare vnto their naturall prince easily beare with all) to be euen right great vices or deformities. Which the straungers neuer excuse, but reporting the same to the worst, still augment them in straunge places, euen to the least of his lookes, counte∣nance, behauiours and gestures. The same of king Agesilaus had with the bruit ther∣of filled all the lesser Asia, Greece, and Affrike, whome yet when the king of Aegypt had seene lying vpon the ground in a medow, with a course Greeke cloke on his back, and himselfe but leane, little, and lame withall, he made of him no great account, but [ I] rather had him in contempt and derision. The like is reported in the memorie of our fathers, to haue happened vnto king Lewes the eleuenth, who being chosen arbitrator in a controuersie betwixt the kings of Nauarre and Castile, and going vnto the fron∣tiers of his kingdome, the Spaniards at their arriuall mocked the French men and their king, Who seemed vnto them as a pilgrim come from Saint Iames of Compostella, with his great cap vpon his head, set all about with brouches, and his iacket of course cloath, without any maiestie at all, either in his countenance, or in his behauiour; and they of his traine all in like sort apparrelled: (For why, he could not abide to see any man in braue attire) whereas the king of Castile and his troupe beeing come, showed themselues in most sumptuous attire, with their horses in their rich caparisons: which [ K] shewed a certaine greatnesse in the Spaniard, insomuch as that it seemed the French∣men to haue bene but the Spaniards seruants, but that there was a great and strong ar∣mie of them not farre off in the field, in readinesse at all assaies: which the Spaniards discouering, yeeld vnto the French king such conditions as himselfe pleased. And yet the same king Lewes the eleuenth considering princes by the opinion of men to bee either prayse or disprayse worthy (who commonly are led away but with the exterior show) hearing that the ambassadours of Venice were come brauely apparrelled, and well accompanied, he caused himselfe to be also most magnificently in royall robes at∣tired,

and so sitting in an high chaire of Estate, admitted the embassadours vnto his [ A] presence.

Wherefore with greater reason ought a prince, when as he commeth to an enter* 1.253 view with another strange prince (which he ought but most seldome to doe) to shew himselfe in such sort, as that there be nothing in his attire, and much lesse in his counte∣nance or behauiour and speech to be discommended. And that is it for which Philip Comines speaking of the enterview of princes, sayth, That they ought to shun it so much as they may: for that their presence alwaies diminisheth their fame, and the opi∣nion conceiued of their persons, causeth them to bee the lesse esteemed: a thing yet more to be feared towards the strangers than towards the subiects.

Now that which I haue said, It not to be fit for soueraigntie, or for soueraigne prin∣ces [ B] to entermeddle with iudgements; ought yet more to be obserued in a popular e∣state,* 1.254 for the great difficulties in assembling of the people, and to cause them to vnder∣stand reason; and then after that they haue vnderstood it, to induce them well to iudge thereof, their iudgements being oft times peruerted by seditious declamations or facti∣ons: which was the greatest occasion of the ciuill warres amongst the Romans, vntill that Sylla the Dictator had remitted the hearing of all causes vnto the magistrats, ex∣cepting the offence of treason, and that in the highest degree.

But yet besides the inconueniences by vs before noted, nothing hath euer bene more* 1.255 daungerous, or more ruinated Commonweales, than to translate the authoritie of the [ C] Senat or commaund of the magistrats, vnto the prince or the people. For that the lesse the power of the soueraigntie is (the true markes of maiestie thereunto still reser∣ued) the more it is assured; as well said Theopompus king of Lacedemonia, who hauing encreased the power of the Senat, and appointed fiue Ephori in title of office, as Tri∣bunes of the people: and being therefore by his wife reproued, for that in so doing hee had much diminished his owne power: So haue I also (said he) much more assured the same for the time to come. For hard it is for high and stately buildings long to stand, except they be vpholden and staid by most strong shores, and rest vpon most sure foun∣dations; all which consisteth in the Senat or councell, & in the good duties of the ma∣gistrats. In which thing the Venetians, as they haue done many things wisely, so haue [ D] they done in nothing more than in that, that they which haue the soueraigntie, inter∣medle not with iudgements onely, but not so much as with any other thing els, which may wel by the magistrats or the Senat be dispatched: Which haply hath bene one of the chiefe meanes wherby that state hath bene so long preserued, considering that there neither is, nor euer was any Cōmonweal, where they which haue the soueraigntie tro∣ble themselues lesse with that which belongeth vnto the councel or the magistrats. The Great Councel of the nobilitie, or gentlemen, wherin the whole maiestie of that Com∣monweal resteth, is neuer assembled but for the creating of new magistrats, or enacting of lawes, all the rest of the affaires of the estate being to be dispatched by the Senat, and the councell of the Ten, and of the Seuen men; and matters of iurisdiction by the other [ E] magistrats. Which if it be a thing commendable, and well appointed in Aristocra∣tike estates, with better reason ought it to take place in Popular estates, Where the moe heads there be, the lesse wit there is, and so the worse resolution also. Neither like I of Xe∣nophon that most famous mans opinion, who speaking of the Athenian Common∣weale, saith, That the more popular that the lawes are, the better they maintaine a De∣mocratie, or Popular estate, When as (saith hee) the people hath the hearing of all matters, and that all passeth by lot and voyce: which thing indeed doth vtterly ouer∣throw all Popular Commonweales. As in Athens, when as by the persuasion of Pe∣ricles, the hearing and deciding of matters, and the mannaging of the state, was taken

from the Senat or councell of the Areopagi, to be brought backe vnto the people; the [ F] * 1.256 citie destitute of wit, and without councell, fell first forthwith into great broyles, and not long after into vtter ruine & decay. But amongst the Swissers, where their Popular estates haue now flourished 260 yeares, and so yet continue and grow from good to better, still flourishing both in peace and warre: those their estates are preserued and vpholden by lawes of all other least popular, nothing being almost left vnto the peo∣ple more than the chusing of their officers, the other rights of soueraigntie being but sparingly and within a certaine conuenient measure communicated vnto them. Nei∣ther was the Roman Commonweale euer fairer or farther from ciuill warres, than when (the maiestie of the people saued whole) all things were done by the Senat and the magistrats: which was from the first Carthaginensian warre, vnto the conquest of [ G] the kingdome of Macedon. But after that both the Gracchies by their most popular lawes had taken from the authoritie of the Senat and the power of the magistrats, as much as they possibly could, all to encrease the wealth and libertie of the people; there ensued thereof a most miserable change of that Commonweale: neither did the citie of Rome euer after cease from ciuill warres and sedition, vntill that immoderat li∣bertie of the insolent people, was by the power of one oppressed and brought vnder, and they so brought into extreame miserie and seruitude. The same inconuenience or mischiefe befell the Megarensians, who from a Popular estate fell into a most miserable Tyrannicall gouernment (as saith Plato) for the vnbridled libertie and insolencie of the people, taking vpon them the hearing of all things, aboue the authoritie, iurisdiction, [ H] and power of the Senat, or of the other magistrats.

But the best kind of Commonweale is that, wherein the soueraigne holdeth what* 1.257 concerneth his maiestie, the Senat maintaineth the authoritie thereof, the magistrats execute their power, and iustice hath her ordinarie course. Whereas otherwise if the prince or the people shall take vpon themselues the authoritie of the Senat, or the com∣maunds, offices, or iurisdictions of the magistrats; it is much to be feared, least that they destitute of all helpe, shall at the length be spoyled of their owne soueraigne maiestie al∣so. And in mine opinion they shamefully erre, which thinke themselues to encrease the princes wealth and power, when they show vnto him his Clawes, giuing him to vn∣derstand, that his will his countenance, and his looke, ought to be as an edict, a decree, [ I] and a law; to the end that there should be none of his subiects which should presume to take vpon them the hearing or deciding of any matter, which might not bee againe by him reuersed and chaunged: so as did the tyrant Caligula, who would not that the* 1.258 lawyers should so much as giue their councell and opinions, when as he said, Paciam vt nihil respondeant nisi Eccum, that is to say, That is he to whome it alone belongeth to giue his opinion; meaning by himselfe: but by the word Eccum, which is, Behold the man; alluding to the word Aequum, which is, That which is right and iust. But this opinion by little and little crept into princes minds, breeding in them an incredible de∣sire of oppression and tyrannie.

[ K]

CHAP. VII. [ A] ¶ Whether a Prince in ciuill factions ought to ioyne himselfe to one of the parties, and whether a good subiect ought to be constrained to take part with the one or the other faction: with the meanes to remedie seditions.

NOw wee haue alreadie declared▪ What a Soueraigne Prince ought to be in the administration of iustice towards his subiects; and if he should take vpon him the person of a judge, when, and how, and in what sort of Commonweale he ought to doe it: let vs now also see out of the tearmes of iustice, when the subiects; [ B] are diuided into factions and part-takings, and that the judges and magistrats are themselues parties also, Whether the Soue∣raigne Prince ought to ioyne himselfe to one of the parties; & whether the good subiect ought to be constrained to follow the one or the other par∣tie, or not. And first let vs set downe this as a maxime, All factions and part-takings to be daungerous and pernitious in euerie sort of Commonweales, and that they ought, if* 1.259 it be possible, by all meanes to be preuented; or if that cannot be before they bee plot∣ted, yet to search the meanes to heale them▪ or at leastwise to imploy all conuenient remedies to mittigat the disease. And albeit that of ciuil seditions and part-takings there sometime commeth great good, as some one or other good law, or some other good [ C] reformation, which had not beue if the sedition had not happened; yet it is not there∣fore to be said, that sedition is not daungerous, although that it by chaunce and casual∣ly draw after it some good: as in mans bodie a disease chauncing, is the cause that men vse letting of blood, and purgations, and so draw away the euill and corrupt humors: so seditions oftentimes are cause that the euill or wicked men are slaine, or driuen away and banished, to the end that the rest may liue in quiet; or that euill lawes and decrees be cancelled and repealed, to giue place vnto good, which had otherwise neuer beene receiued. For which if one shall say, That seditions, and ciuill warres, are good, hee might also say, that murders, parricides, adulteries, theft; and the subuersion of estates & [ D] Commonweales are also good. For why, there is no impietie so great, no villanie so detestable, whereof no profit may redound, either to all, or to some men in particular; yea the verie villanies of wicked men almightie God vseth to draw either to the punish∣ment of the reprobat, or to the glorie of his name. Which yet to prayse, were as if we should commend diseases; as Fauorinus the Philosopher highly commended the feuer quartaine: which were but to confound the difference betwixt good and euill, the diffe∣rence betwixt profit and disprofit, betwixt honour and dishonour, betwixt vice and ver∣tue; and in briefe to confound fire and water, heauen and earth together. Wherefore as vices and diseases are daungerous both vnto the bodie and the soule; so seditions and ciuill warres are hurtfull and pernitious vnto all estates and Commonweales.

But it may be some man will say, That seditions and ciuill warres are good and pro∣fitable [ E] * 1.260 for Tyrannicall Monarchies, and for the maintaining of Tyrants in their Tyran∣nicall estates, they being alwayes enemies vnto their subiects, and such as cannot long continue, if the subiect be once at accord amongst themselues. But we haue before de∣clared, the Tyrannicall Monarchy to be of all others the weakest, as that which is not but by cruelties and villanies nourished and maintained; and yet commonly wee see it to fall and take end by seditions and ciuill warres: so that if we looke into all tyrannies which haue bene destoyed and ouerthrowne, we shal find it most commonly to haue happened of factions and ciuill tumults. Yea euen the most craftie and subtill tyrants,

who by little and little put to death, now some, and then others, to fat themselues with [ F] the blood of their subiects, and to saue their owne vnluckie life, which they lead in con∣tinuall paine and languor, neuer escape the murdering hands of conspirators; who so much the more encrease, by how much moe the tyrant putteth of his subiects to death; others which are vnto them allied, being alwaies prest and readie to reuenge the death of their so nie kinsmen: and albeit that the tirant put to death all their kinsmen, friends, and allies, yet neuerthelesse they shall so stirre vp all the good subiects against them∣selues. And of the goods of the subiects for tyrants to enrich themselues, is to procure their owne ruine and decay: for it is impossible that spleene should fill it selfe, or that the ouergrowing of corrupt proud flesh should fatten it selfe, but that the other mem∣bers must drie, and so the whole bodie shortly after perish and consume also. And ther∣fore [ G] the Florentines in my iudgement had no reasonable cause, why secretly to main∣taine the factions of the Pistoians, whome they had before subdued: for that they fore∣saw not, them whome they thought might so by their mutuall broiles and contentions be weakned, & so the more easily endure the Florentines their lords, by liberty and the vse of armes to grow more fierce and couragious, than if they had liued in peace and quiet, and with aboundance of delights lost their force and strength: besides that, they therewith lost so much of their owne force, by the losse of so many good subiects, one of them by another ruinated and ouerthrowne.

Now if seditio•…•…s and factions be dangerous vnto monarchies, then are they much* 1.261 more daungerous vnto Aristocraties and Popular estates: for that Monarches may [ H] maintayne their maiesty, and as neuters decide the quarrels of their subiects; or by ioy∣ning themselues to one of the parties, to bring the other vnto reason, or els altogether to oppresse them: whereas the people diuided in a popular estate, hath no soueraigne ouer them; no more than the lords diuided in Aristocratie haue no man to cōmaund them: if it be not that the greater part of the people, or of the lords, be not of the facti∣on, which so may commaund the rest. Now when I say faction, my meaning is not* 1.262 of an handfull of people, or some small number of subiects, but euen of a good part of them banded against an other, able to trouble the whole estate: but if they be but few in number, hee that hath the soueraignty in hand, ought at the first to represse them; which he may doe either by commaunding them to lay downe armes, or by referring [ I] the cause of their dissention and variance vnto indifferent judges: or if the matter bee such as may require his own declaration and pleasure, then to doe the same with good aduice, and the mature deliberation of his most wise magistrats and councellours, not in any wise suspected to fauour the one part more than the other: and this to the intent that the prince, or they which haue the soueraignty, should not themselues beare the enuy or discontentment of them which should so bee condemned. But if the faction be grown so farre, as that it cannot by way of justice, or by orderly inducements be ap∣peased, it then be hooueth the soueraigne prince, or them that hold the soueraignety in an Aristocratie or popular estate, to vse their forces for the vtter extinguishing thereof, by the punishing of some few of the ring-leaders and chiefe men in the faction; that so [ K] the punishment may touch but some few▪ and yet the feare come vnto all of them. Nei∣ther ought the soueraigne prince to deferre the matter so long, vntill they bee growne so strong as that they be not any more to be resisted, or that the leaders of them being for feare of punishment become desperat, shall seeke to ouerthrow the whole estate of the commonweale. For there still are, and alwaies haue bene good and valiant men, which for the welfare of their countrey doubt not to aduenture their liues; although there be many, who to the contrary had rather their countrey should perish for them. Which kind of men (the very plagues of commonweales) are vpon the sudden to bee

oppressed▪ lest happely the whole estate of the commonweale were oft times by some [ A] one or other of them to bee indaungered; yea, although such ciuill discord rise but for some priuate displeasure of theirs.

But all this which we haue yet said, is to be vnderstood but of factions which con∣cerne* 1.263 not the estate; for if the faction be directly against the state, or the life of the soue∣raigne prince, there is then no question whether the prince should take a part, or show himselfe an open enemy vnto such seditious, which so professe themselues of all others the greatest enemy of their prince & commonweale: for otherwise, if when the state and welfare of the commonweale, or the prince his owne life is attempted, he shall sit still but as an idle beholder, he shall so inuite and annimate not the more desperate sort of men onely, but euen very cowards to seeke after his life also. But yet a great diffe∣rence [ B] there is to bee made in the manner of punishment of the offendors: for if the number of the conspirators against the state or his person be but few, he shall suffer the Magistrats to proceed against them by order of law, and as he seeth cause himselfe to moderate the heauinesse of the punishment; which the fewer the conspirators are, is so much the sooner to be inflicted▪ and before that moe bee discouered, to the end that by the punishment of some few, the good subiects may stil be kept within the compasse of their allegiance and dutie, and those which were euill enclined, so terrified from their euill intended purpose. Neither yet is too strait or strict enquirie to bee made to find* 1.264 out all the conspirators, least by force of torture and torment, such things bee haply [ C] wrung out, as were indeed better vnknowne than knowne. And yet it is not to bee dissembled or winked at, if the partie guiltie bee once discouered to haue conspired against the life of his soueraigne, or yet to haue but bene willing so to haue done. As it happened vnto a gentleman of Normandie, who confessing vnto a frier (his ghostly father) of a purpose that he had had to haue slaine Francis the first the French king, but yet not daring so to do, to haue repented him now of his so wicked and detestable a purpose, was therefore of the frier so much as in him lay pardoned; who yet neuer∣thelesse forthwith reuealed the same vnto the king, who causing the gentleman to bee apprehended, sent him vnto the parliament of Paris to be tryed, where he was as a trai∣tor condemned to death. Howbeit, that (in mine opinion) the king in his greater wise∣dome [ D] might haue done better to haue pardoned him, for that it had repented him of that his wicked purpose (which the law for the hainousnesse of the fact doe so seuerely punish) & so was become the betraier & accuser of himself before he was by any other accused. And it may be that it had bin better to haue executed him without making of the king acquainted therewith, so to haue disburdened him of the enuy of such a iudg∣ment. So as did the emperour Augustus with Q. Gallus, who hauing not onely pur∣posed, but euen desperatly also attempted to haue slaine him; and being therefore by the Senate condemned of treason, was yet by the same emperour Augustus (dissem∣bling the matter as if he had thereof knowne nothing) pardoned, and so sent away vn∣to his brother then gouernour in one of the prouinces: but was yet neuerthelesse vpon [ E] the way slaine, not without the secret commaundement of Augustus himselfe, as ma∣ny men supposed, vsing therein the like subtilty: a craft that had his vncle Caesar before vsed, in giuing pardon to M. Marcellus at the request of the Senate; who yet was im∣mediatly after slaine, as one of Caesar his most mortall enemies. Yet more likely it is, neyther Caesar (who in a certayne naturall clemency exceeded almost all other princes) neyther Augustus (placed in so high a seat of honour and maiestie) to haue beene willing to haue defiled or stained their so great honour & dignity with the secret mur∣der of them whom they might most iustly haue executed. Howbeit that some of the finer sort to the contrary excuse the matter, as by them done for the safty of their owne

liues; and yet so by his meanes still to maintaine the great opinion which they had be∣fore [ F] * 1.265 caused men to conceiue of their clemency and mercy. But if the conspirators be in number many, and that they be not all discouered, the wise prince ought to beware how he putteth to torture those that be condemned, albeit that he might euen with a becke without danger kill them all: for that for one that he should put to death, there would arise vp an hundred of their allies & friends, who it may be, haue power enough, or at least wise neuer fayle of will enough to reuenge the death of them which were of their bloud; and in case all this were not so, yet ought the prince alwayes to shunne the note and blame of cruelty, as well of his subiects as of strangers: wherein Nero was greatly deceiued, who hauing discouered the conspiracy against his person and estate, would needs by torture & torment know all them that were partakers therein: wher∣in [ G] he found so great a number of them that were, what by right, and what by wrong accused, as that the cōspirators indeed seeing themselues condemned, discharged their choller vpon the tyrants most faithfull and loyall friends: all whom hee caused most cruelly to be slayne; which was afterwards the cause of the open and generall rebelli∣on of the captaynes and gouernours of the prouinces against him. And for this cause Alexander the great hauing put to death Parmenio, Philotas, and the rest which had conspired his death, by a new decree or law abrogated the auncient law of the Ma∣cedonians, whereby fiue of them that were the nearest of kinne vnto the conspirators were still to be put to death. But the best and surest way to auoyd the farther daunger of a conspiracy already preuented, is for a prince to dissemble the matter, as if he knew [ H] not the conspirators, as Tacitus well sayed, Optimum remedium insidiarum, est si non* 1.266 intelligatur, The best remedie of a conspiracie is, not to seeme to vnderstand thereof. So when Hanno generall of the Carthaginensians, had purposed to haue slaine all the Senators, and chiefe men of the citie, vnder the colour of the marriage of his daughter; the Senat vnderstanding of the matter, but dissembling the same, forthwith caused an edict or law to be published, concerning the charges to be made at feasts: wherein the number of the guests, & the charges of the feast (which was not great) was most strait∣ly appointed. By which decree of the Senat, the conspiracie intended, was without any tumult or bloodshed at all quietly suppressed. So in like manner Eteocles captaine of the Lacedemonians, with a strong garrison of souldiors holding the island of Chio [ I] against the Atheniensians, and vnderstanding that the garrison souldiours secretly con∣spiring together, had determined to kill the inhabitants their friends and allies, in whose aid they were come, and so to take vnto themselues the possession of the iland; and that the signall of the conspiratours was, for euery one of them to carrie in their hands a cane, or reed: hee (I say) vnderstanding of the matter, and accompanied with cer∣taine of his most assured friends, & so walking about the citie, slew the first that he met withall carrying of a reed, and so suddenly gaue it out, That hee would kill all the rest that so carried reeds in their hands, and yet withall tooke order with the inhabitants of the island, that the souldiers were paid their pay: and so by the death of one onely soul∣diour the conspiracie was quenched before the fire could bee well kindled: and the [ K] occasion of the conspiracie so taken away, and all againe well quieted. Wherefore eue∣rie gouernour and magistrat ought to take care, not so much to take away seditions al∣readie growne, as to preuent them: For that a sedition once set on fire, is like a sparke suddenly blowne, which with the rage of the people, which setteth all the citie on a light fire before it can be againe quenched. Wherein the princes commaunds are not to be expected, who commonly know least of such things as touch them neerest. Yea oftentimes it happeneth princes wel to vnderstand the secrets, writings, doings, and say∣ings of other forren princes, and yet perceiue not the fire kindled at home in their own

realmes, in their own pallaces, yea euen in their owne bed chambers. The conspiracy of [ A] * 1.267 Pelopidas, for the surprising of the castle Cadmea, and the expulsing of the Lacedemo∣nians out of Thebes, was knowne in Athens, before that any thing thereof was disco∣nered in Thebes, as the euent shewed. For why, but euen a little before that Archias the captaine of the castle was together with the garrison souldiors therein slaine, he was by letters from the bishop of Athens warned to looke to himselfe: which letters be∣cause he would not at supper read, he vsed the common prouerb; In crastinum negotia, To morrow will serue for our businesse. Who knoweth not the emperour Charles the fift to haue bene either partaker, or priuie almost to all things that were any where done by other princes, yet did he not so much as once suspect the conspiracie which * 1.268 duke Maurice and Albertus marquesse of Brandeburg his familiar and domesticall [ B] friends, had euen fast by him contriued against him: yea and had also effected the same before he could feele or perceiue the smoke thereof. But what need forren examples? the conspiracie of Amboise, which set all Fraunce on fire, was diuulged in Germanie, England, and Italy, before it was once suspected by them against whome it was contri∣ued in Fraunce: vnto whom the cardinall Granuellan is reported by his letters to haue first discouered the same, and yet there were aboue ten thousand persons which had therein a part. Whereby it is plaine, such conspiracies as wherein the force and power* 1.269 of many is to be required, to haue alwayes had most difficult and daungerous euents: for that they can neither by a few be effected, neither yet by many be concealed. Yea oft times it chaunceth the conspirators most secret designes to bee euen by women first [ C] reuealed. As it happened to Philotas, who discouering the conspiracie against Alexan∣der the Great vnto a courtisan whom he loued, was together with his complices to his destruction by her bewrayed. So Fuluia vnderstanding of Cateline his conspiracie by one of his souldiors, reuealed the same vnto the Consull Cicero. And in our time the secret designes of the Prior of Campania (generall of the French gallies) for the sud∣den surprising and rifling of the citie of Venice by a souldiour reuealed vnto a courti∣san,* 1.270 was forthwith by her discouered and made knowne vnto the Senat. Yet for all that an hard matter it is for a prince, be he neuer so wise or subtill, to preserue himselfe from the daunger of a resolute man that hath sworne his death: for that as the secret, & [ D] the exeuction thereof is but against one man onely, so is it but in one man alone enclo∣sed, willing and resolued to sacrifice his life (how deere vnto him soeuer) to haue ano∣ther mans, howbeit that he were beset round with an armie. Such an one as Sc•…•…uola is reported to haue bene; who of the euent gaue first name vnto his house and familie, for that he of his owne accord had thrust his right hand into a burning fire, so to bee burnt of, for that he mistaking the man, had slaine the kings lieutenant in stead of the king himselfe. With no lesse boldnesse (or valour should I say) did a seruant of La∣zarus the Despot of Seruia kill Amurath the king of the Turkes, in the middest of his legions of men, so to reuenge the death of his lord, and the dishonour done vnto the queene his wife. So Pausaenias also in the sight of the whole armie slew Philip king of Macedon, Alexander the Great his father. And Peter Aloisius also duke of Placence, [ E] was in his owne castle by two murderers stabbed and slaine euen in the sight of his guard. And he that slew the emperour Domitian went to seeke him out euen into his cabinet with his arme in a scarfe: in such sort as did Aod kill Eglon king of the Moa∣bites. And if Cosmus Medices duke of Florence (hauing ceized vpon the estate) had not alwaies gone armed, neither could his great guards, nether yet his strong castles haue kept him from the hands of most desperat men, who oftentimes found meanes to enter euen into his most close and secret places, to haue slain him an hundred times, what death soeuer they should therefore haue died. Yea amongst the rest of many

most desperat murtherers, there was one, who euen in the councell chamber strucke [ F] him with his dagger, thinking so to haue stabbed him (his guard standing round about him) not knowing him as then to haue had a priuie coat vpon him. And yet well hee knew that his life lay thereon, and so indeed was presently cast headlong out at a win∣dow downe to the ground.

But forasmuch as we haue before touched certaine meanes which may preserue a prince from falling into these daungers, and whereby to hinder the conspiracies which might be made against his person: Let vs now see how he ought to beare and behaue himselfe in conspiracies and factions, which are not directly against himselfe nor his estate, but amongst his great lords among themselues, or among the estates, townes, or prouinces subiect vnto him; all which he ought by all meanes to preuent, and not to [ G] neglect any thing how little soeuer it be for the meeting therewith. For as the great stormes and tempests are caused of most light and insensible exhalations and vapours:* 1.271 euen so seditions and ciuill warres the destructions of cities and Commonweales, are most times begun for most smal matters, and such as a man would not thinke that euen they should worke such effect. In the raigne of Iustiman the emperour all the cities of the Greeke empire were diuided into factions, for the maintaining of the colours of Greene & Blew, which they according to their fancies tooke vnto them in their sports and iusts, one of them brauing and contending with another: which in the end tooke such force and went so farre, as that the judges and magistrats of Constantinople, going about to punish the seditious, were letted so to doe by others of the same faction who [ H] tooke part with them, and so tooke out of the hands of the officers and executioners such as were by them led to the place of execution, and not so contented brake open the prisons also, and let loose all the prisoners, and in the same rage burnt the temple of Saint Sophia: and to auoid the punishment which they (hauing laid downe armes) were not to hope for, made choyce of one Hippatius the captaine and ring-leader of their faction, for emperour; Iustinian with his familie in the meane time lurking in a corner. Which tumult proceeded so farre, as that thirtie thousand men were in one day in that quarrel slaine: and had not he the leader of the faction (and he euen the new chosen emperour) there beene killed, the emperour Iustinian had vndoubtedly had much to do to haue saued his life; who yet at the beginning together with his other [ I] courtiers tooke great sport and pleasure therein. The like whereof happened at Syra∣cusa also, where two of the magistrats become riuals, and so falling out for their loue, at the first gaue occasion for other men to laugh at them, but at length so diuided the whole Commonweale into two such factions, which so banded the one the other, as that the most couragious of the nobilitie being slaine, the people taking vp armes and driuing out them that were left of the nobilitie or better sort, tooke vpon it the soue∣raigntie, and so changed the Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate. Wher∣fore it behoueth a prince, before the fire of sedition and ciuill warres by such sparkes be* 1.272 enflamed, to cast on cold water, or else quite to quench the same: that is to say, to pro∣ceed to the preuenting thereof, either by sweet speeches and persuasions, or elsby open [ K] force. So as did Alexander the Great, who seeing Ephestion and Craterus his greatest friends, vpon a mutuall emulation to be at discord and varience amongst themselues, and so to draw the rest of his valiant captaines into parts-taking with them: hee at the first with faire words, and gentle persuasions sought to make them friends together, but afterwards taking them apart, sharply rebuked them both, threatning withall to band himselfe against him which soeuer of them should first by word or deed offend the other: by which sharp reprehension putting them both in feare, made them friends together. And so our king Lewes, he who for his deuotion towards God, for his loue

towards his neighbours, for his charitie towards particular men, and vpright dealing [ A] towards al, is numbred amongst the Saints; vnto his great praise vsed the matter, as that all the time of his raigne there was neuer difference or contentions betwixt any the princes, which he for his integritie and wisedome himselfe in most friendly and peace∣able manner quieted not. Yet of all things this is in a prince most to bee taken heed of, That in ending the differences and quarrels of the nobilitie or princes, he seeme not to be led or moued with the loue or hatred of any of them, one more than another. Wherin Archidamus king of the Lacedemonians, wisely prouided for himselfe, who* 1.273 seeing two great men his most deere friends at oddes betwixt themselues, brought them both into the temple, and there demaunded of them whome they would make choyce of to be arbitrator of the difference betwixt them? who both answering, That [ B] they would make choyce of none other but of Archidamus himselfe: Sweare then vn∣to me (said he) that you shall both abide mine award, and doe as I shall enioyne you: which they both doing, he straitly enioyned them both, Neuer to depart out of that same church, vntill they had reconciled themselues one of them vnto another, and so became sworne friends. Whereby he wisely without any offence or displeasure vnto himselfe (by giuing of iudgement betwixt them) made them friends, and so with thanks enioyed the fruit of their friendship and good agreement, than which nothing ought to be more deerer or more pretious vnto a prince: for that no fortresses are vnto prin∣ces more assured, no castles stronger, than is the loue and fidelitie of their subiects to∣wards them. But here I speake of a good prince, and not of a tyrant which taketh [ C] pleasure to see the great men still ruinated one of them by another; neither aimeth at any other marke, but how to flesh the great ones one of them vpon another. Howbe∣it* 1.274 that it oftentimes falleth out, that the dogges falling vnto agreement among them∣selues, fall all vpon the wolfe: so as did the factions of the Colonnois and the Vrsins, who hauing discouered that pope Alexander the sixt set them still at discord and vari∣ance among themselues, so by their calamities and falles to encrease the strength and power of his bastard sonne Borgia; they fell to agreement among themselues, and so made head against him their common enemie.

Sometime also a tyrant seeing the nobilitie in the State to flourish with the strength [ D] and alliance of friends, and the fauour of the people, and not to seeke one of them ano∣thers ruine, neither to haue any equall aduersaries to oppose themselues against them; doth yet secretly affoord fauour vnto some of the meaner or weaker sort, and so armeth them against the richer and stronger, and by some notable and irremissable villanie by them committed against the other, bindeth them vnto him, in such sort, as that they can neuer be reconciled againe vnto the parties by them so offended. So as Iohn Benti∣uole the tyrant of Bononia is reported to haue done: who fearing the good agreement of them of the greater sort, easily suffered the chiefest of the house and familie of the Ma∣rischots (then the richest and a man of greatest credit in all that countrey) to bee of his enemies slaine, to the end that hee might so bee dispatched of him, and supported of them of the contrarie faction: all reconciliation being by that so great an outrage bro∣ken [ E] off, and all hope of mutuall friendship vtterly cut a sunder: all which his tyrannicall slights and deceits, together with the fauour of the French king, yet helped him not, but that at length he was thrust out of his estate, and so by violence pluckt headlong* 1.275 euen out of the chiefest strength of his tyranny. But as the bond and obligation of a notable villanie is of all others the strongest, so is it also in euery Commonweale most of all to be feared, for that thereby all the hope of amitie and concord is cut off to∣wards them which haue receiued the iniurie. As it happened to the armie of Car∣thage, which for want of pay reuolting against the seigneurie or state, vnder the con∣duct

of two or three of their mutinous captaines, ceized vpon diuers strong townes & [ F] places which they rifled and ransackt: which captaines and ringleaders fearing to bee by the souldiours at one time or other betrayed and deliuered, persuaded the rest of the chiefe principall men amongst them, to kill the ambassadours of the seigneurie, and to hang vp Hasdrubal the Generall with the rest of the Carthaginensians which were fal∣len into their hands, to the end that hauing bound them by such cruelties, they should now haue no hope at al to saue their liues by composition. In which case there was no other meane for the Seigneurie to vse, but euen plaine force, so vtterly to root them out which could not otherwise be healed: as was afterwards that armie of the Carthaginen∣sians, being by a long and cruell war at length defeated. For why, they had directly ban∣ded themselues against the seigneurie: in which case we haue said the prince must of ne∣cessitie [ G] become a partie, and show himselfe a most sharpe enemie vnto the rebellious.

But if discord and contention be amongst the princes and great men themselues, &* 1.276 that vnder the same soueraigne prince, which yet he cannot either by his princely au∣thoritie, neither by faire persuasion, nor hope of rewards, appease; he ought then to giue them arbitrators, men of great integritie and wisdome, and such as they themselues can like of. In which doing the soueraigne prince shall discharge himselfe of the heauinesse of the iudgement to be giuen, and of the hatred and displeasure of him or them that should be condemned. For if this manner of proceeding is and alwayes hath beene commendable for the ending of controuersies euen betwixt kings themselues, by com∣mitting their differences vnto the arbitrement of princes; and that all nations vse this [ H] manner and fashion: with how much more reason ought a wise prince (as of right hee may) cause his owne subiects to condescend thereunto, and especially them which are neere vnto him in alliance or blood, to the end that their quarrels and contentions should neuer (if it were possible) so farre passe the bounds of reason, as to come to bee tried by the sword or force of armes.

But in ending such controuersies, the prince aboue all things must beware that hee* 1.277 show not himselfe more affected vnto the one part than to the other: which hath bene the cause of the ruine and ouerthrow of many princes and estates. So Philip the first king of Macedon was not slaine, but for that he openly fauoured Antipater against Pausanias a meane gentleman, in denying of him iustice; which was the cause that [ I] Pausianas discharged his choler euen vpon the person of the king himselfe. Neither for any other cause did Henrie the sixt, king of England, stirre vp that long and deadly ciuill warre, wherewith all England was in combustion eight and twentie yeares, and wherein were lost about fourescore princes of the royall blood (as Philip Comines re∣porteth) but for that the king tooke vpon him to be captaine of them of the faction of the house of Lancaster, against them of the faction and house of Yorke: who at length hauing vanquished and ouercome their enemies, put to death the king himselfe in pri∣son, with all the rest of his neerest kinsmen. The conspiracie also of the marquesse of Pescara, against Charles the emperour, was grounded vpon the fauour that the empe∣rour bare vnto the viceroy of Naples, against the marquesse. It were but lost time to [ K] set downe in writing the cruell & bloodie warres which haue bene raised in this realme by Robert of Arthois, Lewes of Eureux king of Nauarre, Iohn Montford, Iohn of Bur∣gundie, and diuers others of our time, which it is not needfull to rehearse, and all for the fauours of the kings, who forgetting the high degree of maiestie whereunto they were mounted, would basely take vpon them the offices of aduocats, of judges, and arbitra∣tors; so descending from the highest vnto the lowest places, so to follow the passions of their subiects, making themselues companions vnto some of them, and vnto other some of them enemies.

But some will haply say, That by this meanes the king shall know newes, and keepe [ A] the parties also in awe: whereunto I also well agree, that a young king might so doe amongst his ladies and gentlewomen, to take pleasure & knowledge of news enough, but not amongst his princes and other his great lords. Now if any man shall further obiect and say, Princes to be oftentimes, yea and that against their will enforced so to doe, and to take a part, when as he which thinketh himselfe wronged, vpon an obstinat* 1.278 mind will not by any reason, persuasion, iudgement, or arbitrement, suffer himselfe to be ouerruled or persuaded. In which case I say, that necessitie hath no law: and yet that the prince before hee may come to that point of extremitie, as to vse his force, ought to proue all the meanes that he possibly may, for the composing of the matter in controuersie, and making of those his great subiects friends: which if it may not be, [ B] then by force and strong hand to ouerrule that which he could not otherwise doe: For that it cannot be, that he which shall be so froward or presumptuous as not to hearken vnto reason, nor his friends persuasion, can haue many to take his part, or to stand fast by him in that his so great and obstinat wilfulnesse.

Yet might some man say, That the occasion of the quarrell may be so secret, as that no proofe can thereof be made, neither any iudgement giuen, and yet that hee which hath so receiued the iniurie, demaundeth thereof an amends: in which case the princes find themselues oftentimes much troubled, as when an iniurie or offence is vnto any man secretly offered or done, which he which did it denieth, and that the trueth cannot [ C] therein be tried but onely by bare surmises & coniectures; in this case what is amongst the common and vulgar sort to bee done? it is an easie thing to say, as that no man ought without most manifest witnesses to be condemned: but souldiours, and such as* 1.279 stand vpon their nobilitie, deeme their honour to be stained, and their reputation great∣ly impaired, except he haue satisfaction, who vpon his oath affirmeth himselfe to haue so bene by any man secretly wronged. For why, such men say, the subiects liues and goods to be all in the princes hand and power to be disposed of▪ but not their honour and reputation. In which case the people of the North haue for the tryall of the mat∣ter appointed combats; as is to be seene in the auntient lawes of the Lombards, of the Saliens, the Ripuaries, the English, the Burgundions, the Danes, the Almaines, and the [ D] Normans; who in their customes call the Combat, The law of appearance: which ma∣ny for all that haue as a most beastly thing reiected, as neuer receiued or practised by the Assyrians, the Aegyptians, the Persians, the Greekes, or Latines, except in lawfull warre, one man against his enemie, and that by the good leaue of the Generall of the armie; or else sometime one Generall encountering hand to hand with another, for the sparing of their subiects blood: so Cossus and Marcellus in battell hand to hand ouercame their enemies kings? Or els one king against another king, as did Romulus with the king of the Latines, and Hundig king of the Saxons, with Roe king of Den∣marke. So also Charles king of Naples chalenged Peter king of Arragon vnto the combat, for the triall of their right vnto that kingdome, which they yet performed not. [ E] Neither is this any meane matter, when as Corbis and Orsua contending for the princi∣palitie before Scipio Affricanus the Romane Generall, said, That they would haue none other judge, either of God or man, to decide their quarrell, but Mars onely. And yet* 1.280 for all that it is better to appoint combats amongst subiects, according to the auntient and lawfull manner of our auncestors, when the persons are of like qualitie which so stand vpon their honour, and that there is some apparant coniecture of the wrong re∣ceiued (for why, the auntient lawes neuer admitted combat in a plaine and euident matter, or wherein good proofe was to be had) for that to deny combat vnro noble personages standing vpon their honour, and at so great oddes as that they can by no

other means be appeased, were but to nourish the fire of ciuill war euen in the entrails of [ F] the Commonweale, which after it is once kindled, enflameth the whole body thereof. For that two inconueniences propounded, wise men haue well taught vs, the greater ought stil to be of vs declined. Ioine hereunto also, that to change a custom which hath for many worlds of yeares bene found necessarie, is not onely an hard matter, but with∣all* 1.281 daungerous also. Rotaris king of the Lombards, had taken the law of Combats from amongst his subiects, but yet at their instant requests was enforced to restore the same againe into the former force; protesting withall, That it was but inhumane and naught, (as is in the lawes of the Lombards to be seene) but yet for all that necessarie to auoid greater inconueniences: For that the law of Combat being so taken away, moe good and innocent men were most cruelly and secretly slain and made away, than hap∣ly [ G] had bene, the daunger and eternall infamie of such hidden treacherie beeing still pro∣pounded to the offendors, to be tried by combat. So king Lewes the ninth, hauing the honour of God, and the welfare of his subiects before his eyes, was the first that forbad combats in this realme; which edect was thus, NOVS DEFENDONS BATAILLES PAR TOVT EN NOSTRE DOMAINE EN TOVTES QVERELLES, We for∣bid Combats in all quarrels throughout our dominions. And for that this edict was euill kept, Philip the Faire, king Lewes his nephew, caused the like also to bee published, whereby he vtterly forbad combats: who yet within two yeres after was at the instant request of his subiects constrayned to restore them againe, by reason of the secret mur∣ders and stabbings, yea euen of the most valiant men, who then were in euery place so [ H] slaine. Philip of France, surnamed the Hardie, duke of Burgundie, did not altogether forbid combats in Holland, but yet commanded them not to bee at all suffered, with∣out the lawfull appointment of the magistrats: whereas before they were there open and common without iust cause euen to all sorts of men. But it was a thing most bar∣barous, that Fronto king of Denmarke in auntient time appointed all causes and quar∣rels to bee decided by combat, as the Saxon historiographer saith. Howbeit that the Russians and Hungarians otherwise vse it not, but when there is no euident proofe of the matter brought in question. But in our remembrance the prince of Melphe, the king his lieutenant in Piemont, found no remedie or meanes better, for the restrayning of the secret murders and mutinies which were ordinarie amongst his souldiors, than [ I] combat to be for them appointed, by the leaue and authoritie of the Generall; with condition, That the vanquished should not be spared, but still bee slaine by the victor, and his bodie throwne into the riuer: For which such combats hee appointed a pub∣like place betwixt two bridges, compassed round about with the riuer: so that the hope of flight or of aid taken away, and that they must either ouercome their enemie, or there shamefully die; the souldiors afterwards began to behaue themselues more mo∣destly, and so liue the more quietly together.* 1.282

But now, when as to haue the lie giuen one, was neither by the Romans thought to be a thing iniurious, neither that our auncestors had allowed the combat for the lie gi∣uen to another man; it began in our age to be a thing not only contumelious, but euen [ K] capitall also; and that especially in the time of Francis the first the French king, who in a great assembly of his greatest peers one day said, that he was not an honest man which could endure the lie giuen him. Which he said, hauing by his heraults at armes giuen the lie to Charles the fift, for some dishonorable speeches he had giuen of him. Which yet since with vs is growne as it were into a law, so that none of the nobilitie or martiall men, which will put vp the lie, is accounted of, as of a man of any worth or valour, but as of a base or vile fellow. Whereof haue risen great quarrels, brawles, and murders, amongst all sorts of subiects. Which to meet withall, Henry the second, who not with∣out

much griefe with a great number of his nobilitie, had seene a matter ended by com∣bat, [ A] by a perpetuall law forbad controuersies or quarrels to be afterwards so tried. And to the intent that no man, who had rashly receiued the lie, should incurre the note of infamie: Charles the ninth reuiuing the edict made by his father, for the forbidding of combats, ioyned thereunto moreouer, That he would take vnto himselfe the honour and reputation of such as found themselues grieued, for that they might not haue the combat for the lie offered them: and yet there was neuer in Fraunce so many murders seene, as when combats were so forbidden. For who should not bee well laughed at, which for the lie giuen him should appeale vnto the judges? And yet in the opinion of the nobilitie and martiall men, he shall seeme to incurre the most heauie note of infa∣mie, which shall not by force of armes repell such a reproach or disgrace offered him. [ B] Neither can the frowardnesse (should I say) or vanitie of so foolish an opinion easily be out of mens minds remoued.

But whereas we before said, that the combat is for the auoiding of greater inconue∣niences* 1.283 to be borne withall, my meaning is not, that it should be by law allowed, but onely in case of necessitie graunted, and that by the princes expresse letters, after the hearing of the parties, and for the auoyding of murders and seditions, which might otherwise ensue. Whereby that inconuenience shall be auoyded, which otherwise without combat could not be prouided for, that kinsmen, neighbours, and friends, should for one mans wrong in a sort be enforced to take vp armes, and so to entertaine [ C] another mans quarrell: as oftentimes it chaunceth the force and furie of wicked men, to fall vpon the heads of good and worthy subiects. But that is in the hearing of the matter especially to be respected, that combat be not graunted for the triall of any but of capitall causes, and those also whereof no manifest proofe is to be had or found out: following therein also the auntient lawes, which will, That the vanquished should bee declared infamous, and so disgraded of all his estates and honours, condemned to some shamefull death, if he will not better die of the hand of the victor. Which seueritie of punishment, and feare of infamie, might stay many as well from entring into combats, as also from leading of a quarrellous and wicked life. For Philip the Faire hauing for∣bidden combats, thought it not good otherwise to restore them againe vnto the nobi∣litie, [ D] but vpon the cause before knowne vnto the magistrats, as it was by the old decree of the Senat prouided. As by another decree of the same Senat giuen in the contro∣uersie betwixt the counties of Foix and Armagnac, it was said, That combats might not take place, when question was of ciuill right and law, which is yet the custome of them of Berne. And by the lawes of Naples also, it was ordained, That combats should not take place but in cases of treason, and of casuall murder: whereas before it was law∣full in any offence whatsoeuer to chalenge the combat of the aduersarie, theft onely ex∣cept: which yet I see by the custome of them of latter time, not to haue beene without good cause lawfull. Howbeit that by the lawes of Spaine no iust cause of combat is allowed. And thus much concerning priuat and particular quarrels▪ with the meanes [ E] to appease the same.

But if quarrels and contentions arise betwixt whole families, or betwixt whole cor∣porations* 1.284 and colledges of the same citie or Commonweale, and vpon such like cau∣ses as doe betwixt priuat men: combats in that case are not to haue place▪ but the par∣ties so at oddes are by way of iustice to be kept in good peace; or otherwise by force & sharpe punishment to be inflicted vpon the offendors to be kept in awe; yet for all that in such sort, as that iustice should still haue place euen in armes in the execution doing: as it was in Rome, at such time as by a decree of the Senat it was appointed and set downe, That foure hundred innocent slaues should be all put to death; with which vn∣usuall

manner of execution the common people all inraged was about to haue taken [ F] * 1.285 vp armes, if the emperor Nero had not for the keeping of them in, dispersed the souldi∣ours of his guard into euery quarter of the citie, so to keepe all quiet, vntill that the exe∣cution was done. Whereof Iustinian the emperour hauing euen in like case failed, fell into the great and daungerous sedition (whereof we before spake) which vpon the sudden set all Constantinople almost vpon a light fire. As not long ago the two most famous cities of Paris and Antwerpe, were in great tumults and vproares, at such time as the people saued from execution certaine persons for their religion condemned to die: whereof the reuolt of the Low countries against the king begun. Neither is this any new matter, but knowne to haue happened in the glory of the Roman Common∣weale: when as at such time as the Consull had commanded one Volero a factious fel∣low [ G] to haue the bastenado giuen him, (as the manner of punishing of such offendors was) the people by force tooke him out of the hands of iustice, euen as hee was to haue bene stripped, and made him Tribune to defend the popular libertie against the Senat and the Nobilitie, with whome the people were still at warre, if they had no enemies abroad. For which cause the Senat and Magistrats chiefe care, was to find out forren enemies to oppose against the people: or if they wanted such, by all meanes to forge new enemies and warres, as knowing them otherwise neuer to cease from seditions & ciuill broyles. For so soone as that the Carthaginensians had made peace with the Ro∣mans, after the first Punique warres, they forthwith entred into a great daungerous ci∣uill warre at home among themselues: which still happened vnto them at Rome, if [ H] they were neuer so little a while without warres. We see also, that they neuer shut vp the temple of Ianus, which was the signe of an vniuersall peace, but twice in seuen hun∣dred yeares space. And if we marke the histories well, wee shall find nothing to haue* 1.286 bene more daungerons and hurtfull vnto a valiant and warlike people, than peace: For that men accustomed to warres, and still trayned vp in armes, seeke for nothing els but dissentions and broyles, neither hate any thing more than to be at rest and quiet. And that is it for which the histories report Ca. Marius to haue bene the best generall of his time in the warres abroad, but the worst and most troublesome man aliue at home and in time of peace: for that he well knew not what peace & quietnesse meant. Yet whe∣ther it be better in a Commonweale to traine the people vp in peace or warre wee will [ I] hereafter declare.

Now we haue in some sort touched certaine meanes for the preuenting of seditions and part-takings: but as it is much more easie to stay the enemie from entring, than to driue him out after he is once entred; so is it more easie also to preuent seditions and tu∣mults, than to appease the same: and yet that more hardly also in a Popular estate or* 1.287 Commonweale, than in any other. For why, the prince in a Monarchy, and the lords in an Aristocratie still are, and ought to be, as soueraigne judges and arbitrators of the subiects: and so oft times of their absolute power and authoritie appease and quiet all their differences: wheras in the Popular gouernment the soueraigntie lieth in the peo∣ple themselues, which are so diuided into factions, who in no other acknowledge the [ K] magistrats, but as men subiect vnto their commaund and power. Wherefore in such Commonweales such seditions and factions are with the greatest care and diligence that possible is, to be at the first preuented: but if they bee once risen before they were well foreseene, then it behoueth the most wise and vertuous men in the estate to take the matter in hand: who by their great wisedome and kind speeches may againe ap∣pease the turbulent motions of headstrong and giddie common people. For as they which are sicke of a phrensie, which causeth them to skip and daunce without ceasing, cannot be cured, except the cunning musitian tune his instrument vnto their mad man∣ner

and fashion, to draw them vnto his owne, and so to fall by little and little▪ vntill that [ A] they be so againe made more quiet and tractable: euen so ought also the wise magi∣strate seeing the people in a rage, at the first to accommodate and frame himselfe vnto their disordered appetite, that so he may afterwards by little and little induce them to hearken vnto reason: and so by yeelding at first vnto the tempest, at length put into the desired hauen. For to seeke by force to stay the rage of an angry and incensed mul∣titude, is no other thing than as if a man should by maine strength seeke to stay the force and course of an headie streame, most violently falling from the high and steepe rockes.

And as for them which goe about by force of armes and strong hand to stay the* 1.288 angrie peoples rage and furie, if they bee not verie strong and well assured of the vi∣ctorie, [ B] they put the estate into great perill and danger: for if the subiect become victor, no doubt but that hee will at his pleasure prescribe lawes vnto the vanquished. And admit that the prince himselfe be not vanquished, yet so it is, that if he attaine not vn∣to the full of his designes, he shall in so doing make himselfe contemptible, giue occa∣sion vnto his other subiects to rebell, for strangers to inuade him, and for all men to contemne him. Which is yet more to bee feared in popular estates, and was most manifestly knowne in the seditions which happened in Rome, wherein they which would needs proceed by force, and openly resist the desires of the people (vp in furie) matred all: whereas to the contrarie, they which sought by faire meanes to win them, [ C] still brought them to reason, and so vpheld the state of the citie, otherwise readie to haue fallen. Appius Claudius seeing the people of Rome to demaund to haue had the obligations and bands for money lent, canceled, (wherein the richer sort and vsurers had a notable interest) was of opinion, not to haue any thing of the due debt remitted. And at another time the people being reuolted from the nobilitie, hee the same man would haue had them most rigorously entreated, without any regard to haue been had of them at all; for that the people otherwise would swell with pride, and become in∣supportable: howbeit, Seruilius at the first time, and Menenius Agrippa at the second, withstood him, and so carried away the matter from him. Which Agrippa shewed in deed, and by a most excellent fable of mans bodie and the parts thereof (which hee so [ D] liuely set before euery mans eyes) that he caused the armes to fall out of the hands of both parties, and so sweetly againe reconciled the people unto the nobilitie: wherby he together with the welfare of the Commonweale, and all mens loue, gained also vnto himselfe immortall fame and glorie. And if so be that wild beasts will neuer by strokes be tamed, but by the kind handling of him that •…•…ameth them: euen so the peo∣ple once moued or enraged, as a beast with many heads, and of all others the wildest and fiercest, is neuer by force, but by good and kind vsage and entreatie to be gained. Wherefore in such time of common vprore and tumult, something is to be graunted vnto the people: and if the sedition be raised for famine or for dearth of victuals, some present distribution is to be made, and reliefe giuen vnto the poorer sort, who are not [ E] with words to bee appeased. For that as Cato the Censor, speaking of the people of Rome, sayd, The hungrie bellie hath no eares. Neither in that case must the magistrats* 1.289 spare faire words or promises, yea more than is euer to be performed. For that the matter so standing, both Plato and Xenophon giue leaue vnto the magistrates to lie, as physitions to children and their sicke patients. So the wise Pericles, to draw the peo∣ple* 1.290 of Athens vnto reason, fed them with feasts, with plaies, with comedies, with songs and daunces; and in time of dearth caused some distribution of corne or money to be made amongst them: and hauing by these meanes tamed this beast with many heads, one while by the eyes, another while by the eares, and sometimes by the bellie, hee

then caused wholesome edicts and lawes to bee published, declaring vnto them the [ F] graue and wise reasons thereof: which the people in mutinie, or an hungred, would ne∣uer haue hearkened vnto.

Yet whereas we haue said, that the people is to be flattered, and to haue something* 1.291 graunted vnto it: yea sometimes euen things vnreasonable; especially in popular and Aristocraticke estates, that is to be vnderstood in time of extremitie, when as it is al∣readie vp in sedition: and not for that one ought still to follow the appetite and passion of the insatiable people, and without reason: But euen to the contrarie, it is so to bee gouerned, as that it be not too hard curbed, neither yet left with the reines at too much libertie. For as it is a right slipperie high standing place to serue the appetite and plea∣sure of the vnsteady people, so is it yet much more daungerous also, openly to oppose [ G] a mans selfe against it: so as did Appius, Coriolanus, Metellus, C•…•…to the younger, Phoci∣on, and Hermiodorus, who whilest they would haue all things of the people by strong hand, and rather breake than bow, they did either vtterly vndoo themselues together with the Commonweale, or at leastwise brought it into most great perill and danger. True it is, that for the prince or magistrats thus to temper maiestie with clemency to∣wards an vnruly and headstrong people, without iudgement and reason, is a most hard and difficult matter: yet is there nothing more necessarie, especially in Popular go∣uernments, than not too much to flatter, neither yet to deale too roughly with the people. But as the Sunne goeth, rising and setting with the other starres and planets, dayly carried about with the most swift motion of the superiour celestiall spheres, and [ H] yet for all that faileth not to performe his owne naturall course by retiring backe by little and little; and that by how much the higher he is mounted vp from the Horison, the lesser hee seemeth for to be: Euen so ought the wise gouernour to doe, following in part the affections and desires of the troubled people, so much the more easily after∣wards* 1.292 to attaine vnto the full of his designes. And albeit that a prince had the power by force to represse and reforme a mutinous and rebellious people, yet ought he not so to doe, if otherwise he may appease them. For what Physitian is there so inconsiderat, as to vse sections, and cauterisings, or burnings, if the disease might otherwise be cured? And so what prince is there so euill aduised, as by way of force and fact to proceed against his people, if with a kind word speaking hee may appease all? But especially in [ I] a Popular estate, wherein it beseemeth the wise magistrat, by all faire means to appease and quiet the passions of a troubled people, in laying plaine before their eyes the euill successe which may ensue of their so euill and disordered proceedings. We read ther∣of many examples, but yet none more famous than that of Pacuuius Caluinus of Ca∣pua, who being accounted a great fauourer of the comminaltie, and an vtter enemie vnto the nobilitie of that citie, yet vnderstanding of a purpose that the people had vp∣pon the sudden to kill all the Senators of the citie, which so cruell a murder hee greatly detested, but yet seeing the common people so resolutely set downe vpon the matter, as that they were not to be remoued, he himselfe made show also, as if he had as well as any of the rest liked of that the peoples will and purpose, yet withall gaue the Sena∣tors [ K] to vnderstand of the great daunger they were in, and of the purpose he had for the safegard of their liues, willing them to bee of good cheere, and to feare nothing. And* 1.293 so afterwards the Tribune or chiefe leader of the mutinous people, hauing shut vp all the Senators into a strong place, as men appointed for the slaughter: but indeed so to preserue them from the present furie, hee then with a merrie and chearefull countenance comming forth vnto the angrie people, spake vnto them thus, That which you men of Capua haue oftentimes wished for, That it might once be in your power to be re∣uenged

of the most wicked and abhominable Senat; you now haue the same put into your [ A] hands, not by vprore and tumult, by assaulting and breaking open their houses one by one, which they keepe and defend with strong companies and guards of their seruants and friends, but euen at your pleasure, and without daunger. Receiue them all shut vp in the court, where I will giue you power to pronounce sentence of euery one of their liues. But before all things it behoueth you so to satisfie your anger, as yet to deeme your owne health and welfare better than the satisfying of your rage and wrath. For a Senat you will not altogether bee without: for that you must needs either haue a king, which is a thing to be abhorred; or els a Senat, the onely Councell of a free citie. Wherefore two things rest for you to doe, the one that you take out of the way the old Senat: and the other, that you chuse a new. And this said, hee sat downe; and so the Senatours names beeing all [ B] put into a pot, hee commaunded the first name that was drawne out to bee read, and him so named, to bee brought out of the court. Is it your pleasure then (said hee) that this man shall first die? Whereunto all the people cried alowd, That it was well said of him, and well done. Well, I see then (said Pacuuius) what his doome is: let him bee cast out; and now for him an euill and wicked man, make you choyce of a good and vpright Senator to bee put into his place. Whereupon they all at the first were silent▪ for lacke of a better to make choyce of: but as soone as one more impudent than the rest had named one, presently a greater crie was heard than before; some cry∣ing out, That they knew him not; othersome exclaiming as fast against him as a naughtie base fellow, of some beggerly trade or other, and so vnworthy of the [ C] place: The like sturre there was▪ when choyce was to bee made of the second, and third Senator, the base artificers and trades-men still nominating some one, and some another: in such sort, as that they now began to fall out among themselues, about the choyce, none of them beeing willing to yeeld or giue place to other, which whilest they did in euerie Senator which was named, there was no lesse trouble and sturre among themselues, than was before betwixt them and the Senatours. Where∣uppon they were better contented that the old Senatours should now still hold their places, than to suffer one of them to bee preferred before another. Wherein the councell of the Tribune was right wise, and cunningly by him put in execution: who after hee had by his wise dissimulation somewhat appeased the mad peoples [ D] rage, hee as it were with his finger poynted out, and layed open euen vnto euerie mans eye, the great hurt and inconuenience that was to ensue, by putting the Sena∣tors to death: as that not onely such a shamefull murder should for euer bee ac∣counted most cruell and inhumane; but that also by the dooing thereof the Com∣monweale should bee without councell, as a bodie without a soule; and the fire of sedition raised also amongst the people, about the preferment, and them that were to bee preferred.

But if the people once enraged be alreadie vp in armes, it is a most hard and daun∣gerous* 1.294 matter to appease them: in so much as that not long agoe there was one that set fire on his owne house (least the Commonweale should with the flames of se∣dition [ E] euen then haue perished) so to turne the citisens then together by the eares to leaue the fray, and to come to helpe to quench the fire, for feare least all should haue beene burnt. Then if any man there bee in vertue and valour exceeding the rest, who will with good speech take vppon him to persuade the people vnto peace and concord, hee onely, or else none, is the man that may appease the peoples frantike fu∣rie and rage. Which thing Virgil most excellently expressed in these few verses fol∣lowing▪

Ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta [ F] Seditio est, saeuit{que} an•…•…mis ignobile vulgus; Iam{que} faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat: Tum pietate grauem ac meritis si fortè virum quem Conspexere, silent, arrectis{que} auribus astant: Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.

And as a sudden tumult rais'd amidst a people great, When as the base and rascall sort are in the greatest heat, And firebrands now and stones do flie, such weapons as there lye, Then if some good graue worthy sire they fortune to espie, [ G] They silent with attentiue eare stand listning to his lore: He with good words their minds doth rule, and calmes the whole vprore.

Such we said Pericles to haue bene in Athens, Menenius Agrippa in Rome, and not long agoe Peter Loredan in Venice, who at such time as the marriners and sea-fa∣ring men banded themselues against the rest of the citisens, and in such sort massacred one another, as that neither duke, neither the Senat, nor other magistrat could come nie, but that they were by force and violence of the furious people reiected; this plaine gentleman Peter Loredan (I say) a priuat citisen, and bearing no office at all, showing* 1.295 but himselfe in the middest of these combats, and holding but vp his hand on hie, cau∣sed [ H] the weapons to fall out of euery mans hand, for the reuerence they all bare vnto the vertue of so graue a personage; and so as it were in a moment appeased all that ciuill discord. Whereby it was to be seene, vertue to be of greater power and maiestie than armes, than lawes, yea than all the magistrats together.

There is also in the reuerend feare of religion a great power for the staying of the* 1.296 tumultuous people. For at such time as the Florentines were fallen out into such a fu∣rie among themselues, as that the citie swome with the blood and slaughter of the citi∣sens: and that they could by no meanes be parted, Francis Soderin the bishop attired in his bishoplike attire, and attended vpon with a company of priests, and a crosse carried before him, came into the middest of the furious citisens, so bandying it one against [ I] another; at the sight and presence of whome, they all for the reuerend feare of religi∣on vpon the sudden laid downe their weapons, and so without more adoo, got them∣selues home euery man vnto his owne house. So also Iadus the Iewes high Priest, in his Pontifici•…•…libus met Alexander the Great comming towards Hierusalem with his victorious armie, with whose port and maiestie Alexander terrified, worshipped the High Priest, and was so farre from ransacking either of the countrey or holy citie, as that he gaue it great priuileges, with whatsoeuer the High priest els requested. With like wisedome pope Vrban is reported to haue turned Attila king of the Hungarians from the siege of Aquilia.

But sometime such is the deadly hatred of citisens amongst themselues, as that they [ K] * 1.297 need of the helpe of their friends and allies, yea and sometimes euen of meere strangers to set them agreed. In which case an other good old man of Florence seeing the citi∣sens without pity to kill and massacre one another, and on all sides to burne one ano∣thers houses, went to request the Luquois their neighbours and friends, to interpose themselues for the appeasing of these so deadly broyles, as had well neere ruinated the whole estate: Wherewith the Luquois mooued, came in great numbers, by whose good trauell and mediation all those slaughters and broyles were well stayed and qui∣ted: a thing both commendable and profitable, not to them onely which are so set a∣greed,

but euen to them also which were the workers therein, as reaping therby great [ A] honour, together with the loue of them whom they so made friends. Yea oftentimes it happeneth, that the citisens deuided into factions, weary at length of their murders and tumults, seeke but to find an occasion for them to fall to agreement; yet being of opinion it to touch them in honour, that should first seeke for peace, therefore continue their bloody quarrels vntill that they haue vtterly ruinated one another, if some third man interpose not himself betwixt them for the making of them friends: which thing oftner happeneth in popular or Aristocratike commonweales, than in a monarchie: wherein the subiects are by the power and authority of one onely prince still to bee set at one, & reconciled amongst themselues, together with the commonweale. How∣be* 1.298 it, that sometime it happeneth the soueraigne prince to make himselfe a party, in [ B] stead of holding the place of a soueraigne Iudge: in which doing for all that he shall be no more but the head of one party, and so vndoubtedly put himselfe in daunger of his life, and that especially when such daungerous seditions and factions be not groun∣ded vpon matters directly touching his estate, but otherwise, as it hath happened al∣most in all Europe within this fifty yeares, in the warres made for matters of religion: for we haue seene the kingdome of Sweden, of Scotland, of Denmarke, of England, the Cantons of the Swissers, yea and the Germaine empire also, to haue changed their religion, the estate of euery of these monarchies and commonweales yet standing en∣tire and whole: howbeit that the truth is, that it was not done, but with great violence, and much bloudshed in many places. [ C]

But religion by common consent once receiued and setled, is not againe to be cal∣led* 1.299 into question and dispute, that so all the wayes and entrances vnto sedition and fac∣tion may be stopped, and the assurances of vnity and peace strengthened; for that all things called into disputation, are so also but as things probable called in doubt: and what can come neerer to impiety then by probable arguments to call in doubt the lawes of God, which are by their nature immutable and eternall; and such as of the truth whereof euery man ought to be most certainly resolued and assured Besides that, nothing is so firme and stable, nothing so manifest and cleare (except it rest vpon most* 1.300 playne and vndoubtfull demonstrations) which may not by disputation and force of arguments be obscured or made doubtfull; and especially where that which is called [ D] into question, or dispute, resteth not so much vpon demonstration or reason, as vppon the assurance of fayth and beleefe onely: which they which seeke by demonstrations and publishing of bookes to performe, they are not onely mad with reason, but wea∣ken also the foundations and grounds of all sorts of religions.

There is a most antient law of Licurgus extant, which the Florentines (of all others the sharpest disputors) established in their popular estate, viz. Ne de legibus semel reep∣ctis ac probatis disserere liceret, That it might not be lawfull to dispute or make question lawes once receiued and allowed. For why he of others the wisest▪ well vnderstood, lawes disputed and reasoned vpon to bee still doubted of; which doubting brought with it an opinion of the iniquity thereof; whereof must needs follow the contempt [ E] both of the lawes and magistrats, and so consequently the ruine and destruction of the whole commonweale. But if Philosophers and Mathematicians cannot abide to haue the principles of their sciences reasoned of, what great folly, or rather madnesse is it to dispute not onely priuatly, but euen openly also of religion alreadie approued. Howbeit that Anaxagoras maintained the snow to be blacke, and Fauorinus the Quar∣taine feuer to bee a very good and wholesome thing; and Carneades hauing one day highly commended iustice, the very next day preferred iniustice before it, and that it was (without all comparison) better to be a verie knaue than a vertuous honest man:

which they all so perfuasiuely did, as that they drew a great number of men to bee in∣deed [ F] of their opinions. Although Aristotle said them which made question, whether snow were white or not, to want sence: but them which doubted whether there were a God or not▪ not to be with arguments refuted, but by the lawes punished: howbeit that he himselfe by necessarie demonstration proued there to be one euerlasting God, and that there could be no moe gods but he. Wherfore, all the kings and princes both of Affricke and of the East, doe most straitly forbid all men to dispute of their religion. Which like strict prohibition is also set downe by the lawes and decrees of Spaine. So also the king of Moscouie seeing his people, who had receiued the rites and ceremo∣nies of the Greekes, diuided into diuers sects and factions, by reason of the diuers prea∣chings and disputations of the ministers: hee thereupon forbad them vppon paine of [ G] death any more to preach or dispute of religion; and withall gaue a booke vnto the bishop and parish priests, wherein was contained what hee would haue euery man persuaded of, and to beleeue, concerning matters of faith and religion, which he com∣maunded them vpon all feastiuall dayes to reade and publish vnto the people: with a capitall paine thereunto annexed, if by any mans exposition any thing were at all thereunto either added or diminished. And Moyses, when hee had most curiously written all those things which he had learned and receiued from Almightie God, and declared the same vnto the people: yet in one chapter of the law (the people yet wan∣dering vp and downe in the desart) he commaunded the priests and Leuits aloud and distinctly to reade the law, yea, and that dayly also, that so it might bee vnderstood [ H] and knowne vnto the people of euery age and sexe: and so in another chapter for∣bad any thing to be vnto the lawes of God either added or detracted. Yet sayth hee not, that they should dispute thereof: but euen to the contrarie, the Hebrewes instru∣cted by the prophets from the father to the sonne: they teaching the law of God in seuen Colledges, which then were in mount Syon, neuer yet suffered men to enter in∣to disputation thereof, as we read in Optatus Mileuit•…•…nus. For why, disputation was* 1.301 inuented▪ but for things probable and doubtfull; and not for things religious and ne∣cessarie, and such as euery man is bound to beleeue: which by disputation are al∣waies made doubtfull. Wherefore seeing that disputations of religion bring not only the doubt and ouerthrow of religions, but euen the ruine and destruction of Com∣monweales [ I] * 1.302 also; it behooueth them to be by most strait lawes forbidden: which after long ciuill war was by the estates and princes of the Germane empire prouided for, and a decree made, that the princes should with mutuall consent defend both the Romane and Saxon religion: whereunto that was also ioyned, That no man should vpon paine of death dispute of the religions. Which seuere punishments, after that the Germane magistrates had inflicted vpon diuers, all Germany was afterwards at good quiet & rest: no man daring more to dispute of matters of religion. Moreouer, seeing that not onely all wise law-giuers and Philosophers, but euen the very Atheists themselues also (as namely * 1.303 Polybius himselfe an Atheist) are of accord, That there is nothing which doth more vphold and maintaine the estates and Commonweals than religion: and that it [ K] is the principall foundation of the power and strength of monarchies and Seignories: as also for the execution of justice, for the obedience of the subiects, the reuerence of the* 1.304 magistrats, for the feare of doing euill, and for the mutuall loue and amitie of euery one towards other, it is by most strait and seuere lawes to be prouided; that so sacred a thing as is religion be not by childish and sophisticall disputations, (and especially by such as are publickely had) made contemptible, or by probable arguments made doubtful, and so at length quite taken out of the minds, both of the hearers & of the disputors toge∣ther. Neither are they to be heard which thinke themselues to be able with more subtill

reasons to persuade all things: for that as Papinian most wisely said, Summa ratio est [ A] quae pro religione facit, It is of all the greatest reason, which tendeth to the maintai∣nance of Religion.

I will not here in so great varietie of people so much differing among themselues in* 1.305 religion, take vpon me to determine which of them is the best (howbeit that there can be but one such, one truth, and one diuine law, by the mouth of God published) but if* 1.306 the prince well assured of the truth of his religion, would draw his subiects thereunto, diuided into sects and factions, hee must not therein (in mine opinion) vse force: (For that the minds of men the more they are forced, the more froward and stubborne they are; and the greater punishment that shall be inflicted vppon them, the lesse good is to be done; the nature of man being commonly such as may of it selfe bee led to like [ B] of anything, but neuer enforced so to doe) but rather it he houeth the prince so per∣suaded of the truth of his religion, without fainting or dissembling to professe and fol∣low the same, still deuoutly seruing the almightie God: by which meanes he shall both turne the will and minds of his subiects vnto the admiration and imitation of himselfe, and at length also plucke vp euen the verie rootes of all sects and opinions: In which doing he shall not onely auoid commotions, troubles, and ciuill warres, but lead al∣so his straying subiects vnto the port of health. Whereof as there are many exam∣ples, so is there none more fit for this our purpose, than that of Theodosius the elder, who at the beginning of his raigne found all the prouinces of the empire full of Arri∣ans, [ C] whose strength and power was so growne and encreased vnder three or foure Ar∣rian emperous their fauourors, as that their doctrine was not onely by eight councels confirmed, which were at diuers times assembled at Tyre, at Sardis, at Sirme, at Mi∣lan, Seleucia, Nice, Tarsis, and especially at Ariminum (where six hundred bishops were of their opinion: and but three of name which held the contrarie) but that they also punished other their aduersaries of opinion contrarie vnto themselues, with confis∣cations, proscriptions, and other most grieuous punishments. Yet would not this good emperour now come vnto the empire, either force or punish the Arrians, al∣though that hee deadly hated them, but graunted vnto them both the Arrians (I say) and the Catholikes, their churches, and suffered them in euerie towne to haue two bi∣shops, [ D] of either religion one: and albeit that hee at the importunat suit and instance of the Catholike bishops, commaunded certaine edicts to bee published against the Arri∣ans, yet was hee well contented to haue the same holden in suspence, and not put in∣to execution; as his letters vnto Ambrose in these words declare, Trade Arrianis Ba∣silicam, mei namque sunt omnia iuris, Giue (saith hee) vnto the Arrians a church: for that all are in my power. Which thing Rotaris also king of the Lombards by his law permitted. And yet neuerthelesse this emperor liuing according to his religion, and in∣structing his children & kinsmen in the same, wonderfully diminished the Arian sect in Europe: howbeit that they haue euer since continued, and so yet do, both in Asia and Affrike, vnder the law of Mahomet, grounded vpon the same foundation. The great [ E] emperour of the Turkes doth with as great deuotion as any prince in the world honour and obserue the religion by him receiued from his auncestours, and yet dete∣steth hee not the straunge religions of others; but to the contrarie permitteth euery man to liue according to his conscience: yea and that more is, neere vnto his pallace at Pera, suffereth foure diuers religions, viz. That of the Iewes, that of the Christi∣ans, that of the Grecians, and that of the Mahometanes: and besides that, sendeth almes vnto the Calogers or religious Monkes, dwelling vppon the mountaine Athos (being Christians) to pray for him: as did Augustus to the Iews, to whom he ordinarily

sent his almes and perpetuall sacrifices to Hierusalem, which hee commaunded to bee [ F] there dayly made for the health of himselfe, and of the Commonweale. For why the people of auntient time were persuaded, as were the Turks, All sorts of religions which proceed from a pure mind, to be acceptable vnto the gods. And albeit that the Romans easily admitted not straunge religions into their Commonwealeas (as in the warres against them of Veios the Aediles had in charge, Ne qui nisi Romani dij, neu quo alio mo∣re quam patrio Colerentur, That no gods should be worshipped but the Roman gods, neither after any other manner than after the manner of the countrey) yet for all that did they easily suffer euery man priuatly within the citie to vse his owne manner and fa∣shion, and his owne religion: yea the Romans themselues receiued into the citie the sacrifices of Isis and of Esculapius, and suffered the Pantheon to be dedicated to all the [ G] gods. Only the Iewes of all people detested straunge ceremonies: whereby they pro∣uoked the hatred of all people against them. For at such time as Antiochus the Noble besieged Hierusalem, the Iewes tooke truce with him for eight dayes, wherein they might keepe holy the Feast of their deliuerance out of Aegypt, dedicated vnto the ho∣nour of the immortall God: Whereunto Antiochus (as Plutarch writeth) willingly condescended; and yet not so contented, with great reioicing brought also bulles and rammes for the furnishing of the sacrifice euen vnto the gates of the citie. Howbeit that afterwards the time of the truce expired, he tooke the citie and sacked it. But as he was about therein to haue sacrificed after the manner of the Greekes, the Priests & Leuites cursing and banning, forsooke the Temple. For which cause Antiochus enfor∣ced [ H] them, as contemners of the gods, to receiue the Greeke ceremonies and sacrifices, yea and caused hogges also to be killed in the temple, and the Iewes to bee enforced to eat of them, tormenting such as refused so to do with all kind of torments and tor∣tures, which in that citie wrought the change both of the religion and state. But Pto∣lomeus Lagus (as Agatharchides writeth) and after him Pompeius, after long siege hauing taken Hierusalem (the same day that the Iewes had before taken truce with Antiochus) yet both of them kept their hands from sacrilege: which Crassus did not, neither Flac∣cus: whome yet Cicero denieth to haue taken any gold belonging vnto the temple; in which oration, as serued for his purpose, hee said, The gods of the Iewes to haue de∣liuered their seruants from the bondage of the Romans. So that the Iewes detesting [ I] the gods of other nations, caused all other people and nations most grieuously to hate and contemne them: For at such time as Quadratus being President of Iudea, a com∣mon souldiour had in contempt showed his tayle vnto the Iewes, as they were sacrifi∣sing in the temple, such an vpro•…•…e and tumult ensued thereof, as that twentie thousand of the Iewes were there slaine. At which time the Iewes by a decree of the Senat, were driuen also out of Rome: where Tiberius caused such as would not remoue thence, ei∣ther to chaunge their religion, or to become slaues; but this was done in Rome onely. For the same Tiberius forbad Pilat, who had determined to haue placed certain shields and escutchions in the temple of the Iewes, to place the same, or to alter any thing of their religion. But Alexander Seuerus the emperor in his priuat sacrifices worship∣ped [ K] Abraham, Orpheus, Hercules, and Christ. But when the Christians as well as the Iewes, had begun to detest those thirtie thousand gods which Pindarus now in his time worshipped, and so began to breed a contempt of the gods in the minds of men, the princes and magistrats began likewise with most grieuous punishments to persecute them, except they would forsweare Christ and the Christian religion, the Iewes (bea∣ring themselues vpon the antiquitie of their religion) being become their accusers and enformers against them, least they should seeme partakers of the same impietie with them. And thus as the multitude of religion and sects was innumerable, some dete∣sting

the rites and ceremonies of others: so thereof proceeded also the diuers and [ A] manifold chaunges of Commonweales. And albeit that tyrants had before exercised incredible cruelties vpon their subiects, yet neuer thought they it lawfull for them to rule ouer mens minds before the time of this Antiochus, whome wee but euen now spoke of. Which was the cause that Theodoricus king of the Gothes (though fauou∣ring the Arrians) would not yet enforce the conscience of his subiects, nor haue them tormented for their religion; least vnder the pretence of impietie hee should haue seemed to haue taken the spoyle of their goods, or bind their minds, which could by no threats or commaunds be constrained or bound. For so he wri•…•…ing vnto the Senat* 1.307 at Rome, vseth these words, Religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur vt cre∣dat inuitus, Religion (saith he) we cannot commaund, for that no man is compelled [ B] against his will to beleeue: as we read in Cassiodore: Which reason of all others see∣meth vnto me most effectuall, for the taking away of such punishments, as are vnder the colour of religion to be inflicted vpon the subiects. Wicked and straunge rites & ceremonies, and such other as the greater part of the subiects of greatest power detest, I thinke it good and profitable to haue them kept out of the Commonweale. For the preseruation of the subiects loue amongst themselues, which is especially nouished & maintained by their consent and agreement in matters of religion: yet if the same reli∣gion be liked of by the opinion of neighbour nations, and of many of the subiects, then ought it not onely with punishments not to be restrained, but also so much as may be prouided, that if it may not without sedition bee publikely profes•…•…ed, yet that no [ C] man be forbidden the priuat exercise of such his religion. For otherwise it shall come* 1.308 to passe, that they which are destitute of the exercise of their religion, and withall dista∣sted of the religion of the others, shall become altogether Atheists (as wee daily see) and so after that they haue once lost the feare of God, tread also vnder foot both the lawes and magistrats, and so inure themselues to all kinds of impieties and villanies, such as is impossible by mans lawes to be redressed. Howbeit what lettteth vs to fol∣low the councell of the most holy prophets, of whom * 1.309 the one persuaded his countri∣men l•…•…d away into captiuitie into Chaldea, That at such time as they should bee enfor∣ced to fall downe before the idols, yet that they should with a pure mind alwayes wor∣ship the euer liuing God: & the * 1.310 other admitted the request or excuse of Naaman the [ D] king of Syria his seruant, but newly instructed in the true religion and seruice of God, if he were present with the king his maister sacrificing vnto a straunge god, so that hee kept his mind pure and cleane from idolatrie. For they are much deceiued, which think Commonweales to be better kept in order by mens commands and lawes, than by the feare of God his iudgements. For as the greatest tyranny is nothing so miserable as an* 1.311 Anatchie, when as there is neither prince nor magistrat, none that obeieth, neither yet any that commaundeth, but that all men liue as they list at libertie in all loosenesse of life, without feare of punishment. So the greatest superstition that is, is not by much any thing so detestable as Atheisme. And truely they (in mine opinion) offend much, which thinke that the same punishment is to bee appointed for them that make many [ E] gods, and them that would haue none at all: or that the infinitie of gods admitted, the almightie and euerliuing God is thereby taken away. For that superstition how great soeuer it be, doth yet hold men in feare and awe, both of the laws and of the magistrats, as also in mutuall duties and offices one of them towards another: whereas meere Atheisme doth vtterly root out of mens minds all the feare of doing euill. Wherfore two inconueniences propounded▪ Superstition (I say) and Atheisme, we must still de∣cline the greater: yet when we may not publikely vse the true religion, which still con∣sisteth in the worshipping of one almightie and euerlasting God: least by contemning

of the religion which is publikely receiued, we should seeme to allure or stirre the sub∣iects [ F] vnto impietie or sedition, it is better to come vnto the publike seruice, so that the mind still rest in the honour and reuerence of one almightie and euer liuing God.

But now, whereas some men maruell how it came to passe, that in the time of Theo∣dosius,* 1.312 considering the diuersitie of sects and of religions that then were, they could so stand without ciuill warres, being then at the least an hundred diuers sorts of them ac∣cording to the account of Tertullian and Epiphanius: whereof the cause was, the multi∣tude and varietie of such different opinions, which so still held one of them in counter∣poise with another. Now in matters of sedition and tumult, nothing is more dange∣rous, than to haue the subiects diuided into two opinions or factions onely, whether it be before matters of estate, or of religion, or for the lawes and customes, or other mat∣ters [ G] whatsoeuer that the subiects are so diuided. For that but one thing can by nature be contrary vnto another thing: and moe things than one to be contrarie vnto one, is a thing not to be imagined. So that where there be moe than two sects or sorts, there must needs be some in the meane betwixt the two contrarie extreames, which may set them agreed, which otherwise of themselues would neuer fall to agreement. And ther∣fore Solon by law prouided, That in ciuill seditions and troubles, euery man should of* 1.313 necessitie take either the one or other part, and that it should not bee lawfull for any man to stand as neu•…•…er: which vnto many seemed a thing vnreasonable, considering that the greatest prayse and commendation of a good subiect is; to bee a quiet ciuill man, desirous and doing the best that he can to liue in peace. Besides that, by this means [ H] the conscience of an honest man is forced, to take either the one or other part, when as haply he thinketh both naught, and that they are both in the wrong. And that more is, it may so happen, that if in such seditions he will follow that part which hee iudgeth the better, he must beare armes euen against his father, against his brethren, and friends, which are in armes in the other side: which were the way so to compell men to com∣mit vnnaturall murders, and to kil euen them whom we ought to defend, & to depriue them of life, by whom we our selues liue. In briefe the law of God forbiddeth him that knoweth the truth, to follow the common opinion of them which are out of the way: whereunto Solons law seemeth to repugne, in forcing a man to take either the one part or the other, although that they be both naught. Howbeit that a man might say vn∣to [ I] the contrarie, this Solons law to be most profitable and necessarie also vnto Popular and Aristocratike estates, wherein is no soueraigne, which standing as neu•…•…er, may de∣termine and decide the differences of them which shall so bee at discord and variance. For men well know, that the most craftie men in time of ciuill warres, withdraw them∣selues so much as possibly they can out of the preasse, if they be not well assured of the victorie of the part that they themselues take (if it bee not so, that they see the daunger such, as that the publike fire is like to take hold and burne euen their own priuat houses) yea oftentimes the more subtill and deceitfull sort set the rest at dissention and debate, that so they may themselues the better fish in troubled water, and make a bridge for themselues to passe ouer, to ceize vpon other mens goods and honors: imitating ther∣in [ K] the priests of Mars, whome the auntients called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Fire-bearers, who ha∣uing orderly performed their solemne execrations, cast fire brands betwixt both armies standing readie ranged, and so stirred them vp to battell: but yet retired themselues in safetie out of the medley and daunger. Now if the law of Solon might take place, these fire makers durst not sow debate and discord among the citisens, seeing that they must themselues then run into the same danger with others. And as for other honest men which loue peace, and like neither of the one nor other faction, if they must needs be constrained to take a part, they will then enforce themselues by all means to preuent

seditions, and in what they may to withstand them: or if they cannot be foreseene, yet [ A] to do what they may to appease them. For why, the great vertue and authoritie of good subiects is of great force to keepe the rash and mad vulgar people in some order: and to persuade them being disquieted againe vnto reason, who would euer be at ods and variance, if they were not by the good councell of the wiser sort better persuaded. By which reasons Solons law seemeth to be vnto cities and Commonweales profita∣ble. Besides that, if in the leagues and societies of princes among themselues, it be good and profitable for them all, some one of them to be of greater power than the rest, or at leastwise to ioyne himselfe with them that bee of greatest power: how much more true and profitable is it in ciuill warres still to take the one or the other part: where hee which standeth as neuter, as he is of no man protected, so lieth he open to the common [ B] * 1.314 spoyle of all men. For so Theramenes, who all the time of the Peloponesian war, and the troubles of the Athenians, had kept himselfe quiet, and stood still looking on, but as an idle beholder, without taking part either with the one or with the other, was him∣selfe at the last forsaken of all, and so left vnto the mercie of the tyrants, who made him a miserable spectacle vnto all men, and in the end most cruelly put him to death. Hee therefore which will stand as neuter, whether it be in ciuill warre, or in warres amongst straungers, ought at the least to doe his endeuour to set the rest agreed: or if hee shall see the quarrels, warres, and ruines of others, to tend to the profit of the better sort, or the assurance of his estate, his wealth or person (as it sometimes happeneth that tyrants [ C] and wicked subiects or citisens agree not but for to •…•…uinat the good) yet ought he which so standeth as neuter, to show himselfe in appearance desirous and forward to set them agreed: which many men haue done euen then when they most nourished and main∣tained such quarrels in the most secret manner they could: A thing which God (as Sa∣lomon* 1.315 saith) abhorreth: if it be not in case (as I haue said) that the concord and agree∣ment of the euill, tend to the ineuitable ruine and decay of the good. For as for one good vertue, there are many vices one of them quite contrarie vnto another; and that for one good man, there be ten which are nothing worth: so God hath also appoin∣ted, That the euill and wicked men should euen one of them by another be brought to ruine and destruction: I will reuenge me (saith God, speaking by the mouth of the pro∣phet [ D] Ieremie) of mine enemies, by mine enemies. I haue said, that good princes and good subiects ought to dissemble the good and pleasure they take in the discord and conten∣tion of other the wicked princes or citisens; for that there is nothing which grieueth a man more, than to see others in all securitie, to take pleasure and reioyce in his ruine and decay.

Thus haue we seene certaine meanes for the appeasing of tumults and seditions* 1.316 amongst many. For which there might yet some more particulars bee also rehearsed; as to take away the vse of belles from rebellious or seditious citisens: so as wee read to haue bene done in the rebellions at Montpelier, and at Bourdeaux, which were yet af∣terward vnto them againe not without a great fine restored: howbeit that the greater [ E] part of the inhabitants of Bourdeaux most instantly requested, That they might not be so restored, hauing felt the commoditie that came thereby. But whether well or euill, I leaue it to the resolution of euery man of sound iudgement. The great emperour of the Turkes, with the other princes of the East, haue taken strait order, That this inuen∣tion of belles, first deuised in Italie, should not into any of their dominions or territo∣ries be receiued: whereby they haue well auoided one of the greatest occasions of ci∣uill tumults and broyles. The noyse and backward ringing of the belles (as when hou∣ses be on fire) being not onely proper vnto straunge accidents, and to put the muti∣nous people into armes, but also to trouble euen the quiet spirits of peaceable men,

and to thrust fooles headlong into fury: as did he, who the more to sturre vp the people [ F] rung the Tocsaine, together with the great bell at Bourdeaux, and was therefore him∣selfe hanged in the belrope, as he had well deserued.

Another and the most vsuall way to preuent sedition, is to take away the subiects* 1.317 armes: howbeit that the princes of Italy, & of the East cannot endure that they should at all haue armes; as doe the people of the North and of the West: no more then they did in auncient time in Greece and in Asia. For so Aristotle speaking of the Barbari∣ans, accounteth it for a strange thing, that a man should in a quiet and peaceable citie* 1.318 weare a sword or a dagger in time of peace: which by our lawes, as also by the man∣ners and customes of the Germaines and Englishmen is not onely lawfull; but by the lawes and decrees of the Swissers euen necessarily commaunded: the cause of an infi∣nit [ G] number of murders, hee which weareth a sword, a dagger, or a pistoll, being more fierce and insolent to offer vnto others iniury, as also to commit murder if any iniurie be offered him: whereas if he were disarmed, he should doe neither the one nor the o∣ther; neither should yet incurre the infamy and disgrace which followeth them, who when they are wronged, dare not to draw their weapons. The Turkes herein go yet farther, not onely in punishing with all seuerity the seditious and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 people, but also by forbidding them to beare armes, yea euen in time of warre, except it bee when they are to giue battell: wheras otherwise if the enemie be not nie, they lay their armes vp in their tents, or in their carriages: and yet they are accounted the best soldi∣ours of the world: which if they doe in the field, and in time of warre, what is it to be [ H] thought them to doe in their townes, and in time of peace?

Amongst many the lawdable manners and customes of the policy of Paris, there is one a very good one, and well put in execution, which is, That no car-man or por∣ter shall weare sword, dagger, knife, or any other offensiue weapon, and that for the murders by them committed in their ordina•…•…ie quarrels which they still had one of them against another▪ which if it might take place vpon all persons: also a thousand murders and stabbings are committed, which should neuer haue happened, neither the seditions and broyles raysed, which haue vpon this occasion bene in many places kin∣dled. For it is not the part of a wise polititian, neither of a good gouernour, to expect vntill the murder be committed, or that the sedition be raysed, before he forbid the bea∣ring [ I] of armes, but as a good phisition preuenteth diseases: and if chaunce be that the partie be sodainly attainted with any violent griefe, he first asswageth the present paine, and that done applyeth conuenient remedies vnto the causes of the disease: euen so the wise prince ought (so much as in him lyeth) to preuent sedition, as also when they are happened to appease them at what charge soeuer: and then afterward to looke into the cause of the diseases farthest off from the effects, and so thereunto to apply re∣medies conuenient.

Now we haue before spoken of the causes which worke the chaunge of estates and* 1.319 commonweales, of which selfe same causes proceed also seditions and ciuill warres, as of the denyall of iustice, of the oppression of the common people, of the inequall di∣stribution [ K] of punishments, and of rewards; of the excessiue riches of some few in num∣ber, and extreame pouertie of the greater sort; of the too great idlenesse of the subiects, or of the impunitie of offendors: and it may be that this last point is therein of greatest consequence or importance, and yet the least of all regarded. Which as I haue before touched, so must I also oftentimes repeat the same, for that the princes and magistrats which desire to be accounted mercifull, do oftentimes turne vpon their owne heads the same punishment that the offendors deserued. And that is it for which the wise Hebrew hath so oftentimes aduised vs, Not to become suretie for another man: not for that he

forbiddeth a charitable dealing one of vs towards another (as many haue thought) but [ A] rather to giue all men to vnderstand, That they which become sureties for wicked men, and so find meanes to deliuer them from deserued punishment, shall beare the pain of the offendors guilt therefore. As was said to king Achab, who had saued the life of Benadab the king of Syria, whom hee should haue put to death, God caused it to bee told vnto him by his prophet, That he was become suretie for another man, and that it should surely cost him his life therefore. Which being but spoken in particular vnto this one king, extendeth yet in general vnto all princes and Commonweals, who haue no more certaine cause of their ruine and decay, than the want of the due execution of iustice. To punish the rebellious, is also one of the meanes to preuent and meet with re∣bellions yet to come, which how it is to be done we haue before said, when as wee rea∣soned [ B] of punishments to be vpon corporations and colledges inflicted; which is to take place when some one corporation, or the least part of the subiects haue erred or of∣fended; but not if all the people in generall, or the greatest part of them be in fault: For albeit that the physitian or surgeon sometimes for the preseruation of the whole bodie, cuts off a mans leg or arme, yet must he not therfore cut off the head, or any other of the principall members, if they shall chance to be infected: but therin follow the wise coun∣cell of the great Physitian Hippocratts, who vnto desperat diseases forbiddeth vs to ap∣ply any remedy at all. But beside the causes of seditions & rebellions, which wee haue* 1.320 before spoke of, there is yet another, which dependeth of the immoderat libertie of [ C] speech giuen to orators, who direct & guide the peoples hearts & minds according to their owne pleasure. For there is nothing that hath more force ouer the minds of men, than hath eloquence: So that our ancestors haue not without cause pu•…•…traied Hercules Celtique not as a yong & strong man with a great club in his hand, but as a reuerend bauld old man, drawing after him a great number of people enchained, & hanging by the eares with chaines, which all issued out of his mouth; to shew, that the armies and power of kings and monarchs are not so strong as the vehemencie and force of an elo∣quent man, who encourageth & enflameth the most cowardly & faint hearted to van∣quish euen the most valiant, who striketh armes out of the hands of the most couragi∣ous, who turneth rage into mildnesse, & barbarisme into ciuility, who changeth whole [ D] Commonweals, and sporteth with the people at his pleasure. Which I say not for the prayse of eloquence, but to shew the force & power therof, which is oftner emploied to* 1.321 euill, than to good. For seeing that this is nothing els but a disguising of the truth, and an art to make that seeme good, which is indeed naught, & that right which is wrong, and to make a great matter of nothing, as of an Emot an Elephant (that is to say, an art to lie cunnungly) wee need not doubt, but that for one which vseth this art well, fiftie vse the same euill, & that amongst 50 Orators it is hard to find an honest man. For that to seeke after the plaine & bare truth, were a thing altogether contrarie vnto their pro∣fession, seeing that the best rule that Cicero giueth vnder the person of Marcus Antonius the Orator, is to say nothing against himself: or rather as Aristotle saith, So well to dis∣guise [ E] matters, as that the deceit thereof cannot not be discouered: or to speake more plainly, to couer all things with lies and dissimulation. So that if we will but wel looke into al them which had the name to haue beene the most noble and famous Orators, we shall find them to haue beene still the stirrers vp of the people to sedition, to haue of∣tentimes changed the laws, the customs, the religions, and Commonweals, yea & some others of them to haue vtterly ruinated the same; in which doing they haue also al∣most all of them ended their dayes by violent death. Which it is not needfull here to proue by the Orators of Athens, or of Rome, but euen by those of our age, who haue so well besturred themselues, as that vnder the colour of religion they haue trou∣bled

all the empires both of Affrike & of the West: yea and many of them so wrested [ F] the scepters euen out of the kings hands. As it happened vnto the king of Marocco, des∣cended (as is supposed) from the house of Ioseph, from whom a preacher vnder the vaile of religion tooke both the crowne and scepter: & albeit that he was commonly called the Asse Knight, yet preached he so well, as that he assembled an armie of sixscore thousand men to take his part. In like sort he which was first called the Sophi, inuaded the kingdome of Persia, and in short time draue out the children of Vsun Cassan the lawfull king, vnder the same coulour of religion. As also not long agoe Iohn of Lei∣den (who of a botcher became a preacher) ceised vpon Munster the Metropoliticall citie of Westphalia, and there taking vpon him the state of a king, was hardly after three yeares siege by the imperiall armie thence remoued. And by the selfe same [ G] meanes Hierome Sauanarola a preacher, incited by Anthonie Soderin, vppon the con∣tention which happened among the inhabitants at Florence, about the estate, so much preuailed with his persuasions vnto the people, as that hee translated the soueraigntie from the nobilitie vnto the people, and chaunged the Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate. No otherwise than had before Ephialtes, by the setting on of Pericles by his seditious orations, drawne vnto the people the soueraigntie of that state, taken from the Senat of the Areopagi; and so made the Athenian estate of all others the most Popular. And to be briefe, we haue seene all Germany in armes, and an hundred thou∣sand men slaine in lesse than in a yeare space, after that the mutinous preachers had stir∣red vp the people against the nobilitie. How often hath the speeches of preachers bene [ H] heard, tending by all meanes to haue incited the princes and people to kill, massacre, & burne their subiects: as did in auntient time Nestorius, preaching before the emperor at Constantinople in this sort, Giue me emperour, the earth void of heretikes, and I will giue thee heauen: destroy with me the heretikes, and I with thee wil ruinat the power of the Per∣sians: for which he was called the Fire maker: For had the emperour giuen credence vnto him, he had so put to death the greatest part, and almost all his subiects, and Ne∣storius himselfe first of all. Wherefore a knife is not more daungerous in the hand of a* 1.322 mad man, than eloquence in the mouth of a mutinous Orator. And yet neuerthelesse it is a meane for them which will well vse it, to reduce the people from barbarisme to hu∣manitie, to reforme disordered maners, to correct the lawes, to chastice tyrants, to cast [ I] out vices, to maintaine vertue. And as men charme the Aspis, Vipers, and Serpents, by certaine words; euen so the Orators (as Plato saith) by the sweetnesse of their eloquent persuations, charme euen the most sauage and cruell people. Neither is there any other* 1.323 greater or better means for the appeasing of seditions & tumults, and to keepe the sub∣iects in the obedience of their princes, than to haue a wise and vertuous preacher, by whom they may bend and bow the hearts of the most stubborne rebels, especially in a Popular estate, wherein the ignorant people beareth the sway, and cannot possibly bee kept in order but by the eloquent Orators: which for this cause haue alwayes holden the chiefe degree of honour & power in such Popular estates, causing the honourable charges & commissions, gifts and rewards, to be still giuen to whom they saw good: so [ K] that in briefe both peace & war, arms and laws, wholy depended on the pleasure of the Orators. And so to the contrarie, there is nothing more to be dreaded in a tyrant, than the Orator which hath the bent of the peoples bow, and is in credit & estimation with them, especially if he hate the tyrant, or his Tyrannicall gouernment. But forasmuch as the rules by vs alreadie set downe, ought to bee applied vnto the nature of Common∣weals, and that the Commonweals, laws & customs, are likewise to bee fitted vnto the nature & disposition of euery nation. Let vs now also speake of the nature of al people, as of a thing most necessary for the good gouernment of Estates and Commonweales.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The beginning of Common∣weals.
• * 1.2

  The florishing estate of com∣monweales en∣dure not long.
• * 1.3

  What the con∣uersion and change of a Commonweale is.
• * 1.4

  The age of a Commonweale how it is to be measured.
• * 1.5

  Kings which made the Ro∣mans their heires.
• * 1.6

  Diuers changes of common∣weales.
• * 1.7

  The naturall change or fall of a Common∣weale.
• * 1.8

  The most plea∣sing and easie change of a Commonweale.
• * 1.9

  Six perfect con∣uersions or chan∣ges of Common∣weales.
• * 1.10

  Vnperfect chan∣ges of Com∣monweale.
• * 1.11

  A Common∣weale sometime holden in sus∣pence.
• * 1.12

  An Anarchie.
• * 1.13

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 27.
• * 1.14

  A meere Anar∣chie the verie ruine of a Com∣monweale.
• * 1.15

  Commonweales sometime toge∣ther with the people vtterly extinguished.
• * 1.16

  A thing vnto Monarchies speciall.
• * 1.17

  An Heremite a∣gainst his will chosen and crow∣ned king of Tri∣polis.
• * 1.18

  Some common∣weales euen in their beginning destroyed.
• * 1.19

  When the flou∣rishing estate of a commonweale is.
• * 1.20

  The florishing estate of the Ro∣maine common∣weale to haue bene in the time of Papirius Cursor
• * 1.21

  The excellencie and perfection of a commonweale how it is to be deemed.
• * 1.22

  The Romain•…•… commonweale at the highest in the time of Traian the emperor, and yet not then in the greatest per∣fection.
• * 1.23

  The causes of the changes of com∣monweales.
• * 1.24

  The first monar∣chies to haue ta∣ken their begin∣nings from opres∣sion and tyrannie.
• * 1.25

  The beginning of Aristocraties.
• * 1.26

  The greatest ho∣nors and offices euen in Popular estates still be∣stowed vpon the nobilitie and richer sort of the people.
• * 1.27

  A monarchie of all estates most sure and durable.
• * 1.28

  Vnto most cruell tirants oftentimes succede most iust and vpright princes.
• * 1.29

  Princes natures much altered by soueraigntie.
• * 1.30

  The fairest be∣ginnings of prin∣ces raignes proue not alwaies the best.
• * 1.31

  Why there be so fewe vertuous princes?
• * 1.32

  Euil princes euen for their fathers vertues often∣times of their subiects beloued.
• * 1.33

  A new prince without great vertues hardly to maintaine his estate.
• * 1.34

  That is nine hun∣dred Thousand crownes.
• * 1.35

  Couetousnesse, crueltie, and the voluptuous liues of princes, often∣times the causes of the change or ruine of their estates.
• * 1.36

  Voluptuousnesse more daungerous vnto a prince than crueltie.
• * 1.37

  Extreme crueltie oftentimes cause of the change of the princes estate
• * 1.38

  Rewards still gi∣uen vnto the kil∣lers of tyrants▪
• * 1.39

  Some for desire of reuenge▪ and some for the de∣sire of honor and the deliuerance of their countrie, to haue procured the tyrants deat•…•… and so the chang∣ing of the estate▪
• * 1.40

  Force and feare, things necessarie for a new prince, for the mainte∣nance of his •…•…state.
• * 1.41

  The notable wis∣dome of Augu∣stus in his go∣uernment, for the establishing of his estate.
• * 1.42

  How Aristocra∣ties or Popular estates are chan∣ged into Monar∣chies.
• * 1.43

  Master of the forces, Master of the Estate.
• * 1.44

  Orders necessary for the mainte∣nance of Aristo∣cratique and po∣pular common∣weale.
• * 1.45

  To chaunge the lawes and ordi∣nances concer∣ning the magi∣strats time, or to prorogue his charge, a thing most dangerous in an Aristocra∣tique or Popular Commonweale.
• * 1.46

  Wonderfull bribes giuen by Caesar in aspi∣ring to the es∣tate.
• * 1.47

  Aristocratique and Popular Commonweals still ruinated by the subiects, ha∣uing too much power commit∣ted vnto them.
• * 1.48

  The mutuall chaunge of a popular estate into an Aristo∣cratie, and of an Aristocratie in∣to a Popular estate.
• * 1.49

  Nothing more profitable for the preserua∣tion of a Po∣pular estate than warres.
• * 1.50

  Popular estates most commonly to chaunge into Monarchies.
• * 1.51

  Tyrannicall go∣uernments most commonly to chaunge into po∣pular estates.
• * 1.52

  The •…•…ickelnesse of the people of∣tentimes cause of the change of the estate.
• * 1.53

  The fickle and turbulent estate of the Florentines
• * 1.54

  Antoninus Pog∣gius M•…•…biauel∣lus.
• * 1.55

  Discord amongst themselues daun∣gerous vnto the gouernours of an Aristocratie.
• * 1.56

  Multitude of straungers in an Aristocratie daungerous.
• * 1.57

  The number of the inhabitants of Venice in the yeare 1555.
• * 1.58

  The change of popular estates into Aristocraties of all others most gentle and quiet.
• * 1.59

  Aristocraties by some great ou•…•…r throwe of the no∣bilitie oftentimes chaunged into popular estates.
• * 1.60

  Monarchies hard∣ly chaunged for the losse of the nobilitie.
• * 1.61

  Ambition and the vnworthie be∣stowing of the great preferments of the common∣weale, thinges most daungerous to an Aristocrati•…•…
• * 1.62

  Discord among the nobilitie a thing most daun∣gerous to the sta•…•…
• * 1.63

  Small matters of∣tentimes the caus•…•… of great chaunges in commonweals.
• * 1.64

  Great men hardly to be called in question to giue an account of their doinges, without the daun∣ger of the estate.
• * 1.65

  How daungerous a matter it is in e∣uerie common∣weale to bannish a great man.
• * 1.66

  This was the Ostracisme ba∣nishment.
• * 1.67

  Great men en•…•…∣mies vnto the estate, are either to be slaine, or by great kindnes to be made therunto faithfull friends.
• * 1.68

  Small Common∣weales more sub∣iect vnto change than great.
• * 1.69

  Small occasions serue to raise great dissenti∣on amongst ci∣tisens, and so the change of the estate.
• * 1.70

  Commonweales most often chan∣ged or ouer∣throwme by for∣rein princes, ta∣king the aduan∣tage of the ciuill discord of the subiects amongst themselues.
• * 1.71

  A Monarchie not so easily changed or ouerthrowne, as is an Aristo∣cratie or Popu∣lar Common∣weale.
• * 1.72

  The resolution of Francis the French king, be∣ing prisoner to the Emperour Charles the fift.
• * 1.73

  The insensible change of es∣tates best and most tollerable.
• * 1.74

  The insensible •…•…stanging of the Venetian estate, and of the state of the German Em∣pire.
• * 1.75

  Kingdomes go∣ing by election and so indeede but A•…•…istocraties, long continued in one familie, ea∣sily chaunge at length into Mo∣narchies as by succession dis∣cending.
• * 1.76

  The most daun∣gerous chaunge of a Monarchie.
• * 1.77

  These noble fa∣milies are nowe also al or most of them extingui∣shed and come to nought.
• * 1.78

  Mans will still mutable, and God his iudgments inscrutable, af∣foord no meane for man by thē to foresee the chan∣ges and ruines of Commonweales.
• * 1.79

  God his inmedi∣ate iudgment most su•…•…den and most dreadfull.
• * 1.80

  By what naturall causes the ch•…•…n∣ges and ruines of Commonweales are to be foresee•…•…
• * 1.81

  Ps•…•…l 10•…•…. Leuit. 27. Iob. 12.
• * 1.82

  Astrologicall pre dictions, not to derogat from the maiestie and power of God.
• * 1.83

  Nothing done by the necessitie of nature, it selfe be ing still subiect to the power of God:
• * 1.84

  Esay. 19.
• * 1.85

  All worldly things still sub∣iect to mutabili∣tie and change.
• * 1.86

  The notable •…•…∣tors of the Astro∣logers
• * 1.87

  The sunne in the creation of the world to haue bene in the sign•…•… Libra. Exod. 23. ver. 16 Exod. 11. ver. •…•…
• * 1.88

  The world to haue taken be∣ginning in Au∣tumne.
• * 1.89

  The auntient Ro maines to haue begun the yeare in September.
• * 1.90

  Astrological pre∣dictions vn∣certen.
• * 1.91

  The rising or fal∣ling of common∣weales not to be iudged or deemed of by the foun∣dation of the townes or cities therein.
• * 1.92

  Taruntius Firmi∣anus deceiued in his horoscope or figure of the foundation of Rome.
• * 1.93

  Cardan his error detected and his opinion reiected.
• * 1.94

  The errour of Peter Cardinall of Arliac.
• * 1.95

  How a man may without offence presage the chaunges of Ci∣ties and Com∣monweales.
• * 1.96

  Ioh. 39. and 40.
• * 1.97

  Vaine feares of∣ten times con∣ceiued, vpon As∣trologers vaine predictions.
• * 1.98

  Genes. 7.
• * 1.99

  The vanitie of the Chaldean Astrologers.
• * 1.100

  The triplicities of the caelestiall signes not to be determinatly as∣signed vnto cer∣taine regions and countries, as the Astrologers ap∣poynt.
• * 1.101

  The ieast of Cas∣sius vnto a Calde∣an Astrologer.
• * 1.102

  The coniuncti∣ons of the superi∣or Planets to haue oftentimes wrought great effects for the al∣teration and changing of Commonweales.
• * 1.103

  The errour of Leouicius.
• * 1.104

  The opinion of the learned He∣brues concerning the consumation of the world.
• * 1.105

  By what order and meane some more certain and probable coniec∣ture might be made of the chaunges and ru∣ines of common∣weales.
• * 1.106

  The greatest and most notable chaunges of es∣tates and Com∣monweales to haue commonly hapned in the moneth of Sep∣tember.
• * 1.107

  What times of the yeare the no∣table chaunces and chaunges of the world most commonly hap∣pen in.
• * 1.108

  Leouicius taxed.
• * 1.109

  Great and marue∣lous effects wrought by the coniunction of the superior Planets.
• * 1.110

  The opinion of Copernicus con∣cerning the mo∣tion & influence: of the earth, re∣futed.
• * 1.111

  The most darke and obscur•…•… opi∣nion of Plato concerning the chaunges and ruines of Com∣monweales.
• * 1.112

  Nothing more obscure than the Platonical num∣bers.
• * 1.113

  The true discord which indeedma∣ryeth the sweet harmonie of a Commonweale.
• * 1.114

  Musike to be of great force, for the chaunging or maintaining of a Common∣weale.
• * 1.115

  Musique most honored in At∣•…•…hadia.
• * 1.116

  Light musike forbidden in the primatiue church
• * 1.117

  Numbers to be of greatforce, what∣by to deeme the chaunge and ru∣ine of a Com∣monweale.
• * 1.118

  The eight booke of Plato de Re∣pub. most diffi∣cult and obscure.
• * 1.119

  [illustration]

  Sesquitertia i•…•… that which con∣taineth all that an other thing doth, and a third part more.
• * 1.120

  Obscuritie by Plato and many the auntient wri∣ters of purpose in their writings affected.
• * 1.121

  Plato discouered and in some sort refuted.
• * 1.122

  Faciamus ho∣minem: Or let vs make man.
• * 1.123

  The foure perfect numbers within an hundred thou∣sand, are 6. 496. 6•…•…8▪ and 8128.
• * 1.124

  Perfect numbers aboue an hun∣dred thousand: 130811, 2096128, 33550336. 536814528.
• * 1.125

  Plato vainely to attribute the per∣fect or euen numbers vnto heauenly things.
• * 1.126

  The numbers of seauen and nine to be of great force in the chaunge of worldly things.
• * 1.127

  Hippocrat. de partis septimestri.
• * 1.128

  The number of sixe to be of great power in the femaile sexe, and the number of seauen in the maile kind.
• * 1.129

  The seuenth day of all others most blessed.
• * 1.130

  The clymacteri∣call yeare of 63, most commonly fatall vnto old men.
• * 1.131

  Great learned men which dyed at the 93. yeare of their age.
• * 1.132

  The seauenth and ninth yeares still daungerous or fatall vnto old men; and the sixt yeare vn∣to women.
• * 1.133

  The Saboath or Seauenth day of all other daies the most blessed.
• * 1.134

  What a perfect number is?
• * 1.135

  * In lib. de oppi•…•…i∣cto Dei.
• * 1.136

  In somnio scipio∣nis.
• * 1.137

  But four perfect numbers from one to an hun∣dred thousand.
• * 1.138

  The number 469▪ the onely perfect number which can well bee applied vnto the changes of cities and Com∣monweales.
• * 1.139

  The numbers of seauen and nine fatall vnto Com∣monweales.
• * 1.140

  Chap 24.
• * 1.141

  The number per∣fect of 496 a number proper vnto the chaun∣•…•…es of Commōn∣weales.
• * 1.142

  The number of sixe to be vnto women fatall.
• * 1.143

  In his booke: De Methode his∣toriarum.
• * 1.144

  Hier. 2•…•…. & Daniel 9.
• * 1.145

  A good discou•…•… of Daniel his seauentie weeks.
• * 1.146

  Iosephus. Funccius. Mercator. Philo.
• * 1.147

  In meth•…•…do 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.148

  Chap. •…•….
• * 1.149

  Chap. •…•….
• * 1.150

  * Chap. 23.
• * 1.151

  How it is lawfull for a man to gesse at the rising and falling of a Com∣mon wealth.
• * 1.152

  Wise men not to be subiect vnto the power or in∣fluence of the starres, as sensual men be.
• * 1.153

  The mine of a Commonweale to be by the wis∣dome of the go∣uernour preuen∣ted, or •…•…ls war∣ning thereof to be by him in d•…•…e time giuen vnto his subiects.
• * 1.154

  Wisdome neuer discouraged with the daungers of the Common∣weale: so long as they see the state wisely and dis∣•…•… gouerned.
• * 1.155

  What opinion wise men had of the distressed es∣tate of the Ro∣maine Common∣wealea, f•…•…et the great ouerthrowe at Cannas.
• * 1.156

  The first rule for the keeping and preseruing of Commonweales in their estates.
• * 1.157

  Violent remedies neuer to be vsed but in desperat•…•… diseases.
• * 1.158

  A notable ques∣tion.
• * 1.159

  Auntient lawes though worse still of greater esteeme and re∣uerence than the new though better.
• * 1.160

  Auntient lawes concerning the estate of a Com∣monweale not to be without great daunger altered.
• * 1.161

  The extreame daunger he was in, which moued any new law a∣mongst the Lo∣crensians.
• * 1.162

  Lawes concer∣ning ordinarie pollicie may of∣t•…•…ntimes be changed but not lawes concer∣ning the estate.
• * 1.163

  The chiefe lawe of all Common∣weales.
• * 1.164

  No lawe so sa∣cred but that vp∣on vrgent neces∣sitie it is to be chaunged▪
• * 1.165

  Better to suffer euill lawes by lit∣tle and little to growe out of vse; then vpon the soden with daun∣ger to abrogate them all at once▪
• * 1.166

  Neither are old lawes to be alto∣gether sodenly without daunger abrogated: or newe lawes rash∣ly •…•…stablished.
• * 1.167

  Dangerous for a prince vpon the soden to displace or caste offe the anntient seruitor of his predeces∣sours, or great magistrats of the estate.
• * 1.168

  All alterations of lawes or other great matters in a Commonweale are best to be made by little and little.
• * 1.169

  The wise course taken of Charles the IX for the abating of the infinite number of officers in the Commonweale.
• * 1.170

  Not good for a prince to vse the greatnesse of his power in displa∣cing of the great officers of his realme and state.
• * 1.171

  Religeous houses with great wis∣dome quietly suppressed at Ba∣sill and Coire.
• * 1.172

  The best and su∣rest way for the suppressing of a tyrant.
• * 1.173

  The wise polititi∣an in the go∣uernment of the estate is to imi∣tate the works of God in nature who by litle and litle bringeth great things to perfection.
• * 1.174

  Reasons to show that magistrats ought not to be perpetuall.
• * 1.175

  Rewards for ver∣tue ought to be vnto all men common.
• * 1.176

  The root of se∣dition is by all meanes to be cut vp in a Com∣monweale which can hardly be where magistrats and officers be perpetuall.
• * 1.177

  Perpetuitie of offices the caus•…•… of impunitie of the great officers.
• * 1.178

  Great magistrat•…•… and officers in doubt to be cal∣led to account where they are but annuall.
• * 1.179

  Euill magistrats most commonly hold together.
• * 1.180

  That •…•…o man should be a iudg in his owne countrie.
• * 1.181

  The ordinarie iudges in Italie straungers.
• * 1.182

  Lib. 7.
• * 1.183

  The great office•…•… and preferments of the Common∣weale giuen in perpetuitie bree∣deth a carelesnes of the Common good both in the magistrats them∣selues and others
• * 1.184

  One man to haue many offices and especially in per∣petuitie, not good for the Commonweale.
• * 1.185

  Old m•…•…n in dan∣ger to be thrust off the bridges.
• * 1.186

  Ambitious men neuer satisfied with honors, of∣tentimes the cause of great trobles in a Com∣monweale.
• * 1.187

  Continuation of great offices of∣tentimes the cause of the change of the estate.
• * 1.188

  Great inconueni∣ences ensuing by making of offices and dignities he∣reditarie.
• * 1.189

  The great incon∣ueniences ensu∣ing of hauing the offices in a Commonweale still annuall or changable.
• * 1.190

  The reason why Tiberius the Emperor would not haue the great officers often chaunged.
• * 1.191

  New lords new lawes.
• * 1.192

  Two great errors oftentimes com∣mitted in the go∣uernment of Commonweales.
• * 1.193

  Michael hospita∣lis chauncelour of France.
• * 1.194

  Commonweales in nature contra∣rie, by contrarie meanes to be also maintained.
• * 1.195

  Annuall magi∣strats best in a popular Com∣monweale.
• * 1.196

  The pollicie and craft of tyrants.
• * 1.197

  The magistrats in a royall mo∣narchie some per∣petuall and some annuall.
• * 1.198

  That the colle∣ges and compa∣nies of iudges ought to be pe•…•…∣tuall.
• * 1.199

  Better many iud∣ges then one alone.
• * 1.200

  Good that infe∣riour Magistrats & officers should be perpetuall.
• * 1.201

  That Senators and Counsellors of estate ought to be stìll perpetual.
• * 1.202

  Lib. de Legibus Cap. 174.
• * 1.203

  A generall and necessarie rule to be kept in euery Com∣monweale.
• * 1.204

  No lawe so good but that it draw∣eth after it some discommoditie.
• * 1.205

  That a good law is not to be chan∣ged for some one discommoditie ensuing thereof.
• * 1.206

  Dangerous to change all the cheife magi∣strats of a Com∣monweale at once.
• * 1.207

  That offices in a royal Monar∣chie are rather to be bestowed by order of law, than by the Princes will & pleasure onely.
• * 1.208

  The erection of the parliament of Paris.
• * 1.209

  The giuing of offices during the princes pleasure not to be discom∣mended.
• * 1.210

  That in euery commonweale there ought to be some estates and magistrats perpe∣petuall.
• * 1.211

  Reasons to show that magistrats ought to be at v∣n tie and concord among them∣selues.
• * 1.212

  Contrary reasons to show that it is good for the Commonweale, that magistrats should be at dis∣cord and vari∣ance among themselues.
• * 1.213

  The fruit of •…•…oes.
• * 1.214

  Lib. •…•….
• * 1.215

  The resolution of the former que∣stion.
• * 1.216

  That the num∣ber of the soue∣raigne magistrats in a Common∣weale should still be odd.
• * 1.217

  The contention of the great ma∣gistrats most dangerous in a popular Com∣monweale: and their too great friendship to be no lesse perilous also.
• * 1.218

  Philip. 2.
• * 1.219

  Kings first establi∣shed to iudge his subiects.
• * 1.220

  Reasons to show that princes themselues in person ought to administer iustice vnto their sub∣iects.
• * 1.221

  The great good that ensueth whē princes in person themselues do iu∣stice vnto their subiects.
• * 1.222

  Examples of great Princes, who themselues in person admi∣nistred iustice vnto their sub∣iects.
• * 1.223

  A notable exam∣ple of the great emperour Adrian for the doing of a poore old woman iustice.
• * 1.224

  To be necessarie for a prince to vnderstand of the affaires of estate.
• * 1.225

  Reasons to show that it is not meet for princes themselues in person to admini∣ster iustice vnto their subiects.
• * 1.226

  Such a prince, such a people.
• * 1.227

  That an euill prince ought not much to come a∣broad for the peo∣ple to imitat his vices.
• * 1.228

  The subiects still •…•…eadier to imitate the vices than the vertues of the prince.
• * 1.229

  600 Crownes.
• * 1.230

  Princes of all o∣thers most hard∣ly to counterfeit vertues, or to dis∣semble their vices
• * 1.231

  Too much fami∣liarity of a prince with his subiects; not good: and al∣wayes to be seene of them in his maiestie, a thing vnto them dread∣full.
• * 1.232

  How princes are to behaue them∣selues, to be of their subiects both beloued and fea•…•…ed.
• * 1.233

  How a prince is to frame his counte∣nance and speech when he showeth himselfe vnto the people.
• * 1.234

  The maner of the kings of Borney.
• * 1.235

  How a prince ought but sel∣dome times to conuerse with his subiects.
• * 1.236

  How the danger least a prince should be dispos∣sessed of his e∣state by him whom he putteth in trust for the mannaging of his affaires, is to be preuented.
• * 1.237

  Iustice better to be administred by good and suffici∣ent magistrats, than by the prince himselfe.
• * 1.238

  An hard charges∣ble, and daunge∣rous matter, for subiects to prose∣cute their suits before the prince.
• * 1.239

  Why the office to iudge and de∣cide matters, a thing proper vn∣to the au•…•…tiene kings, now be∣longeth vnto ma∣gistrats and judges.
• * 1.240

  Not good for a loue•…•…gne prince how sufficient so∣euer, to sit in iudgement him∣selfe, for feare of too much lenitie, or else seu: ritie▪ to the peruerting of iustice.
• * 1.241

  Nothing more contrary vnto true iustice, than lenitie and piti•…•….
• * 1.242

  The people in a Popular estate easily moued vn∣to pitie.
• * 1.243

  A most hard thing for a soue∣raigne prince sit∣ting himselfe in iudgement, to keepe a meane betwixt too much lenitie and seueritie.
• * 1.244

  The most strange & extreame cru∣eltie of Caligula the emperour.
• * 1.245

  The best and su∣rest meanes for the maintenance of a prince in his estate, is by all good meanes to procure the loue of his subiects: and how the same is to be ob∣tained.
• * 1.246

  Not lawfull for the French king to be in person assistant in the triall of a prince or peere accused of treason.
• * 1.247

  The king ought n•…•…t to be judge, where he is him∣selfe a partie, as in matters concer∣ning his owne interest.
• * 1.248

  A vaine obiecti∣on for the short∣ning of suits, if the prince him∣selfe in person take vpon him the administrati∣on of iustice.
• * 1.249

  The quicker iu∣stice not alwayes the better.
• * 1.250

  Causes worthy & well beseeming the princes hea∣ring & deciding.
• * 1.251

  Claudius the em∣perour derided for taking vppon him the deciding of common cau∣ses and matters.
• * 1.252

  The great care that a prince should haue of himselfe, which would oftentimes •…•…it in iudgement, or much show himselfe, and espe∣cially vnto stran∣gers.
• * 1.253

  That princes ought seldome to come to an enteruiew of their persons.
• * 1.254

  The people v•…•…fie to iudge of mat∣ters.
• * 1.255

  That the Senat or Magistrats are not to be depri∣ued of their au∣thoritie & power to haue the sam•…•… giuen to the prince.
• * 1.256

  The Popular Commonweale not to be the best maintained by the most Popular lawes.
• * 1.257

  The best ordered Commonwealth
• * 1.258

  The foolish say∣ing of Caligula.
• * 1.259

  All factions and part-takings dan gerous vnto Commonweales▪
• * 1.260

  Seditions and fa∣ctions dangerous euen for Tyranni∣call gouernments
• * 1.261

  An especiall be∣nefit a Monarch hath aboue other Commonweales.
• * 1.262

  Priuat factions how they are to be suppressed.
• * 1.263

  Factions and con∣spiracies against the prince or estate, how they are to be repressed and the conspira∣tors punished.
• * 1.264

  That in a conspi∣racie it is not good to make too strait enquiry to find out all the conspirators.
• * 1.265

  Torture for the finding out of conspirators ought to be most warily vsed.
• * 1.266

  Conspirators pre∣uented to haue oftentimes bene right wisely dis∣sembled, and not farther enquired after.
• * 1.267

  Princes often∣times better to vnderstand of the conspiracies a∣gainst 〈◊〉〈◊〉 prin∣ces, than of such as are against themselues at Rome contriued.
• * 1.268

  1552.
• * 1.269

  Conspiracies hard to be concesl•…•…d, being oft times •…•… euen by women reuealed.
• * 1.270

  The most dange∣rous conspiracie that can be a∣gainst the person of a prince, and the hardest to b•…•…e auoyded.
• * 1.271

  Of small sparkes oft times do arise the great flames and fiers of sedi∣tion.
• * 1.272

  That the quarrels of great men ought euen in the beginning to be wisely appea∣sed, or by force of the prince sup∣pressed.
• * 1.273

  A wise part of Archidamus in making of two great enemies friends.
• * 1.274

  The craft of ty∣rants in setting other m•…•…n toge∣ther by the eares, sometime daun∣gerous vnto themselues.
• * 1.275

  The obligation of wicked and desperat men grounded vppon some norable vil∣lanie, in all Com∣monweales most daungerous, and how to be sup∣pressed.
• * 1.276

  How a soueraign prince is to end the quarrels and controuersies that are betwixt the nobilitie.
• * 1.277

  Dangerous for a prince not to shew himselfe in∣different in the quarrels and con∣trouersies of his great subiects.
• * 1.278

  When, and how a soueraigne prince is to vse his force for the appealing of the controuersies and quarrels betwixt his great subiects
• * 1.279

  The beginning of combats.
• * 1.280

  Combats when to be admitted.
• * 1.281

  Combats by di∣uers great prin∣ces forbidden, & for the auoiding of greater incon∣ueniences by them again•…•… al∣lowed.
• * 1.282

  Of the lie giuen, what is to be thought.
• * 1.283

  How, and for what cause com∣bats are to be granted.
• * 1.284

  Combats nor to be admitted for the quarrels and contentions be∣twixt families.
• * 1.285

  Seditions arising for the execution of iustice, how they are to be preuented.
• * 1.286

  Nothing more hurtfull vnto a warlike people than peace.
• * 1.287

  Seditions in a Popular Com∣monweale of all others most dan∣gerous, and how to be appeased.
• * 1.288

  That the people vp in tumult or sedition, is not by strong hand or open force to be stai•…•…d or appeased
• * 1.289

  The hungry belly hath no eares.
• * 1.290

  The wisedome of Pericles to draw the common peo ple of Athens to vnderstand rea∣son.
• * 1.291

  How, and when the people is to be flattered.
• * 1.292

  Force neuer to be vsed against the people, where faire meanes may preuaile.
• * 1.293

  The commenda∣ble deceit of Pa∣•…•…uius, to deceiue the angry people.
• * 1.294

  The mutinous people best ap∣peased by the good persuasion of some good old vertuous perso∣nage.
• * 1.295

  Peter Lored an a most notable ci∣tisen.
• * 1.296

  The reuerend feare of religion a good meane for the appeasing of the seditious people.
• * 1.297

  Seditions some∣times appeased by the interposi∣tion and media∣tion of friends.
• * 1.298

  Nothing more daungerous vnto a prince, than in seditions to make himselfe a partie.
• * 1.299

  It is daungerous to call that into question which ought to be hol∣den as resolued vpon.
• * 1.300

  Religion once re∣ceiued and setled, to be no more called into que∣stion or doubt.
• * 1.301

  * Lib. 3.
• * 1.302

  Disputations of religion dange∣rous.
• * 1.303

  Lib. 6. De mili∣tari ac domestica Romanorum dis∣iplina.
• * 1.304

  The power of religion.
• * 1.305

  Religion not to be enforced.
• * 1.306

  How a prince wel assured of the truth of his reli∣gion is to draw his subiects ther∣unto, being ther∣fo•…•…e diuided into sects and factions
• * 1.307

  No man to b•…•… compelled a∣gainst his will to beleeue.
• * 1.308

  To forbid men the priuat exer∣cise of their reli∣gion, is to make them oftentime•…•… to become Atheists.
• * 1.309

  Baruc•…•….
• * 1.310

  〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.311

  Atheisme worse than the greatest Superstition.
• * 1.312

  Why many sects better agree in a Commonweale than two onely.
• * 1.313

  Whether Solons law for part-ta∣king▪ as that eue∣ry man should be of necessitie bound to take ei∣ther the one o•…•… the other part in time of sedition, be good and pro∣fitable vnto Com∣monweals or not
• * 1.314

  The daungerous estate of them that stand as neu∣ters in time of se∣dition.
• * 1.315

  Prouerb. 4.
• * 1.316

  The vse of belles, why in many countries forbid∣den.
• * 1.317

  The best and su∣rest way to pre∣uent sedition.
• * 1.318

  The common wearing of wea∣pons in a peacea∣ble Common∣weale, the occasi∣on of many euils.
• * 1.319

  Impunitie of of∣fendors to draw after it ruine of estates.
• * 1.320

  The immoderat libertie of speech giuen vnto Ora∣tors a great cause of seditions and rebellions.
• * 1.321

  The force and power of elo∣quence.
• * 1.322

  Eloquence in an euill man as dan∣gerous, as a sword in a mad mans hand.
• * 1.323

  A wise, vertuous, and eloquent preacher, of all others the fittest man to appease rebellions, and to keepe the people in obedience to their prince.