The six bookes of a common-weale. VVritten by I. Bodin a famous lawyer, and a man of great experience in matters of state. Out of the French and Latine copies, done into English, by Richard Knolles

CHAP. V. ¶ Whether the vnitie and concord of Magistrats amongst themselues bee good and wholesome for the Commonweale, or not?

THis question, viz. Whether it be good that the magistrats and offi∣cers of a Commonweale should be of accord, or els at discord and va∣riance among themselues? may perhaps seeme altogether needlesse and vaine. For who euer doubted but that it was alwaies expedient, yea and necessarie too, that the Magistrats in euerie Commonweale [ D] * 1.1 should be of one and the same mind? to the end that they all together might with one consent and heart embrace and seeke after the publike good: And if so it be (as wise men haue alwaies thought) that a well ordered Commonweale ought to resemble a mans bodie, wherein all the members are vnited and conioyned with a maruellous bond, euerie one of them doing their office and dutie; and yet neuerthe∣lesse when need is, one of them still aideth another, one of them releeueth another; and so all together strengthen themselues, to maintaine the health, beautie, and welfare of the whole bodie: but if it should happen them to enter into hatred one of them against another; and that the one hand should cut the other, or the right foot supplant [ E] the left, and that the fingers should scrape out the eyes, and so euerie member should draw vnto it selfe the nourishment of the other next vnto it; it must needs fall out, that the bodie in the end must become maimed, lame, and impotent, in all the actions ther∣of: euen so in like manner may a man deeme of the estate of a Commonweale, the ho∣nour and welfare whereof dependeth of the mutuall loue and good will of the subiects among themselues, as also toward their soueraigne prince. Which sweet vnitie and agreement how is it to be hoped for, if the magistrats which are the principall subiects▪ and such as ought by their example to bind together the rest, be at variance and discord among themselues? But euen to the contrarie the subiects shall become partakers of the factions of the magistrats, they first nourishing secret grudges, and afterward open

enmitie, vntill that at length all breake out into open ciuill warre, all for the mainte∣nance [ F] and vpholding euerie one of them of the chiefe of their factions, to the destructi∣on of the Commonweale: or in case stay be made thereof, and that things fall not out altogether so euill, yet must still publike actions by such ambitious discord of the magi∣strats be hindred, and the Commonweale sore troubled: whereunto it shall happen as it doth vnto a maid, for whome (as Plutarch saith) her suters enter into such a ielousie and passion, as that desiring euerie one of them to haue her to himselfe, they so in stead of louing and embracing of her, most cruelly rent her in peeces amongst them. And what good successe may a man expect of an armie, or what victorie is to bee hoped for ouer the enemie, where the captaines and commaunders are at discord among them∣selues? or what iustice is to be looked for, where the judges are diuided into factions? [ G] Yea it hath bene oftentimes seene some of them to haue beene of contrarie opinions and aduise vnto others, and that vpon a verie iealousie and hatred they had among themselues, and so play as it were at hazard with the life, the goods, and honour of the subiects: as Agesilaus king of the Lacedemonians (albeit that hee was one of the most famous of them that euer was) to impaire the credit and authoritie of Lysander whome he hated, reuersed all his iudgements, and gaue sentence quite contrarie, not so much for the iniquitie of the cause (as he himselfe said) as in despight of him his enemie onely. And to make the matter short, most certaine it is, that dissentions and ciuill warres (the capitall plagues of Commonweales) take foot, root, encrease, and nourishment, of nothing more than of the hatred and enmitie of the magistrats among them∣selues. [ H] Whereof it followeth the vnitie and concord of them among thmselues to be vnto the subiects not onely profitable, but euen necessarie also. Which may all seeme right profitable arguments and reasons for the one side.

But now they which more subtilly reason of these matters, deeme to the contrarie,* 1.2 the health, and welfare of the Commonweale to be best preserued and kept by the dis∣cord of the magistrats. For why (say they) the force and nature of vertue is such, as that it cannot be contrarie vnto vertue; neither that good men, although they bee at neuer so great oddes, can yet be enemies among themselues: but being prouoked by the in∣iuries of the wicked their aduersaries, do still wel the more and more encrease and flou∣rish: neither is the valour of worthy men any where more euident and manifest, than [ I] when they without bitternesse contend among themselues; and so prickt forward with an honest ambition, and enflamed with the heat of men like vnto themselues, as with a fire, are by the emulation of their competitors incited to take in hand great matters, and so still to ouercome their enemies in well doing. So when Taxilas king of the Indians had by his ambassadours freely and without resistance offered his kingdome vnto Ale∣xander the Great, (then bearing downe all the kingdomes of the East before him) if so be he wanted wealth; and withall refused not to receiue wealth also at his hands, if hee had of it too much: Alexander glad of such a match, said vnto him, If we must thus contend and combat together, it shall neuer be said, that you shall take this point of ho∣nour from me, as to be accounted more magnificall, more courteous, or more royall, [ K] than my selfe: and so gaue vnto him another great kingdome, with an infinit masse of treasure. In like manner Tullus Hostilius king of the Romans, said vnto Metius Suffe∣tius Dictator of the Albanians, The ciuill discords which thou obiectest vnto vs, wee deem them as profitable to our citie; for we striue together, whether of vs shall better or more ear∣nestly fight for the good of the Commonweale.

Now if contention and emulation be thus good and profitable amongst valiant & good citisens, and wholesome for Commonweales, how much more then ought it to be thought necessarie for most base and abiect men, for the stirring of them vp to ver∣tue,* 1.3

and deterring of them from vice. For of all the great profits which men vse to reap [ A] from their enemies, none is greater than so to liue as that we seeme not to exceed them in vices, or be ouercome of them in vertues. But if such discord and contention be both honourable and profitable in a citie or Commonweale, wherein the princes and magi∣strats are all good men, and striue but for vertue onely; how much more then shall the contention be profitable, where the good striue against the euill? But in case that all the magistrats be euill, then is discord and contention amongst them not onely profita∣ble, but euen necessarie also, least otherwise they beeing at vnitie and concord among themselues, and in possession of the gouernment, might freely and without feare make hauocke and spoile both of the publike and priuat affaires. In which case it cannot fall out better either for the subiects, or for the whole Commonweale, than if they by their [ B] mutuall hatred and accusations shall openly detect and lay open vnto the world, their owne filthinesse, their foule extortions and robberies, as the sheepe are neuer more as∣sured, than when the wolues deuoure one another; as it happened saith Philip Commi∣nes in England, that whilest the great lords slew or condemned one another, the poore people in the meane while remained safe from their inuasion. Which was the wise councell of Cincinnatus, seeing the Consull Appius openly to withstand the people to hinder them for the doubling the number of their Tribunes: Let be (said Cincinnatus) for the moe they shall be, the worse they will agree. And right needfull oftentimes it was the power of the Tribunes to bee broken and weakned by their owne diuision, [ C] when as by the opposition of any one of them, all the proceedings of the rest were so hindered and stayed. And truely Cincinnatus therein said wisely, for so the Common∣weale stood and flourished, the Tribunes oftentimes being at discord and varience among themselues, which (they being at vnitie and concord) would haue in a moment fallen: and so long it well stood vntil that Pub. Clodius a most wicked man, about foure hundred yeares after presented a request vnto the people, which passed into the force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That from thenceforth the opposition of one of the Tribunes should not hinder the proceeding of the rest of his fellow Tribunes. And therfore Cato the Censor, the beautie of the Romane wisedome (and one to whome was giuen the chiefe prayse for wisedome and vertue amongst the Romans) could nei∣ther [ D] endure the agreement of his seruants in his familie, nor of the Magistrats in the Commonweale, but slily and secretly still sowed hatred and sedition amongst them; that so the wicked and offendors might with their accusations as with mutuall wounds fall, and the good so gaine praise. For why, he thought it a thing almost impossible in so great an accord of slaues and of magistrats, but that the one of them should make spoile of the Commonweale, and the other of his priuat substance, especially being in hope to escape vnpunished, and our of feare for being accused. And therefore doubted not fiftie times to accuse offendors, hee himselfe being also fortie times by others accu∣sed: howbeit that he still bearing himselfe vpon the integritie of his forepassed life, and the commendable things by him done, easily auoided all the slanders by his aduersaries [ E] against him fasly surmised. Neither was that Commonweale euer after fuller of good and valiant citisens, than it was in his time. Yea the Senat of Rome allotted a great summe of money to Mar. Bibulus to buy his Consulship, and the voyces of the people, to the intent to oppose him against Caesar his knowne enemie, who had cunningly set vp Luceius his friend (whome the Senat would haue had excluded) that so hee might doe all things as he thought good, his friend and fellow in office agreeing thereunto. And not to go farther, we haue herefore the witnesse of Iulius Caesar, who in his Com∣mentaries* 1.4 saith, The Gaules to haue had a most auntient custome amongst them, to stirre vp their great lords one of them against another, to the intent that the common

people (which were as he reporteth but slaues) might so bee safe and free from their [ F] outrages and robberies. For so one of them opposing himselfe against another, and euill controlled by the good, and the wicked by themselues; there should be no doubt but that the Commonweale should so be in much more safetie and assurance, than if they were of one accord among themselues. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, the dis∣cord of princes and magistrats to haue alwaies bene vnto Commonweals wholesom: as the meane whereby the wicked (as we said) may by the vertue of the good, or their owne mutuall accusations be weakned. Which seemed a thing profitable not onely vnto the Romans, and our auncestours, but euen vnro Lycurgus the wise law giuer al∣so, who therefore himselfe set dissention betwixt the two kings of Lacedemonia, and appointed also, That there should alwaies two enemies be sent ambassadours for the [ G] state; to the intent they should not by their mutuall consent and good agreement be∣tray the Commonweale: but that being at variance, they might still one of them bee controlled by the other. As for that which is said, the parts of mans bodie which re∣present a well ordered Commonweale, to bee neuer at discord among themselues, is quite contrarie; for were not the humors of mans bodie much contrarie, a man should quickly perish: the preseruation thereof dependeth of the contrarietie of hoat & cold, of moisture and drought, of bitter choller to sweet flegme, of beastly desires to diuine reason; as also the preseruation of the whole world next vnto God dependeth of the contrarietie, which is in the whole and euery part thereof. Euen so the magistrates in [ H] a Commonweale ought in some sort to be at difference among themselues, albeit that they otherwise be right good men, for that trueth, the publike good, and that which is honest, best discouereth it selfe by that which is thereunto contrarie: and is still to bee found in the middest betwixt two extreames. And it seemeth that the Romans had this principall end before their eyes, ordinarily making choyce of their magistrats that were to bee placed in the same charge, still enemies one of them vnto another; or at leastwise of quite contrarie humors and dispositions, as is in all their histories to be seene. As when the Senat foresaw that Claudius Nero should carrie away the Con∣sulship, an hoat and sturting man, and withall a most valiant and couragious captaine to oppose against Hannibal: the Senat (I say) procured to haue ioyned vnto him for his companion or fellow in office Liuius Salinator an old captaine, and a man of [ I] great experience, but yet as cold and staid, as was the other hoat and terrible, and yet fit to heat the old age of Liuius, now a little too cold for the warres: who so ioy∣ned and vnited together, gained a most notable victorie against Hannibal, which was the ruine of the Carthaginians, and the preseruation of the Roman estate. These two men also afterwards were by the people made Censors together; who still at dis∣cord, noted one of them another of infamie, a thing neuer before seene: and yet they thus still at variance, were in all mens iudgements two of the most famous and vertuous men that then were in Rome. With like wisedome the Romans ioyned to∣gether Pabius Maximus, and Marcus Marcellus, in their warres against Hannibal, both of them right great and most expert captaines, but the one of them being a cold, and [ K] the other an exceeding hoat man; the one alway still desirous of battell, and the other still seeking for delay; the one called the Roman Sword, and the other the Bucklet; the one a fierce warrier, and the other a long lingerer: by which contrarie humors of these two so great personages the estate was not onely preserued from ruine and destruction, which must needs otherwise vndoubtedly haue ensued, but farre and wide enlarged also. If then the emulation and discord of the most vertuous magistrats be so profita∣ble vnto a Commonweale, what then is to bee hoped for, when the good magistrats shall oppose themselues against the wicked?

And these reasons may on both sides seeme probable, but what in trueth is to bee [ A] * 1.5 resolued vpon, is not so easie to iudge which to do, not onely the qualitie of the magi∣strats themselues, but the diuers formes of Commonweales, is to bee also considered. And yet I suppose, that in euerie kind of Commonweale it is good that the inferiour magistrats and officers, being vnder the power and authoritie of the greater, should stil be at variance and discord among themselues, and that more in a Popular estate than in any other: For that the people hauing none but the magistrats to gouerne them, is most easie to be pilled and polled, if the magistrats bee not one of them by another controlled. And in a Monarchie it is expedient also, that euen the greatest magistrats should sometime be at oddes, considering that there is a soueraine prince to chastise and correct them; so that hee bee not mad, furious, or a child, or one otherwise sub∣iect [ B] vnto another mans power. But in an Aristocratike or Popular Commonweale it is most daungerous, that the great magistrats should bee at discord among them∣selues, and that especially if they bee not good men, who neuer haue any such con∣tention or debate amongst them, as may hurt the estate or Commonweale: but such as was the honourable difference betwixt Scipio Affricanus, the elder, and Fa∣bius Maximus: betwixt Scipio the younger, and Cato; betwixt Liuius and his com∣panion Nero; or the contention of Lepidus with Fuluius, of Marcus Scaurus with Catulus; or of Themistocles with Aristides: whose notable contention for vertues sake was alwayes vnto the Commonweale wholesome. But if the greatest magi∣strats in a Popular estate bee euill and wicked men, or that their ambition be founded [ C] vppon an euill ground, it is then daungerous least that their differences bee cause of ciuill warres; as it happened betwixt Marius and Scylla, betwixt Caesar and Pompey, Augustus and Marke Anthonie, Thucidides and Pericles. And yet much more dan∣gerous such contentions are in an Aristocratie, than in a Popular Commonweale: For that the gouernours, which are alwaies the fewer in number in an Aristocratique estate, and yet commaund the rest, haue still to doe with the people: who vpon the first occasion take vp armes against their lords, if they once enter into quarrels. For a few lords in an Aristocratie are easily drawne into two parts, by the great magi∣strats, who if they fall into sedition among themselues, as also with the people, it [ D] cannot otherwise bee, but that the chaunge of the estate must thereof needes ensue; the leaders of the factions oppressing their enemies: or else the gouernment of the estate falling wholly into one mans hands, which is not so much to bee feared in a Monarchie, whereas the soueraigne prince vnder his power keepeth all the magistrats in awe.

But in euerie Commonweale it is expedient and necessarie, that the numbet of the* 1.6 soueraigne magistrats, or of them which come neere vnto the soueraigntie, should still be odd, to the end that the dissention amongst them might still be composed by the greater part or number of them; and that the publike actions be not by the equa∣litie of them hindred or letted. And that is it for which the Cantons of Vrie, Vnder∣uald, [ E] Zug, and Glaris (which of all others are most Popular) haue beene glad to make in euerie one of them three soueraigne magistrats, whom they call Amans, & not two, for that the third may easily reconcile two being at variance betwixt thēselues: in stead whereof they of Schwits haue foure, as they of Geneua haue also their foure Sindic∣ques, and they of Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Solure their two Auoyers: and Zuric, Basil, Schaffouse, their two Bourgomasters: as some there were which thought it bet∣ter to haue of such great magistrats moe than foure, and yet in odd number also; as in auntient time the Athenians had their nine Pretors, whome they called Archon∣tas; that so the fewer might still yeeld vnto the rest, or be in number ouercome, which

cannot be where onely two beare the sway, except they had alternatiue power to [ F] commaund each of them his day by turnes, so as had the Carthaginensians Suffetes, and the Roman Consuls, so as we haue before said. And therefore by our laws also are three appointed for the common receit, that so the third might still reconcile the other two his companions at difference betwixt themselues, or els by ioyning himselfe to one of them, make that part the greater. Which odd number of great magistrats is more necessarie in a Popular or Aristocratike estate, than in a Monarchy; and the dis∣cord and dissention of them lesse in this state to be feared than in the other. For that as almightie God the Father of the whole Fabrike of the world, and of nature, doth with an admirable concord and agreement gouerne this world, composed of the contrarie conuersions and motions of the celestiall orbes among themselues, as also of the diffe∣rent [ G] natures of the starres and elements, and of the contrarie force and power of planets and of other liuing creatures: euen so also a king (the liuing image of God himselfe the prince of all things) should of the dissimilitude of magistrats, in some sort, at variance among themselues, keepe and maintaine the welfare of his subiects and people. And as in instruments, and song it selfe, which altogether out of tune, or all in the selfe same tune, the skilfull and learned eare cannot in any sort endure, is yet made a certaine well tuned discord, and agreeing harmonie, of most vnlike voices and tunes, viz. of Bases, Trebles, and Meanes, cunningly confused and mixt betwixt both: euen so also of the mightie, and of the weake, of the hie, and of the low, and others of the middle degree and sort betwixt both; yea euen of the verie discord of the magistrats among them∣selues [ H] ariseth an agreeing welfare of all, the straitest bond of safetie in euerie well orde∣red Commonweale. So Caesar making sharpe warre vpon them of Beauuis, hauing in his armie two captaines deadly enemies one of them vnto the other, commaunded them to turne all that their hatred vpon their enemies, who so in his verie sight with great emulation gained a notable victory ouer their enemies, which their dissention had giuen vnto their enemies, had they not had a generall aboue them, who kept them both in awe. Which as it oftentimes happeneth, so did it also chaunce to Lewes the twelfth the French king, who gained the estates of Bolonia, and ouerthrew the Popes armie, by reason of the discord betwixt the cardinall of Pauie, and the duke of Vrbin, who through iealousie of one of them against the other, so hindred & entangled them∣selues, [ I] as that they gaue victorie vnto the French: into which daunger the Roman estate was like to haue fallen, by the contention risen betwixt Fabius Maximus, and Minutius the Roman generals, which had vndoubtedly giuen Hannibal the victorie, and the Romans the ouerthrow, had not Fabius for the good of the Commonweale forgot his displeasure, and by his valour deliuered his rash companion together with the Roman armie, from a most certaine and present destruction.

Wherefore the contentions of the greater Magistrates are most daungerous in a* 1.7 Popular estate or Commonweale, (where there is no other head to commaund them but the multitude) and especially if he seeke how to serue their owne proud and ambi∣tious desires, rather then the common good. And therefore the Roman Senat seeing [ K] Marcus Lepidus, and Q. Fuluius mortall enemies chosen Censors together, went vn∣to them in great number to perswade them now at length for the Commonwealth sake to become friends, or at least wise to suspend their enmitie, so the better to attend vnto their office, being the fairest and of greatest importance in the whole Common∣weale. The like whereof we read to haue beene often done by the Senat, in setting the busie Tribunes, and proud Consuls agreed, at such time as their dissentions seemed to tend vnto the daunger of the State. But as it is not good that the greatest magi∣strates in a Popular estate should be too great enemies; so also is it not conuenient that

they should be too great friends, especially if they be not good men, and that for the [ A] reasons by vs before alleaged. Which was the cause that the yonger Cato seeing Pom∣pee, Caesar, and Crassus so straitly allied together, and that they so conioyned, were too strong for all the rest of the people; cried out aloud the Commonweale by such com∣byning of the great ones to be bought and sold; foreseeing as it were out of a watch tower the stormes and tempests thereof then at hand. Yet true it is that of two extre∣mities it is better that the great Lords and magistrats in a Popular or Aristocratique estate should be of one accord then at discord: for that being of accord, they will al∣waies like better to commaund others, and so in some sort or other to preserue the Estate such as it is, than together with the Commonweale, quite to ouerthrow their owne power, whereunto their discord would bring them, when they had once giuen [ B] sayles vnto the tempest. In such sort as Liuie said of Caluinus the Campanian: Im∣probum hominem, sed non ad extremum perditum, qui mallet incolumi quàm euersa pa∣tria dominari, A wicked man (saith he) but not altogether desperate, who had rather to rule ouer his countrie yet standing vpright, then ouer the same ouerthrowne. So albeit that Mar. Tullius said, The three-headed alliance of Caesar, Crassus, and Pompee to be a thing greatly to be feared: Yet when he saw Crassus the moderator with the Roman legions slaine in Chaldea, and Iulia Caesars daughter Pompee his wife by vn∣timely* 1.8 death taken away, he cried out: Vtinam Cn. Pompei, amicitiam cum Caesare nunquàm coisses, aut nunquàm diremisses, I would to god, O Pompee, (said he) thou [ C] haddest either neuer made friendship with Caesar, or hauing once made it, haddest neuer broken it. For why their friendship much diminished the Popular power, but their enmitie altogether ruinated the same; one of them being in no wise able to en∣dure his equall, nor the other his superiour, vntill that so by ciuill warre the state was quite at length ouerthrowne, and Caesar become master of all. And as for that which Caesar writeth, our auncestours the auntient Gaules to haue thought the dissention of their princes and great gouernours to haue beene profitable vnto their estates, I can hardly be perswaded therein: when as by the report euen of Caesar himselfe, the dissen∣tion of the princes and of the estates of Fraunce, (then for the most part gouerned by Aristocraties) wrought their owne destruction; some of them praying aide of the Ger∣mans, [ D] and some of them of the Romans, being long a prey both to the one and to the other, and in the end vnto the Romans alone as the onely conquerors. Neither is it true the mutuall slaughters of the Nobilitie of England to haue beene commodi∣ous and profitable vnto the comminaltie and inferiour sort, as Philip Comines writeth; yea at such time as I was Embassadour in England, I vnderstood by some of the inha∣bitants there, them to feare nothing more then the factions of the Nobilitie and their ciuill discord: for the better appeasing and repressing whereof they haue often times vsed to assemble the high court of Parliament, whereunto all the States are assem∣bled. And thus we haue declared in what sort the Magistrates ought to behaue them selues towards their Prince, as also how they ought to beare them selues one of them [ E] towards an other, as also towards other priuate men; and whether they ought to be at vnitie among them selues or not. Now it remaineth for vs briefly to show also, how the Prince ought to behaue him selfe towards his subiects; and whither it be ex∣pedient that he should him selfe iudge them, or be him selfe conuersant among them.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Reasons to show that magistrats ought to be at v∣n tie and concord among them∣selues.
• * 1.2

  Contrary reasons to show that it is good for the Commonweale, that magistrats should be at dis∣cord and vari∣ance among themselues.
• * 1.3

  The fruit of •…•…oes.
• * 1.4

  Lib. •…•….
• * 1.5

  The resolution of the former que∣stion.
• * 1.6

  That the num∣ber of the soue∣raigne magistrats in a Common∣weale should still be odd.
• * 1.7

  The contention of the great ma∣gistrats most dangerous in a popular Com∣monweale: and their too great friendship to be no lesse perilous also.
• * 1.8

  Philip. 2.